Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

After takeoff and when gear retraction was initiated on profile; we got a gear disagree warning message. The main gears were up however the nose gear was showing red. After contacting dispatch and patching with Maintenance Control; running the non-normal checklist and upon recycling the gear; it came up as it should and was all green and retracted.  It was determined at that point that continuing to the destination was the best course of action as all systems were normal and running as they should. We landed with no issues and the gear came down just fine.As a suggestion the deicers can start taking a closer look in the wheel well and around the gear area and if they see any significant build up the crew can be notified. The crew can further determine the necessary course of action.

I conducted the preflight first flight of the day and noticed no icing or snow in any wheel well. Each of the wheel wells were clean and no ice was noticed. During the first flight hydraulic tests; we noted lower hydraulic system quantities (~40%-44% ) but acceptable for temperature conditions. We experienced a delay getting deiced due to resourced; however; this was not unusual. In snowy conditions from the runway (wet snow) we departed and climbed. Upon gear retraction we received a Gear Disagree warning. Due to the heavy snow conditions in the initial climb; I suspected a sensor issue potentially exacerbated by the hydraulic quantities.At 180 kts we recycled the gear and the gear retracted normally. ATC was in the loop and they informed us that a previous CRJ-700 experienced the same issue. We ran the non-normal checklist and noted that one of the checklist items noted to land at nearest suitable field. We discussed the issues and due to the field conditions; we elected to initially continue towards our destination while bringing Maintenance and Dispatch into the loop as more suitable fields were downrange. We heard the ice that had formed in the nose area and felt confident this was the culprit. We informed Maintenance and Dispatch of the issues as well and kept them informed during the flight (ACARS messages available). The aircraft landed without incident at our destination. The Gear Disagree was written in the maintenance log and the aircraft was taken out of service. Consult with the mechanics on scene disclosed that all wheel wells were caked in snow/ice with significant coverage over the sensors.My biggest concern as a line check pilot is there may be concern that we did not return to the departure airport as the nearest suitable field. The CRJ variants have had Gear Disagree events over the years; so much so that a memo was published (can't tell you what property it was) directed us to recycle like we did. This in itself may seem innocent; however; upon reflection I do not want to use past practices as a reason for my decision. I was quite confident the gear issue was weather (and somewhat low hydraulic) related. My belief was the air flow would clear the sensor area and the recycle would be successful. I exercised system knowledge and seeing a lot of this in the field. Secondly; I believed we resolved the issue. Diverting would have grounded the plane off-station causing a lengthy out of serviced aircraft due to a gear swing required. We expanded our team and got agreement to continue.

CRJ-900 flight crew reported that possible winter ground debris/ice accumulation may have blocked gear from completely retracting upon takeoff. Crew was able to overcome problem and landed normally.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 112; Flight Crew Total 997; Flight Crew Type 92

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

ECL Non-Normal FUEL IMBALANCE checklist appears to be able to lead a pilot to turn off all main fuel pumps in the low quantity fuel tank with all cross-feed valves closed.We were dispatched and fueled with no center tank fuel and less than full main tanks. About three hours into the flight we got a FUEL IN CENTER advisory EICAS message.We turned on both center tank fuel pumps to the burn the center tank fuel. We noted that the right main tank had approximately 1;600 lbs less fuel than the left main tank. We determined the engines were burning evenly and suspected that fuel had transferred from the right tank to the center tank.We did not have a FUEL IMBALANCE advisory EICAS message but we went to the ECL FUEL IMBALANCE checklist to attempt to balance the fuel. We determined; per the checklist; there was no fuel leak and commenced the checklist.Page 3 of the checklist: there is a box that says'There is no indication of an engine fuel leak and the FUEL IMBALANCE message shows' We checked the NO box as we did not have the FUEL IMBALANCE EICAS message. Upon checking NO; that step blued out showing we completed that step and the very next step; FUEL CROSSFEED switch (either): ON; blued out as well. In other words; upon the FUEL CROSSFEED step bluing out there was no switching to occur per the checklist.Page 4 of the checklist: asks if the Left main tank quantity is low. We checked 'NO' which blued the rest of that page out.Page 5 of the checklist: asks if the Right main tank quantity is low. We checked 'YES'The next step directed and stated 'R fuel PUMPS FWD and AFT switches(both): OFFThis allows fuel from the higher quantity tank to feed both engines. The next and final step of Page 5 is to check when fuel balancing is complete. At no point does the ECL in our configuration direct us to open the crossfeed valves. We did NOT turn off the R main fuel pumps and elected to leave the imbalance as it was as we were not at the fuel imbalance limit. We did contact Maintenance Control and wrote up the fuel transfer issue.Guidance from our training is to follow the ECL without second guessing it. I completely understand the rational as some of the checklists are complicated but in this case had we follow the checklist verbatim we would have had the left tank fuel pumps supplying the left engine and the right engine being fed by no fuel pumps at all. Furthermore; I looked at the 777 Flight Manual Non-Normal FUEL IMBALANCE checklist. It is different from the ECL. Following that checklist would have led to proper fuel balancing.In conclusion: The ECL FUEL IMBALANCE checklist; under certain circumstances; can lead to an engine being fed by no fuel pumps. The 777 Flight Manual illustrates a discrepancy with the ECL. The 777 Flight Manual leads to configuration so the engine will be supplied with fuel pump pressure.

B777 Captain reported a discrepancy between checklists and the flight manual while attempting to correct a fuel imbalance.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

With all checklists completed; we took runway for takeoff after receiving takeoff clearance. I was the monitoring pilot and the FO was the flying pilot. On takeoff roll at a speed close to V1; we received a CASS message 'SPOILER FAIL' followed by a 'SPLRS OPN' indication. I called 'ABORT; ABORT; ABORT'. We followed aborted takeoff procedures- stopping the aircraft safely within the remaining runway distance and advising ATC off the abort. We informed ATC that we did not require assistance. We exited the runway.We advised the FA of the aborted takeoff and confirmed that she and all passengers were belted and unharmed. After talking to the FA; we completed an 'After Landing' checklist. The FO coordinated with Operations for a gate return; and I contacted Maintenance Control to report the abort. Maintenance Control requested the aircraft weight at time of abort and the brake temp indications. The weight was 44;200 lbs and the brake temps were well in the green range. The SPLRS OPN indication remained on the taxi in. After gate return and the 'Parking Checklist' completed; we found circuit breaker 'SPOILER-IND' had popped. All circuit breakers were pushed in during the preflight inspection. The speed brake lever was in the closed position from initial scan to parking check list. We checked the takeoff configuration prior to departure during the 'Before Takeoff Checklist' and the test indicated that the airplane was correctly configured for takeoff. During preflight we observed in the AML look back that there was a previous entry pertaining to an inadvertent spoiler deploy in flight. This previous spoiler write up was written on a previous AML page and was signed off by maintenance with a good ops check. I made an AML entry about our spoiler irregularity and then we deplaned the passengers at the gate and swapped aircraft. The flight resumed with the swapped aircraft and we departed with no further occurrences.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier flight crew received a 'SPOILER FAIL' followed by a 'SPLRS OPN' indication during the takeoff roll prior to V1. The crew initiated a successful rejected takeoff.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 295; Flight Crew Type 6000

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

[We were on the] SADDE Arrival to LAX descending from approximately 12;000 FT to 10;000 FT approaching BAYST Intersection; encountered moderate and greater wake turbulence. The Captain (pilot flying) took the aircraft out of LNAV and used HDG SEL to offset from procedure track. This resulted in a late turn to the west at BAYST. Due to frequency congestion and cockpit workload; this happened before I could coordinate with ATC. Controller said we were behind an EMB-170 but the wake was intense. I suspect it was from an A-340 that was ahead of the EMB-170.

B737-700 First Officer reported 'moderate and greater' wake turbulence in trail of an EMB-170 and an A340. Captain turned off course to minimize the wake effect and they deviated from the assigned track.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 141; Flight Crew Type 15000

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I would like to share my concern about our current -800 loading procedures and how they result in nose heavy flight characteristics during takeoff. I was dispatched in [this] aircraft. The Agent input all 120 Passengers into Zone 1 as per our current procedures. We had 4;000 pounds of freight in the forward hold. The load sheet predicted trim 5.6; but the performance computer generated 6.1. The aircraft required an unusual amount of back pressure during takeoff. I began nose-up trim shortly after liftoff requiring a setting of about 7.5 to achieve acceptable performance. I had the Flight Attendants acquire a zone count during the flight. During ground operations had the Agent rerun the loading with the zone count (49/46/25). The predicted trim was 6.7. I do not know what the performance computer would have generated; but given that it generally adds about .3-.5 units; it may have given me 7.0-7.2 - much closer to normal aircraft performance. Note: Landing trip was 10.5. We departed with 84 Passengers using a zone count of 36/33/15 computation and 1;200 pounds of cargo/bags. The loadsheet predicted a trim of 6.0 and the [flight computer] gave us 6.3. The flight performance was normal during takeoff. The concern is that the policy of placing the Passenger load into a single Zone 1 on the loading schedule is generating routinely nose-heavy performance. Not only are we decreasing the fuel efficiency of the aircraft; but we are not compensating with a realistic trim setting. Please review the software assumptions of this operation.

