Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Weather; Procedure

Aircraft cabin failed to pressurize immediately after takeoff. Performed the Pressurization Fail Checklist and the aircraft would not pressurize. Held close to the departure airport while discussing possible return to the field (RTF) with Dispatch. Decided to RTF. While preparing for the RTF; Dispatch called us and suggested divert to an enroute airport. We referenced the enroute charts for adequate MEA for us being at 10;000 FT and we were comfortable with proceeding to the divert airport. As we were diverting the cabin rate indicated a 3;000 FPM descent and pressurization returned to normal operation. Maintenance Control seemed to believe it was a frozen aft cargo door seal. 40 miles from the divert airport; Dispatch called again and ran numbers for continuing to the filed airport. My crew and I were comfortable with this so we continued to our original destination. With all our low altitude maneuvering; we were showing arrival tight on fuel so I declared Minimum Fuel about 90 miles from my filed destination. About 15 minutes into our divert; I re-ran the Pressurization Fail Checklist to make sure I didn't miss anything and I discovered that I had completed the checklist at the Flight Attendant notify point. Had I continued the checklist it would have led into the Manual Press Checklist; then Unpressurized Flight Checklist. If it were indeed a frozen door seal; the manual pressurization wouldn't have worked anyway. After discovering this error; the aircraft was pressurizing normally so I felt it was better to not continue the checklist because that would have led us to de-pressurize an airplane which was pressurizing normally.

A Q400 failed to pressurize after takeoff and while the crew considered either returning to land or diverting the pressurization began operating normally so they continued to the filed destination. A frozen aft cargo door seal was the suspected cause.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

I was the Pilot Monitoring. On our descent into DEN; we had gotten the ATIS and noticed that it was starting to get pretty windy down on the ground and that moderate turbulence was being reported by multiple aircraft. But [otherwise] everything remained normal. Approach told us to expect Runway 34R. While we were north of the airport; approach had reported an increase of 50 kts in airspeed and wind shear by aircraft and that they were going around. We quickly briefed and reviewed the wind shear escape maneuver if we were to encounter it. We also both noticed what looked like a dust devil had formed right over or near the airport. So; approach changed our runway. In the meantime; we kept getting new ATIS reports via ACARS as new ones were coming quick.Around our base turn; approach announced that there was a microburst alert for the airport. We elected to continue the approach. The aircraft in front had landed without any incident. As we headed down on final; we got a wind shear caution and a jump of about 25 kts. We both verbally acknowledged the caution and continued. I noted a dust front that was moving across the field in front as we approached. As we got close to the ground; around 100 ft.; the plane got tossed side to side and the wings rocked up and down. I called 'unstablized; go around' as I felt very uncomfortable trying to land with the plane being pushed all over the place. The Captain applied go around power and made the call outs and I performed those tasks. The go around was still a bit hairy as the plane was still being tossed to where the shaker came on for a second even though we hadn't pitched up that much nor that hard and the flaps had not been retracted yet since we hadn't attained a positive rate of climb yet.As we finally started to climb; I told ATC that we're going around and they issued a right turn to a heading of 105 and a climb to 9;000 ft. while we were going through the tasks associated with a go around. I read it back and dialed in the heading. Then ATC issued the left turn to heading 245 and I read that back and get it dialed in. All while I was still trying to get the plane cleaned up and we were still being thrown around by turbulence. The Captain queried me about what altitude we were told to climb to and then I realized that I had forgotten to set it in the altitude alerter. I looked at our altimeter and we were just about to blow past it. At this point; we were climbing at a relatively good rate. I immediate dialed the altitude in and the Captain started to lower the nose. As we were trying to slow the climb and return back to our assigned; ATC queried us about our altitude and we returned back down. Afterwards; we had a non-eventful landing and taxi in. Task saturation with the go around and ATC issuing conflicting instructions with the heading changes after a windshear/microburst event caused me to forget to set the altitude in the alerter. Hence; the Captain wasn't sure what to climb to until he asked me and then I remembered which at that moment was too late. Aviate; Navigate; Communicate. That concept ended up breaking down; and as the Pilot Monitoring; I essentially forgot to aviate the aircraft (even though I wasn't flying) by not setting the altitude in the alerter. The after takeoff task items could've waited a second for me to dial in the altitude.

CRJ First Officer reported workload; weather; and distraction resulted in an altitude excursion during a go around.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22; Flight Crew Total 393; Flight Crew Type 350

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

The winds were calm and skies were clear. I was instructing a student in an Cessna 172; and coming in for landing. It was a normal landing and I was on the centerline and the airspeed was around 65 knots. I felt the main gear of my aircraft touch and then the airplane started to lift on the left side. I tried correcting the aircraft with aileron and rudder which seemed to only agitate it more. The aircraft swung even harder to the right. I decided to go the direction in which the aircraft  was veering as I was concerned with the aircraft flipping. So I went off the runway into the grass and didn't hit any sign on the airport or damage the aircraft. The aircraft was then towed back to the hangar.

A pilot conducting instruction reported losing control of the aircraft while landing and a runway excursion with no damage to the aircraft.


Physiological - Other; Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

I brought this aircraft in and parked. The aircraft and crew were scheduled to do a turn; but I had a meeting with management during the turn and at the last minute my First Officer was reassigned to another flight. Our Flight Attendant was the only original crewmember on this aircraft for the smoke filled event.It would appear that the APU ruptured an oil line and it sprayed all of its oil all over the aft equipment bay including the packs. This caused smoke in cabin. The APU had auto-shutdown for low oil pressure. The aircraft was evacuated through the main cabin door and into the terminal. There were no injuries. I went back to the gate to speak with the Agent. She advised me of the evacuation on the gate and that the Mechanic tells her is that the APU has to be fixed and not MEL'ed because of what happened. I told her I would go find out what was happening. The aircraft maintenance logbook had been signed off and there was nobody on the plane. Two of the ramp workers asked me when Maintenance would be back to fix the APU. I told them it was MEL'ed and we might be good to board. They too said that the other Maintenance guy said that the aircraft need to be fixed and not MEL'ed. I called Maintenance and asked if they could assure me that the packs are free of contaminates and that there would not be a repeat of the smoke in the cabin from earlier. They said; 'Sure thing; it is not a problem. It is good to go.' The First Officer and I talked about this and decided to run the engines at the gate up to 70% to see if the packs would blow smoke. We did and there was no smoke. We loaded up; taxied out to the runway with no indication of a problem. We lined up on the runway; I set thrust and called 80 KTS and see some smoke. I tell the First Officer and then call V1 rotate and now the smoke is very obvious and not abating. Gear up; FMS; and I am off COM for 5 seconds to ask if we have smoke in the cabin. I call the back and the Flight Attendant says the cabin is now filling with smoke. 'EICAS' SMOKE TOILET; as I am back on communication and tell the First Officer of the condition in the cabin and state that we will be returning to the departure airport and I am going to declare an emergency. I declared an emergency and set [20] flaps up at 1;000 FT and completed the after takeoff checks. I say your radios; QRH Smoke Cabin; as ATC tells us to level and they will vector us to runway. We turned toward the north to begin the downwind and I turned the packs off to stop the source of smoke. The smoke did not constitute the dawning of masks as it began to dissipate. I began to dawn the O2 mask and could see that our procedures to complete the entire QRH would require us to get extended vectors and spend more time in an aircraft that was now filled with smoke. Our short time in the air and the removal of PACK air stopped addition of any new smoke and then diminished the current smoke. [Emergency Checklist was completed item by item.] The packs OFF; the aircraft was seeking normalization. The cabin passengers were not in distress. We were now 1;500 FT nearing a turn to land. Accomplished (completed) as much of the remainder of this checklist as possible before calling for the Descent Checklist and the Before Landing Checklist. Dependent upon the severity of the situation; the crew should consider an overweight landing; tailwind landing; ditching or a forced off-airport landing. I told the First Officer that the QRH was complete except for three items and they were not as much of a concern at this time as the descent checks and getting on the ground. I briefed the Flight Attendant and told her that if the smoke was causing distress to the passengers that we would evacuate on the taxiway adjacent to the runway and that I would give the command to evacuate through the main cabin door. She said that all of the passengers were in good condition and that they will remain seated unless told to evacuate. There was no order to brace. We completed the descent checks; tuned the ILS and briefed a possible overweight landing because our takeoff weight was 47;400 LBS. Touchdown was uneventful at less than 100 FPM. A short stop on the runway; I made a PA to the passengers to remain seated; and we had an inspection by the fire department and we told that there was no sign of fire or smoke. Some passengers complained of smoke related issues on the taxi in so we got the medics to take a look. We parked the aircraft and shut down both engines and did not have an APU and they had not gotten us a GPU. I left the emergency lights on and exited the aircraft to speak with the fire department. The passengers exited the aircraft and nobody asked for any assistance from the paramedics. I wrote the aircraft up for an emergency landing with smoke in aircraft. It would appear that there was some undue pressure applied to the line mechanics to get this plane out. Against the suggestion of a very competent Mechanic to repair the APU and clean the packs; a different Mechanic with no background on the earlier smoke evacuation was brought in to perform the MEL on the APU. I spoke with both mechanics. One had an 'I told them not to do this' attitude and the other said he knew nothing of the smoke evacuation when he had MEL'ed the aircraft. The Company and the FAA need to be proactive on evaluating the managers that have been interfering with crewmembers and employees as they try to do their jobs. This now makes the second aircraft that has needed an ASAP report by me to bring attention to the fact that safety is being compromised by ignoring the expertise of employees that have to live or die by these decisions as these management individuals sit behind a desk in a warm office.

