Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

We departed London and had just reached our cruising altitude of FL320. It was VMC and we had asked ATC for ride conditions. They advised smooth; no complaints.  Seat belt sign was on.  All of a sudden we received two violent jolts; rolling the aircraft up and to the right. There were negative g's and objects thrown around.  It was sudden and with no warning.  We heard objects being thrown about in the back. Airspeed increased and aircraft was thrown in pitch up and roll; twice. Asked ATC about separation and advised we had a wake turbulence encounter.  They had just turned us with a heading off of the airway.  They advised we were approximately 12 miles behind and 2200 feet below a 777. We advised that we needed more separation and also informed them we had injuries.  No traffic showed on TCAS - probably because he was greater than 2000 feet above.   After we were assured aircraft was under control and we were separated from the threat; I called back to check on the flight attendants (FA).  They were all shaken up; but one FA in the rear had a cart land on her when it came back down; hitting her knee. Advised dispatch and medical.  FA was relieved of duties for the remainder of flight; and seated with her leg elevated and the knee covered in ice.  Her shoulder and neck hurt as well; but the knee was the worst.  There was no sign of bleeding or torn skin; but it was clearly banged and swelling larger than the other knee.    Asked [Dispatch] to bring [Maintenance] in on the line.  Asked [Manager] if we were legal to continue and enter ETOPs airspace after a severe turbulence encounter; explained we had the two bouts of negative g's.   [Manager] advised he would check; and got back to us with an ACARS message explaining he had checked with the fleet; and wake turbulence encounter was not severe turbulence.  Based on this clarification made the logbook entry 'wake turbulence encounter'.  Also made logbook entries for the medical kit being used. FA was being met by her husband anyway at destination; and stated she would prefer to go to [Company] clinic with him; than to be met by paramedics.  Asked [Dispatch] if they could verify if clinic would be open when we arrived; but they never got back to us.   An FA supervisor met the flight and we explained the situation to him.  Lead FA did an excellent job and the injured FA had a very good attitude.

[Report narrative contained no additional information]

B767 flight crew reported encountering wake turbulence at FL320 in trail of a B777 departing EGLL that resulted in injuries to a Flight Attendant.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 1200

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

[We were] initially given [our] departure PDC on ground. This is a SID for 26L/R only. Was re-cleared on ground to 19R [and depart via the SID] transition then AF. Upon reaching 19R; was told taxi across 19R and hold short 19L. Immediately reloaded departure runway and SID in FMS. Since the departure was already loaded; reloading the same SID with a different runway dropped off the transition and did not prompt the specific departure transition. We verified initial SID waypoints and were cleared for immediate takeoff. We experienced many altitude changes upon climb out and were given a heading off the SID for traffic. We were then given [a departure fix] with no specific rejoin the SID instruction. Since FMS dropped off the SID transition during the last minute runway change; we flew [ZZZ VOR] and missed the [two] transitional fixes. Center asked where we were going just after and we stated Flight planned route to [ZZZ VOR]. He noted direct [ZZZ VOR]. We then realized the FMS had dropped off [a fix and ZZZ VOR]. No traffic or airspace incursions were noted.

A Gulfstream Captain reported that reloading the FMC after a runway change; using the same SID; some of the waypoints dropped out.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

During taxi into the gate; about halfway into gate with aircraft straight and on the taxi line for gate X; taxiing approximately 2 kts; the #1 engine was shutdown. Due to the uphill ramp at ZZZ the jet quickly started to stagnate a couple feet shy of the parking spot. As minimal power was added to #2; the nose of the jet veered hard left due to the ramp being a sheet of ice. The jet contacted a B757 stair stand on it's bumper just outside the silhouette before coming to a stop. The Captain initiated full opposite tiller; rudder; and brakes but the jet continued to slide until contacting the stand. The parking brake was set; the jet shutdown and towed into the gate without further incident. A maintenance inspection revealed no damage to the aircraft. Parking ramp covered in ice with an uphill grade into the parking spot caused the aircraft to veer left during [automatic parking] into the gate.  Recommend after discussing with ZZZ maintenance that company pages add a note about the uphill ramp gradient and prohibit [automatic parking] during any inclement weather conditions. Better plowing equipment would also help clear the ramp of snow and ice.