B737-800 Captain experienced conflicting loading procedures and calculations of weight and balance and takeoff performance data. Captain reported that the load planning assumptions in the weight and balance computer and the station lading procedures results in nose-heavy flight characteristics on takeoff and recommends a review of those assumptions and procedures.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 13

Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Aircraft X was descended to 4;100 feet in a 4;700 MVA. I had a lot going on at the time with weather deviations and aircraft repositioning between airports.

NCT Controller reported they descended an aircraft below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Dispatch Dispatcher; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Air Traffic Control Non Radar 33; Air Traffic Control Radar 30; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Human-Machine Interface; Other / Unknown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Airport; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Weather

The tower at BVI continues to improperly send METAR report via Aeronautical Information System Replacement (AISR) as required. This is the only way the weather report for this training airport gets into the system for preflight planning applications and sites. The AWOS 3P is not connected for auto processing. Therefore when the tower is closed or the weather is not processed correctly by the tower it affects TAF forecasting. This has resulted in two of our students encountering unforecasted weather. One student pilot came up on IMC weather; landed at another airport [which is] a serious safety issue; but the right choice. Discussions with both the tower manager about the processing issue when the tower is open and with the airport manager about AWOS 3P connectivity have not improved or corrected the problem. I discussed with the local NWS office the effect of not having the current METAR on the TAF amendments. They stated it resulted in limited forecasting and delayed amendments. This is a serious safety hazard for this airport and training environment.

GA instructor reported improper BVI METAR weather dissemination via AISR. Instructor reported AWOS 3P is not auto processing and measures to correct this have not resolved the issue.


Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Fatigue; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Human Factors; Company Policy; Aircraft; Weather

After review of the details in the question and answer part of this report; it became clear the importance of 777 requirements that the vertical PATH be protected by the pilot flying. For example; had I; as Captain; exercised my defined privilege to set the MCP; I would have set approach minimums as I ordered given authority to delegate. Apparently the First Officer; fatigued as well due to scheduling--made evident by missed radio calls--believed that the use of an ILS as briefed prohibited the use of LNAV/VNAV to place the aircraft both laterally and vertically on the ILS. At least two times an intermediate altitude was set from step down restrictions on the approach plate. Had the '[approach] minimums' been set in the MCP until the OM; the aircraft would have complied with vertical PATH. However; it leveled twice at ALT hold because of [selected charted crossing altitude] MCP settings.  As a result I had to intervene with degraded autopilot modes; i.e. vertical speed and FLCH; to get the aircraft going back to PATH. Due to my slower crosscheck; a strong pattern altitude tailwind; haze; and calling 'runway in sight'; the aircraft flew too high for a [stabilized thrust] approach. At go-around; the aircraft was configured at idle; descending above slope in clear skies with haze. The crew [agreed] that the approach should be aborted. I executed a go-around. Due to radio communication difficulties during the initial approach the First Officer requested approach clearance clarification and another ILS was assigned on base leg. This FMC update was accurate and an at or above altitude was changed to a hard crossing altitude so that VNAV PATH would be protected. This was important due to maritime haze that made it difficult to assess height above the ground. The 777 immediately show[ed] PATH and continued a normal descent until hitting the MCP altitude previously noted. Please note that PATH respects approach requirements which clear terrain and the touchdown point. V/S and FLCH do not and simply move the aircraft vertically without regard to restrictions. I believe PATH is safer for this reason and has proven safe in both VMC and IMC conditions. Provide added emphasis that the pilot flying needs [to] set MCP even during approaches; with confirmation from pilot monitoring so that the LNAV/VNAV system does not compromise the vertical PATH. Once this occurs; regaining the PATH; especially with a tailwind is difficult. Alternately; use LNAV/VNAV approaches so there is comfort level for pilots who are ILS only flyers. ILS guys do not like to mix in LNAV/VNAV procedures in my experience on the 777. The Runway 15 ILS at SBGL is quite abrupt when it is intercepted; the glideslope in particular; due to other aircraft ahead on final in VMC conditions. The VNAV is much smoother.

An apparent breakdown in Mode Control Panel SOP; fatigue; and poorly coordinated efforts by the flight crew of a B777 resulted in an unstabilized approach and subsequent go-around.  Contributing factors were conflicting comfort levels with LNAV/VNAV conducted descent to ILS intercept and the failure of the Captain (pilot flying) to assume control of the MCP panel when conflicts arose between his autoflight configuration preferences and the First Officer's reluctance to abide by his planned utilization of LNAV/VNAV to join the approach.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was First Officer and Pilot Flying on this flight. The Captain was Pilot Monitoring; and the other First Officer was in the third seat. We were in actual instrument conditions; and fully set up and stabilized on the ILS to Runway XX at ZZZ. Somewhere between the GS intercept; ZZZZZ; and Runway XX; we received a GPWS 'Too Low; Terrain' aural alert and light. We all checked and saw that we were on localizer; glideslope; and airspeed. We were fully configured and stable. As soon as we determined this; the 'Too Low; Terrain' aural alert sounded again. Since we were still in actual instrument conditions at night and could not see if there was an obstacle on the approach; I called 'Go-Around; Flaps 20'. We executed the missed approach instructions given to us by ATC. We then requested vectors for the ILS to Runway XY at ZZZ. While setting up for and briefing this approach; we decided that if we got another GPWS message; or anything else seemed unsafe; we would divert to ZZZ1; where the weather conditions were better. We flew the ILS to [Runway] XY without any GPWS alert; and safely landed on Runway XY at ZZZ. We made a report to ZZZ tower about what had happened with our GPWS. A government aircraft made the same approach and successful landing using the ILS to Runway XX after we had done the missed approach. They had no issues with their GPWS. It is possible that our GPWS alert was triggered by an equipment malfunction; however; it was the safe choice to go missed in these conditions. We flew the profile like we train in the simulator. We had to go missed; set up for an approach in the opposite direction; and landed in a direct crosswind. I would suggest adding this scenario at ZZZ with the GPWS alert to one of our simulator lessons.

We were on the ILS Runway XX into ZZZ. We were fully configured flaps 25; on localizer and glide path; and stable through 1;000 ft. The winds were a direct crosswind and gusty. At approximately 800 ft. we received the GPWS aural alert Too Low Terrain. We were still in the clouds at this time. We called Go Around and we executed the go around. The go around went smoothly. ATC asked why we went around and our intentions. We asked to be vectored back around for the ILS Runway XY. Because it was a direct crosswind and we were not sure why we received the GPWS we all agreed it would be a good idea to try the other approach to the opposite runway. We got vectors and set up for the approach. The approach to ILS Runway XY went smoothly without any problems and we landed Runway XY.I'm not sure why we received the GPWS alert. We were on localizer; glide path; speed; and fully configured.

B767 flight crew reported a GPWS 'Too Low; Terrain'  alert during IFR approach in a stabilized condition. Flight crew executed a 'Go Around'. Flight crew then requested another approach which was completed safely with no further issues.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 40

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

After doing a crew swap into an airplane with an MEL'd right Thrust Reverser; we were notified of the MEL and saw the sign off on the sheet. Everything seemed to be fine and the captain taxied out to the runway where we were cleared for takeoff. On the takeoff roll we got a right reverser unlock light and the corresponding red CAS message. The takeoff was aborted and as soon as we taxied off the runway we contacted maintenance who advised us that a circuit breaker for the MEL'd reverser had been neglected to be pulled. They advised us to pull the circuit breaker and try again. On the second take off attempt the reverser unlock light illuminated again along with the corresponding red CAS message. We aborted the takeoff and taxied back to parking; where we contacted maintenance again and they said they were sending out the local maintenance guys who had worked on it that morning. We went to the hotel and a few hours later were contacted by maintenance to go out to the airplane and do a test run up. I went to the airport and conducted the run up and all checkouts that maintenance asked me to run; all successful. When I pulled the MEL to do the MEL to our write up I noticed that the previous MEL was not signed off correctly. It was signed off by a pilot; but had an (M) procedure requirement. The mechanics there advised me that they had not performed the maintenance functions required by the MEL prior to our attempted departure; and that is why there was no sign off by them. There was obviously a breakdown of communication between maintenance and the previous crew; combined with our failure to reference the MEL to compare what was signed off to the requirement of said MEL entry. In the future I will very closely inspect any MEL's and make sure that all maintenance actions required of them have been performed.

GIV First Officer reported they attempted several takeoffs that were rejected when a reverser light illuminated. Confusion over applicability of MEL was contributory.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 26

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

The Denver Sector 9 Controller handed two aircraft off on collision courses at the same altitude. We had to call them and ask them to turn one of the aircraft to keep them from losing separation one minute inside our boundary. Hold Controllers and Supervisors accountable for ensuring separation.

