Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 10900; Flight Crew Type 1600

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Fatigue

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 8300; Flight Crew Type 100

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was Captain; sitting right seat as the pilot not flying. I briefed the RUUDY 4 RNAV departure to the pilot flying. He disagreed with me concerning the initial altitude to which I had set our autopilot. He felt that we were required to maintain at or below 1;500 FT MSL to WENTZ; and to cross WENTZ at 1;500 FT MSL; so that the initial autopilot altitude to be set in the box should have been 1;500 FT. I felt that the altitude restriction of 2;000 FT MSL or as directed by ATC was the governing restriction. Ultimately; although he was still not certain; the pilot flying deferred to me and we set 2;000 FT MSL as the initial altitude hold for the autopilot. After takeoff; we attempted to comply with the noise abatement procedure for TEB. We were climbing steeply. We had climbed to 1;500 FT MSL about one mile before we reached WENTZ and continued our climb. When we reached approximately 1;700 FT MSL; ATC called and advised that we were supposed to have stopped our climb at 1;500 FT. The pilot flying immediately took the yoke and began a descent; but our momentum carried us to about 2;000 FT before we actually started back down.In thinking about why I may have been confused about a procedure that I have flown correctly many; many times before; I believe that I was fatigued and hungry (possibly hypoglycemic). I awoke at about XA00 to catch an airline flight which was scheduled to depart at XE06. The flight was delayed and actually did not depart until approximately XJ40. We arrived at LGA at approximately XN00. We then had to take a taxicab to TEB; which took about an hour. We then had to change the flight plan; pre-flight the aircraft; load passengers; brief and depart. Our actual departure was a little more than 15 hours after I had awakened. Also; I had only had a small sandwich for breakfast at XD00; and a small part of a sandwich at approximately XP00; as my total food intake for the day. Other members of our flight department; and I; have; on numerous occasions advised our owner that we wish to avoid fatigue in these situations; and he has consistently refused to airline us up the day prior to his planned trips and to put us up in a hotel. He has only authorized same day airline; usually by the least-expensive carrier. In the past; this has not resulted in any significant problems. But; it seems that this time; it may have. Because the pilot not flying was younger than I; with less total time; and because I was the 'Captain'; I feel that he deferred to me; even though he knew I was not correct. Neither of us thought to call ATC to resolve the confusion. This may be due to the fact that we were both fatigued and anxious to get home. I intend to go with my other pilots for additional refresher training in CRM to make sure that my other pilots feel comfortable countermanding any incorrect actions I may take. In addition; I intend to speak with my owner to insist that he provide us with necessary crew rest procedures to avoid fatigue. It is quite difficult; especially in a Part 91 situation; for a crew member to walk away from a flight; or from a job; if the owner refuses to adhere to safety considerations. It would be helpful if; under such situations; where the owner is advised of an unsafe condition; and refuses to address it; the FAA would file a notice of civil penalty against the owner; so that the owner; and not just the crew; has a stake in the outcome.

I was sitting left seat as the pilot flying. I am a Captain; but a more-senior Captain was sitting right seat as the pilot not flying. We were briefing the RUUDY 4 RNAV departure. I disagreed with the pilot not flying concerning the initial altitude to which he had set our autopilot. I felt that we were required to maintain at or below 1;500 FT MSL to WENTZ; and to cross WENTZ at 1;500 FT MSL; so that the initial autopilot altitude to be set in the box should have been 1;500 FT. The pilot not flying felt that the altitude restriction of 2;000 FT MSL or as directed by ATC was the governing restriction. Ultimately; although I was still not certain; I deferred to my more-senior Captain and we set 2;000 FT MSL as the initial altitude hold for the autopilot.After takeoff; we attempted to comply with the noise abatement procedure for TEB. We were climbing steeply. We had climbed to 1;500 FT MSL about one mile before we reached WENTZ and continued our climb. When we reached approximately 1;700 FT MSL; ATC called and advised that we were supposed to have stopped our climb at 1;500 FT. I immediately took the yoke and began a descent; but our momentum carried us to about 2;000 FT before we actually started back down.I awoke at about XA00 to catch an airline flight which was scheduled to depart at XE06. The flight was delayed and actually did not depart until approximately XJ40. We arrived at LGA at approximately XN00. We then had to take a taxicab to TEB; which took about an hour. We then had to change the flight plan; pre-flight the aircraft; load passengers; brief and depart. I feel that this may have made me less likely to have argued with the more-senior Captain about the interpretation of the approach plate. It also may have contributed to my reluctance to spend the time and the energy speaking with ATC to try to resolve the dispute about the proper interpretation of the SID; even though I felt strongly that my interpretation was correct.Even though I know from my CRM training that I need to countermand a more-senior member of the flight crew if I am certain that he or she is incorrect; I feel that I was hesitant to do so in this case due to my respect for the more-senior Captain and my fatigued state.

Corporate jet flight crew reports a disagreement over the proper altitudes to fly on the RUUDY 4 departure from TEB; with the junior Captain deferring to the senior Captain. WENTZ is crossed above 1;500 FT climbing to 2;000 FT and noted by ATC.


Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Dispatch

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

This was a Ramp Directed Loading flight. The ramp finalized the loading with two Hazmat items 1 and 2 on board and not secured with any bags. These items were separated one in pit 1 and one in pit 6. I invalidated the flight and contacted Dispatch to notify the crew and advise them they needed to return to the gate. [I] also contacted operations and advised them about the Hazmat and that the flight needed to return to secure both items with the required minimum 15 bags. The flight returned to the gate and the ramp loaded 15 bags in pits 1 and pit 6 to secure the Hazmat.

Load Control Agent directed taxiing aircraft to return to gate due to incorrect Hazmat load configuration.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

While at cruise FL360 received a 'tank 3 pumps off' alert. Consulted QRH which stated that the alert could be considered normal if fuel was less than 10;500 pounds in tanks 1 or 3 because of tip fuel transfer balancing. Crew then received alert 'TNK 3 tip trapped'; followed by a 'Tank 3 QTY low' alert. Tank 3 fuel quantity showed 7;000 lbs. Consulted QRH which said that tip fuel (5800 lbs.) was trapped and unusable. This put us in a possible emergency fuel state. Our destination was 160 miles away and closest suitable was ZZZ which was 50 miles away. [Operations Control] and [Maintenance Control] were consulted and decision was made to divert to ZZZ. [ATC was notified about] the low fuel situation. An uneventful approach and landing was accomplished. Landed with 14;000 on fuel gauges and estimated 8;500 with the trapped fuel deducted.The Number 3 tip tank that contains roughly 5;800 lbs of fuel did not drain into main tank as it normally should. Thus becoming fuel that is unusable. There is no crew action or QRH procedure for crew to perform to correct this. Usually caused by a stuck float/valve switch in tank.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier flight crew reported a fuel system tank anomaly causing fuel to become trapped and unusable and necessitating an immediate diversion.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.7

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was working sectors 17 & 18 combined with no D-Side.  This event occurred with sector 18 traffic.  I took a radar handoff from SoCal approach Manhattan departure sector on Aircraft X climbing on the Loop7 departure.  These aircraft are supposed to be 'climbing via' to 15;000 feet; or otherwise coordinated with altitude restrictions.  No coordination was completed on this handoff.  It was 'as normal' except that the aircraft did not meet the Loop7 crossing restriction at LAX of at or above 10;000 feet. The SoCal controller shipped the aircraft to me when he was approximately 8;800 feet climbing about two miles east of LAX (two miles beyond where the aircraft was supposed to be at or above 10;000 feet).  I immediately noticed an aircraft within SoCal's airspace; Aircraft Y; a southbound [type removed]; just a few miles in front of Aircraft X because the conflict alert was flashing.  Now Aircraft X was going to pass behind Aircraft Y; but not by five miles or even three. This is legal separation for SoCal approach; but this doesn't look right for Los Angeles Center (ZLA).  I told Aircraft X to expedite his climb through 12;000 feet just because that seemed like a 'safer' situation.  At this time Aircraft X informed me that he was not going to be able to meet his KEGGS restriction on the Loop7 departure; which was not a surprise because he had already missed the LAX restriction. At this time I called SoCal Manhattan sector and he asked me to turn Aircraft X north to avoid Aircraft Y and that Aircraft X was my control.  I told Aircraft X to turn left heading 360 and I continued to climb him.  The two aircraft missed by about three miles and about 500 feet vertically at their closest proximity.  I don't think there was any separation error for SoCal.  All of this happened below my airspace and within SoCal's airspace.There was also a B737 (I don't have the call sign) also climbing via the Loop7; that was not given to me with 'constant or increasing' separation (which is required by LOA) and I had to vector him to maintain positive separation with Aircraft X.  This is a common problem with SoCal approach at this sector. The SoCal approach controller should have verbally coordinated that Aircraft X wasn't 'climbing via' or he should have recognized that the aircraft wasn't meeting the climb via restrictions.  Either way it requires verbal coordination that did not happen. The SoCal controller should not have shipped the aircraft so soon; especially with the Aircraft Y in front of him.  I'm not convinced that the SoCal controller was positively separating the two aircraft because he asked me to turn Aircraft X. The impression that I have is that he was surprised by the situation.  I think that it was happenstance that Aircraft X was passing behind the course of Aircraft Y.  All conflicts must be resolved prior to frequency change; and in my opinion that didn't happen here.As far as the overtake situation with the B737 behind Aircraft X (which is a common situation); a simple fix for that would be to put a 250 knot speed restriction on all Loop7 departing aircraft.

