Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 5300

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 15000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

Emergency declared for flight control malfunction. We were on downwind and slowing for a visual approach. Approach had just turned us over to Tower when the First Officer called for flaps 2 and we got an ECAM: F/CTL FLAPS FAULT/LOCKED. We stayed with Approach Control and advised them we had a flap problem and requested vectors for a box pattern over the airport; which were provided. The ECAM itself provides little guidance other than do not exceed 230 KTS. I got the book out and determined that we would be making a reduced flap/high speed landing. At that point; I declared an emergency with Approach and requested the equipment; Dispatch was informed of the situation via ACARS. After determining the approach speed and configuration; I informed Approach Control and Dispatch. I informed the flight attendants about what was going and told them not to prep for evacuation; but that we would be landing fast with hard braking. I also made a PA to explain what was going on to the passengers. Dispatch concurred with our approach speed computation and landing distance required. The landing was uneventful and the brake temperatures never went over about 480 degrees. We advised operations to be careful because of the hot brakes and with the fire department present were able to chock the wheels so we could release the brakes. I spoke with Maintenance Control today (next day after event) and they found that the bolts holding the torque tube driving the flaps on the right side had separated; so the right flaps did not extend when commanded. (The new flight manual format made finding the information we needed very difficult. All the red tabs just got in the way instead of helping. My First Officer and I had both browsed through the new format; but that is not the same as looking for information in the heat of battle. We also discussed using the iPad for the non-normal; but as the software is now configured; it would be a nightmare. I tried to use it to prepare for my PT recently. The search function might work a couple of times then the app would shut down requiring the user to reenter a password; it also shut down several times just turning pages. I finished the exams using my own computer. Another problem we considered was flipping between pages; once we found the material in the paper manual; it was easy to go back and forth. We know of no way to do this with [the iPad application]. Besides fixing the shutdown problem; to be usable; [the iPad application] should have a 'flight mode' that would keep the unit from going to sleep and the only password required should be the iPad password itself. Also; being able to select several pages to move/flip back and forth between them would be helpful. I believe the event went smoothly and that we worked well as a crew. Dispatch was also very helpful and backed up the information we needed. We had plenty of fuel so we never felt rushed which was good because we were both very tired; it was a long day and we both had come off of multiday trips that included both very late and all night flying.

The reporter states that the aircraft was carrying extra fuel and the extra time required to find pertinent information was never a factor. The procedure resulted in the aircraft landing with flaps up and slats 3 and the aircraft was easily stopped in the available runway.

We were descending on a left downwind for a visual approach. It was VFR night conditions. I was the flying pilot and I slowed to 180 KTS and asked for flaps 2. The autopilot was not engaged. We got an ECAM that said [flight control] flaps wing tip brakes locked. The ECAM directed us to fly a max speed of 230 KTS. We maintained configuration; engaged the autopilot and went to the flight manual. A quick calculation of 3 separate charts gave us an approach speed of 168 KTS. We asked ATC for vectors and declared an emergency; asking them to roll the trucks in anticipation of hot brakes. ATC was extremely helpful in giving us vectors for a box pattern on a 15 mile straight in approach. We advised the flight attendants to expect a faster than normal approach speed and heavy braking upon touchdown. We also advised them that we had declared an emergency and the fire trucks would be following us to the gate. After notifying Dispatch via ACARS and receiving a confirmation of our calculated approach speed we advised ATC we were ready to accept approach clearance and had the airport in sight. After an uneventful approach and landing we taxied in to the gate. The firefighters were very helpful in that they came up to the cockpit and verified brake temps were actually trending down before they departed. Our brakes reached a max temp of 490 degrees C. We debriefed with the flight attendants and they felt we had communicated our expectations of them in the situation and had no questions or concerns. My major concern in this scenario is this: how would we have handled this if we would have had only our iPads in the flight deck during this approach and landing? At one point; we had 4 different charts/ manual pages out at once. Specifically; FM ECAM notes for flight control flaps locked; abnormal flap/slat configuration; landing distance; and our maneuvers page for our profile. If we had only had our iPads; how would we have kept this info organized? Thankfully we have had this profile in recent training events; so these charts were somewhat familiar. I am advocating that we ALWAYS have at least ONE flight bag in the flight deck at all times; even after our EFB are exclusively approved for all phases of flight. After speaking with Maintenance the following morning we learned that 4 bolts had sheared off and our torque tube was awaiting replacement.

A319 Captain reports an ECAM: F/CTL FLAPS FAULT/LOCKED; when flaps are selected to 2 during approach which results in landing with flaps up and slats 3. Difficulties are reported locating information in a redesigned flight manual and using an iPad EFB.


FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 12R

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

In cruise flight; I mistakenly briefed the ILS 12L at MSP while my intent had been to brief the ILS 12R (both charts were on my 'clipboard' as both runways were in use). The ILS 12R was properly entered into the FMS; but due to the briefing error we both hard tuned the wrong localizer frequency. At 5000 feet when vectored and cleared for the ILS 12R; I joined the 12R course in LNAV (magenta) and as I switched to approach mode (green) I noted the displacement between the two needles and realized the mistake as the aircraft turned left. I quickly went back to LNAV and requested the PM to enter the correct frequency in both sides. The approach was armed again and continued normally. Our lateral deviation was likely similar to a 'bad vector' where the aircraft captures the localizer but does so after half-scale displacement.As a pilot group we seem to be very good at having the PM verify fixes and altitudes (and speeds) on arrival procedures (STARs); but seem to lack the same FMS cross-check when the PF briefs the approach chart itself. Whether briefing a departure procedure at the gate; an arrival procedure; or an approach; one pilot needs to be verifying the same information is in the FMS. Also; by 'hard tuning' the localizer frequencies (as most of us are taught in the sim and IOE); we introduced an element of human error in the system. The airplane is capable of auto-tuning the frequency for the programmed approach; and had we let it auto-tune; this situation may have been avoided.

EMB-175 Captain reported a track deviation occurred on approach to MSP when the flight crew tuned in the wrong ILS frequency.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 300; Flight Crew Type 150

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

[It was a] normal pattern to a base leg. After deploying flaps; the boost pump was accidentally switched on; which flooded the engine and caused a total loss of engine power. Due to the low altitude and the flaps being fully deployed; the aircraft could not glide to the runway; so I made the decision to take control and land off to the left side just short of the runway. The aircraft stopped rolling approximately 25 feet before the runway threshold. There appears to be no damage to the area where the landing occurred or to the aircraft itself. There is no sign of mechanical failure; only pilot error.

A36TN Bonanza pilot reported accidentally switching on the boost pump causing an engine failure at low altitude; resulting in an off-runway landing.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 196.87; Flight Crew Total 1618.17; Flight Crew Type 1618.17

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 206.5; Flight Crew Total 278.77; Flight Crew Type 278.77

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were on final on 16R coming into Denver. As we intercepted the course and set flaps to 5 we received a TCAS RA to descend. We could see Aircraft Y lining up for 16L to our upper left. The RA indicated that we descend. The CA began to lower the nose in accordance with the RA. Aircraft X did not go away even though we complied with its guidance. Naturally we became distracted with the RA and soon realized we were low on the glideslope. We simultaneously realized we were low just as the glideslope warning sounded. We observed 4 red lights on the PAPI. Fortunately the RA stopped. We were able to level; configure and complete a stabilized approach and landing.

On final approach into Denver on Runway 16R - another aircraft was on the parrallel approach to 16L.  This aircraft was above us and descending.  We followed the TCAS RA instructions to descend and notified Tower Control of the RA.  TCAS RA ended and the we landed without further issues.

Air carrier flight crew reported they received a TCAS RA caused by an aircraft landing on the parallel runway during final approach to Runway 16R at DEN airport.  The crew responded to the RA; but descended too low and received a glideslope warning. Once the RA was resolved; the crew were able to stabilize the aircraft and continued their approach and landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 23600; Flight Crew Type 8600

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

We arrived at the de-ice pad; set brakes; and configured for de-icing as there was at least 1/4 inch of hard clear ice on the wings and fuselage. We were de-iced at approximately XA:55 with a clear aircraft; start of last step at XA:47. We de-configured; contacted ground and proceeded to taxi. As soon as we did both the front and rear flight-attendants called us to say that they still could not see out their jumpseat windows on the left side of the aircraft due to the ice; and that passengers were taking pictures of their iced up windows with their cell phones. We elected to return to the de-ice pad; and were assigned a different bay this time. A de-ice coordinator; checked the fuselage and said the aircraft was clear of all ice and that de-icing fluid may appear like ice. The captain elected to do a visual check himself and concluded all windows WERE covered in ice and to have the airplane properly de-iced. The amount of time this deicing took seemed proper and we were told last step started at XB:08. We visually checked and the windows were clear this time.

