Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 27; Flight Crew Total 11700; Flight Crew Type 1500

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Having listened to the ASOS (winds calm or very light); I approached the airport to land on Runway 16. No traffic was heard on UNICOM. [I] announced my position and intentions. Anonymous voice announced military helicopters hovering to the east well clear of the runway. [I] continued the approach; eventually spotting one of them well to the left of the approach end of Runway 16. [I] judged it to be OK to land. Entering the flare; I encountered very significant turbulence. [I] recovered adequately to complete a reasonable landing. With a lifetime of aviation...I'm no stranger to operations in mixed traffic. However; I had obviously not made adequate allowance for the rotor downwash from a hovering helicopter; seemingly quite a distance away and didn't realize how far that downwash can spread out along the ground in light to calm winds. After landing; I learned these were big military H-60's out doing testing on new helicopters. I welcome the military using the civilian airports; but I suggest two things. Perhaps with some liaison with them we can encourage them; when operating at uncontrolled airports; to clearly announce frequently on UNICOM the type and size of helicopter and potential for hazardous rotor downwash. Also; it may be useful to add a brief caution NOTAM advising of such activity. I've discussed this experience with the FSDO. They also encouraged me to submit it in writing via this report. Perhaps it can save some other pilots some grief!

C182 pilot in landing flare; encountered rotorwash turbulence from military H60 helicopters operating in the vicinity of the runway at a non-towered airport.


M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.5

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X was flashed to R30 from BOI Approach nearly 20 minutes from the boundary with 120 in the altitude section of the flight plan. About 13 minutes later; the handoff was retracted then reattempted with 100 now in the data block. No call was attempted to coordinate this change of altitude by BOI Approach. I saved the controller from a deviation by affecting communication. The BOI Approach airspace test is a failure. It must be ended now. It is a daily occurrence to have amended altitudes not coordinated because of the 'flash as soon as they're on radar; sometimes before' mentality that has been adopted by BOI Approach. In addition to the 'flash first; do no coordination later' mantra that is repeated endlessly within the building that houses BOI Approach; there is no respect for the 7110.65 in transferring communications as soon as possible after a handoff. This sort of disregard of rules and safety are incessant when it comes to BOI Approach and something must be done about this test that is showing a blatant disregard for safety.I submitted a previous reports about an aircraft climbing to the wrong altitude and may have mixed up the times it happened.

ZLC Controller reports of a change to an altitude in the scratch pad area of a data tag that was changed but never coordinated. Controller reports that the BOI Approach airspace is a failure due to things not being coordinated and BOI Approach not having respect for the 7100.65.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

On departure climbing through about 5000 ft. we had a power reduction of roughly 10 inches on the TRQ and corresponding drop of the NG to around 88-90%. The reduction of the power wasn't immediate; it took around 20 seconds for the full power reduction. We had noticed the day before at one point on a departure that the power was around 20 inches; which we thought was possibly an accidental reduction of the PCL (Power Control Lever) but didn't remember moving the PCL. When the event happened we made sure to mark the position of the PCL and verify that it wasn't moving with the power reduction. After the reduction of the power we moved the PCL forward and the power was restored to a normal level but we decided it was no longer safe to continue the flight and requested a diversion to ZZZ. We advised Departure that we were having abnormal engine indications and they gave us priority to ZZZ.After talking with Maintenance; it felt like the issue was probably either a loose linkage to the PCL or an issue with the FCU (Flight Control Unit); possibly an air leak.

PC-12 Captain reported an uncommanded power reduction during climb and subsequently diverted.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

I was Co-Captain SIC (Second in Command) in the right seat. During taxi out for departure Runway XXR at ZZZ; one of the passengers commented about it being warm in the cabin and asked if we could cool it down. I started the APU and turned the bleed air on HI. A few minutes later we were cleared to 'line up and wait' Runway XXR. About that time I smelled something abnormal. Not like electrical or plastic smoke but oily; metallic. I turned around and observed smoke filling the cabin. [Advised ATC] and told Tower we had smoke in the cabin and needed to evacuate the aircraft. I shut down the APU; escorted the passengers off the aircraft and eventually back to the FBO. The PIC (Pilot in Command) completed the engine shutdown and emergency evacuation checklist and remained with the aircraft. The ARFF (Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting) crew confirmed no fire but residual smoke in the cabin and aft fuselage APU compartment. Recovery flight for the passengers was put in motion.

On Taxiway XX in line up to Runway XXR ZZZ; we were number 5. Passengers complained it's warm back here. The crew turned on the APU via checklist. Tower cleared [us] line up and wait. We complied; suddenly smoke filled the interior of aircraft. We the crew [advised ATC] and evacuated on Runway XXR. Ran checklists. No injuries; no damage to persons or property.

Fractional flight crew reported the cabin filled with smoke from a faulty APU prior to takeoff.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

On climb out to ZZZ both airspeed disagreement cautions came on with +/- 10 knot difference between the Captain and FO (First Officer) airspeed [indicators]. Once at cruise all cautions went away and we continued. Upon descent and on the arrival we again got the 'airspeed disagreement' caution for about 5 minutes then it again disappeared. Continuing on the descent at around 16;000 ft. and in icing conditions the Captain's airspeed went to +/- 50 knots causing the throttles to chase the airspeed. I turned off the autopilot; autothrottles and both flight directors as per the QRH and quickly realized the FO side was working fine. The FO continued the descent.

Climbing out; passing approximately FL280 in IMC conditions; with the CA (Captain) flying; we received an 'IAS DISAGREE' indication. There was a split of approximately 10 KIAS between the CA and FO (First Officer) instruments with a corresponding split in Mach. I; the FO; got out the unreliable airspeed checklist in the QRH to look up the possible indications. After a few moments the indication disappeared and the IAS returned to normal. After beginning a descent the same indications returned and then disappeared as they had before. Passing approximately 16;000 ft. there was a large fluctuation in the CA's airspeed causing a large fluctuation in the autothrottles. The CA disengaged the autopilot and autothrottles. We transferred aircraft control since my indications seemed normal. The CA ran the QRH for unreliable airspeed [and] I flew the approach using the autopilot with the autothrottles disengaged to an uneventful landing.

B737 flight crew reported the Captain's airspeed indicator became unreliable and control was transferred to the First Officer.


Mooney Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Total 315; Flight Crew Type 305

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 270; Flight Crew Type 261

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

I was flying as pilot in command from the right seat; with another pilot in the left seat. We were coming back from the local practice area after practicing Lazy 8's and were in ZZZ's Delta airspace by this point. After requesting to stay in the pattern for some performance landing practice; Tower asked us to switch frequency. This frequency is usually used when the Tower is busy and needs a separate frequency for traffic in the pattern. We were instructed to make straight in for Runway XXL; and I complied. I was lined up on centerline on an extended final when Tower asked me if I was lined up for XXL. I told them I was. Looking back on this; I believe this may be because the traffic we nearly collided with was to our left and I assume they were cleared for XXR.After Tower asked to clarify my position; I noticed on the G430W traffic display that traffic [was] very quickly approaching in a descent from above and our back left. As the traffic gets closer to us I pull carburetor and throttle; descending to get out of the way. I asked Tower if they had the location of the traffic above us; and if they were speaking with this traffic. To my recollection all Tower had to say regarding my second question was something like 'No; they are not on my frequency.' I assumed that meant the traffic was on the normal Tower frequency.For about 30 seconds the traffic appeared to be exactly on top of us and at an altitude anywhere from zero to three hundred feet above us; continuing the descent with us. After a brief level off of a couple of seconds to reassess where the traffic was and to consider the terrain below me; the other pilot told me to continue my descent because the traffic was still very close to us. The traffic passed off of our right side and lined up for XXR. They [were] only a couple of hundred feet from us to our 2 o'clock. Once we had traffic in sight we discontinued the rate of our descent and initiated a go-around because of the un-stabilized approach we made. The other pilot landed the plane. We decided to make the landing a full-stop and terminate the rest of the practice because we were shaken up.I am not sure how much I descended or how fast. I did not receive a terrain warning on my G430 but we were under the glide slope as indicated by the PAPI's. Also of note; the traffic was a low wing airplane and we are a high wing; making it hard to see each other. I believe the controller needed to do a better job verifying the other pilot was talking to Tower; and in initiating traffic-avoiding instructions to us both. When Tower uses two separate frequencies for the parallel runways; it should be instructed [for] the pilots to monitor both.

