Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 960; Flight Crew Type 900

Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Police / Security Involved; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

A taxiway incident occurred between my airplane and a grass cutting service employee.  While taxiing along Taxiway Foxtrot on the way to Taxiway Lima; I felt the airplane make contact with something. I stopped the airplane and shut down the engine. I found a lawn service worker lying on the ground with a headset on and an edge trimmer by his side. He was lying on his back. My passenger asked him how he was and he responded with '[expletive language]'. After contacting the local authorities the County Sheriff and a Fire Rescue team showed up at the site. The individual was taken to hospital to determine his needs. No blood or broken bones where identified. The total aircraft damage was to the plastic wing tip light cover and the sheet metal fence to keep light from glaring into the cockpit on the very wing tip of the airplane.I realize this report might not be necessary as the incident was while taxiing at a private airport; but filed this information on an as needed basis.

Small aircraft pilot reported the aircraft wing tip struck a lawn service worker during taxi.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

When flight planning for flight; log history showed two previous write-ups for sudden excessive heat surging into flight during descent below 10;000 FT. When aircraft arrived at gate; Inbound Captain debriefed us that on both the flight to and the return; they suffered the same problem and tried to control temperature by turning off hot air. This did not work and they went to APU for air conditioning and it seemed to work. Also had REV deployed ECAM in flight on the leg to IAH. The local mechanics had never performed the required reverser test and had difficulty getting through the procedure. Eventually; they found someone who had a little experience with that procedure and he came to assist. While mechanics were going through the test required for the reverser; I talked with Maintenance Control about the plan to defer the hot air to address the excessive cockpit temperature problem. Maintenance Controller said the previous crew did not give the hot air off a chance to correct problem. Since this was different than my understanding from my conversation with the crew; I gave the [Maintenance] Controller the benefit of the doubt and accepted the aircraft with the deferral. I asked what we could do if it recurred and he brought the Environmental Control System (ECS) report to my attention and provided the Flight Manual (FM) reference for this additional procedure. He explained that they had difficulty troubleshooting this kind of problem and having a print out of exactly where all the valves were positioned during an event would help. We departed and when we were only a few hundred feet in the air; a rush of hot air flooded the cockpit that was as severe a change as walking into a sauna. Unfortunately; the cabin temperatures also ran very hot this time - that had not been reported as occurring during the previous events. If we were not able to control the dramatic and severe rise of temperature; we would be forced to return to the field. I attempted to control the swing by turning down all three temp zone controllers and grabbed for the FM for the ECS procedure. I believe I was able to capture the event with this first report. With much attention and changes; the cabin temperatures stayed about 74 degrees for a while at cruise. However; after a short period of time; we watched the zone duct temperatures in the fwd and aft cabin shoot up to 90 plus degrees. I attempted small changes to catch the up swing with little effect. Only large knob turns seemed to affect the zone temps. A Flight Attendant called and alerted that a passenger in row 10 was put on O2 and believed it was a result of the stuffiness of the cabin. Also; she said the gaspers were not putting out cold air (later said it was just row 10). Throughout the flight; I provided engineering reports and corresponded with Maintenance Control about the problems. Also; we used the ECS report two more times and noted the circumstances on each print out. During descent into our destination; the aircraft got suddenly very humid and the zone and cabin temperatures again began to rise without any input to the controllers. I moved the forward and aft cabin temperature controllers full cold with little effect. Then; when I selected full cold on the cockpit temperature controller; the forward and aft cabin zone temperatures dropped dramatically. I discussed all our experiences with the outbound crew and the local mechanics upon arrival. I am now concerned about my decision to accept the airplane with a deferral that I felt was wrong because the result was a very work intensive flight that dis-serviced our passengers with a very uncomfortable flight.

A320 Captain believes that he erred in accepting an aircraft with ECS (Environmental Control System) anomalies. The cabin temperature cannot be controlled and much of the time is excessively hot.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 325; Flight Crew Type 10400

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

Half of our airport in under construction. This has led to complicated taxi routes and more runway crossings than necessary. We are using mainly one runway and having to hit gaps with most of our departures and arrivals. An Airport vehicle was inspecting the runway for a bird strike. I had a Aircraft X on a four mile final and I observed  the Airport Vehicle clearing the runway; which was confirmed on frequency. I cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff with traffic on a four mile final. Ground control had told Aircraft X to 'Continue via Charlie; cross Runway 28.' The pilot read this back correctly. Aircraft X; I observed at a high rate a of speed continuing on Juliet; not turning onto Charlie to cross the active runway 1R while Aircraft Y was rolling to depart. Cab coordinator; Ground control and I on local control acted quickly. I transmitted 'STOP; STOP; STOP!' on frequency; first calling the [transposed call signs] but then used the correct call sign quickly 'Aircraft Y STOP STOP STOP!'Aircraft Y stopped prior to runway 10/28; I sent the aircraft on final around; and Aircraft X stopped before his nose wheel crossed the hold short markings of 1R. Because of the tower teams quick reactions a runway incursion or tragic event did not happen. The supervisor put [a report] in stating fault in the controllers. He inputted his opinion that with the Ground controller not saying 'Turn right on Charlie' that it was a main contributing factor to the pilots error. Also; I did not say 'Abort Takeoff' which the correct phraseology is 'Cancel takeoff' and that I did not issue the brasher statement and only gave the phone number. The [reports] are for facts; not opinions. Ground control is not required to say left; right or straight ahead.In the 7110.65 it also states you can use plain language to get your point across and 'Stop; stop; stop;' will get everyone's' attention. He also put the aircraft was at V1 rotation. This is incorrect. Aircraft Y was told to stop near C3 and stopped prior to Runway 10/28 which is before taxiway Juliet where the Aircraft X was attempting to cross. Runway 10/28 from Runway 1R is less than 2000 feet. How the supervisor worded the [report] places fault in the controllers when this was a pilot deviation. It is a sad thing when your 'Superiors' throw you under the bus instead of saying; you did your job and averted a potentially devastating situation. Controllers did our job. This is terrible management that we have to work under everyday by the same offenders.

We were cleared for takeoff. At approximately 65 knots; Tower instructed us to reject the takeoff and stop the aircraft. We did the rejected takeoff procedure; pulled off the runway; and completed the brake cooling requirements. No extra brake cooling was needed. Tower advised us it was due to a possible runway incursion. We notified Dispatch. Due to the rejected takeoff; we had less fuel on board than the minimum fuel for takeoff on our release. We returned to the gate; refueled; and departed uneventfully.

Local Controller and an air carrier Captain reported a runway incursion resulted in the departure flight crew rejecting take-off.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Climbing through FL320 in smooth air we felt several sharp bumps followed by ECAM ENG 1 STALL. The message cleared; but was followed a minute later with several more bumps and ECAM ENG 1 STALL (2) message. That message cleared and was replaced with ENG 1 OIL CLOG message. FAs reported smoke in the cabin and we began to get smoke in the cockpit as well. We donned the O2 masks; [advised ATC]; and requested vectors to ZZZ. FO ran the ECAM/QRH for the oil filter message and the smoke began to dissipate. I coordinated FA items with FAs and advised we planned on a normal landing with no evacuation in approximately 20 minutes. I also briefed the passengers as to the situation; to follow FA instructions; and plan on a normal landing. ATC gave us expedited descent and vectors and we set up for the VOR/DME XXL. The left engine was producing stable power that matched the right engine so I chose to let it run with the understanding we could shut it down if needed.I had the FAs prepare for landing and gave a final PA to the passengers to expect a normal landing; follow the FAs instructions; and remain seated after touchdown. I also advised we would be met and followed by safety personnel. We landed over weight approximately 179;000; flaps full with medium brakes; smooth touchdown; and cleared the runway. Talked to ARFF on frequency and he reported some smoke from left engine which we shut down. They followed us to the gate. Passengers deplaned normally.