The Reporter stated that no crew or passenger requested EMT aid after arriving at the gate. The Flight Attendant who was exposed to the oil when the APU line originally burst wanted to continue the trip even after being asked if she wanted off.

We again started both engines at the gate; and pushed back. We taxied to runway with the packs using engine bleed air. During the Before Takeoff Checklist; I briefed the departure that I would be flying. I briefed that I would slowly increase the thrust to takeoff power. This way the engine bleed source would over stress a pack. While on the takeoff roll; my Captain called '80 KTS.' At this point I faintly smelled smoke and my Captain told me that he smelled smoke. The airspeed was increasing rapidly and I believed that the faint smell of smoke would dissipate as quickly as it had done before. As my Captain called 'V1; rotate;' the smell of smoke had increased. My Captain made a comment about it; and when I glanced over at him; I could see a thick cloud of smoke blowing out of his vent. At around 500 FT; we received an amber SMOKE TOILET EICAS message. My Captain declared an emergency; and ATC gave us altitude at our discretion. I leveled the airplane at 3;000 FT; and my Captain began the SMOKE/FUMES QRH checklist. He also called the Flight Attendant and confirmed with her that smoke was visible in the cabin. After completing the checklist; my Captain informed ATC to have the emergency vehicles follow us down the runway. He told them that we would be bringing the aircraft to a stop on the runway and that he wanted the firefighters to check the tail of the aircraft for any signs of a fire. We received vectors from ATC for a visual approach. I briefed the approach and we were able to land without incident. I brought the aircraft to a complete stop and my Captain assumed the controls. The firefighters circled the aircraft and informed us that there were no signs of a fire. We then got taxi instructions to return to the terminal. The Captain had me call the Flight Attendant to make sure that no passengers required medical assistance. She told me that they were all fine. My Captain decided to have an ambulance follow us to the gate just in case. We taxied to gate and we shut the aircraft down. All of the passengers deplaned through the main cabin door. The fire crew searched the aircraft for signs of a fire; but informed us that there was no fire on the aircraft. We swapped aircraft and completed the flight delayed; but otherwise without incident. I believe the event occurred because the Maintenance crew did not thoroughly clean the aft equipment bay of the aircraft after deferring the APU. My Captain performed the walk around after maintenance signed it off; so I feel very comfortable that there were no outside indications that the issue was not resolved. The only way that this could have been discovered on the ground would have been by taxiing away from the gate and performing a high RPM run up for at least a minute. We had the engines spooled up to 60% N1 at the gate and saw no signs of smoke. However; it seems as though the smoke was created only after the packs were on for a while and the engines were spooled up to takeoff power. When setting the takeoff thrust I advanced the thrust levers at a slower rate than normal; and that didn't seem to produce smoke either. The smoke started only after takeoff thrust had been set for significant amount of time.

A CRJ200's APU oil line ruptured allowing oil in aft fuselage including the packs; which caused the cabin to fill with smoke after takeoff. The crew declared an emergency and returned to the departure airport. The APU was MEL'ed; but the oil contamination not removed.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

My crew was briefed to do 'ready spare' beginning at 2100E ending at 0400E.  (Interestingly enough; the evening before the tentative brief was 'ready spare' from 1900E to 0200E; but after I fatigued the night before the brief changed to 2100E to 0400E 'ready spare.'  There is no doubt in my mind that this was changed as 'punishment' for having called in fatigued.  Confirming evidence to this was that upon arrival at the airport that evening; there were no scheduled flights out after our arrival.  While I understand that we may have been covering flights for other airports; it was obvious that it was a slow night.  Additionally; the other crew sitting 'ready spare' was on from 1900L to 0100L.)  While I do better during the morning shifts; I did my best to prepare for the late night 'ready spare' duty by exercising heavily in the morning and attempting to sleep in the afternoon which I was reasonably successful at doing from about 1500E to about 1800E.  That afternoon we received an email from the Asst. Director of Operations regarding notification that we would be assigned 'ready spare' for the next night;  from 1900E to 0200E and that we should adjust our rest accordingly; so as not to disrupt possible recovery flights assigned to us.  As mentioned above; I had already attempted to 'adjust my rest accordingly' in anticipation of this night's assignment.  Upon arrival at the airport we were informed that our aircraft would not be arriving until after 2100E.  At its arrival; we met the aircraft and I proceeded to do a pre-flight.  During the pre-flight I noticed a 'ding' in one of the fan blades on the Number 2 engine.  I called for a Mechanic to look at it and he said that it needed to be addressed as it was significant.  I wrote the fan blade up which grounded the aircraft.  Once Maintenance declared the aircraft to be out of service; we received a brief around 2230E for a show at 0845E in the morning to limo for a one hour show/go for a transcontinental.  This meant trying to get to sleep less than six hours after I had attempted to 'adjust my rest' by sleeping in the afternoon in anticipation of being on duty until 0400E; only to be told  to show at legal in the morning for the assignment.  I called the ACP on duty and explained that we had prepared ourselves for our duty 2100E to 0400E and now were told to 'shut down' immediately so as to make the radical shift from anticipating going to bed at 0500E or later to having to awaken at 0700E to do the assigned flying. I asked that he see if this could be changed.  He attempted to do so; but scheduling would not even consider making any changes to our schedule.  We could only accept the duty as assigned.  I find it ironic that we received the standard memo from Operations advising us of our assignment to 'ready spare' and to prepare accordingly for the next night when we were already anticipating a very late night; which we did; only to have scheduling make a radical shift in our schedule from a late night shift to a morning shift in a matter of minutes.  How can the company send us memos advising us to adjust our rest in anticipation of a late night 'hot spare' assignment and then have Scheduling whipsaw us completely in the other direction?  This is absurd.  We were put in a no-win situation caused by Scheduling's lack of willingness to be aware of the fact that we are not machines that can be turned off and on like robots and being completely unwilling to even consider what they were asking us to do.  Asking us to try and prepare ourselves for duty well outside normal sleep patterns is unrealistic enough; let alone asking us to do that and THEN shifting us the other way in a manner of minutes.  This goes against all sleep and fatigue research published by NASA on pilot fatigue issues.   Relying solely on the 'fatigue call' is insane in that it fails to apply any reasonable common sense to pilot scheduling.  I would like to see management and schedulers attempt to workat their desks the constantly shifting hours that they expect us to fly multi-million dollar jets.

A Fractional Captain laments schedule changes that result in fatigued flying due to preparing for night flying then suddenly changed back to morning flying.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling; Manuals

Loss of flight manuals (all 737 manuals) in content locker. I lost all 737 manuals in flight ZZZ to ZZZ1. I needed to check an FRM (Fault Reporting Manual) code and found all manuals were gone (no content) in flight manuals-737. The FOM (Flight Operations Manual) and FRMs were still there. I had used these manuals (737-FRM and 737-FM) on an earlier flight; and many times on recent flights with no problems. I called iPad support when in ZZZ1 and they had me remove content locker from the iPad and reinstall it. This restored content to normal operation. They indicated that they were seeing a high level of failures associated with the new content locker. It's disheartening to see this level of iPad failure in flight when these manuals are needed.

Captain reported all 737 flight manuals were lost from iPad while inflight.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 2200; Flight Crew Type 150

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

IFR flight plan filed TVL - ZZZ. 2 pilots. I was the designated SIC and the Pilot Flying for this flight. We elected to depart VFR and obtain our IFR clearance once airborne. We announced our taxi intentions for Runway 36. We noted a few aircraft in the area either landing or flying by the airport. As we held short of Runway 36 at intersection Bravo; we saw an aircraft on our TCAS at 1;700 feet AGL about 4 miles south of the airport heading toward the airport. I visually acquired the aircraft soon thereafter. After hearing no further traffic advisories from other aircraft; the PIC and I agreed to depart Runway 36. The PIC announced our intentions to depart Runway 36 and no further calls (from other aircraft) were initially heard. As we crossed the hold short line; the aircraft that we visually acquired earlier stated their intention to land Runway 36 and began descending. We immediately stopped the aircraft and told the other aircraft we were past the hold short line; but not on the runway surface. The other pilot acknowledged our location and continued their approach to landing. The PIC reiterated that we were already past the hold short line and the other pilot just acknowledged our location. No attempt to increase spacing through S-turns; a 360 or go around was made by the other pilot as we were stopped between the hold short line and the left edge of the runway surface (displaced threshold). Not knowing how fast the aircraft was going to approach the runway; we elected to stay put and maintain visual contact with the landing aircraft. As that aircraft landed; another aircraft (PC-12) announced their intentions to land while on a left base to final. Again; we announced we were past the hold short line but not on the runway surface. They acknowledged our location and continued to land while showing no attempts to increase spacing for us to move our aircraft. After the second aircraft landed; we departed Runway 36 without further incident.