Myself (Instrument Rated SEL Pilot) and the Pilot Flying (Commercial Rated SEL Pilot) were on approach to Runway XXL at ZZZ. The pilot flying was in the right seat and I was monitoring from the left seat. (Note this aircraft does not require 2 flight crewmembers; however; since we were both practicing maneuvers; 2 of us were there).We were directed by Tower to tune to a separate frequency typically used for aircraft doing pattern work on Runway XXL. The Tower queried us on whether we were lined up for XXL; which we replied in the affirmative. Shortly after; I noticed another aircraft on our G430W traffic advisory system quickly approaching from approximately our 7 o'clock position. This aircraft was initially indicating approximately 300 feet above our present altitude and descending. We queried the Tower whether or not they were talking to this aircraft; and the controller responded that she wasn't; but the controller on the main Tower frequency was; and apparently the traffic was landing on the parallel Runway XXR.The traffic advisory showed our aircraft converging at approximately the same altitude; and we immediately took action to descend because this traffic was descending faster and was essentially on top of us. The Mooney (we believe this was a Mooney) is a low wing aircraft; and the C172 is a high wing aircraft; making it exceptionally difficult to see one another. Eventually; after descending well below the glide slope on final; we saw the Mooney approximately 250 feet horizontally and 100 feet above us at our 2 o'clock position. The pilot flying in our C172 continued the approach and performed a go-around maneuver due to our approach at this point being unstabilized. I then took over the aircraft and performed a normal pattern and approach to a full stop landing. We decided to discontinue at that time due to being somewhat 'shaken-up' over the incident.I believe the controller we were talking to may have been relatively new and it was fairly busy on Local Control at the time; but either ourselves or the Mooney should have been given instructions to de-conflict the potential collision on the approach. ZZZ Class Delta airspace can get relatively busy; and when the pattern frequency is separated; both controllers on Local need to coordinate to avoid conflicts such as this. A phone call was made to the Tower explaining our encounter approximately 20 minutes after the event occurred.

Two C172 pilots reported a near midair collision with another aircraft while on approach to a tower controlled airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 2200; Flight Crew Type 600

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors

I was on a jet airway that was assigned to me by ATC (different from the one that I filed) that would take me approximately 40 NM offshore. Approximately 50 NM prior to the point at which I would be the furthest from the shoreline; ATC (NY Center) instructed me to descend from FL210 to 11;000. I replied that I was unable because I was single-engine and that would mean that I was out of glide range of the shoreline. I was surprised by the angry reaction of the ATC controller; who basically asked me what I wanted to do then. I suggested that I navigate to an intersection that would take me closer to the shoreline and put me on another jet airway. The controller issued a two left turns (bringing me closer to shore) which I complied with; and then asked when I could begin my descent (which I replied to). I was instructed to take down a number to call when I landed. The next controller issued a descent clearance which required me to descend at over 2;000 fpm which I complied with.I called the number after landing; spoke to the Operations Manager In Charge (OMIC); apologized; and explained that I wasn't trying to be difficult but that I was being extra careful. The OMIC said he understood; that the controllers are aware of glide ratios; that as a pilot I was likely unaware of letters of agreement the different sectors have with one another; and that if I don't think I could accept a descent I should file over land. The OMIC was very understanding of my predicament.I believe that the controller way overreacted and could have created a dangerous situation by causing a completely unnecessary distraction to me and other pilots on the frequency by both the manner in which he addressed (his tone of voice) and the content of what he said. I believe that all of my communications were professional; yet he made me feel like I was doing something wrong or was an idiot. Neither were the case.For my part; in retrospect; perhaps I should have simply complied with the initial descent clearance but done so at 500 fpm which would have stretched out the descent until I was closer to the shoreline; rather than indicating that I was unable. I also have a much better understanding of the issue from the controller's standpoint (thanks to the OMIC).

PC12 pilot reported declining a descent clearance from ZNY due to his distance offshore and engine out glide considerations. The Controller was not happy and a phone number was provided for a discussion after landing.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

About 6 hours into the flight at FL400; at night; after dodging wx through the ITCZ [Inter Tropical Convergence Zone]; the EICAS displayed 'IAS DISAGREE'.  This EICAS message was not accompanied by any change in attitude; immediately noticeable airspeed error or power.  Called for the IAS DISAGREE checklist from the QRH.  The IAS DISAGREE checklist simply informs the pilot that the CA and FO airspeed indicators disagree; and refers you to the Airspeed Unreliable checklist.  The first few items of this checklist would have you disengage the A/P; turn off the A/T; turn off both F/D; and set a flaps up pitch and power of 4 degrees NU / N1 to 75%.  Because the airspeeds were 'reasonably' matched; we chose not to conduct these first few items.  Our A/S indications were:  CA .798M/242K; Stby ---/242K and FO .815/247K; thus a .017M/5K disagreement.  We did go to the QRH Performance Inflight chapter to determine that at our weight and altitude we should see 2.5 degrees NU and N1 at 89.7% (this is exactly what we had without any adjustment required).  Continuing through the checklist; we switched the FO Air Data to ALTN; removing all discrepancies.  We continued to read the checklist to determine how this might potentially effect our arrival and landing.  The pilot on the observer seat also; retrieved the 767 Systems Manual so we could affirm our understanding of the air data and pitot systems affected.At this point; we were currently about 160NM south of Guam (and headed toward it); and as a crew felt confident in the low impact of this degradation and our ability to continue.  However; we did place a SATCOM call to dispatch; to include a 3-way with Maintenance.  We relayed our aircraft state; and intent to continue unless they had any additional input that might direct us not to pass Guam.  They did not.  They agreed continuing seemed prudent and forecast wx at ZZZZ was OK.  We agreed as a crew to handle any necessary adjustments for arrival via the normal recall review [company] procedures.The next couple hours enroute to ZZZZ were uneventful.  Once the field opened at ZZZZ; and we were able to retrieve ATIS (ZZZZ transmits no ATIS prior to 2030Z); we determined that only Cat III arrivals to RW XXR were available.  We reviewed the B767 QRM Cat II/III Auto-land Approach Required Equipment list and determined a Cat III was still possible using the right ADC in ALTN.  (Side note - we did test the RT Air Data back in normal prior to this; with a resultant large airspeed discrepancy and a momentary Over speed EICAS).  We performed the complete Cat II/III Approach Review and brief for the arrival and Cat III landing.(~9+15 hrs into flight) at FL400; the EICAS displayed AUTOTHROT DISC; L ENG EEC MODE and R ENG EEC MODE.  This indication was cleared by cycling and resetting the auto-throttle.At FL400; the EICAS displayed L ENG EEC MODE and R ENG EEC MODE.  We performed the Engine EEC Mode QRH checklist.  The EECs were operated in ALTN for the remainder of flight.  While we were now discussing that a Cat III was no longer prudent; we received the AILERON LOCKOUT message on the EICAS.  We ran the Aileron Lockout QRH checklist.At this point in the flight I looked ahead on our arrival to see that 'ZZZZZ' had a published hold.  I directed the FO to prep the hold at ZZZZZ and retrieve updated ATIS for our alternate ZZZZ1 and directed the Observer to start calculating a Bingo from ZZZZZ to ZZZZ1.  ZZZZ remained Cat III but was improving as the sun came up separating the temp / dew point spread.  Next I directed the FO to prep RTE 2 for our flight to ZZZZ1 as a contingency.The EICAS displayed RUDDER RATIO.  We asked Approach for holding at ZZZZZ.  We performed the QRH for Rudder Ratio.  During this checklist; we checked the status page and determined the left HYD QTY had dropped to .75.  This checklist has a 15K crosswind and no auto-land limitation.  Winds at ZZZZ were almost nil.I made a SATCOM call to dispatch while holding at ZZZZZ.  This was an abbreviated call.  The intent of this call was not so much to receive input; as it was to inform dispatch of our reasonably high likelihood of a divert to ZZZZ1.  At the tail end of this call; the Duty Pilot (who I was unaware was listening) chimed in essentially; '...don't push it; go to ZZZZ1 if you need'....or words to that effect.For the remainder of the flight; the L HYD System quantity fluctuated between .77-.80.  Pressure however remained OK throughout; and we never received any HYD pressure annunciations.  (I honestly did not look at it too many times; but I believe it stayed 2950+; practically normal.)I think we made 3 turns in holding at ZZZZZ; and during the second Approach informed that the RVR on RW XXL had improved to greater than 2000 RVR.  Subsequently we set up for the ILS Y XXL; departed holding and made an uneventful approach and landing.  It was essentially CAVOK when we landed.No obvious suggestions come to mind.Overall; I believe we exercised CRM and operated well as a crew.  We expanded our crew to include Dispatch; Maintenance and the Duty Pilot more than once.  As time allowed we used secondary manuals (B767 Systems) to enhance our understanding.  At least once; we disagreed on exactly which component had failed; but ultimately agreed on the aircraft state and moved forward.  At least once; a crew member expressed his concern about continuing to ZZZZ.  Those concerns were allayed via contingency plans.Late in the flight; I wondered if operating single ADC effected RVSM compliance.  I decided it did not (that we retained 2 independent altimetry systems); and even if it did; I am valued the 3+ hours of fuel saved at FL400 versus descending out of RVSM airspace.In the cumulative; it was a lot to deal with.  But each of the system degradations happened in a sequential fashion and were dealt with in order.  The morning Cat III weather at ZZZZ was the ingredient that ticked the anxiety box upward.  However; ZZZZ1 was CAVOK and was the out we had left ourselves before bingo.

B767 Captain reported numerous aircraft issues they had to deal with over the ocean.


Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Air Traffic Control Military 0; Air Traffic Control Non Radar 40; Air Traffic Control Radar 40; Air Traffic Control Supervisory 30; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 130

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

I had requested and was set up for the RNAV [approach]. At some point a few miles out from the initial fix the Controller informed me that the approach would intrude on a TFR and suggested the VOR [approach]. We had quite a lot of moderate turbulence and I was having difficulty loading the new approach; setting the minimums and; most importantly; briefing the approach to myself. I was cleared for the approach and to join the 10 DME arc which I believed I did. I was not getting a good VOR signal but GPS showed the inbound course approaching. As I turned inbound on the final course still trying to identify the VOR; the Controller asked why I was not on the arc. I started second-guessing my own procedure but was confident I would get the airport in sight as the AWOS I had been monitoring was reporting 2- 5 miles Vis over the last hour.At this point I looked over and realized I had mis-tuned the VOR freq. Due to the Controller's questioning; very bad turbulence; poor forward visibility and my admittedly botched approach; I decided to discontinue the approach. I was not confident of my position in relation to the missed approach point and elected; for safety; to climb straight ahead as I could see the mountains on either side and had good forward visibility above the smoke.I was then cleared for the RNAV (GPS) C approach and got the airport in sight and landed.I was given a phone number to call; which I did; and was advised of a possible pilot deviation.My interpretation of the clearance 'Join the 10 DME arc; cleared for the approach' was that I had been vectored to the approach. Later; upon review of the approach; I realized I should have flown to the IAF and joined the arc or simply requested the non-arc approach by flying to ZZZ and making the procedure turn.I allowed myself to get rushed in very poor flight conditions. I should have asked for vectors or holding in order to properly review the approach in the first place.

Lancair pilot reported discontinuing an approach after becoming disoriented.


Workload; Distraction; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Observer; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

[It] was my first day back on the job after taking the [previous] month off due to the birth of my first child; so it had been a while since I'd been in the flight deck.  I really hadn't thought about flying much at all for the entire month due to the focus on having a new baby around.  My Captain was fresh off IOE (I think the trip may have been his first since IOE); and we had a jumpseater who was in training about to begin OE who was there to observe.  The jumpseater had been asking a lot of questions during both the flight out; and this flight back.  I found it a little distracting; but as a former ground instructor I have the attitude that if I can help someone learn I'd like to.  I probably should have called for sterile cockpit a couple of times though when discussion was too much. We took off of Runway XXL; and if I remember correctly I think we were on runway heading for the initial climb.  Shortly thereafter; we were assigned a turn to a 090 heading; and when able; direct an arrival intersection.  When I first armed NAV mode and it captured; the aircraft started to turn left.  The jumpseater said he thought we were supposed to turn right to 090; then direct the intersection; so we asked ATC and they said; 'Yes; turn right to 090 then direct the intersection when able.'  I was glad in this case that the jumpseater spoke up as it was appropriate.  I put the aircraft back into HDG mode and made sure it made the turn to 090 by going to the right.  However; with all the further discussion going on between the three of us; I became distracted and apparently did not arm NAV mode for the FMS to capture the route direct to the intersection; and the Captain and jumpseater did not notice either.  After an unknown time (probably a minute but I'm not sure); ATC asked if we were direct the intersection; and we realized and admitted the mistake to the Controller.  She gave us a new HDG; then direct again; and we correctly got on the new assigned course.  The Controller did not seem upset and to my knowledge there were no traffic or any other issues as a result.  I believe the event happened due to the combination of my being out of work for several weeks; the Captain being new to the airplane; and all of the disjointed discussion between the three of us during the event.

A CRJ-200 First Officer reported a track deviation after he failed to select an MCP heading and engage the NAV mode because of distractions from a new hire jumpseat pilot and a just completed IOE Captain.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 1980; Flight Crew Type 920

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 34; Flight Crew Total 1182; Flight Crew Type 60

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Excursion Taxiway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

General Maintenance Action; General Evacuated

The copilot was taxiing to the runway from the commuter air terminal. Upon reaching a right hand turn to follow the taxiway and attempting to slow the aircraft; the copilot says to me; 'I have no brakes.' I immediately reached for the brake pedals and found the left pedal all the way to the floor. We were then in a sharp right hand turn at a low speed. Attempting to pump up the hydraulic brakes with no success; I put the throttle into the reverse position to stop the aircraft. The aircraft proceeded to the right a short distance; partially off of the taxiway into a patch of dirt/grass and came to a stop. The left brake pedal was still fully depressed and non-responsive. I contacted the Tower and explained our situation. At that point; I shut down the engine and debriefed the passengers. The copilot deplaned to place the tail stand and chocks. Airport Operations were on the scene immediately to secure the area. The passengers were then deplaned and taken by foot back to the commuter terminal; approximately 200 yards away. No taxi lights were hit and the airplane was not damaged. Maintenance was called and arrived shortly to tow the aircraft back to the terminal.This aircraft has a documented history of braking issues with maintenance log revealing two prior write ups in the last week for the left brake. Corrective actions were preformed with replacing the master cylinder and entire brake lines. This aircraft was taxied and flow one prior leg today by myself with no braking issues noticed.

I also made a visual inspection of the front of the aircraft and prop and discovered that no damage had been caused by our incursion on to the grass area.

When their brakes failed during a turn while taxiing for takeoff the flight crew of a CE-208 were unable to prevent an excursion off the taxiway. The aircraft had a history of left brake srite-ups in the recent past.


Troubleshooting; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Evacuated; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Upon completion of low approach to Runway XX at ZZZ we raised the gear and observed both Left and Right HYDR PRESS lights illuminate briefly and then lights went out.  I looked at HYD pressure gauge and it was at the top of the yellow arc but quickly rose back up into the green arc.  We initiated another Approach.  On final; flaps 20 and gear down was called for.  As the gear was in transit we saw each HYDR PRESS light illuminate alternately; approximately 3 times and then both lights illuminated steadily.  The gear indicators showed 3 green and flaps were at 20 degrees.  We completed the low approach but on climb-out agreed to leave the gear and flaps in their current position.  The HYD Pressure gauge was in the yellow arc and I turned on the electric HYD pump which brought pressure back up into the green arc; and then I turned the pump off.  Flight Inspection was terminated and we went to holding to run checklists.  We ran [Checklist 1]; HYDR PRESS LIGHTS; followed by [Checklist 2] HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE LANDING and reviewed [Checklist 3] PARTIAL FLAPS LANDING.  We then requested priority handling with ZZZ approach and held in their airspace in VFR conditions to burn fuel down to 2200 pounds.  We picked up IFR clearance to ZZZ1.  We told ZZZ to relay to ZZZZ TRACON that we would be landing at ZZZ1 Runway YYR.  ZZZZ TRACON suggested that we land ZZZ2; 10;007 ft.  I stated that we are a 'Priority Handling' and we will land on [Runway] YYR.  ZZZZ TRACON asked if we could accept Runway YZL; (with the flow) but winds were 020/11 kts.  I restated that we are a 'Priority Handling' and will land on [Runway] YYR.  We flew RNAV (GPS) Runway YYR approach.  Our landing weight was calculated at 17; 844 pounds; REF speed with partial flaps 20 at 142 kts.  We completed [Checklist 2] checklist and on short final turned on Hyd pump.  We touched down approximately 300 ft. before Aiming Point Markings.  Normal braking was not available; spoilers did not extend.  Emer Brake handle was deployed and aircraft stopped in 9;900 feet.  Tires did not blow and we were able to exit Runway YYR at Taxiway ZZ under ships power; shut down; and evacuate.  Hydraulic fluid was pouring out of the belly of the aircraft between the two main gear.

[Narrative added no additional information.]

Learjet 60 flight crew reported loss of hydraulic systems during precision approach evaluations and elected to request priority handling. Flight crew elected to divert and made a safe precautionary landing.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

XA:00 is cut off for check in on XA:30 flight. After verifying all bags had been sent plane side I went plane side to help finish up; i.e.; bring down gate check bags/strollers; pull belts; close doors etc. At about XA:15 after being told by Gate and Lead Ramp that we were clear on ALL bags I proceeded back in to bag room with lead to finish close out. After closing out flight and finalizing flight for departure Lead Ramp realized a mistake in the loading occurred with the loading of dry ice quick packs in the forward compartment. Efforts were made by Operations to call flight back to gate; but to no avail. Aircraft departed gate XA:22 and was airborne at XA:32.

Quickpacks with limited quantities of Dry Ice staged and loaded in forward compartment of A320; contacted load plan and attempted to contact aircraft but was unsuccessful. Aircraft flew to ZZZ1.

Ramp personnel reported aircraft departed with dry ice packs erroneously loaded in forward compartment.


Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 1600; Flight Crew Type 200

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

We suffered what turned out to be a stuck valve as we reached top of climb departing [the airport] at the end of a training flight. This manifested as a sudden vibration felt through the airframe and controls; roughness of the engine and an increase in manifold pressure. At the time we did not know the cause but suspected a lost magneto.We reduced our power setting; descended and circled in order to position for an into-wind landing place; the wind was greater than 10 knots at the time. As we were over a populated area; I determined that the safest place for the helicopter would be a large parking lot; this would also ensure ease of access for maintenance/rescue vehicles if necessary. As we got lower we saw that the only place without power lines or trees was a parking lot in a mall area. At the southern (windward) side was an empty row and we landed there without causing damage to any buildings; people or cars. We took particular note that there was no FOD in the area and our downwash was not blowing anything towards the parked cars.We shut down in order to conduct a magneto check and engine inspection; and after telephoning our Maintenance Department we assessed that the problem had probably cleared during descent and that we should attempt to fly back to base. Start up; takeoff; and return to base were uneventful and we were on the ground for under 5 minutes.Due to the fact that helicopters conducting this sort of flight do not regularly keep in contact with an ATC agency; we did not radio anyone during this event but continued to monitor the [airport's] CTAF. Perhaps if having a flight following service was more common/mandatory this would simplify the decisions like 'who to call?' and 'do I declare an emergency or just inform?' In this case; had I had flight following; I could have informed (in this case) TRACON of the developing situation. A more standardized communications procedure for helicopters would remove one decision from all other decisions necessary during an already-busy landing.

