Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 800

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While flying with my 80+ year old; Air Force trained; employer; who was hand flying in the left seat; we entered clouds after takeoff at around 2;000 FT MSL. When assigned a heading of 340 degrees; the pilot flying lost situational awareness requiring my intervention (while climbing; bank exceeded 50 degrees with a nose down pitch of around 10 degrees). Once under control we completed our climbing left turn with a clearance to 8;000 FT. As we approached 8;000 FT we received a frequency change; after I tuned the new frequency and prior to checking on I noticed our altitude bust. We were subsequently cleared to 11;000 FT; where we broke out of clouds on top. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. I've flown with my employer on many occasions; over 9 years; and in various flight conditions without incident; I consider him a good pilot; and was surprised at this unexpected loss of control on this occasion. We have discussed the event; but I'm very embarrassed about our altitude bust; fortunately there was not a resulting traffic conflict; and I would like to thank the Air Traffic Controller for his understanding and professionalism.

A DA-20 First Officer assumed control of the aircraft in IMC after the elderly pilot flying lost situational awareness during a climbing turn and banked in excess of 50 degrees; 10 degrees nose down.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We arrived about 20 mins early at the gate; and right after a few of my passengers in first class got off the cleaners were getting on the plane. This is unacceptable; I'm making multiple announcements for passengers to stay seated to help with social distances during this pandemic; all while the cleaners are on getting in the way of passengers getting off. There was no social distance by the cleaners what so ever.

Flight Attendant reported aircraft cleaners got onboard before passengers deplaned affecting social distancing efforts.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were dealing with continuous light and occasional moderate turbulence for most of the flight. ATC kept telling us other altitudes were better (started at FL340); so we tried FL320 and FL300; and eventually FL280. Had the Flight Attendants (FA) seated; seatbelt sign was on; and told the Passengers multiple times to stay seated with seatbelts. Flew .76M for turbulence penetration speed; and had the engine heat on (VMC; but wanted the Ignition on). Many reports of moderate turbulence across southeast; but nothing worse. Finally somewhere east of the MHZ VOR ATC said it would smooth out around MHZ. Instead; about 30 east of MHZ; experienced rapid onset of severe turbulence. Aircraft was on edge of control; and moving violently. Requested immediate change in altitude; was told FL340 was best bet at that point. Started immediate climb. Turbulence was severe for several minutes; all the way from FL280 to FL300. Airspeed deviations of plus and minus 30 knots between FL280 and FL300. Moderate until almost FL340. Once ride was better; checked in with FA's. No one injured; either FA or Passengers. Never exceeded VMO/MMO either; luckily. Aircraft felt normal; continued with descent and approach. By coincidence; both my First Officer and I used to fly [as] Hurricane Hunters. We both felt that this turbulence was the worst (or at least the longest duration of severe) somewhat equivalent to a hurricane penetration.

A320 Captain reported encountering tubulence so severe he compared it to his previous experience in planned hurricane penetration flights.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

While pax boarding; noticed haze/smoke in forward part of cabin. There was an electrical burning smell from first part of coach to about exit row. Stopped boarding and deplaned those who had boarded. Smell and haze dissipated.

During the boarding process; C Flight Attendant called from the aft; there was a smoky haze that was noticed in the cabin. He stated that there was an 'electrical' smell and told me to hold boarding and wanted to deplane. I held boarding at the door while C Flight Attendant made an announcement to those standing in the aisle to turn around; exit the aircraft and for all seated guests to gather their belongings and exit the aircraft. I notified pilot of the situation. Captain came out of the flight deck to observe; he said it appeared to be condensation from the AC due to the humid conditions outside. CSA Supervisor; came to see what was going on. I explained the situation. Once all passengers [were] off; all flight attendants; Captain; CSA Supervisor walked toward the aft of the aircraft. Myself; D Flight Attendant; C Flight Attendant; B Flight Attendant and CSA Supervisor all smelled an electrical burnt smell between rows 8 and 16. We all felt charging outlets and power boxes for unusual heat. Captain could not smell. Asked First Officer to check; he could not smell. A second security search was conducted. The smell lingered around row 8-10. Mechanics inspected cargo and on the aircraft; nothing found. We briefed on a plan if there were to be an emergency and all agreed that we felt safe to re-board. A passenger seated in row 10 we noticed had a multi charging port. Captain made an announcement re electronics- to let a flight attend know if a device is 'HOT.' Just before safety demo; XXC [passenger] notified us that her plug was feeling hot while charging her phone and offered to not use at all during flight. I notified Captain of XXC. There were no further issues during the flight. Turned out to be a non-event.

Flight attendants reported 'electrical' odor and haze in passenger cabin. Maintenance and pilots inspected aircraft with no definitive results.


Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action

Upon clearing Runway; taxing via M1 then M then M2. M has a sight dog leg to the right. I turned the tiller to the right and nothing happened. Jumped on the brakes and nothing happened. We were now headed towards the side of the taxiway as the taxiway veers to the right. I then applied reverse and the airplane slowed and started turning right. I turned right to get on M2 and tested brakes and Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) all seemed fine. The First Officer looked back as I angled the aircraft to see if we had hit a taxi edge light. We could not say for certain but didn't think so. Notified ground that it was a possibility and that that area was very slick. Wrote up for maintenance and meet with mechanics to inspect. Mechanics didn't see any evidence that we hit a taxi light. Called [Duty Manager] to inform company. The temp at the time was way above freezing I think around 45 degrees. It was not ice but deicing fluid on the taxiway that make it slick.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported that during taxi they lost control of the aircraft due to de-icing fluid on the taxiway.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The GRACO controller pointed out Aircraft Y; SW bound descending to 045 with a class B clearance.  He had made the aircraft yellow on my scope much earlier; not near my airspace.  I had turned the tag green; because it was distracting me.  After the point out was made; I kept the track green.  There was a lifeguard helicopter crossing BWI final to runway 28 that required a good amount of my attention; I forgot about the VFR point out.  I descended Aircraft X from 060 to 040.  When I realized Aircraft Y was in close proximity to Aircraft X; I issued a traffic alert and climb.  The pilot stated he had the traffic in sight.  He stated he never received a TCAS advisory.  I should ensure point out aircraft remain yellow on my scope; so I don't forget about them.  With the DC SFRA; many VFR are in the airspace and not receiving services.  They are easy to overlook.

PCT controller reports that he received a point out on an aircraft but turned the data tag to a green color because it was distracting him.  He later gets this aircraft and another too close.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The Controller's performance was unprofessional and unsafe. I had just started my airplane and requested taxi clearance and could immediately tell the Controller was overloaded and flustered. He gave me taxi instructions to hold abeam the FBO and to follow an aircraft taxiing to the ramp. I was number 6 for takeoff behind a flight of 5 Blackhawks. The Controller was talking to an aircraft trying to enter the pattern for landing. The aircraft pilot was a secondary English-speaker and was clearly focusing to understand the Controller. The Controller communicated in an exasperated and rude tone repeatedly. For example; at one point the aircraft said 'I am over the field' and the Controller responded aggravated; 'I told you to get on the downwind; now get on the downwind!' The aircraft then asked 'Which downwind?' Though clearly angered by the pilot not following instructions; the Controller was not actually clearly giving them out. The Controller never responded with left or right downwind. He did respond with 'Get on the downwind Runway 32!' As the aircraft was trying to figure out which downwind; the Controller asked the Blackhawks if they could see an airplane. The Blackhawks reported that they saw a helicopter on right downwind at which point the Controller stated something like 'I wasn't sure what type of aircraft it was.' From this; it became clear to everyone listening that there were clear miscommunications from the very beginning. Shortly after the aircraft tried to make a position report; the Controller came over the frequency and inappropriately said 'Hey if you can't speak English you shouldn't be flying the plane!' The unprofessional nature of this statement and general anger from the Controller only worsened an already difficult situation. All of this made it more difficult for the pilot to communicate and understand what was trying to be communicated. Unnecessary condescending actions; e.g. the statements; over the frequency; e.g. 'Hey if you can't speak English you shouldn't be flying the plane;' were clearly taking focus away from flying and contributed nothing to a safe landing. As heard in tone shift throughout the exchange; messaging toward the pilot that he was an idiot and that he was not welcome in the airspace; directly and dramatically reduced the pilot's performance. There were no corrective interjections as I did not want to clog the frequency even more.

