Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 7500

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

The Captain was not that familiar with flying into SFO from Airport ZZZ. He also had mentioned that he had never flown this model of the 777 (I mention this because his unfamiliarity with the flap speeds became a distraction). He seemed to be new on the aircraft. During the arrival briefing; I mentioned that they usually clear us to cross OSI at 8000 feet. He asked me if that would make him low or high at OSI and I told him that would definitely make him high for the approach. He briefed that he would be doing a flaps 30 approach. We were cleared to cross OSI at 8000 and then cleared to a lower altitude once we passed OSI. Once we passed OSI; the captain descended at 250 KTS with the speed brakes full out. The autopilot was engaged at this time. Once cleared for the approach and on final; he began slowing down. When he called for flaps 5; we were too fast and I told him he needed to slow down more. After that; I don't remember the exact order of things; and at some point he disconnected the autopilot; but I did not immediately realize he had done so. He asked for 150 KTS and the gear down and once the gear was down he asked for flaps 25; therefore going from flaps 5 right to flaps 25. Since the speed brakes were still out; we got the caution message and he quickly stowed the handle which caused the airplane to balloon. Then I noticed we were slightly low on the glide path.  It was only slightly so I didn't think much of it; however; I watched to make sure he made a correction to stop the high rate of descent. I saw him make a slight change to the pitch; although it was not all the way up to the FD pitch bars. I know that the flight director tends to exaggerate the amount of correction needed and you don't want to chase them; so the fact that he showed he was aware he was low and correcting prevented me from saying anything at that time. I continued doing the landing checklist. At some point he called for target speed and I waited for him to call for Flaps 30; watching his speed closely as he was calling for flaps very close to the limit speeds.With the checklist done; I made an early 1000 FT call (@ 1080 FT) and set the missed approach altitude. I then looked outside and saw 3 red VASI lights which immediately turned to 4 red VASI lights. I told him he needed to come up. As soon as I said that; the tower issued an altitude alert and directed us to check our altitude and make an immediate correction. I thought about telling him to go-around; but since it was clear and this time he made a larger correction; I did not.  As he was correcting; I glanced at our altitude and it said 970 FT; so I'm guessing the incident occurred right at 1000 FT. We quickly reacquired the glideslope and landed without incident. However; in light of a recent mishap; which occurred in VMC; and recent reports of deviations at our company; I realize now that calling for a missed approach would have been the most conservative response and therefore the safer course of action.

B777 First Officer describes a Visual Approach to SFO by a Captain not entirely familiar with the airport or the aircraft; resulting in a slightly unstabilized approach and a low altitude alert from the Tower.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.0

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 9200; Flight Crew Type 85

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Incursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

I was told twice by the Traffic Management Coordinator and the snow team coordinator that Runway 30 was open. Aircraft X was given instructions to line up and wait on Runway 30. I observed the ADSE-X and I did not see any targets on the runway. I was also in the middle of coordinating a closure for runway 1C due to snow removal. It was IFR and the visibility was heavily restricted. I could not see the entire runway. I could only see the first 2;000 feet of the runway at best. At no point did I observe a target or vehicle on the runway or ADSE-X. Aircraft X was given a departure clearance and a vector to the southwest. Aircraft Y was given instructions to line up and wait on Runway 30. As I was closing Runway 1C center on the ADSE-X; the ADSE-X alerted for Runway 30. I did not hear exactly what it said but I am quite sure that it did not say Runway 30 occupied. I thought I closed the wrong runway when I noticed an unidentified target moving towards Aircraft X. The targets were merging and at merging point. When Aircraft X's target moved passed the unidentified target I asked the pilot if he was still there. The pilot stated that it was close. After observing the aircraft airborne on radar and on the assigned heading; I believe I switched the aircraft to Potomac Approach.I have not had a chance to review the tapes or ADSE-X playback. I will amend this report once I have a chance to review the incident. As mentioned earlier; I was in the middle of closing the runway when the ADSE-X alerted. My initial assumption was I closed the wrong runway. I am aware that my requirement is to issue a cancel takeoff clearance. By the time I noticed and assessed the situation; the targets were merging and merged. There was nothing I could do. I do not know what recommendations I can make on current procedures.

The flight departed the ramp after being deiced and anti-iced with Type I and Type IV fluid with an established holdover time of 20 minutes. We were then instructed by Ground Control to taxi to Runway 01 Center. After holding short of Taxiway F on Z while waiting for Runway 01 Center to open for departures; we were offered Runway 30 after the snow removal equipment finished their runway clearing. We were told it would be about 10 minutes until they were finished. The wait for Runway 01 Center would be a longer delay so we accepted the shorter wait for Runway 30 to accommodate or holdover time. As we looked over to Runway 30; about 20-30 vehicles were finishing the clearing and beginning to stage on Taxiway Q; adjacent to runway 30. We were number 1 holding short of Runway 30 and instructed by the Tower controller to taxi into position and hold on Runway 30. After visually inspecting the wings for contamination and verifying that we had a clean wing and we were within our holdover time we conducted our lineup checks which were completed. The current special observation reported winds 0000 kt; 3/4 SM visibility; light snow and mist; scattered clouds at 500 feet; overcast at 2;300 feet; temperature 0; dew point -1; and altimeter 29.83. Approximately 30 seconds later; the Tower controller instructed us to turn left to a heading of 250 and cleared us for takeoff on Runway 30.Our pulse lights were transitioned to their steady-on takeoff configuration; taxi light and strobe lights were on; power was advanced and autothrottles were engaged; giving us our desired takeoff power. I conducted my normal call outs during the takeoff roll. After my V1 call out; the pilot flying noticed what appeared to be headlights and amber strobe lights at his 1 o'clock position; on the right half of the runway. He then said something to the effect of 'what is that?!' I then looked up and confirmed that indeed there was a truck coming at us. The Pilot Flying immediately looked at the airspeed indicator in the heads up display (HUD) and saw that we were passing through 4 knots above our decision speed (V1). He opted to pull back on the yoke in an attempt to fly over the truck. I believe the driver of the truck saw us at about the same time and made an evasive maneuver into the snow off the runway. I indicated that I saw him spin out and the last thing I witnessed was the truck 'fish tailing' off the side of the runway; facing back toward us. The climb out was normal. Our climb checks were completed and we were handed over to Potomac departure. The remainder of the flight was completed without incident.

IAD Tower Controller and pilot reported a near collision on the runway between the aircraft and a snow removal vehicle.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

[Pratt-Whitney PW-120A] Engine Serial Number (S/N) XXXX-48 was involved in a over-torque on a DHC-8-100 aircraft; at Number 1 position. Engine was changed and sent to Engine Shop. I was instructed by Engine Program Manager to remove Engine S/N XXXX-48's Reduction Gearbox (RGB) (S/N XXXX-06) and install RGB S/N XXXX-24 to make Engine XXXX-48 Serviceable again. Task was completed and engine was signed in Serviceable; February 2014. Engine S/N XXXX-48 was then installed on another DHC-8-100 aircraft; at Number 1 position. Two days later; I was told by the Engine Program Manager that Engine S/N XXXX-48 needed to go out for overhaul. I told him that engine was already installed and flying. I showed him the paper he gave me with his workscope of that engine. After much headshaking he admitted his mistake and thought we did the gearbox swap on Engine S/N XXXX-26. That Engine is in the Shop minus the gearbox. I confirmed with him many times during the repair of Engine S/N XXXX-48; reference to his workscope; that we were doing the correct thing. [The second DHC-8-100] arrived in ZZZ later in the afternoon with torque problems. Questioned Manager's decision to send an engine out for overhaul. Followed Manager's plan. Engine on Aircraft Y was changed. Double check Manager's decision.

A Lead Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) explains how an apparent lack of adequate communication between himself and their Engine Program Manager led to the removal of an overtorqued Engine from one DHC-8-100 aircraft and installed on another DHC-8 aircraft that later arrived with the same torque problems. Engine had been scheduled for overhaul; not installation.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 315; Flight Crew Type 60

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Student pilot with instructor took off from OKV on Runway 35 made left crosswind and then continued to the southeast toward White Post airport climbing up to 1;500 MSL/800 AGL. Approximately 1.5 miles to the south of OKV encountered a small UAV helicopter at the same altitude. [We] came close enough to determine color; type; and approximate size; possibly within 200 FT. UAV was 2-3 FT across; it was red; and was the 3-channel type. We turned our helicopter left and descended to avoid. Made radio call on CTAF advising other aircraft of the UAV and location/altitude. The UAV helicopter should not have been that high or that close to the airport. UAVs need regulation and operators need training in how to avoid piloted aircraft.