A321 Captain reported an inflight engine malfunction. Flight diverted to an enroute field and landed uneventfully.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 11999; Flight Crew Type 1800

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 7000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We were number three in line for takeoff on Runway 16L. SEA Tower crossed two 737 aircraft in front of us across 16L for departure. Two other aircraft had landed on 16R and were holding short of the 16C near the departure end. The two aircraft ahead of us departed from 16C and Tower cleared us to lineup and wait on 16L; commenting that; 'Aircraft would be crossing downfield prior to your departure.' It is unclear if they were addressing us or another aircraft in the takeoff queue. We were expecting to wait for the aircraft to cross downfield before our departure. A B737 landed on 16R and was cleared along with a downfield B737 and an Airbus aircraft to cross 16C to hold short of 16L. We were then cleared for takeoff on 16L. It was clear to us that there were aircraft moving towards our runway at the departure end as we began our takeoff roll. As we started the roll Tower cleared an aircraft to cross 16L. The Pilot Flying exclaimed that; 'They just cleared that guy to cross our runway'; referring to the aircraft downfield. We advised Tower that we were taking off from 16L. Tower re-advised that we were clear for takeoff. Tower then repeated another clearance to cross 16L to a B737 and another aircraft? (Reviewing the recordings of Tower transmissions would be extremely useful). An aircraft then acknowledged the clearance to cross 16L. Discussion in the cockpit quickly turned to whether the aircraft up field were holding short; cleared to cross; or crossing our runway. The Pilot Monitoring missed the 100 knot call as we were all focused completely outside the cockpit attempting to judge the threat. Do you sense the confusion here? Keep in mind that we heard at least one clearance for another aircraft matching the call sign of aircraft holding short of our runway to cross our runway as we neared 100 KIAS. We continued to monitor the aircraft moving towards our runway during the entire takeoff roll. We lifted off and Tower cleared us to switch to Departure. We advised Tower that we didn't like the call they made in the middle of our takeoff roll; they then replied that the aircraft they cleared to cross our runway was crossing behind us. We then heard another call on Tower frequency saying that; 'We don't like it when our gear is down;' referring to the fact that our entire crew was so distracted by the incident that we failed to raise the gear after takeoff until almost 1;000 feet (this call was probably made from another aircraft; the inappropriate comment is not the issue).

Tower cleared us to line up and wait 16L for crossing traffic. After an extended time on the runway with no traffic crossing; Tower cleared us for takeoff. During the takeoff roll I heard tower clear first one; then another aircraft to cross 16L. I announced to the Captain that Tower cleared him to cross our runway. The Captain told the Tower we were on our takeoff roll and Tower responded the traffic would cross behind us. None of us heard any 'cross behind' or 'cross after' instructions from ATC. At least one of the aircraft announced they were holding short for us. The two aircraft appeared to be on taxiways P and Q which means the one on P cannot see down the runway due to the severe angle. As the Pilot Flying; I was a moment away from initiating a high speed abort at 130 knots (V1 160; Vr 166). After departing; all three pilots forgot to call positive rate; gear up; but the airplane that said he was holding short for us (we recognized the same voice) radioed that our gear was still down. This event had unthinkable potential for disaster! Besides the Tenerife potential; if we aborted the takeoff; we would have still been faced with brake temperatures in the melt zone (GW 567.4  130 knots just before I almost aborted) with a probable full evacuation of 284 souls with several aircraft in close proximity.

B777 flight crew departing Runway 16L at SEA reports hearing the Tower clear other aircraft to cross 16L and continue the takeoff but fear an incursion. The crew is so distracted that the landing gear is forgotten until another crew informs them over the radio.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

One day prior; previous write up 'fuel smell in left aft lavatory.' 1:10 into flight; flight attendants call and notify us of a smell in the aft lavatory. Unable to specifically describe the smell. First Officer [was asked] to assess if the smell was present in the lavatory. Decision made to divert to ZZZ. QRH procedure accomplished - smell significantly reduced. 15 minutes prior to landing 2 of 3 flight attendants report having headaches. Priority handling was requested; normal approach and landing accomplished. Paramedics met aircraft; attend to flight attendants. No passenger complaints about health or any request for medical assistance. [Aircraft Maintenance Log] entry made for repeat item of a 'Fuel or Hydraulic smell in aft lavatory and aft cabin.'

A320 Captain reported Flight Attendant notification of fuel fumes predominately in the aft galley. Cabin crew reported health issues in the form of headaches.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

After landing we exited the runway at T6 and Ground Control who cleared us T/A10/B to the gate. Taxiing on ''T'' and approaching the high-speed Intersection T9; I glanced right and noticed an RJ on the runway at a very high speed; he turned and exited T9 without any hesitation with respect to the fact their aircraft was in a limited visibility area with respect to our aircraft. (Almost behind us; to the right) getting the attention of my Captain who applied the brakes abruptly as the RJ was exiting at T9 in front of us. My Captain continued to apply brakes; giving the needed spacing for the RJ. The wingtip of the RJ passed in front of our nose by about 30-40 FT. It was then that Ground Control told us to give way to the RJ.If it hadn't been for our situational awareness there could have been a taxiway incursion. There was no hotspot listed for the T9 Intersection on the airport page. I feel the RJ landed long purposely to put them in a position in front of us for the gates. He followed us on final and we heard no intentions or coordination with Tower for his long landing. The RJ Captain did not use good judgment in controlling his aircraft safely with respect to ours. The RJ flight crew contacted Ground Control long after they were already barreling down Taxiway Bravo. Both the Captain and I were appalled by his unsafe maneuver. We asked Ground Control for his flight number; which they provided. A comment was made on Ground Control frequency 'that's what you get for taxing slow' as their jet was turning into our mutual gate alleyway.

After landing on Runway 14R at ORD and exiting at T6 to T the flight crew of a B737 was alarmed when a CRJ landing long on the same runway exited at high speed on T9 cutting in front of them and forcing them to brake abruptly.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

After pushing back from gate and successfully taxiing the aircraft around the east concourses; ramp control cleared us [to a different] spot and to contact ground. Shortly before reaching [our new spot] we contacted ground control; and they gave us taxi instructions of Golf; right on [the] runway; hold short of bravo; and contact the other ground control.As I began making the left turn to enter taxiway golf; the tiller locked up. I tried to turn it 2 more times; [I] could feel a grinding at [my] feet; and STEER INOP was displayed. I was unable to reengage steering; and at this point I [was] headed at a stationary at [the spot] that was waiting to turn on to the taxi way after us. I quickly tried steering to the left with the rudders; but found they were locked too. My first reaction was differential power; just to slow the aircraft and avoid advancing toward the [other aircraft]. I deployed full reverse on engine number 1; while advancing power on engine number 2. This attempt at steering was somewhat successful and the aircraft veered left and I was able to bring it to a stop a few feet prior from entering the grass on the right side of taxiway golf. My main concern was avoiding the [other aircraft] in front of me. I brought the aircraft successfully to a stop; informed ground control we were unable to move under our own power; and would require tow. I then made a passenger announcement stating to remain seated and unfortunately we would be returning to the gate. About 20 minutes went by; and a tug showed up; moved us to the West hard stand for approximately 10-15 mins. Then towed us all the way to [the] gate. We deplaned. I called dispatch and maintenance control. The aircraft was unresponsive to all of my control inputs. The nose gear steering mechanism malfunctioned; and became jammed. The whole event lasted less than 30 seconds from detection to aircraft stop. After realizing that [neither] the tiller nor rudder pedals had any authority; my only option left was to use differential reverse/power to veer left and away from the head on aircraft while coming to a stop. We were surrounded by airplanes on all sides and I barely had any time to mitigate the situation.It was a mechanical malfunction.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

EMB-145 flight crew reported a near-collision resulted when they lost their nose wheel steering during taxi in a crowded airport environment.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 4500

Inbound to BRL at approx. 15 miles canceled IFR. At 10 miles I broadcast a general advisory to CTAF as inbound to BRL to land. At 5 miles I broadcast intention to enter left traffic for RWY 18. One aircraft responded maneuvering south of the field; a second aircraft announced departing RWY 18; I called the departing pilot for direction of flight leaving the airport and he responded south southeast. I again reported my position.I held altitude waiting for visual contact with departing aircraft my TRFC advisory system began to call traffic 10 o'clock then 11 then 12 as it turned out he was under my nose and completely out of my view before I could determine what evasive action to take the Cessna passed directly in front of me less than 200 feet in a climbing left turn. I asked the Cessna pilot if he saw me to which he said yes when I queried further he responded 'runway 18 is right hand traffic' as though that was a good reason for him to continue towards me.

BE58 pilot reported an NMAC with a Cessna at BRL.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

We were performing a takeoff on Runway 22L in ORD. At the same time; a heavy aircraft was performing a takeoff on Runway 28R. During our takeoff roll; the jet blast from the departing aircraft on 28R caused some of our takeoff guidance to drop and we received FD Lateral and FD Vertical Mode Off messages on our EICAS. By the time we had identified and canceled the messages and made a decision; we were already over 100 knots indicated and made the decision to continue the takeoff and select the appropriate lateral and vertical modes once airborne. The rest of the flight continued uneventfully.

E175 flight crew reported jet blast from another aircraft on the takeoff roll caused loss of the flight director vertical and lateral modes.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 400; Flight Crew Type 40

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Electrical fire smoke in cockpit from malfunctioning electrical equipment. Radio communication was temporarily lost due to power outage in plane. I turned off non-essential electrical; ventilated cockpit; and was able to re-establish radio contact with Departure frequency. At that time I declared emergency due to smoke in cockpit. They cleared me to land. I was able to make [a] successful landing and the electrical issues were contained by turning off power.

