Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Weather; Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft

I was notified that there were some questions about our de-icing. We were towed to the de-icing pad in Eagle Colorado that snowy morning and the de-icing crew took about 18 minutes to clean the airplane with Type I. They indicated they were done with deicing. I asked them if they were going to apply Type IV. There was a long pause and then they said; yes they would begin Type IV application. In less than 5 minutes they said they were done with Type IV application and gave us the required time and fluid information.The visibility was 3/4 mile with falling snow and freezing conditions. My First Officer and I reviewed the charts and guidance to determine our hold over time and procedures. However; the visibility was below minimums for takeoff and forecast to remain below minimums for many hours. After awhile; with the snow still falling; we planned on getting de-iced with Type I and IV again--should conditions improve--prior to takeoff. Some time later; I contacted Dispatch and Operations to discuss our plan and possibly coordinate our return to the gate. Dispatch asked us to return to the gate around 2 hours after our push time and to coordinate with Operations. Approaching that time; the de-icing crew returned to clean our engines and areas of the wing above our engines; to make it safe for engine start; so we could taxi back to the gate. Upon our return to the gate I noticed that the tops of the wings were a colorful mess: patches of snow; areas of thick green Type IV fluid; areas of snow and orange type I mixed together; and some relatively clear areas above the engines. Another pilot (a former de-icing supervisor at EGE and a passenger) approached me and suggested that the application of Type IV had been rushed; did not thoroughly coat the top of the wings; and that they did not apply enough product from different angles as required by SOPs. I held a meeting of the de-icing supervisor; the Operations Manager; myself and the pilot/passenger onboard the airplane. We all observed the wings and the pilot/passenger and the de-icing supervisor held a long conversation about de-icing techniques and requirements. At the end I asked if they were on the same page and if everyone was in agreement about the de-icing requirements. They both said yes. Based on my direct observation of the wings; I noted significant areas of orange and white snow; where it appeared that the Type IV fluid was missing or possibly where insufficient Type IV fluid had been applied. The unusual appearance of the wing was probably due to many factors: the steady falling snow in freezing conditions; the two hours that elapsed since the original application of Type IV; the subsequent spot cleaning of the engines and wing areas with Type I; and possibly that the Type IV needed to be applied more thickly and evenly. I would encourage the station de-icing crews to review the time and methods it takes to properly apply Type IV fluid; to ensure that they are doing it right!

An air carrier Captain described problems associated with de-icing procedures at EGE.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 950; Flight Crew Type 350

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

A recent Call Back issue reminded me of a wind shear/downburst event I experienced during initial climb-out on a training mission. The purpose of the flight was for my instrument student to fly some approaches nearby to prepare for his practical exam. I knew some weather was moving in from the northwest; but it was an isolated cell and I wasn't concerned about it posing much of an issue with our flight. However; it was getting close to the airport and if we didn't depart soon; we would have to wait it out; probably for 20-30 minutes as it passed over the airport. I thought it was farther away than it was; and that we would safely be off the ground and climbing out well before it reached the airport. The initial takeoff roll and liftoff proceeded normally; but just as we broke ground; I saw we would be flying directly into some rain. It was too late to abort the takeoff at this point; so our only option was to continue the climb-out. As soon as we hit the rain; we got rocked by some pretty solid turbulence; and after a few seconds of watching my student on the controls; I determined that we must be in a downdraft and I took control of the aircraft to try and get us out of the rain and downdraft quickly. I could see clear VFR conditions just to the right of our flight path; and that's where I pointed the aircraft while carefully managing our airspeed and climb rate. In retrospect; we should have waited out the cell as soon as I saw it was closer than I expected; even though I felt it was still far enough away. There's always a balance between trying to keep a flight lesson moving along efficiently; and keeping the flight safe. In this case; a delay would have been better; even if it was just to watch the cell pass safely by the airport.

PA28 flight instructor reported encountering downdrafts and turbulence after takeoff with a student on an instrument practice flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 97; Flight Crew Type 16000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

This is not a specific pilot or controller error but will occur more often with many of the poorly designed arrivals and departures.  While descending on the KIDDZ 1 NNEAL transition; Houston Center turned us off the arrival to the west for spacing and when reclearing us to join the arrival wanted us to proceed to the JAAES intersection.  What happened here is we anticipated returning to the original transition which has a waypoint named CAASE and that was the only fix on the FMC legs page that sounded like what he wanted.  The radio quality was very poor and the controller's voice hard to understand. When these procedures are designed (in a nice quiet office) I'm not sure if the following factors are considered or not. 1) Many waypoints have very similar sounding pronunciation.2) Radios have various degrees of performance both in the plane and with ATC.3) In a noisy -300 with one ear uncovered so we can communicate with the other Crew Member (very bad choice in my opinion to not equip them with the hot mic intercom system).4) Aging pilots with reduced hearing ability.5) Some ATC Controllers have a dialect that is difficult to understand. In our case we read back CAASE as that would be the next logical waypoint on our transition and the Controller said JAAES and spelled it but I responded that we didn't see the fix and he respelled it a second time.  That is when I noticed the JAAES fix on a different transition but by then the Controller had cleared us to KIDDZ; so it was a moot point. Had the Controller given the clearance as the JAAES fix off of the LLO transition we would have found it much more quickly. Next area of difficulty on this arrival was after checking in with Approach we were cleared to descend via the KIDDS 1 and expect 12R.  The First Officer and I discussed whether he wanted us to fly the 12 transition or not; as that was what was implied in the Controller's voice.  I had to ask what his intention was and he responded we were to fly the 12 transition. In a moment of quiet radio transmission I mentioned to the Controller that most other airports give us a clearance to fly the 'XX' runway transition upon check in and an expect clearance was just that; an expectation.  He was very nice and said that was just his way of saying it as these arrivals are new to him as well.  I believe he understood how this was not what the pilots needed to hear or proper new phraseology. As mentioned in the narrative I feel that the new charted procedure needs to be tested in the worst of circumstances; bad radios; old pilots; noisy cockpit; and controller dialect.  There should never be similar sounding fixes anywhere near each other...EVER. If the Company is serious about keeping us out of the yellow and red then we need to spend more time flying the plane and less time heads down typing/briefing. When flying these RNAV arrivals to specific runway transitions they should be programmed in at cruise and not have to be entered at lower altitudes while on the arrival where we must do a lot of typing and rebriefing; meanwhile no one is looking out the window for traffic.  We must partner with ATC to have the Center issue a clearance for the specific arrival; transition and runway assignment as far out as possible. I realize that changes can and must happen as we get closer in but for example airports like HOU or LAX are often on the same flow for much of the day and if Approach can pass on to Center which runway transition they would like us to fly we can program fully without just an expectation.  There are just too many fixes to recheck and rebrief when we have to wait until closer in for a clearance.

B737 Captain reports confusion during vectors off the KIDDZ 1 arrival due to similar sounding fix names and expectation bias. The Captain suggests that in order for these complex RNAV arrivals to be flown successfully they need to be entered into the FMC at altitude and not altered by ATC during descent.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

On the RNAV Visual 31 L between fixes WEMIR and CEKMA; SOCAL Approach witnessed a target (aircraft he was not talking to) pop up that was a threat to us.  He instructed us to stop descent immediately; the First Officer did a great job of arresting the descent; then Approach told us to immediately climb as TCAS instructed us to descend.  We followed TCAS and saw the single-engine turboprop pass over us by about 400 feet and in front of us by about one-half mile.  The FO re-established us on the approach and we landed without incident.The beautiful weather in Palm Springs and general aviation aircraft not talking to ATC was THE factor in this TCAS RA. ALWAYS follow TCAS.

Air carrier Captain reported TCAS RA Alert on approach to PSP airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Type 2500

The 'speed restrictions' note on the TOPMM 4 RNAV Departure SID out of LGB listed in the Jeppesen charts; page 10-3C; on the Company EFB page contains confusing formatting. This needs to be corrected to avoid unnecessary violations or extra coordination between Crew Members and/or ATC to clear up possible confusion/interpretation. The note states:'Departing Runway 26R; do not exceed 210 knots until established on the 302 degree course to TOPMM.MAINTAIN at or below 250 knots unless otherwise directed by ATC.'The confusion stems from the fact that despite the line space between the first and second sentences; it is unclear if the 250 knots restriction only applies to Runway 26R departures; or departures from all runways. It would be clearer if the speed restriction included a phrase 'for all runways' or if it was stated first before the statement regarding Runway 26R.' Due to the formatting of this statement and lack of clarity; our briefing/coordination time increased due to the discussion and various interpretations that were possible. Please ask Jeppesen to fix this issue. NOTE: There was no violation and we properly adhered to the 250-knot restriction until given 'normal speed' by ATC at approximately 11;000 ft. MSL.

First Officer reported confusing speed restriction notes on the Jeppesen LGB TOPMM4 departure chart.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 450; Flight Crew Type 450

We were flying direct to CRG and spotted an aircraft ahead flying away from us in what appeared to be a right steep turn training maneuver. I decided to turn the aircraft to the left and realized that they were turning right into us. I made a climbing left turn to avoid conflict. Very congested area; I will use a higher altitude and or alter course to circumvent this area.