We were the first flight of the day. The aircraft was coated with ice from freezing drizzle over night. There was no precipitation from when we arrived at the aircraft until takeoff. The APU and packs were running when we arrived at the aircraft. The cabin temp was increased to nearly full hot prior to passenger boarding to try to assist with fuselage ice removal. OAT was about -3 C. Extra fuel was requested and granted in the event that deicing were to take longer than dispatch had estimated. There was no delay getting into the deice pad. We configured and were told we would get a full body hot type I. I asked how long it was estimated to take and was told about 15 to 20 min. In less than 10 min we were told that deicing was complete and given the deicing data. After beginning the taxi out of the pad both front and rear FA called to say that there was still ice on the windows. We told the 'iceman'; we wanted to come back for a proper deicing. We pulled into a different pad with a different deice crew and initially were told that the windows looked clean. I walked through the cabin and observed that most of the windows especially on the left side were still iced over. Another round of deicing followed and took about 15 to 20 minutes. I walked the length of cabin again and observed that the ice had been removed. We received our deicing information and had an uneventful departure and flight.

A320 flight crew reports having to return to the deice pad after being told deicing was complete; due to ice adhering to the fuselage and passenger windows.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

At about 40 NM east; northeast of IAH at 10;000 ft. we experienced what we thought to be a 5G event. We first became aware of it by the gear warning horn sounding and 3 red gear lights illuminating above the gear handle. It only lasted a couple of seconds; and then it flickered and sounded again. This time the Captain noticed his radio altimeter rapidly fluttering from around 1000 ft. to 1200 ft. This happened intermittently about 3 to4 times until it stopped. It all happened very quickly and I would say we hadn't traveled more than 5 miles from when it started to when it stopped. The warning horn was so loud and distracting it was hard to hear ATC; or ourselves for that matter.

10;000 ft. 40 miles northeast of airport; gear warning sounded [and the] radio altimeter read 1000 to 1100 ft. It cycled three times; then went away. Lasted about a minute [with] 5-10 seconds in between [alerts].

B737 flight crew reported a temporary 5G event during initial approach in which the gear warning horn and red gear handle lights alerted; accompanied by a radar altimeter fluctuation. The event repeated approximately three times during a short period but ceased for the remainder of flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Total 13700; Flight Crew Type 6100

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 6500

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

About 30 minutes into the flight the relief pilot came to the cockpit to advise there was a section of a panel on the left wing that was sticking up in the wind stream. A passenger noticed it first. The Captain called Dispatch and then had Maintenance Control and the Duty Manager on the line (SATCOM). It was agreed by all parties that the safest action would be to divert. There was a concern that the piece might depart the aircraft and hit the tail. The diversion was coordinated with Dispatch and the Duty Manager. We agreed on landing overweight at 345;000 LBS landing performance was received for Dispatch for landing. An emergency was not declared. The flight landed normally and the Fire Department followed the aircraft to the gate.

Approximately 30 minutes after departure; at cruise; Lead Flight Attendant told me; as I was beginning my rest break that a passenger had noticed a panel on the left wing that was raised a few inches into the air stream. I checked the wing surface and reported to the flight deck. The Captain went back to look at the discrepancy; discussed the issue via SATCOM with Dispatch. The decision was made to do a precautionary divert. We also discussed the option of fuel jettison from the center tank; but that would have still resulted in an overweight landing. Dispatch sent runway data for an overweight landing (325;000 approximately). The descent; approach and landing were uneventful and we requested that crash; fire; rescue examine the main gear tires and brakes before continuing to the gate.

B767-300 flight crew is informed by passengers in cruise that part of the left wing near the engine was sticking up into the slip stream in an abnormal fashion. After discussion with Maintenance the crew diverts to a suitable airport. Upon being viewed by Maintenance on the ground the aircraft is taken out of service.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Situational Awareness; Workload; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft X was released IFR off UDD; which off of RWY (Runway) 28 would be an immediate left turn (Southeast) to TRM; climbing to 4;000 feet. When they were released; there was no immediate traffic threat for the departure. By the time Aircraft X departed there was a target flying westbound (opposite direction) at 2;500 feet. On initial contact with Aircraft X; I told them about the traffic and asked if they could stop their climb at 2;000 feet (MVA in the area is 4;000 feet). They questioned the altitude initially; and I explained the situation to them. They agreed to stop at 2;000 feet. I issued a traffic alert; and Aircraft X eventually said they had to turn to avoid the traffic.I am recommending that there be some sort of real controlled airspace in the Palm Springs valley. The TRSA is not mandatory; and there are frequently aircraft (many high performance) that choose not to call the approach controllers and just go straight to the tower. The airspace in the months between September and May is extremely busy at times; and the controllers/pilots have no safe space in which to operate. It is called 'The Wild West' over there for a reason. Everything is shoot from the hip; because you have no idea what is about to happen next. We can not plan on anything; we can never assume anything. The most controlled airspace in the valley is the PSP Delta; which requires participation; while the approach controllers work 20x the traffic and have no 'safe space'.I ask that the airspace be reviewed and considered for a Class Bravo/Charlie airspace to avoid future NMACs or worse.

ATC Tracon Controller reported this airspace needs a review and possible reclassification.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance; Party2 Dispatch

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 87; Flight Crew Type 2000

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

I was the PF on a maintenance ferry flight.  When I talked to maintenance control; I was instructed to maintain a cabin differential pressure of 4.0 or less; with no speed restrictions. I then spoke multiple times with dispatch and the Chief Pilot on Call about flight procedures; and again was instructed to not to exceed 4.0 PSID and not exceed FL220. There were no other instructions to reference MELs to follow or pressurization procedures to follow. We set the Flight Altitude pressurization controller at FL220 and the Land Alt controller at 1150 feet for [destination]. Climbing thru 13;000 feet the PSID was rising rapidly approaching 4.0 PSID; and it peaked at approximately  5.0 PSID. We asked ATC for a leveloff; and ended up descending all the way back down to 10;000 feet to control the differential pressure. We had to get new routing from ATC to comply with their MSA enroute to [destination]. We landed without further event.We were not instructed to follow special cabin pressurization procedures by maintenance; dispatch; or the Chief Pilot on Call.  We did not have an MEL on the aircraft which would have directed us to follow unusual cabin pressurization procedures for the Flt Alt controller and the Land Alt controller. I had never flown a maintenance ferry flight; and my unfamiliarity with the requirements for the flight caused us to mis-set the pressurization panel. Not one of us in the loop thought to look at abnormal pressurization procedures; because the reason we were ferrying the aircraft was for a previous lightning strike; not a pressurization problem.  This was a very frustrating and unique event. I don't know how this could have been prevented on the pilot's part.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

B737 flight crew reported they were not properly briefed on how to fly a maintenance ferry. During the flight they failed to comply with the special procedures.


While eating lunch in between [flights] we were sitting at a table outside the fbo facing the rwy. In front of us was a facility van parked parallel to the rwy approximately 10 -15 ft. Outside the rwy edge line  Just north of the van was a station wagon parked perpendicular to the rwy. A C560XL was back taxing for departure. As the excel spooled up we noticed a woman get in the station wagon.  At the same time as the excel started rolling for takeoff the woman started the vehicle and began backing up. She stopped the vehicle around 5 ft from the rwy edge as the excel went by at approximately 90 knots. She whipped her head around and mouthed something; obviously startled at how close she had come to the excel.  She left in the vehicle and then showed up to our location a short time later. I asked if she had noticed the excel and she responded with 'I did not go over the white rwy line did I?' The close proximity to the rwy that vehicles are allowed to move about unsupervised is a serious safety concern in my opinion  Another crew witnessed the event with us and had the same opinion that it is an accident waiting to happen and added that if the vehicle had clipped the wing the excel could of wound up veering into the fuel farm and we all would of been in the blast area. They also added that due to the power brokers that use ocean reef regularly they didn't see anything changing anytime soon. I feel that the area in front of the fbo is too narrow for vehicles to be moving unsupervised while aircraft are landing or departing. Especially passengers who are not trained or aware of the dangerous surroundings. If the van was not parked in its location the driver might have been aware of the departing aircraft. As it unfolded she didn't see the excel till she was right on rwy edge line due to her line of sight backing out. Since this is a private airport; normal safety policies are not adhered to that apply to even the smallest muni airports that we go into. It is my opinion that not much can be done at this location to correct this problem except extreme vigilance while operating in and out of ocean reef. A simple spotter in front of the fbo to ensure vehicle traffic is clear of the rwy environment during operations could go a long way.

