Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 34

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

I have been into LSZH many; many times. This was the First Officers first ever trip to Europe as a pilot. Arrival here has ALWAYS been the same. BLM 2G to Gipol; then vectors to either ILS 14 or 34. This time we held at Gipol. No problem. After the first trip around the hold we were cleared to 'fly the transition to Runway 34'. We proceeded to fly the transition on LSZH page 11-4 from Gipol to KLO for the approach. A moment later ATC asked if we were flying the transition. I responded that we were. He stated we were going the wrong way and 'no problem; I'll vector you.' He then stated there is a RNAV transition we should have followed. We quickly found it but it was a little late for that. We landed uneventfully.A few things bother me about this. One; I missed the addition of this procedure at LSZH; that's on me; my mistake. Two; it would be really helpful if ATC had cleared us to fly a specific procedure instead of 'the transition.' There is a transition on the approach chart; but it is not what is expected. Three; this is an example of how information gets in electronic manuals unnoticed. I can guarantee you I would not have missed this with paper charts. I always made a note of changes at airports I visit regularly when we had paper. You could easily compare the old and the new. Not so easy anymore.Be careful and read everything. Even if you have done it before. Expect the unexpected.

Air carrier Captain who had flown into LSZH on numerous occasions failed to note the addition of an RNAV Transition on the electronic chart for the approach. Crew followed ATC vectors after Controller pointed out their deviation from the published track. Captain attributes some blame to the automatic update of electronic charts which do not allow comparison of the old vs. new when updating.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 1759; Flight Crew Type 135

The Piper Cub was repositioned approx. 10 feet from the tie-down. Following engine start and warm-up I started to move the Cub forward (I was repositioning to the fuel dock only).  As the Cub started to move forward the right wing of the Cub make contact with the left wing of a parked C-172.  The Cub then rotated to the right and made further contact with the left wing of the C-172; causing damage to both aircraft.

A Piper Cub pilot reports knocking wing tips with a parked C172 during taxi to the fuel dock. Both aircraft are damaged.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 1500; Flight Crew Type 1500

Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

I filed an instrument flight plan from GRI to AGC. The flight was uneventful until the ending. I misjudged the height of the runway and had a harder than normal landing. After rolling out for a few seconds while commenting to my passenger (a pilot flight instructor/friend who had accompanied me on the trip) about the rough landing; I suddenly was unable to control the plane as it began chattering or 'mini-jumping' on the runway. I yelled at my friend that I thought I had experienced a flat tire due to the very rough handling and almost jumping of the plane. The plane then suddenly veered almost 180 degrees to the left and I found myself at a complete stop; almost facing the direction from which I had come. I then heard another plane being cleared to land behind me; and I actually saw the lights of the approaching plane (on final) heading towards the runway I was still on! I tried contacting the Tower but they did not answer or did not hear me; so I increased the throttle to try to move the plane which then moved smoothly and without ANY shimmy or roughness at all; and immediately headed for the closest exit which was a short back taxi but the closest route off the active runway considering where I was facing and that I thought that the plane would not be easily and/or safely movable after the trouble I had experienced. We succeeded in getting off the active runway and contacted the Tower on the second radio. After getting the plane to the hangar by slow taxi with NO difficulty; we shut it down and discussed the events with the Tower again. We also examined the plane and found a) NO flat tires; but b) a cylindrical bronze colored collar was seen around the nose wheel strut that was greasy; easily moved up and down the strut by hand; and contained threads within it that apparently were supposed to be attached/threaded to a received that was located higher in the nose wheel assembly and to which it was (obviously) no longer attached. Further; I gently pushed the nose of the aircraft (while standing at its left side) to the right and it appeared as if the entire nose wheel assembly was loose and wobbled to the right as the plane did slightly displace to the right. I have; of course; contacted our A&P to examine the plane in general and the nose wheel assembly in particular to determine what went wrong and how to repair whatever might have occurred.I do not know if this report should or should not be filed; but as it involved back taxiing on an active runway without permission but doing so because of the sudden incapacitation and loss of control of the aircraft following a rough landing and seeing a plane on approach and being unable to raise the Tower and wanting to ensure that I got off the active as soon as possible yet not being able to declare this as an emergent situation; I thought that if it might help clarify how to proceed for others in the future; it would be worth filing.

After a firm landing during which the nose gear was damaged the pilot of a Cessna Columbia 400 hastened to exit the runway due to following traffic cleared to land behind him.  Slow speed taxi was unimpeded.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors; Logbook Entry; Procedure; Staffing; Manuals

April 2012; Maintenance Control called to advise me of an error on Logbook Page XXX01. This log page discrepancy [noted] that a Ramp Service Contract Provider reported the External Power Receptacle (EPR) door open when our B737-800; [Aircraft X]; came in. Subsequent inspection by a Line Maintenance Technician revealed that the landing on the aft edge [surface] of the door cut-out was damaged; making the door difficult to close. There is no quick Structural Repair Manual (SRM) repair for this condition; so Line Engineering provided Engineering Order XXX-77 to inspect; temporarily repair and defer a permanent repair to the next Heavy Maintenance Visit (HMV). Step-3 of the Engineering Order instructs the Technician to create a deferred item to accomplish a High Frequency Eddy Current (HFEC) inspection on the damaged area every 600 hours until a repair at the next Heavy Maintenance Visit (HMV). Log Page XXX01 was closed-out and the deferral was not initiated. Step-4 of the Engineering Order; the completion verification block; was accomplished by me. I missed the fact that the log page had not been deferred with the inspection and final repair instructions. I am not sure who discovered the error. I have no good answer for why this error occurred. Deferring an Engineering Order is a routine process that all of the people involved have accomplished frequently in the past. The only contributing factor that I can think of is the time of day when this error occurred. The discrepancy was discovered on day shift and subsequently turned over to swing shift. This is usually a very busy time as we are required to conduct a crew meeting; a [maintenance status] turnover meeting; and set for the oncoming shift. On the day in question; we tied into two aircraft with damage requiring structural work. The second item was damage around the ground air conditioning access door on Aircraft Y. Due to staffing limitations and the skill set required; the Airframe Technician who addressed the external power door on Aircraft X was also working on the ground air conditioning door on Aircraft Y. For my part; I was busy with all of the normal turnover and shift start-up processes as well as working with Line Engineering and the Airframe Technicians to accomplish repairs on Aircraft X and Y. This is in addition to communicating the status of the repairs to all other parties with a need to know such as Maintenance Control; flight crews and the Line Maintenance Operations Manager. Once I had been notified of the error; I looked to find the location of Aircraft X. It was due at ZZZ that night. The Maintenance Controller determined that Aircraft X had flown approximately 400-hours since the event occurred; so we had not over flown the 600-hour Inspection cycle. We discussed updating the log page or creating a new log page when the aircraft arrived that evening. Next I contacted the Aircraft Records Department to obtain copies of the original log page and Engineering Order. After reviewing the Engineering Order I was able to determine all other work specified by the Engineering Order had been accomplished; including the initial High Frequency Eddy Current Inspection. Later in the afternoon I attempted to contact the Maintenance Controller who brought this to my attention to go over the process used to correct the error. I was in favor of a new log page. The Maintenance Controller preferred a log page update. He was busy so I called the Maintenance Operations Manager. I told him that it was my intention to create a new log page that referred to the original closed-out log page. The new log page would be the pilot's [permanent] logbook page [second page] to establish the Inspection intervals and Heavy Maintenance repair requirement. The Maintenance Operations Manager agreed with this approach. When Aircraft X arrived; I went to the aircraft and initiated Log Page YYY88 to establish a pilot deferral and Terminating Action for the defect documented on the original Log Page XXX01. I contacted Maintenance Control with this information. A short time later Maintenance Control called me back to inform me that they were not happy with the new Log Page YYY88. They asked me to update the original log page; close-out the new Log page YYY88 on the second sheet. After much discussion; I was directed to void Log Page YYY88 and accomplish the second page update of Log Page XXX01. I voided Log Page YYY88 and updated Log Page XXX01 referring to Engineering Order XXX-77 [and to] accomplish an HFEC Inspection of the door [cut-out] landing every 600 flight hours until repair of the landing is accomplished at the next Heavy Maintenance Visit. The update was accomplished on the second page of Log Page #XXX01. One suggestion that occurred to me is an improvement to our Maintenance Tracking and Compliance software system. Include a pull down menu in the resolution block that requires you to choose the type of reference involved; that is: accomplishing an Engineering Order; Maintenance Procedure; Task Card ...etc. If an Engineering Order is indicated; then another menu would appear to ask if a deferral is required. If yes is selected; the program could be set-up to prevent closing the Log page without a permanent repair. This approach could prevent errors of this kind by forcing a review of the process as the Maintenance Tracking entry is accomplished..