A Los Angeles Center (ZLA) Controller reports of receiving a LOOP7 departure off of LAX that did not make its crossing restriction of 10;000 feet over the LAX VOR. C182 traffic that was en-route near the LAX VOR was a conflict and the LOOP7 departure had to be vectored to miss the traffic.


Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

My first IFR departure from the Front Range airport. FTG was doing IFR departures from Runway 8. As noted in the ATIS. I called tower and requested air taxi to the A6 taxiway for a mid-field departure. I directed [the Pilot Flying (PF)] to land the aircraft on the A6 taxiway into the wind which was strong out of the East. Which is why I wanted the midfield departure as I wanted to avoid a downwind air taxi to the approach end of Runway 8. My mind set was a runway departure. But the tower was expecting a departure from the taxiway as most all of our aircraft depart in that manner. When we were cleared for takeoff I directed PF to turn towards the runway as he was beginning a departure from over the grass between the runway and the taxiway. He did a clearing pedal turn (good for him) towards the runway and I looked over my left shoulder to see a Cessna directly overhead on a departure from the runway. I announced stop over the intercom and we did. We then heard the tower calling traffic to the departing Cessna that a helicopter was departing the Alpha taxiway. Then we both realized that our take off clearance was from the taxiway not the runway. We are not sure if we crossed the hold line but that is a possibility. The rest of the flight was uneventful.We both should have listened more intently to the tower communications and not assume the clearance was for the runway. Also during our briefing we discussed that if ever one of us is confused about anything that pilot should let the other pilot know about it. We were both confused. Had we admitted that earlier the potential runway incursion might not have happened.One last thing. We both were very intent on clearing before entering the runway. PF did the clearing turn and I looked. There for we shall continue to do those things we learned in flight school.

Helicopter flight crew reported a takeoff from a taxiway that may have drifted towards the runway being used by a fixed wing aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 4; Flight Crew Total 6642; Flight Crew Type 2073

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I was 500 feet high at ZZZZZ on the ZZZZZ1 RNAV SID from ZZZ. My flying skills and scan have degraded because I haven't flown for 6 months prior to this trip because of COVID-19.

Air carrier First Officer reported altitude deviation on a departure and cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.


Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Airport; Company Policy; Human Factors

Taxied to Gate in BOS. Made left turn into gate. Captain examined safety zone and announced that it was clear. There was a Marshaller at the nose and none on aircraft right wing. I could not see if there was a Wing Walker on the aircraft left wing. Approach to parking on the J-line was uneventful. After the aircraft was parked; Ramp personnel informed us that the left wing lower scimitar winglet had contacted a catering truck that was parked just outside the safety zone adjacent to the winglet. The contact left a scrape on the side of the catering truck and bent the pointed tip of the lower winglet. Before a determination of just how close the catering truck was to the edge of the safety zone could be made; the truck was driven away. Ground equipment taller than the height of the lower scimitar should not be parked next to the safety zone adjacent to the end of the wing. This reduces the margin for contact error. Tall equipment should be kept forward of the wing.

I was Captain and the aircraft was an -800 series with scimitar winglets. After an uneventful landing in BOS; we taxied toward the Gate. It was a slow taxi through the alley between terminals since there were aircraft parked at terminals to our right as well as our terminal on the left. My First Officer and I visually (and verbally) cleared the Safety Zone as we approached the J-Line. We noticed the normal hazards as we cleared the safety zone; i.e.: belt loaders; baggage carts; provisioning trucks and Ramp Personnel; and all were outside the safety lines. As I was squaring up on the J-Line; I turned my attention to the Marshaler; with lighted wands; and followed his instructions to our normal stopping spot. After completing our Engine Shutdown Checklist; the Agent and either the Marshaler or other Ramp Agent approached and advised us that the lower portion of the left scimitar winglet had clipped the side of the provisioning truck that was parked just outside the safety zone lines. I went out to inspect the winglet and found some minor damage to the lower tip of it and a scrape on the side panel of the Provo truck. We then informed Dispatch; Maintenance and the Chief Pilot on Call of the incident and made a logbook entry of the event. I do not recall if there were Wing Walkers or not; however; the Marshaler never gave any indication that we were too close to the catering truck and did not issue any kind of instruction to stop prior to our stop box. We were not rushed or distracted and were at a very slow taxi speed as we approached the gate. After inspecting the winglet damage; I assessed the status of the aircraft in relation to the J-Line and it appeared that there was a very slight tail drift to the left. After the aircraft was parked; it appeared that both sides of the aircraft wingtips and winglets were inside the safety lines. I believe this was a contributing factor; as well as the Marshaler guiding us into the catering truck; and the general positioning of the catering truck in such close proximity to the Safety Zone. I've always maintained that taxiing the aircraft; especially in tight quarters with personnel and equipment all around; is one of the most difficult challenges we face as Pilots. I now have an even greater respect for entering the Safety Zone and taxiing the aircraft in general. I believe that it's possible that this particular gate area may not be of sufficient size to accommodate -800 aircraft with scimitar winglets. If faced with this situation in the future; I will shut down the engines and have the Ground Crew tow us into the gate.

B737-800 flight crew experienced aircraft damage during gate arrival when the left scimitar winglet contacted a catering truck. The truck was parked outside the safety zone but very close to it and the aircraft; under a Marshalls direction; was on the lead in line.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Electronic Device

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Passenger's POC (Portable Oxygen Concentrator) low/neg battery level required the use of 2 POBs for duration of flight. Under this circumstance; could exception be made to charge POC battery using onboard 120V outlet?

A Flight Attendant used the aircraft's 120VAC system to charge a passenger's two Portable Oxygen Concentrator batteries inflight. She was uncertain about her company's electrical use policy.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 164; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 9411

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Work Refused; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

RTO (Rejected Takeoff) around 88 knots due to IAS disagree on both Captains and FO (First Officer) side. FO airspeed lagged about 15 knots and Capt's AS (Airspeed) began accelerating rapidly. Unable to determine correct V1; Vr and V2 speeds accurately. Vendor maintenance with coordination from ZZZ Maintenance indicated all tests and visual inspections of pitot and static ports were clear and tests indicated no fault. I refused the aircraft to be signed off for flying by Maintenance. [Maintenance Control] sent a team of mechanics and discovered with in depth inspection debris and ash in pitot static system and defective ADM (Air Data Module.)

B737 Captain reported rejected takeoff due to airspeed anomalies.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 222; Flight Crew Type 8000

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While at cruise altitude FL400; aircraft encountered severe turbulence. This caused the aircraft to momentarily exceed our Mach Max Operating speed along with aircraft flight path deviations. The aircraft then encountered a rapid decay in indicated airspeed while still encountering severe turbulence. We [advised ATC] and exercised Captain's emergency authority and began a descent to regain critical airspeed and give the aircraft a larger margin of safety in which to operate. We descended 4000 feet in order to regain our loss of airspeed; once the aircraft was no longer in severe turbulence and completely controllable; we coordinated a new cruise altitude with Air Traffic Control and cancelled our emergency status.We had our weather radar operating with a tilt below our flight path. Our radar indicated no weather on our flight path or within 50 miles of our flight track. Access to our internet weather program would have possibly given us a clearer picture of weather that was not being depicted on our aircraft weather radar.

