Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

I was working the Middletown Sector where we have 3 Parachute jump zones one of which was still active at Red Stewart Airport Waynesville; OH. (40I). There were two aircraft that were jumping; one had just dropped jumpers and was in the descent back to the airport; the other was still climbing to jump from 12;000 FT. I had pointed out the aircraft to Cincinnati Approach because they had been watching the aircraft since the start of my shift and I wanted them to know this was the aircraft's last jumps for the night. As Aircraft X; the jump aircraft; was reaching 11;000 FT; Cincinnati called on the shout line and asked if had exchanged traffic; a target at 11;200 FT to the jump aircraft. I told them I would; at which point I issued the traffic to Aircraft X who stated he had the traffic in sight. I then observed the CRJ2 climbing which led me to believe he received a Resolution Advisory (RA). I was later told that Cincinnati Approach had called wondering if traffic was exchanged because the pilot of the CRJ2 was concerned about the other aircraft being that close to the arrival route. Later as I was CIC I got a call from Indianapolis Center asking similar questions and stating that it might be a good idea to have all the controllers at Columbus Approach start pointing out jump aircraft to Indianapolis Center as well as Cincinnati so all controllers involved with traffic in the area of 40I know who they are and what they are doing. I would like to see Columbus Approach (CMH); Cincinnati Approach (CVG); Indianapolis Center (ZID) and the Parachute jumping company enters a letter of agreement (LOA) that spells out where the aircraft are to climb; who they talk to and remind the pilots of their requirements when climbing or descending within the jump zone. I think it should also be published on the chart for the TIGGR of CINCE arrivals about parachute activity in close proximity of the arrival route near the Red Stewart airport (40I) located at Waynesville; OH.

CMH Controller described a RA event involving an Air Carrier and a 'Jump' aircraft in a nearby parachute zone; the reporter providing a number of recommendations to curb same type future events.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Received Stab Trim [and] Mach Trim caution messages as both systems disconnected as we rotated and raised gear after takeoff. There was prior history of this issue with this aircraft. I was Pilot Flying (PF) and asked my First Officer (FO) to re-engage the Stab and Mach Trim. We continued the climb out and on course when the Stab and Mach Trim disconnected again with 'Autopilot Trim is ND' and 'AP Pitch Trim' caution messages. My FO ran QRH for Stab and Mach Trim and re-engaged both systems again. As we were leveling at 10;000 feet we noticed Alts Caps but the aircraft kept climbing through 10;000. I disengaged the autopilot and we experienced a violent nose down drop of about 200 to 300 feet and heard a loud bang as the autopilot disengaged. I was able to regain control and level the aircraft and re-trim the pitch. We notified ATC and asked for a block altitude while we troubleshot a flight control issue. We notified Dispatch and [Maintenance] via ACARS and we agreed that returning to [departure airport] was the best and safest course of action. I notified our Flight Attendant and made a PA to the passengers advising them of the issue. I was able to re-engage the autopilot and handed the controls over to the FO where he became the PF. I [advised] ATC and we were vectored back. We landed with no further issues and there were no known issues from any passengers. We switched aircraft and continued on 45 minutes after arriving at the gate. Aircraft with a known Stab Trim or Stab motor issues should have a functional test flight before being returned to passenger service. This was quite a disturbing event and could have been much worse.

CRJ-200 Captain reported returning to departure airport after experiencing stabilizer trim anomalies.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Evacuated

Upon reaching approximately FL200; we experienced several thumps from the nose gear and noticed the red landing gear up-lock illuminated. Captain had experienced this before and when it quit we felt confident the flight could continue. After a short period; the thumps returned and a decision was made to discontinue the flight and return to Departure Airport as soon as possible. A descent was commenced and a turn back to the airport was started. The thumping at this point became intermittent. Once we had descended below FL180; and slowed below gear speed; a decision was made to cycle the landing gear. At this point; we got two green lights for the main gear and the red up-lock light. We then asked Approach for delay vectors to work the issue. The gear was cycled 3 times with no change to the gear light indication. We then referenced the QRH. I continued to fly; while the Captain ran the QRH checklist. Following the checklist; we attempted blow the gear down. When that was not successful; we continued with checklist and pulled the D-ring up-lock release. This also was not successful.At that point; we applied Part 91.3 PIC authority with Approach. We communicated with company contacts several times trying out various possible solutions. Additionally; the Maintenance Technician we had on board was in communication with several folks and they offered several possible solutions. None of the ideas had the effect of lowering the nose gear. During the brainstorming; we decided to make a low approach to have ground personnel check on the status of the nose gear. They informed us that the nose gear appeared to be partially extended. We climbed back up to continue working the issue and burn off fuel. During this event; [the] Captain and I positively exchanged flight controls as we worked different possible solutions. We tried several more suggested solutions and some of our own troubleshooting. Eventually we reached a point where we had fuel remaining to execute a final attempt to land leaving enough to execute a miss should things not feel right. We then requested final vectors for the ILS Approach. We thoroughly briefed the approach; and briefed each other and our technician on the possible evacuation procedures. [The] Captain then executed a flawless approach and landing right on the centerline. He timed the deployment of the thrust reversers perfectly to lay the nose gently on the runway. We ran the evacuation checklist and quickly exited the aircraft safely. We helped the ARFF folks secure the aircraft; and then were transported to the maintenance facility.

We were currently performing a confidence flight for a totally different issue and had a normal take-off. Upon reaching approximately FL200 we heard a thump noise and noticed the landing gear red unlock illuminate momentarily. The Captain had experienced this before; and knew what it was. Since we only got three thumps; [the] Captain decided to continue; as there was no issue affecting our flight at this point. Shortly after that; at approximately FL250; the thumping began and we decided to return for landing at which point we asked ATC for a descent and vectors back. During our return; the nose gear thumping continued intermittently and our intent was to get down to FL180 and Slow down to cycle the gear.  Reaching FL180; we continued our descent for our approach and extended landing gear early to make sure it was working properly at which point we got the two main gear green down and lock with no nose gear down and locked indication and a red up-lock indication. We cycled the gear three different times with no resolution. At this point; we ran our QRH checklist with an attempt to blow down the gear; and pulled the D-ring nose gear up-lock release. This was also not successful. At this point; we notified Approach and asked for vectors to try and resolve the issue further. We communicated with Company Operations and Maintenance to try resolving the issue. The technician on board communicated with a maintenance shop; as well; for any ideas they might have. Many attempts were tried with no resolution. Captain and First Officer traded aircraft control with very clear CRM in order to troubleshoot the issue. None of the maneuvers we tried were effective to extend the nose gear at which point we decided to fly a low approach for airport operations to see if our nose gear was extended at which point we were told the nose gear was partially extended. We climbed back to 5000 feet to continue communication with Company Operations; troubleshoot and burn off some fuel for our attempt to land with no nose gear down. We decided that at 2500 lbs. of fuel we would attempt our landing; giving us enough fuel for a second attempt if needed. We then requested vectors for an approach. We both briefed the approach and evacuations procedures as well as briefed our Technician. Weather was good enough for a visual approach but followed the ILS; which gave us 12000 feet of runway. The Pilot flying touched down at Vref and flew the nose down as gently as possible with an extension of the thrust reversers only at a point where I felt I was losing elevator effectiveness and assist with keeping the nose up as long as possible. We came to a full stop and ran the evacuation checklist.We followed the aircraft QRH checklist in order to extend the nose gear. We had many different ideas and techniques to try and extend the nose gear. I really don't know what else we could have done in order to prevent this as I believe that the aircraft experienced some sort of a mechanical failure during the thumping action; maybe having extended the gear earlier could have avoided this mechanical failure but since we were descending fast I didn't want to damage any of the landing gear.

A Citation 750 flight crew reported a malfunctioning landing gear; after several attempts to lower the gear; they could only get the two main gear down; they executed an emergency landing in that condition.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

I was dispatched downline to ZZZ1 to retrieve unserviceable fuel components and tooling. Upon arrival; spoke with Aircraft Maintenance Technician X (AMT); who informed me that fuel levels in all [component] parts are at the required minimum for legal HAZMAT shipment. At that time; I prepared parts for shipment back to ZZZ Station. Took parts to gate at ZZZ1; had paperwork signed by Ramp Agent who placed items in Aft Cargo Bin for shipment to ZZZ. Then delivered Dangerous Goods Form (NOTAC) paperwork to operation agent/pilot and I proceeded to board aircraft. Upon arriving in ZZZ; a coworker informed me that HAZMAT shipment had leaked through boxes into baggage compartment on the B737-700 aircraft. This resulted in the aircraft being pulled from service. Day shift. [Recommend] to make sure procedures in the Maintenance Procedures Manual (MPM) are followed for removing fuel from unserviceable parts/ tooling. Procedures missed. HAZMAT Specialist.

Nine articles of HAZMAT fuel contaminated parts were loaded on aircraft. I verified with Operations and Ground personnel that all procedures were followed and signed two NOTAC's for the articles. Upon arrival; Ramp and Operations informed me [that] two boxes had leaked and we had a fuel spill in the Aft Cargo bin. Maintenance and Dispatch were notified and the aircraft was pulled from service. Crew is pretty much in the dark in this situation and has to trust others to do their jobs properly.

