Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Previous maintenance log had an event where the aircrew had a Number 2 engine driven hydraulic low pressure light illuminate on departure and returned. We inherited this aircraft the next day after maintenance had been performed on the aircraft overnight. Maintenance had found a broken clamp that was blamed on chaffing the hydraulic line in question. It was fixed per the maintenance log with a periodic inspection requirement. We did a normal preflight and pre departure duties. We also met with maintenance personnel and they explained the situation and maintenance performed overnight. Push; engine start; taxi; and takeoff were normal. In the mid 20 thousands on climb out; we got a master caution with a HYD cue. Looked at the overhead panel and saw a Low pressure light in the Number 2 hydraulic engine driven pump. The 'B' hydraulic system quantity was decreasing as well. Ran the HYD Low pressure checklist and turned the Number 2 engine driven pump off per the checklist. Once the pump was turned off; the quantity in the 'B' system stabilized at 39 percent. This was expected with a leak in the Number 2 engine driven pump as the standpipe would 'preserve' approximately 40 percent of the fluid. No low pressure light displayed in the Number 2 electric hydraulic pump. End of checklist. Called OPS/Maintenance to advise of situation and they put us through to Maintenance Control and Dispatch. We were then directed to return. Return and landing was uneventful. We did not [think this was] an Emergency due to we had the 'B' system with the electric pump supplying the pressure and did not require any further abnormal procedures.

B737 First Officer experiences a master caution with a low pressure light in the Number 2 hydraulic engine driven pump during climbout. The engine driven pump is turned off and the flight returned to the departure airport for a normal landing. The identical failure occurred the day prior and was repaired by maintenance.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

After receiving our closeout; Ground was contacted. Ground advised taxi via Taxiway C to V. During our taxi a new revised closeout was received and the First Officer went line by line to compare the two closeouts. There was no change from the first. I taxied the aircraft on C and held short of B1 on Taxiway C. The Tower Controller called and said to taxi up to Runway 25R. The First Officer responded that we were not ready (we still had to complete the taxi checklist). The Tower Controller advised us to taxi to B1 and hold short Runway 25R. The First Officer replied we were unable to depart from B1 due to weight. I told the First Officer to advise the Tower Controller we were ready because I knew it would take us 30 seconds to taxi from our position on Taxiway C to get to the runway and we could easily accomplish the taxi checklist during this time. The First Officer replied to the Tower that we were ready for takeoff and the Tower Controller stated; 'You better not be lying to me;' and then cleared us for takeoff. I told the controller to note the time of this and the controller said the supervisor was right there. I told the controller I did not appreciate the threat and then the First Officer and I completed the taxi checklist and took off on Runway 25R.I have never in [all] my years of flying with [Company] received a threat from an Air Traffic Controller. I consider this unprofessional communication and I hope this type of communication is not considered 'normal' at the LAS tower. Additionally; flying out of LAS during the summer months is a challenge because of the high temperatures that result in weight restricted aircraft. The winds can be quite variable and have a significant impact on runway limited weight. To add unprofessional controller communication to this mix simply adds to the difficulty of safely flying out LAS.

Air carrier Captain reported communication issues with LAS Tower Control during taxi out.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Number 1 engine displayed an amber oil pressure box 15 minutes after departure. We were at FL335 climbing to FL350. With cruise power set; the amber box went away. [An hour and twenty minutes] into the flight; the amber box came back; plus there was a loss of 3 qts of oil. Followed the QRH and elected to shutdown the engine. Consulting with Dispatch; we diverted to ZZZ. Maintenance found the oil cap unsecured. Mindfulness of tasks when performing maintenance.

MD-11 flight crew experienced low oil pressure on the number one engine during climb to FL350. Once level the light extinguished and returned an hour later. After discussions with Dispatch the engine was shut down and the flight diverted to a suitable airport. Maintenance found the oil tank cap unsecured.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 21

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

There was a pair of arrivals staggered by about 0.5-0.75 miles; with the Runway 28 Right arrival preceding Runway 28 Left arrival.  There was a solid 16-32 knots crosswind from the north depending on what altitude they were at.  Runway 28 Left glide slope is 2.85 degrees while Runway 28 Right is 3.00 degrees.  In this very rare set of circumstances; the left arrival is getting a rough ride form the right arrival. Aircraft X  [the first E175] was cleared to land Runway 28 Right and Aircraft Y [the second E175] was cleared to land Runway 28 Left. Aircraft Y was about 2.3 mile final when they advised going around.  I gave them runway heading and 3;000.  I advised them of traffic that departed north and stopped climbing in their southbound turn; an A320; and got visual separation transferred to the pilot.  I then coordinated the go around and was asked the reason.  I said I assumed unstable approach but was not sure.  The aircraft was coming up on level flight and so I confirmed the reason.  The pilot said they were hit by wake turbulence.  I shipped them to Departure; then coordinated with their coordinator the reason.  We logged it in the Tower log; but did not write an MOR (mandatory occurrence report). When the airplane came back around and landed; I inquired about the event.  They said that the airplane yawed to the right and then began rolling to the left so they went around.  That sounds very unsettling to me; however they made it out to fly another approach. No recommendations; it sounds like the pilots did what they were trained to do to save the ship.

SFO Local Controller reported an E175 pilot executed a go-around from short final after encountering wake turbulence from another E175 on final approach to the parallel runway.


Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 800

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing

Made a normal approach to landing and was explaining the setup procedures to a passenger who happens to be a pilot. Got distracted in the conversation and did not notice that the Landing Gear did not deploy; resulting in a Gear Up Landing. When aircraft was raised; the gear deployed after the CB was reset.

Bonanza pilot reported being distracted by conversation with a passenger and forgot to lower the landing gear.


Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 370

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On date I was conducting training in an R22 Helicopter departing out of ZZZ at XA:45 local time to ZZZ1. Winds were predominantly out of the west at around 10 kts and we joined left closed traffic for RWY 26 at ZZZ1. There was high training volume and I estimate 7 aircraft were on the ground waiting to depart or actively in the Right Closed Traffic for RWY XX plus our Helicopter. At around XB:10 local time a Jet taxied to the active with no Radio (or no radio communication was made) as we were on a left downwind for [Runway] XX. Local pilots made calls on the radio so all would be aware of his departure and be vigilant/use caution. The jet took off without incident and departed to the North. As pilots worked together to sequence traffic we made our base and final leg before again departing XX to rejoin left closed traffic. At approximately XB:15 local time on the upwind of XX roughly 300ft AGL without warning the jet made a low pass on runway XY at very high speed. I would estimate the pilot was 300ft off our starboard side and about 100ft below our current altitude. I was able to track his flight after the incident to find his Ground Speed was in excess of 330mph. The Jet than proceeded back out to the North again and ended up circling to land on RWY XY this time to a full stop. (The following is my personal opinion) I believe this pilot does not have any remorse for his action. He has an attitude that the FAA can't/won't get him in trouble for this reckless behavior. He wasn't breaking any REG by operating without a radio in an ECHO airspace but his speed certainly was in violation of FAR 91.117(a) and given the high training volume being conducted on this day the pilot showed a clear disregard for other pilots or even his/her own safety.

Helicopter pilot reported an NMAC in the traffic pattern when a jet trainer made an unannounced high-speed low pass over the runway next to the helicopter.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Upon take off out of ZZZ; Flight Attendant 3; and myself (Flight Attendant 2) noticed a dirty sock smell in aft galley. Upon level off; Captain phoned flight attendants and informed us that they were also experiencing a dirty sock smell in flight deck. We told him we were experiencing the same smell in the aft galley. Captain told us to not start our service; as he was taking the aircraft back to ZZZ; as he felt it was not safe to continue to ZZZ1 with the strong odor.