An instructor and student departed OKV and while climbing through 1;500 FT took evasive action from a UAS approximately 1.5 miles south of the airport.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Prior to departure; we thoroughly reviewed arrival options considering the terrain and lack of good approaches into HND. The safest option was visual to [Runway] 17R. We would have a 3-4 knot tailwind but it was the best choice for our night arrival.We requested the [Runway] 17R visual with Las Vegas approach and they said HND would assign our runway. We again requested [Runway] 17R on initial contact with HND Tower. We were told that [Runway] 35L was the active and they could not accommodate our request. We were vectored to a five mile final for [Runway] 35L and we had the airport including the VASI clearly in sight. At 4-5 mile final we were on the VASI and began descent below 4;000 feet. We received a terrain advisory and we executed a go around. We notified Tower and requested landing on [Runway] 17R. We flew a left visual to [Runway] 17R and landed on [Runway] 17R.With the terrain south of HND; I do not think [we] should land on [Runway] 35L or R. The VASI is 4.3 [degrees] and there is no room for error.

CL-350 First Officer reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning on a night visual approach to Runway 35L at HND.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 3

Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Weather; Staffing; Human Factors; Procedure

I was on south feeder final to MIA; S.  Low ceilings; limited visibility; rain at the airport.  Low staffing in the facility due to recurrent training; training on various other positions; and E-learning Management System (ELMS) assigned by management.  Staggered approaches were being run at Miami with very strong winds out of the east and high volume from my 3 fixes.  We had just combined up the final to me at the command of the Front Line Manager (FLM); I believed the volume still warranted it for another 10 minutes because of the precision needed to keep the finals separated; and the volume was still high. Due to low staffing; the FLM thought it was best to close it to have a body on break.  I had been vectoring my two west arrival gates south of my final into a double downwind because of too many airplanes and to buy myself time with all the frequency congestion.  Aircraft Y was on the GPS runway 9 final approx. 12w MIA indicating 170kts and Aircraft Z heavy was 6 mi in trail on the GPS runway 9 final indicating 170kts.  Both aircraft were level at 030 per our LOA for staggered approaches to MIA.  Aircraft X was approx. 15sw MIA heading 360 to join the downwind level at 030 assigned airspeed 190kts.  There was no convective activity depicted within 20 mi of Aircraft X.  I assigned Aircraft X a left turn heading 265 to join the downwind and to compensate for winds aloft; Aircraft X read it back.  After several other transmissions to numerous other aircraft on frequency; and a talk with an operations manager who had been taking handoffs for me without my permission; I noticed Aircraft X still northwesterly encroaching on my final and indicating 230kts.  I immediately instruct Aircraft X to increase rate of turn and continue left to heading 220 to cross out with the Aircraft Z next on the final.  I also asked Aircraft X what his speed was; he responded 210kts.  High volume initially caused me to miss the very slow; and non-standard rate of turn; but the following aircraft joining the downwind upon the instruction of heading 265 asked to deviate north west on a heading of 290 for ''buildups'' into the final.  I advised unable; no convective activity was observed; and they needed to deviate left of a heading 265 if needed.  Considering the location; I believe the Aircraft X pilot may have commenced a non-standard turn to go north of the ''buildup'' he saw and taking him too close to the runway 9 final opposite direction.  PIREPs were obtained on frequency and no pilots reported turbulence anywhere in my airspace at any altitude which could be heard by all pilots.I should not have allowed the operations manager to have a conversation with me about his taking of my handoffs without my permission while on position with so many airplanes and such high level of complexity with staggered approaches; and I should have advised the supervisor to keep the final a little longer until the airplanes decreased to a reasonable volume for a single frequency.  Also; training should have been suspended in all aspects to promote a safe operation; more positions being opened would have helped avoid controllers being oversaturated with airplanes and provided a safer environment; especially with weather and low ceilings.

A MIA TRACON Controller reported of being short staffed and working a combined position. The Controller issued a turn to an aircraft that he noticed later did not take the turn. The Controller issued the turn again and the aircraft replied they wanted to deviate around a buildup. Then the Controller told them unable and issued a heading to turn to if needed. The Controller reported of distractions in the area and that the position should not have been combined.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 20

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Fatigue; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Staffing; Procedure; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Weather

I was working the mid-shift in Area X.  It was a very complex and busy day/evening/overnight shift.   We had many TMU restrictions and routes that were flying through ZMP and Area X.   We had a full page of active traffic on the ACL.  It was very difficult to determine if more traffic was on the way because all the TMU restrictions were covering up on the screen that depicts aircraft that are heading towards ZMP and Area X.  The traffic built so quickly that I didn't have time to call for help.  The traffic was so difficult and demanding that I didn't have time to enter and turn in icing PIREPs or turbulence PIREPs.  Area X has 21 VHF frequencies on the midnight shift and there was a lot of aircraft chatter about turbulence and about the required routes.  Pilots on different frequencies do not hear each other so there is continual transmissions that are interrupted by other calls.  Frequency congestion is a big problem on the midnight shift and often on the day and evening shifts too.  Area X works airport control at more than 100 airports.  Area X works the Approach Control airspace when the approach controls close overnight.  The supervisor (for the whole building) came down to our area and told us that we should be providing 30MIT for the aircraft on the CAN 5 TMU route; and 20MIT for the CAN 8 route and spacing for the ORD traffic even though we received absolutely no spacing from either ZDV or ZLC.  It was the middle of the night; I was trying to keep aircraft from running into each other!  We bid three controllers in Area X on the midnight shift.  We were down to two controllers working this shift and even though it was projected to be a busy shift; the evening operations manager refused to call in a third person on this shift.  It has been an ongoing problem that the overnight shifts go down to two on the shift and they are not automatically backfilled.  Most of the time when there are only two controllers in Area X on the mid; we (the controllers) can keep up and handle the workload although we become very fatigued.  Last night was a very unsafe workload situation in the middle of the night!  I worked for four hours straight with no opportunity for a break due to the complexity and the workload!  We had three sectors open until XX00 local; we had two sectors open until XX00+30 local.  I was only in the area by myself from XX00+40 local until XX00+55 local.  The air traffic grew so quickly at about XX00+100 local and I was unable to request help due to the workload.  We should have a supervisor assigned to Area X on the midnight shift.  The supervisor should be in the area all night.  A supervisor would be able to evaluate when traffic is building and when complex situations require additional help in the area.  A supervisor could help with PIREPs.  A supervisor would be able to anticipate when sectors need to be split or to figure out when a D-side is required.  A supervisor could answer questions about traffic flow or equipment problems; NORDO aircraft or any other issue that comes up.Right now; we have only one supervisor covering all areas on the midnight shift.  One supervisor is unable to provide help and support to the controllers when it is needed.  We need more staffing on the mid shifts.  Many times there is no issue when we only have two people on the midnight shift; but when the difficult or unusual situations pop up; then there is no help or relief in sight.  Three or four people on the midnight shift would be safer.  If we have TMU programs that are in effect for 24 hours a day; then we need to have TMU specialists in the building 24 hours a day to manage the programs; to evaluate and solve potential problems such as sector or area saturation.  The FAA says that safety is the most important thing; but within our building; it seems as though saving money is more important than safety!  It is unsafe to run shifts with a minimum of people and hope for the best.  I feel that some day that the workload on the overnight shift combined with the time of day along and fatigue issues on the midnight shift will exceed the controller's human abilities and that an accident will be the result.

A ZMP Controller describes a mid-shift with weather and short staffing that develops into traffic overload and possible safety issues.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Upon departure we couldn't retract the landing gear. Upon reaching a safe altitude we ran the appropriate checklist; and performed a [precautionary] landing without incident.   Nothing could have prevented this event from occurring.

Captain reported landing gear would not retract on take off and elected to perform an air turn back and precautionary landing.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure; Staffing; Airport

