Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

While deviating southeastward to avoid a strong line of thunderstorms; deviations continued well past our original estimate of 80 NM. As we continued along the eastern edge of the front about 200 NM looking for a safe opening; we lost situational awareness and exceeded 50 NM offshore without life rafts on board. Around the time we finally realized that we had exceeded this limitation; we received an ATC report of an aircraft in 'moderate' turbulence experiencing a loss of 800 feet in altitude. Because a course reversal would have been well over 200 NM; and deviations westward were ill advised; I elected to exercise Captains Authority and continued along the front a little further until it was safe to turn back shoreward. Even then; we experienced continuous moderate turbulence while crossing over the line. We received a message from our Dispatcher after we became aware; reminding us not to exceed 50 NM. I replied that I was exercising Captains Authority and that it was not safe to turn eastward citing the ATC reported altitude loss event. At the most extreme; we were approximately 120 NM offshore (as we verified by our dispatcher). Given previous personal experience utilizing the old CRJ 900 waiver for 147 NM off shore without a life raft; I knew that if I remained above FL250; I would be within gliding distance of several airports along the coast. I discussed this information with the Pilot Flying and suggested that we climb from FL260 back up to FL300 to increase the safety margin.Once clear of the line; we immediately requested vectors due West (abeam Ormond Beach; OMN) to once again position ourselves no more than 50NM offshore. From that position; we requested to rejoin the new arrival at a fix that would keep us within the limitation. I never told ATC that I was exercising Captains Authority as they were extremely helpful and granted every request made without any priority handling. Had that been necessary; I would not have hesitated. I only informed the First Officer and our Dispatcher.We believed; looking at the radar; that we would be able to turn back towards our filed route with only a minor 80 NM deviation. When we were unable to find a hole along the ATC suggested heading; we should have queried ATC as to where we could expect to be able to turn back Southwesterly. Had we the plotted the closest fix; it would have been immediately evident that we were going to exceed the limitation and would have opened a discussion as to a possible diversion airport. Alternately; informing our dispatcher of our 'minor' deviation in a more timely manner would have alerted him to keep an eye on our position and he might have been able to alert us proactively and helped avoid our transgression. Also; workload permitting; and in no way relieving me of any blame for losing situational awareness; ATC could have volunteered that deviations were currently exceeding 50 NM offshore. Most regional jets do not carry life rafts and I believe that the NYC area controllers have been made aware this after several shortcuts offered along the NY/NJ coast led to similar 50 NM deviations.

From now on; I will take more time to review the radar picture with the Captain and discuss possible scenarios that may arise. Second; whenever flying along the East Coast; I will plot VORs along the coast in the 'fix' pages of the FMS with a 50 mile ring. Tomorrow I will experiment and see if the secondary flight plan built with VORs along the coast will allow a 50 mile course offset which would effectively give a 50 mile limitation line.

CRJ-900 flight crew reported losing situational awareness and exceeding the 50 NM from shore FAR while deviating around thunderstorms.


Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 800

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport; Aircraft; Human Factors

During a nighttime visual approach into ATL Runway 26R I noticed the pavement lights on the runway flashing on and off.  I also noted that the runway lights on the parallel Runway 26L were also flashing on and off.  I had another experienced pilot with me who saw the same thing. We discussed what was happening and thought it may be the propeller strobe effect and runway LED lighting.  So we decided to vary the RPM of the prop and when we did we could change which lights flashed on and off; either the runway or centerline on either runway.  We are wondering if any assessments of this flashing phenomena were evaluated by Human Factors for the distracting nature of landing runway lights flashing on and off during an instrument approach and landing before LED lights were installed and if either this needs to be evaluated or pilots warned of this phenomena.

The reporter states that between the two pilots aboard they were able to figure out what was happening and confirm it by varying propeller RPM. He believes that the phenomenon is very distracting and all pilots of single engine propeller aircraft should be made aware of the effect.

C210 pilot experiences flashing runway edge and centerline lights during a night visual approach to Runway 26R at ATL. When propeller RPM is varied the strobe effect is varied and it is decided that the effect is caused by propeller interaction with the LED lights which are apparently flashing at a high rate.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 6000

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

A high speed rejected take off was performed on runway. The First Officer was the flying pilot; and I might add that this was his first take off after completing training and his performance and professionalism; when thrust into a very high stress situation; is commendable. There was not a second when he did not perform exactly as expected and offered valuable input when needed. 'Text book' is how we performed this together. On the take-off roll at approximately 110 KIAS the master caution illuminated with associated 'Doors' indication. I commanded 'Continue'; and at approximately 130 KIAS the First Officer and I heard screaming from the cabin and the cockpit call chime sounded. I commanded 'Reject.' The indicated airspeed was no higher than 140 KIAS. The procedure was performed and I exited the runway. The rejected takeoff QRH check list was run. I spoke to the lead Flight Attendant and was informed every one was seated and 'OK.' She also informed me that the main cabin door had come open approximately one foot; (12 inches) and that the door seemed to be coming open more until I rejected the take off. The aircraft was equipped with carbon brakes and the reject was much smoother than I had anticipated; and many of the crew and passengers stated the same. I decided to return to a gate. Customer service and technicians were waiting; the door was thoroughly inspected; and no faults where found. There was some tire damage to the number one main landing gear tire and I had the tire replaced. The flight departed approximately 5 hours late. Of the passengers that decided to continue with us; all had compliments for me; customer service; and the crew. The aircraft weight was 175433; with 165 souls on board. Planned for flaps 5 bleeds off; improved climb take off. V1; 154 VR; 157 V2; 165.

A Boeing 737 Captain decided to continue the takeoff when at approximately 110 knots a door warning master caution illuminated. Shortly thereafter; at a speed reported to be no higher than 140 knots; screams were heard emanating from the cabin; the cockpit chime sounded; and the Captain elected to command an abort. Upon inspection; no faults were found other than some tire damage from the high speed rejected takeoff.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Landing on 8L via the channel. Traffic was also landing 4L (originally assigned to 4R I think) arriving from over Ford Island. They passed over the first 2;000 feet of 8L while on a downwind/base to 4L at +500 feet from us (as shown on TCAS) just as we crossed the threshold of 8L. If we'd have had to initiate a go around anywhere between 400 feet and the runway; and started climbing; we would have been in direct conflict with the aircraft landing on the 4s.ATC failed to sequence traffic to both runways. We had a hold short (of 4L clearance) so there was no issue at the other end of the runway; but ATC allowed the timing to be such that both aircraft were at the approach end of 8L at the same time.After landing; I questioned ground as to what altitude traffic should cross 8L when on a downwind/base for the 4s and he said 800 feet. This traffic was clearly lower than that as we were less than 100 feet and the TCAS target showed +500 feet.ATC needs to find a way to deconflict traffic over the approach end of 8L. As long as the traffic landing on 8L doesn't have to go around; there is no problem with the 4s traffic being there; but if the 8L traffic ever had to go around; there could potentially be a problem. I know this is normal procedure for HNL but it seems like a large safety hole.

First Officer reported he was concerned with an ATC procedure at HNL that he felt could lead to an unsafe conflict if a go-around was required.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were assigned to ferry an airplane. The aircraft was at the maintenance hangar and we closed the door and I armed the MCD (Main Cabin Door). When we started engine 1; we got an EICAS message that required a ground reset; which we could not clear. The message was Engine 1 short dispatch. Before maintenance came on the aircraft I disarmed the MCD. Maintenance fixed the issue but before they started the engine to troubleshoot the problem; they asked me to close the MCD. Out of habit; I armed the door and when they were done; I was sitting in 1A and one of the maintenance personnel opened the MCD as it was armed.

The Captain and I were assigned to ferry an Airplane which we picked from the maintenance hangar. We did our normal checks everything seemed great so we closed the door and started engine 1. After Engine 1 was started we got an EICAS message ENGINE 1 SHORT DISPATCH. We ran the [checklist] but the message didn't clear so we called dispatch and notified them then got transferred to maintenance who promptly came out to the airplane to assess the issue. Before maintenance Started to troubleshoot the engine they asked us to close the main Cabin door which the captain did and mistakenly armed the doors. I was sitting in 1B and didn't notice so I take responsibility also. One of the maintenance personnel opened the main cabin door and the slides came out due to them being armed.

