Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation; General Maintenance Action

Descending on approach; the CA (Captain) was pilot flying. All descent and approach checklists were completed; and we had just broken out of cloud bases at approximately 8000'. The First Officer had not done [this approach] before; so as we broke out we were orienting ourselves to prepare for the approach. I pointed out the field to my FO (First Officer) through my left side DV window when we suddenly both heard a dull thump. I looked forward and noticed that my forward facing windshield had completely shattered on the inner layer. Realizing that this is more critical than the outer layer failure; I immediately started reducing airspeed from approximately 220 knots and donned my smoke goggles. We notified ATC that we had experienced and inner windshield failure. The FO and I evaluated the situation and determined that he should fly this approach due to the restricted forward visibility. We positively exchanged controls with the autopilot engaged; and I asked the FO to request an ILS ZZ approach to instead of visual. At this point I felt it appropriate to pull out the QRH for a cracked windshield; since the FO had established positive control of the aircraft and slowed to approximately 180kts with flaps 18 deployed. I ran the QRH; which included turning off affected windshield heat and depressurizing the airplane down to field elevation; as instructed. The QRH was accomplished; so I loaded the ILS ZZ into the FMS and briefed the pilot flying. We commenced a stabilized approach to a normal landing. During taxi towards the gate; operations had advised us that there were no gates available. We pulled into the west [holding area] and sat for 30 minutes while they departed other flights. At this point; the windshield continued to crack; and small flakes and splinters/shards were falling out onto the captain and being blown onto his body by the air conditioning. I continued to wear my fogged up smoke goggles to prevent shards from being blown into my eyeballs. The number 1 pack was deselected in order to reduce some of the airflow in front of his face. After finally taxiing to the gate and deplaning; I was able to get out of my seat and shake out some of the glass. I had several tiny cuts in my fingers and was covered in small glass flakes embedded in my clothing. Neither the First Officer nor I could determine if we had struck a bird; since neither of us were looking out of that window; upon further examination at the gate we did notice a greasy smudge on the pane. I will be visiting a competent optometrist of my choosing at the end of this trip to determine if any particles of glass have embedded in my eyes.

ERJ-145 pilot reported a cockpit window inner pane failure; resulting in reduced visibility and possible injury due to glass splinters.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Troubleshooting; Other / Unknown; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

During takeoff from ZZZ we observed air noise and an odor coming from the cabin. The FO (First Officer) said it smelled hot while for me it smell like bleed air. We were at v1 so we continued. After takeoff the cabin duct overheat CAS appeared. We were cleared to 4000 ft; but requested to level at 3000 ft to sort things out. We were VMC so we told the Controller we needed to return and had the airport in sight. We were cleared for the visual and told to contact the Tower.The CAS light disappeared after turning the cabin temp knob to full cold and reducing power. We decided to burn fuel off instead of an overweight landing. We coordinated with the Tower to circle north of the airport. While circling we maintained 250 ias to burn down fuel quicker in case we had to land immediately.After slowing for landing we found that at 185 kts with the gear and flaps down could have burned fuel off just as quick as 250 with the boards out. That would have been an option to stay below 200 in the class D.

LJ-70 Captain reported a fume event during takeoff accompanied by a Cabin Duct Overheat CAS message. Flight crew executed a safe air return.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.3

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Approaching XA:00 at ZZZ; the weather was deteriorating. ILS to runway 13 approach was in use. Visibility was down to 1/2SM; the RVR was hovering around 1;800 feet; and the ceiling was VV008. I was working the radar position; combined with CIC; while both local and ground were staffed behind me in the TRACAB. We had a fair amount of traffic for how bad the weather was becoming. The ground controller was a trainee certified on ground; and the local controller was a trainee recently certified on local. As a CIC; I was trying as much as possible to pay attention to what they had going on; especially considering the state of the weather. The weather had become bad enough that we had trouble seeing more than a few taxiways and the runway intersection out the window. I hadn't heard the ground and local controllers asking pilots for position reports; which is common when the visibility is poor enough; so as CIC I said; 'don't be afraid to ask the pilots for position reports if you need to;' to which the local controller responded; 'Yeah; I know;' or something to that effect. The center-line and touch-down zone lights were out of service for the runway in use; and we were having a new and potential issue with the runway edge lighting; so I was on extra high alert given the weather.Shortly after this [Aircraft Y] on a 4.5 mile final doing about 150kts and on tower frequency; the local controller cleared [Aircraft X] for takeoff. Runway heading was issued as required by the SOP. Traffic calls were not issued to either aircraft; and [Aircraft X] was not asked to report rolling. The local controller was looking out the window; waiting to observe [Aircraft X] departure. [Aircraft Y] was approaching a two mile final and we still had not observed the departure of [Aircraft X]. Somewhere around this time I told the local controller to tell [Aircraft X] to report departure roll. This was either not heard or it was immediately after that we 'heard' [Aircraft X] departing; which then showed up on radar. When [Aircraft X] came off the departure end and was radar identified by me; I'm not really sure that the required two miles increasing to three separation was insured. Had [Aircraft Y] gone around; (we had already had a one jet go around earlier in the shift) it would have certainly been a close call. For me; there are two issues at work here. First of all; we have just recently had our first trainees certify on local since I was certified as CIC two years ago. I am trying to get used to the idea of being in charge while newly certified people are working without direct supervision. This can also be difficult as CIC is almost always combined with another position. Newer controllers will make more mistakes than their peers after being checked out; which is normal; and everyone learns from that. There is also the interpersonal issue of a younger controller (myself) giving suggestions while acting as CIC to an older controller. I have worked with the controller who was staffing the local position at the time long enough to know that they do not take feedback well. This is difficult to mix with the learning curve of being CIC. I do think it's important to 'pick your battles;' and try to find what's really worth addressing and what isn't.My issue with this incident is I feel like it could have developed into something worse. We were just waiting with fingers crossed to see if [Aircraft X] came off in time without taking corrective action. I could have told the local controller to issue a turn as soon as possible; or have issued that turn myself when the [Aircraft X] called up on departure. The local controller could have made this a safer operation by calling traffic and asking the [Aircraft X] to report departure roll. This was not done.

A CIC reported of a shift where he was in charge and the weather was IFR at the Airport. They could not see the departure or arrival and they thought they had a loss of separation.


First Officer; Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 6000

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related

I was going to let this go but cannot. We had a near event with volcanic ash that could've been completely avoided/threat negated with better local information. Ie: wifi. The call to me at my home seemed (at least initially) very hostile. Like I had made a severe misjudgment. Remember; I was the bunkie. Did you receive a report from either of the Flyers? You complained the report wasn't detailed enough; did I put a 20 min limit on filling this form out?  I advocated that we should cancel the flight. The Captain and Flying First Officer (FO) felt it was safe to go. We worked out a compromise that we all could live with (especially after finally being able to plot forecast path compared to SID. The Captain advocated a delay of up to 5 mins; the 6th min we cancel. The flying FO and I agreed to this very firm number. On takeoff while the two flyers concentrated on the SID; terrain and obstacles I stayed eyes out searching for any type of haze. We missed it all.The question should not have been directed at me and my actions but on the reason for the report to start with. Why does our airline NOT have a place where sufficient data can be obtained to plan a safe; comfortable; route/flight plan avoiding any and all 'issues.'

B767 First Officer laments the lack of information provided by his company on the location of volcanic ash departing SCEL and the company's response to his earlier report on the subject.


Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

During the visual approach backed up with the LOC-DME 26R at Miami; I selected V/S taking us out of the pre-briefed LOC and VNAV configuration I had briefed. I said nothing. I simply wanted a shallower glide path that agreed with the PAPI. As we came through about 300 FT AGL; I was curious about the VNAV path and mashed VNAV. Yes; I know better. The throttles drove up of course and I clicked the A/T off. I judged myself to be slightly high at the 100 FT callout and the FO called out 'plus 10kt.' At 500 FT; the call was stable; target. We landed; the FO called '4000 FT remaining' and we turned off at L3 or L2. I need to be disciplined to fly the plan especially close in to the runway. Alternatively; calling out the FMS inputs would have made a difference. The original switch to V/S would have given the experienced FO the SA to respond to the 'VNAV' input with a N-o-o-o.

Approach normal until about 250 feet. At 250 feet Pilot flying engaged VNAV and the throttles advanced causing an increase in speed. Captain (Pilot Flying) disengaged auto throttles and made a correction to get speed back to approach speed. We crossed the threshold a little fast; maybe +10 knots and landed longer than intended. I felt uncertain of whether I should call for a go around and ultimately; I did not.

