Aircraft Manufacturing and Design (AMD) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 3500; Flight Crew Type 500

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Private pilot instrument student was flying. I was instructing from right seat. Always scanning visually for traffic as well as the ADS-B display; while we were northbound I noticed a target on ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast)  less than a mile behind us at -300 feet (we were at 3;100 MSL). Target was gaining on us and climbing toward our altitude. When target showed -100 feet and nearly merged with us on the ADS-B display (approaching from our 7:00 position); student initiated a climbing right turn to the east since it appeared the target aircraft had no idea we existed. Thankfully; that maneuver started to put some distance as well as altitude between us. However; the target started turning right as well. We continued climbing and turned further right (net 180 by then); while it appeared target was still at their previous altitude (now -700 thanks to our climb) and maintaining a roughly easterly heading but still in a right turn. After we continued our right turn (now heading west); I for the first time caught a visual on the other aircraft at roughly our 4:00 position and 700 feet below (where ADS-B said they were at that moment). They appeared to be still turning right; perhaps practicing 360s -- I don't know. In any case; we were continuing to put distance and altitude between us such that we resumed our northerly heading back to home airport without further incident other than perhaps a minute during which our altitude was 3;800 MSL -- not a legal VFR cruising altitude -- while we made sure the other aircraft was not trying to chase us. We then descended to 3;000 MSL and contacted Portland Approach for flight following for the assurance of an extra set of eyes.

Flight Instructor reported a NMAC in cruise near SLE airport.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Driving southbound on US81; 3 NM north of Hennessey OK; a yellow low wing crop duster was dusting crops from east to west and west to east across the north/south lanes of US81. The aircraft repeatedly flew beneath 30 FT telephone lines on both sides of US81 and less then 5 FT off the roadway as he dusted both fields. Flying in between north and south bound traffic; I was required to stop. Subsequently; the crop duster flew in front of me (southbound) and between a northbound 18 wheeler. Both vehicles had to slow down to keep from getting too close. Crop dusters normally will fly north/south in the area covering crops. Never have I seen an aircraft fly east/west across US81 and fly below the power lines.

An automobile driver traveling southbound; as well as other traffic in both directions on US Highway 81; had to stop to avoid and encounter with a crop duster passing beneath power lines on both sides of the highway while dusting crops on fields to both the east and west of the highway.


Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Air Traffic Control Radar 8; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 33; Flight Crew Total 600; Flight Crew Type 311

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 38; Flight Crew Type 6.1

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Excursion Runway

I was informed that my current student; who is flying with another CFI; overran the runway into a ditch while on a solo cross country flight. The aircraft had minor damage and the student was not injured. While being investigated by the NTSB/FAA; it was found that the student did not have a student certificate.  Later; we found that the student did in fact have a certificate that was issued in 2002 with no expiration date on his IACRA homepage.  While looking through all paperwork; I assumed that his 2002 student certificate was still valid.  After the incident; I reissued the student a new certificate through the IACRA website.  With the new rules and regulations; I have educated myself (after being out of active teaching during these rule changes); along with the student and the other CFI; that the student needs the hard copy of the student certificate for future flights.  From now on; I'll be making sure all my students have their student certificates on their person.  I will also make sure all documents are up to date with the current standards.

I was on my first solo cross country flying out of ZZZ and departed to ZZZ1; on my return to ZZZ I entered a long final knowing there was an obstacle upon entry; cleared the obstacle and was not comfortable with my approach so I proceeded to do a go around; on my 2nd attempt to land I came in to high and fast and again made a go around not being able to clear the obstacle and get the plane safely on the runway.  My 3rd attempt to land; I came in with the proper altitude and airspeed and was able to enter ground effect; the plane had the power fully out and at idle and the plane seemed to not lose enough airspeed and I thought my wheels were down and as I touch the brakes I noticed I was still in ground effect and at that point of the runway there was a point of no return as a highway is at the end of the runway and I didn't want to risk hitting a larger vehicle or semi if I had done a go around which has happened at this airport before.  I was able to get the wheels to touch down and entered full back elevator pressure and full brake and the brakes locked up and the plane seemed to be on ice and slide off the end of the runway approximately 25 feet.  I believe an additional problem other than the trees being an obstacle and the runway in poor condition as well as the runway being only 2;650'; the winds had shifted from the time I was entering the pattern to the time I landed.  I checked AWOS before entering the pattern and it was a cross wind; after checking the wind sock after landing I noticed it shifted to a tail wind. The prevention would have been flying to a different airport with a longer runway as well as no obstacle which is what I am used to.  I could have also initiated a go around sooner after realizing the runway was coming to a close end and yet I didn't want to risk hitting a semi on the freeway which would have ended in possible death.

Instructor reports that current student was training without a current student certificate.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was working an F900. I pointed out the aircraft to adjacent satellite Sector (P) on an eastbound heading at 90. Sat (P) had LJ60 traffic at 70 and handed him off to the Departure Sector (N). N has control for climb after accepting the radar handoff. N climbed the LR60 on a northeasterly heading. Sat P failed to point out his accepted point out to the departure sector. I noticed the LJ60 climbing into my traffic; I immediately issued a turn to 180 heading on my F900. I determined this turn was not sufficient and turned the aircraft more to the southwest and descended the aircraft to 80. I have no idea the proximity; but it looked close. These procedures seem a little misleading to me. The departure sector(S) that I hand off too doesn't own airspace for 20 miles and we are not required to point out the aircraft to the (N) Sector. The P Sector is required to do the point out but that sector is very often extremely busy running all departures and arrivals for both LZU and PDK. So as it often happens; P is responsible for separation of 2 aircraft when he is talking to neither one. I understand it was an error on the P controller but it seems we could maybe standardize the procedure as it is done differently by numerous controllers.

A80 Controller described a loss of separation event claiming the local point out procedures are less than positive with regard to controller actions and responsibilities.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

About one hour from landing; we started to smell a faint burning scent from the packs. It was very faint; but noticeable. It smelled like glycol or plastic burning. It remained constant until we initiated a descent from FL390-FL370. The smell became more pronounced. For lack of another checklist or procedure; we ran the smoke fire and fumes QRH. The smell was only in the cockpit and not the cabin. Since we could not determine the source. We deemed it appropriate to take the safest course of action to expedite getting the aircraft on the ground with no undue delay. We [advised ATC] and asked for CFR (Crash Fire Rescue) to meet us to check for anything out of the ordinary upon landing. We initiated a high speed descent and approach; and performed a safe landing. CFR met the aircraft and checked it over and we taxied to the gate.

B737-800 First Officer reported a flight deck fumes event during cruise.  The crew ran the appropriate QRH checklist and continued to destination.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 22

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Mid shift started on at least 4 sectors (normally on one); 2 controllers held over for one hour. At the end of that time [they were] put on 2 sectors. I had worked one MCO arrival he was unable to stay in the arrival areas [and] deviated well into another area. I was asked by management where the arrivals to MCO should go; I said they cannot make it this way. I was told 'you have 20 coming' the overtime controllers and management left telling me I needed 20 Miles in Trail (MIT) to MIA Center on MCO arrivals.The sector was extremely busy; weather deviations and trying to vector for sequence. Eventually TPA Approach called to tell me to hold TPA arrivals this added to complexity. I called supervisor from Central area to help coordinate with MCO approach that I could take no more departures; the mid supervisor came to sector and helped watch traffic; a fellow controller from east area came and worked d-side till it was somewhat manageable traffic maintained at high volume throughout the next few hours.Do not leave controller hung out to dry with no support just because it is time to go home.

ZJX Controller reported aircraft were deviating for weather and he had to hold other aircraft for airports with weather problems. Controller reported he felt overwhelmed by traffic volume and no support from management.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 55; Flight Crew Total 315; Flight Crew Type 12

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

I finished flying the mission near the Jackson airport and continued towards the airport. While descending to the airport I checked the weather and received a clearance into the airspace and traffic pattern. The weather was 170 15G25 clear below 12;000 feet. I continued to the traffic pattern altitude and was cleared for a left downwind for Runway 20. It was quite choppy around the airport during my base to final turn as I descended further. On short final around 100 feet it became significantly smoother and I continued to land. I was configured to land with full flaps doing approximately 70 indicated on touchdown. I paused; then applied the brakes while closing the throttle. We rolled for 1-2 seconds then I felt a yawing motion to the right. It felt like my right main had locked up so I released the brakes to regain traction and used the rudder to maintain centerline. I asked my [passenger] if my right tire was flat or destroyed and he said no. I regained control of the aircraft; then I immediately felt a second yawing motion to the left followed by a wild spinning motion to the left. The plane rotated like a top 30-40 degrees towards the left while also pushing us towards the edge of the runway. I attempted to maintain centerline but felt too much force and thought I would roll it. I continued towards the grass trying to slow the aircraft and maintain directional control. I maneuvered the aircraft away from airport lighting into the grass and before entering the grass applied some pitch up to prevent flipping the aircraft. I kept the propeller away from the grass and kept pressure off of the nose wheel. Once we came to a complete stop I looked to my [passenger] to see if he was ok. The Tower radioed to us if we needed assistance and I said no. We taxied back to the ramp under the aircraft's power and parked it at the ramp. We were able to safely shut down the aircraft and secure it on the ramp. After the aircraft was shut down I inspected to see if there was any damage and found that the bolt holding the right wheel pan was missing and the wheel pan was loose.