A Line Maintenance Supervisor reports about his efforts to have a damaged External Power Receptacle (EPR) door cut-out landing on a B737-800 aircraft deferred on a new logbook page after an Engineering Order requiring the deferral had been missed weeks earlier. Maintenance Control disagreed and directed him to just update the original logbook page.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Customers in XX1 and 2 didn't know each other and asked me if they can move because they didn't think they could be seated next to each other. I told them once we're finished boarding we can see if there's empty seats or you can talk to the gate agent if not. One of them sits across in XX4 for time being. Customer Service Agent (CSA) comes on and says someone else is assigned that seat. He goes back to see who should be in that seat; comes back and finds him sitting in row XY next to someone; I guess they knew each other. So the other customer stays in XX4.The customer in Y2 was also seated next to a stranger; and asked about moving up to row 1. I said unfortunately because we have seating caps; first class is at its max up there. I said once CSA comes back you can talk to him. I go to get a trash bag to collect the purell wipes; and he's right behind me when I turn around. I was confused why he was there all of a sudden. He said he would go talk to the gate agent. I told him to make sure he has all his bags if he's stepping off; but didn't understand why he didn't just wait for GA to come back. Because he had to come back to sort out the customers in row XX. And he asked why he had to take his things; thinking that meant he'd miss the flight. I asked why not just wait in your seat until the gate agent comes back; and he calmed down and nodded; saying that's a better idea. I guess he didn't hear me when I initially told him to wait for CSA to come back. Then CSA comes on and finishes sorting [out] XX12. Then he talks to Y2 and says exactly what I told him about seat caps; maybe he told him something more I'm not sure. Y2 kept complaining about the whole row 1 being open; and why can't he sit there; as if nobody explained the covid seating caps to him (both me and CSA did).Then; I finish collecting wipes and notice XX2 has a lace mask. Like lacey dress or underwear material; super thin with holes in it. And I ask if she has a regular mask without holes; or we can give one to her. And she has a startled/insulted look on her face; and says how she needs the holes because 'I can only breathe out of my left nostril.' I told her if it's a medical concern; it's not showing up on our end; and we weren't informed of any passengers with medical exceptions. So we would need to talk to the CSA and get that on your booking; so you can get an exception. And then she says how she flew with that mask from ZZZ; and it was fine. I told her it was possible nobody noticed on those flights; and unfortunately it's not allowed. Even if nobody else noticed before; that doesn't mean I can ignore it when I notice.So I go back up and flag down the CSA as he's closing the jetbridge doors. And I ask him about any medical exceptions; and he said nobody was approved for that and that he didn't notice anyone with a lace mask. So he says he'll be back with a mask. We have masks onboard but it was better he did that because she was already giving me attitude about it. He comes back and asks who it was and I said XX2; one of the ones we were talking with earlier. He goes back and gives her the mask and comes back saying how she told him that she wore that mask from ZZZ and I that he told her that it doesn't matter what happened on previous flights. Basically the same stuff from when I spoke to her.She got past him during boarding; then the other FA up front; then me in back during the whole seat issue; and then the GA again when he helped with the seat issue. And it wasn't until near departure time that I even noticed. So I think there's a good chance that on her other flights; those CSAs and FAs didn't notice either.Also; it was obvious she didn't have a medical exemption because she told me she needs a hole-y mask since she can only breathe out of 1 nostril. What I did not tell her was that she was speaking to a FA who hasn't been able to breathe out of either nostril in years because of a medical issue; and I was wearing a regular mask just fine. Iwould feel blessed if I could breathe out of even just one nostril. Somehow she didn't think that breathing out of one's mouth alone is possible in a mask. And I know I'm not the only FA with a similar sinus issue; too; and we all wear regular masks.

Flight Attendant reported that several passengers had seat location issues and another passenger was not wearing a proper face mask.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Total 3739.45; Flight Crew Type 112.10

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 3789.12; Flight Crew Type 363.52

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We initially briefed and set up for the ILS 16R Approach. We were later told to expect the RNAV (RNP) Z RWY 16R Approach. We quickly briefed the approach; to include a review of the RNAV (RNP) approach briefing guide in the QRH. However; the entire guide was not completed due to time constraints. We were cleared for the approach. We received an Alt Hold FMA prior to CLFFF; and reset the MCP altitude. We crossed CLFFF at 11000 [ft] and 210 knots. The autopilot remained engaged. The FMAs showed LNAV and VNAV PATH; but the aircraft did not start to descend. While trying to figure out the problem; CEPEE intersection quickly followed and the airplane did not start a turn. Shortly thereafter ATC said he noticed we were not on the RNAV approach and gave us vectors to the visual approach. We both made another note of the FMA status-LNAV and VNAV PATH. Subsequent approach and landing were uneventful. A few items to point out: I am a new captain on this aircraft-just finished consolidation the day prior. This is the first RNAV approach I have conducted since training. Of course; I am still on high minimums. The First Officer had just been involved with an emergency procedure 6 hours prior to this flight; on a different leg with a different Captain. We believe if ATC would have given us more advanced notice of the anticipated RNAV approach expectation; we would not have been so rushed. In this case though; we're not sure that would have prevented the issue. The RNAV approach is conducted so rarely that all ATC facilities could help the pilot group greatly; as there is much more to accomplish and lengthy briefings which need to take place. We did notice; as we debriefed the flight; that the 'VOR/DME NAV-OFF' step in the briefing guide was missed. Again; we're not sure if this was the cause of the issue. Overall; safety was never in doubt; it was a clear night; and no traffic nearby. It was a good learning experience; and if we were to do it all over again; we would probably ask for vectors for the visual or ILS approach; and as a last resort; holding to have more time to review the entire RNAV briefing guide.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B757 flight crew reported a track deviation occurred on the RNAV (RNP) Z Rwy 16R approach to DEN. Reporters cited a late change to the clearance as contributing.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Staffing; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport

Typical peak afternoon departure.  Estimated 1hr late with 2 MELs; one unfamiliar. Flap system inoperative. About 25 minutes after show time finally got notice and it showed aircraft nearly fully loaded with 1 can to go. Went to aircraft and still pushed late.  After engine start got ECAM flaps extended.  Since flaps should have been fixed in the closed position I believed it was a problem.  Maintenance believed it was an expected spurious ECAM due to the MEL.  It took over 40 minutes to taxi to maintenance area; make calls to duty officer; and attempt calls to 2 tech pilots to finally have Maintenance on ground visually confirm that the notch flap on the left wing was not retracted and the ECAM warning was real.  Returned to gate; tail swapped and blocked out in just under 2 hours.  Nice job by everyone involved.  Flight to ZZZ was uneventful until approach control informed us the Tower was closed due to COVID.  We flew a box pattern while simultaneously looking at ZZZ1 as alternate (we could get there with 10;000 pounds of fuel due to Captain added fuel) and FO working ACARS to get non-Tower approval.  We briefed the details and flew an instrument approach in VFR conditions to an uneventful landing and block in at destination airport.  After block in I studied the events and our crew response and believed we did an excellent job under the conditions but noted the newest FOM revision required an alternate to operate to a non-towered airport; which we did not have.  The following morning; further study showed that the normally 24 hour Tower may have been closed due to COVID; but there was indeed a NOTAM for the closure which both I and the Dispatcher missed.The confusing MEL language refers to 'appropriate AFM performance restrictions are applied' led to longer than necessary hunt for those in the AFM when the only restrictions I could find are in the QRH.  The time I spent trying to make sure I didn't miss any restrictions could have been better spent studying the NOTAMs.  The closure NOTAM was found using the iPad app. which sorted the airport closure first; while company's provided NOTAMs sorted the closure near the end next to the airport inop lighting.  The requirement for the alternate seems to be a change in this week's FOM.The missing NOTAM closure is high workload human error sorting through pages of NOTAMs.  Lowering the workload by changing the MEL to point to the restrictions rather than creating a lengthy search would have helped. Company NOTAMs should be sorted more like the iPad app.

Flight was scheduled out and conducted a return to gate. An aircraft swap ensued and then departed. I took the flight over from Dispatcher #1 at shift change. I am unsure if the crew was given any NON-TOWER OPS info before departure. The following NOTAM came into play upon arrival: Air Traffic Control and Air Traffic Control Procedures------------------------------------------------------ZZZ APTZZZ SVC TWR CLOSED CTC CTAF XXY.Z DLYZZZ APTZZZ SVC TWR CLOSED CLASS D SERVICE NOT AVBL CTC ZZZ3ARTCC .4 PRACTICE INSTR APCH NOT AVBL DLYDid not know if the crew or the releasing Dispatcher #1 saw the NOTAM for the Tower closure due to the aircraft swap and delay that occurred.  Which delayed the flight where the NOTAM became an issue.Double check NOTAM closures when flights are delayed for an extended period of time.Checked NOTAMs to verify Tower was closed. ACARSed the crew a non-tower operations worksheet and informed the crew to contact ZZZ Center for arrival procedures.

