ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Low ceilings vectoring aircraft for ILS approaches (getting visuals sometimes). I was vectoring a King Air IFR inbound to ADS Airport. I was also working aircraft inbound to DAL. I observed an aircraft pop up approximately 3 miles SW of ADS heading NE bound. It showed a computer assigned beacon code; not local but I do not remember the code; but no altitude and only showed something like 90 or 100 KTS. This target moved directly across ADS Airport and I had thought it was being worked by ADS and probably landing there. I cleared the King Air for a visual and the target continued across the airport NNE bound toward the King Air. I called ADS and asked them if they were working the aircraft and they said no and that they could not see any traffic out the window. I told them I would hold on to the King Air (he was approaching 5 NM from the airport) so that I could continue to call traffic. The King Air never saw any traffic and then after they crossed paths; in about a mile or two the other target just disappeared. This took a lot of my attention away from all of the other aircraft to call traffic for a 'Ghost Target.' I originally had all of the beacon codes and call signs; but lost my notes. We did full route the Ghost Target beacon code and the computer showed not stored. The target looked real and it was observed on ADS RADAR; also (they get their feed off of ours.) All of the data was reported to D10 Management through our STARS reporting sheets. Shut down this system until they can figure out what is causing these false targets.

D10 Controller described a 'Ghost Target' event while vectoring an aircraft to the ADS Airport. The reporter noted the STARS equipment should be shut down until the cause of these false targets can be fixed.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Type 7000

At night; the north ramp at ROC is somewhat dimly lit.  There is no centerline taxi line in the alley [between Concourse A and B].   As a result; crews have to be especially vigilant because there are airplanes parked on both sides; and the ramp narrows considerably as you approach the terminal.   As we entered the ramp; one of the wing walkers was standing out in the ramp and motioning us toward him.  I realized he brought us extremely close to the tail of another parked B737.  We need a centerline taxi line to follow.

B737-700 Captain laments the lack of a taxi line between Concourse A and B at ROC.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.0

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.0

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

I was working Approach East when an aircraft checked in descending out of 16;000 feet for 11;000 feet. I told him to expect the visual approach runway and to continue decent to 6;000 feet. He read back that he would expect the visual to 21 and descend and maintain 6;000. About 5 minutes later the low altitude alert went off and I noticed him descending through 4;000 feet. I immediately told him to climb to 4;500 and turned on the emergency map to make sure there were no obstructions in his path. With no obstructions in his path; he safely climbed.Keeping up your scan to make sure the pilots are following your instructions.

On initial contact; the aircraft was given a control instruction by the Approach Controller to descend and maintain 6;000 feet. He read back the instruction correctly. He was observed descending through 4;000 feet in a 4;500 foot Minimum Vectoring Area (MVA). He was immediately given a climb to the MVA of 4;500 feet. During this time I was working the Controller in Charge position as well as Radar Assistant. Both are non-control positions. I immediately pulled up the Emergency Obstruction Video Map to check for unsafe proximity to obstructions. He was not near any obstructions.

Two TRACON Controllers reported that an aircraft was assigned a descent to 6;000 feet; and read back the clearance correctly. The aircraft descended to 4;000 feet and below the minimum vectoring altitude for its area; before the controller noticed and climbed it back to 4;500 feet.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 66; Flight Crew Total 2150; Flight Crew Type 210

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Time Pressure

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related

I was flying my airplane Aircraft X from ZZZ to ZZZ1 at 9500'. My husband was flying Aircraft Y about 5 miles in trail. I was approaching VCV and my husband let me know over air to air I had a converging ADS-B target. I verified the target on my ADS-B and started visually scanning the area. The target was approaching from my 10 o'clock at the same altitude. When it was about 1 mile from me I visually saw a predator drone being followed by a chase plane; a low wing Cherokee; at about a 1/2 mile in trail. The drone and my airplane were on a collision course so I pulled power and stated a descent. I noticed both the drone and Cherokee had also started a descent. I added full power and started a climb and the drone passed about 200' beneath my plane and the chase plane passed just behind me. I flipped over to Joshua Approach on 124.55 and heard the chase pilot and approach discussing that Joshua had issued a descent at the same time I had started to descend to avoid.

Small aircraft pilot reported a NMAC with a UAV. The reporter described a chase plane following the UAV.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Monitored closely aircrafts with recurrent fume events to investigate the root cause of the problem until a permanent solution that yields the desired results is achieved. Including but not limited to replacement of currently used engine life-limited parts; and the check intervals of such parts that could be potentially leading to these fume events. During the takeoff and initial climbout phase at about 500 feet AGL the Captain and I smelled a strong dirty-socks odor. The Captain checked with the flight attendants to confirm there was no odor in the cabin. Shortly after; during the climb phase we ran the supplementary procedure for elimination of odor/fumes in the cockpit/cabin. After turning Pack 1 off; the smell started to dissipate and a few minutes later there was no odor. We notified Dispatch; applied MEL operational procedures associated with one pack off. The rest of the flight was uneventful.

A320 First Officer reported smelling a strong dirty socks odor during initial climb.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other; Party2 Dispatch

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

I was contacted by company in regards to flight from ZZZ-ZZZ1. The ground crew did not provide me with the proper documentation regarding the 6 kg of dry ice that was loaded onto the aircraft. Also; the weight and balance app/closeout did not show that there was an dry ice on the aircraft. It was then confirmed today that the dry ice was indeed on the aircraft for that flight and I was never made aware of it or provided with any documents that would have told me the material was loaded. Company made me aware days after the fact due to their own investigating. Lack of documentation [provided to flight crew.]In the future hopefully there is better attention to detail and double checking that the proper procedures are followed.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

EMB-145 flight crew reported company notification of undocumented Hazmat cargo transported on previously completed flight.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 5720; Flight Crew Type 800

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Maintenance informed the crew that they fueled the aircraft the night before with full inboard tanks and 200 liters per outboard tank for a total of 3;187 LBS of fuel.  SIC set up his side of the cockpit; turned all interior lights checking double checking fuel on board; and checked lights outside.  SIC performed pre-flight and walk around; weighing passenger cargo with the scale; and securing a total of 339 LBS in passenger cargo with net and straps with fire blanket and smoke detectors. All preflight checks were good.  SIC loaded passengers and briefed the passengers while PIC was doing performance checks in the cockpit. The crew started engines took off with PIC at the controls for the first hour.  The takeoff and climb was uneventful up to an altitude of FL100.  In cruise to ZZZZ; the crew noticed the left fuel gauge was intermittently working; going from 0 to 100%; periodically matching the right gauge within 300 LBS.  The crew continued to ZZZZ; and at about 35 minutes from ZZZZ; the crew called Operations; who said he had not gotten a hold of the Controller in ZZZZ; and that he would call the crew back.  He called the PIC back about 28 minutes from ZZZZ; telling the PIC the following: Weather in ZZZZ is 1/4 mile visibility; 100-200 overcast; and that the crew should try to fly over the airport and make an attempt to land in ZZZZ; because of the high profile mission. About 27 minutes from ZZZZ; while the SIC was flying; the PIC worked a time fuel distance problem and determined there would be between 300 and 500 LBS of fuel left on board after flying to ZZZZ and back to ZZZZ1 for landing. The crew determined that ZZZZ2 or ZZZZ3 was the closest alternate airport for landing.  Crew discussed landing at ZZZZ2 or ZZZZ3 if unable to get into ZZZZ due to weather in order to wait out the weather in ZZZZ or ZZZZ3 and refuel.  The crew continued to ZZZZ.       The crew established two-way communication with ZZZZ Safety (Controller).  The crew approached and descended into ZZZZ down to 1;500 feet AGL; maintaining VFR; flew over the airport once; and turned left to return direct to ZZZZ1.  Over the top of ZZZZ; the fuel trips were showing 1;274 LBS.  The crew continued on a direct track to ZZZZ1; with ZZZZ2 20 miles off the right wing (visible on a clear day). ZZZZ2's weather was the same as ZZZZ a low-lying; solid overcast layer; and there was enough fuel to return to ZZZZ1; so the crew continued the return trip at FL095 (9;500 feet MSL).  Later in the flight; crew had to descend to FL075 to avoid weather and to stay VFR.  The PIC established two-way communications with ZZZZ1 Control and that we were 80 nautical miles out from ZZZZ1. The crew observed; about thirty minutes from ZZZZ1; the right fuel low light came on. The PIC turned on all fuel boost pumps and opened cross feed.  The crew stayed at FL075 VFR; tracking direct to ZZZZ1.  The crew pressed the nearest button on the GPS to double check that ZZZZ1 was the nearest suitable airport for landing. The GPS confirmed ZZZZ1 was the nearest airfield.  The crew continued at FL075; and the left low-level light came on.  As the closest airport to land was ZZZZ1; the crew continued to ZZZZ1 and saw the fuel pressure gauge intermittently flickering and decreasing. The PIC informed the SIC that the number 1 engine would start to fail.       The SIC asked the PIC if he would like the flight controls.  As the PIC responded that he had the flight controls; the SIC confirmed that the PIC had the flight controls.  The number 1 engine failed about 24 nautical miles from the ZZZZ1 airport.  The crew ran emergency procedures by feathering the number 1 engine.  After the number 1 engine failed; the fuel pressure gauge for the number 2 engine was intermittently flickering.  The SIC declared emergency to ZZZZ1 Control.  The PIC announced he has a road in sight suitable for landing.  Approximately 5 to 10 seconds later; the number 2 engine fails. The PIC announces the number 2 engine has failed.  The crew ran emergency procedures; feathering number 2 engine on crosswind; flying over the road; and the crew runs landing checklist.  Turning on to a left downwind; the crew observed light traffic on the road suitable for landing with no obstacles in sight.  The crew observed the road had a slight upward slope.  The SIC informed passengers to buckle up and brace.  PIC turned left base and the crew ran before landing checklist; and the PIC calls for approach flaps.  The SIC put in approach flaps.  The PIC turned final over the road; the crew ran the landing checklist and with landing assured; the PIC called for full flaps.  The SIC put in full flaps. After touchdown; the SIC assisted the PIC with braking action.  The SIC announced to the PIC at 60 knots that he had the TOPS so the PIC could steer with the tiller; coming to a stop shortly after. After the aircraft came to a stop; the crew ran shutdown parking checklist and asked the passengers if they were hurt in any way.  There were no injuries to the passengers or crew members.  The crew asked the passengers to disembark the aircraft.       The crew did a walk around and noticed there was a stabilizing telephone cable wrapped around the vertical and horizontal stabilizer.  The SIC determined that the stabilizing telephone cable was approximately 450 feet from where the aircraft came to a stop.  The crew noticed the only damage to the aircraft was a small crinkle on the left hand side of the horizontal stabilizer (approximately 4 inches wide).  During the post flight; the crew recorded the fuel trips at 1;281 on the left and 1;401 on the right for a total of 2;682. Corrective actions must include: Maintenance not fueling the aircraft but crew fueling their own aircraft; PIC signing fuel receipt and SIC initialing receipt to ensure proper grade and quantity; and if aircraft is fueled the night before; pilots must measure fuel with a fuel stick in tanks to ensure fuel was not stolen the night before.  Company should hire a security guard to guard the aircraft overnight to ensure fuel will not be stolen.