C206 pilot reported losing directional control during the landing roll for unknown reasons.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Type 9000

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

We crossed the hold-down fix SELLZ 400 ft. high while climbing expediently to avoid wake turbulence from a B737 we were departing behind; and had been in its wake since 500 ft. after rotating. Focused on climbing out of their wake; I called for max power and was maintaining max climb rate when we realized we were to level at 8;000 ft. As I was hand flying; I initiated a descent and topped out at 8;400 ft. before beginning our return to 8;000 ft. Passing back through 8;300 ft.; ATC said 'I see you are returning to 8;000' and handed us off.

The First Officer was hand flying the aircraft and flew 400 ft. above the 8;000 ft. max altitude at SELLZ. We flew through the [wake] of the aircraft ahead of us numerous times and the F/O was trying to climb above the preceding aircraft's flight path. I said that we needed to level off at 8;000 ft.; but he didn't recognize the error and didn't level off until we had climbed to 8;400 ft. I stated that we needed to descend back down to 8;000 ft. immediately when ATC told us that we missed the hold-down at SELLZ. Then ATC saw us quickly descending back to 8;000 ft. and verbally acknowledged our correction.

B737 flight crew reported overshooting an altitude restriction after being distracted by a wake turbulence encounter departing LAS in trail of a B737.


Inspection; Work Cards; Installation; Testing

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Manuals; Aircraft; Human Factors

October 2012; I was assigned to work a B767-300 aircraft that had a Maintenance entry of a # 1 Engine Oil Pressure Indication problem. I found the Oil Press Transmitter faulted. We replaced the transmitter per Maintenance Manual (M/M) and accomplished an [oil] Leak Check as required by the M/M. The flight crew ran the engine on the gate and no leaks were noted. I was made aware that this aircraft had a flight interruption and returned to ZZZ with a problem with engine oil loss in flight.

Reporter stated the oil loss was found at an oil line elbow fitting further down from where he replaced the Oil Pressure Transmitter on # 1 Engine. He recommends a higher power setting when performing Oil Leak Checks because the Idle Power run settings at the gate are not sufficient to determine whether or not if leaks will occur.

A Line Mechanic reports a B767-300 aircraft returned to departure airport due to engine oil loss in flight.  He had replaced the Oil Pressure Transmitter on # 1 Engine prior to departure.


ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 19520; Flight Crew Type 2869

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

Denver Center warned all aircraft entering their sector that they had been experiencing 5G interference. While descending on the SSKII 3 Arrival; we had an ECAM showing NAV ADS-B 1 and 2 faults. This message disappeared and reappeared several times. About 5 minutes later we lost both GPS 1 and 2. We never recovered the GPS's. During a later descent; the aircraft leveled at BOENG intersection at 9;200 feet with a green ALT CONST FMA. The published altitude was 9;000 feet.  According to ATC; several other aircraft had also reported issues with their ADS-B and GPS systems.

Air carrier Captain reported losing ADS-B and GPS signals inbound to DEN. ATC advised the crew several other aircraft were experiencing ADS-B and GPS system issues possibly due to 5G interference.


ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

The weather was Special VFR and Bethel Tower said they were losing the airspace after four of us were allowed clearance into the zone. We were keeping our speed up to accommodate the Tower and Anchorage Center. I was flying a Cessna Caravan; sequenced one mile behind a C207; which was turning base to final. Bethel Tower told me to extend; that I would be following [call sign]. I started my base turn assuming I would be following the plane ahead of me; which I thought was [call sign]. Tower said that I would be following the C207 which was three miles away coming from the northeast; even though I was positioned 1 mile out to follow the plane that was landing ahead of me. I was completely confused; wondering why they'd make me extend; to maneuver and slow up to trail behind a plane still three miles out when I could've landed and been well clear of the runway since we were losing the airspace. A float plane then called Tower to say he was down and safe on the water. No response from Tower. I continued; following close behind [call sign]; keeping it tight; thinking with a fifteen knot headwind he'd be able to make the first taxiway; Bravo. Tower now asks about the floatplane; is he down and safe. I tell Tower the plane's down and safe on the water. [Call sign] isn't able to make Bravo Taxiway and BET Tower tells me to go-around; which I clearly understand; given my spacing; as I turn the plane to the east; assuming they'll have me land on the parallel runway; 19L. Instead they tell me to leave the zone; to go to the southwest hold. They're losing the airspace; a runway is open right in front of me; I could be down in five seconds; and they tell me to fly back across the zone; the opposite way; to go to the southwest hold. I asked why I can't land on 19L. They tell me they're losing the airspace and to leave the zone. Since I'm already heading to the southeast I explain I'll be heading to the southeast hold. I talk to them later on the phone and ask why they didn't let me land on 19L. Their explanation: they were losing the airspace. In all my 20 years flying around the state the last four to five years dealing with the controllers in Bethel Tower has been beyond exasperating. Even as busy as Bethel airport is ONE controller continues to work both Ground and Tower frequency. When you call on the ground you get no response. You call again; nothing. You call again and you get barked at; CALLING GROUND STAND BY! You call ten miles out on Tower; nothing. You call again. Aircraft coming from the southwest say call sign; even though you just told them twice. They get confused; they're looking for planes in the air when they've already landed. It happens all the time. When you complain to the controllers about how things are not going so well; you get jerked around as I described in the scenario above. It is indeed so exasperating for all the pilots in Bethel that I think it is affecting our safety. These are the rudest; most incompetent controllers I've ever worked with and something's got to be done. Just to compare; there was one Controller; and he was a sheer delight. He changed everything. Pilots would thank him for coming to work. But of course he is gone and now we're still stuck with this.

C208 pilot on SVFR clearance into BET reports being issued a go-around due to aircraft on Runway 19R and also being denied the opportunity to land on Runway 19L. Reporter suggests that staffing (single controller) is the issue.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working R3 during a busy session with 20 plus minute metering delays. I accepted the handoff from Sector 2 of Aircraft X from PDX to ANC. Because we have to do manual hand offs to Canada; I called to make the hand off and confirmed the aircraft's altitude and route of flight. In the midst of the hand off I realized the aircraft was not headed towards the fix indicated in the computer so I ended the call and queried the aircraft to their actually route of flight. I then updated in the computer and re-did the hand off. This is the second incident in as many days from the transferring controller of an aircraft with incorrect route data in the computer. I don't know why it happened.Additional training for the CPC who handed me the aircraft.

ZSE Controller discovers route variation of aircraft and fixes the problem.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 14

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

While working S Departure we requested the tower to stop using RNAV Dual departures due to weather obstructing the South Departure lane. The Tower launched Aircraft X on a BRAVES departure and then Aircraft Y on a Non-RNAV 250 Heading inside of Aircraft X. I have not reviewed the tape nor do I recall Aircraft Y advising me that he was on a heading. I stopped Aircraft Y off at 8;000 on initial contact (climbing out of 3;000) and got a good read back. I then went back to Aircraft X and issued 'Leaving 8;000 cleared direct BRAVES.' I assumed that Aircraft Y was still on the RNAV and would turn parallel to Aircraft X. When I noticed Aircraft Y pass FTBALL without turning I issued a turn to the South. Aircraft were approximately 2 miles apart and Aircraft Y was level at 8;000 and Aircraft X was out of 8;600. When transitioning from RNAV to VECTOR the pilot phraseology may or not convey the fact that the aircraft is on a vector or climbing via the SID. While working departure with numerous requests for deviations and outside coordination happening rapidly it is very easy to miss when the tower transitions. I find day-in and day-out I have to question pilots as to their RNAV status.An easy fix to this problem is for Local Control to key the landline and advise departure an time they transition from RNAV to headings (Example 'Aircraft Y Non-RNAV; Heading 250' or 'Aircraft X is the last RNAV departure.'I really can't believe we don't do this already as a matter of procedure.

A80 Departure Controller reported that two aircraft came off on different departures that were a conflict of each other. One was on a RNAV departure and the other was assigned a heading; but inside of the RNAV departure. Reporter wants some type of standardization to let the Departure Controller know if the aircraft is on a RNAV departure or a heading.