Air carrier flight crew and Dispatcher reported missing a NOTAM alerting that the destination ATC Tower was closed due to COVID-19.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action

Upon pushing back from the gate; I noticed that hydraulic system number one was slightly lower than number two so I told the First Officer that I was going to transfer some hydraulic fluid from the number 2 system to the number 1 system. Once completed; both systems were at 50% (40% is required). Considering that the fluid was above the minimum level and for fear of being scolded or getting into trouble for returning to the gate; I decided to proceed with the flight. We landed in our filed destination without incident and didn't see any noticeable change in hydraulic fluid levels. I told the Captain receiving the aircraft to watch the hydraulic system because there was something strange about it (just a feeling but nothing that I could prove or show). Both systems were at the same levels as they were when we departed but; again; I simply had an odd feeling about them. There are a few ways that I think this safety issue could have been avoided. Firstly; I have called Maintenance previously when the hydraulic levels were not balanced and they told me to just balance it. By doing so; any slow leak would not be noticed. Due to the nature of the operation and the need to continuously swap aircraft such small leaks could also go unnoticed. Additionally; I personally believe; and I'm not an engineer; that a 40% minimum level of hydraulic pressure is too low for operation (but again I'm not an engineer and don't have the necessary knowledge to determine what is a safe amount). Also; I believe that by fostering a culture where a pilot could freely express his/her feelings may have made me less apprehensive about calling Maintenance about an intuitive feeling even though the numbers were at or above the required levels.

A Q400 crew detected a hydraulic system quantity below 40% and transfered fluid to equalize both systems at 50% then learned later in the day the aircraft suffered a hydraulic system failure.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 28C

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I had a situation with ORD ATC and felt compelled to share it as I believe it affects safety; specifically fuel planning and operational safety versus operational convenience. Normal flight; good weather - planned to arrive in ORD with 6350 LBS of fuel.  Actual arrival fuel would have been closer to 7000 LBS.  Forecast was for winds out of the east for most of the day.  On arrival winds were out of the east approaching a 10 KT tailwind for the west operation which was in effect.  Upon checking in with tower and receiving a landing clearance; the wind given by ATC was 070/12 which equates to an 11 KT tailwind.  With the winds exceeding the aircraft limitations I advised ATC that we would not be able to accept 28C for landing.  I was directed to go-around and contact approach.  After completing the go-around and a short exchange with approach I was advised the ORD was not going to 'turn the airport around' for me and that I should proceed to my alternate.  I advised ATC I had no alternate as none was required then or at the time of dispatch. At this time I was looking at about 5500 LBS of fuel and a destination airport off my left wing that would not allow me to land unless I was willing to exceed the aircraft limitations.  After unsuccessfully trying to reach dispatch through VHF over ORD dispatch frequency I obtained another wind report from ORD and the wind was 060/10 which is just below our limit and requested immediate vectors for 28C.  The rest of the flight was uneventful.  I declared minimum fuel during my second approach.  We arrived at the gate with 4300 LBS of fuel. 4300 LBS is about 30 minutes of fuel in the approach area.  Sometime shortly after my arrival; ORD 'turned the airport around' to an east flow.Although I believe the concerns require no explanation; I can't help but comment.  I understand the desire for a west operation in ORD.  I don't; however; understand how that is allowed to compromise safety and why ORD won't 'turn the airport around' until the pilots refuse to operate when I'm sure they are aware of our 10 KT limitation.  Is ATC there to enhance safety or to act as another obstacle?  When they continue a west landing operation with winds nearing aircraft limits without a plan; that seems reckless.  It appears they are hoping that either the winds won't exceed limits or that pilots will either willfully or ignorantly land/take-off anyway.  Hope is not plan.I can't help but reevaluate my planned arrival fuel going forward now knowing that ATC might not allow me to land at my destination airport unless I'm willing to exceed the aircraft limitations.

Air carrier Captain reported ORD can be reluctant to 'turn the airport around' to east arrivals; causing potential issues with tailwind limits.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Shortly after departure (below 1;000 feet AGL) while hand flying; encountered the wake turbulence of the A321 that departed ahead of us. Aircraft rolled left; then right. Did not lose control or have to deviate. I did advise ATC of the encounter. Continued flight without further incident. I did a flex takeoff and didn't recognize the A321 ahead and connect the dots. I should have done a no flex takeoff.

CRJ-900 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence departing CLT from the preceding A321.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 13.7

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Human Factors

Tech Ops coordinated a radar outage on the Airfield Surveillance Radar (ASR)-9. I approved and released the radar. I coordinated a 30 minute recall time. The return time approached and five minutes before the scheduled return; Tech Ops requested additional time. I already was direct about the return time because of staffing and the overall operation for the evening. I denied the extension request and said I need the radar back in 30 minutes. Tech Ops called Maintenance Operations Command Center (MOCC) who called me. I denied MOCC request for the radar outage and MOCC said tough luck it is down!Tech ops needs to keep up on scheduled time for planned maintenance. Coordinate additional time in a timely manner for Air Traffic to plan ahead.

ELP TRACON FLM reported that he approved a radar outage request from maintenance with a 30 minute recall. As time came close to the end of the requested time the FLM checked with maintenance and the operator requested more time. FLM denied request and said he needed radar back in 30 minutes. He then contacted Maintenance and they told him tough luck it is down.


Flight Crew Total 11487; Flight Crew Type 6657

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

General Evacuated; General Maintenance Action

After completing the parking checklist the aft flight attendant noticed a smell of smoke coming from the aft portion of the cabin. After checking it out the captain asked me to contact ground control to get the fire trucks rolling to the aircraft. He also asked me to contact operations to get maintenance out to the aircraft. After accomplishing those two things I stayed at the front of the aircraft and kept the cleaning crew and catering from entering the aircraft. After the fire department declared all clear we handed the aircraft over to maintenance.

We had a normal flight up until just after finishing parking checklist. As we were packing our bags; the aft FA called saying there was a smoke smell in aft cabin. We had just put on ground power and shutdown APU which will matter later in description. I talked with the FA to determine source of smell. We thought that maybe it was coming from brakes since aft cabin door was open; or air conditioning system and it would dissipate soon since APU had just been shut down. We could not see or smell any indication of smoke in first 3/4 of aircraft so I called operations and I directed my FO to call ground to send fire personnel to our aircraft.I then started working my way to aft of aircraft since the aft FA had already started announcing over PA for remaining passengers to leave everything and exit aircraft immediately. A mechanic showed up at that point and we continued to rear of plane but could not smell or see any smoke. Once we reached around 5 rows from rear of plane I could smell smoke and as we went further we could see the smoke. Fire personnel soon showed up and we were trying to determine source of smoke which was dissipating.The plane was empty of passengers at that point so mechanic put the APU back on as we tried to find source. That completely cleared smell. The smell was strongest 3 rows from rear when it happened according to the FA. I remembered that prior to departure there was no water pressure in entire aircraft. Maintenance repaired issue and signed off write up and we received new release. Apparently the only system that is below the 3rd row toward rear of cabin is the water system compressor which only works when there is no pneumatic air pressure from APU or engines. Once we switched to ground power and shutdown APU; the water compressor started and apparently began to smoke. It stopped again when Maintenance turned APU back on as we tried to investigate source of smoke. All in all a little confusing but we worked together as a team and everyone was safe.

B737 flight crew was informed by a Flight Attendant that there was smoke in the aft cabin after gate arrival. The problem was traced to a faulty potable water system compressor.


Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

The passengers wanted to leave early. I had to contact Operations to give them the arrival time and information on the pilots and passengers. I felt rushed. I did my final walk around and pulled the chocks from the nose wheel. As I started to walk away; the aircraft started to roll forward slowly. Not wanting to jerk the aircraft to a stop by using the chocks (since the passengers were already on board); I communicated to the First Officer to use the brakes. He was briefing the passengers at that time. He did so and stopped the aircraft. I ought to have made sure that the First Officer was in his seat in the cockpit before pulling the chocks as per SOP. I did not do so in my rush. In the future; I intend to slow down and to comply with SOPs even if need to delay the flight.

A CE-560XL Captain pulled the chocks while the First Officer briefed the passengers and had to hurriedly call the First Officer to set the brakes as the aircraft rolled slowly forward.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 2500

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification

During clearance I was given climb via the UECKR1 RNAV except maintain 3000 [feet]. Departure told us to climb to 13000 [feet.] Did the expect altitude of 8000 [feet] apply? Thus the [safety report] form; one of many; dealing with SIDS and STARS. SIDS and STARS work until the controller modifies them. Rant over.

CE525 Captain expresses confusion over RNAV SID's STAR's after modification by ATC; in general and the UECKR1 specifically.


Piper Aircraft Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Other Rotorcraft - Helicopter

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 95; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Procedure; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

After lifting from fuel pump area located midfield west side making a 90 degree clearing turn; and hover taxiing toward my departure point; a grass area just west of the runway's parallel taxi way; I announced my location and departure intentions on Unicom frequency. Just before my departure radio call we heard radio chatter by an aircraft in the pattern whose transmission/intentions were garbled and unclear. It is important to note that upon our initial arrival; a few minutes prior the favored runway was the one I was using. With that in mind; I started my northwest departure takeoff run parallel and adjacent to the runway. The west side of taxi way crossing the extended center line f an intersecting runway displaced threshold. At that moment my rear crew member alerted me that a Piper Twin was very close and approaching off our left side which I did not observe until it had passed over and just behind us and was about to touch down on the intersecting runway which we had just crossed the extended centerline of during our departure.From my observation as well as my 2 crew members; it appeared the Piper Twin landed without incident and made no evasive actions. No evasive action was taken by either aircraft and we observed the Piper Twin landing normally. Radio calls on Unicom were made between us immediately after the occurrence; recognizing the miscommunication and confusion of our positions and intentions; we then continued on to our next destination. Contributing factors were an uncontrolled airport with no declared active runway based on current wind direction. Garbled radio calls from aircraft in the pattern. Radio and intercom chatter in and out of our cockpit. Helicopter line of sight to the west southwest during clearing turn and initial takeoff run was blocked by fuel tanks; Fixed Base Operator building and distant tree line; therefore was not able to see the approaching Piper Twin. I was not aware which runway was currently the favored runway.

