Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

A ramp person had come up and asked that we use hand signals for pushback as the comm'(communication headset) were not working. Once we were ready to push there was another ramper on the tug. The Captain gave the signal that the brake was released and we were cleared to push. She didn't see the hand signals the first time so the Captain gave the signal again. The tug driver; then in a rush began pushing. About 20 feet into the push the aircraft jolted and the push came to a stop. At this point there was no communication from the ground crew to cockpit until the supervisors came out and were able to connect the ground comm's. After watching the wing walker walk to the right (he was on the left wing) wing and appear upset; I assumed we had been pushed into something on the right wing; but we could not see anything. At this point I contacted ops and told them we suspected we just got pushed into something and we needed a manager. At the same time the Captain called the flight attendant to see if he could see anything. The flight attendant asked passengers if they saw anything. Which they said they saw a tug drive away; but not actually make contact with us. A manager eventually came out and connected out ground comm's and had informed us that we had been pushed into a tug and that the right wingtip and aileron had been damaged and that we needed to call maintenance to come out and pull us back into the gate. Maintenance showed up and took pictures along with ground ops the document the event. Eventually maintenance backed us into the gate and we deboarded. All passengers were fine besides the delay that was incurred.The aircraft jolted and came to stop. We assumed we either hit something or the tow bar broke loose.Lack of communication between the wing walker and tug driver. From my understanding the wing walker had signaled the tug driver not to push.We came to a immediate stop and contacted operations for further help.Proper communication between tug driver and wing walker. Radio comm's with tug driver could had also helped the situation.

EMB-145 flight crew reported pushback crew pushed aircraft off the gate into a tug damaging right wing area.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

MDW was using a combination of RNP/RNAV Y 13C and Visual Approach 13C all afternoon. Typically; when 13C is in use; ORD protects for the MDW 13C ILS. However; since the ILS was not in use today; ORD was operating as normal with their southbound departures off Runway 22L. When traffic to MDW was light; it wasn't really a big deal. However; with the evening rush; it became more of a problem. Due to MDW's size and also the vast sea of orange lights that is the Metro Chicago area; visuals became a bit more difficult to achieve after sunset. Right now; only one airline is certified to use the RNP Y 13C Approach; and even then; not all of their aircraft are capable. The evening rush included several GA aircraft along with other air carriers which really forced our hand to use visuals. Earlier in the shift; I had asked a CIC to call MDW and see if we could use Runway 31C since the winds were fairly light. I saw one air carrier proceeding on a wide base leg; outside of the RNP Y final approach course. I told him to turn right to heading 090 to continue following the traffic; to which he replied; 'roger; we still have our traffic in sight.' I then switched the aircraft to Tower frequency about 7 miles from the airport. Just then; I saw an air carrier departing ORD Runway 22L southbound; climbing slowly; but assigned the ORD6 SID. The line's FLM-IC saw what was going on and took action to change the advertised approach in use at MDW to the GPS 4R circle to 13C to avoid further issues. I was later told that separation was lost. Under light traffic; using this combination of visuals and RNP Y 13C approaches works; however; under any real load; it quickly becomes a difficult operation which has no built-in safeguards to protect MDW inbound traffic from ORD departure traffic. If Runway 13C is required; then ORD needs to protect for it.

C90 Controller described a loss of separation event involving arrival traffic into MDW and departure traffic from ORD; the reporter suggesting amending procedures when this combination of runways are required.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 10100; Flight Crew Type 750

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Upon my arrival into the [Airport] area; I was experiencing great difficulty in locating the Airport. This was my first time flying into [this airport] and unfortunately; my aircraft was not equipped with GPS or navigation radio… communications only. When I called the tower; thinking I was about 5 miles north the controller advised me that I was actually 3 miles and had violated their airspace and was conflicting with his traffic.I have grounded my aircraft until ALL radio-navigation communication equipment is upgraded to suitable standards; and from now on I will call the tower much further out regardless whether I can see the field or not.

C120 pilot reported that due to older avionics he entered a Class D airspace prior to getting clearance.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 204; Flight Crew Type 8800

Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Coming in for a visual approach and landing at Tucson to end our duty day. It was night; VFR. Our clearance was to proceed direct to CALLS and descend to 6;000 FT. As we descended; we got and maintained visual contact with Runway 11L. I checked the minimum altitude for CALLS; which was 5;000 FT and confirmed that altitude with the First Officer. While I knew the high terrain was just to the west of centerline; I did not verify the altitude of the terrain; which was 4;600 FT. As we approached the terrain; I continued to crosscheck the terrain display on my instruments. The First Officer backed it up as well.Soon after we passed through 6;000; we got a 'Caution Terrain' warning. As I was reaching to take control of the aircraft; the caution changed to a GPWS 'Pull Up Terrain' command. The First Officer stated we have to perform a terrain avoidance maneuver as I was switching off the automation. I added power and was approaching a 20 degree deck angle when we passed through 5;700 FT and the Terrain Warning terminated. I leveled the plane; captured ILS glide path prior to CALLS; and completed the approach and landing. At no time did we lose sight of the runway.I should have taken the time to review the elevation of that terrain before the approach. Definitely don't descend below 6;000 FT until past that hill.

On a visual approach to 11L in TUS; we received a 'Caution Terrain' followed by 'Pull Up Terrain' Warning at 5;500 FT MSL approximately 17 NM from the airport while following another aircraft.Next time approaching 11L from the northwest; I will tune the ILS at a point outside of CALLS to provide terrain clearance around CALLS.

On a night visual approach to Runway 11L at TUS the flight crew of a B737-700 received Caution Terrain and 'Pull Up Terrain' EGPWS warnings roughly 17 NM from the airport.  They complied with the terrain avoidance maneuver; tuned the ILS and intercepted the GS from below; then continued to landing.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

On the arrival into MIA we started picking up strong wake from the aircraft in front of us which I believe was a heavy.  There was no wind and looked as if we were going to be in the wake for an extended period of time.  So I went to vertical speed to stay above the wake.  Taking a quick glance at the arrival they were all at or above altitude constraints.  A couple minutes later thinking I was well above all constraints I noticed on the navigation display an amber circle.  At that moment I realize I was below an 8;000 feet altitude constraint and was at 7;600 feet.  I disconnected the autopilot to level off. About the same time ATC asked about our attitude and gave us a heading and lower altitude.  Fortunately; there was no traffic below us.[Caused by] wrongfully thinking by slowing my descent I was going to be at or above all my altitude constraints and some weather near the arrival that created a distraction.

A321 pilot reported overshooting a crossing restriction on arrival into MIA; citing concern about possible wake turbulence as a contributing factor.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We were cleared for take off 12R MMUN were instructed to follow ROTGI one ALFA departure; contact departure control at the departure end of the runway.  Passing through 2;500 we were radar identified and told to turn 'left to heading of 360; intercept the airway' The autopilot was not engaged. I read the clearance back turned the heading selector to 360 and asked the flying pilot; the captain; if he would like that set up in the box?  The Captain engaged the autopilot told me no and called for Flaps 0 after takeoff checklist.  I checked the speed raised the flaps and engaged the right pack and proceeded with the after takeoff checklist.  The Prior to intercept of the airway the captain turned the aircraft left [right?]; away from course. I told him that I thought the course was to his left.  He did not respond but then keyed the mike and informed ATC we are unable to intercept the airway.  ATC responded that we should be able to intercept the airway from the 360 heading.  I again said the course is to the left of us.  ATC then instructed us to contact Merida center.  At this point; I thought the captain was flying this aircraft single pilot and he had a lost look on his face.  I pulled up the airway on the [tablet]; Tuned in CUN VOR; Dialed in the 012 radial and displayed the VOR on my NAV display.  The NAV display confirmed we were to the right of course and tracking away from course. The captain still took no action.  I then told him 'the course is to our left; you see I have the VOR on the NAV display.'   He then told me he didn't understand.  I told him 'the course is to the left; it is the 012 radial from Cancun.'  He then started scrolling through the FMS.  I contacted Merida Center.  Between transmissions I noticed we were still tracking further from course and the captain still failed to take action.  We were VFR and I debated taking control of the aircraft.  I then asked Merida Center for Direct RAKAR.  Merida directed us to fly direct to MYDIA.  The captain then tried to blame me for the error; claiming I did not put it in the box which confused him.  I told him I asked him if he would like it in the FMS and he responded NO.  He then denied it.  I told him we weren't that far off and are now on a direct course.  He continued to try to blame me for not understanding basic airmanship.  He claimed he didn't understand why a course of 012 from Cancun would apply.  He then told me he must not have understood what I was asking and he didn't remember telling me not to insert it into the box.  I explained that the clearance should have been to turn to a 360 heading and intercept M219; which if he looked on his chart is the 012 radial from Cancun.  After several minutes of back and forth; he told me I should have put it in the FMS correctly.  I have 16 years flying jets 121.  Most of my jet time is international heavy experience.  This captain is a VERY challenging individual to fly with.  He routinely ignores clearances and takes over all of the duties without a single warning; removing the other pilot from involvement.  On other legs he would ask for clearances with out asking the flying pilot if it was ok.  HE has ZERO CRM skills and to be honest our CRM classes are lacking.