Distraction; Fatigue; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

On arrival into Anchorage; ILS 7R; visibility was reported as 6000 RVR. However; upon arrival at minimums; the approach lights were in sight but the entire threshold and threshold and centerline lights were obscured by fog so a go-around was initiated. On the go-around; my EFB popped up multiple (5 or more) updates since it connected to cellular data when near the surface. This blocked the view of the missed approach procedure. I quickly cleared them; while flying the FMC missed and I elected to remain at Flaps 1. Return vectors were quickly issued. I missed calling for the after takeoff checklist; and when vectored back around for an approach to 7L which was reportedly VFR; upon calling for 'Gear Down; Flaps 20' the Pilot Monitoring (PM) placed the gear to 'OFF' rather than 'Down.' Subsequently; the gear warning illuminated when landing flaps were selected. I again called for gear extension which completed extending and the landing checklist was finished slightly after passing 1000 feet AGL. However; it was decided that continuing to land rather than executing a second go-around while fatigued with rapidly changing visibility conditions along with having visual contact with the runway was the safest option. Fatigue: Leading up to the event; we had flown 13 hours block the previous day followed by near minimum legal rest. Although we all felt rested; this must have accumulated some level of fatigue. We then arrived at the aircraft to experience an hour passenger boarding delay. While airborne; due to in-seat entertainment audio failure; the movie was played over the PA system which delayed the start of crew rest breaks. While on my crew rest break for approximately one hour; I was called back to the cockpit to review an unfamiliar FMC message regarding the Inertial Reference Systems.Early in the approach; the Autoland Status Annunciator also annunciated 'No Land 3' this diverted some attention but I do not believe it to be the cause of the event. Distraction: While flying the missed approach; I was distracted by the offering of updates while attempting to glance at the approach plate. My election to remain at flaps 1 after which the 'Flaps Up' call would have stated 'After takeoff checklist'The PM's action of moving the gear lever 1 notch rather than to Down.As soon as I recognized the gear position (still above 1000 feet AGL); I made an immediate call for gear down landing checklist; and assessed the safety of waiting for the gear vs executing a second go-around.While many factors played into the culmination of events; I believe the most prevalent were fatigue and distraction. However; calling for the after takeoff checklist would have prevented the occurrence entirely as the gear handle would have been in a position that would only require one action. As such; my recommendation would be to emphasize the importance of completing the after takeoff checklist following a go-around procedure.

Air carrier Captain reported fatigue and distractions led to some errors on a go-around from a low visibility approach.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

During descent on the ANJLL4 arrival; the Captain (Pilot Flying) used the speedbrake lever. As the lever was extended; the aircraft started an abrupt roll to the left. It was confirmed via the synoptic display that the spoilers on the left and partially on the right were not extending. The crew extended the gear to slow the aircraft to the ATC requested speeds during approach as there was no way to slow without properly functioning spoilers.  Aircraft malfunction. Heavy rain in ZZZ could have frozen the controls in cruise flight.  Examine each aircraft to make sure water intrusion doesn't happen.

B767 First Officer reported uncommanded left roll when extending speedbrakes.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 219; Flight Crew Type 7000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 183; Flight Crew Type 183

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Excursion Taxiway

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

During pushback the left main wheels departed the pavement directly behind the gate. Conditions were dark; headsets in use with a Wing Walker. At completion of the pushback the Tug Driver asked for BRAKES SET.  I complied; the nosepin was removed and I cleared off the Pushback Crew. Prior to disconnect; the tug driver told me to 'Taxi straight out because your left main wheels are very close to the grass.' I asked for clarification and was told the aircraft was on the edge of the grass and to taxi straight out before turning to stay clear (Not exact words). I looked out the left window and could see we appeared very close to the grass and the number one engine seemed close as well; so I asked if the engine was over the grass or not. I was concerned about FOD ingestion during start. I was told it was clear so I acknowledged and cleared off the Crew and called for number one engine start. The F/O started the engine and we completed a normal after start flow and Before Taxi Checklist. I was still concerned about the proximity of the grass to the number one engine so I attempted to taxi out on number two powered up only. We were fairly heavy so I knew it would take a moment to get rolling but we did not seem to be making any progress at all; so I increased power slightly and bumped number one up a little and still no result. After several seconds and still no progress I was sure something was wrong. I shut down number one and called Ops to come and inspect the left side of the aircraft. When the Supervisor arrived on the tug; it was immediately clear things were not normal. At this point we had already restarted the APU so we connected APU electrical and shut down number two and raised the flaps. I indicated I wanted the Ground Crew to come up on headset. He confirmed that the mains were 'On the grass'.  I then notified the FAs via interphone and the Passengers via PA. Then I called my Dispatcher and told her the situation and asked her to notify maintenance so they could have the aircraft inspected if we were able to get back to the gate. About this point the Ground Crew had reconnected the tug and asked me to release brakes so they could 'Pull us off the grass.' Not really sure about the idea but also not having very good information or experience about the situation I reluctantly agreed and the towbar instantly snapped (the A pumps were off and depressurized). Now I was very sure we were well off the pavement and going nowhere. I called Dispatch and got a patch to maintenance to make sure they knew what was happening and advise them of the logbook entry I had made. I also spoke to the Duty Chief. I gave him a thorough description of the events and made sure there were no issues with us continuing our day.  Eventually a plan came together to deplane the Passengers; swap aircraft; and leave this one for an experienced rescue Crew. I spoke with the Passengers from the Flight Attendant station PA; and informed them of the situation and the plan moving forward. The Flight Attendants skillfully handled an orderly and efficient deplaning via the air stairs. The F/O and I inspected the interior and then shut the aircraft all the way down. We went to the next aircraft and continued our trip. For those who are concerned about such things; calling into Dispatch and maintenance and having a Chief Pilot to talk to quickly was very helpful.  I was very grateful for the help and teamwork in; what was for me; a very unusual situation. I  can't be sure from my vantage point what the true causal factors were for the Ground Crew but it seems to me the practice of a single Wing Walker is not covering all our bases too well. Ground Ops may have more input here.   As for me; my only reflective criticism right now is that I should have trusted my instincts and not let them try to move the aircraft at all after the first disconnect. I put too much trust in Ground Crew and Supervisors involved; albeit with little information. I felt like they had a better idea of the situation outside the aircraft but I should have asked more questions. Although I can't say I wouldn't have done the same thing for sure I was leaning that way and maybe more info would have pushed me into waving the Ground Crew off. I knew the aircraft would need to be inspected and had no other intentions but to return to the gate. However; having never really discussed this type of thing in training; or experienced it myself; I didn't immediately understand the full implications or complications in that moment. In reality; we probably didn't risk a great deal allowing them to try just simply because there was no way the tug was going to budge the aircraft but I still would advise others to stop any further action.

During pushback from Gate; the aircraft was pushed too far back. When the aircraft was stopped the left main wheels were off the ramp and on the ground. Although it was dark; lighting was adequate. From the flight deck it's extremely hard to tell the position of the main wheels. Neither the Captain nor I got a sense the aircraft was too far back and we felt nothing abnormal during pushback.

B737-700 flight crew reports being pushed back too far with the left main wheels off the hard surface. The ground crew does not accurately describe the situation but an attempt to taxi out proves fruitless. The engines are shut down and the tug reattached; but the aircraft cannot be moved.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Manuals; Procedure; Aircraft; Company Policy

Working aircraft XXX I was assigned MCM card 4933 and 4934 thrust reverser upper locking hydraulic actuators integrity test. References (AD)-2019-XX-XX. Could not complete this card because Under planning notes: Qty 2 each of CPN ACT6310 actuators as required for this engine position per aircraft to be on hand to accomplish this work card and on page 2 of 16 AD 2019-XX-XY applies to the entire card. This AD can not be deviated from. This was Priority 0 and the supervisor [name removed] gave me a directive to complete this card even though we did not the two CPN ACT6310 in stock.During crew chief meeting with Manager and Supervisor crew chiefs were informed this card will be accomplished and the planning notes do not apply to maintenance.Management must also comply Per GPM 02.XX.X B 1. under Maintenance Obey the Maintenance or modifications procedures and specifications related to Airworthiness Directives and Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 88 Verbatim.

Technician reported being informed that the company won't follow procedures on work cards relating to an AD for thrust reverser actuator functional checks.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 900; Flight Crew Type 250

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency

[I had an] in-flight emergency. Exhaust directly entered cabin due to opening of fuselage floor pan directly behind exhaust pipes. Extreme heat and exhaust entered cabin causing a rapid degrading of cockpit conditions. Mayday called. [I] informed responders that landing will be made at closest airport.

