Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 515; Flight Crew Type 50

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

I was pilot flying on a recent skydive flight. This was a specially authorized flight by the FAA; therefore outside the area we typically fly and skydivers jump from. We initially landed at a public non-towered airport; but were asked by individuals on the ground (unclear if they were airport managers or what their title was) not to use the airport as a base for the jump run (something about a recent skydiving incident and not wanting to draw additional attention by letting us launch from there too); so we moved to a nearby towered airport. We were about 1.5 hours early; so had plenty of time to coordinate with the airport manager on the ground; and the Class D Tower and communicate our intentions to fly jump run outside their airspace in Class E at 4;500 MSL. The professionals at this Class D airport were very inquisitive (asked lots of questions to make sure they fully understood our intentions and that everyone was on the same page); and coordinated with Approach control for our handoff for jump run. Accordingly; due to the correct filing and authorization from the FAA; the NOTAM filed with FSS; and clear communication with the relevant ATC facilities; we truly felt we had done everything 'Pre' flight to make sure everyone knew our intentions; and I had a heightened sensitivity to the importance of this communication because we launched out of this busy Class D airport which typically does not handle parachute operations and I considered that the local approach controller may not be as comfortable with the operation as our local approach controller at the airport we routinely fly skydivers from.The safety issue that concerns me and generates this report is what happened during the jump run. I visually cleared the area and communicated about 3 or 4 times with Approach control the altitude and timing of jump run; including a radio call about 1 minute prior to jump operations. If I recall correctly; approach control did confirm the '1 minute prior' message and relayed that over frequency. The skydivers also visually cleared the area before jumping; and after all three launched; Approach asked me to hold over the area and wait until they were all on the ground so I could report and they could broadcast an 'all-clear' on frequency. As the next minute or two elapsed; I observed Aircraft Y fly north to south and directly through the area I had dropped the jumpers. This location was several miles south of the non-towered; Class E airport we had originally tried to launch from; and I had seen that distinct aircraft on the ground there when we first landed. Because this was a specially authorized flight; and [it was for a special occasion] on the ground; our skydivers had prepared extravagant visual displays (smoke streams; trailing flags; lots of color; etc) and were therefore - in my mind - completely impossible to miss at this stage; with their canopies deployed. To my extreme consternation; I observed Aircraft Y continue a visual flight path directly through the path of the jump operation; with no lateral deviation for clearance from the jumpers whatsoever. I didn't sense the pilot climbing or descending to put a visual distance between himself and the jumpers; and at no time did ATC announce to me; either before or after dropping the jumpers; that this traffic was in the vicinity. I would estimate his altitude to be about 3000 ft; and horizontal and vertical distance from the jumpers to be within 500 ft each; but can't be entirely sure. Given that we had originally landed at this non-towered airport; and had filed NOTAMs appropriately; I have a lot of trouble imagining this pilot was unaware of our jump operations south of the field (maybe 5 miles south or so). I believe he wasn't on frequency with ATC; otherwise I would have expected to hear him while I was communicating with Approach control. And last; even if the pilot didn't know we had authorization to do this jump run during a very specific window of time;hadn't seen us when we first landed there; and wasn't talking to ATC - I have a lot of trouble imagining he did not visually acquire our skydivers as they descended under canopy - again; due to their extremely distinct visual and colorful profile.From a safety and action perspective; my best guess is that ATC either had too high a workload; or was insufficiently familiar with parachute operations; to identify the need for providing that traffic alert to me. When I made my last radio call of '1 minute prior' it would have made a huge difference if ATC had notified me of traffic north of our position; 3000 ft; heading directly over our jump run area. I am keenly aware of my PIC responsibility to visually clear the area before dropping jumpers; but in a case where I do a visual scan and do not pick up traffic; ATC alerts of traffic trending to our position are my last line of defense. Last; I don't want to be put in the position of determining what the Aircraft Y pilot's intentions were; but I cannot rule out the possibility that he was intentionally trying to intimidate our operation. In essence; my responsibility for the safety of flight and my skydivers; and knowledge that this special operation was likely to be unfamiliar to local ATC facilities; made me hyper sensitive to providing clear and frequent communication; and I felt let down that I didn't get that traffic alert in return.

Pilot of a single engine piston aircraft in a parachute jumping event reported an airborne conflict with an aircraft intruding into the jump airspace.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I was working Local East and had a CRJ cleared to land on Runway 26. Right before the aircraft touched down on the runway; the ASDE-X alarm went off and said to 'GO Around Runway 26'. I saw a couple of targets on the taxiways holding short of Runway 26 but I did not see anything on the actual runway. As required; I instructed the CRJ to Go Around and gave him further instructions. I received no response from the aircraft and so I again instructed the aircraft to Go Around 'if able'. This time the aircraft responded and went around. I am not sure why the system alarm on the ASDE-X went off; but it was determined that there was not a vehicle on the runway. It may have been a reflection or a false target response. Either way; the aircraft was literally about to touch down on the runway and was in a critical phase of flight. Sending the aircraft around at this point in time may have been more unsafe then letting him land but as required by the ASDE-X; I have to send aircraft around when the alarm indicates to do so. I would just recommend further investigation on the ASDE-X and false targets. Maybe we can figure out what causes this to happen in order to prevent it from occurring again.

A PHL Controller issued a very late go around in response to an ASDE-X Alarm. The reporter noted the go around may have been unsafe and not needed but mandated by ATC rules.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

We saw a medium sized object perhaps 100-300 feet below us; we were at 4;500 feet MSL too small to be a plane. At first we thought balloons; but that didn't make sense with its track over the ground. It was headed into the wind fairly quickly. My student and I believed it was a drone of some type. There are no current [UAV] NOTAMS in the area we were operating. It was green; black; and silver in color. It had the appearance of a quad copter.

Flight instructor reported sighting a drone while on an instructional flight at 4500 feet.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 6

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft X was an eastbound climber into my sector from sector 32. I was distracted working with other issues to the south and Aircraft X checked on most likely level at FL350 with FL370 and a climb arrow in his data block. I obviously didn't hear it. Minutes later I noticed on my scan the aircraft level at FL350 and a limited data block on a northbound aircraft in sector 32's airspace. I quickly surmised that the aircraft was given FL350 and handed off to me shown as climbing to FL370. So I asked Aircraft X his assigned altitude and he said; 'FL350 but we would like FL370;' and I cleared the aircraft up. This issue has been going on for a while so I called sector 32 and asked; 'hey; are you using something like a dwell lock to remind you when an aircraft needs clearance still as Aircraft X was level at 350?' He said; 'sometimes stuff just happens.' I was like (WOW) in my head and had no real response except to say; 'you might file a report on that one.' Of course my emotions ran high inside and very irritated at the response.According to the 7110.65 an aircraft should be handed off and shipped to the altitude it was assigned. Anything else is dangerous because of memory lapse and aircraft leveling in possible confliction with traffic they would normally miss if given the correct altitude. Area North needs to have a briefing for all controls to return to the basics. If this is happening this often with me; then I am sure with others it is occurring and they are not reporting it.

ZOA Controller reported seeing a confusing data block. Controller checked with pilot and then called transferring Controller to verify what had been done. Reporter then discussed the actions with the transferring Controller.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Aircraft X called me having just departed ZZZ airport. I gave him the standard departure clearance; climb to flight level 230; and leaving 140 normal speed. He had a really hard time reading back the clearance; so I knew I would have to keep an eye on him. Because we are working COVID schedules; I was working all of my area's sectors; so I had other things to do; and moved on to other clearances. I had already taken a point out on Aircraft Y; who was being worked by Area Y; landing ZZZ1. I knew that the two were potential traffic; so I issued Aircraft X a clearance to go direct ZZZ2 which was the second fix on his route; he read back ZZZ2. I went back to other clearances. A short time later; Aircraft X keyed up and asked if ZZZ2 was ZXZ2. I corrected him and told him that ZZZ2 was ZZZ2. (ZXZ2 is a fix in [different state].) Aircraft X had already started to go towards ZXZ2; which put him head on with Aircraft Y descending into ZZZ1. In order to get Aircraft X out of the way at this point; I issued him a 360 degree heading. I had no idea which way he was turning at this point; so I just wanted to get him somewhere that I knew Aircraft Y was not going to be. I called Area Y and tried to get them to stop the Aircraft Y and give me radar contact; but they had already switched the aircraft to ZZZ approach. I had the Aircraft X stop his climb to buy myself a few more seconds. I called ZZZ Approach to try to get them to turn the Aircraft Y south; but they informed me that they had just put the Aircraft Y on a 360 heading as well; and he was much faster than my Aircraft X. I asked them if they could turn the Aircraft Y back to the south; and they said no. At that point; I turned my Aircraft X another 30 degrees to the right. Because the Aircraft Y was still descending; I climbed the Aircraft X; hoping to achieve vertical separation. Vertical separation was achieved soon after. I issued a turn to Aircraft X's next fix; and then a climb to his requested final altitude.The pilot put in ZXZ2 instead of ZZZ2. The [letter] and [letter] are next to each other on a QWERTY keyboard. This was probably an example of a slipped finger starting a domino effect of mishaps.