B767-300ER flight crew reported an unstabilized approach while non-standard use of automation was flown into MIA.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Equipment / Tooling; Procedure; Human Factors

Our company once again turned on DDS (Dispatch Decision Support.) Once again this system caused major problems and safety issues. This program increases the dispatchers workload by trying to recommend when and if an alternate should be used for the destination airport. This system pretty much only looks at visibility and ceiling. Pays no attention the other weather phenomena such as thunderstorms frontal systems or convective activity. After dispatching for some time it was discovered that all radio closeouts (weight and balance) was omitting the runways that was being used to determine the landing weight. I took immediate action and ACARS all my flights in the air with correct runway information and then manually added runway weights for all flights not released. Cause; DDS once again did not work properly. Suggestions; Leave the dispatching functions and decision making to the confident and experienced licensed dispatchers.

Air Carrier complained about the new dispatch software which reportedly increases workload and fails to complete required actions.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 249; Flight Crew Type 3500

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 22000

Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant; Person Observer; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action

Flight started out with me doing the preflight of the aircraft. I did not notice any anything unusual about the main gear tires. Tires 1 and 2 were worn but no deep cuts or cord showing and there was still a tread groove around both tires. Tires 3 and 4 looked to be fairly new with deep tread still left on them. I complete the pre-flight and all my other duties before departure. The taxi out was long but normal as we were headed to RWY XXL for departure. We were holding short of RWY XXL and tower cleared us onto the runway and also cleared us for takeoff. The Captain added power and we started to roll across the runway hold short line. Just about the time we crossed over the hold shot lines the fight attendant called from the back. I picked up the phone and asked the flight attendant what's up. The flight attendant stated that 'she heard a popping noise'. I asked her if it was still doing it and she said no it just did it once. I told the Captain what the flight attendant had said. The Captain asked me if I heard anything. I said 'no' I just heard us crossing the hold short recessed lights. The Captain said 'I did not hear anything either'. I told the flight attendant that I only heard us crossing the hold short taxi lights. The flight attendant said okay. The Captain and I looked over all the engine gauges and overhead panels. The Captain asked me if I think everything look good and I said yes. He said okay then let's go. The Captain had started to push up the power levers at about the same time we looked everything over to make sure we had no indications of a problem. So by the time he asked me if I thought everything looked good; the engines were spooled at about 40 percent and stable. We then started the takeoff roll down the runway. Everything was normal about the acceleration up to 100 knots. I called 100 knots. Still everything was normal about the aircraft as we kept accelerating towards V1 speed. I called V1 then rotate. Again; everything was normal about the takeoff rotation and lift off. I called positive rate and the Captain called for the gear up. Just after the gear was in the wheel well I heard the aircraft behind us call tower. The aircraft in position and holding behind us on RWY XXL said to the tower 'I think the airplane that just took off may have blown a tire'. The Captain and I looked at each other and said that must be us. About that time the tower called and said 'Flight XXXX did you hear that?' I acknowledged the tower and said 'yes'. By this time we are at about 400 ft and we went to heading select and started a left turn on the departure. We continued climbing to 1000 ft and started to clean up the airplane and accelerated to 250 knots. We then switched to departure and told them that we wanted to stay at 4000 feet and that we may have blown a tire on takeoff. The Captain and I both agreed that we should not continue the flight. We had no idea whether it was the left side or right that had blown or if it was one or even two tires that had blown. The Captain said to me 'will you fly?' I said I have the aircraft and switched the flight director over to my side. The Captain said 'I will contact the company; maintenance; flight attendants and talk to the people.' Meanwhile I flew the airplane and talked to ATC. I asked ATC if we could fly out to the southeast somewhere and hold. They gave me the identifier to the ZZZ VOR and cleared us direct to the VOR and hold. So that is what we did. The Captain looked at the QRH but there was nothing for a blown tire. He then called Maintenance and they told him that they were not pilots and to look at the QRH. The Captain told MX that there was no procedure for a blown tire and tried to get some information from MX to help us determine what tires may have blown. He asked Maintenance to check with airport OPS to see if they could tell even which side had blown based on tire rubber on the runway. We came to the conclusion after some time that it was the left side that had blown but we still did not know if it was one or both of the tires. The Captain briefed the flight attendants as if we had blown both tires and we may have to evacuate the aircraft if we go off the runway. The Captain made a PA to the passengers as to what had happened. We knew that we had to do an overweight landing. The Captain asked Maintenance about landing overweight with only one tire. They said it should be okay. We decided to land on Runway YZ with flaps 40 and brakes 2. We landed safely and rolled to the end of Runway YZ. The fire department checked the brake temperatures and said it looks like both tires are still inflated. The fire department asked if we could clear the runway and shut down the number one engine. The fire department then took a closer look at the tires. They thought it would be okay to continue to the gate. We taxied the aircraft to gate. Back at the gate I looked at the tire and indeed it had lost tread; and was damaged; but was still inflated.I have subsequently learned that there may be discrepancies in reports about the sequence of events regarding communication with the flight attendant and the report of hearing the popping noise. I am reporting the sequence to the best of my recollection. I am certain that the Captain and I did not believe we had an actual tire problem before taking off; and only knew of the tire problem once we got the radio report from the other aircraft behind us.

I received communication that there potentially may be; discrepancies in reports addressing a tire failure on takeoff roll. I am unable to address other crew member's recollection of events. After receiving takeoff clearance; aircraft was maneuvered to take off position; throttles advanced to prescribed take off setting; and departure roll began. During the takeoff roll and accelerating; FA's 'chimed' the flight deck. Speed would be estimated at 80 KTS and accelerating. ALL indications NORMAL. At this point in the takeoff roll - I did not feel it appropriate to answer the call due to pilot flying duties. I stated to the First Officer; we would address the call at a safe altitude. Normal take off. We began a left turn at approximately 400+ ft and the First Officer then got in contact with the Flight Attendants. They informed him they had heard a 'bang'. He inquired to obtain more specifics. At that time; the aircraft holding short made a radio transmission that they believed the departing aircraft (ours) may have blown a tire. With this information received; the flight crew informed ATC that we would like to be vectored away from ZZZ to obtain more information from Company and maintenance. Maintenance personnel were extremely helpful. We held approximately 45 miles southeast of the airport to burn fuel to reduce landing weight and coordinate return to ZZZ. Flight attendants; passengers; Company; dispatch; ATC; and maintenance all worked together to coordinate an uneventful return to the airport. Equipment [was] requested. Uneventful landing in ZZZ. Fire department inspected landing gear. Maintenance inspected landing gear. It was determined that it was safe to taxi aircraft to assigned gate.

B737-800 flight crew reported a Flight Attendant informed them of a popping noise as the flight taxied into position for takeoff. The flight crew did not see any discrepancies and departed; but were notified by another crew that a tire may have failed. The flight returned to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 4400

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Other; Party2 Maintenance

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Aircraft; Human Factors; Manuals

I was reassigned to fly a ferry flight for what I thought was to move a flight into position for a revenue trip. Instead it was a maintenance reposition; one time ferry flight; for a fuselage repair. This aircraft had extensive corrosion damage in the aft baggage [cargo] compartment that was discovered on a filter replacement the day before. The extensive damage had been there for quite some time.The photos shown to me by Company Air Carrier Maintenance Technician; were eye opening. There was extensive damage to the stringers; and there was a wire bundle that could be seen hanging loose; no longer secured in place. When I asked the Technician about the damage; he said he had seen worse. The photo looked like something you would see on a visit to the Titanic.  For the safety of crews and passengers alike; I feel that an inspection on all Boeing B757/767 needs to be accomplished before a hull lost happens due to improper Inspection/Maintenance. This problem can have the same consequences as the MD-80 jack-screw problem. We need to get these aircraft inspected and repaired system wide immediately.

Reporter stated not only was the extensive corrosion an issue; but the loose; hanging; unsecured electrical wiring was chafing and could have shorted out; or caused a fire in the Aft Equipment area. The amount of corrosion must have taken some time to develop. That's why he feels inspections of that area on B757/767 aircraft should be accomplished immediately.

I was helping a new Mechanic just back from furlough; [just] aft of the rear bulkhead in the aft pit. While helping him; I noticed this corrosion. The B757 was ferried to company Maintenance Base to repair the Fuselage Frame. The aircraft is still being worked. No other factors involved.