As we pulled into ramp parking spot X with aircraft straight and taxiing approximately 2 knots we shutdown #1 Eng.  As aircraft approached stopping point aircraft decelerated to almost a stop.  To prevent aircraft from stopping I added a little power to prevent aircraft from stopping and aircraft began an aggressive left turn into gate striking a B757 gate adjacent to our parking spot.  Parking brake was set. Damage inspection revealed no damage and aircraft was towed into gate without further incident.Packed ice on snow covered ramp that has a steep upgrade hill pulling into parking caused the aircraft to veer off to the left during [automatic parking] ops into gate.I suggest from talking with maintenance that our [company] pages in Jeppesen manuals need to describe the steep gradient when pulling into the gate areas on the Ramp.  Due to these factors of steep gradient and icy ramp conditions.  Our [company] pages should state in any inclement WX [Automatic Parking] ops are prohibited.  This will prevent any similar incidence in the future.

Pilots reported losing control of the aircraft while trying to park the aircraft.  Aircraft slid into gate resulting in no damage.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure; Airport; Human Factors

Aircraft X was VFR; flew through the departure area at 13;000; where aircraft climb to 16;000 then through the final at a point where arrivals cross through that altitude on descent.  Aircraft Y had to be vectored off the approach path to avoid conflict.  Aircraft Z had to be kept higher than normal to avoid the conflict and was high entering the approach; making it difficult to get to the airport.Aspen has the difficulty of high mountains and high MVA's; aircraft have limited availability to stop climbs; descents on final are through narrow corridors and the approach path is steep.  VFR aircraft not in communication with ATC are a safety risk because we cannot know their intentions; verify altitude or issue control instructions to avoid conflict.  Aspen needs controlled airspace that requires 2 way communication.

Aspen Tower Controller reported problems associated with aircraft in relationship to the high terrain and high MVA's surrounding the airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 111; Flight Crew Total 9045; Flight Crew Type 1469

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 208; Flight Crew Total 11323; Flight Crew Type 9130