ZID Center Controller reported an airborne conflict while working all sectors in Controller's area during COVID-19 scheduling.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

During cruise we noticed that the #2 engine fuel flow was about 1100-1200 pounds higher than engine 1 and 3 with a higher EGT of approximately 75 to 100 degrees at the same RPM. The fuel flow display became intermittent and eventually failed; and was replaced with an amber 'X.' Shortly afterward; we began to receive an intermittent level one ENG 2 VIB HI message and we saw an amber boxed 5.0 reading on the SD. We then saw a Master Caution with the engine 2 oil quantity decreasing to near 0. We performed the applicable checklist which led us to continue the flight normally as long as engine oil pressure and temperature remained normal. Shortly later; while on descent on the arrival into Cologne; we received a level 2 oil pressure low message. The engine 2 oil pressure gauge remained normal. We then received a Level 2 ENG @ OIL PRESS LO message and per the previous checklist we were led to the engine shutdown in flight checklist to shut down the #2 engine. On downwind to EDGG we received a level 2 SYS 2 HYD FAIL message. We observed that the number 2 hydraulic system quantity had decreased to zero. We then performed the applicable AOM (Aircraft Operating Manual) checklist and we requested priority handling from CGN ATC. We asked for a slightly longer final approach to allow for extra time to configure due to the loss of #2 hydraulics. During configuration we observed slower than normal flap deployment; and even a brief and minor self-correcting flap asymmetry due to some flaps reaching position slower than others. We were; however; fully configured and stable well prior to 1000 feet and the landing was uneventful. After block-in CRF (Crash Fire Rescue) advised me of a visible stream of some vapor that he believed to be fuel from the #2 engine during roll-out. Additionally; the Captain and I accomplished a post-flight visual inspection of the number 2 engine and found both the engine and aircraft structure immediately below the engine to be heavily coated in jet fuel. There was also a sizable amount of jet fuel dripping from the engine.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Pilot reported multiple EICAS messages resulting in an inflight shutdown of the #2 engine and a precautionary landing at the destination airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 228; Flight Crew Type 1467

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

While starting our engine; attached to the tug; and stopped only a few feet from [the] Gate; the aircraft parking at [the] Gate (next to us) clipped our wing tip; damaging the aircraft winglet.Make gate entries a straight in procedure instead of angled gate entries that bring the aircraft too close together.

While parked at [the] Gate; we were ready to call for a pushback clearance. I called for a pushback clearance with Ground Control; and we were given clearance to pushback after traffic into [the] Gate had pulled into the gate. I relayed these instructions to the Captain; which he told the Pushback Driver that we were cleared once [the] Gate had pulled into the gate. At this point; the Captain asked if we were clear to 'start two.' The Pushback Driver said he would like to slowly push us back a couple feet in order to start the engines. We rolled back several feet and came to a stop; and I proceeded with the engine start of both engines at the Captain's request. While monitoring the start sequence of the number one engine; we felt several jolts to the aircraft. At this point; we looked at the right wingtip; and noticed that it had been damaged by the aircraft pulling into [the] Gate (adjacent gate). The Captain told the Pushback Driver about the damage and he pulled us back into the gate. We deplaned all the Passengers without any further incidence.

A B737-700 ready for pushback was struck by another B737 taxiing into the adjacent gate and sustained wingtip damage. The aircraft returned to the gate.


PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 800

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Landed short at night. About 25 feet short of runway. 2700 feet x 60 feet runway. No lights in vicinity or airport. I know of 2 trees in approach path that cannot be seen at night directly in line with the runway. In my opinion they need to be removed. Not a direct factor in this case.Airspeed was good for the short field approach which I have made many times and several times at night in last few weeks. I pulled throttle as I normally do when I am about to cross the threshold. But for some reason last night we settled quickly; not sure why. Winds aloft even at 1000 feet were cross runway at over 20 knots. I don't recall exact surface winds but they favored Runway 21. I had just landed prior to that for a fuel stop.

PA46 pilot reports landing short of the runway during a night visual approach to an unlighted runway. A short field landing was planned for the 2700 foot runway with a strong crosswind; but the aircraft settled earlier than expected.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 420; Flight Crew Type 300

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The LAF Runway 10 PAPI has a non-standard 'Slightly Low' indication; which is defined in AIM Figure 2-1-5. The slightly low indication should be a sequence of four lights colored WHITE; RED; RED; RED in that order. The LAF Runway 10 PAPI 'Slightly Low' indication is RED; WHITE; RED; RED. I've already reported this to the ATCT once about 10 days ago; but no action appears to have been taken. Tonight; while inbound to this runway; both my student and I observed the indication.

An instructor pilot on approach to LAF Runway 10 noted the PAPI indication for slightly low was RED; WHITE; RED; RED but according to the FAA AIM should be WHITE; RED; RED; RED.


Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

I was working Sector 30 and was advised by the adjacent Controller that Air Carrier X was heading towards my sector and that he was having radio problems and could only transmit and receive on 134.57 (and 121.5). Air Carrier X departed ZZZ enroute to ZZZ1. The 134.57 frequency is not a frequency we can transmit or receive on. That meant we could only communicate indirectly with Air Carrier X; using other aircraft to relay to him on 134.57 or 121.5. Apparently the Command Center was aware of this problem; and the Supervisor was coordinating with adjacent facilities. As we weren't busy at the time we objected in principle to the situation but had no real pressing need to talk to the aircraft as it transited ZMP airspace. However; not being in direct communications with an aircraft for extended periods of time; heading to a busy destination such as ZZZ1; creates an unsafe situation; as well as additional workload for the controllers. The aircraft should have been ordered to divert to another airport to fix the equipment malfunction before being allowed to proceed to a busy east coast airport such as ZZZ1.

ZMP Controller voiced concern regarding the decision to permit an air carrier; limited to only one frequency; to transit multiple airspace environments and land at a busy east coast airport.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Had a VFR aircraft depart GMU; the tower had called down to coordinate a runway change at the next ATIS. I missed the next coordination; and the runway change was completed and I turned the aircraft on course toward the tower owned airspace. I was stressed about the announcement with the government shutdown; and forgot to get a pointout with the tower. I was very concerned about how I was going to feed my three children and continue to be able to afford gas to get to work.

TRACON Controller reported an airspace violation caused by distractions.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 1350; Flight Crew Type 225

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency

I was descending on an IFR flight plan to 4;000 FT MSL while enroute to destination. Approaching 4;000 FT MSL; the left engine made a very loud sound and shook pretty violently. I immediately began to diagnose the problem by turning the emergency fuel pump to high; which helped the engine run smoother; but did not fix the problem. During this I informed ATC that I was having issues with the left engine; but did not need any assistance at the time. I continued to test the fuel pump and monitor the engine gauges; all of which appeared normal. I requested direct to destination because they had vectored me slightly to the north for traffic. They allowed this and told me to descend to 3;000 FT MSL and contact Approach Control. I contacted Approach and let them know of my situation; and within a minute or so of contacting them I made the decision to shut down the left engine and feather it because it wasn't getting any better. I believe that it was about 3-5 minutes between the first noise and when I actually began to shut the engine down. Since I shut the engine down; I let ATC know and then had to declare and emergency. They were great and I really didn't need any extra help from them. The airplane was maintaining altitude well and the engine feathered just fine. I flew the rest of the way single engine and landed; and when I was able taxied off the runway and had a tug pull me the rest of the way in. After landing; I called Clearance and informed them I was down and just fine; and they closed my flight plan. The only real deviation that occurred during the emergency was that I deviated from 4;000 FT MSL by about 200 FT high for maybe 20-30 seconds and the descent down to 3;000 FT MSL was very slow. After I got pulled in the hanger the mechanic pulled off the cowl and discovered that my number two cylinder on the left engine had split straight in half; luckily above the piston so the piston remained seated.