E175 flight crew reported that; when arriving at the aircraft; maintenance failed to disarm door prior to opening it activating the slide.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 1800

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Automation Overrode Flight Crew; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

In smooth air cruising Mach .78 FL390 winds 280/90. Had checked weather en route which showed we would be going through southern tip of moderate turbulence box. Queried ATC; who reported only light chop. Started to pick up light mountain wave for ten seconds then hit a spot of moderate turbulence and moderate to severe mountain wave. I turned seatbelt sign on and made PA. Simultaneously the aircraft oversped 5 to 10 KTS. ECAM for autopilot disengage. Aircraft began rapid ascent which the Captain was able to stop at FL400. Advised ATC and returned to FL390. No injuries; no traffic separation issues. Advised company and ATC. Hard to tell how much of the altitude gain was due to the wave and how much was due to the airbus high speed protection mode. This mode; which kicks in at Mmo +.01; disengages autopilot and pitches up to slow aircraft. Between the ECAM noise; which takes a couple seconds to silence; and the altitude horn; it's a lot of distraction. The most dangerous aspect of this event is the potential for mid air collision. With the accuracy of the GPS we are often flying directly under or over other planes. With the Airbus programmed to enter steep climb; a nose to nose encounter is a real possibility. I would suggest a standard offset on domestic routes if even just .1 mile to avoid this possibility. Also the Airbus shouldn't be programmed to dump the autopilot while simultaneously taking control of the plane to deviate from the flight path. For reference; max speed for airbus is .82; maximum altitude is FL391.

The reporter did not notice the Mach number reached during the pitch up but believes that the Captain may have delayed the forward stick input between five to nine seconds and was gentle due to passenger considerations.  Autothrust remained engaged and active and the spoilers were not deployed.

A319 First Officer reports an altitude deviation from FL390 to FL400 due to a mountain wave induced overspeed and the aircraft overspeed protection system intervention.


[Company] Boeing 757 aircraft are in service with inappropriate repair of the standoff tray on top of the landing gear trucks. The [company document] allows the tray to be secured in place by using plastic zip ties in a high vibration; high heat area. Due to the vibration; the plates migrate aft causing the wire harness conduit to slip out of the junction box which in turn causes chafing against the sharp edges of the conduit and junction box. We as avionics technicians have replaced many harnesses due to antiskid/autobrake failures due to wires shorting or being cut/damaged. The [company document] allows this temporary repair until there is wire damage discovered at which time a permanent repair is required. Apparently there is a misinterpretation of the [company document] by some senior members of the Maintenance Department who feel that the permanent repairs are not applicable once the wires harness is replaced with new wires and the aircraft is released to airworthy condition with plastic zip ties securing the plates. These zip ties secure the plates for 1 or 2 landings at best then the plates migrate aft causing damage to the wires in the same location. I am concerned for the airworthiness and safety of the aircraft and our passengers. Management knows about this issue and mechanics have been [clearing write-ups with this company document].

A Maintenance Technician is concerned that a company document is being exploited or misinterpreted; thus allowing continued operation without completion of a permanent repair.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

At Cruise at FL330; 70 NM west of CALCO we experienced a rapid roll to the right not exceeding 30 degrees Angle Of Bank (AOB). [We] took control of aircraft putting airplane into Control Wheel Steering (CWS) and Control Wheel Position (CWP) to correct to level flight. No altitude loss. Asked ATC what type of aircraft we were following at FL330 and the spacing. They said it was a B777 at FL330 at 8 miles. Told them we had a partial upset. [ATC] told us to descend to FL290. No passengers were up and about. No injuries to any passengers or flight attendants; continued uneventfully.

B737-800 Captain reported a 'partial upset' at FL330 when he encountered the wake of a B777 8 miles ahead.


Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Aircraft Y was inbound on the GPS 35 to the Mora (JMR) Airport and over to advisories.  Aircraft X called at JMR looking for his IFR clearance.  I did have a proposal for him.  I asked him if he was on the ground and he said no; that he had departed and he was 010.  I gave him his code and told him to maintain VFR.  He replied that he couldn't because he was in the clouds.  I told him that Aircraft Y was inbound to JMR about 10 miles out; inbound.  Aircraft X responded that he was in the clouds.  Aircraft X's code popped up on my scope about 3 miles South of JMR.  I suggested he turn to a 090 heading immediately.  I called Aircraft Y to see if he was monitoring the frequency and he responded.  I issued him a clearance to turn to a 270 heading and climb to 040 and I cancelled his approach clearance.  Aircraft Y complied and said that he had Aircraft X on TCAS.  They were about 2 1/2 miles apart; but they were altitude separated.  Aircraft X should not have departed in IFR conditions.

ZMP Controller described a loss of separation when an IFR aircraft departed non-towered airport without a release; conflicting with an IFR inbound.


Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

I was in the first class galley working the flight attendant A position.  Flight attendant B; approached me and informed me that the passenger in 6A had detected a brown liquid on her tray table.  FA B immediately gave the passenger prewet wipes and the passenger proceeded to wipe of the liquid. Flight attendant B then proceeded back to inspect and also cleaned the soiled area with wet clothes.  Several minutes later after disposing of the clothes in the garbage can in the first class galley FA B noticed that she felt a burning sensation on her hands.  She immediately notified the Captain.  She then proceeded to wash and sanitize her hands.  At this point we realized the liquid on the tray table was not coffee or coke but some type of corrosive.  The Captain advised us to retrieve the soiled clothes from the garbage bin.  I proceeded to put on protective gloves and retrieved the soiled clothes; putting them into the hazmat bag from the Universal Precaution Kit (UPK) and then sealing that bag and placing that bag into a garbage bag and sealing that bag.  We relocated the bag away from the passengers until landing.  Upon landing Hazmat came on board and retrieved the bag.  The passenger in 6A had no issues with her hands burning but reported a slight and temporary itching which disappeared after she cleaned her hands.  She reported back to us that she felt fine and was not concerned.  We reported this information to the Captain.  Upon landing a maintenance crew member came on the aircraft and inspected the tray table and seat for any further fluid.  The passengers all deplaned without any further incident.  Flight attendant B reported that she also had no further irritation to her skin.

The reporter stated that a brown liquid substance was found on a tray table and when the passenger attempted to wipe it off using a wipe it burned her skin. The reporter also stated that another flight attendant attempted to assist the passenger clean up the substance when she too felt her skin burning. The reporter stated that the brown substance was from an unknown origin; suspect perhaps its from a leaking battery from a previous passenger or a cleaning solution used by Maintenance. The reporter stated she was sure the origin of the substance was not from the aircraft itself.

Flight Attendant reported that a passenger detected a brown liquid on her tray table that irritated skin when contact was made.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 248; Flight Crew Type 180

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

My flight instructor and I were descending through 1;300 feet on final approach to Runway 06 at VKX within the DC FRZ; and had just been handed off by Potomac TRACON to the CTAF for VKX when what appeared to be a helicopter crossed directly in front of us from left to right at a horizontal distance of approximately 500 feet and a vertical distance of approximately 200 feet.  Prior to the hand-off by Potomac TRACON we were not advised that there was a helicopter in the vicinity of VKX or which was on a course to cross the established final approach path that we were on for VKX Runway 6 at or around the final approach/pattern altitude.  After making an immediate evasive maneuver to avoid a collision (i.e.; an abrupt descending left turn); my instructor contacted Potomac TRACON on 125.12 and notified them of the near collision.  We were informed by the controller that the helicopter was talking to DCA/National Tower and not to Potomac; and that he 'would speak to them about this.'Proposed corrective actions: That proper procedures are put in place for routing helicopter flights (and any other aircraft); so that they avoid transiting across the airspace used for arrivals and departures at VKX and immediately adjacent W32 at altitudes that would conflict with such arriving and departing traffic. If such transiting is required due to the aircraft's mission; then put in place enhanced safety procedures that may include 1) requiring all such transiting flights to monitor and announce their intentions and positions on the CTAF for those airports; and 2) enhancing coordination and communication between ATC facilities (DCA/National Tower; Andrews ADW) Tower; and Potomac TRACON) which are controlling those flights; and between those ATC facilities and any conflicting air traffic arriving at and departing from VKX and W32. This may include putting in place procedures for the responsible control towers to hand off to Potomac TRACON the control of all aircraft on course to transit the critical airspace/altitudes surrounding VKX and W32 before they reach a certain distance from those airports (10 NM?); so that Potomac is talking to both the transiting aircraft; and the aircraft arriving to or departing from VKX and W32 (who are required to be talking to Potomac under FRZ rules) so that both aircraft can be advised of a potential conflict in a timely manner.  These procedures should augment the general 'see and avoid' responsibility of all pilots under these circumstances.

Piper Cherokee pilot reported a NMAC with a helicopter on final approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 29000; Flight Crew Type 500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

We departed and upon level off at FL300 we noticed an EICAS 'FUEL IMBALANCE 1 and 4'. The entire crew looked at the fuel synoptic in disbelief because fuel is not burned out of 1 and 4 by system logic until tanks 1;2;3;4 are approximately even (about 30k pounds). We ran the fuel imbalance check list and tried to determine if we had a leak but totalizer and calculated fuel were about the same and no other factors indicated to us that we had a leak. We balanced the fuel between tanks 1 and 4 by closing #1 crossfeed. When the levels were within 800 pounds the balance was close enough and we opened crossfeed 1 again. Fuel balance remain good until late in the flight. FO became alarmed when we got to our next fix and we were down 1500#. I had a wait and see attitude and recommended we press on and maybe we would get the fuel score in line with the OFP. By the next fix we were down 2500# on the fuel score and the FO advocated and I agreed to contact [Maintenance]. [Maintenance] downloaded our data and told us there were no fuel error codes and that he recommends we continue our flight but keep a close watch on the fuel. A few fixes later we were 5500 to 6000# down on the fuel score so I told the FO that I felt we should divert and if he agreed; also wake the [relief pilots] up and prepare for the divert. We did NOT initially declare an emergency but when we started dumping fuel to get down under the max landing weight we got out of balance again between tanks 1 and 4 by about 5000#. I told the crew to terminate the dump and I [advised ATC] - mainly because I had no confidence in the fuel indicators and that we would most likely land overweight. We requested a lower altitude to burn fuel to lighten the weight and I pulled speed brakes to assist in the burn. Flight attendants were briefed and we did ask ATC to 'roll the equipment.' We landed 1.9 over max landing and the landing was uneventful.