Small aircraft pilot reported a Tower Controller's phraseology and performance was unsafe and unprofessional.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were on our filed route LAS direct to BCE; then J100 approaching an area of thunderstorms prior to BCE with tops to FL450. We requested a left deviation for weather and were cleared to deviate 'left of course; direct to EKR when able.' We deviated approximately 12 NM left of course to get past the first line of cells. In the vicinity of BCE was another line of cells north of our original course and straight in front of us. We initiated a right turn to avoid those cells; remaining left of our original course line of LAS-BCE-J100. We were still left of our original course and turning toward EKR as we cleared the second line of cells; when SLC Center asked us why we had turned right. We informed them we had been cleared left of course and remained left of our original course the entire time. The Controller indicated that a right turn was not allowed. My understanding was my clearance was to remain left of my original course and that ATC would provide separation for us as long as we did not deviate right of our original course. I was asked to contact SLC Center on arrival; which I did. They informed me the situation would require further review.

An Air carrier had clearance to deviate left of course for weather and direct EKR when able. After clearing the first cell a right turn was made to avoid a second cell; still remaining left of the original course line. ATC informed the crew that they should have received clearance for the right turn.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 7800; Flight Crew Type 4000

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

While on a visual approach to Runway 15 at ADS; approach control called out a primary target that was not communicating with ATC. We were level at 4;000 MSL and primary target was climbing under us. We got a TA at first then a RA requiring a climb. We climbed to 5;000 MSL before the threat disappeared. We advised ATC of our actions and landed without further event.

BE40 Captain reported an NMAC with another aircraft while on a visual approach to ADS.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 151; Flight Crew Total 20080; Flight Crew Type 4483

[On this international flight] we complied with the letter of the new FAR on crew rest. The government has now managed to legislate me into a lower level of safety! Only an individual pilot can know what his body responds to and won't respond to. On the ultra-long haul flights I can see how having the flying pilot's break all in the second half makes sense. On mid-level Europe flying it lowers the level of safety. My entire career almost all flying pilots chose the mid break. They got some level of sleep; were back in the cockpit a few hours before landing to thoroughly plan the descent and approach. Now; after being forced by the government to take the last break; you get back to the flight deck just before beginning descent. You don't have adequate time to get ATIS; plan the descent and find hidden gotchas. Same goes for the approach. If you get assigned an approach you're not used to flying you don't have adequate time to plan for it. The big question; 'why don't you have adequate time'? The reason we all chose the mid breaks before is when your body is already sleep deprived  from multiple overseas trips per month; it takes much longer than normal to fully wake and get your head back in the game. I've watched many of my co-pilots (and myself) over the years and we tend to be sluggish and lethargic for a longer period of time than you might think. On [this] flight I found myself reacting to the situation. My mind is normally three miles ahead of the aircraft; in this case it was all I could do to keep up.Earlier this month I [flew another international flight] with a new hire on his first day in the airplane. The other first officer was on his fifth day in the airplane! I really needed to have my approach and descent well planned out since I would also be in teaching mode with my new pilots. [The destination airport] can be very difficult if you don't manage your energy level perfectly as they often give you a direct that cuts a few miles off the approach. If you have not managed your energy; you will find yourself high and fast rolling out on a short final. This leads to an unstable approach. I found it more difficult to stay ahead of the aircraft and perform to the level that I expect of myself than before the FAA mandated a rest break that my body doesn't adapt to.

B767 international Captain reported he felt less rested and therefore less safe following the FAA mandated international rest break schedule.


We were approaching CHO runway 3 from the north in right traffic. We had briefed that there was a mountain ridge 4000' (according to the 10-7 page) to the west of the airport and that right traffic would be more appropriate. The MSA to the Northwest was 4900' and to the Southeast was 2000' of Gordonsville VOR. We were cleared for the visual approach and to broadcast on advisory since tower was closed. We were downwind descending midfield to 2600' thinking we were appropriately clear of the terrain and the 1796' tower located on the downwind. As we were about to turn base; we were noticing the sector height turning yellow at 025. Then we received a 'TERRAIN' AURAL CAUTION EGPWS and took appropriate evasive action climbing to 3000 feet.The main threat is the tower on downwind and the canted MSA line for terrain based on GVE VOR which is further south and east of the field. We were attempting to stay safe and get configured early outside the SIPME final approach fix as appropriate to have a stabilized approach. We chose right downwind to safely avoid the 4000' mountain ridge 10 miles west of the field mentioned in the 10-7 page. Secondarily; it was late in the day and we were approaching 12 hours of duty. I think the error is that we missed that MSA location maybe assuming it to be further north and centered on the field. The UAS is definitely that the EGPWS caution parameters were set off based on our altitude near terrain and/or manmade obstacle in the downwind. A great deal was learned from this event. Fortunately it wasn't a more extreme EGPWS WARNING; but a UAS nonetheless. We need to be better at Situational Awareness in terrain at night by planning better and having a better idea of the location of the navaid that the MSA is based on. Here it was further south than we thought. At night; as we do in a place like AVL; we should be on a segment of the ILS possibly at this location before accepting the visual. We got into the visual approach mindset and thought we were safely approaching. We need to pay more attention on these clear nights when these threats are present so as to avoid this UAS.

Air Carrier crew reported they received a TERRAIN warning on a night visual approach to runway 3 CHO. Crew reported climbing and made a successful landing.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure; Aircraft

B737-700 aircraft came in on MEL for Dual Channel Mach Trim failure. I pulled Maintenance Manual (M/M) and performed Digital Flight Control System (DFCS) Built-in Test Equipment (Bite) Check. DFCS passed all tests; verified by Lead Mechanic; and on the next day [verified] by the Line Maintenance Manager. I have cleared write-ups like this before; but did not know there were [Mach Trim] Circuit Breakers (C/Bs) pulled; the DFCS passed all tests with [Mach Trim] Circuit Breakers out (pulled). When I got home; I thought about the situation and called Dayshift Line Lead on shift and he verified before aircraft left that the [Mach Trim] C/Bs were pulled. Unfortunately; the aircraft returned to the gate during this time. Maintenance went out and found that there were circuit breakers pulled and collared. The only circuit breakers I knew about were Stab Cutout [Switches] to perform this test. MEL write-ups should have Circuit Breakers (C/Bs) listed that are pulled for any MEL. Graveyard [shift].

Reporter stated he had signed-off the Mach Trim MEL deferral based on the results of the BITE Test of the Digital Flight Control System (DFCS). He has worked Line Maintenance for thirty years and that was the first time he has ever experienced a BITE Test passing for a Mach Trim with all four Mach Trim Circuit Breakers (C/Bs) open (pulled). Part of his check procedure prior to performing a Mach Trim Test is to position the two guarded Stab Trim Cutout Switches on the Center Pedestal from 'Normal' to 'Cut-Out.' He never noticed the Mach Trim C/Bs behind the Captain and First Officer's seats were pulled (open) as part of the original MEL deferral for the earlier Dual Channel Mach Trim failure. Mostly due to the fact his Air Carrier uses codes on the MEL to indicate which C/Bs are pulled instead of actually identifying the C/B location and system. His expectation was the C/Bs would be closed. That's why he has suggested his Air Carrier specifically identify pulled Circuit Breakers on any MEL deferral. Reporter stated what still bothers him; is how could the DFCS BITE Test for the Mach Trim still pass; no one that he has talked with has given any explanation for that situation. The aircraft returned to the gate because the flight crew noticed the C/Bs for the Mach trim were still pulled and collared; even though the Mach Trim MEL had been signed-off.

A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) questions how a Digital Flight Control System (DFCS) Test for a Dual Channel Mach Trim System could have passed with all four Mach Trim Circuit Breakers (C/Bs) 'Open' (pulled). The B737-700 flight crew returned to the gate after noticing the C/Bs were still pulled; even though a Mach Trim MEL had been signed-off.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