Cessna 340 pilot shutdown the left engine in-flight after a loud sound was hear followed by violent shaking. Post flight revealed the number two cylinder was split in half.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.5

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Incursion Runway

I cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff from C1 on Runway 7R. Meanwhile; training was in progress on Ground. I heard both the trainee and instructor yell 'No' at a higher level than normal which caught my attention for concern. I scanned down the runway at the aircraft waiting for a crossing and did not see them moving. As my scan got closer towards the approach end I heard them trying to transmit to Aircraft X to stop. At that moment I saw Aircraft X at C3 taxiing toward the runway while Aircraft Y was approaching the vicinity of the runway threshold marking; rolling at a rapid speed. I was not sure if Aircraft X was going to stop as at this point they were completely past the hold bars of taxiway C3. I knew that Aircraft Y had way too much speed to be able to stop and time was critical; so instead of taking canceling the takeoff clearance I used the time available to get their attention towards where Aircraft X was ahead and to their right so that they could maneuver out of the way if they were able. They were rolling too fast to stop; but not fast enough to rotate yet. I am not sure if Aircraft Y maneuvered to the left or not but they went past where Aircraft X was and departed without incident. Aircraft X stopped just short of the runway edge line; completely past the hold short markings on C3. After Aircraft Y was a safe distance upwind and at a safe altitude I turned them on course and they said that they had seen Aircraft X during their takeoff roll.Before this incident happened I had already put a Cessna in position at full length and there were 2 aircraft inbound. I sent the closer one around to prevent a flyover of the Cessna in position at full length as they could not depart with Aircraft X where they were. Aircraft X called me for departure clear of the runway edge marking; but completely past the C3 hold short lines. I verified with the pilot if they were still okay/comfortable to depart and they said affirmative. I advised them of the Cessna holding in position at full length and cleared them for takeoff. The Cessna departed afterwards without incident. Aircraft X remained in the pattern and landed without incident. The go around went around in the pattern and landed without incident.I am not sure what Ground said to Aircraft X that caused them to do that; but regardless Ground would never give a line up and wait or 'Position and Hold' instruction. It seems that at this airport; recently; I have noticed an increased number (than in the time that I have been here) of pilots taxiing onto the runway claiming that they thought Ground gave them permission to taxi onto the runway and wait for Tower to give them departure instructions. Perhaps some sort of emphasis in pilot training could be made to highlight the fact that Ground controllers do not have that type of authority regarding the runway and would never give such an instruction could help reduce the occurrence of these types of events.The event happened so quickly that not much time was given to be able to identify; react; and get a pilot response (either verbal or in the form of a pilot action) from the aircraft involved. I think Ground did a good job trying to stop Aircraft X even though they said they think their transmissions kept getting blocked; which is why it took Aircraft X so long to stop. The pilots in Aircraft Y did a good job hearing; understanding; and responding to my warnings about Aircraft X because a potential disaster was averted.

DVT Tower Controller reported an unsafe situation with a departure and an aircraft that needed to cross the runway.


The reconfigured 767 is a disaster waiting to happen in an emergency. No cross-aisle for speedy evacuation. Jumpseats are blocked the entire time while service is going on with glass carts; trash cart; and liquor cart. Turbulence only takes seconds to hit and while we are trying to park all three carts on both sides with such a small galley and carts that do not work well; since the wheels of those carts do not turn the right way; it will be a tragic event for crew members. There are no tie downs to hold carts in place. The other issue is no cross aisle. All passengers with seat assignments on the right hand side have to go through the galley. The same time we are performing our service with pre-departure; hanging coats; passing out menus; passing pajamas and the list goes on; while the galley FA is trying to check the galley items; brewing coffee; working with the pilots about their meal choice; etc. Passengers fighting to get to their seats.  We are told; and practice year after year; if exits are blocked; to go across. With the narrow aisles and seats which you cannot possibly cross because of the design; where will the passengers cross over all bunched in the galley trying to evacuate. The only place passengers can cross over is in the middle of the aircraft. This plane was approved by the FAA.  The two lavatories in B/C are in close proximity to the cockpit. Passengers needing to use them will situate themselves in the galley area where we are trying to do our service passing trays; getting drinks; closing and opening the ovens while trying not to hit them accidentally with all moving items such as [galley] carts; setting two up; pouring coffee or tea etc. Instead of them waiting for the lavatories in their area left or right side they decide to play back and forth in the galley area waiting to see which lavatory opens first. We don't have time for that. Should we delay the service until they all go to the lavatories? They don't want to wait in the narrow aisle and inconvenience their seat mates; but wait in the galley interrupting our service. The other issue is who decided on placing our crew rest area aft [in coach]. With all the noise from the galley area; passengers talking; who in their right mind can get a restful rest? Fatigue will be playing a huge role in this. Crew members are poked through the curtain; passengers sit on the armrest awaiting a free lav. Sometimes passengers take it upon themselves to open the curtain thinking a lav is hiding behind the curtain. All these issues need to be investigated and a quick change both for passengers and crew members. Put back the cross aisle and bring the crew rest area to the front of coach. I would love someone to fly with me on a full flight and see what we now have to work with. This is unacceptable and not appreciated by [Company's] front line employee. Happy employees make for a stronger airline and a profitable one. The correct solution can be found.

B767 Flight Attendant reported that their company's reconfigured B767 cabin layout adversely affects safety; efficiency; and crew rest.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure; Manuals

Our revised PDC clearance was -JTEEE1 ALDAY SGF-as filed. When we searched the EFB; we chose exactly that. Runway 18C JTEEE1.ALDAY. The EFB also had a JTEEE1 RNAV page as well but that didn't match our PDC. When we loaded the departure in the FMC; it had 3 or 4 other waypoints listed which in retrospect were the fixes on the JTEEE1 RNAV SID. Since none of these were on the EFB SID; nor were they in the PDC; we deleted them. On the runway; Tower cleared us [direct] to what sounded like JTEEE. My IOE First Officer read back; 'confirm that was direct to JTEEE?' ATC replied; 'yes.' On climb out we engaged LNAV and headed for JTEEE. Departure said we were cleared to CHETO [one of the deleted waypoints]; and I replied 'negative; we confirmed JTEEE.' No other traffic in the area except for a landing to 18L after us.These new departure SIDS need to be listed with transitions. There should be no guessing with a route change as to which one we should fly. It should be exact. Also; there should be a published document in all trip folders that show how each of these departures are pronounced. I heard JTEEE after confirmation with ATC; and ATC claims they said CHETO. All four of us on the jet--which included another 777 Check Airman as second Relief Pilot--heard the same thing. In the digital aero charts FIV [Flight Information Viewer]; there is only one departure for the JTEEE1. Why are there 2 in the EFB then and how was I supposed to know which one was correct? We clearly thought--as we do now--that we were correct.

B777-200 flight crew experienced a track heading deviation immediately after takeoff while on the JTEEE1 RNAV SID off Runway 18C at MEM.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

On flight to ZZZ1 the waypoint HEVAN was in the flight plan. By accident in the FMS HAVAN was typed in. Once we crossed the waypoint prior to HEVAN the plan turned right instead of left. ATC noticed the same time we did and we corrected the problem. ATL Center gave a number to call for the INDY Field Office which the Captain called when we landed in ZZZ1. When the Captain typed in the flight plan on the ground in ZZZ he made a mistake that I didn't catch when we went over the route. Be alert for similar waypoints.

Air carrier First Officer reported imputing wrong waypoint into flight management system. Crew realized mistake and continued as instructed by ATC.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 144; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 11000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

During RNAV GPS approach Runway 27R to Chicago; aircraft had erroneous path indication showing almost full scale below. Acquired airport visually and flew below VNAV path to require proper glide path.  And we flown aircraft using auto pilot in the VNAV; I missed approach would've been required.

Captain reported loss of GPS signal and VNAV on GPS approach resulted in change to a visual approach.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

During cruise flight while en route from ZZZ to ZZZ1 just abeam ZZZ2 we heard a outburst and panic from behind us. We turned to find a passenger in distress and declaring that he was experiencing uncontrollable cramping and he couldn't control or feel his legs or arms and couldn't un-clench his fists. He begged for water and we provided him with water and asked if he was doing ok. My First Officer continued to monitor the passengers conditions as the rapidly deteriorated we observed the passenger going in and out of consciousness and became unresponsive and seemed to stop breathing multiple times. We notified ARTCC but was not met with a response from ATC. We were struggling to gain contact with ATC and advised them of our intentions to divert to ZZZ2 the closest airport and land immediately for a passenger medical emergency. This request was relayed with company aircraft as we were in a communications blackout zone. We transferred controls and I advised dispatch; an ambulance met us on the airfield. Once landing safely on the field we transferred the passenger to the ambulance paramedics. We called Operations Center; and made a maintenance log write up for the aircraft due to the passenger soiling the seat. The aircraft received maintenance and the passenger was taken to the local hospital. Passenger medical conditions; potential pre-existing medical conditions. Complications with asthma/ heatstroke/  panic attack.

Small Transport pilot reported a passenger medical situation inflight.