After arrival; a company HAZMAT Specialist and a B737-700 Captain were informed that two of the nine articles of unserviceable fuel components that were shipped in the Aft Cargo pit had leaked through their shipping containers. Aircraft was removed from service.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Captain called me and said we were landing in ZZZ in 15 minutes to prepare the cabin for landing. The Captain made the announcement that we would land in ZZZ. We landed safely and waited for 4 hrs while they sent another plane to finish the flight. The right engine was shut down due to low oil pressure; made the Yellow Emergency announcement.

CRJ-900 Flight Attendant reported the flight diverted after the right engine was shut down due to low oil pressure.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 1300; Flight Crew Type 60

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

I showed up at the [Company] ramp around XA:50 and conducted my preflight on the airplane. Everything looked good and the trim indicator was in the green box. [Company] loaded up my plane. I finished my weight and balance and flight plan; then started the engines. I taxied forward to the ramp/deice area to complete a run-up. I performed the auto-feather and prop governor test. When I advanced the throttles forward; I heard the takeoff out of trim warning. I bumped the trim nose down to recenter the arrow in the takeoff box and the warning went away. The rest of the run-up went fine. I called Clearance; then Ground; to taxi. I used Runway XXL at the Taxiway XX intersection for my departure. Tower cleared me to take off; I went through my final checks; set the torque; and when I was at my Vr speed; I began to pull back on the yoke to climb. Almost immediately the controls started to get really heavy. I looked down at the trim and the trim indicator arrow was all the way at the top of the box; indicating full nose down. At this point I was out of runway to put the plane back down so I called the Tower and let them know that I had a trim runaway issue and would like to return to the airport. As I circled the airport to come back for a landing; I tried the primary trim and the secondary trim with no response in flight. I ended up landing on Runway XYL and then taxied back to the ramp.Our Maintenance department is going through the plane's systems to check for the issue. Reviewing the weight and balance; I was within weight and CG limits of the airplane.

BE99 Captain reported a trim runaway problem on takeoff and performed an air turnback and precautionary landing.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

I was working RXX/XY. I was told that we would be getting some ZZZ and ZZZ1 landers. RXY was split several minutes later. I began to get ZZZ1 and ZZZ landers as expected. Several minutes later; I was told that I was required to get 15 miles in-trail to ZZZ1. RXY asked the Supervisor for relief on the in-trail. We were told that we need the 15 MIT. Shortly after; RXZ called with a point-out on an aircraft landing ZZZ1. I approved it and began to vector the two lead ZZZ1s behind the point-out. Next I began to get aircraft from RXA also landing ZZZ1 who were tied up with the ZZZ1 landers tied up with the aircraft coming from RXB; RXC; and RXZ. In addition; RXY also had several ZZZ1 landers and we were attempting to sequence them and provide the required 15 MIT. Furthermore; I had several ZZZ landers coming from RXB; RXC; and RXE that I was attempting to get in-trail spacing on. I would estimate I had 13-15 aircraft; most of whom were landing ZZZ1 or ZZZ and I was trying to get in-trail spacing on. A B737-800 was a ZZZ1 lander from RXA that I put on a 270 heading for sequencing. An A319 was a ZZZ lander from RXB who I turned out for spacing. I was putting the B737 behind a ZZZ1 that RXY was working. I turned the A319 back to [an intersection that was near]. As a came back around in my scan; I saw the A319 at FL310 turning back into the B737 at FL310. At that point; I would estimate the aircraft were 7 miles apart. I told the A319 to descend to FL270 and expedite the descent. I issued a traffic alert to the B737 for the A319. I then issued a traffic alert to the A319 for B737. The B737 reported the A319 in sight. A few moments later A319 reported the B737 in sight. I then asked to be relieved. When this happens several things need to occur. 1) Aircraft from RXA need to be routed [to intersection1] and not given direct [intersection2]. [Intersection1] is 75 miles from the RXX/XD boundary. [Intersection1] is 10 miles. Sending aircraft direct there doesn't give the controllers sufficient time to create a plan and execute it for sequencing before going into RXF (which is directly below RXG). 2) Aircraft can just be sent into XX/XY and hope they can sort it out. They should be held in RXA airspace or at least coordinated with XX to ensure that the routing is good. 3) You can't just send 15 aircraft from 5 different sectors; with no plan from TMU or management; slap in-trail on the last minute; and then hope the controller can sort it out. The decision needs to be made to slow the rate of flow in XX/XY to a level manageable by the controller at XX. Whether that comes from holding aircraft until XX is ready; slowing aircraft; to reduce the rate at which they enter XX; or routing them through RXB/XC before XX so that XB/XC can blend them and start something for XX; preferably a combination of the above. Finally; someone needs to let ZZZ2 know that what we can and can't do. 15 MIT at that time wasn't realistic. Give them 5-10 on the first wave and then 15 there after.

I was working Sector XY the Ultra High to the incident sector; Sector XX. Sector XX had a D-Side. Due to TMU initiatives; weather; general lack of foresight by the planners in TMU; and a wanton disregard by supervisory personnel in our Area; Sector (XX) became completely inundated with ZZZ arrivals and ZZZ1 arrivals. The volume was extremely high without required in-trail spacing. At the last minute; as 10 ZZZ1 bound aircraft were in Sector XX; and are longitudinally within 60 miles of each other; a restriction is put out requiring 15 miles in trail on all ZZZ1 arrivals. Due to a lack of oversight and planning in TMU and adjacent sectors not more than 2 or 3 aircraft were proceeding to the same fix. I (along with RXX controller) advised both Central Area and Area supervisors that the in-trail requirement was unrealistic; dangerous; and even impossible. We requested some relief from the in-trail. We were ignored with our concerns about volume and told we could off load aircraft to a different arrival which would've required more time and a full routing to the airport. Separation between two aircraft was lost or nearly lost in what was the closest call I've ever seen as the RXX Controller was attempting to vector aircraft for in trail spacing far beyond the ability of any certified controller and definitely beyond the capacity of Sector XX (half of the aircraft were considerably in adjacent Sector XZ on a point out). Without the RXX Controller's excellent response the situation would've ended much worse.Aircraft should not be rerouted into weather areas; to avoid equally bad weather areas with canned playbooks decided by the generally out of touch with reality flow controllers in the ATCSCC. When a Certified Controller advises a Supervisor of an unsafe situation that Supervisor should respond and not disappear as Central Area Supervisor did for a majority of the turmoil. Flow control must do a better job of preventing over saturation of a sector with haphazard flow control around weather.

Enroute Controller described an unsafe condition when weather factors; re-routes; workload and poor supervisory/TMU decisions led to a loss of separation.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was assigned Sector 12 for approximately 50 minutes I was given several TMU reroutes over this course of time; two had already been issued prior to this event. The air carrier was a point out from Sector 21 and I was climbing a corporate jet reference the air carrier. I issued a reroute clearance for the corporate aircraft that would de conflict with the air carrier via a route change. I issued to the corporate aircraft after BOLDE Intersection IPL.J2.GBN.ELP rest of route. The pilot readback as such and I continued his climb seeing that he was no longer in conflict with the air carrier. Unfortunately after BOLDE Intersection he continued on the ELB1 departure which brought the aircraft back in conflict with the air carrier. The closest proximity appeared to be 5.33 miles at the same altitude. After the next sector had de-conflicted the aircraft once again we asked what the pilot was issued the pilot readback as first instructed. Upon looking at the ELB1 departure there is another fix called BALDI Intersection that sounded similar to BOLDE which was further down on the departure. The corporate aircraft took the BOLDE Intersection as 'BALDI' and inputted the route change after BALDI.I had given this reroute twice before this corporate aircraft and both aircraft had taken the correct intersection as stated. I don't believe there was an issue with the hear-back/readback as the pilot had pronounced it correctly. I would recommend that either the BOLDE or BALDI Intersection be renamed to de-conflict the similarity of the name; especially both are on the same departure.

A corporate crew on the SNA ELB 1 was issued an off route clearance after BOLDE to avoid a conflict with an air carrier; but the corporate crew remained on the ELB 1 track recreating the conflict. There may have been confusion between BALDI and BOLDE intersections; 45 miles apart on the ELB 1 SID.


PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1625; Flight Crew Type 350

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action

I was direct to TNP when I was given a re-route. TNP-V514-V538-GFS(GOFFS)-LAS-ZZZ. Read back was given. Upon crossing TNP; I noticed the autopilot did NOT make the V514 turn to the northeast. I began troubleshooting the problem. I checked to make sure I was in GPS and that was confirmed. ATC then asked me to turn to a heading of 070 to take me toward JOTNU. I placed the autopilot in Heading Mode and dialed 070 into the G500. At this time the aircraft began to porpoise and trim began to pitch up and down. I attempted to disconnect the autopilot with the yoke autopilot disconnect but to no avail. I then was struggling to maintain FL190 and a heading. I happened to be flying with my 15 year old daughter. She was seated in the co-pilot seat. She knew I was having difficulties with the aircraft and she began to have serious anxiety about the situation. While trying to control the aircraft; I was also having to console a distressed passenger who was loudly saying 'I don't want to die.' ATC then once again tells me to turn to 070. I informed them of the situation. I then was able to disconnect the autopilot using the circuit breaker. At this point; I immediately turned to 070 and hand flew the aircraft. I intentionally looked down at the zoomed in GPS to be sure I did not penetrate the Sundance/Bristol MOA/ or R2501E. According to my GPS the airspace was never penetrated. ATC then asked me to call LA Center upon landing. I hand flew the aircraft to [destination.] During the approach to landing; I noted that the flaps were inoperative. Upon landing; I lost the pressure on the left brakes. I was only able to steer by pumping the system repeatedly. I was able to taxi to the ramp without ground incident. On the ground; I called [my Mechanic] and informed him of the mechanical issues and an appointment was set.

PA46 pilot experiences an autopilot malfunction at FL190. Passing TNP the autopilot does not turn to maintain the airway and when heading mode is attempted the autopilot begins to porpoise. The autopilot disconnect does not work and the autopilot circuit breaker is eventually pulled to disable it. During approach the flaps do not extend and after landing the left brake requires pumping.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

On [date] I arrived at work at the ZZZ base hangar. Aircraft X was out of service for a pressurization problem. I was told the outflow safety valves were cleaned and the aircraft was taken on a maintenance check flight and pressurization was working.In further discussions with Air Methods and Management teams the decision was made to change both outflow/safety valves. I was told they had already been ordered and would arrive the morning of [date].On the morning of [date] Technician brought the new valves into the hangar. I installed both outflow safety valves. Aircraft was flown on a maintenance check flight and operated normally.I had problems getting [Maintenance Software] part change accomplished. On [date] I sent an email to Service Engineering in accordance with [Maintenance Software] trouble shooting guide. I was informed that the removed valve part numbers were not in [Maintenance Software] and that is why I could not get the parts change accomplished. [Maintenance Software] part change was completed [date].On [date] I read the follow-up email from Service Engineering and their finding of the part number was not on the effectivity list for aircraft serial number. I got together with Technician; who had ordered the parts and we confirmed the wrong part number had been ordered and subsequently installed.I notified Lead Mechanic and Regional Maintenance Director of the problem and removed the aircraft from service.The parts were ordered by other people. Technician is new to Aircraft X and he was helped by a more experienced mechanic on Aircraft X in entering the order in [Maintenance Software]. The more experienced mechanic could have been more involved in identifying the correct part and effectivity. I could have double checked the effectivity of the part but had thought that had already been accomplished during ordering.

Maintenance Technician reported installing incorrect parts that another Technician had ordered and failed to verify correct part numbers.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 ATC; Party2 Other

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Maintenance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft

The main reason for filing this report is the [priority handling request] due to multiple repeat aircraft malfunctions. Also pertinent from a safety standpoint are events involved in the preparation and execution of this flight. I will address these administrative factors at the end of my narrative.Approaching ZZZ1 airspace at 39;000 ft. we experienced the ALT DISAGREE alert; accomplished the QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) checklist and determined the FO (First Officer) and IFSD (Integrated Standby Flight Display) altimeters were correct. The FO was flying and continued to fly as I ran the checklist. We next noticed the IAS DISAGREE alert and accomplished the QRH checklist for Airspeed Unreliable. The FO continued to fly as I ran the checklist and we determined that the FO and ISFD airspeed indications were correct. At this point the FO reengaged the autopilot and manually controlled the throttles. I advised ATC (Air Traffic Control) that we were negative RVSM (Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum) and we continued at 39;000 ft. I remembered from my AML review during preflight that the previous crew had also written up that both engines had gone into EEC (Electronic Engine Control) alternate mode. When I checked the overhead panel both ALTN lights were illuminated and we were in soft alternate mode. With all the PFD (Primary Flight Display) alerts; the FO and I didn't notice if the ENG light illuminated on the six pack previous to this. With the FO continuing to fly I ran the EEC ALTERNATE MODE checklist and placed the EECs in hard alternate mode. Because we were approaching ZZZ Center airspace I elected to continue to ZZZ and subsequently [requested priority handling] with ZZZ Center. I conferred with the FO and we agreed that diverting into a foreign airport at night would have only unnecessarily complicated our situation. I kept the FAs (Flight Attendants) informed of our situation throughout.Upon checking in with ZZZ Center with a [priority handling request] call I heard a response of 'standby'. Since we were in no need of immediate assistance; I waited a few minutes to check in again. When I checked in the second time I queried the controller if he had heard my [priority] call. He hadn't and after a brief exchange we determined that the standby call was for another aircraft; he was controlling on multiple frequencies and hadn't heard my initial check in call. None of this was detrimental to the handling of our flight; but he was understandably concerned that he missed my first check in with the [priority] call. Meanwhile the CA's (Captain) altitude and then airspeed slowly returned to normal and both disagree alerts disappeared prior to our descent from 39;000 ft. IAW (In Accordance With) with the Airspeed Unreliable checklist we did not reengage the autothrottle for the remainder of the flight; because I did not want to complicate our situation in case the problems reoccurred. The autopilot continued to operate normally.We were given direct to ZZZZZ and subsequently cleared the ILS Runway XX at ZZZ. After an uneventful approach and landing we taxied to the gate. Now I would like to highlight some issues leading up to the flight and initial execution which need to be addressed.When I was assigned the trip by scheduling I was not informed that it was anything other than a normal revenue flight. The first I knew it was anything different was upon landing in ZZZ2 when I talked to the agent meeting our DHD (Dead Head) flight and determined we had to go through customs and then back through security and our flight would depart from a hardstand with no passengers although we had four flight attendants. We were scheduled to depart 55 minutes after our scheduled arrival which was woefully inadequate given how events unfolded.After we exited customs we had a local [company] (I think) employee for escort which was helpful but the hoops we had to jump through were unknown by him or us. At security we were toldto scan the QR code on our phones to fill out a health questionnaire concerning COVID-19; but even though we answered no to all the questions we still had to wait for a 'medic' to check us out and ask us the very same questions; and from what the local agent could determine; it was because we were leaving ZZZ2; regardless of how we answered the health questions. We could have skipped the time it took to fill out the questionnaire and then we had to wait another 10-15 minutes for the medic. He asked us all the same health questions and took our temperature and used a pulse oximeter before clearing us to go through security.When we reached the area where we would take a van to the aircraft; two of our FAs were missing and they had arrived three hours earlier. We were approaching the scheduled departure time. After our remaining FAs showed up; the agent had to get permission for us to go to the airplane which included taking pictures of our (CA and FO) licenses and medicals. This delayed us another 5-10 minutes. Station personnel apologized for all the delays; but they were caused by the airport policies/procedures and not within local [company] control.After arrival at the airplane I was briefed by local MX (Maintenance) that they had changed out the CA's TAT (Total Air Temperature) probe and everything checked out. The next issue is the flight release. There was confusion when we called for our clearance as 'Aircraft X'. Clearance Delivery called us 'Aircraft Y'. After much back and forth confusion we finally figured out we should be 'Aircraft Z'. My mistake for not noticing it in the lines of the release where it is different. At the top of the flight plan it says Aircraft X and the nose number matched the airplane and AML which I am very conscientious about checking. It also shows Aircraft X on the TPS; FIL; NS; etc. To fill out this form it is even listed as Aircraft X. I guess this flight falls under the category of Non-Schedule Flights; but maybe it doesn't because it wasn't assigned a flight number beginning with [number]. Even after reviewing the FOM I'm still not sure what this flight would be classified as but it seems to be the closest to a positioning flight.The final issue I think bears mentioning is that I was assigned this trip while on a XA:00 RAP (Reserve Availability Period). As originally scheduled; it would have finished close to the end of my 14 hour RAP. As it played out it went into that twilight zone between 14 and 16 hours; which although it is legal; it may not be a smart way to do business. From my own personal experience deadheading feels more tiring than actually operating the flight and yet it is not considered in the number of legs for legality purposes. Fortunately; through good CRM (Crew Resource Management); checklist discipline and adherence to SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) the outcome was a safe conclusion to a long day. Although fatigue wasn't a factor for me on this occasion; on another day given the same set of circumstances it very well could have.Incomplete information from scheduling when assigned the trip contributed to increased stress and confusion starting with arriving at ZZZ2 through departure. Multiple [critical issues] presented an increased challenge; especially at night; overwater; in foreign airspace after a long day.Scheduling needs to make sure it is clear to the crew when any part of their schedule is other than a normal revenue flight. Dispatch should also include a statement in the remarks section of the release if the call sign is other than what appears on the HI3; NS; TPS; etc.