B747 Captain reported diverting to an alternate after noting fuel quantity indication system anomalies.


Flight Crew Total 80; Flight Crew Type 80

Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Evacuated

Student pilot rented Aircraft X for a VFR solo cross country flight; operating under CFR Part 91. Before departure; a logbook endorsement was received from the pilot's CFI for the intended route of flight and a VFR flight plan was filed for this route indicating a cruising altitude of 3;000 and five hours of fuel onboard. Aircraft X departed ZZZ1; activated flight plan shortly after; climbed to FL030; and continued for pattern entry for ZZZ approx. 1 hour later. No traffic was observed in the pattern at ZZZ; and a touch and go was made on Rwy YY. On upwind; at an unknown altitude; the engine RPM went from 2800 to 500 in approx. one second. After pumping the throttle the engine restarted then quit again.A 180 degree turn was made back to ZZZ airport; Rwy YX; but not enough altitude was available to reach the field; and the airplane was landed into a nearby body of water. The fuel selector was on the Left tank from departure at ZZZ1; the electric boost pump was on; per the checklist. Upon landing; the pilot was able to get the attention of people on shore who came to the scene in a canoe.

Engine failed after touch and go; aircraft landed in a lake; no injuries indicated.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

Got a High Stage Bleed message.  Less than a minute later got a Manifold message.  Captain followed the QRH. We pulled the engine back to idle and left the bleed closed.  I continued to fly with the auto throttles off.  We were cruising at FL370. We requested lower to keep from bleeding off too much airspeed.  We were given FL290. Got weather for ZZZ and ZZZ1.  We had come through ice out of [the departure airport] so returning there was not an option as we had no wing anti ice.  We decided to continue to ZZZ1 after ATC informed us of rain in the vicinity of ZZZ.  The captain took over as Pilot Flying after completing the in range checklist.  Captain asked me to manipulate the flight control panel for him even though the Autopilot (AP) was engaged.  Since the autothrottles remained off this helped him better monitor the aircraft.  I think having me do the Flight Control Panel (FCP) was a smart move and kept us ahead of the aircraft.  Did an autoland; got checked out by [Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting] with no adverse heat signature on [the affected engine] then taxied to the gate.Manifold message.  Land at nearest suitable airport. We continued to ZZZ1 finding it the nearest suitable.Not sure about how to prevent it.  But; it would have been easier to shut the engine down than leave it running at idle.  Leaving it running at idle meant no auto throttles which increased our workload.

A First Officer reported diverting to nearest suitable airport after receiving High Stage Bleed and Manifold 3 messages.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 3500; Flight Crew Type 1000

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was taxiing for takeoff on RWY 3L.  Multiple taxiways were closed; and I was not familiar with the airport.  Prior to landing at the airport earlier in the day I retrieved and read the NOTAMs that described the multiple taxiway and runway closures.  I determined that the best course of action would be to request assistance from Ground for all taxi operations.  Therefore I requested 'progressive' taxi instructions of the Ground controller after I started the engine on the GA ramp.  The ground controller instructed me 'Taxi A to 3L; cross 30'.  Runway 30 was closed.  Following the instructions I entered Taxiway A from the GA ramp; crossed RWY 30 at A and continued on Taxiway A.  After crossing RWY 30 the ground controller asked me if I wanted an intersection departure.  I responded 'No' and said I wanted full length (of 3L) 'just in case'.  The ground controller then instructed me to 'Taxi to the end of A'. I continued on Taxiway A with the airport diagram on my yoke mounted iPad and my eyes outside.  As I approached the Taxiway B intersection I saw what looked to me like painted ILS hold lines on Taxiway A ahead of me. There were no signs on either side of the markings to indicate what type of hold line was painted on the taxiway. I continued to taxi at about 10 mph and was almost upon the hold lines when I realized they were runway hold lines!  I immediately applied brakes; but was unable to stop before the nose crossed the hold line.  Note that these hold lines are NOT on the airport plate; nor were signs present to identify them as runway hold lines.  I immediately contacted the Ground Controller and confessed I had crossed a runway hold line.  I offered to return to the ramp to fill out whatever paperwork was necessary.  He told me not to worry and to continue.  At no time prior to this incursion did the Ground controller mention there are multiple runway hold lines on [Taxiway] A; or that a runway hold line was located on [Taxiway] A prior to its intersection with [Taxiway] B; or at any other location on [Taxiway] A.  After being told to proceed by the Ground controller I taxied to the NEXT set of hold lines located prior to the Taxiway A RWY 3L intersection; conducted my runup; contacted the Tower Controller; entered the runway; and departed the airport.  What could be done to prevent a recurrence of this incursion???  I do not know how I could have done anything else; save taxi a lot slower when I see yellow paint markings ahead on a taxiway.  Prior to taxi I realized I needed help so contacted ground control for 'Progressive' instructions.  I taxied at a safe speed that considered I had over a mile to reach the runway.  I attempted to use the most conservative departure strategy with the full runway; and I communicated this clearly to the Ground controller who then directed me to 'taxi to the end of A'.  I saw painted markings on Taxiway A perhaps 200 yards before I reached them.  However; the aircraft had several hundred feet of lateral distance from RWY 3L; and was over 1/4 mile from the Taxiway A/RWY 3L intersection.  Perhaps I should have considered the possibility of a runway hold line very distant from the actual runway; and on a taxiway parallel to the runway; but I've never seen this in my flying experience.  Where such an unusual arrangement of hold lines occurs on a taxiway at a location remote from the runway I believe there should be signage to alert pilots. Regardless; the Ground Controller was advising and guiding my taxi navigation.  In my opinion; he should have alerted me to this unusual situation when I specifically stated that I wanted to use the full length of RWY 3L AND he directed me to continue to the end of Taxiway A.  It's impossible for me to 'trust but verify' when the airport diagram has no plate notes that describe this situation; the Ground Controller fails to alert me to a runway hold line located nearly half mile from the intersection of Taxiway A and RWY 3L; and there are no signs located adjacent t painted taxiway markings to alert pilots of this feature highly unusual feature.

A Cessna 172 pilot was confused by the parallel runway approach area boundary markings on taxiway Alpha; which were a significant distance from the runway in use. As a result; the pilot was unsure if a clearance was required to cross it. When asked; ATC did not explain that holding short was required only when advised.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We briefed the route and departure; to include the [engine failure] procedures. We confirmed the route in the FMS. After being cleared for takeoff and reaching 400 AGL; We turned to heading 189 and hit moderate or greater turbulence and mountain waves; which significantly affected us. I had trouble communicating with ATC and performing cockpit duties due to turbulence. Just before reaching 1;000 AGL; Tower said switch to departure. Upon contacting departure we were told 'upon reaching 8;000; proceed direct to a fix'; but the radio quality of the transmission was poor and we couldn't clearly hear the name of the fix. I realized the mountain was on our path and for an immediate left turn to avoid terrain. The Spokane Departure Controller cleared us direct to a fix by name but not the identifier or phonetic spelling; which I couldn't understand due to significant turbulence and poor radio quality. We continued normal flap retraction callouts and takeoff profile. We were given heading a 120; to which we turned; and it took several radio calls between the Captain and ATC to get clarification on the identifier to which we were cleared. This was due to scratchy radios; the turbulence; and some possible confusion on the part of the controller who was talking with us and another company aircraft. We were mistakenly trying to navigate to ENY VOR which caused us to be confused and task saturated. Once we got the correct identifier for HIA and entered into the FMS; we proceeded on course as cleared. However this delay resulted in us temporarily deviating from the charted procedure. This caused the controller to get a low altitude alert although we did not receive any terrain avoidance warnings from our aircraft. In retrospect; the controller admitted on our phone conversation afterwards that this situation is very common. There are a lot of risks and stressors associated with this MZULA.MSO RWY12 and I feel like our outside resources did not help the flight crew. We accept full responsibility for allowing this situation to develop; but changes to this procedure will greatly increase safety in the future.First our Jeppesen charts had no verbal narrative and left us needing FAA charts to understand the procedure. It would be a great help if the procedure could be simplified or the controller's expectations that are outside the procedure could be communicated before we hit significant turbulence. The controller was clearly frustrated with us which only made our situation worse by trying to give us a phone number during a high stress and high workload phase of flight in significant turbulence. This shows the controllers are not fully aware of what human factors the flight crews have and how to help safety of flight. Having poor radio transmission quality was also a significant factor.

