Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

As we were being vectored onto final we noticed that we were only five miles from the aircraft we were following; so we adjusted speed to maintain that after being cleared for the visual. On short final I realized the aircraft following us was about three miles behind us. After we touched down onto Runway 10 we were told 'no delay keep the speed up down the runway and exit onto Runway 4.' As we noticed we went passed Runway 4 slightly; the Controller told us that was Runway 4. During the Controllers' call he also told the aircraft behind us to go-around. We then made a hard left onto Runway 4 and the Controller told us to taxi northbound on Runway 4 and contact ground.  Nothing more was said about the event from the controllers.  There should've been more spacing between us and the aircraft that was following us. Also; there was no lead off lights onto Runway 4 and it can be difficult to see at night. You can't tell the difference between regular runway edge lights and embedded runway edge lights when you are told to keep the speed up at night.  It would've been a better option to give us instructions to exit onto Taxiway E that would have leadoff lights and centerline leadoff lines.

On approach into BWI in VMC we were given multiple speed assignments as were the aircraft in front of us and behind us. Once on final we had been slowed to 150 KTS and cleared for the visual with the aircraft in front of us as well as the runway in sight. In trail behind a 737 we made sure to maintain adequate spacing as the approaches were being run very closely together. We were landing Runway 10 and had briefed that we would most likely be told to turn off onto Runway 4. After touchdown Tower asked us to keep the speed up and make the turn off onto Runway 4 ASAP. From our approach briefing we knew it would be hard to find the correct turn off as you pass 15R and shortly after the correct runway 4; but there are no lead off lights or markings to give you an indication of when you are at the runway intersection. You are simply in a collection of white lights and have to figure out which ones are imbedded in the pavement of the intersecting runway; and which mark the boundary of the grass. We saw the appropriate runway sign but could not tell when we were supposed to turn; Tower advised us that we were in the intersection so we turned immediately and exited the runway. As this was happening Tower told the 737 behind us to go around. The taxi in continued with no other events.If an airport is going to use a runway as a taxiway especially at night; there should be some markings on the pavement leading you to the appropriate runway or lead off lights. Additionally; there should have been more spacing between aircraft so we wouldn't have to both 'keep the speed up' and make a complicated intersection with no markings.

BE400 flight crew reports being unable to rapidly identify Runway 4 after landing Runway 10 at BWI and the Tower issues go around instructions to the following B737. The flying Captain had slowed on final to maintain 5 miles in trail; reducing separation with the following B737.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Taxi in at MIA airport and cleared to taxi to cargo Ramp after clearing Runway 08R and cleared across 08L which was closed.  Upon taxing north [west] on taxiway went past cargo ramp due to ramp being dark and not well lighted.  Tower cleared us to back taxi on Runway 08L at K1 to K2 then back to ramp via Taxiway k.  By being more aware of where cargo ramp was located and the ramp being better lighted.

Taxiing in at Miami we were told to hold at Z for a medical flight that crossed in front to go to customs. Learjet was lost and made a wrong turn and finally taxied in front of us to customs.  We continued to taxi and inadvertently taxied past [our ramp].  The ramp was dark and the gate is not well lit.  We advised tower and they gave us clearance to taxi back on K1 back taxi Runway 8L to K2 then to the ramp via K.  We could have been more aware of ramp location and lack of lighting.  I had not been to MIA in a number of years and could have done more chart study.

Air Carrier cargo crew reports taxiing past their ramp on the northwest corner of the MIA airport due to unfamiliarity and a lack of lighting.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

While descending on the arrival into ZZZ; there was an alert on the EICAS; 'BATT 1 over temp.' We checked the electrical page on the MFD to confirm. It was blinking red and showed a temperature of 90C. We ran the memory items for such event and executed the QRH. We de-energized the battery and took it off Bus per the QRH. The temperature seemed to stabilize at that point. I alerted the Flight Attendant of a possible situation; that we were not [Request Priority Handling] yet; and that we would land in ZZZ as planned; but be ready for the situation to change. We alerted ATC of our issue and requested priority landing in ZZZ. Since the temperature of the battery stabilized; we decided not to divert anywhere and land in ZZZ as planned since we were already on the arrival and close enough. When we were handed off to ZZZ air traffic control; we informed them of the situation; and battery temperatures started rising again; up to 130C at one point. At that point I thought we had entered thermal runaway. [Priority Handling was Requested]; and I requested fire trucks to inspect us on the runway upon landing. I told the passengers they would see emergency vehicles waiting for us; but not to be alarmed. We were just following protocol for the indications the airplane was giving us. The fire trucks inspected us; and the battery panels; and gave us an all-clear signal. We taxied to the gate without further incident. We never got any smoke or smells in the cockpit.

EMB-145 Captain reported a temperature rise in the aircraft's main battery causing a priority landing.


Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

After pushing back onto taxiway C the parking bake was set. Another aircraft was pushing tail to tail with us off [another gate]. ATC advised that aircraft that they were pushing too far and to stop; to which they replied 'say again' as they continued to push. ATC then repeated 'STOP'. We had felt no unusual movement and were unaware of the situation when ATC cleared us to taxi. After beginning our taxi; a third aircraft told ATC that our tails looked very close; but could not tell whether or not there was contact. ATC was unable to make a determination from the tower either and briefed us on the situation and asked our intentions. We elected to return to the gate to have maintenance inspect the tail extremities. Using a lift maintenance inspected the entire tail section and confirmed there was no contact. I contacted dispatch then departed. I'm not sure; but the other aircraft may have been being operated by maintenance.

A321 First Officer reported a near collision with another aircraft during pushback at LAX.


GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 5R; VOR / VORTAC SMO

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

While descending on the AVSAR2A arrival into Mexico City MMMX; we were cleared to descend to 12;000 feet MSL and direct to the Mateo VOR (SMO). Subsequently we received clearance to fly the RNAV (GPS) or ILS Rwy 5. The autopilot was engaged and LNAV and VNAV were selected and operating. Upon reaching SMO the aircraft continued straight through the fix without turning to fly the course out of MAVEK IAF which overlies SMO VOR. Apparently there is a discontinuity there of which I was unaware at that moment. I went to heading select to begin turning back to our expected routing when Mexico City Approach called and gave us vectors back to intercept then ILS Rwy 5R.Checking for a discontinuity on the legs page would have avoided the problem.

MATEO and MAVEK are the same point in space; but they have different names. This leads to confusion.MAVEK is only depicted on the RNAV GPS approach; it is not depicted on the ILS DME RWY 05R. Approach uses both terms interchangeably. The first time I was going into MMMX; I was planning to fly the ILS and did not look at the RNAV approach. I was cleared to MAVEK; but had no idea where it was since it was not depicted on the AVSAR STAR or the ILS approach plate. This is confusing; especially with the language barrier.What makes the situation worse; is that if you are direct to Mateo and then cleared to the RNAV approach; the auto pilot has a discontinuity; gets confused and disengages. You have to be going direct to Mavek; not MATEO; for the RNAV approach to work.Change the approach procedures at MMMX so that there is only one name for the point in space known as MAVEK and [SMO].

Inbound to MMMX on the AVSAR2A arrival a B737 crew was cleared direct to SMO VOR; cleared the RNAV (GPS) or ILS Rwy 5R approach. Upon passing SMO the jet continued straight ahead instead of turning toward the approach.


On the descent passing through approximately 22;000 FT; the First Officer and I felt what seemed like wake turbulence.  The flight attendant felt it as well and called the flight deck to ask what it was; I informed her that it was turbulence and everything was OK.  The flight continued uneventfully to a normal landing.  Upon completing the post flight inspection; the First Officer found the top half of the right engine cowl was missing.

The Flight Crew of a CRJ-200 thought they had encountered wake turbulence during descent around 22;000 FT.  Upon inspection after landing; they discovered the top half of the right engine cowling was missing and presumed lost enroute.


Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Workload

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight operated normally enroute. Upon approach while scanning the instruments the Captain noticed that our engine oil temperature was unusually high; rising steadily into the yellow arc. We discussed our options and that if the temperature reached the red arc we would be forced to shut the #1 engine down. As we came abeam the airport on vectors we agreed that the temperature was very close to the red arc and stayed steady; which ruled out a gauge issue for us. At this point the Captain made the decision to tell ATC we needed to land immediately and would not be able to risk extra delayed vectors in the air as we felt an engine shutdown was becoming imminent. I fully agreed with his decision to do so based on both of our experiences in this aircraft. We declared an emergency and were given priority to land and immediate vectors for the approach. Because this issue would only become worse with time we did not feel it would be appropriate to trouble shoot the problem and felt the safest course of action was to get the plane on the ground as soon as possible. I ran the appropriate checklists before landing and continued to monitor the gauge in case an engine shutdown was needed as we landed the aircraft. The temperature gauge continued to stay in the upper yellow arc on approach but upon touchdown rose into the red arc. We safely exited the runway and shut down the #1 engine. After ground emergency vehicles checked the aircraft and we could tell it had safely shut down and the engine was secured we notified them that we no longer needed any services and taxied safely to our gate while the ground crews followed us.