We had the area combined into two sectors; although we had the staffing to have three open. I had Sectors 09; 10; 12; and 31 combined; which was a normal configuration pre-midshift before COVID; and a normal combination on a daily basis during COVID schedules. This combination tends to get pretty busy; with VFR's; military traffic; plus the IFR's; but I've been working it a lot these last few months; so I'm pretty used to it by now. We also had an FLM present in the area; sitting at the Supervisor's desk doing something on the computer.I started getting busy with aircraft after aircraft calling to pick up flight following and/or a pre-filed IFR clearance off an airport (IPL) for which we provide approach control services. First; Aircraft X called airborne off IPL; looking for his IFR clearance. I gave him his code to squawk and told him to standby and maintain VFR. Went to make sure I was caught up on all the other aircraft. Then Aircraft Z called requesting VFR flight following. I eventually got back to him after finishing up shipping other aircraft; issuing other necessary clearances; etc. Gave him his code and told him to maintain VFR and standby. Then Aircraft Y called airborne off IPL also looking for his IFR clearance. I gave him his code to squawk and told him to maintain VFR; it would be a minute; that I couldn't seem to catch up.At this point I had 15 aircraft on two frequencies. Aircraft X was a small aircraft and Aircraft Y was a slightly bigger/faster aircraft; and I recognized that the Aircraft Y may overtake Aircraft X and they were close; enough so that I didn't want to give the front Aircraft X his IFR clearance yet; especially when I was so busy and couldn't watch the two closely. I did tell Aircraft Y that restricted area was cold; and that if he could maintain VFR and start heading toward JLI [VOR]; that I would be able to give him his IFR clearance eventually direct JLI [VOR]; but this would help speed it up (Because it provided separation between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y). During this time Aircraft A was also calling me for an IFR clearance; off an airport right near IPL. I told him I was too busy and to standby. I also was trying to coordinate the activation of a MOA with adjacent sectors/facilities. The other Controller in the area noticed I was busy and asked if he could help with the MOA coordination.I gave Aircraft Y his IFR clearance direct JLI [VOR] then as filed; maintain 10;000. I had 4 data blocks (Aircraft Y; Aircraft B; Aircraft C; Aircraft X) within a 5.5NM area; working on a range where I'm watching more than 200 miles of airspace. I gave Aircraft X his IFR clearance; turning him to a heading of 285; in preparation for the required LOA handoff to the Approach Control; climbing to 100. I'm not sure why I didn't see Aircraft Y leaving 077 for 100 when I gave Aircraft X his turn (from about a 255 heading) to H285 and clearance leaving 081 for 100; other than I was getting frazzled from being so busy and not being able to catch up; and having the 4 data blocks right close to one another. Conflict alert went off and as soon as I saw it; I turned Aircraft Y to a H315 and Aircraft X to a H255.I want to be very clear that I didn't directly ask the FLM for help; and I know I have a responsibility to do so. But I suspect that if close attention was being paid to what was going on in the area (there were two controllers in the area with two sectors open - there was nothing else happening that would have been drawing their attention away). I said multiple times out loud on frequency that I was busy; that I couldn't catch up; etc; which drew the other Controller in the area's attention to my workload; but the FLM never came over to see if I needed help or to act as an extra set of eyes to get me through this period. I believe if the FLM had noticed and either came over to at least watch over my shoulder as an extra set of eyes; this might have been prevented. It was too late to call another Controller back; I was too busy to separate the sectors. Or...they should have just had three sectors open since my sector(s) were busy and we had the staffing to do so.

ZLA Center Controller reported losing separation due to traffic volume; watching too large of an area and the COVID-19 configuration.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft; Company Policy

November 2012; my First Officer (F/O) and I reported to the gate at ZZZ1 to conduct a revenue flight. Upon arrival we were informed the inbound crew (from ZZZ) had found a fuel leak; and that the aircraft had just gotten out of maintenance for a [fuel] booster pump replacement. We inspected the aircraft and saw the leak; from the wheel well area of the right main gear. It was collecting on the bottom of the fairing at the edge; and dripping from three areas at a combined rate of approximately four very large drops a second. A short time later the Mechanic said he had found the leak and would attempt to tighten the connection. When he did this; the leak worsened. A short time later; I was then called by Scheduling and informed we were to ferry the plane to ZZZ. I called Maintenance Control and was told the Mechanic would drain the center tank; seal the barrel connector and we could ferry. I contacted the base Chief Pilot (C/P) to review this procedure; and then Trainer X in the Training department. Both felt it was safe as described; although Trainer X made it clear there should be absolutely no fluid of any kind dripping before the flight was initiated. At approximately XA:30am local; the First Officer was checking the plane while the Flight Attendant (F/A) and I got lunch. He texted me that the fuel was pooling on the ground; and he initiated the fuel containment through the proper channels which was accomplished. Two additional bags of containment sand were left; approximately 50 lbs. each. A few hours later we sat under the plane with the Mechanic and he showed us where the fuel was running down and pooling in the wheel well before running over the side of the fairing. He stated he had drained the tank; and the fuel could not be coming from the tank as any small residual fuel would have been exhausted. He also had informed my First Officer that the specified sealant could not be found; so he had used a different sealant. Subsequently; the leak was not stopped; and for the remainder of the day I exchanged updates with the ZZZ2 Base CP via text. At no time did I feel the CP was pressuring me to do anything I thought unsafe; and in fact a few times iterated that I should not do anything I thought unsafe. Scheduling called sometime late afternoon and said we were to taxi the plane to the hangar (as our operations part of our Air Carrier [parent company] did not have a tug sufficient to pull the plane there). I informed them that the fuel leak would have to be stopped first. The ZZZ2 CP supported my decision; although it was clear that moving the plane without taxi would be extremely difficult to coordinate. This was early evening local; and my First Officer and I then waited for Scheduling to call with our subsequent assignment; or hotel. Approximately 90-minutes later; I received at text from CP that he was contacting someone in training to see if they thought taxi with the leak was safe. Within a couple minutes I received a call from Scheduling directing us again to taxi the aircraft to the hangar. I then called Trainer X again; and he said the Training Department's position was as follows: I should not do anything I felt unsafe; and that a leak of even a very small magnitude was grounds for not taxiing the aircraft. He was very emphatic about this; and I relayed to the CP and that I would not taxi the plane. Approximately 90-minutes later; we were still awaiting a call from Scheduling; and I contacted the CP and he was briefing Operations Director X. Approximately twenty minutes later we received a text from the CP that the Operations Director X had accepted my decision; and approximately 30-minutes later we got a hotel from Scheduling; with a 9-hour rest period. The next morning we reported at XA:15am. I called Maintenance Control to find out the status and location of the aircraft. They said the aircraft had been repaired; and was at the hangar. I requested a van from the gate area. When I arrived at the gate area the aircraft was there. The leak was still present; and now flowing at just short of a stream. It also appeared from the fuel containment material around the wheel that neither the aircraft had been moved nor had any work done - the material was soaked; but undisturbed. Also the Mechanic had stated there were three mechanics at the Base; one had called out sick and he; the Mechanic; was working a double shift ending later that night. The third Mechanic was coming on that morning. I relayed this status to Maintenance Control. They called back 10-minutes later and asked that I power the aircraft and give them the center fuel tank reading. I stated that while I wanted to help; the Mechanic the prior day had directed us NOT to power the plane at all; and that I would leave any work to the Mechanic on site due to the dangerous nature of the fuel leak and the source not being known. When the new Mechanic arrived; he decided the sealant had not been done with a dry surface; and he re-initiated the process with the proper sealant. He did not address the fact that the main tank had been drained over 16-hours prior; and the leak was still aggressive; indicative of the leak coming from a different location. The First Officer and I got something to eat. When we returned to the aircraft; the APU was running. The First Officer went into the plane while I inspected the leak again. We met a minute later and started to discuss the leak. After approximately two minutes; the First Officer asked where the Mechanic was; and I replied I had assumed he was on the aircraft. We walked around the plane; and at that time the Mechanic pulled up in the company vehicle. It was clear he had left the aircraft unattended; with the APU running; and an active fuel leak. It should be noted that this area is a high traffic area where passengers come within 20-50 feet of this aircraft while they board other aircraft; which are also within 20-feet of this aircraft. Scheduling subsequently called and requested we taxi the aircraft to the hangar. I told them of the prior days events; and that I would not operate the aircraft in any manner as long as the fuel leak was present. We were then scheduled for a deadhead flight to ZZZ2. Before departing; we talked to a different crew that had been asked to taxi the aircraft to the hangar on their three hour layover; but had found the fuel leak themselves and declined the taxi. Threats [were] fire due to fuel leak during taxi. Either because of acceptance of the risk or because a subsequent crew was not aware of the risk. Fire; due to fuel leak and aircraft left unattended by Maintenance with the APU operating.

Captain reports about their Scheduling Department's effort to have him taxi their CRJ-200 aircraft to a company hangar with a running fuel leak from the right inboard wing area near the aircraft's main wheel well.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 11; Flight Crew Total 15; Flight Crew Type 15

Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was on my second flight of the day.  The first flight was dual with my instructor; and the second flight was solo.  Following some maneuver work; I returned to the ZZZ pattern and completed 3 touch and go's with wind conditions reported by AWOS as light and variable.  Just prior to my full stop landing; the wind was reported by AWOS as 060 at 4 knots.  I experienced light/moderate turbulence on final and a right crosswind through my flare and touchdown.  I touched down left of the center line; and felt the plane being pushed gradually to the left.  I applied right rudder and was unable to keep the plane on the runway.  I traveled off the runway; struck a runway marker light with the left gear leg; and came to a stop in the snow.  Cosmetic damage only to the left gear leg; no additional damage.

C172 student pilot on solo flight reported a runway excursion after landing in light/moderate turbulence conditions.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

During our flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 severe weather storms had begun to move into our course of route. ATC advised us of the weather and gave us a reroute to the ZZZ2 VOR which was significantly off route from our original flight plan. Unfortunately; after re-calulating our new flight plan and fuel; we noticed that due to our reroute we would be landing at ZZZ1 with minimum fuel. After getting our new performance numbers we slowed down to long range cruise and advised dispatch and ATC of our fuel situation. Letting them know that if we continued to fly to the ZZZ2 VOR that we would be landing with min fuel. We were given 'deviations as necessary direct ZZZ1 when able'. Our radar showed two storm cells about 3-5 miles in diameter. We decided to deviate around these cells and proceed direct ZZZ1 once clear of the storm. While navigating around these storms we began to experience updrafts and downdrafts. During our course of route the autopilot was engaged and suddenly began to deviate from FL290 by +800/-300 ft. The VSI (Vertical Speed Indicator) showed a climb and descent of +/-4;000 feet per min and the cockpit windows became fogged. During this time the airplane did not feel like it was pitching this extreme and did not exceed +5/-2 degrees. Altitude miscompare flags appeared on our PFD'S (Primary Flight Display) and the VSI had a RED X for less than 5 seconds. I began to run the QRH. ATC contacted us about our altitude and asked if we were having a rough ride. We responded and advised of the situation and were cleared to descend to FL240 at pilot's discretion. After the airplane was stable at FL290 we descended to FL240 and landed at ZZZ1 with 2;400 pounds of fuel and no further incidents.