Two C172s experienced a close encounter in Florida.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

The BMRNG TWO RNAV Departure (JEPP 10-3A-1 19JUN15) out of SJC is unclear whether you climb to 3;000 feet and maintain it; or continue climb past 3;000 feet while expecting vectors for the other fixes.This I believe could cause a future problem with an altitude deviationChange the wording to 'Climb and Maintain' or 'While Climbing Expect'.

An air carrier pilot questioned the SJC BMRNG2 RNAV Departure wording clarity about 'CLIMB TO 3;000 feet'. Should the climb continue while expecting vectors or should the statement be 'CLIMB TO AND MAINTAIN 3;000 feet EXPECT VECTORS'?


Repair; Installation; Testing; Work Cards

[Engineering Order] should break down task to allow less or no partial signing which creates confusion and possibly missing procedural steps.[Engineering Order] REV N OP 5 HSTA (Horizontal Stabilizer Trim Actuator) JACKSCREW REPLACEMENT Op 5 Step 6 instructs to replace the HSTA per the AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual) 27-XX-XX; including Stab Clutch Friction System Test per the AMM 27-XX-XX-XXX-XXX; and lubricate it per Op 4 Step 14. There are too many tasks in Step 6 which results in numerous short signs or [unfinished write ups]. The stab clutch friction test and the lubrication per Op 4 should not be listed in Step 6. The lubrication per Op 4 is covered in the AMM Step H. (15) and in Step 14 of the [Engineering Order] Op 5. Lubrication in the [Engineering Order] needs to be relocated after Step 6. But before Functional Tests. It would be helpful if Step 6 only listed the installation of the HSTA per AMM. Step 6 also instructs to do the Stab Clutch Friction Test per the AMM. This test should be first under the Functional Tests of the [Engineering Order] Op 5 with all the other Functional Tests; starting after Step 6 of the [Engineering Order]. Also; is it possible to leave the stab trim motor out until the Stab Clutch Friction Test is performed? If so; the AMM will need to explain this. This would be Step H. (13) Stab Trim Motor Installation and Step H. (19) Stab Clutch Friction Test of the AMM 27-XX-XX. When following Trim Motor Installation before Friction Test; it is required to remove trim motor again which means removing motor not once but twice. Explain why? Keep in mind; Stab Trim Motor Installation requires an Installation Test. Op 5 Step 9 instructs to perform the HSTA Brake Servicing per AMM 12-XX-XX-XXX-XXX. Step 9 should be relocated after Step 6 of the [Engineering Order] but before Steps of Functional Tests. This brake servicing is also covered in the AMM not once but twice and listed in the [Engineering Order] Step 6. Does that mean HSTA brake requires to be serviced twice or is it a mistake in the AMM? If required twice per AMM; then have [Engineering Order] match AMM in the same sequence for brake servicing to be done twice.

Maintenance Technician reports confusion in work card instructions regarding the Horizontal Stabilizer Trim Actuator.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

After the flight; our flight attendants were upset with us because they claimed they had made multiple attempts to contact us on the flight deck but we never responded. Neither the First Officer nor I ever heard the flight attendant chime. At one point; a little over an hour into the flight; the First Officer noticed the blue call light and spoke with the flight attendant. I did not monitor the conversation due to high volume of ATC chatter. I did notice him adjusting the temperature and laughing during his communication with the cabin crew. At another point; I called back to the cabin crew to let them know ATC was reporting some bumps and to be cautious. After landing and opening the door; both the A and C flight attendants were very upset with us. They claimed we had ignored them. Not the case whatsoever. They claimed they even entered the 'emergency code' on the door but it didn't open. They claimed to have also 'beat' on the door. I notified Maintenance and they ran a systems check of the flight attendant call system and cockpit door. All ops checked normal except the chime in the cockpit was rather low but acceptable.Two things about this incident; the cockpit of this aircraft was very loud. Both of us have approved ANR headsets and may just not have heard the chimes. Or the system was malfunctioning. Either way; our flight attendants did not follow the proper procedures for getting the cockpit door opened if they were concerned. At no time did the alert for the door ring. We tested this as well and the volume was high and we would have CLEARLY heard that warning if the proper code had been entered. The flight attendants need to review their proper procedures for accessing the pilots if the call system malfunctions.

B737-300 Captain is informed after landing that the flight attendants were unable to contact the cockpit during flight and accuse the pilots of ignoring them.


Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

During climbout; First Officer's leg; at approximately FL250 the First Officer noticed that the left hydraulic quantity was decreasing. Captain accomplished QRH procedure and subsequently the hydraulic quantity fell to zero. I declared an emergency and returned to the departure airport. We landed uneventfully.

A MD-82's left hydraulic system developed a leak and the quantity decreased to zero during climb out so an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Per usual cleared for the Instrument Approach and flying the visual profile as normal. Prior to XXXXX ATC requested we make a short approach. As we made the turn towards the runway ATC mentioned a low altitude alert and verified we had the current altimeter. The PF (Pilot Flying) arrested the descent and leveled off momentarily. After realizing our altimeter was showing the current setting we opted to continue the approach and landing as we both believed it would be accomplished safely. The momentary level off had placed us slightly high over the landmark. The PF corrected the descent profile and we landed without incident.If unsure about a procedure that ATC is requesting to mention 'unable'. I think this would prevent the second guess of if we had done something wrong.

EMB-170 First Officer reported during a short approach to landing that ATC issued a low altitude alert; resulting in a momentary level off and being slightly high on approach. The pilot flying corrected and continued to a landing.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

I was on Taxiway A in ORD abeam Taxiway A13 facing west (clockwise flow). I was instructed by Outbound Ground to pull into Taxiway A13 and cross Taxiway B behind the second Company [aircraft] and proceed to N2 then a right turn on N. While I was turning from Taxiway A onto Taxiway A13; a Company [aircraft] (the second one I was instructed to cross behind); turned into Taxiway A13 and we were nose to nose. I immediately stopped my aircraft; set the parking break and notified ATC. The Company [aircraft] proceeded at a fast taxi speed and squeezed their aircraft (I would estimate less than 10-12 feet away) between my aircraft and the edge of the taxiway; disregarding my and their own aircraft and passenger safety. Ground immediately apologized and instructed me that the aircraft was not instructed to turn at A13 but did so anyways. Ground forwarded me the aircraft flight number.Myself and my First Officer felt that [the second Company aircraft] had complete disregard for safety as they did not follow taxi instructions and made a decision to turn onto a taxiway where an aircraft was proceeding in the opposite direction. I feel that if I wouldn't have stopped my aircraft when I had there would have been a collision.In addition to their decision to turn at A13; I am not aware of what their actual taxi instructions; my tail was blocking traffic on A so A12 and A was completely clear of aircraft.Other aircraft failed to follow taxi instructions / disregard for safety.ATC advised me that the other aircraft failed to follow instructions. I had followed all ATC instructions. I filled out a report to make individuals aware of this event that could of resulted in aircraft damage and passenger injury.

CRJ-700 Air carrier Captain reported a ground conflict with another aircraft after the other aircraft made a wrong turn.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 1; Flight Crew Total 250; Flight Crew Type 2

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Shortly after touchdown; the right MLG (main landing gear) departed the aircraft. Directional control was maintained and the aircraft skidded to a stop on the runway. After documentation procedures and mission commander clearance; the aircraft and any associated debris was removed from the runway for repair. No major damage to aircraft.

SandShark UAS landing gear departed the aircraft after touchdown.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 20

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Aircraft X reported on the Local Control frequency having seen a drone pass off of the right hand side of the aircraft on final Runway XX Left. The Local Assist Controller advised me and began looking through their binoculars to see if they could observe the drone. The Local Controller advised the subsequent traffic inbound to ZZZ and the Local Assist advised TRACON finals sectors. The traffic was fairly busy with moderate complexity. At the time I was monitoring Ground Control as there was a chance of having no gates for arrivals as well as repositions for overnight aircraft servicing. I picked up the CIC binder which spewed itself onto the floor because someone had left the rings partially open. Having to put the binder back together took some time and eventually I found the section about UAS unauthorized activity. I started an report; had Ground Control check with the pilot about additional information; and the pilot asked for the number to provide the details. The pilot called a few minutes later and provided all the details that were requested on the form. I then followed up with a call to TRACON; Center; DEN (Domestic Event Center); and finally the ROC (Regional Office Center) due to the significant nature. I was assigned the CIC (Controller in Charge) due to the remaining present controllers all being ineligible. There were 3 late staying people on break; of which two were CIC eligible. I am not sure how the FLM (Front Line Manager) got out of the shift and a CIC always assigned. 3 of us were in the last 90 minutes of a 10 hour day. When calling into the ROC; it was mentioned that I should not be in charge of the operation as well as doing the paperwork. I paused and thought to myself that is a set up for operational failure in a situation like this. This was definitely an operationally urgent notification; as any subsequent report of the drone would shut down the arrivals until we could establish it was safe to do so once again. There was one follow-up sheet of questions that I waited until the late staying controllers came back and give up CIC to take care of.While filling out the report and making the calls; I was no longer actively engaged in monitoring the operation; however I could hear everything that was going on in the background. The team worked remarkably well with Local Control reporting the drone activity for almost an hour; and the Local Assist continually looking to see if they could see it; even though when the pilot called in it was described as unlit.Looking at the event in review; I can see the checklist is great for guidance and there were some really important elements to cover; as this was a very unusual event. Getting the ATIS done; having Local broadcast; notifying TRACON; the airport; and the DEN are all important. I was very happy to follow up and complete the processes; but it kind of bothers me that with all of these great check lists and all; when I called the ROC the QCG (Quality Control Group) person told me if I should not do this without direct monitoring of the operation; then leave it for tomorrow. I don't think that it is very realistic to get the very specific recallable details and information conveyed as this was an aircraft security event. Next time I will call a CIC capable controller back from break to fill out the paperwork and make the calls; and let them figure out the breaks after I go home since the worst case scenario would be about 2 hours and 25 minutes until a mid shift person was able to come and get them out.