Pilot of an experimental aircraft reported declaring an emergency and diverting to nearest suitable airport when extreme heat and exhaust began entering cockpit from an opening in the fuselage floor pan.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On climb out; we were flying the departure; climbing through FL180; and had been cleared direct to the JEWLS way point. We were subsequently directed to maintain present heading for traffic. The PF (Pilot Flying) selected HDG (Heading) mode with the autopilot on. The HDG annunciation moved into the active position and turned green. However; at the JEWLS way point; the aircraft turned on course as though it was still in FMS (Flight Management System) mode. ATC queried us about whether we were still on our assigned heading or had turned at JEWLS. This is what prompted us to notice the discrepancy. We responded that we had turned on course and the Controller had no further instructions for us. After this; we investigated and found the autopilot to still be indicating HDG mode; but operating as though in FMS mode. PF had synced the heading; by habit; after the turn. We subsequently obtained a clearance direct to HYS VOR; which was on our flight plan and proceeded with the flight with no further incidents. Of note: the FMS flashed the message: 'FMS-FMS DISAGREE' momentarily immediately after this event and the two AHRS (Attitude Heading Reference System) headings differed by 2 degrees throughout the flight. I suspect that the primary cause of this event is a malfunction with the automation. The secondary cause was lack of pilot awareness of whether the aircraft was functioning as expected/commanded. Pilots pay special attention to flight modes during off-schedule clearances such as this assigned heading.

CRJ-200 First Officer reported autopilot malfunction and lack of situational awareness caused a heading deviation.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I took over the sector and was briefed on a B777 southbound over the water and was told that coordination had been taken care of with Sector 15. I began the hand off to Sector 15 and shortly afterward they called me and asked if the aircraft had been coordinated in the YANKEE AREA. I told them I just took over and was not sure if YANKEE AREA coordination had been done. I was told by the Controller being relieved that the aircraft was coordinated with Sector 15; however; the YANKEE AREA was not specifically mentioned during the briefing. In fact; I wasn't even aware the aircraft was in the YANKEE AREA since we are not able to depict the YANKEE AREA on the scope. I was fairly busy with other aircraft in the sector and after the issue with the YANKEE AREA came up I asked for a D-Side to help out otherwise I would have devoted more attention to the situation. Military airspace was going hot in/around my sector in less than 30 minutes and I knew I would be getting even busier having to change another Company aircraft's holding pattern to clear DOLPHIN airspace before it went hot. It appears Sector 15 must have some type of depiction for the airspace on their maps because they were telling me the aircraft was inside the YANKEE AREA. The B Area maps do not have any such depiction on the sector map(s). I had asked previously to have the airspace displayed but it has not been accomplished yet. It appears the D Area was able to get some type of depiction on their scope but the B Area was not included. The B area must absolutely be included since the YANKEE AREA is located mostly in B Area Sector 42! On a side note; generally speaking; only about 10-20% of the B Area controllers even know there is a YANKEE AREA and even fewer know what to do with it. I am not even sure myself if coordination is even required at all while working an aircraft in RADAR vs. NON-RADAR. Depict the YANKEE AREA on the scope so that controllers can ascertain when an aircraft is operating in the YANKEE AREA. The YANKEE AREA needs to be briefed as to when coordination is required. Is coordination required only when NON-RADAR or even when the aircraft is in RADAR CONTACT but still remaining clear of ZAK (Oakland Oceanic) Airspace? Brief controllers when and why coordination is required and be specific when briefing so that everyone fully understands what is required and why! This airspace has been in effect for many years but largely ignored most. Lastly; implement an airspace alert when an aircraft will enter the YANKEE AREA just as if it were entering SUA while active. Other sectors use this method to insure coordination has been completed and then afterwards the alert can be acknowledged as taken care of.

ZSE Controller voiced concern regarding the unclear use of the Yankee Area airspace and the fact the subject airspace is not depicted properly on RADAR displays.


B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This concerns circuit breakers being sheared off when removing or installing galley storage containers in the aft galley of 787 aircraft. The container in particular is location XXX; which is set perpendicular and adjacent to the circuit breaker panel. If the container is not aligned properly in the slot as it is being moved; more specifically; angled with the front of the container closer to the circuit breaker panel...there will be damage. This container is above or near head level for most crew members and if there is any excessive weight; the momentum can easily shear the circuit breaker if it hits/contacts. The circuit breaker replacement requires removal of the power panel and access is limited. To my knowledge; any circuit breaker in this condition is a No Dispatch Item. The time required to repair can be extensive; factoring in availability of parts; tooling and accessibility of the damaged circuit breaker. Manpower resources are also impacted; two technicians are needed. This is the fifth incident I have personally dealt with; resulting in aircraft dispatch delays each time.[I suggest] a protective guard that is tall enough to prevent damage to the circuit breakers; open or closed; from the galley storage container as it is being removed/installed. On the bottom of the circuit breaker panel; is a handle to facilitate its removal. The handle runs parallel to the floor. If something could be fabricated similar in design to the handle but wider; a little wider than the row of circuit breakers installed. An upper and lower protective guard would prevent any incidental contact from the container.

Pilot reported concern that circuit breaker heads are being broken off by galley carts being moved due to the lack of a guard.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 4900; Flight Crew Type 1100

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

During a visual approach to Runway XXR we complied with a TCAS RA which instructed us to climb due to a TCAS target 100 feet below us. As we climbed the TCAS target climbed with our airplane. The TCAS target remained at a 100 ft distance underneath us while executing the climb in an attempt to resolve the conflict. During the attempt to create separation from the TCAS target we temporarily and inadvertently exceeded engine power limitations.We visually confirmed that engine limitations were exceeded temporarily. The failure to create immediate separation from the TCAS target lead to distraction of engine power settings. We immediately reduced power while maintaining the climb in accordance with the TCAS RA. Increased scanning would have avoided this event.

DHC-8-300 First Officer reported a sudden TCAS RA for an intruder 100 feet below their aircraft. Maximum allowable engine torque was exceeded while trying to out climb the intruder which maintained a constant 100 foot separation.


Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency

On downwind leg vectors for the ILS we experienced a #2 Source Off light. I directed the First Officer to run the QRH. After the read-respond-do process; the #2 Generator switch was bussed back on. Instead of coming back on the attempt actually tripped off the #1 Generator; leaving no generator powering the electrical system (down to battery power). The crew then ran the Dual Generator Failure checklist and started the APU; however; initially it would not bus to the L or R side. After some delay and ATC vectors; the crew was able to get APU to bus to the left side. Upon regaining sufficient systems and instruments. We ceased checklists and troubleshooting and elected to land with the Captain flying the ILS. An emergency was declared with Approach Control and some priority vectors were offered to final. After landing; the flight was uneventful.I suggest that we look at QRH Electrical SOURCE OFF procedures and possibly add a bullet to check volts/amps on the disconnected circuit prior to attempting to re-bus the generator. If out of tolerance readings are found; consideration should be given to 'NOT' attempt to bus the failed system. As in our case; it made a minor problem major in nature. It appeared that the tripped generator actually kicked the good generator off-line as well when we tried to re-bus it.

[No substantive additional information was provided in the secondary narrative.]

A B737-700 flight crew ended up on battery power only when one bus failed and the second tripped off when the crew attempted to return the failed system to the bus.  They ultimately were able to regain one functional bus and made and uneventful landing.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Other / Unknown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Human Factors

I told the first guy about the second guy. I told the second guy about his overtake with the first guy. As I started to issue instructions for the first guy to exit and taxi; I saw the second guy initiate his own go-around; as I issued instructions to the first guy. No reason to talk to him in a critical phase of flight; so I waited for him to report his go around. IF HE HAD KEPT HIS DESCENT AND APPROACH AND LANDED; RUNWAY SEPARATION WOULD HAVE BEEN MET; the pilot chose to go around even though it was going to work; that's his right.Today I had a discussion with my supervisor. He showed me this pretty graphic showing a loss that came from ASDE data. Remember this is a Tower where we judge runway separation by looking out the windows. I explained to him 'when' he went around; which was well before the threshold. So the graphic is meaningless because the aircraft sped up prior to the threshold. Even though I told him I saw him initiate the go-around as I started to talk to the first guy; I was informed that this will be investigated as a loss.I find this insulting! It is being insinuated that I am lying or did not see what I saw. I was told that I could have used speed control. Wrong! I cannot use speed control inside the final approach fix. That's why I inform pilots about the overtake and leave it up to them to adjust their speed in a safe fashion. I asked if they wanted me to send aircraft around anytime its close and pilot might go around on his own; even though I think it'll work. They said no; don't do that. So here we are; I could have done nothing different. If I send them around because a pilot might go around; I'm wrong. If I let them land but they initiate their own go around; I'm wrong. And then later; when they talk to me; it doesn't matter at all when I tell them what I saw out the window. They only care about the data they can use to make graphics with.The problem is not with Supervisors; but with the desk jockeys that make and investigate these events. It is a continuing problem we see over and over where someone who has never worked a Tower thinks they know how a Tower works. I understand needing to investigate to prevent future problems; but the problem here is they aren't listening to what I saw out the window. What is the point if you don't take ALL information into account? Insulting the controllers that work the airplanes will only add to distractions and reduce controller's abilities. It is time to take a look at this and stop this problem before it gets worse. Either tell controllers to send around airplanes whenever a pilot might go around or listen to your controllers and take what they say with the same weight as the data.

