Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While flying over LAS at FL380 we encountered moderate mountain wave. We had significant airspeed fluctuations and as a result requested a lower altitude. We descended to FL350. 40 miles south of LAS we encountered additional mountain wave which forced an uncommanded climb of 400 FT with the autopilot fighting to maintain FL350. We immediately informed ATC of the mountain wave activity and we received a clearance to descend to FL280. A split second later we encountered what I would consider to be extreme mountain wave and moderate turbulence. We had an almost instant airspeed increase from Mach .75 to the max airspeed checker board of roughly Mach .82. The trend continued to increase even while I had the thrust levers at idle and spoilers at max deployment. The condition worsened and I was forced to disconnect the autopilot and pitch the nose up to prevent an extreme overspeed condition. At approximately five degrees nose up and the aircraft climbing at 400 FT/min. We had a loss of 60 KTS in airspeed instantly. At this point I slammed the flight spoilers to retract and the thrust levers to max and pitched the nose down to six degrees nose down. Now at 220 KTS indicated we were fighting to regain airspeed. Mind you this happened so fast we were acting on instinct and with the moderate turbulence it was a bit of a challenge. It took a 2;500 FPM descent rate and 2;000 FT to regain our airspeed. We leveled as cleared at FL280. We then gave a PIREP of extreme mountain wave with airspeed fluctuations of 60 KTS. We checked on our flight attendants and passengers and everyone was okay. We landed without further incident.Had we known to avoid this area it would have been avoided. We knew there would be turbulence and mountain wave. However we fly through these types of conditions regularly without problem. In this instance it would seem that we were the guinea pigs that prevented other flights from entering that area. I suppose my biggest suggestion to pilots is to respect mountain wave's potentially extreme elements associated with an unstable air-mass. Additionally lower altitudes are always better when navigating such areas. Perhaps if Dispatch were to have an Altitude Risk Assessment tool based on areas of unstable air it would increase our margins of safety. Had we stayed at our filed altitude I think we would have been in big trouble. Additionally it may be helpful to perform high altitude wind-shear escape maneuvers in the simulator. My First Officer reverted to our low altitude wind shear escape training by making call outs on airspeed and trend vectors while I was fighting to keep the aircraft under control. That was very helpful. I don't think current technology can predict the small area of wind shear we encountered as this was a very isolated event in the area. Obviously; avoidance would have been the best measure.

A CRJ-700 Captain describes an encounter with 'extreme' mountain wave activity near LAS.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

When we arrived at the aircraft we noticed a significant amount of what appeared to be the door seal hanging into the aircraft at 4L. We notified the pilots and one of the FOs (First Officers) came to inspect. He said it was already written up and it would be fine. When it came time to arm the doors the FA (Flight Attendant) responsible for this door was unable to arm it. Two other flight attendants attempted to arm the door. They were unsuccessful.One of the pilots was summoned and he was able to forcibly arm the door. He suggested that the door was difficult to arm because it was cold outside. He stated that the seal should not affect the arming of the door. Within a minute or two of taking off I noticed significant popping in my ears. I observed passengers attempting to clear their ears and showing signs of discomfort. Once we were able to get up and proceed to the galley we all began to comment how our ears were feeling. We also noticed that it was extremely cold near the 4L door. We decided to notify the purser and request the pilots be told. I went to the front galley to talk with the purser. She acknowledged that they were also feeling the same thing and she attempted to contact the pilots. Initially they did not respond to her call. When they called her back they stated that they had been busy because we were having pressurization issues and that we had almost diverted to our alternate airport.They said that the situation was under control and they would be manually controlling the pressure for the flight and that we would be flying at a lower altitude. Throughout the flight there were times when we noticed our ears popping and we would confirm with each other that we were feeling the same thing. The area around the 4L door continued to be extremely cold. No one sat in the 4L jump-seats during the flight because of the chilly temperature.During descent there was significant discomfort in my ears and I could see the passengers trying to clear their ears; pulling on their ears; and grimacing. Although we arrived uneventfully it was an uncomfortable flight for everyone and I felt unsafe. I don't know that the pressure problems had anything to do with the door; however it was an odd coincidence. I felt that the attitude toward the problem was cavalier.

B767 Flight Attendant reported problems with a door seal as well as aircraft pressurization issues in flight.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 780; Flight Crew Type 210

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Approaching PAE from the southeast; about 3 miles out and descending through 2400 MSL; the tower advised me of opposite-direction traffic departing Rwy 16L. He had previously instructed me to enter a left downwind and call mid-field for that runway. Shortly after; the controller instructed me to turn west. I hesitated as this made no sense; and he repeated the instruction. I complied at once. About 10 seconds later I spotted the traffic at my 10 o'clock on a converging course and about 300 feet below me; our courses crossed about 3 seconds later. Happily our altitudes were such that we didn't approach too closely.I think my turning west there was an inappropriate instruction. As I recall from private pilot training; head-on converging aircraft should each turn to its right. I should have been instructed to turn north; and the other aircraft to turn south to maintain separation.

The pilot of a general aviation aircraft reported a near mid-air collision after ATC issued a turn that the pilot felt exasperated an opposite direction traffic condition.


Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 24.4; Flight Crew Total 4020; Flight Crew Type 1966

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Declared Emergency

VMC at 6000 requested climb to 8000. 8000 was IMC with temp. +1. Moved forward in seat to inspect wing leading edge for possible ice; negative. Panel went 'black' Chelton panel dark; MX20 dark; GNS 480 dark; no autopilot; no transponder; no comm radio; headset noise cancelling off.  Resulting panic. No transponder or comm but had an 'emergency'; needed time to assess; needed VMC.  Began descent to 6000 exiting clouds in unusual attitude; corrected attitude; assessed situation after selecting 'nearest' airport. FOUND AVIONICS MASTER TO BE IN OFF POSITION. Turned on avionics master; significant reduction in panic but still disoriented and seeking to land safely to assess calmly what happened. With radio back 'online' called center to explain and declare emergency and accept assistance in navigating. Still uncertain what to trust with multiple yellow flags on Chelton EFIS. Visual approach where I spent the night before resuming flight VMC next morning after analyzing what had happened.Assessment: While moving seat forward and twisting to inspect wing leading edge for icing caused knuckle; kneeboard; watch or something to unknowingly depress avionics master to off position. Sudden roar in headset (thinking rapid decompression) black panel; thinking catastrophic failure leading to panic.  Getting to VMC very helpful in rationalization of circumstances. Avionics master switch is recessed for protection from incidental switching but somehow must have hit it 'just right'! Have reviewed with recurrent trainer to incorporate in training scenario so others might recognize symptoms. I'll never forget!

A C210 pilot reports inadvertently switching off the avionics master switch while leaning forward to check the wing for ice. All panels go dark including COMMS (Communications) and autopilot. A descent is initiated; ATC is advised; and the aircraft is recovered in VMC. The switch position is detected and corrected; but the reporter elects to divert and spend the night.


Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway; Ground Incursion Taxiway

I was PIC of a Piper Cherokee landing at ZZZ. Weather was VMC and I was number three on arrival for XXR and looking for Citation traffic inbound. About 3/4 of a mile abeam the numbers; ZZZ Tower instructed me to make an immediate right base; and to switch to a cleared XXR landing; the parallel runway; for traffic (one Citation had just landed; another on the way in). I complied; responded to ATC; and began an immediate descent to avoid too high of a final approach onto XXL.I came in to land on XXL as normal. Just before touchdown; I felt a crosswind gust on the starboard side and felt the aircraft nose point to the right; so I applied left rudder to keep the nose straight. At this point the aircraft touched down; the nosewheel also then touched down and the aircraft began to slide to the left. I attempted to return rudder/nosewheel input to neutral but the aircraft began to skid to the left. This caused the aircraft to turn 45 degrees left of runway XXL centerline.The aircraft then entered the grass area left of XXL; cut across an intersecting taxiway (what I believe was taxiway  E); the right wing root impacted a taxiway location sign; the aircraft then went from the grass onto the taxiway B surface; I then applied rudder pedals to put the aircraft onto the taxiway centerline; and applied full braking power.I do not recall the time between the first jet landing on parallel XXR and my aircraft touching down on XXL; but it was within two minutes. The second Citation landing on parallel XXR was behind my aircraft at all times so I do not believe the second aircraft wake turbulence was a factor.I do not know if I could have avoided this accident with a go around. I remember thinking the landing was a particularly smooth one very briefly; under the nose wheel touched down and the aircraft began veering to the left. I attempted to bring it back to centerline but was afraid that too much right rudder would cause it to skid the other direction. Once I entered the grass; I recall trying to put all control surfaces to their neutral position until the aircraft returned to the tarmac that was taxiway B.