Tower Controller in Charge reported an arrival aircraft reported a drone close to them on final.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 11; Flight Crew Total 169; Flight Crew Type 59

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While approaching LPR my radio was set to 121.7 the wrong Unicom frequency. It should have been set to 122.7. On final for Runway 25 the traffic on Runway 07 radio transmissions were not heard. The Runway 07 traffic was about 3000 ft from the end and appeared to be stopped when I initiated a go around to avoid a collision. I departed LPR and discovered my error and reset the radio to 122.7 and returned to land on Runway 07

CTLSi pilot reported having the wrong frequency set during his arrival into LPR; a non-Tower airport. After a go-around to avoid a conflict with an aircraft on the ground; the pilot set the proper frequency.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Returned from break; all positions advised they lost frequencies and unable to transmit or receive to aircraft. CPDLC/DATA COMM Testing was in progress. Sector 14 was combined with sector 54; no D-side. I asked if R-14 needed any help; 'YES!' was the emphatic reply; however; when I plugged into help from the D-side; the coordination lines were unusable. R-side advised VTABS in use. I have never been trained with the use of VTABS [Voice Switching and Control System Training and Backup Switch] (not that I recall); nor do I know what that is (along with anyone else trained in the building after 2007). I was unable to assist R-14; who was now desperate as [three carriers] were all converging at FL310 without communications. I moved to de-combine sector 54 from sector 14. I was unable to open the position appropriately with 'VTABS'; I still don't know what that is. R14 was able to subsequently coordinate with ZME M27 to descend Aircraft X prior to confliction. ZME later reported they had lost their frequencies as well. This was an unsafe situation on several fronts. Don't combine High and Low Altitude sector(s). Staff D-sides. Train personnel on the use of VTABS; and practice loss of frequencies in training. Discontinue CPDLC/DATA COMM Testing until adequate staffing and frequencies return. We were lucky this time!

Kansas City Center Controller reported losing radios during CPDLC testing and having an airborne conflict between three aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 33.88; Flight Crew Total 8480.20; Flight Crew Type 4074.10

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

This flight was an OE [Operating Experience] with a New Hire FO [First Officer]; and double augmented crew. Normal briefings and departure preparations. Normal takeoff and climb out.I was on break at in the cabin with FO NAME (OE student). Approaching W040 at approximately XA:15 Z I was notified by one of the FAs [Flight Attendants] that I was needed on the Flight Deck.  When I arrived there; FO NAME and NAME1 told me that the 'L HYD QTY' EICAS had appeared and that they were working the HYD QTY - L (C; R) (FM 2.130.4) checklist. At that time the left hydraulic quantity was at .48 and while we were watching it dropped to .47. In accordance with the checklist; we turned off the left hydraulic pumps.We then contacted and consulted with Dispatch and Maintenance Control and made an ELB entry. Dispatch advised that the weather and winds were forecast to be favorable for our arrival in ZZZ. Dispatch said that they would contact ZZZ and advise them of the situation. Maintenance Control advised that it was likely a slow leak and that the checklist offered the best advice for the situation. After the checklist and all coordination was complete; I returned to the cabin to continue my rest. I chose not to wake FO NAME2 and to allow him to continue his rest uninterrupted so that he would be alert as PF.About 30 minutes later at XB:08 a FA woke me again and said that I was needed on the Flight Deck again. When I arrived; I was advised that the R YAW DAMPER EICAS had appeared. We completed the YAW DAMPER - L (R) (FM2.90.46) and made another ELB entry. We researched and found that the hydraulic power source for the right yaw damper is the left hydraulic system that we had just depressurized. We concluded that they were likely related. We advised Dispatch and made another ELB entry. I returned to the cabin to complete my rest period.During the approach briefing we calculated the landing distance for a normal landing; and one for the loss of the left hydraulic system. We were concerned that when we turned the pumps back on during the approach that we might lose the left system quantity completely. We initially planned to configure early for the approach; but on reflection decided to configure normally and then turn the pumps back on when fully configured. If we lost the remaining quantity at that time; we were prepared to reconfigure for a flaps 20 landing. It was agreed that FO NAME2 would make the landing if the system quantity held and that I would make the landing if it did not.On approach we turned the pumps back on after we were fully configured for landing. The pressure came up on the system and quantity held for the rest of the flight. The landing was normal and uneventful. ZZZ had CFR available for our arrival and a tug if it was needed to help us clear the runway.The cabin crew were aware of the situation; but we advised them it would be a normal operation. We choose not to advise the passengers as we fully anticipated a normal landing.One concern arose during the event. During the calculation of the landing distance there was some confusion on which line to use on the chart. With a potential loss of the L HYD system it was unclear if we were to use the line for HYD SYS PRESS L ONLY or HYD SYS PRESS R and C. The title of the column says Aircraft Config/Condition and that does not clarify which row to use. To be safe we calculated both and found that we had ample runway in either case. But it brings up the question does the row titled HYD SYS PRESS L ONLY mean that you 'only' have the left system and the other two are failed; or does it mean that 'only' the left system has failed? After looking at the landing distances; I believe the right row was indeed HYD SYS PRESS L ONLY. But it might be worth a look at this chart for crews who are managing a more critical landing distance issue without the time we had to study it.All the crew did an exceptional job during this event. FOs NAME; NAME1; and NAME2 in particular were exceptional in their handling of the event.

Captain reported loss of left hydraulic system that also caused the right hand yaw damper to fail.  The flight crew performed the required tasks and continued the flight to destination airport.


We were scheduled for a MAX 8. We arrived at [the] gate and noticed from looking at aircraft from the terminal that nose gear was very extended. I walked down jetway and as I was standing in the jetway (greeting passengers as they exited the aircraft) I noticed the aircraft literally bouncing up to the point where the fuselage was hitting the cushions on the cover from the jetway that goes over the forward entry door. The First Officer got back from doing his walk around and told me the tail stand was not installed. I called Ops and asked them to install the tail stand; the response I got back was that it was not required. [Apparently] tail stands are only required on -800s. I believe this is an oversight that needs to be remedied immediately. I witnessed a very near tipping incident. Had it not been for the cover over the forward entry door holding the aircraft down; I believe the aircraft would have tipped. We have the tail stands why wouldn't we use them on the MAX 8s? Are we going to wait for a MAX 8 to tip on its tail before we change our Ground Ops procedures?

B737 MAX 8 Captain reported this aircraft could tip on its tail at the gate since a tail stand is not currently required to be used on the aircraft.


Embraer Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Repair; Inspection; Installation; Work Cards

Air Conditioning Distribution Ducting; Clamps; Connectors

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Aircraft; Human Factors

February 2014; Aircraft X; an Embraer aircraft; was found to have a defective Left-Hand (LH) Bleed Hose Assembly upstream from Fan Air Control valve. Aircraft X went AOG; the part was expected to arrive later that night. Another Embraer aircraft; Aircraft Y; was found to be leaking fuel from the Fuel Pressure Metering Unit (FPMU) and went 'Out of Service'. The removal of the FPMU was started. Supervision decided to cannibalize (rob) the LH Hose Assembly upstream from the Fan Air Control to be installed in Aircraft X. The hose assembly was canned (robbed) [from Aircraft Y] and as it was being installed in Aircraft X; it was found defective [and removed]. The AOG hose assembly [for Aircraft X finally] arrived and was installed in Aircraft X; Operational Check good. The AOG Bleed Hose Assembly for Aircraft Y was due in about three hours later that night. The FPMU for Aircraft Y was removed and the plane turned over to 3RD Shift to install the FPMU. The FPMU was installed and ready for Leak Check later that night into the following morning. Due to the canned (robbed) part being AOG and on the high temperature side of the bleed system; the Check could not be done safely. Supervisor X asked me to install the [defective] canned [Bleed Hose Assembly] part so the Test runs could be done for the FPMU [on Aircraft Y]. I told him we could not install known defective parts. About 15-minutes later he returned and said he wanted me to install the [defective Bleed Hose Assembly] part and run the test. I again said we cannot install defective parts on the airplane; also the hose assembly was on the high temperature side of the Bleed System. Ten minutes later Supervisor X came in again; saying that the part was really just a reinstall and had not caused trouble in this plane [Aircraft Y]. I reminded him that the part was [originally] canned (robbed) from Aircraft Y and issued to Aircraft X and found defective. It was no longer issued to Aircraft Y [where it originally came from] and was known to be defective. The plane was turned over to Dayshift. As I was leaving Aircraft Y; Supervisor Y pulled up and started to enter the cargo bay. Mr. X asked Supervisor Y if he was going to install the [defective Bleed Hose Assembly] part and Supervisor Y said 'Yes'. On returning to work two days later; I found out Aircraft Y was run for the test run with the defective part installed. When the AOG part arrived it was installed in Aircraft X [not Aircraft Y]. The installing of defective parts; even for testing; leaves too much room for error or unintended damage. It needs to be emphasized that a defective part should never be installed on an aircraft without an approved deferral. Lead Mechanic. Defective part installed was issued to another plane and defective. I refused to install defective part; Supervisor Y installed part.