Center Controller reported that the adjacent Center handed them off two aircraft on converging headings at the same altitude; causing an airborne conflict.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 3700; Flight Crew Type 250

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

New York (N90) TRACON consistently asks for aircraft to maintain above 200 knots below the shelf of the New York Class B. In this case we were asked to maintain 250 knots. I have also been asked to maintain 210 knots or greater below the Class B. This creates a conflict between violating 14 CFR 91.117 or telling ATC you are unable; which will most likely upset the controller; jam up the frequency; and create bigger issues.

Corporate Captain reported that New York (N90) TRACON instructed the crew to maintain 250 knots below the shelf of New York Class B airspace. The reporter stated N90 controllers consistently ask aircraft to maintain greater than 200 knots below the shelf.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.5

Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

I was vectoring Aircraft X to follow Aircraft Y for an approach to Runway 5. I issued multiple speed restrictions to Aircraft X due to Aircraft Y rapidly decreasing speed on final. The pilot of Aircraft X did not seem to want to take my speed restrictions as it took him 8-10 miles to drop 40 kts.After an approach clearance including a speed restriction till the FAF and yet another shortly following with that and also informing him why I needed the speed restriction I broke him out just outside the FAF while still having over 3 mile separation with Aircraft X at 2600 and Aircraft Y at 1700. After the breakout instructions Aircraft X continued down final for 1 1/2 miles then descended another 2 hundred feet putting him at 2400 with Aircraft Y at just barely a 1000ft below him. Aircraft X had to be prompted again to break out heading 320 and to maintain 3k. There was a potential loss of separation due to pilot not responding to control instructions in a timely manner.When Aircraft X and Aircraft Yare arriving at roughly the same time; one could say they almost try to manipulate airspeeds; altitudes; etc to force the following aircraft delays.

Fort Wayne Approach Controller reported of one aircraft slowing on final; resulting in the second aircraft having to be taken out and sequenced again. Reporter stated it took two calls to the trailing aircraft to get it off final resulting in a possible loss of separation.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Shortly after takeoff; the aircraft indicated a Nose Wheel Steering failure. The First Officer was pilot flying. Once a safe altitude was reached; the Captain assigned Radios and Flight Controls to the First Officer and verbally completed the QRH. Upon completion of the QRH the failure still persisted. The Captain then notified; Flight Attendants; Passengers; and the Company. He also [advised] ATC and asked to roll fire trucks. The flight continued [to the destination]. The First Officer made an absolutely beautiful landing and maintained positive aircraft control all the way to a complete stop. When the aircraft was stopped; the Captain initiated the After Landing checklist and shutdown. The Tow Team met the aircraft and towed it from the runway to the gate. The aircraft arrived at the gate; on time; with no reported aircraft damage or passenger injury.

CRJ900 Captain reported a nose wheel steering failure shortly after takeoff.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Electronic Device; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Final walk through the cabin I noticed passenger had a small backpack on his lap. I asked him to stow it. He became defensive and loudly said to me 'NO ONE HAS EVER ASKED ME TO DO THAT.' I asked again; and explained it was considered a carry on and therefore needed to go in the overhead; as he had no seat in front of him to stow it underneath. He again stated he had never been told to do that. He opened it and started to remove paperwork and personal items; and the passenger next to him asked me if that was ok. I said; yes he could secure those items in his hand; but not the backpack. I then placed the backpack in the overhead.As we were on the taxiway same passenger was on his phone. Passenger behind him looked at me to get my attention and pointed; at passenger and his phone and mouthed to me 'he is on the internet.' I tapped passenger on his shoe to get his attention and asked if he was in airplane mode. He replies; loudly; 'YES I AM AND WILL YOU STOP TOUCHING ME?' I answered; 'of course.' Passenger behind him; then taps him on the shoulder and says; 'I would appreciate it if you would do as you are asked; and get off your phone.' The father of the disruptive passenger turns around and states the son is using a certain app that isn't on the internet. The passenger who spoke up; looks at me and shakes his head. The disruptive passenger does not comply. When I hear the after takeoff chime; I go to the back galley and explain to [other Flight Attendant] what has been happening. We decide to switch and she will now [takes that part of the cabin]. This switch avoided further conflict between the disruptive passenger and myself. I don't believe I committed any errors. Passenger was not receptive to following directions; or to any verbal contact with me.

A Flight Attendant reported that a passenger was not compliant in regard to stowing of baggage and electronic device usage.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

During the [Scenic] Tour I exceeded the fight Envelope Temperature operating limitations of section of the Flight Manual. I was bound by two different limitations; the ZZZ location with 40.36 degree Celsius and ZZZ1 location with 45.74 degree Celsius.When I arrived for my flight and started prepping for it I was immediately made aware through the Daily Briefing Sheet that the forecasted MAX temperatures will be 40C at ZZZ and 46C at ZZZ1. I knew I will have to constantly pay attention to the actual temperatures for the day.When I took off from ZZZ1 the temperature was reporting 44C (43.9C actual METAR resolution). Landing at ZZZ the reporting temperature was 38C. At ZZZ the company operations were already shut down but air only tours were still going on since temperature allowed for it. My customers went on to do their tour while I waited approximately 50 minutes. During that time I was paying attention to the temperature at ZZZ which was holding at 39C so I was comfortable taking off at this point. I did briefly look at ZZZ1 which was at 45C. When I got into the aircraft before turning on the engine I listened to the conditions at ZZZ one last time before I committed to the flight and it was still holding at 39C.This is where my planning was not completed. I should have asked base at ZZZ to confirm for me the ZZZ1 conditions at that instant since my METAR ZZZ1 information was approaching over 20-30 minutes old (45C). In hindsight which I did not confirm at the time they were still below my operating limitations at 45.6C when I was taking off from ZZZ for ZZZ1. If I did confirm this for ZZZ1 before departing ZZZ I would have known that the temperature was trending up and there is a good possibility that temperature would be 46C. The temperature did reach 46C (46.1C) and operations at ZZZ1 were suspended when I came to ZZZ1.My OAT sensor was still indicating below my limitations but upon coming in for a landing at [the] Ramp the temperature did climb past 46C.I did not experience any rush or pressure to complete the flight. The cause was my planning and was not seen all the way through since I developed comfort that I will be OK to complete the flight by knowing the immediate temperature for the takeoff and not doing the same for landing (that information was about 20-30 minutes old for me at the time of takeoff at ZZZ).

Helicopter pilot reported an encounter with extreme atmospheric heat conditions.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 25

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Arrived in area at XA:35. Could not relieve anyone until my shift started at XA:45. A controller gave a relief briefing to no one and left the position. I had to work the unmanned sector prior to my shift start. The controller left a dummy jack plugged in and left the frequency in the ear. I noticed that an aircraft needed to be descended and handed off but there was no hand set. I found a hand set and gave the clearance. Received no response due to the frequency not selected to speaker. When I figured out the problem the pilot was extremely frustrated. There was no error but a very unsafe situation.

ZOB Controller reports to work and before shift starts another controller gives a briefing to no one; and then leaves the room. Controller reporting to work has to start work before officially being at work.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft; Human Factors

At cruise near Turkey/Iraq border; lost GPS/ADS-b approx. 100 NE of RATVO.  Re-acquired both.  The last 5 to 7 minutes of the loss we were over our RNP of 2.00 (ANP of 2.51). INS NAV worked fine entire time.  VOR worked entire time. Cause Probably due to jamming.  We were ready ahead of time.

B777-200 Captain reported the pilot crew suspected GPS jamming at this location.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Landing runway 24R LAX. At approximately 90 KTS LAX Tower Controller issued taxi instruction to exit at high speed and hold short 24L. This call interrupted our normal roll out and decelerate procedures. We did not respond then LAX Tower again gave same instructions at approximately 85 knots. Again we did not respond; control was transferred to captain. After slowing to taxi speed we exited 24R and held short of 24L as required by normal SOP. After we slowed to exit runway we responded and asked for tower supervisors' number. After coming to a stop at hold short line LAX tower called and repeated the request (twice while we had come to a stop as per normal SOP) we responded as requested. Once crossing runway 24L and on ground we were given supervisors number. At the gate having exited the aircraft I spoke to the tower supervisor. He was unapologetic regarding the controller issuing taxi instruction during our roll out. He further advised me that they reviewed the tape and stated we sounded unprofessional on the radio. At no time did we make any comments beyond the request for the supervisors' number and repeating the instruction. I informed the supervisor that this was a safety issue and that we had no requirement to answer until we had slowed to a safe speed. I also commented that there is a big difference between sounding unprofessional and being unsafe while violating the FARS. I also informed him we would be filing an ASAP and speaking to our local Chief Pilot. I spoke to our Chief Pilot shortly after my talk with LAX TWR supervisor.  I explained the event and our response. At no time did we cross any hold short line; cause any aircraft to be forced into a go around or caused any unsafe event. Tower controller should follow guidance provided in FAR; there is no need to advise us to hold short as we would stop and hold prior to crossing an active runway. Given no guidance our only option is to hold short. We do not need to be given taxi instruction or told to exit any high speed. The runway belongs to us during landing; I have no obligation during roll out to respond; therefore the tower should not be interrupting our landing procedures to issue instructions that are unnecessary.