In retrospect; the moon was not present so shadows of cumulus clouds were hard to make out. We inadvertently flew right over the top of a very small but forming cumulus. The radar did not pick it up; if we had the tilt lower it may have given us a heads up. Having used an auto tilt is of course safer; but we could have made more frequent sweeps of the tilt.

B737-700 flight crew reported encountering severe turbulence at FL400.


Boarding; Service; Safety Related Duties; Deplaning

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Attendant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

While working Aircraft X ZZZ-ZZZ1; I became concerned for the health and well-being of my flying partner.  She displayed numerous symptoms of severe illness including: persistent coughing; sneezing; shortness of breath; weakness; and sweating profusely.  Prior to starting the service; I witnessed [flying partner] remove her tote bag from the galley cart and take several pills.  [Flying partner] then had difficulty pushing and pulling the beverage cart with assistance.  It strained her and seemed very difficult for her to speak with customers; so I had prepared a sign in blue marker that read; 'What do you want to drink?' and listed beverages.  After picking up trash; [flying partner] repeatedly placed her used gloves on top of the galley counter.  Upon descent into ZZZ1; I noticed the orange strap at door 2R was not attached and reminded her to affix it.  At that time; she was coughing and was no longer wearing a mask at all.  I expressed genuine concern for her well-being and was uncomfortable flying with someone who appeared so unwell.

Flight Attendant reported another Flight Attendant was ill during the flight and not able to wear the face mask at all times; especially when coughing.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 17

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Aircraft X called ready to go for touch and go. I cleared Aircraft X for takeoff with right close traffic. I did not get the ATIS and I did not identify the position I was at (LHD tower). I did not hear Aircraft X say MRI tower. I had another aircraft on frequency cleared to land on runway 32. I was trying to obtain the position of Aircraft X. I did not see them and cancelled their takeoff clearance and had them hold short. They read back 'cancelling' instead of hold short. I asked the arriving aircraft if they see the aircraft awaiting departure because I did not have them in sight. Aircraft Y stated that they did not have them in sight either. Once Aircraft Y landed Aircraft X said was he cleared to land we were cleared for takeoff (at this time I had other controllers in the tower helping me find this aircraft that no one could see. I informed Aircraft X that they were told to hold and cancel takeoff clearance. Aircraft X said sorry. I verified that the aircraft was at LHD. Aircraft X stated yes we are located at LHD. I cleared Aircraft X for takeoff runway 32 I still did not observe the aircraft. Aircraft X stated that they were departing for LHD at this time I told Aircraft X to 'say your position please.' I identified that I was LHD tower and had given her a clearance for takeoff and I did not see her and to just verify her position. At this time Aircraft X stated that she was on the wrong frequency 'I'm sorry'. I again asked Aircraft X to say position; at this time she said that she had taken off from MRI. I immediately called MRI tower and advised them that Aircraft X was on my frequency and had just taken off. They asked that I send her to MRI frequency I stated I will after I issue the brasher warning. I issued the warning but Aircraft X just said affirmative and switched frequency back to MRI. Aircraft X landed at LHD.Since LHD and MRI frequency are so alike 126.8 and 126.0 many student pilots are confusing the frequency for MRI and LHD.

Aircraft Z was in the closed traffic pattern cleared touch and go runway 25; with several other pattern and itinerant aircraft. At the approximate time Aircraft Z should have been on short final I rescanned the runway and final approach. I observed a dark blue aircraft stopped on the runway approximately 300 feet from the threshold. Aircraft Z was issued a go around over the threshold at approximately 20 feet AGL. Aircraft Z was observed swerving to the left to avoid the aircraft on the runway. The next aircraft in the pattern was sent around and the others issued control instructions away from the runway.The aircraft on the runway was identified as Aircraft X which had been taxied to the runway by ground control for pattern work. Aircraft X would not respond to numerous radio calls from Local or Ground. Another tower team member also attempted light gun signals. After some time Aircraft X departed without clearance and established communications two miles off the departure end of the runway. Aircraft X requested direct Lake Hood and was instructed to hold over West High for coordination. Aircraft X was observed on RADAR entering LHD airspace and cutting in front of traffic who had to maneuver into Merrill airspace. Aircraft X was instructed to contact LHD tower.After listening to audio recordings; it was revealed that this was a pilot deviation due to the pilot communicating with Lake Hood tower rather than Merrill Tower. Merrill controllers should continue to remain vigilant and scan runways when aircraft are on final approach.

LHD and MRI Controller's report of an aircraft at MRI airport on the ground; talking to LHD Controller's asking for takeoff clearance. LHD Controller clears aircraft for takeoff and at MRI the Controller sends an aircraft around because the aircraft was close to the runway.


Maintenance ferry flight; no passengers on board. On visual approach at 1;800 feet Pilot Flying called for gear down. Gear failed to extend with accompanying ECAM message L/G GEAR NOT DOWNLOCKED along with RED UNLKD lights illuminated in landing gear position indicators. Coordinated with Tower - we maintained 1;800 feet and flew an extended traffic pattern. Performed non-normal methodology and ECAM action. Unable to extend landing gear after second attempt. Proceeded to L/G GEAR NOT DOWNLOCKED abnormal procedure. Followed procedure and attempted a total of five normal gear extensions with QRH directed wait time between gear cycles. Gear failed to extend normally. Proceeded to L/G Gravity Extension checklist and performed gravity extension. Gear extended with all gear positions indicating down and locked. Requested ARFF. Landing and taxi was normal with no further issues. Requested ARFF follow us to ramp for safety precaution. Discrepancy was entered in [the logbook] and advised maintenance facility of issue. Filed report with Dispatch post flight on the ground.

[Report narrative contained no additional information]

An A321 flight crew reported the normal gear extend system failed to deploy the landing gear; so they used the backup gravity system.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

When being cleared to taxi to our gate; the ground controller said 'right on Zulu right on alpha taxi into gate at November; give way to the 88.' We interpreted this to mean give way at November. The controller meant give way at Zulu. The controller said; 'I said give way to the 88'. I answered giving way. The pilot of the 88 then said; let them go ahead. The controller agreed and we continued to our gate.The clearance did not seem confusing but unfortunately we misunderstood the instructions. The controller was not clear about where we were to give way. There were several 88s within sight. I will ask the controller where to give way when they give ambiguous instructions.

A pilot taxiing to the gate reported LGA Ground taxi clearance included giving way to a MD-88 at 'N' which he thought happened but the controller meant a different MD-88 at Taxiway 'Z.'


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

A C560 was departing BFI; checked on the frequency climbing to assigned altitude of 2;100. I advised them to expect a 'step up climb' due to a heavy B767 departing SEA 4 miles in trail. Soon after RADAR identification; the C560 advised that they were responding to a TCAS RA and descending 'back down' to 2;100. When I observed the C560's Mode C; it indicated 2;300 and I issued a traffic call referencing an unidentified VFR target indicating 1;600 at 1 o'clock and 1 mile. On initial contact; I did not observe the VFR traffic as a potential conflict for the C560. The traffic was no longer a factor and the C560 continued on their route and climb without further incident. I am not certain that BFI Tower issued a traffic advisory to the C560 prior to frequency change while both aircraft were still within the lateral limits of BFI's Class D airspace. Better communication between me and the BFI Tower Controller or between BFI Tower and the C560 might have prevented the TCAS RA.

S46 Controller described a TCAS RA event between an IFR BFI departure aircraft and an unknown VFR aircraft operating nearby; the reporter listing less than complete communication between ATC personnel and the VFR aircraft.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Type 25000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Type 5000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

We were cleared for the visual approach to Runway 35R at 9;000 feet. The DRUMM approach segment was to 9;000 feet; and we started down to 7;000 feet for FRONZ approach segment. ATC alerted us of a MVA altitude alert. We corrected up to the altitude of 7;500 feet as ATC said that altitude was needed for that segment. We were cleared for the visual and were following the step down altitudes.I contacted one of our managers here at the Company; and they followed up on it for me and there was no documentation noted by ATC of any issues or violations. Company Manager said that we might have touched the Class B airspace limit and that would trigger the same alert per DEN ATC. The rest of the flight was uneventful.

We were at 9;000 feet MSL approximately three miles east of DRUMM on the visual to Runway 35R. We had Runway 35R in sight and were cleared the visual. Abeam DRUMM we started a descent to 7;000 feet MSL. We leveled at 7;000 feet in between DRUMM and the FAF FRONZ. ATC informed us of a low altitude alert and advised the MVA was 7;500 feet. We were approximately 1;200 feet above the terrain and out of caution climbed up to 7;500 feet and intercept glidepath shortly later. No GPWS alerts occurred.