Human-Machine Interface; Fatigue; Confusion

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We were landing on Runway 18 and it was the First Officers leg. Approximately 80 NM southeast we reviewed the arrival and he briefed the approach to 18. As he read I followed along on my approach plate. Everything was normal as we were cleared for the visual approach to 18. The F/O selected approach mode on the autopilot and it armed. Our intercept angle was approximately 60 degrees (heading 240 to intercept 183 inbound course). We passed through the localizer without a capture; had a short discussion on not intercepting; and then corrected back to the left. Almost simultaneously ATC called asking if we were landing 18 center. I do not know how far we penetrated airspace for traffic landing the parallel runway; but no TCAS events occurred.As it turned out the First Officer had selected the proper ILS frequency but had selected an inbound course of 003 not 183. This was our second identical turn. The first day was an early get-up and departure; and the second day a late morning departure with a late return scheduled for more than nine hours later. I can't speak for the First Officer; but I was fatigued. I would normally double check frequencies and headings. I think due to being tired and this being our home base which we all know extremely well; I was too complacent.

We were instructed to call ATC once on the ground. During conversation controller said traffic was about one mile behind and 1;500 FT above and he had to tell him to stop descent and that he was going to write this up. I said OK and hung up. About 10 minutes later he called back and after further discussions with his Supervisor had decided that it did not warrant a write up.

A fatigued flight crew; complacent by virtue of returning to their home domicile failed to note the PF's ILS was set to the inbound course reciprocal failed to intercept the localizer and experienced a modest traffic conflict with traffic for a parallel runway.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

An Orion P3 was cleared for the LOC/DME BC 35 at KOA. After vectoring the aircraft onto final and clearing it I observed it intercept and track the BC inbound. The P3 then reported established and was instructed to contact KOA Tower. I scanned my other traffic and when I returned to the P3's target I observed it to be east of course. I called KOA Tower and advised the Controller and asked if the P3 was going to execute the missed approach. I was advised to standby while the Controller double checked. The P3 reported the airport was not in sight and that they'd lost navigation. KOA asked me what I wanted to do and because the P3 was below my MIAs (Minimum IFR Altitude) and issued a climb to 5;000 and a heading of 330 away from the terrain. The P3 returned to my frequency and operations continued normally from here. The ambiguity of this whole event really bothers me and my performance could have been better. First; we have an aircraft off course below the MIAs. I rightly queried the Tower and here is where I think communication broke down. Rather than have a longer discussion I felt just issuing a climb above the MIA and a heading to return the aircraft to safe area was the best course of action. I failed to have the Tower Controller tell the P3 they were below the MIA so I do not know if they ever received that warning. What I have determined is that I need to ensure that the advisory is issued next time and to take control of the situation quicker if the Tower doesn't. I've reviewed this over and over and next time I will be sure that I include an instruction to the Tower to issue the safety alert along with any control instructions.

A HCF Controller had a below MVA event with traffic on the LOC/DME BC at KOA executing a missed approach procedure turning in the wrong direction.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

We were being vectored onto the ILS approach Runway 26 into PHX. There was an Airbus that was being vectored on to the parallel approach for 25L into PHX. Because we were both intercepting our respective localizers at the same lateral point from the field; we got an RA to descend. The TCAS did exactly what it was supposed to do- it doesn't know that we are intercepting a localizer; and so it sees two airplanes that are opposite direction and converging and issues the RA command. The Captain turned off the autopilot; turned away slightly from the traffic; and descended approximately 300 feet. We had the traffic in sight the entire time; and we were able to stabilize the aircraft before the '1;000 ft above the field' call out. Why does ATC keep on having aircraft on parallel approaches intercept parallel localizers at the same lateral point? If they would space it out by a mile; this wouldn't happen. And if it's happened to me twice now in the last 6 months; it must be happening to other people as well.

While on the visual approach to Runway 26 we received a Descent TA.  Another aircraft was on approach to 25L and also joining final.  We had the aircraft in sight and we also complied with the TA and started a descent.  Our position was just outside PRUNN on approach to Runway 26.  We were at 3;000 [feet]; and descent was to approximately 2;700 [feet].  We then leveled off and joined the glide slope and landed on Runway 26. ATC was notified of the TA.

Air carrier flight crew reported descending in response to an RA from an opposite direction Airbus on approach to PHX.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew; Person Gate Agent / CSR

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

[I] wanted to share about our flight today to SYR to raise awareness on the very poorly painted yellow taxi lines at the gate area in SYR at gate X. We stopped aircraft to make sure we were on the yellow line during taxi in at gate X in SYR. Most of the line is extremely hard to see and almost seemed like there wasn't even a line there in some spots. Both the First Officer and I during our slow taxi in were confident on being on what appeared to be a line; but almost felt like we were taxiing 'in the blind' at times with what appeared to be the yellow line. After we parked; we talked with several ground personnel working our flight along with the Gate Agent and they agreed on how bad the line is. They said they made someone aware of this; but they didn't seem too confident on the yellow taxi line getting taken care of anytime soon. They were nice and we all agreed that this needs some awareness for safety reasons. It was a beautiful sunny day with a dry ramp and just figured this report was worth filling out to raise awareness for safety to look into this for future ramp safety with visible lines present; especially in poor weather conditions or at night.Keeping safety first; knowing to stop the aircraft which we did to ensure a safe taxi into the gate area. Raising awareness on this to look into this for ramp safety; not only at this gate at SYR; but to maintain vigilance at all airports keeping safety a priority. Sometimes when things like this happen; this becomes the norm since others think it will get fixed soon as flights come and go. When I asked the ramp if this was going to get painted anytime soon or in the future; they weren't too confident on this.

A Captain noted the lack of visibility of the SYR gate lead in line lines and his inability to determine his aircraft's position relative to the gate.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Had a Low Oil Pressure indication; followed by a suspected fume event. Returned to departure airport. Landed overweight and did not declare an emergency. Cause: did not have time to refer to FOM. QRH did not contain required declaration guidance in the overweight landing procedure. Suggestions: there is a full page of 'additional information' attached to the Overweight Landing Procedure in the 757 QRH. It would be helpful to add a reminder that; at [company]; per FOM; a declaration of emergency with ATC is required for all overweight landings. It would have also been great if the Dispatcher had the procedure/authority to declare for the flight as we were able to communicate we were returning and were overweight.

Right Engine oil pressure at 33 psi (yellow band) after takeoff; followed by increased fumes in cockpit and cabin. Returned to ZZZ and although told ATC we were returning due to fumes and were going to land overweight. We did not specifically declare an emergency as required by Flight Manual part 1.

B757 flight crew reported experiencing a low oil pressure indication followed by fumes in the cockpit. Flight crew decided to return to the departure airport and executed an undeclared overweight landing.


Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 6850; Flight Crew Type 1800

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related

I got an erroneous indication on the cockpit display then a complete loss of GPS signal. After several attempts to regain a signal and be able to navigate to the next Waypoint; I had to ask Center for a heading till I sorted out the issues. Finally after several minutes I was able to get a distance Waypoint and able to navigate to that intersection and no further issues happened. This happened near the area of Restricted airspace R-ZZZZ past ZZZ1. Looking back; I'm convinced my GPS signal was jammed by the military.

BE90 Pilot reported indication of temporary loss of GPS signal near restricted area and stated it was due to GPS jamming.


Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 188

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Went out for a few takeoffs and landings and remained in the traffic pattern. The first takeoff and landing was normal as was the second takeoff. On landing when I went to brake I found that the right main gear brake was not operating and consequently departed the runway to the left and then down into low area left of the overrun area. While off the hard surface I hit a couple of runway lights and incurred some repairable damage to the leading edge of the left wing. There were no injuries to myself or any ground personnel who came to my aid and towed my aircraft back to my hangar. I sealed a fuel leak on the leading edge of the left wing and put the airplane in the hangar. When I came back the following day to check on the damage I found a sizeable puddle of brake fluid below the right main gear and upon cursory inspection found that the bleeder valve on the brake had worked itself loose. Once again this is a fairly easy repair.

An Experimental aircraft pilot reported a loss of right brake control during landing that resulted in a runway excursion and contact with several runway lights. Later; the right brake bleeder valve was found loose and leaking brake fluid.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Sea; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 135; Flight Crew Total 2430; Flight Crew Type 195

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

While on base leg of traffic pattern engine stopped. Suspected fuel exhaustion. Purchased more than enough fuel for mission and had fuel in tanks when started. Aircraft either burned more than planned fuel or FBO did not pump the final amount ordered. Training took place over 2 days. Aircraft started with approximately 10-15 gallons. We purchased a total of 80 gallons over the 2 days and flew 7.8 on the Hobbs meter. Much of that was spent at idle and reduced power learning to taxi and handle the aircraft on the water. Flight time was much less and the aircraft has never burned more than 10 gallons per hour. I know this because I have purchased [20] gallons; flown for 2 hours and had more remaining than I started with.