Pilot reports of receiving a hold short instruction from LAX Controller while they were rolling out on the runway. Pilot stated they didn't like the call at this time and were going to hold short of the runway as required anyway.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 0.5

Confusion; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport

I was working ground control; controller in charge; and clearance when Aircraft X exited Runway XXL at Taxiway X. Taxiway X was being used for dump truck crossings north of Runway XXR. I had recently taken ground control from previous controller who told me on the 2 minute overlap to 'stay off Taxiway X' which was obvious to me because of the volume of dump trucks calling me to cross there. The airport did not place cones or barricades to restrict crossing so I thought we were just avoiding using it; not that Taxiway X was NOTAMed closed. I saw Aircraft X clearing the active runway at Taxiway X and attempted to mitigate the situation when a dump truck called for a crossing from Taxiway Y to Taxiway X; so I had the truck hold his position. I wasn't talking to the aircraft yet and did not know where he was going. I asked local; who was very busy too; to put the Aircraft X on my frequency. Shortly thereafter Aircraft X checked on at Taxiway X. It appeared to me he was still crossing Runway XXR; which was closed due to the dump trucks working on the infield beside it. there were no vehicles on Taxiway X and I was holding the truck out of the way; so I projected the quickest way to solve the situation was to allow the Aircraft x to continue across Runway XXR; Taxiway X and Taxiway Y to parking. I didn't chastise the pilot and I went about my work. Later; I wondered if the ATIS had Taxiway X closure on it so I listened and found that it did. I am writing this report a week later after coming to work after my days off and told to write a statement on this event by the supervisor; that either the airport or management was filing a pilot deviation on Aircraft X. I had a chance to listen to the tape and only then did I hear the Aircraft X say he was short of Runway XXR on Taxiway X. At the time of the event; it looked like he was rolling right on through. If I'd known he was stopped/stopping; I would have turned him on Runway XXR to and crossed there. At the time of the event; I thought Aircraft X was coming on through at Taxiway X so I just kept the trucks out of the way. Leading to the event were many factors: airport partially closing a taxiway but not putting up barricades or visual cues. I was told; after the fact; on the overlap from preceding controller 'to stay off Taxiway X.' I didn't project it closed to aircraft at the time of the incident - mostly that I need to avoid using it to keep dump trucks moving there. Local had been clearing everyone at Taxiway Y and I thought he told the Aircraft X to turn at Taxiway Y so when he was rolling on Taxiway X I felt I tried to get local to catch him; and in the meanwhile; I kept other vehicles away from him until I could talk to him. I was answering phones; clearance requests; and dozens upon dozens of ridiculous crossing requests from 8 or more vehicles to cross Taxiway X to Taxiway Y and vice versa. The vehicles were dominating my frequency; overkeying aircraft; blocking aircraft on clearance and they were a total distraction. I could hear the exasperation in my voice on the tapes as I was already tired of these guys just 1/2 hour into my shift and felt helpless as the Aircraft X was heading their way. I feel bad that the airport is going after this pilot - even more so now that I learn that I had a chance to turn him and avoid the Taxiway X crossing north of Runway XXR I was so task saturated when it happened; I thought it was too late to turn the Aircraft X. I also work the majority of my shifts in the radar room. I cannot remember the last time I worked ground control; let alone busy ground control. I felt like I was still spooling up since I had to hit the ground running when I took over the position.Airport should have put cones or barricades across echo on Runway XXR to indicate a closed taxiway. That would have removed any ambiguity in my mind and the pilots'. Airport should do construction overnight instead of during the middle part of our busiest days. airportshould never have removed all the vegetation fro runway safety area; leading to horrible blowing dust problems for two years; only to try and fix it with tacifyer (whatever that is) then hydroseed (which immediately died because there's no water in the high desert at 100 degrees in the summer) and finally this latest band-aid fix of dumping rock on the desert by the runway to try and fix the original problem they made by scraping everything green off the airport.

An aircraft entered a NOTAM closed taxiway. The Local Controller had been advising aircraft to exit the runway at a taxiway other than the closed one. The Ground Controller was able to tell vehicles to hold short of the taxiway to prevent a confliction with the aircraft.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Type 1700

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was working the final to SNA airport; TUSTIN sector; frequency 121.3. Aircraft X was on a heading 100 at 3;000 MSL on the base. When I reached out to Aircraft X to vector him right turn heading 170 to intercept the localizer Aircraft X was no longer on my frequency. Aircraft X not responding and continuing on heading 100 I reached out to Aircraft X again turning him right heading 270 to join the final. He was no longer on my frequency proceeding towards high MVA of 3;700 followed by 4;400 MVA. I jumped on guard frequency to try to get hold of him; I reached out to SNA Tower whether they had him on frequency and in case they did to give them immediate right turn heading 250 and climbing to 4;000 towards lower terrain and away from proceeding descending traffic from the NE. At the same time all other sectors in the area were trying to reach out to Aircraft X. It is unknown how Aircraft X ended up on SNA Tower frequency and how long he was on their frequency but eventually SNA Tower was instructed to give Aircraft X westbound heading 270 and climb to 5;000 while Aircraft X was in 4;400 MVA at 3;000 still on a heading 100. Aircraft X was also instructed by Tower then to contact approach PACIFIC sector on 128.1.From the Controller point of view I would just recommend extreme vigilance from pilots especially when put on a base. If pilot knows he is flying through the localizer without being told to expect vector to the final across the localizer; he should question that and reach out to someone right away. Especially if he hears the phrase 'clear to land'. That instruction is a Tower responsibility only. If pilot hears that on frequency while thinking he is on approach frequency or any other frequency but Tower; he should follow up and look for solutions immediately.

As the PM (Pilot Monitoring); on downwind at SNA at 3;000 ft.; we were given a right turn to base with an Approach Controller. While on base; now with a [different] Controller; we were expecting a turn to intercept final. When we were not given the turn on a now busy frequency both the Captain and I assumed they had forgotten about us and we asked for a turn with high terrain approaching off of our nose. We were initially given a left turn into the terrain and immediately denied the turn and then we were given a right turn with a climb to 5;000 ft. The radios were very busy and sometimes cutoff; so I spoke clearly and methodically. There was a frequency change given as we leveled off at 5;000 ft. and when we checked in on the frequency we were given 'cleared to land; 20R'. We were approximately 8 miles from the field at 5;000 ft. and confused by the 'clear to land' call; so we requested a turn back to downwind. We were handed off to Approach Control and given vectors back to final and landed uneventfully.Lesson learned; fly the aircraft first which the Captain was doing expertly.  Navigate second; which we did by knowing where we were at and what we were expecting to happen headed toward final and overshooting final.  Communicate by listening closely while talking slowly and methodically on the radio when things get busy.  Always double check your frequency selected on the radio.  Keep your guard volume up loud enough that you can hear clearly; but not a distraction to your primary frequency (mine may have been a bit too low).  After landing and debriefing with the Captain; we assumed there was a handoff issue during a shift change.  There also could have been an inadvertent (unknown) radio change that was off the correct frequency.  We are unsure what actually caused the communication breakdown with ATC; but we were eventually able to get a vector away from the terrain without any alerts along with an altitude change with additional vectors back to final for an uneventful landing.

TRACON Controller and Pilot reported the aircraft went through final approach course heading toward terrain; then switched to tower frequency; resulting in confusion on both sides.  The aircraft was then vectored for another approach.


A C182 departed Boise Airport; Runway 10L; on the 'Boise 2 Departure (BOI2).' Approximately 5 miles off departure end; it appeared that the aircraft was straying north of the BOI2 SID track. I asked the pilot to verity she was established on the BOI2 departure. The pilot responded that she was; but she was having difficulty meeting the required climb gradient. I responded with 'roger.' She then told me she wasn't going to make it over the hill in front of her. I immediately vectored the aircraft 20 degrees right to avoid terrain (while below the MVA); and asked her to 'do her best through 067;' which is the published MVA. She was able to climb to her filed altitude and had no problems. Boise ATCT had; until approximately 1 month ago; a Diverse Vector Area (DVA) that allowed us to vector aircraft south of the airport below the MVA. The DVA was especially useful for smaller/slower IFR aircraft. We could vector the slow aircraft south for faster; succeeding; departures.  Further; aircraft were not required to meet an ATC climb rate of 420 FT/NM when being vectored below the MVA (while in the DVA). I believe it is necessary to expedite the implementation of a new DVA for Boise ATCT.