Flight crew reported runway incursion and ground conflict with landing aircraft at TVL non-towered airport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Incorrect Labeling/build of Dangerous Goods. Cargo was not labeled with dangerous goods label. Dangerous goods box not properly secured to the cargo pallet.

Airline Ground Personnel reported arrival Dangerous Goods box not properly secured to cargo pallet as well as incorrect Dangerous Goods labeling.


Training / Qualification; Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

Relief Pilot; Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

We made a normal takeoff and climb except we made provisions for the inoperative autothrottle system which was placarded by Maintenance under MEL. Flap retraction was normal; until the copilot; who was the pilot flying; noticed a slight roll even with the autopilot engaged; as well as the 'LE ASYM;' discrete light and accompanying EICAS message. I told the copilot to keep the speed down which at that time was about 240 KTS.I told Departure that we needed to return and declared an emergency. I told the First Officer to continue to fly and talk to ATC while I ran the QRH procedure with the relief pilot. We entered a hold at 10;000 FT and started to dump fuel after advising ATC. In the hold we configured the aircraft for landing following QRH procedures.At one point the copilot allowed the aircraft speed to deteriorate into stick shaker. He quickly recovered. Once we were ready for the approach we stopped dumping fuel and were vectored to a visual approach to Runway 27R. I took control of the aircraft and also allowed the aircraft speed to slow into stick shaker; forgetting that the auto-throttle system was inoperative. Again we quickly recovered airspeed and continued the approach.An over weight landing was made with a soft touchdown. Maximum reverse was used to slow with minimum manual braking. After exiting the runway we were examined by CFR officials and given the all clear to taxi to a hardstand. Later the co-pilot told me that while we were running the QRH procedure; he had forgotten about the inoperative autothrottle and allowed the airspeed to increase beyond the flap limit for our configuration. I made a subsequent logbook entry stating the overspeed.Although the LE Asymmetry procedure went well and the crew coordination during the emergency event was excellent; airspeed control was a problem. The workload was very high for all crew members and the added complication of the inoperative auto-throttle made it even more difficult. Being as basic aircraft control is paramount; more attention should have been paid to speed control and more attentive crosschecking by the other crew members should have been briefed due to the abnormal throttle situation.

Aircraft weight approximately 380;000 LBS airspeed margin between min clean and configuration max therefore small. Rain showers and low altitude chop in area. Due to requirement to land flaps 20 the Captain decided to reduce weight by dumping fuel; however; the left dump nozzle failed to open and the right center boost pump low pressure light illuminated with fuel still in the center tank. As a result the dump was stopped with about 3;000 LBS still in the center tank. We landed overweight on 27R with autobrakes off; at approximately 350;000 LBS. The situation required more aggressive manual throttle management. Atmospheric conditions; narrow margins; busy ATC; procedure completions etc. created challenges.

When faced with a LE ASSYM EICAS warning shortly after takeoff the transatlantic bound flight crew of a B767-300ER found their tasks seriously compounded by: A. Having been dispatched with the autothrottles MEL'd inoperative; B. Multiple fuel dump system anomalies precluding their ability to dump fuel to minimize exposure to high landing speeds and resulting braking hazards; C. A narrow speed window between exceeding the flap limit speed at the high end due to their heavy weight and the stick shaker for their flap configuration at the low end; the proximity to which proved an issue when having to manually control thrust due to the deferred autothrottles.


Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Crew member showed up late for van and not in uniform and obviously ill. She said something about a migraine and rode to the airport with her eyes closed. The ride was very long due to rush hour traffic. During the van ride; the other F/A and I were talking and both thought there was no way she could work. When we got to the airport the van driver pulled me aside and told me I needed to do something about her (both that she seemed sick and she smelled sick) the other F/A and I were able to pull the captain aside and share our concerns and the van drivers comments; even telling him that she was not fit to fly. We shared the same concerns with the lead F/A when we got to the airplane. To my knowledge; neither of them spoke to her; and we began to board. We were rushed during the boarding process; even closing the door with bags in the cabin that needed to be checked. After takeoff when the sick F/A came to the back; she went in the lavatory and proceeded to get loudly and violently ill. Myself and the other flight attendant were left to serve and clean up a full 321 by ourselves.I have had some time to think about this; and am extremely disappointed that I feel our concerns about the ability of a crew member to do their duties was virtually ignored. I know we were in an out station; and removing her from the trip would have caused great delays and customer inconvenience; however; that is exactly what should have happened. An ill crew member is often not a very good judge of their own ability and we have an obligation to look out for each other and act in the best interest of our coworkers and passengers. I do not feel I had the tools to do so. We go to great lengths to outline procedures for ill pax; etc. but those were not applied here. We must not fail at our primary duties in order to protect the operation. Without us doing our duties; there is no operation. We need to feel to feel more empowered to do what we know is right.

A321 Flight Attendant reported another Flight Attendant was obviously ill; but worked the flight anyway. This put additional workload on the remaining flight attendants.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 15

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Confusion

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

While working the Local Control (LC) North position I had a student pilot call inbound 8 [miles] west at 4500 MSL. I observed two aircraft in close proximity 8 [miles] west of DVT at the same altitude; I asked the one talking to ident. I observed the ident and informed the pilot of the other aircraft doing 360s on an 8 mile final not talking to anyone. The problem is we have a lot of aircraft in that area and the pilot will just go out to the west and do 360s without telling anyone. We have all seen many close calls and we have informed management of this numerous times. It is getting to be a huge safety problem. We need a class delta extension to make sure pilot call us when they are on final more than just 4.5 miles. We are here for the safety of the flying public; let's make sure that we do all we can to make this a safe place.

While working many aircraft; Aircraft X called inbound was initially told to hold outside the airspace. After a few minutes was given straight in runway 7R and report a 4 mile final. There was also another on a final behind him. I then observed someone doing a 360 on a 4 mile final I asked Aircraft X if that was him he replied yes. I immediately turned him south bound and turned the other aircraft north to avoid a collision. This is a huge problem in DVT pilots are doing 360's without asking or even telling the tower. I had been telling the (FLM) Front Line Manager for at least 20 minutes of all the pilot problems I was having; he was listening to me. Then as it got busier he went on break rather than opening up a Cab Coordinator position to help with the flow of traffic.We need the FLMs to help us with pilot education so the frustration doesn't get this high. We also need an airspace extension out to the west so we can have these guys under control.

DVT Tower Controller report of aircraft doing 360 degree turns outside of the Class D airspace. Controllers request an extension to the Class D in this area due to close calls with other traffic inbound to DVT.


Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Climb out from IAD with a step-up level off of 10;000. Auto throttles engaged but hand flying the aircraft. Lightweight aircraft. After receiving clearance from ATC; I dialed in 10;000 feet on the MCP; but failed to realize that upon reaching that altitude the auto throttles will push up the throttles to accelerate; not bring the throttles back as normal. Due to the aircraft being lightweight; the throttles increasing power rather than decreasing power; and lack of a faster instrument scan; I ballooned through the assigned altitude (approximately 550 feet). The aircraft was descended as quickly as possible. While recovering to 10;000 feet; the controller stated 'Aircraft X; say altitude.' The aircraft was already descending through approximately 10;200 feet and leveling; and my response was 'leveling one zero thousand feet.' The controller responded 'Roger'; but made no other comments. The rest of the flight was uneventful.Lack of awareness of what the auto throttles would do on a level off at exactly 10;000 feet. Slow instrument scan. Some fatigue; after a 12 hour period; flying at night.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B757 flight crew reported an overshoot on level off at 10000 feet with the autothrottle engaged and hand flying due to the power levers advancing to increase speed.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was assigned to work task by a crew chief. The task was for #3 brake is worn I pulled the paperwork left the ready room and arrived to the Aircraft (AC) to find the jet bridge pulled and the ground crew pushing off the gate. I'm just concerned about on time departures only aircraft maintenance is just an afterthought. I returned to the crew chief and informed him but he mentions nothing in the log book don't worry this is a very common. If you compared Task (Assignments to an Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT)) numbers to the AC you would find a difference between task and log book items generated by the task that the AMT was given.Example # 1: You get a gate call for cargo damage the Flight crew has no idea it was called in from another department the AMT goes out looks maybe tapes it up and never documents it because the crew never mentioned it and time restraints.Example #2 : AMT gets a gate call reading light out nothing in the book gets a part out of free stock replaces it and lets it go at that because he might take a delay writing it up.Example # 3: AMT is working a Flight orders parts for the AC changes them but since the crew never put it in the book it's good to go.If you also compared parts ordered for an AC and items written up you will find disparity also. With free stock there is a problem with accountability I have no way of knowing how many times something has been changed as in example # 2 the light bulb how many times was it changed? And if there is an underlying problem with the item like a bad socket short in the wiring behind a wall etc. Maybe tie the task to a logbook and generate a record would be a good idea.