A319 Flight Attendant reported that the Captain executed an air return after experiencing a 'dirty sock' odor in the flight deck and confirming that the cabin crew experienced the same fumes in the cabin.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

When on the ground in ZZZ; I noticed the right pack had been blowing hot air and was uncontrollable in both automatic and manual modes. I made an entry into the maintenance log and called maintenance control to defer the right pack. Once we were en-route we proceeded with the MEL procedures for operating on a single pack. Everything went normal and we proceeded up to our cruise altitude of FL240. When we were at cruise for a little bit of time we noticed that there was an interruption in airflow. We looked up and the L pack switchlight was illuminated OFF and under the ECS synoptic page it was showing the right pack had turned off as well. I then tried to press out the switch and repress it in to see if it would come back. It did not. At this point we realized the cabin was depressurizing and we needed to start a decent. We told ATC and they told us to descend and maintain 17;000. We started down at a rapid rate but the cabin altitude was still climbing constantly at 700 feet per minute. I then pulled out the QRH thinking we had the aircraft under control just having to descend. I proceeded with the abnormal X-XX (unpressurized fight Packs off procedure). The first thing I read was airplane altitude...not above 10;000 ft or lowest safe altitude which ever is higher. This meant to me to get the airplane down to 10;000 ft which we were going to request from ATC but they had us go down to 17;000 ft temporarily. Then I proceeded with the QRH procedure which lead us to press the EMER DEPRESS button. At this point we knew we'd be depressurizing the cabin and deploying the oxygen masks however by the time I had reached this step we had already received the Cabin Alt caution message and were about to get the Cabin Alt warning message.The aircraft was close to 17;000 ft and the cabin altitude had reached approximately 9;500 ft when I decided to follow the QRH procedure and press the EMER DEPRESS. This; of course; depressurized the cabin and blew the passenger oxygen masks. We then proceeded to descend to 10;000 ft and stay there. ATC had let us know they had requested priority handling for us and we were heading to ZZZ1. I called the flight attendant and I had given her [preparation briefing] since we were now a priority aircraft as a precaution. Once we were at 10;000 ft for a while I decided that the passengers and flight attendant could remove their masks and let them know of the situation. I told them we had a malfunction with our only operating pack which led to depressurization which is why the masks had fallen but that we were at a safe altitude and had everything under control. I told ATC that we were at a safe altitude and could cancel our priority handling as long as we still head into to ZZZ1 but they decided to keep our priority status as a precaution. We continued to ZZZ1 normally and ran all our normal checklists. We then started an approach which led to a normal landing and taxied off the runway where we taxied to the gate with emergency vehicles following us as a precaution. Everything else went normal.[Cause was] Equipment malfunction while operating on a single pack.Avoid dispatching with a single pack at higher altitudes or at all with passengers onboard.

Captain reported a pack failure at altitude that resulted in loss of cabin pressure followed by a diversion.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 366; Flight Crew Type 2900

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft In Service At Gate; In-flight; Pre-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

We arrived at the aircraft for our flight to find the ramp closed due to heavy rain and lightning at the field. After a few minutes the lightning moved off the field and the ramp re-opened; but it was still raining. I went to the aircraft and found the Main Cabin door and cockpit door were left open during the heavy rain; resulting in water in the cockpit. When the Captain arrived we discussed and decided to have Ops bring us some absorbent pads to clean it up. With the cockpit floor now dry again we performed a normal preflight and departed uneventfully. Upon passing about 15;000 feet MSL we turned on the radar because of storms up ahead. The radar then failed in all positions (Manual and Auto; both sides). We discussed between ourselves and decided that continuing onto the oceanic tracks at night without radar; with storms in the area to be a bad idea. We had decided we would probably return to ZZZ; but would discuss with Dispatch prior to commencing the return. The Captain then attempted to make a call to Dispatch on SATCOM 2; only to have it fail as well. At that point we theorized that the water we found in the flight deck upon arriving at the aircraft might have leaked down into the floor and to the [Company] bay; causing shorts. The Captain was eventually able to get through to Dispatch on SATCOM 1; and all this information was relayed. After about a 15 minute call with Dispatch and Maintenance Control; it was decided to return to ZZZ. We started the diversion and ATC was notified. When we started the descent; the aft FAs (flight attendants) called to tell us that they smelled 'something burning' in the aft galley; but could not locate it. At that point the Captain took the aircraft and requested priority handling. I took the QRH and ran the Smoke or Fumes in the Cabin QRH Checklist. We had enough time and were able to complete the entire QRH and all the required items before landing; pertinent to the diversion. About 10 minutes after the initial call the FAs called us to tell us that the smell had dissipated and they were never able to locate the source. We landed on Runway 8R and stopped on the runway to have airport rescue and firefighting in ZZZ confirm that they didn't see anything on the outside of the aircraft. After a successful inspection from airport rescue and firefighting we taxied to the gate and deplaned the Passengers.

B737-800 flight crew reported water in the flight deck due to L1 door and flight deck door being left open during a severe rain squall.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

The incident happened during our descent on the ZZZZZ arrival into ZZZ. As far as I remember; we had been cleared by the previous Controller and told to do the XXL transition. I had already programmed the FMS for that specific arrival and pre-loaded the ILS XXL. The weather was not an issue with a clear sky and great visibility. I briefed a visual approach for XXL; backed up with the routing of the ILS for that same runway; and made sure we had the discontinuity between the last point on the arrival - ZZZZZ1 and the first point on the approach - ZZZZZ1. We were then told to contact the next Controller and assigned different altitudes on the arrival while maintaining the routing. For some reason; at one point; I thought/assumed we were cleared for the visual and got rid of the discontinuity by linking the first point on the approach with the last point on the arrival - ZZZZZ1. I turned to the Captain to ask him to 'confirm' and proceeded by removing the discontinuity. Because we were not cleared for the approach yet; the aircraft proceeded past ZZZZZ1 on a XXX as expected; but because it was now programmed to fly the approach it started turning at ZZZZZ2. The Controller asked us if we were flying the RNAV; we responded that we were doing the XXL transition and as the Captain said these words we realized we had made a mistake by leaving the XXX. The Controller kindly reminded us what we were expected to do and gave us a heading to intercept the localizer for the visual XXL. What led to this mistake is mostly my fault. I was fixated on flying the visual; and I forgot to actually make sure we had been given the clearance before getting off the arrival. My mind was too focused on the preconceived idea of what was expected rather than what we had actually been cleared for that I failed to properly communicate with my Captain. I was complacent; and this led to confusion in the cockpit and with the Controller.

During our descent on ZZZZZ arrival into ZZZ; we were cleared to descend via ZZZZZ ; XXL transition. We programmed the FMS for that particular arrival and transition and preloaded the ILS XXL. The weather was good with clear sky and great visibility. Pilot Flying; briefed the visual approach XXL back it up by ILS. We made sure the discontinuity between the last point on the arrival ZZZZZ1 and the first point on the approach ZZZZZ1. We were told to contact the next Controller and assigned us different altitude on the arrival while maintaining the routing. I contacted the next Controller and for some reason we thought; we were cleared for visual via ZZZZZ1 transition. As we past ZZZZZ1; we continue to fly heading XXX as we approached ZZZZZ2 the plane was about to transition to the new fix. At this point ATC assigned us a heading 350 and asked us if we are flying the RNV transition? Which responded yes and I realized the error. At this point he assigned us 310 heading to intercept the localizer and cleared us for visual to XXL.We were both fixated and our mind was set on the preconceived idea of what was expected rather than what we had actually been cleared for; especially when the proceeding traffic receives that clearance. I (we) failed to confirm and communicate with each other and ATC. I got complacent and side tracked; the combination of these two led to the confusion in the cockpit and with the Controller.As a (Captain/Pilot Monitoring) I should have communicated and confirmed that we are both on the same page and understood the clearance and when in doubt ask the ATC for clarification. I want to make sure and get the confirmation before removing the discontinuity and not to rush. Do not assume if previous aircraft receives particular clearance we will get the same and avoid complacency. I will emphasize this on my future arrival briefings to ensure this doesn't happen again; FOOLISH ASSUMPTION/MISTAKE.

ERJ175 flight crew reported a clearance deviation due to flight crew communication breakdown during approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 165; Flight Crew Total 4177; Flight Crew Type 3607

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 208; Flight Crew Total 2223; Flight Crew Type 1245

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Assigned and cleared for the DYMND arrival into SFO. Upon reaching the initial fix of arrival; we were cleared to descend via arrival. Set the charted minimum altitude of 7;000 feet in MCP and executed in VNAV path and crossed ARCHI at 7;000 feet. Reviewed ops alert in route which stated ATC would assign altitude of 8;000 feet to maintain within Class B airspace; but we were not assigned altitude with the descend via clearance. No conflict occurred.

Both of us independently read the operations alert and checked it with the database. On crossing ARCHI intersection at 7;000 feet ATC informed us there is a NOTAM that says to change crossing to 8;000 feet. To my knowledge; no event occurred and the approach and landing were normal. Later on the ground I found the NOTAM. The NOTAMs were reviewed before flight.