An A320 First Officer reported a departure from MMUN with the Captain flying; during which a track deviation occurred as the Captain did not comprehend the clearance. The Captain believed that the First Officer had not set up the FMC properly and the First Office felt that the Captain had poor CRM skills.


Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

This is a general report on conditions at the CLT airport ramp area. Over a period of 6 days; we witnessed Regional Jets with careless taxi (too fast). We were cut off by a Dash 8 [one night]. The ramp workers are continually driving in an unsafe manner. An aircraft can be stopped with nose over the equipment road and there is no consideration by operators of the aircraft or conditions at the time. They simply run around the nose of the aircraft (without even slowing and it appears without a glance to one side of the other); certainly without looking at the aircraft or crew. Local attitude is the issue; and I believe they have gotten away with it so far. The real problem is when something happens I have the impression we are going to get someone killed. I believe there needs to be an adjustment in the operations of ramp and possibly and adjustment in how aircraft on end concourse are pushed so as to not require aircraft wing or nose to intrude on ramp road area.

An Air Carrier Captain comments about the unsafe CLT airport ground operations by taxiing aircraft; ground crew; ramp operations; and conflicts with aircraft pushed from concourse end gates onto ramp roadways.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Time Pressure; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Approach called and said they have an emergency aircraft in my airspace; smoke in the cockpit. Just letting me know. A few minutes later they called back and said I needed to talk to the aircraft because he needed the closest airport and they couldn't really help him because of his position. Aircraft X checked on; said he had low oil pressure. Approach gave me a pretty good position report. I asked him to squawk a code; he only idented.He said he was IFR. I treated him like IFR and cleared him to ZZZ via radar vectors and descend to 051. He had a hard time following the heading to ZZZ. Once he crossed the 051 Minimum IFR Altitude (MIA) I descended him to the next MIA; 042. Shortly after I gave him this altitude he made a big turn to the south re-entering the 051MIA; I gave him a Low Altitude alert and asked him to turn back to the north to get away from that line; he gave me about a 90 degree turn. Around this time; I believe; he asked me to write down a cell number. It took me three transmissions to understand what he was asking.After observing another turn off course; I decided the pilot was having a hard time keeping his heading because he was having a hard time seeing his instruments and flying the plane. I decided the best course of action was to not over stress the pilot with too many questions. He asked for the ceiling at ZZZ; we can't receive the weather there so the D-side called Approach for the weather. The supervisor called the CWSU [Center Weather Service Unit] and they gave an estimated ceiling between 2;500 and 3;000. At this point I made the decision to descend him below the MIA. I gave him a descent to 025; I thought that was about 1;000 AGL. I never called low altitude alert. We lost radar on him about 4.5 miles SE of the airport. I kept getting altitude reports from him. I asked if he could see the airport; fields or roads; he said 'No; it was hard to see'.  He reported at about 027 he broke out of clouds; still couldn't see the airport. Eventually he did and said downwind landing not sure if he would make the field. He did and landed safe. It would have been helpful to be able to pull up the ZZZ; ZZZ1 or the ZZZ2 AWOS in En Route Automaton Modernization (ERAM).

A Center Controller reported of an aircraft that was handed off from approach control that was an emergency. The Controller vectored aircraft to the destination. Along the way the aircraft was given an altitude and heading to maintain. Given a lower altitude the aircraft turned into a higher MVA. A low altitude alert was issued. The pilot could not see due to clouds and an oil and smoke issue. The pilot got aircraft turned around and descend through clouds; found destination and landed.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Workload; Time Pressure; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Takeoff Teterboro Runway 24; winds variable 320-360 degrees; 12 KTS gusting to 30 KTS. Altitude Select set to 1;500 FT. LNAV Departure; VS as vertical mode. Departure - fly 240 degrees to WENTZ Intersection. Cross WENTZ at 1;500 FT - right turn to 280 degrees to RUUDY and maintain 2;000 FT. Windy conditions on departure and liftoff. At 1;300 FT and leveling; the autopilot disengaged due to moderate turbulence and strong winds. Immediately took control of the Global and flew manually. Due to turbulence I was unable to level at 1;500 FT. Global climbed to 1;800 FT - 1;900 FT when I finally was able to start descent to 1;500 FT approaching WENTZ. Crossing WENTZ I turned 280 degrees; turned back on the autopilot; called for 2;000 FT in the Altitude Select and climbed to approaching RUUDY. At no time was the aircraft out of control of in conflict with other aircraft.

A Global 700 autopilot disconnected on the TEB Runway 24 RUUDY 4 Departure at 1;300 FT due to turbulence and the pilot descended from 1;800 FT to cross WENTZ at 1;500 FT.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

160 nm east of waypoint DUSAC over the Eastern Pacific we experienced a quick moment of severe turbulence which caused the aircraft to bank as much as 45 deg. Altitude FL370. Mach .80. Wind 260 @ 110. VMC on top. Layer 4;000 feet or more below us. LNAV/VNAV on. Autopilot on. Seat belt sign on due to continuous light chop.Aircraft slowly began to roll (similar to a mountain wave event) which got our attention. Seconds later aircraft began to bank right excessively and rapidly. Autopilot and Autothrottle were disengaged and a recovery to straight and level flight was achieved. Recovery was smooth and forceful but not abrupt. Bank angle may have reached as much as 45 deg right. Airspeed remained within limits. Descent was arrested manually before -300 feet. No significant sink rate. Engine instruments normal. No ECIAS or STATUS messages.After autopilot reengaged and flight seemed normal; FO called FAs to make sure both they and pax were okay. No reported injuries. A few minutes later I made a passenger announcement. No one seemed to care. It just felt like turbulence to them. There were two aircraft below us at 360 and 350 about 10-20 miles ahead. There was another aircraft (likely a 737-800) 2;000 feet above us but far enough ahead to be out of TCAS range. In my professional opinion (25+ years) this was not a wake turbulence event. A blind announcement was made on guard. As air was again relatively smooth; returned to Mach .80 speed and continued flight with no further incidences. Normal landing in HNL. No apparent damage on walk-around.I think this was a case of wrong place at wrong time. According to WX charts; we were likely in the vicinity of the crossing of a 120 kt. jet stream at both FL340 and FL410.

B757 Captain reported experiencing an uncommanded 45 degree bank angle at FL370 that the reporter felt was related to jet stream activity.


Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

After HYLND intersection we were cleared to MERTO intersection both crew members failed to recognize that METRO was typed in the FMC; incorrectly. The aircraft turned west instead of North. ATC asked us to clarify the waypoint. We corrected the active waypoint to MERTO and proceeded on course.Aircraft was late to arrive. During the rush to get the flight ready I told the First Officer that I would load the FMC while he did the walk around and ice check. During our preflight duties the First Officer checked the route; briefed me; ran the checklists; and proceeded with the deicing coordination. Once airborne and past HYLND intersection the aircraft turned west toward METRO intersection instead of MERTO. ATC asked us if we had turned west which we had. He told us that there had been confusion in these two waypoints in the past and cleared us direct MERTO.

A B737 had a track deviation when a rushed crew entered waypoint METRO instead of MERTO. ATC commented the error had occurred before.


I am a FLM that was training on the arrival position. Weather was VFR and visual approaches were working well; we had approval to use the inboard runway. Air Carrier X was on an adjacent RADARS frequency on approach to 24R; Air Carrier Y was on approach to 25L on my frequency; and Air Carrier Z was on a vector to be paired up with Air Carrier Y for 25R. I did not slow Air Carrier Z in time to keep in a good position to see or follow Air Carrier Y; my instructor had to take over to prevent the situation from becoming worse. On play back we became aware we may have lost standard separation between Air Carrier Z and Air Carrier Y and Air Carrier Z and Air Carrier X. Air Carrier Z overshot final; because his speed was too fast and the Controller had to expedite Air Carrier X through 050. Air Carrier Z was restricted to 060; above both aircraft; but both the straight in traffic had not descended through 050 before we lost 3 miles. Both aircraft were observed vacating 060; but I don't know if the vacated altitudes rule applies here or not. I have been assigned to the area for almost 2 years; but so much of my time is spent on FLM duties; my training on RADAR is sporadic. I would like to see training be made the priority for new FLMS that come to the area and allow them to become fully certified in the area prior to taking operational duties. I feel I have not been given enough time to train to stay proficient in what I've learned in the past and then given a chance to apply lessons learned in future training sessions.