We were flying from ZZZ2 to ZZZ. During our preflight preparations and AML review; the CA (Captain) advised me that the previous crew had written up both engine EEC's (Electronic Engine Control) for going into alternate mode. I was the PF (Pilot Flying) and the CA (Captain) was the PM (Pilot Monitoring). Approaching ZZZ1 airspace at 39;000ft.; night time; we experienced an ALT DISAGREE alert. The CA accomplished the QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) checklist and determined the FO and IFSD (Integrated Flight Standby Display) altimeters were correct. We next noticed the IAS DISAGREE alert and the CA accomplished the QRH checklist for Airspeed Unreliable. The first (Indicated Airspeed) two steps for this checklist are turn both the autopilot and autothrottle off which I did. The aircraft continued to handle safely and correctly when this was done. Subsequently; per the QRH procedures; I reengaged the autopilot and manually controlled the throttles. The CA advised ATC (Air Traffic Control) that we were negative RVSM (Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum) and we continued at 39;000 ft. to ZZZ. The CA then scanned the overhead panel and saw that the EEC ALTN lights were illuminated and in soft alternate mode. The CA then ran the EEC ALTERATE MODE checklist and placed the EECs in hard alternate mode. At this point; the CA and I discussed possible courses of action. We decided that continuing to ZZZ was the safest course of action because the aircraft was handling safely and correctly; the QRH procedures for these alerts did not require us to either land ASAP or at the nearest suitable airport; diverting into a foreign airport at night would have complicated our situation; and we were approaching ZZZ Center airspace so working with their ATC controllers would be easier to deal with. We had four FA's on board with us (no passengers); and the CA kept the FAs informed of our situation throughout the flight.Upon checking in with ZZZ Center the CA declared a [priority handling] call as a precaution in case any or all of the system alerts we had dealt with earlier reappeared. The controller told us to stand by; he obviously did not hear our [priority] call on our initial check in. Since we were not in need of immediate assistance; we decided to check in several minutes later - this time we established positive communication with the controller with our [priority] call. Meanwhile the CA's altitude; and then airspeed; slowly returned to normal and both disagree alerts disappeared prior to our descent from 39;000 ft. IAW with the Airspeed Unreliable checklist we did not reengage the autothrottle for the remainder of the flight because we did not want to complicate our situation in case the problems reoccurred.We were given direct to ZZZZZ and subsequently cleared the Runway XX at ZZZ. After an uneventful approach and landing we taxied to the gate.[I believe the cause was] maintenance procedures that did not correct the writeups from previous flight. Or an aircraft system that failed.[I suggest] review maintenance procedures for the alerts we had to deal with on this flight. Ensure any corrections or modifications to these maintenance procedures are disseminated to both domestic and foreign maintenance department; both in house and contract maintenance.

737-800 Flight Crew reported several human and indicator errors involving electronic engine control; altitude and airspeed.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Conducting the visual approach; RNAV back up Runway 28C in PIT. ATC instructed maintain 3;500 feet until established on final. Crossed FAF about 500 feet high to comply. As I was making a positive correction to get the aircraft on vertical profile; received a 'Terrain; Terrain'. This occurred above 2;000 feet. Made slight correction; warning ceased and landed uneventfully.

A320 Captain reported being high crossing FAF then receiving 'terrain; terrain' warning from aircraft.


Flight Crew Total 7523; Flight Crew Type 4271

Flight Crew Total 10593; Flight Crew Type 5764

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Just after level off from departure (FL330) a flight attendant called. I answered the call. The flight attendant sounded excited and told me that there was smoke/fumes coming from one of the aft lav trash bins. She wanted to talk to the Captain so I transferred the issue to the Captain. After the initial conversation with the flight attendant the Captain told me to contact ATC to immediately return and that I have control of the airplane. We were given priority direct and descend. The Captain also directed that we execute the smoke and fumes checklist while he continued the conversation with the flight attendant. We accomplished the emergency procedures checklist; flew fast and expedited our descent. Slowly the information coming from the back of the airplane was that the situation was under control and that there appeared to be no more smoke/fumes coming from the trash bin. ATC asked if we wanted a closer airport but we declined after determining that the situation was not as dire as first thought. We coordinated with ATC; dispatch; the flight attendants and operations that our arrival plan was to have the emergency response vehicles follow us to a gate and then have the firemen board the airplane as a precaution to assess the problem. Landed without incident. After arrival at the gate it was discovered that a passenger had entered the lavatory; smoked an e-cigarette and blew the smoke into the open trash bin. After the smoking passenger left the lav the next passenger discovered smoke coming from the trash bin and reported it to the flight attendant. The biggest threat in my opinion was the communications problems associated with using the smoke goggles. Trying to communicate simultaneously with ATC; flight attendants and each other was very difficult. We also later learned that we had a pass riding Captain in the back that could have really helped in the communication in the back of the airplane but at the time we were unaware that he was there.

We had a normal takeoff and everything was fine until we reached cruise altitude. I had the first officer turn off seat belt sign once at cruise. The lead flight attendant called just after reaching cruise. The first officer answered but then gave inter-phone to me. She said the Lav (aft right) trash bin was emitting smoke and fumes. She could not determine the source of smoke or fumes. I instructed her to fight the smoke by using extinguisher either halon or water whichever could stop the smoke. We accomplished the emergency procedure for smoke and fumes; informed ATC; and ran QRH clean up items. We also reviewed LAV smoke checklist. The most difficult part of our work was talking to ATC and Flight Attendants (FAs) with oxygen mask on. ATC gave us a clearance direct and a descent to FL200. Within the next 4 minutes; I called FA to ask status of smoke and fumes from trash bin. She said smoke had cleared and she smelled some remnant of the fumes but they dumped full bottle of water into the bin. They had pulled bin out and check it's contents but there was only wet paper towels. We decided to continue to our departure airport instead of diverting to a closer one; once FA informed us smoke was cleared. We then removed our oxygen masks and used normal communications. Soon a pass riding 737 Captain who did not check in with us called to inform us that neither one of the squibs in trash bin had discharged.We contacted dispatch and informed them of our smoke and fume problem and that we were returning. We would have emergency personnel follow us to the gate. We expedited our descent and landed after running normal checklist items. Once we arrive at gate we had passengers remain in seats until fire personnel could evaluate aft Lav. I then talked to FA again and fire personnel as we tried to determine cause of smoke and fumes. I asked if she remembered what passenger was in Lav just before smoke was discovered. She did not remember but then a female passenger stood to say she could recognize person if she saw him again. We went to jet bridge where police were waiting. The young man was identified and once questioned admitted that he blew smoke from an e-cigarette into trash bin.

A B737 Flight Crew reported being informed by a Flight Attendant of smoke coming from an aft lavatory trash bin just after level off at FL330. ATC is advised and the flight returns to the departure airport. The smoke quickly dissipates during the descent and no charred paper is found in the trash bin. At the gate a passenger admits to having smoked an E-cigarette and blowing the smoke into the trash bin.


Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

During takeoff we had good airspeed at 80 Kts and we both confirmed; but at approximately 100 Kts the First Officer called Airspeed Discrepancy with his airspeed being very erratic and it dropped to approximately 60 Kts while my airspeed was at 100 Kts and increasing normally. I called reject and we aborted the takeoff doing all the appropriate rejected takeoff procedures which included a manual spoiler deployment due to it being MEL. The First Officer advised the Tower that we were rejecting and once slowed to a safe taxi speed; we cleared the runway. After clearing; we ran the After Landing Checklist; the Rejected Takeoff QRH Checklist; and the Brake Overheat QRH checklists to a completion. The brakes number 1; 3; 4; and 5 were all rising to a high temp so we contacted Ground to find a safe spot to taxi to avoid people and equipment. We got cleared to taxi off of [the runway] to avoid possible hazards and contacted Maintenance to confirm our plan of attack and see if they had any other ideas to help us. They agreed with our plan to not set the parking brake and allow the brakes to cool to below 500 temp before going to a parking spot. We had another MD-11 qualified pilot on the jumpseat so we used his help to contact Operations and confirm our thoughts and procedures. The First Officer expertly ran all the checklists and helped tremendously throughout the whole situation. Kudos to both of these crewmember for a job well done. After the brakes which peaked at 571 degrees cooled below 500; we contacted Ground to taxi to our ramp coordinated parking spot. Upon reaching the parking spot; we completed our shut down Checklists and wrote up the appropriate Maintenance write-ups for the hot brakes and the airspeed problem. We also debriefed the maintenance team on all the write-ups and details.I don't believe you can prevent these types of maintenance problems from occurring. We just have to be ready for them and do the appropriate procedures safely.

[Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information.]

MD-11 flight crew reported rejecting their takeoff at about 110 kts when the First Officer airspeed indicator became unreliable.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency

Immediately after takeoff; we received a master caution with the following EICAS messages: Hydraulic pump fail A; hydraulic fluid low A; hydraulic PTU fail. At the same time; we noticed that the main gear had retracted; but the nose wheel was extended with a green light. We executed the checklist for the Hydraulic Pump Fail A and diverted to [nearest suitable airport]. We notified company. We asked for crash equipment to stand by. After using the emergency gear extension per the checklist; we executed the ILS and stopped on the runway using the emergency brake. [We were] towed to the service center where they found a ruptured hydraulic line in the nose wheel bay. One important problem to note is the difficulty that we had getting in touch with the company. When we first notified company it was via the [VHF] frequency. We were asked to call in on the satellite phone; so that the Flight District's Officer could be conferenced in. On my first call; I dialed the Dispatch hotline via the number on the sticker on the phone. I called this number twice and did not get an answer (phone rang). Second; I tried the normal number on the phone sticker. I dialed this number twice and got a recording both times that said that the number was out of service. At this point; I told the First Officer what was happening and he dialed the 800 number to Dispatch from memory and was able to get through. Suggestions: Thorough inspection of hydraulic lines. A Cessna Mechanic said that this was the 'weak link' in the system. Perhaps these lines should be replaced more often. Check of phone system at Dispatch. Stickers in airplanes with phone numbers might need to be replaced.