A B757 flight crew flying the SFO DYAMD RNAV arrival crossed ARCHI at 7;000 feet and were informed by NCT a NOTAM was issued changing the ARCHI constraint to 8;000 feet; the SFO Class B floor in that area.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

HYD EDP 2A caution msg displayed during cruise at FL340.  Quick scan realized HYD Pump 2 was in the ON position from the single taxi procedure.  Selected the HYD Pump 2 to AUTO and received HYD 2 LO PRESS.  Completed QRH for HYD 2 LO PRESS directing the HYD Pump 2 to be selected ON.  Hyd System 2 synoptic page indicated no hydraulic pressure and quantity was zero but outboard brakes pressure still had about 2600 PSI.  We continue the QRH flow with System 2 pressure less than 1800 PSI which directed 'max altitude FL260; land at the nearest suitable airport'; Flaps 20 landing; Vref (45) plus 12 kts minimum; landing distance increased 1.90% (only left Thrust avail). After completing the QRH; flight controls were transferred to CAPT with Com 1; directed FO to notify Dispatch of our situation and ask Dispatch for possible diversion airports.  Contacted ATC with a request for FL260 and notified ATC we have to divert and will let them know of our intentions regarding airports. ATC asked us what we need for runway length.  I told ATC about 10;000 ft runway with consideration for the QRH and full pax count plus 5 crew members.  Dispatch did relay ZZZ as the diversion but not sure if they received our ACARS Runway 34 was closed. At this point; committed to ZZZ1 given the runway length available and suitable; ARFF support; and/or Maintenance.  ATC cleared us direct to ZZZ1 and priority handling and ARFF support was waiting.  Also directed jumpseater to review over the QRH on his own to ensure we did not miss anything.      Did a visual to Rwy XL; backup by ILS/LOC Rwy XL.  Upon touchdown and confident that we had enough runway to roll; opted to NOT use the one left thrust reverser and applied brakes the last 1000 ft before exiting taxiway B5. Fire trucks inspected aircraft on taxiway B with no visible damage or leaks. Taxi and parked at gate.              Flight Attendants were notified of the diversion with a yellow level precautionary landing only and expect it to be normal.  FO (jump seat) said one of the FA may have mistakenly made a PA that it was an emergency landing. One passenger in 1st Class wanted to know more details on the Hyd Sys and why we diverted but he declined to elaborate.  Did talk to both FA after all pax deplaned; they were okay.Maintenance personnel; FO/CAPT: verified on post flight some residual hyd fluid on the right engine bottom aft enclosure; minimum fluid on the tarmac under the right engine.   Note: HYD Pump 2 ON for single Left Eng taxi and forgot to switch to Hyd Pump 2 back to AUTO after Right Eng started.  Also FO said he did not see any indication of hyd fluid leak on pre-flight.

CRJ-900 Captain reported a HYD 2A engine pump caution message at FL340 and noted the pump was selected to on and not auto as it should have been. The hydraulic system 2 synoptic indicated no pressure and no quantity. The QRH called for a diversion to the nearest suitable airport which was accomplished.


Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Working midnight Ground Control with lots of phone calls from city about openings and closings. Multiple taxiways closed for construction add to the complexity level for the majority of the cargo aircraft on midnight [shifts]. Airline maintenance flights up and down from hangars have long instructions and are one way in and out from hangars due to construction so it's constant calling Ground.  Local and Ground coordinate runway crossings and I had given Aircraft X instructions to taxi across airport to the departure runway. I shipped the first one to local and crossed the 2nd one. Aircraft X had just passed the hold bars for the runway when I looked up and saw Aircraft Y on short final. I told the Local Controller to send Aircraft Y around on short final.

Ground Controller reported they issued runway crossing instructions to an aircraft and as the aircraft crossed the hold short lines the controller noticed an aircraft on short final which was issued go around instructions.


ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

While in cruise at FL360; I observed that the oil pressure on the left engine had dropped. The oil pressure indicator dropped into the amber range as I advised the Captain. The oil pressure continued to decrease as we referenced the QRH. We verified the oil quantity and confirmed that the loss in oil pressure was likely due the loss of oil quantity. The oil quantity was indicating 3 quarts by that point. We decided to perform a precautionary engine shutdown and completed the procedure as per the QRH. I advanced the right engine thrust to the detent. The QRH instructed CONT thrust; however I left the thrust setting in CRZ per the Captain's request in an effort to avoid any damage to the remaining engine during our diversion. We were high enough we did not need extra thrust to make it to a suitable airport. The Captain declared an emergency and we were cleared to descend to FL250 at pilot's discretion. I commenced driftdown procedures per the QRH while the Captain queried ATC for nearest airports and accompanying weather. Three airports were presented as options. One was behind us but was in or near a very large convective system. Another was ahead of us; on our route; and reported as clear by another aircraft on frequency so we considered that airport and ATC advised that the third was closer though; and also ahead of us; although thunderstorms had been reported in the vicinity. We did not; however; observe any buildups in the area so the Captain determined that the precipitation in the vicinity was not severe enough to warrant continuing to the further alternate and elected to divert to the one suggested by ATC. After the Captain loaded the ILS approach into the FMS he assumed control of the aircraft and I continued with the remaining QRH items. ATC cleared us for the approach and we performed the approach and landing without further incident. We were able to comply with all ATC clearances/restrictions throughout the incident and made a successful landing. No evacuation was required and we were able to taxi to the ramp under our own power. No external damage was observed upon post flight inspection. The precautionary engine shutdown in cruise was a significant threat to the flight. Poor ATC communication as a result of the Controller's weak English contributed as a threat to the flight by increasing the workload required to determine a suitable destination.

An EMB-145 flight crew; after completing an inflight shut down of the right engine following a loss of oil quantity and pressure; diverted to and landed safely at the nearest suitable airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 89; Flight Crew Total 7955; Flight Crew Type 7955

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Human Factors

I am in the ZZZ pilot crew room lounge area.  There are greater than 12 pilots not wearing masks.  Approximately 8-9 at the table area and another 5 at the recliners/lounge area.  I thought wearing a mask is required.  I just heard a PA announcement upstairs in the terminal that says masks are required inside the terminal. Don't you have cameras down here? This is a blatant disregard for the face mask and social distancing policy!!  I guess I have to leave because I don't want to be down here.

Air Carrier First Officer reported pilots are not adhering to face mask policy in the crew lounge area.


Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Descending into ZZZ my First Officer (FO) and I noticed there was an unusual sound but we couldn't tell where it was coming from; I called the flight attendant and asked her if she could hear anything and she said no everything sounded normal to her in the back. We then pulled up the engine page and looked at the engine system followed by checking the electrical page but we couldn't see anything abnormal. We continued our descent and started our approach; it was visual conditions so we were on a visual approach to Runway XX; we had already canceled IFR. I called for flaps 12 and the FO put flaps 12 in; we noticed that the sound had changed a little so we again went through the engine instruments and everything still seemed normal. As we continued to add flaps we noticed the sound would get a little louder each time and when we went flaps 32 we could feel a small vibration coming through our feet. We checked the hydraulic page and everything looked fine; we then checked the flight control page and everything still looked normal. I was hand flying and did not notice any change to the handling of the aircraft; the only thing we noticed was the sound and then the small vibration. We continued to land with no issues; just a normal landing. After parking the aircraft and deplaning; I asked my First Officer to take a little extra time with his post flight to see if he could see anything that would have made the noise and vibration on the approach. After his postflight he came in and said he couldn't see anything unusual outside. I finished up my tasks and then decided to walk around the aircraft myself. When I got to the left side I noticed something sticking up on top of the wing maybe a foot or two from the fuselage. I grabbed a ladder and climbed up to look at it; I found that the trailing edge of the flap was cracked right next to the fuselage and then again about a foot or two away there was another crack. The top trailing edge of the flap had a piece that had come off and was sticking up. I took pictures and called the mechanic on call. I sent him the pictures and he called me back with a plan to send a mechanic down on a different aircraft that night. I went off duty at that point and when I got back to the airport the next morning my aircraft had been swapped out with a different aircraft for us to continue our day.

Captain reported finding cracks in the trailing edge flap assembly on post flight inspection following detection of excessive noise on descent to landing.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was training on the R-Side on Sectors 04-15-16; and FAI Approach called my D-side concerning a VFR aircraft; Aircraft Y; having trouble maintaining VFR. The aircraft was at 15;500 feet headed northeast bound from FAI. We immediately started researching weather through the Flight Data Printer (FDP); weather cameras; and gathering PIREPs from other aircraft. We decided that the airports west of FAI were the best options and sent him in that direction. One of my biggest concerns for this pilot was hypoxia. He didn't have oxygen on board the aircraft.Shortly thereafter Aircraft X called from the same area at 11;500 feet having the same issue only he was in IMC; and was unable to climb higher. We sent him in the same direction and he started picking up icing. He then began having trouble maintaining altitude; but he was well above the terrain. For this reason we [gave priority handling to] the aircraft.We continued gathering PIREPs and working them far enough east that they were able to find clear air. Both aircraft were eventually handed off to FAI approach and they were able to land safely.

ZAN Center Controller reported two aircraft that were VFR needed help due to weather and icing; both aircraft were helped and landed safely.