PA-18 seaplane instructor pilot reported the engine quit in the traffic pattern because of suspected fuel exhaustion.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 221.45; Flight Crew Total 16673.38; Flight Crew Type 16673.38

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Operating Aircraft X ZZZ to ZZZ1 as Captain on Date. Departed Gate XX using #2 engine but aware of 5 minute warm-up for engine #1. With approximately 8 aircraft in front of us for T/O; I called for the 'Delayed Engine Start' procedure. Engine #2 starts normally and is running for at least 6-7 minutes before Tower tells us to 'Line up and wait Runway XXR/W'. During taxiing onto Runway XXR; another Company aircraft tells us that they have observed flames coming out of the tail cone of #1 engine. We ask and receive permission to taxi off Runway and ask for ARFF (airport rescue and firefighting) to come out and have a look. I make ELB write-up. During the entire time; there were no abnormal engine indications in the cockpit. Both engines shut-down; Fire Chief reports small fuel leak from engine #1. Maintenance asks us to proceed to [area] for further inspection. Maintenance says; 'There is oil leaking where it should not be'. Maintenance advises that write-up for oil leak will be accomplished by Maintenance. Maintenance advises aircraft will be towed to gate XY for further investigation. Over an hour spent at Gate XY until ops advises swap with new airplane at Gate XZ. Flight leaves 4 hours late and proceeds uneventfully to ZZZ1.

Upon being cleared onto runway another aircraft informed us of flames briefly coming from engine number 1. We coordinated with ATC; fire department; Company Maintenance; Dispatch; and Operations as well as crew and customers. Fire department said they observed a fuel leak after number 1 was shutdown but no other issues. At a hard stand Company maintenance stated they saw oil in the number 1 engine. We were tugged to a gate where we deplaned and given a new aircraft at a different gate.

B737 flight crew reported that another Company flight crew informed them of a tail pipe fire on their #1 engine during taxi for take off. Flight crew secured the engine and maintenance diagnosed the issue; which resulted in the aircraft removed from service.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 1050; Flight Crew Type 450

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

I was cruising VFR at an altitude of 2500 FT MSL to MDT. I contacted Harrisburg Approach prior to entering the TRSA for VFR advisories. Harrisburg gave me a transponder code and then verified radar contact. I was told to climb and maintain at or above 3500 FT to which I replied 'Unable due to not being able to maintain VFR.' The controller said to maintain VFR and remain at 2500 FT. As I proceeded on course; I saw that my present course would take me into the MDT Class D airspace but since I was talking to Harrisburg Approach; I assumed that two-way communication with Harrisburg would suffice for the Class D airspace. After reviewing the FAR/AIM; I realized that I should have altered course or asked Harrisburg to leave the frequency and contact MDT for clearance thru Class D airspace.

Pilot under flight following questions if he should have contacted a Tower for clearance through the Class Delta.


Embraer Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted

Leaving ZZZ2; we were assigned an aircraft that was non-RNAV. Heading between ZZZ2-ZZZ there were thunderstorms and we were able to navigate between VORs and radar vectors. ZZZ approach control took our handoff and approximately 20 miles out we were advised that the previous arrival had reported a 30kt loss of airspeed on final. At this time I elected to slow the aircraft as the pilot flying. The Captain (CA) and I discussed whether or not to continue; or to hold; or divert. Based on the information received from approach control we figured the aircraft had come in a while before us when there were still cells on or near the field. We were vectored onto final and cleared for the approach. At approximately 1700 FT MSL after intercepting the glideslope; the airspeed trended upward rapidly. We experienced about a 30kt gain and I decided that the threat of wind shear was still prevalent and decided a go around was our best option. I called for the go around and executed the go around. Approach control took our handoff and assigned vectors for us to make a plan of action. We requested delay vectors to the southwest to decide whether to divert or to hold for another approach. At this time we evaluated our alternates and with weather quickly deteriorating we decided to divert and found ZZZ1 to have the best weather. We contacted dispatch to have our alternate changed and executed the diversion. En route to ZZZ1 we continued to get bounced through cells and struggled with turbulence and precipitation. The rest of the flight proceeded with no other abnormalitiesAfter our diversion from ZZZ and landing in ZZZ1. We contacted dispatch to decide whether to try to make it into ZZZ [intended destination] again. Our dispatcher said the weather looked good between ZZZ1-ZZZ. Having looked at a radar scope on my phone I saw weather between the two locations but believed we could make our way east to get to ZZZ. There was a hole around ZZZ in approximately 30 miles in all directions. Our dispatcher informed us there was no wind shear forecasted (we experienced wind shear on the first attempt into ZZZ and decided to divert to ZZZ1). Our dispatcher also had trouble clearly communicating and we felt hung out to dry. We looked into a good weather alternate in case we could not make it into ZZZ. ZZZ2 had good weather and that was our plan. Taking [off] with a NON-RNAV aircraft we were able to take vectors to go around cells and approached ZZZ from the southeast. Lightning was all around us and we were in and out of moderate to heavy rain and light to moderate turbulence. I was increasingly worried that the weather was over ZZZ. Approach control took our hand off and told us of a Wind Shear alert on the 16R runway. It was a 20kt loss. We ask for holding vectors and evaluated whether or not we could get in or not. In discussion with approach they thought there was an opening from the south to land XXL and the winds were announced 310/7. We were informed cells were moving northeast and approximately 50mph. We were vectored a right then left S turn to get through a cell and right before turning on final approach informed us of a small precipitation area on a 2 mile final. By our radar depiction it seems tiny and light precipitation Just inside the marker on the glideslope and at 190 knots we received a crew alerter 'WINDSHEAR' I do not recall the color of the alert but I immediately rotated the aircraft and executed the go around and followed the wind shear guidance. Guidance lasted only a few seconds but it was apparent we were in an updraft associated with a cell. I asked for higher altitude and immediate vectors away. Approach advised us everything was available. I believe we initially took 6000 FT and a right turn 160. I think they ended up vectoring us into the storm however we continued around to a 210 heading and immediately declared our intention to divert. Once reconfigured and in a manageable workload the Captain (CA) began to get a hold ofthe dispatcher and he was slow to respond. Approach and center controllers advised us of several airport's weather. We decided that our fuel was better served to go back to ZZZ1 where we knew what the weather was like and it was closer; giving us more fuel to evaluate. In trying to avoid cells with no RNAV I asked from FL210 and vectors through weather. ATC as well as our weather radar were worthless. We chased turbulence precipitation and lightning all the way to ZZZ1. Within 30 miles of ZZZ1 everything smoothed out and we completed the flight with no further issues. Both the CA and I felt the dispatcher was in over his head and was struggling to stay ahead of his required work. I believe there was pressure on him to launch and complete this flight. Other operations were also experiencing delays. Weather was obviously a threat. All people involved in working this flight felt pressure to complete the mission and I believe this lead to launching a flight was not meant to make it. Having a non-rnav aircraft made navigating difficult. We were really left to the opinions of ATC and I believe it left us to get bounced around more than necessary. A wind shear [alert] became apparent leading into ZZZ. I believe we handled it as safely as possible and our training lead to a safe outcome to the flight. I wish our dispatcher and us had come up with a plan to delay the flight until the weather would have moved out. However; I was up against a duty issue (we had 40 minutes to launch) I think this further pushed the idea to get the aircraft airborne which was a poor choice. I don't believe it will ever be necessary to launch a flight to 'beat the weather.' I have a lot more respect for thunderstorms and wind shear and will not operate a critical phase of flight in the vicinity of a thunderstorm.

After the first diversion I called dispatch and we discussed the weather conditions at ZZZ and decided we had a hole of opportunity to get into ZZZ if we left soon. During cruise the weather started popping up close to the field and finally during the approach tower told us they had LLWS reported. Maybe a minute after that advisory we received a Windshear (amber) caution and went around diverting back to ZZZ.Flying a non FMS aircraft using green needles. We were on edge from the previous windshear go-around diversion.Lack of Dispatch communication.

After diverting once for weather at intended destination an Embraer regional jet crew takes off again for the final destination airport after Dispatcher advises weather should remain clear for their arrival. Upon arriving into the terminal area the crew faces heavy rain; turbulence; and lightning and is forced to go-around on approach due to windshear warning. Crew diverts back to the original diversion point. Crew cites lack of assistance from dispatchers as well as a NON-RNAV equipped aircraft as contributing factors.


Eurocopter AS 350/355/EC130 - Astar/Twinstar/Ecureuil

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 17500; Flight Crew Type 2000

During descent from mountainous terrain; I descended too early and passed within less than 300 feet AGL of a ridge. This was an unintentional excursion during descent from mountainous terrain into the valley floor. I was leaving a 1000 foot AGL cruise to a planned 1500 foot cruise in lower terrain. During my descent I noticed my radar altimeter decreasing in altitude; I expected it to indicate approximately 300 to 400 feet passing the ridge; but I noticed it actually indicate a low of just above 200 prior to starting its climb back up to indicate approximately 2000 AGL. I never intended to be below 300; but the aicraft indications did show that I was below 300.