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure

During flight planning for [our] flight from [mainland U.S. airport] to ZZZZ; we noted the dispatchers' notes 'Captain call dispatcher for flight plan briefing.'  Prior to calling the dispatcher we reviewed the Operational Flight Plan (OFP); weather; NOTAMS; and maintenance history of the airplane.  During this review we noticed that the ZZZZ forecast called for very strong gusty winds for many airports within 200 miles of ZZZZ. We called the dispatcher who advised us that he did not have time to note all the areas of turbulence on the flight plan and to avoid a delay in publishing the flight papers he added the note to call dispatch for a briefing.  We suspected that in addition to not being able to note all of the areas of turbulence enroute that he may have been unable to devote the time he would like to completely review the dispatch of this flight.  This seems to be a reoccurring issue with many of the dispatches we are seeing these days.  Dispatchers are simply overloaded with too many flights at one time to properly address the issues surrounding each flight completely.We accepted the flight plan with the planned fuel load and an alternate of ZZZZ1; which is 266NM from ZZZZ and would require 21;400 lbs. of fuel to reach from ZZZZ.  [Our original plan showed] an arrival fuel of 41;700 lbs. at ZZZZ.  This plan results in our flight having no more than 30 minutes of hold in the ZZZZ terminal area before needing to divert to ZZZZ1 or coordinate another plan of operation.While enroute for over 9 hours we updated both the observation and forecast for ZZZZ and other surrounding airports.   We did not receive any pro-active communications from dispatch or the ZZZZ station regarding the deteriorating operating conditions at the airport.  This fact is disappointing given that we have state of the art communications equipment all functioning properly; yet we have no idea that anyone but us is looking at what is being forecast in ZZZZ.  If others in the company were looking at the potential impact of this wind event on ZZZZ operations; they were not sharing any of that information with us.Upon arrival in ZZZZ airspace we were given holding at three different fixes and each hold resulted in holding times that exceeded the EFC that was originally issued.  We advised dispatch of each of these holds and our fuel state via ACARS.  After the third hold we were now beyond our 30 minutes of holding capability and we advised ATC that we were now at minimum fuel.  Many other aircraft inbound for ZZZZ were also in these holding patterns awaiting clearance for approach.  We observed that the terminal controller was clearly 'task saturated' when one of the many aircraft on frequency reported leaving his assigned holding altitude due to a TCAS Resolution Advisory (RA) with another aircraft in the same holding pattern as them at the same altitude.After not hearing from dispatch; despite sending 3 holding reports via ACARS; we contacted dispatch via SATCOM because we were now not able to continue naming ZZZZ1 as a viable alternate; due to an anticipated low fuel state if we diverted to ZZZZ1.  Dispatch advised us that they suggest we consider ZZZZZ1 or ZZZZ2 as potential diversion alternates.  We advised them of our intention to use ZZZZ3 as our alternate due to favorable ceiling; visibility; wind direction [and] velocity; and close proximity.  We were very surprised when the dispatcher advised us that ZZZZ3 was not an advisable alternate due to the fact that the airport could only accept one diversion and there was already a diversion aircraft on the ground in ZZZZ3.  It appears that the dispatcher is ONLY considering the ability of [our airline] to efficiently process one diversion at a time at that location.  However; as a result of our three holding patterns and that ZZZZ ATC had instructed us to hold for a fourth time (for an indefinite amount of time) due to the need to 'turn the airport around' from a runway 16 operationto a runway 34 operation; we advised ATC we could not accept the further holding due to low fuel; and [were] requesting clearance to ZZZZ3.  We also advised dispatch that we were proceeding to ZZZZ3 despite their objection to that course of action.  We landed safely in ZZZZ3 and taxied to a remote location and shut down.Our dispatcher began to flight plan us for a 45 minute flight back to ZZZZ with 2:30 of fuel remaining upon landing at ZZZZ.  Since this was a 3-man crew we asked dispatch to contact the FAR 117 desk to determine if we were legal to continue.  The 117 desk quickly and correctly noted that we were unable to continue due to having 14 minutes of available time before exceeding our FAR block limit of 13:00.  The flight cancelled in ZZZZ3 and also resulted in an outbound flight cancellation from ZZZZ.  The aircraft was ferried from ZZZZ3 to [the U.S.] the following day.This diversion highlights a lack of communications and information flow between station operations; dispatch; and the flight crew which stands in stark contrast to the level of pro-active communications I have seen at [our airline] back in the 1980's and 1990's.  We clearly should have had more information about the impact of the winds; number of go-arounds; and acceptance rate on ZZZZ operations so we could make the best decision possible.  Effective communication regarding operational events such as this wind event is simply not occurring today and in just this one incident resulted in considerable operational disruptions to our customers; tens of thousands of dollars of added cost and significant lost revenue.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A flight crew reported considerable difficulty getting timely weather and other operational updates on their flight to an international destination.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Environment - Non Weather Related

I was the CPC training on Local Control. The Developmental being trained cleared aircraft 1 for take off while Aircraft 2 was on short final. Aircraft 1 advised Tower that there was an aircraft on short final and the Developmental immediately cancelled Aircraft 1's take off clearance and told them to hold short of the runway. After discussing the incident the main reason the Developmental cleared aircraft 1 for take off was the fact that he didn't see Aircraft 2 on short final because the windsock obstructs our view of the flight path of all aircraft landing Runway 23. Since the actual Tower is being rehabilitated and the windsock is a very big obstruction to our vantage point in the mobile Tower; I suggest the windsock be relocated or taken down until we return to the actual Tower.

MMU Controller described a take off clearance not accepted by the departing aircraft because of traffic on short final; the Controller noting the Tower visibility from the temporary tower is obstructed by the wind sock location.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company is applying flight time restrictions wrongly to exceed the flight time of their crews who fly to the U.S. As example; a flight ZZZZ to ZZZ is around 14 hours block time; 4 crew flights. They don't compute the time in the rest (bunk) towards the total flight time; so they only log 7 hrs each way. Crews are flying more than 130 hrs a month and logging less than 100 hours; all this with the consent of the Foreign Civil Aviation Authority. With more than 100 flights to U.S. each week this is a huge safety threat to all. On top of that the rest are they getting in some U.S. destinations after these long flights is less than 24 hrs in the rest facility (hotel). For obvious reasons this cannot be raised to Company or Foreign Civil Aviation Authority.