ASRS has received reports concerning the relaxed standards at Ocean Reef Airport previously. Pilots who use this airport should be extra vigilant.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 19000; Flight Crew Type 1700

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 9; Flight Crew Total 28000; Flight Crew Type 9

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Aircraft

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While entering the downwind via the 45 for Runway XX; right traffic at ZZZ; we were following a Cessna. I was sitting in the passenger seat as the NFP (Non-Flying Pilot)/Safety Pilot observing my friends landing. We completed our landing checks and continued following the Cessna. As the Cessna reached our four o'clock position I told the PF (Pilot Flying) that he was clear to turn base leg behind the Cessna. We made our radio call; and turned to base leg. After we made another radio call to final; a young woman flying some sort of low wing canopy glass cockpit airplane turned directly in front of us and cut us off in the pattern. She did make a radio call announcing her turn to base. Approaching her turn to final she then queried 'how many airplanes are in the pattern and where are you'. I am sure she was completely unaware of our position. Out of the turn we were approximately less than a quarter of a mile at her seven o'clock position. Clearly she had no idea that she had just cut us off and was now on a simultaneous approach with another aircraft. The PF did not have the conflicting aircraft in sight until late after turning final. In the interest of safety; I took control of the airplane and elected to fly a parallel to her track. I passed by her left wing approximately 400 feet lateral distance and nearly level with her aircraft. Once I knew we were safely passed her aircraft I executed missed approach. We then came around for another successful landing to a full stop.

As background; ZZZ was heavily congested with training and weekend aviators. The approach to the downwind leg was reported via UNICOM as 4NM southeast to enter a 45 - downwind entry. We coordinated spacing with another crosswind aircraft to follow us for spacing in the pattern. Our aircraft was operating with LED strobe lights and all landing lights for visibility to other aircraft.Reported downwind; uneventfully. And recognized the aircraft we were to follow and mimicked their pattern to minimize spacing conflicts. Reported our base turn to UNICOM; uneventfully. Our track on base leg was approximately 2 NM from the end of the runway. At no time was our location questioned by the conflicting near miss aircraft.Reported a base-to-final turn; uneventfully and unquestioned. Upon the completion of the turn to final; I focused on vertical alignment to the runway and did not see the conflicting near miss aircraft. The PNF (Pilot Not Flying); in a radio call questioned the conflicting near miss aircraft to determine her position upon hearing the UNICOM base report. After it was determined the conflicting aircraft turned inside of our location; resulting in cutting us off placing our aircraft in a hazardous flight profile; PNF took control of the aircraft in a professionally coordinated manner. At this time; the conflicting near miss aircraft was well within 1/4 NM and somewhat above our altitude; which was approximately 300 ft. AGL. Because of her proximity to us; and her apparently being unaware of our location; the resolution was complex. Keep in mind in her base to final turn (Right Hand pattern) with a low wing aircraft she would have then been unable to locate us visually. In a UNICOM radio call; the conflicting near miss aircraft questioned 'how many aircraft are in the pattern and where are you'; indicating her further lack of awareness to traffic as she was a close in final; an inappropriate time to establish traffic.Suspecting her unpredictable actions; we were prevented from a turn to side step since it would have blocked our ability to monitor her activities. Our inter-cockpit discussion created the point; given our closure rate; that our only recourse; in the interest of safety; was to parallel her path; fly past her which would have given her awareness of our location; then when ahead of the conflicting aircraft; we could safely initiate a missed approach; which we did.We remained in the pattern for another approach and full stop landing; uneventfully.

Pilot on final approach reports a near miss with another aircraft.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

During climb after takeoff we experienced a major engine malfunction and associated engine fire. It was decided to split duties; with the Captain flying the airplane and communicating with ATC; and the First Officer running checklists to prepare for an immediate return. During this time there were a lot of distractions with ATC and the cabin calling to work out the details of the return. As the event progressed; we learned that we might not be able to extinguish the engine fire. After both fire bottles were used; the engine fire warning remained. At this point the prime objective became to get the airplane on the ground as soon as possible. To make matters worse; after donning O2 masks; communication was disrupted between the Captain and the First Officer; resulting in much difficulty in running checklists. Due to the time constraints; we were not able to resolve the communication problem. After landing it was discovered the Captain's headset cord had become tangled with the O2 mask hose and also the Captain's seat arm rest and the airframe of the airplane. I used my captain's authority to deviate to meet the needs to get the flight on the ground. In light of the emphasis of the danger of fire and/or smoke; I felt that the best course of action was to get the airplane on the ground as soon as possible. It is possible we missed standard calls at some points; and although [we] completed all the correct checklists; [we] did so in a hurried manner. On final; we had allowed extra energy. It's possible we exceeded flap extension speeds by a small margin. Also; it became apparent that our extra energy nearing the runway could cause us to go much longer than desired. I decided to extend the flaps to 35 instead of leave them at the normal 15 for a single engine landing. We discussed the fact that we would not be attempting a go around with a fire still indicated and that the Flaps 35 setting would be the better of the two possible courses. In our debrief we discussed we had probably broken the sterile cockpit rule on taxi out. We had briefly discussed the location of [the] gate in the terminal. Also; we discussed the fact the Standby Instrument display was flickering. The display was readable; but we had a brief discussion of whether it was a distraction or not. It was decided with weather not an issue; we would continue with the flickering display.

Some of the checklists were a quick 'finger drag' as time/position/communication issues were encountered due to the crew thinking the engine was still on fire. There were two items on the immediate action card that I remember executing in the incorrect order...I believe the T-handle was pulled before the condition lever went to fuel off.

Q400 flight crew reported engine fire after takeoff; and after discharging bottles the fire light remained on. Crew felt pressure to get aircraft on the ground as quickly as possible; and some SOP deviations may have occurred.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 1250; Flight Crew Type 2

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was flying a drone over my house and realized I was technically flying in Class D with no permission to fly there.  Drones create a new and unknown area of operations as this case demonstrates.  I was well far from the airport (almost at the lateral Class D limits); and I was flying very low; so I was not endangering any traffic.  However; it has been bugging me that I did fly in Class D without permission.  I have been thinking about what I would do differently.  For example; perhaps I would try to contact the tower with my hand-held radio.  This would be difficult because I am not high enough to get a good signal to the airport.  Should I have given them a call to let them know?  Would they think I was nuts if I called them about a little drone that would not have an effect on their operations?  These questions do need to be answered; and it is not clear to me where the line is drawn.  For example; it would be too conservative to suggest that I could not fly the drone 4 feet above the ground; or even up to roof top level.  I felt compelled to write this not only to admit I may have done something I should not have; but also to spur the conversation of what should and should not be done with drones in technically controlled airspace.Note: this was the third or so occurrence of this operation in the past couple weeks; and the reported date only reflects the most recent occurrence.

A UAS pilot flying his aircraft low near his home realized it was in PDK Class D airspace. He was uncertain what action he should take to notify ATC about his intended flight.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 23.5

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

When I took over Sector 24; Finley Radar (QFI) had just been taken out of service for maintenance. Usually when this happens; affected adjacent facilities are notified. Aircraft X had already departed RDR but was still in GFK Approach airspace. A short time later they called a handoff. I advised them that our radar was out and to terminate and ship Aircraft X to me. The aircraft checked on requesting clearance into R5402 and R5403 which I could not do as those airspace were not active until about 20 minutes.As this was all playing out; the question was raised that these drones cannot be operating in our airspace if our radar is out of service as we cannot radar monitor them. In the meantime; a second aircraft; Aircraft Y; departed heading for the airspace. By this time it was decided to recall the radar.In this situation; having a predetermined non-radar route to transition from approach control into the restricted areas would have solved the problem. In the bigger picture; there is a big push from the highest levels of government to get these drones integrated into the airspace system. Yet; very little thought seems to [be] given by these individuals as to what it really involves; how complex it is and most importantly; how to do it safely. All that seems to matter is it needs to be done so that people can make money.This is a very dangerous path to follow and can only lead to serious problems down the road. Safety should be the first order of business; not money. Procedures need to be developed to insure safe operation for all involved. These procedures need to be clear and not buried in legal terms.