A SF340 engine developed high oil temperature during approach so an emergency was declared; a short approach requested while the oil remained below the red arc and a normal landing followed after which the engine was shutdown.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

When descending through FL300 we were cross feeding from right tank to left engine when we got the 'fuel boost pump L' CAS message amber on. I then turned off the crossed switch. Then the 'fuel press low R' CAS message came on. I then turned the boost pumps on. At that time the right engine quit running. We then ran the engine securing checklist followed by the single engine approach and landing checklist. We decided to land at [a nearby alternate] for the long runway and [fire and rescue] if needed. We made a normal landing with a non event. We taxied to [FBO] under power.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CE-750 flight crew reported the right engine flamed out during descent due to a failed boost pump.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

Level at 11;000 feet [after departure] and accelerating; the L OIL PRESS LO annunciator illuminated.  I noted the Oil Pressure to be 35 PSI at this point and decreasing rapidly.  I was the Pilot Flying; and at this time I took the radios so Captain (CA) could run the appropriate checklists.  I requested return to [departure airport].  Complied with QRH OIL PRESSURE LOW.  Step 2a says 'with oil pressure less than 35 PSI and OIL PRESS LO Annunciator; Engine Shutdown Required. Refer to Engine failure/shutdown procedure this section'. Complied with QRH ENGINE FLAMEOUT/SHUTDOWN/FAILURE.  Secured the Left engine as oil pressure was dropping through about 10 PSI. CA notified the cabin crew with the nature of the [situation] and to prepare the cabin.  He also addressed the passengers that we would be returning to [departure airport] due to mechanical issues.As the pilot flying; I got the weather and decided [on] the best suitable runway.  I flew a visual approach; single engine. We ran all appropriate single engine approach and landing checklists.  Emergency vehicles met us on the taxiway; where we told them we could taxi to the gate.  They followed us there for safety purposes. Upon arriving at the gate; we were met by mechanics; who further informed us that a Chip Detector had 'blown' and we had lost all oil. QRH phraseology changes from one procedure to the next.  Needs to be uniform for faster compliance.When referring to a procedure in the QRH that should be followed next; it would be helpful to have the procedure number for faster look up.

A MD-88 First Officer reported returning to the departure airport after shutting down the left engine because of low oil pressure.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

[Aircraft X's] flight plan [included] FKN ISO; but he flew down J193 to CVI. This is a common occurrence at sector 34. I've turned it in to the supervisor and Operations Manager in the past. It has been an issue at DCA in the past. I don't know what happened tonight; but it is really unsafe. I was trying to get him higher through FL340 traffic that I had.  I almost issued FL340 when I saw he was not on course. I asked him where he was going and he said to CVI. I asked if that was what he was issued off the ground and he said; it's what was in our flight plan. We were not showing the same thing. This has been an issue for at least 3 years. It seemed to have been fixed; but in the last few months I've seen it several times and have now had 2 close calls with it. We need to find out what the problem is with the issuing of this route at the Towers. I find it hard to believe that all of these occurrences are pilot error.

ZDC Center Controller reports of a close call because an aircraft was on a different route than what ATC had. This has been a problem in the past but was reported to be fixed. Problem of incorrect routing is surfacing again.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

During stable cruise [we had an] amber indication on ED1 hydraulic 1 low pressure. Ran QRH and were directed to land at nearest suitable airport. Diverted to [nearest suitable] and complied with ATC instructions. On our descent we decided declaring an emergency was the right thing to do. Made visual approach with no issues and once clear of the runway we ended the emergency.

CRJ-200 First Officer reported losing #1 Hydraulic System. Flight declared emergency and diverted to nearest suitable airport.


During the initial climb of the flight we experience 6 events of strong radio interference due to ACARS transmissions/crosstalk. These events caused both discomfort due to the very loud volume of the interfering transmissions and difficulty in understanding ATC communication. The interference partially masked ATC transmissions between ATC and other airplanes.  Additional interference events occurred during the flight for a total of 10 events.  During the last six weeks many crews have been experiencing frequent events of radio interference due to ACARS transmissions/crosstalk. These interference events should be a safety concern. They caused in more than one occasion to miss/misunderstand critical ATC communications and instructions during the departure phase of the flight.Something changed since December 2013. The interference could be caused by changes in the ACARS communication software; protocols; procedures; equipment.  Usually after Weight Off Wheel both the FMS and the EICAS show an 'ACARS NO COMM' message; shortly after that a very loud burst of digital communication is heard into the pilot headsets. In the worse cases the interfering signal is repeated multiple times during the first few minutes after take off. There should be an investigation of these events. In the meantime pilots should be provided temporary procedures (like disabling the ACARS system) to be used during the departure phase of the flight. As today; six weeks after the beginning of the interference problems the airline has not provided pilots with any kind of information; recommendation or addressed this safety issue in any noticeable way.

CRJ-900 First Officer experiences communication radio interference caused by ACARS data transmissions right after takeoff; resulting in missed ATC communications.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Total 1900; Flight Crew Type 400

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Confusion; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

After our descent via the STAR; we were following vectors into ZZZ; we departed ZZZZZ Intersection perhaps on a heading of 290 or 300; at one point we basically paralleled the airway 20 miles at 3000 ft southwest from the ZZZ VOR.At that point after following various vectors; and listening the controller yell at another aircraft using the words 'turn immediately'; a heading of 360 was given to us; which I remember complaining to my First Officer; telling him  'that heading will put us more to the north and away from ZZZ'; also on the path of departing traffic from a nearby airport; my first officer tried to confirmed the heading but due to other radio clutter and other transitions was not able to confirm it; by then we heard the words 'Aircraft X turn Immediately to 180' our TCASII gave us a Traffic advisory followed by an Resolution advisory which I follow descending from  3000 to 2300 approximately. At that point I saw a Saab 340 going above us less than one mile; we reported the traffic in sight; no abrupt maneuvers were necessary; we were clear to climb back to 3000; never made it to a heading of 360; the TCASII went off before then. Following this incident several more TA on the TCASII were noted before landing in ZZZ. Later; after landing and during the flight debrief; it was noted that perhaps the intended heading given by the ATC controller was 260; the confusion between 260 and 360 was the contributing factor causing the incident. To this day we are not 100% sure; only that is the more logical heading. Radio clutter made more difficult to confirm the instructions. We were handed over to the next controller and landed at ZZZ; we were never advised of a possible violation by any of the controllers. After this event; we did some training on ADM and CRM; to help us prevent any events like this from happening again; personally we will confirm and altitudes and heading change by both pilots.

Due to a radio clutter issue the flight crew misunderstood an assigned heading clearance in a high density terminal environment. The erroneous heading resulted in an airborne conflict which generated a TA and RA event. The aircraft was then assigned an immediate heading to exit the traffic threat area and landed uneventfully.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; MEL; Manuals; Procedure

On ETOPS Pre-departure Check; noticed # 1 and # 2 Engine Outlet Guide Vanes (OGVs) all had metallic tape installed; reference Maintenance Manual (M/M) 72-33-00-6. No logbook documentation; no tracking document for a temporary repair item. I referred to company Procedures Manual which clearly states that all instances of metallic tape require a Technical Document; even if the repair is considered permanent. [I] notified Supervisor and Manager. Told that Mr. X in Maintenance Control said no Technical Document required. [I] went off shift before I contacted him. Called back; and Mr. X indicated no applicable Technical Document for ATA Chapter-72; so could not provide Technical Document Number to Manager. After much discussion; [he] signed-off item in violation of directive stated in our company Procedures Manual; even after I explained there was no Procedures Manual relief for what he was doing.Part of problem is Engineering revised same Maintenance Manual on September 2012; renaming 'Speed Tape' to 'Vibration Damping Tape'. Engineering appeared to be trying to circumvent Procedures Manual mandate on [use of] metallic tape (my point of view). Perceived attitude from local Manager was that this is a normal fix; and not a big deal. Create metallic tape tracking document for all Engine ATA Chapters as well. Train all Aircraft Maintenance [personnel] that there are no exceptions for metallic tape. Tracking Document was not applied.

A Line Mechanic reports about the lack of proper documentation and deferral tracking of metallic type Speed Tape applied to the # 1 and # 2 Engine Outlet Guide Vanes (OGVs) on their B767-300 ETOPS aircraft.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Automation Aircraft TA; Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On approach to 16R at SEA; clear; VMC; just prior to 1;000 feet AGL; we received a TCAS TA; then a momentary RA. This was caused by a single engine prop departing BFI. They made right downwind departure; which I think is not normal. This caused them to be closer to the arrival path into SEA. I saw the traffic at our 7-8 o'clock position before the RA. Traffic was well behind us and proceeding behind our path. We got the RA for about 5 seconds to monitor vertical speed. The First Officer; pilot flying; followed the RA. After; we were able to continue the approach on Glide Slope with no issues. Reported the event to SEA Tower on approach. Right downwind departure from BFI should not be allowed when aircraft are landing 16's to SEA. Even if they remain low; the rate of climb will trigger an RA possible with traffic on approach to 16; as [it] did to us.