AS350 Pilot reported starting a descent too early and passing within less than 300 feet of a ridge.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 71; Flight Crew Total 5400; Flight Crew Type 1200

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were on final approach; when I dropped the gear; the left main indicator light did not come on. I radioed Tower that we had a problem and did a go around. The Tower verified the gear was down on the fly by; we recycled the gear at that point. On the second drop still no green light for the left main. I then went through the emergency gear drop procedure and still failed to get a green on the left gear. We had the Tower verify the gear were down a second time on approach and landed. The plane landed on all three gear; but the left gear collapsed on roll out.

The pilot of a PA-32 reported a main landing gear extension problem that resulted in a left main landing gear collapse during landing.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 600

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Wake Turbulence suspected: We were aware of the other aircraft by ATC & TCAS. Other aircraft was level at FL400 same direction approximately 12-17 miles ahead. Turbulence was bordering on moderate. No vertical acceleration was noticed.Aircraft change in attitude: Pitch: 3deg down Roll: 15-20deg Yaw: No significant changes. There was buffeting. No stick shaker. Autopilot was engaged but self-disconnected. No auto throttles were engaged

HS125-800XP FO reported encountering wake turbulence at FL400 from same direction/same altitude aircraft 12-17 miles ahead.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 474; Flight Crew Type 12723

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

While flying the RNAV Arrival into ZZZ; the initial Approach Controller gave us a descend via the RNAV Arrival. We requested an RNAV Z Approach with him and he said expect that. Prior to the ZZZZZ intersection the Controller gave us 'descend to 7;000 feet.' Then; we were handed off. Upon check-in with '(call sign) seven thousand)' the Controller said 'descend via the ZZZZZ 2 Arrival; expect the ILS ...' I replied with 'We can't descend via there's not a published altitude to descend to.' The Controller said there is. I replied that I believed the last published altitude to descend to was 12;000 feet at [fix] intersection; now 10-15 miles behind us; so I demanded an assignment of a numeric altitude to help clear the confusion.Approach said 'descend and maintain 5;100 feet.' He said 'I show [fix] intersection at 7;000 feet.' I replied 'Yes I see that now.' I discussed this with my First Officer and we both agreed that this is not a valid descend to altitude. I asked Approach if he had a minute for a question. He did. I told him we [wish to] clarify some information; and could he explain his thinking. The Controller said 'I see [fix] at 7;000 feet. I understand you are using Jepps plates. I'm using ICAO.' But ZZZZZ1 and ZZZZZ2 are also listed at 7;000 feet and both Jepps and ICAO plates are identical. 7;000 feet on this arrival is a minimum enroute altitude. It is not a valid descend via altitude. Per Jepps briefing bulletin 16-A1 Jepps SID/STAR-5 in the Jeppesen Airways Manual; published intersections on a STAR are listed in bold blue with lines above and below to define at; at or above; and at or below requirements. Minimum enroute altitudes are black without bold or lines above and below.I think the Controller was confused and having a bad day without a paycheck. I know our Approach Controllers are exceptionally well trained and professional. I think this was just a mistake with an unusual new chart. However; it may be worth reviewing this particular STAR because most STAR arrivals do not list minimum en route altitudes after the last published descend via altitude.

Air carrier pilot reported a communication breakdown with ATC regarding a descend via clearance.


Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Aircraft; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Chart Or Publication

We flew at 37;000 feet for turbulence direct BIL direct to [an NRS waypoint] (a distance between the fixes of 156nm) and we were just maybe five to ten miles past KD84U [another NRS waypoint] when Center said that they showed us 5 miles south of course and that we couldn't go any further right of course. This totally caught us by surprise since we had just crossed over KD84U and the airplane was tracking the Navigation Display (ND) line to [fix] which was 489 miles in front of us. I immediately checked that we were in NAV on the PFD and the Flight Computer Plan (FCP) and we were. While the First Officer talked to Center I immediately double checked that I had typed in the correct waypoints; I had; and then I pulled KD84U and the next fix up to compare the Latitude and Longitude to the flight plan release. They all checked and on the GPS Position Monitor and we showed real close to the [fix] position. Everything said we were on course and where we were supposed to be. So I told Center that everything matched and we were; as far as we could tell; exactly where we were supposed to be. Center said that their computer had a predicted course for us and we were five miles south of the predicted course.I asked if she could verify how close we were to KD84U since we had just overflown it and she said those points were not in their computer. The wind was around 015 degrees at 65 knots; we were showing the airplane crabbing to the left. I asked for an assigned heading until we could straighten the course discrepancy out and she said our present heading would be fine but we couldn't fly any further to the right. This tracked us over the white line that we would have been flying anyways if we had not got into this discussion. We never could account for the difference. Shortly we changed to another frequency and went back on course with that controller's permission and there really wasn't any change in the track.UNKNOWN what lead to this discussion and Center did not say they were taking action; we are doing this report in case they do and because there wasn't anything that we could see wrong to fix. The problem was that the DEN [Center] computer was predicting us one place with its line and it did not include our fix of KD84U or I would guess [the next NRS waypoint].  So if it was predicting us from known fixes it may be possible that we were tracking differently. This sounds like an ATC computer software problem or company needs to be notified to change how they file us.Figure out if this was an ATC computer program/software issue.

An air carrier pilot reported ATC advised them they were 5 miles south of course. The pilot verified they had the correct route programmed and their instruments showed them on course.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Prior to departing de-ice was required. After deicing during taxi out I noticed a slight odor which I attributed to the de-ice effects. During the flight the odor at times increased. It had a somewhat dirty sock smell with a trace of plastic. We looked for but did not see any signs of smoke. The odor was unpleasant and as we were neared the top of descent I decided to have Maintenance determine its origin upon arrival. After shutdown we discussed the odor with Maintenance. They initially thought it may have come from the de-ice process. After they had left the cockpit to attend to another minor write-up my First Officer stood up to go to the back of the aircraft when he noticed sparking and flame coming from the wire bundle leading to the left lateral window. He went to get a fire extinguisher. I shook the bundle and turned off the window heat and pitot heat switches. The flame went out. I could have been more conservative in my assumptions of the odor coming from the de-ice process and investigated the cause more thoroughly before takeoff. Maintenance will have to offer solutions to prevent the shorting/arcing from occurring without any fault lights or circuit breakers popping.

[No additional information was included in the secondary narrative.]

The flight crew of an A310 continued their flight to destination believing an odor continuing through the flight was the result of residual fluid from de-icing prior to departure. As they got up to depart the aircraft at the gate they were confronted by a flaming wire bundle powering the window heat.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 6230; Flight Crew Type 4

The subject airplane was an Aeronca Model TAC65; called the Aeronca 'Defender'; a conventional-gear fabric-covered airplane. On landing number 7 of an aircraft familiarization and checkout flight with a rated Private Pilot with previous tailwheel endorsement; the left landing gear folded back and aircraft veered approx 30 degrees to the left and came to a stop about 20 FT to the left of runway centerline; on the runway (a dirt and gravel surface) with left wing low. The previous 6 landings; 5 at a different airport; and one at this one and the rest of the checkout flight; had been very good; smooth; no bounces; no indications of any problems. The pilot had handled the aircraft with precision and very smoothly; and I had decided I considered him competent and safe to fly the aircraft safely on his own. When we landed this time; where the flight had originated; and the aircraft was based; with a full-stall landing and groundspeed estimated at about 40 mph maximum; the airplane started leaning left on roll out. I saw the pilot (in front) had already full right aileron; and some right rudder; but the wing continued to lower on the left and a scraping sound was heard as the left gear was digging into the dirt. The airplane veered a bit to the left and stopped in a cloud of dust. We unstrapped; turned off the fuel and magnetos; and exited the aircraft. Then we could see the stub end of the left gear appeared broken and was outside of the oleo gear housing; and the broken gear had caused us to lean and veer to the left. There were no injuries. Damage appeared confined to the broken landing gear. A close walk-around inspection before flight had shown no anomalies. Aircraft had been recently inspected in accordance with Annual Inspection procedures. I don't know of anything we as pilots could have done to induce the gear failure; or to have any way to know the gear was about to; or had; broken.