Controller advised the biggest concern was the corridor between GFK and the restricted area. The controllers have to be able to monitor the aircraft in this corridor and they were not able to due to the radar being OTS. Once the radar was returned; [about 15 minutes] operations could continue.

Radar outage. Aircraft X departs RDR; goes to restricted airspace R5402. Needs to get there through TFR. With a radar outage we cannot radar monitor the aircraft. There is no approved routing we can use to get the aircraft to R5402. Also if aircraft goes lost link at any time before entering the restricted area it cannot be monitored. Either we need the radar or the aircraft cannot fly; unless we can get some approved nonradar routing. There is still problem of lost link though.

ZMP Controllers describe the radar being released to Maintenance for a specific time; then realized that they shouldn't be operating drones in the airspace if they don't have radar. Controllers then advise they get the radar back in service. Controllers state it is a big push to get drones integrated into the NAS; yet very little thought is being given to provide the controllers specific procedures.


Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure; Airport

While operating a flight I experienced an incident during taxi out. We had previously taxied out for departure with an expected delay prior to departure. Ground issued taxi instructions after pushback which put us on the far side of the runway where we could wait out our delay. As I taxied around the terminal; especially since I was unfamiliar with the airport; the taxi instructions bothered me as unclear; so I asked for clarification. Ground then instructed me to cross the runway turn right onto the taxiway and hold short of the runway facing south. I complied with these instructions and we began waiting for our departure time. After approximately 30 minutes; our departure time was extended a further 90 minutes. After a brief consultation with Dispatch; we elected to return to the gate. We received clearance from ground and returned to the gate. This process took longer than normal; as operations was busy with other aircraft.As soon as the last passenger was off the aircraft; Ground called us and indicated our time was had improved and we immediately began re-boarding passengers; loading bags and updating paperwork. After boarding was completed; I needed Dispatch to update performance numbers since we had lost several passengers; Dispatch informed me that they were having difficulty generating numbers and would get them to me as soon as possible. We pushed off the gate; ran our checklists and contacted Ground for taxi. Ground informed us that we had a short wait and that we would 'do the same thing as last time' and that we would 'hold short of the runway...facing south' to wait. I made the 180 degree turn which from the gate which placed us essentially on the taxiway believing that I was cleared just as the prior time to cross the runway then turn right to hold short of the runway from the north side I turned on my lights; visually cleared the runway and proceeded to cross.As I approached the hold short line Ground Control hurriedly instructed me to hold short of the runway. I stopped; but only after the nose had crossed the hold short line. We held that position as per Ground instructions as an aircraft which had been on the approach; but was obscured by the clouds went around and then continued across the runway. At the Ground Controllers request; I called the Tower after stopping short and we discussed that ground had actually originally instructed me to hold short of the runway on which I had not heard or had not understood. We discussed the confusion in the instructions as I had understood them.I feel that the extra taxi distance on the first taxi out gave me an opportunity to mentally review the instructions to find 'red flags' and ask for clarification while the second taxi out was shorter with additional work load applied; therefore leading me to not question what I believed was my assigned taxi clearance. In hindsight; those are the moments; especially at an unfamiliar airport; which require extra vigilance and slowing things down.

EMB-145 Captain reported a runway incursion at CAK airport.


ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Aircraft X was making right closed traffic to Runway 7R. He disappeared from the scope somewhere near the crosswind to downwind turn then re-appeared on base. Aircraft Y did the same thing. This has been a problem for a long time. I have been at DAB for a long time and it has been a carryover in the log since before then. I've also been told our ASR-9 hasn't been optimized in 18+ years. We had a safety meeting not long ago and we came up with a plan of action to get this issue resolved and as far as I know; no steps have been taken to fix this particular safety problem. We've been having problems with FUSION since we got it and we have a Band-Aid on it for now but the RADAR coverage for the 7R/25L traffic pattern is still unacceptable. Fix our equipment whether the problem lies with our ASR-9 or STARS in general. This kind of presentation is UNACCEPTABLE AND DANGEROUS.

DAB Controller voiced concern regarding the on going lost target issue on the Tower RADAR when traffic is near crosswind to downwind; the reporter unsure if the problem resides in the ASR-9 and/or STARS equipment.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 4600; Flight Crew Type 65

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency

I was instructing in a Phenom 100. I had a student in the right seat and a student observer in the back. We had completed a practice [localizer back course] approach; did a touch and go and then stayed in the pattern for the option. The student was flying during the training and after our second touch and go; while on the upwind leg in the pattern I noticed a strong electrical smell. I asked the student if he noticed [it] and he too noticed the smell; at that point the observer in the back who was on a headset and listening in; said she smelled it as well. In my opinion; it smelled like electrical piece of equipment was burning. I attempted to contact the Tower on COM 1 which we had been using during our training and made multiple radio calls while we turned to crosswind; but was unable to reach them. At that point; I took control of the aircraft; asked the student to squawk 7700 and to also try to contact the Tower on COM 2. The smell was still noticeable at that point and we were fortunate to make contact with the Tower on COM 2. I took control of the radio at that point and declared an emergency to the Tower. I asked the student to run the normal before landing checklist and we completed our visual pattern to a normal landing. I did notice prior to landing that COM 1 had completely failed as indicated by a RED X which finally appeared over the frequencies; additionally we had a AURAL WARNING FAULT message. Once we landed safely; I assessed the situation - the smell had subsided and there was no indication of fire or smoke. ATC asked for our intentions and I told them we were able to safely taxi the ramp under our own power. After reaching the ramp we shut down the aircraft and met crash/fire and rescue. They checked out the aircraft to ensure there was no fire and there was not. At this point; our maintenance technicians are investigating what caused the electrical smell and subsequent failure of COM 1.

An instructor pilot and two students in a Phenom 100 identified a strong electrical smell during climbout. When they attempted to contact the Tower Controller; they were unable. When they made contact on the second radio; they declared an emergency and landed safely. Indications are that the Number 1 communications radio failed for an unknown reason.


Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Coming into ZZZ on the Arrival; we were cleared from ZZZ intersection to Runway XXR transition. We were at 10;000 feet and started descent to cross ZZZ intersection at 8000 feet; getting close to ZZZ intersection; and ATC said to slow to 210. Wanted to slow faster so we went to Vertical Speed and passed ZZZ intersection at 8000 feet and continued descent with 7000 feet now in window. I noticed we were passing thru 7000 feet prior to ZZZ1 intersection (7000 feet) and ATC called us on altitude passing about 6700 ft. I thought I had gone back to VNAV but didn't. I tried to slow descent with Vertical Speed and that wasn't happening fast enough so I kicked off autopilot and stopped the descent at about 6500 feet then added power and climbed back up to 7000 feet. At this point; the turn for ZZZ2 intersection was starting so I started turn and re-engaged autopilot and hit LNAV and VNAV. The aircraft was not turning to course; and I noticed that autopilot had not engaged; so I manually turned to try and re-intercept course. We were now south of course and ATC called and notified us of that and gave us a turn to 070 to intercept the ILS Runway XXR final course. Intercepted final and flew ILS to Runway XXR; landed uneventfully and received phone number to call ATC. Called our ATC Specialist during aircraft swap and informed him of the situation and then he called ATC.In the future I will review transition on arrival more thoroughly; pay more attention to my own calls; know what mode I am in and make sure it is the correct one and that it is actually engaged. Make sure my PM speaks up and points out my errors or questions my intent.

Captain (Pilot Flying) on the [arrival]; instructed to descend and maintain ZZZ intersection at 10;000 feet then to descend via the [arrival];cleared for the ILS Runway XXR Approach. Next crossing restriction was ZZZ1 intersection; at or above 7000 feet. Captain was in LNAV/VNAV initially; but somehow came out of VNAV. He started initial descent; failed to cross ZZZ1 intersection at or above 7000 feet. Descended to 6500 feet when ATC asked what altitude we were at. Captain disconnected autopilot to climb to 7000 feet. In the process; did not make the turn at ZZZ1 intersection and also sped up to 250 knots and did not maintain the 210 knots originally assigned by ATC. ATC asked about our course and speed deviations. Switched over to Tower. Landed without further incident.