Flight crew learns during a weather diversion that they may have departed with less fuel than they thought; when first the right then the left fuel low lights come on. A successful emergency landing is accomplished on a highway with both engines feathered.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

During climb after departing ZZZ; we experienced light clear icing; which began around 12;000 ft and ended around 20;000 ft. During this time; we noted STALL PROT ICE SPEED status message displayed; as well as the WING and both ENG BLEED VALVE OPEN advisory messages displayed. Roughly around 24;000 feet and still climbing; we experienced a master warning EICAS message (A-I WING 1 LEAK). The FO was flying; so I asked him to maintain control of the airplane; and to handle the radios while I ran the QRH checklist. The checklist drove us to press the wing ice protection button out; which we did. Almost immediately the EICAS message disappeared from view. I brought up the ice protection schematic on my MFD; and verified the wing valves were closed. We continued and completed the checklist.We exited icing conditions around 20;000 feet; and it appeared that clear skies were ahead and above us. We decided to continue the flight and landed safely at ZZZ1.We decided that icing conditions were not forecast or reported on our WSI app along our route of flight. We also could not see any apparent icing conditions ahead. With this in mind; ultimately I decided that we could continue the flight safely to ZZZ1. I also did not feel that this warranted an in-flight call to Dispatch and Maintenance; however; I did call maintenance control after we reached the gate at ZZZ1. I informed the controller what we experienced; and we both agreed that a discrepancy no longer existed and therefore did not make an AML entry. At the end of our day; I made the next Captain aware of our event verbally when we got to ZZZ2.I wish that I had taken a picture after the wing valves were closed on the ice protection schematic on my MFD. I think we handled the situation well as a crew; and we both agreed that we could continue the flight safely.

EMB-175 Captain reported that the wing bleed air system malfunctioned while the aircraft was experiencing icing during climbout.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Aircraft X was filed on the KKILR3 arrival. Due to dispatch filing error the extra NAV information was filed incorrectly and En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) showed Aircraft X unable to fly the KKILR3 RNAV STAR. So the Route was shown..KAMMA..XXX.KKILR3.KMSP. The Clearance Delivery controller at [the departure airport] issued this. Only when the ZAU HARLY sector questioned the flights ability to fly the KKILR3 was the XXX questioned by the pilot. The aircraft was issued corrected routing and continued with no issue. ERAM will not hand off aircraft with XXX in their route to adjacent facilities so the equipment must be changed in the flight plan menus in the EDST. I am uncomfortable changing this information because I don't know this information. We are taught a work around to make this work. I would rather put in Non-RNAV routing that ERAM shows he can fly and coordinating with the adjacent facility. If there is an incident I don't want to have to explain why I changed equipment information on a flight.Training for the clearance delivery controller so they don't issue XXX routing. A way to override the XXX so it hands to adjacent facilities and I can coordinate with the receiving controller I verified with the pilot that they are able to fly the RNAV SID/STAR.

We routinely see aircraft that are able to fly the advanced RNAV into MSP but show up on the User Request Evaluation Tool (URET) as unable (with XXX in the routing). We were told to just amend their flight plan to [indicate the correct equipment suffix] for the departure; enroute; and arrival portion. I do not like to do this as I'm not 100% sure what I'm actually changing. If they were to crash; someone may come back to me asking why I changed those values. My answer would always be; 'I don't know.' So instead; I ask the pilot if he is able to fly the advanced RNAV arrival (the KKILR) into MSP. If he says yes; I change his route to the BAE.EAU9.MSP routing. That way the BAE sector can handoff the aircraft without having to do a manual handoff. I asked the aircraft if he was able to fly an advanced RNAV; more importantly the KKILR; and he replied yes. Then the pilot said he had a question about his route. He told me that he was cleared to MSP via the SID out of [the departure airport] to KAMMA..XXX.KKILR3.MSP. He questioned the 'XXX' fix. I then let him know that the 'XXX' was not an actual fix and that was our computer's way of telling us that his aircraft wasn't able to fly the advanced RNAV. I recleared him to the MSP airport via after KAMMA the KKILR3 arrival. Then I let the BAE controller know that he was really flying the KKILR arrival; but couldn't get it to accept it and that's why it showed he was on the EAU9. I recommend first and foremost to stop making it a requirement to change things in the URET about an aircraft's equipment if we aren't sure what exactly we are doing. It could be affecting more than we know. Second; because it should no longer be a requirement to change the equipment values; I think there should be a manual override so we can allow the flight plan to pass to another facility without having to change the equipment. Third; I would recommend skill enhancement for whoever cleared the aircraft to the MSP airport via KAMMA..XXX.KKILR3.

Chicago Center Controllers reported a problem associated with incorrect routing and being told of a fix they do not like to use for it.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 1122; Flight Crew Type 31

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Climbing out of ZZZ I was on an IFR flight plan in VMC conditions in a climb just about to transition altimeter setting to 29.92 transitioning into the flight levels.  Engines were set at climb power (37.5' Mp 2400 RPM full rich) and the autopilot was engaged on Nav mode Direct ZZZ1 in Vertical Speed mode at about 800 FPM climbing at approximately 155-160 KIAS.The nose yawed hard right and I heard a tone change in the right engine.  At this time I disconnected the autopilot to hand fly the aircraft.  The mixtures were already full rich so I advanced the props forward to 2500 RPM.  I normally would have pushed both throttles full forward but knowing I had more than sufficient obstacle clearance below me and not wanting to put additional stresses on the left (good) engine I left the Mp on that engine at 37.5' and pitched for airspeed of 155.  Normally you would pitch for VySE however to maintain cooling and a higher margin of directional control I intentionally kept speed at 155KIAS and accepted any change in vertical speed which may have resulted.  I [notified ATC] and on multiple occasions told the controller to stand by and I did some trouble shooting and made a decision on what to do.  Leaving the left engine at about 37.5' and now at 2500 RPM I noted the right engine was producing only about 15' of manifold pressure; flowing 38 GPH of fuel with good pressures and oil temps with CHT's decreasing quickly.  As I moved the right throttle forward thrust rapidly decreased on the right engine causing more yaw.  When I decreased throttle to verify the thrust came back somewhat.  I made the decision to shut down; feather and secure the right engine which I did.I trimmed the aircraft and considered what was going on thinking this was likely an issue with the right turbo based on my engine inputs.  Although the engine was secured and I knew I could make an emergency landing single engine I decided to attempt one restart on the right engine under the thought process that one good turbocharged engine and one engine essentially operating as normally aspirated was better than one turbocharged engine and a feathered engine.  My aircraft has a digital engine monitor so if the right engine ran out of oil pressure or produced pressures or temperatures out of range I would get a visual alarm on the annunciator light in front of me.I told the controller that I wanted to divert to ZZZ2 and I turned towards the airport.  The controller cleared me to ZZZ2 and told me to let him know when I had the ATIS information.  Hand flying the aircraft with a very frightened wife beside me I tuned in ATIS on my Comm 2 wishing the controller had given me the altimeter; wind; runway in use field elevation and a vector and a frequency for tower.  I descended to pattern altitude and made an entry onto a right downwind and switched to tower.  Tower told me they briefly saw me trailing smoke.  I asked whether the smoke was black or white and they said it was white.  They stated white so I now knew I was losing oil somewhere.  I made a partial flap landing (20 degree) at 110 KIAS and made a slightly long landing.  After clearing the runway I shut down the right engine and performed an after landing checklist.  With the assistance of Ground I taxi the aircraft to the FBO and began making arrangements to get my wife home on a commercial flight and I called ZZZ Center; my Mechanic and an experienced CFI to get the link on how to file a report. Contributing factors were my relatively low time in type and time flying high performance turbocharged aircraft. I believe that my actions were for the most part good however I am still on the fence as to whether restarting an engine after shutdown was a good idea or whether I should have kept it feathered and headed straight for ZZZ2 with it feathered.  Factors affecting human performance were primarily fear and adrenaline.  I was very shaky during this event.  I believe that my biggest mistake was not being more firm withATC.  I should have requested in no uncertain terms that ZZZ Center give me the local altimeter setting runway in use winds and tower frequency when I wanted them.  I should not have taken my attention away from flying the aircraft single engine to turn in ATIS on my Com 2 and try to get basic information while listening to him direct other aircraft.  In the future I will remember that ATC is there to assist me and I will be more direct with requests during an [urgent situation].All in all I think everything turned out fine.  The failure appears to be catastrophic failure of the outboard turbo on the right engine.  A post mortem on the turbo and further inspection and oil analysis of the oil; screens and engine components and an analysis of the data from the engine monitor will tell shed further light on what happened.