I was the First Officer and Pilot Flying departing MSO. I received and read back the clearance from ATC which included the MZULA5 Departure MSO transition. I programmed this into our FMS and the Captain and I thoroughly reviewed the route in the FMS and on our Jeppesen plates. We also briefed the procedure for engine failure departure. In my takeoff briefing I again described the departure we were assigned. After being cleared for takeoff and reaching 400 AGL; I turned to heading 189 as charted. Immediately we began to encounter moderate turbulence. Just before reaching 1;000 ft AGL; Tower said switch to Departure. Upon contacting Departure we were told 'upon reaching 8;000; proceed direct to ________ ' but it was very turbulent and we did not clearly hear the name of the fix. I immediately realized the flight director was not commanding a left turn in accordance with the charted procedure. The Captain asked to say again the fix; and the controller said the name but not the identifier or phonetic spelling. At 1;000 ft AGL; I called out 'flight level change'; followed by the normal flap retraction callouts and told him we needed a left turn since I knew from the charted SID that's what we were supposed to do. Meanwhile the Captain was trying to get clarification on the fix to which we were to proceed. We knew it would be a left turn so he asked for a left turn and we were given heading 120; to which we turned. During this entire time it was very turbulent and took a lot of effort and concentration to focus on safe flying. It took several radio calls between the Captain and ATC to get clarification on the identifier to which we were cleared. This was due to scratchy radios; the turbulence; and some possible confusion on the part of the controller who was talking with us and another company aircraft. Once we got the correct identifier and entered it into the FMS; we proceeded on course as cleared. However; this delay resulted in us temporarily deviating from the charted procedure. During this time; we had terrain radar displayed on our MFD and were well aware of our surroundings and the location of rising terrain; and at no time did we ever get a terrain caution or warning.Although the SID was correctly programmed into the FMS; for unknown reasons the Flight Director did not command the left turn to intercept the MSO 159 radial. The extreme turbulence and difficulty understanding ATC instructions caused a delay in turning to the assigned fix; resulting in a course deviation. First of all; given our route of flight; it would have made much more sense if; in the pre-departure clearance; we would have been given the Salmon transition. This fact was even stated by the ATC supervisor on the phone when I called him after we landed. He further stated they have had frequent problems with pilots and aircraft not following the procedure we were assigned. Second; I could have anticipated a potential issue; and tuned the MSO VOR in NAV 1 and 2; along with the radial to intercept prior to takeoff. If I return to MSO in the future; I will definitely do that as a backup in case this kind of thing should happen again. I realized we were supposed to be turning left; which is why we asked for a left turn in the interim while trying to get the identifier for the fix and get that loaded in the FMS. The significant turbulence and the communication difficulties with ATC were definitely contributing factors in this temporary deviation. Nonetheless; as a pilot it is my responsibility to safely and correctly fly the plane; so I will ensure I have a backup navigation source programmed and ready in the future. And if I go back there again and get assigned that same SID; I will ask for the Salmon transition rather than the MSO transition; as suggested by the ATC supervisor. Finally I will brief my Captain on what happened previously so we can be vigilant and prepared.

Flight crew reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC departing MSO when they had a track deviation following communication difficulties.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

I was acting as Pilot Flying on flight. CHA was VFR when we checked on with Chattanooga Approach we were told to expect visual approach to Runway 2. Approach instructed us to descend to 3;600 feet and vectored us to enter a left downwind to Runway 2. The weather was VMC and visibility was good. We were visual with the surrounding terrain and lighted obstacles. I also had the terrain radar displayed on the MFD for additional situational awareness. Once we reported CHA in sight when we were abeam the airport on the left downwind; Approach Control cleared us for the visual approach for Runway 2 and told us to contact the Tower. Tower cleared us to land Runway 2. Approximately abeam MORTT; the FAF for ILS 2; 2;500 feet was dialed into the altitude selector and we began our descent in order to cross MORTT at 2;500 feet. Just as I was reaching for the heading knob on the FCP to start our base turn the GPWS 'Terrain; Terrain' aural alert sounded. I immediately executed a climb to clear the conflict and the Captain informed Tower. As we requested to be vectored for the ILS; Tower handed us to Approach Control and we climbed to 4;000 feet. As we were still on a downwind heading; Approach Control; vectored us onto the final approach course for the ILS and cleared us for the ILS. We then landed in CHA without further incident.Suggestions: In the future when operating in an environment such as CHA during a visual approach; it would probably be best to coordinate with ATC to extend downwind and not to start the decent until turning base or until established on the final approach course.

On the left downwind for Runway 2 into CHA; cleared for the visual approach to Runway 2 within 10 miles of the airport. Descended out of 3;600 feet for 2;500 feet when we received a GPWS alert with a Pull Up. Thought maybe it was a false alert; queried ATC and discovered we exceeded descent parameters or the VS rate gave the aircraft the illusion we were too clear to the terrain. The alert happened around 3;000 feet. We were clear of all obstacles and terrain. I told the flying pilot to add power and pitch up climb to 4;000 feet. We were extended in the downwind and re-vectored back on the approach and landed on Runway 2 with no further occurrences.Use a lower descent rate; possibly wait until established on the approach; or start the descent closer to the base leg.

Air carrier flight crew reported a CFTT incident during visual approach to CHA airport.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 450; Flight Crew Type 150

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Upon going around at ZZZ; on Runway XX; our Cessna 152 began to struggle to climb; combined with [an] rpm drop. Both student and I confirmed oil pressure and oil temp were in the green arc; 10 seconds later our oil pressure began to drop and oil temp began to rise. At the first indication of the changes in operating range; I pitched for best glide and [requested priority handling]. I turned 180 degrees back to ZZZ and let Center know of the situation and changed over to advisory and did the same. The motor began to shake itself apart and we glided back and made the runway safely. Upon inspection from Maintenance; the motor has suffered internal failure and will need a new motor.

C-152 Flight Instructor reported engine failure shortly after takeoff resulting in a turn back to departure airport.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

On takeoff; I noticed an odor. After takeoff; the odor increased. We called the FAs and they smelled it as well and said that it was strong. It smelled like some type of burning smell. We [notified ATC] and returned to land at ZZZ. Paramedics met the aircraft at the gate as a precaution; but nobody requested any medical attention. The smoke/fire/fumes checklist does not perfectly fit the scenario. As I had dealt with fumes before; I knew that we would only be running a modified checklist. In the checklist; some of the 'yes/no questions' refer to smoke; but not fumes. In a case with invisible fumes or odor; these questions don't apply and it's difficult to tell if fumes have dissipated because the oxygen masks prevent identifying if a smell is still present. Post-flight discussion with maintenance personnel revealed that aircraft had a compressor wash completed prior to the flight.

On departure from ZZZ we noticed an odd burning smell with no identifiable source. We saw no smoke in the cabin. We confirmed with the cabin crew and decided to return to ZZZ. We [notified ATC] and returned to ZZZ after running an amended smoke fire fumes checklist. We landed in ZZZ without incident. Review the smoke fire fumes checklist for some ambiguity.

EMB-175 flight crew reported detecting a 'burning odor' on departure. After completing the QRH procedure; crew executed an uneventful return to departure airport.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

We had just started boarding when the Captain called to the back of the aircraft and asked if we smelled anything unusual.  I could smell an oil/chemical smell. We then deplaned the pax that had boarded and we got off the aircraft.

A319 Flight Attendant reported a fume event during boarding resulting in deplaning passengers.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Airport; Weather

On the COTAL NORTH arrival in VMC we requested and received approval to descend to 1;700ft and direct to COTAL on the ILS DME 07 in MRLB. We were experiencing light to moderate turbulence at altitude and we decided that a lower altitude would provide the passengers a better ride. We were following the coast line over the water and descending. About 20 miles to the North of the airport there is a peninsula that extends further out from the coast line. We were fully aware of it and we had out EGPWS selected. We discussed it and our decision was to fly further west of it. The GPWS was two steps ahead. This triggered the GPWS terrain warning. We then climbed and turned to the right leaving the auto pilot on. The system worked as designed.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier flight crew reported the GPWS sounded an alarm as it was descending for an approach.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

During preflight inspection of the HAZMAT container; I was unable to verify the contents of a box because it was packed in such a way that none of the packing labels were visible. Upon telling the DG Agent; she called her manager. He showed up and agreed that the label should be visible. He then released the netting enough so that we could verify the contents; and re-secured the cargo. The HAZMAT package was incorrectly oriented so that labels could not be seen during preflight inspection. The package could have been correctly oriented so that HAZMAT labels were visible during the preflight inspection.