Helicopter pilot experiences a power loss during initial climb and elects to land in a parking lot. The engine anomaly appears to clear up during descent but the approach is continued to landing as a precaution. Visual inspection on the ground reveals no anomalies and the helicopter is flown back to base.


Gulfstream Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Company Policy

We encountered a Resolution Advisory while descending through 31;000 feet prior to NAVEE intersection on the HUSTN TWO arrival into KCLT. As the pilot monitoring; I turned off the flight directors; and the pilot flying turned off the auto-pilot to respond to a 'descend' command from the RA. A gulfstream on a flight test had experienced a rapid decompression and was descending on top of us from our 10 o'clock position. The guidance from the TCAS system saved us from a traffic conflict. We advised ATC; and after we were 'clear of conflict;' we proceeded to CLT without further incident. Training and the system worked perfectly.

[Narrative contained no additional information].

Air carrier flight crew while descending through 31;000 feet responded to a 'DESCEND' RA. A Gulfstream above them was descending because of rapid decompression. They responded to the RA and were then 'clear of conflict.' 'Training and the system worked perfectly.'


We were just inside the outer marker for RWY 34R at approximately 5700 ft on final. A drone was spotted by both myself and my First Officer approximately 100 ft or less passing off our right side. The drone was traveling south. It was just off our right wing. It was a good sized drone with red and green navigation lights. Someone was flying drones in an unauthorized area. Suggest better ways to track drone operators.

A321 Captain reported sighting a nearby UAV while on approach to 34R at Salt Lake City.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 42; Flight Crew Type 533

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

On ILS Y 22R after being cleared for approach. I was Pilot Monitoring; and First Officer was maintaining assigned speed (I believe it was 210 knots); this -700 did not have speed intervention; so First Officer had to disconnect the auto throttles to maintain assigned speed after calling for flaps. There was additional discussion regarding this configuration since the FMC Speed wanted to decelerate to flaps 1 maneuvering.We were established on ILS Y 22R LOC at 4;000 feet; just as glideslope capture was occurring (do not remember if autopilot B had captured GS when we hit wake turbulence). The left wing dipped; and then the aircraft went into a solid right roll. The autopilot did not correct; so First Officer immediately disconnected the autopilot and attempted the upset recovery. I recognized he was using positive control input to correct the upset. While he did not call out 'upset;' it was obvious to me by his handling of the aircraft that he had gone through the [upset training] module; so I continued to monitor. This lasted several seconds. I estimate we entered at least 35 degree bank to the right; and it would not have ceased without our intervention. We did not hear a 'bank angle' warning during the encounter.We had minimal loss of altitude (no more than 200 feet); but this occurred as the Glide Slope came in; so we started to get high on path. I immediately informed TRACON that we had a sizable wake encounter. He then informed us that we were 3 miles behind a 757; he asked if we had sustained any injuries with the encounter. I notified him that I wasn't sure yet and that we would be breaking off the approach. With new ATC instructions; the First Officer continued to hand fly while I tried to bring automation back on line. For some reason; the MCP would not respond to any of my commands. While the First Officer maneuvered with raw data; I reset flight directors and auto throttle; and we were eventually able to get Autopilot B back on line.I assigned comms to the First Officer and I called back to the Purser to ask about their condition. She informed me that people were pretty shaken up but everyone appeared to be in their seats alright (and that she had her best 'poker face' on display); I could tell by her voice that she and the passengers were pretty rattled. I told her I would make a PA explaining what happened and we would be on the ground in the next 10 minutes or so. I made the PA and came back together with the First Officer. I set up for another ILS Y 22R approach while he continued Pilot Flying duties; and the subsequent approach/landing were uneventful.I recall there may have been a slight quartering tailwind at our altitude that contributed to the wake vortices lingering and required the multiple speed reductions by ATC; but the winds on the field were appropriate for the runway in use.

B737-700 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on approach to DTW in trail of a B757 that they responded to using the prescribed upset recovery procedure.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1925; Flight Crew Type 30

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

During the initial climb heading south to keep at 2500 ft. in a turn the left door blew out and departed the aircraft. Returned back to the airport with no other problems. Did not request any emergency equipment or assistance during or after landing.

Vans RV-10 Pilot reported aircraft door departed aircraft on takeoff resulting in an uneventful air return.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 82; Flight Crew Type 790

Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

I was pilot flying and set thrust for take off; pressed the TOGA button to engage take off thrust; I noticed right thrust did not fully advance. I called for check thrust. Captain noticed that the no. 2 engine would not achieve takeoff thrust. He called 100 knots but I noticed he was heads down at the engine gauges and I called V1 I achieved Vr and he called for a rejected takeoff. I said 'negative we are passed V1'. He pushed the thrust levers to full thrust and we rotated without incident. I disconnected autothrottles and was able to achieve climb thrust for the climb to cruise altitude. At cruise the Captain called Maintenance Control to discuss the issue and they told us that the aircraft had a similar incident on [previous month]. We continued the flight without incident and debriefed the situation at cruise. We talked about the fact that we were such a light weight and the speeds V1 and Vr came so much earlier than normal.

During takeoff; the PF (Pilot Flying) called for Set Takeoff Thrust.  The autothrottles advanced the left and right thrust lever toward target N1. Engine 1 attained takeoff N1; however; engine 2 would not attain the called for value. The PM (Pilot Monitoring) advanced the engine thrust lever for the right engine toward the firewall stop; but the engine would not respond with a higher thrust setting. Due to the extremely light weight of the airplane; V1 was attained very quickly and after the problem was sufficiently thought through. The takeoff continued and was within normal parameters. The Captain conferred with Dispatch and Maintenance Control above sterile altitude. The flight crew; in concert with Maintenance Control and Dispatch; elected to continue to ZZZ1.  No further anomalies were encountered.

B737 flight crew reported number engine low N2 during takeoff roll and subsequent crew response to an uneventful takeoff.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors; Manuals

I was assigned to replace a Main Landing Gear (MLG) brake on a B747-400 aircraft on the North Ramp with Mechanic Y. We printed the Maintenance Manual for brake replacement and the [associated] Task Document [that included sign-offs] for the brake change. After about one-half hour my partner was reassigned a different job and I was working alone. I than got two other mechanics to help and then; they were also reassigned. I was then working by myself and several supervisors were rushing me to complete the job as the aircraft was a departure for picking up passengers for an upcoming International Summit. I completed the brake change per the paperwork and nowhere in the paperwork or the Task Document (T/D) does it state to have the torque arm inspected by an Inspector. I was informed by Management that I failed to flag the job for Inspection per the new [expanded] Inspection Required Checklist. Nowhere in the paperwork for this job does it say to have the [brake] torque rod inspected; We; at Legacy Carrier X; have never had to have an Inspector check a Main Landing Gear brake change and our Legacy Air Carrier's RII list does not show this as an Inspection item. The training I received from our [merged] company about the new expanded Inspections lists and my responsibilities was inadequate. The training was rushed to us so the [merged] company could get a Single Operating Certificate (SOC). Most Legacy Air Carrier X employees were told by Management to read approximately 20-30 Engineering documents that were delinquent [outdated]. This policy of requiring the Mechanic to know every item on the new Inspections list was poorly communicated to us.

A Line Mechanic reports a new; expanded Inspection Required Checklist for maintenance work accomplished that was implemented after their merger; was poorly communicated by Management and contributed to his missing an inspection item on a B747-400 brake change.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was made aware of aircraft diverting due to the loss of engine oil on the number two engine. It was discovered that a line next to the fuel/oil heater was loose. The day before; I was involved as an inspector of the installation of a scheduled HMU (Hydro Mechanical Unit) change. I performed a detailed visual inspection of the HMU prior to engine runs. During & after the engine runs no leaks were noted.Due to the fact that only an idle leak check is required; fittings and connections are not tested for integrity under max loads. During any eng change; fuel pump; HMU ect. regardless of its test status (tested or untested) the engs should be taken to high power setting to verify the integrity and security of all fittings and connections while under max pressures and loads. I believe if this had been a part of the run procedures this incident could have been avoided.