A Lead Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports about the reinstallation of a known; defective Left-Hand (L/H) Bleed Hose Assembly on an Embraer aircraft by a Maintenance Supervisor without an approved deferral. Lead Technician had refused three previous attempts by another Supervisor who wanted him to reinstall the defective hose assembly.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Airport; Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

The north taxi lane remains closed; this creates safety issues as congestion now is excessive due to multiple rolling holdouts on the late afternoon bank. If an emergency situation were to arise; you have a one way blocked street to work with.  Aircraft cannot move to and from the ramp freely during times of peak activity because of flights waiting for gates. Airport authority also closes [Taxiway] NC at will and without coordination. This removes any offload avenue one may have on the N side of the airport.The key safety issues are as follows:-There are no painted lines or clear guidance for aircraft parking and the effect on [Taxiway] NC behind.-Airport Authority will park aircraft in unsafe positions as there are no markings. (putting wheels to the grass).-The area is unlit. Unlike other unlit areas; this area has no markings or clearance lines to mitigate lack of lighting.-The area is not charted or defined. Pilots use Jeppesen charts to navigate an airport; they are released and published on a cycle. This area is not charted for defined - in standard publication cycle or supplemental.-The area has old lines extending to the west from [Taxiway] NG. As this is not lit either by green or overhead lighting; this is confusing. Why are the old lines not removed? In past temporary applications the old lines have been removed and grinded off.  (Spot 19 temp line from [Taxiway] SF; Spot 3 moved; and so on).-Barriers are not lit.-Equipment is left out there at all times of the day with no designated parking boxes. (GPUs; stairs; work lights; ladder structures; and so on.) Ground services use parking boxes on airport ramps so they know where to safely park equipment. The boxes ensure safe clearance in all conditions. Boxes on airport ramps are labeled to ensure the correct GSE is placed there. Incorrectly placing the wrong GSE in a storage box may have vertical impacts.-Narrow body and smaller aircraft can't turn around when pushback or taxi errors are made. In other areas where this is similar; those areas are charted; marked and defined. (D north ramp; [taxiways] RA/RB; [Taxiway] A north west apron with [Taxiway] A RON box. All defined and marked with proper boxes and lines.-Spot 8 is used by the FAA for inbounds constantly and is technically closed. This is not defined or measured against the current [Taxiway] N lane closure. For example; can a medium sized transport enter spot 8 with aircraft parked on N lane all the way to the east? Unknown and not charted or no NOTAM. The east line on [Taxiway] ND is not defined; it's just a line east of spot 7. *This line is not labeled and measured against the closure*. As the [Taxiway] N lane closure is not defined (what aircraft on what spots can park there); one does not know how much wingtip clearance there is on the east land of [Taxiway] ND in the spot 8 area.

Dispatcher reported concern regarding the ramp and taxi areas at the IAH airport. The Dispatcher lists lighting; closed taxiways; aircraft parked in unmarked areas; missing painted lines or old lines that need to be removed and uncharted areas. The Dispatcher states the Jeppesen charts are unable to track the changes in a timely manner.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 6000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Original assignment was dead head to DEN then fly DEN to ZZZ. The deadhead flight was maintenance delayed until midday; no rest hotel provided. Assigned to a later flight for dead head to Denver. Subsequent aircraft to Denver was delayed resulting in a Crew Critical Off-time (CCO) issue. Reassigned to fly afternoon flight to ZZZ1 and return to ZZZ2 same day.Also; I was advised the ZZZ2 overnight was an RON layover. (ZZZ2 based) Newly assigned flight to ZZZ was delayed; and also was delayed further by insufficient staff to up load aircraft. APU would not start. Customers sat on aircraft for more than an hour; resulting in a Passenger altercation event in the cabin. Captain and lead attendant made futile attempts to move the situation along. Finally; the air bridge was returned for the XXX and other supervisor to board. Flight was re-closed after resolution of the passenger issue. Another delay then occurred because the push crew was understaffed. Flight sat on the gate for a total of two hours total awaiting for ground services. Upon arrival at ZZZ; ATC assigned us a go around; causing another delay.Finally arrived at ZZZ2 late evening. The First Officer FO had started his day later and noticed he was worn out from that day. Next day assignment was scheduled for ZZZ2 to ZZZ3; then a (XA:30 hours) dead head (middle seat) ZZZ3 to ZZZ4 all in the same day; with morning departure to ZZZ5 (XK:30 hours).Was too tired to safely complete a schedule that was unusually grueling; because the first day had unusual wait times; excessive delays; reassignments; operational issues; land lack of a rest area provided.

B757 Captain reported refusing a flight assignment because of fatigue.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 13; Flight Crew Total 401; Flight Crew Type 401

Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

After departing ZZZ1 for ZZZ2; my alternator failed; so I turned off non-essential electrical items and tried to fly as directly as possible to ZZZ2 to conserve battery power so I could contact ATC at ZZZ2. In attempting to fly a direct course; I may have penetrated the southwest corner of ZZZ Class D without establishing contact with the Control Tower. This Class D has a keyhole shape; and I may have penetrated the very corner. If I was in Delta; it would have only been about one minute as I turned left to ensure I did not remain in Delta. Dealing with the electrical problems kept me from giving a wider berth to Class Delta.

PA-28 Pilot reported loss of alternator during flight and entered Class D airspace without two-way communications.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

At cruise amber alert R forward window heat. Completed checklist. The outer window pane shattered. Called Dispatch and Maintenance. Diverted to ZZZ. Picked up another aircraft and continued to ZZZZ.Cause: window heat failure.

I was the Relief Pilot on break when I was asked to go to the cockpit by the A FA. He had received this request from the cockpit. The right front outer windshield pane was cracked/shattered. The Captain and First Officer coordinated with Dispatch and we continued to ZZZ where we landed on Runway XXR without incident. The passengers and crew disembarked the aircraft without incident and proceeded to an adjacent gate from which the flight to destination was continued.Possible maintenance issue as the airplane was recently in storage (parked) at I believe ZZZ1.Ensure aircraft storage is performed at a base where inclement weather - especially heavy rain - is unlikely to occur.

Air carrier flight crew reported that an outer windshield pane shattered during cruise following a window heat failure.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument; Other Tailwheel

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 31; Flight Crew Total 408; Flight Crew Type 28

Troubleshooting; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

I was flying Aircraft X.  The aircraft had its Navigation lights; rotating beacon; wingtip strobes and Landing/Taxi Lights activated at the time of the incident.  There was 1 passenger on board.  I was in the pattern for runway XX at ZZZ. Before turning base; I made a radio call on CTAF that 'Cessna Cardinal is turning base for Runway XX at ZZZ'. While turning base I observed a cargo van with an amber flashing light on the roof entering the airport from an access road onto Taxiway Charlie. I made another radio call on CTAF 'a Cessna Cardinal is turning final Runway XX touch and go ZZZ.'  The van proceeded on Taxiway Charlie to Taxiway Alpha.  As the van turn on to Taxiway Alpha; I made another radio call on CTAF 'Cardinal short final Runway XX; ZZZ.'  The aircraft was at about 50 feet AGL about to across the runway threshold when I made that radio call.  I touched down at about the 1;000 foot marks.  I observed the van slow down near the hold short lines for the intersection of Taxiway Alpha and Runway YY/XX.  As I was rolling out passing Taxiway Delta; the van accelerated across Runway YY/XX.  I applied heavy braking to slow the closing distance between my aircraft and the van.  The van was approximately 600 feet in front of me when it crossed the runway.  The van never made any radio calls while on the airport property.  When able I exited the runway on taxiway Alpha to the FBO.  I shutdown at the FBO and advised the Airport manager of the incident.

GA pilot reported having to provide heavy braking to avoid a van crossing the runway they were landing on at a non-towered airport.