PA-28 pilot reported a loss of control on landing that resulted in a runway excursion.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 24

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Yesterday I handed off a west bound aircraft which was landing at DWH; level at 060; to I90 Tomball sector. The undirected hand off flashed initially to the I90 DAS sector. Thinking that this was an ERAM anomaly I retracted the hand off and directed the hand off to I90 Tomball. Upon acceptance of the hand off I switched the aircraft to I90 Tomball sector and no further communication with the aircraft or any I90 controllers occurred after that. This afternoon; as colleagues were discussing the recent re stratification of some of I90's airspace it occurred to me that there were some changes made around the NE inbound gates. When I checked the sector map I found that the floor of the I90 DAS sector had indeed been dropped to 060 from its previous floor of 070 prior to the Optimization of Airspace & Procedures in the Metroplex (OAPM) changes last May. I am reasonably certain that I allowed the aircraft in question to enter I90 DAS sector without a point out or hand off. When an undirected hand off flashes to an unexpected sector that some effort is made to find out why this is occurring. Had I quickly reviewed the overhead chart I would have had my answer and would have avoided this event.

ZHU Controller describes a situation where he thought an undirected handoff was incorrect. The Controller took the handoff back and directed it to what he/she thought was the correct area. Controller later finds out other facilities airspace had changed; which resulted in an airspace deviation.


ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Aircraft X was direct WUVON descending to 4;000 to intercept the final approach course to eventually get the field in sight and cleared for a visual approach. Aircraft Y was about 5 miles in trail direct FRNNY going slightly faster than Aircraft X. As Aircraft X was approaching the final; I observed that there was an unidentified VFR aircraft at their 11 o'clock northeast bound climbing out of 3;300 feet. I instructed Aircraft X to amend their altitude to 4;500 for traffic. VFR traffic and Aircraft X were going to merge so I turned Aircraft X to go behind the traffic. This in turn caused Aircraft X at 4;500 to cross the path of Aircraft Y who was level at 5;000.In the process of recovering separation between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y; Aircraft X descending to 5;000 may have penetrated Niles airspace. Aircraft X was turned to a heading of 340 to continue their descent and away from Niles airspace.I should have just turned Aircraft X northbound; climbed and possibly resequenced them when the VFR target further became a factor. With Aircraft Y 5SM in trail and keeping his speed at a higher velocity; it would have been the easiest option.

A TRACON Controller reported vectoring an aircraft off their approach to avoid unidentified VFR traffic lost required spacing with the arriving in trail traffic.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Procedure; Human Factors; Manuals; Company Policy

Overnight maintenance is often performed at the [Company] maintenance hangar. [Company] mechanics often taxi [Company] operated [Airline] Embraer E175 aircraft from the [Company] maintenance hangar to the [Airline] terminal after the completion of overnight maintenance at the [Company] maintenance hangar.The [Airline] aircraft are repositioned from the [Company] maintenance hangar to the [Airline] terminal after the completion of overnight maintenance so the aircraft is at the [Airline] terminal in advance of when the first flight of the morning is due to depart. First flights of the morning start early. The goal of zero first flight delays is emphasized and is a primary objective and a key performance metric.At the beginning of my work shift; I asked if there would be an opportunity to taxi an (Embraer E175) aircraft (with myself as an engine run-taxi trainee) with a more senior mechanic (who is fully trained and certified to run-taxi as technician in command of the aircraft); from the maintenance hangar to the [Airline] terminal.In response to my request to participate in the aircraft run-taxi operation as a run-taxi trainee; I was told that after completion of high power engine run tests of Aircraft X; by the senior mechanic ; I could; as a trainee; participate in the taxi of Aircraft X with the more senior mechanic to terminal gate at the [Airline's terminal] so the Aircraft X would be in position at the [Airline] gate in advance of the first scheduled flight of the morning.There was a limited amount of time available to accomplish the high power engine test on Aircraft X and then taxi Aircraft X to the [Airline] terminal and still have the aircraft at the assigned gate in time for the first scheduled flight.Senior Mechanic; and I; as a run-taxi trainee; performed high power engine run tests to test the bleed 2 system. The high power engine run tests were necessary after maintenance on the bleed 2 system was performed. The maintenance of the bleed 2 system was performed and completed by mechanics on the previous shift. We completed the high power tests; leaving 30 minutes time available before the first scheduled flight.The operational (high power) check turned out good; and I was told by [the previous] shift Lead Mechanic to go ahead and sign the aircraft maintenance logbook (as inspector) and to have [Senior Mechanic] to sign the aircraft maintenance logbook as mechanic after we taxied Aircraft X to the terminal.Aircraft X was scheduled for [first] departure. We taxied Aircraft X to the [Airline] terminal gate. We remained with the aircraft and met the flight crew as the flight crew arrived at [the] gate. At this point; I noticed another deferral placard installed associated with Bleed 2 system.Once I was aware of the deferral placard; I called [the previous] shift Lead Mechanic asking why there is another deferral for bleed 2 since we were already asked to perform high power run tests.In response to my question; I was told to clear and sign this deferral as well; as [the previous] shift had completed the maintenance associated with the deferral of the bleed 2 system. [The previous shift Lead Mechanic] said there was an M-action needed to be completed prior clearing [the deferral]. The M-action requires the NPRSOV Valves to be unlocked. In response to the need to complete the M-action as quickly as possible; we divided the work needed to complete the M-Action task and each of us performed a portion of the task. I focused on reviewing the logbook and called the office for help so someone could bring the tools and help us. [Senior Mechanic] was reading the reference information [Maintenance Manual] section 36-XX-XX. [Other Mechanic] went to get the necessary tools. I focused on signing off the gear pins; wake up; engine run; and bleed 2 NPRSOV locked closed work orders. [Senior Mechanic] inspected the system and found the bleed 2 NPRSOV High Stage was locked closed and Low Stage was locked open while deferred and determined that the High Stage valve needed to be changed (to both valves closed) as he compared the valves in question with the valves on the other engine and verified his findings with a review of [Maintenance Manual] section 36-XX-XX. Then either [Senior Mechanic]; [Other Mechanic]; or both [Senior Mechanic] and [Other Mechanic] performed the M-action of actually unlocking the NPRSOV valves as [Other Mechanic] said he has performed this particular M-action before.When I was nearing completion of my portion of the task of helping with paperwork and signing previously mentioned write ups in the log book; I was told by [Senior Mechanic] that the required M-Action was completed and that the valves were put in the proper configuration. I then took pictures of the valves; and sent the photographs of the valves to [previous shift Lead Mechanic] so he could take a look at the photographs of the valves. I signed the log book; and cleared the deferral with Maintenance control. [Senior Mechanic] signed his portion of the logbook and someone else (I believe [Other Mechanic]) returned the log book to the Aircraft cockpit and closed the engines cowls. The aircraft was then taken by the flight crew and 2 hours later I received a phone call from [Senior Mechanic] that Aircraft X came back to the gate with bleed 2 problem.  After performing (as a run-taxi trainee) engine high power run tests and taxing the aircraft; we determined that an m-action needed to be completed within a short period of time in order to avoid a first flight delay. In an effort to complete the m-action as quickly as possible and avoid the first flight delay; we divided the tasks involved needed to complete the m-action. I was given the task of signing the maintenance logbook. The task of actually performing the m-action was assigned to another mechanic. As it turns out; whichever of the other mechanics ([Other Mechanic] and or [Senior Mechanic]) performed the m-action; the mechanic did not perform the m-action correctly.I trusted a more experienced mechanic; [Senior Mechanic]; an RII inspector; to verify that the m-action was completed correctly. I felt comfortable with him inspecting the work and verifying that the m-action was performed correctly; as he was reading the aircraft maintenance manual and was checking and verifying the position of the valves. The pressure to complete the mission of getting the first flight out on time played a role in the events leading up to the maintenance error. In retrospect; I should have not signed off [the deferral] until I personally verified that the valves were properly positioned (activated) and unlocked in accordance with the applicable reference data.In the future; I will be extremely vigilant to personally verify the proper completion of all maintenance I sign off; regardless of the qualifications; experience; and training of any and all other mechanics involved; and to insist that others do so as well. I will be vigilant to resist the pressure to compromise my commitment to personally verify any and all work I sign off in order to meet deadlines. I believe it is most important to make sure that I personally verify all work that I sign off is completed properly and without compromise and in accordance with all applicable reference data.

Mechanic reported that an aircraft returned to departure airport after engine maintenance work was done incorrectly.


B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

International flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1; Pilot Flying; Captain on this flight. In cruise for approximately 10 minutes at FL310 when we received an EICAS message of HYD pump failure and a CAC (Cabin Air Compressor) shut down due to load shed.Ran checklist for HYD pump failure. No checklist for CAC load shed...multiple other electrical system failure/ load shed status messages.Called Company Dispatch and Maintenance Control on SAT phone. Discussed failures and systems affected by the multiple electrical system load shed items. Original source of failure was indicated as an electrical Transformer/Rectifier failure.Myself; Dispatch and Maintenance Control all agreed that a diversion was best course of action and to not continue on flight to ZZZ1. ZZZ was chosen as diversion airport.Fuel dump was required in order to land below max landing weight.Return to ZZZ coordinated with ZZZZ Center; fuel dump also approved by ZZZZ Center and initiated at FL310.Dual flight management computer (FMCs) failures also occurred after turn around to ZZZ.Dispatch coordinated new flight plan; landing data and station coordination for our ZZZ arrival.Normal descent; approach; landing at ZZZ on Runway XXR in VFR conditions. Taxi to gate and normal shutdown.Debriefed Dispatch; Chief Pilot; Company Operations Manager after shut down and checklists completed.