B737 Mechanic reported the aircraft he worked on diverted due to engine oil loss caused by a loose engine oil line fitting.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 138.92; Flight Crew Total 17500; Flight Crew Type 1897.82

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

During climbout from IAD on the JDUBB2 departure we were given a climb from 3;000 to 10;000 feet. The aircraft was very light. Rate of climb was higher than usual given the light weight; in excess of 4;000 feet per minute. TCAS alerted us to traffic passing above at 10;000 [feet] with a 'Traffic; Traffic' call followed immediately by a Resolution Advisory to 'Level Off.' I complied by lowering the pitch attitude to just below the Resolution Pitch Advisory indication on the ADI. The Clear of Conflict annunciation quickly followed and the climb to 10;000 feet was completed. Our aircraft was never closer than 3;000 feet to the target aircraft; we never completely leveled off or deviated from an assigned altitude.

B737NG Captain reported responding to an RA departing IAD.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 3700; Flight Crew Type 300

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

The flight was approximately 5 hours. Had fuel for 6.5 hours.Approximately 2/3rds of the way through the flight the engine began to get rough and vibrate. I started to troubleshoot with the checklist after verifying temperatures and fuel pressure. I used the 'engine discrepancy check rough running engine'. After doing this I determined the problem to be a spark plug on the third cylinder While on L mag.This process distracted me and I most likely did not keep up with changing tanks for the next bit of time as I was thinking about it. After about 15 minutes it went smooth again and so I re checked the magnetos and they were both back to normal. Again I was thinking about it for maybe 15 more minutes. Because of this I believe the fuel on the left tank was left on too long and the fuel gauge did not show an accurate amount.As I got closer to the airport and started descending I used the descent checklist and changed to the right tank. The left at the time was indicating about 13 gallons and the right about 19 gallons. I knew this was probably not correct because I had been flying already for 5 hours and that would mean I have 2 more hours of fuel. I reduced power when I started my descent slowly retarding throttle back to 18 in.As I descended to 4;000 feet and reached 18 in. the engine began to run rough again. I checked the instruments and saw that the cylinder 4 EGT was too low on the annunciator. And also the fuel flow was fluctuating. The engine started surging from lack of fuel. I quickly did the Engine Failure After Liftoff and noticed I was already on the tank with higher indicated fuel so tried the left tank. Without helping I tried to go back to right tank. Notified ATC that I was requesting priority handling and turning to the airport for [Runway] XXL. I knew there was a Learjet approaching for [Runway] XXR and this influenced my decision. Performed the maximum glide checklist. Shut down engine when I had the field made. Landed safely on Runway XXL with no damage to airplane requested for a tow and called my Dispatcher. The fuel gauges were indicating top of yellow arc still on left and half on right tank. After parking it settled down to 1/8th left tank half right tank. Confirming my suspicion; they were not accurate. After fueling the aircraft to bottom of tabs after Maintenance checked it out they found 3-4 gallons useable in the left tank and the remaining fuel in the right tank of approximately 20 gallons. Maintenance did not find anything wrong with the airplane.It is clear to me that I got distracted dealing with the problemMidway in the flight and missed changing the tank for an extended period of time. In the future I will write down the time I change fuel tanks and the estimated remaining fuel in each tank and compare it against the fuel gauge. I will also change tanks more frequently to prevent such a big imbalance. Every 30 minutes. I am unsure of why the airplane struggled to produce power other than the potential low fuel on the left tank. I would think switching to the tank that was fuller in the descent checklist would have solved this issue.Fuel was checked prior to the flight to confirm it was correctly filled.

Bonanza pilot reported distraction contributed to improper fuel balance; causing fuel starvation to the engine and an In flight Shut Down and precautionary landing.


PMC; Performance/Thrust Management Computer

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

After taking off from; the MCDU said check weight. We noticed on the takeoff performance print out it said XXX passenger instead of YYY. We aren't sure when the discrepancy happened. I was curious if it happened since I tried to put in the climb gradient per the new memo and it possibly kicked out the numbers if the system isn't up yet. There wasn't a way in flight to see what passenger were invited in a b and c.Being new I thought if it was more than 2;000 lbs off it wouldn't generate takeoff performance. When scrolling through page 3 I thought it said 1800 lbs which would have made sense since there were less people that arrived than showed on our prelim. After looking in flight it said 18;000 lbs difference.

Air carrier pilot made an incorrect entry into the flight management computer generating incorrect weights for the flight.


Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Air Traffic Control Military 1; Air Traffic Control Radar 14; Air Traffic Control Supervisory 4; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 700

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance; Party2 Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

I am co-owner of a 1958 Beechcraft Twin Bonanza D50A. This aircraft was purchased in 2013; including an uninstalled dual-wheel control column. One evening June 2013; in anticipation of receiving dual instruction in the aircraft; I was inspecting the wiring for the push-to-talk and electric elevator trim to see if replacing the single wheel column with the dual wheel column would require any rewiring. I had spent a few hours the previous day with our uninstalled dual-wheel column; and felt that I completely understood the inner workings. It appeared that no wiring changes would be required to swap the columns; so I decided to do the work myself; and have it inspected two days later by my partner's Airframe/Powerplant (A/P) Technician; [who also has] an Inspection Authorization (IA) rating. I removed the single column from the central shaft. This allowed me access to the inspection plate behind the control wheel. I removed the cotter pin and nut from the control wheel shaft; and then removed the control wheel from the single-wheel column. I attempted to install that same wheel into the dual-wheel column; but I couldn't get it to fit. I started to suspect that the control column parts were dissimilar; despite appearing identical to my eyes. Afraid that I would screw things up; I reinstalled the control wheel into the single-wheel column. I then reinstalled that column onto the central shaft. I did a flight control check and found that the controls responded correctly with full range of motion; and that a neutral wheel resulted in a neutral aileron. By then; it was after midnight; so I locked the plane and decided to call my co-owner in the morning so he could get his A/P Technician out to do the swap for us. I'm not accustomed to sharing a plane; so it didn't occur to me to leave a note grounding the aircraft. I knew of no plans he had to fly; and he knew I was working on getting the dual controls installed. I woke the next morning to a call from my partner informing me that he had a flight control failure on takeoff. I told him what I had worked on; and that I hadn't thought he was planning to fly. We agreed that the plane was grounded. Since my flight control check was good; I was hopeful that there was another explanation for the failure. Tension between my co-owner and me over the incident kept him from sharing the results of the inspection with me until yesterday. It appears as though I did cause the failure. There is a very small pin or key that fits into a groove in both the control wheel shaft and the sprocket of the column; locking them together. My co-owner found it on the floor of the aircraft. Apparently; the torque on the nut provided enough friction between parts to allow the control wheel to move the flight controls in the absence of airflow. After takeoff aileron control was ineffective; as the control wheel spun freely. I wasn't sure how to report this since I wasn't involved in the flight. I clearly erred in not immediately grounding the aircraft after performing work that I was not rated to perform. Despite my intent to have an A/P Technician inspect the flight controls prior to flight; I failed to notify all authorized Operators of the aircraft's unairworthy state. This was a wake up call for me; both in the dynamics of co-ownership; and in the difference between A/P [technical] supervision and an inspection by an A/P [Technician] after work is complete. I had no business working on the flight controls of an aircraft without supervision.

Reporter stated his co-owner partner applied rudder and differential engine power to their Beech D50A Twin Bonanza after takeoff to correct for the loss of control wheel input to the ailerons. The engines are Lycoming GO-480 (geared type). He believes the flight experience of his co-owner made the difference that prevented a crash. No damage occurred to the aircraft; but CFR was alerted as the Twin Beech returned to field.

A pilot was informed by his co-owner partner their Beech D50A Twin Bonanza aircraft loss control wheel input to the ailerons on takeoff. Reporter had reassembled the single wheel column without any maintenance supervision after attempting to replace the single wheel column with the dual wheel column.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Started getting vectors for ILS approch in IMC condition and cleared to 3;000 feet. We received a short vectors to intercept and cleared for the approach. PF (Pilot Flying) armed the Approach mode in green needles; captured localizer; but never received glideslope and started to descend in vertical mode. As we approached 1;000 AGL; PF executed a go-around. On a second approach; we received a glideslope right before final approach fix. We continued to safe and uneventful landing.

IMC conditions; ATC vectored us to the ILS to a shorter-than-normal final approach; creating additional pressure. Once established on localizer; PF (Pilot Flying) armed the approach; then used vertical speed descent to capture GS (Glideslope). GS never observed on either PFD (Primary Flight Display). As we approached 1;000 AGL we executed a go-around. On the second approach; the GS appeared exactly as we crossed the final approach fix on both PFD; we landed and advised tower. We notified [Maintenance] and Tower of possible ground or aircraft equipment failure.Cause: Possible ILS GS equipment failure/interference caused no GS signal.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported irregular ILS Glideslope indications during ILS approach.


ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

We were cleared for takeoff from runway 24R. We were assigned the DOTSS1 departure; but on upwind ATC said 'turn left heading 210'. I scrolled in the heading and selected heading for my FO. Once established on the heading my FO called for flaps 0. As I was selecting them I noticed an aircraft on our TCAS that was +1200 ahead and to our left. I told my FO use caution for possible wake turbulence. I looked out to see where it was and discovered it was an A380. ATC thought it was a good idea to cross our little Embraer behind a 380's flight path. And; then we got the wake. My FO hand flew it. He did great and we came out the other side. In the meantime ATC said to maintain 4;000 and direct PEVEE. I could barely get my hand to the push to talk button because of the wake; but managed to get out a 'Standby'. My FO recovered the airplane and then I told ATC what he had done. He didn't much express a care. I called the FAs to make sure all was okay; they were and we pressed on.I'm not an ATC [Controller]; but I'm pretty sure that 380s are dangerous to small airplanes. And; I'm pretty sure that 7 miles in trail is the acceptable distance. If I had known that we were going to cross paths with the A380 I would not have accepted the heading. ATC is going to cause an accident in LAX with those A380s. I wish they would alert us to when we are near them.