B767 First Officer reported HAZMAT container content labels were obscured due to improper loading. DG Agent reloaded container to permit proper preflight inspection.


Flight Attendant Airline Total 15; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 6; Flight Attendant Total 15; Flight Attendant Type 95

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Upon rolling down the runway for takeoff an extremely heavy fuel smell permeated the cabin in all areas. It was so bad that we flight attendants felt nauseous; light headed and 2 of the 4 of us nearly passed out. [It] stayed very heavy all the way through the 10;000 foot climb. After that it began to subside. The cockpit also told us that they had the very heavy smell also. I know this cannot be healthy and upon discussing this with other flight crew; this is not an isolated event. I personally filed every report I could think of along with an injury on duty. I had headaches for several days following this event and didn't feel right in the head.

A321 Flight Attendant reported a very strong fuel smell as the aircraft accelerates for takeoff. The odor was detected by the flight crew as well; but began to diminish passing through 10;000 feet. Other Flight Attendants detected the odor and some felt nausea but the flight continued to destination.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Total 122; Flight Crew Type 122

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Approached ZZZ Runway XX for landing at approximately XA:50 from the south. After monitoring radio communications and no one in the pattern I made the decision to approach for landing straight in. I made a radio call stating my intentions and reporting 3 mile final for runway XX. I reduced throttle and speed to within flap range. I input flaps adjusted trim and further reduced speed. I turned on the runway lighting and adjusted course to the left then made a radio call for a mile final approach to runway XX. I verified my indicated airspeed was 62kts as I approached the runway; aimed for the numbers; and reminded myself the runway is closer than it appears in the dark. I then touched down hard on the runway and the nose of the aircraft bounced high sounding the stall warning. When the nose gear came back down in contact with the runway again it did not support the aircraft and the propeller came in contact with the runway stopping the aircraft on runway XX. My first concern was that I was obstructing the runway and tried to make a radio call. However; the radio was not working; at which point I powered down the aircraft and was attempting to open the canopy when I was approached by bystanders at the airport. They asked if I was okay and moved the aircraft off the runway via [Taxiway] 1A; by holding on to and lowering the tail pulling the aircraft on its main landing gear.

GA pilot reported experiencing a bounced landing; followed by a hard landing which damaged the propeller and caused the aircraft to be stopped on the runway.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

[Maintenance Technician] called in the Pre-Departure Clearance (PDC) for Aircraft X and that he had one defect in the logbook. Reported all lavs would not flush. There was water sprayed when the button was pushed but there was no vacuum. I told him it sounded like the Vacuum Blower was not working and to check 2 circuit breakers on the P91. The Vacuum Waste Blower and the Vacuum Waste Cont. He reported both breakers were set. I had him then check that the service doors were closed and they were. It was concluded to go ahead and put the Blower on MEL because other than no vacuum; the lavs operated normally. Looking at the MEL; I instructed [the Maintenance Technician] to pull and collar the 2 breakers he had previously checked. This was part of the Configuration Change Procedure in MEL 38-XX. While he was doing this; I emailed to his office the required placard to be placed on each of the lav doors. When [the Maintenance Technician] called back; we confirmed the 2 breakers that were pulled and I completed the logbook with him. We then completed the PDC and the aircraft was ready to depart ZZZ. [Later] dispatch was talking with Aircraft X and that none of the lavs were operating and that he was going to return to ZZZ. Knowing that I had just worked that issue; I looked again at the MEL and discovered that I had instructed [the maintenance technician] to pull a breaker that was supposed to be closed. This breaker; Vacuum Waste Cont; provides the power to each lav flush circuit and is required to be closed for the lavs to operate on the ground and in flight. This why the lavs were not operating. I spoke with the captain in flight and explained the situation and that his issue would be quickly resolved when back on the ground. After arriving back in ZZZ I spoke again with [the maintenance technician] and told him the situation and to remove the collar and reset the breaker. We did this and the lavs operated normally except for the vacuum function on the ground. An Overweight Landing inspection was completed as well as another PDC and the aircraft departed again with no further issues. It was a complete misread of the Configuration Change steps in the MEL. I would say the steps were hastily glanced over by myself instead of deliberately reading each word. What jumped out to me was the way in which the 2 breakers were identified: VACUUM WASTE BLOWER (F2) and VACUUM WASTE CONT (C11). In the MEL book; these names are directly inline horizontally and vertically with one another. The top one has you open the breaker but the one below has you verify that it is closed. Again; I just saw the 2 breaker names and knew I was making configuration changes by pulling breakers.  MEL Maintenance Procedure step should be removed from the procedure where it currently is and placed as a prior 'Note' or a 'Caution' since the step is more of an advisory to make sure that the breaker is closed than it is a step with a required action; especially when the previous step has the action of opening it.

I was directed by [maintenance] controller to pull and collar Vacuum waste controller Circuit breaker and Vacuum Waste Motor circuit breaker to apply MEL 38-XX. [Maintenance] control had found after the aircraft was in-flight that [Maintenance] controller had; in error; directed me to pull the Circuit Breaker and collar the Vacuum waste controller Circuit breaker which caused the LAV waste system not to work at all and the aircraft to turn back to ZZZ. The Circuit Breaker for the vacuum waste controller was not supposed to be pulled and collared as was thought from MEL 38-XX after reviewing the MEL with ZZZ; per [maintenance] directions I pulled both the Vacuum Waste Motor and Vacuum Waste Controller Circuit breakers. I had double and tripled checked with [maintenance] if these two circuit breakers were the correct ones to be pulled and collared before I finished signing the work off.

Maintenance personnel reported that the incorrect circuit breakers were pulled when deferring a Vacuum Waste Blower.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

During cruise at FL350 the number 2 engine experienced sudden and severe surges. We the flight crew per procedures and checklist secured the right engine. We did an exit from the NAT tracts per [Company] procedures. After 15 mile offset we paralleled course and continued descent to FL215. We then turned back to ZZZZ via [coordinates] and ZZZZZ direct outer marker Runway XX at ZZZZ. As we started our descent the number 2 engine overheated and was shut down. We proceeded to the outer marker and flew a single engine approach to ILS Runway XX. Landing was uneventful and we had ARF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) examine aircraft and engines. With their concurrence we proceeded to gate where we deplaned all passengers. All appropriate checklist were followed and the flight attendants were advised of duties and expected outcome. The passengers were also kept updated by the flight crew. Right engine; number 2. Had a sudden and severe engine surge/stall that required engine shut down in-flight.

At FL350 on NAT Track in Oceanic Airspace; the right engine experienced a compressor stall with associated engine indications. The engine was reduced to idle where it remained within limits. Per standard procedure; we [notified ATC]; diverted off track; initiated a descent; and diverted to ZZZZ. We were about 600 NM from ZZZZ and monitored our situation during the ensuing 2 hour transit. Descending through FL140; the right engine EGT approached the maximum limits; so we shut it down. We executed all appropriate emergency procedures and landed without further incident.

B777-200 flight crew reported right engine failure; compressor stall; requiring shut down and divert.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 1150; Flight Crew Type 1000

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Departing VFR south on RWY 13 Right Blake Island departure. After take-off; right turn to crosswind; I continued at 800 ft. flying to the shoreline towards the Fauntleroy ferry dock. Landing traffic for SeaTac was overhead and I maintain focus of keeping altitude at 800 ft. and visual separation from traffic. I failed to turn downwind as per VFR departure procedure before direct to ferry dock.

Columbia 400 pilot reported deviating from published procedure on departure from BFI.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 600

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Excursion Taxiway

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

The First Officer (FO) Pilot not Flying (PNF) (an experienced Citation contract pilot) and I Pilot Flying (PF) departed the ramp part 91 after completing the approved after start checklist. The thrust reverser checks were completed per company SOP with the PF remaining head outside and the PNF calling for '(L/R) paddle up; 3 lights; emer. stow; arm; paddle down; no changes; complete.' This completed the final after start checks.As we were taxing on the parallel to runway 26 we needed to add a fix to the FMS. I elected to add the fix as I am more familiar with the FMS and transferred aircraft control to FO. I stated 'Your controls' and the FO responded 'my controls.' I asked FO to repeat the spelling of the fix and as I entered the fix I stated 'I got it'. At this time FO believed I was again taxiing and looked down to confirm my entry. The wind was from the right at approximately 90 degrees and 15 knots and yawed the aircraft enough to cause the right main to drop slightly off the taxiway. The edge was wet and the right aircraft main settled in the mud. Taxi speed was a walking pace. We shut down and coordinated with Airport Operations for Passenger transportation back to the FBO.I believe this incident could have been avoided completely by electing to stop and set parking brake before attending to any cockpit chores after the after start check is completed. In the event that it is not possible to stop in a taxi line of aircraft it should have been made clear that that the proper command for aircraft transfer should have been 'My controls;' 'Your controls' as well as always announcing and verifying when one crew member's eyes are not outside the aircraft during ground movement. My use of a statement of 'I got it' is also vague and should not have been used.Our after start checklist is designed to have all checks except thrust reversers completed before taxi for the sole purpose of freeing both pilots attention during ground movement. However; routing changes or taxi chart verifications sometimes demand one pilot be heads down. We will amend our SOP's to include concise verbiage-and distribute to all pilots- concerning these issues.