B787 Captain reported multiple systems failures and electrical load shedding resulted in an air turn back and precautionary landing at departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 64; Flight Crew Total 113; Flight Crew Type 1

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

I departed [and] upon reaching approximately 300 feet AGL; I retracted the landing gear. Within 2-3 seconds; there was a distinct electrical burning odor and when I looked at the GPS unit; it was off. I looked at the gear light and it was off; and I noticed that the plane was not accelerating and instead was flying at 100-115 knots consistent with the gear still being down. I entered the traffic pattern and I cycled the gear and tried to power off and on the avionics. The GPS unit just flashed on and then off repeatedly upon restarting the avionics. The gear did not light up. I had no communication and initially squawked 7600 and made a low pass over the runway. I then had my passenger change my headset to my portable radio while I called [Unicom] on my cellphone. The Unicom person informed me that my gear was partially down and I instructed him to call [the airport] and notify them of my situation. I entered the pattern a second time to try to recycle the master and battery switch. Within 5-10 seconds the electrical burning odor returned. I tried the portable radio but Unicom could not read me. I did a second low pass and spoke to the Unicom again about if my gear came down when I cycled it and they said no. I decided to divert to [a nearby airport] due to the longer runway and emergency fire equipment in case of gear collapse. Unicom notified me that Approach was expecting me on their frequency. I [advised ATC] on my portable radio prior to entering their airspace. No response several times until an airliner relayed my [transmission] to Approach approximately 4 miles from the field. They cleared me for landing. My passenger manually cranked the landing gear as per the POH. I did a low pass over the field and asked the tower to confirm my gear was down. It was up. While maneuvering the aircraft back; the passenger cranked the gear in the opposite direction. On final; they confirmed that the gear was down and I was cleared to land. I landed and the gear stayed down.

BE33 pilot reported diverting to a nearby airport when the landing gear failed to fully retract. Gear was extended via the emergency method resulting in an uneventful landing.


Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

During takeoff R GEN OFF EICAS message illuminated. We requested to remain in the local airport area to run checklists. ATC granted our request and authorized a return to the runway. We completed the checklist with the generator being reset. I elected to return as the safest option as we were VFR; the runway was right there; we had previously operated the aircraft with no indication of a generator issue for over 3 hours; en-route weather called for thunderstorms. I believed the return to determine the cause of the failure before proceeding to be the safest choice.After takeoff clearance was received and during taxi onto the runway; the off flag in the standby gyro appeared. We requested to taxi clear of the runway. After stopping on the taxiway the flag receded. I called the Chief Pilot and requested clearance from ATC back to the runway for departure and completed an uneventful takeoff.

At takeoff R GEN OFF EICAS message illuminated. We then requested time to run the check lists and were granted time in the local area for them to be completed. We completed the check list and the generator was reset at that point. With all systems operating normally we requested and were given clearance to land.

Although it reset and operated normally; the flight crew of a B757-200 opted to return to their departure airport when their EICAS advised the right generator was off.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 2; Flight Crew Total 1700; Flight Crew Type 700

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

Lost fuel flow and pressure causing turbine engine to flame out. Emergency landing performed without power restored. Attempted contact with Tower but unable due to simultaneous aircraft warnings overcoming radio operations. Discussed with the tower the nature of the emergency post flight the aircraft ground support team who helped recover the aircraft from the runway. Aircraft maintenance was performed prior to the next flight by qualified maintenance personnel by bleeding the fuel control unit. Small amounts of air entered the fuel system and correct measures have been taken as future prevention.

The pilot of a turbine powered experimental aircraft experienced a flame out and emergency landing due to air in the fuel control system.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was in cruise from ZZZ to ZZZ1 at 3;000 feet MSL with the autopilot engaged. Flight following with Approach was established and we were in communication. I saw an aircraft converging from the left and took evasive action to avoid a collision. The aircraft appeared slightly lower; so I chose to climb.I reported the near miss to Approach (frequency we were on). They responded claiming to have called us multiple times about the converging traffic. We did not receive any transmissions in-regards to traffic. The radios were silent.

Cessna 210 pilot reported executing an evasive maneuver resulting in an uneventful NMAC event during cruise.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We have a winner for the most unsafe airport in the country. For the umpteenth time; the tower has cleared an aircraft on to the runway with an aircraft on short final. In this instance; an air carrier (Aircraft Y) cleared to line up and wait while we were on short final. The controller delayed takeoff clearance for the Aircraft Y due to a previous aircraft having not cleared the runway. The controller realizing his error; instructed the Aircraft Y to start his roll; and then taxi clear of the runway. The pilot responded that jet engines take a while to spool up and when the tower tried to make an excuse of 'this is a normal op'; Aircraft Y responded; 'we are not [other carrier].' Good for him. The tower received an 'alarm' and instructed us to go-around. Pretty normal for this airport. This is a chronic problem at SNA with aircraft being cleared to line up and wait with an aircraft on short final. Landing aircraft are constantly given delayed clearance to land.Do not allow aircraft to be cleared to line up and wait with an aircraft on short final.

B737 Captain reported they were issued go-around instructions due to an aircraft on the runway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 22000

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 430; Flight Crew Total 10500

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Ground Personnel; Person Flight Crew

One minute before pushback in OKBK we received our final takeoff weights. Approximately one hour later; while airborne; we received an ACARS message from the Dispatcher advising our final weights had been revised AFTER our take off and that our actual weight was really 1;864 LBS heavier! The extra weight would not have been critical since a temperature drop from to 36 degrees C (from 38C) gave us an approximate 10;000 LBS cushion before reaching our maximum allowable takeoff weight for this flight.My Observations: These final loading errors are unacceptable given the high ambient temperatures along with the usually tight weight limitations in which we operate in the Middle East. On this flight; the temperature was not a crucial factor and we were not maxed out on weight. Yet; as we all know; any extra weight can affect an aircraft's performance. A timely fix to this problem needs to be found.OKBK passenger and cargo loading procedures need to be re-examined with direct personal visits by Dispatch and Load Planning representatives until satisfactory procedures are attained. Hopefully; we can prevent any future incidents like this.

[Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]

A B777 flight crew received a revision to their takeoff weight and balance data one hour after departure.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 7500; Flight Crew Type 15

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

While descending from altitude for a landing I experienced catastrophic propeller failure. I lost a blade 8' out from the hub on a fixed pitch Sensenich propeller.This propeller has a rare 2600 rpm limitation in this application on fast homebuilts; for a harmonic issue. I had only owned it for 6 weeks and maybe flown it a total of 9 hours. It failed while I was cruising at 2450 rpm.It is normal in these fast homebuilts to pitch the prop for takeoff and climb; then just turn them up fast for cruise. This is not the way you run this prop. My learning experience is that I would have no way to know how this prop was operated prior to my purchase. This prop should have been replaced with a wood or composite prop more suited for this operation. I will be a huge advocate for getting these propellers off of fast homebuilts.After a quick shut down of the engine I positioned myself for an uneventful landing in an alfalfa field. No further damage occurred from the landing. Smooth landing on a good surface. Wings were pulled to get the airplane home. Upon further inspection once home took notice of damage to firewall.1. Engine mount broken clean through in 11 places.2. Alternator was busted up and loose inside cowling.3. Exhaust was broken at every flange and was laying loose inside cowling.4. Engine Crankshaft was severely bent.5. Starter ring gear was broken in several places.6. Cowling was cracked and damaged in several spots; but was structurally intact and aided in keeping engine attached to airplane.From the time of failure to prop stopped was best estimated at 8 seconds. I pulled mixture and turned magnetos off; after which I pulled the nose up to a point where the airplane slowed enough to stop the prop from Windmilling. My best guess by looking at the damage is that I had just a few seconds left before the engine would have come free from the airplane; leaving the airplane uncontrollable.I am concerned that this prop limitation is not widely known and it could take a life. I am an A&P/IA with lots of experience with these airplanes and it was this experience that help with quick recognition of the problem.

Reporter stated the propeller was aluminum; appeared to be in excellent condition with no nicks or damage of any kind. No indication in log book of when the propeller was installed.