A helicopter pilot departing a non towered airport reported a NMAC with an arriving aircraft.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were cleared via radar vectors off airway to 4;000 feet. IAF altitude was 3800 feet. FO was descending in Level Change from 6;000 feet. Just didn't look right out the window; so I told the FO to come out of Level Change and level off (around 5;000 feet.) I was crosschecking the terrain display and toggling my EFB to the Approach page from the Arrival page. Terrain display showed terrain OK; but still didn't look right. FO descended to approximately 4700 feet when ATC gave us a terrain alert and told us to climb back to 5000 feet. FO stated he was sure that we were given 4000 feet but I responded that I didn't feel comfortable flying into the terrain just because we were cleared to do so.

B737-700 Captain reported becoming uncomfortable during descent on arrival into BUR about the time ATC issued a low altitude alert. No GPWS warning was received.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Workload; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Situational Awareness; Workload; Troubleshooting

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Weather; Procedure; Human Factors; Airport

Prior to departing; crew was briefed by Flight Following on destination runway conditions.  Flight Following passed along a report from airport state maintenance that BOW MU readings for runway 19R were 65/67/65.  There was a runway condition NOTAM: !ZZZ  11/341 ZZZ RWY 1L/19R FICON PATCHY THIN SLUSH DEICED LIQUID 100FT WIDE REMAINDER ICE OBSERVED. Descending into the airport; crew received information November: Wind 150@25G34 Vis 5SM -SN/BR FEW007 OVC012 1/1 A2909.  We were cleared for approach ILS 19R from center; then handed off to tower.  We requested latest runway conditions from tower and were told a B-737 reported braking action 'Good' less than 1 hour ago.  We continued the approach stabilized and landed on the centerline within the touchdown zone.  When brakes were applied; braking action was found to be less than reported.  Once reaching a slower speed; the aircraft weathervaned to the left; continuing down the centerline.  Coming to a stop; the airplane slid forward under no sideload force towards the edge of the runway.  Assessing the situation; the crew determined there was no damage to the aircraft and that we could safely taxi back to the center of the runway; made a 180 degree turn for a back taxi; and exited the runway.  The crew reported braking action 'Poor' to tower and requested that taxi route on taxiways and ramp be inspected by state maintenance crew.  We determined we could safely taxi to our parking on the ramp.  We reported to tower that we had come close to the edge of the runway and they should send someone to inspect it.  Tower relayed to us that state personnel inspected and found everything to be fine.  State personnel also reported that when checking braking action on the runway; 'Poor' was actually giving credit to current conditions.  After exiting the aircraft; the crew inspected the tires; landing gear; engines; and found no scuffing; markings; or irregularities.  Everything appeared to be normal.  Giving more accurate and updated braking reports.

A DC-9 landed on a snowy runway previously reported with 'GOOD' braking by an air carrier crew but discovered 'POOR' braking. The aircraft skidded with no side load toward the runway edge and was taxied to the gate with no apparent damage.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Human Factors; MEL; Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Manuals

Mechanic Y reinstalled a First Officer's Pitch Trim switch on a EMB-145 aircraft; which I inspected and back-signed.  I did not notice it was installed 180-degrees from the proper position.  We then made a Logcan discrepancy [write-up] for an Operational Check for the replacement of the switch.  At the time we could not apply power to the aircraft to perform the Operational Check; so it was turned over to the night shift.   When the Operational Check was complied with; it was not caught that the Horizontal Stabilizer was moving in the wrong direction.  I have completed and submitted an inspection manual discrepancy report. Due to the severity of this incident; the manual in question needs to have a warning and possibly an illustration of the proper orientation of the Pitch Trim switch.

Mechanic reports he inspected; but did not notice a Horizontal Stabilizer (H/S) Pitch Trim switch had been installed 180-degrees from the proper position on an EMB-145 aircraft. An Operational Check of the Pitch Trim by another shift failed to notice the H/S moving in the opposite direction contributing to an inflight incident.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Type 8100

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

While cleared to taxi out by ATC for departure on Runway 28; we took a wrong turn to enter Taxiway U. BWI Ground cleared us to taxi via Taxiways A; P1; and U. Instead we joined U from P taxiing via A; E; P; and U. Departing from the X Gate alleyway at night; contributing factors included an absence of taxiway signage; multiple illuminated construction barriers; and an aircraft on Taxiway P. When questioned by Ground about the incorrect turn; we acknowledged the mistake and no further discussion occurred. The remainder of the flight was conducted uneventfully. Taxiway signage could be improved coming out the alleyway of the X gates. Aircrews should not taxi their aircraft until ATC routing instructions are mutually understood and verified.

An air carrier pilot reported they were given taxi clearance via Taxiways A; P1; U to Runway 28; but because of night conditions; construction barrier lights and poor signage transitioned to U at P. ATC alerted about the error.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 700

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Upon completing a short field landing on runway 20R at SNA I cleared the runway at taxiway J eastbound.  I thought the tower controller had instructed us to cross 20L and call ground.  Just as soon as I had crossed the hold short bars for 20L I saw a Cessna 172 rolling out on runway 20L and came to an immediate stop.  We were approximately at the western edge strip when this happened.  He veered off the runway and exited the runway diagonally onto taxiway J and C.  I contacted Ground and we returned to parking.  No damage to either aircraft resulted.

BE-20 Captain reported a runway incursion and ground conflict that resulted in the other aircraft veering off the runway to avoid a collision.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

Upon approach in CYHZ we encountered decreasing performance windshear. Turbulence went from moderate to severe. After windshear guidance was complete we failed to retract the gear below VLO; and also failed to turn off the wipers before 170 KTS. VLO exceedance was 10-30 KTS. Wiper exceedance was 10-30 KTS. It was hard to read instruments.Threat of windshear was known. Error was improperly cleaning up the aircraft in accordance with its limitations. It was a very challenging event. Maintenance was contacted after diversion.

EMB-145XR flight crew reported diverting to an alternate after encountering wind shear on approach to CYHZ. Landing gear and windshield wiper limits were exceeded on go-around.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was advised by the 'gate keeper' after the fact that we had flown an Airbus aircraft from a Maintenance facility with the overwing exits not armed.  I do not recall anything abnormal on that flight. There was no indication of an unarmed door. There was no ECAM alerts. It was a busy flight with last minute calls for catering and two jump seaters. We were concerned that the tug; without chains; would be able to push us on a solid sheet of ice. Planned; briefed; and executed De/Anti Ice.  Since Maintenance had worked on the overwing exits; it would be nice to know that procedure had been done. Sort of like gear pin write ups. You don't rely on the writeup to check for gear pins; but you do double check that the gear pins have been removed!  Maintenance did some work on the overwing exits but failed to re-arm the exits. As pilots we have learned to look primarily for ECAMs and pulsating amber indications. It is easy to overlook something that is just not where it usually is; that is part of human nature. Similar to a pilot doing a gear check and thinking he is seeing three green lights; when in fact he only sees two greens. He has seen and said; 'Down and three green' for so many times he says; 'Down and three green' again. We did not see anything to draw our attention to the lack of an armed slide; and we proceeded to fly the flight.     I suggest three things; all are barrier builders: First; if an over wing exit is going to be disarmed and then rearmed by maintenance; then; before the fact; a log book entry is made; similar to Gear pins installed; that an overwing exit is being disarmed. Followed by a log book entry; that the overwing exit is confirmed rearmed. The second thing that can be done; if Maintenance does not want to do the above; Maintenance should confirm on the Doors Page that the overwing exit is showing armed after they worked on it. The third thing; suggest to Airbus that an amber indication shows on the doors page that an over wing exit is NOT ARMED when it should be. Now; we only get an amber indication if the over wing is actually opened.