Flight Attendant Airline Total 19; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 10; Flight Attendant Total 19

It feels like every time I get on a plane; I'm doing so to work a 13 hour duty day with flight time of 8-9 hours with 3 flight segments; often with sits of 2 or more hours. We are now seeing more flight time for each segment worked. We used to average 5 hours per day of flight time. A 1 day trip had 5 hours; 2 day trips were worth 10; 3 day trips 15; etc. Now we see 2 flight segments worth 15; 3 worth 20 and 4 day trips worth upwards of 26 or more hours! By the time I get to the 3rd flight on the last day; I feel intoxicated. I make numerous mistakes when making PA announcements. I forget tasks; such as cooking meals; passenger requests; leaving personal items on the plane. My situational awareness is greatly diminished. When disarming doors; I feel nervous that in my tired state; I may do the wrong thing and blow a slide. My feet ache because I am on them more; usually to keep from falling asleep on the jump seat; but also just because I am now working 13 hours instead of 8 or 9. When driving home; I am anxious and angry because I'm so tired. I'm more prone to get upset at other drivers. I often miss exits or cut other cars off when changing lanes because I was not fully aware of where other cars are.When I look to trade trips; or pick up trips on days off; these are the only types of trips I see. Everyone is trying to get rid of them in hopes of picking up something better. I recently had one of these 3 day trips. It had 2 working flight days with a long layover. Day one had just over 7 hours of flight time; with 3 flight segments and just over 30 hours on the layover. Day 3 had 3 flight segments; with 13 hours on duty and nearly 9 hours of flight time. I dropped the first turn on day one; so all I did was the one segment to the layover. While in the layover; I was anxious about the rough day ahead of me; with [an early morning] departure and not getting home until [late at night]; so I decided to drop the turn on day 3. I wound up working a 3 day trip that was worth only 3 hours! I can't keep doing this.Of course; I've begun complaining to other flight attendants about this and I hear the same thing. People are sick of these trips; these long duty days with long sits where it's near impossible to rest in private and maybe nap. People are sick of long duty days where they feel exhausted by the time they land; whether it be on a layover or at home. I've been seeing and hearing flight attendants sleeping on the jump seat. I saw it on my last trip; where our lead went to the back of the plane and closed her eyes for half an hour. It is unsafe. This is an accident waiting to happen. Something must be done.I do what I can to get out of these trips. Some trips don't have the turns that we can drop; and I avoid those; so I can drop turns and try to have only 1 of these horrid days of working 13 hours and 8 hours or more of flight time. I can't keep working 3 day trips worth 3-5 hours. I can't keep pushing my body; not as young as it used to be. I'm too junior to hold anything better; and soon; I may be back on reserve; where many face two of these trips back to back- 6 days worth nearly 40 hours. I realize we have a contract between the union and the company that allows them to build trips like this. But really; shouldn't these extremes be the exception and not the rule? I'm exhausted and beginning to fear going to work for feeling worse; or making a huge mistake because I'm so fatigued because of how trips are built. Nearly every Flight Attendant I speak to is saying the same thing. I encourage them to file reports and work to change how these trips are being built. We never had flying like this before; and things seemed to be just fine. Now that we have all merged; many of us feel like the company is out to get us; out to wear us down to have us quit; out to upset us. I'm 19 years into this career and back at the bottom. I can't see leaving to go somewhere else. So I fight back in an effort to get trips that are once more a little more civil and humane.

Air carrier Flight Attendant reported the schedules have become extremely fatiguing and expressed concern about the long term effects.


Piper Single Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 7100; Flight Crew Type 800

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

[After takeoff] at approximately 100 FT AGL engine began to run noticeably rough; but maintained partial power. [I] immediately advised Tower that [I] was landing with a rough running engine. [I] was cleared to land XXR. [Corporate jet] on final for XXR was advised to prepare for possible go-around. Was able to land XXR and clear under power without further incident. [Corporate jet] was advised runway was clear and landed without incident. [I] taxied under power to parking spot for further investigation. [I] called Tower who advised that it was a non-reportable incident. Incident reaffirms wisdom of always briefing a departure emergency plan.

PA-12-150 pilot reported a rough running engine early in the climb and returned to land at the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 252.6; Flight Crew Total 14396.63; Flight Crew Type 2185.15

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft pushed off gate without final hazardous cargo manifest. Delayed taxi until manifest received.

B777 Captain reported missing Final Hazmat Cargo Manifest during pushback for departure.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

During cruise check PM noticed an Abnormal Cabin Pressurization indication at 16;000 feet based on Cabin Altitude versus differential pressure chart; MEL BOOK (Section X; Page X). At the moment Cabin Altitude was indicating 4;400 feet; Cabin Rate 700; Delta P 7.1 crew observed for about 1 minute and noticed that cabin altitude continued to rise up to 5;900 feet. Captain immediately requested lower (10;000 feet) and informed ATC about the situation. At 10;000 feet the cabin altitude remained steady 5;500 feet and Cabin Rate indicated 0. Crew followed QRH procedure (PRESSURIZATION AUTO SYSTEM FAILURE/CABIN DEPRESSURIZATION/CABIN RATE ABNORMAL FLUCTUATIONS). ACARS was INOP. Captain contacted Dispatcher through AIRINC notified about the issue. Crew and Dispatcher agreed to stay at 10;000 feet. Crew had terrain mode selected all time for situational awareness. Also; FA was notified about the problem.  The entire flight we were VMC. Crew landed in ZZZ. At the gate Captain wrote up the problem; and contacted Maintenance.

EMB-145 First Officer reported cabin altitude was uncontrollable and the flight crew elected to request an immediate descent. The flight continued to destination airport at a reduced altitude.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.0

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft X departed ZZZ on the TERPZ6 OTTTO transition. Aircraft X checks in 'OUT OF 2000 FOR 4000 VIA THE TERPZ6'. Aircraft X is radar identified and instructed to 'CLIMB VIA THE TERPZ6 DEPARTURE'. The top charted altitude for the OTTTO transition is 17000 feet; but Aircraft X levels off at 4000 feet. The controller notices Aircraft X level off and instructs him that he should be climbing to 17000 feet. The aircraft replies 'WELL THEN YOU WOULD HAVE TO CLEAR ME TO THAT; RIGHT?' The controller begins to explain that the 'CLIMB VIA' instruction from departure deletes the 4000 foot exception that the tower issues the aircraft. The pilot is clearly confused since there is a crossing altitude at FOXHL of at or Above 17000 feet. The pilot states 'HE HAS NEVER HEARD OF THAT BEFORE' and later says 'HE DOESN'T UNDERSTAND THAT AT ALL; THE CROSSING ALTITUDE IS AT OR ABOVE SEVENTEEN; and YOU HAVE TO CLEAR ME THERE FIRST'. At this point; other pilots begin chiming in on frequency telling Aircraft X where he can find the top altitude listed on his chart; and no other pilots were questioning the CLIMB VIA instruction. Meanwhile; the controller is moderately busy; working combined positions; with ZNY calling on the line; and the controller has been informed of an ELT in her area. Work load is high and moderately complex. This is the absolute worst time to answer several questions on frequency about a procedure that the pilot was clearly not proficient at. It disrupts scan; causes an unnecessary distraction; and greatly increased frequency congestion. [Air Carrier] pilots have routinely questioned CLIMB VIA instructions off ZZZ. Recommend they develop a training plan to brief pilots flying to ZZZ specifically regarding the TERPZ6 departure.

A TRACON Controller reported an air carrier pilot was not familiar with 'Climb Via' phraseology and leveled at an interim altitude unnecessarily.


Workload; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Distraction; Workload; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft X arrived in ZZZZ with a deferred APU bleed valve and was positioned at a ramp level gate with portable ground equipment. During boarding; we discovered the need to add an MEL requiring additional fuel; and were advised it would take an additional 20+ minutes for the fuel truck to return. Cabin air temp was not being adequately maintained by the ground air conditioning cart; so we elected to switch to the 'huffer' external air cart to provide air to the packs for increased cooling during the additional delay. After several attempts by the ground crew to get the cart to supply air; it began to provide adequate air supply. Soon after; an acrid smell began to fill the cabin and a light haziness was visible throughout. We selected the packs off and asked the ground crew to turn the external air cart off. The decision was made to deplane due to poor air quality and rapidly increasing cabin temperature. Some difficulty was experienced communicating effectively with gate and ramp personnel to initiate this process. Once it was understood that this was both necessary and a priority; we were able to deplane without further incident. Dispatch; maintenance control; and the Chief Pilot were notified. After the airplane was inspected by maintenance and returned to service; I verified with each crew member that they were not experiencing any symptoms; felt in good health and verified verbally with each that they were 'fit to fly.' No passengers indicated to the crew any physiological symptoms from this event. After a fresh aircraft security search was accomplished; Aircraft X; boarded and departed uneventfully.  This event; while more nuisance than [critical].; required a great deal of crew interaction and awareness to overcome threats introduced by scheduled operations with supplemental air systems and engine start procedures to a hot; humid; international environment. Decreased physical comfort; and barriers in communicating with ground personnel greatly increased workload. While I believe we ultimately managed this situation thoroughly and appropriately; there is always a possibility that details could have been missed; mishandled; or not communicated to us along the way.Ultimately; my primary recommendation is to avoid dispatching aircraft with deferred APU; APU bleed source; or other [non-]dispatchable but nonetheless non-routine procedures to destinations with extreme air temperatures; performance considerations; or regional differences. When issues arise with seldom used ground equipment; cabin temperatures can quickly become intolerable; creating an additional distraction for crews and an uncomfortable and potentially hazardous cabin environment for all. Additionally; the language challenges introduced by international operations make communications during non-routine operations more difficult; exacerbating already challenging situations; increasing potential errors; and delaying efficient reaction to adverse situations. In our case; even while using simple; straight forward language; we were often having to repeat and reconfirm numerous times that individuals understood what was needed. This often led to delayed response and increased discomfort for our crew and guests.