Air carrier flight crew reported receiving altitude alert from ATC on approach to DEN airport.


Communication Breakdown; Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Gate Agent / CSR

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport; Company Policy

I was completing the last round trip of six days of flying. My Flight Attendant had a maintenance item that was concerning and put a hold on boarding. Now I had ticket agents; ground agents and Operations all hounding me to board. I had to call the maintenance item in and wait for someone to come out for that. My workload and task saturation was severely increased at this point. When it came time to do my job finally; we were able to complete our tasks after numerous interruptions. I did look over the entire release; weather and NOTAMs reviewing them with the First Officer. When we arrived at our destination the agent told me the runway was closed and we needed to see how many passengers we could take. At this time I told her they were doing construction and it wasn't closed. I went back over the release and saw where the closer was buried in the end of the NOTAMs. I saw all the other information for the runway but missed the obvious. I noticed that we were planned by the Dispatcher to land on that closed runway and did not catch it until after we had landed.The pressure and constant interruption from all the agents caused me to overlook something I normally would find. I did read the NOTAMs; but for some reason did not see where it said the runway was closed. This is why I checked off the arrival runway on the release thinking we were originally planned to land on a runway that was opened at the time of our arrival. I did not plan or intend to make this oversight; but simply let the distractions overcome me from seeing this clearly. The constant distractions and pressure the company puts on us to make turns or meet their metrics is becoming a problem that is trading safety for meeting metrics. It makes it harder for me to do my job safely when there is more than one person constantly putting pressure on you to make the aircraft move at all cost. The company during the initial brief does not have any First Officer look at or even brief the NOTAMs for the arrival; enroute or departure city. It seems like they have not been trained to include this in their brief or I don't even know if they even are trained to look at them. This is something I have been noticing since the transition. This now places the sole burden on the Captain to catch everything and takes away another set of trained eyeballs from going over the full release.

Air air carrier pilot reported they overlooked a runway closure in the NOTAMs.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

While climbing through 16;000 feet we were given a turn direct to the [destination] airport as well as a climb to 19;000 feet. I executed a direct to in the FMS and then selected 19;000 feet. It was at that time that the aircraft began to feel like it was skidding. The Captain made the comment that the aircraft felt like something was wrong and it felt like we were losing an engine. We checked all the engine gauges and all were with in normal limits. We then looked at the inclinometer and found that the aircraft had full left ball. It was at the time [I] initiated rudder hard over immediate action items. Very shortly after pressing and holding the quick disconnect button we received master warning EICAS messages of dual pitch trim failures. The Captain made the decision to return to [departure airport]. We [advised ATC]; and it was at that point we made a descent to 11;000 feet and requested vectors. I was purely focused on controlling the airplane because it was continually wanting to go in to a cross-controlled condition. The aircraft required heavy left rudder input. The Captain ran the QRH for the pitch trim failures first; [and] he was able to get them back. Once that problem was fixed we ran the QRH for the rudder hard over and we kept that system off because they were not working properly after running the procedure. We then notified the Flight Attendant. We informed her we would be touching down in 15 min and that there would not be an evacuation. We then set up for approach. There was a slight crosswind but we elected to land on [the] largest runway; we also elected to land flaps 22 so that we could keep the speed up to maintain more rudder authority. We were able to land the aircraft safely and taxi the aircraft to the gate.The threats we had to deal with were two simultaneous failures; one of which (the rudder) did not present in an obvious manner. The only error that we as a crew made was we did not brief how were going to transfer controls after landing or how we would react if we lost control on the ground.I feel that the crew as a whole acted to near perfection in this situation. We took our time handling the problems. I focused solely on flying the airplane while the Captain worked on the checklist and communications. We worked through the problems efficiently and were able to land the aircraft safely.

EMB-145LR First Officer reported returning to departure airport after experiencing issues with the rudder and stabilizer trim.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

This is a report of a wake turbulence encounter at 10;000 FT during arrival into LAX near the SMO VOR. Shortly after leveling at 10;000 FT and slowing per ATC request; I encountered wake turbulence from a preceding aircraft. TCAS placed the aircraft at our 12:00 and about 10 miles. Initially; the wake encounter was very mild with only slow rolling left and right. When it persisted; I slowed my airspeed 10-15 KTS and requested a climb. Very soon the encounter worsened and I disconnected the autopilot when faced with 30 degrees of bank left and right with large control inputs required to maintain level flight. A second request for a climb was made when positive aircraft control began to deteriorate. Altitude control required a power increase to maintain altitude. I advised ATC that I was climbing to get out of a wake turbulence encounter. At about 10;300 FT; positive control resumed and I leveled off at 10;500 FT. I advised ATC that I was resuming a descent back to 10;000 FT when they provided a right vector away from my previous track. I was then advised by ATC that I was following a B777. Winds at altitude were calm. This may have had an impact on wake dissipation.

At level flight; experienced moderate to severe aircraft roll from a preceding heavy B777; resulting in a rapid roll to 30 degrees. The Captain required almost full control deflection to stop the aircraft from rolling. The B777 was about 7-8 miles in front of us and descending.

Q400 flight crew reported encountering wake vortex following a B777 into LAX that resulted in significant roll. Captain deviated from assigned altitude to assure control.


Improperly Operated; Failed; Malfunctioning

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Student

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Was flying straight and level at 6;000 feet. layer of clouds 1 mile ahead asked ATC for deviation off course. ATC approved 15 degree left or right of course before I could deviate was in clouds was straight and level for a few minutes then due to turbulence aircraft was banking to left was trying to get back to straight and level but then started losing altitude when that happened I notified ATC 'unable to maintain altitude and was calling out my flight level.'Once I got positive control of the airplane again informed ATC and then ATC asked me if I want to return to VRB or FPR so I asked for a return to my home base FPR. Miami Center then decided to [advise] for me at FPR and gave me non Gyro vectors. Once my Heading indicator seemed to be working fine I resumed my own navigation and asked for a low approach over 10R so that the Tower could check my landing gear for any damage. Once I was given an all clear from ATC I made right traffic for 10R and landed safely.

PA-28 pilot reported loss of inflight control due to entering IMC; turbulence and a heading indicator malfunction.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

While operating a flight we were approximately one and a half mile final to the runway when the Tower Controller cleared a business jet for takeoff. The First Officer commented on the Tower clearance and I verified I heard the same clearance. Then we saw the jet cross the hold short line; entering the runway. At that time; I called for the go-around. The First Officer notified the Tower. The Tower gave us instructions for a right visual pattern for the second attempt at an approach and apologized for the error. We completed the second visual approach without incident. Post flight; I sent an ACARS message to the Dispatcher; advising them of the go-around and the fact that we only used TOGO thrust. The Tower Controller cleared a business jet for takeoff on the runway as we were on one and one half mile final.

CRJ-900 Captain reported executing a go around when the Controller cleared an aircraft for takeoff as they were on short final.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 149; Flight Crew Type 3839

While turning onto the lead in line to the gate; a maintenance pickup failed to yield to our aircraft; forcing our abrupt stop to avoid a collision. LGA Ramp was notified. Airport authority personnel met the aircraft at our request. The driver of the vehicle was cited by the airport authority. Company Operations was also contacted.

Air carrier Captain reported making an abrupt stop during taxi into the gate at LGA due to a conflict with a vehicle.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

I was in the cab and had only been monitoring LC-2 (Local Control) for a few minutes when I observed two separate losses of separation with Aircraft X. First Aircraft Y was cleared to land on RY 25R and was still airborne approximately 50 feet AGL abeam the closed runway 34R when Aircraft X was cleared for take-off RY 30 from LUAW (Line Up And Wait). He was instructed to turn left just after he touched down (when you hear the audio in FALCON remember that when LC-2 instructed Aircraft Y to turn left onto K2; he had just touched down) while Aircraft X was on the role RY30. The second loss of separation was with Aircraft Z the number 2 aircraft on final RY 25R he was over the number of RY 25R as Aircraft X crossed the intersection of RY 25R on RY 30.I believe he was trying to get Aircraft X out for some reason; because I kept hearing him say that he got the release at the worst possible time. I believe the ATC's was aware of the location of all of the aircraft; but spoke as though nothing had happened. The FLM (Front Line Manager) was working CD (Clearance Delivery) combined with CIC (Controller in Charge) and I do not believe he was in any way aware of the events that just took place right next to him. I waited a few minutes after LC-2 was relieved and left the tower to file this report. Although FALCON REPLAY is not as good as eyes on; I thought it might help. I don't know what to do about this; I was watching the whole thing; and I believe the ATCs was completely aware of the rules he was breaking but did it anyway.