EMB-170 Captain reported an RA with traffic on a nonstandard departure from BFI.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

While on arrival to ZZZ; I started making radio calls about 12 minutes out. After my 3rd call to ZZZ traffic; a helicopter reported doing hover work on the runway; mid field and requested any traffic to report. I immediately responded; 'We were on final for RWY 3.' We received no response; but as we got closer. Both the First Officer and I visually cleared the runway and proceeded to land. It wasn't until we were touching down that I noticed a helicopter on the runway. We had no time to go around and was committed to landing.  It was at this time I applied max braking and try to anticipate the helicopters intended movement as its motion was subtle but erratic. It wasn't until the last few seconds I made a radio call ordering the R-22 to clear the runway. Which he started to comply with as we were coming to a stop just short of Taxiway A5 on the runway. We came to a stop approximately 10 feet from the R-22 rotor disc. The aircraft color was green and I could not make out a tail number. We spoke with the gate agents at ZZZ to try and determine the aircrafts FBO in order to have a discussion with the pilot. It was determined the aircraft was the property of a flight school at a nearby airfield. Both the First Officer and I also left statements with the Fire Department on ZZZ.' With increased commercial traffic; ZZZ needs to have a control tower.

Flight Crew flying CRJ-900 had a ground conflict with a helicopter during landing.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Preflighted aircraft at gate in SEA during light drizzle and 4C OAT.  I inspected the wing for possible clear ice after fueling.  I did not detect any ice; and passengers were boarded.  Take off and climb out were normal with anti-ice on.  In flight; cabin crew called us to inform us that they saw ice formations on the top of the right wing.  The formations were streaked in the slipstream like rivers of ice.  There were no unusual airframe or aerodynamic vibrations.  Flight was continued with no further problem.

B737 First Officer reports inspecting the wings for ice formation after refueling during light drizzle and finds no ice. The Flight Attendant's believe they see ice  on the wings during flight but no abnormal flying qualities are noted.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

I was working the Local and Helicopter positions combined at DCA ATC. I have been CPC/FPL for [a short time].I accepted a handoff from Potomac TRACON on Aircraft X 2 miles west of ZZZ. Aircraft X contacted DCA Tower and requested to fly Route 1-Route 4 -ZZZ1 and then to ZZZ2. I radar contacted Aircraft X; approved the request and issued the altimeter.Aircraft Y called on a seven mile final to DCA and requested to land on Runway XX. I then I cleared Aircraft Y to land.Note. My standard practice for helicopters flying the DCA helicopter route is to issue any pertinent landing traffic by the time the helicopters pass over the South Capitol Street Bridge.Aircraft X asked if I had issued traffic on the aircraft landing Runway XX. I thought I had applied my standard practice of issuing traffic to the helicopters over the bridge so I informed Aircraft X that I had issued the traffic.Once Aircraft Y landed; he asked about the flight of three helicopters off his right. I informed him I had issued traffic to Aircraft X.Neither aircraft declared a near miss on frequency. At all times I had maintained Tower applied visual separation between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y.I recommend recurrent helicopter training for the facility to prevent this incident from occurring in the future with other controllers.

DCA Controller reported they failed to issue traffic information to multiple VFR flights on approach.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 15.5

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

Aircraft X; E75L; on the arrival; following Aircraft Y; a B737 (700 series) about 11 miles behind. The pilot said something about getting some pretty good wake turbulence and asked who they were following. I told them it was a B737 about 11 miles in front (measured 10.9). I asked Aircraft Y to verify they were actually a 7 and not an 800 series; they said affirmative. I asked them if they were any heavier than normal; they said no. I went back to Aircraft X to ask them if they got an un-commanded roll. They said yes; and 35 degrees (I think they said to port; it was a wing roll). I asked Aircraft X if anyone had gotten hurt; he said no they had asked the flight attendants; but everyone was OK.This is the first time I've had a wake event with a 700 series. I know that the 8/9 (and A321) can generate these problems. In talking to the OM (Operations Manager); we had a discussion about conditions that are more conducive to making wake turbulence stronger and less amenable to dissipation such as low winds; not much shear that might cause it to break up faster.In addition to this event; I was privy (during training) of other events in the last couple of weeks. One was a CL30 following an A321 at the same altitude about 10 miles back. The other was when I was training an R side on 65 with an A320 at FL350 and a B772 at FL360. I have been telling my R side developmental to call the traffic and make sure they follow the .65 procedures of saying heavy and giving a cautionary. In this case; he did; which gave the pilots at 350 a chance to be prepared for the traffic. I know that often a 1000 feet vertically doesn't generate any wake turbulence for the lower aircraft; but in this case the pilots at 350 felt it and said 'they got rocked by the wake.'I'm giving these reports because of being told previously the FAA was looking at them; collecting data; and trying to do something about it. I think we need more training for en route controllers about wake turbulence because of the over reliance on 1000/5 [1000 feet/5 miles] and the predominant mindset of wake turbulence not being a problem; even so much for heavy aircraft; in the en route environment. These trends have shown that it a problem because of the accuracies of RNAV; the better design of the wing; and (speculation here) RNAV arrivals that change flight characteristics with the way the FMS flies the plane. Also; we need to train controllers (and probably weather people) on the conditions which could make wake turbulence more of a problem. I also recommend research (CAMI and others) on preceding aircraft problems that might generate more wake turbulence problems for the training aircraft.

ZAB Controller reported an E175 11 miles behind a B737-700 encountered wake turbulence causing a 35 degree un-commanded roll.


Flight Crew Total 3200; Flight Crew Type 1450

Conflict NMAC; Ground Event / Encounter FOD

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Approaching PVD on radar vectors for the visual approach Runway 23. Small GA aircraft on VFR and not in contact with ATC got into close proximity of our flight path. We reacted with an RA and maneuvered on a climb per TCAS instructions to clear conflict. GA aircraft was believed to be within 300 ft of vertical separation. On final approach the runway had a trash bag and other FOD; so the ground crew failed to clear the FOD from the runway causing a go around instructed by ATC. Go around executed around 700 ft AGL. [Caused by] aircraft flying VFR near complex airspace. And trash bag on runway. Followed per [company] procedures in both cases. Encourage VFR traffic to be in radar contact if flying near complex airspace.

Air carrier Captain reported reacting to an RA triggered by a light aircraft during their arrival into PVD; and then executing a go-around after noticing FOD on the runway.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 19

Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Procedure

Eglin Missions Coordinator had called the day before to try to approve Aircraft X and Aircraft Y; IFR at at 14;000 feet and 15;000 feet; to do holding north of R2915; just to the west of CEW; for a few hours. They were denied; correctly; by the Supervisor.  That is right in the way of all departures and arrivals into PNS Approach and VPS Approach; as well as PNS N MOA (Military Operating Area); and some departures/arrivals into PAM Approach.  You will be hard pressed to find a worse spot in the entire US airspace to have two aircraft hold for hours; during the middle of the day. They were planning on doing some sort of military targeting or work from that position south into R2915; repeatedly.After being denied on one day they launched anyway on the next day; and claimed to be VFR; at two IFR altitudes.  When I took over the sector they had already been approved as pointouts by the previous controller; who had also voiced objections to the Supervisor; but VPS Approach or missions decided to launch them anyway; in spite of being denied the previous day. I worked for probably an hour and a half with Aircraft X and Aircraft Y in the way; moving perhaps three dozen civilian and military aircraft around these two 'VFR' aircraft at IFR altitudes. There was no loss of separation; but it greatly increased overall complexity and workload; with little communication or teamwork from VPS Missions.  As far as I understand; VPS approach controllers were not exactly happy with these aircraft in the way either; nor was PNS Approach.  If there had been more weather in the way; this could truly have been a colossal headache and possibly led to multiple separation errors.Note that the controller relieving me eventually; did not want to take the sector; and invoked Article 65 on the recorded briefing; as well as informing management that he was uncomfortable with the situation. At the time; PNS N MOA was active; just north of the Aircraft X and Aircraft Y holding area; as well as Rose Hill [MOA]; along with the standard high level of inbound/outbound traffic; all directed at CEW; during this time of day.  I cannot stress enough how poor of a spot that is to have aircraft holding; especially at those altitudes.Never allow this again.  VFR or IFR; the FAA cannot allow the military to use up hundreds of square miles of airspace; and then take up even more airspace when they are unable to stay inside there already vast released airspace.  They are literally putting civilian traffic in danger.  If they must run some sort of targeting mission at R2915; come in from the south. Do not go north out of R2915. Missions coordinators at ZJX must deny these sort of insane requests by default; not approve them and then have the area supervisor try to be the voice of reason at the last second; let alone the controller at the sector. Readers unfamiliar with Crestview sector (R10) will not realize how crowded this airspace gets regularly; let alone with added aircraft holding right in the center; that are not in communication with ZJX; and have a poorly defined holding track/mission.