Flight crew reported overshooting an altitude on the arrival and missed a turn to the next fix due to difficulties operating the autopilot and flight director. ATC provided a vector to intercept the final approach course.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger; Person Flight Attendant

We smelled odor on takeoff and persevered through it. While unpleasant; we did not even discuss diverting. This is odd now; because we had our scarves over our noses. We (me [Flight Attendant] Number 4 and Number 2) just waited until smell abated and continued to get up; work; and serve. Then on landing; the smell returned even stronger. The front Number 1 [Flight Attendant] called and we confirmed we had smelled the same thing at that time. The Number 2 [Flight Attendant] had tremors and expressed illness. I felt very light headed and foggy; but not as bad as her. She proceeded to throw up after departing the concourse outside and had to run inside to continue emptying her stomach. We went to the clinic; but no blood was taken.

B737-800 Flight Attendant reported odor on takeoff which dissipated and returned even stronger on landing. Two flight attendants reported physiological issues and received medical evaluation at clinic.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

I received a phone call from Captain X on a Cessna C560 aircraft in the afternoon January 2014. He stated that there was a dime size chip in the #1 Engine Exhaust Cone. I advised him that we have had the coating come off in the past but it was a non-issue and I was going to contact Pratt-Whitney to verify. I spoke with the Engine Manufacturer Representative and he requested pictures. I called Captain X back and he advised he would send a picture to Maintenance Control. I told him [Captain X] the Pratt Representative didn't think it would be an issue; but wanted to see a picture first and we would call him back after the Engine Manufacturer Representative looked at the picture. Captain X sent the picture around twenty minutes later and I forwarded the picture to the Engine Rep. I went to a meeting; but advised the [Control] Desk that the Engine Rep had been forwarded the picture and they should contact the [flight] crew after he calls Maintenance Control to advise if the exhaust cone was good; or needed to be evaluated. After returning from the meeting about ninety minutes later; the Desk advised the Engine Rep [had to] defer the judgment on the exhaust to Cessna. Another [Controller] was going to call the [flight] crew and advise them but they were already airborne. Maintenance Engineering had an AFIS sent to the crew and had the aircraft diverted for the exhaust to be evaluated. I believe there was a disconnect on both sides in this instance. Maintenance Control; I; should not suggest to the flight crews that something may be 'OK' until the evaluation has been made by the proper technical group. Also the flight crew should have contacted Maintenance Control back to verify that the exhaust was a non-issue before lift-off. I believe it is important on issues like these that Maintenance Control stay in constant contact with the crews so they are aware that a suspect problem is under review; so they do not take the aircraft without the proper approvals.

A Maintenance Controller describes how a lack of adequate communications between Maintenance Control and a Cessna 560 flight crew allowed the aircraft to depart while a chip on the # 1 Engine Exhaust Cone was still being evaluated. Aircraft had to divert for additional evaluation of the exhaust cone.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 8500; Flight Crew Type 1000

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

IFR flight to KSEF IMC. In the approach phase of the flight an approach clearance was issued for the RNAV to runway 1. My clearance was direct FOSEL maintain 2000 feet Cleared for the RNAV1 Approach. My speed was reduced to 210 knots and the aircraft configuration was changed to a landing configuration. While in the turn to the Center came on the radio and cancelled our approach clearance but had no additional clearance. For what felt like the next 20 seconds or so no instructions where given. I asked Center what the problem was and they replied that the missed approach portion of the approach if needed would interfere with the bordering restricted area. This approach has been in effect for years and the restricted area is depicted on the plate.In [my] years of flying in and out of SEF I had never had a controller tell me this. Finally a new clearance was given and it was to climb to 3000 feet but still no heading. I maintained my navigation on the published portion of the approach but did not descend. I was level at 2000 feet. The controller then came on again and told me that I would need to do a Visual Approach if I wanted to land at SEF. Wow; ok by this time the aircraft was just a few miles from the field and I told Center that I would like to continue to the field to see if a Visual Approach would be possible. They agreed. We had been monitoring the weather and it was reported 1000 broken 10 miles visibility. Just about 1 mile from the field I was able to get a visual on the field and I told Center I was cancelling IFR. I started a left turn to 270 and started a descent to 1000 feet. The controller then came back and said I had descended without permission and that they had not read back the cancellation therefore my clearance had not been cancelled. I had maneuvered the aircraft to stay clear of the clouds and landed with no further issues. On taxi in we listened to the AWOS again and it was now reporting 1000 scattered. I still have not found a legitimate reason for them to tell me that I was basically on my own at 2000 feet above the ground and going 200 knots.

Corporate pilot reported ATC cancelled the approach clearance without any further instructions so the pilot cancelled IFR; but was then advised should not have descended.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 6900; Flight Crew Type 100

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Taxiway

During taxi the aircraft experienced a loss of nose wheel steering and the aircraft began to veer to the right. Left rudder input and left differential braking were unable to overcome the right hand turn and prevent the aircraft from exiting the taxiway. The use of differential power on the right engine to attempt to control the right turn was also unsuccessful in turning the aircraft. The right main gear departed the taxiway and entered into soft mud which pulled the aircraft to the right and caused the aircraft to come to a stop with the nose wheel approximately 10 FT off the taxiway. There were no injuries to report and all passengers exited the aircraft once the engines were secured.

A C421 pilot reported losing nose wheel steering on taxi out; resulting in an excursion into the mud.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

I was not fully configured and about 10 KTS fast at the thousand foot call and elected to continue the approach; subsequently unstable. The First Officer made the correct call-outs 'NOT STABLE; GO-AROUND.' On approach to 17R at Pudong 1;500 feet to glideslope (G/S) intercept; 160 KTS. I planned to call Flaps 20; Gear Down at intercept but Tower interrupted with RVR reports and clearance to land. (I was still trying to get my seat adjusted and HUD display set since it was my first landing certified to use the HUD which added to my loss of situational awareness momentarily.) All I got out was Flaps 20 call before the PNF responded to the Tower. By now we're 1;300 feet AGL when I call for Gear Down/Flaps 30 with 15 KTS to lose. PNF commented at about 1;200 feet we weren't going to be stable at 1;000 feet. Flaps and speed both reached at 1;000 feet AGL at the same time but the Before Landing Checklist was not complete therefore it should have been a go-around. If I had it do over I would have gone around; and I will next time! And I would most definitely have been fully configured at 'G/S ALIVE;' call instead of waiting. Not good CRM along with poor leadership which; I'm sure frustrated the PNF to no end. I took full responsibility and we debriefed it thoroughly. Please see above comments but basically allowed the HUD to become a distraction rather than a landing aid.Comply with standard operating procedures at all times.

A widebody Captain flying his first approach utilizing HUD failed to achieve stabilized approach criteria until right at 1;000 AGL at which time the First Officer advised a go-around was appropriate per SOP. The Captain opted to continue the approach and landed safely. A complete debrief of the event ensued after parking.


Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

G/A (Go Around) due to not breaking out at minimums in BZE. Held at BZ901 NW of the airport. After about 15 minutes a flight made it in. A B737 ahead of us went missed approach. We landed after breaking out just above minimums (lower than 100 ft above minimums). During the entire hold and subsequent approaches; several aircraft were requesting Special VFR arrivals. Field conditions were 2500 meters and the ceilings were 300 to400 ft. We landed on the second approach. Used the turn button on the south side of the runway; about 6000 7000 ft from the approach end; to turn around. Used TCAS to see how for out the next arrival was. Noticed a target +300 ft just west of the airport. Initially I thought he was holding because there was a lack of closure. That's when it got crazy; suddenly he breaks out of the rain shower heading towards us. Tower makes a non-directive statement about us still being on the runway. Cessna Caravan says 'I have the aircraft in sight' and continues his descent right at us. Immediate mental calculation of open grass area to our left. I try accelerating but realize we'll never make the turn off in time. FO (First Officer) broadcast 'we're still on the runway!' Aircraft continues descent towards us. FO says for the second time (internally) 'what's he doing? He's still descending!' I try flashing landing lights (under wing; probably worthless effort; all lights were still on). I transmit 'AIRCRAFT IS STILL ON THE RUNWAY; GO AROUND!!!' Aircraft stops descent at approx 50-75 ft. FO 'why isn't he climbing?!?!' I start maneuvering aircraft right of centerline to get more separation between the vertical stabilizer and the aircraft. At this point I'm not sure if he's going to land ahead of us; try to land over us; or is just buzzing us. Dumb. No; beyond dumb. Aircraft on the go around drifts left of centerline towards us and I stop my attempt to gain lateral separation. He goes right over the top of us about 50 to75 ft. We haven't even reached taxiway C so we're 4000 ft(?) from the end of the runway and he's less than 100 ft directly over the top of us. We clear the runway. ATC never said a word directing a go-around (that I recall). Cowboy aviation at its worst.  It was a Cessna Caravan that checked in as we were on the approach and was told that it was #7 for the approach. The aircraft in question wasn't cleared by ATC to attempt to land. He did it on his own. And the tower controller didn't order a G/A. And when the responding aircraft said 'I have the airplane in sight'; while continuing to descend; it bordered on bizarre. ATC did nothing. The FO spoke up directly to the approaching aircraft. That didn't stop his descent. At that point I sternly ordered a G/A. Thankfully he listened. A major lesson learned; I will recommend to anyone that asks that they should avoid that operator at any cost. Need positive ATC control. Can't have local pilots operating as they choose to. Lack of safety oversight.