LGB Tower Controller reported two losses of separation by the same Local Controller; who in the reporters mind knew the correct procedure; but did not apply it.


Our company preaches 'safety first' heavily yet [directs employees to conduct] practices--clearly in an effort to save money--that do not put safety first; such as the procedure at ORD which states: 'AIRCRAFT CAN AND WILL BE DE-ICED AT THE GATE WITH THE JETBRIDGE ATTACHED AND THE MAIN CABIN DOOR OPEN.' Am I really the only person who thinks this is unsafe? How many passengers and/or employees need to get de-icing fluid sprayed in their face before the company changes this procedure? De-icing fluid is toxic. I have already flown with a crewmember who personally knows of someone sprayed with de-icing fluid because of this practice.

A B737 First Officer expressed incredulity at a company directive advising that aircraft 'can and will' be de-iced at the gate with the jetway in place and the passenger door open. He stressed the risk of personal injury; the toxicity of the fluids involved and his belief that the procedure was implemented solely as a cost saving measure with safety relagated to a subordinate concern.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 151; Flight Crew Type 537

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Type 433

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Crew received a 'Terrain; Terrain' warning on a visual approach to 31L at PSP in VMC conditions at night. Pilot Flying disconnected AutoPilot; went to Takeoff Go-around thrust; stowed speed brakes; and performed the escape maneuver approximately 18-20 miles east of the airport. Crew had the airport in sight at 21 miles and was offered and accepted a visual approach to 31L. Occurrence was at 6;600 feet MSL and maneuver was terminated at approximately 7;500 feet. Crew then proceeded direct to CEMEK and descended via the charted RNAV Visual 31L to a normal landing. Descent rate at time of the occurrence was 1;000 FPM. Descent on the visual was on a normal 3 to 1 descent profile for landing.

An A319 flight crew reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning on a night visual approach to PSP Runway 31L.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 6000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

About 45 minutes after departure we received a PACK R EICAS message. The First Officer was pilot flying and the Captain was pilot not flying; the Captain elected to take control of the aircraft and commanded the First Officer to run the PACK R Checklist. This checklist was unsuccessful in resetting the pack and the right pack remained failed. Per the checklist; the pack was switched off. During this time at the Captain's request I brought up the MEL for the right pack on my iPad and the MEL was read and discussed by the four of us. The Captain contacted Dispatch via SatCom; and Maintenance was brought online. Continuing the flight was discussed; and several Captains further up the operational control chain were consulted. It was my belief that the flight should be aborted and returned to the departure airport; since we were early in the flight; and loss of the left pack would result in an unpressurized situation. However; it was pointed out that in the event of loss of the left pack the aircraft could descend to a lower altitude and proceed to an alternate; unpressurized. I acknowledged this plan of action but was unhappy with it; since we were going to be in a very remote area of the world and unpressurized polar operations was not something I felt should be considered so early into a long (15:40) flight. As we all know; MEL's are only controlling on the ground; but I have always considered them as advisory in nature for enroute failures; since there are reasons for limitations put forth in a MEL. In the case of a pack failure and MEL 21-51-01; there are a couple significant limitations that kept bothering me during my rest period. Under Spec Notes; E states that the aircraft must remain within 60 minutes of a suitable airport; G states that the Overhead Flight Attendant Rest area be considered inoperative; and ETOPS are not authorized in the flight planning restrictions. At the end of my rest period I realized what was bothering me. At the time I (incorrectly) believed that failure of the operating left pack would have left us unpressurized; and I finally realized that a left pack failure would have not only left us unpressurized; but it would have also left us without cabin heat. If cabin heat could not be maintained and an alternate landing field was not nearby or unsuitable except in dire emergency (such as the Russian strips); the cold air temps passengers and crew would be subject to could have caused significant physical distress. By the time I realized this; my break was almost over and we were well beyond a return. I discussed the matter with the other flight crew members and we all agreed it was a factor that was missed earlier in the decision being made to press on with the flight. Digging into the AOM during my layover; I was reminded me that if one pack is inoperative and the operating one fails the operating pack will go into Standby Cooling Mode to maintain cabin pressure. However; it is unclear if cabin temperature can be maintained; and this could be a significant factor if the divert field was a considerable distance away. If cabin heat cannot be maintained and an alternate landing field was not nearby or unsuitable except in dire emergency (such as the Russian strips); the cold air temperatures passengers and crew would be subject to could cause physical harm. I believe the decision to continue was flawed based on the fact that the MEL considered the OFAR to be inoperative for normal operations; and the possibility that failure of the remaining pack may have resulted in a pressurized but unheated aircraft. Being only 1 hour into the flight; I think we should have returned for this malfunction. I request we examine single pack operations/failure and determine if the decision was correct or not; so that if this situation arises again we can be better prepared.

B777 Relief Pilot reports losing a pack early in in a 15 hour flight. The decision is made to continue the flight and the reporter questions this decision based on MEL restrictions for dispatch with a signal pack.


Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Arriving in TUS we had briefed the RNAV RNP Y Rwy 11 approach.  Our clearance was for the ZONNA 1 arrival which took us from SSAND to OTUKE.  Just outside SSAND we were cleared to fly the lateral course for the RNAV Y.  We cleaned up the box and turned on to the course.  The next fix was LUYEG; our clearance was to cross at 11;000 feet cleared for the RNAV Y approach.  We slowed to 240; went flaps 1; did the LAVS procedure.  The FMA went to PATH and looked normal.  We read the Approach checklist.  I checked the FMAs again; it indicated SPD not PATH.  There was no VNAV scale to indicate high or low on the path.  I selected V/S and slowed the rate of descent.  Before I could enter the next stepdown altitude in the MCP; ATC called with a low altitude alert.  There was no EGPWS warning.  I disconnected the A/P and initiated a climb.   We were in VFR conditions.  We reengaged the A/P and selected 9;500 feet for a crossing altitude at HODPU.  We did the LAVS procedure outside of HODPU.  The FMA went to PATH and looked normal until it crossed the fix and then it went to speed.  After that we used the A/P to fly the lateral course put each crossing altitude in the MCP.  On final I disconnected the automation [and] flew a visual approach.  First Officer did an excellent job monitoring; calling out deviations; and analyzing the problem.  We delayed reading the approach checklist until the FMS was correct for the approach that we intended to fly.  I was distracted by the checklist reading and that caused a delay for me to recognize that the FMA for the vertical mode was no longer in PATH.  We had asked the ABQ Center Controller to clear us onto the approach [but] he told us to make our request to Approach Control.  It meant that we were making changes to the FMS just before turning on to the approach.First Officer and I discussed the FMS setup; the approach; our procedures in the debrief.  We were unable to determine what error caused the airplane to not fly the RNAV approach correctly.  It would have been helpful to do everything earlier; complete the changes to the FMS and read the Approach checklist well before we were cleared onto the approach path.  That would free both pilots to monitor the automation and catch deviations sooner.

Wide body transport Captain reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC on approach to ABQ when the flight crew missed a change in the FMS vertical navigation mode.


Boarding; Safety Related Duties; Service

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

A party of 3 came on just as we were to close the flight; the agents stated he was exempt from wearing a mask; to which we questioned what he was told he was going to be able to do for the flight; which was not to wear his mask.  The crew on the whole questioned what the Agent was saying; the Purser approached the Captain who said he would ask ZZZ operations; in the meantime the Lead came down and agreed with the crew that there were no exceptions to our mask policy; with debate and talking to the passenger we all looked to find it in black and white; while waiting for ZZZ to call back; the gate agents closed the door and pulled the jet bridge.  The Purser explained to the passenger from [seat number] that he and one of his guests could move to seat area X to keep them separated from the majority of our guests; during the flight I have to say I had to tell his friend to keep his mask on more; I chatted to them prior to landing and informed them they would have to wear their mask for their trip itinerary as there were no exceptions...that they had been miss informed prior to our flight.  They actually seemed nice.