A CE-560 crew was taxiing while the Captain went heads down to enter a fix and passed off the controls to the First Officer Once he found the fix the Captain said 'I got it.' The First Officer thought this meant he was taking control of the airplane back and then they rolled off the right side of the taxiway because no one was in control.


General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

During the preflight; we started the APU and did our preflight checks. After the 2 minute limitation; we turned on the bleed air on the APU. Thirty seconds later; the cabin and cockpit filled with smoke. We promptly shutdown the APU; powered down all aircraft systems; turned off the aircraft battery; and evacuated the aircraft. There were no fire indications. We then ran into the FBO to have them call the fire department. The fire department showed up and found no smoke or fire indications. They did not require any report or further information from us. We then called Company Flight Tracking and Maintenance to alert them as to what was going on. Secured aircraft and waited for Maintenance.

[Narrative 2 had no additional information]

BAE-125-850XP flight crew reported the aircraft filled with smoke when the APU bleed air was selected at the gate. APU was shut down and airport CFR summoned.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I plugged in for a relief briefing. A helicopter was approximately 3 northwest climbing out of 2;500 FT when I first observed the RADAR display. A CRJ9 was departing Runway 2; northwest bound. I was not aware of what heading was assigned to either aircraft. During the relief briefing; Departure Control requested Tower stop the CRJ9 at 2;000 FT. Controller giving relief briefing may not have heard this request because another aircraft was calling at the same time. I heard the request and told Controller working Local Control to stop the CRJ9 at 2;000 FT. Instructions were relayed to pilot. No loss of separation occurred. Local Control did not coordinate with Departure to make sure they knew we had issued instructions to pilot of the CRJ9. Local Control could have maintained better awareness of current traffic while conducting relief briefing. Departure Control could have used phraseology 'break for control' to interrupt the 'RELIEF BRIEFING.'

Tower Controller described a potential conflict event when; during the relief briefing; the Controller being relieved failed to maintain awareness of current traffic.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 78; Flight Crew Total 3270; Flight Crew Type 134

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

The aircraft was on a test flight; operating with VFR Flight Following from Center; and conducting numerous symmetric and asymmetric thrust test points at V2min and Vac. When the incident occurred the aircraft was stabilized in a test point with Flaps 20 Gear Up at 123 KCAS with left engine at 85.3%N1 and the right engine at idle. After just under 5 minutes of stable flight; climbing at approx 500 fpm; there were a series of loud bangs from the left engine and a smell of oil entered the cockpit. Engine indications in the cockpit showed a rapid decay of N1; N2 and ITT. The engine was fully instrumented for performance flight test and an [aerospace company] engineer on board was able to confirm a significant engine stall event and that the engine was shutting down.The aircraft was turned direct [to the nearest airport]; leveled at 7;000 ft MSL; accelerated to 200 KCAS with Flaps Up; and the ENG FAIL L checklist was executed to completion. A PAN PAN PAN call was made on the current frequency. During the transit to [the airport] the trailing cone static system was retracted and water ballast moved to adjust CG to approximately 10%. Communication was established with Company Dispatch using a satellite phone. The One-Engine Inoperative Landing checklist was used and the aircraft landed from a visual approach.During the landing roll BRAKE DEGRADE R advisory message appeared momentarily and braking action was poor from the right side. During taxi to the FBO brake temperatures peaked around 550 C on the left side; 200 C on the right (both well below expected fuse plug release). Thrust reverser was not used for the landing as it had been inhibited due to the instrumentation suite installed in both engines.Preliminary inspection post-flight indicated probable contained blade failure in the HP (High Pressure) compressor section and possibly some damage in the LP (Low Pressure) compressor too.One learning point from the event was with the electronic checklist that was used on an iPad. A hard copy QRH was available on the flight deck; but it was in the PF (left seat) cockpit side bin and the PM (right seat) was in the habit of using a pdf reader app on an iPad for Normal checklists so forgot to ask for the hard copy. The Index of CAS (Crew Alerting System) messages in the iPad QRH was not hot-linked to the corresponding pages in the QRH so the PM resorted to using the word search function to skip as quickly as possible to the appropriate procedures. It would have been much more convenient in a high stress & high workload situation if hot-links were available in the index; and to jump quickly from the ENG FAIL procedure to the Landing procedure.A CRM learning point was that both pilots were unaware that the current aircraft configuration meant that auto ground spoiler would not deploy on landing. There was no mention of this in the QRH Landing procedure. Normal cockpit procedures; with the PM watching for ground spoiler deployment on touchdown; identified the issue immediately and the spoilers were manually deployed using the speed brake handle. In post-flight discussions it was found that the Flight Test Engineers on board were aware of the functionality; but assumed the pilots knew it.

A First Officer reported that during testing they heard a series of loud bangs and an oil smell in the cockpit; then an engine flamed out so they landed at the nearest airport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

This was the first leg of the third and last day of the trip. Our original schedule was to overnight in DSM and do DSM-ZZZ-CLT-ZZZ to finish the trip. The ZZZ flight ended up being cancelled so we sat in the airport for a few hours while our next move was sorted out. We ended up being assigned to take the same aircraft and operate it with passengers to ZZZ1. We loaded up and prepared to pushback. The day before it snowed over a foot in DSM. The aircraft needed type I treatment for frost; and the ramp area was 100% covered in compact snow and ice. DSM de-ice procedures is to do a partial push back; apply fluids engines running; then complete the push. We pushed back halfway out of the gate; started engines; and completed the pre de-ice checklist. We were treated with type I; and the push crew (who was also the de-ice crew) returned to finish the push. When they started to push again; the tug appeared to be spinning out on the ice. The de-ice truck then came over and sprayed a little fluid around the tires of the tug; but the tug still wouldn't move. After about a minute of trying to get the tug loose we heard a loud pop and queried the tug driver what it was; and he said that the '____ pin' (I can't remember what it's called. It's a pin that's designed to break under pressure to preserve the nose gear. I will refer to it as the 'tow bar pin' hereafter). The tow bar pin had broken; so we needed a new tow bar. We decided to disconnect and go get a new tow bar. At this point the captain said 'brake is set'; and motioned to set the brake; and we saw that the brake had been on the whole time. We informed the crew and contacted Maintenance (MX); who came out to inspect the nose gear. It was then realized that the broken tow bar was stuck to the nose gear and they hassled with it for some time before it was finally disconnected. It turns out that it was frozen to the nose gear. Once the broken tow bar was disconnected; MX inspected the nose gear and said that there was nothing wrong with it at all. We connected a new tow bar; finished the push; and completed the flight normally; although we felt rather silly and embarrassed. Although it was our mistake; there were factors that made this mistake much more likely. The pre-ice check includes 'parking brake set'; but the post-ice check makes no mention of the parking brake. This makes sense; since most fluid applications are done while not under tow. However on one of the rare occasions application is done during partial pushback; then it is something you have to remember on your own. The other factor was the icy ramp. Since the ramp was extremely slippery and completely covered in ice; it made perfect sense that the tug would get stuck. Had it been cleared; it would have been extremely obvious to check the parking brake. But with all the ice; that didn't even go through our heads and it wasn't until the captain attempted to set the brake did we see that it was already set. The captain actually said out loud 'brake is released' to the ground crew several times; but the brake was never noticed. Adding a note to the checklist; or adding parking brake would help with avoiding a recurrence. As would extra care in actually checking things; not just saying them. (For both pilots).

CRJ-900 First Officer reported pushing back on an icy ramp with the brake set; resulting in damage to the tow bar pin.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

DescriptionWhile on visual approach to 36L at CLT; just after glideslope intercept at CANUK (4000 feet) aircraft encountered wake turbulence from the preceding aircraft approximately 3-4 miles ahead of us.  ATC had just assigned a speed of 160KIAS and we were decelerating through 170KIAS.  Airspeed was 165-170KIAS during the event with flaps at 20 degrees.  The aircraft rapidly rolled to the left; right; left; right.  Or; it may have been right; left; right; left.  The autopilot kicked off and the stall warbler briefly sounded.  As quickly as it started; it ended; and the aircraft automatically returned to stable flight.  The entire event may have lasted 2-4 seconds.  Airspeed remained 165-170KIAS.  IdentificationThe rolling.The autopilot disconnecting.The stall warbler sounding.CauseWake turbulence encounter from preceding aircraft.  My guess is that buffeting; swirling winds from the wake vortices briefly buffeted the aircraft and the AOA sensors just enough to set off the stall warning system.  ResponseThe aircraft quickly returned to stable flight.  The event ended so quickly that we were still on the glideslope with no perceived loss of altitude or heading.  We resumed the approach and landing with no further incident.  Just to make sure though; the remainder of the approach was flown approximately 1 dot high and slightly upwind of the centerline.  We queried ATC (approach) on the type of preceding aircraft and were told that it was an Airbus 321.  SuggestionsBetter separation from A-321 aircraft.