TRACON Supervisor (FLM) receiving training reported a loss of separation event; noted the training provided on the position has been very sporadic and not in keeping with a reasonable chance to learn the sector.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Number 2 engine had no throttle response when powering up for takeoff. Never rolled. Exited runway.Under investigation; may be throttle cable.

Widebody Airbus Captain reported Number 2 engine failed to spool up when throttle was advanced for takeoff.


Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Situational Awareness; Workload

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure; Weather

I was flying. Due to weather; maintenance events; and operational issues; I was faced with a duty day extension. With the captain's insistence; I agreed to extend at an outstation to get the plane; passengers; and crew back to our domicile. I ended up extending two hours and ended up blocking 8.5 hours of flights on this day; while a large portion of it was delays in taxi due to weather and ops at our home airport. The total LOGGED duty day was over 13:43 and I state over due to the fact that we had to take the flight attendants' van due to the company's inability to ensure that we had transportation set up for us in overnight station. The company did not have a van for the pilot(s) and we were forced to take the earlier van; thus truly starting this day off earlier than scheduled and adding to the fatigue. This event only gets worse as this incident report will attempt to summarize.  I attempted to secure other transportation but was not able to do so and the captain was unwilling to press this issue. He just wanted to take the earlier van. After going to the room to attempt to get rest in overnight hotel; I was met with a room close to a doorway to hallway stairway and slamming doors. The elevator was also located adjacently. The captain secured a new room but I was not able to secure a new room. He was moved to suite and executive area further up in the hotel. I was not able to get an uninterrupted period of rest due to this and was also forced to take an earlier van which also forced me [to] awaken earlier and cut off 2 hours long and our flight down with all the delays; ended up being right at 4 hours long.Once on the ground at our overnight station; we were met with an extension request. I agreed to extend to get the passengers; crew and plane home. After agreeing to extend; this trip started to unravel more. I was met with a maintenance issue that had to be addressed and on the taxi out; a data link issue with ACARS occurred that caused a longer delay. By the time we landed and processed in via customs late at night; (global entry was closed and we were forced to be in line with everyone else) my duty day actually hit 15:00 + hours. With the heavy rains; I could not get to the parking lot due to backed up traffic via the employee busses backed up. Due to all this; I got home and in bed around after midnight.I had another 2-day trip staring mid-morning. On the drive home; I called scheduling; to discuss this etc. During this time; a two-day trip over the same period came into open time with a late afternoon show time. I asked the schedulers if due to this extended trip and late night arrival they would trade a 2-day trip for a 2-day trip that was open and showed later in the afternoon and they REFUSED. All I wanted to do was mitigate a fatigue event by trading my two trip that showed later in the afternoon. Again; the schedulers refused and I declared fatigued for my trip that showed in just a few hours due to all the factors listed in this report; lack of adequate rest in the hotel room provided the night before; lack of contract specified hotel transportation and inability to secure additional transportation; as none was available at the time; and finally; the lack of the scheduler's ability to trade a nest day 2 day trip for a trip in OPEN TIME that would have given me more rest and mitigated this fatigue event all together. I am being charged sick time for this event. I am requesting that I be paid for this fatigue event by this company and not by sick time. I exhausted every effort and even went above and beyond to try to mitigate this working with scheduling to fly out later but they refused and chose to instead use 2 reserves instead of trading a 2-day trip for a 2-day trip and allowing me to get rest; go out later; and ultimately run a more efficient operation during a critical weather event. I understand that it is my job to fly and scheduling's job to schedule but once again this group couldnot see the forest for the trees. I looked out for the best interests of the company; crew and safety and now I am being penalized with a deduction of my sick time. This is not right and I am sure that you all will see the large picture in this report. The fact of the matter is that I was not safe to fly the next 2-day and I tried to help by offering a solution that was not going to be accepted based on some principal that made no sense. I was fatigued due to combination of events but more so do to the operational inefficiencies of the scheduling group's inability to work with this event on a perfectly legal trade both in contractual terms and FAR terms.

First Officer describes a day's events which resulted in flight time over 8 hours and duty time. He was forced to call in fatigued after crew scheduling refused to permit a later check in trip.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

LGB tower had cleared us for landing on RWY 30. There was no mention of a helicopter on the RWY. At approximately 1500 MSL; I asked the FO (First Officer) if it looked like there was something on the RWY around the numbers. It looked like a black spot in the vicinity of the RWY numbers. The FO said it looked like a rubber mark to him. I concurred. At approximately 600 feet MSL; we saw a helicopter rapidly exiting the runway from the RWY number area towards the adjacent TWY D3. He was clear of RWY at 500 feet MSL. We landed. The FO and I discussed afterwards that we BOTH never saw the helicopter! Tower NEVER said anything either! I called the tower manager to discuss. He told me that the controller on duty was working two helicopters mid field; and four other aircraft in the pattern; excluding us. He said that the helicopter was previously cleared to land on the numbers (30). This implied that he was to exit the runway ASAP afterwards to the nearest taxiway as per the AIM. He never did. He said that the controller assumed he had exited. He said he believed the controller was task saturated. Interestingly; the top of the helicopter was painted black. For some reason it completely blended into the runway environment. The tower manager agreed.

An Air Carrier Captain reported that while on short final; a helicopter was observed sitting on the end of the same runway. The conflict was resolved in time for the aircraft to land safely.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

While on final approach segment of RNAV 27 Approach; in VMC conditions; we were given clearance to land with what we believe was inside the three mile wake turbulence buffer between a 'small' aircraft. At one and a half miles from landing; the departing aircraft; cleared for takeoff; had not begun takeoff roll. ATC told the departing aircraft; 'Landing traffic; one and a half miles out.' At approximately one-half mile; the departing aircraft lifted off the runway. We decided landing was safer than executing a missed approach by possibly creating a less safe situation of climbing through the previous aircraft's wake turbulence. We encountered wake turbulence prior to touchdown; thereby requiring Pilot Flying to maintain thrust on engines so as not to lose critical airspeed at touchdown. These actions resulted in a longer than normal landing.I believe more familiarity with possible RECAT separation practices at participating airports; in this case; SAN. We should be better prepared to execute a missed approach during these situations.

B737 Captain reported encountering jet blast effects from the preceding departure while on short final at SAN.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight [in] question is [an A319]. MELs are Center Tank Pump; Auto Fuel Feed System and Clock GPS mode. The problem was with MEL [on] Center Tank Pump. Since the center tank pump is inoperative; 1640lbs of fuel is stuck in the center tank. I planned the flight with the wing tanks only which came out to 16700lbs. The MEL manual stated that the dispatcher was to 'notify load planner that any fuel in center tank is considered unusable ballast; must be counted in payload (part of ZFW) and accounted for during weight and balance computations.'After finding that 1640lbs of fuel was in the center tank; I called [load planner] and asked him to adjust the ZFW. His reply was; according to their RF file; they were to use the airplane's standard envelope and no action was required on his part. This not sitting well with me; I called the Loads Supervisor. I explained that we needed to adjust the ZFW by the amount trapped in the center tank and he informed me that he would look into it. A few minutes later; [he] called me back and also stated that CLP was unable to do anything because their RF file stated no action was required. I conferred with other dispatchers and [another manager] who all agreed that some action needed to be taken. The [other manager] and I spoke with [the load supervisor]; who informed us that he would not adjust anything with the ZFW. I advised [load supervisor] that if no action was taken; I would not accept this airplane to fly its mission. During this time; I reached out to [the] Captain and informed him of what was going on. I asked him to please stay at the gate until this situation was resolved. He was okay with that decision. A few minutes later; a [different] load supervisor got involved and shared with everyone that the ZFW is adjusted as ballast weight; as described in the MEL manual; and was able to adjust the weight to reflect 1640lbs of unusable ballast in the center tank. [Flight] pushed 19 minutes late. [Load planners] choosing to not follow the MEL manual directly violated Airline's policies and procedures and potentially FAA regulations.

Air carrier Dispatcher reported some load planners were not aware of all the implications of the MELs on the subject aircraft.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

After landing at ZGHA; crew exited C7 and were cleared Taxiway C; C4 then cleared to cross Runway 36L at B4 then handed over from Tower to Ground frequency for onward taxi. Ground ATC cleared crew to Taxi 'B; B2 stand 123 follow follow me' which was read back verbatim. At A3; an Air Carrier Y entered the Bravo taxiway right in front of the crew. The traffic wasn't holding at A3 but was on a continuous relatively quick taxi through the holding point. Crew were given no warning or instructions by Ground Controller and due to the local language (Mandarin) crew were unaware of any taxi clearance given to any other aircraft. Crew slowed down with medium braking and taxied to the stand uneventfully.