A Captain and Maintenance Technician report about extensive corrosion damage found in the Aft Cargo Compartment; Aft Equipment Bay of a B757-200 aircraft. Pilot also notes immediate inspections and maintenance need to be accomplished on B757/767 aft fuselage sections to prevent a hull lost from similar excessive corrosion.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 38; Flight Crew Total 480; Flight Crew Type 200

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

The purpose of this flight was to provide a joint introductory lesson for two people (an adult and a male child of 12). The Piper Warrior III had full fuel and three people on-board; but was within the weight-and-balance. The taxi to the runway and run-up was normal and consistent with prior flights in this particular aircraft. The shorter runway was in use; so a flaps-10 takeoff was performed. The takeoff roll was slow; but consistent with past performance of the aircraft at this weight. The student performed the takeoff and initial climb; assisted by me (verifying full power and proper control inputs). However; at approximately 150-250 FT AGL; it became apparent to me that our airspeed and climb rate was not normal. I took control of the aircraft from the student and attempted to level off to gain some forward speed to prevent a stall. I was only able to get about 300 FPM maximum climb rate and about 100-150 RPM short of a normal full-power climb. I informed the Tower that we would be circling back for landing; and that the engine was not producing full power. Tower asked if I wanted to declare an emergency; and I responded in the affirmative. I attempted a landing back on the departure runway; but experienced a lot of thermal lift over short final; and had to perform a go-around due to the short runway length. I then attempted a landing on the longer cross runway and was eventually able to landing without incident. Equipment was standing by upon landing; but a normal taxi back to the FBO was uneventful and emergency services were not required.A full-power run-up after deplaning was performed and the aircraft didn't exhibit any usual behavior. A possible theory for the poor performance was the near-gross-weight of the aircraft; the density altitude; and the low-performance engine. Additionally; the temperature and dew point was conducive to carb icing; so the relatively long taxi to the runway and time spent at low power could have caused some carb icing to occur. At the time I didn't attempt full troubleshooting of the engine issue given the poor performance during the climb and need to climb above rising terrain. However; the aircraft wasn't exhibiting any of the other usual signs of carb icing (the RPM was lower than expected; but it wasn't decreasing); and all other engine parameters were in their normal ranges. In the future; I will give more consideration to possible carb icing on the ground prior to takeoff; and alter my run-up procedures to include an extended test of the carb heat control to see if the RPM fluctuates at all suggesting possible icing. Use of the longer runway when wind conditions allow when at similarly high gross weights and density altitudes will also be another consideration.

A PA-28 Instructor pilot experienced poor climb performance shortly after takeoff; leading to a declaration of emergency and return to field for a safe landing. Reporter thinks that carb ice was a possibility.


Flight Crew Total 2052; Flight Crew Type 267

Flight Crew Total 12543; Flight Crew Type 5033

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Police / Security Involved

After landing about 10 minutes early we had to wait for a gate on the ramp just short of gate. The parking brake was set with one engine running. After about 15 minutes of waiting for our gate to open up we (the pilots and 1 flight deck jump seater) hear a loud repeated banging on the flight deck door. The Captain quickly called the forward flight attendant and the jump seater got out of his seat and looked through the peep hole on the door. The flight attended explained that an irate passenger from the back of the aircraft had come forward and was standing at the door pounding on it because he was going to miss his connection. She said she told the passenger that he cannot do that. The jump seater confirmed that a man was standing at the door. The Captain quickly made a PA to demand all passengers immediately take their seats and that it was not ok to bang on the flight deck door. The Captain had me call operations and explain we had an irate passenger banging on the door and need a gate as soon as possible and requested law enforcement and a customer service manager meet the airplane. We were changed to [a different] gate; taxied around the terminal and parked. Law enforcement met the plane and dealt with the passenger on deplaning.

Law enforcement questioned him and he apologized; said he was bipolar with explosive personality and was off his meds. Law enforcement contacted the FBI; they were ok with a strong verbal warning and let him go. The Flight Attendants were ok with that as was I; along with Dispatch and corporate security through the Dispatcher. Customer service supervisors and inflight supervisors were also present. Law Enforcement escorted him out of the secure area of the airport.

A319 flight crew reported an irate passenger began banging on the flight deck door while the aircraft was waiting for a gate.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 1748; Flight Crew Type 1650

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was flying through an area of developing isolated precipitation. I had been authorized by ATC to deviate multiple times due to precip and build-ups but at the time was on my flight plan direct route. At the time my Nexrad weather (Sirius XM through a Garmin display) showed no precip directly in front of me. Upon entering a cloud (cumulus with base at about 6;000; top estimated at 13;000) I immediately encountered heavy precipitation and severe turbulence with increases (300+ FT) and decreases (200 FT) in altitude. Upward turbulence caused me to exceed 300 FT (by about 50 FT) from my assigned 10;000 FT altitude on one occasion. I had switched off my autopilot and was hand flying the aircraft as soon as I encountered turbulence.  As I was recovering and was back at 10;000; Memphis Center advised me that he showed me more than 300 FT over my assigned altitude. He then gave me the local altimeter setting. I advised him of the brief encounter with precip and turbulence that caused my changes in altitude. Center advised that he showed no precip on my route at that time. He authorized me to deviate as needed to avoid further build-ups.  My Nexrad had shown no precip either. Less than a minute after the incident my Nexrad showed an area of precip immediately behind me. I continued to my destination without further incident. In retrospect I should have asked to deviate around the cloud in front of me. I was in VMC prior to entering the cloud and saw no indication I would encounter precip. I could see the cloud base and saw no precip and since I saw none on my Nexrad I chose to stay on my direct route rather than ask for a deviation around. The fact that I was in an area of rapidly developing isolated precip should have told me that conditions were such that there was a likelihood of encountering what I encountered; regardless. In such conditions requesting deviation off course would be a much better plan.

PA-32 pilot reports entering a rather benign looking cumulus cloud; that has no returns showing on XM Nexrad; to find a rough ride with 300 foot altitude deviations. Once clear of the cloud the Nexrad does show some returns.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS ILS 24

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

We were cleared direct to RIZER (the final approach fix for the ILS 24 at ISP) and then cleared for the visual approach.  We descended to 1;400 feet MSL (the glideslope intercept altitude for the ILS).  As we approached RIZER from the southeast (heading about 330 degrees); we began a slight descent to intercept RIZER at the glideslope crossing altitude of 1;271 feet.  As we started the descent; we saw towers that looked to be right under RIZER.  At about that time we got a 'Caution - Obstacle' alert. The Pilot Flying (First Officer) disengaged the autopilot and adjusted the pitch slightly.  At that point we were right over the towers and; if I remember correctly; about on glideslope.  After passing the towers; it dawned on me that it was dark and that alert should have triggered a go-around. For this particular approach; the glideslope altitude over RIZER is only 625 feet above the towers.  These towers are not the highest terrain on the chart and are kind of hidden behind the Localizer feather.  As you pitch down to capture the glideslope; it apparently takes very little pitch change to activate the alert.  Our first error was missing the towers on the chart.  An obstacle only 625 feet under the final approach fix is something you shouldn't miss.  Our second error was not going around.  By the time it dawned on me that it was night time and that the alert required a go-around; we were already past it. The final approach fix should be moved so it is not right on top of towers.  If it were a mile or two farther out; you would be better established on the glideslope before crossing the towers.

An air carrier Captain reported an EGPWS CAUTION OBSTACLE alert from towers 625 feet below RIZER intersection which is the ISP Runway 24 ILS glideslope intercept point.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Just prior to the tug disconnecting from the aircraft I notice a Ramp Supervisor running towards the driver. The Tug Driver informed me of a late bag and wanted to know if they could load it in the forward cargo bin. Before I could tell him to wait until I shut down the number 2 engine; the MASTER CAUTION and FWD CARGO lights illuminated. I immediately shut down the number 2 engine and before I could tell the Tug Driver to wait until the engine spooled down; the MASTER CAUTION and FWD CARGO lights went out just as quickly as they had come on. I tried to explain to the Tug Driver the requirement to shut down the number 2 engine before loading bags; but he acted like he didn't know what I was talking about. The Aircraft Operating Manual and Ground Operations Manual clearly states the requirement to shut down the number 2 engine before loading late commodities. What concerns me about this incident is that we had a Supervisor and three Push Crew Personnel; and none of them waited for the engine to be shut down; nor stop an individual from approaching the aircraft with the engine running. I don't know if this is an isolated incident; Ramp Personnel are unaware of the danger; or individuals ignoring Company policy and procedures in an effort to save time. If continued; this practice may result in personal injury or loss of life.The following recommendations are provided. First; review/training for all Ramp Personnel on loading late commodities procedures. Secondly; the warning in the Ground Operations Manual needs to be updated to mirror the warning in the Aircraft Operating Manual regarding the dangers of extreme ingestion hazard.

B737-800 Captain reported a ramp employee approached the aircraft and loaded a late bag without waiting for the Number 2 engine to be shut down.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 7500; Flight Crew Type 3500

Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

While performing a practice ILS to Runway 1L at ADW; the Radar Altimeter sweep twice to 250 ft. The practiced ILS was performed coupled and had engaged at the final approach fix. The sweep occurred approximately 3.5 miles from the end of the runway. The helicopter was about 1000 ft. AGL then swept down to 250 ft. AGL. Stabilized for a second then returned to the correct altitude. Then it swept a second time. This sweep of the Radar Altimeter did not effect the helicopter controls.