CE-750 First Officer reported loss of hydraulic system A. They declared an emergency and diverted to the nearest suitable airport; where a hydraulic line failure was diagnosed.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Fatigue; Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was just doing my normal thing once I was unloaded at ZZZ. On my way to ZZZ1 taxiing via [Taxiway] A for departure and was transmitting my intentions. For example; taxiing for departure Runway 35; it will be a north bound departure; ZZZ traffic. I heard nothing on frequency which is pretty common and not unusual. Setting torque once lined up on Runway 35; I initiated my takeoff roll only to see another aircraft landing or departing (couldn't tell) Runway 30. What the heck! Why weren't they on frequency? It was smaller GA traffic though; so I was not surprised. I had to delay my rotation just to ensure I would not take off into their belly. I would call this a near miss. Once on the ground at ZZZ1 a local airport man rode up to my plane on a tractor looking thing while loaders were offloading. He asked what frequency I was on. I said [frequency]. He said frequency is [frequency]. I was appalled at what had happened and extremely embarrassed. I later apologized to the other aircraft doing pattern work there on the correct frequency. Always double check frequencies. If you don't hear anything check your frequency or talk to the previous approach frequency to try to get traffic advisories.

Beech 99 Captain reported that selecting the incorrect CTAF frequency resulted in a critical ground conflict.


Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14.7; Flight Crew Total 146; Flight Crew Type 122

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted

During a pleasure flight; the low fuel light came on in the Robinson R44. Upon noticing; I immediately reduced collective and slowed to 80 knots to preserve fuel and began considering the nearest appropriate place to land. Being close to ZZZ; I headed directly there to land while keeping an eye out open areas to auto rotate to in the case of engine loss. After landing; I sent my passengers into the FBO; refueled the helicopter; and sent my passengers onto dinner. I called a friend and previous Flight Instructor to discuss what happened. I then flew the helicopter back to ZZZ1 alone.The issue began during the preflight. A friend and our significant others joined me for a sightseeing tour. During the preflight; the friend kept asking questions and pulling away my attention. When I first checked the fuel gauges; I misread them as being mostly full when they were mostly empty. I even quickly redid the weight and balance in my head to confirm we were under maximum weight. I have no idea how I made the mistake other than I was simply going through the motions while distracted. I then missed when I did the physical check of the fuel tanks as the hangar was dim and I did not affirmatively see the fuel level. Again; I allowed myself to be distracted and just go through the motions of unscrewing the fuel cap and looking into the tank. As I finished the preflight; I mentioned to my friend how important the preflight was and asked him to be quiet while I did a second preflight. Unfortunately this time; I simply confirmed the gauges showed the same fuel level as before and did not check the tanks; but was thorough for the rest of the preflight. The startup of the helicopter took longer than usual with several attempts due to the cold weather. During my takeoff check; I repeated out loud that gauges were green and we had fuel - again just confirming the gauges were in the same position and not really looking at what they read.I was excited and nervous for the flight. I allowed myself to be distracted and go through some of the motions. I have now placed an emphasis on each and every step of the preflight. I will no longer allow distractions to be present while I am doing important safety work.

R44 pilot reported diverting due to a low fuel indication attributed to distraction during the preflight check.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working LC2.  Rwy 26R is closed and I am shooting gaps on Rwy 26L.  Let me start by saying that I have worked at PHL; CLE and CVG where we landed and departed the same runway all day long.  So with my 23 yrs of ATC experience I feel that I am qualified.  Since 26R has been closed; the FLM's like to stand right behind LC2 and offer 'suggestions' on how many departures to get out in each gap.  The FLM behind me was vibrating like a tuning fork because the TRACON was giving me 5 miles at 170...more than enough room to get out 1 maybe 2 departures.  [Certain air carriers] typically take their time rolling; but you can usually get out 2 crjs if they are not the same RNAV.  The supervisor ordered me to get two out in the next gap.  Both departures were back to back westbound departures; and it's likely separation would not have existed; let alone the minimum spacing required by Atlanta Tracon on back to back departures.  I was angry that the supervisor was setting me up to have an operational error (it's not the first time this supervisor has set me or other controllers up to have an error; and NONE of us appreciate that)  and I let him know that; I refused to roll the second aircraft and asked him to step away from me.   A newer controller would have taken the bait and had an error.  And I watched this same supervisor sit behind 3 different LC2 controllers and tell them how many to get out in each gap.  Talk about micro management.  The FLM's love to force the new people to roll fast and possibly have errors.  It is NOT about SAFETY; it is all about the departure rate....always.  Management will of course deny this; but the controllers know it to be true.Just now; I was working LC3 and the FLM told me to roll 6 departures before I crossed any arrivals and STOOD right behind me breathing down my neck until I did what he told me to do.  This has to stop immediately.  It is creating an UNSAFE working condition in the tower. Tell the FLM' s to back up and let the controllers work and not try to talk them into rolling too fast and possibly having an error.

Local Controller voiced concern regarding supervisory oversight and separation judgments.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

After takeoff; when 'Gear Up' was selected; the left Main Landing Gear (MLG) indicated an unsafe 'Up' position. The appropriate check was executed; which also concluded that the left Main Gear Door was in an unsafe position. We advised ATC; declared an emergency; and contacted Flight Control for an aircraft return to ZZZZ. The landing was uneventful. After landing; the mechanics found a broken bracket on the [Main] Gear door; had been the cause of the problem. EFIS; FMS/FMC.

An MD-11 Captain reports that after takeoff; when 'Gear Up' was selected; the left Main Landing Gear (MLG) indicated an unsafe 'Up' position. Emergency declared; aircraft returned to field.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 114; Flight Crew Total 3532; Flight Crew Type 3532

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; MEL; Procedure

Our release for this flight included the following under the MEL Item Info 'Treated Fuel'.  A search of the MEL manual and the FOM revealed no information to further describe what this means.  The Captain called Dispatch who had to conference in maintenance to inform us of the meaning.  Maintenance said the plane had been in storage and was only on its second leg after coming out of storage.  A review of all the maintenance paperwork provided to the pilots did not communicate this information.

Air carrier First Officer reported not being able to find information on a treated fuel related MEL. First Officer stated the aircraft had just come out of storage.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Incursion Runway

I was ready [to] depart VFR from VUO. I contacted Pearson Advisory on 119.0 and advised I was departing Runway 26 with a Class C cutout departure. Pearson Advisory acknowledged; advised that PDX was departing to the west and cautioned for wake turbulence. I looked to the east and did not see any aircraft. I announced on the CTAF that I was departing Runway 26 with a Vancouver Lake departure. As I moved forward across the runway hold short line I again looked east and saw a small Cessna on short final. I immediately stopped before turning onto the runway. At that time I heard the Cessna pilot say she was going around. I had not seen her before that. I asked her if she had announced she was on final and she said she had. I did not hear that. My passenger who is experienced with airport operations did not hear any position reports from the aircraft. This was not a near collision. The evasive actions taken were that I stopped just beyond the hold short line and the other airplane initiated a go-around.

Pilot reported a critical ground conflict while taking runway for departure with aircraft on final approach.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 208; Flight Crew Total 10717

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused

About 10 minutes prior to scheduled pushback from gate; a ramp supervisor entered the flightdeck and introduced himself.  He had a phone with pictures he had taken of cargo he wanted to show me.  It showed a torn box with a propane cylinder in it.  He proceeded to tell me that one of the ramp loaders while loading a shipment of cargo noticed this box was torn open and saw a cylinder inside.  He inspected it and found out it was a propane cylinder that was full of propane.  The cargo was from the USPS and was a load of the same type of boxes weighing 1800lbs.  The rampers called their supervisor and he came to inspect the cargo and took pictures of it. The hazardous material was not declared and their was no record of this type of cargo.  It was the supervisor who came up to the flight deck to notify me of this. He told me the boxes were loaded with full propane cylinders. The gate agents were wanting to close the main cabin door about 5 minutes before push and we told them to hold off because they had to offload the cargo.  The hazardous cargo was offloaded in about 10 minutes and the ramp supervisor told me it was all offloaded and we were good to go. We proceeded to taxi out and the rest of the flight was uneventful.

B-737 Captain reported refusing USPS cargo of undeclared propane tanks that rampers discovered during cargo loading.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

The climb out and cruise phases were uneventful. During descent out of FL290 we received a CABIN Pressure Emergency alert with pressure reading 11000. We donned the O2 masks and began a rapid descent down to 10000; coordinating with ATC. The ECAM action items were accomplished. FAs and passengers were informed of the situation when ECAM was accomplished and at a safe phase of the descent. We were cleared for the ILS and landed with no further incidents. One passenger requested medical attention after landing; but deplaned before medical arrived at the gate. Upon arrival at gate; I informed maintenance; dispatch; and the chief pilot on duty of the situation. I feel everything went good and the whole crew handled the situation well and with professionalism.