Air carrier Captain executed a go-around at minimums after an ILS approach to Runway 7 at MZBZ and enters holding. The second approach is successful; but with no full length taxiway; a turn around and back taxi is required to clear the runway. During the back taxi a Cessna Caravan commences an approach without clearance and is reluctant to go-around when the air carrier aircraft is detected on the runway.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

ATC ordered go-around on Runway 27R due to traffic conflict. Traffic entered the landing runway.

Air carrier First Officer reported ATC instructed them to go-around due to a traffic conflict.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

BUF ILS 05. Note 1 at the bottom of the page states 'RVR (Runway Visual Range) 18 with Flight Directors and Autopilot......'. Note 3 in the briefing strip note section states 'Autopilot coupled approach not authorized.' Remove the 'Flight Directors and Autopilot' from Note 1.  While a fresh crew might be expected to catch this; at the end of a long day; a tired crew might not; so why not make it easier for them.

Reporter reported conflicting guidance on the BUF ILS 05 instrument approach chart referencing autopilot use.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We were cleared for a visual approach to runway 34 in HPN. While on the base leg; tower cleared a cirrus on downwind to make a short approach to the same runway. As we rolled onto final; the cirrus was still on his base leg. We queried the tower as to the spacing and if they needed s-turns. Tower asked us to do an s-turn and I commenced the maneuver. This gave the cirrus enough time to land and as he was exiting the runway to the left side; tower again came on and told him to stay on the runway and make the next right turn available. We were approximately a half mile final at about 500 ft at this point. The cirrus swerved back onto the runway and started to head for the next taxiway on the right. At this point the other pilot came on the radio and said they had stalled their engine. I immediately initiated a go-around and entered right closed traffic upon tower instruction. We came back around and were able to make another visual approach to a successful landing.ATC was hurrying to close their facility for the night. They should have let the cirrus stay in the pattern behind us in the first place and make us number 1 to the runway. After they had cleared the cirrus she should have let the pilot of the cirrus exit the runway as he had originally intended and we would have been able to land safely. The cirrus pilot shouldn't have accepted the new clearance to go to another taxiway and should have continued his exit.

Legacy 600 Captain reported they had to go-around because the aircraft landing ahead of them was still on the runway.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue

Aircraft X was ready to push out of Gate XX; leaving ZZZ going to ZZZ1. Departure equipment check includes checking the towbar to ensure it is fully connected to aircraft Airbus 320.Push Driver; entered the pushtractor and instructed wingwalker to remove the nose landing gear chalks. Push Driver started the pushtractor and engine roar and everything turned on. As the Push Driver scanned; the runway and neighboring gates for push clearance; he communicated to flight deck 'Ready for push out and break release.'Flight deck responded 'Stand by'. Push Driver stood by; monitoring his area and his equipment and informed his wingwalkers to stand by for push. Seconds later; flight deck called 'Ready for push' and Push Driver replied 'Copy that. Pushing out' Push Driver flashed his wingwalkers with his headlights and told them 'Pushing out' Push Driver set the pushtractor to gear 'F3' and waited for the equipment to roll forward. Push Driver gently tapped on the gas to gain movement with the aircraft. Pushtractor and aircraft moved synchronously and sluggishly. Push Driver pressed on the gas a little harder to gain more momentum but all of a sudden; the pushtractor acted up and jumped and the towbar followed the jump. During that jump; Push Driver was shocked but readied himself for a possible breakaway. Push Driver let go of the gas to stop the pushtractor's misbehavior; but seconds later; towbar gave way. Push Driver immediately pressed on the break while watching the plane breakaway slowly. With quick reflex; Push Driver contacted the flight deck; yelling 'BREAKAWAY! BREAKAWAY! BREAKAWAY!' before the communication cable was about to break off. Communication cable stretched but never broke off and flight deck'replied brake set' Everything was stopped and supervisor who was watching the dispatch came to inspect everything. Push Driver set the brake and turned off the pushtractor. Dispatcher came out to inspect the damage with supervisors and others who saw the breakaway. Towbar had several bolts break off and the part where the towbar connects to the nose landing gear got bent but the latch that locks in the plane remained in the lock position. After Supervisor did their investigative duty; I was instructed to move the pushtractor out of the way for the plane to return to the gate. Another dispatch guided the plane to the correct stop mark so that Maintenance can inspect the damage on the nose landing gear. Maintenance informed us that the towbar connection piece was damaged and so the plane had to go out of service. Plane was offloaded and a new plane was used for Aircraft X.

Pushout Driver reported the tow bar pins broke and the tow bar damaged the aircraft's nose gear.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

A small twin was enroute to MYLS descending from FL210 to FL190. When the small twin was leaving FL198 or FL199; a medium transport was cleared to from FL210 to FL200. At this time the medium transport was overtaking the small twin about 7 miles behind. I had just received a briefing and I was D61. During this event; there was OJTI going on at R61 and the clearance was issued by the Developmental. The R44 Controller mentioned to the R61 team 'watch out for the little guy' in reference to the small twin when he heard the clearance for the medium transport. That was discussed briefly and the R61 Controller conducting the training mentioned that the small twin had left FL200 and he considered it so the altitude was available for the medium transport. Like I mentioned above; I was the D-Side during this time and although I saw and heard the clearance after I heard the Controller conducting the OJT say that he was looking at it and the small twin was out of FL200; I moved on with other D-Side duties.This event highlights the confusion surrounding vertical separation procedures described in 7110.65 paragraph 5-5-5. The rule is vague and it even states that standard separation might not be maintained at all times while using this rule. Further more the CBI [Computer Based Instruction] that we complete about radar separation gives a bad example on the application of this rule. The example is about a F18 requesting a climb after a prop reports leaving the altitude. According to the CBI; that altitude is available and ok to assign as long as you consider aircraft performance. In my opinion; that is an example of when not to use the rule; but the CBI teaches that it is ok to do so. The event between the small twin and the medium transport can be thought of as similar to the F18 and prop example. The point is that the 5-5-5 Paragraph B rule is vague and a more clear description of its application is needed in order to avoid misapplying it. Also the CBI should be consistent with the interpretation of the rule.

ZMA Controller describes situation related to vacated altitude separation and his concern that the application of this rule needs a more clear description.


Confusion; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; MEL; Aircraft

It was a full flight with a jumpseater in the cockpit. We were delayed on departure by maintenance. The previous crew said the Flight attendants heard a thumping sound from the right rear service door. Maintenance removed the right rear service door deflector. That deflector was put on CDL and we pushed from the gate 26 minutes late. We departed without incident. As we were getting close to our cruising altitude of 35;000 feet the aft flight attendant called up and said the right rear service door was loud. We promptly checked the status page on the MFD and it showed locked and green. We also checked the EICAS screen and the Cabin Altitude and Differential Pressure were stable and at normal levels. As soon as we reached 35;000 feet we felt our ears pop. We both looked at the EICAS screen to see the cabin altitude increasing rapidly. Within seconds it went from normal to above 17;000 feet. We donned our oxygen masks immediately. The Cabin Alt Hi warning went off and we completed the [checklist]. We made an emergency descent to 10;000 feet. We completed the QRH items and when we reached 10;000 feet we told the passengers we were stabilized and level at 10;000 feet. We also said they can take their oxygen masks off and that we were diverting. We landed in ZZZ without incident.On the ground in ZZZ we called maintenance thru dispatch and logged the rapid decompression and Passengers Oxygen masks auto deployed in the [aircraft logbook]. During the postflight walkaround I noticed the right rear service door gasket had squeezed out thru the top of the door. As contract maintenance showed up at the plane he opened the right rear service door and noted that no bolts were in place to hold the door seal in place. Those are the same bolts that hold the door deflector plate to the outside of the service door. There was however clear packing tape present on the seal to apparently hold the seal in place until the door was closed.