Aeronca Instructor pilot; performing a tailwheel checkout for a private pilot; reports a landing gear failure on the seventh landing all of which had been very smooth. The aircraft is stopped on the runway with no other damage reported.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

I was the Captain operating Aircraft X.  Climbing out of approximately FL280 we received the Right ENG Bleed warning message (First Officer Flying Pilot). I took the flight controls and stopped the climb.  The bleed air closed before the bleed source could be selected to non-affected engine source. Initially; I did attempt to complete the procedure; However it did not work.  The bleeds closed automatically leaving us with no air. We immediately put on our oxygen masks; I notified ATC and asked for a descent to 15;000.  After the descent was initiated. I inquired ATC about 10;000 and terrain clearance.  After reviewing terrain clearance and verification with ATC we continued to 10;000. The First Officer completed both the descent checklist and the R Bleed Duct warning check list while in initial descent. During the descent the oxygen masks deployed as both the cabin altitude and then cabin warning messages were received.  The masks deployed automatically.  At 15;000 the APU was started.  Initially the APU would not supply air.  After a second attempt to go to manual APU we obtained air on the aircraft.  The flight attendants were contacted and an announcement was made to the passengers.  The company was notified via ACARS.The fire trucks were requested due to the nature of the situation; initially I was very concerned about the extreme heat in ZZZ and the passengers health without air conditioning.  The flight returned to ZZZ without further incident landing Runway X.  The flight attendants reported all the passengers were OK and did not need assistance.  I made an announcement once we were able to take the masks off at 10;000.  I explained the reason for the return to ZZZ.  In addition once at the gate another announcement was made apologizing for the inconvenience. Dispatch was contacted by telephone once at the gate.  2 maintenance write ups were completed at the gate: 1. R Eng Bleed Warning. 2. Pax oxygen masks deployed auto. After a delay we received another aircraft and the flight was completed to ZZZ1.

I; the First officer; was assigned as the flying pilot on Aircraft X scheduled from ZZZ to ZZZ1; After a normal pushback;  start up and takeoff; we received a Right Bleed Master Warning [(R(L) bleed duct] at approximately FL280. As per procedure; I stated I have the radios and controls and asked the Captain to reference QRH for R(L) Bleed Duct. However; before the Captain could perform the QRH procedure the bleeds closed and the aircraft depressurized. I also saw that the passenger oxygen light had come on indicating the passenger oxygen masks had deployed.  The Captain took the controls and initiated an immediate descent. The Captain ordered oxygen mask on.  Once at a safe altitude (15;000 ft as best as I can remember) we notified ATC; and I began to run the checklist for descent and QRH for R(L) Bleed Duct. Once the Captain determined it was safe; we continued down to 10;000 feet and we began setting up for a return to ZZZ. All Diversion procedures were completed and we conducted a normal approach (still with priority) to ZZZ Runway X. As per the CRJ-900 system manual and QRH; a Left or Right Bleed Duct leak will cause all bleed air sources to be closed within 30 seconds causing a loss of pressurization. This is not enough time to perform the manual bleed procedure per QRH. Therefore the manual bleed procedure should at least be a checklist item.

CRJ-900 flight crew reported an aircraft bleed system malfunction during climbout. Flight crew diverted to nearest suitable airport.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Preflighted TKS system prior to flight into possible icing. Ramp personnel complained of TKS fluid chemical odor at plane. Prior to climbing into cloud layer (OAT 0*C +/-) turned on TKS anti ice system in 'Normal' mode for possible icing. Flight continued in and out of rain/snow mix. Heater off; all vents closed. Noted TKS odor in cockpit; burning of eyes; throat irritation; and slight difficulty breathing. Noted although forward side vents closed still had airflow entering cockpit and flappers closed but pointed up directing air into eyes. Then noted strong air flow entering cockpit through closed cockpit side window; air entering through rear seal on window. Aircraft is not pressurized so it is not air tight thus TKS mist entering cockpit.

A C-208 Captain reported eye irritation and breathing difficulty after using TKS in flight. The fluid seemed to enter through the closed cockpit side window's rear seal.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors

The departure requires that aircraft remain at or below 1;700 ft. until crossing the [VORTAC] 102 radial; at which time there is a required turn to a heading of 213 degrees. The departure had been set up in the FMS with VNAV engaged and the top altitude set at 4;000 ft.; which was assigned in the clearance. This set up procedure was consistent with that specified in company [training course]. Approaching 400 ft. AGL; Tower instructed us to start our turn and contact Departure. This was very confusing because we had not yet reached the fix for the turn. Because the FO (First Officer) was immediately responding to Tower and then contacting Departure; I was unable to command 'autopilot on'; 'set heading'; and 'set climb power;' and it was then that the V-bars suddenly disappeared from the PFD (Primary Flight Display). Without any other heading indicator at that moment; I manually started turning toward the direction of the HSI course indicator; which was pointed toward about 225 degrees. I was mostly focused on pitch and power to stay under 1;700 ft. Things were happening very fast; and the controller asked our heading and issued a low altitude alert (I had all the terrain in sight). The FO was trying to clarify ATC's instructions and ask for a vector to the next fix; but the MFD map display froze and he couldn't immediately identify that fix. Meanwhile; I readjusted my heading and the controller issued a climb to 7;000 ft. He then asked us to call on the phone due a possible pilot deviation. Afterwards; I tried several ways to get the FD to reappear; including turning it on and off; but the only thing that finally made any difference was pressing the pitch sync button. After that; the avionics continued to behave erratically during our flight because the map display remained frozen and there were instances where the autopilot overshot heading changes. After landing; we reported the flight director malfunctions to Maintenance and entered squawks in the maintenance log. They issued deferments under the MEL; and the remaining two legs were hand flown without the use of any flight director or autopilot; and the aircraft was brought in for maintenance at ZZZ1. Although the immediate causes of this incident were the confusing instruction of the Tower Controller and malfunction of the flight director at just the wrong time; it would have helped if I had made a better mental note of the turn direction instead of relying on having the FO to reset the heading bug. I was mostly focused on flying the flight director and remaining below the 1;700 ft. climb limit. The company requires us to use the flight director; but this also tends to reduce one's situational awareness; unlike flying 'raw data'.

King Air Captain reported flight display failures on departure and other avionics and autopilot issues during flight.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 200

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft on ZZZ TRACON frequency reported engine trouble and needed to land immediately; choosing ZZZ Airport. During the exchange with ATC they asked the pilot to write down a phone number to call if they landed safely.  This is an unnecessary distraction during what could be a high stress life or death situation.  It is a reminder to all of us that we need remember basics when it comes to flying safely: Aviate; Navigate; Communicate.  I called ZZZ TRACON at the completion of our flight and spoke to a supervisor about this and Supervisor defended the position that it was appropriate.  There are many documented instances of ATC detracting from the focus of aircrew during an emergency in order to get superfluous information.   Discussion with regarding priorities during a flight emergency and not allowing ATC to distract from critical flight duties/procedures.This issue should be escalated with the FAA AND INCLUDE TRAINING FOR ATC CONTROLLERS SO THAT THEY UNDERSTAND THE GRAVITY OF DISTRACTING AIRCREW DURING AN EMERGENCY.

Light Transport aircraft Captain reported another pilot on frequency was experiencing engine issues and was asked by ATC to write down a phone number while trying to immediately land.  The Captain reported concerns with asking a pilot in distress to get 'superfluous information' while trying to focus during an emergency type situation.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 98; Flight Crew Total 7437; Flight Crew Type 253

Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was cruising at 8;000 MSL on a clearance direct to HEVVN Intersection. The autopilot was engaged in NAV mode and ALT HOLD and the heading bug was centered on my current heading. I was in VMC conditions. There were some build ups in the area; but none along my flight path at that moment. The autopilot made an uncommanded hard left bank (I believe the autopilot disengaged but I am not sure.) I took the controls; pressed the autopilot disengage button; and smoothly rolled wings level and then returned back on course. There were no unusual attitudes and minimal change in altitude. I believe the change in heading was close to 90 degrees by the time I rolled wings level and then into the right hand turn. Once back on course; I reengaged the autopilot and there were no further issues the remainder of the flight.As I was recovering the aircraft; I received a call from ATC scolding me for deviating 'for weather' and that I was on an IFR flight plan and had to ask before doing so. I would like to reiterate that this was not a weather deviation. I also explained to the controller that it was and autopilot malfunction not an intended deviation. I also had every intention of contacting ATC to let them know that a deviation had occurred; but I wanted to FLY the aircraft first and then communicate.

A BE36 pilot was distressed that ATC scolded him for a purposeful track deviation for weather when; in actuality; his autopilot had malfunctioned and turned the aircraft some 90 degrees left before he could disconnect it and return to his cleared track.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

MEL; Procedure; Aircraft; Company Policy

I was pilot flying. The aircraft had the left generator placarded inoperative; and the APU was the 'second' generator per the MEL. After departing; approximately halfway to our destination; in cruise; the APU lost oil pressure and automatically shutdown. After consulting the QRH; the Captain declared an emergency as we were now down to one generator; night IMC; wintertime conditions. Checking weather at the nearest airports; we determined that the weather was not suitable for our condition; and we were seeking a VFR; if at least marginally VFR airport. After checking several airports; we decided on an airport we had just passed with 4 miles visibility; 1;000 FT; 11;900 FT runway; braking action good. The Captain did a great job working the QRH and normal checklists; and managing the flight deck as we flew to our divert airport. We discussed the possibility of the remaining generator failing; and then him performing the 'battery only' approach and landing. Fortunately; the remaining generator did not fail; and we landed uneventfully. This flight was my second emergency landing in less than two months. Both emergencies occurred from items that were previous write-ups in the logbook or placarded MEL items of important systems. In the case of this event; my only suggestion is that placarding a generator inoperative; with APU having a prior recent history for shutting down to low oil pressure (or any reason/history in the logbook); especially wintertime; is a bad idea. This was a 'learning experience' for me; and will guide my decision making in the future. This event is a good example of an emergency being entirely preventable.