LNC IV pilot declared an emergency and landed after noting smoke in the cockpit from malfunctioning electrical equipment.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Airport; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

We were assigned LOC/BC 31L due to reported hazy conditions at BRO. Approach Control cleared us for the approach and Tower cleared us to land. On short final the Tower called traffic on the right downwind for Runway 35. We looked for the traffic but did not see it and told the Tower that we did not have the traffic in sight. At 200 FT the Tower asked if we had the traffic in sight. At the same time we received a TCAS TA. Using the TCAS display for reference; I visually acquired the downwind traffic directly overhead (0 mile lateral separation) with 400 FT vertical separation. I told the Tower that traffic was in sight and the First Officer continued the landing. There would not have been enough vertical separation for us to safely execute a go around.

An Air Carrier Captain reported a near miss on BRO Runway 31L short final with another aircraft on a visual approach to Runway 35 after the crew had previously reported that aircraft not in sight and ATC failed update the traffic's position.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 175; Flight Crew Type 5030

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

All events through pushback were accomplished without note. During pushback; a puddle on the ramp aft of the normal oil spot was noticed behind the #2 engine. Puddle was not present on the walkaround. A stream of drops along the ramp was also noticed while the #2 engine was run. After five minutes the fuel leak had not stopped and we towed back to a gate. Maintenance was called; ran several tests; and two engine runs. The leak dissipated as the tests were completed. No fuel appeared to be leaking while engines were running; except for one within limits from the heat exchanger. Forms were completed to indicate it. Aircraft pushed and started again. No leaks were noted.Shortly after takeoff/cleanup; Captain announced a split in the thrust levers. Autothrottles were used for takeoff with VNAV (climb page 2L adjusted for 202 knots at 1;000 feet AGL). Looking at the engine instruments; I noticed the #2 thrust lever about three knob widths ahead of the #1. #1 N1 was at commanded power with the #2 N1 showing the white commanded power bar of about 95%; but the engine only producing about 88-89%. Further advancement of the throttle lever produced no increase in power. Vertical Speed was selected and we reduced our climb rate to bring the power back. As the power came back; the throttle synced and power matched. VNAV was reselected and as the power returned to full climb; the split reappeared with the #2 indicating a commanded increase without the engine delivering the power.As this was being discussed; the center tank fuel pumps were turned on (750 pounds in the center tank). Immediately after the pumps were turned on; the power matched and all indication were normal. As soon as the center tank fuel was exhausted; the split returned. Crew leveled at FL 270 and elected to return to ZZZ. As power was less than full climb at cruise/descent; and no abnormal indication were present during these flight conditions; no QRH Checklists were run. The rest of the return to ZZZ was completed without note. Engine performed as expected from level off to shutdown.Contract Maintenance expressed an increased level of calls from aircraft coming from the paint shop; fuel leaks were common with these aircraft.  Would recommend a Maintenance individual check and run engines prior to returning the aircraft to the line.

Origination flight on an aircraft that had just come out of the paint shop. Preflight was uneventful with no fuel drips or puddles noted. We pushed five minutes early. On push back #2 was dripping fuel and did not stop after a short time and engine was shutdown. After consultation with Maintenance Control; we returned to the gate and called Contract Maintenance. Contract Maintenance did four motoring tests as directed by [company's] Maintenance. With each test; the dripping became improved. Then an engine run was completed with decreased dripping; but not to a small enough level to allow Dispatch. Contract Maintenance then opened the cowl and did an engine run to determine location of drip. After that run; the component dripping was identified and the dripping had decreased to an amount that allowed MEL. MEL was completed. This was about a 2.5 hour process. Ground Ops and Operations were very helpful with accommodating the Passengers as well as they could. I had given periodic in-person updates to the passengers. Finally; we pushed-back and the engine starts were uneventful without any drips. Uneventful taxi. We took off on Runway XX with a headwind 20G30. On push up of thrust; #2 lagged a bit and I pushed the thrust lever up to get closer to match and continued my crosscheck.  As we approached V1/VR I noticed #2 still lagging by a few percent and pushed up the throttle some more. Normal on centerline liftoff and climbout. After liftoff; I informed the F/O  (First Officer) that we had a split throttle situation. We cleaned up on schedule and began to evaluate the situation (again the aircraft had no adverse flight characteristics). With the aircraft cleaned up and climb power set; we observed that although the #2 demand pointer was correct; the #2 N1 lagged approximately 2-5% N1. Once our climb rate was reduced in Vertical Speed and at a slightly lower climb thrust setting; the engine was normal and tracked normally with the demand pointers and thrust lever position. To this point we had continued to follow ATC instructions to keep it simple. We found that the engine reacted the same with the autothrottle On or Off. Also we had 750 pounds of fuel in the center tank; so once established in the climb we turned the pumps on and immediately #2 N1 returned to normal operation at full climb power. When center tank was empty and pumps turned off; the malfunction returned. With this information we leveled off and informed ATC that we would probably need to return to the airport. While level we reconfirmed no other abnormal conditions or switches out of place. Also at level flight in this situation there were no conditions that warranted a QRH Checklist although it was discussed. F/O and I discussed the situation and decided that without the aircraft able to achieve full climb thrust on Main Fuel pumps only; the safest choice was to return to the airport. F/O flew and talked to ATC; while I informed flight attendants and passengers of need to return to the airport for safety reasons and gave them our ETA. I called Station Ops on VHF and informed them of our need to return; get a gate; and asked them to contact Dispatch. We also confirmed via ACARS with Dispatch the need to return due to engine unable to achieve full climb power (or something like that). The F/O did a very good job and stayed ahead of the aircraft preparing for the briefings; descent; and Approach Checklist. We referenced the Diversion Checklist to ensure we had covered the suggested items. We accomplished a normal descent and asked for a long visual approach to increase probability of a stable approach and landing without the need for a thrust needful go-around. F/O flew stable approach and landing with normal braking. No emergency was declared; no special handling requested; and a normal weight landing occurred. Uneventful taxi-in and shutdown. Flight was canceled and the passengers accommodated as best as Ops could. Debrief with the flight attendants yielded that although disappointed in their flight being cancelled; they were appreciative of the Safety of turning back. Immediate notification with XXXXXX was done after engine shutdown with Dispatch; Supervisor; Maintenance; and Chief Pilot.The Location X crews both above the wing and below the wing were very familiar with the Maintenance trouble shooting of engine drips on starts because they have seen it more the once from aircraft coming out of the paint shop.  An engine run after paint shop would have found this problem before a revenue flight was disrupted.  Maybe this may be a prudent practice--an ounce or prevention may have saved a pound of Customer frustration.  Perhaps a faster crosscheck by myself might have allowed a reject option in the 70-90 knot range; but even then there was no decrease in power and I perceived the N2 engine thrust close-enough to N1 engine thrust to ensure a safer option than a medium speed reject.

B737 flight crew reported an air turn back after 3 knob throttle split developed in climb with a lack of power on an engine following a 2.5 hour maintenance delay for a fuel leak issue.


Challenger Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 1000; Flight Crew Type 300

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Our C150 training flight announced a 1/2 mile right base to final for SNL Runway 17. Another aircraft identified itself as 'flight check Challenger on 5 mile final.' The flight check aircraft then proceeded to announce 'this isn't going to work.' Our aircraft asked 'will you be going around then?' A comment was made to the effect of 'this will be the last one.' Flight check aircraft then proceeded to fly under our aircraft [between our C150 on final and the runway.] Upon seeing the aircraft appear underneath our flight while on final we asked 'flight check; did you see us as you flew under us on final?' Flight check responded 'yes; we saw you.' Our aircraft went around and landed uneventfully. The 'flight check Challenger' departed the area to the west. At no time did our C150 training flight do anything other than enter and fly the VFR traffic patter per the FAR/AIM and A/FD.

A breakdown in communication between a straight in Challenger and a base leg C150 at a non-towered airport resulted in a close encounter on final.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 46; Flight Crew Total 357; Flight Crew Type 244

Upon receiving my frequency change handoff from ZZZ Tower; having just taken off from there; I tuned to Pt. Mugu on 124.70 to request flight following to VNY at 3;500 feet. They responded that they were too busy to safely accommodate the request. Understanding what that implied to the busyness of the airspace around me; I proceeded with the flight; maintaining an extra vigilant scan of the sky outside; and monitoring 124.7 and then SoCal on 134.2 as appropriate; while cruising at an altitude of 3;500 feet. Roughly 13 nm from VNY; over Simi Valley; following the 118 freeway towards VNY; I saw Aircraft Y passing directly in front of my plane from the left side of my windshield to the right in what appeared to be a climbing 180 turn to the east. With a high closure rate we were ultimately under 50 feet apart. I brought my power back to idle and made a descending turn to the left with a bank of over 50 degrees. Even so it seemed like we would still impact. With our separation at that point being under 10 feet. No contact was made; and upon rolling back to straight and level flight I could see Aircraft Y flying in straight and level flight as well; a few hundred feet above me and now with about half a mile of separation and furthering. No one came on frequency (134.2) to report this; that I observed; and after a few minutes I proceeded to switch over to VNY and call Tower to report that I was inbound for landing. My interpretation of the facts stated above is that Aircraft Y was not on 134.2; or on any kind of flight following/plan; was engaging in either a training maneuver or evasive maneuver to avoid collision; though not adhering to the idea that two aircrafts in threat of colliding shall each turn to the right; and were at the wrong altitude for their originally westbound heading prior to turning 180 degrees to the East. No strobes; nav or landing lights could be observed on Aircraft Y post near miss. It appeared that there were two people aboard Aircraft Y.