Due to concerns and pressure for 'ON TIME' departures many minor maintenance items were not being worked or in many cases worked but not recorded.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I stopped my one aircraft at 040 by cancelling his approach clearance. This was because the controller next to me had an aircraft that was going through his and my final and was conflicting with him. Due to a big tailwind; the trailing aircraft was given a late speed reduction and eventually was broken out to be re-sequenced. I then gave aircraft one an approach clearance once the conflict was resolved. I had the turboprop on a 330 degree heading (on base) to follow aircraft one. I then made a couple transmissions to other aircraft on frequency. I glanced down at the turboprop and the ATPA was displaying a red bat pointed at the aircraft I was re-sequencing passing off the turboprop's left. This confused me and I thought I had already turned the turboprop onto final. I realized that he was still on a 330 heading when the CA alerted me. I then took corrective action and the turboprop told me he was responding to his TCAS. A B737 was the aircraft he was responding to. The B737 was on the other final and had the turboprop in sight maintaining visual separation. I think in this situation; ATPA was a distraction more than a helpful tool. In the past I have used the 'cones' or 'bats' to show an aircraft's heading. At a glance when the ATPA showed the turboprop's proximity to the aircraft passing off his left the 'bat' pointed in a direction towards his 'turn on' heading to final.

Conflict developed between two air carriers conducting parallel approach procedures. The Automated Terminal Proximity Alerts (ATPA) tool introduced a measure of confusion contributing to the event.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Pitch trim inop above 250 kts. Returned to departure airport.

Flight Crew reported inoperative pitch trim over 205 kts. and returned to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 116; Flight Crew Total 396; Flight Crew Type 182

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

I was deadheading in the cabin when I was asked by the Captain to come to the flight deck due to an [urgent situation]. By time I reached the flight deck the number two engine was already shut down. I assisted the primary crew anyway possible to lessen the workload and stress. I assisted with cabin and airport operations communication; checklist completion; and any other tasks the crew needed help with. The primary crew did a fantastic job and needed very little assistance.

Deadheading Pilot reported being asked to come to the Flight Deck and act as an ACM (Additional Crew Member) during an inflight event.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

A trainee was training on LC1 with a supervisor.  LA1 was staffed with a local safety council member which is why I do not want them to be a de-identified version because both of the controllers suggested that the following situation was not a safety issue nor involved them breaking any rules when I brought it up to them before they departed both aircraft.  Aircraft X departed rwy16R on an IFR departure to take them southwest-bound.  A few seconds later; the trainee departed the much faster Aircraft Y on rwy16L southeast bound.  I had brought to their attention that Aircraft Y will catch up to the Aircraft X before the point where both aircraft are to make their turns per the SID (the VNY 2.2DME @ 1750 MSL).  Despite this; the IFR Aircraft Y was only issued traffic later once airborne and still drifted close to and overtook the other Aircraft X that had departed off the parallel.  Neither the supervisor training; CPC-DEV; or LA1 (LSC member) seemed to care and only watched it play out to a very unsafe situation.  The only way to prevent a collision would have been to take one aircraft off of the SID because they failed to consider aircraft performance with the IFR departures.  All three of the people working the runways thought they could use visual separation (controller applied) as a way to provide separation before the SID turn. My role was me working ground control and watching this scenario.  I tried to advise the locals of the performance situation that would lead to the extremely close call for traffic.  It was poor management of traffic when the only two operations pending was the departure of those two IFR aircraft.Two small IFR propeller aircraft departing separate runways to different directions (that will not cross flight paths) does not guarantee separation.  Controllers should be taught to launch successive IFRS with spacing that does not involve both reaching the VNY 2.2DME simultaneously and then turning different directions.

VNY Ground Controller describes a loss of separation with a faster aircraft over taking a slower aircraft on departure.


Physiological - Other; Fatigue; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overrode Automation

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

On short final to land Runway XXR we heard a 'too low; flaps' audible warning. As the PM; I saw we were at flaps 25 with a planned flaps 30. I called this out to the First Officer who was the flying pilot as I selected flaps 25 and performed the landing check which we had apparently missed on approach. We made a normal landing. This was our second day in a row of very early flights with wake up calls and 3 time zone changes. While I didn't feel fatigued; I suspect I was more tired than I realized. We had just flown a nearly 5 hour cross country flight with a breakfast of a couple spoonfuls of granola; a couple spoonfuls of yogurt; and a few grapes. This was our company provided meal for the flight. While I normally take responsibility for providing my own food; this is not always possible in the current COVID environment. I believe this was a significant contributing factor. In hindsight; the proper response would have been to perform a go around and set up for another approach. While I don't feel my handling of the situation was unsafe; it was not consistent with company procedures. With reasonable sleep and nutrition I'd like to think I would have made a different decision.

Air carrier Captain reported receiving a flap aural warning message due to having an incorrect flap setting on final approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 222; Flight Crew Type 8000

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Aircraft was written up on the previous leg for inoperative Vertical Speed mode during autopilot use. On departure this leg; Tower advised to stay with them for numerous heading changes. Climbing through 1;000 feet AGL; Tower advised new heading which we turned to; still in Takeoff Go Around (TOGA) mode manually flying with autothrottles on; we cleaned aircraft up; continued climb toward 3;000 feet MSL. There were moderate turbulence encounters from there until cruise altitude. Passing 2;500 feet MSL; Tower advised us of a new heading which Pilot Flying (PF) turned to; passing 2;700 feet; Tower advised yet another heading and gave new frequency. Passing 2;900 feet; the autothrottles started to retard for the TOGA speed and Altitude Acquire Que. At 2;950 feet the flight directors started to direct a descent and I noted PF following them I advised 'you are sinking start a climb'. At 2;800 feet we again were in a climb toward 3;000 feet.  At 2;900 feet PF engaged autopilot; I noted Altitude Acquire; CMD B presented autopilot engaged; autothrottles engaged; aircraft overshot 3;000 feet passing 3;100 feet and continued to climb.  I advise PF to correct.  PF disengaged autopilot and corrected back but not before we reached about 3;275 feet MSL. Back at 3;000 feet; autopilot was engaged with no further issue. ATC did not mention altitude deviation. We both thought this might be related to the previous Vertical Speed failure writeup; but that was not verified and it appeared the winds there were causing issues with the autothrottles input and FD commands during Altitude Acquire.

A B737 Captain reported flight director and autopilot anomalies during altitude capture with an inoperative autoflight mode.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 7850; Flight Crew Type 2900

While in cruise; the cabin altitude began climbing at an uncontrollable rate. The 'Emergency Descent' checklist appeared on the Crew Alert System. We donned our masks; advised ATC and followed the 'Emergency Descent' checklist. The cabin regained pressurization and we leveled off at FL240. The QRH led us to check the bleed air pressures from both engines. We noted that the left bleed air valve had shut off. We completed the 'Bleed Air System Failure' checklist. Normal flight was then continued to our destination.

A G-IV flight crew initiated and emergency descent when the cabin altitude began to climb uncontrollably. Upon stabilizing the cabin while maintaining FL240 they determined the cause to be the left engine pneumatic bleed valve that had shut off.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Airport / Aerodrome / Heliport; Aircraft / UAS

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 235; Flight Crew Total 2600; Flight Crew Type 800

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Distraction

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)

Flying westbound about 6 to 7NM north of ZZZ at 2;500 ft MSL squawking 1200 under the Houston Class B airspace. My plan was to fly at that altitude until clear of the Bravo outer ring and then climb to a higher altitude. With about 1.5 NM before clearing the outer ring of the Bravo; I noticed what appeared to be a drone or possibly a larger bird ahead of me at my 11 o'clock; slightly lower than me and climbing. I started my climb a little earlier than planned thinking I wouldn't climb into the Bravo. The distraction prevented me from adequately monitoring my position and I was in the Bravo for about 1 NM up to about 3;300 ft MSL. Looking back; I could have reset the autopilot target altitude to 2;900 ft instead of the 8;500 ft I had previously set it to as I was preparing to climb in a few moments. A turn would have been an option as well; but there was a Class D to my left so a right turn was the only option. If I were to have made that right turn; I would have lost visual with the potential threat.