Tower Controller reported Quality Assurance staff suggested a pilot initiated go-around due to preceding traffic was an ATC Operational Error.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused

Today while doing my walk around; I saw 30 laptop computers being loaded into the belly. Each of these Computers had a Lithium Ion label printed on the box. There were several questions asked and no one seemed to know if these computers were okay for passenger aircraft. They were removed and reshipped via the freighter. The reason in writing this; is it's not the first time and I have seen everything from camping stoves; bear spray; to road flares being loaded in passenger aircraft. There is a growing trend of material getting through all our checks. NoneThis is a result of contracting; high turnover; and poor training. We need to train vigilance and make better observations when handling cargo or baggage.

First Officer reported Lithium Ion battery powered computers without required documentation being loaded in cargo compartment.


Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight was dispatched and incurred Number (1) engine generator issues and needed to RTBL (return to blocks) for maintenance. We went back out to marshall plane back in and were short the second (2) wing walker because the rest of crew was sent to other assignments. We activated the (Accu-Park) red stop lights and were waiting on the second marshaller when the crew spooled up the engines and proceeded to pull into the gate. At NO time was the green light on (Accu-Park) activated or a manual hand signal given to pull in to gate envelope. The aircraft proceeded to pass its stop mark by thirty (30) plus feet and stop nose gear almost to inner VSR. This also brought the wing and Number one (1) engine within ten (10) to fifteen (15) feet of striking second jet bridge. Refer to Supervisor's pictures from all angles to get perspective needed to reference this incident. Once the crew decided where they wanted to stop we chocked aircraft and waited for direction from the Company. After taking pictures we proceeded to push aircraft thirty feet back to the appropriate stop mark for a B767-400.

Aircraft Marshall reports a B767-400 returning to the gate for maintenance but with insufficient manpower the Captain is instructed to wait. The Captain elects to self park; missing the stop point by 30 feet with no other ill effects.


Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airport; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors

Ground Controller sounded very busy and very agitated. Directed us to hold on our gate referencing inbound taxiing aircraft. First Officer (FO) called to ask the location of that aircraft and was literally yelled at. We pushed and received taxi instructions the (FO) wrote down [our instructions to] hold short of D7. There is a lot of ground traffic associated with construction in that area and some signage was not visible where we expected it to be. The taxi instructions we read back didn't make sense looking at the 10-9 page so we stopped at the top of the alley before entering any taxiways. The Ground Controller began yelling and berating us and gave us different taxi instructions than what we had read back. He was so unprofessional I asked him for his operating initials which he declined to provide and I said 'Okay; I show XA:58 on the time what do you have?' He replied 'I don't even know what that means.' We taxied and departed. Upon arrival; I contacted one of our ATC Specialists who contacted the Tower Supervisor who promised to listen to the tape and get back with him.Being cautious while taxiing isn't normally cause for an ATC Ground Controller to become abusive. I would do things the same way under the same circumstances. Abrasive and aggressive grounds crew created confusion in taxi instructions compounded by construction.

During a very busy Ground Ops time; I called for pushback. The Controller said to stand by. After a few minutes passed; I again called for push. We were told to give way to inbound Company then push. We couldn't see (boxed in) so I queried the Ground Controller about the Company traffic. He snipped at me saying 'our Ground Guys could see him'. It was becoming apparent that the Controller was stressed; but I didn't try to cause an issue. After pushback; I called for taxi but his instructions were confusing to me. I was only receiving partial instructions due to my headset volume. I read back the instructions incorrectly and he reissued them. We taxied forward; but due to construction; lighting issues and the recent incident; we stopped to verify our position. What we were told and what we were seeing simply did not make sense. The Controller then became frustrated; reissued the taxi instructions and made a comment about 'making it as simple as possible' for us. Not only was I confused about the instructions and reticent to taxi out into an area with construction; I was also taken back by his sarcastic tone. We weren't trying to confuse the issue. It was dark; lots of construction and we did NOT understand what he wanted us to to do. The Captain grabbed the MIC and asked for his operating initials and the Controller refused. Instead he reissued taxi instructions and we departed without further confusion.I understand the operating tempo can be stressful on both sides of ATC experience. However; I feel we did the right thing by not allowing the pressure to force us into action when we weren't clear on the taxi route. It wasn't my intent to initially readback the instructions incorrectly. I always write them down and verify on my iPad with the 10-9 chart. However; there was no need to compromise professionalism and talk down to a crew either.

B737-700 flight crew reported encountering an over stressed Ground Controller during an attempted push back during a very busy time of the night. The flight crew had to ask for clarification on the taxi instructions which seemed to infuriate the Controller.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 48; Flight Crew Total 2700; Flight Crew Type 15.1

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I flew into Montgomery field for the first time to drop off two friends. After refueling I called ground for an IFR clearance. I was told Taxi instructions which I repeated back correctly. As I started to taxi; she started to give me my IFR clearance. I advised the ground controller I would prefer stopping to write down the instructions but was told to keep taxing. I thought perhaps she would wait until I taxied to the hold short area; but the IFR clearance was delivered while I was taxing. As I was attempting to write down the clearance I failed to turn right on Hotel and started down taxiway Delta toward runway 28 Left. The ground controller saw my initial movement down Delta and asked that I stop immediately; which I did. This all happened while we were still trying to give me my IFR clearance. I stopped immediately; about 100 feet before the hold short line of runway 28L at Delta. I never crossed over the hold short line and was well behind it; at least 100 ft. The ground controller asked if I could turn a U-turn and exit on Delta onto Hotel. I stated that I could not. After a few minutes wait she cleared me to back taxi on Runway 28L and exit on Charlie; then proceed down Hotel to Alpha to depart 28R. I proceeded to do so. I was given the tower phone number and asked to call the number. I choose to call the number before taking off from the hold short area.

Part 91 turbojet committed a taxiway incursion aggravated by ground control insisting that the pilot accept IFR verbal clearance while continuing to taxi.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

We were cleared for takeoff on [Runway] XXL in ZZZ. As pilot flying; I advanced the throttles to 40% and heard the Captain call 'stable.' I started hunting for the TO/GA button and was sure I found it. The autothrottle arm switch disengaged. The Captain reengaged the switch twice. It disengaged twice as I tried commanding takeoff power. We canceled takeoff clearance; taxied clear and called maintenance which resulted in an MEL for autothrottles. After all paperwork and communication was complete; the departure was normal. Once we were at altitude on the transit; I started thinking through the scenario in greater detail and realized that I may have pressed the autothrottle disengage button rather than the TO/GA button.This flight was my first at the controls in almost two months. I have less than a year of experience on the plane. I reviewed many things prior to my first day back; but TO/GA switch selection was one that I didn't specifically think about and it caught me off guard with less than ideal muscle memory.

FO was pilot flying. On takeoff autothrottles did not advance thrust levers when TOGA was pushed and A/T ARM switch clicked to the off position. I reset the A/T switch twice. Again the switch clicked to the down position. We then taxied clear of the runway and contacted maintenance to MEL the A/T system.At cruise the FO realized that he probably had been pushing the A/T disengage button instead of the TOGA buttons.

Air carrier flight crew reported the FO may have pressed the autothrottle disengage button rather than the TO/GA button during takeoff roll. The flight crew rejected the takeoff and cited the FO's lack of flying as a contributing factor.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 3100; Flight Crew Type 2000

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC

Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

While training a student in steep turns at 1;500 FT MSL and below a Class B shelf of 3;000 FT MSL; we were approached by an ultralight aircraft headed directly for us. We turned to avoid him and he also turned toward us. We came with 300 FT horizontally of him and at the same altitude. We climbed away from him to the south to evade his flight path. This caused us to stray into a lower Class B shelf that began at 1;200 FT MSL. As soon as we realized this; we reduced power to idle and descended rapidly as we turned back north to exit the airspace and reduce altitude at the same time. A northerly wind contributed to the speed with which we deviated into the Class B airspace. The problem was caused by fixating on avoiding this ultralight aircraft and we lost positional awareness. We should have assigned one person to fly and the other to track traffic; instead of both of us trying to watch the traffic maneuvering wildly; and loose positional awareness. In the future; I as the instructor will fly the plane and have the student track the traffic.

A flight instructor and student maneuvering at 1;500 FT reported taking evasive action from an ultralight and so entered TPA Class B at 1;200 FT during the avoidance maneuver.


Distraction; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action

On 60 KTS on the takeoff roll we received the following EICAS warning messages. E2 A/I Fail ENG REF A/I DISAG. We immediately aborted the takeoff and exited the runway safely. Once stopped; we ran the appropriate QRC and QRH items; we were directed by Maintenance to return to the gate. Soon after our gate return; we deplaned the passengers and swapped aircraft. The threat to this flight was an Anti-Icing System on the takeoff roll when the flight would be conducted in winter conditions. Any error that presents itself on the takeoff roll should be taken seriously and this was no exception. We executed the aborted take off and following the appropriate checklists in a safe and efficient manner. The outcome was satisfactory as we received a new aircraft.