An RV-4 pilot described his experience and aircraft damage sustained when his fixed pitch Sensenich propeller lost a blade 8' out from the hub in a descent. Engine damage was substantial even though secured within seconds of the failure.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 1.8; Flight Crew Total 395; Flight Crew Type 395

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Aircraft; Airport; Human Factors

The flight involved a short trip to a new airport for a short weekend visit.... The flight concluded with a hard landing; which resulted in inappropriate braking and a blown left main tire. As the approach unfolded; the correct answer was to go around and set up with less energy. I was aware of that alternative and decided at the time that it was less desireable than proceeding with the landing; as I felt the airspeed was close enough that I could handle the landing. However; the plane continued to float and I had reservations about aborting in a full flap condition at low airspeed; so I continued the landing and tried to get the plane on the ground prematurely; which is a recipe for bouncing in a tricycle geared airplane.The runway does have a 1.3% slope in the the direction of the landing. Glide slope indicators had been NOTAM'd Out of Service (OTS). The 4;000 foot x 75 feet runway should not have been uncomfortably short or narrow for me landing a Bonanza F33; with proper energy management. No one was injured and there is no other apparent damage to the airplane other than the tire. It is difficult to single out a single causal factor for this poor landing; but the prominent one probably was lack of recent flying experience.... I was legally current; but not as proficient as I could have been or should have been for flying a high-performance; complex airplane into an unfamiliar airport like the incident airport.I; like others who have been legally current but not sufficiently proficient because of inactivity; usually do not have a problem; unless there are other contributing; or I would prefer to say complicating; factors. There were several here; and that's perhaps the biggest lesson:  yes; you can fly with relatively low recent experience--if there are no other contributing; or complicating; factors.... Looking back; I should have canceled this flight before it began. One check ride was not enough to give me a good margin of safety for a trip such as this; especially considering my mentally tired condition....

General Aviation Pilot experienced a hard landing and blown tire after floating results from excessive speed on approach to a down-sloping runway.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 141; Flight Crew Total 25500; Flight Crew Type 500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I departed on an IFR flight plan to a nearby uncontrolled airport. While at 3000 feet on a base leg vector for the GPS approach; I experience a total electrical failure and all navigation and communications equipment went off line except for the transponder.I set code 7700 in the transponder and began a descent back to VFR conditions. The communications radio automatically transferred to 121.5 (guard). I attempted to contact Approach on guard but was unsuccessful. I could hear Approach trying to contact me and I could hear another aircraft trying to contact me for relay. I was unable to communicate through this relay.Upon exiting the clouds at about 900 feet AGL; I could see the downtown area. Having a known geographical reference I elected to return to my departure airport. I continued to try to communicate with Approach Control on guard but was unsuccessful. I finally established brief communications with the Tower on guard and informed them of my situation and was given clearance for left traffic and landing. I was also advised of inbound traffic on the ILS to the right runway. That was the last two way communication to be successfully completed. I was asked to IDENT and when I did; the transponder failed too.Now on downwind; I initiated an attempt at normal gear extension but that was unsuccessful. I performed the alternate gear extension procedure. I could feel some drag on the aircraft and noticed a speed reduction; thus I was of the opinion that gear extension to some degree had occurred. I was unable to confirm any gear down indication due to the power failure and unable to communicate with Tower for any assistance. I continued on base leg and final and landed. I touched down on the main gear; unfortunately the nose gear collapsed upon touchdown.

PA32 pilot reports departing on a short IFR flight then losing electrical power. The reporter elects to descend to VMC conditions below 1000 feet AGL and return to the departure airport. The landing gear is pumped down manually and the nose gear collapses on touch down.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 145; Flight Crew Total 6820; Flight Crew Type 972

Workload; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 26000; Flight Crew Type 600

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Aircraft; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Cleared via KOLTT ONE RNAV arrival from original filed flight plan; then clearance as filed by Dispatch. Programmed FMC for Runway ATL ILS 26R based on current ATIS and prior experience that landings in ATL are usually on shorter runways and with arrival from the north; 26R was expectation and highest probability. Initial descent via arrival and ATC altitudes assignments; to include crossing ERLIN at 14;000 at 280 knots. Initial contact with ATL Approach Control confirmed Runway 26R as assigned landing runway. Then over or just after passing KOLTT and in descent to 7;000 feet; landing runway was changed to 27L and told to 'follow Runway 27L path.' As Pilot Monitoring; I immediately selected ILS 27L from FMS database; and then attempted to select KOLTT arrival for 27L. There are 18 pages of arrivals for ATL and FMS would not cycle through the arrivals to correct page. Tried to get the correct page for 25-30 seconds; too long. At the same time; the Pilot Flying was attempting to manually enter EAGYL fix to get an initial heading to join the arrival. The Pilot Flying asked me to get a heading from ATC; and I told ATC that 'XXX; having FMS programming problem; request heading.' ATC issued a heading of 170; Pilot Flying made the heading change; and then was heads down making inputs on his CDU to manually input points on the arrival starting with EAGYL. Both Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring were heads down making inputs. I took over making FMC inputs after EAGYL through TAMMY. The boxed items on the descent checklist were completed. We were turned to 095 heading; but inside the programmed/charted KOLTT RNAV flight path. I asked Approach Control how long the final was and was told '10 miles.' Shortly afterwards; Approach Control turned us north; heading 360; asked is we had the field in sight; Pilot Flying said he had the field; and I told Approach Control; 'XXX; has field in sight.' The vector was just outside the final approach fix. We were cleared for a visual approach; and switched to Tower frequency. Remainder of approach and landing were normal. Preventive Measure: There are 18 pages of arrivals for ATL in the FMS database; starts on page one when DEP/ARR selected. It is time-consuming to get to the desired page in a short time period. It was taking several seconds to cycle from one page to the next...too long in a time critical segment. Pilot Flying was making manual arrival fix inputs; as Pilot Monitoring was trying to select the correct KOLTT RNAV arrival for 27L. Selected ILS 27L first; thinking it might limit the arrival choices...it did not. Didn't realize the Pilot Flying was heads down also; until he said he had EAGYL fix programmed. Kept trying to get the arrival page too long; maybe 20-25 seconds. Both pilots were heads down for 15-20 seconds; too long for phase of flight; though augmented crew was theoretically was listening and watching. Should have just stayed with heading assignments from Approach Control. Fortunately; it was VFR. Seems making a 'short notice' runway change by Approach Control; requiring FMS reprogramming; and telling the crew to follow the '27L path;' a terminology or phraseology I am not familiar with; added unnecessary threat to the arrival.

We were set up for the KOLTT 1 arrival to 26R at ATL. Clearance was changed to the KOLTT 1 for 27L. While loading the FMC; it was very slow to respond. ATC asked us if we were proceeding direct to the EAGYL intersection. We stated that we were having FMS loading issues and requested a heading which was then given. The FMC finally accepted the new clearance however ATL Approach Control continued to give us vectors to 27L final. We landed without incident.

An air carrier international crew reported that A80 changed the approach over KOLTT on the ATL KOLTT 1 from an ILS 26R to Runway 27L and because there are 18 pages of arrivals the crew requested vectors to final while re-programming the FMS.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

On the RNAV (RNP) Runway 19 arrival; after completing the checklist; fully configured at GREYZ; somewhere between I believe JUBOL and WIRSO we received an EGPWS 'Caution Obstacle' alert. Simultaneously the tower called and said we were low on our altitude. The First Officer tried to respond to the tower but mistakenly pushed the autopilot disconnect button creating a confusion for me as the flying pilot as to what just happened. At that point; I started to hand fly the aircraft back onto the proper course and altitude for the remainder of the approach. As I was climbing; the aircraft back to a higher altitude we got slow and had to add power. With the nose up attitude; there was a momentary disorientation as to where the runway was located. Found the approach lights and VASI; corrected for being high and made a normal landing. Neither the First Officer nor I can understand how the aircraft got into this situation.  We had pre briefed the approach and checked all the points. Everything seemed normal from GREYZ and SETOC points on the approach. This is obviously not acceptable and I would greatly appreciate it if someone would look into this so I can find out if it was human error or FMC error.

B737 Captain reported simultaneously receiving an EGPWS 'Caution Obstacle' alert and an ATC low altitude warning while on approach into DCA.


We were experiencing a maintenance delay on our flight. As we were getting close to our new departure time; a Flight Attendant told us the mid galley chiller had shut off twice. We notified maintenance; who apparently deferred the chiller. A new maintenance release was generated. We wanted to make sure there was dry ice for the food in the chiller (or that the chiller was empty); so I spoke with the Flight Attendant in the mid galley. She informed me that the mechanic had told her to use the chiller; and to pull and collar the circuit breaker before arrival. In complete disbelief of what I heard (and having concern for the safety of the operation); I relayed that information to the Captain. The Captain and I went to the mid galley and confirmed that the circuit breaker was in fact in [contrary to] the Minimum Equipment List. We created a new writeup highlighting the incorrect maintenance action; and called for the jet way and a mechanic. The circuit breaker was pulled and collared; a new maintenance release generated; and we were underway. On taxiout; we had another maintenance issue that required a return to gate (L HYD QTY). At this point; we were out of duty time and the flight cancelled. After the passengers got off; we were leaving the aircraft and overheard one mechanic tell another to make sure you pull the data and voice recorders. I do not know who told them to pull the voice recorder; but there was no accident or incident; and the FARs are clear that the voice recorder can not be used for anything other than that. These two separate incidents on this flight lead me to question the oversight and leadership on the maintenance side of our operation.