GA pilot reported seeing a UAS close by at 2;500 feet. The pilot climbed to avoid the UAS and flew into Class B airspace without clearance.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 41; Flight Crew Total 2160; Flight Crew Type 3

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was flying a light sport aircraft on an instructional flight. Approaching Cambridge-Dorchester County Airport; I announced my location and intentions on the 45 for left downwind Runway 16. I heard a Piper Cherokee announce its intentions as it entered the crosswind for Runway 16. I had the Cherokee in sight on the crosswind when I turned downwind and announced my position on downwind. As I was completing my downwind; I heard the Cherokee announce its position behind me on downwind. I turned base leg and announced my position. Just as I was about to turn final I heard the Cherokee announce its position on base leg and ask my intentions. At that time I observed the Cherokee pass over me approximately 100 feet above my altitude. I told the Cherokee that it had just passed over me and that it should land and I would land after it landed. The Cherokee did a touch-and-go and remained in the pattern.The Cherokee failed to monitor CTAF transmissions; and failed to make an adequate visual scan for other aircraft in the landing pattern. I failed to confirm on CTAF that the Cherokee behind me on downwind had my aircraft in sight.

Light Sport Aircraft (LSA) pilot reports being overtaken on the base leg of the VFR traffic pattern by a PA-28 that had reported entering on the crosswind but apparently never understood the location or the speed of the LSA.


ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

After pre-flight we discussed the maintenance issues; one of which was MEL 22-10-02 which is in reference to the 'heading bug' being inoperative with the autopilot. We discussed the MEL which stated that the aircraft was airworthy and capable of operating in RVSM and RNAV scenarios. During the flight we received clearance via the SOCKK TWO RNAV arrival. Before reaching GUTZZ intersection we received direct KIILO; and approximately 20 NM from KIILO we received a 'descend via' clearance for the SOCKK TWO arrival. Due to the speed restriction given to us of 270 and the late descend via clearance we determined that we 'might be a little high' at KIILO. I informed ATC (Fort Worth center) and we received clearance to be high at KIILO as long as we maintained 270 KTS. We maintained 270 and made the altitudes listed at KIILO. It is around this time that the Fort Worth center controller gave us a left turn for spacing. The captain then advised the controller of our current MEL and that we would have to disconnect the autopilot to make the turn; and therefore be unable to continue the RNAV arrival. The Fort Worth Controller then cleared us to stay on the arrival and maintain 230 KTS. We were then handed off the Regional Approach control. We checked in with Regional Approach control and were issued a speed reduction to 210 KTS; a descent to 6;000 MSL and a left turn. The captain then reiterated our MEL and that if we took the turn we would have to disconnect the autopilot and would be unable to continue the RNAV arrival. The controller acknowledged the issue; and issued the turn again; at which point we immediately disconnected the autopilot and made the turn to the assigned heading. Shortly after which the Regional Approach controller advised us of a 'Possible Pilot Deviation' and we copied a phone number down. We complied with each altitude and speed restriction given to us during the flight and landed the aircraft without further incident.I believe this was a miscommunication/ misunderstanding with Air Traffic Control and ourselves. Better communication of current aircraft operational limitations with Air Traffic Control; and possibly more understanding of company operational limitations by Air Traffic Control could easily prevent this situation from reoccurring.

WE were descending on the SOCKK2 into DFW and was cleared to KIILO intersection with altitude relief until BOOVE; but given 280 knots or less and was doing 270 knots. At some point around KYSSS intersection ATC asked us to make a left for spacing. My first officer initially responded 'unable'. I took the radio call and explained that we have an MEL that is operationally limiting the aircraft. Advised that we can take the turn; but that would require the autopilot to come off and then we would no longer be able to continue on the RNAV arrival. ATC then advised to stay on the SOCKK2 and slow to 230 knots and we complied. Next controller issued a left to us prior to BOOVE intersection. Advised controller of same issue and he stated he understood and needed the turn for spacing. Autopilot was turned off; made turn and continued with vectors. We were advised by ATC to copy a phone number for pilot deviation. Once at the gate; I called the number and was advised they will be investigating the incident. I stated my case with the person on the phone and asked for all tapes to be saved and a copy for myself. Was given a phone number to their Quality Assurance manager and told he would be in touch with me.This was due to a poor MEL. The write up was for the heading bug and the MEL was for flight director modes. Poor guidelines given on the MEL. Please refer to MEL 22-10-02. I did not know or understand what this MEL was actually referencing by the MEL itself. Once airborne we needed a vector for weather and put the aircraft in Heading mode and realized that the Heading bug was not functioning properly. We could not turn the aircraft to a specific head using the Heading bug. In no way did this MEL address this issue. Once on the ground I called MX and advised that this aircraft should not be flown until fixed and they agreed.

CRJ900 Flight Crew reported being dispatched with MEL 22-10-02 for the heading bug not controlling the autopilot. This became an issue during the arrival when ATC issued a heading and the crew informed them the autopilot must be turned off to comply and they could no longer fly the RNAV arrival. ATC issued the heading again then asked the crew to copy a phone number for a possible pilot deviation.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Approaching CLT from northeast for the IVANE RNAV arrival; Washington Center cleared us direct to MSTRD Intersection. We were at FL340. Soon thereafter we were cleared to descend via the IVANE arrival landing north CLT. We had confirmed all the altitudes and speeds for the arrival as per SOP. Autopilot was in managed speed and managed descent. All crossing points were in magenta. The 'doughnut' on the FMA was showing on descent as well as the PROG page on the FMGs screen showed 0 deviation. (On profile descent). We had rechecked the crossing restrictions after activating direct to MSTRD Intersection to make sure no crossing restrictions had dropped out. Within six miles of the MAYOS Intersection (while still descending) the MAYOS Intersection icon suddenly turned orange. The doughnut and PROG page still showed us on correct descent profile; however a quick mental math computation revealed we would not cross MAYOS between FL260-220 but high! Even with maximum effort descent we still crossed MAYOS above FL270; 1;800 FT high all while the doughnut and PROG page showed us on proper descent profile! The arrival was completed with no further abnormalities. Center did not question our high altitude nor seem aware we had crossed MAYOS high. There were three Airbus pilots (one jumpseat rider) who had no idea why all our aircraft information showed we were on proper descent profile when we were in fact 1;800 FT high at MAYOS Intersection except the sudden orange shade MAYOS turned too late to make the proper altitude restriction. I could only surmise that by going direct to MSTRD Intersection to start the arrival could some how cause an aircraft software anomaly. I have been on the Airbus about 1 1/2 years and maybe started to trust the logic a little too much. From now on I will be mentally calculating the descent rates to crossing restrictions to back up the logic. Lesson learned!

Reporter states the descent path was captured several minutes after being cleared direct to MSTRD. The managed descent was initiated prior to the top of descent point and the path was captured by the FMGC.  After crossing MAYOS high; the aircraft continued on its descent making all restrictions without alterations.

A319 Captain reports missing the crossing restriction at MAYOS during the IVANE 2 RNAV arrival to CLT. The FMGC had been correctly programed and showed on profile until six miles prior to MAYOS when the waypoint turned orange indicating the crossing restriction would not be met.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Fatigue

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

We were descending via the [Arrival] into ZZZ. After ZZZZZ we requested deviations around cell build ups on the arrival. Approach approved and said 'Direct ZZZZZ1 when able and descend to 6000 feet.' I used CWS (Control Wheel Steering) to avoid the cells. We reset the FMC to direct ZZZZZ1 and were descending to 6000 feet. I was high due to still avoiding some lower buildups but turned toward ZZZZZ1 and was descending to be at ZZZZZ1 by 6000 feet. Everything seemed fine until I noticed that it didn't look like the aircraft was going to level at 6000 feet. I was trying to figure out 'what is it doing now' when I realized that I had not gone from CWS back to CMD on the autopilot. I reacted - a little too late - and the aircraft descended below 6000 feet by about 400 feet. Approach queried as to our altitude and we responded that we were aware and correcting. The correct altitude was re-established and CMD was re-engaged; the rest of the approach and landing was completed without incident.This was a bonehead mistake. I don't use CWS much; and in an attempt to keep the ride smooth for the passengers opted to use this mode instead of Heading Select. I should have told the PM (Pilot Monitoring) to help me remember to reengage CMD since I don't use CWS much; this is a busy part of the flight and I was a little tired - in the Yellow. This would have helped maintain the shared mental model and prevent this rookie mistake.