CRJ-200 Captain reported wake turbulence in trail of an A321 on a visual approach to CLT.


Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace

Approaching DCA we were informed by ATC winds are 060 at 18 gusting 39. Shortly after while on the approach we experienced wind shear. I immediately executed a go-around and followed the wind shear escape guidance. As per SOP set max thrust; press TOGA button; disconnect auto throttle; disconnect autopilot; maintain wings level; and pitch to follow wind shear guidance. Return to desired flightpath. When the aircraft [has] escaped from wind shear; request a vertical and lateral mode to exit WSHR/ROLL mode. When the aircraft was in a safe flight attitude and wind shear was escaped I immediately executed a left turn to avoid the P56 prohibited area. ATC then issued heading directions and we followed. At this time we were made aware that we may have violated P56 and issued a phone number. When we got on the ground and were safely at the gate we contacted ATC and gave the air traffic controller the required information.At the time of the go around due to wind shear safety of flight was in jeopardy; if the proper wind shear procedures were not followed correctly. I believe I did everything in my power to keep the aircraft in a safe flight attitude while complying with the P56 restrictions. As soon as wind shear was escaped we complied with every other aspect of ATC directions.

ERJ-170 flight crew reported an incursion into P56 during a go-around after encountering wind shear on approach to DCA.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS 35L

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

I was the pilot monitoring and we were descending via the BOSSS 1 Arrival into DEN.  ATC then cleared us direct to DYMON (Runway 35L Final Approach Fix) and told us to descend and maintain 9;000 FT.  Approximately 20 NM south of the airport; and as we were descending between 12;000 FT and 9;000 FT; the First Officer and I confirmed that we had the field in sight.  I advised this to ATC; and they cleared us for the visual approach to Runway 35L.  The First Officer set 7;000 FT (the GS intercept altitude at DYMON) in the altitude selector and began slowing and configuring for the approach.  He called for Flaps 1 after we had slowed to 210 KIAS.  My eyes were focused mainly outside the aircraft scanning for traffic; as conditions were VMC and we were in a busy terminal environment.  I began to notice that we were descending rather rapidly and were still pretty far from the airport.  As we began to level off at 7;000 FT; ATC issued us a low altitude alert.  They also notified us that we had descended below the floor of the Class B airspace and told us that the Minimum Vectoring Altitude in that sector was 7;500 FT.  We climbed back up to 7;500 FT and they informed us that we reentered the Class B airspace.  The Controller then handed us off to Denver Tower and we continued the approach and landing in an uneventful manner.  The number one thing was that both of us should have maintained better situational awareness though out the whole approach sequence.  We were descending in FLCH mode; which is pretty common in the terminal environment.  Unfortunately; I didn't notice right away that we had a 30 knot headwind.  This headwind; combined with the Flaps 1 configuration; caused our descent profile to steepen way more that the typical 3-3.5 degrees one would expect with the throttles at flight idle.  By the time I noticed the unusually steep descent angle; we were already too low.  Selecting a shallower descent angle in VS or FPA mode would have prevented this from happening.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

An air carrier crew flying a DEN Runway 35L visual was about sixteen miles from the runway when they descended to 7;000 FT and out of Class B airspace where ATC notified them about the error which they corrected by climbing to 7;500 FT.


Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Dispatch

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors

Flight dispatch called the load planner after the flight was released from the gate advising that the aircraft was over ramp weight. The final weight manifest did not indicate an overweight condition; Over ZFW (Zero Fuel Weight) and/or TOG. The load planner advised the dispatcher to review flight plan due to showing no weight manifest abnormalities.

Load Planner reported being notified by dispatcher that the aircraft was overweight.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Evacuated; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

I was walking down the first class aisle towards door 2L to do my walk around; when a flight attendant asked me to come back to aft cabin because she smelled smoke. I took a few steps to the aft and started to smell smoke; at the same time an agent ran down the jet bridge and yelled fire exit the aircraft. I ran further to the back and yelled loudly to the flight attendants in the aft to exit because of fire. We all ran out of the aircraft to the top of the jet bridge we could see smoke at the rear of the aircraft and fire trucks spraying water. I went down on the jet bridge stairs to assess the situation outside. I first saw charred clothing and electrical cords laying all over the ramp underneath the jet. I walked further aft and saw the trucks still spraying water on the smoldering pallet of cargo. There was also a ramper on the ground being treated by EMTs. I have video of the fire actually burning and several pictures of the cargo pallet and scattered debris. It appeared to me that the fire started on the pallet not the loader. I feel we dodged a bullet that the fire started on the ground and not after takeoff. We would have lost an airplane had it burned like in flight. Hopefully someone views the ramp/gate surveillance tapes and determines where the fire actually started from. I was very disappointed in the company and with the lack of communication with our crew on this event. It has been nearly 72 hours since this event occurred and I have yet to hear from anyone from the company. Really sad! The flight attendants were met by a flight service rep upon arrival back at ZZZ1.

Flight crew of a large turbojet aircraft reported a ramp fire occurred before departure on a cargo pallet before it was loaded into the cargo hold.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Type 1831

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

On the takeoff roll; set takeoff thrust; called out '89 knots;' cross-referenced the engine gauges and noted number 2 Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT) rapidly increasing thru 900. As the EGT reached 930 and continued to rise; I elected to reject the takeoff (approximately 119 knots); informed ATC and passengers. Cleared runway and referenced the QRH for Rejected Takeoff (RTO) procedures and any applicable engine checklist (none quite fit this scenario). Held out for brake cooling and returned to the gate. Prior to the RTO; we had returned to the gate for a hot start on the number 2 engine.While I feel confident that the RTO was the proper action; my reading of the situation may have [been] distorted by the numerous human factors that had bombarded me in the previous few legs. A hot start just before the RTO. The last leg of the evening before found me in the middle of a personal conflict between two employees that resulted in a Station Manager and Chief Pilot in the cockpit [and] on the phone with me during preflight duties; a frustrating event that both kept me up that night and distracted all day.

A B737 flight crew reported executing a high speed rejected takeoff when the number 2 Exhaust Gas Temperature rose above 900 degrees.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 23.5; Flight Crew Total 116.3

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I was entering the traffic pattern from the north of the airport and the Tower told me to go right downwind and I didn't understand and I went to the left downwind instead. I thought I was supposed to follow the aircraft in front of me; not seeing the other aircraft on left downwind which had to take evasive action. I understand now that I made a mistake and was confused about where I was supposed to go. I have requested extra training from my flight school so this won't happen again.

C172 pilot reports being cleared to enter right downwind; but was confused and followed traffic ahead into the left downwind. Another pilot also on the left downwind took evasive action to avoid the reporter.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We were deviating left of course and given direct FQF when able. When we were about to go to FQF we saw another cell with another behind it but clear to the south so we were told right deviations no more than 10 degrees. So we took the current track and added 10 degrees giving us a heading of 066 deg. ATC said we were more than 10 degrees to the right and told us to hold back 5 degrees left. He told us that the 10 degrees right was from the track to OBH that we had never gotten. He told us that direct OBH currently was 056 degrees but he limited us to 061 deg.I feel like there was some confusion as to what the 10 degrees deviation was from and he wasn't being helpful or clear with his instructions.

Reporter stated that Controller's last instructions did not make sense; since at the time; the course to FQF was essentially the same as the course to OBH; and 10 degrees to the right of either would have produced the same track. Reporter further stated that the combination of the differing opinions as to where the aircraft was cleared after deviating; and having an ambiguous reference from which to base a 10 degree deviation to the right contributed to a communication problem between crew and Controller. Reporter also stated that the Controller was very busy during these transactions.

EMB-175 Captain reported confusion with ambiguous weather deviation vectors from ATC.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Aircraft X flight plan showed a filed route of OTHH./.SSM..TVC.PAITN2.ORD; but he was flying the SSM.PAITN2.KORD which took him left of course by about 20-30 miles. I questioned him on his filed routing and cleared him direct OBSTR.WYNDE5.ORD to clear up confusion.Get rid of the TVC transition. I personally have filed several reports on these pilot deviations regarding this arrival with two segments of an arrival starting at the same point; but continuing on different directions. I have had at least 8 pilot deviations regarding filing and flying different routes. Access my previous reports for more information; and a complied list of previous issues that were documented.