An EMB145 EICAS alerted E2 A/I FAIL ENG REF A/I DISAG so the takeoff was rejected and the aircraft returned to the gate where an aircraft change was made.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 23000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 4500

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Passenger found delamination; damage and dent to the area behind the slat on the top part of wing. Maintenance could not guarantee that area would not continue to tear or peel back. Satcom voice also inoperative.

Right wing damage or dent/deformation/delamination after inboard slat retraction. Reported by business class passenger sitting at window next to damage location.

Flight crew reported that a passenger in business class on their B777 aircraft noticed damage; dents and delamination of the right wing upper surface behind the inboard slat; after slat retraction. Aircraft returned to departure airport when Maintenance could not guarantee the damaged area would not continue to tear or peel back.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 20502; Flight Crew Type 8502

Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

I flight planned the flight at my hotel room before we left to go to the airport. I saw that the aircraft had deferral for Spoiler Fault displayed on upper ECAM. Maintenance had attempted to fix the issue several times in different stations; but they had no parts. I read the requirements of the MEL and I didn't think that it was going to present a problem for our flight. Maintenance was supposed to have the faulty spoiler #4 on one wing and the other wing's symmetrically opposed spoiler deactivated and secured in the stowed position; per MEL. We called local maintenance for a window wash and the Mechanic that showed up to do it told me that they worked on the spoiler fault here all night and that the Aircraft was ready to go; but the deferral was still there. We took off. While I was flying I did not notice anything unusual as far as the flying characteristics of the airplane. I engaged the autopilot and we proceeded with the climbout.The first thing that we noticed was when my First Officer mentioned that the airplane has a slight bank to the left; while tracking on the airway in LNAV mode and when it was supposed to have wings level. At that point I noticed that the Beta target was a bit off to the left. I looked down at the rudder trim indicator and I saw that the airplane was putting a constant 1.7 degrees of right rudder in. The airplane was obviously flying sideways. I told the F/O to go back and look at the left wing. We set up with the FAs and he walked back. He looked out of the window; with care so he doesn't alarm the passengers. When he came back to the cockpit; he confirmed our suspicions of the #4 left wing spoiler actually floating at about; I would estimate; 5 to 7 inches above the horizontal stowed position.I immediately; typed a message to Maintenance control explaining what was going on and I sent a 'CALL ME' message to Dispatch. My main concern was the added drag on the airplane and the subsequent increased fuel consumption. Thankfully we had flight planned with enough gas; for altitude flexibility due to turbulence reports and I knew that our destination demand was under capacity. The QRH chapter for this kind of abnormal situation had the extra burn at 10%; which is A LOT of fuel. We estimated an additional 2;800 lbs to 3;000 lbs. I knew we had it; but the burn would be big.Our Dispatcher was an invaluable source of information. With his help and our airmanship; we all concluded to continue the flight to our destination with the airplane's degraded performance; but at lower cost Index; slower speed than flight planned and higher altitudes as soon as we had the performance to fly them. It should be noted that at our second fuel score before taking the fuel saving measures; we were already down 1;100 lbs from our checkup and at that point we still had 3.5 hours of flying to go. By the time we got around 600 miles to go; we had reversed the trend of excessive fuel burn to only 100lbs down from planned. We concluded the flight 6 minutes early at the blocks; with 7;800 lbs in the tanks.We should have never had to deal with such a mess. All because maintenance; while attempting to troubleshoot; they forgot to reconfigure the aircraft per MEL.

I noticed during the climb that the airplane has a bank to the left; and that the beta target was displaced. I mentioned it to the Captain and checked to see if we had a fuel imbalance that would cause the issue. Once we unable to determine a cause from the flight deck I went back to look at the spoilers to see if they were all retracted. I saw that spoiler number 4 on the left wing was extended about 6 inches.I handled the aircraft and radios while the Captain coordinated with dispatch and maintenance to ensure we had the fuel to make it to our filed destination.

A320 flight crew reported the number 4 spoiler was discovered floating because Maintenance had not completed the spoiler fault MEL procedure.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 9; Flight Crew Total 264; Flight Crew Type 264

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

While practicing landings I had an event. It happened on my second landing right after touchdown. The aircraft veered to the right leaving the runway; traveling through the grass and coming to a stop on the taxiway. I was told by the tower to taxi to a nearby tie down area. After parking the aircraft I got out and inspected the aircraft for damage; found that the left main wheel pant; and right main wheel pant fairing were damaged.I was the only person onboard and was not injured. I contacted the flying club after securing the aircraft in the hangar. Tagged the aircraft grounded until the club's maintenance personnel inspected and returned it to service.

C172 pilot reported losing directional control after landing resulting in a runway excursion that did minor damage to the aircraft.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other; Party2 Maintenance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

MEL; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

On Preflight; discovered the forward dropped aisle emergency lights were out of position; shifted forward. To make sure there weren't a bunch of burnt out bulbs and it was actually out of position; I counted the bulbs. There were 18 illuminated. The MEL says there are 24 installed and 18 required. When I checked the aft aisle emergency lights I counted 24. The MEL says 18 installed and 14 required. It appears that the two light strips were installed in each other's position. When we called Maintenance Control; he said he knew the MEL to be incorrect. Reference the picture of the emergency lights under MEL 33-20-01. Maintenance Control said to count the number of asterisks on that picture. The picture matches what was installed on the aircraft (except for the forward left light being shifted forward out of position; that was sent in AOG) but is contradictory to the text written in MEL 33-50-03. So; our aircraft had 18 forward; 24 [aft]. This is opposite the text; but matches the diagram. Maintenance Control said the diagram is correct and the text is wrong. We don't know which it should be. Is the diagram in the MEL just advisory or do the asterisks count as good information? If so; either the diagram or text is incorrect. This could mean that possibly all Excels are out of compliance with the MEL and/or Maintenance Control is mistaken about which is correct in the MEL. The data given is contradictory. [Recommend] grabbing two light strips; count the bulbs; correct it in the MEL.

A First Officer questions the contradiction of text in MEL 33-50-03 for the number of emergency lights that must be illuminated at the forward and aft aisle emergency light strips compared with the light diagram in MEL 33-20-01. Maintenance Control says the diagram is correct and the text is wrong. Concern that numerous CE-560XLs may be out of compliance were also raised.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

I experienced an electrical issue while flying through the (ZZZ SFRA). I was flying south-eastbound at 3;500 feet MSL per the procedure depicted on the ZZZ TAC chart. As I was passing directly over ZZZ and making a radio call on the air-to-air frequency to report my position; my intercom and a number of other electrical systems simultaneously failed. My radio transmission was cut short mid-sentence. Immediately thereafter I noticed a burning electrical smell. I quickly shut off the master switch to reduce the risk of an electrical fire. At this point it was clear the flight could not continue and a landing at a nearby airfield would be necessary. My home base; ZZZ1; was only 20 NM north of my current position. I elected to execute a climbing 180 degree turn to reverse course within the SFRA; north-westbound at 4;500 feet MSL. Once north of the SFRA; I remained clear of Class B; C; and D airspace; staying well west of ZZZ2 and the ZZZ3 Class C shelf. As I approached ZZZ1 from the northwest; I contacted the Tower Controller from my cell phone; and he cleared me to land. The no-flap landing was uneventful.As for lessons learned and next steps; I have a handheld radio; but the battery was unfortunately dead. I need to check this more regularly so that it can be relied upon in the event of lost comms. I've also printed out a list of ATC phone numbers in case I need to reach other facilities using my cell phone (I luckily had ZZZ1 Tower saved as a contact on my phone). I also think I should have more seriously considered descending immediately and landing at a closer airport; such as ZZZ4. By climbing to join the reverse course of the SFRA; I put myself in a more dangerous position if an inflight fire had actually developed. Additionally; I have a fire extinguisher in my airplane; but it was secured under the back seat; and I never touched it. I should have removed it from its harness and had it ready to go in case it became needed.I think it's extremely important that pilots regularly think about what they would do in these types of abnormal situations. These situations don't happen often; but when they do quick action is sometimes required to avert a real emergency. I'm lucky this occurred during a daytime VFR flight. A couple weeks ago I was flying at night in IMC on an IFR flight plan. Had this occurred then the situation would have been far more serious.