An Air Carrier pilot reported a foreign air carrier does not include crew rest time during flights as flight time and is not complying with FAR's regarding crew rest after long overseas flights.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was relieving RADAR Controller at the Sector during a very busy complex time for traffic. After I logged into the position; the RADAR Controller I relieved stayed behind me to make sure I had the traffic. During this period the RADAR Controller I relieved; trying to help; changed my range to a closer range so we could see the traffic better. My range went from a 100 range to a 65 range. This did help at the time; but I am used to running on a 90-100 range. Therefore I saw the traffic between a CRJ7 and an A319 and believed I had more than 5 miles lateral when I descended the A319 to FL300 in order to start this aircraft down for their destination. Since I was on a 65 range this was not the case. Conflict Alert did not go off until I lost separation. I believe this happened because the RADAR Controller I relieved was trying to help; but by doing so; I was put into a situation that I was not used to; i.e. running traffic on a 65 mile range.

I was the D-Side position for at least 30 minutes prior to the event until 30 minutes after the event. The Radar Controller was working complex traffic at a high volume. The incoming controller monitored the position for about 2 minutes prior to accepting the position; during the exchange of Radar Controller; the outgoing controller stood behind the position for an overlap. At this time the controller doing the overlap recognized that between the complexity and volume of traffic and that there were a lot of Data Blocks overlapping making it hard to recognize what needed to be done and what actions were a priority. The controller that was overlapping decided to help the Radar position out by telling the controller sitting at the Radar position what to do and trying to separate Data Blocks; the overlapping controller changed the range of the RADAR scope. It was adjusted to a 90 mile range which made the Data Blocks easier to see; but somehow; or for some reason; the scope was then adjusted to a 65 mile range without (in my opinion) the Radar position knowing. I was not aware that we were working on a 65 mile range at the time and when both aircraft passed each other; laterally it looked like we had more than 5 miles between targets. It happened quickly; by the time we knew what happened the two aircraft had lost separation. I recommended to the controller taking position that he starts adjusting his range from 100 to 90 at this sector; because when we are busy 100 mile range is too large and creates a lot of Data Block overlap. I also would recommend the exiting controller to never adjust a Radar side range while someone else is working.

Enroute Controller being relieved by another controller adjusted the display range to assist the on-coming controller with Data Block overlaps; the effort resulting in a loss of separation event.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3; Flight Crew Total 250; Flight Crew Type 240

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I had taken off from KMMU. Prior to takeoff; I had informed Morristown Ground of my request: Take off MMU; proceed to EWR direct; transition Class B airspace to the Statue of Liberty; remain in the Class B up the Hudson River. I have performed this routing at least 4 times prior to this instance without incident. Morristown Tower handed me off to Newark Tower. I believe at that point EWR Tower told me to remain clear of the New York Class B. My altitude was 1;500 feet MSL; and I had adjusted to EWR's Altimeter Setting. I was approximately 7 NM out on a 270 radial from the EWR tower; essentially perpendicular to the main runway alignment. I was given a Bravo clearance and told to aim for the EWR Tower. From this point on; I would usually be given Vectors to overfly the approach end of the Runway in use and proceed towards the Statue (this is located midfield). However; this is where this occurrence deviated from what I was used to. I was told to proceed South at approximately 3 NM out; now parallel to the main Runway alignment. When I was abeam the Runway 4 numbers; the Tower instructed me to 'Proceed on Course; overfly the 22 Numbers and remain South of the Newark ATC Tower. This has been my first flight in 60 day; so while not overwhelmed; I was still 'knocking the rust off a bit'. This airspace is complex; but having done this flight multiple times previously; I had no reason to think this was too much to handle. So when I heard this instruction; my mind interpolated this information; I was already abeam the Runway 4 numbers; and the instruction was to 'remain South of the Newark tower'. I interpreted; based on where the Controller had me fly to and the instruction 'stay south of the tower' that I was on the correct flight path. Further; there was no other Local traffic other than arrivals and departures to the field; so I figured there was no reason for ATC to have me divert this far south just to fly north again. Based on this; I set up to cross over what I had assumed was the RWY 22 numbers but was actually the RWY 4 numbers. At 1 NM out on this path; the controller of course instructed me to turn Left and reiterated I was to fly over the 22 Numbers. At the same moment; I began to have some squelch issues with my headset. In this time; the controller turned me back to the North (180 turn) and I then became reoriented and realized what exactly he wanted me to do. I flew north past the tower and began to turn to cross over the RWY 22 number. I had the numbers visually and aligned toward them; but the controller said; 'You have to fly by my rules if you want to use my airspace; sir'. I was perplexed and now disoriented because I had to unscramble his instruction; and then when I finally did; he still corrected me. He told me to run back out to the west of the field and we would try this again. He instructed me to remain 'At or Below 1500' which I thought was an odd request considering there was a heavy commercial traffic arriving and departing the field. There was some moderate chop; so I decided to stay at 1;300 as to give myself some room in case I hit some updrafts in order to respect his altitude instruction. Again; I was now reoriented to cross the RWY 22 number; he cleared me to do so. Overhead the field; he told me that my altitude indicated 1;200 and that if I wanted to fly in his airspace I need to learn how to keep Altitude. I responded with a compliant; 'yes sir' so as to not trigger any spiteful action like rerouting or even investigation; as I felt that wasn't too far away. Just before I was handed off to LGA tower; I heard a similar incident transpire in which this controller was having an interpersonal issue with what I believe was a helo doing some photo work. This controller was disorientingly unclear in his instruction which he followed up with curt ambiguous reprimand. I have never had this problem before and have performed this same route at various time of day with various traffic flow and have never experienced this. I couldn't help but feel that the routing to the south of the field only to proceed North again then make a 35 degree bank to shoot his desired track of between Runway 11-29 and the tower was just an action to discourage VFR traffic and make it known I was not welcome. I am fully aware that Transition service and overflight are provided on a workload permitting basis; so just turn me away instead of posing obstacles meant to give me a bad experience. Having said that; I should have inquired further and double checked the runways to ensure what the controller said was accurate. Even if I felt like I was an intrusion; I should have taken the time to verify all facts with an ambiguous request. From now on; I will always double check a controller's instructions and make sure they are coherent. Trust; but verify.