Safety Officer reported they experienced a ground conflict at ZGHA airport and referenced language barrier with Tower was a contributing factor.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

I was working multiple positions when I heard local 1 instruct Aircraft X to make a right 360. I looked at Aircraft X and observed aircraft turn right in to Aircraft Y. It appeared that Aircraft Y had to take evasive action to avoid Aircraft X. To my knowledge neither aircraft made a statement on the frequency. It appeared that the aircraft came within 300 to 400 feet of each other.I believe a complete review by outside sources of this event is warranted. This is not the first issue for this individual recently. The controller has made statements of problems at home and fatigue.

A Tower Controller reported of an NMAC. Local Controller turned one aircraft towards another aircraft making the second aircraft take evasive actions to avoid turning aircraft. Reporter wanted this to be looked at and stated it was due to the Local Controller having issues relating to home and fatigue.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Just received a message stating I did not complete [the] COVID assessment for yesterday.  I believe I just forgot to send it due to flight deck distraction with maintenance in there.I arrived at the aircraft and Maintenance was still on it completing their First Flight of the Day (FFOD) check so I had to wait and work around them in the flight deck. I did pre-flight the thermometer and take my temperature and all was OK. But with the mechanic in the flight deck and the FO and Forward FA it was a little busy. I thought I had submitted on the COVID digital assessment; but I must have forgotten and when I got it my seat I continued with my set up believing I had done it. I must have forgotten to submit.For now add it onto the checklist as a FFOD item.  Or send us an ACARS message on our first flight. Maybe just have us when we check in on every leg to attest our fitness for duty that that counts as a COVID check.   I think there are solutions to this COVID affirmation than just pulling up the COVID assessment.   If we are not fit for duty for these reasons we should not be reporting to work anyway.  I think scanning the barcode every leg is a much better way for pilots to confirm COVID compliance without adding an extra step which can; by accident; be forgotten to [be] taken.

Air carrier Captain reported forgetting to complete the COVID-19 assessment before the flight due to a distraction.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 189; Flight Crew Type 10769

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

While conducting the HYDRR1 RNAV Arrival into PHX in a B737; we were directed by ATC to keep our speed at 300 knots until GEELA; and then comply with speeds at GEELA. We complied with this; and as we approached GEELA we were given a speed reduction; which we complied with.  At .3 DME prior to CHAVO with the aircraft in LNAV/VNAV PATH; the aircraft was leveling at 9000 feet at 210 knots as depicted on the arrival.  It was mid-afternoon in PHX with temperature in the low 100s and occasional moderate turbulence.  At this point I received a VNAV disconnect message; which I cleared.  In the few seconds it took to assess what the aircraft was doing; and reengage a mode on the MCP; the aircraft may have crossed CHAVO up to 200 feet low since I had the bottom altitude of 7000 feet in the Altitude window while the airplane was VNAV PATH.  I had applied a little power while determining whether I needed to level or continue descent.  Now; (maybe five seconds after the disconnect) we were past CHAVO. I decided to idle the power; dial 1000 FPM into Vertical Speed and continue the descent to comply with LEMOE at 7000 feet.  With the turbulence and the disconnect; the speed had accelerated to near 230 knots.  I deployed speed boards to slow the aircraft back to 210 knots while continuing to comply with the LEMOE crossing restriction.

We were descending on the HYDRR 1 RNAV Arrival; Runway 25L transition; into PHX. We just received the new ATIS; which included a windshear advisory. The arrival was normal until AGGLA; with LNAV and VNAV PATH engaged. As we were approaching CHAVO; 210 knots/9000 FT; the FO had to deploy the speedbrakes as the airspeed was increasing. Simultaneously; we encountered moderate chop. The Controller asked us what the winds were; and I reported they were 350/10. At that moment; I think the VNAV PATH disconnected. It appeared the aircraft was not going to level at 9000 FT because the Vertical Speed was also increasing! The FO immediately tried to level the aircraft and arrest the increasing speed; but I believe we went below 9000 FT at CHAVO. Our maximum airspeed through the event was 220 knots. We were back in VNAV PATH after CHAVO; and the rest of the arrival and landing were uneventful. The FO thought we made the CHAVO restriction; but I'm not so sure. There were no other aircraft involved; and the Controller did not say anything else to us.Although I don't think this was a full-blown windshear event; I suspect a combination of the shifting tailwind and turbulence drove the VNAV to disconnect. Also; the thrust levers were at idle; and the speedbrakes were deployed throughout. Therefore; I don't think the FO could have done much more to slow down. Finally; I think the FO did a good job of recognizing this dynamic event; and responding about as quickly as he could.Although I don't think the FPA went to VNAV SPD; an additional signal to alert us when the FPA comes out of PATH; or switches to SPD; would be very helpful. I'm sure many other Pilots would agree.

B737 flight crew experience a VNAV disconnect during the HYDRR1 RNAV Arrival into PHX approaching CHAVO. CHAVO may have been crossed 200 feet low and the speed was allowed to increase above the CHAVO limit of 210 knots.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Laptop Computer (performance; planning; etc.)

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 4612; Flight Crew Type 336

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

I received my departure clearance over the phone with Approach prior to takeoff. I was released to depart Runway XX and climb to 5;000 ft.  Upon contacting Departure on climb out and giving my position and altitude the Controller asked me what airport I departed.  I told him ZZZ. The Controller then informed me that my filed flight plan was for ZZZ1.  I'm not sure how ZZZ1 got into my flight plan but it appears he was correct.  I was given a phone number and called it as soon as I landed. Later in the day when I landed back home in ZZZ; I got a call from ForeFlight and they told me another person's info had somehow be entered into my iPad and was causing some problems.  I'm not sure if that was the cause of the wrong airport or unrelated.  My ForeFlight account was fixed and seems to now be working ok.

Pilot reported departure airport error due to ForeFlight airport information being incorrect.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Avionics

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Company Policy; Procedure; Manuals; Human Factors; Aircraft

Aircraft was sent to Contract Maintenance Facility X for accomplishing repairs to the windshield center post that had been found damaged. After the permanent repair was accomplished; the aircraft had a chronic airframe vibration that had been going on for quite some time. It was found that the area of concern was from the center windshield lower area extending down the front bulkhead/radome. ZZZ Maintenance discovered that the radome upper seal had been installed facing down instead of facing upward and sealing airflow out from the radome area. It was also discovered during inspection that the repair for the windshield center post had not secure hardware; was leaking water and had to be re-addressed before further flight. After all repairs were done according to proper references; the aircraft has been put back in service after a successful test flight.Contract Maintenance Facility X failed to do a proper SRM repair and follow [aircraft Maintenance manual] procedures on installation of windshield framing fasteners and radome seal. We have had a few of these repairs come from Contract Maintenance Facility X with poor workmanship. Contract Maintenance Facility X has been known on the floor to do poor work and aircraft have come back from their MRO (Maintenance; Repair; Overhaul) needing repairs. Historically a lot of aircraft come back in rough shape and require immediate repairs upon return to service. My suggestion is to audit Contract Maintenance Facility X and maybe suggest looking for a new vendor.

Technician reported a third party maintenance contractor failed to make correct repairs on an A319; resulting in a recurring airframe vibration in flight.


Flying to IRESH; the FAF; we were visually fixated on a closed field (HLR) approximately 3 miles North of intended airport. Initially briefed a straight in ILS to Runway 01; but VFR traffic was landing Runway 19. Identified/discovered wrong airport overhead ILE. Distance on the MFD was not proportionate or representative of actual distance to ILE. Had to adjust pattern to land on intended runway (ILE) and subsequently overshot final; causing us to briefly fly into Gray AAF airspace. ILE is uncontrolled. Landing was uneventful.Increased vigilance for uncontrolled airports.

Since the wind was less than 10 knots we decided to use the calm wind runway number one. As we approached the area we noted KGRK. Looking further into distance we saw an airport and it was the only airport that showed up on our nearest airports on the MFD. It was located about where our airport was supposed to be we set up for the ILS one in the FMS. We proceeded to IRESH the final approach fix and announced our intentions on CTAF to land on Runway 1. And then we heard from traffic that they were landing on runway 19. This Airport has right traffic RW 1 one and left traffic for 19 thus keeping all the traffic on the south east side. Gray approach cleared as for the visual and we switched to Unicom. I announced we were going to do left traffic runway 19. We were at 2;500 feet with eyes on what we thought was the landing runway and had just started to descend down about 2;200 feet MSL I realized by looking at the MFD that we were over the top of the runway. We immediately climbed back to 2;500 feet. It was immediately evident that what we were looking at was not our airport. It was in fact KHLR. There was traffic in the left pattern for runway 19 on downwind; we made a left 270 and entered a right base. Then we made a short approach to runway 19 and landed at KILE. We may have entered Class D airspace of KGRK while making our left 270 back to Runway 19 at KILE. After landing [we] called GRAY Clearance delivery on 121.7 and cancelled IFR. Nothing was said. If I would have spent a little time reviewing the sectional I may have noticed the third airport and been looking for it during arrival. Fortunately we did have an approach in the box or else we probably would have landed at the wrong airport. I think this is a tricky place to fly into. Make a special note of the close proximity of Class D for KGRK as well as KHLR. Also; if a crew cancels IFR in the air and does a left pattern for 19 they are likely to penetrate KGRK Class D. KILE also has a flight school and if they are using 19 it poses an issue for jet traffic using 1.