When a defect was identified with the galley chiller; maintenance utilized the MEL and deferred the system.  A Flight Attendant reported to the flight crew that maintenance personnel had suggested using the equipment and pulling the circuit breaker prior to arrival; in contradiction with the MEL. The flight crew had the system properly deactivated prior to departure.  After returning to the gate for an unrelated maintenance issue; the flight crew reported overhearing maintenance personnel discuss pulling the circuit breakers for the flight recorder and voice recorders for an unknown reason.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 163; Flight Crew Type 14000

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were shocked to see that we were low on the PAPI as we broke out of the 900 feet ceiling when flying the RNAV (GPS) Runway 6 into RSW. I leveled off on the approach; got back on the VASI glidepath and landed uneventfully. I thought we were doing everything correctly at the time; but after a lot of reflection later that night; I discovered we made several errors that were caused by untimely distractions.The Tower was closed. We had briefed the FOM Tower closed procedures before beginning the descent. As we passed over LENPE (IAF) from PASTR to CELBO; we got a call from Miami Center to call them once on the ground. The First Officer misunderstood them as he was having headset issues. I clarified the call to him as I set zero in the altitude window. Between LENPE and CELBO we got an FMC message of 'No V-Speeds.' We had forgotten to type in the V-Speeds so I quickly entered them. The aircraft didn't want to slow below 175; and I was preoccupied with this issue and finally called for flaps 30 just above 1;000 feet. We did the Before Landing Checklist and promptly broke out of the weather.We missed the 'Crosscheck' call due to the ATC call and 'No V-Speed' distraction. We missed the 1;000 feet call due to the later than desired final flap extension and performing the Before Landing Checklist. Both of these distractions took my attention away from monitoring the approach as I should have.Both the Crosscheck and 1;000 feet callouts are tied to specific positions and altitudes. If the pilot is distracted at those points; it's easy to forget these important safety checks. I plan to be in the landing configuration before the FAF in the future so I can put all my attention into monitoring the approach below that altitude.

On approach into RSW; with the Captain as the pilot flying; we had difficulty slowing with the gear down while extending the flaps on schedule for the RNAV Approach to Runway 6. We were landing after the Tower was closed and were being given directions during the descent and approach from Miami Center on after hours procedures. They provided this as a clarification because [another] aircraft didn't follow flight closeout procedures; which caused their own Company aircraft to hold overhead the airport. Due to the above situations; I got distracted with the radio calls; was heads down looking up procedures in the FOM; and did not provide the 1;000 feet back up calls for the Captain. We broke out of the clouds at 900 feet correcting for a slightly 'high' glideslope needle deflection; but noticed red PAPI's on the runway. The Captain reduced our descent rate; re-established glidepath and landed without incident. It scared us to wonder why we were given high indications by the flight director; had trouble slowing; but low PAPI's after breaking out on this particular RNAV.Evaluating the flight afterwards; I should have suit-cased the closed Tower operations at altitude; double checked the descent rates and landing speeds; and have provided better backup to the Captain. There was another causal factor: I found my personal headset not working when I got to the aircraft; so I used the backup headset provided in the back of the Captain's seat. Because of this new single ear headset configuration; which I was not used to; I felt behind the aircraft at times and crossed between the Green; Yellow and Red zones of RRM (Risk Reporting Matrix) as my headset fell off or the ear piece popped out. The Captain did a great job backing me up on radio calls; and he did a great job maneuvering the aircraft onto glideslope. However; my prior preparation (by bringing my issued headset as a backup; running data and researching FOM procedures at altitude) would have caused less distraction on the approach and freed me up to be a better copilot.

B737-800 flight crew reported seeing low altitude indicated on the PAPI lights after breaking out at 900 feet on the RNAV Runway 6 approach at RSW.


Piper Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 700; Flight Crew Type 275

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

I departed on an IFR flight. My student was at the controls and retracted the gear after takeoff. At about 700 AGL we realized the red 'gear unsafe' was still illuminated. I looked at the mirror on the engine nacelle and saw the nose wheel was not quite fully retracted and the doors on the nose wheel housing were still open. I decided to recycle the gear and see if it would retract properly with another try. When I put the gear in the down position; I noticed that there was only a green indication for the mains but not for the nose. The red 'gear unsafe' light was also illuminated. I could see the nose wheel in the mirror and it appeared to be in place. I called the tower and said we'd like to return the airport because we were having issues with our nose gear. At this point I took over controls of the plane. I entered a left downwind and tried switched the lights on the gear indicator to see if it was possibly just an issue with a light. I then tried to recycle the gear 2 more times with the same results per tower's suggestion; I did a low approach over the runway and had tower visually inspect the gear. They told me; 'all gears appear to be down.' I entered the downwind one more time and went through the emergency gear extension checklist but it did not produce any new results. I also tried to G load the plane by pulling back abruptly on the yoke and pushing the rudder pedals to yaw the plane back and forth; hoping to lock the nose wheel in place. Tower advised me to fly on a SW vector for a few miles while they made sure emergency crews were in place. During this time I continued to try and g load the gear into place to no avail. After a few minutes I decided our only option was to attempt a landing. At this point I was 50/50 on whether the gear was fully locked into place. I touched down as soft as I could with full flaps and full aft trim; attempting to let the nose wheel down nice and easy. It ended up being a good touchdown but the second the nose wheel touched; it collapsed. The landing wasn't very rough but I could definitely hear the props strike. We came to a stop; shut off the mixture; fuel selectors; magnetos and battery master and exited the plane through the passenger door. We remained about 20 yards away as the emergency crew immediately covered the plane in foam and water. I did not see any fire but bystanders said they saw a small amount of smoke.

A Flight Instructor and student experienced a nose landing gear problem. Following several attempts to ensure that the nose landing gear was extended; the landing gear collapsed during landing.


Relief Pilot; First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

We were on a random track oceanic crossing of the Atlantic. CPDLC established with Gander and HF contact with Gander on HF radio. We received a CPDLC message from Gander: 'Gander ATC advises higher flight level may be available if requested.' We were at this time at FL300. We checked our flight planned altitudes and performance page and agreed that we could climb to FL340. We submitted CPDLC request for 'Request Climb to FL340 due to performance' two minutes later. Twelve minutes had passed and we did not get a response from Gander. During this time we were starting to experience light to moderate turbulence so we initiated another CPDLC request to Gander to 'Request climb to FL340 due to weather.' Seven minutes later we received an uplink from Gander: 'Climb to reach FL340 by N5456.0 W041; report level FL340.'  We accepted this uplink and started our climb to FL340. When level; we sent the 'armed level at FL340' report via CPDLC. I should note that we were careful to check TCAS to ensure there were no other aircraft in the area that we may cross altitudes with. There was only one other flight behind us by 35 NM; no other traffic.  About 5 minutes after level off at FL340; we received a SELCAL page and got on the HF to talk to Gander. They told us that Gander needed us at FL310. We did not question the instructions and began a descent to FL310 and reported level at FL310 to Gander via voice on HF. A few minutes later; we received another SELCAL page from Gander and they wanted us to re-confirm that we were at FL310. We confirmed this on HF voice and submitted a CPDLC plain text message stating that: 'We are still maintaining FL310.' We did not hear from Gander again except via SELCAL page when they requested a voice position report. At this time we also submitted a CPDLC position report. Not sure why there was confusion about the altitude; but we do have copies of the CPDLC uplinks and downlinks that show we did get clearance to climb to FL340. ATC must have decided they had made a mistake to allow us to climb to FL340 and re-assigned us to FL310. We immediately complied with all ATC instructions and are not aware of any traffic conflicts that may have been caused. Unknown why ATC assigned us to FL340; then after we had leveled; decided they wanted us at FL310. Seemed that our CPDLC data link was slow to process and may have contributed to any confusion there may have been.

We were Oceanic with Gander CPDLC and HF radio. We got an ATC uplink stating; 'GANDER ATC ADVICES HIGHER FLIGHT LEVEL MAY BE AVAILABLE IF REQUESTED.'  We sent ATC a message; 'REQUEST CLIMB TO FL340 DUE TO AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE.' We got no response and 12 minutes later when we hit turbulence we sent a message; 'REQUEST CLIMB TO FL340 DUE TO WEATHER.' Seven minutes later we received the message; 'CLIMB TO REACH FL340 BY N5456.0 W041; REPORT LEVEL FL340.' We then climbed to FL340 and armed the level at report. After we leveled off we received a message from ATC stating; 'STANDBY.'  Our level at FL340 report went out about this time. Then we got a SELCAL from Gander Radio. They relayed a message telling us that FL340 was unavailable and to climb and maintain FL310! We then proceeded to descend back to FL310. There was no traffic around us on TCAS; except a company flight about 30 some miles behind us. We then went back and forth with Gander radio confirming that we were at and maintaining FL310. ATC gave no sense of being upset with us. The CPDLC response time seemed to be extremely slow and our communications seemed to end up overlapping each other and causing confusion. Communication with Shanwick was fine on CPDLC. Gander seemed to be having problems and we ended up having to give position reports the whole way on HF.

