Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Leveling FL360 while accelerating to cruise through 240 KIAS; a high-frequency vibration was felt through the elevator controls. We slowed to 200 KIAS and the vibration remained. The vibration was pronounced enough that we decided to [advise ATC] and divert to [a nearby airport]. We were given a lower altitude and a heading for the descent. We kept the airplane at 200 KIAS for the entire descent. Dispatch noticed we were descending and sent an ACARS inquiry. We explained the situation and they sent us info on [the airport]. I was concerned about the effect changing airplane configuration would have; so I elected not to use speed brakes for the descent and to do a no-flap landing. We briefed the Flight Attendants about the situation/divert and told him we didn't feel it would be necessary to issue brace commands. The landing occurred normally on 18L at 45;100 LBS. The rescue trucks were called off and we taxied normally to the gate. Post flight inspection revealed nothing unusual.Conditions were ideal for this occurrence. The weather was cloudless and smooth all of the way to the ground. The vibration occurred during a low workload phase of flight and traffic at the diversion airport was light. The duration of the descent allowed sufficient time to complete the necessary diagnoses and run all pertinent checklists. The undesired state was; of course; an elevator that didn't feel right.I'm not sure what the cause of the vibration was; but I felt the crew; dispatch; and ATC communicated well.

EMB-145XR Captain reported diverting to an alternate airport after noting a high-frequency vibration in the elevator.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 8000

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

During the visual landing at MIA [Runway] 8L; we scraped the paint off of the tail skid. Upon discovery during the post-flight; the Captain made the appropriate log book entry and Maintenance accomplished the necessary inspections. The aircraft was returned to service without delay. The approach was stable and progressed normally right through touchdown when the nose pitched up somewhat abnormally; which is when I think the tail skid scraped the runway. Simultaneously with our landing; a B777 was on takeoff roll from MIA [Runway] 8R and we had a crosswind from that direction as well. I think there was adverse wake from that aircraft that caused our pitch up. In the future; greater awareness of wake turbulence combined with crosswinds may prevent this situation from developing.

B767-300 First Officer reported scraping the tail skid on landing after encountering wake turbulence from a B777 taking off on the parallel runway.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

During climb out passing FL200 received ECAM warning HIGH BRAKE TEMP; Pulled up wheel page and saw #5 [brake] temp was 325C and rising. Immediately executed high speed descent with ATC approval to FL190; slowed below 250KIAS; and extended landing gear.  Temp dropped to below 100C.  Diverted and declared emergency. Turned brake fans on after landing during rollout; temp was stable on all wheels below 100. After fire crews and maintenance cleared us to taxi to parking received ECAM warning again and #5 temp went to 29 C; turned on brake fans again and temp slowly dropped. Appeared to be brake malfunction on wheel #5.

During climb to cruising altitude while passing FL190; we got a Master Caution and ECAM warning for Brake Overtemp. We referred to the Wheels page and noted the temp on Number 5 indicator was at 320 degrees and rising. The aircraft had an MEL for Brake Indicator so we pulled the MEL and it was for Number 8. We coordinated with Center to descend to FL190 and slow to drop the gear. We initiated a high speed descent and slowed to 250 and dropped the gear. Temp began to slowly decrease. We coordinated a divert and declared an emergency. All checklists were complied with. Diverted and flew the ILS [approach]. Turned brake fans on after landing (during rollout) and noted temp was not much over 100 degrees. Turned fans off after fire crew and MX cleared us to taxi to parking. We noted temperature increasing and got another ECAM warning at 295 degrees. Brake fans were turned back on and we parked the aircraft at ramp. Shutdown was normal.Brake system malfunction caused overtemp of brakes after retraction and in flight.

A300-600 flight crew reported brake over temp after takeoff. They declared an emergency and diverted to nearest suitable airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I had filed the flight plan earlier and listed myself as PIC; but after landing in TEB the SIC; who is also rated and current in the aircraft; wanted to fly this leg back to our home base. After takeoff from Runway 24 the PIC climbed to 1;500 FT on way to WENTZ Intersection. After crossing WENTZ the SID required crossing TASCO at 2;000 FT. I saw on the FMS that we had passed WENTZ; but did not know of our position in relation to WENTZ; and said that we could climb to 2;000 FT. While communicating with Departure we were told that we had missed WENTZ by two miles and that we should turn to a heading of 300 degrees. I instructed the PIC to turn to 300 degrees and maintain 1;500 FT. We had climbed to 2;000 FT and were holding altitude waiting for further climb instructions upon learning of the missed intersection and instructed that we should be at 1;500 FT; we descended to 1;500 FT at the direction of Departure Control. It seemed that this problem arose from a loss of situational awareness on the part of the PIC and the work load at that time by SIC (myself) and the PIC. Having flown this SID before; I am at a loss as to just why it went the way it did. The PIC and I discussed the SID and what could have been improved during the execution of the SID. I believe taking time to fully understand what each of us are [expected] to do will go a long way in preventing this in the future.

A Corporate flight crew departed on the TEB RUUDY 4 departure and believing they crossed WENTZ climbed to 2;000 FT but ATC gave them a vector with a descent to 1;500 FT because they missed WENTZ by two miles.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 194; Flight Crew Type 12000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 178; Flight Crew Type 7500

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

On downwind abeam the field; we were given a right turn and cleared for a visual approach to Runway 31R at DAL. Another Company aircraft was reported to us; we acquired it visually and it was cleared visual approach to 31L. The other a/c had already slowed way down to burn excess fuel and both a/c were converging towards the same point in space on final. There were 38 knots of overshooting crosswinds at 2200 ft AGL and it was imperative that I not overshoot the final approach course to keep safe separation on the other a/c. While turning and descending to line up on the runway; the FO pointed out a tall building located off the approach end of 31R. A second later we received a single 'Caution; Obstacle' Alert. I immediately disconnected the autopilot; applied full thrust; and climbed until we were clear of the obstacle. We then continued our approach to a normal landing. After landing; the FO and I debriefed the event and we realized after checking the FOM that even though we were in VMC; night time requires a mandatory go-around for a GPWS Caution on final approach. I confused the recovery procedures for a GPWS Caution Alert at night VMC with day VMC procedures. Better FOM knowledge would have prevented this mistake.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737NG flight crew reported receiving a 'Caution Obstacle' GPWS alert on a night visual approach to DAL Runway 31R.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Type 11000

Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Type 100

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Descending into ZZZ at the ZZZZZ Arrival at the ZZZZZ way point; the FMC AP/RST (Flight Management Computer Auto Pilot Reset) light Illuminated at the ZZZZZ turn point; disengaging the LNAV; VNAV; and the autopilot.  ATC communication was congested; and as we were troubleshooting; and attempting to communicate with ATC; the PF who was hand flying; allowed the aircraft to get high on path and deviate laterally from the course.  It took several attempts to communicate with ATC and re-establish the lateral and vertical course.  Doing so caused our speed to be above the charted speed at ZZZZZ1; and ATC cleared us on a heading and descent below the ZZZZZ1 fix restriction. The Pilot Flying hand flew until on the base turn; the autopilot was re-engaged in the Heading Select and Vertical Speed mode.Landed safely; and the malfunction was reported to Maintenance Control and documented in the logbook. This was my second leg in a MAX 8 aircraft in more than two years; and the aircraft differences; although not great; were distracting and likely aggravated the situation.As always; when automation fails or malfunctions; select another mode or turn it off; and revert to basic airmanship and fly the aircraft.  Do not get buried in troubleshooting.

Lost LNAV over ZZZZZ2 fix got a AP RST yellow light. Couldn't reset anything. Hand flew; we were high and fast over ZZZZZ1.

B737 MAX 8 flight crew reported FMC AP RST light illuminated during approach and auto pilot would not reset; causing Pilot Flying to hand fly the approach and landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 260; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 3200

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Incursion Runway

The First Officer landed on Runway 28R at SFO. We proceeded to Taxiway T turnoff where we exchanged control of the aircraft. As the exchange was happening; we were instructed by SFO Tower; 'cross Runway 28L expedite crossing aircraft on final.' My First Officer acknowledged the crossing and I aligned my aircraft with Tango; added power to hurry across; I did my last check of 28L before crossing when I saw an Airbus going rapidly down the runway. I immediately brought my aircraft to a stop past the hold short line but before the runway edge lights. The Airbus on 28L stopped his aircraft short of Delta and called the Tower. SFO Tower sent the aircraft around; the Airbus on 28L cleared the runway at Delta and when the way was clear I taxied across 28L and on to my gate. I remembered later a partial clearance to another aircraft to expedite which I believe was the other Airbus on 28L. I am certain that if I had not stopped my aircraft we would have at least collided wingtips. There is not enough room to have an aircraft clear 28L at Delta and simultaneously cross an aircraft of Taxiway Tango.