EMB-175 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence from an A380 after takeoff from LAX. Reporter expressed concern with ATC procedures regarding A380 wake avoidance.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 4150; Flight Crew Type 500

Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft took off from ZZZ enroute to ZZZ1 on a VFR Flight. When approximately 10NM west of ZZZ at an altitude of 1;400 ft. MSL; a slight inconsistency the operation of the engine was noted. When another brief change in engine sound and operation was heard and felt again; a climb was initiated to 2;500 ft. MSL. As the PIC (Pilot in Command) and sole occupant of the aircraft; when another brief change in engine sound and operation was heard and felt; a turn back to ZZZ was initiated. While returning to ZZZ the sporadic changes in engine operation become more frequent. At approximately 5NM from the airfield; priority landing status announced on CTAF to other aircraft operating in the pattern and practicing instrument approaches. At approximately 3NM west of the approach end of RWY (Runway) XX; the aircraft would no longer maintain level flight. A descending left 180* turn directly to a grassy field was executed. Configuring the aircraft for landing; an additional 90* turn to the south was made in order to land length-wise into the field. After maximum braking; the aircraft came to a stop in the southwest corner of the field; approximately 30 yards from the field perimeter. Landing rollout was approximately 960 ft. No injuries to the pilot; no damage to the aircraft; and no damage to property occurred. A number of local emergency personnel and vehicles responded within 5 minutes. Local media also arrived on scene as well as some witnesses. Word was passed to the property owners regarding the occurrence. Aircraft recovery efforts are forthcoming; and the plane will be disassembled and trucked home.

Single Pilot reported a forced landing due to a malfunctioning engine. No injuries; no damage to aircraft or property.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing; Weather

One of the most important details of this report is that in the North Area we have 5 radar sectors. There is DBQ (63); LNR (64); BAE (60); HOR (61); and Harly (62). On this shift; we had 6 CPCs scheduled to work 5 radar sectors. Many times on shifts; traffic is fairly slow so we are able to combine positions. Sometimes we combine all of the low altitude sectors together which is a very risky move in my opinion; as Harly is an ORD and MKE departure sector. The main issue that arises here is that we are forced to work all the low altitude sectors combined on a 125 mile range as well as have our altitude limits set to the ground (as we own from the surface to FL230 in DBQ sector); when you have 6+ ORD departure 5 MIT and 3-4 MKE departures and several overflights in Harly alone; it is much more difficult to accurately determine separation at such close distances. Also; as ORD is one of the busiest airports in the world; the limited datablocks around ORD and MDW make it so that it is very difficult to see actual data blocks that you are in control of at times. One more issue that arises here is that you have 5 frequencies: 133.3; 132.1; 135.55; 125.05; and 133.95. This makes it extremely easy for miscommunication between pilots and controllers; especially when busy. To put it simply; the agency is staffing our area with the least amount of controllers possible; and it is creating unsafe working situations; putting many CPC's and the flying public in extremely vulnerable and compromising positions. I signed into the LNR radar sector position. At the time it was LNR and DBQ combined. There was a massive line of moderate; heavy; and some extreme precipitation that extended from CID to DBQ to JVL and all the way to ORD. At this time there were numerous ORD and MDW ground stops; which resulted in my holding of numerous aircraft over the DBQ VORTAC. I should also mention that something that complicated my sector is that I had the VOK E; S; W and WIANG ABC MOAs and ATCAAs active. After about an hour and a half of working here; I start to see that numerous ORD arrivals started being handed off to me. At no point was any type of plan communicated to me; but I did notice that the route was going to be a huge issue for the area as the Harly controller seemed extremely busy already; and all of these ORD inbounds that we normally do not work would now be cruising through his departure sector. A notable point is that our 6th CPC had now been allowed to go home at this time; and as you will see we desperately needed the extra body; in fact; probably could have used a few more.In order to give the Harly controller a fighting shot at getting on top of the ORD inbounds; my plan was to expedite all of the aircraft to 170. At this time; numerous aircraft expressed to me that they were minimum fuel or could not fly the entire route. Due to the traffic and frequency congestion; I was unable to answer each one of their calls; most of the time I had to specify that if they needed to divert; they should do so and to not expect any short cuts. I must reemphasize that during no time during this huge push was any semblance of a plan expressed to the controllers on the floor. Numerous times I heard shouting across the room that the BAE..MKG..RHIVR routing was not good; then contradicting reports that it was good; etc. During all of this; we had a code floating towards our airspace that I noticed at 170. I immediately recognized that it looked very similar to an ORD arrival. Sector P04 at ZMP started calling us for coordination and my trainee d-side answered the call. What my d-side trainee eventually communicated to me was that for whatever reason; ZMP could not get the aircraft to flash at me and so I immediately put in a 'vp' flight plan; to get something in the machine. I changed the aircraft's callsign to Aircraft X; and gave him routing which I thought was good: FAH.ERNNY2.KORD. Time passed; and I initiated an AIT (Automated Information Transfer) to the Harly sector. Harly informed me while the aircraft was over the CHDRR intersection (normally when MKE approach has the handoff); that he could not get the aircraft to handoff to MKE; so my trainee D-side initiated a manual handoff. MKE approach then informed us that they would not accept the aircraft as the pilot would not be able to fly that route in weather. I didn't really know what to do at this time as I had no idea what route to give the aircraft so; unfortunately for the aircraft; I put him on a series of vectors in Harly's airspace and finally pawned him off on the Northeast area; sector 27; as they were already working ORD arrivals. This entire situation was extremely dangerous and the most frustrating thing; apart from the lack of staffing in the area at the time; was that no plan was ever communicated to us controllers. Several things could have alleviated the dangers of this event immensely.1. Needed 4 more CPCS on the shift at the time of the event. This would have brought us from 5 to 9 CPCs.2. Extra staffing would allow us to open up positions and have more than one d-side in the area. I would recommend opening up DBQ; and putting a d-side at LNR; BAE; and Harly.3. Have our floundering TMU formulate and communicate a plan with our supervisor.4. Give us a supervisor that is familiar with our area and airspace. The supervisor at the time; due to no fault of his own; seemed to be totally clueless and had no insight or direction to provide to us. He was put in a situation where he was set up to fail. 5. Cancel the military airspace as our IFR operations were highly impacted and made more complex due to the existence of the cumbersome VOK E/S/W + WIANG A/B/C.

ZAU Controller describes a shift where aircraft area deviating and the sectors that he is working have been combined. Aircraft are not flying as instructed because of weather and one aircraft is not accepted by the facility he would normally hand it off to. Controller reported that this was a staffing issue.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

On final approach to LNK airport we were on the ILS 18 under visual conditions; it was dusk; the First Officer was flying and as we came about 100 feet above touchdown I noticed birds (geese); I verbally communicated Birds and it was too late; we hit about two of the geese and I could tell there was about a flock of 6 or so. During out decent we briefed the possibility of birds and we had our eyes open; however; with the dusk situation; we didn't see them till it was too late. After hitting the birds I looked at the engine indications and they were all in the green; the First Officer did a fantastic job flying the aircraft till we landed. We notified the ATC about our bird strike; they gave us a phone number to call; we called and talked to them and they wanted to know what kind of damage it was; and if it was considered aircraft accident. I told them; that Maintenance had been notified and I wasn't able to answer that question; the police came and took our names down. I called the Manager on Duty and he said we hand the situation well. Also; talked with Controller and filled the paperwork with them.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

EMB-175 flight crew reported a bird strike on final approach that resulted in damage to the aircraft.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency

During cruise at FL410; the First Officer noted high oil temperature on the left engine. The crew then noted zero oil quantity on same engine. High Oil Temperature Checklist was performed. During procedure; oil temperature continued to increase and entered the red band; so the engine was shut down in accordance with the checklist and all indications returned to normal including oil quantity. The decision was made to [divert] as [another airport] was closer than [our destination] and the crew was familiar with airport and level of support available. Also; [our planned destination] had high winds at the surface which were not conducive to safe operation (280/27G39); mountainous terrain and high altitude above sea level.

During the initial stage of cruise flight; I noticed the left engine temperature in the yellow band. I pointed this out to the Captain; who then looked up the proper procedure in the QRH. As we were going through the checklist in the QRH; the engine temperature moved into the red band. Per checklist instructions we secured the left engine using the Engine Failure/Shutdown Checklist. We then notified ATC; declared an emergency and began the drift-down procedure. During the descent the Captain made contact with the company and we determined the best course of action was to divert. We then coordinated with ATC for direct routing. Upon arrival we landed without further incident.