A319 Captain reported loss of cabin pressure during descent.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Company Policy; Logbook Entry

Noticed flight was over burning fuel at much higher than normal rate. Crew also called to ask if load planning had the correct ZFW. All those number checked out. It was discovered that the OEW was incorrect for the aircraft. OEW more than 92000 difference. A normal OEW of that ac would be approximately 321k. Flight over burned 6;000 lbs.

B777-200 flight crew reported they queried Dispatch about a high fuel burn and were told the operating empty weight used to calculate fuel burn was more than 92;000 pounds light.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 156; Flight Crew Total 222; Flight Crew Type 114

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Took off Runway XXR at ZZZ. On climbout engine started running rough. At 200 feet significant loss of engine power. Advised Tower of immediate return. Tower cleared us to land on Runway YYR. When we were about to touch down we saw another aircraft had been cleared off Runway YYR. That aircraft maneuvered to avoid us and we maneuvered to avoid him to the best of our ability. Due to that we touched down in the second half of the runway; had to push the brakes hard and got flat tire. We did not have enough time to declare an emergency; however we informed the controller we lost power and controller responded by clear to land YYR. After that the controller informed us to go-around; but we couldn't go-around due to power lost; and maneuvered to avoid the other aircraft on the runway. No injuries or damage caused. We were 2 person on board.

C152 pilot reported an engine malfunction after takeoff resulted in an immediate return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

I inherited this flight at turnover. It was a Ramp Directed Loading (RDL) flight; so it wasn't planned by a Load Planner. I received a call from the Ramp Lead at approximately XA00z. I noted the flight was OUT; but not yet finalized in [computer]. I displayed the flight in [computer]; so I could see how it was loaded. The Lead advised that he was unable to close out the flight; and also advised that cargo Item 3; with dry ice; was buried by cargo item 2; which was a bulky freight item with 18 pieces at 1383 lbs. He advised that pit 4 was bulked out. He had planned to load priority bags in pit 4 to secure the dry ice; but had no space. He said they ran out of time and pushed the aircraft like that. He asked if we could final the flight this way; since the dry ice was secured by the bulky cargo item 2. I advised the Lead that this wasn't acceptable; and that was why the system prevented him from closing out. He said the flight had already taxied away from the gate. I advised him that the flight would have to come back to the gate. I advised him he should either pull the hazmat cargo; or move the bulky cargo to pit 6; and move the bags in pit 6 to pit 4 to meet the 15 bag requirement. He said he would talk to a Supervisor. I advised my Shift Manager on Duty [SMOD] of what was going on. He reviewed [computer] and concurred that the flight would have to come back. The SMOD advised the OPS manager. I then got a call from the Dispatcher; who I advised what was going on; and she communicated with the crew that they would have to come back. I then got a call from the ZZZ Zone Controller; who I also advised what was going on. While the flight was coming back; I got another call from ZZZ ramp. I'm not sure if this was the Ramp Supervisor; or someone else. He seemed confused. He asked if the Hazmat had to be moved out of pit 4 because of the nesting system. I advised him no; that this aircraft doesn't have a nesting system; so Hazmat is allowed in pit 4. He asked if they could just move the bags to pit 4. I said yes; however pit 4 may be full; per my earlier caller. After the fight returned; Ramp moved bulky cargo item 2 to pit 6. The 17 bags in pit 6 were moved to pit 4. The flight now met the 15 bags requirement with the dry ice. Ramp finalized the DSTG [Departure Staging Guide] and DDLR [Display Departure Load Record]; and I sent the final weights. After getting a fuel top off; the flight pushed for the second time at XA57z.

Commercial Airline Load personnel reported Hazmat cargo incorrectly configured in cargo compartment for air transport after gate departure.


McDonnell Douglas Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Our in-flight position has Tower frequencies/FSS frequencies for satellite facilities that are part-timed to us when they close at night. In all cases; except one (BET Flight Control Tower); when the Tower facility/FSS location is open; we cannot select their frequency and communicate over it. There is one exception; BET Tower frequency 118.7. I received a radio call on Emmonak RCO 122.55. The frequency selector for Emmonak is 3 positions up from the BET Tower frequency selector. I saw the BET Tower frequency call indicator light flashing. I selected that frequency and began to talk on that frequency; overriding any other communications that BET Tower was having with aircraft in their local area. Bethel Tower frequency 118.7 is the only frequency on our position where we can override their control instructions when that ATC facility is open. This frequency needs to operate just like all of the other satellite Tower/FSS frequencies; i.e. when the facility is open; we should not have the ability to transmit any communications over their control frequency.

ENA FSS Controller voiced concern regarding the existing override capability their facility has for a BET Tower frequency.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Training / Qualification

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Cleared to 'cross ZZZ at or above 14;000 feet; cleared for the ILS Z XX approach.'  Inattention to what mode the descent was in and tied with teaching on an OE; I descended to approximately 13;000 feet before realizing the error. We were in VMC conditions and had terrain in sight.  ATC did not mention the error.Performing OE for new FO and inattention to cleared altitude. Pay more attention during training on OE.

PM on OE and cleared to cross ZZZ at or above 14;000 feet; then cleared for the ILS Z Runway XX approach.  VMC with terrain in sight; descended below 14;000 feet prior to ZZZ.  Noticed the error; but ATC did not say anything.  Continued the approach and landed without further incident. Probably inexperience with the plane mostly; and also recency/currency; this was my first flight in an actual plane in about 7 months.  It was a new plane (I was on OE) and an unfamiliar airport.  The Check Airman and I had discussed the arrival/approach and how he was going to fly it during cruise but at the time were reviewing how to use the different descent modes to fly the approach and were momentarily distracted.More active monitoring and attention to what the plane's programming is doing; also experience in the plane will likely help.

Air Carrier flight crew descended below their cleared altitude. The crew cited distraction and the FO's lack of flying as contributing factors.


Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Our flight deviated from the lateral track depicted on the RNAV arrival we were assigned; we went off course. Company policy has us brief the arrival routing; approach; missed approach; post landing taxi plan to include hot spots and expected hold short points exhaustively.  That briefing is then acknowledged off by the approach checklist normally executed before descending through 18;000 feet.  We had done our jobs and properly briefed the assigned RNAV arrival and expected runway. The destination ATIS advertised ILS and visual approaches to 16L & 16R.  We had briefed the anticipated arrival runway (16R).  Weather was VFR; 6 miles visibility and 6;000 feet overcast ceiling (nighttime). Late in the arrival phase (at or below 10;000 feet) the approach controller issued us a completely unexpected clearance; we were issued the RNAV (RNP) Z to runway 16C.  I believe that 16C had been listed as the departure runway [on the ATIS]; not an arrival runway; and is not the usual runway we are normally assigned.  This chart has an effective date of 13 Nov of this year; it has only been in effect [for a week or so].  The ATIS had said nothing about RNAV RNP approaches to the destination.  There were no navigation fixes out of service and the ILS's were serviceable. To complicate matters only one pilot's iPad had chart 22-21 RNAV (RNP) Z to 16C; the other pilot's iPad did not have this chart (we believe we both updated our iPads prior to our first departure the previous day and were current).  Neither of us had seen or flown this approach before. There is a safety reason company procedure has us brief the instrument approach well in advance; and a sterile cockpit below 10;000 feet...  Below 10;000 feet things get busy and both external and internal threats are compounded by the time compression and the relative closeness of the underlying terrain. The very late runway approach clearance forces us to reselect the approach from the aircraft's FMC (The approach was available in the aircraft FMC) and review the various points.  We also need to tie the newly assigned approach to the RNAV arrival.  This requires briefing; verifying and cross checking.  In the middle of all of this briefing; verifying and executing activity the LNAV function disconnected and the jet wandered off the lateral course of the RNAV arrival. We discovered our LNAV disconnect and took immediate action to rectify our off course error.  By the time ATC queried us about our lateral deviation we were rejoining the arrival (I estimate we got 2 miles off course). Interestingly enough the same RNAV (RNP) Z Rwy 16C was issued to a competitor's jet immediately behind us.  They sounded a little surprised by the instrument approach assignment.  A few moments later that same competitor's jet told the approach controller that they were 'unable' the RNAV (RNP) Z to 16C approach.  The approach controller told them to expect the ILS to 16C.  In retrospect I should have done the same thing as I expect the Captain of that flight is not sitting up at a computer filling out their equivalent of this form; as they probably didn't make the mistake I did. I asked the controller if he had time for a question; to which he answered affirmative.  I asked him what was driving the RNAV (RNP) Z to Rwy 16 approach we had been assigned.  He answered me: 'expect the ILS to 16C.'  Except the ILS to 16C didn't answer the question asked.  In fact he is now changing the runway approach assignment that forces me to start the whole briefing-selecting-verifying-executing exercise again. I'm not sure that controller has any idea what he does to our work load when he changes an approach from an ILS to a RNAV (RNP) back to an ILS (now on a base turn descending to 3;000 feet).  I understand managing my work load is not his job.  I can always just say 'unable' and go around.  I can usually keep up; and I'm interested in cooperating; but tonight I missed a LNAV disconnect and got off course trying to make it work.We are VMC now and the safety of the aircraft is assured so I start the process of selecting the ILS both from the jet's FMC and my iPads.  Halfway thorough this exercise the controller asks if we have the destination airport in sight to which we answer in the affirmative.  He clears us for a visual approach. I am familiar with RNAV (RNP) approaches and am comfortable flying them.  The timing of this never previously issued or flown unexpected approach type clearance below 10;000 feet; not listed on the ATIS (that's why we listen to the ATIS right?) placed a heavy load of keypad pushing; briefing; cross checking and verifying that is normally done 30 to 40 miles behind our position; and at least 10;000 feet higher.  Tonight I committed an automation error; the autopilot reverted to heading select after the LNAV disconnected and we drifted off course. This event was caused by my inability to follow a set of instructions correctly; the task was unexpected; assigned late and required multiple steps.  In the midst of trying to get the steps correct I committed an automation error that caused the LNAV to disconnect resulting in a lateral course deviation.