GA pilot reported an NMAC at VNY airport.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

This task card instructs to drain water out of the fuel tanks. Stored aircraft fuel tanks have been treated with the hazardous chemical Biobor JL. There is no caution or warning in the document making the technician aware that precautions need to be taken. The fuel that is removed from the tank has to be disposed of in a particular way. There is no caution or warning for that either.Include cautions in the step for PPE (Personnel Protective Equipment) requirements and disposal of treated fuel. Include requirements in document header under tooling and under references to any applicable maintenance documents.

Technician reported that Work Cards associated with the use of Biobor JL in aircraft fuel tanks during storage are missing critical information and should be revised.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

After landing XXR we exited at taxiway. We contacted ground and they instructed us to taxi via [taxi route] into the ramp. When we made the left turn we could see a marshaler indicating for us to enter the ramp on [the next taxiway]. To the left of us on [the taxiway] there was a parked helicopter. I stayed right of centerline and was taxiing very slowly while watching the wingtip. Unfortunately I misjudged the distance between the left wingtip and the helicopter tail. The marshaler ran from his stationary position to the aircraft and indicated to stop. The left wingtip went under and butted against the right horizontal stabilizer. I stopped and shut down the engines and inspected the damage. Follow company SOP's and when a distance from a wingtip is in question just stop and request a tug.

G450 Captain reported misjudging distance from wingtip to a parked aircraft and made contact during taxi.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy

I am reporting this due to minimum crew onboard. During the boarding process from ZZZ-ZZZ1; I noticed that a passenger in the jetway was not wearing a face covering. When she entered the aircraft; at the forward entry; I politely asked the passenger if she had a face covering or a mask and if so; I kindly asked her to put it on. She shook her head and said 'Whatever.' I politely informed her of policy concerning wearing a face covering throughout her journey and offered her a complimentary mask. She appeared to be searching for her personal mask in her purse and refused a complimentary mask and walked away.After the boarding process was totally complete; the Ops Agent confirmed with me that all of the passengers were onboard.I proceeded to make the All Passengers Onboard PA. Afterward; I closed a few forward overhead bins a concerned passenger informed me that when she went to the aft lavatory; the passenger who came onboard without a face covering had taken it off. I thanked the concerned passenger and reminded her that the mask can be briefly removed for eating or taking medicine and also; thanked her for bringing it to my attention.Because; it was bought to my attention. I proceeded to address the passenger who boarded without a face covering and noticed once again that she was not complying and was not wearing a face covering. I politely approached her and kindly asked her to comply with airline policy and to put on her mask. Before; I could say anything else she immediately interrupted me and her tone of voice became aggressive toward me. In her aggressive tone of voice; she said: 'What! You got a problem with me.' I said no ma'am and quietly walked away. Because; she was not wearing a mask and her tone of voice elevated and she became aggressive. I did not want any potential traveling droplets to make contact with my eyes. Therefore; I quietly walked away. At this point; we were still at the gate and I knew I only had a short window to have the non-complaint passenger addressed concerning her not wearing a face covering.Therefore; I went to inform the Captain but he was in the lavatory. Also; I knew the Ops Agent had confirmed with me that boarding was complete. Then; I asked the C-Flight Attendant to stand at the forward entry; so; I could notify the Ops Agent for the appropriate Ground Operations or Supervisor to address the non-complaint passenger then I returned back to the aircraft.When the Ground Operations or Supervisor(s) arrived; I remained in the forward entry while they talked to the non-complaint passenger. I am not sure what she told them or what they said to her; but she and someone traveling with her were escorted off the aircraft. After; they deplaned. The Ops Agent said goodbye and closed the door.   With the world-wide spread of the coronavirus that could potentially spread through respiratory droplets; from person-to-person. In my mind; I was thinking this is a precaution COVID concern for the health and safety of the wellbeing of every passenger and crew member onboard and the best time to address policy is before we pushed back or have to return back to the gate because of a non-compliant passenger who was not wearing a face covering. The Captain was in the lavatory; the boarding process was totally complete and confirmed by the Ops Agent that the last person had boarded the aircraft. I had made the All Passengers Onboard PA. The concerned passenger was watching me after I spoke to the non-complaint passenger to see what I was going to do about the issue. I wanted to be proactive and take precaution; before closing the forward entry door; or possibly having to return back to the gate with a potentially bigger problem. The forward exits were monitored by Flight Attendant C. The aft exits were monitored by Flight Attendant B. When I returned back to the aircraft both Flight Attendants were visible to the passengers.In closing; for the safety; health; and wellbeing ofall of our passengers; the crew; and myself; I am committed to upholding airline policy and value every customer; their concerns; their health; their safety; their wellbeing; their business; and their flight experience when they board our aircraft.I believe it would be helpful if someone from ground operations could be visually within reach; for at least the last ten minutes before departure; to address or assist with any matter that may occur onboard or during the remaining minutes before departure time.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger was removed due to non-compliance with face mask policy.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

A B757 received a Low Altitude Alert on approximately 4 mile final Runway 07R. I issued the Low Altitude Alert to the B757 and went over to check the ILS panels. As I was checking the ILS panel; the B757 advised me the glide slope signal was weak; and I noticed that the ILS was set for Runway 25L. I configured the ILS for Runway 07R and advised the B757 that I had reset the ILS. The B757 continued the approach and landed with out incident. During over ocean traffic; I usually leave the ILS for Runway 25L/07R in the west configuration (Runway 25L) since we do not use this runway for arrivals and departures due to overnight noise abatement. I had already completed this portion of the watch check list when the city closed Runway 25R/07L. I must have forgotten to set the ILS for Runway 25L/07R to east configuration (07R) when the City closed Runway 25R/07L. I usually visually check the ILS panels when I provide the relief briefing to the relieving FLM/CIC. While the visually check of the panels is not a requirement; it is a personal preference that I usually perform and did not do this time. Had I stayed with my routine when I was relieved from the GC/CIC position; I would have caught this issue. In the future; I need to stay with my routine.

LAX Tower Controller described a Low Altitude event experienced by a aircraft on final for Runway 7R indicating glide slope difficulties; the reporter acknowledging that the ILS configuration was not changed as needed for this late night operation.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

I was working the BFI final and turned Aircraft X on to final and issued traffic that was VFR going outbound less than a 1/2 mile north of the localizer. I shipped the Aircraft X to Tower as he was now approaching their airspace. Aircraft X went around on about a 4 or 5 mile final. Luckily the traffic that was descending into the adjacent airport was 4 miles north the Aircraft X or this could have been a very ugly situation. Our airspace needs to be amended to make sure VFR aircraft remain clear of the final. The proximity of the two airport's finals are too close for us to have to worry about TCAS RA'S. We need the airspace around this airport's final approach course to be protected from the runway threshold to about 15 miles out north and south of the airport.

A TRACON Controller reported an aircraft they had just shipped to Tower went around in response to a TCAS/RA for an unidentified VFR target in the vicinity of the Final Approach course.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

Aircraft X was at 29;000 feet descending to 24;000 feet when I took the handoff. I don't remember him checking on. The pilot called me and asked me if I have traffic. I wasn't aware of any traffic; but either Conflict Alert went off; or I quick looked the sector above me. There was Aircraft Y at 28;000 feet wired with Aircraft X who was now at 28;000 feet descending to 24;000 feet. I told Aircraft X to turn 30 degrees right immediately and to expedite his descent. I didn't call and get control because I believed the situation was imminent and I had a Radar Assist who could have called. It was a Supervisor who was on my Assist and he's not good at all.There were a lot of conflict alerts going on during this entire session with military aircraft in or around my airspace. I was trying to suppress those Conflict Alerts to clean up the scope. I may have suppressed Aircraft X and Aircraft Y without knowing it. The sector above me was where the conflict happened. The controller working those aircraft is by far the worst controller I've ever worked with or around and that's not an exaggeration. That Controller needs to be taken off the boards. Bottom line or never let them work radar again.