C172 pilot planning a VFR flight over EWR and through the Class B; reported receiving confusing instructions from EWR Tower; and a reprimand when they are not correctly followed.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I got the briefing for Operational Supervisor/Controller In Charge (OS/CIC) and went on break; after I had taken Radar from the previous controller; I got a phone call from the pilot of Aircraft X.  I took down the information he gave me about an event that took place earlier.  He informed me that earlier that evening he was doing an ILS approach into RVS VFR and was switched to advisory frequency.  He said the approach controller then vectored Aircraft Y to the same runway IFR.  From what I gathered from the information; I thought that the helicopter was not being provided IFR separation services.  He said that he was inbound on the approach and decided to break off the approach and was nearly missed by Aircraft Y who was closing in behind him.  He said that when Aircraft Y checked on advisory frequency; there was not enough time for him to respond with a position report.  Brief all controllers on the appropriate procedures for having an IFR aircraft being vectored for the visual approach behind a VFR aircraft conducting the instrument approach into an uncontrolled airport.

A TUL Tracon Controller reported of a helicopter that was on an approach being followed by a jet. The helicopter elected to break off the approach because of the close proximity. The Controller wanted the facility to brief all controllers on the appropriate procedures for having IFR aircraft vectored for the visual approach behind VFR aircraft.


Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

During my compliance check I noticed Passenger X did not have a mask on. Passenger X's face was covered with a hoodie. I asked Passenger X to put a mask on and the reply was 'no I will not.' Passenger X was going to use the hoodie because it was a barrier. Passenger X started to shout at me and continued to tell me the hoodie would stay on. Passenger X started to go on about how a mask doesn't protect anyone; so at that point I said I would be back right back. Because he wanted to escalate the situation I went up to tell the A Flight Attendant; she came back and explained to Passenger X the company's policy. Passenger X's wife [also] added that the mask doesn't protect anyone. In the middle of flight; he then again put a blanket on his head and the mask was completely off.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger did not comply with the face mask policy.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 13; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 400

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 260; Flight Crew Type 44

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency

During a training flight; my student and I were conducting stop and go landings. After takeoff we retracted the landing gear and upon full retraction; I simulated an engine failure by reducing the throttle to idle. My student put the gear handle in the down position lowering the landing gear and proceeded to carry out the rest of the emergency procedures as outlined in the Emergency Checklist. After completing the emergency procedures; I gave him back his engine and told him to execute a missed procedure. Upon attaining a positive rate of climb the student raised the gear. When the gear reached full retraction; we heard a noise from the back of the airplane. I told my student we were going back to the airport to make a precautionary landing. Upon lowering the landing gear handle; I discovered that there was no green light giving us a positive gear down indication and no wheel visible out my window. We spent about an hour and a half after that burning off fuel; discussing our options; troubleshooting using the Gear Failure Checklist; and going through all of the Emergency Checklist items for a gear up landing. Recycling the landing gear several times did not remedy the situation. We also tried using the emergency gear pump to lower the gear. This did not work either. We called airport operations to get emergency crews on the scene. After discussing our options with each other and ground support; we made the decision to do several practices approaches to get ready for a gear up landing on the runway.