B777 flight crew reports confusing clearances from Gander Oceanic after receiving an offer for; and accepting FL340. Once level they are told to maintain FL310; and after verifying; the crew descends to FL310.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 20

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC

Aircraft X was inbound from GRACE intersection on a vector for the ILS RWY28L at PIT. Coordination and point out via automation for descent of Aircraft X to 4000 [feet] for icing was accomplished with DS (Departure) position. Aircraft X was level at 4000 MSL just east of BTP airport when I observed a fast moving target departing BTP airport squawking VFR and climbing toward Aircraft X. I inquired to DS if they were talking to the target. DS stated that someone was calling them right now (this was yelled across the room due to urgency).Conflict alert activate as the traffic pass less than a mile at the same altitude and behind Aircraft X. DS tagged the aircraft VFR as Aircraft Y who subsequently requested VFR flight following to ZZZ.Aircraft X stated urgently as the traffic was issued that they were IMC. Aircraft Y call sign routinely depart BTP airport requesting IFR in the air when there is a RCO at BTP to safely pick up the clearance. In this case; I believe the aircraft was illegally operating in IMC conditions VFR. Have the local FSDO with jurisdiction; contact the company and have a safety discussion about operations using IFR RCO; the effects on controller workload and coordination. In addition; investigate and follow up on the actions of the crew of Aircraft Y. I bet they bust VFR weather minimums routinely with a big sky theory attitude; but would be surprised when they see a replay of how close they were to the other aircraft.

PIT TRACON Controller reported an airborne conflict with an IFR aircraft and a VFR aircraft that may have been VFR in IFR conditions.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 9800; Flight Crew Type 5000

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Upon arrival at the gate we complied with the station specific APU off procedures and refrained from starting the APU; we arrived at the gate with engine number 2 shut down and left #1 running.  The crew was in the proper position to park us and the Jetway driver was present; it took approximately 2.5 minutes to get the power turned on.  The safety hazard was that the ramp crew opened both cargo doors with an engine running and the beacon on.  They had a belt loader up to the forward door during this time as well.  I was tempted to shut the engine down right there but it was night and I feared creating a more adverse situation in the cabin going down to Emergency lights.During deplaning I asked the ramp lead if it was their procedure to start offloading bags with an engine running and he responded; 'No; no one is supposed to approach the plane until they get the safe to approach signal'.  He was standing in front of the nose of the plane and could see the other rampers opening the forward door and he did nothing.  However; another ramper did show him something on a cell phone during this period.

A B-737 Captain was distressed when; after a night gate arrival; both cargo doors were opened although the left engine was still running while awaiting ground power availability. A station policy directing that APUs not be utilized on arrival aircraft was cited as a contributing factor; as the running engine was required to power aircraft systems including lighting for deplaning passengers.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 1800; Flight Crew Type 400

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft X was issued a descent to 2500 feet but as soon as I said 2000; the pilot started to read back 2000. This caused the 500 (of the 2500) to be blocked and when I un-keyed; I just heard the call sign portion of the transmission. The aircraft descended to 2000 feet and asked for an altimeter setting and I noticed the aircraft below the 2500 minimum vectoring altitude (MVA) and assigned altitude. I issued low altitude alert and instructed them to climb to 2500 feet.  I missed the read back. This all stemmed from the aircraft departing ZZZ with a known mechanical issue and low on fuel. They had diverted to ZZZ earlier (unknown to me) and was trying to reposition back to ZZZ1.They departed ZZZ1 minimum fuel and would not accept an approach at ZZZ1 that was consistent with the flow of traffic. I should have [requested priority handling] for the pilot immediately and handled it as one. The pilot put the FAA in a tough situation as I was trying to do my best to help the pilots who were in a bind; but I also missed many things I should have done.I did not ensure the aircraft had the weather and NOTAMs at ZZZ1; [request priority handling] for the aircraft; advise them of their position when vectoring them on to the localizer; allowed them to intercept the localizer inside the final approach fix. I did not catch the lack of read back when I issued 2500 MVA altitude and they over keyed me with a read back of 2000. Issue a brasher to the pilot.  I need to make sure all the phraseology and regulations are followed on our side (ATC)However; Aircraft X's principle operations inspector needs to investigate if the flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 was conducted legally and safely. It was very apparent the urgency to land immediately after taking off from ZZZ. This should not have happened. This caused me to make shortcuts and put the FAA at risk of liability as well as put the pilots at risk of missing something like landing on runway XX at ZZZ1; a closed runway. The pilots were wanting to land on runway XX at one point.

Upon departure from ZZZ to ZZZ1; a short 5 minute or so flight; we were given a heading and an initial altitude of 3000 feet on initial departure. Given we were taking the plane in for maintenance; the plane had enough fuel to meet the minimum FAR requirements for an IFR flight. While setting up for the approach at hand; we were told by the controlling facility to descend and maintain 2;000 feet which was read back. A couple minutes went by as we were being vectored in for the approach and ATC gave us a low altitude alert followed by a command to 'descend and maintain 2;500 feet MSL'. Having already been cleared down to 2000 feet initially after we asked for lower; we read back the instruction for 2;500 feet followed by a 'we were initially cleared down to 2;000 feet MSL'.At that point; the controlling facility told us that they weren't going to debate over it and we instigated the climb to 2;500 feet. We only meant to reiterate the initial 2;000 foot altitude instruction for clarification purposes; not for argumentative purposes; as that was the initial instruction given to us after all. After landing; we received a phone call to contact the appropriate controlling facility to clarify the situation. We pulled the tapes from the appropriate controlling facility at the time of the incident and the tapes coincide with our initial hearing of '2;000 feet MSL;' not '2;500 feet MSL'. The altitude is clearly heard as 2;000 feet being the instruction given and 2000 feet being the instruction read back; not '2;500'. In order to keep a situation like this from reoccurring; an articulate tone should be adopted in order to hear and say the correct altitude assigned. Given that a weather system was rolling through as well; that added extra workloads on both us; the pilots; along with the controlling facility.

TRACON Controller and air carrier pilot reported the pilot descended below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude due to a misunderstanding of the assigned altitude between the two parties.


Bombardier/Canadair Undifferentiated or Other Model

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Air Traffic Control

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

I was Pilot Monitoring. First Officer was Pilot flying. We were executing a Visual Approach backed up with the GPS. We were cleared to land on the left downwind leg and started the descent while turning base to cross the Final Approach Fix at 2;300 feet when the Tower gave us a low altitude alert. The airplane also gave us an obstacle warning. We were aware of the obstacle and did not think it was a factor as we were turning base and had situational awareness regarding the airport and terrane. We did not check with the Tower for the Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA); which should have been the case. We climbed to the MVA to intercept the final approach course and landed safely. In the future; when cleared for an approach; I will be sure to request the Minimum Vectoring Altitude if not given.

Air Carrier pilot conducting a Visual Approach reported receiving a terrain alert from the aircraft and ATC.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Tonight's event was a culmination of many months of working these sectors this year. I am not sure how ZNY 58/59 operated prior; but since we started working these sectors; I am continually appalled at N56 Kennedy High and N68 Dixie Sectors disregard of 7110.65 and SOP/LOA agreements! At least once a shift I see either N56 or N68 descend or turn in our airspace without coordination; run boundaries and/or completely violate our airspace without a point out or; if we get a point out; it is late and the aircraft is already in our airspace. I was working 58/59 combined. I could see a FL370 aircraft running the boundary between 19 and 58. This happens a lot and those aircraft are more than 3 miles of 58's airspace. But I look for them because most of those aircraft at this time at night are overseas European and beyond flights and many times I have seen N56 turn them early or run the northern CYN boundary without coordination; a point out or a phone call. So; I watched my boundaries because; as I said above; at least once a shift; CYN or SIE are violated by N56. Tonight this; Flight ABC took a hard right turn after RBV. I assumed initially that his turn would take him to run the northern boundary of CYN/SIE as they always do and maybe I would get a call and maybe not. My attention was diverted for a moment as I had some other things going on in the southern part of my sector and before I knew it; N56 was calling me saying 'point out'. At that moment I looked up and was very surprised to see that same limited code at FL370 headed SE on about a 150 heading and if he did not start a turn soon; would possibly be in conflict with an Air Carrier aircraft also at FL370 to PUT. I tried to reference the Air Carrier and understood that Flight ABC had taken a wrong turn as the controller indicated. I went on to other things and kept watching the code continue SE bound and not start a turn. I was getting worried so I called N56 again to ask him if the aircraft really was turning. His reply was we are doing all we can do. I asked him if he saw my other FL370 traffic and referenced the code again. His only reply was that his point out was at FL370 (obviously I knew that) and that when the aircraft turns; the aircraft would turn. There was no urgency. He would get to it when he would get to it even though he was 50 miles + into my airspace at this time. I turned the Air Carrier to a 090 heading and assured separation. But; it was not until I called N56 the second time that I finally saw any difference in the trajectory of the intruder code. I understand that accidents and mistakes happen especially when language barriers exist with English being a secondary language of some pilots. However; I believe that the continual rebel attitude and complacency of the N56 and N68 controllers that the rules do not apply to them significantly contributes to these incidents becoming more frequent and with possibly worsening results. As an example of this 'cavalier' attitude; another Air Carrier entered my airspace and ran the boundary of CYN/SIE eastbound. It was not until the aircraft had already violated me for approximately 10 miles that I finally got a phone call for a point out. I replied 'I guess so'. Again; this is just the way that these ZNY Controllers operate. This is not the first report I have submitted regarding their inability or unwillingness to follow the rules that they wouldn't think twice about forcing us to do should the tables be turned. Recommendation; Retrain all N56 and N68 controllers and managers and reprimand them when they do not follow the rules. I also believe that this is as management issue as well. If the managers allow this behavior; what is going to force a change in behavior? Are we not in a 'Safety Culture'??