EMB-145 flight crew reported severe weather in cruise.


Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On right base for DFW 18R with the field in sight we were cleared for the visual approach. The entire airfield was in view except for a localized rain shower that appeared to be centered just left of 18L with outer bands of what appeared as light rain on the approach to 18R. The runway was clearly visible through the shower. An aircraft just ahead of us was cleared to land and I had it in sight as we intercepted the centerline and stared down the glide slope. We were stable at 1000 ft and the controller asked for a PIREP from the aircraft that had just landed. They reported the rain on final and noted seeing lightning. I never did see any lightning while we were on final; and I had watched them until they were on short final. I was looking for them because I was concerned that they had cleared the runway; but could not see anyone on the runway or the high speed taxiways; but I remember seeing aircraft taxiing north bound on Taxiway G. The rain began to hit the aircraft shortly thereafter. Passing 500 ft the runway was still in sight; but visibility began to fall. The runway began to fade from view and I remember seeing 4 approach lead in lights; then 3; then 2; and I started to push the power up as the Captain called for the Go Around. I hit the TOGA and started to rotate the nose up when it felt like we hit a wall of water and the wind shear alert went off. I rotated up into the command bars but the Captain stated we were not climbing and asked for more thrust and adjusted the power. We still were not climbing and I raised the nose slightly in small increments anticipating the stick shaker. I never did see the height above the ground; but recall seeing the hash marked area of the radar altimeter depicting the ground.As quickly as it stared; it ended and we flew out the back side into the clear. We cleaned up the aircraft; and climbed to 3000 ft hdg 190 on ATC instructions. They told us DFW was closed and would vector us for holding. The Captain told them we would need immediate vectors for AUS. We discussed arrival fuel at AUS and the fact that the weather seemed to be building from the west and south. With possible enroute deviations and an unknown weather situation south and west; we asked ATC about DAL and they gave us a vector in that direction. The Captain talked with Dispatch and they recommended AFW. ATC gave us vector to the west for AFW. While heading west ATC informed us that there was a thunderstorm on approach to AFW. The Captain asked if it would be clear by the time we got there; and we were told; it was not moving.We discussed FTW which was right in front of us. The distant alternates seemed questionable unknowns; and we had exhausted all the other close by alternatives. There was a sense of a deteriorating weather condition in the area and if we wait too long to decide; what if this last option was taken away? The Captain asked for the field length and the decision was made to put the aircraft safely on the ground and go from there. We were given clearance for a straight in approach and landed.

Large transport crew executed a missed approach after losing visual contact with the runway on short final. The airport was closed shortly after. The crew diverted.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 114; Flight Crew Total 2250; Flight Crew Type 947

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Human Factors; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

To the best of my recollection on approach to ZZZ [ATC] was reporting winds 16 gusting to 30. [ATC] was also asking all airplanes taking off or landing if they were experiencing wind shear. Some were and some weren't. The aircraft landing ahead of me was a Dash 8. When [ATC] asked the pilot if he'd experienced [any] wind shear; he reported he hadn't. After overflying the windsock I decided to land Runway XX. Around an estimated 8-10 feet off the ground I experienced wind shear that caused my plane [to] loose lift and drop hard onto the runway. Upon landing; the right side front shock clevis broke. Forward ground speed at the time was no more than an estimated 10 miles per hour due to the wind speed and the landing speed of my plane; which is 25 miles per hour. Upon breaking; the shock apparently acted as a crutch as no damage was done to the wing (other than a cracked fiberglass wingtip); no damage was done to the prop; and no damage was done to the lift struts.After gathering up some volunteers we lifted the right wing to get the landing gear back under the plane and used ropes and a ratchet strap to secure it enough to push it off the runway and to transient parking. The next day; with my mechanic's help; we inspected the wing; prop; struts and landing gear; installed a shock absorber and I flew the plane home.Although I couldn't ask for a better outcome (no damage to the plane and no injuries); I got lucky with the shock rod acting as a crutch. I will be installing safety cables to protect the plane in event of another landing gear failure.

Super Cub pilot reported experiencing windshear during landing.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 495; Flight Crew Type 126

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

[I] was cruising at 10;500 ft. msl. Having just past the PMD VOR northbound and on a heading of 315; I was in the vicinity of WJF when I encountered wake turbulence from an aircraft. There were no traffic alerts or advisories; however 3 military aircraft were seen. One; a C130; was crossing west to east and ~1;000 ft. lower than us. Two others; estimated to be a C5A and a KC135; were turning south and would pass off our left wing approximately 5 miles to the west. I assumed they were descending on approach to Edwards AFB as this is along a straight line from this position.None of these aircraft passed in front of us nor were at the same altitude us.[I] encountered wake turbulence [and] was immediately rolled inverted and to the right approximately 270 degrees of roll. To recover from this upset I continued the roll to a wings level attitude; but the nose was ~ 30 degrees low (below the horizon) and we were on a course of 253. The recovery was normal and the forward airspeed did not exceed 180 kts. Vne for this aircraft is 220 kts. and Va is 182 kts.We contacted Joshua Approach and informed them of our upset; saying we had just done a uncommanded 'barrel roll' and had recovered. There were no injuries to passengers nor damage to the aircraft. After recovery we regained our cruising altitude of 10;500 ft. msl but overshot when I misread the altimeter and reset the autopilot.During the upset we were using an autopilot which did not disengage during the event.We continued our flight and landed at our destination with no further problems. Subsequent checks showed no damage or loss of fuel or fluidsConsidering the number and type of aircraft operating in the vicinity of our flight; I believe we should have been alerted to the traffic and the possibility of wake turbulence in the vicinity.

C310 pilot reported a loss of aircraft control due to a possible wake turbulence encounter.


Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

At the gate in ZZZ; during the boarding process; we were receiving our fuel for the flight. We had a large fuel spill at the gate due to some issue with the fuel truck; or the aircraft; which directed fuel into the left wing fuel tank only briefly; and then solely into the right wing fuel tank until full and then overflowing onto the ground under the outboard span of the wing. Fuel covered the concrete surface and also went into storm-type drains embedded into the concrete under the wing of the aircraft. Our first indication of an issue was an 800 pound fuel imbalance which triggered an EICAS caution message. I do not know the underlying cause of this incident.Earlier; we had started the APU pulling into the gate at ZZZ; anticipating a very quick turn due to previous delays. The parking flow and checklist has the #2 fuel pump ON to supply the APU; and the #1 fuel pump off; unless cross-feeding fuel to the APU; which was not the case today. This is a normal condition for line operations; and very often; aircraft are fueled with the APU running and the pumps in this configuration. I was asked whether I had turned ON or OFF fuel pumps during fueling; by ground personnel; but the pumps were configured by muscle memory (cockpit flow procedure prescribed by the Aircraft Operations Manual 1) and verified with a checklist upon engine shutdown; well before being fueled. The pump switches were not touched after the chocks were installed.The First Officer stated to me that the fueler; when asked to stop fueling; released the rope which holds open the valve on the truck; and awaited further instructions. For some reason the fuel flow did not stop coming out of the truck; whether by mechanical discrepancy in the truck; aircraft; or the physical properties of motive flow of liquids. Immediately; the First Officer ran outside to tell the fueler to stop fueling. Fuel tank 1 was at 2400 lbs consistently at this point; and tank 2 was at about 4000 lbs; and increasing by the time the First Officer returned. The First Officer came back into the flight deck stating that the fueler said he would stop fueling.We both noticed that the number 2 fuel tank (only the number 2) was still filling rapidly. The First Officer ran back outside to notify the fueler about this; and then ran back inside the flight deck to report that the fuel tank was spilling fuel at a high volume and rate; and that even though the fueler said he had stopped; the fuel was still flowing out of the truck into the aircraft. The #2 tank had been over-filled; and it dumped fuel until the fuel truck actually stopped pumping fuel. By planned calculation; we would have had a total of 2700 lbs of fuel on the aircraft (balanced between both tanks) upon arrival at the gate. When I shut the aircraft down for the gate-evacuation; the aircraft had approximately 2400 lbs of fuel in the left tank; and an over-filled right tank around 5600 lbs.The First Officer conferred with me and executed an evacuation into the jet bridge for passenger safety. I completed the emergency evacuation QRH procedure; shutting down the aircraft APU and electrical system; but in my judgment; not pulling the fire handles (to avoid an inadvertent discharge of the fire retardant into the engines.) The First Officer called ZZZ ground control to report the fuel spill on the aircraft's comm radio; and then went outside the aircraft to initiate some sort of containment and address any issues with personnel below the wing. I ushered the passengers towards the gate area for their safety and verified the aircraft and jet bridge were both vacant before meeting with the fire chief on the ramp area in front of the right wing. I notified dispatch when I was able; and answered questions for the dispatch supervisor. We were given the all-clear by the fire chief to unload bags so that we could keep our operation moving. While in conversation with the fire chief; a pump and hose were being used by (I believe) the fuelcompany to remove fuel from the storm drain which was located below the right wing of our aircraft at the gate in ZZZ.In all; we estimated a spill of up to 250 gallons of Jet A. When all statements were made and recorded; I retrieved the aircraft log and entered three discrepancies. The first was that the aircraft single point refueling system (SPR) seemed to not accept fuel into the left wing fuel tank. The second write-up was that the aircraft's right fuel tank was over-serviced resulting in a fuel leak. The last write up was that the aircraft had a 3000 lb fuel imbalance and must not be moved.