The flight attendants reported that they had a possible fire in the aft galley. An oven which had been turned off for about 45 minutes was found to be very hot and there was a faint electrical odor. There was no smoke. She asked permission to pull the circuit breakers in the aft galley and I said yes. I said that the oven should cool down slowly once power was removed but to keep me informed. A few minutes later the Flight Attendant informed me that when they opened the oven door; the oven was found to be glowing red hot on the side panel holes and was emitting intense heat. One Flight Attendant donned a PBE and discharged one Halon fire extinguisher into the oven; as it did not seem to be cooling down. I was the pilot flying and at this point I directed the First Officer to run the QRC/QRH for Smoke Fumes or Fire in the Cabin. At this time I also overheard a Flight Attendant making a PA about these unusual activities in the aft galley and I immediately followed it up with my own PA. At this point I told the passengers that the flight attendants had dealt with an oven overheat and that power was removed and the situation was stable and we would be watching it closely. On the flight deck the First Officer had gotten down to step 11 on the QRH. Galley power was off. Just a few minutes later; the Flight Attendant informed me that the oven did not seem to be cooling down and the adjacent bins also seemed quite warm. There was clearly concern in her voice. We decided that the second choice of step 11 was appropriate: We proceeded down that path which involved diverting to the nearest suitable airport. I informed the Flight Attendant that we would divert to ZZZ and she seemed relieved. Although we were just north of ZZZ1 and about 110 miles south of ZZZ; we were at 40;000 FT and were at the perfect distance to accomplish our descent; giving us time to finish the QRH and adequately prepare for the approach. The winds at ZZZ favored landing to the north (straight ahead). It was very simple to continue straight ahead and begin a normal descent. Landing at ZZZ1 would have required a higher workload due to the extra maneuvering that would have been required and a more difficult energy management task. It would not have been any quicker unless we did an emergency descent profile which I did not feel was appropriate. Once the decision to divert was made; I had the First Officer complete the QRH and start building the approach in ZZZ. I declared an emergency with Center; using the words galley oven fire; gave them our souls on board and fuel; and our intention to divert to ZZZ. I asked Center to inform our company Dispatch of our emergency and intention to divert. I made a second PA informing the passengers that although the situation with the oven seemed stable; the oven was not cooling down as fast as we would like; and the safe course of action was to divert to ZZZ (words to that effect). During the 20 minutes or so it took to get to the airport; the fumes and heat dissipated gradually and we decided that a normal taxi to the gate and deplaning was appropriate. We so informed ATC that we did not anticipate any evacuation and intended to taxi to the gate.During the descent; Dispatch called us and I talked to them briefly about our situation and intentions. Dispatch sent an amended release via ACARS for the divert to ZZZ. RNAV GPS Y Runway 34L approach; with field in sight 15 miles out. Passengers deplaned; all seemed in good spirits. No smoke in the cabin; no injuries. Passengers remained calm the entire time. I made another PA in the gate area to thank the passengers for their patience and understanding; and informed them of the plan to fly in replacement aircraft. I offered to answer questions that anyone might have as soon as I completed required paperwork and phone reports. The First Officer remained in the gate area talking to passengers while I went back to the aircraft. I wrote up three discrepancies in the logbook; the oven overheat; the use of the PBE and the use of the Halon fire extinguisher. Mechanics flew in and about 2 hours after landing; found the oven controller to still be quite warm. Mechanics found no damage to any structure or wiring; suspecting a runaway controller. FAA Maintenance Inspector arrived about the same time the mechanics did and questioned the crew and the mechanics inspected the galley oven briefly. He asked for and was provided copies of all Maintenance logbook write-ups; and the Maintenance Ferry Permit which we provided to him. He commented that he thought we did everything right. Mechanics' initial assessment was a runaway oven controller (thermostat).

B737-700 Captain is informed of a runaway oven in the aft galley by flight attendants requesting permission to pull circuit breakers; which is granted. The oven does not appear to be cooling down and a halon fire extinguisher is discharged into the oven and the crew elects to run the QRH for smoke or fire that cannot be extinguished quickly and divert to a suitable airport.


G2 Heritage (Glasair II) / G3 Heritage (Glasair III)

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

What led to the event happening: I had just gotten back from leave.  I worked the mid the night before after returning from that leave; and then had an OT shift to work an early morning.  Traffic was fairly light; but complexity was fairly high due to multiple things happening all over the sector.  The sector is fairly complex in that it requires changing transmitters and receivers constantly to talk to and hear aircraft in the sector.   This sector often has a D side.  My D side had just gone on break and the sector seemed to be fine; but then I was overcome with some additional challenges; and my D side returned from break right about as this situation was happening. Terrain in this sector is the highest in the center and it requires a lot of monitoring of aircraft to make sure they are meeting MIA's.  We have been on 6 day work weeks for a long time due to the staffing issues FAA wide; but it definitely has impacted the moral and has exhausted myself.  I was slightly blind-sided by the call from the aircraft due to no weather reports south of ZZZ1.As the complexity was rising in the sector due to multiple different situations; I had a departure aircraft of type I am not familiar; depart one of the busiest departure airports in our center.  The aircraft was a slow climber and requested to deviate below the terrain.  The call caught me off guard and I approved his request to deviate noticing the terrain close to him but not the MIA he was currently in.  I approved a slight deviation to avoid the higher terrain to his right; and shortly after noticing my mistake; I corrected myself and asked the pilot to tell me the conditions (IFR/VFR) to see if that could save me; but then ultimately told him that I cannot approve his request to deviate below the terrain until he was above unless he was declaring an emergency.  He said that he was not declaring an emergency and was correcting back on course.  I then issued a proper clearance to deviate out of the MIA.  The pilot had already turned off of the SID a few degrees before I caught the mistake and corrected it.-Hiring needs to improve in the FAA so that we are not working 6 day works weeks constantly and getting exhausted-Staffing needs to improve from hiring more people so that we can not be overcome with sick leave requests and the constant COVID happenstances that we are finding ourselves in today.  There is a constant out flux of people due to sickness or the FAA medical office taking peoples medical clearances away even when they are not sick and are testing negative for COVID.  -People are abusing the system most likely due to the two reasons above and are finding every way they can to get out of work because of the poor mental health and low staffing numbers that we are in every day.  My recommendation is that the FAA fixes their hiring issues immediately so that more problems don't continue to arise from the extreme apparent staffing issues we are currently seeing.

Center Controller reported an aircraft that was climbing below the MIA and wanted permission to do so.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 4; Flight Crew Total 166; Flight Crew Type 17

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

With this aircraft I'm unable to 'dip' the tanks to get a reliable measurement of fuel onboard. I have to use the fuel gauges. Fuel assessment before flight: Left tank indicated 1/2 full; right tank indicated 5/8 full. While in flight I noticed fuel was being depleted faster than I expected and decided to return to ZZZ. Right Traffic XXR. After touchdown the aircraft started to porpoise so I went around. This happened twice. On the third attempt I was on right base to final and ATC instructed me to re-join the right downwind then (if I remember correctly) gave me a landing clearance for XXR.While turning to final; the engine quits; [priority landing] procedures ensue; [requested priority handling] with ATC; landed safely in the desert East of ZZZ. What I think happened [was] fuel starvation. I incorrectly thought I had [approximately] 2.7 hours of fuel on board based on the fuel gauges. What I've learned [is that there should be] a digital fuel management system installed.

M-20 Pilot reported fuel starvation caused engine failure and resulted in an air turn back and off airport landing.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 228; Flight Crew Total 1150; Flight Crew Type 130

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Landing at ZZZ with about 40 minutes of fuel estimated upon arrival. Upon entering traffic pattern; I experienced some delays due to faster aircraft on final for [Runway] XXR. Cleared to land number two behind a military F-16 and ahead of another military jet; I believe an F15. Tried keeping my speed up; but it wasn't enough and told to go-around. Upon going around and entering the traffic pattern a second time; I was now at minimum fuel and declared minimum fuel. Tower told me they will get me down and that I'm number two behind a Company jet. Following behind the Company jet; I noticed they were taking a long time to get off the runway; so I slowed down as much as I could so I could avoid another go-around. The Company jet began to exit the runway as I was getting close to touching down and then I was told a second time to go-around. I replied 'Unable' and landed. By the time of touchdown the jet was clear of the runway completely. Tower and I both exchanged apologies as I was taxiing to the FBO and went on our way. I wanted to report this since I did land without a landing clearance; but I was uncomfortable with doing another lap in the pattern with such low amount of fuel. I felt the safety of flight would be compromised and decided to land rather than risk a worse situation.

C320 pilot reported landing without clearance due to low fuel caused by a go-around and conflict with military jet aircraft and a commercial passenger jet that didn't clear the runway in time.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 358; Flight Crew Type 11000