A320 Captain reported a ground conflict in SFO when he was cleared to cross 28L at Tango at the same time another Airbus was clearing the runway at Delta. Reporter feels that is a dangerous clearance.


The Captain's and First Officer's approach plates for the DCA River Visual Approach; had very different information in the body of the approach even though nearly all the information on the top of the plates were identical; including the dates. The one difference was that the First Officer's plate said [predecessor airline] on the top. The Captain's did not.  In the charts available on [Crew Mail]; there are three River Visual Approach plates.

The reporter clarified that the approach plates in question were paper plates; and that one of the plates had no recommended altitudes depicted at the various DME arcs.

Air carrier Captain discovers during briefing for the River Visual approach to DCA that there are significant differences between his version of the procedure and the one the First Officer has.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Attendant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

During boarding of the flight; the C Flight Attendant brought it to my attention that he had forgotten to brief the exit row on our previous flight. I had been distracted dealing with a mask compliance issue in the front row and I had forgotten to verify with the C Flight Attendant if his over wing had been briefed.I need to next time take a moment to take a breath and think about all of my duties I need to accomplish.

Flight Attendant In Charge reported being distracted by a face mask compliance issue and not verifying all before takeoff duties were completed.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

We were operating under an MEL that required the aircraft to be fueled over the wing. The MEL inoperative stickers were present in the cockpit and on the single point-fueling panel. The fueling crew had no issues with fueling the aircraft over the wing and we were able to depart on time. Upon arriving in ZZZ; the First Officer and the company Dispatcher notified Operations that over-the-wing fueling was required per the MEL. About 35 minutes prior to departure; the fuel truck showed up and the fueler proceeded to hookup to the single point fueling port. The First Officer asked if the fueler noticed the MEL sticker on the fueling panel; the fueler said; 'Yes'. The First Officer explained that over-the-wing fueling was required due to the single point-fueling port being MEL'd inoperative. The fueler disconnected and advised us that a supervisor was required to be present for over the wing fueling. The fuel truck then drove away. About 10 minutes prior to departure (with numerous request put into Operations as to the whereabouts of the fueling truck) the fuel truck showed up again and proceeded to hook up to the single point fueling port. We again advised the fueler that the single point fuel system was MEL'd and cannot be used. The fueler stated; 'This is how my supervisor is telling me to fuel your aircraft.' Again; the fueler was instructed to disconnect from the single point fueling port. At this point; I notified the dispatcher of what was occurring. When the supervisor finally showed up; about 10 minutes after scheduled departure time; we gave the supervisor the fuel order in gallons to be added per wing. Over-the-wing fueling process was then completed by the fueling supervisor. However; this was not without problems. When the right wing fueling was completed; I inspected the fuel cap and found that it was installed incorrectly; the fuel cap tab was facing forward against the airstream. I instructed the fueling supervisor to remove the cap and install it correctly; flush with the fuel cap tab facing backwards.Upon returning; we parked. This gate requires the use of stairs for disembarking the aircraft. While the passengers were de-boarding; I heard a chime and noticed that the fuel door open message was displayed on the EICAS...by the time I could get around to the fueling panel; the fueling supervisor (different supervisor from earlier) was there with the fueling crew. They were hooked up to the single point fueling port and actively fueling the aircraft. I asked if they noticed the MEL sticker on the fueling panel; the supervisor said; 'Yes.' I asked the supervisor to stop due to the MEL...the supervisor said; 'No; I am fueling it this way...it takes too much time and effort to fuel the aircraft over the wing.' I explained that the single point system was MEL'd inoperative and this aircraft has a history of this system not working. Continuing to fuel; the supervisor stated; 'Your maintenance is wrong; it is working; and I am doing it this way'. I again explained that the use of this system is not allowed due to the MEL; the supervisor said nothing and continued fueling. Since I was done with my trip; I advised the oncoming flight crew of the MEL and what was occurring with the fueling operations. To me; this is a case of flagrant disregard and lack of respect for safety and compliance with our company MEL's; policies; and FAA regulations. This isn't a case of the fuelers not noticing the MEL sticker on the fueling panel...they simply made the proactive and purposeful decision not to comply with the posted MEL sticker. Furthermore; two different fueling supervisors directed their crews to not comply with the MEL and utilize the single point fueling system after repeated notifications from the Flight Crew and our company Dispatcher. There appears to be an issue with attitude and respect for safety within the fueling operations.

EMB-145 Captain reported that refueling personnel failed to adhere to the procedures required by an MEL which affected the single point refueling port.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 2823; Flight Crew Type 2139

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

While flying southwest just east of the HPW VOR at approximate 900 FT; the non-flying pilot noticed something red and immediately looked up to see a small tailwheel aircraft heading directly toward us. He immediately began a descent away from the other aircraft. The oncoming aircraft appeared to be at or below 1;000 FT. We estimate that we passed within 100 FT of the other aircraft. I; the flying pilot; had been looking at something out the left window at the time. The aircrew person did not see the oncoming traffic. Approach had just terminated flight following with us and we had not yet contacted the next Approach. The traffic had not been called to us by Approach prior to discontinuing service. The oncoming aircraft took no evasive action. It would appear that he never saw us. This incident was discussed at length amongst all on board the aircraft in an effort to learn from the incident. None of us saw the aircraft coming. All on board the aircraft were engaged with the flight and discussing observations in the area at the time.

A pilot reported taking evasive action during a near miss with a single engine aircraft at 900 FT near HPW VOR.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

During climb out around 18;000 ft in an aircraft with a pack deferred; we received a Bleed Duct warning message followed by a Bleed Duct caution message. The failure in the bleed duct system caused a shutdown of the only operative pack; resulting in the depressurization of the aircraft. We coordinated an immediate descent to 10;000 ft while we completed all applicable QRH checklist. We did not declare an emergency with ATC. We ended up receiving a Cabin Alt warning message around 10;000 ft and donned our oxygen masks; we then requested a descent to 8;000 ft. We were already at a higher speed (around 310 knots) due to the quick descent to 10;000 ft. We were still completing checklist; coordinating with ATC; dispatcher and cabin crew for our return to the departure airport while we were descending down to 8;000 ft. Once below 10;000 ft we failed to slow the aircraft to 250 knots due to the high workload. We were above 250 kts at 8;000 ft for several minutes before we recognized our mistake; and corrected with no inquiry from ATC about our speed. We continued to our destination without incident for landing.Due to the high workload environment from a system malfunction and completing the associated abnormal checklist; the aircraft was above the 250 knot speed restriction below 10;000 ft for several minutes.

CRJ-700 Captain reported receiving a BLEED DUCT warning message resulting in the only working pack shutting down. An immediate descent to 10;000 ft was initiated and a return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Distraction; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

After a diversion to our planned alternate we had a routine enroute and descent phase. We contacted Tower on about a 10 mile final. We were approximately 5 miles in trail of a B737; and we heard them check in as well. I overheard tower tell them about a Medevac helicopter who was operating to the east of the airport and transiting to the west. Once we were on about a 5 mile final; tower provided us with a traffic call for the same helicopter. The first call we received was traffic at our 10 o'clock and about three miles; and that the traffic had us in sight and was maintaining visual separation. Due to the lights of the city; I did not see the traffic; and it was not yet showing up on our TCAS.Inside of a 4 mile final; at approximately 1200 ft. we received a Traffic Alert for the traffic. On TCAS it showed him at 200 ft. above us and inside a mile. I immediately saw the traffic visually and told the first officer that I had the traffic in sight. Based on the traffic's track and altitude; I very quickly suspected that we might receive an RA. I instructed the first officer to go slightly below the glide slope to increase our separation. Very shortly after that; at 1050 ft. we received a 'DESCEND DESCEND' TCAS Resolution Alert. The First Officer followed the TCAS guidance and I informed ATC. Due to the switch at 1000 ft. to Traffic Alert only we never received a clear of conflict; but we were able to visually identify that we were clear of conflict at about 800 ft. We were one dot low on the glide slope but correcting and all other approach criteria were stable so I quickly asked the First Officer if he felt stable. He responded that he did; so we agreed that we were okay to continue the approach. At our closest point; the helicopter was directly above us and approximately 200 ft. above; leading to a significantly reduced margin of separation.This event was caused by several factors. The helicopter pilot had us in sight and was maintaining visual separation; but in our opinion; the separation provided was not adequate. I was not able to visually identify the traffic until the Traffic Alert occurred; and at that point there was very little we could do to avoid a loss of separation. I do not believe we should have been sequenced by air traffic control to pass directly underneath the medevac's flight path. After landing I communicated my concerns to tower and he said that once the helicopter reported maintaining Visual Separation; he had no further responsibility to separate us. If that is correct; I believe it is a fundamentally unsafe procedure. In this event it led to us receiving a descending RA at 1000 ft. leaving us with very little maneuvering room. I should have made more of an effort to find the traffic prior to receiving a Traffic Alert; but with the city lights it was difficult. This was at the end of a very high workload; 3 hour blocked flight with significant weather; holding; a diversion; and fuel considerations. I believe that this type of event could have been prevented with better planning from air traffic control. There was clearly a difference in expectations between the helicopter pilot and us; and the helicopter pilot may have been comfortable with 200 ft. of separation; but we were not.