A B737-800 was dispatched with an engine generator on MEL and an APU with a history of low oil pressure auto shutdowns. While inflight the APU auto shutdown causing the crew to declare an emergency and divert single generator to a nearby airport with suitable weather.


Flight Data / Clearance Delivery; Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 16

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

I was working Clearance Delivery and Controller in Charge (CIC). Local Control was getting releases for the NIITE SID off of Runway's 28 as we were 28/28 due to strong wind out of the west. TRACON was releasing aircraft initially heading 050. The Local Controller acknowledged and was going to clear their first aircraft. I advised them we cannot just turn right heading 050 as there needs to be a SID assigned that includes the climb gradient for Mt San Bruno northwest of the airport. Local control called back to TRACON and said as mush; and offered to put the aircraft on the SHOR7 heading 050 vector first fix. TRACON agreed and then said go SHOR7 heading 070. I have never seen a 070 assignment.Local control worked through the lineup; and when they got to Aircraft X; the pilot asked if they were still on the NIITE. This occurred while the Local Controller was offline coordinating the next three releases; of which Aircraft X was number one. The Local Controller came back to Aircraft X and said to fly the SHOR7 departure heading 070. The pilot asked for rest of enroute to connect to their route. The Local Controller then stated SHOR7 070 vector SYRAH. The pilot read it back. When the Local Controller cleared the aircraft for takeoff; the pilot asked if after LIN they should expect JSICA. The aircraft was never cleared over LIN; just filed for by the company. The Local Controller clarified SYRAH Q128 JSICA ILC as filed. The pilot rogered the route and said cleared for takeoff.I believe the origination of this issue was a miss read PDC; where the company had filed KSFO SHOR7 LIN JSICA ILC and the original preferential departure route assigned was KSFO NIITE3 SYRAH Q128 JSICA ILC then as filed. If the SYRAH Q128...was picked up all would have been navigable.The bottom line is that our noise abatement needs to be fully reviewed based on the fact that TRACON uses a 050 heading for most departures to avoid delay reporting. That is fine if we are working towards a solution for the long term; however; with all of the Operations of Airspace and Procedures in the Metroplex that is being introduced to the operations between SFO; NCT; and ZOA; this is just skewing any possible data accuracy and is beneficial only to SFO; OAK; and NCT; whereas the East Bay communities south of OAK are now bearing the brunt of the noise (traffic) and every single one is a required point out within NCT airspace between two entirely different areas. There has been an incredible amount of time; energy; and resources that the airlines have had to invest all to be told 'fly heading; climb and maintain.' This seems to be something that could come back to bite the agency under the scrutiny of an investigation; should something ever go wrong. Let's address this once and for all.

Flight crew did not detect that their PDC was different than what was filed by their company. The Tower Controller did not believe the TRACON's departure procedures were efficient and caused noise pollution over certain communities.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

This report is being submitted concerning possible failures in our safety reporting mechanism. Specifically; Flight Manual 1 requires fire/smoke/fume events to be reported. FAR 25.831 require continuing airworthiness of compartment air to be free from harmful concentrations of gases. This aircraft experienced a smoke/fume event in May and again three days later. We have had numerous incidences of onboard fire/smoke/fume events. The objected data on the amount of these incidences shows an accelerating trend. Embraer airplanes out of service due to fire/smoke/fume events seem to confirm the accelerating trend. Specifically; 40 events of this kind since March 2014. Despite the overwhelming amount of occurrences; flight crews are not being given notice of occurrences or follow up of mechanical history of the aircraft after an occurrence. There has been no proposed change of procedures to prevent further occurrences. Embraers are being considered airworthy even if both engine oil consumption rates are chronically in question. Maintenance action to determine what is causing the occurrences. Enhance the reporting procedures in order for the crews who fly these aircraft are aware of the problems by disseminating information to pilots. In light of incidences; enhance the training of fire/smoke/fumes which are already in our manuals and increase training in smoke/fire/fumes recognition. Coordinate training with Aeromedical to ensure all crews are aware of the physiological effects of fire/smoke/fume inhalation. Coordinate training of flight crew with airport crash/fire/rescue under FAR 139.319.

EMB145 Captain believes that his company's aircraft are involved in chronic smoke and fume events and the flight crews are not being given notice of occurrences or follow up of mechanical history of the aircraft.


Communication Breakdown; Workload; Situational Awareness; Fatigue

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Staffing

Every day the Lobby at midday and after is short staffed.  Today was even more so! I was assigned to Position X to help passengers with their check in on kiosks.  Both Position X and X1 were open for passenger use.  There had only been myself and another agent assigned in that area and before I was even half an hour into my shift I was the only Customer Service (CS) agent working in both Position X and X1! Absolutely unacceptable and unbelievable! As I was working with a passenger; other agents were directing passengers who were unable to use kiosk on their own to see me.  Passengers started tapping and pulling at me to get me to attend to them but I was the only CS agent working in Position X and X1.  I kindly asked passengers to please stop touching and tugging at me; especially during this time of COVID.  I had no idea that the other agent who had been in Position X working was asked by a (Supervisor) to sign in to Position X2 to help clear the line leaving me all alone to assist all guests in X and X1.  Staffing needs to be properly assigned to the Lobby and not leave the Lobby short staffed on a continual basis and causing Lobby agents to burn out from overload.

Customer Service Agent reported concerns with the daily under staffing in the airport lobby and the difficulties it is creating during the COVID-19 pandemic.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 5600; Flight Crew Type 140

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

I departed in VMC conditions to complete three takeoff and landings for 90 day currency before picking up my passengers and returning to base. I was picking up the aircraft from an off site paint facility. During my first approach to landing at the airport; I experienced a red gear unsafe light after extending the landing gear. I cycled the gear multiple times and could not get the red gear unsafe light to extinguish. Knowing that it would be best to get the aircraft back to base; I asked the Tower to communicate my intentions to my passengers via a land line. I was circling VFR over the airport at 3;500 FT MSL as instructed when I asked the Tower if I could pick up my IFR clearance to base. The Tower recommended that I turn northbound; continue VFR and pick up my IFR clearance with Center. I turned to the north and started a climb from 3;500 FT to 16;500 FT. While in the climb; the Tower came on frequency and read off my IFR Departure clearance which was to 'fly runway heading; maintain 5;000 FT; contact Center and squawk ----.' I was confused by this as I was already climbing through approximately 5;800 FT and continuing VFR northbound. I entered the new squawk and contacted Center. Center asked me what altitude I should be at and I told them I was VFR. They were confused because I believe the Tower handed me off as an IFR departure. I thought I was still VFR and that is what I told Center. I explained to them that I was working an emergency type of issue over the airport before proceeding on my flight plan route. I had not declared an emergency with the Tower. I started to level off at about 6;100 FT when they cleared me to a higher altitude. They asked if I currently had an emergency condition and I said no. I explained to them that I was working a gear unsafe issue and that I would work it out and declare an emergency if required. During approach into base; the gear unsafe light stayed on; I executed the emergency checklist; declared an emergency and landed without incident. I believe the altitude deviation was a failure of communication by both myself and the Tower. I was confused by the Tower instructing me to continue VFR and pick up my IFR clearance with Center and then a short time later; reading off my departure IFR clearance. I should have questioned my altitude assignment of 5;000 FT before continuing to climb. I thought I was still VFR and failed to have the Tower clarify their instructions. In the future; I will question my altitude assignment if there is any doubt at all of my assigned altitude.

CE510 Captain experiences an unsafe gear indication during approach and elects to divert to an airport where repairs can be made. An IFR clearance for the diversion is relayed by the Tower and causes some confusion.


Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Routine Inspection

Aircraft X arrived at the gate with the APU duct pressure seal clamp not installed. The aircraft was taken out of service. This job takes approximately 4 hours to correct if you have no other issues. There have been several other aircraft with the same issue.

Air carrier Technician reported an APU pressure duct seal clamp not installed and took the aircraft out of service for maintenance.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 30000; Flight Crew Type 11000

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 9000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Descending into IAH on the MSCOT arrival we were given three runway assignments; the last being RWY 27. When we entered RWY 27 into the FMC; the altitude dropped out at BYSUN intersection. We caught the omission; but crossed the fix approx 400 FT high.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

B757 flight crew reported crossing BYSUN high after runway assignment was changed three times on arrival to IAH.