[This report contains no additional information.]

A C-172RG landing gear did not extend for landing so the instructor and student burned fuel down; completed all checklists and made a successful gear up landing.


Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Clearances from LAS Departure are getting more confusing. As all the RNAV SIDs have altitude crossing restrictions; pre-departure clearances (PDC's) state 'FL190' and 'comply with all restrictions'. On a previous departure; upon initial contact; Departure Control responded 'Climb to 190' which I understood to mean climb as cleared by our PDC and to comply with all restrictions. The other pilot's interpretation; however; was to just climb to FL190 which deletes all restrictions. When we asked for clarification we were told to comply with all restrictions. On a later departure; however; we received the same clearance but; when we again inquired; we received an 'unrestricted climb' clearance. The phraseology used by LAS Departure Control is very confusing. 'Restricted and unrestricted' sound very much alike. We discussed the situation along with a jumpseater while in cruise and we all had different interpretations.Any other airport uses 'climb and maintain' or 'delete restrictions' or 'comply with restrictions.' Please; clarification on these clearances is needed.

An A319 Captain addressed his confusion with terminology used by LAS Departure with regard to complying with altitude restrictions on the RNAV SID's when flights first check in after takeoff and established on their climb to FL190 per their PDC assigned SID.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 31; Flight Crew Total 125; Flight Crew Type 120

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

I was practicing landings on Runway XX at ZZZ; the wind was variable at 3 kts. After five short field landings; I switched to soft field landings. On my second second soft field landing; the wind was at about 240 degrees (judging from the windsock); so I was correcting for a small crosswind from the left. I had a nice stable approach; a good transition; and a good soft touch down. I closed the carb heat; raised the flaps and throttled back up to take off. Immediately after throttling up I got a significant gust from the right which lifted my right wing; turned me to the left and lifted the plane back into the air. I was still correcting for a left crosswind; so this took me by surprise. I was able to catch it with right rudder and get the wings level; but by then I was off the runway to the left at about 30 degrees off the runway. Since the left wing came down suddenly (actually the right wing came up); I thought I blew a left tire. I was airborne at about 5'; but only going about 50 kts; so I wasn't climbing. In the moment; I didn't understand why the plane wasn't climbing (full throttle). I checked that the flaps were up and then decide to close the throttle and get the plane back on the ground. Once the wheels were on the ground; I was able to keep the nose up; but didn't want to stomp on the brakes or make any abrupt turns as I was in the dirt infield. As I got the plane slowed down; I was across the infield and approaching Runway XX. I was able to take a quick look left and saw that no one appeared to be on the runway heading my way.Once on Runway XX; I came harder on the brakes; but saw a taxiway light dead ahead. I diverted left enough to avoid a prop strike; but still hit the light with my right wheel. I stopped approximately thirty feet past the light off the south side of Runway XX. The tower called and asked if we were okay. I said that I thought I had blown a tire; but that I was fine. I also told him I had taken out the taxiway light. The tower instructed me to shut down and stay put; and that there were sending someone out.I shut down the engine and got out to inspect the plane. All the tires were fine and there didn't appear to be any damage to the plane. We rolled the plane back onto the runway. A mechanic arrived and suggested that we take the plane down to his shop to look it over. They couldn't tow the plane because it had wheel pants; so I taxied it to the shop.The mechanic looked the plane over and determined that a there was no damage except a small crack in the front of the right wheel pant where it hit the light. The prop was fine and didn't appear to even have any dirt on it. He provided a written statement that it could be returned to service and suggested I call the flying club to confirm the next steps. I called the owner of the plane and let him know that everything was okay except the wheel pant. I then called the VP of Operations for FBO and explained all of the above. They said that if the mechanic had cleared the plane; then I could fly back to ZZZ1 and meet with him and the plane owner.I taxied back to Runway XX and confirmed that the plane was handling normally on the ground. The wind was now 260 at 9kts but gusting to 16kts. I did a full run-up before departing. On initial roll-out; I paid close attention to the plane's reactions and was prepared to abort the take off if there were any abnormalities. The plane flew perfectly; So I returned to ZZZ1. I then met with the plane owner and VP of Operations to discuss what had happened. After discussing the landing; they had some suggestions for the future. They noted that ZZZ is notorious for having a significant wind shift from one end of the runway to the other. He suggested that if I had been quicker with full right rudder; I could probably have salvaged the take off. He suggested I work on being more active on the rudder on landing; especially in gusty conditions.After discussing the landing with my Instructor; he said Ishould be more patient with the landing phase of touch and goes (especially soft field landing ops) and to be sure the plane was completely settled (not flying anymore); and check to see that the flaps were fully retracted before throttling back up for takeoff. He also suggested that I switch to other training agenda (not landings) if it gets gusty.I believe that the unexpected gust from the right (when I was correcting for left crosswind) hitting me just as I throttled up (with the flaps probably still coming up) caused the plane to be lifted off at a low speed and put off course - something I could have caught if I had been better prepared/expecting it. I'm glad the plane wasn't damaged but also appreciate the important lesson regarding cross wind landings in gusty conditions. I've done well with cross wind landings; but the next time I notice it getting so gusty; I will simply call it a day until I have more cross wind experience.