We diverted due to weather. On final approach we received a TCAS Resolution Alert due to a medical helicopter crossing the final approach. I was Pilot Flying for the approach. When we received the Traffic Alert; I initially assumed it was an aircraft on a parallel approach. The Pilot Monitoring reported the aircraft in sight. The helicopter had also reported us in sight. Only moments before the Resolution Alert did I realize the aircraft was going to cross directly in front. We received a descending Resolution Alert. I complied with the Resolution Alert. The helicopter passed approximately 200 ft. above. I don't recall ever hearing a clear of conflict call. We descended below 1000 ft. and the TCAS went into Traffic Alert Only mode.A medical helicopter was crossing approximately 3 mile final at approximately 1200 ft. while we were on approach. I was manually flying a challenging approach due to high winds and did not recognize the threat until a few seconds before the Resolution Alert.

CRJ900 flight crew reported 200 ft. of separation with a helicopter on approach.


While enroute to ACK; almost directly over BOS at FL190; the co-pilot noticed an aircraft below us at our approx 1-2 o'clock position. At the time we were just given direct to LFV VOR. The aircraft did not show up on TCAS. It looked white/slightly grey; had an approximate wingspan of 10-15 feet; and was traveling southbound. It also had two strobe lights on the tail. It seemed to be approximately 1;500 FT below us. It was moving away and behind us at a good rate. We told ATC about what we saw; and that it looked drone like. They did not see anything on their radar at the time.

PC12 Captain reports sighting a drone like aircraft near BOS approximatly 1;500 FT below his FL190 cruise altitude. ATC had no knowledge of the aircraft.


This is a safety concern regarding the awareness of a type of carry-on bag 'AWAY'. These bags have a built in lithium ion 37 watt hour battery supporting USB functions. These batteries can only be removed from the inside of the luggage with a screw driver. This brings my safety concern in the instances where we run out of overhead bin space; can checking these types of bags potentially be a safety risk? Should we bring an awareness to [the appropriate personnel] to look for these types of bags and allow only inside the cabin and not cargo hold?

Air carrier Gate Agent reported concern about the safety of gate-checking luggage that has internal lithium ion batteries.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

I was PM during a visual approach backed up by the ILS 27L into ORD. Just prior to reaching the FAF the aircraft was completely configured; on speed; localizer and GS. As the Captain began to make the SOP FAF calls; I started to key the radio to check in with Tower. He raised his right hand off of the thrust levers to indicate to me to wait so that we could make the calls then check in with Tower (aviate; navigate then communicate). In that brief moment we caught the wake of the preceding aircraft (not a heavy); the autopilot disengaged while the stick shaker started. I do not believe we were even 10 knots below ref at the time. The Captain canceled the autopilot alarm; added power; and continued the approach. The aircraft was never more than a half a dot off LOC or GS.

CRJ-200 First Officer reported a momentary stick shaker occurred after encountering wake turbulence on approach to ORD.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 350; Flight Crew Total 1450; Flight Crew Type 400

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Holding short of Runway XX at ZZZ; our aircraft was given a departure clearance void time of 60 seconds from ZZZ Center. We initiated an immediate departure on Runway XX. After climbing via the obstacle departure procedure; we proceeded enroute and contacted ZZZ Center again. We then heard another aircraft call back to ZZZ Center; and stated they were forced to initiate a go-around as they were on final approach to Runway XX. It is my guess that our departure is what caused that aircraft to go-around. I however; do not recall seeing the aircraft on final approach; or hearing a radio call that the aircraft was on final approach. Conditions were VFR at the airport; but IFR traffic load was heavy. I do not recall ATC advising us of the aircraft on final approach. It again is responsibility of us as a crew to ensure the approach/runway was clear for takeoff. If this incident was caused by our departure; we should have more clearly made sure it was safe for takeoff; and will do so in the future.

First Officer reported another aircraft conducted a go-around after his aircraft took the runway for takeoff to beat a clearance void time.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

APU (Auxiliary Power Unit) bleed was on MEL (Minimum Equipment List) so we had to start Number 1 engine at the gate. After engine start all parameters were normal with engine stabilized. The external air and electric were disconnected and jetway removed from aircraft. Shortly after ground crews notified us via intercom that engine was on fire followed by saying that continuous flames coming out of the back of engine. Engine was shut down immediately and QRH was performed. No cockpit indications of fire and ground crews confirmed no fire after shut down of engine. Fire Department were called only as caution and we asked jetway to be reconnected to the aircraft for normal deplane. Entry was made in AML (Maintenance Log) and Maintenance was notified. We never had any indication in the cockpit of fire. We treated the ground crews alert as an ongoing fire and took action based on that. Safety is always top priority and in this case our external resource being our ground personnel played an important role by alerting us of the possible fire.

Air Carrier pilot reported that when they started number one engine ground crew reported flames coming out of the engine but no indications of engine fire were received in the cockpit.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft X arrived as flight from ZZZ. The flight crew reported the right Nose cowl anti-ice valve illuminated in flight. Company Maintenance Control was notified and the decision to place it on Mel 30-00-XX-X; with associated Mel 36-00-XX. The AMM references were received and the right engine was opened to lock the nose cowl anti ice valve in the open position and the high stage valve in the closed position. The AMM calls for the cannon plug to the TAI (Thermal Anti Ice) pressure switch to be disconnected. While in the process of completing the MEL procedure I was receiving maintenance call from our other business partners. I disconnected the cannon plug for the anti ice valve instead of the pressure switch. The high stage valve was locked closed and engine cowls closed. The log book signed and aircraft released for service. The aircraft left the gate and returned to gate after EICAS warning. Upon arrival back to gate the right engine fan cowl was opened. The anti ice valve cannon plug reconnected and the TAI pressure switch cannon plug disconnected per the AMM. The engine fan cowl was closed and the logbook signed. The root cause for this incident was the distraction of the incoming maintenance calls and not going back three steps to make sure the proper cannon plug was disconnected. The aircraft left the gate and the fight arrived to ZZZ without further problems.

Technician reported not complying with MEL procedures for engine anti ice deferral; resulting in a rejected take off and a return to the gate for maintenance actions.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 18

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Weather

Please look at Sector R55 and R54 at the times I provided. These sectors are unsafe when we have weather.These sectors are unsafe when we have weather. Controllers are being put in unsafe situations every time there is weather. Management is not doing enough to keep the controller safe. I think immediate action is required before a midair happens. Would somebody please do something to fix this problem? Drastic changes need to be implemented immediately.

ZLA Center Controller reported that two Center sectors are unsafe when there is weather.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

While working the X position during cruise after completing beverage service; I opened my jump seat to sit down. Jump seat severely injured my finger tip. Aircraft was diverted to ZZZ [and] parked on the Ramp. [I was then] met by EMTs; was removed by EMTs; and taken by ambulance to hospital for surgery; creating an inadvertent minimum crew violation as I was injured and had to be taken off the aircraft without being able to deplane passengers first.

Flight Attendant reported injuring a finger while operating the jump seat; causing a diversion and a potential minimum crew violation.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 89; Flight Crew Total 13200; Flight Crew Type 1000

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Coming up on [fix] I requested descent. The controller stated it would be 15 miles. I was at my Top of Descent (TOD) so I waited 15 miles and asked again. The controller stated he would descend me when he decided.  I told him I was past TOD and was coming close to not making MERMA at 14;000 foot restriction.  He then started vectoring me 7 times with over 180 degree turns and being a jerk.  All this time slowly giving me 1;000 foot descents. He was rude and threatened me that he would have to give me a phone number. Finally he gave me direct to [fix] and cross at 14;000 feet. With that clearance I read it back and said good day. He came back and stated to stay with him. I stated yes sir just wishful thinking. He blew a gasket yelling at me that IF I had one more non vernacular aviation comment he would violate me. Then an airliner spoke 'you go boy' and the controller thanked them.  Really...  So I asked for the phone number so I could complain as then he changed my frequency and stated that I should have filed for a lower altitude next time and I stated due to operations I was unable and he spouted off that I should have went at 11;000 feet VFR then. The next controller seemed to be also trying to help their buddy out and make me violate the FAR. This gaining up on a single pilot jet operation is unacceptable and to be a bully and trying to push me around is not right. His nasty comments and how to operate my aircraft is just wrong. I did call the number and the supervisor started off apologizing to me and that they would not come after me for anything. I thanked him and told him my side and that I needed to file a SAFA and he agreed it would be good to advise you so we may never have this happen again.  I purposely filed the west leg of the arrival to get down in time and the controller before was helping give a short cut that was not asked for but appreciated.