During cruise the crew observed an increased oil temperture on the left engine as well as a low oil quantity. After performing the appropriate checklist; they shutdown the engine and divert to a suitable airport.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 136; Flight Crew Total 450; Flight Crew Type 117

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I inadvertently flew into R-5017B following along I70 Northeast of Las Cruces Int'l Airport (LRU) due to poor chart verbiage. I am requesting an update be made to the VFR charts here in this area to be more clear about R-5017B. Currently; on the chart it reads 'R-5017B EXCLUDES THE AIRSPACE AT AND BELOW 1500 ft. AGL'. I fly all across the United States testing ground based communications for leakage on certain frequencies for FAA and FCC compliance. I fly these grids at 1500 AGL and when I checked my Las Cruces grid (as I always check the airspace I'll be flying in) I noticed that the grid was partially inside of R-5107B yet noticed the text on the chart and was surprised (to what my interpretation was) that I was going to be able to hit the grid over the town of White Sands seeing as I fly my grids at and below 1500 AGL. I was not on flight following as all my grids in this are were in uncontrolled airspace and I was more free to switch between the different CTAF's I would be able to monitor traffic and report positions on. It wasn't until I called up center to get flight following from my on site station to ABQ that I was told to copy a number for pilot deviation. I have sent pictures of the VFR chart to many very seasoned pilots along with a few CFI's today after my incident without telling them what happened; each of their interpretations of the text on the VFR charting was identical to mine. I hope that my experience today helps to hopefully change the chart to make it more clear; that there is only a very small specific area for the excluded airspace and to prevent further pilot deviation in this area.

Pilot reported inadvertent airspace violation due to poor chart verbiage.


Time Pressure; Physiological - Other; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

On departure climb out at 8;000 the First Officer and I noticed a strong electric burning smell. Shortly thereafter we heard commotion (movement and yells) in the cabin of the aircraft followed by multiple call button tones from passengers. The #3 Flight Attendant called the cockpit and notified us that passengers were yelling there was smoke and it smelled like electrical fire. She reported: The smoky area was isolated in the center portion of the cabin (row 20). She had initially thought it was condensation; but after getting closer (she went to row 20) it was obvious to be smoke and burnt electrical. We notified ATC and leveled the aircraft at 11;000; the smell began to dissipate; but there was still an electrical smell lingering. At this point; the First Officer and I deemed that the smoke or smell was not strong enough in the cockpit area to don oxygen masks or goggles. Also; due to the smoke and smell dissipation; I determined the QRH procedure was not required. I verified the reports twice with the # 1 Flight Attendant and also verified that the smoke and smell was dissipating. At this point; I determined and conferred with the First Officer that the best course of action was to return to the airport. I declared an emergency with ATC; notified the #1 Flight Attendant; briefed the passengers; and notified Company we were returning. Upon inspection by Maintenance; the problem was isolated to a blown/burned light ballast in row 20. Side note: After arriving; I was informed by Maintenance that this was not the first occasion with our aircraft fleet and that it could (a theory) be related to the 166 seat conversion wiring. Of course this was theory; but seemed worthy of noting.

Shortly after takeoff a MD-83 crew and passengers detected a strong electrical burning smell with smoke in the cabin; so an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport where a burnt florescent light ballast was found in row 20.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 542; Flight Crew Type 500

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

During taxi to the run up area at the approach end of Runway 34 at MEV; I heard Minden area traffic on the radio. I decided to listen to the destination AWOS on the same radio; thus switching the CTAF frequency to standby. In order to hear the AWOS; I had to pull the squelch button out. When I pushed the button back in; I could no longer hear the AWOS. As a result; I did not realize that the CTAF frequency for MEV remained in standby. When I departed Runway 34; I first transmitted my intentions (on the wrong frequency); then looked for departing traffic on Runway 30. I did not see or hear the aircraft departing Runway 30 until his shadow passed overhead. I looked down at my radio; saw my mistake; and switched frequencies in time to hear the other pilot asking if I was on frequency. He stated that I passed 'right below' him. Presumably; he needed to take evasive action. There was no contact. This incident would have been prevented had I not neglected to set the CTAF frequency to active on my radio. At the time of the incident; I was well rested; well hydrated; and not distracted by issues outside of flying. I have over 300 hours in the airplane in question; and am very familiar with the layout and function of the radios.

A pilot departed MEV Runway 34 without the local CTAF frequency selected and had a near miss with an aircraft which had just departed Runway 30.


ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

[We had] Air Carrier XXXX en route to Wyoming; and Air Carrier XYXX en route to Colorado both on frequency at the same time. Air Carrier XYXX handed off to Sector 1 for descent clearance to FL340 as per the FOP for aircraft landing Colorado. Air Carrier XYXX given the frequency change to Sector 1; Air Carrier XXXX answered the frequency change instead and the read back was missed. Air Carrier XXXX checked in at Sector 1 at FL380 and the Sector 1 Controller acknowledged Air Carrier XXXX and issued a descent clearance to FL340. Air Carrier XXXX inquired about rides at FL340; the Controller at Sector 1 then called Air Carrier XXXX; Air Carrier XYXX and issued a frequency change to Sector 3 and told the pilot to inquire about rides there. Air Carrier XXXX accepted the descent clearance and frequency change where it was noticed that the incorrect aircraft was descending to FL340 and violating the airspace of Sector 4. Appropriate action was taken to correct the descent and Air Carrier XXXX was climbed back up to FL380 and Air Carrier XYXX was descended to FL340 and shipped to the appropriate frequency. Have this Air Carrier change similar sounding call signs if they anticipate the aircraft being in the same sector at the same time.

[Narrative #2 had no additional information.]

Enroute Controller described an unauthorized descend and airspace incursion when a same company aircraft with a similar sounding flight number initiated a descent issued to another company aircraft.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 42; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 366

Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

After getting the ATIS for TEB we briefed for the ILS to Runway 6 with the possibility of circling to Runway 1. The Controller had cleared us direct to VINGS Intersection and had descended us to 2;000 FT. ATC was very busy and there reports of geese in the area. Prior to reaching VINGS we were given a 090 heading to intercept and were cleared for the ILS to Runway 6 and told to contact the Tower. After crossing VINGS we maintained 2;000 FT until reaching glide slope intercept and then followed the glide slope. Just prior to DANDY we got a very brief TCAS TRAFFIC alert. I looked to my right and saw an aircraft climbing out of EWR. TCAS showed he was about 1;000 FT above our altitude and was not factor. My attention went back to the PFD in which I noticed we would be crossing DANDY on the glide slope. At that point I remembered from previous trips to TEB the 'mandatory 1;500 FT at DANDY.' We had not briefed this crossing in our approach briefing. I believe this occurred because of a lack of proficiency using the EFB in the aircraft. I have been using my iPad for Commercial Charts on the other aircraft I fly. I chose to use the EFB installed in this aircraft so as not to add more distractions in the cockpit. The EFB was left in the segmented view by the previous crewmember and I failed to change the view. In this case the profile segment was set to the briefing strip and not the profile view of the approach plate. Not seeing the profile view I failed to notice the mandatory crossing at DANDY Intersection.

A Corporate pilot on approach to TEB Runway 6 was very busy; distracted by a TCAS; and because of workload did not cross DANDY at the mandatory 1;500 FT constraint.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

While conducting the approach RWY XX into ZZZ; at a position just prior to ZZZZZ; we experienced a FLAPS FAIL Caution Message. At the time of the failure; our airspeed was 200 KIAS; the altitude was 2;500 feet.; the OAT was -20C; and the flaps failed in the 0-degree position. The FO (First Officer) (PF) (Pilot Flying) took the radios and notified ATC; while I (PM) (Pilot Monitoring) completed the QRH. ATC issued us a series of vectors; while we completed the QRH and coordinated a diversion to ZZZ1. Once the abnormal procedure was complete; I assumed control of the airplane; and was the one who accomplished the subsequent landing. We requested the ILS RWY XY at ZZZ1 and landed without incident. ARFF (Aircraft Rescue & Fire Fighting) crews were present along the runway; though an emergency was not declared. The root cause of this failure is; at present; unknown to myself.