On initial arrival into Seattle; the current ATIS information listed the ILS for Runways 16C and 16R in use at the airport. Prior to the top of descent; the ILS for 16R had been set-up and briefed. Some time after checking in with Seattle approach; we were given instruction to fly the RNAV RNP Z Runway 16C approach that joined with the new HAWKZ 4 arrival. At this point we were between the Waypoints of PIKEZ and COFAY on the arrival. The Captain attempted to re-program the FMS for the new approach. Since this was a new approach; I discovered that I did not have access to the approach on my iPad since we had been on a two day trip and I did not perform an update on my Jepp FD-Pro App on the layover. The Captain; Pilot Monitoring (PM) had updated his Jepp FD-Pro App at the layover and thus did have access to the approach; so we agreed that I would brief and fly off of his approach plate. In the attempt to re-program the new approach in the FMC and prepare to brief; the correct sequence of Waypoints along the HAWKZ 4 arrival in which we were established dropped off of the LEGS page in the FMC and a discontinuity was created after the Waypoint that was directly in front of us. I had requested that the PM 'clean up the LEGS page' prior to executing the change; however this did not happen due to the high workload that was placed on the PM at that time. Consequently when the aircraft traversed the next Waypoint and reached a discontinuity on the LEGS page; it sequenced out of LNAV and into CWS. We immediately saw the change and attempted to immediately turn towards the next Waypoint as well as correct the discontinuity and re-engage the correct lateral navigation; however we reached a lateral excursion of 1.45 RNP prior to correcting back to the published course. ATC queried us about our lateral excursion at which time we were already correcting; and we advised them of our correction back to course. We continued the arrival and were re-assigned the ILS 16C approach without further event.The primary cause of this event was the assignment of a new approach. Since the ATIS listed the ILS as in use for all active runways; this was what had been set-up and briefed. Consequently receiving instruction to change to an unfamiliar and new approach not listed in the ATIS; created a high workload environment for both myself and the PM.

B737-NG flight crew experiences a runway change during arrival to SEA on the HAWKZ 4 approaching COFAY. The ATIS had said to expect the ILS 16R and the runway and approach were changed to RNAV RNP Z Rwy 16C. During the change to this new procedure; a discontinuity is introduced and a track deviation occurs.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Last night while 1 hour 40 minutes from [our destination] we got a series of EICAS messages that didn't at all seem connected. I placed a phone call to Tech Ops to try to track down the issue. They assured me it sounded like just indication issues and that it shouldn't be a problem. We continued our flight. About 30 minutes later (about 1 hour from [our destination]) we heard 2 beeps on the radio followed by what sounded almost like a tesla coil noise. I heard ATC try to contact us; we could not transmit back. Instead; we squawked ident. ATC asked us to Squawk Ident again if we could hear them; and we complied. 2 minutes later; the radios went down completely; we could only hear every 3rd word or so if anything so we squawked 7600 followed by 7700. I tried reaching ATC on HF as well; but was unsuccessful.At some point; I called [someone] I know from the Sat phone who is an Air Traffic Controller at [the destination airport] to see if she could put me in touch with Approach via phone. Later approach called me while in holding for the approach.There were other; smaller things happening in the aircraft that made us worry that we could lose more systems as time progressed. I will leave those out as they have no relevance on what ATC saw; however MX has been notified of these issues as well.We were not assigned an arrival at this point; so we continued on to our last fix. Afterword; we entered holding and descended in the hold. It was at this point that Approach reached us via the Sat phone; we informed them of our status and our intention to shoot the ILS approach after holding was complete. They agreed. Upon getting to a safe altitude to begin the approach from; we began to try to configure the aircraft. This is when we realized that the flaps did not; in fact work. We re-entered holding to trouble shoot this issue. ATC; in return called to ask us for our intentions. I explained to them that we were having another issue with our flaps and they asked us if we could take a vector on the phone so that they could get Aircraft in to [the airport] while we ran our checklist. We complied. They took us away from the approach and asked us to orbit while we worked the issue and to keep them on the line. I asked them to have ARFF standing by (due to the no-flap situation) as well as a 'follow me' car once we land. After running the checklist we informed them that we were ready to attempt the approach. We then made an uneventful no-flap approach and landing.

G200 Safety Manager reported communications failure in flight following a series of EICAS messages that seemed unrelated. When begining the approach; the flaps would not extend and a no flap landing ensued; using a cell phone for ATC communications.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We had an MEL restricting us to FL310. We were climbing out and there were some thunderstorms in the area and as we were going around the weather we leveled at FL300 with a bit of a bumpy ride. It was difficult to determine if we would be on top of the cell ahead and I could see that we were near the tops of the clouds visually. I asked the Captain if he could get us FL320. He said yes; requested it and we climbed to FL320. We cleared the weather and we were at FL320 for about three minutes when I realized our mistake. We then descended to FL300 and completed the flight.

First Officer of a large turbojet reported briefly climbing above an altitude restriction set by an MEL to avoid weather.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Arrived at ZZZ gate X after operating Aircraft X on the XXth of May (local date). Gate was clear and marshaling crew ready when we arrived. Parked normally and parking brake was set and 'set' light verified illuminated. Then directed my attention to overhead panel watching for external power to be connected. The parking break released and the aircraft rolled forward several feet before I was made aware the aircraft was moving. Stopped the aircraft again and tried to set the parking brake. Could feel the parking brake latch 'grab' when top of rudder pedals when depressed and parking brake handle pulled up but the brakes would not 'latch' all the way and hold the pedals. Several attempts were made to set the parking brake with no success. Aircraft was held stationary after initial movement by manually holding the brakes until a tug arrived and moved us back to the proper parking position and the chocks were in place. There was no injury to anyone on the ramp and no damage to the airplane. Parking brake would not fully engage.

B767-300 flight crew reported the parking brake failed after parking at gate.


Electronic Library (other than Nav database)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Equipment / Tooling; Company Policy; Manuals; Human Factors

Using my iPad to research company information. It stopped responding and indicated 'LOADING.' Never recovered. Tried hard re-boot of iPad - no help. After the hard re-boot I tried to open the app and it flashes a number of 'LOADING' screens then a LOGIN screen that; I believe; requires an Apple account. Entered my Apple account information and it rejects it. I checked the app versions and they both appear current. I had this same issue on a flight and had to remove apps plus disable the hotel wireless input and use the LTE signal to re-load the apps and then 125 updates. Apparently this will be required again.

B757 Captain reported problems with his iPad apps while trying to obtain company information.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 520; Flight Crew Type 125

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On a training flight to complete the CPL long cross country I experienced a loss of alternator power during climb from ZZZ. I returned to airport and alternator worked find on the ground. Decided to make return trip to ZZZ1 and after climbing out the fault reappeared upon retracting flaps. Since no maintenance was available at ZZZ the decision was made to continue the flight with radio mast off including transponder. Visual flight rules existed and see and avoid was used.  To conserve batter power all radios and other equipment were turned off. Upon entering Mode C required airspace (ZZZ2) the radio master was turned back on to transmit location and MODE C.  Gear was able to extend and flight terminated without incident. There was a period of around 140 NM in which no transponder data was transmitted; but flight safety rules were followed and an Ipad with GPS and traffic was used to ensure proper separation from other aircraft.  No incident occurred other than the travel without transponder transmitting data. Upon reaching ZZZ1 a panel under the horizontal stabilizer was found to be ripped in half. This doesn't seem to be related to the electrical failure and more due to fastener failures. Mechanic was called and all issues will be resolved promptly.

Pilot reported experiencing a loss of alternator.