Flight Attendant reported having to explain to a passenger that there were no exemptions to having to wear a face mask.  Passenger and two others traveling with him were not compliant during the flight.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 1295; Flight Crew Type 175

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Loud bang with an instant loss of cabin pressure. Oxygen masks which were placed on the back seat were not there. Deployed speed brakes; reduced power to idle; pointed nose down until speed reached red line. Contacted ATC while descending in VFR conditions and got clearance for 11;000 FT. Entered IMC and leveled and stabilized the aircraft with lower speed at 11;000 FT. Started looking for the reason for cabin pressure drop; Found that the rear window on driver side was missing. Verified that all controls were working properly. Advised Controller about missing window and that everything was OK and under control. Received clearance for 9;000 FT. Continued flight to destination at 9;000 FT without window with 170 KTS IAS. Landed without any problems.

A Lancair 4P lost cabin pressure at FL200 when a passenger window failed.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Troubleshooting; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Following a normal taxi and reduced thrust takeoff we were climbing to 10;000 FT and turning east when we got an insufficient fuel message. When we looked at the PERF INIT page destination fuel showed 0.0K. We checked the FMS fuel used versus fuel on board plus the overhead fuel system panel and the fuel on board looked normal. Then the Relief Pilot noted the fuel flows were different with the left engine burning 10;400 LBS/HR and the right 3;200 LBS/HR. The First Officer pointed out the left engine was near max thrust and right near idle. In addition; both throttles were in the idle position. Finally; I noticed the slip indicator was indicating 1/2 full scale left deflection and realized that the engine thrust indications were correct.I then disconnected the auto throttles and adjusted the right thrust lever to see if we had control of that engine; which we did. I then checked left thrust lever and realized we had no control of that engine. We were leveling at 10;000 FT and the aircraft was now accelerating on one engine at full thrust and other at idle. The only way to slow the aircraft at this time was with spoilers at full deflection. So we shut down the left engine from full power (as we had control of engine thrust) via the fuel control cut off switch; declared an emergency and returned to our departure airport for a single engine; flaps 20; overweight landing. We advised ATC and requested CFR to be standing by as we were vectored for an ILS approach. We notified the company; briefed the flight attendants and made a PA to the passengers. We then prepared for a single engine landing running the single engine checklist and obtaining performance data for landing. With the cabin now secure we conducted an uneventful flaps 20 overweight landing utilizing autobrakes three. We exited the runway for fire crews to check aircraft and; when all was declared OK; were cleared to the gate. At no time were there any engine exceedences or status messages. At the gate we made two logbook entries; one for the engine problem and one for the overweight landing.

When the left engine remained at takeoff thrust with the thrust lever at idle and was unresponsive to autothrotte and/or manual inputs the flight crew of a long range Boeing twin shut the engine down and returned to their departure airport.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

We were departing SJC via the RNAV Departure. We accelerated to 250 knots not realizing we were still below SFO Class B airspace. The Controller pointed out the speed below Class B. We reduced speed back to 200 knots until entering Class B. We attribute this oversight to a confusing clearance and quick turn of the aircraft before departure. We didn't take time to review overlying Class B airspace.

A corporate pilot reported exceeding 200 knots below Class B airspace.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

FO was PF. During takeoff; at 80 kt call; no airspeed was noted on the FO's airspeed indicator. We preformed the rejected TO procedure and taxied back to the gate. The issue was written up in the logbook; and maintenance found debris in the FO's pitot tube. MX cleared the debris and apparently blew into the pitot tube to verify the blockage was removed. While I'm not an A&P; it does not seem like that would be an approved method to verify the pitot tube was cleared. However the mechanic was in contact with Maintenance Control. The aircraft was subsequently signed off.We taxied back out for the next takeoff. The FO was PF again; and during the takeoff roll; all indications seemed normal. During the brief; we assigned the Pilot in the First Observer's seat the task of comparing the standby Airspeed to the FO's airspeed. All indications were normal during the takeoff roll. As soon as we were airborne; the FO's airspeed dropped by approximately 15 knots and created an 'IAS DISAGREE' 'AILERON LOCKOUT' and 'RUDDER RATIO' message. After completing the Unreliable Airspeed QRH; and subsequent QRH checklists; then returned to the field uneventfully.When an aircraft returns to the gate with a substantial fault in the air data system; the company should probably take that return more seriously from a Maintenance standpoint than a 'Could not duplicate' signoff. The lackadaisical approach to such a serious malfunction should seriously erode the confidence in our maintenance organization following approved policies; procedures and best practices to maintain a high level of safety. There should be a strict protocol developed and followed for flight critical and ETOPS critical systems.

B767 Captain reported an aborted takeoff due to an airspeed anomaly. After Maintenance addressed the issue; a subsequent takeoff was successful; however the problem returned once airborne and the flight returned to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 15350; Flight Crew Type 11250

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Flight crew conducted RNAV STAR verification prior to descent; all constraints in database matched those charted; and no anomalies noted. ARTCC issued vectors for spacing during step-down (approximately FL290). First Officer left frequency to make descent PA. Upon First Officer's return to frequency; Captain was in the process of reading back the clearance to descend to FL240 and proceed direct to an intermediate fix on the arrival; which had a crossing window between FL220 and FL260. ARTCC issued 'descend via' clearance for the arrival as; '[Call Sign]; after [the subsequent fix]; descend via the [STAR].' First Officer read back clearance verbatim. Captain set the floor altitude of the arrival and managed the descent. First Officer queried Captain as to whether the descent should be initiated before the subsequent fix. Captain sarcastically said; 'Well; we have to start down now to make the constraints further down the road; right?' First Officer attempted to query ATC regarding the clearance; but radio chatter prevented a timely call. First Officer went 'heads-down' to compare the charted constraints with those shown on the Navigation Display to find why the FMS had initiated such a steep descent as though the aircraft were very high on profile (which simple observation did not support). Captain said; 'Hey; this is supposed to be above 220!' First Officer redirected attention to Primary Flight Display (PFD) to see aircraft descending through FL220 a couple miles before the fix. Captain abruptly set vertical speed to zero to arrest descent. Captain then noted that the floor of the next fix was also FL220; and that the FMS software would have the aircraft crossing about 3000 FT low. First Officer scrolled through the rest of the arrival on the MCDU and found that many of the fixes showed projected crossings 1;000 to 3;000 FT beneath their charted floors; which was not the case during the initial STAR verification. It is unclear what caused the problem because neither pilot noticed when the FMS descent profile changed. Captain flew the remaining step-downs manually to prevent deviations. Multiple vectors and step-downs along with heavy radio chatter prior to the 'descend via' clearance probably inhibited situational awareness to some extent. The clearance was unclear and inconsistent with what pilots are taught to expect; a concise clearance would have been either; '[Call Sign]; maintain FL240 until passing [the subsequent fix]; then descend via the [STAR]; or; '[Call Sign]; cross [the subsequent fix] at or above FL220; then descend via the [STAR].' The most significant reason the First Officer did not recognize the impending issue upon descent was the Captain's derisive attitude regarding the descent clearance and his unilateral decision to initiate the descent without ATC clarification. These factors compelled the First Officer (PNF) to divert his attention away from monitoring the flight path. Besides better coding in FMS software; which is a persistent issue with RNAV descent profiles ATC clearance should be more concise and better crew coordination on the part of the Captain.

A narrow body Airbus First Officer reported that after verifying the IVANE RNAV crossing restrictions the flight received spacing vectors then returned to the arrival where he discovered subsequent crossing restrictions were as much as 3;000 FT below the charted constraints. ATC Descend Via phraseology standardization was also questioned.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22; Flight Crew Total 6198

Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 1200

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency

During climb; the Captain noted a smell similar to a 'rub strip' odor; normal during a 737 first flight. Because this was a first flight and no secondary indications were noted; we continued climb. Neither I nor other flight personnel initially smelled the odor. Later in the climb; other crewmembers also began to faintly smell the same odor. After cruise; the faint odor was again noted and seemed to intermittently dissipate. After completing high altitude checks and entering the lower altitude block of 14;000-16;000 FT; the Flight Analyst came forward to announce that he could smell fumes in the flight deck but not in the aft passenger cabin. The Captain and I elected to don oxygen masks for the remainder of the flight. At that point; the crew elected to terminate further flight checks and return to the airport. We also ran appropriate checklists. While being vectored for final approach; we declared an emergency with Approach Control for priority handling and an uneventful approach and landing ensued. The fumes and actions taken were fully described during debrief with Quality Assurance and Maintenance.

[Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]

A B-737 flight test crew declared an emergency; donned oxygen masks; and returned to their departure airport due to recurring fumes in the cockpit.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 24R

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During the transition from the SADDE SIX STAR to the ILS 24R approach; at LAX; we began a turn at SAPPI as depicted on the approach plate.  However; it was ATC's intention to keep us on a 068 heading as described in the STAR.  These are two contradictory depictions of what is expected when transitioning from the STAR to the Approach.  With the weather and my task saturation at the time as the non pilot flying; I do not recall if we were issued the 068 Radial to track or heading to fly after SMO; but monitoring what was depicted on the PFD Map and the approach plate seemed to match up with a turn at SAPPI.  After landing; the First Officer (FO) and I; talked with SCT ATC.  They told us that this deviation had been happening a lot lately and were wondering; firstly; why it was happening and; secondly; how they could fix it.  We had a lengthy conversation over the phone in much greater detail than this report; but this is the basic reason why it happened to us: When loading the flight plan into the FMGC there is no discontinuity created between the STAR and the Approach (they connect together at SAPPI).  I have never seen this before.  A STAR that ends with a heading or vector will depict that heading or vector into infinity; and there will be a discontinuity created in the flight plan.  During our briefing of the arrival and approach we noted that we were to expect a heading after SMO-068R 9DME but we were confused about why the ILS 24R showed us staying on the 068R until SAPPI and then turning to the approach; but the flight plan in the FMGC seemed to verify that this was how it should be done.  The fact that both the FMC and the Approach plates showed this turn at SAPPI caused confusion on our part.  Both our inexperience with the STAR/APCH at LAX and our high work load/task saturation at the time contributed to us not questioning ATC and verifying both what we were seeing on the plates/FMGC and their instructions.We were told that ATC is working to change the approach plates; but that this process could take some time; and that their controllers are making an effort to clarify approach instructions.  It is my hope that in the mean time we could add a note of caution to the airport briefing page.

Pilot stated he and Captain had never flown into LAX and they were both caught off guard when the aircraft turned base leg. Less than halfway through the turn to 150; ATC contacted the aircraft and turned back to downwind. Pilot stated he had never seen a STAR and approach that went all the way to the ground like this did. Pilot stated that he wasn't sure how many times the turn off the downwind had happened but he said FAA at SCT had noticed it increasing and at the same point.

Pilot reports of flying into LAX on the SADDE6 arrival and at the SAPPI intersection the aircraft turns to join the Runway 24R final. Pilot does not recall being issued a heading to fly after SMO. Pilot called SCT after landing and had discussion with Operations manager who stated this had been happening a lot lately and were wondering why it was happening and how they could fix it.


Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 32; Flight Crew Total 12650; Flight Crew Type 100

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency

After rotation and on initial climb; the aircraft continued to pitch up; the elevator trim was moved to down trim and the cables became loose and tangled. I leveled off at 5;000 FT MSL which is approximately 500 FT AGL; with full forward elevator pressure and declared an emergency on 122.90 'Unicom'. I announced to an aircraft holding short of runway I would be landing [on that] runway and that there were 3 souls on board. The landing was uneventful and I taxied back to the tie down spot and wrote a maintenance discrepancy in the rental log and spoke with the manager of the flight school that the aircraft need maintenance.

PA34 pilot reported the aircraft was difficult to control in pitch shortly after takeoff because the trim cables were loose and tangled.


Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency

Descending on the arrival; Number 3 Engine flamed out. No aircraft vibrations or fire/damage indications. [We] accomplished QRH Procedures; engine shutdown; engine restart attempted one time unsuccessfully.  Landed; fire crew checked aircraft; no fire/damage indications; received permission from Maintenance Control to taxi to parking.

[This Report contains no additional information.]

A MD11's number three engine flamed out with no secondary indications; checklist was complete; an emergency declared and the flight landed uneventfully.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 500

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Right after rotation heard circuit breakers popping and lost my airspeed and altimeter on the First Officer's PFD. After checking in with departure we told them that we needed to return due to a problem with the aircraft. We were told to level at 3;000 and left turn to 270 degrees to setup for the left downwind; which is the longest runway available. After running the appropriate checklists for the level one items we declared an emergency and were vectored for a 30 mile final and setup early to make sure that none of the failures would effect our approach and landing. The landing normal and uneventful; after taxing in we found out that 7 circuit breakers had popped on rotation; causing the failures and error messages that we had received.

On rotation; numerous circuit breakers popped causing multiple alerts and failure of data on First Officer PFD. Climbed to safe altitude; ran appropriate checklists and declared emergency; air turn back. Once on ramp determined that 7 CB's had popped: engine ignition B Engine #1 // air data computer #1 // hydraulic quantity indicator #3 // hydraulic quantity indicator #1 // turbine bypass valve #3 // APU system and door power // HF Comm #2.

MD11 flight crew reports the sound of circuit breakers tripping as the aircraft rotates and loss of the First Officer's airspeed and altitude indication. An emergency is declared and flight returns to departure airport with no further issues. Seven circuit breakers are found tripped on post flight.


Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge

We were finished boarding and I was doing my compliance check walking through the cabin with 42 passengers. When I came back to the front the bridge that connects the A/C (Aircraft) with the jet bridge was pulled back already. I then asked the gate agent why he did it. He just shrugged his shoulders and was surprised that I even asked him. Then I said to him very firm: 'Put it right back.' He said: 'Why?' Then I told him 'this is a safety issue and you cannot pull that bridge until I am ready.' I also asked him if he had received the paperwork from the CA (Captain) yet and he said 'no'. Then he continued to argue with me and did not put the bridge back. He asked again 'Why?' Then I said 'what if we have to evacuate and then there is no bridge?' His answer: 'Then I put it back.' I said: 'You put it back right now!' He still wouldn't do it. The CA had heard our conversation; got out of his seat and just motioned him to put the bridge back which he then finally did. Then the CA asked me to get him to come to the cockpit door because he wanted to talk with him. He explained to him again why the gate agent cannot pull that bridge until we are ready and I tell him it is ok. He then argued with the CA about it and still didn't get it why he had to do it. And when he finally pulled the bridge; after I told him it was okay now; I closed the door 7 min early. We were not running late and even if we would have there still was no reason to try to close early.

After returning to the front of the aircraft prior to door closure; an EMB145 Flight Attendant discovered that the Gate Agent removed the small connecting bridge and asked him to put it back. The agent asks 'why'; but does not put it back until the Captain intervenes.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 32; Flight Crew Total 700; Flight Crew Type 450

On controlled approach [we were cleared to land by the tower] into Runway XX at ZZZ; a departing airplane (single engine personal) passed almost directly over us with approximately 100 ft. - 150 ft. separation. Apparently this aircraft made a right turn out on departure from Runway 17 and then another right turn to depart to the north as we were turning final to the south. The reason for this report is that the tower did not advise us of oncoming traffic or sound any alert (this is the reason we have a tower at ZZZ after all). In this instance; the presence of a manned tower actually created more risk than would have an untowered airport because at the latter; the pilots would have been talking to each other and made each other aware of their position and proximity.There was a relatively new controller working approaches and departures at the time; this was definitely a factor. However; the senior controller at this facility was working 'ground' and presumably was backing up the new controller. However; the relatively new controller apparently was not advised to alert us to oncoming traffic. I have X00 hours flying into and out of this airport with over a thousand landings at ZZZ and this was the closest unalerted 'miss' I have experienced. There should have been an alert voiced; I almost took evasive action and would have had the oncoming plane been any closer. Its fortunate we saw the traffic but only did so with 300 ft. horizontal separation. The 'new' controller has been working at this facility for approximately X months and ZZZ is not that busy of an airport. Basic pilot approach/departure traffic alerts should be nearly automatic by now. This controller requires close supervision and; if performance does not improve; reassignment may be indicated to maintain safety.