ZJX Center Controller reported receiving a handoff and communications from an overlying sector of an aircraft that was in direct conflict with another aircraft in the overlying sector.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 18200; Flight Crew Type 550

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

RUDDER FAIL CAS message followed by dutch roll induced by light turbulence. Unable to maintain altitude or airway. Initially [requested special handling] as dutch roll increased in intensity. Requested block altitude initially; but ATC did not understand this request. Requested lower altitude and descended to FL301.  Was able to stabilize the dutch roll and reconnect autopilot. Followed QRH procedure; but rudder remained completely failed including trim function; discussed options for landing airport and diverted to ZZZZ due to favorable wind conditions and weather. Completed safe landing at ZZZZ about 1:40 after initial event. Flight control computers were operational hydraulics were all operational Remote Electronic Units 15 and 16 were both failed along with Rudder LVDT Disconnect.

Gulfstream G650 Captain reported that Rudder Fail CAS message followed by Dutch Roll required a diversion to a suitable airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 7.3; Flight Crew Total 965; Flight Crew Type 125

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

While I was parking I noticed that the aircraft was on the ramp being worked on.  I walked out and asked the Mechanic if everything was ok and he told me that everything was good and that he would be finished with the new spark plugs shortly.  They finished working on the aircraft and ran the engine up.  Everything sounded fine to me from where I was standing. I talked to the Mechanic about the airplane.  He told me that they had changed the oil and when they ran it up it had been running rough.  They removed the spark plugs and had found two fouled; so they replaced all the spark plugs.  They then ran it up a second time and it seemed fine.  I loaded the aircraft according to my weight and balance plan then accomplished the pre-flight.  The aircraft was already fueled when we arrived.I received my taxi clearance and proceeded to taxi while Ground informed me that my clearance was still good.  I informed them I would be ready to copy it in the run-up area.   During run-up the right magneto was slightly lower than the left; but within the max drop and within 50 RPM of the left.  The prop cycle was normal; all engine instruments looked good.  I was to climb to 4;000 and expect 6;000 10 minutes after departure. I contacted Tower and was assigned a transponder code and asked to hold for IFR release.  Shortly after that conversation a small jet landed and I was cleared for takeoff. The climb power setting was 23 inches of MAP at 2;400 RPMs.  The cowl flaps were left full open for climb.  At 3;000 MSL I leaned the engine.  After leaning I was showing 90 KIAS and about 500 FPM climb.  At 3;900 MSL Approach cleared me to climb to 6;000 MSL. I leveled off at 6;000 MSL and I ran the cruise checklist.  Power was set to 21 inches of MAP at 2;400 RPM.  The mixture was leaned to 50F rich of peak EGT as per Cessna's Pilot's Operating Handbook.  The cowl flap was closed as called for in the check list.  CHTs were normal and the OIL was about 75% up to Max Oil Temp. I was then handed off to Approach. About a mile from the VOR I started setting up for my turn to heading 250.  The engine dropped off; line similar to when you lean an aircraft engine too much and starve it of fuel; then came back on like nothing had happened. I started a scan of the engine instruments.  Everything seemed normal to me except that the EGT was now at 25F rich of peak EGT.  I started to enrich the mixture back to 50F rich of peak EGT when the aircraft started to shake violently.  I called Approach with; 'Mayday; Mayday; Mayday; we're losing our engine turning for ZZZ now.'  Approach advised me that ZZZ was 20 NM away and that ZZZ1 was 10 NM west of us.  I asked him for vectors while I changed my map from the IFR low enroute chart to the VFR sectional chart to help me find the airport. I set the mixture full rich; made sure the prop was still at 2;400 RPM and set full power on the throttle.  I was able to make 22 inches of MAP; but could only hold altitude at 4;900 MSL at 100 KIAS. Once on ZZZ1 CTAF I called out that I was overhead at 4;900 MSL circling clockwise for an emergency landing.  I circled over the arrival end on the runway at about a 30 degree bank at 18 inches of MAP.  The engine was running smooth at this time like nothing was wrong.  I started to think that it might have been a lose spark plug or a problem with the carburetor.  I made sure that my passengers were OK and told them that we were over the runway and going to land; that everything would be okay. I pitched for about 110 KIAS and lowered the gear.  I then ran the before landing checklist and checked my chart for the field elevation. At high key I set the flaps to 10 degrees.  At low key I started to reduce the power and the engine started shaking violently again I tried carb heat but that didn't help.  I tried adding power for 18 inches of MAP but that caused even greater shaking.  So; I cut the power to idle applied full flaps and turned for the numbers.  I held 80 KIAS until flare andcalled on final for Runway 22.  We landed and I turned off the runway.  I pulled the mixture to the full lean position and coasted to a safe distance from the runway then stopped.  [Later] I talked to the Mechanic that I had talked to before I departed.  He told me that [the FBO] had found that two of the push rods had bent in flight. I feel that there may have been engine damage from a previous flight or flights.  Rather than reserving this aircraft for cross country flights the FBO mainly uses this aircraft for complex; commercial; or CFI training.  That may have caused heat damage from slow flights at high power settings and multiple climbs and descents going from full power to idle power.  Most other FBOs I have flown at do not allow C182s to be used for that type of training.

C182 pilot experiences a rough running engine at 6;000 FT and accepts vectors to the nearest suitable airport. Arriving overhead at 4;900 FT with the engine still producing power; a gliding circling approach is planned and executed successfully. Maintenance discovers that bent pushrods were the cause of the rough running engine.


Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

The number 2 engine did not spool up on takeoff. The takeoff was immediately rejected with maximum speed of 30 knots. Returned to gate and aircraft was taken out of service by maintenance.

B737-800 flight crew reported rejecting takeoff due to engine malfunction.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

In a conversation with a local pilot; he described a situation that had occurred the day before; while he was out flying in the local area. This pilot stated that he was flying VFR in the local area and requested to do a full stop landing at MEM and taxi back for a departure. The pilot stated that he landed on Runway 36R and was instructed to hold short of Taxiway 'S' and contact Clearance Delivery for his clearance back out of the Bravo Airspace. While trying to obtain a clearance from Clearance Delivery the pilot stated that Local continued to depart aircraft off Runway 36R as he sat between the white runway edge paint and the runway side of the hold short line for Runway 36R. He stated that as aircraft would depart behind him his aircraft was getting rocked very violently. Have a special interest item added to team briefing to cover this type of situation; to help educate someone who apparently does not understand how to handle this type of situation.

MEM Controller discussed an event with a local VFR C172 pilot who's aircraft was 'rocked violently' while holding near a departure runway; the reporter planning controller briefings to increase awareness.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Type 9832

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company flight planning system failed to provide sufficient routing instructions from point of non-redispatch to intermediate dispatch airport. Non-redispatch routing passed through numerous areas which would have required emergency authority. Original Dispatch release used ZBAA as the intermediate dispatch airport enroute to VHHH. Due to Pilot Bulletin regarding company's new aircraft use of ZBAA; the captain requested and received clarification from Chief Pilot and Dispatch Supervisor that ZBAA was in fact 'legal' to use. Enroute; the Dispatch release was updated to remove ZBAA and instead use an intermediate redispatch from JMU VOR in Shenyang FIR directly to RJAA. The other IRO and I came on deck after the new release had been accepted; and this was part of the captain's change over briefing. Shortly after the captain left to begin his break; the redispatch message arrived; all was in order; and the redispatch was accepted. While comparing the redispatch message; the redispatch plan; and the non-redispatch plan; it was noted the flight planning software had built the non-redispatch as direct from the redispatch fix; JMU (in Shenyang FIR); to RJAA. If we had flown the route; we would have been flying off airways to leave China's Shenyang FIR; into Japan's Defense Areas (JDA); and through the company's self-imposed no fly area. Company flight planning system failed to provide sufficient routing instructions from point of non-redispatch to intermediate dispatch airport.

Air carrier First Officer reported the company flight planning system failed to provide sufficient routing instructions from point of non-redispatch to an intermediate dispatch airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 9600; Flight Crew Type 4000

I agreed to call in fatigued as a crew for the following reasons: 1) The Captain appeared extremely fatigued at the time. 2) We had sat around 6 hours and were all experiencing that 'tired dullness' you get with a rolling departure time slip. 3) Although still legal; our duty day was in jeopardy. Assuming we pushed 45 minutes after our assigned aircraft blocked in; we would need minimal ground delay to takeoff and stay under our maximum duty day. 4) We observed the weather getting worse; freezing drizzle with ice and snow pellets. Our experience told us the taxi out and deice would be lengthy and contribute to our lack of mental alertness and undoubtedly bust our duty day. 5) Finally; we projected ahead 8 hours to our arrival; approach and landing; that made us feel uncomfortable given the high terrain and a weather forecast that was marginal. So instead of fueling; catering; loading cargo and passengers and then hopefully pushing within duty day and hoping that we would experience minimal ground delay that would include deicing and then somehow magically feeling refreshed after an Atlantic crossing to execute a high threat arrival; we decided as a crew to make the fatigue call and put a stop to an unsafe chain of events that was being linked together.