Arriving to pre-flight the aircraft the First Officer found that maintenance was working on the right rear service door due to a write-up from the previous flight. The work was completed and released to the flight crew; resulting in a new CDL item for the removal of the Door deflector and a 26 minute delay. The flight pushed back from the gate and departed. During climb to FL350 the Flight Attendants called the cockpit complaining of extremely loud air noise coming from the right rear service door. The status page on the MFD showed all doors locked/green; the cabin altimeter; differential and rate were showing normal values appropriate for climb at altitude. As the aircraft was leveling at FL350 both the pilot flying; monitoring and cockpit jumpseater felt their ears pop; both pilot flying and monitoring checked the pressurization and noticed that the Cabin Altitude was rapidly rising to over 17;000 feet; O2 masks were donned immediately then the CAB ALT HI warning appeared on the EICAS; and the [checklist] was performed. The descent was initiated and diversion toward ZZZ completed. Throughout; the cockpit jumpseater assisted in co-ordination with the flight attendants; and radio communication with ATC while checklists were being performed. Upon reaching 10;000 feet the QRH items were completed and the captain made an announcement that it was safe to remove O2 masks. No further incidents occurred; a normal landing was executed; and emergency terminated. Once at the gate after shutdown was completed the captain made the appropriate entries in the [aircraft logbook]. Upon performing the post flight walk-around the first officer; captain and contract maintenance tech noted the door pressure seal on the right rear service door was protruding through the top of the door; upon opening the door; it was noted while speed tape was applied to the exterior of the door to cover the bolt holes of the removed door deflector; clear packing tape had been applied to the top corners of the inner door seal which was meant to be secured by the door deflector bolts that had been removed.

The captain of a regional jet reported a complete loss of pressurization at the top of climb necessitating an emergency descent and a diversion to an alternate airfield. The peak cabin pressure was reported as 17;000 feet. There were no injuries. A post flight inspection revealed an improper repair to an external service door.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Workload; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Took off from Runway XXR at ZZZ. During climbout; passing approximately 4;000 feet; the Number 2 engine power reduced to approximately 35% N1. Tried closing and advancing the Number 2 power lever with no effect. Advised ATC and requested priority handling. Turning right to the west; realized that we were in a good position for an almost straight in approach to Runway XYR. Wind was light and almost a direct crosswind to the parallel runways at ZZZ; so I requested landing on XYR. No unusual engine indications were noted other than the lack of thrust. Left the engine running to maintain electrical and hydraulic systems. Landed normally with 15 degrees of flaps.CRFF (Crash Rescue Fire Fighting) inspection showed no leaks or other problems so we taxied to the gate. The landing was made at less than the max landing weight. On the ground; the engine idle remained at 30% N1. Probably could have slowed down and more thoroughly run the checklists but position and conditions were conducive to an immediate landing. Other than the lack of thrust the aircraft operated normally.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported the engine rollbacked to approximately 35% N1 during the initial climb; resulting in an immediate return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Workload

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency

On approach; the First Officer asked for gear down and I complied. After positioning the gear handle in the down position; I noticed that we did not get any of the 3 green lights. There were no red disagree lights indicated. The alternate gear position indicators were showing 3 green. We elected to break off the approach about 2000 FT AGL and work through the issue. After looking at the QRH for a possible checklist and not finding one; we [advised ATC of our situation]. We noticed that other lights were inoperative also which led us to start looking at circuit breakers. We found the Section 5 circuit breaker popped and elected to exercise emergency authority and reset the Circuit Breaker. There was no time to communicate with Maintenance Control as we were circling the airport at 2000 FT and had 5.9 fuel left on board. This procedure was successful and we got the 3 green indication on the gear. I informed the flight attendants of our situation and because of time constraints; let them inform the passengers that they would be seeing airport fire trucks as we landed as a precaution only. We landed uneventfully.

A B737NG's Section Five Circuit Breaker opened in flight which prevented both the green and red landing gear indications with the gear handle down but after locating and resetting the circuit breaker all indications were normal.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Before boarding I notified agent and 2 flight service personnel that passenger in seat XX needed to be moved away from my jumpseat for social distancing. The seat is directly facing the YY jumpseat. I have legitimate concerns of contracting COVID -19 when seated directly facing a passenger in such close proximity. I confirmed a 2nd time with the agent that I wanted the passenger moved. Flight service informed me that the passenger would be moved to a different seat. I was satisfied with the answer and boarding began. As we reached the end of boarding I observed that the passenger still seated in original seat; our legs would also be extremely close; was coughing; and was not wearing a mask. A different agent came aboard aircraft and I notified her that he was supposed to be moved. She responded that she had no idea what I was talking about. I requested flight service to return to the aircraft. Flight service stated that the flight was at complete [XX]% capacity and they couldn't move him because no other seats available.  They informed me that if I was scared I will just be removed (without pay; missed trip; disciplinary action). I asked flight service for a few minutes to allow him to gather my options which now meant delaying the flight. I briefed Captain on what was transpiring. I was informed that I would be disciplined if I chose not to work the flight and the guidelines states it is sufficient enough if both passenger and I have on masks while facing each other. I asked flight service if they had extra masks to provide passenger; which they did not. I spoke with passenger regarding wearing a mask which; although disgruntled; he was able to produce from his carry on luggage.  I returned to boarding door and informed flight service that I would work the flight.  Boarding door was closed quickly and we rushed to push the flight.  Through all of the confusion I did not brief my exit rows. After arming my doors and completing All Call; I went directly into the lav in an attempt to gather my composure; completely forgetting that X people in the exit row needed a manual safety demo as their monitors were stowed. The chaos and confusion while boarding; the lack of clear and concise communication from flight service; coupled with my fear of how to protect myself from contracting COVID-19 led to my lack of focus and poor performance of required duties.

Flight Attendant reported requesting a passenger be moved to accommodate for COVID-19 social distancing.  Passenger was not moved and in the process Flight Attendant forgot to brief emergency row.


Inspection; Repair; Installation; Work Cards

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Avionics

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors

I replaced a previously broken External Power receptacle pin per the Maintenance Manual (M/M). This pin was subsequently broken again several days later (please see aircraft history). These pins break frequently due to their design. They are mounted by a small diameter threaded area which is a weak spot relative to the diameter of the pin. Also the External Power cord receptacle housing is shallow and does not support the Power Cord well when it is connected.

Reporter stated the External Power Panel (P19) receptacle electrical pins can be removed and replaced from outside of the B737-800s; using an Allen wrench (key) that is inserted into the center; at the end of each exposed pin; and back-screwing the pin out. He suspects the same design exists on the  B737-700/-900 NexGen aircraft. The copper pins are machined down to be narrower (smaller diameter) at the end that screws into the receptacle base.  That design is different than the older series B737s that required a Technician to open-up a panel in the Nose wheel well; right; forward sidewall tunnel in order to access the larger; thicker diameter pins that are secured with a locking nut. Reporter stated connecting and disconnecting the External Power cords contributes to the newer designed pins breaking frequently and generally at the same lower aft pin location; which is one of the larger diameter pins. Sometimes a pin breaks off just above the threaded section that screws into the receptacle base. When that happens; Technicians have to use a flat-head screwdriver and hopefully push in and twist the remaining piece of copper pin out. Because the External Power Panel receptacle housing is also rather shallow; the weight of the External Power cord can put a stress load on the pins. Broken pins cause electrical power drop-offs requiring APU operation to supply electrical power for the aircraft at the gate; using more fuel.