ZDC Controller voiced concern regarding the continued airspace incursion events by ZNY Sectors.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Company Policy

While being marshalled into BWI Gate X after sunset; the Ramp Agents were blatantly disregarding Company and FAA Safety procedures and standard operating procedures. The Marshaler had one lit wand and one unlit wand. The Right Wing Walker had two unlit wands. This is an ongoing issue in BWI. Ramp Agents have become lackadaisical and lazy about being disciplined in following the everyday; every flight; 'breaded and butter;' 'back to basics;' standard operating procedures. Nothing has changed or improved lately.1. Ramp Supervisors need to ensure all lighted wands are operating before sunset each night.2. Ramp Agents need to ensure the lighted wands are operational before marshalling an aircraft into the Safety Zone. Do not Marshall the aircraft into the Safety Zone until a FOD (Foriegn Object Debris) walk down has been completed; Safety Zone is clear; and each Ramp Agent has two operating lighted wands.3. Leadership including the BWI Station Manager and Supervisors needs to ensure consistent compliance with all Safety procedures (using lighted wands at night).

Air carrier flight crew reported that ramp agents are not following Standard Operating Procedures.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

While on final approach; I was the pilot monitoring. I mentioned to the Pilot Flying that we were cleared for the Visual Approach and were directed by ATC to remain on center line to the runway. There was an aircraft departing  using the opposite direction runway. ATC had indicated to us that they would pass on our left and above and it would not be a factor. The Pilot Flying was worried about the oncoming traffic and started descending more rapidly. I mentioned to him that we should not get too close to the terrain that is on final. He indicated to me that there was too much going on with oncoming traffic and the workload. I indicated to him that we should level off to preclude a aural warning of terrain. We did get a terrain warning; and I indicated we should climb to comply with our SOP. The Pilot Flying momentarily leveled off. The Pilot Flying failed to listen to me about climbing. The warning subsided and we continued in for a uneventful landing.

A corporate jet Captain reported the co pilot descended too low on a Visual Approach despite their instructions and received a Terrain Alert.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

During takeoff detected odor during climbout. It didn't last long in the climb and was not noticeable during cruise flight; during descent into ZZZ passing 26;000 or so we started smelling this odor again; while descending further the smell became stronger. The flight attendants in the forward cabin called to say they were smelling a strong odor / fume up in the forward galley area by the cockpit door. Stated it did not extend into the passenger cabin area. As the odor / fume became stronger in the cockpit. I [notified ATC] and we donned our oxygen masks and ran the QRH.We were in significant weather deviating around thunderstorms moderate turbulence; and moderate rain with icing.Note: engine anti-ice was on throughout our descent. Wing anti-ice was on for approx. 5-10 minutes during descent. Odor and fumes seemed confined to the cockpit and forward galley only. Once down around 3-4;000 most of the fume/odor was gone. Successful landing on Runway 4R with winds 080 feet at 26 gusts 34 knots.Aircraft just came from ZZZ1 after a heavy check. It was ferried before this flight. I suspected a left engine bleed issue or fume due to its presence primarily in the cockpit and its recent heavy check. Smell was similar to paint on an exhaust pipe or a BBQ that gets very hot for the first time. No visible haze or smoke was present but the fume was definitely strong enough to require use of the quick don masks for safety. Some mild eye irritation was noted in the last 30 minutes of flight. The cabin crew reported that the fumes were not affecting them or present in the main cabin.Would like to extend our sincere thanks to Center; Approach control and tower/ground controllers for their outstanding support during this event. Also the ready support by ZZZ's crash fire rescue team that responded to our [situation]. They were with us until all the passengers were off the aircraft.I also would like to commend my crew; starting with my First Officer; for his professional performance during this inflight event that was as complicated as it gets; trying to evaluate the source; coordinate with ATC when needed; working with flight attendants and assistance with avoiding severe weather. He was the most important player in this event and his skillset and training was evident all along the way. Kudos for a job well done. Secondly; appreciation for an outstanding job by our flight attendant crew for their exceptional job of preparing our passengers and the cabin for our arrival in this situation. It was a total team effort to get us all to the gate safely.

B737-800 Captain reported fumes in the cockpit and forward during climb; clearing in cruise; and returning on descent.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 22

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

D10 controller called and said 'Quit deleting the speeds; these aircraft are not making their crossing restrictions.'I answered with 'They are all assigned the STAR altitudes and speeds.' I later realized that the controller at D10 was saying that I had failed to make the pilots comply with the restrictions. In the Center environment:1) The controller issues the restriction.2) The pilot reads back the restriction correctly.3) The pilot is expected to comply with the restriction. If the pilot cannot comply with the restriction he/she is to tell the controller that they cannot comply and the controller will come up with a new plan or restriction that will work.We were recently assigned to watch an eLMS [electronic Learning Management System] instruction course about departure routings. In the course it said that the controller was responsible for the pilots' actions even when the controller issued the correct restriction and the pilot read the restriction back correctly. Hold the pilots responsible for their actions. We cannot have two sets of rules. Currently in the center environment the pilot is responsible for complying with the restrictions they are given. According to this eLMS course: In a TRACON or tower environment the controllers is responsible for the pilots' actions even when the controller does everything correctly.If I am wrong about the rules please tell me and all center controllers as soon as possible. The pilots have to be responsible for their actions. Controllers cannot be held responsible for the mistakes of pilots. That is just insane.

ZFW Controller describes situations where D10 controllers complain about aircraft not making crossing restrictions; because the ZFW Controller is issuing different speed to the aircraft than what are on the STARS. The ZFW Controller thinks it is up to the pilot to tell him that can't do the speed and make the restriction.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

While supervising a student conducting an instrument approach I noted that he/she had incorrectly selected the outbound radial [rather than its reciprocal inbound course] to comply with our ATC clearance. I noted this; and then waited a period to see if the student would correct the error. I eventually changed it for them and they started to debate with me. Then ATC called. In retrospect there had been a repeat of the same sort of errors with respect to a clearance. At the time I had the impression that they had cleared us for the approach and we shortly began a procedure turn. We hadn't deviated very far from the course when ATC advised that we weren't cleared and that we indeed should continue outbound. I began writing notes for the debrief in my new electronic flight bag (EFB) and continued to have things occur that required annotation. Unfamiliarity with the system to take notes efficiently diverted my attention from the student selecting the incorrect inbound course and by the time I noticed the error--by looking outside--we were almost one mile off course with less than 4 miles to go to the MAP. Embarrassing to say the least. Technology needs to serve its purpose and not be a distraction. As an instructor my 'second' priority is giving instruction; my 'first' must always be flying the airplane. Just because a student is advanced doesn't mean that they won't make mistakes.

An instructor providing IFR training in a C-172 allowed himself to get distracted by taking student error notes on a new EFB. As a result; he allowed/participated in a minor track deviation until advised by ATC.


After consulting with the First Officer (FO) we elected to use Max auto braking for landing on [GFK] Runway 35L. The braking action was 45/45/35 mu report. I wanted to land and stop in the first 2/3 of the 7200 foot runway. Upon touchdown; full reverse was applied to both engines. Auto brakes worked as advertised. As we slowed 80 knot and 60 knot calls were made from the FO. Reversers were stowed as per standard operating procedure. As we came to a slow crawl; dust entered the air conditioning system and dust mist filled the cockpit. Main cargo fire warnings illuminated.I instructed the FO that the fire warnings were from the dust from the runway. Subsequently the Main Cargo fire warnings ceased on the taxi into the gate. Taxi in and shutdown were uneventful.The runway was very contaminated with sand from deicing the runway unbeknownst to the crew.I think that if I had known the runway was not only contaminated with snow and ice and that it had great quantities of sand debris on the runway; I still would have used max auto brakes; however I would have used less engine reversers and would have come out of reverse sooner.