A Center Controller reported two VFR military aircraft from Eglin AFB entered a holding pattern at non VFR altitudes (14;000 and 15;000 feet) adjacent to R2915 and in conflict with the major traffic flows through the sectors. The previous day the military's request for these aircraft to perform this operation on IFR flight plans had been denied.


Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Diverted

Upon arrival at destination and after careful planning for a low visibility approach throughout the flight due to forecast conditions; the Captain set up for CAT3 approach. On the approach with Approach Armed and 3 autopilot's  engaged 'No Autoland' was annunciated. Autoland Status was reset and 'No Autoland' went away.  On approach with Loc and Glide slope captured 'Land 2' was annunciated. Go around by the Captain; with autopilot engaged was commenced due to downgrade. While following Tower instructions for go around; we began experiencing degrades in the automation that did not present any EICAS messages but created confusion and problems with 'what is the aircraft doing now' type of concerns! We leveled off at 3000 FT and set up for CAT 3 Land 2. While receiving vectors with autopilot engaged; the flight director/autopilot  would only command 5 degree bank in turns. Due to concerns of unknown system faults causing problems and the inability to trust the automation for another approach attempt; the crew elected to divert.  We then requested deviation to ZZZZ which was CAT1.  During climb the autopilot stopped capturing altitude and at one point we missed our level off by 200-300 FT. Attempting to reset some unkown fault and non-EICAS displayed system failure; the Captain and First Officer tried to reset the system multiple times.  They turned off Autopilot and both Flight Director's twice; tried each Autopilot; to try to reset the system but it did not work. Each time the automation would restrict turns in Heading Select to 5 degrees AOB despite attempting the auto or 5-25 degree settings.  The autopilot and flight director had difficulty maintaining or capturing altitude. We set up for Cat1 ILS. On approach; LOC captured but when Glide slope was about to capture; the pitch annunciation went blank and Glide slope did not capture. At that moment; the plane also pitched up. We then flew  the approach manually to landing using raw data. On touchdown; the spoilers did not deploy (they were armed) and were deployed manually.  None of the faults were annunciated except the downgrade to Land 2. 1. Make sure aircraft maintenance does not dispatch aircraft with questionable automation and keep the aircradt better maintained to a level so this incident does not happen.  2. When operating with degraded automation; increase attention to any deviation of operating parameters.

B757 First Officer experiences an Autoland downgrade during a CAT III approach and the Captain goes around. The autopilot displays bizarre behavior while setting up for another attempt and the crew elects to divert to an airport with CAT I weather.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was flying from ZZZ - ZZZ1. I was Pilot Monitoring and my First Officer was Pilot Flying. The weather at the time was heavy rain; 4 sm visibility; and overcast at 2;200 ft. At the time ZZZ was in a south flow and we were set up for Runway XXR. After we pushed back; ran the after start checklist and were ready to taxi; ground informed us that they were switching to a north flow and to expect Runway XYR; and stated the winds were '300 at 14 kts.' I stopped; re-entered the numbers in ACARS and the new numbers for Runway XYR were flaps 20 instead of flaps 8; which I promptly read out and pointed at. Somehow; however; the new flap position did not get selected. I then called for the runway change checklist; ran it; and began our taxi. Upon commencing the takeoff roll and passing through 80 knots; I was doing my scan of the instruments and noticed the flaps were still at 8 and not 20; so I selected 20. We got a 'config flaps' warning which promptly went away as soon as the flaps reached their newly commanded position so I continued the takeoff roll and lifted off without any issues.The reason I elected not to abort the takeoff was because we were in heavy rain and the aircraft only had one operable thrust reverser. Adding a 'flaps __' item in the before takeoff above the line checklist but the barriers that are currently in place have been sufficient numerous times before. I simply made a mistake that I have learned from and that will make me more vigilant and observant in my duties.

CRJ Captain reported that distraction and a runway change resulted in takeoff with an incorrect flap setting.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Was scheduled to deadhead back to ZZZ from ZZZ1 after an overnight and deadhead from ZZZ2. I checked the load on the aircraft that morning and the aircraft was overbooked by X people it was an X type aircraft for XXX passengers.  Several messages of maintaining social distancing were played throughout the airport as well as physical signs about maintaining at least 6 feet between you and other people.  We had several announcements on the aircraft from ZZZ2 about spreading out and maintaining social distancing recommendations.  Yet here we were scheduled on an aircraft where every seat was filled.  I notified crew scheduling about the situation (they should have already known).  I had found an aircraft going directly back to my home (ZZZ3) which was less than half full and asked to be released.  I did notify my crew about the situation and told them what I was planning.  However; the FO lives in ZZZ and had no other options; the FAs did not think they could get released and thought that they had no other options.  With no N95 masks to protect themselves and with studies showing that over 50% of infected individuals are asymptomatic the company put their crews in a no win situation with the high possibility to be infected and unable to perform their duties within 2-14 days as well as possibly infecting other crews within that time not to mention their families.Crew scheduling has the same software and better than crews do to check aircraft loads.  Our partners know what their aircraft loads are.  Just two weeks ago a similar situation presented itself and our partner replaced the same type aircraft with a much larger aircraft] in order to enable social distancing and passenger comfort as well as crew safety.  We have multiple aircraft sitting unused and deteriorating on the runways and taxiways of all of our hubs.  There is no excuse for allowing this situation.  We were a valid and available crew; aircraft need to fly in order to avoid future maintenance issues and there are aircraft not being used.  At a minimum someone should set up some crew only flights for transporting commuting and deadheading crews; so we can reduce our exposure. They could be shared between all airline companies.  At the same time or in addition more aircraft should be utilized as passengers should not be forced to sit next to each other and violate CDC guidelines.  Our partners could start enabling us to fly; but instead had canceled several flights (not for crew availability or aircraft) during the day.  Just offering some suggestions as to how we can do this better and not put our aircrews nor our passengers in jeopardy.  Fortunately; I had other options; most others do not.

Air carrier Captain reported being scheduled a flight at full passenger capacity and was concerned about social distancing and exposure to COVID-19.


Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

We took-off in daylight and landed in darkness. Enroute; I noticed that the landing lights seamed dim and it was difficult to tell if we were in a cloud or not with the retractable underwing lights. I didn't think much of it; and assumed that the clouds weren't thick. Turning the cockpit illumination way down would allow me to see that there were lights going on and off; but in a very dim method; similar to what I am used to seeing when the lights are turned on NOT in a cloud.After landing; the tower commented that we did not have our landing lights on for landing. This was NOT true. I had the lights on for landing. As I was taxiing around I started playing with the various lights on the aircraft and while ALL lights on the aircraft cast SOME very little illumination only the taxi light and the runway turnoff lights cast some useable light that could illuminate something before I would have it at taxi speed. The underwing landing lights and the Nose wheel landing light cast no useable illumination. They did create a little bit of a glow but literally the light did not reach forward of the cockpit.I have a suspicion that these are LED bulbs. They cast a very different light; and [have a] focus different from normal LANDING lights. I have a further suspicion that they are meant to be a taxi lights; but that they have been used as main landing lights; and do not cast the adequate light for the purposes of flight. As they do not cast the EXPECTED amount of light; not only are they unusable as an illumination device for the cockpit flight crew flying the aircraft; but as a safety issue do NOT allow OTHER aircraft to see our aircraft and judge its relative position in darkness.I did not write up these lights at the time. As every light switch had some sort of functional bulb attached to it; at the time it did not occur to me. I should have written them up; and will going forward. Tower's comment to us on landing at makes that abundantly clear as I ponder it away from the aircraft.[My] suggestions is to verify the lights are correct in the aircraft in question. They do NOT even provide enough illumination to allow the aircraft to be seen in flight by another aircraft and are completely useless for illuminating a landing at night.

An Airbus 321 Captain reported that the landing lights were very dim. The Captain alluded to the possibility that the wrong bulbs had been installed.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 350; Flight Crew Total 1250; Flight Crew Type 300

Physiological - Other; Training / Qualification

Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Practicing aborted take offs on runway. The student failed to correct for the simulated aborted takeoff; the student froze and applied rudder only; as the aircraft  began yawing towards the grass area the IP took the mixtures and cut both engines and attempted to maintain directional control. The aircraft came to a full stop in the grass area. No damage or injuries noted to the aircraft or the field.