A Line Avionics Technician reports their B737-800 NexGen aircraft External Power Panel (P19) receptacle has redesigned electrical pins that break more frequently; causing External Power drop-offs; increase use of their APUs and fuel burn to supply electrical power for their aircraft at the gates.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I got distracted with the airplane being a MAX which caused me to forget to [ensure] I received the pink form Battery Powered Wheelchair or Mobility Device Form. I had discussed the form initially with the First Officer at the gate because I saw the customer in the wheel chair. Also the Flight Attendant asked me to make sure that the wheelchair was boarded and I made the comment 'I will know when it's boarded because I'll get the pink form.' However because I was getting reacquainted with the MAX I forgot to ask the agent for it. Also I would like to note that the Release may have the incorrect code for the wheelchair. The better code for the wheelchair should have been [a more appropriate code]. At least one of the wheelchairs had a battery because I saw the wheelchair at the gate and the customer sitting in it. I will make a notation on a paper to remind me in the future. It will also be helpful to remind the gate agents / ramp personnel we need the form. Unless we see the person in the wheelchair or the wheelchair itself we may not be aware we need the form.

Air Carrier Captain reported undeclared Hazmat transported due to a communications breakdown between flight crew and Dispatch. The required NOTAC was not provided to the flight crew prior gate departure.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was climbing through Flight Level 180 and was given a clearance to descend and maintain FL180 while the local altimeter setting was 29.77. This conflicted with FAR 91.121. The Captain queried the clearance and was told again FL180. ATC responded affirmative. The Captain states this was not a legal clearance and ATC responded it was for traffic avoidance. We were unsure if separation had been lost but there was no TCAS TA or RA and we proceeded normally after descending to FL180.

B737 First Officer reported ATC assigned them FL180 when the altimeter setting was below 29.92.


Mooney Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Inbound to ZZZ 10 miles out I call my location and intent for left traffic for runway XX at ZZZ airport. I make my traffic pattern calls and as I call on final I hear a static on the radio and assume it is traffic at another airport on [the same frequency.] It was not till my landing flare that I see Aircraft Y rotating opposite direction on the runway approximately 2000 FT in front of me. The aircraft sidesteps to my right and over flies my right wing at approximately 75 FT. I query the aircraft and he makes a statement that they called a right base to land XY (opposite direction) but that I decided to land anyways. Assistant airport manager at ZZZ overheard the radio calls and stated to me he heard my radio calls; but none from Aircraft Y until I queried him. At no time did I hear any radio calls from Aircraft Y until I queried him. The lack of radio calls from Aircraft Y; and decision to land opposite runway after hearing my radio call on final.

C402 pilot reported a near mid-air collision while landing with an aircraft that was departing opposite direction at a non-towered airport.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 1900; Flight Crew Type 60

Unable to obtain VFR radar service from NY Tracon; C180 was circumnavigating the outer ring of the NY B airspace generally East/Northeast at a VFR altitude of 5500 in VMC with an airspeed of approximately 130 KIAS and ground speed of 150 kts. At about 10.5 miles off the 100 radial of the SAX VOR; [a] B777 was visually identified by the pilot flying as posing an immediate threat to the safety of flight. Evasive maneuvering including a maximum performance climb was initiated by pilot flying. Pilot not flying then observed the B777 cross directly underneath the C180 at a total distance allowing the pilot not flying to identify individual people within the B777 aircraft. ADSB IN was in use on the C180; using the Garmin Pilot app on an iPad. The B777 was not observed electronically prior to evasive maneuvering. After the C180 leveled out at about 6000 ft the pilot not flying was able to capture a screenshot of the B777 showing an altitude separation of -500 ft. It is estimated this took place 20-30 seconds after the incident. The pilot flying and pilot not flying were able to confirm using two separate and distinct GPS navigation systems that the C180 was in fact in Class E airspace several miles outside NY B outer ring. Position was also confirmed visually using ground based landmarks. Both the pilot flying and the pilot not flying were able to observe Mode C operation of the C180 transponder; and had previously received radar service on this flight; so are confident Mode C was operable at the time leading up to the incident.Probable cause was ATC refusal to take VFR handoff to provide radar services to VFR aircraft. Contributing factors was ATC inability to maintain separation of an IFR aircraft from additional traffic. [B777] crew's inability to determine separation from VFR traffic using on board traffic detection equipment. C180 crew's inability to see and avoid traffic approaching the NY Bravo airspace until evasive maneuvering was required; due to navigation requirements to avoid airspace and weather in the area at the time of the incident. Possible solutions for consideration would be to ensure air carrier aircraft maintain altitudes more typically associated with air carrier operations while still outside the Bravo airspace. 30 miles from EWR does not require a B777 to fly at 5500 ft when this altitude and area is typically congested with VFR traffic. ATC's refusal to provide radar service to aircraft operating in and around this area should be reviewed. It is common for NY Approach to refuse handoff and not to answer VFR aircraft looking for assistance when operating in these congested areas. Proper approach frequencies specific to airspace and altitude allowing for pilots to monitor approach while circumnavigating an area where multiple frequency changes are common for multiple sections would allow pilots to at least easily listen to the correct frequency while transitioning this airspace to obtain additional awareness of other aircraft.

C180 instructor pilot reported an NMAC with a B777 near SAX VOR.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

[Maintenance Control] called to ask if there was any Hazmat onboard. I asked my Service Recovery Specialist; who confirmed that there was a SAX onboard with HAZ. The [Operations Control] called next and said that the Fire Suppression System had been deactivated and that Maintenance had not hooked up the halon cans to the hoses. I sent an ACARS to the crew to let them know the situation and asked them if they would divert to ZZZ1 or ZZZ. Both airports were equal distance from their current position. [Operations Control] came back and asked to put them on the ground in ZZZ if the crew was OK with that. The flight diverted to ZZZ.When I've called ramp agents in the past about a fire suppression system being inoperative or deactivated; it's either been an MEL or a restrictive [Deferred Item]. After I got word of this issue; I went back through my MELs and [Deferred Items] and saw 'FSS (Fire Suppression System) SYSTEM' on a non-restrictive [Deferred Item]. Throughout our training; my class was told repeatedly that we do not need to read the non-restrictive [Deferred Items]. If important systems like these are going to be non-restrictive [Deferred Items]; I would suggest training new dispatchers to read them. I will be reading through them from now on.

Cargo Operations Dispatcher reported becoming aware of Cargo Fire Suppression System being deactivated with Hazmat on board. Flight crew executed a precautionary diversion.


Flight Attendant Airline Total 31; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 8; Flight Attendant Total 31; Flight Attendant Type 90

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Captain called me and said it looks like we're going to encounter the light chop earlier than we expected. Just a heads up. I called the back and Number 2 answered and I relayed message. [Flight Attendant] Number 2 said we're almost.I go back to serving breads at and that's when we felt like we were rocking. I went up to ceiling and just started to grab anything to hang onto. Then went down to floor. I heard people scream. Then I started getting calls. 1st one was Captain checking on us. Then the back where they said we have 3 flight attendants down. Only 2 passengers got hurt. The seatbelt sign was on. Both refused paramedics assistance.

B777 Flight Attendant in-charge reported an inflight turbulence encounter that injured flight attendants and passengers.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 23150; Flight Crew Type 4633

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 187; Flight Crew Total 11388; Flight Crew Type 4287

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Slightly late Controller Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC) logon. Shortly after passing the coast out fix DOGAL on an RLAT shoulder NAT track we realized CPDLC was not logged on with EGGX. We logged on successfully as soon as it was realized. Shanwick later asked us for our DOGAL position report on the HF which was given. After passing 20W we confirmed that Shanwick had received our 20W position report via CPDLC which they did.Contributing factors. CPDLC normally transfers automatically from sector to sector. CPDLC did not auto transfer after logging on with EDYY. Also Shannon ATC was looking for a lost comm aircraft for quite some time which was distracting. A CPDLC check box would be useful on the Class II nav checklist in the FM and also on the flight plan.

DOGAL was the designated coast out fix. We were cleared RLAT shoulder track; F360 mach .84. We passed DOGAL and realized that CPDLC was not logged on. We logged on with EGGX. Shanwick made a cell call request for a position report for position DOGAL. The report was sent. We contacted Shanwick to confirm a position report at 20W. The report was received by Shanwick. No further action was necessary. CPDLC continued to work throughout the flight.

B777 Captain reported failure of Controller Pilot Data Link Communication to log on with EGGX from EDYY during coast out. The log on was accomplished manually but not in time to send the position report for the coast out fix. EGGX made contact on HF to get the missing report.