The first two days of the trip were reasonable. However on day 3 there is a significant PM to AM swap. In addition we had weather challenges due to rapidly changing conditions. As a result; I did not get to sleep until after XA00. By day four we had a XE:45 bus scheduled. This night was also scheduled as a minimum rest; less than 12 hours. While this was adequate rest for a couple legs; I felt that continuing on the trip would not be prudent.With minimum rest periods; there is no down time to recover nor opportunity for exercise and eating without cutting out sleep. The frequent swapping of flight attendants adds to the fatigue element. It wreaks havoc on Crew Resource Management. It seems as if crews are in a constant state of flux and uncertainty. Debriefing rarely happens. This current practice seems needlessly disruptive especially in the Q400. With 4 to 5 legs a day; it pushes a difficult trip dangerously close to an unsafe trip. While the swapping of pilots to aircraft has improved; the swapping of a FA (Flight Attendants) is still an issue. We had to perform a missed approach in ZZZ due to rapidly deteriorating conditions. This was challenging enough with adequate rest and four legs. From my experience; the effects of fatigue are most dangerous when they are masked by an adrenaline rush. This is not a time when one wants the margins of safety to be significantly reduced.Maximum of 3 legs to follow rest of less than 12 hours. Reduce number of FA crew swaps in Q400.

Q400 Captain reported safety concerns regarding crew rest and crew swaps following a challenging 4 day trip.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

I was on the RNAV XX approach into ZZZ. At ZZZZZ; I did my in-range flow and reduced power to 21 inches of manifold power; turned the aux pumps to low; and went through the rest of the flow. Shortly after that I started to notice vibration; though initially; I wasn't sure whether it was vibration or just a continuance of the moderate to severe turbulence we had experienced over the mountains. Then I saw that the fuel flow on the right engine had gone up to about 150 while the left engine was at around 100. Also the rpm and manifold pressure indications on the two engines had diverged. I also saw that I wasn't holding speed at this power setting even though I was descending; so I pushed both throttles up to maintain 120 knots. I wasn't sure which engine was the problem initially - we are trained to look for deficient fuel flow and by that measure the right engine seemed to be working overtime while the left engine was deficient. I then noticed that I had drifted right of course. That indication; along with the fact that the left engine rpm; manifold pressure and fuel flow seemed to be normal; suggested that the right engine was the problem; though it still seemed to be making some power. I corrected the course deviation; got back on course; maintained speed; delayed deploying full flaps until I was absolutely sure that I had the runway made and then landed. Once I pulled the power back to idle and landed; the right engine quit completely. I taxied to the gate on one engine. I was confident that it was safe to do so as the pavement was completely dry and there was no ice.

C402C Captain reported vibration and engine failure on approach.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Just prior to departure; we were informed that ground personnel had loaded two aircraft batteries in the proper containers. Captain was given the HAZMAT form; which he endorsed; then push back to fly the leg. After airborne; the Captain realized that there was a required dispatch amendment; so he immediately notified Dispatch to get the proper amendment. The flight continued to destination without any further issue related to this COMAT.

Air Carrier Captain reported flight release missing required HazMat amendment during cruise.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Returned to [departure airport] as a result of passenger disturbance. Evaluated climb limit weight; runway length limit and elected to land overweight. Declared emergency with ATC. Notified company; requested police and medical. Completed normal and overweight checklists. Elected to land on longest runway. I was PM; FO was PF. Ref speed was rather high on final due to overweight condition. On approach in VMC FO was slightly high on glideslope and slightly fast. In an effort to reduce altitude and airspeed autopilot and auto throttles were disconnected. I was unaware of this. Speed brakes deployed. Speed rapidly decayed; and stick shaker activated. I pushed up the throttles as FO retracted the speed brake. Stick shaker stopped; remainder of approach was stable. I failed to observe the rapidly decaying airspeed due to a minor distraction from ATC.Suggestions: Never a reason to disconnect [autoflight resources]; which if engaged provides protection against low speed excursions. A greater degree of monitoring by PM must occur. Avoid distractions; particularly during an overweight landing. Contributing factor on my behalf was that having VMC with runway in sight; and the situation very much under control lulled me into monitoring at a lower level than I otherwise would have. An awareness of how speed can rapidly decay with speed brakes deployed.

B777-300 Captain reported airspeed became low enough on a hand-flown visual approach to trigger a stick shaker.


Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors

The GIBBZ arrival is a very busy arrival and it was even busier than usual that day. I got distracted both by the approach and the added distractions of two close encounters with VFR traffic and many turns and descents from ATC at a busy time of the arrival. We landed with the seat belt sign off. Passing through FL180 we were distracted by the busy GIBBZ arrival. Just as we were passing through 10;000; where I would usually check the seatbelt sign; we were given our runway assignment and it was not what we had expected (we were given [Runway] 19R) and we were given what sounded like an urgent traffic alert with a turn off the arrival to avoid VFR traffic. We also had to call the Flight Attendant; because we didn't have a sterile light. Then; as we were trying to prepare for the approach to Runway 19R we were given another turn back towards the airport; then a frequency change. On checking in we were given another traffic alert of a VFR target less than 2 miles and 500 FT above our assigned altitude. We picked up this traffic visually just as the resolution advisory was being enunciated. We called and kept the traffic in sight visually until we were clear of conflict; then finished the prep for the approach; transferred controls; did a quick brief; and switched controls back. I think I called for the in-range; but we were now less than 5 miles from the final approach fix and were given more vectors and a frequency change to Tower. Now I began configuring for the approach as Tower asked us to keep our speed up to the marker. Unfamiliar with [Runway] 19R; I spent a little time reviewing the distance to the runway and altitude of the FAF to figure out what a safe speed to the marker would be since I know that we have a lot of configuration issues with IAD approaches. Once we were completely configured; I called for the 'Before Landing' Checklist and we must have skipped the In-Range Checklist; because the Flight Attendant called us once we were stopped on the taxiway and informed us that the seatbelt sign was still off. I've been told that we are trying to stop doing the GIBBZ; I think that's a great way to reduce distractions during the arrival phase into a busy airport.

Air Carrier Captain reports forgetting to turn on the seatbelt sign prior to landing at IAD due to the extremely busy arrival and approach phase. Vectors to avoid VFR traffic and the GIBBZ arrival were cited as the major distractors.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 425

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport

Recently the power company has installed new power-line poles in close proximity to the drop zone. The new poles are taller and pose a great safety risk to landing and departing air traffic at the airport as well as skydivers. They are maybe 200 feet off the threshold and are extremely dangerous on hot days as well as all approaches. The power line company said they had notified the proper people at the FAA and the FAA deemed it not necessary to notify the drop zone/airport management.

Pilot reported recently installed taller power-line poles located near WI14 airport and drop zone pose a safety threat to aircraft and skydivers.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors; Airport

Crew cleared 13R at DAL on C3; and called Ground for taxi instructions. PNF (Pilot Not Flying) did not catch the entire clearance due to a given taxi way (M5) not being on the current chart. PNF then responded with the first taxiway (D); and asked for a repeat of the remainder of the taxi clearance. After holding short of D1 on D we were given the clearance D; D3; E; M5; cross 13L; A5 to the ramp. We started to taxi; slowly; and were immediately instructed to expedite our taxi by the Controller; we assume because another corporate jet was waiting to taxi opposite direction. PNF then informed the ground Controller that our previous confusion was due to M5 not being on the current chart. GC (Ground Control); with an irritated; demeaning and obstructive attitude informed us that it was not on the chart because it just opened; and that we should 'familiarize ourselves with it'. Another exchange occurred; initiated by the GC; and PNF repeated instructions to the ramp. In summary; the crew felt the Ground Controller's attitude; combined with unnecessary 'suggestions'; after the crew informed him of their issues with the clearance led to a decrease in safety operating margins. Contributing factors were that the current chart did not show two of the taxiways (M5; A5) given in the clearance by the Ground Controller; and we were not informed of their location; except when GC stated 'you'll see them when you get down there'; again with an obstructive and demeaning attitude. Additionally; M5 and A5 are not on the FAA construction plan for DAL; listed on the FAA website. NOTAMs for DAL show both taxiways' commission and dimensions; but not their location.NOTAMs for new taxiways need to include their approximate location on the airfield; as the current NOTAMs only give their dimensions and date of commission. When controllers are aware that those taxiways are not on a current chart; because of their recent commissioning; they need to inform crews as part of the taxi clearance. Crew needs to ask for a progressive taxi instruction when unclear of location of taxiways.

Captain reported communication breakdown with Ground Control and changes to taxiways that were not on available charts or NOTAMs.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 24000; Flight Crew Type 10000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Reviewing my flight plan I noticed in the MEL item info on first page of flight plan an MEL item referring only to a 'root fillet fairing' and no other items.  Researching the item listed I came across another MEL item of far worse consequences; stating the flight control position indicator in the cockpit was unreliable and contained a long and potentially dangerous preflight check for the flight crew to perform.  This plane should not have been in service for 3 days with this problem.