BOI Controller reported vectoring below the MVA because of a slow climbing GA aircraft.  The reporter listed the recent elimination of the DVA as a contributing factor.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 28; Flight Crew Total 239; Flight Crew Type 239

Troubleshooting; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 30; Flight Crew Type 30

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Evacuated

On a cross country from ZZZ to ZZZ1; we did 3 touch and goes at ZZZ1 and then headed back to north to ZZZ. We climbed to cruise at 8500 ft. MSL and then upon reaching our TOD we went through our descent checklist. Then; descending through 6000 ft. MSL; my student added power to slow the descent and to level off. Immediately we had engine roughness; then a rise in RPMs then another drop in RPMs. I took controls and my student read our QRC for engine problems in flight. We slowed to our VG of 73 KIAS; made sure that the fuel shut off valve was open; enriched the mixture and had the same roughness; and then rise in rpms then a drop. We double checked that the fuel pump was on; we opened the alternate air and at about this time we had low rpms and the engine almost died. Then; we turned on the boost; prime; pump and got the last rise in RPMs and then the engine stopped producing power. The propeller was windmilling from aerodynamic force. At this time we were descending through 5700 ft. and did not check the mags as we did not feel that we had enough time to do so. We followed my [forced landing] training of ABCDE. A. airspeed; get to VG (73). B. Best place to land. My student and I discussed our glide ratio and determined that we did not have enough altitude to make it to the airport; and chose a field to land in and began setting up for landing. C. Checklist we began to go through our [forced] landing checklist; D. Declare; I [requested priority handling] Aircraft X is going down in a field east of a certain highway. About this time our propeller ceased spinning. E. Execute. We completed our [forced landing] checklist items and performed a soft field landing; touching down at 55 KIAS or slower. We rolled with our nose wheel off the ground for approximately 20 paces. at approximately 260 paces from touchdown the plane rolled into a slight depression of about 2 feet down and 4 feet 6 feet wide; and rolled up the other side of the depression on an equal rise of about 2 feet at which time the front nose wheel broke from the gear and the remaining NLG strut dug into the dirt and brought us to an abrupt stop causing the plane to pitch forward onto the nose at which time the propeller spinner was slightly dented on the bottom side. The pitching motion was not enough to make us flip tail over nose and we settled back down on the main landing gear and then rolled back down into the depression. Both my student and I were wearing seat belts and shoulder restraints and were unharmed. We secured the plane and then exited the aircraft and called for assistance. We both had prepared our cross country flight plans and our estimations for our fuel burn for our flight was between 9-10 gallons. Our preflight inspection showed our dipstick with just about 12 gallons and we had our school's dispatcher add 5 gallons which would give us a comfortable safety buffer. Yet upon landing and securing the plane we stuck the plane again and found it dry. This plane is known to have its fuel gauge read 6 gallons low on the gauge; and was showing near empty; which normally means that it should've had 6 gallons left based on previous experience.

We took off from ZZZ to ZZZ1 back to ZZZ. Before the flight we checked the fuel and we had 12 gallons; on our flight plan it said that we would need approximately 8.9 gallons for the way there and back. We had our dispatcher go out to the plane and put in an extra 5 gallons; and when we visually check the tanks with the stick; it read right under 18 gallons; so probably around 17 gallons. The flight there was fine; the flight back was also ok until our descent. Before our descent we noticed that the fuel tank read 0. In a previous flight our tank read 0; but when we landed we visually checked the tank with the stick and it read 6 gallons. Coming out of decent at 6000 ft. MSL I went and put power back it. The RPMs came up as normal; then started sputtering. Immediately my instructor took controls. We enriched the mixed; cycled the throttle; and turned on the fuel prime. The engine was not going to get us there. He got the plane to our glide speed; 73 KIAS; as we quickly started doing math for whether or not we could make it to the airport to land. After some quick calculations we determined that we couldn't make it back; and we were going to have to find a field. After choosing our best place to land; we started going through [forced landing] checklists. At about 500 ft. AGL my instructor got on the radio and [advised ATC]. I then flipped to the [forced] landing checklist; ran through the steps; and then we executed the landing. We did a soft field landing keeping the nose up as long as we could; then rolled it out. All was fine until we saw a berm in the distance coming up fast. We hit the berm and the plane went up on the nose; then came right back down. We were at a complete stop; so I unbuckled quickly; opened the canopy; and back away from the plane; in fear that a fire may start. We both walked away from the accident ok. No injuries; we were wearing our seat belts; and were fine. Soon after the landing passerby's came to check on us; then 15 minutes later [medical and other officials] came to see what had happened.We made several flight plans on how much fuel should have been consumed; and kept coming to numbers around 9-10 gallons; and in the absolute worst conditions 14 gallons. Our 18 gallon load should have been plenty for us; but when we landed I visually checked the fuel with the stick; and we were completely empty.

Flight Instructor reported fuel starvation during descent resulting in a forced landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 156; Flight Crew Type 11000

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 190; Flight Crew Type 3200

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Confusion on taxi clearance with Ground Control led to wrong execution of desired taxi instructions.  F/O contributed by confusing Taxiway F and E with each other on readback to Ground Control. Ground Control exacerbated the confusion by non-standard terminology. Ground was referring to F5 as Ramp 5 Taxiway and F4 as Ramp 4. This may be clear to aircrews who are very familiar with Atlanta. Ground Control was very quick in reading taxi instruction; and very quick in passive aggressive comments to several aircrews taxing out. This set a very hostile atmosphere between Ground Control and taxiing aircrews. Not good for CRM. Sometimes slow is fast on giving taxi instructions to aircrews and giving them time to respond and clarify. I should have refused to taxi until Ground could take a deep breath and verify what he wanted us to do. Ground Control needs to keep comments professional and concise. Lecturing aircrews during congested radio communications does no good for anyone.

While holding short of Taxiway F; I called ATC just as another aircraft finished their readback. The frequency was very congested; and the Captain and I had already noticed the Controller was being condescending; and kind of rude; to the other people on the frequency. After I finished my taxi request; he responded by saying; 'how about if aircraft wait for other aircraft to quit talking before they call ATC.' I waited until there was a break in calls and called again. This time the Controller said 'standby.' After a minute or two; the Controller called us back and said 'taxi to Runway 8R; right turn on Foxtrot; left at Ramp 5; Left on E follow [aircraft] at Ramp 4.' I read back the instructions. I started by saying '(call sign) taxi to Runway 8R' but apparently swapped Taxiway E and F and instead of Ramp 5; said Foxtrot 5; as clarification to what Ramp 5 meant; since Ramp 5 is to the right; and the taxiway to the left is named F5. The Ground Controller responded by saying 'It helps if the aircraft responding uses their call sign in the readback and that was all wrong.' He repeated his instructions again several times and I read them back several times and was trying to figure out what he wanted as he was being very short and using a lot of non-standard phraseology; such as Ramp 4 and Ramp 5 for the Taxiways F4 and F5. After my final readback; the Controller said what we thought was 'just taxi via Ramp 4.' In retrospect I believe he was saying hold short of Ramp 4 and wanted us to turn right on Foxtrot; left on F5 (which he continued to call Ramp 5) left on E and hold short of F4. The Captain started to taxi on F4 to join E to Runway 8R. The Controller was talking to other aircraft complaining more about their readbacks as well. After we were almost at F2 he came back again and said that our taxi was all wrong and that we needed to turn left at F2; join F and taxi behind the MD80 (that had apparently come out of the same ramp spot we did) and 'follow that aircraft you almost cut off.' After that we followed the other aircraft to the runway uneventfully and the rest of the flight was without incident.

Air Carrier Flight crew reported a breakdown in communication during taxi out at ATL.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; General Police / Security Involved

As PM; I noticed fast moving LED's approximately half mile ahead of us and 200 to 300 feet below us on short final to Runway 10R at CMH. It appeared to be a drone of some sort; so I notified Tower and he immediately responded that he had eyes on it just as I finished pointing out the 'traffic'. The PF kept flying a great visual approach and landed uneventfully. Tower notified a police helicopter in the air nearby and they had him spotlighted before we even got to the gate (a one minute taxi; almost from 10R).

Air carrier First Officer reported a near miss with a UAV while on short final to CMH Runway 10R.


Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Ground Personnel

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 ATC

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Procedure

The flight originated in ZZZZ and our destination was ZZZZ1. The cargo hold was loaded with 96;378 kg of hazardous cargo. We arrived at the aircraft late due to a road closure. We began normal preflight duties and complied with the flight plan requirement to notify dispatch that the subsequent flight plan leg was onboard. During this time I took the opportunity to request approach plates for ZZZZ1 as when I entered this airfield identifier on the iPad it would not show any information. Dispatch ACARSed us back and instructed us that to get the airfield to appear you must utilize the alternate airfield entry; not the primary destination field. We attempted this and it worked. However the only information provided here is an airfield diagram; no instrument approaches are available to crew members here. This is confirmed in the station guide and charter message and thus a daylight visual approach is required into this airfield.After a slight delay due to fueling; temporary loss of ground crew; and a slot time the aircraft departed  at XA45z and was scheduled to arrive in ZZZZ1 at XH21z. I was the Pilot Flying and the First Officer was the Pilot Monitoring during this leg. The forecast weather at ETA was wind 070 Degrees at 9 kts; 8;000 meter visibility with haze and no clouds (VFR). About an hour before arrival the visibility began to drop to 2;600 meters (1.6 mi) and was projected to be below VFR minimums at our ETA. I inquired dispatch via ACARS to clarify the diversion plan. They confirmed that they did in fact want us to utilize ZZZZ2 in the event of a diversion. As we began our descent; the First Officer and I began to prepare to go into holding. We agreed upon and set a Bingo fuel of 22;000 kg (14;000 to get to ZZZZ2 with a 8;000 landing minimum). Once we arrived in the terminal area; we were instructed by ATC that ILS approaches were being conducted to Runway XXR and visibility was 2;000 m and projected to drop to 800 m in the next hour. The last aircraft to shoot an approach advised Tower that they had broken-out at 300 feet. This was a very different weather picture than what our Dispatcher had initially provided in the flight plan and subsequently sent to us. The weather that ZZZZ1 Tower was providing was much lower than all the weather that Dispatch was providing to us. I wasn't even sure they had access to ZZZZ1 weather information because of the great disparity. The First Officer and I elected to abide by what the airfield tower/ground was calling only.At this point we joined a holding pattern and attempted to wait until the weather was sufficient. During the one hour and twenty minute hold the crew persistently inquired about the current weather situation. The visibility never reached above 4;000 meters (2.5 mi). As we never reached VFR minimums we were unable to shoot the visual approach to Runway XXL into ZZZZ2. After we neared our Bingo fuel of 22;000 kg I notified Dispatch we had 10mins remaining on station. They attempted to piece another closer alternate which they suggested as ZZZZ3. I told them we were unable to use this. This was way too late to begin this process. This should have been accomplished two hours ago when I asked if they still wanted ZZZZ2 as the alternate before we even began our descent into ZZZZ1. Now we were forced to initiate a diversion to ZZZZ2 which was our designated alternate on our flight plan. It was estimated at being an additional one hour and twenty minutes to fly to the alternate airfield. During the 511 nm diversion; ATC held us at FL260 even though we requested FL340. Once we arrived in the terminal area; The First Officer contacted Ramp Control and they denied us entry to their ramp stating that our PPR# on the flight plan was only valid for passenger military flights not hazardous cargo nonmilitary flights. So to be clear we had hot cargo and no place to safely park. We were cleared to shoot the ILS to Runway XXL and I began intercepting the localizer and glide slope. We [requested priority handling] and told them it was for low fuel. About 15 nm on final; ZZZZ1 ATC told us to go-around because there was confusion about where we would be able to park the aircraft once on the ground. We followed ATC instructions and turned back to the south and went into holding again this time however with significantly less fuel remaining about 11;000 kg. We attempted to find a solution to the multi-layered problem of where to park but time was running out and eventually we utilized priority handling and began a turn back to the airfield by now we were 25-30 nm to the south of the field inbound descending out of 5;000 ft with about 8;500 kg left. The Controller kept telling us to standby and I sternly told him to clear all traffic between us and the runway we were landing regardless of his instructions. The ILS XXL was flown and the aircraft landed with no problems. We landed with 7;700 kg remaining. Ground Control directed the crew to taxi the aircraft clear of the runway and wait till a flow me car showed up to direct them to parking. After 30 mins of waiting we eventually taxied to parking and shutdown. At shutdown we had 5;500 kg of fuel remaining between all four main tanks.1. A good company policy might be to NOT accept charters to locations without all required information. Perhaps [Company] should have a charter feasibility checklist which should be completed before agreeing to accept the charter. Some of these required items might include: Jeppesen Plates; types of available approaches; possible parking locations; air-stairs and tow bar availability; lighting for night ops etc. The company doesn't need to accept charters that set us up to fail. By not providing us approach plates for ZZZZ1 with the possibility of fog and having us scheduled to arrive early morning set us up to have to divert. This made all of us look bad. The process by which we protect the company from dead-end charters needs to begin at the point of acceptance. This will lead to more satisfied customers and better margins for safety.2. Dispatch MUST select alternates with the nature of the charter in mind. Hazardous Cargo flights are especially sensitive to this. We must have a viable alternate that we can actually land at and proceed to a hot cargo spot on the airfield without having to declare priority handling or cause an international incident. A fake PPR# and no actual coordination with airport authority is simply unacceptable for charter service of this type.3. Remind Dispatch to NOT direct the crew to continue to hold until the fuel reaches FMC reserves. That isn't their job. They have a supporting role; not a directive role. Had we listened to them we would have had a worse situation with an unplanned and less coordinated diversion and possibly an international incident.4. Instruct Dispatch to not bring up a new possible divert field less than 10 min from beginning the diversion. There simply isn't enough time to review this. This has to be done earlier so the PIC can assess the option fully. Also there needs to be awareness on protecting the PICs train of thought during a critical phase of flight. A type of 'sterile cockpit' from Dispatch might help this. If the crew had a procedure to give a '10 min from diversion' ACARS maybe Dispatch could treat that as a temporary sterile cockpit. There are a great many things that have to happen as you begin a diversion. Distractions that detract from the task at hand can cause errors. A procedure like this might help prevent this.5. The weather needs to be accurate. If there is a disconnect between the weather the Tower/Ground is showing and what the weather Dispatcher is showing this could create confusion and lead to bad decisions.6. Tell MOD not to ask the crew to illegally exceed flight time on a two man crew after a diversion and subsequent emergency. Our total flight time after flying to ZZZZ1 and then diverting was 9+20. This is well overthe limit. There is no way we could have legally continued to operate this flight on from ZZZZ2. They shouldn't have even suggested it. I would recommend that the company adopt a policy that anytime pilots have an emergency; afterward they need to be entered into rest immediately no questions asked. This is because most major emergencies tend to overload a pilot with information. It can sometimes take pilots some time to process what just happened and during that processing cognitive skills and reaction times can be significantly degraded.

Weather was below required VFR for ZZZZ1. Entered Hold. Notified Dispatch and asked to confirm alternate if needed. Held until minimum reserves. Diverted to our filed Alternate ZZZZ2 as requested. Not given permission to land due to special cargo. Held until minimum fuel needed to commence approach. [Advised ATC] and landed. Exceeded flight time for basic crew and forced into rest.1. Hold Dispatch accountable for prior permission at alternate airfield when special cargo is onboard. Cargo was for civilian side of airport and unaware of cargo. Military side was aware but did not grant approval.2. Provide crews going into ZZZZ1 with approach charts.3. Weather from the Tower. They weather that dispatch was sending us was much better than weather from the field. 4. Add 3rd crew member to give flexibility on special cargo flights when VFR weather required.

B747 flight crew reported that poor weather caused a diversion; and hazardous cargo without proper paperwork created an issue when parking.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Around 100 knots on takeoff roll received multiple caution msgs; and; my PFD and MFD went dark for a few seconds. Captain decided to reject takeoff. It turns out the right Gen went out but also took a T.R with it. Bus ties were not working as they should. Ran DDG off the runway and taxied back to the gate. Mx had problems resetting the bus ties. Mx finally got everything everything straightened out and we left for ZZZ without further incident.

Slightly above 80 kts we got some screens flickering; then load shedding; multiple EICAS messages; which included R Gen Off. Since it appeared worse than a Gen Off indication I elected to abort the takeoff at about 100 kts. We informed tower and cleared the runway at G taxiway. Stopped the aircraft upon clearing the runway to run checklists; evaluate the situation; and see how hot the brakes will get. Upon further inspection we also had a Transformer Rectifier Status message. I elected to run the R Gen Off QRH but that was unsuccessful especially since the status message. I told the First Officer to run his after takeoff flow. We then contacted our companies Dispatch via Satcom. Told them the situation and that we would do a block turn back to give the plane back to maintenance. Me and the First Officer monitored the brake temperatures as we seen a high of 8 on the btms. The brakes were already cooling off really good and we didn't anticipate any problems so we elected to slowly taxi back into the blocks. When the First Officer did a walk around he didn't notice any defects to the tires; or brakes; etc. Maintenance had to do an engine run up to disconnect the Electric drive as there appeared no way to get that generator back online. When they did that they got multiple load shedding and the Lower Eicas went blank. The Apu generator was operating so none of that should have been happening and it appeared to be a bus tie issue not closing properly. They did a couple engine run ups and eventually got the bus ties to work correctly; the Gen Drive to disconnect normally; and got the Transformer Rectifier Eicas to clear. We later operated the flight with 1 engine generator and the Apu on the whole flight per the DDG. No other issues noted.