PA-60 Pilot reported an engine failure during climb due to turbocharger failure. After feathering and securing the engine; the Pilot attempted an unsuccessful restart and diverted to a precautionary landing.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Departing Runway 9 at MMH; with a very light passenger load; we performed a static thrust takeoff; thrust levers were set to T/O prior to brake release. At approximately 60-70 KTS we hit a bump in the runway and received a 'GLD [Ground Lift Dumpers] UNSAFE' caution message. The Captain started to retard the thrust levers at which point the message disappeared and the Captain advanced the thrust levers back into the T/O position citing a concern about the stopping ability of the aircraft. We continued the takeoff uneventfully and continued the flight to our destination with no further issues. We did not receive the 'GLD UNSAFE' on landing.The bump in the runway may have caused a fluctuation in the radar altimeter causing the message to be displayed. Since there was a concern that the aircraft's stopping ability may have been affected continuing the takeoff was a prudent decision; however after the initial reaction of bringing the thrust levers out of the T/O detent an abort would have also been warranted. There was very little time for me to react or speak up but I also should have been more assertive in stopping the aircraft after the thrust levers were retarded.Best way to avoid the situation would be by making a plan of action and adhering to it. If there may be messages that we are to disregard then they should be briefed ahead of time. However; once any action to abort the takeoff is made it should be carried out.

A Medium Transport flight crew departing MMH got a momentary GLD UNSAFE warning as they approached 80 KTS. The Captain initially began to reduce thrust to reject the takeoff; but reconsidered; re-established takeoff thrust and continued the takeoff successfully.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 13; Flight Crew Total 4209; Flight Crew Type 3627

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 17500; Flight Crew Type 2500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The aircraft right center fuel pump low pressure light would not go out with the switch on.  The flight would not be legal to operate in ETOPS airspace (ZZZZ-ZZZ).  Due to the COVID pandemic; deplaning passengers/crew at any of the stations was unavailable.  Decision was made to operate the aircraft back to ZZZ1.  For FDPs originating in ZZZ1: 'The second sequence will begin in either ZZZZ1 or ZZZZ and have no more than one segment; ending in ZZZ.'  Due to the inability to continue the flight to ZZZ and the inability to deplane the aircraft; the decision was made to have 'Crew B' operate the aircraft from ZZZZ2 back to ZZZ1.

We had a center tank (right) inop fuel pump on deck in ZZZZ2. We were thus unable to complete the future ETOPS portion of our assigned trip to ZZZZ1; ZZZZ and ZZZ. My copilot and I reached our time limit during the ensuing company machinations to determine the fate and future of our trip. When we timed out we were on the ramp in ZZZZ2. There are dramatic virus pandemic restrictions of personnel in ALL of the X locations encompassed by company. These were supposedly excepted/exempted for crews that got 'stuck' in the various X locations due to maintenance issues; etc.; but apparently were not; at least not in ZZZZ2.  The company was aware of our plight; and the restrictions; and determined the best course of action was for the relief pilots to assume flight duties and fly the aircraft back to ZZZ1. The relief crew planned and flew the flight back to ZZZ1 without any known incident.

Air carrier flight crew reported equipment problems and having to change destinations due to COVID-19 restrictions.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 333; Flight Crew Type 3500

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

We experienced a temporary lost communications situation on departure from Oakland on [date] at approximately [time] Z. We were cleared the COAST 9 Departure and heading to ZZZ. There were no radio issues prior Oakland Tower's hand off to Departure. When attempting to acknowledge the hand off; it became clear that there was a problem. The Captain assumed control of the aircraft and leveled at 2;000 ft. per the initial hold-down. I assumed Pilot Monitoring duties and attempted to make contact with Oakland Tower; Departure; and any station on Guard on both VHF 1 and 2. We were apparently receiving intermittently and not transmitting at all. It sounded like a stuck MIC whenever we tried to transmit. The Captain directed squawking 7600 and initiated the published lost communication procedure. Shortly after turning to the south; I tried Tower one more time; this time with the audio panel hot MIC switches in the center; off position. Whether this last action resolved the problem directly is uncertain; but communication was restored. Upon establishing contact with Oakland Departure I inquired about returning to our originally issued squawk code. Communications for the rest of the flight were normal. Upon landing at ZZZ we called the Oakland Tower to ensure there were no open issues to discuss. Maintenance conducted numerous tests but was unable to duplicate the problem. After being cleared; we flew the aircraft two more legs that day without further communication difficulty.

Air carrier flight crew reported that a radio malfunction resulted in a temporary loss of communications with ATC on departure.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

Troubleshooting; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

The BFL radar equipment could not pick up the aircraft's transponder. I told the pilot he would need to be routed via non radar route (which would have added time to his flight) or he could cancel IFR. The pilot canceled IFR and I tried to provide flight following using a primary target. Please note that both Fresno Approach and Los Angeles Center could see the aircraft's transponder.I recommend replacing the radar and equipment with 'NextGen' technology. This has been a constant problem and even more dangerous since we are limited to one beacon channel. When BFL equipment cannot pick up an aircraft's transponder; it causes 'tunnel vision' and makes it more likely a controller will miss providing safety advisories and services to other aircraft.

BFL Approach Controller reported of not being able to see an aircraft's transponder. The Controller gave the pilot the option of being routed non-radar or cancelling IFR. Pilot cancelled IFR and Controller tried to provide flight following. Controller reported that ZLA and FAT Approach could see the aircrafts transponder. Controller requested the radar be updated during NextGen technology.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

We received an 'expect NOTOC' ACARS message during preflight. Once the pushback crew was on the headset I asked about the NOTOC and was told that we had two Personal Parcel Shipments (PPS) with a UN1845 that were marked 'dry ice exempt' that did not require a NOTOC. I wasn't aware of any exemptions for dry ice so I called and conferred with my Dispatcher. Finding no dry ice exemption in the FOM we called the pilot HAZMAT hotline number located in the FOM (Cargo Operations Control) where it was confirmed that a NOTOC was required. A NOTOC was received in short order but it took us about 30 minutes off the gate to get a revised DG (dangerous goods) revised Load Closeout. Incorrectly labeled dry ice shipment caused the problem. Reporter suggests correct Information regarding Personal Parcel Shipment limitations be provided when shipping dry ice.

Captain reported NOTOC received after Captain corrected ground personnel misunderstanding that NOTOC was not required.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 168; Flight Crew Type 1419

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

While on HLYWD ONE arrival to LAX we were cleared the ILS 25L. Once on the glideslope; we began to encounter moderate wake turbulence (significant pitch and roll excursions) from the aircraft we were following. At this point; I disconnected the autopilot and manually flew about a dot high on the glideslope. At approximately 14 miles from the runway we were told that the approach clearance was canceled and to maintain 4000 feet and track the localizer inbound. I called for both flight directors off then on and then VOR/LOC and V/S to 4000 feet. We were asked to visually identify an aircraft on a close in base for Runway 25R. We were then told to descend to 3100 ft and again asked to visually identify the aircraft still on a base for 25R. There was smog obscuring visibility and we never saw the aircraft. TCAS traffic display was also not showing a target. In the descent we were told to go around and given a left turn to a heading of 140 and climb to 4000'. We began the go-around procedure but did not get 4000' set in the ALT SEL window of the MCP before climbing through 4000'. I leveled at 4400 feet and began a descent back down to 4000 feet. We notified ATC. At this point we were told that the aircraft inbound had declared a medical emergency and that was the reason for their short approach to 25R. We were cleared the visual to 25L and landed without further incident.