A319 Captain reports being dispatched with an MEL for a root fillet fairing which states the flight control position indicator in the cockpit was unreliable and contained a long and potentially dangerous preflight check.


Workload; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Other; Party2 Dispatch

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

After departing gate; we taxied to the runway. We accomplished flows; flight control checks and taxi checklist. First Officer (FO) had paperwork he was reading from for takeoff data; but as we discovered after takeoff; he was reading from the preliminary and not the closeout. We were a little rushed being number 2 for takeoff after a 9 minute taxi; but not what I would say in the yellow. After takeoff we got a message from dispatch. This was our first awareness that we had taken off without a closeout. We immediately requested a closeout but didn't get one for over 4 hours and 30 minutes. Luckily we took off 700 pounds lighter than the numbers that were used. We never got any alerts from the FMC indicating there was any abnormalities with our takeoff data. We all couldn't believe that we departed without a closeout. FO said he was busy monitoring our taxi and just simply didn't realize that we didn't have a closeout. IRO just assumed FO had one.Causes were a short taxi and lack of communication between 3 pilots. I as the Captain was focusing on taxiing at night and accomplishing check list. I have always thought that it was procedure for the FO and IRO to go over closeout entries; but after discussing this with my crew; I found that this happens about 50 percent of the time. I realize that the Captain is supposed to discuss the closeout with the FO but in reality the Captain usually is heads outside while taxiing and depends on the IRO and FO to review it.  This is the first time this has happened to me in 35 years. I believe that a policy should be in place that the FO and IRO; (if one is on board) should review the closeout as procedure; or hand closeout to captain if possible on a flight with a two man crew. Previously; we didn't have data to enter until we got a final weight and balance. The system now can set you up to takeoff without a closeout.

Took over flight from previous dispatcher. I was informed of no load closeout due to computer issue. Captain had departed without final closeout without dispatcher's knowledge.While enroute; captain requested an updated Zero Fuel Weight/Center of Gravity (ZFW/CG) for his landing. I asked both load planning and the manager if anything had been resolved (flight was now two hours enroute). I was told load planning had no confidence in what was on the aircraft and they would give no ZFW but his CG was within limits.We continue to have issues in regards to inaccurate load closeouts. Combination of new employees and new systems are what we are being told.

The A330 crew departed without their final weight and balance.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

We were cleared for the ILS23L; 3;000 FT until established and 180k to XEROX. At XEROX; still on approach; the controller issued the clearance 'XXX maintain 3000 FT and fly heading 140.' I initially didn't hear our call sign and thought it sounded like a clearance for another aircraft in the terminal area. After determining that the clearance was in fact for us a go around was initiated with the autopilot at first on and then disconnected; the turn to H140 was slow and altitude of 3;000 FT over shot by 550 FT.The clearance caused some level of confusion and delay since 'go around or discontinue approach' phraseology was not used by the controller. From that point better high altitude/approach and go around procedures and crew coordination were required in this situation. Better pilot/controller communication. Expecting the unexpected; with more thought given to go around procedures at a point other than minimums.

While on the ILS approach to Runway 23L at IND; the aircraft was descending through roughly 2600 FT on the Localizer and glide-slope (captured and tracking) autopilot was on. The Pilot Flying (PF) and Pilot Monitoring (PM) were discussing items relative to the approach when the Controller announced 'maintain 3000 FT fly heading 160.' No one seemed to hear it; except me; an Relief First Officer (RFO). While we were already below 3000 FT; it would be impossible to maintain something we had already passed through on the Glide-slope. Regardless; I asked PM; the First Officer to verify with ATC that those were indeed our instructions and that they were intended for us. PM at that point confirmed with ATC that those were our instructions. Never did I hear the terms cancel approach clearance or go around; perhaps those words were 'blocked'. Upon execution of the 'go around' we exceeded our clearance altitude.Improper; or non-standard phraseology during assignment of Go around/missed approach. Standard phraseology; probably would be a good idea to have controllers and pilots talk face to face from time to time; perhaps recurrent training or the like.

IND TRACON issued a go-around to an air carrier at 3;000 FT on approach to IND Runway 23L but the flight crew missed the command because of a nonstandard phraseology.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

My flight diverted to ZZZZ due to persistent unidentifiable odor in the cockpit extending into most of the business class cabin. [Advised ATC]; decided not to delay landing; and landed overweight. Landing was uneventful. ZZZZ emergency crews inspected aircraft; and determined it was safe to taxi to gate. Cockpit access system electronics overheated. Maintenance found system circuit breaker open.

B777-200 Captain reported a divert due to smoke in the cockpit and business class cabin area.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 84; Flight Crew Total 2292; Flight Crew Type 435

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors

Generator failed enroute. An unknown battery charge was remaining. I contacted Tower for landing and requested an overhead approach. Tower was busy and told me to expect the straight-in approach. I repeated I needed the overhead and Tower told me I had to do a straight-in. I told the Tower I would have to [request priority handling] to get the overhead.The overhead in this type aircraft is standard operating procedure for safety reasons. Rarely; I will accept a standard pattern; but only if everything is working properly. In this case I already had a failure and did not want to compound the situation. Given an electrical failure the following systems are impacted. Fuel boost pump; emergency fuel system (in the event of a carburetor failure); all coolant and oil temperature readings; coolant and oil door actuators; all warning lights in the cockpit; all avionics including radios. Given I already had one failure and not knowing when the battery may fail; a straight-in approach is a high-power; low-energy approach; meaning any hiccup in another system would most likely result in an off-field landing with potential property damage and possible injury to persons on the ground. The overhead provides an additional measure of safety by ensuring a higher energy state over the field. The overhead also is the fastest way to get on the ground; thus eliminating traffic delays in most any environment. I should have been able to work into the traffic pattern and do the overhead; but the controller's lack of knowledge of the safety aspect of the overhead pattern required me to [request priority handling] to deviate from his instruction to ensure as much of a safety margin as possible. The controller overreacted to the situation; which should have been a non-event.

P51 pilot reported a generator failure enroute that required him to request priority handling and make a precautionary landing.


Situational Awareness; Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

During the climb out the First Officer and I heard a relay click about once every ten seconds. It sounded like it was coming from behind the Captain's seat. There were no EICAS messages present at this time. We brought up the electrical page on the MFD and saw that GEN 4 was showing 28V; but 0A and still indicating green; not amber. Generator 2 was carrying the entire load for the right side network. GEN 2 was showing around 28V and 250A. GEN 1 and 3 were around 110-120A. I asked the First Officer to start the APU so we could have another generator available. The APU generator came online and was sharing the load with generators 1; 3; and 2; but GEN 2 always had about double the amperage of the other GEN's. About 5-10 minutes later we started getting the GEN OFF BUS messages for generators 1; 3; 4 and the APU GEN. They didn't all go offline at the same time. We would get a GEN OFF BUS EICAS message for one generator and reset it per the QRH; and it would come back online; but shortly afterwards either the same generator or a different GEN would go offline. During this time when the generators were coming off and on; GEN 2 was always online and; and would initially share the load with the other generators but slowly the amperage would bleed off the other gens and leave GEN 2 as the only generator carrying any amperage. GEN 2 was also showing a voltage of around 33V at this time. I had been talking with Maintenance and Dispatch; and decided it was time to return to the departure airport. After telling ATC that we would like to return; GEN 2 came OFF BUS and the aircraft went in to standby power. We were in level flight at 290-300 KIAS when the airplane went to standby power; opening the nose gear doors. We declared an emergency with ATC and requested a diversion to the nearest suitable airport. I notified the Flight Attendant that we had an electrical emergency and were going to land as soon as possible and to prepare the cabin for landing. I took the controls from the First Officer and asked him to review the QRH for a loss of all generators. During our descent toward the divert airport; we were unsuccessful at getting any of the generators to come back online. As we prepared for our emergency landing; ATC vectored us for an approach to Runway 17; and we were able to perform a visual approach; with Flaps 0. After landing we stayed on the runway and were going to wait for a tug to pull us off the runway and to the terminal. I decided to try and reset the generators; and Generators 1 and 3 came online. The nosewheel steering was working at this point so we taxied to the terminal; parked and deplaned normally at a Gate. There was a mechanic there from another airline who was there waiting for us at the gate and had been informed of the situation by Maintenance Control. We performed a maintenance test of the electrical system at the gate. During the test; GEN 2 would not come online; and there was an EICAS message for GEN 2 OFF BUS. The GEN 2 indication on the MFD was amber; reading around 6-7V and 0A. Other than that; the system was working normally. We taxied the aircraft to the Mechanic's hangar and I noted the discrepancies in the aircraft logbook.