While checking [initial flight release] at the hotel and in the van to the airport we noticed that this aircraft; [Aircraft X] had [a] MEL for an inoperative APU bleed valve. Arriving at the gate it was noticed that external air was not connected to the aircraft.  Maybe there was confusion by the ground crew who likely heard the APU and figured the cabin air was being conditioned so we explained the need for a ground air conditioning cart to be connected; and quickly. ZZZZ Operations complied and by the time we boarded the aircraft external air was connected. It was also apparent that operations did not know of the need for an external air cart to start engine #1. For reference the airplane was parked at position XX with no jet way access. Checking the logbook we discovered the inbound crew had to defer the B-System Autopilot with an MEL. Further inquiry into the MEL we noticed the need for [an additional] MEL to also be applied for the Altitude Alerting System.  This unfortunately prevented us from flying in RVSM airspace and required an additional 1;000 pounds of fuel. Operations advised this was to going to take roughly 20 minutes.At this point there were numerous complaints of excessive cabin temperature.  We discussed and decided it was prudent to transition to the external air cart per Supplemental Procedure X.XX to operate the PACKS to try and cool the cabin. Conditioned ground air was disconnected and the external air cart was connected.  Unfortunately there was confusion trying to get the air turned on which further heated the cabin.  At about the point we were about to deplane due to excessive cabin heat the external air-cart began to provide sufficient pressure to turn on and operate the PACKS. While the PACKS did begin to cool the cabin it did not take long for the two of us to notice both a strong acrid odor and a visible haze throughout the cabin.  At this point we turned the PACKS off.  While the odor did slowly begin to dissipate we felt strongly about having passengers disembark until the cabin temperature and air quality were under control.  Naturally at this point the fuel truck arrived and station ops wanted us to quickly fuel and transition to starting the engines.  We objected and a few minutes later passengers were headed into the terminal.  We did not sense the need to evacuate given with the PACKS off the air quality was stabilizing.At this point we felt it prudent to make a logbook entry for the air quality event and felt we endured a Level 2-3 air quality contamination.  Our suspicion was that the source of the contamination was the external air cart and it likely having not been used in conjunction with the aircraft Pack's often in ZZZZ.  Per Dispatch; Chief Pilot and maintenance control advice we wanted to make sure that our suspicions were true and that there was not an issue with the aircraft itself. The remainder of the events were uneventful as we successfully started engines; ran the packs; observed aircraft cooling and improved air quality.  Unfortunately our flight was re-dispatched to ZZZ1 for late night customs control and two new pilots with legal rest; but the customers all made it safely to ZZZ2 at around XA:30am.  I feel confident that our interactions as a crew ultimately led to the right decisions being made.  This scenario provided numerous distractions; namely the addition of an MEL; additional fuel; non RVSM operations; a language barrier; excessive cabin heat; frequent calls from the cabin regarding potable water; starting an engine with an external air source and an air quality event.  I feel our priorities never swayed from our interest in passenger and crew safety and operating the aircraft in an airworthy fashion.  That said this scenario provided numerous irregular operations and there is the potential we may not have thought of everything. I completely understand that aircraft scheduling is complex and not always visible to crews.  That said; not having APU bleed air ina tropical location definitely causes passenger and crew discomfort even when all ground external air carts and ground conditioned air operates normally.  With the addition of a language barrier and equipment not operating seamlessly this caused numerous threats and the potential risk to passenger and crew health.  ZZZZ Operations had the best of intentions and definitely was doing everything they could to accommodate our demands.  Given the non-routine nature of having to start an engine with an external air source and the inability to clearly communicate; dispatching aircraft to tropical locations in a foreign country doesn't make sense to me. I have no doubt the ground crew in ZZZZ is appropriately trained to handle these events; but my suggestion would be to limit reliance on the use of such equipment to aircraft that happen to break in these locations and not be dispatched to these locations with similar MEL's.

B737-800 flight crew reported a fumes event during preflight while executing a special procedure for operating ground air and starting engines. After a delay the flight ultimately departed.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 359; Flight Crew Type 4500

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

The event I will describe started as a rather innocuous flight crew error that due to some poor decision making almost turned into a very public professional embarrassment. We were assigned arrival Gate # [1]. The key to this whole event is that both the Captain and I; although stating Gate # [1] numerous times from commencement of the arrival tasks on; were actually thinking of Gate # [2]. I can't speak for the Captain; but I looked at my -7 page and still mentally pictured it as Gate # [2] for some reason. We landed on 17L and after crossing 17R on Taxiway F; we called Ground Control. We were instructed to taxi to the ramp via G and H1. Now keeping in mind we were thinking Gate # [2] (incorrect); I queried the Controller and said; 'We are going to Gate # [1] in the alley.' She; the Ground Controller; replied; 'I know; but Taxiway J is blocked.' At the time; we were confused as to why this mattered. We continued north on G. As we passed Taxiway H3; and could see the alleyway to Gate # [2]; we saw it was wide open with no airplanes in the alley or at the gates. I remarked to the Captain that these instructions made no sense and I was going to ask Ground Control to again state the route she desired. At this point; the frequency became very busy and as we approached G1 at the limit of FOM acceptable taxi speed for cornering; I suggested to the Captain that maybe we should stop short of G1 until I talked to Ground again. He stated 'No; she'll get over this;' and immediately initiated a turn onto the ramp at G1; contrary to our taxi clearance. I am not sure if I expected him to continue to go straight to H1 or to accept my suggestion to stop short (which I have done numerous times in similar circumstances); but I was not expecting him to turn into the ramp and; as such; had no time to formulate an appropriate intervention. Just like that; we were off the movement area and on the uncontrolled ramp. As soon as we got our nose into the alley; we realized our mistake; and all the confusing communication with Ground Control instantaneously became brutally clear. Luckily; there was enough room to execute a 180; and as soon as we turned; we saw another airplane coming our way. I got on the radio; got a hold of them; and they stopped and made room for us to go to our proper gate. Around this time; Ground Operations was all over us on the radio asking where we were going because the Ramp was nervous we were going to mess everything up. We taxied to the gate on the non-movement area without further issue. A couple of more bad breaks and we could have ended up nose to nose with another airplane with nowhere to go. Aside from a little embarrassment; this could have been much worse. If the Captain had stopped short of G1 and allowed me to ask the Controller for clarification; as I had suggested; the error chain; in all likelihood; would have been broken immediately. Granted; after the fact the Captain apologized to all the right people; myself included; and took full responsibility; but the question remains - why did it have to take such a visible error to make him realize my suggestion may have had some merit?

B737 flight crew received clearance to taxi to a certain gate; but had another gate in mind and proceeded to taxi to the wrong gate. The error was realized before a serious traffic conflict materialized. Reporting First Officer attributes part of the problem to lack of good CRM on the Captain's part.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction; Training / Qualification

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing

Today we completed XX moves; which puts us at the upper limit of historical average daily movement totals; a rate that has been ongoing consistently for over a month; at the same time while dealing with staffing issues largely related to out of service personnel due to the ongoing public health situation.  All that being said; this team could be considered as being pushed to near its operational limits.  This report serves to document an inconsistency in the midst of this already stressful situation. It needs to be mentioned that I have previously submitted two reports on this issue; and a few of my colleagues have indicated they have as well; yet the situation continues to cause issues. Like so many other problems that this company attempts to address; the issue garners some focus for a while; but is soon forgotten.While assigned to operate super tug X; we were tasked to tow off an aircraft X type from gate X.  The Z gates on the X terminal at ZZZ are known entities when moving aircraft X type; because of the minimal clearance between the nose gear and a line of concrete curbing between the building and the gate.  I was acting as the observer on this move; and so I prepared the ship to tow while my partner attempted to capture the nose gear with the super tug X.  Because of the extreme limited space; it took him approximately twenty minutes of constant maneuvering to capture the gear.  Obviously this adds unnecessary strain to us which could affect our focus. Numerous times while he was attempting to connect; the bumper of the super tug X made contact with the curb wall; at one point almost knocking it over.  This was not due purely to neglect; but more so because there was simply no other choice; he needed every available inch and more to complete the task.  During the course of this; our Supervisor called us to inquire as to our status.  I let him know we were having difficulty; without being specific; and his response was that other crews had towed off of that gate many times without a problem.  I am not sure having just seen it firsthand how that would be possible.  We had significant difficulties which jeopardized aircraft and equipment; although there was no reportable damage in this instance.Later on that day; during the busiest part of the shift; we again took an aircraft off another questionably accessible gate.  At this time; though; no other gates were available.After the main flight departure bank had left; we took another aircraft; an aircraft Y type 2; to a gate which it would have been better not towed to.  After releasing the aircraft; I checked the time and it took a full five minutes to egress with the super tug X from the area in front of the plane.  Ideally it should take about one minute; or perhaps two depending on driver competence.  It took five minutes because it is significantly more difficult to access or egress from the X; Z; and Y gates on the X terminal at ZZZ with a super tug X. This is due to space constraints.  Tows should not be assigned to these gates unless operationally necessary beyond just a basic need.  In the case of the second tow; it was necessary; because there was no other gate available.  On the first tow; from my perspective on that gate; I could see that two other more optimal gates were unoccupied. On the last tow; I decided that I would count the available gates on the North side of the terminal; but I did not have to because they were all open; the only aircraft on that side was the one we had just placed.  All though it will soon be a moot point; as the aircraft X type will no longer; at least for a time; be routed through ZZZ; I still feel it is necessary to bring it up because of the avoidable oversights which gave rise to the situation; escalating the risk level with little to no need or gain.