[Narrative 2 had no additional information]

A320 flight crew reported departing on a ferry flight with the overwing emergency exits not armed by Maintenance personnel prior to flight.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Confusion; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown; Confusion; Troubleshooting

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight from ZZZ to ZZZZ; routine through the departure and enroute phases of flight. Planning on landing on Runway XX visually; using the RNAV approach as reference. It was my first time flying into ZZZZ and the Captain had briefed me that this would be different than most operations I was used to. Descending as we approached ZZZZ; Captain asked me to cancel our IFR as we were able to maintain VFR. I complied and we were handed off from Approach to the field's UNICOM. As we began our approach; we noticed a small rain shower over where the field is located. We briefed the possibility of abandoning our approach if the rain affected our ability to see the runway. Around this time an aircraft landing in front of us called us over UNICOM to inform us that they had no issues on their approach to land and they reported improved conditions from what we previously expected.The Captain; who was flying; began a descent and I noticed he was starting to descend below the 2;300 ft. altitude at ZZZZZ." I spoke up and reminded him of the altitude at that waypoint and he took corrective action. Passing ZZZZZ on final for the runway; he began another descent; this time down to an altitude of around 600 ft. roughly 4 miles from the runway; and it was at this time that I was able to clearly see the runway and called it in sight. However; the Captain had seen it before me since I was not familiar with this airport. Although we were still maintaining VFR; this descent put us about 600 ft. above the water still roughly 4 miles from the runway. Passing the FAF; the Captain continued down to the published minimums for the approach; rounded up to 400 ft. It was at this altitude over the land that we received a GPWS alert. This surprised us both as we were above published minimums and had visual of the runway and all land and obstacle between us and the runway in sight. The alert disappeared as I looked and noticed my RA showed 400 ft.; still above published minimums. With the alert gone [and] runway and all terrain in sight; we continued our approach to land and the remainder of the flight was uneventful.This was my first time flying into ZZZZ2; including ZZZZ; and at the time only had 60 hours in the aircraft as a First Officer. The Captain previously elected earlier in the trip to fly both legs into and out of ZZZZ since it presents unique challenges being an uncontrolled; short runway; island airport in ZZZZ2 with unique weather requirements for dispatch. During the flight the Captain explained how different this flight would be compared to what I was used to in my short time at the airline. This prepared me to expect some differences; especially in the approach to landing phase of flight. The Captain briefed me his plans for the approach; including approaching the field VFR. Starting the descent early to 600 ft. was something that I rationalized to myself as being part of the differences to be expected as the Captain previously explained why he was doing so. This resulted in us flying lower to the ocean further out from the runway than we should have been and likely the reason for the GPWS alert upon reaching our rounded minimums after the FAF being referenced.Looking back; even though it was my first time flying into this unique operating environment with an experienced Captain; I should have been more aware of how low we were compared to how far we were from the runway and queried the Captain further on this and call for the approach to be abandoned. During our post-flight debrief I brought up the GPWS alert and asked if this was something we should report and the Captain assured me it was not necessary and dismissed this as saying he could just explain what he was doing to whoever might ask. Going forward I know this should not be the case and reports should be filed if there is any question of their need or warrant.I would welcome additional training for operations into international airports such as ZZZZ which have unique operationalchallenges and potential hazards; especially for relatively inexperienced new first officers like myself."

Arrival into ZZZZ is VFR only for our company aircraft. Island in sight and IFR cancelled at 5000 ft. in the descent. Pilot report from aircraft landing 5 minutes before us was visual with runway on the approach above 1000 ft. Since we were VFR; we needed to remain VMC; so we used the lateral guidance of the RNAV approach and configured for approach and landing early. I had the field in sight and descended for cloud clearance along the approach path. Once inside the final approach fix inbound; I descended to 400 ft. as that was the MDA. In visual conditions the GWPS alert too low; terrain" sounded. Both pilots had visual contact with terrain with no obstacles along our path. I clicked off the autopilot to react if a go-around or maneuvering would be necessary. We continued inbound and landed Runway XX with no further incident.Numerous scattered layers of clouds in the area; but visual with the area and the pilot report gave us the impression that the weather would be adequate. I request further training in company procedures in ZZZZ2. VMC arrivals in a regional jet are problematic but required by company policy."

E175 flight crew reported a GPWS Too Low Terrain Warning on approach to a non-towered airport after cancelling IFR and recommended more training to be given for special airports such as this one.


Flight Crew Total 4670; Flight Crew Type 2046

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

When briefing the ILS Rwy 03 approach into LPPT; we noticed that the briefing strip frequency did not match the plan view frequency. For the approach we initially set 109.5 but on base determined that the LOC/GS was not identifying nor present on our Electronic Attitude Director Indicator. After switching to the plan view frequency of 109.1 the LOC/GS appeared and it properly identified.

Reporter stated that the LPPT ILS Rwy 03 Approach in the company's Jepp FD Pro (iPad) subscription contained '(Airline)' in the title and had 109.5 listed in the briefing strip as the ILS frequency. Reporter accessed that chart during CALLBACK phone conversation and stated that; at this time; it still lists 109.5 as the ILS frequency. Reporter then accessed company's Ops Alerts and found a correction to the Rwy 03 ILS frequency; dated 17 Sep 2018; that changes it to 109.1 and which will be published at their next Jepp FD Pro release. Current Jepp FD Pro LPPT ILS Rwy 03 Approach Chart for the reporter's subscription was dated 7 Sep 18; effective 13 Sep.

B757 Captain reported ILS frequency error on approach chart briefing strip.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 1700

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Declared Emergency

After 4 hour sit; tail swapped into [another aircraft] due to cargo door issue on original aircraft. At first we were told by Maintenance that this aircraft was unavailable as it was scheduled for maintenance for recurring 'flight control; slat; trim issues'. Cargo and crew then switched to this aircraft and advised it was green. En route portion of flight was uneventful. Upon final approach and fully configured with First Officer flying a visual autopilot off VMC approach. At approximately 2;000 FT AGL aircraft suddenly pitched up to approximately 10 degrees; after slight delay throttles advanced to maintain bugged speed at 120 KTS. I then asked First Officer what he was doing. He then stated it wasn't him and at that time I instructed him to turn off all flight control automation. First Officer confirmed all automation was off; which I verified. I then commanded he discontinue the landing. At that time aircraft was climbing to approximately 2;500 FT. I then joined the First Officer on the yoke and applied full locked arm pressure. First Officer then retarded throttles and we were able to level the aircraft at 3;000 FT. First Officer continued to fly the aircraft at 210 KTS; 3;000 FT. I then declared an emergency and we cleaned up the aircraft. We then maintained 3;000 FT and ensured basic control of the aircraft. Trim then seemed to be operating normal. We then reconnected the auto throttle and then the autopilot and flew a hand flown ILS. Once configured at 2;000 FT for landing stab trim was not used by the First Officer. Aircraft landed without further incident. In review it felt as if this situation was a run away nose up stab trim.

I was flying a visual autopilot off VMC approach. At approximately 2;000 FT AGL aircraft suddenly pitched up to approximately 10 degrees; after slight delay throttles advanced to maintain bugged speed at 120 KTS. The Captain asked what I was doing I told him it wasn't me at that time he instructed me to turn off all flight control automation. I then disconnected the autothrottles/autopilot. The Captain then told me to discontinue the landing. At that time aircraft was climbing to approximately 2;500 FT. The Captain then helped me push the yoke forward to stop the climb. I then retarded throttles and we were able to level the aircraft at 3;000 FT. I continued to fly the aircraft at 210 KTS; 3;000 FT. Trim then seemed to be operating normal. We then reconnected the auto throttle and then the autopilot. I then flew a hand flown ILS. Once configured at 2;000 FT for landing I did not use the trim for the remainder of the flight. I then landed without further incident.

B757 flight crew reports accepting an aircraft with a history of trim issues; but are assured by Maintenance that the aircraft is good to go. During approach the aircraft abruptly pitches up and the First Officer has difficulty maintaining control. With the Captain's help the aircraft is returned to level flight and in trim. The next approach and landing is uneventful.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The aircraft arrived with an inbound [log write-up] for a brake issue that required a brake change. The tire in question had been written up as low pressure in flight. Found valve core loose and serviced. No leaks noted. The Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) limits for tire pressure low were not read because all available manpower was at the aircraft; and there was no access to them outside the shop. AMM requires tire change and mate on axle changed when taxied with low pressure. This is what was overlooked. The brake change required all available manpower. The tire pressure item was lower on the priority list; as the brake was causing a delay and taking all the attention. There were no obvious defects to the low pressure tire other than the valve core being loose; it did not leak after being serviced. This would be alleviated if we had more manpower; more ground time than 1:50 to perform ETOPS checks; and portable AMM access. The brake on this aircraft is heavy; and was very hot from landing. It could have been deferred per MEL but the outbound weight of the aircraft precluded this option; dispatcher would not allow.