An EMB-135 electrical system began malfunctioning after takeoff and finally only STBY POWER was available so an emergency was declared and the flight diverted to an enroute airport for maintenance.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 88; Flight Crew Total 5570; Flight Crew Type 906

Automation Aircraft TA; Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We departed Eglin AFB; Runway 19; on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight clearance. Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) existed on departure and throughout the flight. Our departure instructions were to fly the runway heading and climb to 3;000 FT. Immediately after departure; Eglin Tower reported VFR traffic at our 1 o'clock position descending into Destin. We were then instructed to contact Eglin Departure. The situation rapidly deteriorated to the point that the aircraft's Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) issued a Resolution Advisory (RA); which; per the FAR's (91.123(a)); we complied with. The TCAS RA Commanded an increased climb rate which we accomplished. We did not see the traffic until it passed just beneath our nose. Tower issued a departure clearance while the other aircraft was descending across our planned departure path. The other aircraft was under control of the TRACON and operating under VFR conditions at the time; in Part 93 airspace. The TRACON Controller failed to adequately control the other aircraft once it cancelled its IFR flight plan and reported us in sight. The other aircraft reported us in sight; while we were rolling down the runway for departure. I don't believe the other aircraft fully realized the performance capabilities of the B737 aircraft on departure; nor did the Departure Controller.

B737 First Officer experiences a TCAS RA departing VPS Runway 19 with an aircraft landing at DTS. The arriving aircraft had reported the B737 in sight during the takeoff roll but apparently failed to take the climb rate into account.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 68; Flight Crew Total 209; Flight Crew Type 209

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Flying to see a friend and lost power at 9;500 feet. Intermittent power but not enough to maintain altitude. Ran through my checklist with no luck and requested priority handling with [ATC]. They gave me vectors to ZZZ which Copilot had already identified and we did a 16 nm glide and descent and made the airport. Kept fiddling with fuel and lean combos and had time to take down a phone number for ATC so I could call after landing then switched to the Unicom for ZZZ. Double checked the weather and made the airport with about 3;000 feet of altitude to spare. Spiral descent to downwind and landed without incident. There was a policeman waiting when we landed and mechanics on duty.I had 11 hours on the plane since a 100 hour inspection. The ignition harness had been replaced during that inspection at the same time a new electronic starter was installed. It was apparent to the mechanic at ZZZ that the spark plugs had not been removed; cleaned or replaced. One had ceased firing and was visibly oval shaped from wear and the other had corroded through the ceramic liner and was not firing properly and all 12 had not been cleaned. There was visible rust on the exterior of 2 of the other 10 (I'm not a mechanic but I read the 100 hour checklist to mandate a close look of any rusty parts). If the spark plugs were not removed; then they didn't do a compression test. The Cessna 100 hour checklist calls for a compression test and an inspection of all engine systems.According to [Mechanic:]Replaced ignition switch with new ACS A-510-2K with matching door locks.Replaced elevator tips with new SA-0532001-94 & SA-0532001-100Replaced aileron rod ends with (4) new S1819-3Replace landing/taxi light switch with new 0713035-1Replaced air filter with new BA6108Performed an Annual Inspection as described under Title 14 CFR 43 Appendix D and was determined to be in an airworthy condition at this time.Please contact for further information.

C172 pilot reported an engine failure and forced landing due to improper maintenance.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 162; Flight Crew Total 12416; Flight Crew Type 4760

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Manuals; Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors

I was just notified of an inadvertent error in interpretation of a Maintenance Carry Over (MCO) item - an inoperative Right Aft Boost pump - by our Dispatcher; which we failed to catch as well. We were not 'rushed' during our preflight and took the time to thoroughly review the item. My copilot read the MEL line for line. Our only question was the minimum fuel value statement under the procedures section. Since it stated 'minimum fuel value' of 12;200 LBS and not specifically [individual] 'tank value' we did not challenge our dispatch fuel of 17;000 LBS for our short 50 minute flight. The Dispatcher also read the requirement to be total versus tank value. In hindsight; I should have called the Dispatcher to make sure that we were both on the 'same page' with the MEL interpretation.I consider myself a very meticulous Captain who asks questions and is not afraid to call for assistance when needed. However; in this case I was incorrect in my assumption that the flight plan was correct. In reviewing the situation; my First Officer and I believe the MEL should be updated with more specific wording. In the future I will be more vigilant and ask more questions of Dispatchers and Maintenance; especially when fuel totals are involved.I believe the MEL should be rewritten so that there is 'no doubt' about how much fuel should be on board. I was surprised to read the 767-300 procedures clearly stated what the minimum value was for takeoff and landing for the 'affected tank'. The 757 procedures simply stated 'minimum fuel values' next to these numbers. Had the 757 MEL mirrored the 767-300; I believe we would have caught the Dispatcher's error. In addition; I recommend that MEL also state the required minimum total fuel on board. Finally; the MEL should state the 'total unusable fuel' value of 3;000 LBS as well.

Both the B757 flight crew and their Dispatcher misinterpreted the minimum amount of fuel required in the affected tank when dispatched with the Aft Boost Pump inoperative.


Party1 Dispatch; Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We took off and blew number 3 main tire. We had no idea what happened. Tower was told that there was FOD on the runway from aircraft behind us that took off. Less than 60 minutes after we took off [company] maintenance sent a letter to mechanics [to our destination] to inspect the aircraft upon arrival. We were never told of this problem. When we landed we did a normal landing and taxi to the gate. When we arrived we were met by the gate agent when she informed us what had happened. That was the first we heard of it. The FO (First Officer) and I went outside and saw the damage. Several dents under the wing and an exploded tire. The aircraft was taken out of service and the return flight cancelled. Needless to say I am not happy with [the company] handling this situation. We should have been notified so we could properly prepare for a safe landing. We could have made plans for flaps 40 landing with minimal braking. I would have also had fire trucks standing by in case the other tire blew on landing. The communication between ATC should have found its way to us. I called the [duty manager]; Dispatcher and [maintenance control] after we found all this out and not one person knew anything about our blown tire. This could have been a really bad situation on landing that could have been avoided with proper planning. I believe we dodged a bullet on this event.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 Crew reported being informed after a landing that aircraft blew a tire on take off. Crew was upset for not being advised prior to landing.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

The flight began at an arrival at the airplane an hour before departure. The aircraft was completely unpowered as the GPU was unable to maintain power to the aircraft. This began a series of resets of systems in the aircraft and eventually ended in a call to Maintenance Control for the final reset that [we] were not able to accomplish. Maintenance Control had to walk us through a reset for the 'terrain' fault. We continued to prep the airplane; get our clearance and we chose to do an in depth route review do to the very short flight duration.  [We] did a complete speed and altitude verification of the IVANE2 arrival at this time. We were pressed to get off in time for our 'wheels up' time as the ground crew was new and things were going very slowly but we made it to the end of the runway with a couple of minutes to spare. Our take off clearance was to climb on a 050 degree heading to 5;000 FT.Takeoff was normal; clean up was normal; and we were handed off to Departure. They climbed us to 11;000 FT and a left turn to 310 heading. Again all was normal. Our flight plan routing was radar vectors to MAJIC; IVANE2 arrival to CLT. At this time First Officer pulled the IVANE2 chart and the RNAV 36R approach to CLT out. We reviewed all the speed and crossing restrictions on the IVANE2 and briefed the approach. We were switched over to Atlanta Center and on contact we were cleared to climb to 13;000 FT; direct MAJIC; descend on the IVANE2 North arrival. We climbed to 13;000 and began the descent and approach checklist. First Officer selected the managed descent for the arrival and I gave the passenger arrival announcement. Moments into the announcement Atlanta Center called us and asked for our altitude. We replied 11;800 FT descending on the IVANE2 North. His reply was MAJIC has a 13;000 FT crossing altitude; climb back to 13;000 FT and resume the arrival. On two occasions the speed and altitudes on the arrival were checked. First Officer felt that when he had selected the managed descent that the aircraft would maintain 13;000 FT until passing MAJIC and follow the path down on the arrival. The problem was; we think; that when Atlanta issued the climb to 13;000 FT it dropped out the 13;000-17;000 FT crossing at MAJIC or it dropped out when First Officer selected managed descent for the arrival. Either way the MAJIC speed of 250 KTS remained; but the altitude restriction dropped out and did not restrict the aircraft from beginning a 1;000 FT per minute descent. In researching this in my limited spare time today I have found that the same problem has occurred on the arrival with flights originating from ZZZ to CLT. Problem there takes place with the FL260 crossing. I believe this scenario occurred because of multiple events taking place in a very short time; but the primary reason is that the flight plan to CLT from ZZZ1 is at 12;000 FT. When the route is loaded it loads a predetermined and set arrival conditions for the IVANE2 arrival so that when it is reviewed on the ground it looks fine. But when the 13;000 FT climb clearance is given by Atlanta Center; the altitude restriction drops out. I enjoy flying the Airbus and have done so for many years but even after all these years it does things that I cannot explain. Automation is primarily to reduce the work on the pilot. However; it requires more attention to be directed with our monitoring skills; there lies its faults.Even though I was not flying the aircraft; I accept responsibility for the incorrect path that it took. My job was the pilot not flying. My lesson that I learned today was that it is necessary to review the crossing restrictions and speeds on these RNAV arrivals but the pitfall is that even after you have reviewed and verified the restrictions; you cannot follow the flight path on the ND screen as I believe I was taught. One must use the arrival page to verify the aircraft will meet every restriction published. I have found that there are too manytimes that the crossing restrictions and/or altitudes drop out when certain criteria are changed from the published and programmed arrival. All of this works very well on paper and when it is flown just exactly like the arrival is set up. My own personal opinion is that the first time that a change from the designed program occurs; ATC should take back positive control of the aircraft's arrival. On the Airbus; assigned speed decreases will take the aircraft off the flight path almost instantly and there is a short window that the speed brake can adjust before it leaves the programmed decent path. Bottom line suggestion for this case; emphasize verifying speed and crossing restriction off of the page in the book and do not trust that just because the pilot JUST checked and verified every restriction prior to beginning the arrival that it will still be there when you get to it. Until this day; I have always reviewed and verified from the page to the ND and MCDU then used the ND to make sure all of the restriction are met. From this day forward I will be using the arrival page to verify the aircraft will meet the restrictions not what is shown on the ND.