EMB145 Captain reported a significant fuel spill while fueling was in progress at the gate. The aircraft was safely evacuated and the spill was addressed by ground personnel.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Our clearance was YOKES4 DEHLI ONL...ZZZ. We were assigned RWY 25; due to performance requirements we requested RWY 17R or RWY 8. We departed 17R and took off. We looked at the SID chart in air to again verify YOKES then DEHLI. We agreed that it looked correct. ATC then asked where we were going told them to ZZZ currently direct to DEHLI. We were assigned a heading and given a phone number to call. I asked if there was a different route for us to fly he said no. In flight I asked dispatch if they heard anything; we were not aware of what the issue was. Called [ATC] on the ground. He stated that there was a fix after YOKES called CHICI then DEHLI and that there has been other crews/flights that have had the same issue and they are tracking the problem. He stated they have notice possible RWY changes and or FMS issue may be leading to the deviation. He also said [manufacturer] is tracking the problem. RWY change due to performance needs; the small print in the corner of the chart showing the one fix that was missed. Possible software issues with the FMS. Look into how the FMS loads the departure when loading different RWY's; let other crews know that this is occurring on this departure; making the part of the SID chart with the CHICI fix in it larger.

CRJ-200 Captain reported a track deviation when his FMS apparently failed to load the entire YOKES4 SID out of DEN.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 136; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 8000

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 10900; Flight Crew Type 4937

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On descent into San Francisco we were descending via the bdega one rnav arrival planning on a visual 28r approach. Upon checking in with final approach descending through 17000 feet for 11000 feet; we were told again to descend via the bdega one arrival for a visual to 28L. The clearance was accepted and 28L was briefed. The fmc however was not loaded with the new approach and I as the monitoring pilot failed to verify this. Due to a failure to carefully review the arrival neither of us realized the arrival split at corkk for the separate runways. This caused us to turn towards FINSH on the arrival for the 28R transition instead of toward BRIXX for the 28L transition.  The approach controller notified us that we turned toward FINSH instead of BRIXX flying the wrong transition. We were given a turn to a heading of 140 and further descent to 7000 feet.  We acknowledged the mistake and preceded to properly program the FMC with the appropriate routing and approach.  The rest of the arrival and approach was uneventful. I was simply complacent in the runway change and did not use due diligence to verify the effect of the runway change on the arrival routing.  I should have become aware when the controller recleared us to descend via the arrival after administering the runway change.

Flying the BDEGA 1 RNAV arrival into SFO; I had programmed the FMC for an ILS to 28R. Upon checking in with SFO approach we were assigned 28L. I changed the ILS frequency to 28L and briefed the approach changes to the Captain. However; I did not change the approach in the FMC. This caused us; upon reaching CORKK fix to track 099 towards FINSH which is the 28R transition. Shortly after the turn; ATC informed us we were flying the incorrect transition and assigned us a heading of 140 towards the proper transition. The flight continued without incident. Having recently flown this arrival I had an expectation bias towards flying the 28R transition. I failed to study the arrival chart thoroughly enough to be prepared to fly a different transition if given 28L. Not changing the FMC immediately to the new runway assignment was an omission error on my part. Had I done this; the navigation error would have been avoided.

B737 flight crew reported being cleared for the BDEGA1 RNAV Arrival to SFO Runway 28R. NCT changes the runway during the descent to Runway 28L. The ILS frequency is changed but the FMC is not updated resulting in the Runway 28R transition being flown and not the Runway 28L. NCT takes note and issued vectors.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Time Pressure

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

On a flight from ZZZ-ZZZ1; we were cleared on the standard route.  Having not flown as much as usual during the COVID-19 pandemic; I tried my best to stay ahead of the airplane where possible.  We began performing the brief for the ZZZZZX arrival before performing the climb checklist; and also briefed our eventual landing on [Runway] XXL at ZZZ1.  During this time; we reached our cruising altitude of FL220; but did not realize that we had missed the completion of the climb checklist.ATC notified our aircraft that our altitude readout was between 250-300 feet higher than it should have been.  This was because we did not reset the altimeter through FL180.The decision to brief the arrival and approach earlier than expected caused a routine checklist to not be performed at the normal time. Altimeters were reset; the checklist was performed; and altitude was corrected. Although staying ahead of the airplane is generally a good idea; don't allow the neglect of standard procedures to be what breaks the barrier to safety.

Air Carrier Captain reported not completing the climb checklist resulted in an altitude deviation during departure. The Captain cited the decision to brief the arrival and approach earlier than expected caused a routine checklist to not be performed at the normal time.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 114; Flight Crew Type 8500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

The taxi out and takeoff were routine and uneventful. We were flying an aircraft that had the new version of the ACP [Audio Control Panel] installed with the latching hot MIC function.  Upon our initial climbout at approximately 2200  MSL we were handed from Tower to Departure Control.  We made initial contact with Departure and were cleared to 12;000 feet.  We continued our climb and at some point our microphone became stuck. We were adhering to the sterile cockpit and at 10;000 feet the Captain (PF) called for the Climb Checklist. We ran the climb check and continued to climb and level at 12;000 feet.  At this time we had a small discussion about our Agent and how our initial loadsheet was incorrect and how the Agent had tried to justify his error on the original loadsheet. After a short period of time I started to question; to myself; why we hadn't gotten a further climb.  At that time I attempted to call Departure on COMM 1 and quickly realized that I was not receiving a response.  I attempted to switch to COMM 2 and at that time realized that we had a stuck MIC. Upon switching to COMM 2 we still had a stuck MIC; and I motioned to the Captain as such. He picked up my motions quickly as we had previously discussed how he had gotten a stuck MIC with his Bose headset. He then reached up and unplugged his headset and within a few seconds the stuck MIC was cleared. I then was able to contact departure on COMM 2 and he stated that he had been trying to call us but was unable but he could hear us. He then gave us a frequency change and we continued on. The rest of the flight continued with the Captain using a backup headset and I was using a Bose. No more stuck MICs were encountered on this flight. To the best of my knowledge no violation of the sterile cockpit was committed and no inappropriate language was used on the open MIC.

Climbing thru 2500 feet we were cleared to climb to 12;000 feet. We maintained sterile cockpit thru 10;000 feet; accomplished the climb check; and leveled off at 12;000 feet. Soon after that we started wondering if ATC had forgotten us; so we asked ATC about resuming our climb. That is when we realized we had a stuck MIC. The aircraft was outfitted with the new moisture proof COMM panels and we were using the locking interphone feature. We turned off these switches and tried VHF 2; but we still had an internal stuck MIC. I unplugged my headset from the aircraft; and soon after doing that the problem corrected. I am not sure how long we had a stuck MIC; but I don't believe we engaged in any inappropriate talk and I know we had a sterile cockpit. I did not make a logbook writeup as I believed the problem to be my personal headset and not an aircraft equipment problem.

Flight crew experiences a stuck mic during initial climb and attribute the problem to the combination of a new ACP and a Bose headset. When the headset is unplugged the stuck mic goes away.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Cockpit filled with 'smoke' after turning on packs following de-ice. [The apparent] cause was De-icing fluid must have gotten into the bleed air system. We got some from the APU supplied bleed air. I had hoped that the engine bleed air system was not affected; but it was actually worse. We de-iced during heavy snow and I halted the process when it was apparent that the intensity of the snowfall was such that the entire Type I/Type IV process wasn't sufficient to stay ahead of the snowfall. Turning on the packs with APU bleed air we experienced 'smoke' in the flight deck but none in the cabin. Packs off stopped the problem. We waited 30 mins until the snow lessened and completed de-icing. Hoping that the problem has corrected itself I put the packs on using engine bleed after waiting 3 minutes. However; the 'smoke' returned even heavier. FA's (Flight Attendants) reported a slight smell. We returned to the gate and the aircraft went out of service. Never saw this in XX years of flying.