Ground employee reported difficulty moving aircraft off a specific gate due to reduced clearance.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

We were being vectored for the approach to Rwy 22 in LGA. We were sequenced behind a [heavy Airbus] that; when pointed out to us; appeared to be at our altitude and at least 3 miles ahead of us. We were at 170 knots; given a final turn to intercept the localizer and cleared for the approach; then swapped to Tower. At 2000 ft; just prior to glideslope intercept; still 170 knots; we experienced significant wake turbulence. The autopilot was engaged; yet the aircraft rolled sharply to the left; about 20-30 [degrees] of bank and then violently to the right; at least 35 [degrees] of bank. The autopilot attempted to recover; however the upset seemed significant enough that I made the decision to disengage the autopilot; and due to our relatively slow speed; increased thrust and held altitude to fly out of the turbulence.Due to the visual conditions; and the fact that we were at glideslope intercept point; we could have continued to land; but we both felt doing so would lead to another wake encounter. Instead we informed Tower that we were going around due to a wake turbulence encounter and requested to be sequenced back in for the approach. I spoke with the FA who informed me that no one had been injured and everyone was fine in the back. Due to the high work load environment; and this reassurance I chose not to make a PA to the passengers. There was more than the required separation behind the [Airbus].

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ-700 flight crew reported executing a go-around after encountering wake turbulence on approach to LGA in trail of a heavy Airbus.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 327; Flight Crew Type 12000

Training / Qualification; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

We were on a flight to BUR; on descent on the JANNY 5 Arrival into BUR. At some point near JANNY intersection we were cleared to descend to 6;000 feet. Since this clearance was understood to be a 'descend to' (now) not 'descend via;' I commanded a new non-VNAV mode which we had been using. I believe the new mode was Level Change/Vertical Descent in FPM. It was not a VNAV descent mode. I verbalized this change. Shortly afterward; the Approach Controller asked if we would prefer the ILS or the RNAV Y to Runway 8 in BUR. We requested the RNAV Y Runway 8. He then cleared us for this approach; direct WABBT. RNAV Y links up with JANNY 5 at WABBT Intersection and we were cleared to this intersection. We selected WABBT direct; closed the discontinuity; reviewed WESKI as the FAP [Final Approach Point] with a corresponding 2;700 feet altitude; agreed and set that altitude into the MCP window. At that point I believe I made an error by not verifying and verbalizing VNAV PATH as the vertical mode. This set up the aircraft to continue a moderate rate; non-idle; descent on autopilot toward 2;700 feet. At about 4;900 feet and approaching WABBT; a GPWS Caution Obstacle Alert was heard. I immediately disengaged the autopilot and the autothrottles and pitched aircraft into a climb. Shortly afterwards; Approach Control asked us to verify altitude. We responded we were climbing to 6;000 feet. After WABBT; RNAV 8 Approach then started a series of stepdown altitudes and arc left turns. I asked my F/O [First Officer] for the next altitude so I could safely begin to descend again. He interpreted this as a verbal altitude whereas I wanted an MCP altitude window setting. I also commanded a direct enter toward the ZEMEP intersection but inadvertently forgot the autopilot was disengaged and would not execute the turn automatically so we briefly overflew this intersection before turning back on course to re-intercept the approach. We re-established the approach; configured; then flew the approach to Runway 8 which became visually in sight several miles out. We were handed off to Tower and made a normal landing at BUR. When we were cleared to 6;000 feet I should have chosen a VNAV mode rather than assuming I would be pulled off further STAR/approach restrictions for the remainder of the flight. I had an expectation bias that we would be receiving vectors but were re-cleared on a procedure that required VNAV. More importantly; I should have verbalized and verified VNAV PATH on procedure requiring its use. This was missed as we turned the discussion to the minimum altitude to set in the MCP window. Lastly; on any segment of the approach a missed approach should have been called and executed even when a long way from the MDA/DDA point of the approach.

During descent on the JANNY 5 Arrival/RNAV Runway 8 Approach; the aircraft descended below hard 6;000 feet MSL altitude. Causing a 'Terrain Caution'. We were cleared to descend to 6;000 feet MSL approximately 8 to 12 miles from waypoint WABBT. The Captain; as PF [Pilot Flying]; entered 6;000 feet in the altitude window and selected Level Change. We were subsequently cleared the RNAV Runway 8 Approach to BUR at WABBT. As it was our next point; the Captain closed the discontinuity in the flight plan and put 2;700 feet in the Alt Window for the FAP on the approach. I agreed with the altitude setting. Apparently; the Captain never selected VNAV; didn't verbalized the descent mode; and I never verified VNAV PATH. I looked out the window and less than a minute later I heard an aural 'OBSTACLE Caution;' looked over and saw a yellow obstacle on my display; told the Captain we are below path and to climb 'NOW!' He disconnected the autopilot; advanced the thrust levers and climbed back to altitude. The obstacle was about eight to ten miles away and more than 1;000 feet below; but we were over 1;000 feet below altitude. ATC called us as we were climbing through 5;700 feet to verify altitude. While maneuvering back to course we were laterally displaced for a few minutes by about a mile and slightly late on the turn to the strait-in portion of the approach. ATC queried if we were in our turn; to which I stated we were. At about the eight-mile final; Approach asked what happened around WABBT with our altitude. I told him we were still trying to figure that out; but probably a programming or automation error. Foremost; we must verify VNAV modes and closely monitor the descent profile; this would have prevented everything that occurred. Also; we should have verbalized the descent mode; then I we would have been more likely to verify and/or catch our error. When I realized that the Captain was not immediately correcting back to course after recovering our altitude; I should have either taken the aircraft; requested vectors to final and/or told the Captain to execute a missed approach. Since we were in VMC conditions and about ten miles from the field and were never really established on the approach; I didn't think about executing a missed approach. If ATC would have given us our clearance earlier; we may not have missed the VNAV PATH problem. Not that it was any fault of ATC; but the sequence and timing of the clearances made the mistake much more likely; by giving the 'descend to' instead of 'descend via' clearance and then clearing us an RNAV approach very close to WABBT. This made the pilot have to edit the flight plan; change altitude window; and change the VNAV profile (if not already descending via) in a very short time period.

B737 flight crew received a Ground Proximity Warning System Alert while on descent to destination airport.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

INS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 12L

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.4

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was settling in to the Controller in charge (CIC) position and began observing Local Control's (LC) traffic situation.  Aircraft X was on a right downwind to 12L; along with Aircraft Y.  After the outgoing CIC departed; I observed Aircraft Z tagged for RWY 30R; but was not aware of any ODO (Opposite Direction Operation) coordination for Aircraft Z.  In hindsight; perhaps the coordination took place while the other CIC was on and it did not get passed to me.  I started to get up to ask LC about Aircraft Z; but traffic suddenly picked up and he became very busy working to sequence the inbounds for 12L and 12R; and ensure they would not conflict for Aircraft X turning final.  Next thing I knew; Aircraft Z was already inside the airspace; but yet there were still other aircraft making their initial calls tying up the frequency.  Finally; LC confirmed that Aircraft Z was on frequency; advised him of the opposite direction traffic for RWY 12L; and issued circling instructions prior to Aircraft Z reaching the RWY 30R.I became concerned about watching a potential conflict between Aircraft X and another helicopter that was north of the final for 12L.  Once that situation was no longer an issue; I saw that Aircraft Z appeared to be inside the 2 mile cutoff on RWY 30R with Aircraft X on short final for RWY 12L.  I stood up and was trying to find a chance to get LC's attention to alert him of the need to get Aircraft Z off the final and circle to the ramp; but traffic was still very busy and I did not get a chance to safely get his attention and let him know.  Then; at least one of the aircraft on final for RWY 12L or 12R urgently alerted LC that there was an aircraft 'flying the wrong way' near the final for RWY 12L.  LC immediately took appropriate action to correct that situation and get Aircraft Y out of the way of the aircraft on final.  Aircraft Y was re-sequenced to follow traffic inbound to RWY 12L.  Finally; I became aware that it appeared Aircraft A was on a mile final and did not lower his landing gear.  I advised LC; who then reminded the pilot to lower his gear; and Aircraft A landed safely.  Aircraft X had exited without incident; Aircraft Z circled to land the ramp; and Aircraft Y also landed safely.  I would describe this whole situation as a series of events that came together to overload LC (as well as the CIC trying to monitor) and thus resulted in the new ODO procedures not being followed.  Specifically; with a high performance (jet) aircraft on the final; local procedures specify the opposite direction traffic needed to have abandoned the opposite direction approach prior to reaching a 2 mile final for RWY 30R.  In hindsight; this could have be issued to the ODO pilot on their initial call.  Additionally; I don't believe complete traffic information was exchanged and I am not sure if the coordination was complete (it may have occurred before I was in the operation).    With that said; I think LC otherwise kept priorities straight and was focused on ensuring that a safe operation took place; specifically with IFR jet traffic operating close to other VFR traffic on the finals.  The situation became incredibly complex when it appeared one of the VFR pilots became confused and was flying towards the other traffic on final trying to land; in conjunction with a situation where a pilot appeared to overlook lowering his landing gear on final.  Looking back; I believe these highest priority; critical duties (mitigating a possible NMAC or gear-up landing) made it unfeasible for LC to take action sooner to get the ODO traffic off the final inside the cutoff point.  There are a number of opportunities to learn from these events; and that includes that ODO operations must be approached with great caution; especially when there is a potential for heavy/complex traffic situations.  (On a side note; the 2 mile cutoff point seems reasonable to protect for a high performance aircraft going around).  The trap thatcan occur is that ODOs are approved during a period of light or routine traffic; but then traffic suddenly increased resulting in the ODO being overlooked or not handled in compliance with new rules and procedures.  Further; with a series of different rules and cutoffs depending on aircraft types; parallel runways; IFR vs. VFR; etc.; controllers are undoubtedly facing a learning curve for these operations.  The advice I have discussed with many of my coworkers is to err to the side of caution while we adjust to the new ODO procedures.  Suggestions include: asking for help when needed (such as having another position call approach to disapprove a previously approved ODO); and if necessary due to volume (or even simply forgetting what's needed to run a specific operation); immediately taking corrective action to safely break ODO traffic off the final and eliminate the issue.