Cessna Citation 525 single pilot twice requested descent to 14;000 FT to make the MERMA restriction.  Pilot was reportedly chastised by the Controller and felt he was vectored excessively by ATC.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 0; Flight Crew Total 780; Flight Crew Type 700

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

I was flying to get a transponder check at RYY. En-route I flew over Dobbins airspace; and contacted their controller before entering their airspace. Since my route would take me directly from Dobbins airspace to Cobb County's airspace; I asked the controller if she would hand me off; or if I would need to contact [them] before entry. The controller asked me to stand by; and notify me to change frequency as I was about to enter the airspace. I change the frequency shortly before entering the airspace; but the frequency was busy; and I was not sure if the controller had handed me off or not. The frequency was quite busy; and there was not an opening to speak with ATC until I was already in the airspace; at which point it was clear that my aircraft was disrupting the planned traffic.

C172 pilot reported entering airspace without radio communication due to confusion over an ATC handoff.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 780; Flight Crew Type 80

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing

Following standard briefing from flight service; system checks; and run-up; departed and initiated climb to the northwest. As I climbed engine began running rough. I changed fuel mixture and switched fuel tanks. Engine continued to run rough and produce only partial power. I decided to return to airport. On short final I set flaps and adjusted trim to landing configuration. As I approached touchdown; I realized gear-up warning alarm was sounding. I moved landing gear lever to down position. However; it was too late for gear to fully extend and plane touched down on runway and landed with gear up. Notified UNICOM that I landed gear-up on runway and that there were no injuries. I shut down all systems on the plane and exited. At this time the cause of the engine problem is unknown. One possible cause is that an injector became plugged causing the partial power. The primary cause of the 'gear-up' landing is not following landing checklist under all landing conditions.

M20E pilot reported landing gear-up because of distractions dealing with an engine problem.


Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

During the takeoff roll I noticed a drop in manifold pressure in the left engine. Checked airspeed; 80 plus KTS; and determined I was committed to the takeoff. I rotated normally; retracted the gear with a positive climb indication and prepared for a possible turbocharger failure and planned to return to the airport. Around 150-200 FT AGL the left engine failed.I executed the Engine Failure after takeoff flow from the QRH while maintaining positive control of the aircraft; then noticed a zero reading on the left engine fuel flow indicator and saw smoke coming from the left engine. I feathered the left engine and continued the climb to 500 FT AGL where I contacted the Tower; declared an emergency; and conducted a left traffic pattern to return safely to the runway; after which I taxied to the ramp escorted by a fire truck.

After suffering and engine failure immediately after takeoff; the pilot of a C-402 declared an emergency; performed an inflight shut down; and flew a closed pattern back to a safe landing.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

On taxi out; the flight crew noticed that we had two status messages; indicating 'IB GRD Spoilers Fault' and 'Flt Spoilers Fault.' The First Officer reviewed the QRH; which said that all systems were operating normally. Per the company's operating manual; the flight could be continued without communicating with the Dispatcher if it is determined that the flight could be operated safely in accordance with the provisions of the MEL. We determined that the flight could be operated safely in this manner; so we continued with the takeoff. We also were receiving the green 'Takeoff Config OK' advisory message; further confirming the safety of the takeoff. At about 40-50 KTS on the takeoff roll; we received an EICAS warning message and aural warning of 'Config Spoilers.' We discontinued the takeoff safely; and taxied off the runway. We returned to the gate; received corrective maintenance; and continued the flight without incident. The undesired state was that the airplane's configuration warning system alerted the crew to a possible unsafe situation during takeoff. After this experience; I will treat all spoiler-related status messages as a threat to an incident-free takeoff. In this case; I would consult with my Dispatcher and Maintenance Control to address the status messages before attempting a takeoff.

CRJ200 Captain receives two status messages during taxi out indicating 'IB GRD Spoilers Fault' and Flt Spoilers Fault.' The crew determines that the aircraft is good to go without maintenance action. During takeoff the configuration warning sounds and the crew rejects.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 30000; Flight Crew Type 65

Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather

[I was flying a] Sonex; conventional gear; (tail wheel). During takeoff after tail was in the air; for what ever reason; combination torque and crosswind; the aircraft began a turn to the left. [I] was unable to correct to the right because this aircraft does not have differential braking and did not have enough wind to have rudder authority. Braking with the tail in the air; trying to avoid a ridge along side of runway came in contact with a runway light. Only damage was to the ends of the propeller from contact with the sand and grass. No injuries. The takeoff was a 'rolling' takeoff and most likely there was some wake turbulence from an earlier takeoff of larger plane. (AT-6). Not having differential braking and not feeling comfortable trying to put the tail down while trying to use max braking caused lack of directional control.

A Sonex turned left off the runway during the takeoff roll because of torque and crosswind. Unable to stop; the pilot continued as his propeller struck sand and grass before liftoff.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Two T6's; were on downwind. I turned the first T6 base and descended him to 3;000. Apparently; both aircraft took the turn and descended and the second T6 happened to be over an antenna with an MVA of 3;500. After listening to the tapes; I realized the second T6 readback the turn and descent as well. When I noticed the second T6 turning and descending; I immediately climbed him back to 3;500 and turned him back to downwind. The two aircraft came in to the airspace together; but I could have reminded them again of the similar sounding call signs. I also should have listened to the read back more closely.

TRACON Controller described a below MVA event when traffic with a similar call sign initiated a turn and descent issued to another aircraft; the Controller immediately issuing corrective action.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger; Person Flight Crew

We were on descent into ZZZ at 11;000 feet; it was -7 SAT and ahead; there was a rain cloud so we selected engine anti-ice to on. We flew through the cloud and smelled what the cockpit could describe as 'ozone;' or moisture from the cloud. The A Flight Attendant called up to the cockpit and said the aft of the cabin smelled a 'faint electrical burning smell.' I told the A [Flight Attendant] that we flew through a cloud and the smell had gone away and to check if it was electrical and if it was getting worse at all. She came back and called and told me the smell had subsided. It was all within 15-30 seconds.Upon landing; I had the A [Flight Attendant] came up the cockpit and called the aft galley on speaker. I debriefed the crew and we discussed what we smelled; and had decided the smell must have been the passing through the cloud. I left the airplane and a non-revving First Officer called me to tell me that he had smelled a 'strong electrical smell.' [He said] that the passengers around him looked alarmed; and one was covering his face. Another non-revving Captain told me that he smelled a 'burning oil smell.' I wrote up the incident to have Maintenance further investigate what the odor could have been; as there were 3 different smells throughout my aircraft. I had written up and advised Maintenance of the discrepancy well after the incident because I didn't know the severity of the odor until the non-revving First Officer called me to ask me how I didn't write up a bad fumes event.

Air carrier Captain reported a fumes event that initially appeared to be localized to cockpit was also experienced by flight attendants and passengers.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 260; Flight Crew Total 14500; Flight Crew Type 4500

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Human Factors; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication

With autopilot engaged and cleared to descend via the FRDMM One RNAV STAR; the aircraft descended below FL240 at BRVRY while showing on profile. It descended to FL233 before I could disengage the autopilot and (correct the) descent. We recovered; landed and then wrote up the system.

An air carrier flight crew cleared via the FRDMM RNAV STAR to DCA failed to comply with the crossing altitude restrictions at BRVRY.


Training / Qualification; Confusion; Time Pressure

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Manuals

Aircraft X had an escalation of cause and concern when an unidentified passenger of the flight was seen coughing and blowing mucus from the nose while at the gate area. A flight attendant on Aircraft X noticed a passenger coughing and blowing mucus from the nose. This flight attendant working the flight has a friend in [Management] and decided to call them. While enroute the Sector Manager alerted me that there is a belief that a passenger onboard may have symptoms of COVID-19 and the flight may be met at the gate by CDC (Center for Disease Control) agents. This of course necessitated an immediate call to the Captain operating the flight to ensure he and the flight deck crew were in the loop that his flight was possibly under suspicion of carry a passenger with COVID-19. The Captain called the lead Purser of the flight attendants and asked for an update. They said the passenger seemed fine now. The Captain confirmed through ACARS messaging and SATCOM updates that no preventative action was required. The flight arrived safely into ZZZ as scheduled and no CDC agents met the flight.We had a bit of a communication breakdown as misinformation caused misunderstandings. It was initially believed a flight attendant called Medlink or [Operations Control] expressing concern for passenger. This was not the case. The Sector Manager approached me with updates and informed me of CDC personnel can be expected to approach the aircraft once it reached the gate. Fortunately this did not materialize as it turned out to be a false alarm. We are going to need more information on what policies or procedures may be implemented and how can we protect a passenger if they are falsely accused of having COVID-19. And if a passenger does have it and it is known how will the passengers onboard be informed and how will suspected COVID-19 infected passenger be safely removed from the aircraft? Will the aircraft be subject to quarantine? Will the flight be isolated from terminal and remotely parked? A lot of unanswered questions. [Operations Control] is making serious efforts to address the issue with a newly dedicated support team however this information in [publication] came out the day this event actually transpired and I was unable to use that service as recommended. We can expect an escalation of these COVID-19 incidents; especially in the next two months.