A CE-560 flight crew reported an airspace violation when they had the wrong airport in sight during a visual approach to a non-towered airport.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 22R

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 332; Flight Crew Type 8000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft

We were in VFR conditions and were able to visually see that the aircraft locked onto something other than Little Rock Airport 22 R frequency. We disconnected automation and visual hand-flew to the correct runway. My major concern is what would have happened in IMC. The Approach Controller was busy and gave us a heading of 190 to intercept 22 R LOC. We were descending and once we corrected the flight path we got a little high. Once cleared for the visual and handed over to Tower we asked for an S-turn to the west. We reported to the Tower and I called the approach facility and told them about the navigational error on 22R localizer frequency.

Air carrier Captain reported a Runway 22 localizer anomaly at LIT airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 12000

I am writing to express my concerns over the removal of 1 copy of the QRH from the flight deck. In my opinion; this practice may compromise safety. My concern primarily pertains to a situation in which the non-flying pilot must utilize the QRH but it's located next to the flying pilot. There are non-normals that arise and the flying pilot may be able to hand off the QRH to the non-flying pilot; but as you know; there are many non-normals in which it would not be prudent for the flying pilot to attempt to hand off the QRH to the non-flying pilot. An argument could be made that the QRH should be switched from side to side and should at all times be next to the non-flying pilot. But; during an abnormal; the role of non-flying pilot may change with the circumstances. Of course the electronic version of the QRH may also be utilized. Though to me; using the iPad to simultaneously run a QRH checklist; and utilize it for Jepp charts may expose pilots to unnecessary risk. A paper QRH allows pilots to physically hold their finger next to items yet to be completed while at the same time use the iPad to reference a Jepp chart. In sum; it seems that if we are still going to provide the aircraft with one copy of the QRH; there is little to be saved by not providing two.

Air carrier Captain reported his concern with his airline's decision to remove one of the hard copy QRHs from the cockpit; leaving one hard copy and the iPad as source material for QRH procedures.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 17; Flight Crew Total 2478; Flight Crew Type 266

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

I was returning from ZZZ1 after 4 circuits of the pattern doing full stop taxi backs in Aircraft X.I pre-flighted the aircraft at ZZZ for the [short] flight to ZZZ1. The fuel gauges read tanks on the right & slightly less on the left. This aircraft has the extended range tanks. I also fly a C170B with standard tanks. When I used the dip stick to measure fuel the indication showed that I had .5 inches in each tank. In the C170B that is calibrated to 4 gallons usable in each tank. That equates to 1 hour flight time. The additional 10 gals in each tank from the size change equates to an additional 1+ hour flight time. With 2+ hours of fuel I launched without adding more.During the [short] trip to ZZZ1; I noticed that the fuel gauges were erratic; going from tanks to empty and back. So; I paid special attention to the clock to insure I could make it back to ZZZ with fuel.After 4 pattern circuits with no prolonged waiting for takeoff; I headed back to ZZZ. On the climb out I did notice that both fuel gauges were reading empty. I attributed it to the erratic gauge issue earlier as the time said I had enough fuel. I got to approximately the 6-statute mile 45 entry to XXR pattern at ZZZ.  As I was descending from 2500 feet to pattern altitude; I felt the loss of power.  I verified the mixture was full rich; tank selector was on both; I pushed the throttle full in and there was no increase in engine RPM.  I slowed to best glide speed and [requested priority handling].I let them know that I may not make the airport and may have to set it down on [a road] that parallels the runways on the east side; closer to me from where I was coming from. As I got closer; I thought I might make XYL; the opposite to the current flight operations.  As I got closer still; I realized I could not make that and set up for a landing on the road.  Then I thought about trying one more thing; pumping the throttle one more time.  I got a burst of power that allowed me get over airport property.  But the hangars I was now over put me too high for a XYL landing; I continued across the field to the XYR runway and managed to set the airplane down in the last 1;000 feet. And get stopped before running off the pavement. I rolled off of XYR onto the run up area between the runways.  I pumped the throttle several more time to keep the engine running and got permission to cross the takeoff end of XXR to maybe get back to the FBO; but the engine quit while on XXR and I had to be towed back to the FBO. Total time for the flight was 1.5 hours Hobbs.What I learned was that 1+1 does not necessarily equal 2+ when you do not know exactly how 2 different sized tanks relate to a calibrated dip stick for the smaller tank.Also learned not to pass up 4 options to put gas in the tank. 1st before takeoff; 2nd at ZZZ1 before returning; 3rd at ZZZ2 going and coming back.

A Cessna 170 pilot reported undercalculating the fuel required for a flight; resulting in a fuel starvation event; and a near off-airport forced landing.


Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Aircraft

We were returning to MEM with the FNCHR RNAV STAR and the landing north transition inserted into the FMS (long downwind legs included). This was loaded in flight after takeoff and since we had been landing north in Memphis for the entire trip and my entire trip before this one; I did not expect much of a change. We started the descent on profile; but we did not realize that a change had been made to the flow of traffic in Memphis to a landing south transition until it was too late to make all of the speed restrictions on the arrival and we ended up being high on one of the restrictions (although not by much and ATC did not make any sort of comment on our descent.) Once we got below 10;000 FT; we were in a normal position to continue the arrival. Runway flow change; if one is expecting an RNAV arrival with a long leisurely downwind and all of a sudden a new transition arrival is inserted; one has to quickly verify the FMS altitude and speed restrictions on the FMC with the ones on the chart. The information on many of the Memphis RNAV arrival charts are not presented in an easy to read format and they take much time to read; understand; and interpret compared to the arrivals that we are commonly given in Atlanta. [I am concerned that] any sort of additional distraction or system failure is going to make it very difficult to follow these procedures.We need simpler RNAV arrival procedures in the Memphis area and less of them. We do not need all of these RNAV arrivals into an airport that has lost a great deal of its traffic.

A CRJ had pre-programmed the 'landing north' transition on the FNCHR RNAV STAR to MEM and realized too late that the airport had switched to landing to the south; eliminating the long downwind track and lowering the appropriate crossing altitudes on the arrival. A modest failure to cross at the required altitude at one waypoint resulted.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

When I was adding power for takeoff; the plane began to pull to the right. I realized the right engine was spooling up slowly; and initiated a reject. We taxied clear of the runway and stopped. After making a PA announcement; we checked for indication of why the engine had spooled slowly. We found no secondary indications of a problem. After discussing the matter with [maintenance]; we decided to give it another try. We made a PA that the issue was resolved; taxied to the runway and made an uneventful takeoff and departure. During the climb out the purser called and told us we had failed to make a departure announcement for the second takeoff.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

An A320 crew reported a rejected takeoff due to a slow spooling engine. Upon attempting a second takeoff the crew reported that they failed to notify the Flight Attendants to be seated for departure.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 489; Flight Crew Type 2

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

We departed in a C182RG on an IFR flight plan to perform an IPC. I was flying and was accompanied by a CFII. We contacted departure and were cleared direct to [several fixes]; then cleared straight in to the ILS 29. During cruise I programmed the approach into the GNS530 and coupled the autopilot; intending to have the autopilot fly to the Final Approach Fix (FAF). The flight had been normal to that point. I began a descent and captured the localizer on NAV1. After turning onto the final approach course; and while descending into IMC; the GNS530 flickered briefly; then went dark and displayed an 'INITIALIZING' message on the screen. Shortly after that the MX20 Multi-Functional Display (MFD) also went dark. NAV2 was unaffected so I continued to fly the localizer while the PNF executed the troubleshooting checklist. During that time; the SL70 transponder began flashing 'FAIL' in its squawk code display; then COM2 failed. We were at approximately 1;800 feet and below the clouds; which I would estimate had bases of approximately 2;500 feet. We maintained that altitude; aborted the approach; and turned back towards our departure airport. After a few minutes more troubleshooting; we elected to attempt a precautionary landing at [a nearby alternate airport]. While on final approach; we were unable to confirm that the gear were fully locked so I went around and we followed the emergency gear extension procedure. We were unable to lock the gear so we orbited for some additional troubleshooting. During this time; COM2 began operating and we were able to contact approach and inform them of our situation. We then got a low voltage caution. I reset the alternator breaker; which resolved the low voltage indication. The PNF tried powering the GNS530 back on and it took power; but then dropped offline again. We contacted approach to cancel IFR and proceeded VFR to [departure airport]; maintaining radio contact with them until we landed.During the flight there were no warnings or indicators of the impending failure. During preflight the alternator belt was inspected and found to be intact; and it was still intact after the flight. This airplane was grounded [on an earlier occasion] because the renter found that the battery had insufficient power to crank the starter. Other than that I am not aware of any other known problems with the aircraft electrical system. Because we were able to maintain VFR flight after our descent; I did not feel it was risky to continue troubleshooting in flight; as we were near an airport; had plenty of fuel; and were in an area with no significant terrain or obstacles. I believe that the alternator trip off was caused by extending and retracting the gear. The gear appeared to be locked when we extended it manually but because we couldn't verify it; we elected not to attempt a landing until we could confirm the gear down.