The air hoses on the new TLD air units are too short and pose a potential safety issue when being used around our wide body fleet. The unit is large and bulky and has to be place directly in front of the aircraft's engine in order for the hose to be able to reach and supply conditioned air to the aircraft. In addition the ramp agent has to bring the unit up with a tug which requires them to drive up to the aircraft fuselage; disconnect the unit and then drive their TUG between the engine and the fuselage and under the aircraft's wing in order to remove the tug from under the aircraft. When it's time to remove the unit the agent has to reverse the tug the same way he just exited; hook up to the unit and then back the unit out. This causes a potential safety issue not only to the aircraft but also to the agent.

Air carrier Ramp Agent reported a potentially dangerous situation resulting from short air hoses on their ground air conditioning units.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Human Factors; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication

I was PF and the CA was PM. 160 NM prior to top of descent; we sent ACARS request for BUR ATIS and landing data. ACARS ATIS was VMC; winds 330-20G27; expect RNAV visual RWY 33. We discovered there was no RNAV to RWY 33 in Jeppesen FD PRO so I briefed a visual approach to RWY 33. The CA loaded an approach for RWY 33. While he loaded the approach for RWY 33 he mentioned RNAV to RWY 33 was an option in the MCDU menu for BUR but we obviously could not select it legally as this approach is not in the JeppFD PRO database.I discussed my parameters for energy management; my planned configuration gates and my use of automation; which was auto thrust and autopilot on until the turn from base to final. We descended via the JANNY 3 RNAV STAR. At approximately position ELMRR on the JANNY 3 ATC issued a heading of generally South for the visual downwind to RWY 33. They informed us these would be vectors to the RNAV Visual RWY 33. We reported to ATC we did not have the RNAV visual RWY 33 approach plate and we would accept vectors to the visual RWY 33. The descent profile and configuration to downwind for RWY 33 was as-briefed. Aircraft configuration on downwind was speed 190; flaps 1. My briefed plan was to be on the approach at 1500 ft fully configured. Past the runway abeam point ATC issued a turn to base which put us inside the approach by approximately 1-1.5 miles.  I dialed speed to 170; called for flaps 2 and gear down. The CA recommended managed speed so I pushed for managed speed and called for configuration to flaps full. The CA completed the before landing checklist and asked if I had the preceding aircraft on short final in sight to which I responded affirmative. The CA reported to ATC we were visual with preceding aircraft and ATC cleared us to land. Half way through the base turn at approximately 1300 we received a 'caution terrain; caution terrain' voice alert. I immediately clicked off the autopilot via the sidestick; increased the bank to approximately 15-20 degrees toward the landing runway and applied aft stick pressure to arrest the descent. I then received a 'speed; speed' voice alert. I clicked the instinctive disconnect button on the trust levers and advanced thrust to what I believed was the CLB detent.  I looked at the FMAs and saw the A. FLOOR FMA. The CA stated 'I have control of the aircraft'. I responded 'you have control'. I looked back at the FMA and saw the TOGA LK FMA. The CA leveled the wings; pulled the power back; pushed the instinctive disconnect button and established Vapp. He established the aircraft on final at approximately 3 miles and 1000 feet. From this point on the approach was SOP and in full compliance with stabilized approach criteria. The CA and I have fully debriefed this event.Post-flight I happened to meet the aircrew from the preceding aircraft we followed into BUR that night. That CA commented they have all the RNAV approaches to BUR runways and noted how challenging night visual approaches are into this airport. I accessed the Jeppesen website; selected BUR and discovered the RNAV visual RWY 33 approach is in the Jeppesen database among several other RNAV approaches to this airport.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A319 flight crew reported getting low and slow during a night visual approach to Runway 33 at BUR. The Captain assumed control for the final approach and landing.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

There was heavy weather in St. Augustine Sector. It was a solid line extending from GNV towards SAV. I was working multiple aircraft southbound. Most were deviating Orlando International arrivals. Others were overflights going to MIA; FLL or the Islands. I requested additional Warning Area airspace but was told that the military would not provide any more. I had a little room to work with; but the weather continued to march eastward and eventually my aircraft began to deviate into military airspace. I called on some point outs to Sea Lord. I told management that we need to implement CAR40 procedures to avoid violating the Warning areas. The area in question was W158A. I continued to work with what I had. Over 30 minutes passed and CAR40 had NOT been put into effect. It should have only taken 5 minutes. At the time I had 7 aircraft in my sector and 6 of them deviated into W158A. This is dangerous because I can not see aircraft that the Navy might have flying in there. Basically; I can not ensure separation from a mid-air collision when aircraft under my control fly through the warning airspace. CAR40 procedures are what keep these commercial aircraft safe. They were not used.TMU and local management ignore the concerns of the controller workforce. They should work and listen to us. It is us; the air traffic controller; who are the ones certified on the various sectors. TMU is not even certified in the areas that they work with. This is why it is a continuing problem. Some of them try hard; but if you just don't have the knowledge necessarily you won't be able to help; more times than not they make it worse.

ZJX Controller describes weather scenario which causes aircraft to deviate through a Warning Area in which he did not have control of.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We were instructed to change STAR to the GESNR1 arrival and then the RNAV Y Runway 09 at IAH. The last point on the STAR; HOWLN; is also the 1st point on the RNAV approach. I connected the 2 points and reviewed but we noticed as we were approaching HOWLN there was a VECTOR prompt on the FMC. I tried to delete the vector but was unsuccessful. When we hit the point where we should have turned and commenced the approach; the aircraft did not turn. Approach Control broke us off the approach and gave us vectors.We should have told ATC when we couldn't correct the FMC so they could have just given us vectors.

B737-800 pilot reported a track deviation occurred on arrival into IAH following a last minute clearance change that was complicated by the FMC not responding as expected during reprogramming.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 606; Flight Crew Type 8000

Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On initial contact with Denver Approach we were told to expect Runway 16L. Within approximately 20 miles of the field we were told to expect the RNP Z approach to 17R. After quickly briefing the approach and programming the FMS; we were then concerned with and discussed a thunderstorm just north of the field and windshear alerts from Approach to other aircraft. While on the downwind I happened to look down at the FMS and realized we just passed the last point on the STAR and there was a discontinuity. About the same time we tried to salvage the approach; ATC told us we weren't on the approach and gave us a vector to fly for the visual. Don't let distractions break habit patterns (close up discontinuity when cleared for RNP approach) and have better monitoring skills.

B737-700 Captain reported a track deviation occurred on arrival into DEN following a late ATC change to the clearance.


Vans Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6; Flight Crew Total 1272; Flight Crew Type 1272

Workload; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Cruising at 6;500 feet experienced a sudden onset of engine roughness and corresponding reduction of power. EGT of Number 4 cylinder was negligible. Not knowing the seriousness of the problem; I began evaluating off field landing sights as I trimmed for best glide speed in anticipation of a full engine out situation. I had the sectional in my lap and saw a paved airport nearby; did some mental estimates on speed; rate of descent and concluded it was makeable. I turned towards the airport; selected the CTAF and requested and received active runway so I could plan the direct approach.Next I tried combinations of throttle; RPM and mixture with no success in smoothing out the vibrations. Still able to maintain some power; my attention turned to informing the traffic on CTAF (there's an active flight school there and the pattern was quite busy) that I was inbound with one cylinder out and would be making an expedited landing.Through all this; aviate/navigate/communicate; I did not feel; since the engine had been producing some power; that this constituted an emergency; but I was very anxious that one could develop rapidly depending on whatever was wrong. I elected not to squawk 7700; nor did I feel I wanted to divert attention to changing frequency to Approach and go through the story. I was focused on getting on the ground ASAP.With the runway aligned perpendicular to my flight path and blocked by trees; I spend a lot of time trying to find it. During one glance at the GPS (Garmin 430) I noticed I was probably right on the boundary of the Delta airspace and had descended to 2;000 feet; but moving away from it. I had observed no other aircraft in my vicinity.The landing was uneventful; and subsequent inspection discovered a completely severed exhaust pipe on Number 4.The workload and the anxiety of losing complete power contributed to a possible brief violation of Delta Airspace without contacting ATC.

A VANS RV pilot reported that he detected what he thought was a failed engine cylinder and diverted to a nearby airport. On the ground; he determined the Number 4 cylinder exhaust pipe had severed completely.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 21; Flight Crew Total 1213; Flight Crew Type 515

Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I arrived at ZZZ to take on fuel. After fueling; I taxied to the far end of runway XX. After an initial ground roll for takeoff; I rejected the takeoff because I was not building sufficient airspeed in order to safely depart. I taxied back to the very edge of runway XX; including all of the displaced threshold area; and made a second takeoff roll. Short/soft field technique was used throughout for this soft field with fairly long grass. After becoming airborne; the aircraft struck a tree(s) just past the departure end of XX. I was unsure of what damage the aircraft had suffered; but the propeller/engine was not affected. I called up Approach; [coordinated with them;] and was vectored to ZZZ1 where I made an uneventful landing and taxi.I have 500 hours of flight experience in this airplane. I have used it previously at other; shorter turf airstrips. I did not believe it would be an issue to get in and out of the airpark for fuel. I may have been overconfident given my experience with the aircraft.

Reporter indicated there was also minor damage to the right wing leading edge; but was not considered to be substantial.

BE-36 pilot reported contacting a tree during departure from a turf airstrip.