The maintenance technicians did not recognize that a tire that was operated with low pressure required a replacement along with the adjacent tire. This is due to the loads imposed upon the tires while operated in this condition.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Captain was pilot flying and was cleared to 'descend via the Korry 3 arrival' into LGA. All crossing restrictions were programmed in the MCDU and verified. Captain had planned for a high speed descent as there was no speed restrictions assigned. During descent; ATC adjusted our clearance to include '270 KTS at BRAND.' Speed brakes were extended to help meet this assignment and aircraft was in managed speed and managed descent. The aircraft was programmed to cross DAVYS at or above 13;000 FT and the MCDU indicated that this restriction would be met. At approximately 13;300 FT I noticed that with the current descent rate; it did not appear that the level off would occur by 13;000 FT at DAVYS. The vertical speed level-off button was pushed and even then; the descent rate was such that the aircraft was going to descend below 13;000 FT 2-3 miles prior to DAVYS. Just below 13;000 FT; the Captain disengaged the autopilot and leveled off around 12;200 FT followed by a return to 13;000 FT and then the KORRY 3 arrival without further complications. There was no alert or indication by ATC that a crossing restriction had not been met. It appears that on the A320 aircraft specifically; using speed brakes at higher speeds on descent will induce descent rates that will not be able to be overcome to meet some crossing restrictions while using the autopilot. In this circumstance; the A319 aircraft probably would not have had a problem; and this event serves to remind that the A320 aircraft are slower to respond while on autopilot to changes in pitch. In any regard; when ATC changes an airspeed clearance on an arrival; in the descent; to something less manageable; it may be prudent to say 'unable' next time.

During a high speed descent on the LGA KORRY 3 arrival; ATC issued a 270 KTS BRAND constraint which caused an A320 to go below the DAVYS 13;000 FT constraint by 750 FT.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Avionics

Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure; Manuals; MEL

An Airbus aircraft had Vent Blower Extract Fan Circuit Breaker popped. Circuit breaker that was popping was for Hi-Speed Fan; troubleshot to Fan Blower. So we had one and Removed and Replaced (R/R) Fan Blower. Performed Operational Check and got all indications in cockpit which are Flow Bars that switch from inboard to overboard when you pull circuit breaker for Flight/Ground; which tells you which fan is working; Hi or Low speed. Since I got the flow bars I assumed both [fans] were working and I was done. Had I waited at least two minutes between checking the Hi and Low Speed Fan I would have got the warning. It takes a few minutes to get the warning. Maintenance Manual tells you the fan will go to Low-speed; but hard to hear in the cockpit so you look for flow bars. What happened is that I assumed that both fans were working because [of] the indications and I did not reversed the MEL process [procedure] and double check myself. We decided in our Shop that a second person will check the reversal of the MEL. Avionics cooling. Gate turnback.

A Line Technician reports that an Airbus aircraft returned to gate after he had replaced hi-speed fan blower for popping the vent blower extract fan circuit breaker. The vent blower fan had been on MEL deferral.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

The aircraft was in cruise flight at 10;000FT. When we were cleared to 8;000FT; I had the speed set in Manual; but at 290kts. At approximately 9;500FT; I noticed the error. I leveled the aircraft; set 250kts; and deployed the speed brakes. As I did this; ATC queried our speed and the FO responded that we were slowing to 250kts. ATC later vectored us around traffic; but made no further comments regarding our speed. I do not know if the vector was related to our speed.Approach duties such as the briefing; speed setting; and landing assessment are typically complete by this point in the flight. However; on this flight we were still performing these tasks; creating a higher than normal workload for this phase of flight.Perhaps training could be made available regarding workload management with new First Officers. This was the second leg off IOE for the FO. I was entirely unprepared for how much my workload as a Captain would increase with a new FO. If someone had told me to mentally prepare myself for flying with an incapacitated pilot; I think I would have avoided the speed deviation.

EMB-175 Captain describes exceeding 250 knots below 10;000 FT while on descent. He mentions a new First Officer as a contributing factor for not noticing their speed.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

Arrived at ZZZ maintenance facility to reposition aircraft to ZZZ1. Accomplished full originating/acceptance checklists. Completed fully all normal checklists prior to takeoff. No unresolved discrepancies. Normal takeoff with flex power. (However; we did not shut down APU until just prior to take off; thus PACKS were on APU till that point). Immediately after 'Positive rate; gear up; speed mode' the cockpit filled suddenly with smoke of moderate density. The smoke had a distinct smell that comes only from the PACKS and definitely NOT electrical or fuel. We discussed and shut off PACKS and dumped cabin to clear smoke as we were at low altitude. While climbing we advised Tower of the smoke and requested remain in the pattern for return to field. He asked if we were declaring an emergency and we replied NO; NOT AT PRESENT. ( the same reply we gave to all subsequent questions ). We referenced EPC and QRH. On downwind we got a SMOKE FWD LAV warning and audio. First Officer got up to inspect lav and found it was only from the residual cockpit smoke and no fire was present. Also checked aft lav. Warning indication on EICAS went away. Returned to cockpit discussed all relevant circumstances and determined the threat was managed and ZZZ1 (10 minutes away) offered better maintenance and rescue and fire facilities. Made low approach to runway and coordinated with ATC and proceeded to ZZZ1 uneventfully. (PACKS remained OFF).

Air carrier Captain reported a fume/smoke event after takeoff. After troubleshooting flight crew executed a safe air return.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X had two aircraft vibration write ups. Rudder and elevator hinge line inspections were accomplished. Both elevators were removed; reinstalled; and adjusted; changing all 10 hinge fittings. The rudder also had 7 worn hinges replaced.I generated a card for a Functional Check Flight per GPM (General Procedures Manual) 10.XX.X. It was signed off by management stating a FCF (Functional Check Flight) was not required.Retrain everyone on the GPM procedures for a FCF.

Aircraft Mechanic reported that management stated that a Functional Flight Check was not required after working on flight control components.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 216; Flight Crew Type 4500

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

SCT Approach vectored us from a base leg onto final within 1.5 miles of a heavy B777. We got cleared for the visual approach and started to maneuver for spacing by slowing with flaps 10 and s-turns. Not long after turning onto final; we got into the wake turbulence. The aircraft banked both left and right as we fought to get out of the turbulence. ATC sent us to Tower. I put in the frequency and believed to have switched to Tower. We maneuvered the aircraft upwind and high just as we started to feel the burble of more turbulence. The sun was low in the sky directly in our line of sight. This made the runway and the preceding aircraft difficult to see. We continued down the flight path fully configured and with the checklist complete. As we got below 1;000 FT; we viewed a green light from the Tower and questioned whether we were cleared to land. I thought we had been but; as we started to feel possible turbulence again; we continued to focus our efforts to landing the aircraft as we were close to the ground. Once we landed; we turned off and contacted Ground. They queried us as to whether we saw the green light and we confirmed that we had seen it. We then taxied to the gate for parking. ATC should have let us know that the heavy was already at approach speed at 15 miles out as he positioned us behind him. ATC vectored us to final too early and put us too close to a heavy aircraft. As a crew; we should have gotten vectored back around instead of continuing on the approach. The distraction of the wake turbulence; low sun; and maneuvering kept our focus from verifying the communication with Tower.

[Narrative contained no additional information.]

B737-700 Captain reported wake vortex encounter that provided enough distraction Tower was not called for landing clearance.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 5841; Flight Crew Type 5841

Training / Qualification; Workload; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