Flight Crew reported a rejected take off caused by electrical system failures.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; General Maintenance Action

I was directed to turn left from a heading of 020 to 330. I bugged 330 and the plane turned right. I disconnected the Number 1 autopilot and started back to the left; re-engaged the Number 1 autopilot and the plane again turned right. The zipper was left. I again disconnected the Number 1 autopilot and turned left. ATC asked us about our heading and we told them that we were having flight control problems. I manually rolled out on the assigned heading and engaged Number 2 autopilot. No further problems until landing when we had a complete HYD QTY Number 2 failure. I did a precautionary shutdown of Number 2 engine while taxiing in order to prevent any possible damage to the Number 2 engine and its associated systems. The failure was somewhere in the flight control systems of the right wing as evidenced by the hydraulic puddle under it. Hydraulic system Number 2 failure and Number 1 autopilot failure.

Crew was directed to turn left from a heading of 020 to 330. I rogered the turn command and saw the Pilot Flying (PF) twisting the heading bug. I went heads down to insert an FMC input. I heard the autopilot disconnect and the PF manually turned to the left. I needed SA and watched the PF reinsert the heading in the FCP and then re-engage the autopilot. The aircraft turned right instead of the commanded left. PF again disconnected the autopilot and manually turned back to assigned heading. ATC asked about our status and I told them we were having a malfunction. PF requested that I manipulate the FCP while he flew. I turned the HDG bug LEFT to assigned and pulled but the zipper then went right. I then pushed HDG hold and then reattempted a LEFT input to assigned and the FCP then accepted that and gave us a left zipper. After rolling out on heading we engaged Number 2 autopilot. No further problems until landing when we had a complete HYD QTY Number 2 failure. Captain directed a precautionary shutdown of Number 2 engine while taxing in order to prevent any possible damage to the Number 2 engine and its associated systems. The failure was somewhere in the flight control systems of the right wing as evidenced by the hydraulic puddle under it.

The reporter states that the hydraulic system failure was not annunciated until after touchdown; but the aircraft handled strangely during the hand flown approach. At the time this was attributed to the strong quartering right tailwind. Maintenance found a leak in the right wing spoiler actuator which was repaired but no faults could be found with the autopilot.

MD11 flight crew reports the autopilot turning the aircraft to the right when the heading bug is turned to the left. The autopilot is eventually turned off and the aircraft manually flown to the desired heading. The autopilot is then successfully reengaged. During the hand flown approach the aircraft handles strangely and after landing the number two hydraulic system fails.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 7200; Flight Crew Type 300

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; Human Factors

Upon departure from airport 47N; I noticed my GPS position shifted to a position north of the field even though I was tracking south followed by a fault indication... I suspected possible interference or spoofing or an issue with GPS unit itself as I have experienced this in the past and had to troubleshoot the issue with my avionics shop and manufacturer on numerous occasions so I immediately restarted my GPS unit in the aircraft.  As I continued to track south and my unit was resetting I noticed WRI airport just south of us and immediately turned right and initiated climb to try to avoid their airspace.  I then immediately contacted WRI for flight following and was advised I did indeed fly into the norther portion of their airspace.. This was completely unintentional and was the result of an equipment failure...

Small Twin Engine aircraft Single Pilot reported possible GPS jamming or equipment failure near WRI airport. The pilot stated the situation contributed to an airspace violation.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Workload; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

While training for the Part 61 commercial multi-engine course for the student. We did a full engine shut down at 4;500 FT; 4 miles east of the airport. The engine was fully feathered for about 1 minute before we started doing the checklist to unfeather the engine and commence an air-restart. The engine did not un-feather after following the procedure in the checklist; so we changed to do the starting the engine without accumulator checklist; however on our 4th attempt to start the engine with the starter the intercom stopped working and the right engine instruments stopped working as well. After this happened we decided [to call] ATC but they could not hear us properly so we went ahead and declared an emergency; squawk 7700 and make a straight in for Runway 28L. We could not communicate with ATC properly; however we could hear them fine. We did a couple of 360 degree turns to lose altitude. Before reaching 1;000 FT and having the runway assured we decided to put the landing gear down and it did not work; so we proceeded to do the Emergency Gear Extension Checklist and we had a 3 green gear down indication. We landed the aircraft with no other issues. Later on after we cleared the runway we were met by the emergency vehicles and towed back the ramp.Better maintenance inspection on the aircraft since it is not the first occurrence on this same airplane with the same engine. Add to the checklist to remind us to reduce the electrical load and wait longer time between times we try to restart the engine; since when its happening while trying to teach the student and other thing come into play we tend to fully focus solely on what the checklist says and forget to think about the other factors. This way maybe we could have maintained our radios to have better communication with ATC and being able to lower the landing gear using normal procedures.

A PA-44 instructor and student shutdown an engine for training but were unable to unfeather it. Multiple unfeather attempts drained the battery; caused communications difficulties; required manually lowering the landing gear and landing in an emergency condition.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Person Ground Personnel; Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Upon arrival after completing the parking checklist and after opening the L1 door; the two forward flight attendants; the first officer; and I smelled a faint fuel smell which we all assumed and agreed was coming from outside the aircraft given that there was an aircraft right next to us fueling. Our APU was running and the winds were gusting from the northwest which was directly towards our tail at the gate.My first officer and I also discussed the likely possibility of a fuel spill somewhere near us on the ramp. In my experience on this aircraft is it is not uncommon to get a faint; exhaust like fume smell in the air conditioning system and thick condensation during hot; muggy summer nights such as this one was. I assume the smell was stronger in the cabin than in the cockpit since both the FO (First Officer) and I had our air vents closed. The flight attendants requested that I make a PA stating that everything was ok and there was no cause for alarm and we are aware of the condensation and smell; which I did. The two forward flight attendants also informed me that 'they opened the doors in back' which I thought meant that the two rear flight attendants had opened the rear aircraft doors for ventilation. Our number three and one FA's (Flight Attendant) meant to inform me that passengers were exiting through the over wing exits. This was a simple misunderstanding that was caused by task saturation in the cockpit; monitoring the APU indications; and determining the cause of the smell.I was later informed that passengers took it upon themselves to open all four over wing exits and exit onto the wing. I was told that it was estimated that 15-20 people were on each wing at one point. Our number two flight attendant vocally told passengers to stop exiting through the over wing exits. She had no chance to prevent passengers from initiating the uncommanded evacuation given the crowded aisle and interior that is typical of everyone standing when the seat belt sign is turned off. Our number four flight attendant made a PA instructing passengers to stop and to not evacuate or exit though the over wing exits. I did not hear this PA.The FO and I opened our air vents and the fuel odor got stronger and the condensation thickened. I then shut off the Ram Air; APU AIR switch; and both packs; which caused the fuel smell to lessen considerably in intensity and the condensation stopped completely. A man who works the ramp came up to the cockpit and told us we had fuel leaking out of the APU. I then told him to connect external power and I began to shut down the APU. I also told the first officer to go outside and inspect the APU fuel leak with the ops personnel. We informed ground of the fuel leak and we requested ARFF (Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting) to come inspect the area as a precaution; which they did.I was told by the gate agent that only one person had jumped off the left wing. I was told by operations and my flight attendants that a few passengers came back into the airplane through the over wing doors; and the rest exited the wings on baggage belt loaders. There were no injuries that I know of. This was confirmed by all four flight attendants and operations personnel. Upon inspection of the APU; fuel was in fact leaking out of the non-ram door area and the fuel spill was about fifteen feet in diameter. I was instructed by maintenance to pull 5 circuit breakers; which I did; secured the airplane with the securing check; and made the appropriate entries in the maintenance logbook.

After parking at arrival gate aircraft experienced an APU fuel leak. Fumes spread throughout the cabin before passengers de-planed. Over wing exits were deployed and some passengers temporarily exited onto the wings. APU was shut down and fumes dissipated.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Bombardier/Canadair Undifferentiated or Other Model

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Aircraft X departed to their destination via direct. I left him on runway heading until he passed the tower airspace and issued a climb to 5000 feet. I gave him a reroute by routing him via BUBBA. I phonetically spelled BUBBA to the pilot and he read back to go direct 'BUBBA' then direct. I told him to fly heading 130 and direct BUBBA when able. I entered the routing change into the Flight Data Input/Output (FDIO) since I was also working Flight Data. Aircraft Y departed Runway 22 at GSP. I left Aircraft Y on runway heading to pass behind the expected track of Aircraft X with a climb to 100. At this time Aircraft X was already south of the flightpath of Aircraft Y with an expected heading of approximately 120 to BUBBA. I noticed that Aircraft X appeared to be slightly farther north than expected. It appeared he was on a heading of between 060 to 090 degrees. Because I made the entry into the FDIO before Aircraft Y departed; I had only seconds to attempt to determine the unexpected heading of Aircraft X before the aircraft began rapidly converging. I issued Aircraft Y a traffic alert and a turn to heading 270 in an attempt to turn him away from where it appeared Aircraft X was going. I then gave a traffic alert to Aircraft X and he reported the traffic in sight and 'no factor; passing above him'. I told Aircraft X to maintain visual separation with the traffic. Even though approved separation did not exist before applying visual separation I was unsure of where Aircraft X was heading so I wanted to make it clear to him to avoid Aircraft Y. After separation was reestablished I asked the pilot of Aircraft X where he was going. He told me that he was direct to BUBAA instead of BUBBA. The primary cause of this incident is the pilot's failure to navigate to the correct fix. It is possible that the situation could have been less severe if I had a way to more accurately determine the heading of Aircraft X. We are using ARTS IIE radar displays so there are no tools to help determine current heading. It is extremely hard to determine the heading of a slow moving aircraft on our radar equipment. There is little movement between each sweep of the radar and our primary targets actually jump around away from their actual flight path by about half a mile. Due to these factors it is extremely difficult to determine a slow aircraft's current heading in less than 5-6 radar sweeps or approximately 30 seconds. If I had STARS (Radar display and software) with track history or projected tracks enabled I may have been able to more quickly determine the actual track of Aircraft X and give Aircraft Y a more appropriate turn away from Aircraft X by going directly east. Due to the speed in which the situation developed I doubt that any controller would be able to completely avoid a loss of separation; but it's possible that it could have been mitigated.