B737NG first Officer reported encountering wake turbulence on approach into LAX. ATC directed a go-around; and the flight overshot the cleared altitude during the go-around.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.6

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Working arrival sectors combined during evening arrival push. Very busy with multiple IFR inbounds as well as VFR advisory services. I did not notice the conflict between Aircraft X and the VFR target until the Conflict Alert sounded. I issued a traffic alert; although it was late and I mixed up the appropriate order of the phraseology. It was all I could do at that point. NUW approach later called for a point-out on a VFR target that I believed was involved in this occurrence; so I asked the controller for the call sign and they identified the aircraft as Aircraft Y. I asked the NUW controller to pass along that the aircraft had flown outbound along an active approach course for BFI and that such actions are not necessarily the safest way to operate. FALCON indicated the closest proximity between Aircraft X and the first VFR target was 0.46 miles laterally and 600 feet vertically. As Aircraft X continued down the localizer the next VFR target which the Conflict Alert sounded for passed within 0.44 NM laterally and 700 feet vertically. Aircraft X spent at least 4 miles of the last 11 miles the aircraft flew in a Conflict Alert status with a target nearby.Something needs to change. The VFR aircraft are transiting a very narrow; busy corridor of airspace and are doing so without any communication with ATC. It is simply unsafe. The VFR aircraft in this area at the very least need to be in communication with ATC so that we can assign; as necessary; altitude restrictions ensuring the safety of all the aircraft involved. The solutions are not hard and while they are potentially more restrictive to VFR aircraft the bottom line is that what happens day in and day out in that airspace as it exists and operates now will eventually result in a very bad accident.

S46 TRACON Controller reported an aircraft on final approach for BFI conflicted with VFR aircraft transiting the approach course not in communication with ATC.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 49; Flight Crew Total 307; Flight Crew Type 307

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Operated Aircraft X ZZZ-ZZZ1. Had MEL 38-XX-X (lavs not usable below 16;000 ft). At cruise Flight Attendant said no lavs were flushing. Contacted Dispatch and patched into maintenance to discuss problem. Maintenance was unable to find a fix; Dispatch and crew decided best option was to divert to ZZZ2. Ran QRH for diversion checklist; as well as overweight landing since we were overweight by 3;000 lbs. Requested Runway XXR. Landed [Runway] XXR taxi to gate with no issues.

B737 Captain reported being forced to divert when it was discovered during cruise that the lavs would not flush.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

All operations were normal until we had an indication of an engine fire warning in flight. During cruise flight at 9000 ft. MSL while flying through light rain; the left T-Handle; indicating a fire; illuminated. At that point my trainee (Pilot Flying) performed the immediate action items per our checklist. The light remained illuminated past 20 seconds. I decided we should [advise ATC] and perform an engine shut down. I [advised] ATC and planned to land at ZZZ. I notified Dispatch of my decision over company radio. My trainee completed the engine shut down under my supervision. Once we were established on [the] ILS Runway XXL at 2000 ft. and 5 miles from the final approach fix; I took controls of the airplane and landed. The reported ceiling was 6000 ft. overcast. We had the airport in sight 5 miles out; at ZZZZZ.  There were no other indications of a fire throughout the event.  I believe rain caused the plane to have a false indication of a fire. The trainee verbally identified the fire handle illumination as I saw it and continued with the engine fire warning in flight memory items and checklist.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A Beechcraft Model 99 flight crew reported a fire indication in the left engine; resulting in an in flight engine shutdown and diversion.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 230; Flight Crew Type 15

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

I approached and successfully set down the main landing gear during a 2-point landing. As the plane slowed and the tail came down a series of corrections were made using rudder/brake input in an attempt to maintain directional control down the runway. These corrections became over-corrections leading to a 'ground loop'. During the course of the ground loop the plane's lower left wing tip made contact with the runway. No people were injured and no airport property was damaged.These events arose from a series of over corrections made during landing. Contributing factors included the pilot's limited time in the plane and large difference from the previous types of planes flown. Corrective actions for the future would include further training with a qualified instructor to gain the required skills and confidence to land this type of aircraft.

GA pilot reported a ground loop during landing due to rudder over control; which resulted in wing tip contact with the runway. Pilot inexperience with the aircraft was reportedly a major factor.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Without selection RTU changed off original frequency on base into ATL.  We noticed voice change and selected last remembered frequency.  Turned onto final [and] asked for correct frequency.  Returned to Approach.  If continued we would have caused a conflict with 27L approach.  Last specified instruction was to expect to follow B757 with one more turn so we felt that was the best way to avoid the other aircraft on final.

While receiving vectors from ATL Approach on a heading of 360 to intercept Runway 28 final approach course; frequency dropped out on its own.  The crew attempted to re establish comm but frequency had been lost. Contacted prior frequency and turned to intercept but overshot final to the north.  We re established on a heading of 230 to intercept final for Runway 28.Overshot final on runway 28 because of loss of frequency and consequent lack of final vector to join final app course.  Put same frequency on radio 1 as well as on radio 2 in case last frequency on radio 1 goes out.

CRJ200 Flight crew reports an inadvertent frequency change during approach causing an localizer overshoot before communication can be reestablished. See ACN 1105158.


Pilot Flying; Flight Engineer / Second Officer; Instructor

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 234; Flight Crew Total 13953; Flight Crew Type 135

Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 155; Flight Crew Total 650; Flight Crew Type 40

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After glider Aircraft X was returned to service to our glider club after a new paint job and annual inspection; it's maintenance logbooks were secured in club safe and the glider was reassembled and marked OK for flight on our status board. As a result; the glider flew multiple times post annual inspection for glider club operations; including student pilot training operations.Without access to the maintenance logbooks; pilots; including myself; had no way of verifying first hand the maintenance status of the glider other than the club's maintenance status board which had the glider in a green status.This situation can be prevented by better communication between certified mechanic and club representative after completion of annual inspection or making making maintenance logbooks available to pilot's prior to flight.

At the most recent annual inspection; unbeknownst to me; the AI (Aircraft Inspector) had not signed off the glider for return to service; noting some discrepancies. Due to apparent miscommunication between the mechanic and the club; the club had since assembled the aircraft and returned it to service; marking it airworthy and ready for use on the club equipment status board. The aircraft airframe logs were locked in the club safe along with other documentation.Recently; this miscommunication was found out and it so happens that the glider was used for instruction by myself and other club instructors in the interim.The club has discussed ways to both mitigate the status of the aircraft and necessary actions to return it to airworthy status; as well as measures to prevent this from happening in the future. As one of the measures; the club has decided to include a copy of most recent inspection sign off in the aircraft flight binder so it is readily available for the PIC to determine airworthiness of the aircraft.

Instructors and a student pilot reported lack of access to maintenance logs caused an aircraft to be operated in a non airworthy condition and suggested changes to the club's procedures to mitigate this.


Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft

Approaching KEGGS on the ORCKA2 RNAV Departure; while in VNAV; ATC notified us that we were not meeting the climb restriction. Aircraft was in VNAV with ECON climb selected and accelerating prior to disengaging the auto pilot. It should have been climbing at a slower speed rather than the ECON climb speed of 320 KIAS to achieve the required climb angle. The speed of 320 was priority over the altitude. I believe a tailwind also compounded the problem. We were about 12000 MSL when ATC notified us that we would miss the 13000 restriction. It is unknown to me exactly how far off we would be at KEGGS; but I knew we wouldn't make it and realized my mistake. Even still I disconnected the autopilot and began to trade excess airspeed for altitude to attempt to make the restriction but then immediately encountered wake turbulence from the B777 ahead of us. We missed the altitude restriction mostly because of VNAV leveling us off to accelerate. But to make matters worse; when I disconnected the autopilot and got into the wake of the preceding aircraft I couldn't be as aggressive to correct as would have been needed. Once out of the wake; I put the aircraft into a 280 KIAS climb and got back onto the profile; easily making the next restriction of 15000 or above at COOPP. ATC never said anything else to us about the event. I should have noticed sooner; corrected the flight path and asked ATC for relief from the restriction.

B737 First Officer reported missing a crossing restriction on climbout from LAX citing VNAV performance and a wake turbulence encounter as contributing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 2800; Flight Crew Type 900

Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

While being vectored onto final for Runway 28 into ORD; we were in solid IMC all the way. Our instruction given was to cross WAVIE at 5;000 FT; cleared for the ILS 28. When the approach was to be activated in the GPS unit; something gave an error and the GPS was not indicating correctly; causing a momentary loss of situational awareness. I knew we were established on the localizer; but for some reason thought we were past WAVIE at that point when in fact I was still about 3 miles away and had not crossed it yet. While the issue was solved in short order; during that time of getting the GPS to indicate properly; I allowed the airplane to descend down to 4;600 FT instead of maintaining 5;000 FT when I thought I was further ahead on the approach than I actually was. After getting a heads up from ATC to climb back to 5;000 FT; I initiated a climb and was back at 5;000 FT within 10 seconds. I never received any traffic alerts; TCAS advisories or any other collision warnings from the onboard equipment or ATC. Some of the factors that resulted in the deviation was losing situational awareness due to the GPS not sequencing properly; not engaging the autopilot while correcting the issue to hold altitude. For the future; I will be sure to make better use of the autopilot if something like this should happen as well as simply flying raw data in the event of a GPS malfunction on approach.