Dispatcher reported there was concern and confusion regarding an ill passenger due to the lack of defined policy and procedures for situations involving COVID-19.


Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

On the initial climb out while passing through approximately 1000 ft; we had the amber message 'STEERING INOP' come up on the ECIAS. I was the pilot flying and Captain was the pilot monitoring. After climbing through 10;000 ft; Capt ran the QRH for STEERING INOP in an attempt to remove the message. After multiple unsuccessful attempts to remove the message; he proceeded to the next step which is to turn the nose wheel steering off. We continued on to [the destination]. While enroute; I continued flying the aircraft and working the radios while Capt informed the Flight Attendants about the situation and was coordinating with Maintenance and Dispatch. As we began our descent Capt informed the passengers of the situation and what to expect. Once we switched over to Approach; he requested the longest runway. On final approach; I switched over the controls to Capt. and then became pilot monitoring. We made a successful landing then came to a complete stop. Once stopped; we attempted to turn the nose wheel steering back on to see if it would work. That was unsuccessful and at that point I notified the Tower that we would need a tug to tow us off the runway.

CRJ-900 First Officer reported landing without incident after the nose wheel steering failed.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was vectoring the final to Runway 12 at TRACON; (West Approach). A BE30 was working in South Approach; immediately South and adjacent to my airspace. A point out was given to me by the South Approach Controller. This coordination included the BE30 aircraft was to slightly penetrate my airspace by going to a 12 mile final. I observed the BE30 aircraft on the final to the adjacent airport so I turned my traffic inbound to [the Class C airport]. Then I observed the BE30 aircraft reverse course; toward my traffic. Apparently the BE30 aircraft needed to intercept his final from the north side. I was not aware; or at least didn't fully understand the requested route by the BE30 aircraft. Both my aircraft and the flight check aircraft were at 3;000 MSL. I immediately vectored my B757 away from flight check and initiated a climb. I was turning to a 160 heading to join the localizer and turned my aircraft away; to the right heading 220. I believed this heading would provide the necessary course divergence separation. Better coordination; in detail; of Flight Check requirements. I have for years wondered why flight check cannot provide a detailed request of their requirements to the facility; prior to their arrival. This would allow for proper planning and quite possibly better service to the flight check organization. Making this up as you go along can lead to confusion; (as I believe was the case here); and possibly create a less safe environment for all.

TRACON Controller described a conflict event during Flight Check operations noting that increased and detailed coordination between Flight Check and local ATC facilities is needed.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Upon entering aircraft  for preflight FA (Flight Attendant) 2&1 smelled strange burning smell in cabin. Specially strong near aircraft right window exit. Notified Captain; he smelled same odor. Captain turned off APU; smell persisted. Captain called maintenance and saw brown oily looking substance above window exit. FA's were onboard for approx 15-20 min and began to all notice mild symptoms; funny taste in mouth; mild headache; dizziness. FA's deplaned and sat at gate. Captain refused aircraft; FA's were removed from trip by manager.

A319 flight attendants reported a fume event during pre-flight. The Captain was notified; APU was secured and maintenance was summoned. Captain refused aircraft.


Routine traffic; it started with the departure of a Falcon 2000; departed on [a SID] departure. For noise abatement the aircraft start their turn on the departure at 1.8 DME and 2;000 FT. The Falcon started his turn but turned wider than normal. Tower has automatic releases and releases aircraft 5 miles in trail per the LOA. When the second aircraft departed; a Citation X; there was 4.51 NM between the two aircraft. The Citation started his turn at 1.8 DME but turned tight and it was observed that there was going to be an issue between the 2 aircraft. The second aircraft was potentially turning inside of the first aircraft. During this time; training was going on in the sector. I immediately noticed the issue and began telling my Trainee about the issue and that something needed to be done immediately. His first thought was to climb the first aircraft but only climbed him 1;000 FT. He gave traffic trying to get the traffic insight but the second aircraft was unable to initially get the traffic insight. The first aircraft started climbing as the second aircraft was also in the turn for [another SID] departure. In the turn it appeared that we did have the 3 miles required and seconds later we had the 1;000 FT requirement. At the same time; I also gave the second aircraft a heading to the right of 180 degrees to ensure separation. When the heading was issued the second aircraft reported that he had the traffic insight. I instructed the aircraft to maintain visual separation from that traffic and turn back to a 120 degree heading. While both aircraft are in the turn and flying different patterns it is hard to determine if separation is lost. It appeared to me that we did have three miles and 1;000 FT prior to the visual separation; however; it was reported that separation had diminished in the turn at one point to 1.84 NM and 400 FT as the aircraft was rapidly climbing. Neither aircraft reported a TCAS event as they were on different departure procedures and were continuing away from each other. There are many different methods that can be used to alleviate this scenario in the future. One of the issues was that training was in progress and although the Trainee was new to this sector he/she was not new to the area and I afforded too much latitude in his/her decision making. I should have taken control immediately and made the scenario work rather than let it develop as it did. This is a common problem with successive departures off [this airport]. All aircraft fly the departures a little differently which can cause problems when you are getting departures with minimal separation. One way to solve the problem is control the turns for the departures to ensure no misconceptions and all aircraft are under your control. Also; what should have happened immediately is that a traffic alert should have been given to ensure each aircraft involved start to listen up more effectively. During the event when the first aircraft was climbed he questioned the climb before starting the climb that costs valuable time. Another solution to fix the problem would have been to cap the altitude of the second aircraft to 4;000 while the second aircraft was at 5;000 just ensure that the second aircraft stayed away from the 4;100 MVA. This sector requires positive control at all times. It is situated right under [a Class B airport's] finals and just south of [a Class C airport's] finals; there is no room for error and precision is a must. Attention to detail and ensuring all aircraft are complying will all procedures at all times. Always use caution with business jets; they don't fly these abnormal departure procedures as often as the airliners. I know the hazards of the position well and was just discussing with my Trainee what to look for and how to fix it. The problem was I didn't take control soon enough and should have ensured separation first and discussed how he would have handled it later. This is not an abnormal situation. In Sector X it is notabout if this will happen again but when will this happen again and the answer is sooner rather than later. We have to constantly have a plan B for when it does. I know this and should have ensured separation before it ever got this far. I have learned a valuable lesson when training.

TRACON Controller providing OJT described a loss of separation event when a second departure turned inside the previous departure causing the conflict; the reporter acknowledging a failure to intercede in time.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 1; Flight Crew Total 274; Flight Crew Type 274

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Excursion Runway

I was doing 3 landings for currency before a planned [sight-seeing flight] with a passenger later that day. Everything was normal before takeoff. There was no evidence of a leak on the ground at the tie-down area and the plane braked fine during the brake check and taxiing to the runup area. I completed three landings: first one was a full stop with a taxi back (two left turns); second was a touch-and-go; and third was intended to be a full stop. On the third landing I realized that I was having a right brake failure. After using up more than half the runway and not wanting to go over the end of the runway I made a very shallow veer into the grass just to the left of the runway and came to a stop near the end of the runway. The tow truck was able to pull the plane out of the grass while still parked on the runway. There was no damage to person; plane or property. The plane has since been serviced and it was found that one of the brake lines had a hairline fracture; which resulted in a loss of pressure. The brake line was replaced and the plane has recently been returned to service after completing its annual.