After a 1-hour maintenance delay in ZZZ; we set off for ZZZ1. The flight was uneventful until we began to descend into ZZZ1. The forecast for our original arrival had been winds 220/6; 6 SM; BKN 100; VCSH. So; while the weather wasn't spectacular; it certainly wasn't something we were concerned about when we departed. Even at the time of the delayed departure; the weather had not changed from the forecast. Prior to top of descent; all briefings were completed. Threats acknowledged (short runway; possibly wet; landing distance; night; go-around into possible weather; autobrakes max and windshear potential). As such we choose Flaps 40; autobrakes maximum; for a landing distance of about 5;000 feet. We only had 2 selections; normal or good braking at MAX AB; after that there were no options for autobrakes; something I remarked during the brief as a definite threat given the short runway. As we descended in ZZZ1 on the arrival; we began to see numerous thunderstorms and lightning; but nothing at the airport. Below 9;000 feet it was clear and we could see the airport; but to the North; South and West; thunderstorms were everywhere and the lightning was out of a movie; turning night into day. With just one aircraft in front of us; we were on vectors to the ILS XXR. Again; no weather or Thunderstorms within 10-15 miles of the airport and the weather that was there was North; South and West of the airport. We were slowed and fully configured by the FAF. The approach was stable throughout; only with some slight deviations due to winds and light turbulence. Throughout the approach I keep thinking about the go-around and possible windshear; but knowing all along; I really don't want to have to go-around into it. As the aircraft in front of us landed and cleared the runway; we were given clearance to land at 600-700 ft. Winds were reported less than 10 knots with no gust. At about 100 feet before landing; I began to feel the airplane start to encounter some gusts; nothing unstable; just making me work for it. I remember thinking to myself; this shouldn't be this hard given the reported conditions. At about 50 feet; I began to feel the airplane sink; I added power; no luck; added more; still no luck. I made the decision in my mind to go-around; and at that exact same moment the GPWS screamed; 'Windshear; Windshear; Windshear'. Without hesitation I slammed the throttles to the forward stops; rotated to approximately 15 degrees; pushed TOGA and held my breath. For a brief moment; it seemed as if nothing happened. I'm honestly not sure if we got the warning again as I became focused on flying the plane and getting away from the ground. Within about 3-4 seconds I could see our airspeed vector immediately start a positive trend and Instantaneous Vertical Speed Indicator (IVSI) was climbing at 4;000-6;000FPM. I immediately felt we were out of the event so I began calling for the go-around configuration changes and cleaned up the airplane. However; our event wasn't over; after telling the Tower of the windshear event; we now needed to navigate the numerous thunderstorms that were West of the airport. We asked for an immediate left turn to a downwind; which was granted and kept clear of the storms. Now; we had a decision to make. Make another attempt; or divert. Having the fuel; we choose to head in the direction of another approach. ATC vectored us behind Aircraft Y who was on approach. We felt that if Aircraft Y was able to land; we would at least consider an attempt. However; as we started the approach; Aircraft Y went around for windshear. At that point; I made the decision to abandon the approach and immediately head to ZZZ2. After we completed the After Take Off checklist (for the second time); declared MIN FUEL; flew some vectors; reviewed the ZZZ2 10-7 and 9 pages; approach brief/threats and deviations for weather; we landed 'uneventfully' in ZZZ2. So; commence the debrief. What went well?  First; my gut told me I should fly this leg. Despite trying to get the training done; it seemed for me to be the safest option. We all have moments like these in our IOE's. Trust yourself; if you think you should fly; then fly. This is where (CRM/TEM) Planning and Decision Making; along with leadership come in. Remember; safety is our number one priority. Next; our threat forward briefing during the descent check was critical (Situational Awareness/Communication). When I briefed the windshear escape; little did I realize I'd be using it.  Also; during the maneuver; I did see my First Officer (FO) ensure the speed brakes were stowed; an outstanding back up. What could have gone better?  The one part of this we didn't review was how the Pilot Monitoring (PM) responds to the windshear escape. They provide key information to you when you are in the middle of a windshear event. This won't be something I'll soon forget to mention when I brief windshear. Next; the actual windshear escape/go-around. It happens so fast in actual operation; yet in the simulator we all know it's coming; as well as; what to do and what to say. Without identifying and briefing it; I would guess the PM might not be saying anything as they are reacting to the event. In our case; the FO; after being startled by the GPWS alert; was back in the loop as I called for the go-around configuration changes. Throughout the actual windshear event; I didn't hear him say anything.  During our debrief; he knew what he was supposed to say; but because of the 'startle' (distraction); by the time he gathered himself; the event was over. Also; since we hadn't reviewed it in the threat forward briefing; it was understandable given his experience. However; he was right there with me on the go-around procedures and clean up. This; I believe; was because we briefed the GA procedure and he was fully aware of his responsibilities (Communication and SA). Now the divert.  Simple right; just tell dispatch and ATC; plug it into the FMC RTE page; load the approach and go (Automation/Workload Management). That is of course would be simple; if you aren't coordinating with dispatch; ATC to deviate for thunderstorms; being almost on top of the airport deviating too; and while all the while watching your fuel state getting lower and declaring MIN FUEL (time compression). This is where we could have reviewed the diversion guide in the FOM; but we choose to forgo that due to time constraints and weather. Also; as diverting airports went; ZZZ2 was the only airport that was not being affected by the weather. Furthermore; we reviewed the ATIS and NOTAMs; but did not ask Dispatch for landing data. We did however; do an evaluation of our landing data per the FM; by reviewing the 10-7 page which lists no special engine out for our landing runway (Rwy XXR; 10;200ft); and we also knew we had the landing distance based on our data from ZZZ1 and the FM. Another not so well; was we forgot to re-cruise the FMC. As a result; we were unable to load the ILS approach. I'm here to say the re-cruise; 'slipped' my mind. That led us to not being able to load the FMC ILS approach due to altitude constraints. However; I did have the FO load the ILS in the FMC; which gave us a white line depiction of the approach despite being unable to execute it. Given the VFR conditions; we were able to fly a visual approach and back it up with the ILS. Next; where is the communication with the Flight Attendants? An area that was really tough. Given the time compression; after the go-around and we deviated away from the thunderstorms; I called the Flight Attendant's and told them what happened; and let them know that we were diverting to ZZZ2. I asked the Purser if she could tell the passengers; as I just didn't have time to make a PA (Workload Management). Once we landed; we still had to coordinate with operations and the passengers upon landing to determine what to do. Keeping the people informed was my biggest concern.  I went into the cabin to let the passengers know I was sorry about not getting them into ZZZ1 and for having a delay in talking to them about the divert. Given the weather everyone saw out the window; no one seemed to mind and most were thankful we were just on the ground safely. The final resolution was the flight canceled in ZZZ2 due to the ZZZ1 curfew and the passengers were bused to ZZZ1. This took almost an hour after we parked.

An air carrier pilot reported executing a go around due to encountering Wind Shear and receiving a Ground Proximity Warning. The flight diverted to a nearby airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 216.12; Flight Crew Total 14075.20; Flight Crew Type 3026.63

Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 15216.73; Flight Crew Type 1463.75

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

At 39;000 feet enroute cruising IMC; icing conditions; the left engine vibration reached 7.0. The intensity of the vibration was felt in the airframe throughout the cabin; audible in the flight deck; and shaking the glareshield. In accordance with the Flight Manual; we reduced power on the left engine to 60% N1 and the vibration level dropped below 4.0. After various power setting tests; we determined 60% N1 was the maximum power setting to keep vibration level below 4.0. This power setting was inadequate to maintain altitude and airspeed. Since we were still left of course on a weather deviation; ATC was unable to approve our request to descend until we reported back on route. The Captain was notified and returned to the flight deck. At that point; we sent a CPDLC message with a request to descend. We were cleared and descended to 33;000 feet. At this altitude; the aircraft was able to maintain 250 knots in level flight. After some discussion with Maintenance Control and Dispatch; the degraded engine performance condition required landing at the nearest suitable airport. Dispatch coordinated the ground response and ATC issued a divert clearance. The descent; arrival; approach; and landing were conducted as if we were a single engine aircraft; with the exception of starting the APU.

B787 flight crew reported excessive vibration from the left engine resulted in a diversion.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

We entered Aircraft X to find that both Ram iPad mounts were missing. After waiting for paperwork we finally received the flight plan and in the MEL/CDL (Minimum Equipment List/Configuration Deviation List) section MEL/CDL 25-20-XX (NEF) (Non-Essential Furnishings) was listed. We set about to verify the validity of the applied MEL within the DDG (Dispatch Deviation Guide). The MEL in the required column requires '0'; zero. We referenced section 4 of the NEF program and found that the Ram Mounts were covered in the NEF listing under Flight Deck item 30. 'EFB (Electronic Flight Bag) Tablet Ram Mounts Missing.' I will point out that the language states exactly 'Mounts' as plural. Satisfied that we had complied with the regulatory requirements for Maintenance Dispatch of this flight we proceeded with an uneventful flight. Subsequently we found out that a conflict may exist between the company DDG/MEL/CDL/NEF program and the FOM (Flight Operations Manual). There is 'Tribal Knowledge' interpretation that implied within the paragraph personal EFB (pEFB) Mount in the last sentence of: 'If necessary; utilize the Single pEFB Dispatch or No pEFB Dispatch Procedures above.' This sentence creates ambiguity. In our case both the CA (Captain) and FO's (First Officer) pEFB's were fully functional. The FOM draws one back to 'Procedures above' and there is a reference to no pEFB Dispatch that leads one to 'Coordination with Dispatch is made to obtain hard copies of the pertinent: Jeppesen charts for the route of flight and DDG pages for items on deferral'. The subsequent flights Dispatched and the Dispatchers after us evidently applied this logic and provided hard copies of all pertinent information. We were not afforded this FOM application. Please keep in mind that we both had fully operational pEFB's. We scoured the FOM for more definitive guidance outside the above mentioned passages and can find nothing else related. To say the least this is perplexing and confusing and it would be very helpful if the [safety officials] would or could address this issue and drill down for an answer. If the [safety officials] can address this issue it would go a long way to clearing up much confusion with in the FOM and the DDG/MEL. Your help is appreciated.

There appears to be a disturbing trend within Maintenance Control to cover maintenance write ups and discrepancies entered into the aircraft maintenance log record with remedies from the AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual) outside the DDG/MEL (Dispatch Deviation Guide/Minimum Equipment List) system. I understand that this manual is integral to accomplishing maintenance task. The problem is that Maintenance Control seems to be the only ones who have access to the manual(s) and they are unwilling to share the information for remedy to the flight crews or the contracted maintenance personnel; that is the majority out in the field. If Maintenance Control employs this tactic outside the DDG/MEL system there is no check and balance and there is a potential for safety consequences. Allowing access to the manual(s) so that all parties involved can follow and understand the various steps seems basic but; over and over I am seeing denial of this safety step. It also puts the mechanic's in the unenviable position of being dictated to in order to perform required maintenance procedures verses reading and accomplishing the involved steps. If the [safety officials] can address this potential safety concern and propose a remedy all stake holders would be better served.