B767 First Officer describes the reason for a fatigue call after a six hour rolling delay prior to an international flight.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

After takeoff at around 1;000 AGL; the pilot not flying (PNF) called my attention to the illumination of the CABIN DOOR and DOOR SEAL annunciator lights. I was navigating the RNAV departure when the PIC called ATC to inform them of the abnormal annunciations and to request return to Runway 14. The PNF informed the passengers of the problem and to remain seated with seat belts fastened as we returned to the field. On base leg; the cabin door opened. I did not feel any abnormal change in aircraft performance and made the turn to final. The PIC declared an emergency and we landed within the next two minutes. Although I did not hear it; the door made contact with the ground on roll out but caused no control problems. We taxied clear of the runway and stopped onto an available taxiway. We shut down and waited for assistance.

On landing; the First Officer kept the left wheel off the ground as long as possible; but the door made contact with the runway/taxiway eventually as evidenced by the damage noted postflight. We taxied off the runway and onto the taxiway and shut down. I proceeded to calm the passengers down first and then contacted the Company. Following his instructions; we deplaned the passengers and had them escorted to our facility. We also had the aircraft towed for maintenance.

A CE-560XL alerted CABIN DOOR and DOOR SEAL at around 1;000 feet after takeoff so an emergency was declared and as the flight returned to land the door opened and contacted the runway after landing.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Cessna CE-750 Aircraft was being ferried by Contract pilots from ZZZ to ZZZ1 to install a new Left wingtip. When the aircraft arrived; the Aircrew opened the Main Entry Door with the aircraft still pressurized. This caused the door to be forced out with great force causing significant damage to the door; hand rails and other attach points. No injuries. The [flight] crew wrote up: Aircraft stayed pressurized upon landing and after shutdown; cabin door flew open when unlatched. Aircraft Maintenance Technician X investigated the Pressurization System on the aircraft and found it to be operating correctly.My thought [as Maintenance Manager]:I was told that the APU was running when the aircraft taxied in. I would suspect a [flight] crew error during the after landing portion of the flight. I was always taught that before opening an aircraft door that you ensure that the aircraft is depressurized.[Recommend]:Follow the Post Flight Checklist and ensure aircraft isn't pressurized prior to opening the Main Cabin Door (MCD).

A Maintenance Manager reported about significant damage to the main entry door; hand rails; and other attach points on a company Cessna 750 aircraft after the flight crew opened the cabin door upon arrival with the aircraft still pressurized. Main door blew open 'with great force' when the door was unlatched. Aircraft had remained pressurized upon landing and after shutdown.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

A normal takeoff clearance was received. After airborne Tower cleared us direct to FEZTR. At about 6;000 ft. Tower handed us off to Departure. Departure assigned us a heading stating; 'you're way off course.' The Captain; as Pilot Monitoring; replied that Tower gave us direct FEZTR. Eventually Departure cleared us to another fix down line and own nav on course. The Tower gave us a late handoff and told us to go direct to FEZTR. After the confusing check on with Departure Control we both agreed that it was odd to be cleared to a down line fix by Tower. And it was odd that Tower kept us on frequency so long. And it was odd that Departure knew nothing about it. We had a rider in the jumpseat listening in and we all agreed that we heard the clearance to FEZTR. We could have asked Tower for a handoff sooner. We could have questioned Tower's instruction to go direct FEZTR; but we thought Tower and Departure control were jointly monitoring/coordinating our progress reference some other traffic. On check in with Departure Control; we said we were climbing via the departure; but it would have been more clear to highlight the non standard situation by stating we were proceeding direct FEZTR per Tower's direction.

Air Carrier flight crew reported Tower issued a clearance to a fix and Departure Control did not know about it.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

A Hung Start on ENG #1 was detected in ECAM display. During second start attempt a Hot Start and EGT over-limit showed on ECAM display. At the same time radio calls from adjacent aircraft reported fire coming from ENG #1. Reports about fire were confirmed more than once by radio from witnesses. Situation was reported to Ramp Control; ARFF (Airport Rescue Fire Fighting) was requested. Captain called for 'Engine Fire on the ground checklist'. Checklist was performed by First Officer; fire was suppressed and confirmed from outside personnel. ARFF personnel did not arrived to our aircraft when requested. Once situation was under control; the plane was towed back to the gate.

Flight crew reported a second hung start and accompanying engine fire while attempting to restart the #1 engine. The flight crew shut down the engine and the fire was suppressed by ground personnel.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Evacuated; General Maintenance Action

After takeoff upon retracting gear; we received an AMBER A side HYD LEVEL LOW message. Upon selecting HYD synoptics noted that the HYD Quantity in the A side had dropped to 11%. We continued our climb on the RNAV Departure ran the checklist at a safe altitude; and opted to make an emergency return to ZZZ. We alerted ATC of the condition; requests and advised the passengers of the situation. We completed the checklist setup for a landing to runway XXR and advised the tower that we would like emergency equipment standing by. Following landing and application of emergency brakes we stopped the aircraft and advised the tower that we would need to be towed from the runway upon opening the cabin door we observed smoke coming from the left main gear area and evacuated the passengers to the edge of the runway. In coordination with the fire department on site we secured the aircraft and insured there was no fire. The passengers were picked up by a van and returned to [the FBO]. The aircraft was towed from the runway to [the FBO] with no further incident.

C750 First Officer reported loss of hydraulic fluid after takeoff that resulted in a return to the field and smoke from the landing gear area.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 165; Flight Crew Type 160

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security

We filed from ZZZ to RDD because of inclement weather and low ceilings. Because we were planning on stopping to eat at a restaurant in the terminal we requested parking; but were told to park at the GA ramp and walk to the terminal. Once we arrived we found the there was no way in and nobody was around so we called for guidance. The person was very helpful and after exhausting our combined ideas the person relayed to security that we needed help and to let us into the building. However; our reception by security was that of a security threat and we were immediately questioned about our intentions. We were also asked if we had seen the signs indicating that it was a restricted area. The signs would have been effective if they were lit but because it was night time and overcast we did not see them until the guard pointed them out. Our licenses and aircraft were photographed and we were told that what we did was equivalent to 'running across the runway at San Francisco airport.' Ultimately; we made it clear that we would not have entered such an area if we had known. Since this has happened; I've learned about other pilots that have accidentally gone into such an area and am realizing that what happened with us is a recurring issue. I believe that improving the lighting for the signs at RDD would help remedy this. Additionally; it may be helpful to identify restricted areas on the airfield diagrams.

Pilot reported inadvertently walking into a restricted area while attempting to cross the ramp at RDD airport. Pilot also reported that signage was not lit and therefore not visible prior to entering the area.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

We were cleared for visual approach at FERGI intersection to Runway 19 at DCA. At start of approach all parameters on profile; however; after completing landing configuration by GREYZ intersection; I chose to go outside to utilize visual cues to follow the river to the runway vice crosschecking the LNAV/VNAV information. Undershooting crosswind from the left also compounded line-up to undershoot from the northwest. Momentary obstacle alert and simultaneous low altitude alert from Tower resulted in immediate correction of approach navigational/line-up deviation resulting in uneventful landing. At no time was situational awareness comprised.Better understanding and choice of LNAV/VNAV Approach choices to be programmed into the FMC. I should have chosen to utilize RNAV (RNP) Runway 19 Approach which would have allowed me to couple aircraft to autopilot.

Air carrier First Officer reported that they chose to utilize visual cues to crosscheck the LNAV/VNAV information; as a result they received an obstacle alert and a low altitude alert.


Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Airport; Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

I contacted Approach roughly 25 miles southwest of the airport. I was assigned a squawk code. Radar contact confirmation took longer than usual. Considering the large volume of traffic talking to Approach; that did not strike me as concerning. I was asked to ident; and radar contact was confirmed. I was given instructions to fly heading 030 for sequence. No further instructions from ATC were received; and I continued to fly heading 030 as instructed. This heading would eventually put me roughly NNW of the field. As I start getting close to the field; I start worrying that heading 030 would eventually make me cross the approach path to the runway. At this point I am still with Approach and I have not received any other instructions from ATC.At a point roughly 2 miles northwest of the field; my concern has grown enough that I make a call to Approach and ask the controller to verify that he still wants me to continue flying heading 030. At this point I am given instructions to turn left to heading 310. I acknowledge and begin my turn. A few seconds later; I was given instructions to turn right to heading 150. I acknowledged and began my turn to the right. I was then issued instructions to turn IMMEDIATELY to heading 150. I acknowledge and bank to the right as much as I deemed safe given my current airspeed. At this point; flying heading 150 had me intercepting the approach path for the runway; and I am 1-2 miles from the runway threshold.Approach had not turned me over to the Tower and I did not have a landing clearance; so I asked Approach to hand me over. Approach approved the frequency change; I contacted Tower and got a landing clearance. As I exited the runway; Tower issued me a statement to call Approach for a possible pilot deviation. After securing the airplane; I made the call to Approach. I briefly talked to the supervisor; who stated they were extremely busy at the moment and asked if he could call me back. After waiting for 2 hours without a callback; I decided to call Approach again. At this time; the supervisor stated that they were still very busy; and he had not had a chance to review the tapes. We agreed to talk either later that day or the following morning after he had a chance to review the tapes of the events. Before ending the call; I inquired why I was asked to call. The supervisor stated that an aircraft had to make a go-around. No other details were discussed at this time; and I agreed to call back the following morning. The following morning I placed a call to Approach. The supervisor stated that they were again very busy that morning; but he took a minute to briefly discuss the incident with me. He stated that; after reviewing the tapes; 'I was clean'.According to his review; it appeared that primary radar contact was lost after the initial contact was acknowledged. He stated that I 'popped up again' at the time that I was issued instructions to fly a different heading. The supervisor agreed that I was properly following the initial instructions I was given; and the conversation ended at that point.

GA pilot reported being issued an assigned heading and received no further instructions from ATC until they asked for instructions 2 miles from the airport.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 3300; Flight Crew Type 500

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 93; Flight Crew Total 5787; Flight Crew Type 2000

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We departed with zero passengers in VMC. I was the pilot flying (PF). We climbed to our cruising altitude of 41;000 feet with about three ATC level offs on the way up. About one minute after level off we experienced a rapid loss of cabin pressurization. We both noticed the change of pressure first in our ears which drew our attention to the pressurization controller.  I saw the cabin rate climbing through 2;000 fpm; as it approached 5;000 fpm I called to put the oxygen masks on (Pilot Monitoring said he saw the rate get to 7000+ fpm). By the time I had my mask on and secured the Master Warning along with the Cab Alt annunciator had illuminated. At this time I executed an emergency descent per the Flight Safety memory items. Due to hand flying the airplane I did not put my headset back on so I did not hear any of the radio communications between PM and ATC. PM did verify that we were an emergency aircraft and that we were continuing the descent. To my understanding; the PM did not declare an emergency but said we were in an 'emergency descent'. I did perform cross checks with PM throughout the descent; checking for any physical signs of hypoxia or adverse effects of the depressurization.  We leveled off at 11;000 feet per ATC instructions at which time we removed our masks and completed the emergency checklist.  We decided; as a crew; that continuing to [destination] was the nearest practical airport to land at. At that point we requested to fly direct at 10;000 feet and completed the flight without issue.  Approaching 24 hours since the incident I have not felt any physiological effects of the depressurization.

The ATC controllers were extremely helpful and accommodating and the requests they had for information were appropriate and did not interfere with the management of the situation from the cockpit. Once we got back and shut down; we as a crew declined any further flying that day. This turned out to be a very good decision as a couple of hours after the completion of the flight the adrenaline wore off and extreme fatigue set in which only abated after a night's rest. Had we been on a flight at this time; reaction times and decision making would have definitely been compromised.

CE560XL flight crew reported executing an emergency descent after loss of cabin pressure at FL410.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

After flight was airborne for two hours; Load Planning was notified of incorrect weight manifested for a [loading document item].  Weights were invalidated to correct known weight error. After the correction was made in the [document]; due to cargo system constraints the commodity's new weight was corrected in their operating system but wasn't able to transfer into [the computer system].  Cargo help desk was reached and requested to forward the airway bill for known pallet weight.  Loading documents were finalized and new weights sent generating a change of 8;340 lbs. representing 1.74% change from the original takeoff weight.

Air carrier Load Planner reporting receiving an 8;340 lbs revision (1.74% of TOGW) after the affected flight had been airborne for two hours.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

An A320 was cleared for take off with traffic about 2 3/4 miles on final. The aircraft took forever to start their roll. With a 15 KT headwind; I used 1 1/2 miles as a cutoff with some movement and clearance acknowledged. The A320 still was not accelerating; when I cancelled their take off clearance. As such; it was at this time; the aircraft was powering up and then down as they acknowledged the aborted departure. Of note; the aircraft was bound for one place; and the next departure in sequence was same company; same model; going to another. The performance of the next departure roll was incredibly different. Both rotated at about the same take off distance. This is mind boggling when observed; and definitely a safety hazard for an airport with intersecting runways. These pilots need to be performing more similar in this situation; as it is undoubtedly an inconsistency in flying technique. It is unacceptable that this occurs; as this has involved unsafe aborted departures; and unfair go around's for arrivals.

SFO Controller voiced concern regarding the very different same company pilot techniques during takeoff's; the reporter noting performance within the same airline should be more consistent.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather

On approach to ZZZZ it was the First Officer's leg. The airfield was configured for a north landing with winds gusting out of the north upwards of 40 knots. At approximately 500 feet I took the aircraft from the First Officer as he is new to the aircraft and the situation was getting out of his comfort zone. Shortly thereafter we got a windshear warning and went around. We had enough fuel to try again; which we did and I stayed on the controls. At almost the same altitude we encountered another windshear warning and went around again; this time heading directly for our alternate ZZZZ1. Once at our cruise altitude of FL220 neither ATC nor dispatch was able to get hold of anyone at the alternate airfield. With some communication with dispatch and ATC we made the decision to divert to ZZZZ2. By this time we were getting really low on fuel.We landed at ZZZZ2 with just over 1100Lbs of fuel. Extremely gusty conditions. Our alternate airfield should have been open for us but was not. I'm not sure where the breakdown occurred that led to [our alternate] not being open but this should NOT happen; ever!

FO's leg - turbulent all day; everywhere we went - configured for flaps 22 with winds gusting about 36 knots; FO said: 'Let's review callouts for Go-Around because I have a feeling we are going to have to go around.' We discussed how; in case of windshear (which had been reported at the field) we would not change configuration until safely out of WS. At about 500 feet AGL FO asked Captain to take the aircraft because of being new (second trip off IOE) and it was obvious this was serious gust / crosswind. Within a few seconds of positive exchange of the controls; we received Windshear message and red message. Go around was executed. FO called tower to say we were going around due to windshear. We climbed out at 200 knots and set up to try approach again - experienced same message at the same time / place / altitude as on first attempt. At this time FO told ATC that we needed to divert and we contacted Center. Center asked us to state intentions. FO said: we need to divert and ZZZZ1 is our alternate and we need a heading please. Center said ZZZZ1 was closed could we go to ZZZZ2 and about this time we told dispatch we needed to divert and dispatch said that ZZZZ1 was waiting for us. We relayed this message to Center and he said he was calling them to see if they would stay open for us and then (a minute or two later) he said he got no response from ZZZZ1 and asked again if we could to to ZZZZ2. FO said; 'negative due to fuel.' At this time captain said to tell Center we were 'Emergency Fuel.' About this same time; captain did some calculations and was also communicating with dispatch via ACARS and said; 'Yes. tell him we will go to ZZZZ2.' I believe at this time we had about 2300 pounds of fuel. The weather was very good at ZZZZ2 and we got priority handling. When we rolled off the runway we had about 1100 pound of fuel. The captain was PF from the time of the first exchange of controls; and from then on out. We were on final/short final and the FO noted the approach lights and airport in site and calm winds; when a green laser was detected off right side of the Aircraft. The FO said; 'do not look outside.' The captain asked what it was and FO said; 'Don't worry about it - I'll tell you on the ground. I think it was a laser.' Obviously the fuel management took priority at this time and we both agreed we should not go around; but land. Our alternate was in the mountains at night. On paper it seemed like we had plenty of fuel.I suppose our second approach attempt ate into that and then; due to no radio contact with ZZZZ1; our alternate choice was further than planned. Also; once we got on the ground ZZZZ2 had no stairs to accommodate our aircraft and our passengers eventually deplaned in a somewhat risky situation. Then; once at the hotel; we waited over an hour to actually get room keys. In windshear I would probably not attempt a second approach but go to the alternate after one missed approach. Also; look very closely at the services available at the filed alternate and other airports in the vicinity. The captain was very calm and managed the situation appropriately given the remaining options.

EMB-145 flight crew reported diverting to a second alternate after two go-arounds at the original destination and the primary alternate being closed.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 249; Flight Crew Total 5372; Flight Crew Type 1609

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 138; Flight Crew Total 7412; Flight Crew Type 76

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

I was fatigued from operational issues related to managing the hydraulic failure and emergency air return to ZZZ. My fatigue was also related to the all-night flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ that morning with day sleep in the field layover hotel. I was too fatigued to accept duties associated with completing an additional flight to ZZZ1; especially with an unknown departure and arrival time. If the flight had somehow managed to depart in the next hour after our block in; I knew that I would still be too fatigued on arrival to safely respond to anything beyond a routine arrival.