Just before commencing the approach at ZZZ to RWY XX; and approaching the ZZZZZ waypoint; I asked the CA (Captain) who was pilot monitoring for flaps 8. Flaps Fail caution message immediately illuminated. We broke off the approach and received a heading away from ZZZ at 2;500 feet. I took the radios while the CA ran the QRH and coordinated with Dispatch. I continued to fly; and transferred controls to the CA for the landing. We decided to divert to ZZZ1 taking in consideration turbulent conditions; strong gusty winds; and the longer runway. We received a series of headings and climbed to 5;000 while working the problem. Landing with flaps zero at ZZZ1 RWY XX was without incident. They had emergency vehicles waiting for us; but we did not declare an emergency. Cause of flaps fail is unknown at this time.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported Flaps Fail Caution Message on approach and diverting to an airport with a longer runway.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Supervised refuel at [FBO] support at ZZZ with an upload of 400 gallons. Total fuel load onboard 5;600 pounds; each wing had 1;400 pounds each; (2;800 pounds) fuselage 2;800. Passengers arrived and flight departed ZZZ normal uneventful. ATC held us down at 3;000 ft. step climb to 6;000 ft. radar vectors over ZZZ1. After passing ZZZ1; ATC gave us climb to 14;000 ft. MSL. Out of 10;000 ft. a Right Red Fuel Pressure light illuminated. All other indication normal. Engine climb power normal. Fuel balance normal. No other warnings. Reference QRH followed ALL procedures. TO MONITOR INDICATIONS - IF FUEL PRESSURE LIGHT DOES NOT GO OUT; FLIGHT CAN BE CONTINUED AT ALTITUDE IF ENGINES ARE OPERATING PROPERLY' We had no additional indications of a malfunction. Climbing up through 30;000 ft. to assigned final FL 400 we noticed a fuel imbalance . This was 20 minutes into the flight. The left wing quantities 1;000 points right wing indication went to 800 pounds. While trying to transfer and balance fuel; we noticed the fuel rate decreases. Crew agreed that the cause of imbalance and Red light unknown we should divert to closest airport as a safety precaution. REQUEST ATC TO DIVERT DUE TO UNKNOWN FUEL IMBALANCE. Stopped climb at 390 received descent clearance to FL 360. Started descent. Power idle. Pilot flying hand flew the aircraft and found imbalance or need for trim. Pilot flying duties took over ATC communications while pilot not flying notification of passenger that we had to divert. Continue to troubleshoot fuel loss and reviewed QRH again looking for guidance. Pilot Not flying suggests ZZZ2 [as] it was straight ahead 60 miles with long runway. We had a lot of altitude to lose. ATC agreed and assigned heading southbound. Pilot not flying loaded ZZZ2 into FMS. Monitoring fuel balance problem. ATC gave clearance to 3;000 ft. As we approached 17 miles away ATC gave us level off at 14;000 ft. and vectors away from the airport. With the rate of fuel loss increasing and balance not maintained crew agreed it was time to [request priority handling and] did not want to turn way from the airport. ATC acknowledging [request] and gave us descent clearance again and turn back to the airport. Fuel imbalance getting worse. Pilot not flying could not maintain 500 pounds in right wing. Fuselage gauges display over 2;000 pounds. The fuel panel was displaying a fuselage EMPTY light. With transfer we could push fuel to both or wing tanks. The confusion and problem could not be identified. Priority was to keep fuel in the left wing. Get on the ground as soon as possible. ATC Tower ZZZ2 transmitted smoke coming from the back of the aircraft in the flare. Made normal landing with Left wing was 1;000 pounds quantity; fuselage EMPTY; right wing quantities 20 pounds. Taxing in on one engine. The right engine shut down as a precaution. In summary 5;600 start fuel; 1;241 Fuel Burn; 1;050 Fuel Remaining 3;310 Fuel loss in flight. Fuel quantities gauge 1;050 Left Wing; EMPTY fuselage; EMPTY Right wing. Cause for leak unknown. Reported to flight control and maintenance at ZZZ3. Landed the airplane with normal trim. Crew confirmed loss of fuel upon landing and opening the door seeing the fuel leak. Total flight duration 41 minutes. First problem revealed 15 minutes into the flight. Diverting from 39;000 ft. to touch down when fuel imbalance discovered was less than 25 minutes from start to finish.

Learjet Crew reported that a fuel imbalance resulted in a diversion.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Student

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 238; Flight Crew Type 29

Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Flight originated from ZZZ via IFR flight plan. Initial point of landing ZZZ1. Aircraft landed at ZZZ1; fueled at FBO. Aircraft departed in left downwind. Aircraft autopilot was selected on to climb aircraft at 100 kts. direct to ZZZ VOR. Upon level off at 7;500 ft.; cruise checklist was completed. [About 15 minutes later]; loud 'thud' was heard. Pilot flying initially believed passenger in rear had dropped large item; which was not the case. Instructor Pilot pulled out flashlight to inspect right side aircraft wing. Upon inspection of left side wing; Pilot Flying noticed 2 of the 4 vortex generators missing as well as a black mark. Pilot Flying and Instructor deemed the safest option would be to discontinue flight and return to ZZZ1. TRACON was notified of situation and provided assistance. TRACON closed VFR flight plan upon request. Aircraft entered left downwind. Instructor Pilot took control of aircraft for approach to landing phase. Aircraft was forced to land over maximum landing weight. After shutdown; pilot and Instructor were able to confirm 2 of 4 vortex generators had gone missing; crack visible on aircraft surface and patch of aircraft missing. Blood splatter was visible across entire left side of aircraft. Propeller had no visible damage.

Pilot reported a bird strike resulted in aircraft damage.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy; Airport

We should be more cognizant of our location and taxi instructions. Contributing factors were that neither pilot had been to LGA in multiple years and the airport briefing pages and ACARS messages were not as clear as they could be. A note on either of those noting that the correct gate has a sign with the terminal number on it would have helped greatly. Our gate has an XX sign whereas the wrong gate only has X on it. Also; there are too many frequencies (tower; ground; company; ramp; ground; then ramp again) to be called after landing especially when it's such a short taxing exiting Runway 4 where there isn't much time for both pilots to be fully concentrating on taxiing and not distracted by other duties.

Air Carrier pilot reported turning the wrong way while taxiing due to confusing gate signs and confusing taxi communication procedures at LGA.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 4200; Flight Crew Type 1200

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Airspace Structure; Airport; Human Factors; Procedure

On a frequently flown direct-route round-trip route to and from BDU from the north; three open parachutes were encountered at or very near HYGEN intersection. There is a parachute symbol southwest of LMO between the LMO runway depiction and the HYGEN depiction on the sectional chart. HYGEN is also depicted on the IFR Low chart. The A/FD (Airport/Facilities Directory) for LMO states 'Parachute jumping on and invof arpt primarily of rwy; avoid overflights mid fld.' Also in the A/FD there is a 'Parachute Jumping Area' depicted as being nearly adjacent to taxiway B at LMO.In my opinion; parachute operations southwest of LMO are extremely hazardous and should be terminated. Parachutists drop paths vary considerably depending on winds; altitude; and other factors; and in this encounter their paths were very near HYGEN intersection; a crossing-point of two significant airways; V-220 and V-85. During a common VFR practice of tracking along and over airway routes and intersections such as HYGEN; airplanes' altitudes are often flown that are lower than IFR minimum crossing altitudes and that fact could put aircraft in conflict with free-falling parachutists that had exited their jump planes but had not yet descended to where they open their chutes; and therefore would be very difficult to see and avoid in time. HYGEN is less than a mile from the parachute depiction on the sectional chart.The parachute symbol is only about 1/3 of a mile from the approach path for the VOR-DME-A instrument approach for LMO; for which the approach path; based on a VOR; is variable since it is based on the positional limitations of BJC VOR that is 15 miles distant. The parachute symbol is similarly 1/3 of a mile from the approach path for the RNAV (GPS)-B approach into LMO. Both of these approaches are favorites for practice by locals in VMC; when parachutists are frequently active. The approach paths for both of these approaches crosses exactly over the 'Parachute Jumping Area' that is depicted adjacent to taxiway B at LMO. In other words; a practice instrument approach would pass exactly through the parachutist's landing area at the airport essentially at the missed approach point. The AFD admonition to 'avoid overflights mid fld' is in direct conflict with the instructions to be followed when practicing these two instrument approach procedures.The jump plane pilot routinely makes a call on the CTAF frequency when his jumpers are away; but a pilot approaching the airport may miss that one warning if he or she is listening to the LMO AWOS-3. Additionally; the jump plane pilot's communication could be blocked by other voice traffic on the CTAF. The 'jumpers away' call is easily missed. If an aircraft is cruising just a thousand or two thousand feet below the jump plane when the 'jumpers away' call is made; the aircraft's pilot may not be able to see free-fallers in time; and not have time to avoid free-falling parachutists.I believe this situation is a disaster waiting to happen and I hope you can influence the powers that be to take action. I do not wish to publish this recommendation at some future time because of hearing of the death of a parachutist and possibly the occupants of an aircraft if a parachutist goes through the windscreen of an aircraft.

Pilot reported parachute operations in the vicinity of LMO put skydivers and aircraft in danger because of the zone's proximity to V220 and V85. Reporter also stated; regular CTAF communications may interfere with the 'jumpers away' call.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was working GC (Ground control). Aircraft Y had just landed RWY 31L and was instructed by LC (Local Controller) to turn right at either taxiway E or C4. LC observed Aircraft Y making a right turn off at C4 then cleared Aircraft X for take off (who I believe was in position at the time). I noticed Aircraft Y continuing a right handed turn onto an old decommissioned reverse exit (Juliet I believe was it's name). I immediately yelled to LC to stop his departure and that Aircraft Y was still on the runway. LC immediately canceled the takeoff clearance. By this time Aircraft Y had done a complete 180 and was slightly working his way southbound on the runway; eventually continuing a right hand turn for C4 again.The old reverse turn off 'stub' should have been and still should be completely demolished. Currently it exists as a approximately 50 foot piece of concrete coming of off C4. There are yellow painted X's however at night most likely difficult to see. Furthermore this airport would greatly benefit from an ASDE-X. This would have given LC an even better idea of the situation.

Tower Controller reported a runway incursion due to an aircraft taking the improper taxi route.