Helicopter Instructor Pilot reported the Radio Altimeter swept twice from the aircraft's altitude to 250 ft. AGL and back again while on final approach.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Type 10000

Distraction; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Runway 11 at AUA has the visual illusion of a vehicle on the runway at midfield.  As we passed through 1;000 feet on final approach to AUA; the Pilot Flying said to me 'I think that there might be a vehicle on the runway'. I could immediately observe a dark; vehicle-sized object clearly contrasted on the concrete runway surface in the first third of the runway. I asked Tower to verify a clear runway. The Tower Controller complied and offered that we were cleared to perform a go-around; if we deemed that to be necessary.  As we got within 200 feet of touchdown; I focused hard and could discern that it was; in fact; a patch of asphalt (or paint) on the concrete surface. As we entered the flare; it was totally obviously NOT a vehicle or any threatening object.

B737-700 Captain reported a visual illusion on the runway due to discolored asphalt.


Troubleshooting; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Workload

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Aircraft Automation Overrode Flight Crew; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We departed LAX runway 25R via the HOLTZ 9 RNAV SID. Shortly after passing WEILR; climbing through 2;000 feet to 5;000 we were given a clearance direct PEVEE and I believe an altitude clearance to 7;000. I was Pilot Monitoring (PM); the autopilot was off. I entered direct to PEVEE in the FMS; then selected 7;000 on the Flight Computer Plan (FCP). When I looked back down at our navigation display to verify that PEVEE was the active waypoint; there was no magenta line from our position to PEVEE. At first glance; the MAP was blank because PEVEE and the subsequent waypoints were just beyond the MAP range selected. We were still in NAV and the aircraft was turning to intercept the subsequent leg; from PEVEE to HOLTZ. I called SoCal departure to request vectors due to a map problem. Upon selecting an expanded range; we could see there WAS a magenta line from PEVEE to the next waypoint; HOLTZ. While the First Officer (FO) turned to the ATC cleared heading; I reentered DIR TO PEVEE and the magenta line appeared correctly on the NAV display. I advised SoCal that we were able to navigate to PEVEE. They responded with a clearance direct TRM. As far as I know; we did not cause any traffic conflicts.I am fairly certain that the initial DIR TO PEVEE was correctly entered into the FMS providing a leg from the turn point (TP) to PEVEE. Then; as I was setting the altitude; PEVEE sequenced due to our position just past abeam the waypoint. This left PEVEE in position 1L in the FMS and HOLTZ in 2L; with no magenta line from our position to PEVEE; our clearance.Assuming that I am correct regarding the cause; this was not technically an equipment malfunction; but was a computer following its programming. This situation might be prevented by initially using the heading mode to begin the turn direct to the waypoint. Then set the altitude clearance. And then; input the direct to into the FMS; check the FMA and the magenta line on the NAV display and monitor to assure that the aircraft is proceeding as cleared. Basically; protect the clearance; course and altitude; THEN accomplish the more complex programing and verifying.Also; displaying a larger MAP range would improve situational awareness and may help to quickly capture errors like this.

We talked about it on the flight; not sure what happened; but the FMS worked great the rest of the flight.

A crew flying the LAX HOLTZ 9 RNAV SID was cleared direct PEVEE abeam WEILR which caused the FMS route to skip PEVEE and select HOLTZ. The crew caught the FMS error and asked for an ATC vector while the error was corrected.


Both the commercially provided and FAA taxi diagrams for the airport are extremely inaccurate. Taxiways are depicted on the wrong side of the runway; are unlabeled or are missing altogether. For example there is no taxiway south of Runway 6/24; but there is a Taxiway A that extends north of 6/24 and intersects both runways. There were no D/FDC NOTAMS regarding taxiways or changes to the airport configuration. There was no disruption to the flight; but I believe this could pose a safety hazard for future operations at VDI.The airport diagrams should be changed to accurately reflect the layout of VDI.

The reporter continues to believe there were no taxiways to the south of the field.

A BAE-125 Captain reported the airport diagrams for VDI inaccurately portray the actual situation. In particular; there now exists a taxiway parallel to Runway 6/24 which also provides intersection access to Runway 13/31.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 96; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

While on the takeoff roll the left engine quit. I aborted the takeoff; recovered directional control of the plane and advised the Tower who then cleared me off the runway. [After clearing I] contacted Ground Control and was cleared to taxi to the ramp [which I did] without any incidents.

When the left engine of the SW4 Merlin failed on the takeoff roll the pilot rejected the takeoff; recovered directional control; exited the runway and returned to the ramp.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During aircraft change to Gate XXX for flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1; Release noted aircraft MEL'd (Minimum Equipment List) with inoperative wing body overheat detection; limited to FL 240; one pack operation. Inbound Captain noted aircraft was warm; but they came from a location at 65 degrees. ZZZ was 106 plus on the ramp. Inbound Captain said they tried to get swapped but Company refused request. I checked gate service's air; and cockpit was above 100 degrees and climbing as well as cabin with minimal airflow from vents. PC air was connected and unable to cool aircraft. I called Dispatch and refused aircraft for passenger service safety issue. Within 5 minutes we had another aircraft at Gate YY. At YY; the off going Captain was informed he would be taking the MEL'd aircraft to ZZZ2; even though I very specifically informed Dispatch the aircraft was unusable due to being unsafe for passenger flight. I believe this is Captain shopping.

Air carrier Captain reported aircraft had inoperative cabin cooling and was re-assigned to another flight crew.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Type 1373

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 202; Flight Crew Type 65400

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I was the Pilot Flying. The flight was uneventful until the approach. This was my first time into PSP in a long time and the Captain had only been in there a few times previously. We were able to get the METAR only while en route and it was reporting the wind VRB at 4 knots. This left us guessing on what runway they were using; but saw in the forecast that the wind would be shifting to the northwest. We decided to set up for the RNAV visual to 31L. About 15 minutes out; we received the voice ATIS which confirmed 31L.  We checked on with SoCal Approach and they said expect vectors for the visual to 31L. Since we were both pretty unfamiliar with the airport and with all the high terrain; we were more comfortable with the RNAV visual and requested that. We received a vector out to the north of SBONO and a descent to 7;000 feet. The airport was in sight almost the entire time we were vectored. However; as we were getting closer to SBONO the sun was creating a lot of visibility issues and we lost sight of the field. There was also a lot of haze and the mountain behind the airport cast a shadow over it making it very difficult to see.  We also noticed our descent to 7;000 feet took us below what's published at SBONO; which says to cross at or above 7;500 feet. We asked the Controller to confirm we were cleared to 7;000 feet and he responded 'that's what I was told.' We were sort of confused by the response but could see that terrain would be no factor. I was still a little unsure if we would be given direct to SBONO or another intermediate fix. A few miles from SBONO we were given direct to it and to report the airport in sight. We could not see the airport at this time due to setting sun. We both were trying to visually acquire it and became distracted with it. During that time; I set 1;300 feet in the altitude selector and we were in VNAV path. I think I announced to the Captain 'That is what I was doing;' but can't say with certainty. The aircraft was in VNAV PATH; so after crossing SBONO; it started descending to cross WEMIR at or above 6;000 feet. At about 6;400 feet; the Controller came on and said to stop the descent and climb back to 6;600 ft. and that we were not cleared for the visual approach and we need to report the airport in sight. We climbed up to 6;600 feet which he said was the minimum vectoring altitude. We continued flying the lateral portion now becoming really high. We still couldn't see the field and the Controller said he couldn't get us a descent even though according to the chart we could be at 4;000 feet. Eventually we located the airport and he cleared us for the visual approach. We were configured and able to get back on path to execute a stable approach. The rest of the flight was uneventful.  The lighting conditions made our visual approach very difficult. I should have better communicated the setting of a lower altitude and made sure the Captain agreed with it. I must say; the attitude and helpfulness of this Controller was poor. The response we got when verifying an altitude was non-standard and unprofessional. Our clearance was also not very clear but we should have verified it before descending. Sometimes a little more communication from the Controllers helps so we have a more shared mental model. I think putting a little more on the Company page could help because I was not really sure what to expect as far as an approach going in. More communication from the controller on what to expect and better [automation management] on my part.