Air Cargo Captain reported that after landing on a runway contaminated with sand the aircraft filled with dust that had been ingested by the packs following use of reverse thrust.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were cleared for takeoff on Runway 36 and told to maintain Runway heading. As we were lining up for takeoff; I saw a GA aircraft approximately 3.5 miles to the South of the airport. I also observed a C152 midfield; just to the east of the centerline of Runway 36 on a northeast heading approximately 100 feet AGL. This aircraft was on a practice miss approach or go around. It appeared that the C152 was turning right.Takeoff roll and rotation were normal. No unusual events noted.At positive rate; First Officer (FO) Flying Pilot called for gear up. Right after selecting gear up; we got a TCAS popup and we observed a C152 at our same altitude (approximately 300 feet AGL) and approximately 250 Feet on the left side of our aircraft. At no time during takeoff roll and/or rotation did the FO or myself see the C152 anywhere near our flight path. Nor did we see the C152 turn left into our flight path.Below remarks are from a conversation that I had with the MSN Tower Supervisor:The Supervisor told me that the C152 was a local based trainer with a CFI and student on board. The Tower Supervisor also told me that the Controller had told the C152 to turn right twice and maintain a pattern altitude of 1000 Feet (which I did hear). The Controller didn't get any readback from the C152. Right after the second attempt trying to communicate with the C152; the Controller got distracted by another aircraft. When the Controller looked down field; he observed that the C152 had actually turned left. He thought that the C152 was well west of the extended centerline of RWY36. In my opinion the C152 was not well west of the extended centerline of Runway 36.Human Error was caused by Tower Controller getting distracted and the CFI not having situational awareness (missed ATC call).[Suggest] Delay takeoff until you are sure that all aircrafts are clear of the departure path at a ATC controlled airport.

EMB-145 Captain reported NMAC with a C152 shortly after takeoff from MSN.


PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 14580; Flight Crew Type 2700

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Physiological - Other

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Short final to runway 35; long term construction on airport. Landing runway with new seal coat; lights; stripes; no ground traffic; no visual runway barricade; etc. Short final; hazy day; sun coming up; unable to visualize yellow 'X' on numbers '35' prior to touch down. The yellow 'X' was smaller than the '35' and obliterated by the runway marking '35'; along with shadows and haze. Distorted the view resulting in inadvertent touchdown on runway 35. No incident or accident.Mitigating factors; aside from shadows; small; difficult to visualize 'X' in the ambient light; no additional runway blocking markers on approach; nor 'X' light poles etc. available. Personal physiological needs.  RX: Need bigger; more visible 'X'; place Larger 'X' over painted runway markers where it is more easily visualized; etc.

The pilot of a PA46 landed on a closed runway at a non-towered airport. Although the runway had an 'X' over the runway number; it was reported to have been very difficult to see.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 21.5; Flight Crew Total 85.6; Flight Crew Type 31.4

I experienced an on-airport forced landing due to an engine failure; with no injuries and no damage to the aircraft or airport property. The flight was entirely normal and uneventful through takeoff; cruise; descent; pattern entry; and turn onto final approach. My description will therefore commence with once established on final approach. Note that I had already completed the descent checklist during initial descent before entering the pattern and GUMPS check on downwind. During each of these checks I verified mixture RICH (but leaned slightly one index finger knuckle to account for high density altitude); fuel shutoff IN (meaning full in so fuel is NOT cutoff); and prime OFF. This is all in addition to the standard descent and approach checklist items. Because I already knew that the Katana can lose an engine if power is reduced to idle and the fuel pump is OFF; I double-checked the pump setting and mixture; as per my habits; not only on descent but in every leg of the pattern including final. I also always start my approach high to account for any engine failure on short final. That proved to be a lifesaver. After rolling out on the centerline I dropped full flaps and trimmed for 60 knots. I reduced power to slightly above idle and let the aircraft descend slightly faster vertically down to the glideslope. Slightly above the glideslope I advanced the throttle slightly to anticipate intercepting the glideslope; intending to increase power about 100 RPM to maintain the glideslope. Up to this point the approach was stabilized and entirely normal. There were no gusts or turbulence and the approach was right on centerline. Upon advancing the throttle; there simply was no response from the engine. I immediately advanced the throttle smoothly to about 75% of full travel; and the engine responded with a slight increase of RPM; perhaps 100-150 at most. I glanced down quickly to check for fuel pump ON. It was. I checked the mixture setting and it was right at 1 index finger knuckle lean of full rich; right where I had put it. I then checked the fuel shutoff by physically pressing on it; and it was full IN; meaning fuel flow was on. Finally I glanced at the prime switch and it was OFF. I didn't verify ignition switch or master switch position until after landing; but after full stop I verified that the ignition switch was still on BOTH and the master switch (both sides) was ON. There simply was nothing I could find in my technique or procedures that would have caused an engine failure on short final. Once I completed my internal scan for possible causes of the power loss; I focused on flying the airplane. I shoved the nose down to maintain 60 Kts; and then realized that I was too far below the glideslope to make the runway. I could also see that the approach light array was a significant barrier. So I decided to depart the centerline early and aim for the grass to the immediate west of [the runway]. This only required a slight bank to the right. I could see that it would be close to clear the hill immediately above the road running east/west just before the approach end; so I decided to raise the flaps to half setting to stretch the glide. I wouldn't have done so had we been lower; but I decided early and high enough that the risk was minimal. I also knew that this aircraft's flaps retract slowly; and with its large wings and low drag profile I was likely to stretch the glide slightly; which was all I needed. It worked. As the flaps retracted I shoved the nose down some more and I could feel the aircraft accelerate. As we approached the ground I resisted the almost overwhelming temptation to haul back on the stick and maintained 60 kts as long as possible. Somewhere along the way; I don't recall exactly when; I broadcast a mayday and then focused on the landing. I flared the aircraft but leveled off slightly high. We landed firmly but the touchdown was actually less firm than some landings I did as a student pilot. I did note the airspeed during the flare as my eyes were outside; but I'd say we had slowed to 45-50 kts at touchdown. I don't recall hearing the stall warning horn; so I did a good job maintaining speed to avoid spinning-in. I thought the aircraft was starting to roll to the right during the flare and I thought for a moment that I had stalled; but then we were down and rolling out. I realized later that I had touched down on an incline from left to right which created an illusion of banking to the right during the landing. Once the mains touched the nose wheel came down immediately even though I had the stick well back; and we were down. There was no bounce. I only had to make minor rudder adjustments to track straight during the rollout. The surface was perfect for an emergency landing - firm enough to allow good directional control but soft enough to help cushion the landing. I used only minor brake pressure to bring the aircraft to a stop. Our location was perhaps 50 feet west of [the runway]; short of the approach end and almost abeam the approach light array. Had we landed on the centerline we probably would have crashed into the array; with significant damage to the airport and aircraft and probably significant injuries. Once the aircraft was stopped I immediately checked my passenger; who reported he was fine with no injuries. I checked myself; also with no injuries; then commenced shutdown procedures except I left the master and avionics on. After about 30 seconds I called the Tower to report no damage; no injuries. The Tower responded that help was on the way. I then completed shutdown procedures and we exited the aircraft. I did a quick walk-around and noted no gas leaking; and no apparent damage to the aircraft. An airport operations car arrived soon after; followed by emergency responders. I called the flying club and notified them of the incident; and then filled out paperwork with the airport operations person. The emergency responders left and a tug arrived to tow the aircraft to flying club maintenance; once NTSB approved moving the aircraft. My passenger and I were dropped off at the flying club after which I returned the aircraft book and we left. I flew this aircraft with my primary flight training CFI; for my FAA flight review and annual flight review; combined. During the run up prior to departure for this flight; I leaned the mixture slowly to max RPM as I had been trained previously. Upon reaching max RPM the engine stabilized and then suddenly stopped! [The Instructor] thought that I had leaned the mixture too far; and suggested setting the mixture full rich for run up and takeoff. So we did that; restarted the engine; and no further issues were noted during the rest of the flight. But I was surprised since in all previous training I had received emphasized leaning the mixture for highest RPM; which typically was about halfway of mixture lever full travel. I never mechanically set the mixture to halfway; I always set it based on delivered RPM. During the incident flight today; I set the mixture slightly lean of full rich both for departure and arrival (one index finger knuckle length); to account for high density altitude. This was a mixture setting considerably richer than max RPM but slightly leaner than full rich. I felt that was the safest thing to do since I didn't feel comfortable going full rich at high density altitude; but I was satisfied that leaning to max RPM might not have enough margin.Note that I have flown three other Katana tail numbers and did my first solo in the Katana; with over 31 hours in type. I had always set the mixture in these aircraft; as trained; for best RPM and never had any problems as long as the pump was ON; including during extensive touch and go operations. In all of these aircraft best RPM was typically about halfway of mixture level travel. I also flew these aircraft in high density altitude operations as like today; and during the winter during extreme cold.Root cause has not yet been determined as the aircraft is still being examined by flying club maintenance. I am filing this report because the Katana may have a previously unknown sensitivity to mixture setting at high density altitude. It is already well known that the Katana can lose an engine if power is reduced to idle while the fuel pump is off. In my case the pump was on; so either the pump failed or there is some other issue. It was definitely not pilot error.

The pilot experienced an engine failure in a Katana DA20-C1 Eclipse and successfully landed short of the runway. The engine did not respond to throttle increase after turning final.