A C208 pilot reported descending early after being cleared for the ILS while attempting to correct a problem with the GPS. ATC notices the deviation and the reporter corrects back to 5;000 FT and continues with the ILS approach.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We had just received our position briefing; at this time I plugged in being the trainer. I looked up and saw an aircraft exit Runway XX at Charlie. At that time I rerouted my headset cord around some hidden hooks so the cord doesn't get in the way of the trainee. As this happen the trainee made a transmission to Aircraft X to taxi via Charlie; cross [RWY] YY; then Mike 3 Mike to the ramp. The pilot read back everything correctly. At this point I had just finished routing my cord (5 seconds or less) I then look up and see an aircraft exiting [RWY] XX on Charlie had stopped. Aircraft Y was cleared for takeoff Runway XX and was rolling down the runway. Another aircraft had just exited XY at Charlie and was taxiing fast towards Runway XX. At this point everyone was yelling stop. The Ground Trainee yelled stop. At this point Aircraft X stopped in the middle of Runway XX. Local had told Aircraft Y to stop. Aircraft Y stopped a few thousand feet before Aircraft X. What happened is the trainee got the aircraft mixed up and used the wrong call sign. Aircraft Z exited Runway XX at Charlie; and Aircraft X exited Runway XY at charlie. The pilot of Aircraft X read back cross Runway YY at Charlie but instead crossed Runway XX at Charlie without clearance. The controller mixed up two aircraft both taxiing on Charlie. Aircraft X crossed Runway XX at Charlie had not been given clearance to cross that active runway but instead was suppose to cross Runway YY.

Instructing Controller reported experiencing a ground conflict due to Developmental using the wrong call sign between aircrafts.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Type 22000

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

On initial climb out off of Runway XX ZZZ; we experienced the aircraft pitching up without the autopilot engaged at approximately 4500 feet. I tried using the down trim and it was not working; I immediately pushed forward on the yoke and manually trimmed the aircraft back into trim. We notified ATC we needed to level off at 6000 feet. We assessed the situation and ran the appropriate checklist. While doing this we advised ATC we needed to return to ZZZ and [coordinated with ATC]. We were vectored for a downwind leg for Runway 23. The approach was briefed; [performance data calculated] with non-normal and brake cooling checked; Dispatch notified and QRH Checklist completed. We made a flaps 15 landing with no further issues.

On initial climbout; passing approximately 4500' MSL; the Captain (as PF [Pilot Flying]) verbalized that the nose down trim was inoperative as the pitch attitude rose to 20 degrees NU (Nose Up). The PF began leveling the aircraft with nose down yoke and manual trim followed by the activating the stab trim cutout switches; leveling off at approximately 5500' MSL. As PM (Pilot Monitoring); I coordinated with ATC and requested a level off at 6000' MSL. As the PF leveled off at 6000' MSL and turned downwind; he told me that the nose up trim had been working; just not the nose down trim. We descended to VMC at 4000' MSL and ran the QRH Stab Trim INOP procedure to completion. We set up for the ILS XXR to ZZZ; selecting flaps 15 according to the QRH/checklist; and landed uneventfully. Emergency vehicles met us coming off the runway but no further assistance was required.

B737 flight crew reported nose down trim inoperative on initial climb out.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Was initially cleared to SEEVR via JRHED and SEEVR 2 ARR. Received 2 weather re-routes on the ground [before departing]; and received 2 more once airborne. One changing our arrival to JRHED via SEEVR for BRDJE 2 ARR. The BRDJE 2 was loaded in the FMS. Was complying with altitude restrictions on BRDJE ARR crossing SEEVR at 20;000. ATC then queried which arrival we were flying and our altitude. Discovered the wrong clearance; ATC had us do a 360 and put us on the proper arrival. Flew the balance of the SEEVR 2 ARR.[The departure airport] was overwhelmed with delays and re-routes due to weather. We needed to ask for clarification 3 times as did other aircraft. We needed to be more proactive after enroute changes to confirm the proper arrival.

Our flight was to DFW. Getting out [on departure] was hectic---bad weather; complicated reroute; checking required fuel; min fuel concerns; etc. Finally got airborne; then received another full change in our routing to DFW. Our original route had us on the SEEVR.SEEVR2 Arrival. The next route put us on the SEEVR.BRDJE2 Arrival. The final reroute put us back on the SEEVR.SEEVR2 Arrival.We did not change/catch that we needed to put the SEEVR.SEEVR2 back into the box. (Both arrivals share SEEVR intersection and BRDJE intersections on the profiles; but they have different crossing altitudes) Center cleared us for the arrival; more than likely the verbiage was SEEVR.SEEVR2; we had the SEEVR.BRDJE in the box; acknowledged descending on the 'SEEVR' arrival; however we didn't catch that we needed to be on the SEEVR.SEEVR2 rather than the SEEVR.BRDJE; we didn't catch our error and promptly crossed SEEVR too high; based on SEEVR having a lower crossing altitude for the SEEVR.SEEVR2; rather than the SEEVR.BRDJE Arrival. Hence the crossing error/deviationWe thought we were on the correct arrival; we were descending properly for those crossing altitudes we expected. I believe a pitfall to these two RNAV arrivals is sharing intersection names; giving you a false sense of being correct; being on the right STAR. I now will pay very strict attention to the cleared STAR and verify we have that arrival in the box.

After several reroutes; the crew followed the second reroute arrival rather than the third reroute clearance. The transition routes were similar but had different crossing altitudes which resulted in an altitude crossing restriction not being met.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

The aircraft was experiencing a vibration shortly after takeoff that neither the cockpit crew nor the cabin crew had experienced before. The vibration was not due to engine vibration and all systems indications were normal. No ECAM warnings or messages. We continued to climb on our route while the First Officer and I talked about possibilities and decide on a course of action. The vibration stopped around FL260. We continued to climb to FL360 and reduced speed to .73 Mach/280 knots. After contacting Dispatch and Maintenance; I made the decision not to continue to [destination] and coordinated with Dispatch to divert [to an alternate]. Approach and landing were uneventful.After arriving at gate; Maintenance believes the vibration was due to either:1. A faulty hydraulic service panel door that would not close flush with the fuselage and could possibly have departed the aircraft in flight; or2. A cracked sealant on a panel beneath the fuselage; or3. A seal on the right wing root.None of the possible causes would have been detected by crew walk around. The hydraulic service panel door had to be handled to ascertain that it would not close properly.

A320 Captain reported diverting to an alternate airport after experiencing inflight vibration that was possibly due to a service panel door or a wing root seal.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 26; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 130

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airport; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

McCall Airport (MYL) says that it has PAPI for Runway 16; but when I was there it [did] not appear to be on and working. I did not see a NOTAM for PAPI out of service. Please check with them to make sure the PAPI is working. If not; that the PAPI is NOTAMed correctly.

Pilot reported that the Runway 16 PAPI lights at MYL were not on and there was no NOTAM regarding the outage.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Weather; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

For the east arrival push into DEN; beginning around XA:00 and lasting until sometime after XB:30; Sector 9 and Sector 16 became over-saturated and unsafe. The numbers in these sectors had been forecasted to be well over MAP (Monitor Alert Parameter) numbers for some time prior to the sectors going red. Management and TMU were alerted to the upcoming situation.Compounding the very high volume was the complexity in the sectors. Denver Approach restricted our arrival gate to one route with 5 miles in trail. ZMP was asked by TMU to provide us 2 routes with 10 miles in trail per route. ZMP offloaded arrivals from the LAWGR arrival to the AALLE arrival to help accomplish this despite the fact that LAWGR was the only arrival we were permitted to use going into approach. Sector 9 was then tasked with rerouting all AALLE arrivals and blending them with the existing LAWGR stream. While trying to accomplish this they had a high volume of deviating overflight traffic due to weather on the southern boundary of the sector.Sector 9 did the best they could but began to fall behind. This resulted in a Denver feed entering Sector 16 that was falling apart at the boundary of sectors 16 and 9. Sector 16 also had a volume issue that was alerted well prior to the over-saturation. Sector 16 then became overwhelmed with trying to manage the volume of traffic while also trying to reestablish the Denver arrival sequence.The safety of the NAS was severely compromised due to a lack of planning when it was obvious early on that traffic volume was going to be well over the limits of these sectors during a highly complex time. Aircraft should have been routed around or below these sectors to alleviate unnecessary volume and complexity. Some aircraft were routed around the sectors and the answer from TMU and management about the oversaturation was 'there could have been more airplanes; but we routed some around.' This answer is unacceptable. More effort should have been made to make sure the volume and complexity did not get to the point where controllers were overloaded and unsafe.In the end; multiple Denver arrivals ended up being routed to the northwest arrival gate because the controllers on Sectors 15 and 16 could not get them sequenced in. This increased workload for Sector 33 who also had his own traffic to handle. Sector 16 had to refuse hand-offs and point-outs due to saturation.When Center is restricted by TRACON to one route for arrivals; all involved Centers need to be under the same understanding. It increases workload and complexity to change aircraft to another arrival for stream balancing for both pilots and controllers. The aircraft that were switched to the AALLE arrival in ZMP airspace were subsequently switched back to their original arrival and re-sequenced upon entering ZDV airspace.When the TFMS alerts Management and TMCs that a sector will be well over negotiated safe MAP numbers for a session; a plan needs to be put in place. Aircraft need to be rerouted or sent to an altitude to avoid overloaded sectors. The high volume in sectors that were already being asked to handle a higher than normal complexity due to weather and sequencing or rerouting constraints became very unsafe. TMCs in conjunction with management should have made sure that the volume in those sectors never exceeded limits.