During practice aborted takeoff; aircraft departed the hard surface of the runway and came to a stop in the grass.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 14

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload; Situational Awareness; Fatigue

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Aircraft X was climbing out of about 20;000 feet when I switched him to the High Altitude sector. He was handed off to ZZZ1 Center High altitude sectors. A little while later the low altitude sector pointed out an aircraft at 23;000 feet going eastbound. I was thinking that they were showing it to me because the same guy was working both planes but that was not the case. I got so use to ZZZ1 Center sectors being combined down there that I didn't put together that I hadn't pointed out the Aircraft X in the climbout to the low side and he didn't know anything about him pointed right at the other aircraft. ZZZ1 Center had to turn both planes last minute to avoid and situation. I ended up violating a sector in ZZZ1 Center and cause a unsafe situation with two aircraft they were forced to turn. I am trying to adjust back to a normal schedule and this is the first day shift I have worked since last month so my sleep schedule is a little chaotic as I am trying to adjust.Not sure anything is needed to be recommended it should have been obvious on my first day shift back in normal operations that things would not be the same as they have been because of the pandemic.

A Center Controller reported they assumed adjacent sectors were combined but they were not; which resulted in an airspace violation and two aircraft on conflicting routes entering the next facility sector.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 8; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 8

Honeywell GDC service is used for generating computerized flight plans under contract with annual fee. This service is usually accurate and reliable. In this case the quick compute flight plan (as well as all other available suggested and other) flight plan routings were the same. ATC advised that our clearance took us right through Restricted Airspace over Yucca Mountain. All the routes they offer are going through this area. ATC - ZLA - gave us vectors to remain outside of R airspace and there was no occurrence incident. This report is to advise that the computerized flight plan service; Honeywell GDC Go Direct does not have an accurate airspace model for avoiding Restricted Airspace in this area and needs to always be supervised and checked.

Captain reported that the Honeywell GDC computer-generated flight plan built a route through restricted airspace.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

We had a bird strike at rotation taking off Runway 19 at DCA. The bird hit the radome and the Captain's windshield. On climb out there was a loud squeal and we suspected a window seal leak. We [advised ATC of the situation] and with Captain's authority; landed overweight. We followed the appropriate QRH procedures. The landing was normal; touchdown was less than 50 feet per minute and we weighed 147;000 pounds. A bird strike form has been submitted. The Aircraft Maintenance Log (AML) was filled out appropriately and addressed by maintenance; no damage was found.

Takeoff from DCA Runway 19; just after rotation we had a single thump on the airframe and noticed a large bug splat on the Captain's forward windscreen close to the center line. We concluded it was a bird strike; no other indications noticed. The Captain continued the climb and clean up with no problems until reaching roughly 4;000 feet where a very loud squeal was heard. We assumed a window seal had been compromised and under Captain's Authority decided to [advise ATC of the situation] and divert. Speed never exceeded 250 and altitude no higher than 5;000. Aircraft maintained pressurization throughout. We did notice the squeal decreased and ceased at less than 1.4 differential PSI (3;500 feet). Appropriate QRH checklists were accomplished. We landed overweight at 147;000 with less than 60 feet/minute [on the] Vertical Speed Indicator (VSI) on touchdown; 30 flaps; brakes 1 and rolled long to prevent overheating brakes. Crash and rescue met us on just off the runway for inspection of airframe and brakes. No issues. Bird strike form submitted.

B737-800 crew reported a bird strike on departure from DCA which resulted in a loud squeal and a diversion.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 8500; Flight Crew Type 500

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Joining the localizer at ORD we encountered wake turbulence from a B747 ahead of us. The turbulence was surprising because it put our aircraft into a bank one direction; we recovered; then the other (probably the other wake trail.) Very little altitude was gained or lost. We felt this was probably pretty surprising to the passengers as it had been a very smooth ride up to that point. The Captain decided to make an announcement explaining this to the passengers. The heavy was more than 5 miles ahead of us but we didn't have it in sight. Must have been some strange wind patterns or the heavy was high joining or something for us to encounter this because we were pretty much on the localizer and glideslope joining. The rest of the approach we came in a half dot high and didn't encounter anymore of the wake.

B737 First Officer reported encountering wake vortex in trail of a B747 on approach at ORD that caused uncommanded roll.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft radar failed shortly after takeoff. Declared an emergency complied with all appropriate checklists and returned for landing; at 155;000 LBS all was uneventful.

B737-800 First Officer experiences the failure of the weather radar shortly after takeoff. An emergency is declared and the flight returns to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

On a visual approach to 16R; we were about 4 miles in trail of a 737 with autopilot and autothrottles engaged. I was PM [pilot monitoring] and noted that the 737 was on higher path to the runway; and we would probably clip their wake. Outside of FINKA; we encountered the wake turbulence and experienced approximately 30 deg left roll in response. The AP and AT disconnected and the Captain resumed hand flying the airplane. The following caution messages posted on EICAS: WINDSHEAR FAIL; AT FAIL; STALL PROT FAIL; and AOA LIMIT FAIL. I grabbed the QRH and started looking for the messages while configuring landing flaps. I didn't want to be heads down in the book instead of monitoring flight path and speed; so I set aside the QRH to resume monitoring the Captain's manual approach. We considered a go-around; however; the aircraft was configured and stable; so we continued to landing. I noted that we lost green dot; amber and red band indications on the speed tape. After landing; the caution messages cleared and were replaced by ADS PROBE 2; 3; & 4 FAIL messages. I looked at the QRH while we taxied in. We ran the [checklist] and handed the airplane over to maintenance. After reviewing the STALL PROT FAIL QRH; I saw it calls for Vref Full + 15 knots; which was about 5 knots faster than our bugged Vapp. If I had to do it over again; I would more strongly consider going around to complete all the QRH procedures; especially in cases of high winds or low weather.

ERJ-175 First Officer reported encountering wake turbulence on arrival into SEA that resulted in multiple EICAS messages.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

While descending into ZZZ; we experienced a dirty sock/musty smell starting around FL180.  The smell dissipated as we descended; and was completely gone during approach and landing.  The #1 Flight Attendant (F/A) called at 4;000 feet; and reported that they were experiencing the smell throughout the airplane.  I spoke to the FA after landing and the FA did not report that any customers had complained.  To date; neither myself nor First Officer have experienced any physical problems.  No further input.

A320 Captain reported a fumes event during descent starting at FL180. Fumes dissipated gradually and completely dissipated during approach and landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 108; Flight Crew Total 3318; Flight Crew Type 1356

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

While executing the RNAV Approach in to ZZZZ. We were told by ATC to execute a missed approach due to drone activity over or near the airport. We executed the missed approach; entered holding and were vectored back for a second RNAV approach; this time uneventful. On the first approach we also came within 1/2 a mile of a paraglider at our altitude in the vicinity of the ZZZZZ intersection.

777 First Officer reported an ATC initiated missed approach due to drone activity.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

While cruising at FL450; and approximately 100 nm east from ZZZ; and after about an hour into the flight; our Flight Attendant came up to cockpit to inform us about a loud noise back in cabin. After confirming myself as the Flying Pilot; the Non Flying Pilot went back into the cabin to assess the situation. Upon returning to the cockpit; he explained to me that one of the life rafts had begun to inflate; and had broken through the cabinet which contains it. We requested from ATC to descend. ATC initially gave us FL240; and while descending; we and requested a divert to ZZZ; while stating to ATC what the nature of the situation was. We landed in ZZZ approximately 20 minutes later with no further incident.  Possibly a faulty valve on the raft.  Maintain periodic checks on life rafts.

In cruise flight at FL450; one hour into the flight; there was a very loud bang and the Flight Attendant rushed up front. There were several other loud popping sounds after the initial one. Went back to check and the forward right side life raft was trying to deploy in its compartment. The secondary sounds heard were of the cabinet breaking and coming away from the galley. I slid seat R1 forward to block the possibility of full deployment after advising the passengers and the cabin hostess to move to the most aft seats available in the aircraft. Everyone was briefed that we would need to be seated as far away from the issue and not to touch anything that might cause it to further inflate. Also advised them of a precautionary descent to a lower altitude and diversion plan to ZZZ.  PIC advised ATC asking for a flight level change down to 20;000 feet and a turn to ZZZ and we called for the equipment to be waiting. We continued down to 11;000 feet and planned for landing in ZZZ on Runway XX without further incident or injury. We deplaned the passengers and stayed with them in the FBO; until a plan could be formulated to take care of them. Unknown cause of un-commanded life raft inflation. Life raft inspections across the fleet possibly to make sure there aren't any other issues.