C172 pilot reported a runway excursion occurred when the left brake failed on the landing roll.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 4500

Airport; Company Policy; Weather; Staffing; Human Factors

Our flight was being dispatched during severe weather events. The airport was experiencing moderate to severe turbulence and wind shear which was causing multiple diverts and go-arounds. The forecast was not to improve until well after we were gone. PIREPS from the inbound crews suggested a need to find a different route and altitude. One Captain said it was the worst he had ever seen. Needless to say we started a new plan to the route and altitudes. Dispatch had us on a track with moderate to severe turbulence forecast and our en route alternates; although legal; were not going to give us any help if we had a cargo fire and had to divert. I needed a new route and alternates. The response I got from Dispatch was 'I do not have time for this and since the planned route is legal just take it and leave me alone. I have other more important problems like the diverts.' My reaction was I cannot believe what I just heard. I tried again explaining that we needed alternates that worked for us and also a new route possibly south. Again; I was stonewalled. Dispatch said there was '...no time to take a look at a new route or alternates and once again to leave me alone as I have no time for you.'I called back at least half a dozen times trying my best to get some help from our Dispatcher. All the pilots in the room were listening to this and we figured out that we were all on our own and that the flight planning is going to be on us. Dispatch had decided that we were not important enough to help out in a situation that really needed extra care in planning and coordinating.I really hope this is an isolated incident. Dispatch markets themselves as the 'go to' guys in time of need. Today; we lost them completely. And we were told in no uncertain terms that we were to go away and take what was filed. Do not think; do not plan; and do not mutually agree on a safe plan. This is UNACCEPTABLE. International operations half way around the world need particular care in planning and conducting a safe dispatch and flight.

The Captain of a yet to depart Eastbound Transpacific flight during extreme weather conditions voiced concern over conflicts between himself and a harried Dispatcher who was too overwhelmed with higher priority situations to discuss new routes and alternates for the flight.


Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Descending to 9;000 feet on the BUNTS3 Arrival into PHL a target appeared on our MFD with no corresponding altitude. We began to look for the traffic and then received a TA alert from the TCAS and then spotted the target at our 12'oclock position within 3 miles. I then turned off the autopilot and turned at about 30-35 degrees bank to avoid colliding with the aircraft. The Captain called ATC and advised them we were maneuvering to avoid colliding with the traffic. After we were clear of the traffic we requested to direct BUNTS to return to the arrival. After we returned to course we asked ATC about the traffic and they said they didn't have a Mode C transponder and didn't think they were above 3;000 feet.Always be vigilant for traffic regardless if ATC advises you of them or not. Be especially vigilant if the traffic target does not have an altitude shown.

We were in VMC conditions and descending to cross BUNTS at 8;000. The TCAS showed a primary target a few miles ahead of us. We heard the 'traffic' call by the TCAS. We both started scanning even more in the 10-1 o'clock position that TCAS showed the traffic. I didn't have time to ask ATC; when I spotted the traffic at 12 o'clock and less than 3 miles; we were closing in fast (IAS was 250 knots). I called out 'traffic 12 o'clock' to the First Officer who was flying. He confirmed he saw it and immediately turned off Autopilot and made a sharp bank right to avoid the plane. As we turned right to overtake the plane; we passed about less than a 1/2 mile and passed through the same altitude (I could make out that it was a Piper Cherokee type plane with fixed gear). In the turn we notified ATC that we were deviating off course to avoid traffic at 9;500 ft traveling in a NE direction. ATC stated that he wasn't aware of any traffic in that area above 3;000 ft. We were cleared direct BUNTS by ATC after a lateral deviation of a few miles and continued to PHL uneventfully after avoiding and passing the traffic.

CL65 flight crew reported taking evasive action to avoid a collision with a light aircraft on arrival into PHL. Reporter stated the conflict aircraft had no altitude readout on the TCAS.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Planned fuel was 6;040 and got fueled to 6;200. We took off with roughly 6;000 pounds of fuel and minimum fuel was 5;564. So we left with well above minimum required fuel according to release. We were enroute and about halfway to 2/3 of the way through as I monitored our fuel burn. I noticed based on current conditions at that time (winds aloft were greater than planned and ATC requested Mach .77 or greater while .76 is planned); that we would be about 700 pounds under planned landing fuel. So as a crew we quickly setup for long range cruise and contacted ATC that we needed to slowdown even though they insisted we maintain a high speed. So we slowed to Mach .63 for long range cruise and then ATC descended us to 27;000 feet from 31;000 feet starting down early because we were slower than surrounding traffic.Then we get instructions shortly after to change arrivals keeping us away from other traffic. Once we finally got situated with the changes; dispatch beat me to notifying them and sent us an ACARS asking about the route changes and fuel. So we told them current plan and situation and based on the information back from dispatch; we had sufficient fuel as long as we maintained LRC (Long Range Cruise speed) to ZZZ allowing us to land with just 100 pounds of fuel more than planned and dispatch had us landing at roughly 1;850 pounds. At some point ATC also queried us asking about why we would be taking off with less fuel than we need to do the flight; even though we didn't. We actually took off with more fuel than planned. ATC was actually being unprofessional about the whole thing and giving us a hard time; because we asked to slow down to conserve fuel as stated over the radios in order to avoid getting into a bad fuel situation later or having to declare minimum fuel; and then he put us on different arrival and etc. It just created more workload and pressure by his attitude and questions as if it was our fault than it needed to be and ATC did not help with that even though they're there to help us.He made us sound bad on the radio as if we didn't know what we were doing about our fuel. Then sometime later while setting up for new arrival; ZZZ does a runway change as well after we got our LDR (Landing Distance Required) and brief; so that added more workload trying to update everything and re-brief in addition to ACARS taking longer than usual to respond. During all of that; Center then instructs us to level at 19;000 feet after getting the first descend via due to VFR traffic at 17;500 feet!  After traffic passes Center then gives us descend via again with immediate handoff to Approach in the same transmission. So First Officer does the handoff while I'm assessing and starting down seeing how quick we need to descend.  I saw we needed to do 6;000 feet or more a minute in order to meet the crossing restriction. I knew that wasn't going to happen so right as I was going to tell First Officer to let ATC know we can't make the restriction because of the level off earlier due to traffic as he was checking on; Approach immediately on initial contact asked if we would make the crossing restriction and we said no.He immediately then got upset and asked if we told the previous controller who would be Center and we said no because we didn't have time as we literally just switched and got the clearance at the same time and literally a few seconds later discovered we couldn't make it work. So we explained that to Approach but he wasn't accepting that and blamed us for not making the restriction or notifying Center before talking with Approach. But we literally had no time between the clearance and handoff at the same time and during the frequency switch that's when we noticed the issue and first transmission with Approach we weren't given the time to tell him that before he asked and queried us. So Approach then gives us two small delay vectors and rejoin arrival. But Approach said we should've told them early on we couldn't make itbut again we explained the situation and that we were not given that chance to do so. So we then continued on after that with no further issues.Insufficient fuel planning on release as it never reflects the actual fuel burn since release doesn't account for delay vectors or vectors on approach. The issues with ATC and last second changes to arrival and runways were a result of not having enough fuel at normal cruise followed by slow ACARS affected our ability to fly the planned arrival causing a higher workload for us and ATC which then caused the hiccup with crossing restrictions and with crossing traffic as well.  For fuel; we slowed for LRC and got a couple shortcuts once on the banker arrival. We were able to gain most of our fuel back because of LRC and landed with 2;200 pounds. For the crossing restriction; we just explained the situation to ATC and along with Center; Approach gave us a hard time and we notified them we couldn't do it; then we carried on with no further issues after that.For fuel planning and fuel contingency; we should be doing a minimum of like 500 pounds and 750-1;000 pounds extra on IFR days. Also for holding fuel; that should be 600 pounds minimum as we realistically burn more than 400 pounds on a go-around on a VFR day. As far as ATC goes after discussing with my First Officer as the situation that unfolded after another as a result; we maybe should have declared Minimum fuel early on knowing we wouldn't have enough unless we slowed down. But because of LRC and little to no delay vectors we determined to have enough hence why we never declared. However; if we declared min fuel early on that would've maybe given ATC more understanding even as frustrating as it may be; and allow us priority to slow and not have to descend via and etc. And that maybe would've avoided the issue with crossing at ZZZZZ1 and etc. One thing led to another; so next time maybe declare min fuel and decline a descend via to stay up high longer and to reduce workload. It was a good learning experience except for lack of professionalism and help from ATC.

Air Carrier Captain reported being unable to comply with ATC speed assignments due to fuel concerns and was unable to comply with a crossing restriction due to ATC stopping their descent for VFR traffic. The Captain reported Center and Approach Controllers criticized and questioned them on the frequency over both issues.


Indicating and Warning - Air Conditioning and Press.

After opening the passenger/cargo door at gate; received an OVBD COOL caution and a DISPLAY COOL FAIL status message that would not clear. I went through the QRH checklist and even after selecting 2 other fans; messages would not clear. I wrote it up and called Maintenance Control. In the middle of the write up; he interrupted me and asked if I had cycled the passenger door. No jet bridge was attached. I was told to do that so they could save the money from calling out Local Maintenance. I cycled the doors and the message cleared. I wanted to continue the write up but he had me mark 'Entered in Error' across my write up instead. I reminded him a couple of times that I believed the write up was required and I was disregarded. That same issue in flight; if not cleared; is a land at nearest suitable airport. On ground; no fan would clear the messages. I did not want to argue because Maintenance had labeled me as uncooperative in a previous; similar event. This situation seems to be a common; accepted; and expected sort of thing so I am not sure if this would be considered an issue but wanted to highlight it anyway.