RV7A Single Pilot reported a new tower controller failed to provide departure aircraft alert thereby resulting in an NMAC event.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Cleared for takeoff Runway 13L at DAL; with clearance to after departure turn left to 100 degrees; expect radar vectors to join the Hubbard 9 SID and climb to 3000 ft. ATC issued caution for prior departing air carrier (Aircraft Y) from that runway. Takeoff; initial left turn and initial climb were uneventful; but I kept my flaps at 15 for a steeper climb until retraction at about 2000 feet altitude. I was hand-flying with the yaw dampers (YD) on. Shortly after retracting my flaps; I sensed a strong; steady; smooth roll to the left. I instinctively countered with increasing right aileron input until I was at the limits of my physical arm strength. I initially suspected some sort of flight control/automation/YD/aileron trim malfunction; and deselected the YD. At this point; I was gradually yawing and rolling to the left. I could not stop that movement despite my strongest effort.Suddenly; the left rolling force diminished; and my countering inputs turned me substantially to the right. I naturally decreased my inputs; and scanned my panel to see if there were any unusual annunciations (there were none). I looked out at my left wing to see if there were any unusual flight control indications (there were none). At this point I was just happy to be wings level and in control. ATC then issued an urgent left turn instruction; I am sure to mitigate reduced separation from the traffic departing from the parallel runway 13R. I complied immediately; and eventually resumed the SID.After the fact; I realized that I had encountered the wingtip vortex from Aircraft Y in front of me. Having given (as a [check pilot]) and received (as a line pilot) hundreds of such events in decades of simulator flying; it was unlike any event I had experienced before. The simulator events were far more abrupt and violent; this real experience was smoother and built more gradually to an overpowering force level. I was sure I could avoid any vortices from the preceding Aircraft Y by a steep climb and our initial left turn. That was obviously not the case. Perhaps insisting on increased separation in the takeoff interval would have been wise. Not sure that the PC-12 simulators can be programmed for such an event; but it would be helpful to experience it in that environment. What happened to me reminded me of previous simulator aileron trim runaway malfunctions; not wake turbulence encounters.

PC-12 pilot reported encountering wake turbulence departing DAL in trail of B737 that produced an 'overpowering' roll.


Try to be more proactive with Maintenance especially when the aircraft has a history of fume events and not fly that particular aircraft until the problem has been found.

A320 Captain reported a fume event on aircraft with a history of fume issues.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Workload; Time Pressure

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Upon entering the control room I noticed that all of the 8 sectors that we work were combined down to two scopes. At this time of night there are usually 4 scopes open. There is a traffic push that runs [for 30 minutes] that requires at least 3 scopes open and especially with the amount of weather. One scope was all sectors north of RDU and the other was three sectors south of RDU. The north scope had a lot of weather to the south end resulting in very little traffic due to the predominantly northern traffic flow. The south sector; comprised of two high altitudes and one low sector; had about 15 aircraft all going north and all heading for the moderate; heavy and extreme precipitation at the north end of the sector. The area FLM was plugged into the D side of the south sector and told me to sit there and help the R side controller. As I sat down the R side told the FLM that the aircraft that were running right at the weather decided that the gap had closed and that they did not want to go any farther north. The northern half of the sectors was covered in heavy precipitation with a line of extreme precipitation across three quarters of the top from west to east. The R side began turning all of the aircraft south while I began to put in new routes on all. The plan was to take them south; away from the weather and then east into the adjacent sector in Bay 3. From there it would be a straight shot north along the coast while staying east of the weather.The R side had aircraft on three frequencies and congestion was a major issue. He had to repeat himself; aircraft were stepping on each other and there was a lot to get done. I was taking calls from three sectors at Atlanta Center and two from Jacksonville Center while trying to update routes in the URET (User Request Evaluation Tool). I was still catching up with the R sides plan when I received a call from the Bay 3; D Side; asking me to take radar on a flight going north to BWI. I told the D side unable and explained our situation. None of our aircraft would go through that weather and neither would [this aircraft]. We were turning 15 aircraft south and then east into their sector and that we were too busy to take any more. He said 'OK' and hung up. There was no way that we had time to take another aircraft who would just deviate and add to our workload. The frequency was so congested that adding another would have been detrimental. Seconds later the R side from Bay 3 called me. 'So you are not going to take my [aircraft]? He requested this route for weather'. I told him that we couldn't because no one was going through that weather and that all of our traffic was being vectored south then east and into his sector. 'Yeah; all of your traffic is coming into my sector but you won't take my traffic?' I said 'no; we can't.' He replied; 'Then if you're not going to take my traffic then I'm not taking yours. 'Come on;' I said but he interrupted me. 'Don't give me that; you're going to give me all of that traffic but you won't work with me?' he replied. I told him that we were just picking up the pieces here referencing the chaos that was going on in our sector. At that point; I had to make a decision. There were 15 aircraft heading east that still needed routes and adding one more who would just deviate and add to the mess did not make sense. As our traffic approached the boundary with bay 3 we were wasting time talking about this. A decision was needed before all of our traffic piled into bay 3 without permission and the window to stop and hold all of them in our airspace was rapidly closing. The traffic in our sector was known to us but we knew nothing of what was happening in Bay 3. If I missed this window while arguing with this person; bad things were going to happen when our traffic merged with the traffic in the other sector. If you don't take my traffic I won't take yours he said. I told him that 'We're in the hold then.' He hung up. I could not argue any longer. I feltthat there was no time left and that no matter what; the next controller would not take our traffic. Bay 3 forced us into a no notice hold because the controller over there was unhappy that we wouldn't run his one airplane into known heavy and extreme precipitation that no one else would fly through. What happened next was not as bad as running into Bay 3's traffic but it was not good. The R side began putting all traffic into present position holds; about 15 aircraft total. They were spread out enough and at different altitudes that only two came close but separation was never lost. I immediately called Atlanta and Jacksonville Centers and shut them off for all traffic. After about 10 minutes; we got word that we might try a small opening in the weather. The R side asked for a pathfinder and got several volunteers. The small gap worked and we began the process of rerouting our traffic a second time; through a gap to the north east. At this point I had to call bay 3 for a point out and the controller informed me that he would take our traffic now. It was a full 10 minutes later and we were now running a new route. Altogether; traffic was shut down for about 20 minutes while we cleaned up the sector. After reviewing the Falcon and voice tapes I learned that the Bay 3 controller did not have more than 6 aircraft in his sector. He had minutes before rerouted a BWI arrival to the north and could have easily done the same with the second one. The bay 3 controller also entered our airspace with the aircraft without our permission before eventually turning him out. Staffing - There is no way that those sectors should have been combined that early. We should have more controllers per shift but management will not pay for the overtime to staff. Take away the manager bonus for saving overtime money and we can get back to safely running trafficTMU - What were they doing running all of this traffic into extreme precipitation? Why do the airlines have such a say in this safety issue? We are going to do serious harm to an aircraft by running them at extreme weather. We saw it a few weeks ago where traffic was run through a corridor with reports of severe turbulence because the airlines did not want to spend the money to put on extra fuel for the reroute. Same thing here. We are running at extreme precipitation and when we have nowhere else to go; the sector goes to hell. Attitudes - Controllers cannot just shut off traffic because they are unhappy. This has become almost common place at ZDC. Just a few weeks ago a Bay 1 controller essentially shut off the east coast by refusing to take all traffic because he didn't like getting two EWR arrivals with less than the requested miles in trail. The sector that was feeding him was inundated with weather and was working with less than a third of the airspace due to deviations. In our case the controller did not like being told no. He also did not want to work our traffic. He had seen it coming and seemed angry that he would have to take it. Too many controllers spend their time complaining about others who work less traffic then them. Why should I have to work all of this traffic when the other area gets more breaks and doesn't have much traffic? This is crap. We all need to look out for each other. The bay 3 controller was dodging traffic instead of helping us out. Professionalism - You need permission to enter another controller's airspace. If permission is not granted you do something else. That's what we had to do. It is not a negotiation. That bay 3 controller tried to intimidate us and threaten us into doing something that we could not do. That's just wrong. I explained our situation and expected help from a fellow controller. What we got was nothing of the sort.

In my opinion; this was a failure on multiple fronts. Command Center and Traffic Management Units; while slowing aircraft volume during the day; seem to have; a 'release the hounds' mentality once the sun sets and normal volume is winding down. The Front Line Manager in my area did not appear to be very engaged in the operation of the area. I should have asked for help a little earlier; but; as it was the end of the night; staffing was poor.

ZDC controllers reported being flooded with traffic and weather then having a disagreement with another Controller which led to unplanned holding and an airspace violation.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; Ground Event / Encounter Object

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors

Operated the left MLG (Main Landing Gear) jack during gear swing. When we were close to the required height of the MLG tires off the ground; the tail jack failed and brought the tail down and nose up. I ran from under the wing to seek safety.

While jacking aircraft; aircraft tail jack failed; causing aircraft damage. I was in the wheel well at the time; verifying the level condition with the plumb bob during the jacking process. Plumb bob showed 0 degrees pitch and roll.

B737-800 technicians reported that as the tail jack failed in the middle of jacking the aircraft; the aircraft tail dropped hard on the tail jack; causing significant damage to the tail section.