C182 Pilot reported an electrical failure onboard; resulting in a loss of all communications and a return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3.2; Flight Crew Total 414; Flight Crew Type 387.5

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Ground Excursion Runway; Ground Incursion Taxiway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

I was doing pattern work in calm wind with excellent visibility. During my first landing; I felt the airplane pull to the left when rolling out; but otherwise nothing was unusual about my landing or taxi back. During my second landing; the plane pulled hard to the left. My efforts to correct the course back toward the center line and slow down using rudder and brake made the roll out feel erratic and out of control. With no other aircraft on the parallel and drifting toward a short stretch of flat grass without obstacles; I chose to go over the grass and onto the parallel rather than exit at the appropriate taxiway. There was no damage to the aircraft or property (Only my pride.) I expect that the cause of my unusual runway exit was being distracted by thinking about a complicated day of work ahead and; although the wind was calm; there must have been enough of it that I should have been doing more to correct for it.  I had a discussion and flew with the Chief Pilot of the club after this. It's all been a good reminder that even after nearly 1;300 landings; there's NO time to be distracted or complacent in aviation.

C172 pilot reports a runway excursion during his second landing in 'calm winds'; ending up on the parallel taxiway.


Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Maintenance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

While inflight at 36;000 ft.; EICAS 'HYD 2 LO QTY' illuminated. No QRH checklist was available. We monitored HYD SYS 2 level at 20% and decreasing approximately 2% every 15 mins. Contacted Dispatch and Maintenance via Commercial Radio to discuss system problem. Told by Maintenance to monitor and report any other problems. Dispatch recommended continuing to ZZZ and ZZZ1 may become a diversion point if system failed. Continued to monitor system and the level decreasing. FO (First Officer) and [I] thoroughly discussed options and possible totally system failure and our planned course of action. Once in contact with Center; asked for priority handling and quickest route to airport. On final course once the landing gear was extended 'HYD PUMP 2 FAIL' illuminated. We broke off approach the visual approach and completed QRH checklist for the failed pump. Once the checklists were completed and we quickly re-briefed we asked for second visual approach and safety landed.Immediately after landing; multiple red warnings and yellow cautions illuminated and I took the airplane. I noted limited braking and no nose wheel steering on the aircraft. I safely slowed the aircraft using moderate braking and we exited the runway using rudder steering on a high speed exit. We stopped on the taxiway and told Ground we need to run some checklists. We completed the checklists but all the failures were associated with the hydraulic system level being at zero. I then noticed excessive brake temperatures and contacted Ground Control for aircraft crash rescue to inspect aircraft for hot brakes. We started the APU and shut down both engines. Aircraft crash rescue inspected aircraft and confirmed no abnormalities; we contacted ZZZ ops for aircraft tow to gate. Tow team safely towed to gate and we deplaned. Maintenance met us at the gate and we entered the failure into the aircraft log book. I then contacted Dispatch; SOC and the Duty officer. During this situation we continuously updated the FA's (Flight Attendants); passengers and ops. During our Commercial Radio conversation with Maintenance; they really provided no guidance which I understand is our policy. They simply stated to monitor it and call them back if it got worse. This was also Dispatch's guidance. I'm not sure if this situation was briefed up to a supervisor and if it was it may have changed the guidance. After the call; I've started coming up with what to do next as I watched the level go to 20% to zero during the last hour of the flight but still had no other EICAS messages. We had thoroughly briefed and discussed in detail for every possible failure and our course of action. Even though the system had not failed; I was concerned it would. We got priority handling from ATC and I had briefed them on the situation. Because it had not failed; I choose not to [request priority handling]. In hindsight; [requesting priority handling] may have further expedited our arrival and approach. I had a feeling that the large surge in system pressure during the landing gear extension would cause the hydraulic 2 pump to fail. And on final once we placed the gear down; it did. We calmly broke off the approach and completed our already thoroughly pre briefed QRH checklist. At that time I only had 2 cyan messages on the EICAS and we had no other abnormalities or aircraft problems that made me feel a [priority handling request] was needed. We did not change our aircraft configuration during the missed approach while completing checklists and coming around for the second approach. All systems were normal; but I knew we needed to land soon as any further hydraulic system 2 issues would surely drive us to more QRH checklists and possible loss of aircraft systems. On short final; all was normal and we safety landed; I suspected that other messages would come up as the WOW switches closed; and they did; a lot of them. I was already at the ready and took the aircraft from the FO once on the ground. I used moderate to more than moderate braking to safety slow and stop the aircraft. I chose to exit the runway on the high speed using only rudder steering as we had no nose wheel steering. Once clear; I set the emergency parking brake and called for the top red messages which was the reverser failure which I could hear the #2 engine reverser was still deployed. After that we ran a spoiler fail checklist and I told the FO to stop as all the messages were associated with the hydraulic system 2 level being at zero and I noticed the increasing brake temperatures. I called for crash fire rescue as a precaution. We started the APU and shut down both engines. I made a PA to let the FA's and passengers know our situation. Crash rescue inspected our aircraft; including the brakes; and noted no issues. We had already called ZZZ ops and asked to be towed in. The tow was ready and towed us into the gate. Once parked; we started deplaning and I started all my phone calls. The FO said goodbye to the passengers as they deplaned. I asked if the FA's wanted to debrief and if they were ok; and they just said we are fine called Dispatch; who notified SOC and the duty officer.Maintenance was there at the aircraft right as I parked. We had called Maintenance for a consult prior to leaving ZZZ about possible fluid on one of the lines on the nose gear. They had told me that it was torque fluid and not to worry. This was never put into the aircraft logbook. Once parked I could see the maintenance personnel immediately inspecting the nose wheel area for the possible leak; The leak we not there; The leak was found in the left hand elevator area. I wrote up the discrepancy and handed the aircraft over to Maintenance. In hindsight when I called for the original consult for possible fluid on the nose gear; a logbook entry should have been made. [Requesting priority handling] was always on my mind; but with only cyan messages and Maintenance's guidance to monitor it and to call them back if it got worse; I never did; I should have and I think we may have gotten to the airport faster; though I knew the landing gear extension; regardless of when I did it; would cause further system issues. Rolling the emergency vehicles and declaring was not something I was felt we were at during the event; until we landed and further systems failures manifested. Declaring and rolling the trucks would have been a more conservative approach and what I would have done knowing what I know now. Given all that happened; safety and being conservative was always our #1 priority and felt we handled the situation very well. I think that Dispatch and Maintenance could have provided better in flight guidance and a supervisor should have been notified. An inflight diversion to ZZZ1 while I still had fluid was a something I considered and Dispatch mentioned; but maybe I should have made the decision for them. Watching the level go from 20% to zero and knowing the issues to come was unnerving.

E175 captain reported decreasing hydraulic system #2 fluid at cruising altitude that lead to a hydraulic pump failure on final.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

While working SR [Radar Position] for the departure push ([company 1] departures and other scheduled air carriers that all try to leave at the same time in the morning); Aircraft X departed on heading 280 so other traffic could be turned inside of him. I left him on this heading until around 5 or 6 miles west of the airport before sending him direct his first fix. At that point; he advised me that he was actually a /G and wanted to go direct [to] his destination; rather than ZZZ. At this point ZOB had already taken the handoff and we didn't have control to amend the flight plan. I had a number of other departure aircraft I was working at this point; including other northbound departures that he may have conflicted with by going direct his destination. I coordinated with ZOB to let them know that he was /G and wanted direct. They advised that they had his request. I relayed that to the pilot but told him that for now he needed to proceed direct ZZZ. I also admonished him to please make this known while on the ground; before he gets in the air. He asked what type of aircraft we showed on his strip. I told him [type]/G. He revealed that he had asked Clearance Delivery for his [different type aircraft]/G flight plan and they apparently gave him the wrong one. There are two main points to be taken from this situation in my opinion. #1. The [company 1] departure aircraft have a serious problem with their dispatch. We often have as many as 3 or 4 different flight plans for a given callsign each morning; each having different equipment suffixes and aircraft types. They need to find a way to reduce the confusion on their end. This would greatly reduce the workload and confusion on our end. #2. OJT was in progress when he received his clearance this morning. I checked the tapes to see if we did indeed issue the wrong clearance. We did. I have a few recommendations.1. Remove [Controllers initials] eligibility to be an OJTI. He's a dangerous enough controller working on his own. When he's charged with providing oversight on a developmental; it's a disaster waiting to happen.2. Coordinate with the [Company 1] departures dispatch to have them reduce the number of flight plan duplicates we get each morning.3. Brief controllers that we shouldn't be clearing 'as filed' when an aircraft has filed half a dozen different flight plans. When it comes to these departures in the morning; we should be confirming aircraft type; equipment suffix; and correct routing with each of these planes. This would help alleviate any confusion or ambiguity going forward.