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Speed All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Weather; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Just after confirmation from the FAs (Flight Attendants) that they had secured the cabin as requested and were seated due to expected turbulence on the arrival I was notified we had a medical emergency in progress. At that point I informed the FO (First Officer) of the situation PF (Pilot Flying); and asked him to take COMM 1; inform ATC; and do his best to avoid weather and turbulence since we would now have people up in the cabin during the descent do to the event in progress. He acknowledged and I began the STAT-MD connection procedure and coordination with the FAs. Unfortunately the FAs were having a rough time getting their medical headset connected and finding a Doctor onboard. The Passenger was unconscious with a very low breath and heart rate. By the time the FAs were able to respond to STAT-MD we had already transitioned through the ARINC sector and a new patch had to be made again. When the new patch was made the FA could not communicate on the headset and decide to put the headset on the Doctor assisting.This caused a complete 'lock up' of the COMM due to the Doctor of course not knowing our procedures and keeping the transmit button depressed causing a hot mic. Stat MD was trying to give us instructions but were inaudible due to the blocked frequency. After repeated attempts of calling the FAs over the intercom and even PA announcements; the Doctor was finally removed from the headset so we could make a plan of action with STAT-MD and Dispatch. I immediately made contact with The FAs and requested to not put the Doctor on the headset again and I can relay if needed which is standard operating procedure. At that point of conversation I heard the autopilot disconnect; and felt a semi abrupt pitch up of the aircraft. Immediately I observed the FO hand flying the aircraft at a 2;000 FPM climb through FL360 with power at idle and speedbrakes deployed. Airspeed was close to over speed indication.I made a call out of airspeed and inquired what was going on. FO stated he had an updraft and was preventing an overspeed. I aggressively called for him to lower the nose observing the airspeed decreasing rapidly and the engines now near idle. The FO immediately lowered the nose and regained control of the aircraft. After control was assumed and he reconnected the autopilot; I went back to dealing with the emergency medical issue and inquiring the FO what happened. He was descending to FL240 from FL400 when he said we hit an updraft. We were in moderate turbulence the entire time but I did not observe much airspeed fluctuations that would aggravate airspeed that bad. I notified Center of the climb during the descent due to an updraft at that point we were given another crossing restriction.Now back in the green; I was trying to get landing data and ATIS for a low-vis approach into ZZZ. We were experiencing difficulties due to ACARS NO COMM through the weather and 2-wire going up and down with service. At that point I observed the FO once again near overspeed and made the callout. He corrected speed and was complaining it was the aircraft. Trying to figure out what was going on I noted the descent page had be set at 320 kts. I immediately corrected the setting to 280 (turbulent penetration speed) and explained you can't set an airspeed that high and not expect an overspeed especially since we had been in moderate turbulence the entire time. I asked ATC to waive the next crossing restriction so we could slow appropriately and we continued safely to ZZZ. While debriefing the event we talked about task saturation and what had happened. I never got an answer if he had reset the descent page to that high of an airspeed. During cruise we set at ECON at CI40.Preventative Measures: I believe the FO felt like we needed to expedite the arrival due to the medical which caused both near overspeed events and the climb during a descent. As PM (Pilot Monitoring) I was never informed of the new setting and missed seeing it due totask saturation dealing with the medical emergency communication issue. The CI was set normal and we were ECON setting; which is what leads me to believe this theory. Also the FA putting an untrained Doctor on our medical headset blocked our COMM 2; which really escalated the medical emergency especially since we were dealing with inclement weather and turbulence at the same time. I have never ran in to this situation. I believe task saturation and additive conditions caused a breakdown in our CRM putting the flight in a situation.

Air carrier Captain reported FO expediting arrival with priority medical and over sped the aircraft.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Manuals; Airport; Human Factors; Procedure

Acting as Pilot Flying in left seat on a scheduled 91k flight with 2 passengers during closed Tower operations. Upon release from Center; the Pilot Monitoring cancelled IFR and switched to Unicom frequency; making all appropriate VFR calls for approach; landing; and taxi. Upon landing; we were met at the aircraft by Airfield Operations who asked if we knew they were on the runway on our approach. I stated I saw them on a taxiway to the left of the runway. The gentleman said he was on the runway and heard no calls on the radio on CTAF frequency. I stated I heard the Pilot Monitoring making all calls and the FBO heard all calls. Pilot Monitoring and Pilot Flying discussed radio frequencies and recognized we were on Unicom and not CTAF on arrival and the Airfield Ops personnel stated they do not monitor Unicom.After review of AIM and FOM; was still unclear as to priority of frequencies; determined crew should have been talking and monitoring CTAF. Review priority of frequencies when CTAF and Unicom is provided in addition to recommending airfield operations personnel monitor both frequencies.

[Report narrative contains no additional information.]

A flight crew landing at an airport where the Tower was closed communicated on Unicom instead of CTAF when there were ground personnel working on the runway monitoring CTAF.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40.5; Flight Crew Total 753.6

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

I am a flight instructor at a 141 school. I am currently one of the instructors teaching the Private Pilot curriculum. The error I committed was sending one of my students on a solo flight without a current solo endorsement. Normally in our curriculum; a student pilot solo endorsement would not expire before the student earns their PPL. Due to COVID; our curriculum got pushed back and winter break put a pause on the private curriculum just a few flights before the check ride. The time added was enough for all student solo endorsements to expire. Knowing this; we added a reminder in our CFI guide that follows along with our Private Pilot Training Syllabus. The reminder was placed on the flight just before the solo flight. Due to the lost proficiency over winter break; I was not ready to give this student a new solo endorsement at the beginning of this spring semester.The issue began on the flight before the solo flight. This particular flight was the fourth time I had instructed this curricular period in the last 30 days so; I felt confident on the expectations of the flight. Because of this; I did not review the CFI guide before or after the flight and therefore missed the solo endorsement reminder. With my full permission; my student then flew solo the next day.I discovered the issue when I went to send that student on their next solo flight and I asked them to prove to me they had their required documents and endorsements. I then quickly gave a new solo endorsement.

Flight Instructor reported a student flew a cross country flight without having the correct solo endorsement.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 0.5

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

While working the radar at the Center; I verbally coordinated with the controller next to me that I would coordinate with Approach; that Approach can have control for descent on Aircraft X who is landing at an airport just outside of their airspace. I called Approach and told them Aircraft X will be descending to 9;000 feet; their control with me. As Aircraft X started to descend; Aircraft Y; a C525; departed southwest bound climbing to 10;000 feet from another Approach's airspace that would put him in conflict with Aircraft X. I then called them and told them to stop Aircraft Y at 8;000 feet and assign a 180 heading; to go behind Aircraft X and to avoid the TFR area. I then called the other Approach and pointed out Aircraft Y climbing to 8;000 feet on a 180 heading and that Aircraft X is still their control reference that traffic; and my control on Aircraft Y. They said point out approved. As Aircraft Y leveled off at 8;000 [feet]; Aircraft X continued his descent through his altitude. Approach then turned Aircraft Y further southeast bound to avoid conflict with Aircraft X in the descent. With the approved coordination with both Approach Controls; I'm unsure of what form of separation was being applied or if all of the approved coordination was accurately relayed to the appropriate controller.

A Center Controller reported they handed off an arriving aircraft to an Approach Control and coordinated a plan to resolve a confliction with a departure from another Approach Control but observed the arriving aircraft descend through the altitude of the departing aircraft.


Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Super tugs finished moves to Gate ZXX and Gate ZXY during the XX:00 bank on DATE. They were then observed empty joining [Taxiway] XX without talking to Ramp Control; cutting off aircraft currently on [Taxiway] XX.

Dispatcher reported two super tugs cut off a taxiing aircraft on the taxiway without talking to ramp control.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Gate Agent was extremely pushy trying to board us. Lots of bags and passenger assistance needed. Left full exit row to assist elderly woman 5 rows past exit row then wait for complete boarding to go brief [the exit row passengers]. Had to arrange lots of bags to keep from checking plus unusual amount of folks going to back lavatory and interrupting.When aisle finally cleared passenger stopped me to put backpack in overhead and completely blocked; passed exit rows without briefing. After demo; passenger in exit row called me over and said they were not briefed. I briefed then. This has never happened before.

Flight Attendant reported not briefing the exit row passengers due to being distracted.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

I recently submitted a [safety report] to report problems with MD-80 FMS operations on some of the new RNAV arrivals into DFW. Yesterday; I received a close out message that stated that the MD-80 Fleet Captain had been notified and was aware of issue. Today I had an almost exact repeat of the issue in a different FMS-equipped aircraft on the BOOVE 1 RNAV arrival.During operation to DFW; I encountered a problem with the FMS operation. Shortly after departure; I noticed that the FMS was not computing ETA's and predicted fuel for the next waypoint and destination. I confirmed that all the necessary information was entered correctly into the FMS. Having seen this problem before and realizing that the VNAV function of the FMS would likely not be available; I thoroughly briefed the FO on alternate procedures we would use to comply with the numerous restrictions on the BOOVE Arrival. As we approached the beginning of the arrival; all VNAV information to include TOD point; the Vertical Deviation Indication (VDI) and scale were not present and remained unavailable during the arrival. We executed the descent using the airspeed and vertical speed modes of the autopilot. The 'green arc' altitude crossing indicator did function normally and provided altitude prediction guidance as we stepped through each of the altitude constraints. All lateral; speed; and vertical constraints were complied with. After passing the last waypoint on the arrival and while transitioning to the instrument approach; the VNAV and associated VDI displayed functions returned and appeared to operate normally. The close out message on my previous report suggests that this is a KNOWN ANOMALY with MD-80 FMS aircraft. While some knowledge of this problem is anecdotally passed around among MD-80 crews; I do not recall seeing any official guidance from our fleet managers regarding this issue and suggested alternate procedures to manage these high-workload RNAV arrivals.We recently received a company message regarding the importance of making smooth; constant rate descents on the new RNAV arrivals into DFW. The absence of a functioning VNAV makes this goal all the more difficult. I highly suggest that the MD-80 fleet team put together some type of communication regarding the limitations and possible degraded operating modes of the FMS system when dealing with complex RNAV arrivals to include guidance on how to best comply with the stringent altitude and speed constraints in the absence of any VNAV guidance. I would also suggest that it be made a HOT ITEM by the training department and include a related training module in our next training cycle.