We requested an RNAV visual [Runway] 13R; since we were flying into the sun and there was a thick haze in the valley. We were given 7;000 feet; then direct SBONO. SBONO has a restriction of 7; 500 feet or above. I asked approach to verify 7;000 feet was the assigned altitude since SBONO was 7;500 feet. The Controller replied 'That's what I was told;' in a very condescending tone. We were headed directly into the sun and there was a thick haze in the valley. The Controller asked us to report the field. I was looking intently for the field leaning over the glare shield so I did not have the MCP or anything below it in view. We were headed right into the sun and there was thick haze up the valley. The approach was going to turn us north; so I knew we would be able to see the field then.The Controller had given us direct SBONO but not a clearance for the approach. As I was looking for the field; the Controller told us to 'Stop descent and climb to 6;600 feet. You were not cleared for the approach! I looked at the MCP and saw that my FO had begun the descent. The Controller stated 'You were not cleared for the approach; but told to report the field.' I told him there was thick haze and the Sun was in our eyes. He said 'Well you asked for the RNAV. What would you want to do? Something else?' I just replied that we would have the field soon. He had to stop someone else from climbing and explained to the other aircraft that he had an aircraft descend that he had not expected. I finally spotted the field and informed him; then he cleared us to 4;000 feet; then handed us over to Tower. All we needed was for Approach to turn us north. While it was an error on my part; in not monitoring the approach; I was taken aback by the Controllers attitude that I hesitated to respond to his asking 'What would you like?' He seemed to have not liked our request for this approach. He cleared us direct SBONO but did not confirm 7;000 feet. While it was our fault that the descent was started early; his attitude and lack of input were not helpful. When we finally spotted the field he cleared us to 4;000 feet and handed us off to the Tower. The rest of the approach was uneventful. While I admit that I failed to do proper monitoring; mitigating circumstances were at play in that I was intently looking out the forward windshield for the field under a very difficult visual situation and he did not reassert 7;000 feet.  I found the Controller to be totally unhelpful and confrontational. We were both unfamiliar with this approach and airport from this direction and that is why we requested the RNAV visual. The Controller could have been more helpful by clearing us to SBONO but reminding us to maintain 7;000 feet; or suggesting another approach or even giving us vectors. He was totally unhelpful; which in my experience; is very unusual from Controllers in general; from my experience.

Air carrier flight crew reported descending on a visual approach to PSP Airport before being cleared to do so. Flight crew stated that due to the hazy conditions and angle of the sun they had difficulty visually finding the field. Flight crew added that issues with unclear ATC communications contributed to the event.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 53; Flight Crew Total 1340; Flight Crew Type 885

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Shortly after taking off; while leaning during climb the engine starting running rough. I noticed that cylinder #2 and #4 had no EGT. Looked up and saw [an airport] about 7 miles ahead and found frequency and [advised ATC] and made a normal straight in landing. Asked where the maintenance shop was and taxied. Door was locked. Fireman called mechanic and no one picked up. I called my mechanic and discussed the problem. This plane 2 years previously had a similar problem and was found to be a clogged fuel injector. Mechanic asked if I had access to tools. Fireman was able to get access to the hangar and tools.My mechanic told me where the fuel injectors were and how to remove them. Found #2 and #4 were partially blocked and I cleaned them with compressed air. Followed mechanic's instructions to replace the injectors. Started the plane and did a mag check and found that #2 and #4 were working properly on both mags. Later flew plane to mechanic. He called Lycoming and felt it best to replace the fuel pump and several components in the fuel system. He also replaced the fuel injectors with the newer style.

C177RG pilot reported diverting after the engine began running rough. Problem was later traced to partially clogged fuel injectors in cylinders #2 and #4.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 189; Flight Crew Type 1255

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

It was a hot day and the Flight Attendants (F/A's) were continually reminding us that the cabin was warm. We were also running about 30mins behind schedule so we felt rushed to make up time; and at the same time; cool the cabin as quickly as possible. Upon receiving our takeoff data at the gate we noticed we were going to have to do a bleeds off takeoff. It's been a while since either of us had done one so we took the time to look in the manual and review the procedure so we would properly execute the procedure. The aircraft was already warm and having MAX's long engine start sequence didn't help. After pushing back; with our departure runway practically right in front of us; being in a hot aircraft and 30 minutes late; we definitely felt the pressure to get things moving. After waving off the crew; our MAX engines finally got started. After the start during the First Officer's (F/O's) flow; he stopped at the air conditioning panel and realized we discussed the procedure for takeoff but not re-configuring after takeoff; nor had we discussed configuration taxiing to the runway. So while we waited for the MAX's engine warmup we discussed reconfiguration after takeoff as well as deciding to keep the air panel configured for takeoff; since it would be a very short taxi. After our discussion the F/O called for taxi. I released the brakes and since [the runway] was so close; I decided to do my pre-take off flow coming out of the ramp. So I chimed the F/A's and did a throttle burst all at once right out of the ramp area. And the mistake was made. We got the Takeoff Configuration Warning and horn. I stopped the aircraft; advised ATC we stopped; set the brakes and we accomplished the QRH items and with a successful throttle burst; did the Before Taxi Checklist and made an info only in the logbook. We then called for taxi and departed for an uneventful flight.Flows need to be accomplished and completed before any briefing discussions or questions take place. We both feel if we had waited to have the discussion after the FULL before taxi flow; we would have caught our mistake.

After the Before Push Checklist; Captain stated it would be an Engine Bleeds Off takeoff. (First Officer was in the Yellow.) I replied it has been two years since I preformed this takeoff procedure. To mitigate this risk; I read the Engine Bleed off Takeoff procedure in the MAX AOM [Aircraft Operations Manual] to Captain to be familiarized with the procedure. We pushed back [and] started the engines. During the engine starts; the Captain stated for me to call Ground after a minute and thirty seconds passed; after engine start; because we were so close to the runway. I performed my after engine start flow when I got to the bleeds; I stopped and I asked the Captain how he would like to configure them. Once configured we agreed enough time had passed to call for taxi. As we taxied; the Captain performed the before takeoff flow. We heard the Takeoff Configuration Warning. We stopped the aircraft and performed the proper checklists to reconfigure the aircraft for takeoff. Additive conditions involved in this event: First Officer (F/O) unfamiliar with Engine Bleeds Off takeoff. Very hot cabin. Short taxi to runway. Flight Attendant (F/A) PA about the hot cabin. Once I heard the announcement. I told the Captain I had not made announcement to the passengers about the hot cabin and if he wanted me to keep the right engine bleed on before takeoff as stated in the AOM.On my next Engine Bleed Off takeoff; I will complete my normal flow so the Captain will hear 'Standby Flaps'; then go back to re-configuring the bleeds properly. [I will] become more familiar with this procedure prior to my trips in the summer months.

B737 MAX 8 flight crew reported receiving a Takeoff Configuration Warning when the Captain performed a throttle burst check before the flaps were set for takeoff.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

The pilot was filed to land at OBE and change destinations to AVO due to severe thunderstorms. I vectored the aircraft direct OMIGE for the RNAV Runway 05 approach and issued him to maintain 3;000 ft. As he was approaching OMIGE I noticed he was in a northbound turn and asked if he was entering a procedure turn or something. He responded; 'I'm in trouble'. I asked for the nature of the emergency and he said he was in a microburst and could not control the aircraft. I tried to remain calm and told him course and altitude is his discretion and to try to maintain level wings and penetration airspeed. I observed a sharp climb and a rapid turn to the north. I offered him vectors to LAL and he was able to regain control of the aircraft and accept vectors to the Lakeland airport. I handed him off to Tampa approach and thank god he landed safely. I have never been more scared for another person in my life. I would recommend that this pilot not fly near severe thunderstorms and stay safe on the ground.

ZMA ARTCC Controller reported an aircraft was caught in a microburst and eventually regained controlled of the aircraft after vectoring to another airport.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

The event itself was a rejected takeoff on Runway 1R of SFO. It occurred when the takeoff roll commenced and the warning system of the airplane alerted us to the fact that configuration was not set properly for takeoff. Tower was notified and we exited the runway to the right. Company was called by the Captain to inform them and to make sure proper procedure was followed. Once all proper checklists were completed a new takeoff clearance was obtained and the flight proceeded normally. During night operations in SFO as we started to taxi to the runway which would be one of the 28 runways; ATC decided to switch runways to the 1's and give us a new clearance. We started preparing the aircraft for the new clearance and the Captain asked me (the First Officer) to determine what the amount of tailwind we would have on this takeoff to make sure we would not violate the maximum 10 KT tailwind requirement. As I worked on this we continued to taxi. Since we were the first to be given the new clearance and we were task saturated we made it to the runway without having completing the taxi check as normal. Without having called for the Taxi Check; the Before Takeoff Check was called for and completed; and we were immediately cleared for takeoff. Right after the power addition for takeoff we got the aural takeoff warning letting us know that the flaps and autopilot were not configured for takeoff. An immediate rejected takeoff was performed. Make sure that regardless of the situation; all checklists and procedures have been completed. Even if this involves a delay and taxi off to the side to complete if necessary. Do not let ATC push us into going when we are not ready. Be especially vigilant when things happen outside of the normal flow of things. Always take a quick look around to verify proper configuration before takeoff power is added.

A First Officer reported that SFO changed the departure during taxi and because of task saturation the crew failed to configure the aircraft for takeoff resulting in a rejected takeoff.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Troubleshooting; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; General Maintenance Action

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

While working the West Radar scope I completely lost radar. My radar screen went black for approximately two seconds and then came back on showing TRACON airspace and secondary targets. My radar had changed to modes and I was unable to select Fusion mode. At the time I had 4 aircraft in the final airspace/box within 6 miles from one another. All aircraft were issued appropriate altitudes prior to losing radar contact to ensure separation and right before losing radar I was able to apply merging target procedures per the FAAH 7110.65. When I regained radar; it wasn't usable in a timely manner and I had to slide over to an adjacent scope to continue working traffic. No other scope had issues to my knowledge.It was my understanding that at the time of this occurrence maintenance was working on the radar to some extent. Maintenance seemed to be surprised after hearing me state 'I lost radar.' I was later told the error was a 'no user' issue and explained that it wasn't anyone's direct fault. Regardless; this is unacceptable. Luckily; I was able to utilize the adjacent scope during a moderate traffic session to continue running final traffic with overlapping approaches. I'm not sure what caused this event and I'm not sure why I was unable to obtain an answer. This was not a good time to lose radar; even if momentarily. It also shouldn't be a surprise to maintenance that is possible radar could be lost for the work they are conducting. Due to this I'm unable to recommend anything in regards to preventing a re-occurrence.