LAN TRACON Controller reported a problem with a certain company and the amount of incorrect filed flight plans that cause confusion daily.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 196; Flight Crew Type 4420

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Routine Inspection; Aircraft In Service At Gate

Aircraft; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

During early morning walk around of Aircraft X; a MAX registered in Date; (XA00; dark). I came to the inspection of #2 engine inlet and blades; etc. I noticed that every blade exhibited a central area of wear on its back face about 1'-2' away from the hub on the composite part; but more importantly that I noticed that every blade seemed to have some cracking or hazing to it extending over the surface of the blades as well. I have had limited exposure to LEAP engine wear; and as such made a note of it. I took a close look at the #1 engine as a comparison to see if it matched; and it did not. It certainly had the small patch of wear exhibited by removal of the black color so that the composite looks grey or white; about 1'-2' out from the hub but did not have the hazing and surface cracking the #2 had. As such I asked for ZZZ Maintenance to take a look and tell me if it was normal wear and tear. They advised that it was and we had no issues for our series of flights in the aircraft.My concern is that this wear looks to someone unfamiliar with it as something 'bad' and might cause unnecessary delays at especially Contract Maintenance stations; etc. in the future if identified by others on walk around.

First Officer reported concerns over Engine Fan Blades with wear and discoloration on the aft faces.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing; Weather

I was working Dallas High and Waco Low combined and started to get aircraft that were already deviating around thunderstorms that were covering the north half of my airspace.  Aircraft were mostly confined in the lower 1/3 of my airspace and all deviating.  I got multiple Austin arrivals that I had to descend below all the Houston Departures and provide MIT with barely any room the turn aircraft.  In the middle of this; my supervisor came over and informed me that the OM was watching and had called him to order me to start calling weather.  I was too busy at the time to call weather and I feel this was an unnecessary distraction at a bad time.  I'm being told now that many supervisors are telling other controllers that I had a blatant disregard for safety and simply refused to call the weather out of spite.  This is grossly inaccurate and upsetting to me because I am now being paraded about as an example of what not to do.  If the OM was up front watching me; he should have realized that it was getting busy and should have called the supervisor to suggest the sector be split off.

ZFW Controller reports of weather and deviating aircraft in his sector.  Controller is told by FLM to issue weather and states he was too busy to issue the weather.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

[The First Officer] and I flew Aircraft X from ZZZ to ZZZ1. During the cruise portion of the flight; we both felt the airplane vibrating a bit more than usual. We looked around near the engine and props to see if anything from that area would cause the vibration and also looked at the engines performance page on the Multi Function Display screen to see if there were any abnormalities. Everything was performing normally and we decided to scan everything through our window starting from the inboard part of the wing; then the engine and the outboard part of the wing. We ensured the flaps were up as well. We then looked at the horizontal stabilizer and saw it shaking up and down as if the plane was hitting turbulent air. It looked a bit more than what we usually see. We both agreed we could continue safely to ZZZ1 but would divert and land immediately if we felt the vibration get any worse. As we continued to fly the vibration was intermittent. There was not a repetitive pattern rather the plane would vibrate for 10-20 seconds and then return to a normal vibration. During our descent the vibration was more frequent; instead of intermittent; but was not more intense. Once we parked at the gate in ZZZ1; I examined the rear section of the aircraft and called maintenance to request someone come look with me. During the inspection I saw that a screw had pierced through the plate which is connected to the horizontal stabilizer and the bottom of the fuselage. We brought the plane to the maintenance hangar and I asked [the] ZZZ1 Maintenance Manager to look at the plane with me and I told him about what I found. As he inspected the screws in the plate on the other side of the fuselage a screw fell out in his hand. I then called Maintenance/Operations Control and told them what was happening since the plane was going to be written up and our next flight was going to be delayed.

Air Taxi Captain reported excessive vibration on descent which caused the aircraft to be removed from service at the destination airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 156; Flight Crew Type 8000

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Upon departure; aircraft did not seem to pressurize. After noting this we received an Auto Fail light on the pressurization panel. We proceeded to run the QRH and asked ATC for vectors and stay at 10;000 FT. Once we were directed to place the pressurization switch in standby mode we noted this did not fix the problem. I tried to ACARS Dispatch and contact MX Control on the radio with no luck. I decided to return to XXX for landing; as the aircraft would not pressurize. No emergency was declared. Upon extending the gear we noted a loud noise in the flight deck along with a vibration. Once we landed and returned to the gate I went out to check the E and E door and found that it was left open. There was no indication in the cockpit this door was open and the light pressed to test and checked normal. Maintenance met the aircraft and noted the same things and deferred the E and E door sensor. Double-check with First Officer that he was able to complete thorough preflight (with de-ice truck spraying the aircraft) during walkaround. Pay better attention when Crew Member is not familiar with the aircraft.

Upon landing; I turned my phone on; within 30 seconds; Scheduling was calling me; asking me to operate Flight X; XXX to XXX. I said no problem; Scheduling informed me it was due to depart in 15 minutes. I proceeded to the gate; and discovered I was the First Crew member to report. After checking in with the Agent; I asked about deicing for the active frost conditions; and was informed that we were to be deiced at the gate. I proceeded to the aircraft to check the logbook; and commence my preflight duties. I discovered; as the first person on the aircraft; the gear pins were already removed; but it appeared that Maintenance was just on the aircraft; and it may have been repositioned. I discovered that the APU was already running; was on the bus; and providing air; and there has been an alert for 'Duct Overheat' since arriving at the aircraft. I immediately turned down the left pack air temp; ran the QRH and reset the Duct Overheat alert. It successfully reset. I watched it for a few minutes to ensure it would not re-trip. After the safety check; I proceed outside to perform the walkaround. As I began; and I reached the nose of the aircraft; the Zone Supervisor and Assistant Station Manager were on the ramp; shouting to me to 'lookout; they are going to deice.' The deice truck had arrived and was prepared to commence deicing at the gate (before boarding). I got out of the way; and the operation began. When I resumed my walkaround inspection at the nose; I did make a point to examine the EE bay door; but did not notice anything unusual; in retrospect; I may not have gotten down to my knees on the deiced ramp to get low enough to look at the door clearly. I have several thousand hours on the 737 at another carrier; but I am not used to how low you have to get to properly ascertain the belly door is fully closed and latched on an old 737; straight wing aircraft. It is much lower to the ground; and harder to see. By the way; at 6' 5;' that is no easy feat anyway. The walkaround inspection completed; and deicing completed; I returned to the cockpit; the rest of the Crew arrived; and the Passengers boarded. We left in due course; no one feeling rushed. All checklists properly completed. We departed normally. On climbout; both the Captain and I noticed our ears popping. With the complicated RNAV Departure and a priority of flying the aircraft; we held off running any checklist until the aircraft was cleaned up. We shortly leveled off at 10;000 FT; told ATC we needed to stay at 10;000 FT and ran through the Pressurization 'Auto Fail' checklist. We had no control of pressurization in Auto or Standby and even ran the Rapid Depressurization checklist; despite that we did not have to don O2 masks or make an emergency descent. The pack and bleeds were in auto and the Air/Ground switch was verified in 'FLT'. We noted the outflow valve was fully closed. We had no lights; even ran a lights test; with no abnormal indications. We simply had no differential pressure; and cabin altitude was 10;000 FT. We did have an 'Auto Fail' and '''Standby''' indication on the pressurization panel. In standby; we still had no control of pressurization. We went to manual mode; and still had no control of pressurization. We ACARS'd Dispatch about the situation and suggested a return to XXX; which was agreed to. An emergency was not declared; we just needed to return for Maintenance. The Captain and I did a nice job splitting workload; I was very familiar with local XXX operations and reloaded the FMS for a return and approach to XXX and got ACARS messages to Dispatch while talking to ATC; while the Captain was talking to Company ops in XXX; the F/A's; and the Passengers. We accomplished a normal descent and arrival briefing and approach briefing and completed a Visual Approach. We noted a substantial increase in airflow noise as we lowered the landing gear; but all indications were normal. Landing and return to the gate were normal. Upon completing the Parking Checklist; we exited the aircraft; and discovered that the EE bay door was full open; and the cockpit light; while not burned out; indicated the door was shut. There were multiple opportunities to prevent this from happening. 1. Indication and warning systems are presumed to be functional when the airworthiness is signed off by Maintenance. 2. When an aircraft is returned to line service by Maintenance; either from a reposition or Maintenance checks; the aircraft should be verified (QA?) ready for line ops; and all Maintenance and service doors not in use should be verified closed; tools removed; connections made; etc. 3. The First Officer should catch a discrepancy such as an open door that is not normal (EE bay); which was specifically pointed out in training; despite the distractions of being re-Crewed; and deiced; and interruptions to the exterior inspection; and 4. The Tug Driver and Push Team should verify that all doors are shut and the aircraft is ready for flight. The failure to accomplish all four of these checks at the same time caused the air return. I cannot speak of the other three; but I was not as familiar with the older 737's; and thought I was doing an acceptable job of the inspection. Today's experience has shown that to not be the case this time.

B737-300 flight crew reports being unable to pressurize after takeoff. QRH procedures are complied with but still no pressurization and the flight returns to the departure airport. Post flight reveals that the E&E compartment door is open and the door warning system is inoperative.