B737 First Officer reported an altitude overshoot due to autopilot usage while evading weather.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Repositioning empty back to Fairbanks Chena Marina Airport; following a passenger flight from that same airport.  I called Fairbanks Approach at 30 NM NE at 3500 MSL.  Although there were not a lot of calls at at the time; I was 25 NM NE before I was able to give my information to Fairbanks Approach; and receive a transponder code. I proceeded directly to Chena Marina Airport in the absence of any other instructions and descended to an altitude of 1500 FT as I approached the Fairbanks International Airport.  I received no traffic advisories anywhere in the vicinity of the Fairbanks airport from the approach controller. At approximately 1 mile NE of the Fairbanks International Airport (PAFA/FAI); I received instructions to contact Fairbanks Tower; which I promptly did.  Immediately afterward; I noted that I was on a 45 degree converging collision course with a Helio Courier at my same altitude; which had just taken off from Fairbanks International Airport 2R; although I don't know if it was from the paved strip or gravel ski strip.  He would have been on a course of approximately 20 degrees; and I was flying a course of approximately 230 degrees.  I altered my heading to the left to go behind the Helio.  After I turned; I received a call from a female voice tower controller advising me of the traffic; and of a second aircraft flying away from me toward the west; which I could see was no factor.  I did not see the other aircraft take any evasive action; although subsequently; the Helio pilot called in and asked for the N Number of the Cherokee that 'just about hit me.'  A male voice tower controller asked the Helio pilot to call the tower upon his return; and he would have that information for him.  The Helio pilot said that would be in about two hours. The landing at Chena Marina was uneventful. I am thankful that I was scanning for aircraft and that I was able to see the other aircraft in adequate time.  This was a case of ideal weather conditions; and a low wing aircraft descending while the high wing aircraft was climbing; along with an additional factor of the long nose on the Cherokee making forward and down visibility limited.  I believe an earlier hand off from Approach Control to the tower could have avoided this situation; with perhaps a prompt from me.  However; sometimes Approach Control at Fairbanks does not hand off aircraft until fairly close to landing; or in cases of lower traffic; not at all; up through landing and taxi.

PA32 pilot inbound to Chena Marina reports a NMAC with a Helio Courier departing FAI Runway 2R at 1500 FT. The PA32 pilot was Radar identified and talking to FAI Tower but neither pilot received a traffic advisory until evasive action had been taken by the PA32 pilot.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft

Airline was notified by the FAA twice that Aircraft X was not broadcasting ADS-B Out Parameters.The First time the item was deferred and wasn't worked for a year due to the aircraft being in storage because of the pandemic.   The item was worked in ZZZ1 and signed off.Airline was notified again the ADS-B Out was not broadcasting.   Airline found a wire that wasn't capped as called out in COA (Certificate of Approval/Authority) X.

Maintenance Technician reported one of their aircraft was found to have wiring issues causing the ADS-B to malfunction. The aircraft had been in storage for an extended time period.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 47.1; Flight Crew Total 336.8; Flight Crew Type 250

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Approximately 3 NM northwest of 06FA; I encountered a drone that came close enough to hear the propeller noise from the drone inside my cabin. Neither TCAS nor ATC advised of the drone; which was approximately the size of a bird and traveling at a high rate of speed. The small size of the drone made it impossible to see in early morning haze and low light conditions. The drone did not have any operating lights. All navigation and anti-collision lights were on for my aircraft.I advised ATC of the presence of the drone; shortly before being handed off to the next ATC facility. The small size of the drone made it impossible to see until it was too late to take any evasive action; and but for luck; the drone would have impacted the aircraft.

The reporter did not identify the UAV type in the early morning light but heard it as it passed.

An IFR PA-28 pilot near 06FA at dawn in VMC reported a near miss at 5;000 FT with an unlit drone which was very difficult to detect in the low light conditions.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 4; Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Time Pressure; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working R13 and descended Aircraft X to TANDY at 130. The Aircraft (AC) was pointed out to sector 14. The R14 controller and I were surprised that an aircraft on the ORCKA departure auto popped climbing through 121 to 150 in Sector 14's airspace without a point out from SoCal or from Sector 18. We were unsure of who's responsibility that was and as to which controller had actually given the climb instruction or if the AC was climbing via a SID.I think it was the very next aircraft; Aircraft Y; we (R14 and myself and the Controller In Charge) were watching because he had the same departure and sure enough that aircraft also auto popped to Sector 14 and was now traffic from my TANDY arrival. I called the traffic to Aircraft X; who I was talking to; but was unsure of what altitude the other aircraft was climbing to. I then realized a loss of separation was going to occur. I told Aircraft X to maintain visual separation from the traffic and he complied. If these aircraft are climbing out via a SID; that SID is not separated from 14's airspace. SoCal or sector 18; must initiate a point out as those aircraft climbing are traffic for the TANDY and LEENA arrivals. This is an unsafe situation that needs to be addressed as soon as possible. The sector 13 controller will not see the traffic auto pop until it is possibly too late. The aircraft climbing out on the ORCKA will auto pop to sector 14; then 14 has to call traffic to sector 13 for their arrivals.

[Two aircraft] were LAX departures climbing via the ORCKA1 SID. Aircraft X was on the TANDY4 arrival with a restriction to cross TANDY at 130. SCT departures' airspace limit has been reduced by 1000 ft. With sector 14 from 130 to 120. Both departure aircraft entered the confines of sector 14's lateral limits while still climbing without a point out from departures. There was never a loss of standard separation; but that was by luck of the position of the aircraft at the time of the event. The combination of the new climb via departure mixed with the airspace change is what likely caused confusion for the SCT controller. More time to learn and understand all aspects of the departures and airspace would likely help. Also; I'm not sure if one already exists; but an 'at or below' restriction to miss 14's airspace and traffic would be great on the ORCKA1 SID.

ZLA controllers reported an airborne conflict when a departure aircraft entered their airspace without proper handoff from SCT TRACON.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 850; Flight Crew Type 40

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

After takeoff I immediately began to notice oil on my windshield.  by the time I was at 500 FT my windscreen was covered in oil.  I began an immediate left turn to join the left downwind for Runway 6.  I informed the Tower that I was returning to the airport for immediate landing with oil on my windshield.  This was acknowledged by the Tower and I was cleared to land on Runway 6.  By this time I was on downwind and starting to think I might want to land on Runway 15.  I asked the Controller if I could have Runway 15.  He cleared a Grumman [to exit] at the next taxiway and cleared me to land on Runway 15.  By this time I decided to continue to Runway 6.  Tower told me the airport was mine.  I made an uneventful and mostly blind landing on Runway 6.  The oil filler cap was loose and had come off inflight.

A Bellanca Viking pilot made an immediate return and landing with Tower's assistance when engine oil began coating his windshield after takeoff.  The oil filler cap had not been secured prior to takeoff.


Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

On takeoff roll after power set by the autothrottles; we received a Master Caution with ENG light. I checked the engine control panel and saw both engines had degraded to soft ALTN. I checked the engine stack and parameters were good.  Above 80 KIAS; I told the First Officer (FO) we were continuing. Autothrottles then disengaged. I confirmed takeoff power was set manually and continued the takeoff. I was unaware somewhere during the takeoff roll that my FO's airspeed and altitude became unreliable. After takeoff from [RWY XY] at about 800 feet AGL; we received a stall warning because the FO's airspeed was indicating low. I cross checked the standby airspeed indicator against my airspeed indicator and performed the airspeed unreliable checklist memory items. The stall warning quickly went away as we accelerated. After we were at a safe altitude; we got in the QRH for Unreliable Airspeed and EEC (Electronic Engine Control) Alternate Mode checklists. Called Operations for phone patch to Dispatch and gave them all the information and that we would be negative RVSM. Informed Flight Attendants what was happening. Dispatch and Maintenance Control determined we were okay to continue to our filed destination.Dispatch ran new flight plan and we had enough fuel. We put EEC malfunction in the performance computer. We also realized we were probably going to have the stall warning on final approach. Uneventful landing. Debriefed with Maintenance. This aircraft had a bird strike inbound to our departure airport. Maintenance did required inspection and signed logbook.I feel we performed well as a Crew. If we had noticed the airspeed problem below 80 KIAS; I would have aborted.

Cleared for takeoff; Captain initiated the takeoff roll normally with autothrottles engaged. I referenced my airspeed indicator after confirming the takeoff N1 was set; getting ready to announce '80 knots' but my airspeed was hovering at 50 knots and unusually slow to accelerate. I then referenced the Captain's airspeed indicator and saw we were passing through 90 knots according to his (which seemed logical). At that time; the Master Caution - ENG recall lights came on and autothrottles disengaged. I verbally acknowledged the Master Caution - ENG and the Captain referenced his airspeed and announced 'continuing.' I referenced my airspeed indicator again and it was slowly passing through 70 knots as the Captain's was approaching 100 knots. The Captain called 'V1; Rotate' at the appropriate airspeed based on his airspeed indicator. Engine instruments were normal throughout.