BJC Controller reports of an Opposite Direction Operation that Local Controller is unaware of its close proximity and violates the facilities ODO Policy.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 163; Flight Crew Total 5797; Flight Crew Type 5797

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Type 713

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency

We had a normal departure. After crossing into [oceanic] airspace we noticed the #1 engine was reading 40% which got our attention. As we continued to watch the oil qty decrease we determined our best course of action was to divert to the closest station. Congestion on the frequency necessitated our use of the call pan-pan to break in. We declared an emergency and requested clearance which was immediately received. We were a little more than an hour out. We got an HF phone patch to dispatch / [Maintenance Control] and notified them of our intentions. The oil qty indication continued to decrease and before the descent indicated as low as 21%. Once the nose was pointed down there was a slight increase in the indication. Our arrival was normal / uneventful. At the gate with the engine shut down for a period of time the oil quantity read 40%. Contract Maintenance arrived and conferred with [Maintenance Control]. The residual oil was cleaned from the engine and cowl and the engine refilled with oil. We ( the crew ) preformed an idle engine run at the gate while maintenance observed the engine. It was determined that the oil was coming from the IDG drain pad tube but not the location of the actual leak. The rate was measured and [Maintenance Control] determined that it was within acceptable (at idle) parameters. They said we were good to go. My personal decision was that to me that it was not acceptable and I would not take the aircraft in that condition. A leak at idle is one thing it's an entirely different matter at high power and without a real fix I would not take that aircraft over the water (class 2 ) at night to an intended destination with poor weather. The oil quantities were looked at on the ground but it was the situation where I can't recall the actual numbers but know they were acceptable. The oil had been topped off prior to arriving but I have no idea when the leak developed and had nothing to gauge the loss against.  [Flight was cancelled]. We had the passengers on the aircraft the whole time prior to the cancellation due to the customs issue and the hope that the leak might be a quick fix.

Upon maintenance inspection; the oil leak was isolated to the IDG. In coordination with the [duty manager]; the crew determined that further flight on the engine without proper maintenance was unsafe; so the remainder of the flight segment was cancelled.

B737 flight crew declared an emergency and diverted to nearest suitable after they noticed loss of oil quantity in the right engine. After landing the crew refused to fly the aircraft on to the final destination when Maintenance determined the problem could be deferred.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 17

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 196; Flight Crew Total 9953; Flight Crew Type 9953

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

I was told by the FLM (Front Line Manager) that Aircraft X was coming off gate XX and given appropriate taxi instructions by the CPCIT (Career Professional Controller In Training) I was training on OGC. The pilot reported that another aircraft cut them off at the last minute causing the pilot to take evasive action by slamming on brakes. This caused flight attendants in the aircraft to become injured. Due to the departure demand and number of aircraft taxiing around the airport (120 departures and approximately 90 arrivals) it is extremely difficult to make every single traffic call accurately. My CPCIT instructed the aircraft to taxi; and based on her judgment; the pilot had enough time to make it in front of the other aircraft. She did not think speed would be an issue with the other taxiing aircraft. The airlines could spread the departures out throughout the rush a bit more. The demand for 120 departures in 45 minutes is an extremely busy rush; and difficult for any controller to make every single traffic call and get it right every single time.

We pushed off gate XX in ZZZ tail South. We were instructed to taxi North on A. Ground control gave us no instructions to follow or give way to other aircraft. We visually cleared the area prior to taxiing. Almost immediately after we started moving Aircraft Y appeared from behind us and to our left on taxiway A (taxiing Northbound). I immediately called out the conflict and applied the brakes. A flight attendant was injured; so we returned to the gate without further incident.

ORD ATC and A320 flight crew reported that another aircraft cut them off during taxi; causing them to slam on the brakes; which injured a flight attendant.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The new AOA documentation and training lacks details of what we are actually seeing with regards to AOA display; and what they mean to the pilot in terms of aircraft AOA. [Flight Manual] documentation just shows what the AOA display looks like; and if in error shows amber fault. What it does not do is tell us what the numbers mean in relation to the aircraft AOA. What does a six mean? A two? Or any other number?

B737 pilot expressed concern about the lack of detail in the documentation and training for the new Angle of Attack (AOA) system being installed in their aircraft.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

On approach to LWB while descending to 6;000 we were directed to go direct to the airport and call the airport when in sight and we then called the airport. We then both believed Washington cleared us for the visual approach to Runway 22. We had the RNAV 22 approach in the box at that time [and] I gave the First Officer direct to DENLE.The First Officer started his descent and passing through 5;200 ATC asked if we had the field in sight and we told him that we did. He replied back that his MVA was 6;000 feet for that area and that he had not cleared us for the visual. He then cleared us for the visual to Runway 22 and turned us over to [the] Tower. There was never a conflict with terrain or other traffic. Just a normal visual approach.[Due to] frequency congestion; work load; and [expectation bias] we may have missed part of his communication to us. After landing and discussing the situation we both thought he had cleared [us] for the approach. I need to have more situational awareness in the future and query ATC when there is a possible miscommunication.

On descent to LWB while descending to 6;000 with the autopilot engaged we were asked by Washington Center if we had the airport in sight. Captain (pilot monitoring) replied affirmative and we were told to go direct to the field. (We both believed we heard cleared for the visual approach). We had the RNAV GPS Runway 22 approach loaded in the FMS as a back up to our planned and briefed visual approach. The Captain selected direct to DENLE (FAF) and set the altitude select to 4;000 feet. I selected NAV and VNAV and the aircraft began its descent at a 3.0 degree top of descent point. At approximately 5;200 feet (800 below our original assigned altitude) ATC Controller asked if we had the field in sight and told us we had not been cleared for the visual approach yet and that we were currently below his MVA. We told the Controller we were in visual conditions and had the airport in sight. The Controller cleared us for the visual approach and we landed without event. Never during the descent of approach was terrain separation lost or did we ever receive a GPWS warning. This was a normal visual approach with the exception that we did not have an ATC clearance to descend.I need to listen better to what is actually said versus what we expect to hear. It is extremely unfortunate that both of us committed the same listening error. A very significant part of the safety of our ATC system is based on both pilots hearing the same thing. This fact is our checks and balances; our barrier to error. I was very aware of our altitude in respect to the approach and the fact that we needed to begin our descent. Our assignment to go direct the field and inquiry if we had the field in sight was at the correct time to start our descent for a normal visual 3.0 degree approach. This fact may have lead me to hear what I wanted to hear. We felt somewhat rushed to make sure we completed the trip on schedule.

Fractional Jet crew reported descending below cleared altitude on approach to LWB when erroneously believed were cleared for a visual approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 680; Flight Crew Type 560

I was instructing student in Aircraft X. We were on right downwind Runway 16 at BDN at 4;500 MSL.Aircraft Y pilot made a position call with him being 'on a 3 mile 45 for right downwind 16.' Shortly after that radio call was heard; my student observed the plane being adjacent 50 feet (+/-20 feet) to me at an angle; forcing me to do an evasive dive.I made a radio call after I made the evasive maneuver; that I will slow down and he can turn downwind.

GA flight instructor reported an NMAC during approach to BDN non-towered airport.