The reporter learned later that Maintenance identified a faulty voltage regulator for the charging system.

A C182 pilot on an instrument check flight with a flight instructor reported the loss of several electrical components; likely due to a faulty voltage regulator.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 104; Flight Crew Total 5004; Flight Crew Type 771

Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action; General Evacuated

Tower clears me for IFR departure runway 9R. Taxi on runway for full length static departure. Aligned centerline applied brakes and slowly set takeoff power. Engine instruments checked; N1 matched ECU target power and brakes released. On the roll; aircraft accelerating; airspeed alive; 80 knots engines crosschecked good and approximately 102 KTS-105 KTS I felt a rough bump and heard a rumbling noise on the right side of jet. I knew immediately I had a right main tire failure. I simultaneously applied MAX brakes and pulled thrust to IDLE followed by deployment of speed brakes and transmitted to ATC 'XXX ABORTING.' With my main focus to slow the jet while maintaining directional control; the jet remained at high speed down the runway. ATC advised turnoff at Uniform Taxiway and I transmitted 'UNABLE.' The controller informed that Uniform was the end of the runway and I transmitted acknowledgement with 'WE ARE GOING OFF END.' Approaching the final third of the runway; I knew with the speed and energy the jet was moving; that there was not going to be sufficient pavement to stop. The final 500-800 feet of available pavement; I applied the Emergency brake as last efforts to stop. There was no change in deceleration compared to the normal braking used. An estimated 30-40 KTS passing the departure end of Runway 9R onto the grass; I Continued to hold maximum back pressure on the control yolk to relief as much weight to nose wheel to prevent the jets nose gear from collapsing on the grass. I maintained directional control and the nose of the aircraft remained plus/minus 20 degrees from extended runway centerline from takeoff to final stop. The jet came to an abrupt stop approximately 200-300feet beyond the pavement; onto the grass. I immediately turned avionics off and moved the thrust levers to CUTOFF. With a close eye on the engines spool down; I DID NOT notice any unusual engine spool down indication. I turned the battery off and immediately called the control tower and advised them we were safe and experienced no injuries. I opened the cabin door and performed a brief post flight walk around. As I came to the aft maintenance bay; I opened the door and confirmed no lights on the ECUs; Oil or Hydraulic bulbs. I unplugged the battery and continued the post flight walk around. I specifically inspected each engine inlet casing and confirmed NO debris or FOD in or around the engine inlet. I installed the engine inlet and exhaust covers and exited the airplane. The wings or fuselage never contacted any part of the terrain. After securing the aircraft I initiated a call to my mechanic.

A Premier 1 (RA390) tire failed during takeoff. Due to the high speed reject; the pilot was unable to stop on the runway. The aircraft sustained little to no damage in the grass after the pilot successfully protected the nose gear.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Evacuated; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Accelerating down runway and after the 80 knot call out; we heard a loud bang and a yaw to the right. It was immediately followed by ECAM messages. The take-off was aborted and we stopped on the runway. ENG 2 FAIL was the top ECAM that was noticed. As we were assessing the situation the F1 called and stated there was smoke coming from ENG 2. There was no indication of fire from the cockpit. An aircraft behind us stated they saw a puff of smoke before the abort and also saw smoke coming from ENG 2. At this point ARFF arrived. We conferred with them and they stated they saw no fire from ENG 2 and that the wheels looked fine. The decision was made not to evacuate. We continued with all the applicable QRC QRH ECAM and normal checklists. Eventually we configured for a one engine taxi and had ARFF follow the aircraft to the gate.

A320 rejected takeoff due to indications [loud bang; right yaw; number engine smoke; right engine fail EICAS] of engine fail. Aircraft Rescue & Firefighting [ARFF] confirm no active fire; escorted to gate.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy

This is a general concern of safety regarding the (Company) vaccine mandate.  After the mandate was announced on (date); I noticed many employees were distracted by the impending decision between their livelihood and a permanent medical decision.  On the push back during one flight; a ramp crew member stated their concern.  Other crew members stated their concern about this mandate and this could lead to distractions at work; which could in turn lead to unsafe conditions. If employees were given a choice or an option for this mandate; I believe the distractions would be eliminated.

Ramp employee reported that pushback ramp crew members have expressed concern about being distracted due to the company's vaccine mandate which could lead to unsafe conditions.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 21750; Flight Crew Type 4000

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Weather; Procedure; Equipment / Tooling

I took the desk at approximately XA:50 and was unable to log in until approximately XB:20. During this time I had no operational control and an international flight diverted. They made at least 8 attempts to contact me via ACARS to receive landing performance data and my acknowledgment that they were diverting. When my computer did work I was unable to divert the flight in Sabre and it required an IT specialist about 15 minutes to correct.

We showed up to flight plan for our flight home and did not have any track messages or the ETOPs CP [Critical Point] page. I called dispatch but our dispatcher was unable to transmit the information to the station. We asked for the track messages and ETOPs CP page to be sent to the ACARs printer. We also asked for [a nearby airport] to be added as an alternate due to forecast thunderstorms at destination. The station was waiting for confirmation of the fuel load; so I asked the dispatcher what the new fuel load would be. She said our fuel load did not change adding the alternate - she just moved extra fuel to alternate fuel. This negated the reason for our request (additional fuel for TRWs and alternate) so I told her to add 2900 LBS to the original fuel - which was fuel for [the alternate]. The fuel was added and remarks annotated -increase per Captain request. As an aside; we ended up needing the extra fuel and did divert [to filed alternate]. When we arrived at the aircraft; the track messages and ETOPs CP page had printed on ACARs along with ETOPS weather. Our ETOPs entry point was more than 3hrs into the future. As we approached the point where we generally get ETOPs weather; we asked Dispatch for the weather. No reply. As we were approaching the ETOPs entry point; we called up our own weather and sent and [an ETOPS OK message] advising we had not received ETOPs weather but called up our own. Dispatch quickly replied that ETOPs weather had been sent to our printer; but there was nothing on the printer. She may have been referring to the weather she sent prior to departure.Descending into destination airport; we received a message from Dispatch (same dispatcher so we are guessing she was working a double shift) saying we might get some vectors for weather into destination. We ended up getting vectored all over and sent a message to Dispatch asking for help from ATC coordinator to avoid a divert. Our last message from Dispatch was 'ATC said they would take you with no hold.'We continued to get vectored and were approaching bingo fuel. We sent multiple messages to Dispatch requesting divert airport info; best weather at our two alternates; and [that we] were hoping for some priority through our ATC coordinator to avoid a divert. No reply. We were busy with ATC and deviating around weather; yet still no answer from Dispatch. More messages were sent to Dispatch asking for help with ATC. No reply. We reached bingo fuel and requested clearance to [alternate] and sent a divert message to Dispatch. No reply. Sent another message to Dispatch to confirm they knew we were diverting. No reply. The relief pilot called ops [at alternate] to give them a heads up that an international divert was inbound. Taxiing in; we had a message from Dispatch: 'Shift change here. Couldn't log on to computer through your diversion. Computer started to come alive when you were on final...' The diversion occurred without DISPATCH having any idea what was going on.We parked remotely and I called the new dispatcher after shutdown. He said that due to shift change; we were out of any kind of operational control for at least 15 minutes. He did not get the messages until we were on final. And apparently did not get a detailed hand off from the previous dispatcher. The new dispatcher was extremely helpful as we returned to destination.

A Dispatcher's computer system malfunction prevented him from assuming operational control of an international flight which was in the process of diverting for weather. The Captain of the B767 aircraft involved also reported stating they were faced with the need to divert due to weather and low fuel was unable to communicate with Dispatch to coordinate doing so. Upon landing they received a message advising the lost contact was due to a shift change and Dispatcher delays logging in to the Dispatch System Software.


ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Signed in at Sector 10; ERAM was in Channel B. All of my altimeters were stacked in the upper left hand corner. The relieving specialist showed me a route display for a C130 that had the plane going to a GFS radial. I was redistributing my altimeters and asked all aircraft to standby; after I finished; I made a couple of transmissions before I noticed had turned east toward a hot restricted area and hot MOA R2507/Kane East. I asked the C130 where he was going. He said to work in Kane East. I asked him if he was cancelling IFR and proceeding VFR as the area was currently hot. He responded; no I'm on a flight plan. At this juncture the plane had already passed about 1 mile from R2507; and was heading toward Kane East. The specialist at 09 jumped on the line with Yuma; while I turned the C130 back to the West. The route display was entirely incorrect from the filed flight plan of this aircraft and it created a very dangerous situation. I'm informing you of this dangerous situation that ERAM creates with peoples settings! My attention is on setting my scope up; not with the planes. I have to drag about 12 altimeters from the upper left hand of the scope to their positions. Take ERAM offline. Do not bring ERAM back up until it can be demonstrated these and many more issues are fixed. I thought we worked in a safety first environment; not one that pushes flawed new systems through with words like; 'they're working on that; or; it'll get fixed on the next update; or there's a work around for that'.

ZLA Controller voiced concern regarding ERAM anomalies; suggesting ERAM be taken off line until some of the identified flaws are changed.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 12

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 194; Flight Crew Type 595

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Weather; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

While doing a DME arc to ILS 12 to BZN we were cleared to descend to 11;000 feet. During level flight we received a GPWS 'PULL up' oral warning. I immediately complied with the oral warning and engaged in a GPWS escape maneuver. Once we leveled off at 14;000 feet it became evident that we were clear of terrain. We immediately advised ATC of our GPWS escape maneuver and return to the previously assigned altitude.

A large transport's EGPWS alerted PULL UP on the BZN ILS DME 12 at 11;000 feet. The First Officer took the appropriated action and the alert ceased at 14;000 feet. The terrain beneath the aircraft rose to about 9;400 feet which may have activated the terrain closure feature.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We were assigned holding at CAMRN at 12;000 feet. Determined that our target maneuvering airspeed was 182 knots so decided to hold at 200 KIAS. After starting the outbound turn; we were assigned a descent to 11;000. Almost immediately after we entered heavy precipitation which caused the ice light to illuminate despite the Total Air Temperature being plus 12. We also immediately encountered moderate turbulence. Captain (CA) was heads down sending an ACARS to dispatch about the hold. As the aircraft (on autopilot) rolled to the right to fly the outbound leg; another good jolt of turbulence caused a 15-20 knot loss in indicated airspeed. This combined with the bank angle; and engine and wing anti ice being turned on caused the stick shaker to momentarily activate disconnecting the autopilot. By the time the CA was 'heads up' the First Officer/Pilot Flying had over corrected the recovery and was climbing through 12;800. We notified ATC and were told to continue to 11;000 when able. There were no secondary stall notifications.

Regional turbojet flight crew reported experiencing a brief stick shaker after entering heavy preceipitation while situated in the holding pattern.


AH-1 Huey Cobra/Modern/Super/Combat Scout

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.5

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Aircraft X went IFR into SLI on a TACAN approach. SLI GCA is operating out of a temporary building so for now we have no direct shout line to the tower or GCA. I called the inbound on Aircraft X and shipped him to the tower. He goes missed still on an IFR code. I have no way of knowing if he is IFR or VFR. So I ask him; verify you went missed VFR? He says yes and requests a PAR approach. I ask him if he is GPS equipped as he must be to do a PAR per our LOA (Letter of Agreement) with SLI. He says no; so I ask him to say intentions. He says he wants to cancel IFR and go VFR to NFG.This has happened multiple times. We have no way of knowing if these aircraft are going missed IFR or VFR; (if they cancelled with the tower). We have no shout line to find out and the number we have to call you have to call from the desk or you can't hear them. The reason this is a major safety concern is because when an aircraft goes missed off SLI it goes right through our LGB final; which we protect for by making a hole. However; if I have an aircraft like Aircraft X that says he is VFR only to have him say he is IFR I am now vectoring him below the MVA. We have had aircraft do multiple approaches and said VFR over and over only to go missed the final time and say they want to cancel IFR. I am not sure if it is the tower not explaining things or the aircraft not understanding but it happens every single day and with no shout line is totally unacceptable. Tell SLI; that aircraft are not allowed to go missed unless it is needed; like for FOD on the runway. Or make it a requirement for them to call us on the phone and let us know exactly what the aircraft going missed is doing.

SCT Controller reported that there was confusion whether an aircraft that went on a missed approach was on an IFR code. Controller did not know if the crew were IFR or VFR and asked. Pilot stated VFR on the missed. More confusion ensued when the pilot then said they wanted to cancel IFR and go VFR to another airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 2; Flight Crew Total 663; Flight Crew Type 575

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Runup on ramp revealed no problems. Everything was normal. I called departure; runway 24. Takeoff was normal. During ascent from runway; all electrical began flickering; and finally died. Total electrical failure. Began orbit in left downwind 24 to troubleshoot. No communication with CTAF in spite of working handheld. No verification of landing gear down possible. Entered left base and final. Executed normal approach. Aircraft landed smoothly on belly No injuries; and no fluids on ground. Aircraft was towed to parking. I believe electrical failure was due to failed alternator or relay. I failed to engage the emergency gear down lever; nevertheless; the emergency gear down extender arm on the empennage failed to drop the gear as well. Also recycling the master switch may have reset the electrical as well.

Aircraft had in flight electrical failure with cause unknown. Pilot stated that the emergency down landing gear system did not work. Pilot landed with landing gear retracted with minimal damage to aircraft. There were no injuries. Maintenance facility raised aircraft off runway & operated emergency gear down system. Landing gear came down & locked. Aircraft towed to hangar for repairs. I performed an annual inspection on [early that year]. Landing gear operated normally on jacks with normal & emergency down system. Log book entries were made to reflect this test. [Weeks before; the] aircraft owner requested that a new battery be installed. I serviced; tested & installed a new battery on that date. Aircraft owner did not supply aircraft log books until [after the incident] to make battery installation entry.

Pilot of PA-28 experienced complete electrical failure after takeoff. Landing gear failed to extend. Pilot made gear-up landing at departure airport with minimal aircraft damage.


Inspection; Installation; Work Cards; Repair

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

This report is being submitted in order to bring attention to the third recorded Airbus 320 keel beam re-work damage.  This Aircraft is currently undergoing a maintenance visit at our Maintenance Base.  During the inspection of the Keel beam area; it was found to have numerous mis-drilled/mis-located holes into the structure.  It is believed that this damage occurred during a previous maintenance visit by an Outside vendor. The reason this area was worked previously; was to comply with an Engineering Authorization (E/A) to strengthen the Keel beam areas that were manufactured prior to Airbus using a stronger Keel beam structure currently being used today. The original Keel beam modification was covered on numerous Aircraft during maintenance visits at Airport ZZZ.  Aircraft / Cabin potential damage caused by other damage. Contracted Maintenance. [Recommend] to have a fleet directive assigned to all Airbus Aircraft that had this modification performed at the Outside Vendor (OSV).

Reporter stated that so far; three out of four of their A320 aircraft with serious keel beam damage occurred during a keel beam modification intended to beef-up; strengthen the earlier A320 aircraft Keel beams. Instead; the Airbus Service Bulletin (S/B) the outside vendor had signed-off as accomplished at the repair station during a previous maintenance has now caused extensive maintenance delays and an engineering nightmare for obtaining approved repairs to the keel beam mis-drills and mis-located holes for the main landing gear door fittings. His air carrier has decided to issue a fleet directive to try and identify just how many of their A320s are affected. He and other mechanics at his air carrier are not encouraged by what they have found so far.

An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports another company A320 aircraft was found with numerous mis-drilled and mis-located holes in the aircraft's keel beam. Damage was believed to have occurred during a previous maintenance visit by an outside vendor who had signed-off for accomplishing an Airbus Service Bulletin to strengthen the earlier model A320 keel beams.


Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

During taxiing in for the gate; at A4 Taxiway; the position sign is in between the taxiway and the vehicles entrance making it confusing. So we started the taxi a little soon and then corrected it after we advised ATC. The area needs better lighting and markings.

Light Transport aircraft flight crew taxiing into the ramp at IAD Taxiway A4 turned early because the Taxiway signage position coincides closely with a ground vehicle access road.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Aircraft / UAS; Airport / Aerodrome / Heliport

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 92; Flight Crew Total 9750; Flight Crew Type 4800

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS); Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Being vectored for visual approach to Runway 32R at OMA; was starting a left base turn when cleared for the visual to [the] runway when copilot stated drone; my head was turned left looking at airport environment when I looked forward a drone went over the right wing end just above aircraft.