Maintenance personnel completed and cleared a B737 bird strike maintenance log entry. On the next takeoff; the First Officer's airspeed lagged in relation to the Captain's and the ENG light accompanied the autothrottle disconnect. During the turn after takeoff the First Officer's stall warning alerted.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) .7

Party1 ATC; Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

A Light Sport aircraft inbound on Campbell Arrival [receiving] radar advisories with A11.  Instructed to enter left base Runway 25. A Piper Aztec departed Runway 25 on Campbell Departure.  Traffic was not issued with the Aztec's takeoff clearance because the Light Sport was over Campbell airstrip 110 knots on the Campbell arrival and should not have been a conflict for the Aztec per the lateral separation provided by the Campbell Departure.  A radar replay showed that the Light Sport did not fly the Campbell Arrival correctly.  From Campbell airstrip he overflew Tudor Bus Barn to Providence Hospital putting him in conflict with the Aztec outbound via Tudor Bus Barn on Campbell Departure.  If he had flown the Campbell Arrival to the left base 25 over Boniface as depicted; there would not have been a conflict.  Aircraft reported inbound from the northwest; and A11 called on the land line regarding that aircraft.  I relayed Approach's information to the pilot and issued traffic for another aircraft inbound from the northwest.  I did not return my scan back to the south until the Light Sport and the Aztec passed; at which time the Light Sport reported NMAC.  The Aztec was still on frequency and stated; 'It was not that close.'Pilot forum explaining the imperativeness of flying arrival/departure procedures precisely.  Maybe using radar replays or flight simulator depictions.

MRI Controller reports of an aircraft that is supposed to follow a route into the airport and does not; while a departure reports having a NMAC with the arriving aircraft. Routes would have been separated if the arrival was following the prescribed route.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Dispatch

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

Some 30 min after flight took off; the station called and informed dispatch that the flight has 11 more bags then the load manifest is stating. They informed us that the aircraft has 11 bags in its rear cargo bin and that those 11 bags are not on the load manifest. It appears that the ground crew has failed to check the rear cargo bin and fully unload the previous flight. After receiving this information the crew was informed via AIRCOM about the situation. Crew has provided information about the passenger and cargo load that they have so dispatch can verify the performance data. After running numbers through Flight Data Performance tool I have not gotten any warnings about CG being out of its limits. Crew have manually entered additional cargo weight and confirmed this information.

A Dispatcher reported ground personnel notified him 30 minutes after an aircraft departed that 11 unreported bags were in fact in the aft pit. No performance or center of gravity issues were discovered.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

I was the PF on [this flight]. While at cruise we started receiving multiple cyan EICAS messages. They read SPOILER FAULT; LT ENGINE FAULT; RT ENGINE FAULT; PROX SYS FAULT; STAB TRIM FAULT. We then got a yellow WOW FAULT yellow caution msg. We complied with the QRH and it led us to believe that we would have degraded braking; no nose wheel steering; and possible no TR's (Thrust Reversers) upon landing. We called maintenance and confirmed these failures. We decided since [the destination airport] has runways exceeding 12;000 ft; it made the most sense to continue to our destination as the plane was otherwise behaving normally. The PIC briefed the passengers about the issue; assured them of our safe landing; but told them there would be fire trucks. I notified ATC and advised them that we would be needing [the long runway] and it was likely we would have to be towed off the runway. I requested CFR (Crash Fire Rescue) at the runway; but declined any enroute assistance. We landed without further incident; and were able to taxi to the ramp under our own power.

Bombardier Challenger First Officer reported receiving multiple EICAS messages indicating faults for various systems.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Other Person; Person Ground Personnel

I took over this flight at shift change and outgoing Dispatcher advised they had just received information about undeclared HAZMAT (hazardous material) being on the aircraft.  Service recovery advised that there were 98 packages of lithium batteries in position 2R; which was located too close to ADG (accessible dangerous goods) loaded in position 1L.  At this point; flight was about 3 hours out of ZZZ; notified crew of issue via ACARS; and after service recovery consulted with Duty Officer; determined no immediate safety issue existed; so flight continued to ZZZ1. I do not know what caused the issue; aircraft was already in the air when I found out about it and the error was with the loading of the dangerous goods and lithium batteries; anyway.  You would need to contact hub to find out the cause.

Air Carrier Dispatcher reported aircraft en route with Hazmat cargo was incorrectly loaded at departure. Flight continued to destination since no immediate safety issue existed.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 1480; Flight Crew Type 1200

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

And another of the type 'Tower Controller does not understand that a VFR pilot needs to hear that he is cleared to enter the Class B airspace'. I file a similar report about a week ago about a Controller in the LaGuardia Tower. This time a similar thing happened with Newark Tower. I had departed and was heading directly towards Newark. After a while [departure airport] hands me over; and I make my initial call with Newark Tower. He asked for my intentions; and I told him that I wanted to fly direct to Newark; then to the Statue; then northbound over the Hudson. He gave me instructions to overfly the Newark airport. When I was about to hit class B airspace; I told him that I still don't have a Class B clearance; and he replied that; yes; I would; he gave me instructions how to fly over the airport. But; VFR traffic needs a clearance to enter class B airspace (unlike IFR).I criticize the following:- A very arrogant attitude towards VFR aircraft in the NY airspace area. Every student pilot learns that VFR aircraft need a clearance to enter class B airspace; instructions won't do (unlike IFR).- A lack of competence. Tower controllers; and then from very busy airports such as LaGuardia and Newark; should know at least as much as student pilots do.- A very arrogant attitude towards responding to pilots afterwards.

Pilot reported he was unhappy with techniques used by New York area ATC personnel.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

While turning on to [taxiway] SC the aircraft started to slide. I placed the throttles in reverse idle to make sure I did not depart the taxiway that was covered in ice and snow. I was at my slowest possible but wanted to make sure that I had reverse thrust available if I continued to slide down SC that has a steep decline. The throttles did not come out of reverse idle but the right engine flamed out. We attempted to restart the right engine but approached a hot start approximately 547 degrees. We stopped the right engine start procedure and stopped taxiing because the taxiway condition was nil and could not get any traction with the nose wheel or differential breaking for the turn. Requested snow crews plow the ramp and tug crew pull us into the gate. We were towed without incident after the snow crews plowed the ramp.

While the Captain was taxing south on taxiway M; approaching SC. We were at a crawl and I could feel the airplane sliding to the right. I asked the Captain 'Is the airplane sliding?' The Captain acknowledged and stated that he was going to unlock the thrust reversers into idle. As soon as the aircraft stopped sliding; the Captain announced he was stowing the reversers. We successfully made the turn onto SC and slowly began the downhill descent to the ramp. The Captain reported that the right engine had flamed out during the thrust reverser deployment. I saw no abnormal EICAS messages other than the normal right engine shutdown messages and no limits had been exceeded. The Captain requested an attempt to restart the right engine. The start attempt was aborted after EGT approached red line and recorded a max EGT of 547 was reached after fuel cutoff. While trying to enter the ramp from SC; there was visible snow on the ramp where we needed to enter and crews could be seen beginning to actively clear the ramp. The aircraft again began to slide right. The Captain brought the aircraft to a stop and we agreed that a tow-in would be needed.

Flight crew reported sliding while taxiing due to snow and had to be towed back to the gate.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Was doing a training flight for a rusty pilot returning to flight. Wind was about 270/17 [kts.] G24. We were taxiing from parking to Runway XX. Pilot seemed to be fine on the taxi. I was looking down trying to fix some static on my headset by readjusting the plugs. The aircraft rotated suddenly to the right and off the taxiway into the grass. I took control and taxied back onto the taxiway. No further issues. We ended up not flying due to the strong crosswind.My analysis was that the pilot was overpowered by a strong gust from the right that was strong enough to rotate the plane about 30 degrees to the right. The pilot hit full left rudder but did not apply brakes or try and counter with brakes due to his lack of experience. My fault as I should not have been heads down. He just got hit by a very strong gust and didn't react properly. The taxi back onto the taxiway was uneventful but I was a bit more observant!

C172 instructor pilot reported that while the student was taxiing a strong gust of wind rotated the aircraft and it went off the taxiway. Flight instructor regained control and taxied back onto the taxiway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 225; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 9000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 28; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 1400

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Climbing out felt thump; got immediate multiple ECAMS; ended up losing green hydraulic quantity and system. First Officer ran ECAM then backed up with FM. He spoke with Dispatch and Maintenance Control. I made decision to return; configured starting on downwind. [We were] fully configured; on speed; all checklist completed by 5 miles. Uneventful visual landing and differential braking. [We] had coordinated early for tow to gate.

Climbing through FL200 felt thump; ECAM came on for green low hydraulic pressure; resulting from complete loss of green hydraulic quantity. Eventual ECAM settled on low green hydraulic quantity. Captain directed me to run ECAM. Shut off PTU and engine 1 hydraulic pump as per ECAM. Completed ECAM and talked with Dispatch and Maintenance Control. Completed ECAM and backed up with checklist; followed up with Landing Distance checklist; gravity gear extension checklist; and tow in checklist. Captain flew 13 NM straight in; full flaps uneventful as per FM guidance.