MD-80 Captain described limitations of his aircraft FMS that makes flying complex DFW RNAV arrivals difficult.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

An A319 called up on a Visual Approach to the Runway XXC. I didn't have any aircraft close to Runway XXL for departure; so I switched the A319; and cleared him to land on Runway XXL. Meanwhile; Ground was taxiing about 7 aircraft out for departure; so I was checking the sequence for departure. I requested that Ground Control taxi a Dash-8 to Runway XXL at E to split up two aircraft that were departing westbound one after another. I forgot that the A319 was on final for Runway XXL and cleared a B737 for takeoff. The B737 did not respond. The A319 verified his clearance to land on Runway XXL. Initially; I cleared him to land again thinking that he was lined up for Runway XXC; as forgot I switched him to Runway XXL. I double checked the ASDE-X; looked out the window; realized that I had switched the A319 to Runway XXL and immediately sent the A319 around. The B737 had crossed a few feet over the hold line for Runway XXL; so the ASDE-X Go-Around Alert went off. I coordinated with 'Departure Y' to let him know that the A319 was a go-around; turning right heading 195; and maintaining 2;000 FT. I then shipped the A319 to departure. I would recommend reducing the amount of time I was position late in the evening.

Tower Controller described a directed go around event where he/she failed to realized an arrival aircraft was changed to a parallel runway with traffic cleared for takeoff.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

While operating Aircraft X; we had a GPWS event. I was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) and the first officer was the pilot flying (PF). It was a clear day and we had the terrain in sight the whole time. We had been cleared for the visual approach into ZZZ and were configuring to land; coming over the hills/mountains. There was some turbulence and as we were coming over the mountains; we received the GPWS warnings. I had previously mentioned to the first officer it might be advisable to stay slightly high until we we're past the hills/mountains. Once we received the warnings; we immediately stopped the descent and complied with the GPWS command. We continued on with the visual approach and landed without any issue. We detected the event had occurred when we got the GPWS warning.The cause of the event could be attributed to the mountainous terrain; slight turbulence; and the fact that we were cleared for the visual approach and descended slightly early coming over the terrain.Once we received the GPWS warnings; we arrested the descent and complied with the GPWS commands.To avoid events like this; it might be helpful to delay getting cleared for the visual until you're closer to the airports; past terrain such as hills/mountains. Also; stay at a slightly higher altitude when crossing over terrain such as hills/mountains.

E145 Captain reported a GPWS warning on approach with the terrain in sight.


Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

After completing work on an interior log item on Aircraft X; I checked the flight deck to make sure the battery was off. I found the battery on and switched it to off not realizing the APU was running at the time. I then called my Lead to make sure it was OK to leave the battery off; but he told me the plane was leaving soon and to leave the battery on. I put the battery back on; then immediately left the aircraft and returned to the ready room and told my Lead I was off the aircraft. A few minutes later we got word that there was a fire in the tail area of aircraft X.

Technician reported turning the aircraft battery switch to off with the APU running; then turning the battery switch back to on a B757. Later it was reported that there was a fire in the APU compartment.


Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Manuals; Human Factors; Company Policy; Aircraft; Procedure; Staffing

[Engineering Department] originally wrote an EA (Engineering Authorization) for replacement of numerous damaged airbag seatbelt covers to be replaced NLT (No Later Than) 2902 FC (Flight Cycles). When the TWD came; and the seat-belts could not be replaced; [Engineering Department] wrote a revision to the original EA allowing additional time provided no airbag material extrudes outside the covers. Per that EA; if there was any material found outside of the cover; the seat needed to be placed on MEL (they also mentioned a specific MEL; which is not their determination). After that EA was written; and during the accomplishment of repair instruction II of the EA; Maintenance found airbag material extruding outside of the cover. At that point ; and due to the amount of seats that would have been unusable; [Engineering Department] wrote another EA against the previous EA allowing the seats to continue in-service (USEABLE) with subsequent inspections to be accomplished. This is in direct violation of the MEL's; [Procedures Manual] ([Maintenance Control] determines which MEL is to be used)In an effort to mitigate a delay and ensure all seats were available; regardless of the safety of the passengers; [Engineering Department] issued a 3rd EA against previous EA's. The use of EA's by engineering has been out of control and getting worse. All to ensure an on-time performance disregarding the safety of passengers and crew. There needs to be a limited availability for the use of Engineering Authorizations. In the past; every EA ([Engineering] and [Line Engineering Order]) came through Maintenance Control to be issued. The Controller had to approve its use and their name was on the Authorization prior to its issuance. We were the checks and balances. Now; there aren't any. There was also extremely limited [Procedures Manual] and guidelines for issuance of an Authorization. I believe; in order to ensure safety and compliance; the use of the carte blanche EA process needs to be reined in and check and balances re-established as before.

Air Carrier Maintenance Technician reports improper use of Engineering Authorization to defer maintenance action.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; MEL; Human Factors; Aircraft

[EICAS] Status message - DET TURB OVHT ENG R about one hour into flight. Checked for message in QRH. Could not find. Relief Pilot and First Officer later checked and could not find either. Sent notification to Dispatch. They requested we call [Maintenance]. Upon [communication] patch with Maintenance; it was determined that a cautionary landing was recommended. Maintenance stated there was no Turbine Overheat notification protection and therefore a landing [best] best course of action. Maintenance stated QRH required this for the indication. We stated we found no such status message in our QRH; but decided best course to follow Maintenance and Dispatch recommendation. Requested ATC course direct ZZZ and declared an emergency. Reviewed QRH procedures for an Overweight Landing and elected to do so. Landed on speed at 157 KTS/500 FPM descent rate at 552 K. Normal rollout. Remaining issue is why above status message not in QRH? Did find it in MEL under 77-3. If item can be flight crew placarded; why air interrupt the flight? [Recommend] update/correct QRH for above Status message. Dispatch/Maintenance recommendation inconsistent with MEL. However; we opted on the side of conservancy rather than continue. Indication malfunction.

Decision made to return to ZZZ; declared emergency; reviewed procedures for Overweight Landing and executed same. Landing; rollout and taxi in [was] uneventful. The status light and its relationship to the QRH are confusing as written.

Four pilots question why an air turnback was recommended by Maintenance when the same EICAS Status message for a Right Engine Turbine Overheat indication on their B777-200 aircraft could be placarded by the flight crew; in flight; under MEL 77-3. An emergency was also declared. No reference to status message in their QRH. Erratic Autothrottles on final also noted.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 4900; Flight Crew Type 100

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

After being switched on downwind from XXL to XXR; requiring overflying the field; and then being told to go around and switch again to XXL; the engine sputtered and lost power while on downwind for XXL; approximately abeam the departure end. I immediately began a 90deg turn toward the runway and advised tower I would be landing against traffic (on YYR). I was able to lower the gear and partial flaps; complete the 2nd 90 deg turn onto the runway; landing about 2000 ft down. Tower directed traffic on final to XXL to go around. I turned off the runway at Taxiway X; but had to get out and pull the plane across the line.This experimental aircraft has both fuel gauges and a fuel flow/totalizer instrument. The gauges are not very accurate; and in the past I have depended on the totalizer for actual fuel-on-board.  In this case; the gauges were reading empty (as they often do below ~7 gals/side); but the totalizer reported 13.3 gallons remaining (of 60 gals total capacity) when I entered the pattern. After pulling the plane to a safe area; I sumped both sides and both showed no fuel. I added 3.5 gals from a gas can to the right tank. The engine started fine and I taxied the plane to the hangar without incident.  I was very lucky indeed.I am not the builder; but the 3rd owner of this unusual GP-4 experimental aircraft. In my honest opinion; the discrepancy between the heretofore reliable fuel totalizer and the actual gauges led me to disregard the gauges; the wrong response.  Because of the tank arrangement in the plane; it is not possible to 'stick' the tanks to check fuel. I think that the correct fix for this problem is 3-fold. [1] Replace the unreliable fuel  gauges with a carefully calibrated digital system. [2] Recalibrate the fuel flow/totalizer instrument over a number of flights against actual measured fuel used. [3] Until both #1 and #2 are completed; fully fill the tanks and set a *maximum* flight time of 4.5 hours between fills. (Nominal average fuel burn; chock-to-chock; is 10 gph. Total capacity is 60 gals; so this should leave at least 15 gals as minimum fuel.