A CRJ-200 pilot observed equipment cooling warning messages after the aircraft doors were open. He began to make a log book entry and contacted Maintenance Control. They were familiar with the problem and proposed a solution; to cycle the door. When this cleared the messages; Maintenance Control suggested voiding the write up to avoid the time and expense of a maintenance call. The pilot was concerned that this was against policy; but complied to avoid seeming uncooperative.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

[I became aware that] both of these flights were in the same airspace with the same call sign. The other Dispatcher notified ATC and [changed one of the flights] to mitigate the problem. Both flights had been planned already when [this dispatch shift] got in.We failed to [change the flight number of] one of the flights before both flights got in the air.We should not be assigning two flights out of two different stations the same call sign because there is no notification if it becomes an issue.

Air Carrier Dispatcher reported noticing two company flights were in the air simultaneously with the same flight number.


Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

At about one hour into the flight the flight attendants began to feel dizzy; nauseous; and light headed. All were affected at the same time. We were scheduled to continue on a second leg; but because we were all feeling extreme fatigue with headache; shortness of breath; and the C Flight Attendant was having chest pains. I contacted the Captain to notify him that the entire crew was ill. I told him that the C Flight Attendant reported that he smelled something that smelled like dirty socks; just prior to takeoff; but didn't say anything because he was new; and wasn't sure what the source of the odor might be. The two senior flight attendants had not noticed the smell. The Captain asked me what I wanted him to do; and I said it would probably be a good idea to call Flight Services to let them know that the crew is ill. He asked if we wanted paramedics. I said yes; we should probably be checked out; because we were all feeling the same symptoms. He suggested that we call MedLink; which I did; however the call was disconnected before we were able to relay information; and we were landing; so I had to take my position. Upon landing; paramedics met the flight; and examined the crew. The Captain left and went to another flight. He did not file any reports. Paramedics released the crew. Flight Services required us to go to the hospital to be evaluated. We took a taxi; and were at the facility for 5 hours. We were x-rayed; and blood was drawn. I asked the Doctor if they checked the blood for CO; he said no; we do not have a protocol; since 'this issue seems to be more political than medical in nature.' I have had a previous incident; which was verified by the Flight Deck as an APU fluid burn-off. I had the same physical symptoms: Severe headache; lasting for 2-3 days; nausea; and extreme fatigue; and temporary memory impairment.Cause is undetermined. The Captain did not file a report. All of the flight attendants were affected; with the same symptoms; but the flight deck crew did not validate any problems.Aircraft maintenance and proper understanding and education of the affect of exposure to toxic fumes.

A Lead Flight Attendant reported that all the flight attendants on a leg were extremely fatigued; dizzy; nauseous and light headed. After landing the flight attendant crew were met by paramedics and sent to a medical facility where the physician said the issue was political not medical. One Flight Attendant reported a dirty socks odor.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Fatigue

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Cleared for visual 27R and although familiar with PHL and clear sky; couldn't pick out runway initially. Vectors were to a visual inside FAF and picked up runway a bit late; selected autopilot off; but failed to turn off flight directors. Speed was managed so just as flaps three called for and selected by captain; speed increased to over speed flaps. Go around was conducted while nose was pulled up and power manually reduced and flight directors turned off. After vectors to final again; almost did the same thing as flight directors had been turned back on again while hand flying aircraft; when power came up again; captain turned off flight directors and landing was made. After shutting down at gate; we had [a] discussion about what we had done wrong and about remembering to shut off flight directors in manual flight unless right on course and slope. After all night flight with minimal to no sleep in previous 24 hours I was not on my game but should have caught flight directors. I let automation surprise me and got complacent going into a known field.Flying approximately once every two to three weeks on reserve since January I just feel comfortable in plane again before sitting for another few weeks. I therefore have flown mostly ILS and rarely hand fly visuals. After little sleep [the] previous day and flying all night I should have chosen to take ILS rather than short vectors for a visual. I need to fly more visuals at more appropriate times to become comfortable with them.

A fatigued Airbus First Officer attempted a hand flown visual approach to PHL Runway 27R; but was forced to execute a go-around after failing to turn the flight directors off. Autothrust advanced power on the approach which also resulted in a flaps overspeed.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

We landed without landing clearance from the Tower. Approach vectored us to intercept the localizer; just prior to intercepting localizer; Approach changed runway to the left runway. The Captain changed the runway in the FMS. I referenced the Jeppesen chart for new runway. Approach gave us another heading; then cleared us back to the right runway and the Controller apologized for confusion. The Captain updated the FMS. I referenced original chart for the right runway. We intercepted the localizer and were cleared for the approach. Approach instructed us to maintain 170 knots until the Final Approach Fix. I did not hear a frequency change to Tower as I was focused on configuring the aircraft to ensure a stable approach. After landing; we exited the runway. The Captain noticed he had not switched to Tower and he contacted Tower for instructions. Tower cleared us to cross and contact Ground.Approach initially cleared us to descend via the arrival except to maintain 11;000 feet. We were kept high throughout the arrival. We were cleared initially for the right runway; then just prior to intercepting localizer; we were cleared to the left runway and then again to the right runway. This resulted in increased task saturation and increased focus on configuring the aircraft due to the close proximity to the airport. Ensure both pilots confirm 'cleared to land' prior to landing.

[Report narrative contains no additional information.]

A321 flight crew reported they were not issued a frequency change to the Tower and landed without a clearance.


Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Distraction

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Electronic Device; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Approximately one hour after takeoff the number one flight attendant informed me that a passenger's computer started to smoke and get hot. The computer was shut down and the smoking stopped. I directed the flight attendants to run their high energy battery fires checklist. The computer was placed in an empty catering cart and placed in the rear of the aircraft. All checklist items were observed. At approximately 30 mins from landing the number one flight attendant called the cockpit to inform me that the computer was again getting hot. I [advised] ATC and was given traffic priority for an approach into [our destination]. Crash fire rescue was requested but never showed up. After parking at the gate again no fire personnel showed up. I decided to roll the catering cart with the computer off the aircraft and onto the jet bridge. We then deplaned all passengers.  Ground personnel removed the computer from the catering cart and returned it to the passenger.

An air carrier flight crew was advised by a Flight Attendant of smoke in the cabin associated with a passenger's personal computer. The computer was removed to a safe area and an uneventful landing was accomplished at the destination airport.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Troubleshooting

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

At takeoff; shortly after flaps retraction at 400 feet; the Stab Miscompare annunciator illuminated; and the Hyd Press and Master Caution Lights came on. We cancelled the Master Caution; contacted ATC to advise of our inability to accelerate beyond 200 knots due to an equipment malfunction; continued our climb to a safe altitude; ran the checklists; and then decided to return to the airport for a precautionary landing when there was a loud 'Bang' or thump heard and felt in the airframe when we disconnected the Hydraulic Press Circuit Breaker per the abnormal checklist.After running the associated checklists; which also included pushing the circuit breaker back in at the beginning of the approach; the Stab miscompare remained illuminated until we extended the flaps to 15-degress. The Hyd Press remained on; however; until we later extended the landing gear; at which time it extinguished. A normal landing was made on Rwy 26R and we taxied in and parked uneventfully.I'm not sure what we could have done to avoid this. There were no prior indications of a pending malfunction that we were aware of.

A CE-560 STAB MIS COMP alerted after takeoff followed by a HYD PRESS light so the abnormal checklists were completed and the flight returned to the departure airport.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9.1

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

I was working sectors combined. A tower called requesting IFR release of 2 aircraft; one; Aircraft X on the IFR ODP and the second westbound IFR. I released both aircraft. Aircraft X was the first aircraft airborne approximately 3.5 miles south of the airport heading NW bound. The ODP should have taken the aircraft east. Aircraft X checked in with me and I replied what are you doing and then issued a low altitude alert. I asked the Aircraft X if they had the terrain in sight and they replied yes. In the meantime Tower rejected the other aircrafts takeoff clearance; which would have put the two aircraft in the same proximity heading towards each other. Aircraft X was on the boundary of a 2;700/3;000 foot MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) heading NW bound. I didn't give the aircraft a heading to maintain; I was comfortable with direction he was heading while he climbed. I was summoned to the QA (Quality Assurance) office to review the event. We discussed the event and I was told by the team I did a good job. During the event the District Office informed QA that there was nothing done for a total of SEVEN minutes which was absolutely false! Today I was given a PRC from my immediate supervisor informing me that the District was forcing my facility to issue me a PRC for failing to issue a heading. This sector is a VFR/IFR training area and happens quite frequently. I would like the local flying academies first work on bettering pilots on the English Language prior to flying and second be held more accountable for their actions.