Student Pilot flying C-172 reported loss of aircraft control during touch and go with crosswind that resulted in a runway excursion.


ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

ZBW transitioned to new Q routing's through our Kingston Sector. We have had trouble with transitioning to the new routes; both en route and with proposals. At times; it seems the HOST is against us; as it applies existing PDR and PDAR routing's which contradicts the Q routing structure. Today all the proposals had been checked; but as is my habit; I rechecked them as time allowed. There were four proposals off of BDL for IAD. Scanning them; I saw 2 of the 4 were bad. Actually; as I learned later; 3 of 4 were bad. We need a PDAR from BDL to IAD to catch these bad proposals. Staff says it is not possible. They cannot create a PDAR that incorporates an arrival; in this case; the HYPER3. If that is the case; why do we have an arrival that extends all the way up to ALB (Albany; NY) and BAF (Barnes; MA) serving a Washington DC airport? We need a preferred route that HOST can apply between BDL and IAD. There is no help in this matter from staff; they have washed their hands of this problem. They say it is the controller's job; even when the HOST is introducing blue HERT routing that contradicts the new Q route structure that staff put in place.

ZBW Controller voiced concern regarding the new 'Q' routing system that seems to contradict the HOST PDR/PDAR efforts. The reporter noted that the facility staff has been less than helpful in resolving this issue.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.5

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Observer

While working as Controller in Charge I had a sector quicklooked behind the desk as it was the busiest sector. Another sector controller had a question to which I told him to standby as I noticed an MSAW alert on the quicklooked scope. By the time I noticed there was an aircraft below the MIA(Minimum IFR Altitude); there was nothing I could say to the Controller working the aircraft as the aircraft was climbing. I do not think the controller working the sector ever issued a lower altitude alert. I think the controller did not understand that we are required to avoid MIAs while the aircraft is climbing to the MEA(Minimum Enroute Altitude).

ZSE Controller in Charge reported observing a sector with an aircraft below the Minimum IFR Altitude.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 2900

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 9000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