GP-4 pilot reported loss of power on downwind due to fuel exhaustion.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

After leveling at 10;000 ft MSL; IMC; we had an ICE caution message appear. We turned on the wing anti-ice system. The cowl anti-ice was already on. Shortly after an ANTI-ICE DUCT warning message posted on ED1. While we were running the QRH checklist the warning message extinguished. It did not reoccur. Then an ANTI-ICE DUCT caution message posted on ED2 for approximately 15 seconds; then cleared. It did not reoccur. Approximately 1/2 to 3/4 of an inch of rime was visible on the wiper arm at this time. We notified ATC and requested an emergency return to ZZZ and lower altitude to get out of the freezing precipitation. An intermittent R Wing A/I (anti-ice) caution message posted until landing. It did not stay up long enough to run the R WING A/I caution QRH checklist. We returned to ZZZ safely. No ice accumulation was noted on post flight inspection.  Apparent equipment failure. Wing anti-ice warning and caution messages in icing conditions with ice accumulating.

CRJ900 pilot reported experiencing intermittent R Wing A/I Caution messages during cruise.


Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Weather; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure; Company Policy

Aircraft X was transitioning from the STAR to approach on the flight into destination airport. Aircraft X checked in with Approach Controller and informed him they were in receipt of information Mike; issued at (time). The Approach Controller stated that information Oscar was now current and for the Crew to get it and report back once in receipt. Aircraft X asked the Controller if there were any significant changes in information Oscar from Mike. The Controller stated that since the ATIS is now two letters later the flight should check and get Oscar. Aircraft X stated that they were busy and requested the Approach Controller provide weather contained in information Oscar. The Approach Controller ignored this call. It seemed to the Crew of Aircraft X that the Controller was being intentionally difficult or possibly was not aware of the most current weather. It did not seem busy at this point and the frequency and arrival demand was low. It appeared to the Crew that the Controller had ample time to provide this information. When time permitted; Aircraft X received the ATIS internally using ACARS. Information Oscar was the latest report and it contained a significant change in weather to include 4 SM visibility and TSRA (yeah that's a moderate thunderstorm) at the field. Aircraft X reported receipt of Oscar to the Approach Controller and highlighted the fact that this ATIS stated there was a TSRA (moderate Thunderstorm and Rain) at the airport. The Approach Controller should be aware of deteriorating weather at the destination airport and should either confirm Pilots have this information or provide to them when requested). Other aircraft on the frequency queried the Controller about the current weather when they heard what the new ATIS stated.The Approach Controller then reported that there was reported wind shear gain of 25 knots on two mile final to 4R reported by previous aircraft and began providing weather updates. This Approach Controller did not inform Aircraft X of most current weather when requested by Pilots to do so. The delay in the Pilot Crew in receiving the most current weather which included a significant change in weather increased workload at a very critical phase of flight increasing risk and the possibility of committing errors. Had the Approach Controller complied with Aircraft X request the Crew would have had more time to plan for change in weather conditions.The Approach Controller needs to be reminded of his/her obligations under 7110.65. There are times when Pilot workload is high and a reasonable request to ATC can reduce this workload. Pilots expect Controller to comply with guidance in 7110.65. Recent experience indicates that Approach Controllers are increasingly shirking the basic duty of providing arrival weather and increasingly expect Pilots to obtain the latest ATIS even if it has recently changed; this means they are either unaware of the most current weather or do not understand that they should provide it upon request. There are times when the task of obtaining the latest ATIS in a compressed time situation can cause a serious distraction. It's one thing to be prepared for these issues; it's another to have these situations created because someone isn't doing their job. I understand that the same could be said for a Controller; but this did not seem to be one of those situations. In addition a thunderstorm on the field at the destination is critical information and should be provided to Pilots immediately. In this case; that was not done either. This is the pertinent section from the FAA order: FAA JO 7110.65; section 2-9-1 states: Controllers must ensure that Pilots receive the most current pertinent information. Ask the Pilot to confirm receipt of the current ATIS information if the Pilot does not initially state the appropriate ATIS code. Controllers must ensure that changes to pertinent operational information is provided after the initial confirmation of ATIS informationis established. Issue the current weather; runway in use; approach information; and pertinent NOTAMs to Pilots who are unable to receive the ATIS.

An air carrier pilot reported that the Approach Controller would not read them the latest ATIS forcing them to get the information via ACARS.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 414; Flight Crew Type 309

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

My student and I were on a training flight heading to PRC from the north for closed traffic. This particular flight was the student's final review flight before submission to the stage check and as the instructor I wanted to evaluate my private pilot student on traffic patterns. My student was given the clearance by Tower to make right base for a 4 mile final for Runway 21L. As the instructor; I monitored the progress of flight and my student eventually neglected to descent from 8;000 FT MSL to Traffic Pattern Altitude (TPA) and overshot the normal position to make right base for a 4 mile final. When it became apparent to me that with our current heading we weren't able to fly the pattern as assigned; I gave my student time to notice his deviation and make appropriate corrections. During this time I had also noted converging traffic (head-on) on our MFD of our G1000 equipped airplane which was still in Class D airspace and climbing for a northwest departure. As time elapsed it became clear that my student was not going to take the appropriate actions to either change heading to a right base or take evasive actions to avoid converging traffic. I took the controls and maneuvered to the right to give way. As I was making the right turn I noticed on the MFD that the converging traffic was making a left turn instead of also giving way to the right and I subsequently initiated a climbing right turn to avoid getting too close. It was during this climbing right turn when I made visual contact for the first time and noted that the separation between us was about 400 FT horizontal and 300 FT vertical. After the other aircraft became no factor any more Tower advised us of a heading 110 to make a 3 mile final for [Runway] 21L. I believe the conflict was caused by my student not descending to TPA as soon as possible after receiving the before mentioned clearance. A contributing factor is also my failure to see the trend of our flight paths and my inaction of taking the controls from my student sooner. A second contributing factor is also the other pilot's incorrect action to give way to converging traffic. In the future I will set myself clear standards of unsatisfactory performance during evaluation flights in congested airspace and avoid giving my students extra time to notice any deviation from the established standards without stepping in.

An instructor reported a near miss in PRC Class D airspace after his student failed to descend to the traffic pattern altitude and extended the aircraft's downwind leg into the path of a departing aircraft.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10.0

Fatigue; Situational Awareness; Workload

Staffing; Human Factors; Company Policy; Weather

I was on the sector for a long time and every aircraft I spoke with deviated around weather the entire time. For 2 months now we've been working up to 2 hours at a time; sometimes over. We're fried mentally. A controller comes in to relieve me and I tell him to work my Assist for a minute while I get caught up. He sits there and doesn't help; so now I'm really behind. We released the first arrival and a departure while I leave the aircraft direct to downwind to build in space. I cleared the aircraft for a visual approach and I thought the first aircraft was about to land so I cleared the second aircraft for the visual approach and shipped him to Tower but I think the first aircraft had flown around the airport to lose altitude or something while I was trying to get my deviating route lines caught up. I shipped the second aircraft to Tower when the first aircraft wasn't on the ground but Tower used visual separation so it was okay; but we are operating on a razors edge with not nearly enough staffing and we're getting killed. Help us. Staff our area and facility! We are keeping airplanes apart in impossible conditions every day and being set up to fail. We're all sick of it. You should have an Assist position any time there are JAC arrivals and weather but we are pressured to run without one due to low staffing. Unacceptable!

Center Controller reported clearing an aircraft for visual approach and handoff to Tower prior to receiving a landing assured call for previous aircraft.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Hidden dangerous goods found in container from Aircraft X at warehouse by breakdown. 31 piece nickel metal hydride batteries found in one fiberboard box in bad condition not prevented from short circuits.

Safety Analyst reported discovering packaging and handling errors of HAZMAT shipment on arrival.


ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Environment - Non Weather Related; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors

Very near miss/midair with white glider while on the FISSK4 arrival into MDW. Was at 250 knots [and] 4;000 feet as I recall in contact with Chicago. Approximately over IGQ airport; close to the boundary of the mode C veil on the charts. Glider came from left to right; I saw it at the last second and realized it was going to come very close in front of us but we were not going to collide. No time to react or even say anything or take the controls from the SIC. I alerted Chicago of the near miss and at that time said we missed by 500 feet. After analyzing the event it was much closer; maybe 100 feet - 200 feet vertical and horizontal. I could see the pilot inside the glider. No TCAS alert or target; even with it on the 7.5 mile range. Chicago had no target or communications with the glider. No evasive maneuver was accomplished. Landed uneventful and passengers were unaware of the event.