Corporate pilot reported that while on approach to a Class C airport; they observed a UAS pass over the right wing of the aircraft. The aircraft landed safely.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.5

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was training on the RADAR position on sector 30.  Traffic was light and not complex.  Aircraft X checked in westbound at FL340 and then shortly after I acknowledged the check in; he reported that he had just seen a weather balloon pass directly beneath his flight path about 1;000 feet below.  The sector team had not been made aware that a weather balloon without a transponder was to be launched anywhere near our airspace; but it turned up on my boundary with another sector at approximately FL330.  We notified the supervisor who was aware of the balloon but not the exact whereabouts because it was not equipped with a transponder.  He did come back to the sector team with much more information about the balloon but after the aircraft had already reported passing over it.  The pilot then advised me that he would recommend that we provide vectors to any other aircraft flying through the area.  This is an unsafe situation because we have weather balloons that we cannot identify with the radar that are climbing and descending through air traffic without us having any knowledge of where they are actually at in real time or what altitude they are at.  We were told that the operators had a waiver in which a transponder was not required because of the size; but the concern of the pilot leads me to believe that no pilot would want to hit one of those balloons cruising at FL 340.  There is prescribed phraseology in the 7110.65 about unmanned balloon operations but the verbiage is vague; and ties our hands since a pilot can request a vector around the area where the balloon last was; but we don't know where it is in real time so we could actually be vectoring the aircraft in the path of the balloon without knowing it.  Many people in the facility believe this to be a problem and we've seen many balloons go up and come down without issue; but after hearing the pilot's concern and myself and my trainer having no previous knowledge of it; I believe there need to be changes to the procedures regarding weather balloons.I believe that all weather balloons should be equipped with a transponder so we know the exact location and altitude because then we could actually provide a helpful vector to aircraft that request it.  We can also advise aircraft more accurately.

Aircraft X was at FL340 westbound. He checked on frequency stating that a weather balloon had just passed right below them by about 1;000 feet.  It had a lot of stuff hanging off it and advised if anyone else went through that area; they should be vectored around it. You could tell the pilot was upset by this.  At this point; I was training the R-side so I had him ask the supervisor if we knew anything about a weather balloon. We were informed that there was one in that area climbing to FL890 that did not have/require a transponder.  We informed all aircraft in the area of it; and advised if they would like vectors around the area ask; but; we cannot see the balloon on radar.I recommend the FAA to stop issuing waivers to balloons without transponders. I have worked multiple situations with balloons that have transponders which make traffic calls much easier and practical.  Pilots appreciate this information; as it seems unnerving for them to fly through a large balloon.  It is unsafe to have balloons as large as these fly through our airspace without us having any way to track them.

ZDV Controllers reports that an aircraft under his control reported a balloon at FL350. The controller did not know anything about the balloon but the FLM was aware of the balloon.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

We had just taken off from ZZZ ferrying to ZZZ1 for a revenue flight. When after level off I went and turned the aft coffee maker on to brew some coffee. When not even 10 seconds after the power was turned on; I heard a loud pop come from behind the coffee makers. When I looked at the circuit breakers I noticed that they had popped. I immediately went to the cockpit and the pilots immediately asked what happened. Because they received multiple messages indicating a power surge coming from the galley equipment. After explaining what had happened; the pilots immediately disabled all power going back to the galley and cabin. They contacted [Company] Maintenance and were advised to divert to ZZZ2 for further maintenance with this occurrence. I have noticed on these particular coffee makers on the Gulfstreams that the coffee makers are on a slide out drawer to help put water in the brewer. When pulling out the drawer; the wires that connect to the coffee maker backing drag along with the drawer. So when the drawer is slid back in place it connects to a latch. The wires tend to get caught in the latch. This is where I believe the problem was with the above mentioned issue. Having those wires where they don't risk getting pinched in the latch would be a good idea to look into.

Flight Attendant on G450 aircraft reported coffee maker circuit breaker popped inflight.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

While assigned to operate a MD-80. I met the inbound crew. Off going #1 FA indicated that she had difficulty operating the forward entry door. Off going Captain also indicated a potential difficulty with the door but that he had gotten it to work. When asked if it had been placed in the Aircraft Maintenance Log (AML) he said no because he didn't want to incur a delay or have the aircraft taken out of service. I entered the item in the aircraft AML and called for Maintenance. The first Mechanic immediately said that there was a problem with the door. A Maintenance Supervisor came out and overrode the Mechanic. My #1 FA tried the door and also experienced difficulty. The discrepancy appeared to be one of an intermittent nature and therefore also the serviceability of the door. Since a Captain; two FAs; a mechanic and myself all had experienced difficulty with the door I desired some sort of maintenance action be performed. The Supervisor informed me in no uncertain terms that no maintenance at all would be performed and if I didn't like it my only choice would be to refuse the aircraft. So I elected to refuse the aircraft. The door could have been placed on NEF (Non-Essential Furnishings) which would have at least involved maintenance on an ongoing basis while the aircraft was kept in service until a more thorough check of the door could have been accomplished; but that wasn't done. Instead the Supervisor elevated it to level 5 management and a Chief Pilot was sent out to speak to me; the Captain. This could be viewed as an attempt at intimidating the Captain into accepting the aircraft and so-called Pilot-Pushing. The Chief Pilot; to his credit; supported my decision. The Supervisor also informed the Chief Pilot that no maintenance action would be performed. Then; instead of realizing a potential intermittent problem with the door went further; blaming the FA; instead of the door; which is disingenuous at best; and told the Chief Pilot that my #1 FA didn't know how to operate the door properly. The Maintenance Supervisor is not in the Flight Services Training Department; is not qualified to evaluate FA compliance; nor is it in his job description; duties and responsibilities to make such a judgment. What does that say about the off going Captain; the first mechanic; the off going #1 FA and myself? All unqualified? I told him that she was qualified and current and mentioned to the Chief Pilot that if that was not the case then the Chief should have her removed from the flight sequence; which of course he did not do. Later; after the Chief had returned to the flight office I called him and he said that after further reflection had called Operations and told them that his concern was that after the aircraft AML had been cleared another Captain would not be familiar with the aircraft history. He was told by Operations that the aircraft would be taken out of service. But; it wasn't. I noticed this and called and spoke to another Chief; because the first had left for the day; and he said that he would check into it. The aircraft continued to operate. I spoke with two [maintenance controllers] and they told me that an instruction would be issued on the aircraft; but upon further inquiry discovered that it wasn't issued. The aircraft continues to operate. I gave the first on-coming Captain to operate the aircraft a turnover brief. I think the issuance of a Technician Instruction and NEF would still be a prudent course of action and also a renewed emphasis on eliminating pilot-pushing and potential pilot intimidation.

MD-80 Captain reported a main cabin door problem was not documented by the off going crew and entered the discrepancy in the aircraft maintenance log. A mechanic verified the problem; but the Supervisor overrode the decision resulting in the crew refusing the aircraft after enduring pilot pushing and threats from maintenance.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure

Approaching SJU airspace; SJU Approach rerouted us.  First fix of new route was DONQU and we were cleared direct to that fix.  We made error in understanding that fix; and we thought we were cleared direct to DONKE which was a fix on our original flight plan.  A few minutes later the Controller called and asked us if we were direct to DONQU.  We told him that we were direct to DONKE and he corrected us and told us to proceed direct to DONQU.  We proceeded to that fix with no further issues. I suggest changing name of one of those fixes.  They are both in same vicinity and sound similar.

Air carrier Captain reported a track heading deviation during approach to SJU airport.  Captain stated they were confused over similar sounding intersections DONQU and DONKE.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.5

Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

It all happened with 20 to 30 minutes of my shift. The position was not too busy when I first sat down but quickly got busy. Multiple aircraft were calling on different frequencies. Aircraft were departing satellite airports looking to pick up an IFR clearance in the air. Other areas and facilities kept calling; and pilots kept stepping on each other. There was also a lot of paperwork to clean up and things to organize when I sat down. I had noticed that the aircraft was going to be a factor for a satellite departure so I took them off the arrival and gave them a 050 heading. Once the traffic was clear I turned the aircraft to a 360 heading and issued 2;000 feet. That is not a normal procedure for me at all and if I do take people off the arrival I usual give 6;000 or 3;000 feet. I have no idea why I issued 2;000 feet.I had already told the others in my area that I was too busy to answer other questions and put them in an uncomfortable position to question the altitude I had issued. I noticed the aircraft was around 2;400 feet at the northern most part of the 2;600 foot Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA) and didn't change anything because by the time the climb would have started they would have been well out of that MVA. There's not much that I could have done to change the situation.

TRACON Controller reported they mistakenly issued an altitude to an aircraft which resulted it in flying below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.