GSP TRACON Controller reported an aircraft deviated from its assigned course.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Normal Flight to ZZZ. Dispatcher informed us of moderate turbulence on descent into ZZZ. As we got closer to ZZZ; I informed the Cabin Crew that we would give them a 15 minute warning prior to descent into ZZZ; so that they could secure the cabin and be seated for the descent.Later I gave the Cabin Crew this warning and to be seated in 15 minutes. Approximately 3 minutes later I received a call from the cabin and they stated they had a medical issue with passenger and the passenger had an apparent seizure and was unconscious. I asked if they had any Doctors on board and they said they called for that and had no response yet. I asked them to also call for any Nurses on board and to call our POC via their hand held devices.I sent a message to Dispatch and asked for paramedics to meet the aircraft at the gate. After that when checking back with the cabin to see if any medical workers had responded to help. The Cabin Crew informed us that they had doctors and a nurse that were now evaluating the passenger; and that they reported that the passenger was unconscious with no pulse.We advised ATC and looked at our landing options. Winslow was the closest airport but it was XA pm at night and in our opinion would have limited medical options. ZZZ1 was the next closest airport at just over 120 miles. We discussed going to Flagstaff but I know the Flagstaff airport is quite a long way south of ZZZ1 and I felt that could be an issue for quick medical help. ZZZ was just slightly farther than Flagstaff by only a few miles but given the better medical infrastructure we felt that was our best option. I felt the passenger would get to a hospital faster by landing in ZZZ.We did our best to land as soon as possible. After arriving at the gate the paramedics met the aircraft at gate.We had three doctors and a nurse on board that responded to help our passenger. They all did their very best to help. I spoke with the nurse and two of the doctors after we landed and they stated that they did all they could but the passenger had aspirated and cardiac arrest. They were unable to get the passenger's heart to respond.They used everything at their disposal. They gave chest compressions and tried an Epinephrine shot. Nothing worked and our passenger's heart did not respond. They stated they could not use the defibrillator because there was no cardiac activity and the defibrillator does not work in that condition.Cardiac arrest.Doctor and nurse stated that all airlines should look at updating the medical kits. There are new tools available that would be helpful.

Air carrier Captain reported that an in flight medical emergency resulted in a diversion.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Workload; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

During the climb out of ZZZZ we got a Master Caution '>Autopilot' on the EICAS. At the time the right autopilot was connected; and in LNAV and VNAV modes. There was no autopilot disconnect; and there were no FMA mode flags. We noted the issue; looked at what the QRH had to say; and continued. We decided that the best thing to do was monitor the situation.We leveled at 8000 ft. and began getting 'direct to' clearances that shorten the distance from ZZZZ to ZZZZ1. We had begun a descent that put us in a good position to land in ZZZZ1; but then our route was cut much shorter than anticipated. We were cleared to descend to 3000 ft. on a heading of 220. I had called for flaps 5; and had the speed brakes extended in FLCH mode to help get us down a little quicker. The speed bug was down between Vref for flaps 1 and 5 with the flaps extended (not in transit) to Flaps 5. Passing about 4500 ft. in the turn to heading 220 we were given further turn to 280; and cleared for the ILS approach. We do not have a chart for the ILS approach to that runway and were shooting a VFR approach; and the Captain was stating this to the controller to get a clearance for the visual approach - consistent with the limited information available for this airport in [software].I was looking at the heading window; dialing heading 280 when the Captain called out that we were approaching a speed that would overspeed the flaps. I stopped; looked at the PFD (Primary Flight Display) to assess the situation that had suddenly developed; and my first impulse was to change the vertical mode to V/S to shallow the descent in order to slow the airplane; in the 1-2 seconds that I had moved my hand to carry out that change the Captain began saying 'Pull up! Pull up! Disconnect the autopilot and pull up!' I looked back at the PFD; saw that we were at the high speed cue; and descending through 3000 ft. The Flight Director had captured the altitude. 'ALT' was displayed on the FMA. There were no FMA mode flags. It appeared that the autopilot had stopped following the Flight Director guidance; and may have pitched down further. I disconnected the autopilot and recovered the aircraft to straight and level flight as quickly as I felt I could without over stressing the wing. We had descended to roughly 2300 ft. Throughout the recovery the Flight Director showed guidance to maintain 3000 ft.There was some discussion as to whether we should attempt to climb back to 3000; or continue the approach from our present position. At 2300 ft. we were just slightly low on the approach. We were established on our straight-in course to the runway; and I had heard cleared for the approach at some point in the preceding few seconds. We confirmed our approach clearance; and continued the approach to a landing at ZZZZ1.Once we shut down the aircraft we wrote up the autopilot as not functioning correctly because it failed to follow the Flight Director guidance. We could find no reason why it would've stopped following the Flight Director guidance prior to the event; and believed that the autopilot malfunction was the cause of the event.This event highlights how rapidly a situation can develop. The only times my eyes were off the PFD were when I had them on the Mode Control Panel to control the autopilot. What I saw on the PFD when I looked back had me believing I must have been distracted for a significant time for this to develop; but I know that is not true. It developed within just a couple of seconds; and this was confirmed by the other pilots who didn't believe that I had missed anything.The situation got to the point that it did because of a turn clearance that came at the exact moment that the autopilot stopped following the Flight Director; and it occurred right around the time that we would call 1000 ft. to level off. We all know this 1000 ft. is a critical time; and our crew was paying attention. It highlights that even when we're doing everything right; something canquickly develop.As the pilot flying my mind went into an upset recovery mode for a few moments. The aircraft attitude was not outside the normal pitch or roll limitations; but I saw and treated this as a recovery in which I temporarily ignored route and altitude clearances until I was confident the plane was recovered to straight and level. This mentality was not easy to leave as we continued to the landing. In the future I will probably ask that we discontinue the approach for a few moments to ensure everyone in the cockpit (including myself) is ready to continue to the landing. To be roughly on glide path at 2300 ft. meant that when we recovered and continued to landing we were at least nearing an 8 mile final; and because of the issue we had to continue to move with purpose to continue that approach from a Flaps 5 configuration to being stable and configured at 1000 ft. Taking a moment to slow the tempo down after that event would've been a better course to take.

On climb out just before level off at 8000 ft. (short flight; final cruise altitude) we received an 'auto pilot' caution message. I was the Pilot Monitoring and we went over the QRH (advisory QRH; no action) The Pilot Flying was advised that per QRH the Autopilot was working at degraded mode. The autopilot seems to work properly tracking L nav and leveling off at 8000 ft. and holding altitude properly. I asked the Pilot Flying to pay extra attention to the autopilot. Shortly afterward; we were descending to 3000 (FLCh mode) and on a turn towards the airport for visual approach. At 3000 ft. I called altitude and airspeed. I noticed [the] airplane wasn't leveling and airspeed actually accelerating towards flaps 5 limits. I called the Pilot Flying to disconnect the autopilot and pitch up to return to altitude and to prevent flaps over speed. We recovered around 2600 ft. and climbed back to 3000 ft. without exceeding AFM limitation (G loads and flaps over speed).We continue to [our] destination for a visual approach followed by a normal approach and landing. At the gate we entered [the] discrepancy in [the] aircraft logbook. Maintenance could not duplicate issues after test and diagnostic.This was a short flight with [a] high workload and ATC barrier. Even though this was a high workload environment. As a crew; we should have disconnected the autopilot and hand flown the airplane or use another autopilot. Pilot flying should have paid more attention to the airplane and so should have I (Pilot Monitoring).I hope we can add a note in the QRH to try and connect [the] other autopilot even if the current one looks like it's doing a good job.

B747-400 flight crew reported continuing to use an autopilot after it had previously triggered an EICAS warning resulting in altitude and heading clearance deviations.