Captain reported an NMAC with a glider while on approach to MDW airport.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Captain flying descent on BUFIE arrival. Captain reset altitude window for descent on arrival to lowest crossing limit. Captain commanded aircraft start down early for crossing restriction with the expectation of LNAV clearance direct to SLI at our request. Aircraft began descent for crossing restriction and when I noticed altitude deviation I told the Captain. Captain immediately corrected the deviation. ATC issued a clearance direct SLI immediately after the deviation.

When the Captain of a B757-200 preset the bottom altitude of an anticipated RNAV STAR clearance he failed to ensure an appropriate VNAV mode and the aircraft began a premature descent.  The First Officer intervened and ATC shortly issued the anticipated clearance.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 136; Flight Crew Total 389

Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Exhaust gas leak on board while conducting a biannual flight review. Upon entering left midfield downwind; I noticed a smell of exhaust fumes in the cockpit and requested right turn out direct to ZZZ. Tower approved this turn out and we headed direct to ZZZ at 2500 feet. Upon reaching 2500 both pilot and I (instructor) began feeling symptoms of carbon monoxide poisoning. We slowed the aircraft down momentarily to open the windows to get additional fresh air into the cockpit. We then proceeded to close the windows so we could get our speed up to land back at ZZZ for a straight in approach. We requested all other traffic in the area to heed us so we could arrive with no delay and everyone flying at ZZZ made sure to stay clear and help us arrive as quickly as possible. I did not officially declare an emergency with ATC as it was more vital to communicate my intentions with the traffic currently flying at ZZZ which proved to be a huge help to us; however I should have declared an emergency with the other tower and landed there as soon as I smelled the exhaust rather than try to make it back to ZZZ.

C172 instructor pilot reported detecting exhaust fumes while in the traffic pattern and elected to depart the pattern and return to home base.


Beechcraft Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 323; Flight Crew Total 776; Flight Crew Type 500

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While conduction a 141 stage check for cross country training enroute I had the student divert to 7M3 (Bearce Airport as labeled on the sectional chart). While in the process of diversion I heard a radio call over multi-comm 122.9 for a Baron B58 enroute to Mount Ida airport. Looking at the sectional there is no clear indication that 7M3 is associated with Mount Ida as there are several small towns in the vicinity. This diversion was done as part of a 141 stage check to assess the student's ability to divert while in the air and a sectional was the only document referenced. While on a base descent to set up for landing I caught sight of a Baron B58 passing below us on final. A climbing right turn was executed out of the pattern. I announced over 122.9 for the position of a Baron in vicinity of Bearce. And a Baron replied that he was on final into Mount Ida Airport. The Baron had broadcasted a single call that was inbound to Mount Ida; I had broadcasted several calls as to our intentions to land at Bearce. After talking to some other local pilots the airport's name as stated on its sign is Mount Ida Airport; yet the sectional provides no indication directly of this name. This situation could have been avoided by using the proper terminology as stated on the sectional map and also by myself consulting an AF/D possibly prior to the flight. If the airport is commonly known as Mount Ida its name on the sectional should include this to avoid future confusion.

A flight instructor reported an airborne conflict; due in part to airport name confusion. Reporter was inbound to 7M3; an airport that is listed as Bearce Airport on sectional charts; but is often referred to as Mount Ida by pilots familiar with the airport.


General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

During preflight; First Officer found a crack in the inboard pylon of the Number 3 engine. The crack had migrated across a previous weld. The crack was reported to Maintenance; and written up in the logbook. Maintenance consulted with Maintenance Control and determined that the crack could be stop-drilled; an EA was required; requested and received. A two hour delay was incurred. Original crack was welded. Crack started at a rivet hole and migrated across the weld. Several things bother me. Why was this not discovered by Maintenance? Why did the out-going crew miss the crack unless it started on our flight which is doubtful. I think we need an individual from flight operations with a significant maintenance background and use them to QA maintenance on our aircraft. I have flown with this First Officer before and he keeps finding things that are being missed. Maintenance apparently needs more people...staffing adequate.

MD11 Captain reports a crack in the inboard pylon of the Number 3 engine being discovered by the First Officer during preflight. A previous crack had been repaired by welding; but the crack had propagated through the weld. A stop drill is authorized and accomplished. The Captain questions scrutiny of the aircraft by Maintenance and other flight crews.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Just after takeoff we received a 'Bleed 1 Overpress' Caution msg. We waited until completing the after takeoff checklist and the autopilot was engaged before running the QRH procedure. The aircraft we were flying had Pack #1 deferred and this played a role in the mistake I made. The QRH procedure directed me to cycle the #1 Bleed button and I mistakenly cycled the #1 Pack button. After cycling the #1 Bleed button if the root caution msg is still present the procedure isolates the duct and requires a return to the nearest suitable airport.  We [advised ATC] and returned to ZZZ. All other checklists and procedures were completed [and the] remainder of the flight was uneventful.The primary cause was misreading the QRH procedure. I feel that had I cycled the Bleed 1 button we would have cleared the msg and we could have continued to our filed destination. I fixated on the existing MEL associated with the #1 pack and that led to not carefully reading the QRH. Also when I saw a diversion would be necessary if the msg persisted; I got ahead of myself by beginning to immediately think about how to handle the divert.Slow down and take time. Reread checklists and procedures. Also do [not] assume association of MELs to other caution msgs.

ERJ-175 First Officer reported returning to departure airport after receiving a 'Bleed 1 Overpress' caution message and incorrectly running the QRH.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Type 220

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Party1 Flight Crew; Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Procedure; Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling; Aircraft

After clearing RWY 28 on landing rollout; we were cleared via standard taxi route (STR) GREEN 7 to hold short of RWY 27L for further clearance. I was unable to correctly retrieve the STR on my iPad navigation chart to verify the clearance the First Officer (F/O) copied. I continued the taxi per the F/O's instruction and ultimately made a left turn onto Taxiway R to hold short of RWY 27L at Taxiway R3. The STR actually required a right turn onto Taxiway R to hold short of RWY 27L at taxiway R7. The ATL Controller advised us that it would be OK to continue to R3 and hold short of RWY 27L. The real problem was that I was unable to get my iPad navigation page to leave the airport diagram (10-9) to view the Standard Taxi Route to verify the routing the First Officer provided me.I need to anticipate the STR we are most likely to receive; and view it prior to landing. Additionally; gaining more familiarity with the iPad Navigation Program and enhanced ability to rapidly change pages more easily would have helped in this situation.

I pulled it up on the EFB and we turned left onto SC. I expanded the verbiage so I could find the Tower Frequency for 27L. In doing so the left hand column was not visible. We were monitoring the correct frequency; however; I read the instructions for the top block which was actually for the GREEN 3. We became aware of my mistake when Tower asked us where we were going. I shrank the EFB display back to where I could read the route designations and directions and realized my mistake.

After landing on Runway 28 at ATL a B737NG was cleared to taxi via STR (Standard Taxi Route) Green Seven. Utilizing an expanded view on the iPad EFB to better read it; the First Officer directed the Captain to taxi instead via Green Three as the identifying script for each STR was no longer displayed. The Captain advised it was too difficult for him to access given his limited exposure to the medium and was; thus; relying on the First Officer's directions.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft

Descending for the RNAV approach on a 90 degree base 5 miles from the final approach fix descending to 2300 feet. Around 2500 feet the terrain warning sounds while in IMC conditions so we execute a terrain escape maneuver and climb out to 4000 feet. I informed ATC what we were doing and he informed us there was no terrain in that area. He then vectored us back around to the approach course and we landed. The terrain message sounded again at 2300 feet coming back around again but we knew this one was erroneous by talking to ATC and we were level about to intercept final approach course. The GPWS was then deferred once we got on the ground. Comply with the warning first and fly the airplane. There is plenty of time to figure out if it is an incorrect warning once clear of the occurrence.

CRJ Captain reported that a false terrain warning sounded during descent.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

On climb out above 10000 ft and accelerating right wing began oscillating and shaking the aircraft dramatically above 280 knots. We [contacted ATC] and said we would like to return to the airport of departure. Upon slowing the aircraft below 250 knots the oscillation stopped. We burned 2000 lbs of fuel to get to landing weight and landed uneventfully. Right aileron servo had failed.

A320 Captain reported a failure of an aileron servo led to right wing oscillations above 280 knots.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 650; Flight Crew Type 610

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

When I started the flight I had a normal taxi and run-up nothing seemed to be out of place. I experienced a normal takeoff with no abnormalities. Once at altitude my student pointed out the fact that [the] flap had become dented during some phase of flight. At this point I decided to stop the flight and head back to ZZZ. Because the flap was dented I decided that I would take the controls and do a flapless landing. When I started to land I put the weight of the aircraft on the main wheels and noticed that the left main wheel was now missing as the left wing started to keep getting lower and lower. I then decided to cut the mixture and come to a complete stop on the runway and wait for assistance. What I think happened is the one of the bolts that hold in the landing gear came loose and on takeoff came undone and took the rest of the landing gear with it. On preflight I did not see anything out of place as well as on taxi and run-up. When we got out the aircraft like I thought there was no landing gear and I made the right call to cut the mixture on the runway. All things considered I think I did the best I could have for the situation; which is minimum damage to the aircraft and no one was hurt.