GSO TRACON Controller reported the radar scope went blank for a few seconds.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I had just arrived in the Tower Cab; assumed responsibility for the CIC position. Right after I got a briefing  I became aware that the Local Controller had a Remos departing Runway 9 from a touch and go (left traffic Runway 9) and a PA28 executing a climb out (missed approach off Runway 33 localizer approach) that placed the aircraft in very close proximity; airborne near the intersection of Runway 9 and Runway 33. I observed the PA28 passing either directly above; or above in very close lateral proximity (I estimate about 200 FT) above the Remos who was airborne (probably 75 FT above Runway 9) over Runway 9 on the upwind leg following the touch and go. The Remos became airborne; descended as the PA28 passed; and then continued in the traffic pattern. I asked the Local Controller about the event and he indicated that the PA28 was doing to fly the Loc 33 missed approach; the implication was that; the missed approach was the method he was using to separate the two aircraft; even though the PA28 would likely overfly the Remos as the Remos was departing. I listened to the DALR recording of the event; and discovered that the Local Control had cleared the PA28 for the OPTION on Runway 33 at the same time the Remos was on Runway 9. Both controllers indicated they were NOT aware of any distractions in the operation during the event. Brief controllers on required separation for intersecting runway operations. There is also a lack of understanding whether the operation would have technically been legal if the PA28 has not been cleared to use Runway 33 (which is what I believe the Local Controller was planning to use as separation between these two aircraft); and had just flown his missed approach over the Remos.

Tower CIC witnessed a conflict event involving departing traffic and an aircraft on a missed approach; the reporter noted the Local Controller failed to ensure separation.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

We experienced smoke in the cockpit and a burning electrical smell. Shortly thereafter; we experienced multiple system failures and ECAM warning messages. One of which was to land ASAP. The First Officer and I donned O2 masks and started emergency procedures. I [notified] ATC and requested to divert to the nearest suitable airport. After following checklist guidance; ECAM procedures and applying some systems knowledge; the smoke subsided; but the odor remained.Communication with the flight attendants was established and the plan to divert was communicated to the flight attendants. I asked them to prepare the cabin for an immediate landing; which they did. A diversion message was sent to Dispatch advising them of our situation and landing plans. I asked them to advise ZZZ operations of our impending arrival; which they did. A normal landing at ZZZ was made; and after communicating with the fire department; we deplaned. We asked that the passengers deplane; but leave their baggage in the overhead bins; which was later retrieved for them. No injuries were reported; the First Officer and I were quick to don our O2 masks; and neither of us felt any ill effects from the smoke. Contract Maintenance quickly arrived at the airplane and found that the number 1 battery had overheated and was likely the reason we had smoke in the cockpit. One of the ECAM actions had me turning off the number 1 battery; and in hindsight; this action probably contributed to our success more than anything else. Suggestion: Replace NiCad batteries with Lead Acid batteries.

A321 Captain reported diverting due to smoke in cockpit and uneventful landing.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Training / Qualification; Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Aircraft

Training was in progress on Local control. Aircraft X was sequenced to follow Aircraft Y. Aircraft X had the wrong aircraft in sight and turned base early and at the same time as Aircraft Y. Aircraft Y had to maneuver off final to the north for spacing. Aircraft Y called the tower and spoke with me; the CIC (Controller in Charge); and said Aircraft X got as close as 50 ft. prior to him maneuvering. Aircraft X was also on his check ride.

I was training on the Local Control position. There were 4 VFR aircraft in the traffic pattern for RWY XX and 1 VFR aircraft on practice approach RWY YY. Aircraft Y was VFR in left traffic for RWY XX and given a sequence to follow Aircraft X. Aircraft X was VFR in right traffic for RWY XX. Aircraft Y was given a sequence of number 4; to follow Aircraft X on right downwind. Aircraft Y was extending their downwind until they had their traffic in sight. Aircraft Y asked if their traffic was turning final RWY XX. I visually scanned the traffic pattern to verify Aircraft X position. I saw Aircraft X on final for RWY XX. Aircraft X was the 3rd aircraft on final at the time and was on an approximately 4NM final. I cleared Aircraft Y to land RWY XX after my visual scan. Aircraft Y must have had the incorrect aircraft in sight; the aircraft preceding Aircraft X was an Piper. Aircraft Y flew into the flight path of Aircraft X; cutting them off. Aircraft Y had to make a quick turn north bound to avoid Aircraft X. Aircraft X saw Aircraft Y; after Aircraft Y turned to the north; and Aircraft X made a south turn to avoid Aircraft Y. At this time Aircraft X made a call to Local Control that he was making his north turn to avoid Aircraft Y. I did not see the two aircraft turning to avoid until Aircraft X made his call for the north turn. Aircraft Y rejoined the RWY XX final; in front of Aircraft Y; and was reissued a landing clearance for RWY XX. Aircraft Y was instructed to make a 270 degree turn back to final and rejoined RWY XX final behind Aircraft X. Aircraft X was reissued a landing clearance for RWY XX. Both aircraft landed without further incident. About 10 minutes after Aircraft X landed; the pilot called the tower to let us know that Aircraft Y was within close proximity to him and he would be filing a safety report.

ATC Instructor and trainee reported misidentified aircraft in traffic pattern resulted in NMAC.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 16

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

I work at D21 TRACON. We implemented an entire new airspace under a program called Metroplex. Day one was yesterday. All these incidents are from yesterday. I wasn't given time to fill out reports yesterday. I did not write down call signs of the aircraft involved yesterday because there was no paper available. I've tried to look up the information on Falcon [replay system] but it's been difficult at this point to find the events I wanted to find.Yesterday morning; I worked the earliest arrival bank from the West Final (A) and was descending aircraft to three thousand [feet] and telling them they were leaving the Bravo airspace and when they'd re-enter it. It turned out I was violating West Satellite (Y) airspace without coordination. I didn't know Finals lost three thousand [feet] there until after looking at the airspace while I was working. The A Controller on north flow can no longer go to three thousand feet further away from the airport which forces the A Controller to not descended aircraft. This becomes problematic when more traffic shows up on both sides because A has to be at four thousand [feet] within three miles of the adjacent final who has aircraft at five thousand [feet]. There's simply not enough airspace to safely get those aircraft to the final at four thousand [feet]. You end up stacked at four; five; six; and seven thousand [feet]. You end up taking aircraft out of the Bravo at four [thousand feet] or descending to four [thousand feet] and stretched much further away from the airport. Also later that day; I cleared a [Carrier] aircraft for the ILS Runway 3R approach who was on a STAR from the south east that transitions to the final. I think it was close to [afternoon] local time but I'm not sure. The times in CEDAR [Comprehensive Data Analysis and Reporting] don't seem to match with the Falcon times (even with Zulu time). There was a loss of standard separation with an aircraft on the adjacent final because the [Carrier] aircraft kept descending on the approach when they should have stayed at five thousand [feet] until LIONZ. I was looking at airspace changes and looked up to see the [Carrier] aircraft descending out of four thousand five hundred [feet] less than three miles from traffic at four thousand [feet] on the adjacent final. I canceled the [Carrier] aircraft's clearance and climbed them up to five thousand [feet]. Once separation had been reestablished I cleared the [Carrier] aircraft for the approach. I believe Management had DTW Tower issue a Brasher Warning to the pilot after they landed. Also; there was a representative of [Carrier] in the TRACON talking to one of our TMU coordinators when this even happened and he was made aware of the event and pilot's call sign.North finals really need to have three thousand feet so they've got two altitudes to use further out. The way it's set up now; those aircraft will exit the Bravo laterally; or if you point out to Y; they'll descend out of the Bravo. The Bravo airspace should be extended further southwest at three thousand [feet] and three thousand [feet] should go to A. Also; procedures to keep aircraft from TOL Approach Control away from that airspace should be in effect when DTW is on a north flow.

D21 TRACON Controller reported an operational error due to not knowing airspace had changed with Metroplex program implementation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 177; Flight Crew Total 15500; Flight Crew Type 8000

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Taxiing out of Gate X at ATL; we completed engine start and were cleared to join the left lane southbound. Weather was restricted visibility in moderate rain. As we approached the first vehicle lane crossing; the First Officer called out 'Look out' and 'Stop.'  I looked to the right and coming out of the corner of the right windshield I saw a tug pulling baggage carts; approaching at very high speed.  I braked to a quick stop.  We reported the near collision to Ramp Control.  We were not able to record the identification number on the vehicle as it was moving too fast.  There were no injuries or other adverse consequences.