ZDV Center Controller reported the Monitor Alert Parameter numbers for two sectors became over-saturated and unsafe.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 83; Flight Crew Total 1689; Flight Crew Type 119

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

I was involved in an aborted takeoff on Runway XXR at ZZZ. I was sitting left seat as the instructor on a checkout flight to teach a commercial course at the flight school. During the run up with RPM at 1800; I noticed the oil pressure to be at the upper limits of the pressure gauge. After the run-up was complete I briefed the pilot flying of the oil pressure and we briefed the possibility of an aborted takeoff. On the takeoff roll at full power I advised the pilot flying of the very high oil pressure so the pilot called to abort takeoff. The pilot flying controlled the aircraft and tasked me with advising ATC. Once clear of the runway the oil pressure dropped to within the limits and we were able to taxi to our parking. We returned to base and wrote up a discrepancy on the issue.

C-172RG Flight Instructor reported a rejected takeoff due to a high oil pressure indication.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Immediately after takeoff; while I; (as Pilot Flying); was still hand flying; the aircraft experienced a significant electrical failure. Simultaneously numerous lights went dark; the right EHSI [Electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator] and EAI [Electronic Airspeed Indicator] blanked; the lower EICAS failed; and the left FMC failed. The EICAS presented a long list of failures at the top of which was R AC BUS OFF. Mixed in with the failures was also that fact that the landing gear handle was locked down by the ground sensing lock. I continued to fly and took over the radios to advise ATC we wanted to level off and stay in the area. The Pilot Monitoring then got out the QRH and began to run the checklist for an AC bus failure. Whatever caused the failure also tripped the bus isolation relay; so even though the APU was running we remained with limited electrical services. I [advised ATC] since the problem was unresolved; and we had no idea what caused it. Since it was at night; we thought it was the better part of valor to bring the aircraft back before it reoccurred or got worse. As ATC vectored us around; the Pilot Monitoring managed to restore power to the aircraft. Having completed the QRH; we were able to raise the gear finally and stayed at flaps 5 since we had never retracted them. After that; it was simply a matter of completing the relevant checklists; setting up for an approach and returning for landing. That all happened with no further issues and we taxied back to the ramp and turned the aircraft over to Maintenance.Looking back on the actions; kudos to the Pilot Monitoring for staying on task and getting the aircraft powered back up in as timely a manner as a checklist will allow. In retrospect; grading my own actions; I think there are a few things I could have done a bit better. First of all given the timing of the failure; we were taken quite by surprise. Electrical failure of that sort; close to the ground; with a lot going on is not something we practice much; so the reflexes aren't quite as honed. I can't say it was scary; but it did give me a small adrenaline rush and that served to speed up my thinking to the point where I am afraid I might have rushed things and perhaps missed something; though I am at a loss to say what it might have been. I am a big believer in 'slow down; take a breath'; but I am not sure how successful I was. Point number two is that in retrospect; I wish we had paid closer attention to what exactly fixed the problem. That seem silly; but in a relatively complex troubleshooting operation; noting if it was the first; middle; or last option would have made the mechanics jobs a lot easier. All in all; it was a successful outcome; and hopefully; I will take away the reinforcement to help keep things steady and slow down when the brain goes into overdrive. Also; making notes as much as possible to what helped and what didn't when trying to solve a system problem will be a definite addition to my thought process.

B767 Captain reported multiple and significant electrical system failures requiring an emergency landing.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Weather received with flight release prior to departing for TPA visibility was greater than 6 miles; wind variable at 3 KTS; clear forecast for time of arrival. Release included no alternate airport. Considering the weather report available at that time; an alternate airport was not required. Enroute TPA; ZJX Center advised of thunderstorms developing in the TPA area. Captain (pilot monitoring) left Comm 1 to the flying pilot and called Dispatch to obtain an amendment to the flight release indicating MCO as the alternate airport for the flight. Upon arrival in KTPA area; Approach controllers requested keep 'speed up' and expressed confidence that the 'Popup thunderstorm' would quickly dissipate and/or depart the vicinity of TPA. Just prior to switching to Tower frequency; the initial Approach Controller advised that a MD 88 had just landed TPA reporting minimum visibility due to rain but a smooth ride. Thereafter; TPA Final Approach Controller issued instructions to increase speed for in-trail traffic and cleared Aircraft X for ILS 1L approach; 'Maintain 170 KTS until five-mile final.' We Intercepted glide-slope at 2600 feet with autopilot engaged in approach mode. In order to comply with ATC instructions; initial descent on the GS was conducted with the aircraft in 'Clean' configuration at 170 KTS. When we switched to Tower frequency; the Tower Controller alarmed; 'Windshear Alert! 20 knot change in wind speed on the runway and a wind direction change from 320 to 270.' Pilot monitoring verbalized; 'That's on the runway. We'll be down by then (sic). We can continue.' At approximately 1700 feet; pilot flying requested configuration for landing and Landing Checklist slowing the aircraft to approximately 140 KIAS. As Pilot monitoring flipped switches; made PA; and read the landing checklist; aircraft encountered wall of water associated with thunderstorm over TPA. Pilot flying noted and verbalized increase in airspeed in excess of 20 KTS stating; 'That was more than a 20 knot increase in airspeed! We need to break-off this approach!' Pilot monitoring appeared to note airspeed indications; that the autopilot was engaged; and that the current airspeed corresponded to autopilot maintaining GS despite significant updrafts. At about the same time; Tower Controller transmitted; 'The aircraft ahead reported airspeed deviations of 20 KTS on final and just broke off its approach.' Before we could respond; to the Tower an aircraft on approach behind us interrupted to check-on the frequency and advise the Tower Controller that it had just experienced a 20 knot increase in airspeed and intended to break off its approach. Just then; we encountered another 15 knot [plus] increase in airspeed. At that point; we declared our intention to break off the approach requesting immediate turn to avoid further penetration into the thunderstorm. Tower responded with instructions for left turn to heading of 330 and a climb to 3000 feet. Pressing TOGA on the power levers positioned the flight director nose-up. The pilot flying pushed the power levers forward; asked for max power; initiated climb; asked for flaps 7; noted increase in airspeed indication and climb indication on the VSI; turned toward the desired heading (heading bug had been set by the pilot monitoring) and requested gear up prior to 150 KIAS. When pilot flying verbalized that the FD indicated a turn indication opposite the desired direction; the pilot monitoring pressed the FD mode sector on the autopilot control panel stowing the distraction. We found clear air about five miles from the airport. The crew discussed fuel quantity; considered the fuel consumption effect of another approach attempt... followed by another missed and then a flight to the alternate in trail of several other aircraft that were also likely to also be deviating at that time. Upon receiving additional information from the TPA Approach Controller that the once dissipating thunderstorm now appeared to be building in intensity once again and 'Boiling' over TPA; Aircraft X departed immediately for its alternate; MCO. At least two air carriers and a couple other aircraft diverted to MCO. One B737 aircraft opened that it had plenty of fuel and elected to hold for several minutes. A corporate jet aircraft requested to hold over 'Airshow' to keep an eye on the thunderstorm with expressed intent to advise ATC when ready for approach. The request was denied. The explanation given was that too many aircraft were being diverted through that airspace. Consequently; the jet expressed its intention to divert to LAL. Aircraft X diverted to and landed at MCO without further adventure. Following a personal after-action analysis; and a review of Aircraft X subject matter pertaining to the events; the pilot flying has concluded that a unique cascade of errors lead Aircraft X to commence an approach into severe windshear in violation of company policy. The errors included: -Absence of reliable forecast weather data available to the dispatchers and to the flight crew before the flight departed. -Failure of the flight dispatch process to assure timely monitoring of changing airport conditions throughout the conduct of the flight from departure and prior to the arrival of Aircraft X at TPA.-The initial; intermediate and final approach controller's assurances that the thunderstorm appeared to be local in nature; temporary; dissipating; and moving away from TPA; issuing instructions to 'Keep your speed up;' combined with rapidly changing weather conditions; and miscommunication between the TPA Tower Controller and TPA Approach controllers that were handling the flight. A Flight Dispatcher must monitor the progress of each flight under that Dispatcher's control until the flight has landed or until the Dispatcher is relieved by another Flight Dispatcher and must keep the PIC or any other party involved in operational control notified of any significant weather change that could present a challenge to safety of flight. Flight monitoring; at a minimum; must consist of the monitoring of each flight's fuel state; flight time remaining; destination and alternate airport weather trends; enroute winds and weather (including Pilot or other reports reflecting clear air turbulence; thunderstorms and low level windshear); and the status of airport and navigational facilities.The power of a thunderstorm is extreme and the potential for placing your aircraft; crew and passengers into a hazardous situation is very real. Turbulence; windshear; heavy rain; lightning; ice and hail are all associated with thunderstorms. Crews will use all available resources to detect and avoid thunderstorms.Windshear Avoidance1. Carefully assess all available information such as pilot reports of windshear or turbulence; low-level windshear alerts (LLWSA) and weather reports including thunderstorm activity. Avoid areas of known windshear.2. Severe windshear is that which produces un-commanded airspeed changes greater than 15 knots. If severe windshear is indicated; do not takeoff or continue an approach until conditions improve. Report any windshear encounters precisely and promptly. Whenever a pilot reports windshear; controllers are mandated by regulations to advise other pilots.If windshear conditions with airspeed variations of +- 15 knots from the stabilized approach speed are encountered; a go around should be initiated.