Challenger 350 flight crew reported a life raft inflated while at cruise and having to divert.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 7100; Flight Crew Type 1500

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy

Arriving at an airport on a short IFR flight I had been cleared for the visual approach to runway 19. Approach mentioned that they had lost my Mode C; so I tried resetting the transponder without success. I contacted the Tower and was cleared to make the left base to 19. Seconds after receiving that transmission my radios went dark. Realizing that I had a total electrical failure; I reverted to non-radio procedures and made an upwind toward the Tower so I could observe the light signals. As I was cranking the gear down I received the solid green light and entered a left downwind for 19 and completed the circuit for an uneventful landing on 19. During the taxi to the FBO I was able to energize the emergency circuit; regaining my radios and contacted ground. They took my phone number and I proceeded to park the plane.This incident was caused by my failure to turn on both alternators after engine start; which caused the battery to run down. At the urging of one of our mechanics; I had recently adopted the new practice of turning on the alternators after starting each engine; presumably to preserve the alternators. Perhaps I was tired and/or distracted; but I totally failed to comply with my new checklist/flow routine. Furthermore; every pilot is or should be on edge about navigating through [busy] airspace. Consequently; I was distracted from my normal full cockpit scan; by which I would have quickly noticed a discharging battery and the faulty position of both alternator switches.Lessons learned:1. Go back to turning on both alternator switches along with battery switch for engine starts; coinciding with POH/AFM guidance; by the way.2. Close adherence to checklist items.3. Concentrate on full cockpit scan; especially in busy; complicated airspace.

A C-402 Pilot forgot to turn the alternators ON after engine start because of a procedural change to leave them off until after engine start and when nearing his destination lost all electrical power with dead batteries. He discovered his error after landing and establish communications with ATC.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The TFR in place at Bedminster; New Jersey places airport 47N within the 30NM ring. This; of course; requires pilots to be on an IFR flight plan or have a VFR flight plan on file; and have a transponder code and communication with ATC. For those of us who operate at this airport; we have been told by ATC that we are unable to depart IFR; unless able to climb in VMC to the Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA) of 2000 feet. We have been told that the reason for this is that SBJ VOR is the only IFR departure fix that has been flight tested for this airport and SBJ is within the 10NM 'no fly' ring of the TFR. 1. This restriction is causing undue burden on the pilots wishing or needing to depart in IFR conditions from 47N. 2. This restriction is effectively denying access to the flying public from using their own tax-payer-funded public ATC system. 3. With the vagaries of weather reporting; this restriction is potentially encouraging unsafe practices by encouraging pilots to depart in marginal conditions in order to pick up and continue on their IFR flight plan. Anecdotally; I understand that there are other nearby non-towered airports where this same problem exists. The solution to this is to flight test one or more additional departure fixes that lie outside the 10NM TFR ring.

GA pilot reported instrument departure procedures ATC imposed upon an airport with a nearby TFR in effect are unsafe.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

While working Sector 21 during a busy departure/arrival push; Aircraft X reported that on the previous sector he had an RA and had to descend for the traffic.  The traffic was in my airspace; but SoCal Tracon was working the aircraft climbing into my airspace as LOA dictates.  This is problematic because often enough they do not issue or look for VFR traffic in our sky even though they are climbing into it.  This is what happened with Aircraft X.  We don't really know when they climb or turn aircraft and is often too late to call them with traffic.  I did see the traffic at 15;500 feet and did issue it to some of my aircraft; but was too busy to tell if it would have been a factor for Aircraft X who was talking to SoCal and apparently did not see the traffic (or did and didn't do anything to avoid it).Either give SoCal TRACON more airspace to climb aircraft in their own sky or change the LOA to only climb to the top of their airspace (13;000 feet).  This had been a problem for as long as I have been assigned to ZLA.

ZLA Controller reports of pilot telling him about a RA that he had while talking to the underlying Approach Control.  Controller alluded to this happening all the time.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 9600; Flight Crew Type 700

While climbing through approximately FL230 at our best climb speed; ATC requested us to increase climb rate as it would help them out tremendously and also gave us a frequency change. I told the FO to reply that we could not increase our rate of climb as we were already doing the best we could. The FO (who is also a company Captain) told the Controller that we would give him the best we could and acknowledged our frequency change. Before the FO contacted the new Controller I reiterated that we needed to let them know that we could not increase our rate of climb. The FO then stated to me 'I'm not going to tell them that. I will tell them that we will give them what we can and let them figure it out.' I was taken aback by his statement and attitude. The FO then contacted the new Controller and told them that we were climbing as fast as we could. At this point; having told the new Controller we were climbing as well as we could; I let the issue drop for the sake of not creating a hostile environment on the flight deck. The Controller did not make any further mention of our climb rate.  I was so taken aback by this Captain's attitude that I did not respond as I would have with a new FO and gotten on the radio myself and made clear that we could not comply with the ATC request to increase climb rate. In the future I will not attempt such diplomacy as I tried on this Captain acting as an FO; but will act as I would normally and make sure there is no confusion between ATC and my aircraft. One very important human factors lesson I have taken away from this issue is the effect that having two Captains on a flight deck can make. Our company routinely uses two Captains and in such cases in the past the other Captains have always deferred to the individual that is designated as the trip Captain. I have also done this when I have been assigned as an FO. I have learned to be vigilant in the future for other's who may not remember that I am the Captain. I will include this reminder of crew roles in all future crew briefings.

BE-350 Captain reported having CRM issues with a Captain-qualified First Officer.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 300

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Human Factors

I was instructing a private pilot in a Super Decathlon; he was trying to earn his tailwheel endorsement. We were doing touch and goes and according to ATC the primary radar was nonfunctional. We were in the right downwind leg near the approach end; when we were instructed to do a left 360 turn. We read back the instruction and completed the left 360 turn. We were then told 'extend [your] upwind; I'll call your downwind' by the controller. Before we could clarify the instructions; the controller then told us 'correction extend downwind I'll call the base' and we read it back before continuing our downwind past the approach end of the runway. The controller then told us to make another left 360 turn and we read that back and begin and begin the left 360 turn. At this point we were at least a mile past the runway and unable to see it. We came out of the 360 turn and continued back on our extended downwind. I then noticed that we were getting close to the extended centerline of the runway; so I told the private pilot that he need to move to the left. As he began turning away from the extended centerline we saw a T38 pass below us uncomfortably close.

Decathlon instructor pilot reports being issued two 360 degree turns on the downwind for spacing for an inbound T38. During the maneuvers the student allows his aircraft to drift into the final approach course and a NMAC results.


Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

We departed out of ATL behind an A320 and got into some wake turbulence after liftoff. I had the yoke fully left all the way to the stop and held it there for a few seconds and it felt like we still slowly rolled to the right in the wake. Feedback from company: The download for your flight came in and you definitely got into some wake turbulence. At 230 FT AGL while pitched up 17 degrees on a 275 heading at 169 KTS; it appears you hit the preceding traffic's wake for the first time. Roll angle went from zero to 3 degrees to the right in one second. In the next 2 seconds; your aircraft banked to a maximum of 17.5 degrees right while you input 25.75 degrees of left aileron deflection. By comparison; the First Officer hit 25.94 degrees to the stop on the flight control check; so yes; you did have it fully to the left for 1.5 seconds and from the data point at which you first hit the stop for the next 2 seconds; right bank increased from 11.4 degrees to 17.5 degrees. The aircraft then rolled left; reaching a maximum left bank angle of 7.8 degrees 2 seconds after you came out of full left aileron. While the aircraft rolled left; you input a maximum 13.2 degrees of right aileron; so about half input. From there the rolling motions settled down and you got the autopilot on at 754 FT. Vertical G's reached a minimum of 0.84G one second after exiting the second wake encounter and there was a maximum lateral G of 0.094 at approximately the same time; so there was very little side loading. Interestingly the AOA in the first wake with the full left deflection decreased from 8.53 degrees to 4.66 degrees but increased to a maximum 9.67 degrees as you entered the 2nd wake with the left deflection. That's pretty high and usually enough to show a hit of continuous ignition in the -200 but we don't see this parameter in the -900. For comparison; your maximum AOA at rotation was 8.17 degrees. Speed loss was minimal; only about 9 KTS; but that brought you down to V2+4 at 650 FT 4 seconds after the second wake encounter. That may be far more than what you were seeking; but it's interesting to see how the aircraft reacts (or sometimes does not quickly enough) to wake encounters.

CL-65 Captain reported encountering significant wake turbulence in trail of an A320 departing from ATL.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 7500; Flight Crew Type 50

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While attempting to fuel my plane; I noticed a C-152 land; taxi back to RWY 36; and takeoff. Because of problems with the card reader on the pump; I was unable to get gas and decided to fly a few patterns while the line crew sorted out the problem. During this time I didn't notice any aircraft in the pattern; and figured the C-152 had departed. I taxied out and after my before takeoff checks; I scanned the pattern and took off. I flew a standard crosswind; downwind and base; announcing my position using standard reports. I heard someone making traffic reports on CTAF but I couldn't understand what they were saying because of their accent. I figured they were at one of the nearby airports that use [similar frequency] because I didn't see anyone in the pattern. When I turned final; I saw the 152 I had previously seen slightly below and ahead of me (perhaps 3 aircraft lengths ahead of me) as I was in a descending left turn. I broke out of the pattern to the right; performing a 270 degree turn to achieve safe spacing on the Cessna and land. Human Factors: I should have been more curious about which airport this aircraft was flying the pattern. I don't know if I would have understood or gotten a response; but I could have asked the pilot where they were directly.