PA-28 instructor pilot reported the left main gear departed the aircraft at some point; and a landing was made with it missing.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 34000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

I was assigned a reserve duty period that began at 1 PM. At 1:03 PM I got a phone call from Scheduling and was given an assignment to fly a flight to Mexico and return to [an airport] to clear Customs then return to [our origional departure airport] all in one duty period. I was to operate the first leg and then deadhead the next two. When I asked about the duty period he said it was under 12 hours and legal and that if needed he could fly me an additional 2 hours and even a possible 16 hours total if needed. I questioned whether having to clear Customs and do a turn in Mexico plus the 9 hours or more of flight would add up to a legal 12 hour maximum assignment. It was not apparent to me until I actually reported to work and saw the paring they had built; which showed me reporting at 3 PM and also taking off at 3 PM along with times way; way under normal block for an airplane that had to maintain within 162 NM of the coast line; that they had made up a bogus Trip Pairing to appear to be in the 12 hour maximum duty period as per the FAR. I called and told the Chief Pilot's Office to review this and was told I would have to make the decision but it would not go very well if I called in fatigued before the trip; but if I were going to do that I should do it sooner rather than later so they could assign it to someone else. It was implied I would most likely have to come in on a day off and explain why I did not take the flight. When I checked in; I saw the Trip Pairing showing 11:55 Duty Period; but still had us taking off at 3 PM and it was then 2:49 PM and I was at the computer checking in. I arrived at the gate at 3:10 and found they did not have the crew members listed; which took another 30 minutes to sort out and get our names on the paperwork. While talking to Scheduling; I mentioned the issue of having a bogus departure time and they corrected it to 4:15. This now by their records put us at a scheduled 12:25 Duty Period. This is what I had been telling them all a long- IT WAS NOT A LEGAL PAIRING! The other Captain and First Officer scheduled to deadhead down and fly the last two legs arrived at the gate about this time with all the same concerns we had. She was talking with the Chief Pilot's Office and could not get them to do anything about the illegal assignment. They only told her to fly it and file a grievance. And knowing that she too would have to visit the Chief Pilot on a day off and explain why she reluctantly got on the flight. Everyone knew Scheduling was building a pairing that was intended to look legal but none of the times added up and their intention from the beginning was to make it look like some unforeseen issue had occurred which caused it to be extended to 14 or more hours. Table B of FAR 117 says we can only be scheduled for 12 hours of duty if we report after 1 PM local. They made us start the trip with 12:25 on the trip sheet. We flew this pairing with 56 minutes turn in Mexico and 1:08 to unload and clear Customs and take back off again and ENDED UP WITH 13:44 DUTY TIME! We all knew when we arrived in [the airport for Custom's] we would be done for the day - but when we arrive in [the airport with Customs] the very first thing the Gate Supervisor said to me and the other Captain was 'I only have one 35 passenger bus and there are no hotel rooms [here] (actually later she did say she found 13 rooms). You have to get these passengers to [their final destination].' The other Captain had been off high minimums only about 1 week. I called Scheduling and they said we had a wheels-up time of 3:12 AM. This took us to the 14 hours they had always planned on flying us. The most concerning thing of all was on our arrival into [the airport with Customs] I was sitting in the second row in First Class and at about 1;000-1;500 AGL I heard a GPWS warning followed by an escape maneuver- GOT MY ATTENTION! Why did this happen - they were tired! This Captain; although new in the left seat; was in the TrainingDepartment for many years as an instructor on the Airbus. She is very competent and flies the aircraft much better than most but fatigue had set in. When you go on duty at 1 in the afternoon you don't expect to be flying at 3 or 4 in the morning. A less competent pilot may have messed up the escape maneuver and they might be picking people off the hill today. What did we; as crew members do wrong?  We let it happen and worried about Chief Pilot and Company pressure along with loss of pay more than safety.  What did the Company do wrong?  Scheduling thought they could play games with numbers and get into the 2 additional hours not intended to be used as a part of a normal assignment to build an unsafe for operations pairing.  What did the Chief Pilot's Office do?  Not their Job!  Which is to provide guidance and prevent unsafe operations from happening. Instead they put undue pressure on the flight crews by making it very apparent if they turned down the trip they would be looking into why. Had they questioned the actions of the Scheduler; this pairing might not have been flown.

A321 Captain describes a trip paring assignment that does not meet the new FAR 117 rules and the lack of any guidance from the Chief Pilot's Office.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.7

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors

I cleared a Falcon 2000 (DA2000) for takeoff and observed an opposite direction inbound jet that had been maneuvering through final and circling; turning final about 13 mile final. Both were IFR and I was not in communication with the jet on final. I switched the DA2000 to NCT so they could turn them and then checked with NCT to ensure they had contact with the departure; and they did. I then observed the inbound jet turning north (about perpendicular to the inbound) approximately 5 miles from the inbound traffic. There was a VIP TFR in place forcing departures to depart opposite direction to avoid the TFR; and had been several arrivals that the departure had to wait for. I think the approval Controller did not wait for the departure to get airborne after they gave me the IFR release and I cleared the departure. I think they were rushed and that having them tour the tower could help them to see how the flow of traffic is at the Tower. The area working this departure normally does not work departures from Oakland.

OAK Tower Controller reports of an opposite direction arrival that gets close to his departure. The sector is one that usually does not work departures in this configuration.


Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

We had begun our descent into ZZZ. Was 5 1/2 hour flight from ZZZ1. I was the A Flight Attendant. I noticed a smell in the forward galley. It was slight when I first noticed it. I am new to flying on the Airbus and there are many new sounds; etc.; that are unfamiliar to me. So in my mind I think originally it was just a unique smell to the Airbus. However; once we passed 18;000 and pilots made arrival notice to prepare cabin; the smell began to get stronger and I began to have [a] headache. At 10;000 chime I was called by pilots and asked if I could smell odor in cabin; as they could smell in flight deck; and the smell was stronger. I told them that yes I could smell odor and tried to describe. They said to get crew secured and that we would be on ground in 5 minutes. The B and C were mid cabin doing final cleanup. I walked to mid cabin and could still smell the odor; but not as strong as in forward galley. Told my B and C to get seated and informed them what pilots had stated and asked if they could smell odor; and she said yes. We all took our jump seats. As we were landing; sitting in jump seat in forward galley; I tried to see where smell [was] coming from; like air vent; etc.; but I could not diagnose. Once on the ground and deplaned; crew all debriefed with pilots of the event and what we all smelled; etc. At this point I now had tighter chest and lungs and felt unstable a bit; but I did not get sick. No passengers made any comment to me regarding smell during [deplaning]. Continue to research what is causing these events to happen on the Airbus.

A320 Flight Attendant reported strong odor in cabin and experienced health issues.


Beechcraft Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 1725; Flight Crew Type 1200

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

I was flying the 18 DME arc segment of the VOR/DME-C approach to KFCH; between BLEAR and IKOGY. While flying at 2000 AGL; at approximately the 195 radial; TRACON called VFR traffic not in communication with approach; opposite direction at 2500 AGL. I reported visual contact and the other aircraft (another Beechcraft) passed 500 feet overhead. A short time later; TRACON reported the traffic had reversed direction to follow me. I checked and verified traffic at my 5 o'clock position. TRACON called for a turn to the north; by which time the traffic had passed toward my 7 o'clock position. I regained visual contact with the traffic and saw it moving toward my 9 o'clock position; approximately 150 feet laterally to my left and 100 feet above my altitude. I replied that I would be deviating from the route and assigned altitude as required to maintain separation. The other aircraft basically flew in formation at my 9 o'clock position maintaining 150 feet lateral and 100 feet vertical separation for 15-30 seconds; followed by a pitch up and right turn to cross over my aircraft.By this time; I was flying through the final approach course and TRACON asked for my intentions; offering a clearance or vectors as desired. I requested and was cleared for the approach with the intent of a missed approach to the hold. The conflict situation was a significant distraction; and the controller and I did not coordinate an altitude for the missed approach hold prior to executing the missed - however; we coordinated on the go for 3000 AGL.Two things stand out. First; attempting formation flight without prior coordination or communication was an unprofessional act on the part of the other pilot. Second; the best course of action on my part would have been vectors to a new approach.

The pilot of a single engine Beechcraft reported a near-mid-air-collision while on an instrument approach near FCH; with another single engine Beechcraft that maneuvered nearby without coordination.