SF340 First Officer reports departing for TPA with a clear forecast and no alternate required. Enroute developing thunderstorms are reported and an alternate is requested from Dispatch. During the approach; a 20+ knot speed increase is noted and heavy rain is encountered. Aircraft ahead and behind the SF340 break off their approaches and this crew soon follows and diverts to their alternate.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 17

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

I don't remember what happened.  Apparently Aircraft X encountered wake remnants from Aircraft Y during climb out to 17000 feet.I have no recommendation.

N90 Controller is not sure what happened but one aircraft may have encountered wake remnants from a larger aircraft during a climb.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

During run up plane showed no signs of malfunction; both mags were [within] standards. After takeoff at about 1100 ft crew contacted Departure and were instructed to climb at or below 2500 ft and resume navigation. As soon as the student added power and started climbing; IP (Instructor Pilot) heard a noise like something popped. Immediately IP looked at the RPM gauge and saw it drop to 2300 first and then to 2000. At that point IP took controls [and] tried to climb as much as [possible] since the aircraft was at a good distance from the airport. At the same time IP contacted Departure and requested to go back to [departure airport]. They asked if any assistance was required and IP said negative just need to be back. At that point Departure asked if we needed a straight in. The plane had started to lose altitude and the RPM kept dropping. At that time IP told Departure we need direct [to the airport] and we were fully aware that [the airport] was using [west runways] at the time but IP requested to use [east runway] since it was the closest and the plane kept shaking and was hard to maintain altitude. They cleared us and then Tower cleared us to land. As soon as the plane feels abnormal turn to an airport and land as soon as practical.

C172 Instructor Pilot reported returning to departure airport after the engine began to lose power.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

I was the Relief Pilot on break and got a call from the Captain that they needed me up front. We had an ELMS P110; fuel jettison; door lock 1L/2L/3L/4L; cargo heat; C1 hydraulic pump and several other EICAS and status messages. We made a SAT call to Dispatch and got a patch to Maintenance Control. We attempted to dump fuel but the fuel dump system was inoperative. After reviewing the landing data chart we landed at 519K pounds. The runway was snow covered but braking action was reported as good by a company aircraft shortly before we landed.

A B777 Electrical Load Management System (ELMS) P110 had a fault which caused numerous sub-systems to de-power; the crew diverted to a nearby airport.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.5

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Overcast day with low ceilings. Working multiple approaches to multiple aircraft to multiple airports. Aircraft X was cleared for an approach descending to 2800 feet until established. I noticed Non Mode C traffic about 5 to 6 miles ahead and called traffic with altitude unknown. Aircraft X responded 'IMC'. I called traffic again a couple miles later and informed Aircraft X targets appear likely to merge. Aircraft X informed me they were just coming out of the clouds and searching. Normally they would already be shipped to the tower but I kept him on my frequency in case I had to abort the approach. The tower called when the targets were a few miles apart and told me the last know altitude of the target was 1700 feet. I informed Aircraft X of the last know altitude and he informed me he had the traffic in sight. I then switched him to the tower. I was informed a few minutes later the target was Aircraft Y and he had a waiver to fly without Mode C. Aircraft X called my supervisor to ask how did we know the Non Mode C aircraft's altitude; what he was doing there; and how come he didn't get an RA if we could see his altitude?I don't think anyone should be flying around the Mode C veil without a transponder; especially under a Class B airspace. I'm not sure who would issue a pilot a waiver for that. It is very dangerous and a completely unnecessary risk in such a technical airspace. I would also make the Class Bravo more restrictive to reduce the amount of IFR to VFR issues.

SCT TRACON Controller reported an unidentified aircraft not in communication with ATC and no Mode C crossed the final approach course of an inbound aircraft on approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 11500; Flight Crew Type 4500

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was working the Asper/Tilly position combined during the arrival push at Dulles. I had numerous aircraft on two different frequencies and created a complex frequency congestion on the position. I had an aircraft depart Dulles on a 270 degree heading. The heavy jet was a southbound departure where the Departure Controller would vector this particular aircraft over the Blues intersection at 12;000 FT. The heavy jet departed Dulles; and I issued an initial instruction for the airplane to climb to 5;000 FT. The Manne Controller was using the radial feed at Dulles in which airplanes descend to 6;000 FT on the two arrivals (Royil/Shnon). I observed the heavy aircraft climbing through 5;100 FT and I an instructed the pilot to maintain 5;000 FT at all times. I did have the opportunity to review the tapes and it clearly states my instruction for the aircraft to climb to 5;000 FT only. The pilot read back 5;000 FT so I expected the aircraft to maintain the assigned altitude. The pilot responded to an RA Conflict and I observed the aircraft climbing to 5;300 FT then back down to 4;800 FT. Right afterward; the aircraft responded to another RA and continued to climb back up to 5;300 FT again. All aircraft were descending to 6;000 FT on the arrival so there was no reason why the TCAS should tell the aircraft to climb because it just escalates the situation. TCAS played the most important part in the situation. TCAS however did not provide the best outcome for the situation; but this could have been an isolated incident. After the heavy jet cleared the traffic; I did climb the aircraft direct to BLUES and switched the aircraft to appropriate sector. During simultaneous approaches at Dulles; climb an aircraft to 4;000 FT if assigned a 270 heading off Runway 30. When departure gets busy; there may be a time when merging traffic calls may not be made due to your attention being diverted somewhere else. In this incident; I had numerous aircraft on frequency with requests. Now you would have at least 2;000 FT of vertical separation to ensure that a TCAS event would not happen. I understand the Tower is protecting for a missed approach; but it ties our hands as a Departure Controller.

While climbing after take off from Runway 30 IAD and being RADAR vectored by Potomac Departure Control; we received a TA followed immediately by a RA. As non-flying pilot I performed a visual scan and located traffic and informed PIC (flying pilot) of aircraft's position. PIC disconnected AFS and followed command bars. Initial response to RA apparently caused a secondary RA which was complied with. ATC issued altitude compliance instructions. I informed ATC of TCAS warnings. ATC requested a telephone call at completion of flight.

PCT Controller described a multiple TCAS RA event involving a departure aircraft assigned 270 heading; the reporter suggesting a lower initial altitude be assigned these aircraft during simultaneous arrival operations.


Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

On final approach Runway 17L at MCO; as pilot monitoring; we spotted a drone at our altitude at 1500 feet MSL less than 1/2 mile off to the left; as we approached glide-slope intercept. We were at Flaps 2; and would normally have completed configuring the aircraft for landing and would have begun the before landing checklist by 1500 feet. However; we immediately reported the drone to ATC/Tower which caused more distractions. Confirming location of the drone and providing a description to Tower put us late configuring with gear and final flaps as we approached 1000 feet and began the before landing checklist.  We descended below 1000 feet by the time all was complete. Everything appeared stable fairly quickly and the FO (First Officer) made a normal landing.  We both agreed after landing; however; that the distractions from the drone and Tower communications caused us to configure later than normal and a go-around would have been a better course of action.  Distractions from drone and ATC/Tower contributed to the incident.  Suggest better awareness of altitude on final approach when distractions occur.

A321 Captain reported encountering a drone while on approach to Orlando International Airport.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

On final approach to Runway XX in ZZZ; when flaps were selected from 20 to 25; we got a TE FLAP DISAGREE MESSAGE. We notified the tower; performed a go around; and ran the QRH checklist for the caution message. We were vectored around for another approach; and requested priority handling due to the longer landing distance; higher landing speed; and uncertainty of our exact flap setting. Once we landed; we chose to clear the runway and cancel the priority request. We wrote up the flap malfunction in the AML and let line Maintenance know.

B757 Captain reported a Trailing Edge Flaps Disagree Message on final approach that resulted in a Go Around and a precautionary landing.