Reporter states that there is inconsistencies in the application of MEL deferrals as well as conflicts between the information in the MEL and the Flight Operations Manual in regards to the pilot EFB (Electronic Flight Bag) and the MEL associated with the EFB mount on the aircraft when it is missing/inoperative.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.5

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors; Manuals

While I was working the ZAU sector; I was reviewing my routes to ensure correctness. I also read what was in the remarks. I noticed that Aircraft X had written negative RVSM; but he was filed RVSM capable; non-rnav. I called back to ZMP so that they could check with the pilot to see if he meant Non Rnav; not Non RVSM. He told them that he in fact was negative RVSM; and it was filed wrong. ZMP fixed it in their computer. Aircraft X was above RVSM altitudes at the time; however he flew for quite sometime outside my airspace at 41000B43000 feet and many other altitudes to get there. I am unaware if there was ever a loss of RVSM separation; however I feel I should fill this out because I was aware of this. I told my Quality Control local department of this event. I then coordinated appropriately with all adjacent sectors for any new clearances and point outs needed.I believe airlines and companies need to have some type of fail safe system in place to not allow an aircraft who is Negative RVSM capable file as RVSM capable based upon their tail number.

I was on the sector for 7 minutes when ZAU called and asked to confirm if Aircraft X was indeed negative RVSM. Negative RVSM was in the remarks of the flight plan; but the equipment suffix/W was not in agreement. The remarks had already been checked when I assumed the position so I had no reason to check them. I asked the pilot if he was RVSM capable and RNAV capable thinking the remarks section was incorrect. The pilot confirmed that he was negative RVSM and RNAV capable. I asked what his equipment suffix was to which he indicated/G.My hat is off to the ZAU controller for catching what could have been a separation problem down the line. Negative RVSM pilots need to make sure that the proper equipment suffix is filed and also be sure to communicated on the first transmission to ATC that they are indeed negative RVSM even if the are above RVSM airspace. As controllers we do rely heavily on the coral box as an indicator. One can see how the remarks section of a flight plan can slip through the cracks especially during position relief. We don't tend to redo work that has already been indicated complete.

Center Controllers reported an aircraft in RVSM airspace that was not RVSM capable.


We had an engine over temp climbing out of ZZZ; an IOR was completed by the Captain and incident report was also completed - for details concerning the actual incident you can refer to those reports. [ATC was advised] and partial power air return to ZZZ was uneventful. For the purpose of this report; I am concerned about the inaccuracy of the QRH. I notified the CPO of my concerns. I will include a 'cut and paste' of that email below. So we had an engine overheat; that required an air return to ZZZ with partial power on the #1 engine - no shutdown required. Once the engine overheat caution was recognized; I opened the QRH to the front index; identified the page to turn to as 80.9 and turned to 80.9. The only checklist to start on 80.9 is the 'Engine Fire/Overheat Detector Fault'. I knew this could not be right; so referred then to the 'Fire Protection' Table of contents which again directed me to the 80.9 page of the QRH for 'Engine Overheat' ... again not correct. The 'Engine Overheat' checklist is on page 8.10 - and is mislabeled in the QRH! My concern is this; we have a lot of different pilots with a wide range of systems knowledge; experience and wide ranges of complacency. Under the circumstances; with perhaps two pilots who are level 1 or 2 professional then we risk someone turning to page 80.9 in the QRH; see the words 'engine' and 'overheat' in the Checklist header - proceeds to run a one line checklist which is quite simple and then decides all is well and presses on when the fact is they may have an engine that is about to catch on fire and become a major catastrophe. I am VERY CONCERNED about this and am disappointed that no change has yet been made - no pilot bulletin or something to at least let pilots know about this error in the QRH. Yes... it may be another year or more until this incident occurs again; or it could happen within minutes of me submitting this report! And under the right circumstances we may end up with an engine overheat that is not properly managed with dire consequences. I do not feel I am being dramatic - I am concerned about the safety implications of this situation. I would appreciate a timely response from the ERC; I am willing and able to speak to the concerns of this report further with a phone call but really expect to see this addressed and remedied in a timely manner. I trust that in this narrative you can sense my sincere concern for the possible consequences of not addressing or correcting this error. Please note - I would appreciate a personal response to this report please.Following is the email that was sent after the incident:ZZZ pilots conducted an air return for #1 Engine Overheat---see report belowGrabbing the paper QRH and looking up 'ENGINE OVERHEAT' it directed them to page 80.9 which is the wrong checklist. That page number is incorrect. Correct page number for Engine Overheat is 80.10. We discovered that the hyperlink on the iPad QRH also directs them to page 80.9 but correctly places them on page 80.10. Pilots utilizing the paper QRH will be placed on page 80.9 and will run the Engine Fire/Overheat Detector fault checklist. Which is wrong. The new QRH hyperlinks and directs the pilot to 80.9---again; wrong checklist. If I have confused you guys we are on the same team. It took ZZZ 10 hours to type this up. Best thing to do is go to the iPad and you'll see what we are talking about.

B737 First Officer reported that the the QRH reference was incorrect for an engine over-temp.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.9

Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Aircraft X was inbound from our western arrival gate to FLL. They were inbound to the airport descending for the approach. Aircraft Y; a VFR popup off of TMB who climbed to the northwest under the Miami finals; and was only known because of ADS-B who it was; cleared out from under the bravo and continued its climb up to 045 under the FLL finals. Aircraft X's descent had to be stopped; causing them to be high; unstable; and unsafe on the approach. This is not a safe way to work parallel runway traffic into FLL; needing to always stay high because VFRs are allowed to climb and fly willy-nilly through them.FLL airport is the 19th busiest airport in the USA; and one of the top 3 fastest growing; averaging 8% growth each of the last 5 years. FLL has a basic Class C airspace surrounding it that is beyond out of date and unable to aid in the safety of its aircraft on the finals. Planes inbound to each of their parallel runways are not offered any sort of protection until within 5 miles of the field; which allows several dozen VFRs each day to climb; descend; and transition across each final; without ATC advisories creating a very dangerous; unsafe; and hazardous situation in the skies above. The FLL Class C is inadequate; and out of date; and needs a major airspace change around it; whether a bigger Charlie; or a full blown Class B before it's too late.

Miami TRACON Controller reported an airborne conflict due to a VFR aircraft climbing into the FLL final.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Handed off from Paris Controller (who had a thick accent.) What I understood and read back was '...contact Brussels on 125.6'. The pilot flying thought he heard 125.0. Because the Controller didn't correct my read back I checked in with Brussels on 125.6 The Controller acknowledged immediately (leading us to believe that 125.6 was the correct frequency) and what I heard and thought he said was 'descend to FL180'. The pilot flying heard the same and initiated a descent to FL180. I read back 'leaving FL230 for FL180.' As we were descending the Controller queried us and asked if we had started our descent. I replied 'affirmative; descending through FL220 for 180'. Controller then said to reset transponder as he showed us still at FL250.Realizing something wasn't right I instructed the pilot flying to push altitude hold. The Controller realized something wasn't right at the same time and asked for our position and whether we were on 125.6. Controller told us to maintain FL215 and explained he thought we were [another company flight]; who subsequently checked on to the frequency moments later at FL250. The Controller said there was no conflict and handed us off to 125.0 (Maastricht; I think). It was very hard to discern the difference between [the flight numbers].English not primary language of Controller. Controller not speaking slowly and concisely. My failure to resolve immediately with the Paris Controller the discrepancy between what I heard and what the FO (First Officer) heard (125.6 vs 125.0). Internationally it's sometimes a group effort to discern clearances. In this case it didn't work because the Controller on the wrong frequency was expecting an aircraft with a similar call sign.Reminding Controllers to speak clearer and slower with foreign crews. Any time there is a discrepancy; immediately resolve it before continuing.

Air Carrier flight crew reported an altitude deviation in European airspace when they took a clearance to descend intended for another aircraft with a similar call sign. Flight crew also stated language barrier issues contributed to the event.


Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related

Recently a decision was made to limit the number of employees on the bus to provide more space in order to contain the spread of COVID-19 virus to our employees. While this is helpful and proactive it falls short of CDC guidelines which limits crowds to no more than 10. Furthermore the 6 feet separation guideline for social distancing is impossible.

Ground employee reported the employee bus carries more than 10 passengers and 6 feet social distancing separation is impossible.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

I am filing this report for a Mechanic because he is afraid to file [it] himself because of a threat from a Supervisor of repercussions. The Supervisor gave a directive to do a #1 service on [the] aircraft without paperwork. Both the Lead and the Mechanic said they would be happy to do the #1 service and requested it to be assigned. The Supervisor refused to assign the #1 service but then threatened them stating; 'It better get done or else there will be repercussions.' The mechanics reached out to me for guidance and as it looked like this situation was starting to escalate I returned to work. By the time I got there the Supervisor had already left but the Technician was very disturbed by what had transpired. Unless something has changed; it is the understanding of the mechanics and from the Union side that paperwork is required for everything we do on an aircraft. EVERY Mechanic is willing and happy to do a walk around/#1 service on every through flight providing a #1 service is assigned which covers the Mechanic from a FAA compliance standpoint.The front line mechanics do not understand why Management stress 'paperwork paperwork' and follow procedures and then in the next instance; direct under threat of discipline; technicians conduct maintenance without paperwork?

Observer reported filing report regarding paperwork requirements for another Mechanic that received a threat from the Supervisor.