J3 Cub pilot reported an NMAC in the pattern at the non-towered airport.


Boarding; Safety Related Duties; Service

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Other / Unknown; Physiological - Other

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

After the cleaners sprayed the aircraft; we were rushed to get on the plane and board. The smell of the spray was so strong; we could immediately taste and feel irritation in our throat; eyes; and taste it. Even during the demonstration my eyes were very irritated. It wasn't until after takeoff and the air was circulating that we felt a tiny bit of relief.

Flight Attendant reported after the aircraft had been sanitized a strong odor remained for a lengthy period of time resulting in throat and eye irritation.


Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Procedure; Airport; Chart Or Publication

Cleared to 9000 feet near FFU on the QWENN3 arrival for RW 34L. We received a TERRAIN EGPWS caution at 9000 in IMC near FFU. Immediately disconnected the autopilot; initialed a climb and advised the controller that we were in a climb responding to a TERRAIN alert. At approximately 9800 feet the EGPWS caution message stopped. As we started to descend back to our last assigned altitude ATC confirmed that we were descending back to 9000 and subsequently gave us multiple turns/headings in a rapid succession to get us back on the final approach course. As we began to comply; ATC announced that we were left of course; gave us a turn to the Northwest away for the final approach course and assigned us 10;000 feet. We were then vectored to a left downwind and subsequently back onto the ILS RW 34L approach.Minimum Vectoring Altitude on the arrival causing EGPWS alert near a critical point of transition from the arrival to the approach phase of flight. Recommend raising the Minimum Vectoring Altitude along that segment of the arrival.

A CRJ-200 inbound to SLC on the QWENN RAV STAR was cleared to 9000 MSL in the vicinity of FFU VOR. As they neared FFU the received an EGPWS Terrain Warning and executed the evasive maneuver until the warning ceased. ATC then vectored them with step down altitudes to a safe landing.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Procedure; Manuals; MEL; Aircraft; Human Factors

This is a follow-up report similar to one I filed four months ago. This pertained to door window fogging on B767s and the absence of language in the MEL to identify this condition as unserviceable. The same scenario played out again at ZZZ in August 2013. A B-767 aircraft arrived with the forward Right Cabin Door window completely covered in condensation. Supervisor X explained to me that the Technical Manager approved the condition and issued MEL 56-XX. I told Supervisor X that I would not be a party to the deferral. Our Air Carrier is not taking seriously the [need for] visibility [out] of the door window. This is why MEL 56-XX must be revised to explain fogging and condensation are not permissible.

Reporter stated the B767 Main Cabin Door windows have electric heaters to prevent window fogging and moisture condensation build-up. Although the MEL allows deferral of the heating panels for the window; the real issue is the obscurity; the inability to see out of the window caused by the fogging and condensation build-up on windows from the inoperative window heaters. No indication light comes on in the cockpit when the door window heater fails. Moisture build-up on the door window is the only indication of a malfunction. Otherwise the door window heat is considered to be functioning. Reporter stated FAA representatives and his company's Engineering department all agree that the Cabin door windows must be clear to see out of and that an obscured window is a 'No-Go' item for the aircraft. But the MEL for the door window heat deferral does not have a proviso requiring the window to be clear prior to deferring the item. The B737s do have language in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) requiring window replacement due to lack of visibility; but the B767 AMM does not have similar verbiage regarding window obscurity. On the previous incident; the B767 aircraft was pulled out of service to repair the window heater failure. Their B767-300s are used on high valued flights; so the departure pressures on Management are really high. He has been reassigned away from their Line ETOPS departure aircraft and believes this sends the wrong message to other employees when they see safety discrepancies that should be addressed.

A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports about his Air Carrier's continued practice of releasing B767-300 aircraft with Main Cabin Door window viewports completely obscured by moisture condensation due to window heater panel failure. No Cabin Door window visibility requirements exists when deferring heat panels under B767 MEL 56-XX.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

I was scheduled to fly out of ZZZZ to ZZZZ1. While in cruise; I noticed the rudder pedals on the pilot side didn't mobilize as they should when pressed on to engage the brakes. I asked my SIC to perform the same checks on his side and he noted the pedals felt operational. We decided to continue our flight to ZZZZ1 and land taking into consideration that we might not have brake pressure and would have to perform a go-around and diversion to a longer runway. Rain had just ended in our destination and the runway was slightly wet. After touchdown; I try to engage the brakes to verify their status. Brakes started engaging on and off while we rolled on the runway. We decided to go-around. Before diverting to ZZZZ2 we acknowledge the fact that the runway was slightly wet and decided to try landing again. This second landing was firmer than the first one; I; as pilot flying; applied the brakes once more and this time around; no braking action was noticed therefore we decided to perform a go-around and divert to ZZZZ2. After touching down in ZZZZ2; brakes didn't engage appropriately; they were intermittent. After shutting down at the main ramp in ZZZZ2; deplaning and sending the passengers to a lounge; I talked to our mechanic on the phone and we both noted the brake fluid was lower than usual. The company flew another aircraft with a mechanic which happens to be also a pilot. He inspected the brakes visually and noted that the system looks fine. With that assessment; we accepted a ferry permit to fly back to base ZZZZ without passengers; for proper maintenance action. After touchdown in ZZZZ RWY XX and noting the fact that my 'now' SIC is a mechanic; I pushed on the rudder pedals to engage the brakes and try to assess what the issue was. This prompted no braking action. I communicated this to my SIC/Mechanic; and I increased pressure on the rudder pedals trying to note a response from the system with no luck. Eventually; after I kept applying pressure to the rudder pedals; the left and right main gear tires deflated disabling our aircraft in the runway. After this happened; we notified ATC (ZZZZ Tower) and shut down on the runway.

Pilot reported that the brakes did not show any braking action during several landing attempts. Pilot diverted and while attempting to brake upon landing; both main gear tires deflated.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 1200

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Approaching DEN we were given an arrival change.  As you know; the arrivals into DEN are complex RNAV arrivals.  During the arrival; a speed change was given while descending.  After the speed change was given; a subsequent runway change was given to an RNAV 35L.  After this runway change; another speed change was given on the RNAV arrival.  All these changes resulted in an enormous amount of heads down time for the pilot monitoring.  We were never able to get the RNAV 35 L briefed correctly or were we able to get it in the FMC before we were cleared for the approach due to all the changes that ATC was giving us.  Since it was VMC we reported the airport in sight and were cleared for the visual approach.  If it had been IMC; we would not have been able to accept an approach clearance due to how we were handled by ATC.  This is an ongoing problem in DEN.  The arrivals are very complex RNAV arrivals and ATC needs to know that late changes to the arrival; runway; or speed changes drastically increase our workload and create an unsafe condition.

Pilot reports of speed changes assigned by ATC not in compliance with what is on the arrival.  Also the pilot describes in the scenario late runway changes.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 08

Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Communication Breakdown

Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance

Arrival into Miami; FO [First Officer] briefed 26L. Miami changed airport around at the last minute to land 8L. I set up navigation radios and briefed approach while FO flew and configured the airplane. The localizer did not identify for 8L so FO switched to LNAV under VFR conditions (Later found out that Miami had not switched localizer from the 26R approach to 8L localizer) Late switch to tower and I dialed in the incorrect frequency 119.3 instead of 118.3. Checked in and we both believed we received clearance to land. After landing FO realized we were on the wrong frequency and checked in with tower. Due to compressed time because of the runway change with the additional complication of the wrong localizer identifier I rushed to enter the tower frequency and dialed in the wrong frequency. After attempting to check in with tower; I assumed tower issued clearance to land when in reality we were on the wrong frequency. Suggestions:Lesson learned is to confirm landing clearance is given before landing.

We were both task saturated at the end of a redeye flight. I was solely concentrating on the approach and landing and did not notice the radio issue until after landing. I should have cross checked the radio and confirmed that we had a landing clearance.

B737-800 flight crew reported they landed without clearance after a late runway change following a red-eye flight.


Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working sectors 15/16; RED FLAG-Alaska (RF-A) airspace was HOT and all RF-A players had returned to base(about an hour previous) with the exception of COSMIC11 and COSMIC12. The COSMIC flight was working in the vicinity of the DELTAMOA when Aircraft X requested IFR pickup about 55 NM southeast of FYU in YUKON2 MOA. I issued an IFR clearance to Aircraft X before requesting airspace back from EIL Range Control. I realized my made a mistake; and immediately tookaction to rectify the situation by attempting to contact EIL Range Control to request the return of unused portions of airspace; specificallyYUKON2. My actions were interrupted by COSMIC11 and 12 requesting IFR recovery from the southern boundary of YUKON1. OnceI issued the IFR clearance to COSMIC; I contacted EIL Range Control and took the airspace back.Military airspace should be called COLD once all aircraft have exited; not waiting until the scheduled time

ZAN Controller voiced concern regarding the failure of the military to provide timely coordination with regard to the status of restricted airspace resulting in a probable technical airspace infraction.