Air carrier Captain reported a ground conflict with a baggage vehicle at ATL airport.


Flight Crew Total 11019; Flight Crew Type 7952

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

On Taxiout [at] ZZZ on a Taxiway; the left main wheel separated and the tire blew. Hydraulic leak; unable to taxi. Deplaned aircraft with buses on taxiway.

B737 Captain reported that a main wheel failed during taxi.


Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Time Pressure

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

After pushback and an uneventful taxi to [the] runway; we initiated our takeoff roll. Everything was normal until a few seconds after the 80 KTS call. At that point we noticed a small variation of aircraft thrust followed by STAB TRIM aural warning as well as a red boxed STAB TRIM indication on the EAD and a red boxed STAB TRIM number on the ANU indicator. At that point I decided to abort the takeoff fearing a possible runaway stab trim situation. Upon exiting the runway; we also noticed that all of our takeoff speeds along with all other FMS Data had been cleared from the MCDU's. We contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control and the decision was made to return to the gate for deplaning and aircraft swap. The trip progressed normally after that; and we arrived at our destination about 75 minutes behind our original scheduled time.

After the 80 KTS call; a B717 EAD alerted STAB TRIM; the aural STAB TRIM warning sounded and the ANU indicated red STAB TRIM; so the takeoff was rejected and aircraft returned to the gate where it was removed from service.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

I arrived at the airport with the rest of the crew to execute a flight to ZZZ. The aircraft was MEL'd for the Cargo Door Indicator system 52-XX-XX on the flight release and was found to be documented correctly in the aircraft maintenance log by the CPT (Captain) and reviewed by myself. This MEL mandates that the crew; before each flight; establish communication with a trained person outside of the aircraft to make sure the cargo compartment door is in the closed position with the handle locked and in the recess and that the trigger plate is latched (handle stowed position). Upon initial communication with the ground crew; the Captain notified the ground crew of this MEL and that we would need the cargo door checked to ensure it was closed and latched correctly. When ready for push; ground crew stated that chocks were removed and aircraft was clear of FOD but did not mention cargo door. The Captain asked the tug driver to please ensure that the cargo door was verified closed and latched; there was a pause for about a minute and the tug driver stated the cargo door was closed. The rest of the push back and takeoff took place normally and no other issues occurred until around an hour into cruise flight. I was the PF (Pilot Flying); in cruise flight at FL260 if I remember correctly; I went to the ECS (Environmental Control System) page on EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System) 2 to check on the cabin and pack output temperatures to ensure our passengers were remaining as comfortable as possible. While scanning this page; I noticed that our cabin altitude rate of change was not zero but increasing by 100 FPM which I thought odd since we were in cruise flight. I then looked at our cabin altitude which was 8;000 ft and thought this abnormally high for flight at FL260. I then brought both these indications to the Captain's attention. During this short conversation with the Captain; we received the CABIN ALTITUDE caution message aural alert and message on EICAS. The Captain stated that I would take radios and maintain aircraft controls while he pulled out QRH. He then stated that we should request 15000 ft from due to a cabin pressurization issue that we were troubleshooting but no emergency declaration at this time. The Captain told me this was done to be closer to 10;000 ft should the issue get worse. I let ATC know and we were cleared down to 15;000 ft. I started the descent in VS mode with AP (Autopilot) on at a rate of 2.5. I thought this was sufficient for the current situation considering cabin alt was only increasing by 100 FPM and cabin altitude was at 8;500 ft. Soon after the descent was initiated and the Captain was doing the QRH I noticed the rate of change went from 100 to around 1;000 FPM and I let the Captain know about this indication. Not long after; passing through around FL180 the CABIN ALTITUDE Warning message was displayed. We immediately reacted by donning O2 masks and establishing communication with one another. I then asked the Captain if he would like to declare an emergency. He said to [request priority handling] with ATC and notify them of descent to 10;000 ft. I [requested priority handling] with ATC and requested 10;000 ft and was given the request immediately and was asked what else was needed to which I told them to standby while we worked the checklist. I adjusted the descent rate from VS 2.5 to 4.5 in order expedite to an emergency rate of descent. I deployed the flight spoilers to full; throttles at idle and allowed the airspeed to increase from about 260 to around 280 in the descent. During the descent I noticed the Captain still had the QRH open to the Amber CABIN ALTITUDE message page and suggested that maybe we should change to the Red CABIN ALTITUDE message and he immediately agreed. During the descent I continued to monitor cabin altitude and the highest value I saw was around 11;300 ft. Approaching 10;000 ft I began to level the descent with VS to prevent the aircraft from going below the chosen altitude. Once at 10;000 ft the Captain stated that we could remove O2 masks and we did. The Captain called back to the Flight Attendant to check on the passengers and asked if everything was OK with the airplane. The Flight Attendant stated she thought we were nearing [our destination] but passengers were puzzled when they saw mountains but everyone was fine and did not notice the incident. As the aircraft leveled at 10;000 ft the Captain was just finishing the immediate action items at the top of the QRH page. We had already donned masks and were at 10;000 ft so he said exchanging controls was no longer needed and he completed the rest of the checklist to where it said land at nearest suitable airport. We had a short discussion about what was best; continue to ZZZ which we had already briefed and loaded before the cabin altitude event and we were less than 30 minutes away or divert to nearest suitable and reload and brief everything. We both decided to follow exactly what the QRH stated even though it was going to be a lot more work and induce more pilot workload. We looked at the airports closest to us on the MFD (Multi-function Flight Display) and settled on ZZZ1 because it was the closest; had [an air carrier] ground crew; and we were both familiar with the airport. I let ATC know of our intentions and they obliged with direct to the field routing and began to descend us into the terminal area. The Captain had begun working the manual pressurization checklist as this was occurring and I began to pull up the ZZZ1 charts and preparing the FMS (Flight Management System) for the arrival. ATC gave us the ATIS which was fortunate as this would have also increased pilot workload going into the diversion airport. I was able to brief the approach as we were on an extended base vector for Runway 21 and finished as we were being vectored to final. This is when we both noticed that we were both high and faster than we should be at this stage of the approach. I began to try to slow the airplane down with spoilers and brought in flaps as able but we were still high at 2;000 ft. The Captain asked if I thought a go around was necessary and I agreed that was the safest course of action. He requested a go around with left traffic due to the fact we were VMC. We executed left traffic and re-intercepted the course for 21 in a much better aircraft state (speed; altitude; and configuration) and landed without further issue. Once at the gate we deplaned the aircraft and were told by ground crew they found our cargo door slightly open.My best guess at the cause is the ground crew did not in fact get the cargo door fully latched or there was a problem with the latch. This caused the cargo door to come open in flight resulting in the loss of cabin pressure and subsequent emergency and diversion. It's impossible to know for sure which is the case from my perspective.Train ground crew better for situations dealing with MEL'd cargo doors and other various aircraft equipment deferrals that they have control over.

CRJ-200 First Officer reported encountered depressurization event inflight due to cargo door unlatch issue.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 17100; Flight Crew Type 7300

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 320; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 5600

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Our aircraft had the Right Generator deferred inoperative which required the APU to be run continuously. After setting takeoff thrust; we received an EICAS message 'LT GEN DRIVE' and we elected to abort the takeoff. The abort occurred below 80 KTS and the flight attendants were advised to remain seated. After clearing the runway we got another EICAS 'EQUIP COOLING.' We first verified with the flight attendants that the situation was under control and then ran the check lists for the abort; brake temperature check; generator drive and the equipment cooling messages. We requested a return to the gate and advised Maintenance Control and Line Maintenance of the write ups. The aircraft was later taken out of service.

We then returned to the gate for maintenance.

A B757-200 flight crew; dispatched with the right Generator deferred inoperative; rejected their takeoff below 80 KTS when they received a left generator drive EICAS message. Upon clearing the runway they received an equipment cooling EICAS message.


Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Both engines started during pushback. Taxi to runway; approximately number 7 in line for takeoff; so 10-15 minute taxi/warmup. Cleared onto runway and cleared for takeoff during turn on to runway. Captain transferred control of aircraft; including throttles to me as we completed the turn. Aligned with the centerline; I advanced the throttles to approximately 1.4 EPR; noted all parameters normal; and called for autothrottle ON. As the autothrottle advanced; a loud bang and immediate yaw to the left was felt. I applied right rudder pedal to keep the aircraft on centerline as the Captain simultaneously retarded the throttles. By the time I looked down to the engine instruments; both engines were still running and showed just over 1.05 EPR. Our speed was always lower than 60 knots; and as we rolled out; we informed the Tower and were instructed to exit the runway. As we exited the runway; I spoke to the FA's and confirmed that there were no additional indications of any problem other than the engine failure and that all passengers were calm and safe. Upon exiting the runway; we were informed by ATC that there were reports of FOD on the runway. We stopped the aircraft; briefly discussed the problem; and agreed that the left engine was the one with the problem. We shut down that engine and felt a bit of an abnormal vibration as it shut down. We then started the APU and eventually taxied back to our assigned gate. Unsure how it could have been prevented. All procedures were followed and a safe outcome was achieved.