B737-800 Captain reported a 'smoke' in the flight deck event resulting in a return to gate.  The aircraft was subsequently taken out of service.


GPS; FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS ILS 36L

Aircraft / UAS; Airport / Aerodrome / Heliport

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle sighting. On ILS 36L; about 4;000 ft MSL Captain reported seeing 2 drones left of the aircraft. Unfortunately since the objects were on the other side of the cockpit I have not had direct line of sight. According to the Captain they appeared stationary; or flying in formation.Crew reporter the sighting to the approach controller and continued the approach without incident. Weather conditions were broken clouds; towering Cumulonimbus with bases tops 3;000-7;000 ft if memory serves right.

Reporter had no additional information to share.

Air carrier flight crew saw two UAS while on final approach to landing and reported the sighting to ATC.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 1150

As I was taxiing out to Runway 20 at FIT I was coming up to the second to last taxiway on the right; where I observed [another light aircraft] coming towards the taxiway from the hangar. I observed the pilot in [that aircraft] taxiing head down at a normal taxi speed. He was not able to see me and I had to hard brake to a point where the squeaking from my brakes was able to startle him enough where he raised his head. He stopped on the intersection at about my 2 o'clock position; and he was looking at me at which point he made a radio call apologizing that he 'did not see me there' I asked him to please keep his head up when taxiing; because if it was anyone else taxiing around not looking up; there would have been a taxiway collision where my prop would have been eating through his wing.

C152 pilot reported braking abruptly to avoid a collision on a taxiway at FIT airport.


B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft was pushed back and crew cleared to start engines. The Before Start Checklist was called for to 'Below the Line'. The checklist was complied with and completed. Upon review; the 'Fuel Pumps-On' was still 'white' and reflecting that the fuel pumps were not sensed 'on'. Upon review; we were in agreement that the checklist looked like it had been properly complied with and that the fuel pumps were indeed on. We were in agreement that this was not a normal situation; and that we didn't want to try to 'force' the checklist to look complete. Company Dispatch; Maintenance and Operations were all brought into the loop. It was agreed upon to tow the aircraft back to the gate to try to make sense as to why the Before Start Checklist was not sensing complete; primarily in regard to why the fuel pumps were not sensed 'on'. The flight was ultimately cancelled as no one; at the time; could determine why the fuel pumps were not apparently working the way we expected them to. I don't know why this event occurred. There has been a discussion; relayed by the Captain; that perhaps the fuel load had the center wing level at an amount that perhaps created a situation where the Center Pumps would appear to be needed by the crew when the 'aircraft' thought they should be off. Having sat through the entire event and witnessed nearly all of the Maintenance effort and diagnosis; I am left puzzled with no clear knowledge as to why the checklist didn't reflect completed; enabling us to start the engines and complete the flight.If what was discussed re the fuel level in the center tank being the issue (pumps on v pumps off); then perhaps a caution or highlighted discussion should be given to the crews about this situation developing should be given. Is it or isn't it an issue?

We pushed back from the gate. Set the brakes and was finishing the before start checklist. The First Officer got to the line item FUEL PUMPS ON which was highlighted white and would not go green after turning on all main and center tank fuel pumps. Our release fuel and load was 87;100 lbs; full wings and around 12;000 lbs. in the center tank. We took a look at the pump switch configuration and found all 4 main tank and center tank pumps selected ON. We then elected to try resetting the pump switches off then on 3-4 cycles to correct what we thought might just be an erroneous sensing by the computer controllers system logic. No changes. We then called Dispatch and got a phone patch to Tech Services and asked for assistance to figure out and fix the problem. They ran various telemetries and noticed that the left fwd-right fwd and aft pumps had all load shed giving us the indication of no pressure output from the pumps in the ON selection. We tried further resets of the main pumps as they were showing no pressure output and it seemed to everyone involved (crew & Tech Services) that it had something to do with the Electronic Checklist not being able to clearly sense an item complied with and being unable to move forward on the that line item. Further data showed that the APU was powering the airplane and was nowhere near its maximum power ability or demand which also confused the situation for load shed and Tech services ran out of ideas to explain the situation so we returned to the gate and called Contract Maintenance; who arrived and took over the situation. They worked with Tech services for hours until the flight crew ran out of duty time and then called the flight. It was my understanding that they would continue the troubleshooting with Tech services through the night. The next day I called Maintenance Control to find out the status of the airplane and was told it was ready for service.Apparently unbeknownst to us all (crew; Tech services; contract maintenance ) it was normal for the load shed situation during the before start checklist. We all saw the pressure lights ON on the 3 main tank pumps and assumed there was a problem (fuel pump to provide pressure for engine start) and troubleshot the issue as such. Maintenance and Tech services figured out the issue the following morning and returned the aircraft to service.In flight manual Volume one it states 'NOTE-PRESS lights may be illuminated until after engine start because of load shedding'. We all assumed it was due to the center tank pumps being load shed until after engine(s) start as they are override pumps to distribute the center tank fuel first. For those of us who flew previously the 767 and 777 that had this type of system; it seemed normal to us and that it was very odd to get a main tank fuel pump load shed during engine start; especially with APU loads with comfortable limits; a good amount of fuel in the center tank; and not having noticed the fuel pump pressure indications. Maintenance and Tech services had the same opinion. During further troubleshooting they verified that the pumps were operational but not finding any documentation that the load shed scenario was correct and continued to troubleshoot for a fault in the system(s). Eventually they received information regarding this issue from Boeing that produced a document that pressure lights would be on and load shed normal. It was also discovered in B-787 Operations manual volume II fuel system description page 12.20.1-12.20.2 that 'when less than all engines/generators are operating; there may not be sufficient electrical power to operate all pumps. In such cases; the fuel system automatically determines the best pumps to operate depending on how much electrical power is available. Certain pumps may load shed until enough electrical power is available. The indications that a fuel pump has load shed are that the pump switch PRESS light is illuminated and the pump is labeled LOAD SHED on the fuelsynoptic. It also was pointed out in 787 Operating manual volume I; before start checklist expanded page NP 3.1.5 'If FUEL IN CENTER EICAS msg is displayed: CENTER FUEL PUMP SWITCHES-ON.' I also had a conversation with Captain Y; Boeing 777/787 Tech pilot who informed me of an issue Boeing discovered with the airplane that if you have around 12;000 lbs of fuel in the center tank it can cause issues with the system logic to display the FUEL IN CENTER MSG accurately for reasons unknown at this time. He also said Boeing had previously had this 12;000 lb fuel figure in the manual but for reasons favoring the EICAS msg (FUEL IN CENTER) it was deleted from the manual. In this event; we had been planned with a release fuel of 87;100 lbs which after deducting the wing fuel would leave around 12;000 lbs of fuel in the center tank. If an anomaly occurred as per the information shared by Captain; it would fit the scenario that happened to us that night as we had all main tank pumps selected and center tank pumps. If the airplane logic for whatever reason did not detect the 12K of fuel in the center to display the FUEL IN CENTER EICAS msg. it would not allow that the fuel pumps on line item to be sensed normal and completed and allow the line item to go from white to green and let one move on with the rest of the checklist. The next day I instructed dispatch to plan the fuel to have at least 15;000 lbs in the center tank to avoid this anomaly . We tested the situation before departure and found all had worked normal an as described. All these mentioned events occurred and caused much confusion to the crew; Maintenance; and Tech services and made for a difficult situation to resolve in a timely manner. I also believe there may be issue on how this is described in the manuals that can be inadequate or confusing to both pilots and Maintenance. The above mentioned 12;000 lb center tank fuel anomaly should be mentioned and elaborated in pilot and maintenance manuals. Until a resolution is found; fuel should be planned by Dispatch to stay away from that 12;000 lb figure in the center tank- either stay below/above it 2000-3000 lbs as we did on the flight back to ZZZ. Make it a Hot Item for 787 initial and recurrent training.

B787 flight crew reported a gate return due to fuel transfer pump operation impeding completion of the engine start checklist.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

I have an ASAP report on file from [a few months ago] concerning a fuel leak where the mechanic told me that it was going to be signed off as an acceptable leak in order to be moved to a place where it could be fixed. I subsequently found out the sign off was used to keep the airplane in service. At the beginning of the trip I am presently on I ran into a pilot friend who while discussing the alarming amount of fuel leaks in the Hawker relayed the story of a recent incident he had with a plane where the odor of fuel in the cabin aft of the club seats was so strong he felt it was a fire hazard inside the plane. He wrote the airplane up.Today; a few days later; I just happened to be assigned to [a particular Hawker]. I did not remember that this was airplane I had the fuel issue with [a few months ago]. While pre-flighting with the APU running the odor of fuel in the aft service bay was overwhelming; and there were drops of fuel under the keel. Looking through the logbook; this plane has been written up twice for a fuel leak/strong odor of fuel twice since I wrote it up. Both times it has been signed off as CND and has continued in service. One of the write-ups was made by the friend who I ran into earlier this trip who had the strong smell of fuel in the cabin.I spent a little time in the aft service bay looking for visible leaks. The First Officer I'm flying with spent less time in there but he also was overwhelmed by the odor. Both of us were light headed for an hour afterwards.