During the climbout; approximately 20 NM from MAJIC Intersection; we received an FMS amber message 'Speed discrepancy at MAJIC.' While I was troubleshooting the problem we were given clearance to 'Descend via the IVANE2; North Transition.' I looked at the ND; verified the restriction at MAJIC; and selected Managed Descent expecting the aircraft to maintain 13;000 FT until reaching MAJIC. Again; the 'Speed Discrepancy' message appeared and I returned to dealing with that problem. The ND and FMS indicated the correct speed of 250 KIAS at MAJIC but there was no pink 'slow down' point indicated on the ND map display. I activated Selected Speed to slow the aircraft to 250 KIAS from 310 KIAS to avoid a speed infraction at MAJIC. I continued to troubleshoot the speed issue; as we were required to use managed speed to meet speed restrictions further into the arrival.As I continued to troubleshoot the 'Speed Discrepancy' issue; apparently the aircraft began a 1;000 FPM descent. At approximately 10 NM from MAJIC I realized our altitude was 11;500 FT and then we both saw that the MAJIC altitude restriction of 13;000 FT was no longer in the FMS.We used procedures; policies; and flows to verify the arrival procedure two (2) times and overly depended on the automation to maintain the correct restrictions. Ultimately we failed to adequately monitor the arrival as I became fixated on the Managed Speed issue. I may have erred by not editing the FMS cruise altitude to 13;000 FT before our departure; however; I honestly believe that this had no bearing on the 'disappearing' restriction at MAJIC as we verified the arrival restrictions two times before being cleared. Faulty software? The FMS indicated the correct speed restriction yet it repeatedly warned us of a false discrepancy. Also; the inadvertent removal of the crossing altitude restriction at MAJIC. Several other issues (related to our flight; but not related to the arrival) before our departure may have task loaded the crew ('In The Yellow'); although we did not feel overwhelmed ('In The Red'). First; I think that maybe we should not be issued RNAV arrivals if we are at departing from an airport very close to Charlotte as both crewmembers are very task saturated during these flights. Second; even after the arrival verification; I think that both crew members should verify each restriction during the arrival using both the FMS and the arrival chart plate. Third; Dispatch should not file flight plans with a cruise altitude lower than the minimum altitude at an initial fix on an RNAV arrival i.e.; 12;000 FT filed altitude with a minimum crossing of 13;000 FT at MAJIC last; I think that it may alleviate errors if the controllers would verify the initial altitude restriction on the first fix of the arrival i.e.; we were cruising at 13;000 FT toward a 13;000-16;000 foot altitude window at MAJIC. It may have helped us if we were cleared 'Descend via the IVANE2 RNAV Arrival; North Transition. Maintain 13;000 until MAJIC.'

A319 flight crew reported an altitude deviation on IVANE2 arrival to CLT.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 21.92; Flight Crew Total 10274.05; Flight Crew Type 10274.05

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Before we were able walk onboard our plane we had to go to gate XX for a temperature check.Once on board our FA said our crew meals were not boarded and airport operations informed us catering was shut down.  CA went to procure 2 sandwiches in the terminal while I set up the cockpit.  I rushed through the cockpit setup as we arrived later than planned to the plane. Our clearance was ZZZZZX.ZZZ then as filed. While loading the route in the FMC the ZZZZZX departure was loaded without selecting the ZZZ [VOR] transition.  Upon returning from the preflight inspection 15 minutes before scheduled departure time; I proceeded to verify the route.  I did not catch the error that the ZZZZZX departure was loaded without the ZZZ transition.On the before takeoff checklist; I missed another opportunity to catch the error when I read FMC ...ZZZZZX ZZZZZ.  The box should have been loaded ZZZZZX departure ZZZ transition. After takeoff during initial climb; I noticed the airplane symbol was off course on the Jeppesen ZZZZZX.ZZZ SID. I brought this to the CA's attention; but before we could investigate further ATC called to say we were off course.  We flew ZZZZZ direct ZZZ rather than the ZZZZZ.ZZZ; which was our clearance.ATC cleared us direct ZZZ.  The rest of the flight was uneventful.

Air carrier First Officer reported programming the FMC incorrectly for the SID; which resulted in a track deviation. Reporter noted several delays that contributed to rushing through cockpit set up.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 37; Flight Crew Total 6435; Flight Crew Type 18

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

UAV was flown on circular orbit that was within the fenced in area of ZZZ at 1;400 [feet] MSL. Up to the point of the accident; the flight lasted for about 45 minutes (approximate) with no system anomalies noted. Location of the GCS was on the center infield at ZZZ. The operation was within line of sight involving the remote pilot at the GCS; a sensor operator sitting next to the remote pilot; and three visual spotters looking at the aircraft. The first indication that an onboard system malfunction had occurred was that the camera sensor stopped working. This was closely followed by one of the spotters telling the remote pilot that the aircraft appeared to be descending. The UAV autopilot was no longer responsive to the active orbit over the cornfield inside the ZZZ area and the aircraft descended to the point of impact in a driveway. Minor ground damage; occurred during the post-crash fire.The exact cause of the loss is not clear at this time but appears to be consistent with total onboard electrical system failure. The flight was conducted in strict conformance with the manufacturer checklist and Certificate of Waiver or Authorization. The flight was conducted using waypoint orbits over the airport property coupled to the autopilot. No anomalous annunciations were indicated at the Ground Control Station prior to the aircraft becoming unresponsive.According to the Manufacturer; Aircraft X has only one main electrical bus. All electrical consumers; including the autopilot; are connected onto that bus that is driven by a single voltage regulator. Aircraft Y; according to the manufacturer; has multiple; independent electrical buses which would reduce the probability of total electrical loss to the avionics.

Remote pilot reported a complete loss of control of UAV due to electrical failure.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Top Clam shell of cabin door opened on takeoff.Cause - Cabin door not secured properly? Did not notice if door warning.

Cessna 402 pilot reported the upper clamshell door half opened after takeoff.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Workload; Troubleshooting