SCT TRACON Controller reported an aircraft flew the departure procedure incorrectly placing it below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were cleared for the ILS DME Runway 07 at MROC and cleared to descend to 7;000 FT on the LOC. About 20 NM from the airport inside LOPEZ descending through 9;000 just about to intercept the glideslope; we received an AURAL WARNING; from EGPWS; TERRAIN; TERRAIN; TERRAIN; PULL UP. We were in weather IMC and rain showers; so the First Officer; immediately performed the escape maneuver; and the warning ceased immediately. We requested a right turn to avoid thunderstorm buildup to the north and climbed initially to 12;000 FT then recleared to 14;000. We were vectored in sequence for another approach with no warning on the second approach. The minimum vectoring altitude where we were; based on raw data was 6;000 FT.

After holding due to weather and aircraft traffic at MROC airport we were on final for the MROC ILS Runway 07 approach. While on the localizer and at approximately 8;000 FT in a rain storm/IMC conditions near the TOMAS Intersection we received a 'terrain-terrain-pull up' aural warning. I was the pilot flying and initiated a mandatory 'escape maneuver climb' due to the IMC conditions. I climbed the aircraft and we eventually leveled off at 14;000 FT with ATC clearance. We returned to holding due to weather/aircraft traffic in the area and then completed an uneventful approach/landing into Runway 07 at MROC.

B737-800 flight crew approaching TOMAS Intersection at 8;000 FT arriving MROC in IMC receives an EGPWS terrain warning and executes the escape maneuver. A second approach flown in a similar manor produces no warning.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

We were in position for takeoff on 18R with thunderstorms in the vicinity when the wind rapidly shifted from southwest to West to northwest; and Tower announced wind shear advisory for 18R.  The wind (now approx. 320 deg. at 20 gusting 30) exceeded the tailwind limit for 18R so ATC turned the airport around.  While taxiing to 36L we set up the runway change and ran the performance numbers using the wind shear profile.  We briefed the departure; performed a new T-brief and reviewed the precautionary wind shear procedures including the First Officer (FO) use of Flight Path Vector (FPV) after setting TOGA power. We re-accomplished the Before Takeoff checklist.We were the first aircraft to be cleared for takeoff after the airport was turned around and by this time the sky and radar returns looked satisfactory for takeoff and an initial departure along the SID route.The initial takeoff roll was uneventful; the FO announced 'MAX POWER SET' and then stated 'NO Speed Reference System (SRS)'.  I was at first surprised by this. I glanced down to my FMAs and they looked normal including having SRS displayed.  I then looked over at the FO PFD and saw no Flight Module Annunciator (FMA) except thrust.  I became confused and concerned at this point because I didn't know if the FO's 'NO SRS' callout referred to mine as well (possibly an intermittent failure); or if there were problems with the air data system since he had not make the IAS crosscheck call out ('80 KNOTS').  Being concerned with the instrumentation status (air data system; SRS; and windshear guidance capability) and the potential for wind shear; I was not confident that it was safe to continue the takeoff and decided to reject.After clearing the runway and completing the checklists; we tried to establish the IAS at reject and agreed on a conservative estimate of 110 KT.  We knew it was above 85 KT because the autobrakes had engaged; but it didn't feel much faster than that; probably due to the split between GS and IAS due to the strong wind.We discussed what had occurred and concluded that the chain of events started with time compression due to the rapid rise in IAS owing to a combination of maximum power and the strong headwind component.  The FO's MAX POWER SET' call out was then delayed due to the characteristic engine lag in reaching the target power setting.  The FO had already selected FPV at this point and the disappearance of all his FMAs except thrust did not seem correct to him when he was looking for confirmation that SRS had engaged; so he announced 'NO SRS'.  This seeming anomaly contributed to his not making the '80 KNOTS' call out on schedule; then I announced REJECT before he could catch up and accomplish the IAS cross check which routinely follows the 'MAX POWER SET; SRS' call out.We discussed the system functionality and verified that both CAPT and FO FPVs and FMAs seemed to working properly.  We successfully tested the wind shear advisory system.  We concurred that there appeared to be no abnormality or fault with the aircraft; the RTO was due to human factors; and therefore no (Aircraft Maintenance Log) AML entry was needed regarding the cause of the RTO.We contacted Dispatch and Maintenance.  Maintenance advised that an RTO inspection should be made so we arranged to taxi back to the gate.  We would probably have needed to do this for fuel anyway because at this point we were close to the minimum [required dispatch fuel] on the Release.At the gate we entered the RTO in the AML and debriefed Maintenance.  I also telephoned the Duty Officer to notify him of the event.  The Duty Officer also discussed the FO's duty time situation with him.  We subsequently refueled and departed.The rapid rise in IAS and the FO's erroneous belief that SRS was not engaged led to the '80 knots' call out not being made in a timely fashion and the unusual announcement of 'NO SRS'; which resulted in confusion and concern on the part of the Captain (myself) that culminated in my erroneous conclusion that the aircraft may not have  safe to fly in the circumstances and my decision to perform an RTO.The FO stated that he felt that a contributing factor may have been his recent extended absence from line flying which produced a lack of recent experience with the wind shear takeoff profile in line operations.In future when performing a wind shear profile takeoff; I will brief the FO to not select FPV until after T-O power has been set and the 'MAX POWER SET; SRS' and '80 KNOTS' call outs have been made. I will; as well; brief the expected change to the FMAs when FPV is selected.

With thunderstorms in the area; A-300 Captain elects to use max power and FPV (Flight Path Vector) for the flight director mode. FPV is selected early by the flying First Officer and when SRS (Speed Reference System) disappears from the FMA's he announces this indication and the Captain elects to reject.


Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

After a normal departure and climb to FL270 we had been at cruise for approximately 25 minutes. During an assigned vector standard rate turn to the left we observed a loud banging sound coming from the left nose wheel area. The sound and banging increased in intensity. I contacted the Flight Attendant and she informed me that she heard and also felt vibrations at her station. We reduced thrust and airspeed to approximately 200 KTS but the banging sound continued. No abnormal engine or systems indications. We were unable to determine the cause of the sound and I declared an emergency. Getting the aircraft on the ground was a priority as we did not know if there was a possible structural problem that could affect flight control. We got a clearance to proceed to our divert airport and initiate descent to 2;000. At this time we where approximately 30 miles from the divert airport. Our destination was experiencing bad weather and was never an option considering the situation. Once we initiated the descent the loud banging sound began to subside. The Flight Attendant was briefed and I spoke to the passengers informing them of a problem that required us to land. I also reminded them to pay attention to flight attendant instructions in the unlikely event of an evacuation. On final approach I asked the Tower Controller to see if he could see anything unusual with regard to the aircraft or landing gear. He was not able to see anything. The aircraft touched down smoothly with a minimal descent rate. Aircraft came to a stop on run way and no abnormal indications observed. I elected to move the aircraft off the runway and requested we stop at a area that would allow emergency vehicles to inspect the aircraft. Coordinating with ATC/ Maintenance and/Emergency personnel. We where informed no visible damage to nose gear or nose wheel area was observed but instead they informed us that the left inboard main was blown out. After conferring with company Maintenance and my First Officer I decided the best plan of action was to deplane the aircraft at the gate since there was no threat to aircraft or passengers to do so. Company SOP's where followed and we ran the appropriate checklists. After deplaning neither myself nor any crew member spoke to anyone other than company and authorities. My only contact with any passengers was comments directed toward us; commending us for safely getting them on the ground. I was contacted by the company via telephone and I explained the nature of the emergency and course of action taken. Possible structural/aircraft integrity was questioned. I feel that my crew and I followed company SOP as well as prepared the aircraft; ATC and passengers as much as possible considering the nature of the problem. I would like to add that my First Officer and Flight Attendant did a very good job performing their duties. Their performance was paramount to the positive outcome of this event. I would follow the same course of action if faced with a similar situation.

During cruise flight an EMB-145 main landing gear tire exploded which resulted in material loudly banging the fuselage; so without knowing the sound's source; an emergency was declared and flight diverted to a nearby airport.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

Level at FL370 L AFT entry door light on. Pressurization was normal. Per QRH procedure; cabin crew was instructed to verify door handle was closed. It was slightly raised; and per procedure; cabin crew moved handle to closed position. Warning light initially extinguished; but re- illuminated. Cabin crew reported handle rose up again. Per QRH procedure; as handle was not in closed position; we elected to divert. Dispatch was notified and they concurred with divert decision.

B737-800 Captain reports a left aft entry door light on at FL370. The cabin crew finds the door handle slightly raised and moves it to the closed position extinguishes the light. The door warning light returns and the handle is found slightly raised again and elects to divert for maintenance.