Beechcraft / Beech Aircraft Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft X was issued pilot discretion descent to 9;000 ft. He started down and I was busy working other traffic and had large differences in altimeter settings between ZZZ and ZZZ1 areas. I saw him go down to 8;900 or 8;800 ft. and thought it may just be a bad altimeter setting or since I had several frequencies that maybe he got stepped on trying to tell me he had airport in sight and wanted to cancel IFR. So I gave him altimeter setting for the closest airport; then asked him to verify altitude. On the next radar sweep he was still descending so I issued a low altitude alert and had him climb back up to 9;000 ft. He climbed back up and let me know about some forest fires in the area.

A Center Controller reported an aircraft descended below its assigned altitude and flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Received full route clearance from Clearance Delivery at HPN.  Clearance was copied down as BASYE SEALL V188 GON V374 intercept 130 Radial ORW V46 ACK.  Upon checking enroute chart for spelling of intersection saw BASYE and not BAYYS which as 30 miles away and also north of HPN.  Departed and received radar vectors got cleared direct BAYYS but went to BASYE 40 degrees right and 8 miles versus BAYYS 20 degrees right and 20 miles.  When we turned the Controller asked us where we were going and then gave us phonetic of BAYYS realized must have spelled BASYE wrong and inserted correct waypoint.   Should have queried Ground Controller on spelling to ensure right fix was selected.  Names sound very familiar.  Captain could not have helped because fix I wrote down on clearance was BASYE so when he cross checked route in FMS against clearance I had copied there was no difference.

First Officer reports being cleared via BAYYS after departure from HPN but enters BASYE in the FMC.  ATC detects and corrects the error.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Chart Or Publication; Airport; Human Factors

Taxied out of our CLT ramp to runway 18L; and the ATC instructions were 'Taxi via Alpha; join taxiway Charlie; hold short of Runway 23.' Reference CLT Taxi Diagram; page 10-9. Previously the First Officer and I had discussed the intersection in question between Alpha and Charlie; noted that it was a runway incursion hot spot (HS1); noted that there were some 'islands' along the taxiways; and that from the diagram it was hard to tell on which side of the island was taxiway Alpha located.While taxiing on Alpha; thinking that the first 'island' encountered was that island that seemed to split Alpha in two; I turned the airplane onto taxiway Golf and quickly realized we had made a wrong turn. ATC told us to hold our position because the area ahead of us was under construction. We attempted a 180 thinking we had enough room for the turn but soon realized we didn't have the space for the turn so we stopped the maneuver before getting stuck sideways. About 5 minutes later ATC was able to provide a 'follow me' vehicle that got us through the construction site (which was clear) and to taxiway Charlie towards Runway 18L.I blame the event on my unfamiliarity with the field and poorly lit taxiway signs; a poorly depicted diagram; but specially my failure to cross check and ask ATC when I wasn't 100% sure of my taxi route. Using the ground position feature and the clearer picture of the iPad would have helped understand the cleared taxi route.

Air carrier Captain reported mistakenly turning onto Taxiway Golf from Alpha towards a construction area during night operations.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 82; Flight Crew Total 13073; Flight Crew Type 265

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Chicago Approach assigned us an altitude of 3;000 FT from JOT to KGYY putting us in an environment with uncontrolled general aviation aircraft. We were advised of uncontrolled aircraft traffic at our altitude and was given a heading to avoid it; but it was given too late. An RA was commanded which we complied with putting us in a descent to avoid the traffic. ATC was informed of our actions. After initiating the descent the conflicting aircraft was observed passing overhead at our assigned 3;000 FT altitude. Airports were overflown on this route to Gary with several general aviation aircraft nearby. Being in this environment for such a long time flying to Gary is to be considered hazardous and warrants increased vigilance. Chicago Approach was extremely busy at this time working with traffic above us arriving Chicago Midway. Reliance on Approach Control for aircraft separation in this high traffic area is not to be assumed even if flying IFR.

A Corporate pilot reported a near miss en route to GGY after being assigned 3;000 FT by C90 in very busy airspace.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 9; Flight Crew Total 590; Flight Crew Type 435

Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

I landed on [the] runway with straight skis and slowed to taxi. The surface was glare ice. Upon turning left 90 degrees; the plane; due to lack of traction; turned approximately 120 degrees and hit a blue runway side light. After exiting the plane to direct it to the taxiway; I taxied the aircraft to its tie down and returned on foot to inspect the damage to the light. The light was rendered inoperable so I placed it next to another; similar light so that no other aircraft would hit it under normal circumstances. There was no damage to my plane and I; the sole occupant of the plane; was uninjured.

PA-20 pilot operating on skis lost directional control on the icy surface while clearing the runway and struck a runway edge light.


When in decent into LGA we were instructed to descend from 5000 to 4000 ft. fly over the Statue of Liberty and fly up the Hudson for the arrival. We complied and as we were about 4500 ft.; and just prior to overflying the Statue of Liberty; I looked down and saw what looked to be a drone just below us maybe 300-500 feet below. I saw what to be an X type drone white with black propellers and green and red blinking lights. I reported to ATC about the drone incident asked if the Captain had seen it; which he did not; and we did not need to take any evasive action for the drone. We continued in to the airport normally and had no other incidents. After landing; I contacted NYC TRACON and told him what I witnessed and the information of what he wanted to know.

B-737 First Officer reported encountering a drone while on vectors for landing at La Guardia.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 9000

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Early this summer I was with a primary student on approach to land behind an airliner. Suddenly the airliner; for no apparent; reason decided to go around. Of course following close behind I had instructed my student to stay high and land past the point that the airliner was going to touch down. When the airliner decided to go around it created a tremendous wake event. I alerted the Tower that I would need to take immediate evasive action and turned ninety degrees to avoid the wake. In over twenty years of flying I have never had this happen and it made me think that this is not something we teach students. I think this should be an issue that is included in textbooks. I certainly will alert my students to this possibility in the future.

C152 Instructor Pilot reported encountering wake turbulence on approach to AUS when the air carrier aircraft preceding him executed a go-around.


Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Approaching ZZZ we received  vectors for the right downwind to Runway XX. We were approximately 3 miles west of the airport when calling the airfield in sight. After being cleared for a visual approach the Captain began descending to 4;000 feet; the minimum altitude for the FAF. Shortly after leveling off at 4;000 feet and while turning right base; Approach Control issued a low altitude alert. Around 10 seconds later the EGPWS sounded with the aural warning. Auto pilot was then disengaged and the power was added to start a climb. The Captain hand flew the aircraft onto the inbound course through base and to final and landed without any further issues. The Captain started the right base turn prior to the 4;138 foot peak; but the closure rate tolerance for the EGPWS had been exceeded. We both had the airport/terrain in sight and we were very confident in our flight track; and therefore did not elect to perform an escape maneuver. [Suggest] approach brief to include the terrain height when landing in hilly/mountainous terrain. A steeper descent to make the turn to right base earlier.

CRJ-900 First Officer reported completing an uneventful landing after activating EGPWS and ATC low altitude alert.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working Finals and while controlling about 7 aircraft; my frequency transmitter was stuck on. At first I wasn't sure if it was a stuck microphone or our own transmitter. We've been having many issues with the frequencies and have called them out numerous times in the last 2 months. I went to standby transmitter/receiver and nothing changed. I called the Supervisor over and asked him to get me extra airspace since I was going to get backed up already due to complexity/volume and to tell feeder sectors to not switch any more aircraft until I could solve the issue or get to a backup frequency. I just tried to work over the transmitter issue. I could barely hear the aircraft; but they were following directions so I kept working while trying to communicate with the supervisor. I ended up having an overtake with Aircraft X and Aircraft Y. I did tell Aircraft X to slow twice; but did not and could not hear the readback. Separation was lost down to about 1.4 mile. Although not a large gap between standard ILS to ILS separations; the frequency issue that caused it is the reason I am writing this report. I plan on filing another systemic report on the lack of repair of our radios and believe that this situation ended up OK; but it adds a large amount of risk to the NAS to use frequencies that do not work with our traffic volume. The only thing I did not do; was go to the ECS frequency transmitter/receiver. I believe that our frequency issues need to get resolved. We have had to deal with this many times in the last month; only to be told to go back to it and is should work. That is unacceptable due to our volume of aircraft and complexity of airspace/aircraft types including foreign air carriers and language barriers.

A TRACON Controller reported that two aircraft on short final lost appropriate spacing due to an aircraft overtake when the the Controller's primary and backup radio failed.