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

We were originally scheduled to fly flight non-stop to HNL; but due to strong enroute headwinds we were forced to make a tech stop in PDX. While still in the departure airport I attempted to complete all of my preflight planning for both legs of our day so that we could minimize our ground time in PDX. When I pulled the flight plan for the PDX-HNL leg; the filed routing was as follows: PDX..ONP..40129..ADTIL..BILLO.R464.BITTA..HNL. The first thing that caught my eye was the waypoint '40129' which I was unable to find on the FIR boundary; so I contacted our Dispatcher and asked for clarification of the location of this waypoint. After speaking with the Dispatcher I learned the waypoint in question was N4000.0W12900.0; or 40N29. I inquired as to whether he intended to file us over a waypoint that was not located along the FIR boundary and his response was that it was done that way to 'cut a corner around military airspace' for fuel savings. I also asked why the waypoint was depicted as it was on the paperwork rather than the more familiar depiction of '40N29' and his response was that sometimes the computer prints it that way. I also noticed that our flight plan was filed without an arrival into HNL; but I didn't give it a lot of thought since we were arriving much later than normal and my assumption was at the hour of our arrival that we would most likely be cleared direct to the HNL airport once HCF identified us on radar. I hung up with the Dispatcher and continued my preflight preparations. My next issue came up when I attempted to plot the ETP which was 'N4029.0W12905.5'on the plotting chart. Unfortunately when I attempted to plot the ETP; it came up approximately 20-30 miles east; or left of the plotted course line that connected ONP with 40N29. I once again called our Dispatcher and informed him of the problem I was having with the ETP not falling on the plotted course line and his response was that 'sometimes it does that'. Unable to resolve the issue at this point; I continued my preparations and my plan was to have my First Officer; who was already on the jet; review the paperwork with me in the event I was making an error in plotting. We got busy with other duties and decided we would further review the paperwork on the ground in PDX. After arriving in PDX and loading the FMC for our next leg to HNL; we were surprised to find that there were numerous errors when comparing the legs page of the FMC to the computer generated paper flight plan in our possession. One of the first things that caught my attention was that there was no consistency in the errors we were detecting. For example; on one leg segment the magnetic course was in error in excess of three degrees to the south when comparing the FMC legs page to the paper flight plan; and on the next segment it would be in error in excess of three degrees to the north of course. The worst error I recall us detecting was a difference in magnetic course of 7 degrees on one leg segment; while another leg segment had an error of 11 NM; but the magnetic courses were within tolerance of +/- 3 degrees. By now my First Officer had received our clearance via PDC on ACARS and that clearance was somewhat different from our filed route on the flight plan. The PDC clearance was as follows: 'KPDX ONP 4007N/12930W ADTIL./.PHNL'. Ironically when we entered the PDC cleared route into the FMC; nearly all of our errors disappeared; but we still had the issue of the ETP not falling on our plotted course line that connected ONP to 40N29. Since we were having the issues and errors that we were detecting; I contacted our Dispatcher and requested that he refile our flight plan with a fix that was located along the FIR boundary. After pulling the new flight plan; we eventually departed and had an uneventful flight to HNL. After thinking about all the issues and problems that we had; I'm suspicious that the company was doing everything in their power to manipulate the flight plan as muchas possible in order to achieve their desired fuel burn that would satisfy FAR's/policy and get us to HNL. If this was the case; unfortunately their manipulation of data in an attempt to reach a specific fuel burn resulted in substantial errors that we thankfully detected prior to pushback thanks to our policies and procedures that are in place. My suspicion is that the company attempted to manipulate flight planning data in order to achieve their desired outcome as far as fuel planning for our flight.

A Captain reported that during a fuel stop in PDX; a careful flight plan review exposed numerous Dispatcher flight planning errors in an apparent attempt to cut corners and save fuel. A new FAR compliant flight plan was issued.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 140; Flight Crew Type 140

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

I had filed a VFR flight plan electronically prior to engine start. Upon initial contact with MIC Ground Control; I requested VFR separation services and was given a squawk code and Departure frequency.When I received my takeoff clearance; I requested that the Tower activate my VFR flight plan (in accordance with AIM 5-1-4(f). I prefer to activate this way since during departure there's little time available to contact Flight Service to activate my flight plan. The Tower informed me that my flight plan would automatically be activated upon contacting Departure. This seemed unusual to me and differed from past experience but I acquiesced. When directed by Tower I switched to Departure and continued my flight. When I was approximately twenty miles from my destination and prior to descent Minneapolis Center terminated radar services.Upon arrival at my destination after shutdown I called Flight Service to close my flight plan. At that time I was informed that my flight plan had never been activated. Had something happened to me during the final twenty miles of my flight no search and rescue would have been initiated due to the controller's error. I later discussed the issue with a Tower Supervisor at MIC who verified my story with the tapes and confirmed that the Controller had made an error. The Supervisor indicated that many of the controllers were young and inexperienced. I learned from this that a healthy skepticism is required in aviation to insure personal safety.

A PA-28 pilot was surprised to learn that his VFR Flight Plan had never been activated as he had been advised it would be by the Tower right after takeoff. He was later advised by a Tower Supervisor that many of the Local Controllers were young and inexperienced.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 325; Flight Crew Type 230

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

A C172 was handed off from Center. The Controller requested 6;500 FT MSL because the pilot reported icing. On initial contact; I asked the pilot if he was still receiving ice and he said he was. I attempted to vector the aircraft on the most expeditious route to lower MVA's. When the aircraft was in the 4;500 FT MVA; he said he was continuing to accumulate ice; estimated to be 3/8 inch by now. The pilot said he was having trouble holding altitude and airspeed. I decided to declare an emergency situation without advising the pilot of this fact. Working closely with the EOVM; I descended the aircraft to the 3;500 FT MVA a couple miles prior to that MVA boundary; hoping that the icing would abate. It did not. At this point; I decided to attempt vectors to a visual approach; however; when the aircraft was one mile southwest of the airport; he was still in IMC and still accumulating ice. While the pilot remained relatively calm; I sensed he was becoming more concerned about the icing; his deteriorating airspeed; and his inability to hold assigned altitude. I asked if he had pitot and carb heat. He said he did and they were both on. I vectored the aircraft about 1/2 mile from the outer marker; assigning 2;800 FT; the glide slope intercept altitude. I cleared the C172 for the ILS approach; and he started to turn inbound. I received a landing clearance from the Tower and cleared the aircraft to land; instructing him to remain on my frequency. He seemed to follow the approach for about two miles; then appeared to stray to the east of the final. The pilot asked if he was on course and I told him he was straying eastward. The aircraft was now on about a three mile final; and I decided to give him an emergency ASR approach; assigning vectors and step-down altitudes to 1;800 FT. When the aircraft was on short final at 1;800 FT; he said he had just broken out of IMC and had the runway in sight. The pilot landed safely; and I instructed him to change to Ground Control. I was later informed ground personnel reported the aircraft had approximately 1 inch ice on all surfaces. Continue to attempt to educate the aviation community about the dangers of icing; especially to light aircraft with no icing protection.

Considering wind aloft and temperature information; mistakenly thought temps were low enough to avoid ice accumulation. About halfway into the flight noticed the beginning of some icing. Initially asked to climb higher; due to lack of performance decided on lower to 6;500 FT. Kept ATC informed on ice accumulation as various vectors and altitudes were tried to get out of the icing conditions. Ice continued to accumulate as we approached the destination. Reported up to one inch ice accumulation but may have over estimated. Ended up needing vectors to a final approach course and tension and workload increased within 3 miles of destination. Nerves made it difficult to objectively evaluate aircraft performance but it seemed to be decreasing; requiring full throttle to maintain airspeed and altitude for the last 30 miles. Poor education about icing conditions and a lack of experience led to this situation. Inaccurate assumptions almost led to an accident.

TRACON Controller described an icing event; declaring an emergency for the aircraft and providing an emergency type ASR approach to accomplish uneventful descent below IMC.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 16; Flight Crew Total 288; Flight Crew Type 40

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing

While practicing an engine out landing; power set to idle; I left the gear up to increase gliding distance and forgot to put it down on short final. The aircraft skidded 150 to 200 ft. down the runway ending up at the left edge. The hull was scraped; but the wear did not go through and one of the sea wing extensions sustained minor scrape damage. A smooth landing; one observer noted; but a little noisy leaving expensive white hull debris in my slide path. The aircraft was jacked up using wing jacks and manufacturer supplied jack points; the gear extended and was returned to its hangar under its own power.

A light sport aircraft pilot reported a gear up landing with no injuries and minor damage to the aircraft.


Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport

Our aircraft was cleared for takeoff. The First Officer was pilot flying. Normal transfer from me to him. First Officer pushed power up and I did final thrust adjustments and called out 'thrust set'...all systems normal.' After adjusting thrust I looked out at the runway and noticed the red take off hold lights illuminate. I called out reject; took control of the aircraft and did the reject procedure. We were at approximately 80 knots. We called tower; cleared the runway; reviewed the QRC reject checklist and did the brake cooling chart. We went back to the gate to have a brake inspection per the operations manual guidance. I informed tower that the red THL lights had illuminated after we began our roll and Tower said they did not know why. There were no vehicles or aircraft on the runway that would have triggered the lights. I suggested they deactivate the system if that was the case. Good crew coordination with my excellent First Officer. Not sure why the lights illuminated but the runway was clear and they were not on when we began the take off roll.

Air carrier Captain reported a rejected takeoff due to the red runway incursion warning light activating during their takeoff.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Delay due to weather. Parked on tarmac for about 30 minutes when the toxic fumes became so strong in the cabin. I called the captain and told him possible TCP fumes. Smelled like burning chemicals and the odor was so strong I put a portable oxygen bottle on because I could not breathe and at that point I became incapacitated to assist in the cabin as a working flight attendant. The Captain returned to gate to let passengers and crew off the aircraft. A321 aircraft has bleed air into cabin; mechanical issue. This is maintenance or an engineering problem with the aircraft.

A321 Flight Attendant reports donning an oxygen mask; after 30 minutes of waiting for takeoff; due to foul smelling air in the cabin. The Captain is informed and the flight returns to the gate.