A319 flight crew experiences a thump climbing through FL200 followed quickly by an ECAM for Green Hydraulic quantity low level. After ECAM actions Captain elects to return to departure airport for an uneventful landing using a gravity gear extension.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 211; Flight Crew Total 957; Flight Crew Type 313

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

A Cessna 150K departed ZZZ1 piloted by an instructor and student after performing a checklist backed thorough preflight check. We flew cross country to ZZZ and ZZZ2 performing touch and go landings. On our last leg from ZZZ1 to ZZZ1 we flew west of downtown Chicago underneath the ZZZ class Bravo 1900 ft. shelf. Somewhere due East of ZZZ; the aircraft engine attempted to fail and we lost altitude from 1600 ft. MSL to 1400 ft. MSL. After playing with the throttle; the engine came back to full power and we continued on to ZZZ1. Between 3-5 miles possible from ZZZ1; the engine began to fail again. All fuel items were on and rich. Playing with the throttle did nothing this time and knowing about our altitude; I made the decision to make a 180 degree turn into the golf course where a forced landing without engine power was executed. Nothing and no one was damaged or injured and a safe landing was made. The fuel level in the right tank was indicating a quarter and the left was indicating just above empty. Upon exiting the aircraft; we noticed the left fuel cap had somehow gotten disconnected from the fuel tank neck and was being held on by its chain. All flight planning fuel burn items indicated landing with 7.4 gallons of fuel left at ZZZ1.

C150 Instructor pilot reported fuel cap came off with loss of fuel; resulting in an off airport landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 500

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Lost engine on take off; landed on same runway as took off.  During landing roll used intersection #1 to exit and clear runway.

Pilot reported they lost the engine on take off and landed on the same runway as used for take off.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.5

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Confusion; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

We are working approach control airspace as part of a COVID-19 mitigation plan. Aircraft X was on approach to ZZZ; which is in Approach airspace; when Approach called and asked for a block for an approach in ZZZ1.  I had previously told a Controller at [another facility] that I would not be able to approve that approach because I was blocking for the aircraft into ZZZ.  When [other facility] called back and asked again for the block for ZZZ1 I again told them no.  The other Controller began to question me.  I explained the block that I needed and he still seemed confused.  I then was trying to get off the line to get back to my traffic.  I then said 'If you can keep him clear' and that I couldn't authorize the approach with my rules.  [Other facility] then said they could give him an alternate missed approach.  While I don't believe I specifically approved the approach my language may have been interpreted as authorizing the approach.  At the time I was thinking that the approach may have some procedure that I was not aware of that would allow the approach to run but upon rereading the Center SOP I do not believe that would be the case.  While I don't believe that the aircraft lost separation with each other or specifically with protected airspace they may have been on approach at the same time which is not allowed by the Center SOP.I do not believe that these approaches conflict as published and the restriction can be removed.  However; we also need more concise rules about what approaches we can and cannot run.  Our procedures were designed for the Midnight shift with low traffic and when we run the day shift we face a lot of delays because our rules are not as lenient as the approach controls that usually run the airspace.  When I have tried actually determine if these approaches conflict I keep running into problems because I am not sure who to contact and can never get concrete answers.  A central office that could evaluate the procedures; or someone in the center specifically trained in approaches who could determine whether or not they conflict would be helpful.

Center Controller also working Approach Control airspace due to the COVID-19 pandemic; reported communication issues with another Approach facility resulting in an airborne conflict.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I issued an incorrect altitude to Aircraft X on a crossing restriction. (A point-out to Sector X; was approved descending to FL250.) I cleared Aircraft X to cross ZZZZZ at FL230. The pilot readback FL230 correctly. FL230 is not in my area of jurisdiction. I did; however; type the intended altitude of FL250 into the data block; and subsequently made a handoff to the Sector Y. The receiving controller at Sector Y alerted me of the error when the pilot checked in vacating FL250 for FL230. Separation was not lost with any surrounding aircraft. However; this did cause a violation of airspace with Sector Z; whose area of jurisdiction is FL230 and below. I cannot recall issuing the incorrect altitude. Traffic was light and not complex. Although I felt rested and capably; my focus was obviously not where it should have been. I do not remember being distracted. But; there were conversations about the current state of affairs regarding the government shutdown; lack of funding; and potential resolutions and/or outcomes. Consciously and subconsciously; I have been very concerned about my personal financial situation since the start of the shutdown. With each passing day my worries grow and fears fester. My sleep patterns have become increasingly intermittent despite proper fatigue mitigation techniques. I feel extremely exhausted and stressed by this situation. I worry for the health and safety of my wife and children. I wonder how am I going to support my family as my financial savings dwindle ever closer to zero. My focus is obviously not where it should be. In order to perform my duties I must have absolute attention and focus. I have reached the demoralizing conclusion that I am no longer in control of my financial situation. This burden must be relieved in order to regain my focus.

ZNY Center Controller reported an airspace violation due to external distractions.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Rotorcraft

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

I am aware that the construction adjacent to the hospital; and the 3 cranes operating in close proximity to the helipad have been an ongoing issue. However; it has been passed on to me that if the cranes are not moving and they do not prevent an approach into an acceptable wind azimuth it is preferred to land at the hospital for the patient transfer. I was on approach on a patient and crew drop off; when I and the crewmembers did not observe crane movement so completed the landing. However; after the crew and patient disembarked I was to reposition for fuel and was ready for takeoff when the crane closest to the helipad swung from South to North counter-clockwise; above and to the left of the rotor disk. Had I lifted; the potential for collision was extreme; and if I had parked facing the South instead of North; I would not have even been able to see if the crane was is operation due to the hospital building entrance. After the crane cleared; I picked up to a hover and made sure I could depart away from the crane before it resumed operation. I find it hard to believe this is a standard operating procedure. I am aware that if it seems unsafe because the crane is in motion; the other options are to land at nearby locations. However; everything was safe for approach; but then not for takeoff. At that point it is too late to land somewhere else.I feel the need to be in direct communication with the crane operators instead of gambling on if they are going to have the patience for us to perform our job and jeopardize my team's safety. These cranes already present an obstacle issue in the stationary position.

BK-117 medevac pilot reported construction cranes near a hospital helicopter pad pose a serious threat to the operation as there is no communication between them and the aircraft.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Aircraft / UAS; Airport / Aerodrome / Heliport

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS); Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On Date at approximately XA:20 local time in Seattle; I was Captain and in the role of Pilot Monitoring (PM) on flight from ZZZ to SEA. At the time; we were conducting an ILS 16R. At 300 ft AGL; we encountered what appeared to be a drone. The position of the drone was approximately 150 feet vertically above the aircraft and 150 to 200 feet laterally off the right side of the aircraft. At the time we were in VMC conditions with at least 10 SM visibility; light rain; and it was night. The First Officer (FO) was Pilot Flying (PF) and he disconnected the autopilot and auto throttle at FINKA intersection. As we approached 300 ft AGL we both spotted the drone at about the same time. The drone had a white light on the underside of it shining downward towards the ground which allowed both myself and the FO to see it and in that moment determine it was not a collision threat; although it was very close. It appeared to be stationary laterally and possibly climbing away from us. The drone had no other position lights other than the white light on the underside of it which made it impossible to see at night until we were underneath it. I elected to continue the landing as this seemed the safest course of action. After landing uneventfully; we reported the drone to Seattle ATCT. They gave us a number to call and I spoke to someone in the tower. We categorized it as a near miss for FAA/ATC purposes. I followed up with a phone call notification to dispatch and the Flight Operations Duty Officer. The FO conducted a post flight walk around and noted no evidence we contacted the drone and no aircraft damage present. Additionally; I wrote up the near miss with a drone in the aircraft logbook to ensure maintenance also conducted a visual inspection. A [local authority] met me at the gate to gather some information about the encounter. No recommendation other than including drones as a possible threat on every flight. The drone was located in Class B airspace where it should not have been; at night with no discernible position lights other than a downward facing spotlight.

Air carrier First Officer reported seeing a lighted UAS off the right side of the aircraft during final approach into a Class B airport during night VMC conditions. The flight reported the UAS to the control tower and landed safely.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Putting the gear down; the left main light did not illuminate. The decision was made to go around. Eventually after about 15 seconds; the left main gear down and locked light did illuminate. However the decision was already made to not land. Approach gave us a heading of 180 and altitude of 6;000 ft. We cycled the gear one more time and experienced the same. The left main gear did not illuminate down and locked until about 15 seconds after the selection of gear down. The QRH was handed to the First Officer; the correct procedure was selected (Gear will not extend hydraulically) and run through the process. Since all three gear down and locked lights were on; it was determined through the flow chart that the aircraft was safe to continue to land. The landing was without incident and we were able to taxi to the gate.

C402 flight crew reported executing a go-around after the left main gear was slow to indicate down and locked.