HS-125-900XP Captain reported encountering multiple fuel leak issues over the last few months in the Hawker fleet that he feels are not being properly addressed by Maintenance.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Total 2770; Flight Crew Type 763

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 152; Flight Crew Total 9317; Flight Crew Type 4356

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Gate agent was ready for early push. Planned Dangerous Goods was printed and noted. Cabin was secured and ground crew ready to push 10 mins early. Checklist completed and push back clearance received; as the IRO I was checking all the documents as many were being printed as we began push. I noticed that we had not received the final DG. The Captain stopped the push and we called operations. Final DG showed up right away and continued push with out further issues.

Gate agent came up early said they were ready for push. I think that we were caught off guard by the agent saying they were ready that early. We pushed early. The IRO was cleaning up the paperwork and noticed we did not have the final DG summary. We had only pushed a few yards; the Captain stopped the push. We notified ground and called ops to ask about the final DG Summary. As we were talking to ops; the final DG Summary printed out. We called ground and continued the push without incident.

B-787 First Officer reported pushback initiated from gate without required Final Dangerous Goods Report. Documents received after momentary delay.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

After startup at airport; I taxied out; making radio calls on CTAF as I went. I said I would be taking Runway YY; left turnout for [destination]. Meanwhile; there was Aircraft Y taxiing along the runway; taking the parallel taxiway. Since I was at the beginning of the runway; I took the runway; lined up and started my takeoff roll. The Aircraft Y did not stop; it pulled out into the runway; at taxiway Delta near the opposite end. Because I was near rotation speed at this point; I did not hesitate; just continued the takeoff. Unfortunately I did take off over the top of Aircraft Y. There was a lot of room; I felt it best to not abort the takeoff; and so flew on out. I felt I could have shown better 'defensive driving.' I never made radio contact with Aircraft Y; could have done a better job at making sure they knew I was taking off. Never again will I assume the other pilot knows I'm there.

After loading passengers aboard for [the] flight; passengers were briefed. I announced 'ZZZ traffic; [aircraft] on the ramp taxiing for a Runway XX departure for ZZZ1;' electing to do so as I thought the sun would be slightly behind me on roll-out rather than in my eyes; and the haze which was on the east end of the runway 30 minutes earlier had mostly dissipated but still over the river east of the airport.I double-checked the AWOS ensuring it concurred that the visibility was better than 10 and not reporting the haze present prior; and again before entering the runway announced CTAF that we would be back taxiing at Delta (intersection) for a XX ZZZ departure for ZZZ1. I looked east on the runway checking for traffic and noting the weather; squinted with the sun; looked west; saw nothing of threat; looked east again and back-taxied on XX Shortly before turning around for take-off we heard an aircraft roaring above us on an easterly heading. I saw an aircraft overhead; immediately tried to contact them but didn't hear a reply. I checked my radios -- I was transmitting on CTAF with the volume up; and AWOS was back in the back-up position on radio #2 which was now listing (Company frequency). I watched the aircraft turn out to the west. Keeping them in sight I departed Runway XX; stating again that we were headed for ZZZ1; and had the other aircraft in sight. I finally heard the other aircraft state it was headed for ZZZ1; and I reasserted that I had it in sight; and that I would follow it to ZZZ1. When we switched frequencies to [other CTAF] and the other aircraft made a call on that frequency; the call came through poorly and broken. I stated that the call was breaking up; and the other pilot stated some difficulty with the transmit button that day.ZZZ has a 'new' Runway YY/XX. It's 1000's of feet shorter than the previous ZZ/AA; and now requires back-taxiing from any entry point to utilize the full length of the runway for takeoff. I thought I'd picked the best and safest runway for flying to ZZZ2; which is west of ZZZ1; due to the sun; and potential haze east of the airport. I hadn't heard any other traffic at the airport after Aircraft X taxied out before I loaded passengers. I knew it was bright from the relatively low sun shining on the Delta taxiway to the runway; as it would've been at Bravo for Runway YY; but I thought I'd checked appropriately for traffic. Nothing about the flight was rushed or hurried. In hindsight I think about the 'Watch for Motorcycles' bumper stickers that come out every spring; and will personally incorporate a longer look for traffic. ZZZ has a lot of pilots that generally communicate very well with each other; and maybe that 'faith' led to some complacency or expectation that anyone present would communicate. I realize that communication at that airport; while advised; is not required; and I feel thankful that I get the opportunity to realize and remember not all aircraft may self-announce; whether taking off or landing.

Two pilots reported lack of communication between them resulted in a conflict.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Maintenance Action

On departure climb; we received ECAM message Engine 1 Oil Filter Clog. We complied with the ECAM instructions and monitored the system. Approximately 30 minutes later; we received ECAM Msg Eng 1 Lo Oil Press. Oil pressure was 80 psi and dropping when we performed the ECAM Action. We shut down engine one in accordance with the procedure. Oil pressure was 50 psi at the time of the shutdown. The engine shut down normally. I [advised] with Center and asked for a turn direct to [a nearby alternate]. I assigned the First Officer flying duties and proceeded to communicate with the crew; passengers; and Company. At the time of the shutdown; we [were] at FL300 and cruising at M.78. There were no indicators such as noise or vibration; but the flight attendants reported loud noises at about the same time as we received the ECAM message. The descent was uneventful and ATC was extremely professional and helpful. We initially received vectors for the ILS but I requested to go [a different] Runway XXC; which is 2;000 feet longer because we were going to have to perform an overweight landing. Approach and landing were uneventful. We touched down with a descent rate of less than 100 fpm and stopped normally. I cleared the runway and was met by ARFF which inspected the engines and brakes at my request. Once released by the ARFF Commander; we taxied to the gate. The passengers deplaned the aircraft normally. The Fire Chief inspected the engine and reported that the site gauge for the oil showed it was full. The oil quantity indicator also showed there was greater than 15 quarts. It appears the issue was a completely clogged oil filter.

A320 Captain reported diverting to an alternate airport after an inflight shut down of the #1 engine because of low oil pressure related to a clogged oil filter.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was working Final and cleared Aircraft X on the RNAV approach from a fix at 4000 feet. The next fix had a crossing restriction of 3000 feet. Aircraft X was not descending and I asked the pilot if his FMS shows the fix at 3000 feet; or at or above 3000 feet. The pilot said that his FMS shows that fix is at or above 3000 feet. I indicated that the approach plate has the fix AT 3000 feet and told them to descend. I told the Supervisor on duty about the situation. There have been multiple E175s having this issue where the FMS shows an 'At or Above' altitude on the approach; and the approach plate is an 'AT' altitude. Have [Company] double check their FMS to make sure it matches the approach plates.

We were flying the LINKK1 STAR into IAH with the GPS Z 27 approach transition. We were given a different descent clearance to 4000 expedited and slow to 210 kts. We were then cleared for the GPS 27 approach. After passing the fix SYYKO (the last fix before intercepting the final approach course) ATC asked us what our FMS read for the restriction at SYYKO. We stated that it read 'at or above 3000 feet.' ATC then informed us that it should read a hard altitude of 'at 3000 feet.' We were then given clearance to descend to 3000 feet and again cleared for the GPS 27 approach. We finished the approach and taxied to the gate without further incident. Once we got to the gate I called the Houston approach controller and spoke with him about the altitude deviation. He stated that this had been a reoccurring issue with our E175s flying the GPS Z 27 approach when crossing the SYYKO fix. We discussed the issue with the FMS database as well as the VNAV logic of the aircraft to want to stay high until it can perform a 3.0 degree glidepath to the next altitude restriction. He was very helpful and I told him I would send an email to the chief pilot to alert the rest of the pilot group to the FMS error and the need to manually input the 3000 foot restriction at the SYYKO fix. He also stated that there was no traffic in the area and we didn't cause any other disruption to the flow. Also I have never noticed this error using the same fix when on the ILS 27 approach.We always read through the arrival fixes and verify each waypoint restriction however on most approaches there are not the same kinds of restrictions so verifying each waypoint altitude is not a normal part of the briefing. Also considering that with the use of ATC radar vectors we don't actually fly over many of the points on an approach and our altitude and speed are constantly being amended by ATC. On our CAT 2 checklist though one of the required briefing items is to verify every point on the approach and the associated altitude. This kind of expanded briefing and just always double-checking the approach chart to make sure you don't miss something would help prevent these kinds of deviations. If we would have noticed the discrepancy between the FMS and the chart we could have queried ATC to verify that we should be at 3000 feet at SYYKO.

I90 TRACON Controller and EMB175 flight crew reported the E175s have an FMS anomaly where a crossing restriction is programmed as 'at or above' when it should be 'at.'