ZMP Controller describes route of a flight that has a transition that has two segments which causes confusion because the transitions go in different directions.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 1080

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict NMAC

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Conducting flight training at ZZZ. There was a near miss involving myself and another plane on final.Prior to the incident; radio traffic around ZZZ became distracting for both my student and I while we were practicing steep turns; so I turned the volume down to where I could still hear the other traffic; but could focus on my lesson.Conducting left traffic Runway XX; on the takeoff roll; I instructed my student to apply take off power; and climb out at 85 kts once gear was retracted and propeller set to 2500 RPM. We turned left crosswind 500 AGL; then left downwind for [Runway] XX. Proper radio calls were made on left crosswind and left downwind. Visually scanning the area; I did not see any other traffic. Midfield downwind landing gear was set to the down position; green gear light verified. Once abeam the numbers [Runway] 21; power was reduced to 2100 RPM; flaps 10 degrees; and 75 kts established. 45 degrees off our landing point; left base radio call was established; then left base was turned; and 20 degrees of flaps established. Final call and turn was made; 30 degrees flaps and a normal landing.Once parked and shut down; a gentleman walked briskly up to my plane and informed me that we had just turned final 'a quarter mile in front of him'. He also explained he heard my radio calls; and was responding. I had not heard him so I inspected my volume knob for com 1; finding it turned down too far to have heard him. I apologized sincerely; and will ensure that volume remains where I can hear other pilots at all times.

C172 flight Instructor reported an NMAC during approach to landing as a result of turning down the radio volume and not hearing an inbound aircraft's radio transmissions.


On climbout received a HYD QTY LOW R EICAS alert approximately FL140. Subsequently received a HYD PRESS PRI R and then a HYD PRESS SYS R alert and Caution. Complied with all checklist items. After discussion with Captain; [Operations] and [Maintenance Control] elected to continue to destination. Did not declare an Emergency however requested to have emergency equipment standing by to inspect landing gear for potential fire from remaining fluid dripping on brakes. Aircraft made a normal flaps 30 landing using speed derived from the QRH. Captain assumed PF (Pilot Flying) duties prior to landing and I became PM (Pilot Monitoring). Aircraft cleared the runway and stopped to complete the inspection by airport personnel. After completion taxied unassisted to assigned gate.

B777 First Officer reported experiencing an in-flight hydraulic system failure.


Gulfstream Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Light Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

After FILPS Intersection we were given a heading of 150 and 4;000 feet for radar vectors; visual 27 SWF. We were in the vicinity of Gardiner PJA; just north of SWF; when I spotted the twin engine jump plane at our 11 o'clock high and one mile in a steep descent parallel to our course. A few minutes earlier we did hear jumpers away. ATC tried repeatedly to contact the jump plane when it suddenly dove to the right and rapidly towards us. I banked the plane hard right; 45 degrees; with a descent. We Simultaneously received a RA for the same. We leveled off at 3000 feet and did a visual landing at SWF. the Jump plane probably came within a few hundred yards of us; I could clearly see it up close passing under our belly to the rear. The Jump plane finally answered ATC and sounded a little excited. We briefed the pax after landing; they had no idea of the event as we are a smooth bunch up front. They were appreciative. All is well.ATC vectored us through the Gardiner Jump area which would have been fine if the Jump plane had been more attentive to the radio at the time. Maybe ATC should keep us out of there in the future? I know we'll be more attentive.

Captain reported an RA Alert while in descent for landing. Pilot took evasive action and landed safely.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

My maximum duty day was 13 hours and I was at 13.25. I said I could not complete the last leg.... The Scheduler said I can be extended by two hours. I said 'The Pilot in Command and the certificate holder may extend maximum flight duty periods specified in Tables B or C of this part to the extent necessary to safely land the aircraft at the next destination airport or alternate airport; as appropriate. 117.19.' I stated that I do not agree that this will be safe. The Scheduler told me that they will give me a 'note' in my attendance record.  This creates a negative work environment and is harassment at its best to get someone to break the 117 FAR. The company says that it is not an attendance issue. Then why put it in my attendance record? This is also used to take pay away from employees that do not agree to the extension. This is a very unsafe thing to do because I have seen where people will break the 117 rule just so they don't get this put in their attendance record or lose pay. This action by the company will cause someone to crash an airplane that should not have been put in this type of situation. These rules were to save lives while the company is pushing people to break them. This is just as bad as people being harassed about fatigue calls.

EMB-145 First Officer contends that company policy regarding the two hour flight time extension under FAR 117.19 is incorrect and that pilots who do not comply are unfairly pressured to accept flights.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 28000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

The preflight briefing indicated the right wing fuel tank gauge will be inoperative for the flight.  When we got to the airplane; the maintenance paperwork indicated everything had been fixed.  Two hours into the flight; the left wing tank showed a 20;000 LB imbalance with the right wing tank showing more fuel.  The 'fuel disagree' checklist popped up and we started to complete it.  Before completion; the total fuel indication disappeared along with the left wing fuel indications.  We now; only had a right wing fuel indication.  The 'Fuel Disagree' checklist was inadequate for this situation.  We then elected to do the 'Fuel Leak' checklist and found it also inadequate; without a total fuel reading.  The same was true for the 'Fuel Imbalance' checklist.  After contact with Dispatch and Maintenance; it was concluded that a fuel leak was possible; but could not be verified visually; or by checklist.  Without being sure the airplane was not leaking fuel; an immediate diversion was planned.  Under this situation; we found the 'Fuel Disagree;' 'Fuel Leak;' and the 'Fuel Imbalance' checklists; inadequate to determine with certainty; whether the airplane was leaking fuel; or if the fuel sensors were the problem.  Making the wrong assumption could lead to a serious problem.

B777 Captain experiences a left fuel tank quantity indication failure in cruise; which also causes the failure of the total fuel indication.  A fuel imbalance indication had briefly annunciated before the quantity failure and without any method to determine if a fuel leak existed the crew elects to divert.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 247; Flight Crew Total 6858; Flight Crew Type 4005

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 478.72; Flight Crew Type 478.72

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

On [Runway] XXL takeoff roll shortly after '100 knots' callout; Tower called 'XXL Microburst Alert; departure end; gains/loss of +/-30 kts.'Captain directed Reject at 120 knots-- Rejected takeoff procedures were complied with and RTO braking was engaged throughout the evolution.Tower was advised of RTO and passengers were advised to remain seated.Captain cleared runway at Taxiway and stopped the aircraft. Brakes were held and not set.First Officer ran Rejected Takeoff QRC (hard card); followed by Rejected Takeoff QRH (cockpit manual). Rejected Takeoff Brake Cooling Time chart in QRH was referenced for -9ER. Conditions used were: 160k; 6000 PA; 120 knots. Captain confirmed with pilot in jumpseat that 120 knots was speed of Reject before directing chart entry.Determination was made (using parameters above) that aircraft was in the Caution range; and after crew discussion; Tower was advised that no Emergency was being declared at that time and that aircraft would taxi back to the gate. Captain made announcement to passengers and briefed flight attendants and the After Landing Checklist was accomplished and 'Return to Gate' ACARS message was sent. First Officer attempted to contact Operations for gate assignment but was unable to contact. Secondary attempt was made with Ramp Control but was unsuccessful as well. Another [airliner] aircraft on the ramp relayed to return to gate.Captain taxied with efforts made to minimize/not use brakes during the taxi. Number 2 engine was secured when turning onto [taxiway]. A loud bang was heard; taxiing became rough and the aircraft listed to the right. Captain immediately stopped aircraft and held the brakes. Ground was contacted; fire trucks were requested; and souls; fuel onboard; and intentions were passed. Fire trucks responded and contact on discrete frequency was made between Fire Commander and flight deck. Fire crews reported both right tires had deflated and that the right outboard tire had shredded; leaving rubber behind the aircraft on taxiway. Some minor smoke was present; but no fire was observed. Fire crews monitored both gear areas for the remainder of the evolution and brake temperatures continued to drop. Fire crews chocked front wheels and brakes were released.Captain again made passenger announcement and briefed flight attendants. First Officer again attempted contact on Operations frequency but was unable to get a response. Ramp Control was contacted; and they coordinated air stairs and busses for the passenger and crew removal to concourse. First Officer contacted Station Maintenance and relayed the situation and was advised that Station Maintenance was aware and was inbound to the aircraft. An ACARS message was sent to Dispatch advising of the event.Captain coordinated between Fire Commander and flight attendants on disarming doors; egressing passengers; and assisting those who needed wheelchair assistance. No injuries or issues were reported. Parking Checklist was completed and the aircraft was left with Station Maintenance. A write up was completed. Captain and First Officer returned to Flight Operations and contacted Chief Pilot after CRM/Threat and Error Management debrief.

[Report narrative contains no additional information.]

A B737 flight crew reported on takeoff roll ATC called out Micro-burst Alert causing a high speed rejected takeoff.


B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 115; Flight Crew Total 3839; Flight Crew Type 1378

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

While walking back to do my walk-around; I hit the front right luggage bin with my eye; causing a cut; minor bleeding; and a black eye. The front bin when open is below eye level and only leaves approximately 1 foot of isle width. Two different Flight Attendants also hit their heads on bins prior to them closing; and one hit her head after landing. I was also informed that multiple passengers complain about hitting their heads on this aircraft.

B787 First Officer reported that the design of the cabin overhead bins resulted in an injury.