In climb out from Runway XXR at ZZZ; a pilot announced over the Tower frequency that our right main landing gear was smoking.Tower restated the observation. I elected to extend the landing gear. Shortly after; another pilot stated it might be hydraulics. We acknowledged and were transferred to departure. Meanwhile no EICAS messages appeared; so I called for gear retraction after looking at the Hydraulic synoptic and requested the after takeoff checklist. Shortly after; EICAS Hydraulic related messages began appearing: the most prominent being: Hydraulic System C. I transferred control of the aircraft to the First Officer after a quick brief; notified Departure Control of our condition and [requested priority handling]; along with a request to hold and work through checklists.ATC acknowledged giving us vectors instead. The vectors complicated matters because they kept us transferring frequencies frequently while we were accomplishing checklist items. With a total loss of a system hydraulics and appropriate checklists completed; I notified Dispatch; [Maintenance Control]; spoke with the lead Flight Attendant and briefed the passenger. We coordinated preparation for landing but I deferred on the need for a brief to evacuate with the Flight Attendant.After consulting all pertinent data including non-normal landing distance data; and notes on secondary system flat/slat extension times; and unavailable components; a briefing for a long straight in final approach to Runway XXR was briefed and I flew the approach.The landing was uneventful; we had [crash fire rescue equipment] standing by along with a request for a tow vehicle. [Crash fire rescue equipment] communicated with us after I brought the aircraft to a stop on the runway stating: you are still losing hydraulics from the right main gear. Therefore; after checking brake temps I decided to accept the tow vehicle in lieu of a possible brake overheat/fire; especially after Maintenance arrived; requesting we shut down all hydraulics and the engines; (which we did after starting the APU) and the hydraulic fluid continued. We were towed eventually off the runway but it took a while because the first tow vehicle broke down.Meanwhile the Lead Flight Attendant called (I had been in contact since landing) and said a few passengers in the back were complaining about the smell. The aircraft was half empty so I had the Flight Attendant move said passengers and I turned off the Recirculating fans. The Flight Attendant called back and said the smell had dissipated.At the gate we disembarked the passengers; I met with Maintenance and called the [Chief Pilot].

First Officer reported fatigue from aircraft maintenance problems and did not think it was safe to fly.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 85; Flight Crew Type 85

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict NMAC

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

I was on a direct flight path from ZZZ1 to ZZZ and confirmed with ZZZ Approach that I was approved to changed frequencies to ZZZ. Once I was approved to changed frequencies I began calling out my position to the CTAF for my positions at 10; 5; and 3 miles outside of the airfield.I then let the traffic know I was entering the right downwind for Runway XX and saw a plane exiting the runway on the ground; but no other traffic in front of me. When I announced I was turning base I heard another call that that someone was going to extend their downwind; but still did not see any traffic in front or around me. I had thought this was to allow for my approach. After I called that I was turning final I was in line with the runway; I heard another call that someone was turning base. I was a little high; but nothing to cause concern so I went a little further down the runway than normal.When I landed I heard someone talking about Aircraft X on the radio asking if they didn't see the other plane. When I said that I was flying Aircraft X and asked details about what just happened; I didn't get an answer. When I exited the runway I saw another plane exiting very early on in the runway and realized that we must have come down at the same time. When I parked and spoke with the other pilot; I was apparently coming down directly above him. Thankfully he was making a short field landing and I was a little long for mine or things could have been a lot worse.There were multiple things that seemed to be going on at the time of this situation.Nobody was picking up my communications and they thought that I just came out of nowhere; even though I could hear everyone else. They were also checking the other ADS-B in the area and he said that I was nowhere to be seen on there.After getting inside we tracked my ADS-B and it showed my travel from ZZZ1 to ZZZ; but it dropped the signal about a mile from ZZZ.I checked my comms when I was leaving ZZZ and confirmed that I was heard loud and clear before I left. I'm not sure why I had communication with ZZZ1 Ground; ZZZ1 Tower; ZZZ Departure; and ZZZ Approach; but then nobody could hear me when I switched frequencies to ZZZ.In the future I will ensure to have 2 way communications with other pilots in the pattern of a non-towered airport to make sure that they are hearing me properly.

C172 pilot reported an NMAC due communication issues with the aircraft.


Medium Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related

EWR had a ramp supervisor file a safety report about bringing in an Aircraft X aircraft into gate CXXX. The concern was that there is no stop mark for the Aircraft X painted on the gate lead in line; and that because the profile of the Aircraft X is different than the Aircraft Y it could create a safety concern. The Aircraft X has a wingspan that is 9 feet greater than that of Aircraft Y. This puts the wingtips closer to (and perhaps outside of) the designated painted safety zone clearance line. Over the previous week several Aircraft X planes were parked at the gate; fortunately without incident.When questioned; the ramp supervisor said it's a situation that everybody seems to be aware of but nobody seems eager to correct.

Ground Personal reported the aircraft parked in this ramp location are parked too close together. The agent states there is no stop mark on the ground for the larger sized aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Maintenance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Our aircraft had a left fuel gauge deferred inoperative. We received the fuel sheet and completed the calculations to confirm required fuel on board. The maintenance release also listed flight crew steps that were to be accomplished. We read through and accomplished the required steps. We departed the gate; but then incurred another mechanical issue; specifically a R ELEV PCU status message. We sent multiple messages to Dispatch and Maintenance Control but after some time we still had not received a response from either. Local Maintenance then advised us to return to the gate. While local Maintenance worked through the problem we determined we needed to refuel back up to the cleared value and added 262 gallons to bring us back to the required level. We received another fuel sheet and again completed the required flight crew steps listed on the maintenance release. About an hour or two into the flight Dispatch contacted us about the fuel. They had discovered the fuelers had not used the dripstick method to confirm the known quantity of fuel on board. Although we all agreed the correct amount of fuel was on board there was concern about the missing dripstick readings. We decided to stop enroute to confirm fuel on board. Dispatch coordinated this with the station. Communication with Dispatch and Maintenance was difficult. This was due to very scratchy and weak company radio frequencies. Just as we were about to start our descent Dispatch again contacted us and requested we go to ZZZ; a [company domicile] instead. This was due to the concern that the flight crew might incur a contractual duty time problem. Again communication was difficult due to weak signals. I questioned the decision to change the destination at the last minute and informed Dispatch that; due to the original fuel issue; the safest course of action would be to continue to our originally planned stop. We were just beginning our descent and were already too high and had to use speedbrakes on most of the descent to get down. This concern of duty time limits greatly added to our workload for the current phase of flight. The approach and landing were uneventful. Over ACARS Maintenance asked us to check the fueling panel on the lower right wing for an orange deferred decal and number. I determined there was no deferred decal on or in the fuel panel. It should also be noted that; during the preparation for descent; I was reviewing the diversion guide in the FOM on my iPad; relying on it for real time information and; as I was reading; it crashed; returning to the home screen and requiring me to reenter the password to get back in. Not the best time for this to happen.

[No additional information was included in the secondary narrative.]

Dispatched with a deferred left main tank fuel gage the flight crew of a B757 encountered bookeeping issues that required an enroute stop to have the fuel on board checked via drip stick readings.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 37.6; Flight Crew Total 49.3; Flight Crew Type 49.3

Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

I was flying solo and was practicing landings on Runway 27. As I made the first landing; after touch down; the aircraft veered to the left and went off the paved area; across a taxiway and onto the dirt in between the taxiway and the ramp where it came to a complete stop and was shut down. The aircraft was later pushed back onto the taxiway and taxied back to the ramp. No injury was made to myself. The aircraft was inspected by Maintenance who determined that no damage had been made. No damage was done to any signage or equipment on the airfield. The latest METAR report that was issued while I was standing at the run-up area prior to departure reported the winds to be 240/8. The previous METAR stated 280/6. After I touched down I experienced the aircraft oscillating around the yaw axis and that these oscillations progressed as I was rolling. I decided to initiate the takeoff potion of the touch and go and retracted the flaps and applied power. As power was applied; the aircraft veered left and I decided to abort the takeoff. During the deceleration the aircraft went across the parallel taxiway and stopped in between the taxiway and the ramp area. After the aircraft had come to a complete stop; ATC asked me if I was alright over the radio and if I required any assistance. I reported everything was alright and declined any assistance and said that I would contact my school. ATC advised me to shut down the engine. I was thereafter approached by persons who had witnessed what happened; these people asked me if I was alright and helped me push the aircraft back onto the taxiway. I then started the engine and taxied back to my school where I parked the aircraft and had Maintenance take a look at it. No damage was found.

C172 student pilot reports losing control during a touch and go landing resulting in a runway excursion but no apparent damage to the aircraft.