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We started the aircraft normally; and began our taxi; with instructions to taxi via T; A; A8 to runway XX.  Noted  AH-1s just to our left (south of the SIDA area) were now running.  As we finished the turn onto A; ground informed us that we had a clearance window in about 10 minutes.  We taxied to the end of the runway.  When tower cleared us for takeoff; we did the before take-off check; taxied into position; and released the brakes while advancing the power levers.  Almost simultaneously; we received aural warnings for flaps and autofeather.  A quick scan showed the flap handle was still at 0 degrees.  We rejected the takeoff and taxied clear of the runway.  It quickly became obvious what had happened: the taxi check had not been completed.  We taxied back to the runway after doing the after landing check and then the taxi check; and completed the flight normally thereafter.The primary causes of this event were distraction; complacency; and frustration.  We were distracted by the Marine's helicopters; both as interesting aircraft and the concern as to whether or not they were pulling any pitch; which would create significant wind.  Once we were past the helicopters; I remember starting to call for the taxi check when I was interrupted by the call from ground telling us we would be further delayed.  We were already about two hours late at this point; as we had to wait out fog at one of our destinations earlier that morning.  This added to my already frustrated state.  We had a new FA being checked out on the 120; and while she was doing fine; she was much slower than an established FA.  We had to execute a go around inbound; as traffic was not going to be clear before we got to the runway.  As we were late; the fueling vendor was not expecting us; and had to be called multiple times to fuel the aircraft.  There were other minor issues; all of which compounded into a general frustration that was a distraction in itself.  Finally; the day had started with low ceilings and fog but was now VMC; which allowed a sense of complacency to also enter the picture.There are several ways similar situations can be avoided in the future: Recognize that frustration and distraction can be very similar to physical hazards like hypoxia.  You don't recognize how affected you are.  Just by being aware that these issues can creep up on me; will prompt me to be extra vigilant in ensuring that they don't cause me to lose focus on my duties. A more thoughtful approach to Threat/Error Management.  It is easy to brief that complacency or frustration is a threat; but it is much more useful to focus on how you will manage that threat.  Taking a moment to really consider both the implications and possible avenues for dealing with your state of mind can pay large dividends later on.    -Perhaps the company could in the future produce [CRM] training that more specifically addresses threats that are primarily personal responses to external stimuli; as they can be difficult to identify. Most importantly; take the time to do the job right; especially when the situation has deviated from the norm.

On take-off; the aural warning alerted us to incorrect configuration. The captain performed a rejected take-off. We taxied back to the runway; and realized that the taxi check was not performed. We completed the taxi check (flow and checklist) and pre take-off check and departed normally.The taxi check was not performed during taxi out and the omission was not noticed by either pilot. On taxi out; there were two military helicopters preparing to depart (rotors spinning) and they were of concern to us. During taxi; when I would normally hear the captain call for the taxi check; the ground controller gave us our departure window; which I then read back. After that; the taxi out was uneventful; and our attention was on the other traffic at the airport. Since we were beyond the point in a normal taxi out where the taxi check would normally be performed; it did not occur to me that it had not been performed.Other factors include:1) 5th leg of the day - a 6-leg day with no breaks2) running two hours behind due to weather on leg 23) flight attendant IOE4) heightened vigilance on airport traffic due to a go-around on arrival due to a late hand off to tower and conflicting traffic in the pattern5) uncomfortably hot cockpit due to weak cooling from the packsSuggestion:1) Add a check of the flap setting to the before takeoff checklist (above the line).

EMB-120 flight crew reports being distracted during taxi out after a long day with weather and other delays and forgets to do the taxi checklist. The flaps were not set and autofeather was not armed; resulting in a takeoff warning horn and a rejected takeoff.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 2500; Flight Crew Type 2350

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

Aircraft was directed to move up and hold short at A16 for a planned departure on 35R. The hold bar is located at the intersection of Alpha and A16 where the aircraft would block other taxi traffic on Alpha from passing behind to the end for 35R departures. This hold bar location seemed to be extremely far away from the runway surface. The aircraft was moved passed the hold bar to clear the taxiway anticipating the correct hold to be ahead closer to the runway. The aircraft was immediately stopped just passed the hold bar when a hold bar closer to the runway was not seen. Tower advised the aircraft of the error and requested a call by phone which was accomplished later. Aircraft was cleared for takeoff and departed. The aircraft and the pilot were at APA for their first time and this departure was the first takeoff from APA. The lack of local surface operational experience was a factor associated with the occurrence. The airport diagram could be improved by showing the location of the hold short lines on the diagram to assist pilots with preflight understanding of the airport's configuration.

I was working Local and I had cleared a corporate jet to land Runway 35R. Ground Control had taxied a small aircraft to the South Run up area; an area that is not published or marked on the airport and sits on the east side of Taxiway A near Runway 35R. As you know; APA does not issue a runway assignment to an aircraft who needs a runup until they have completed their runup. The A16 pad; otherwise known to management as the South Run up area; is about 50 FT away from the hold lines for Runway 35R at A16. They were struggling to get the small aircraft to correctly respond to the clearance because the initial instruction to Runway 35R at A16 was read back as full length. The procedure sucks. As he was leaving the pad; they shipped him to me. I was checking the winds when the FLM who was giving a skills check to the GC yelled out 'watch the Bonanza;' in which case I observed him cross the hold line with his entire aircraft and then stop and I sent the corporate jet around. I hesitated slightly because I was trying to determine if the corporate jet could sidestep to Runway 35L; but he was too close so I sent him around. The small aircraft acknowledged his error on frequency. I spoke with the pilot on the phone today and he stated he was not familiar to APA and he didn't exact to be at the hold bars to soon and expected them closer to the runway.

A pilot crossed the APA Runway 34R hold short line on Taxiway A16 because it is so far from the runway and aircraft stopped there would block Taxiway A.


Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 7400; Flight Crew Type 230

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Airport; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

The new hold wigwag lights at DVT at the hold lines are so bright at night that they create a significant loss of night vision for flying and increase probability of a loss of a crew and airplane. Please make them find a way to dim the lights to preserve night vision for the aircrew of any airplane. No one seems to be able to dim them at night. They are excellent for daytime illumination.

GA pilot reported lighting at DVT airport is too bright at night and could cause loss of night vision.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 14L

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Upon arrival to BFI we were flying the JAWBN SIX ARRIVAL without incident until we reached ALKIA fix on the arrival. At that point it diverges in three different directions depending on the runway in use at BFI; or traffic going to McChord Field. The way I had my chart set on my screen; it looked to me that the landing south heading of 070 off ALKIA fix was correct for the arrival; so I didn't catch it right away. (I had the chart zoomed in so I didn't clearly see the south courses on the screen.) When the airplane started to turn to the 070 degree course it looked correct to me. In addition to that; we were task saturated in the descent looking for traffic and setting the airplane up to land on a 20 minute flight. We discussed the arrival runway briefly but the FMS (Flight Management System) defaulted to landing south and we didn't catch it in time. The Approach Controller turned us to a heading; and advised of the landing runway heading requirements for the arrival at ALKIA; and we proceeded and landed without further incident.The arrival procedures that I have seen lately are being used for so many different airports and landing directions that it is becoming difficult to see these types of errors before they happen. Instead of having one fix where three different things can happen; have a different name for each procedure that is runway specific and leads you to a different fix; or onto the approach. Such as JAWBN SOUTH; JAWBN NORTH; etc. Denver is becoming more like this as well; if we are task saturated it can be confusing to get a common split point like ALKIA and know for sure what is supposed to happen when you get there. Even if you have briefed the approach; it can cause confusion. In the future; I know that I am going to have to see the multi divergent courses piled on one fix as a threat and focus on them in the brief to ensure what should happen at the fix is clear before we get there and things are busy.

When I programmed the FMS before departure I entered the JAWBN6 arrival with the default Runway 14L because the winds at BFI were calm. I had the intent of changing that later when I received the ATIS and arrival runway. We were descending; but not descend via and with no speed restrictions but following the arrival points. ATC called traffic for us and I put up the traffic screen instead of the arrival procedure. We got to ALKIA and turned left to 070 degrees (MANSEQ for Runway 14L). ATC queried; 'Are you guys turning left to 70 degrees?' We said we were and he gave us a new heading and informed us we should have flown 163 degrees for the transition to landing north and assigned us a new heading. Short; busy flight; missed the change to correct runway. Adding factors are the interruptions during FMS (Flight Management System) programming when line personnel show up with ice; papers; catering and interrupt your flow.ATC could have different arrival names for landing north and south etc. The POLAR2 for north; and SUNBM4 for south. But ultimately the responsibility was our and we made a human error on the short busy flight.

Corporate jet flight crew reported a heading deviation while on the JAWBN SIX ARRIVAL to BFI.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 2.2; Flight Crew Total 1048; Flight Crew Type 927

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

In the pattern doing touch and go landings; while on left downwind for Runway 9; a high wing airplane passed beneath me on an easterly heading of approximately 090. I estimate that the vertical separation was approximately 200 FT. The wind was from 110 at about 12 KTS. Runway 9 was the favored runway and was the one in use by local traffic.

A PA28 pilot in the JKA Runway 9 closed pattern at 1;100 FT reported a near miss with a high wing aircraft which passed about 200 FT beneath his aircraft.