Fatigue; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

During brief at gate in EWR I mentioned to First Officer EWR had some tricky taxiways and whole area here is a 'HOTSPOT'. Conditions; Wet; Rainy; Overcast; they said 10 miles on ATIS but it was hazy. Taxiing out from abeam gate XX. We rolled forward to the north. First Officer and I saw the sign for RC taxiway and I turned right. Ground gave us taxi instructions; 'Aircraft X; RC; Bravo; Romeo; Runway 22R at Whiskey'. Ground then said (as we taxied east out of ramp) that he'd appreciate it if we didn't use A9 in the future as it was a ramp entry not exit. (There were no other aircraft taxiing around us.)  We inadvertently were not on RC but on A9 taxiway!  The signage somewhat misled both of us seeing the RC sign on our immediate left.  (A9 sign must have been on our right) those taxiways are close together and simple and easy mistake to make. I realized we were on A9 at this point because it didn't go straight thru to Bravo only Alpha then ended.  First Officer and I were confused for a few seconds and I realized RC taxiway was in fact on our left! We should have stayed north on ramp for the next right turn. If you are viewing the EWR 10-9 you can see this area of uniqueness; you must continue north and west to get to RC. So we turned left on Alpha joined RC then Bravo and continued cleared taxi route. Established on taxiway Bravo I then immediately apologized to Ground Control and said the signage was a little misleading at 'that' intersection.  I understand our error completely.   But First Officer said 'I don't get it we are on RC!' I said no we were not. Also the taxiways were hard to see painted nomenclature with wet and reflective surfaces.  Was flying a 5 day sequence that had us up very late on west coast first three nights then sequence had us leave early on east coast on day 5. Better to construct sequences the opposite way. An early getup followed by next several day's late departures is taking the 'human element' into consideration! This may have been a casual factor if you look into our sequence.  Unfortunately; this human element in regards to sleep patterns has disappeared!

During our departure briefing; the Captain said that there were some confusing taxiway and stated that the entire airport is a hotspot. When taxing out of ramp area; Ground stated 'RC B Runway 22R'.  Once crossing A to B the controller stated that we used A9 not RC.  We both agreed and saw the signage for RC; but based on the taxi plate; the Captain did turn early. Five day sequence with late start and backing earlier each day and in which we ended last day with a XA:00 wake up; but previous days on West Coast; so overall sequence fatigue.  We briefed what was expected; but both missed; and I think human factors did come into play.  Lead out/in lines drop you off at A9; maybe RC on deck with arrow forward would keep this from happening; also that part of the ramp is uncontrolled; maybe fixing whatever reason its uncontrolled would help.

Air carrier flight crew reported they turned on to the wrong taxiway at EWR Airport and cited confusing taxiway signage and fatigue as contributing factors.


We were given instructions to line up and wait 24L and started the turn onto E8 from holding short at D8 on E (non-standard due to construction). Immediately after our clearance; another aircraft was given the instructions 'up to hold short of 24L'. Like 'we' normally do; the aircraft was right behind us to aid Tower with quick departures. As we passed the 90 degree point in our turn; their cockpit had passed the tip of our right wing; obstructing the Captain's view of our right wing as it (the turn) moved past the 90 degree point to the 130 degree point and right back in to the taxiway area. I saw this happening and the closure rate was incredibly fast; and all that would come out of my mouth was 'go go go go!' (Heart Rate 199) My estimation is that we missed each other by about 18 inches.

Aircraft had a ground near miss with another aircraft while taking the runway for departure.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

A customer had a medium size aux battery plugged into a power port at their seat and from the battery to a phone that was being charged/powered; when the battery suddenly got very hot and started to smoke. It was unplugged from the power port and disconnected from the phone and a Flight Attendant transferred the battery to a steel coffee carafe per the inflight procedure. According to the Purser; it was initially too hot to handle and smelled strongly of being burnt. Customer said she bought the battery in China because it was such a cheap price. I inspected the device after it was cooled down and did not see any external damage to it; although there was still; after a couple of hours; an odor to it and it was slightly warm to the touch. Battery says Smart AC 120; and 'WABAN' on the face of it.Ban customers from having any LIPO batteries that are not installed in a device. Ban them entirely from checked baggage (Good luck with that).

B777 First Officer reported a passenger's auxiliary lithium polymer battery began smoking in flight and was hot to the touch.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

During the preflight paperwork review; the following NOTAM was noted on the release paperwork: DIK 06/001 DIK TWY A BTN RWY 7/25 AND RWY 14/32 CLSD [with dates and times]. Translated as: Dickinson ND Taxiway Alpha between Runway 7/25 and 14/32 are closed from June X; 2014 at XA44 Zulu to June Y; 2014 at XE59 Zulu. Therefore; for our arrival time; our paperwork indicated that Taxiway A would be open. On arrival into DIK; Minneapolis Center advised that 'The two NOTAM's we have for you are Runway 14 REIL's out of service; and the airport beacon is out of service.' Our release paperwork and no advisory from Center regarding other pertinent NOTAM's; indicated to us that there would be nothing impeding our ground operations in DIK. We briefed that the planned exit point would be at the end of the runway; via a left turn onto Taxiway Alpha; and that we could not utilize Runway 7/25 for any movements as the RJ exceeds the weight limitations listed on the Airport Diagram notes. Runway 14/32 is 100' wide; and taxiways at DIK are very narrow; and all turns at this airport require over steering to ensure that you do not drag the main gear off the taxiways. As I started to carefully turn left onto Taxiway A; the First Officer quickly stated that a few low barricades were still present on Taxiway A. I immediately stopped the turn; assessed my position relative to the edges of the runway and taxiway; and decided we were stuck because I could not continue a left turn (to spin the airplane and back taxi) without risking taxiing the nose gear or potentially the right main into the grass. I immediately set the parking brake; and the First Officer contacted DIK Operations while I called on the CTAF to see if there were Dickinson Airport Operation' staff monitoring the frequency. The Airport Ops Supervisor responded; and he coordinated with Operations to bring out a tug/towbar to reposition the aircraft. I then contacted Minneapolis Center; cancelled IFR; advised them we were still blocking Runway 14 for the time being; and asked them to again review their NOTAMs for DIK. The Controller advised (I am paraphrasing) that 'our NOTAMs drop out of the system when they expire; so we didn't have anything about Taxiway A still being closed when you started your approach.' The DIK Ramp agents repositioned our aircraft; and I then taxied the airplane to the terminal via the other taxiways. At no point was the aircraft off a normal paved surface; and we utilized normal pushback procedures. When we got to the terminal ramp; I spoke with Mr. X from Airport Operations. I showed him our paperwork; and he stated (I am paraphrasing) 'That was the old NOTAM. We cancelled and reissued the NOTAM this afternoon with a different time and date on it.' He also showed me the 'new' NOTAM; which stated: DIK 06/005 DIK TWY A BTN APCH END RWY 25 AND APCH END RWY 32 CLSD BARRICADED [with dates and times]. This is obviously a completely different NOTAM that neither Dispatch nor Minneapolis Center had access to. If it was put into the NOTAM system; the three methods we have to catch these threats to our operations (Dispatch review; Pilot Review; and Controller review of NOTAMS) all should have caught this error. The obvious resolution to this would have been for me to taxi the airplane to permit a 180 degree turn on the runway. In my defense; I maintained the centerline to the very end in planned anticipation of over steering for a 90 degree turnoff to an OPEN taxiway. Taxiing the RJ on a 100 FT wide runway in preparation for a PLANNED 180 degree turn requires planned deviation off the runway centerline and strict awareness on where your outboard main gear is relative to the pavement edge. I simply could not guarantee that we could stay on the taxiway or runway surface at all times if I tried to turn out under our own power; so it is far safer to just stop and ask for assistance. No operational or customer service issues arose from this; other than a delay.

Regional jet Captain lands on Runway 14 at DIK planning on using Taxiway A for taxi. Taxiway A is closed and a U turn is not advisable. A NOTAM closing Taxiway A had expired but a new one was issued; which the crew did not have access to.


Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

A couple weird things happened during our arrival to ORD today. Descending on the VEECK 1 near HANNI; ORD TRACON told us to maintain 280 KTS. We were descending at 280 at the time; around 11;000 FT; in LNAV/VNAV. About a minute after our level off at 11;000 FT; the controller told us again; he needed us to maintain the 280 KTS. We looked down and we were at 250 KTS. The airplane had slowed itself; and we really have no idea why. To our knowledge; the automation was set up correctly; and we verified the correct settings were still in place after the Controller noticed the slowdown. We sped back up.A few minutes later the Controller told us to maintain 180 KTS. We thought this was odd; since it was a 100 KTS slowdown right after he told us to maintain 280. After we slowed down; somewhat ironically the controller came on and said he needed us to speed back up to 250 (now below 10;000); and that he had given the slowdown to the wrong airplane. We sped back up again.Finally; we were vectored to an intercept for the ILS 10R; autopilot and automation ON; Approach mode armed for the capture. The airplane flew right through the LOC without as much as a wing rock. We caught it immediately as it was happening and started a manual turn back. However; the Controller noticed too; told us we had passed through the LOC and gave us a new vector back on from the other side. He then re-cleared us to the approach. The concern here is traffic separation on the parallel runways. Again; we have no idea why the airplane did this. All correct modes were verified before and after the event.

An air carrier automation fully active on an ORD VEECK 1 did not appear to honor the selected modes when it failed to maintain a SPD Select during level off and then failed to capture an armed APP LOC.