Taxied into position for takeoff. After cleared for takeoff; First Officer assumed control of aircraft and pushed throttle up to 1.4 EPR. All engine parameters normal. He then called for autothrottles ON and pushed up throttles while releasing brakes. Right as power reached MAX setting; felt and heard a thunk with a yaw to the left corrected by First Officer. I assumed control and aborted takeoff at around 20 knots retarding the throttles. We informed Tower we were aborting takeoff and requested taxi to next intersection to clear. As we stopped; a flight attendant called to inform us of a loud bang and heavy vibration. We shut down the left engine. I noted higher EGT on left side and that the ART had fired. Tower then notified us that we had FODed out the runway. We started APU; called Operations and taxied uneventfully to a new gate. Maintenance came up after deplaning and said that we had lost aft turbine section of left engine.

MD83 flight crew experiences a left engine failure just as the power is pushed up for takeoff and rejects.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

I was the Pilot Monitoring and the Captain was Pilot Flying. We checked the ATIS in ZZZ and set up for; briefed; and reviewed the LDA Runway XX into ZZZ. At first we calculated landing performance for flaps 5; but after encountering ice speeds we decided to land with flaps full for the lower approach speeds. I ran the performance numbers for a flaps full landing with ice speeds and we adjusted the landing speeds on the MCDU. In due course; we were cleared for the approach. The Captain set 1;700 ft. in the altitude selector for the FAF; and we were in LNAV and PATH until the fix prior to the FAF. At that point the vertical mode was changed to FPA. I believe at that moment the FPA was too steep; which eventually gave us the warning. At about 900 ft we received a 'caution obstacle' EGPWS warning. The Captain immediately adjusted the flight path; stopped the descent; continued his turn to follow the river visually after the FAF for XX; and we landed on Runway XX in ZZZ. Corrective Actions: In the future I will double verify the FPA setting after exiting VNAV and make sure it matches the chart so as to stay above any fixes between the FAF and MAP.

While on final over the river in visual conditions during Runway XX LDA approach we received a momentary caution terrain alert while in the middle of the river. We broke out early on the approach. I configured the plane early with the landing gear down and eventually flaps full; I felt this was better as we were experiencing a 6 kt. tail wind for landing. Once we were established on the approach I asked for FPA of 3deg down and was following the path; it wasn't till we were receiving a momentary caution terrain that I noticed the FPA was at 3.8 instead of the three I asked for. I adjusted my flight path and was scanning; we were in the middle of the river; it was dusk/evening and the lights were making it difficult to see the approach lighting but was able to clearly see the runway The caution terrain alert went away immediately and it did get my attention; I evaluated the situation looking at the middle of the river where we were at; I leveled out added a bit of power and was able to continue the approach successfully however I look back now I question whether or not I should've done a go around. I also should have noticed the FPA was not set to 3 degrees as I requested which Contributed to the situation. The train map did not appear probably due to the fact that it was momentary.Although I am very familiar with ZZZ and a flown it many many times; this is one of the first times I have flown into ZZZ as captain. looking back I should have done a terrain avoidance go around. EGPWS RECOVERYA. In day visual conditions with terrain and obstacles clearly in sight; immediately take positive corrective action until the EGPWS warning/alert stops; terrain clearance is assured; and advise ATC.B. At night or in IMC; the following EGPWS alerts require an immediate recovery using the recovery procedure: 'PULL UP' 'TERRAIN; TERRAIN' 'TOO LOW TERRAIN' 'OBSTACLE OBSTACLE; PULL UP'

EMB175 flight crew reported momentary EGPWS warning on final approach.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

During preflight the Mechanic was in cockpit still doing his work. I visually verified that the right cowling was locked but did not physically verify. After Mechanic finished I continued my paperwork check and started the aircraft. When I was 200 ft. airborne; the cowling started to open partially. I requested to return to the runway and land without declaring an emergency. I was distracted which caused an interruption of flow during preflight. I called Dispatch; Director of Maintenance and Director of Operations to inform them of the situation. I should preflight thoroughly and avoid distractions. If interrupted; start over and verify with check list.

C208 Pilot reported the right cowling partially opened after takeoff.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 31; Flight Crew Total 47; Flight Crew Type 47

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

On touchdown on Runway XX; I applied too much right brake; resulting in the turning of the aircraft to the right. The direction of the aircraft was pointed too far to the right to correct; given the speed; before running off of the runway. The aircraft came to a smooth; full stop in the grass to the right of the runway. ATC asked me if I was alright; and asked if I thought I could taxi back to the runway. I replied that I did (considering that the aircraft didn't hit any objects and came to a smooth stop); and taxied back onto the runway. I was then given clearance to taxi back to parking. I was uninjured and the plane wasn't damaged in any way. The airport wasn't damaged in any way either.

Student Pilot reported a loss of control during landing.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

[Flight Attendant] 'A' asked 'C' to call to the back to see how many spare life vests were on board. 'B' said there were 10. 'A' then informed 'C' that on the previous flight we had 12 lap children but only 10 spare life vests. On the flight in question; we were told before boarding there would be 12 lap children on board. All 3 flight attendants were very aware and concerned about making sure no 2 lap children were in the same row so that everyone had an oxygen mask. All 3 flight attendants checked to ensure that there were no 2 lap children on the same row. We were so conscience about the amount of families coming on board and trying to accommodate everyone's seating needs and requirements that it never occurred to us about being short on spare life vests. When we arrived in (city); and the ops agent at that destination made us aware of the mistake; we were very concerned and all said that we realized this needed to be written up.

Following a flight with many children on board; the flight attendants realized that they did not have the required number of spare life vests on board.


Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Load Planning called Dispatch shortly after takeoff and said that a flight had illegal weights. She said that finalized weights showed 91 passengers; seven first class and 84 in coach. These weights were finalized by the computer and sent to the flight crew. Then passenger service changed the passenger count which invalidated weights. However; the flight had been out too long so Load Planning didn't get an invalid message alert.Once the Load Planner saw the new count she realized the flight was tail heavy and called Dispatch. Dispatch contacted the flight and asked them to move one passenger to first class and to block row 34.

A Dispatcher was advised that a flight had taken off with incorrect final passenger counts and the aircraft was technically tail heavy. The flight crew was advised to move passengers and block off the aft row of coach seats.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 189; Flight Crew Total 8322; Flight Crew Type 2012

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting; Workload

This occurred during the preflight planning phase of our flight. This report is mainly for informational purposes; as there was no operational impact caused. Our normal SID (departure procedure) chart from ZZZZ had a challenging altitude crossing restriction on it which frequently caused discussions among the crews about how to best meet the restriction. Apparently we were not the only airline having trouble with this; because on the flight in question we noticed that the chart had been revised and the restriction had been removed from that particular procedure. However; the reason for this report is that it was very difficult to notice that a procedure change had occurred because of a feature of Jepp FDPro. Specifically; we had all updated our chart database and were current. The SID chart had been updated but at first none of us realized there had been an update because Jepp FDPro transferred our previous chart highlights automatically from the old chart to the new chart during the update process. So; it was nice that items which each of us had highlighted on this particular chart were highlighted on the new chart...but; at the same time; it was very difficult to realize that there even was a new chart. One of the biggest clues to a chart user that a new chart has been issued is that all of your previous highlights have disappeared! But with the current version of Jepp FDPro we all had old highlights on a new chart. I only noticed that the procedure had been changed because I was looking for something very specific on the chart and realized it was gone. I told the other pilots about it; and the flying FO realized that his new chart actually had a blob of highlighter over the area where the altitude restriction had been on the old chart; but now on the new chart there was highlighter with no note underneath it. So this report is just to bring attention to the fact that this feature of Jepp FDPro of transferring highlights from an old chart to an updated chart has the secondary effect of making it very difficult to realize that an update had occurred. It is a potential safety threat in that a chart user might not realize a chart has been updated because he/she sees his previous highlight marks and could assume that it's the same chart. The highlight marks; both on the paper chart as well as the electronic version of the same; is something very subtle; but I never realized how much of an important indicator it is to tell you that a chart has been revised when the highlights disappear in the revision process. While we were able to realize that the procedure had changed; it may catch another crew by surprise. I recommend that in future versions of Jepp FDPro that highlight marks should not transfer from one iteration of a chart to the next because the helpfulness of this feature is far outweighed by the confusion it causes.

Air carrier First Officer reported the new version of Jepp FDPro transfers highlights the pilots have entered on old charts to new charts. This makes it difficult to identify a new chart.