Turning base leg for ILS parallel approaches in progress 2;000 foot ceiling; Captain (an airbus LCA) asked me to 'Clean up box.' I selected NO STAR and extended one of the fixes. While on base leg; Cabin PR LDG ELEV Fault ECAM annunciated; (usually a sign of FMGC 1 having a problem in my experience). While starting to sort this out; we were given a turn to intercept Localizer (northeast hdg) and a speed to maintain until the marker. During the next 20-30 seconds; things got a little confusing. Things I'm pretty sure happened were the uncommanded autopilot disengagement and associated sound; my ILS symbology disappearing; 2FD2 FMA on my side; followed by 1FD2 and the Cabin Pr ECAM sounding again; Captain losing his map display as we had different ranges selected; a few MCDU messages on my side OPP FMGC/Independent Operation; etc; and me finally selecting LS (RAW) on my Nav display. At that point; I saw what I thought was LOC south of us and told Captain we need to come right. Within a few moments of that; ATC advised us we were 'capturing the wrong Localizer and to turn right to 180 degrees and maintain 3;000 FT.'  Captain gave me the aircraft and started a dialog with ATC describing our situation and requested a vector to visual conditions (again 2;000 foot ceiling). Once that was sorted out; we were vectored for an IMC descent to a visual.  What was troubling from this point was both of us ultimately ended up in STBY NAV with the proper ILS frequency/course tuned; and I had selected the correct ILS on MCDU2/FMGC2 (mine); yet the identifier remained steady on [the original runway] for both of us the entire time with what appeared to be erroneous glideslope indications. The identifier for the original planned runway; I presume was stored in FMGC 1. Not sure if this is an anomaly or just how the system works? Fortunately it was VFR below the cloud deck! Uneventful landing /taxi back. MCDU still locked/not responding to any button pushing even after shutdown. Wrote up Maintenance item FMGC 1 Fail.

This is my third FMGC failure in approximately seven months. The failure is the same every time. One FMGC fails and the associated MCDU locks up. The first predictable incarnation of the precipitous events is the MAP NOT AVAILABLE message followed by the CAB PRESS LDG ELEVATION....Adjust. The failure never happens the way it is described in the systems description nor Non-Normals. In this case; as in the last three the MCDU locks up; this time it was my MCDU and the FMA's on the PFD show 1-FD-2. This is then followed by a mode reversion to HDG V/S. The MCDU status lights never illuminate to indicate independent operation. Although the system displays 1-FD-2; an indication that both FMGC's are operating; one has indeed failed. Then the operative side; in this case FMGC-2 is operating; but is erratic at best. We were unable to select an ILS. I then went to STBY NAV after giving the airplane to the First Officer to fly while I troubleshot the system. This happened at the time we were intercepting final. Due to the wind; we encroached on the parallel runway; although; I specifically flew a heading which diverged from the localizer while trying to regain control of the situation at hand. We were unable to successfully tune the appropriate ILS in Stby NAV; it's almost as if the FMGC would not relinquish control of the NAV; even though the RAD NAV page showed blanks. We were vectored off the approach. I made a request to descend below the 2;000 foot overcast layer and pick up the airport visually. This request was initially denied; then granted. We landed uneventfully after being vectored for the visual. In addition; as in the last 2 cases; during the rollout; the airspeed tape fails and I believe shows V1 INOP.

A319 flight crew experiences FMGC failures while being vectored for approach when No STAR is selected in the FMGC to clean up the map display. ATC is advised and vectors for a visual approach are provided.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 13; Flight Crew Total 100; Flight Crew Type 100

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway

I was practicing touch-and-go's in the pattern at UNV. Prior to flight; a briefing was obtained from DUATS; and no weather issues were apparent. Winds were light. A preflight inspection of the aircraft did not identify any issues; and the run up and taxi to Runway 24 were unremarkable. Four approaches were performed; three of which were touch-and-go and the other was a practice go-around. All three landings were normal. While accelerating for the fifth takeoff; all appeared normal; and when the aircraft was close to rotation speed it suddenly deviated to the left of the centerline; pointing towards the left edge of the runway; and an attempt to correct with right rudder suggested to me that I would not be able to get back on the centerline without significant rudder input and further loss of control. The airplane became airborne after rolling into the grass off the left side of the runway near the 2;000-foot marker. After achieving a positive rate of climb; I immediately communicated with UNV Tower indicating that I was OK and that I wasn't sure if there was an unexpected wind on the runway or something else had happened. I entered a left downwind for Runway 24; and did a check on the rudders and other flight controls; and concluded that everything was fine. I landed normally on runway 24; requested a taxi back to the hangars; and the taxi procedure appeared normal. Upon returning to the hangar; I did a full inspection of the airplane and did not notice anything unusual except for a few tufts of grass on the left and right brakes. Several days later; another pilot noted dents to the underside of the tail; on the passenger's side. Discussions with others including flight instructors failed to conclusively identify the issue that led to this event; but perhaps it was caused by a temporary lapse of attention in which deviation of the airplane from the centerline was not noticed until it was too difficult to recover. It is believed the damaged tail was caused by striking a runway light.

C172 pilot reported loss of directional control on takeoff roll. Control was regained after liftoff.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

We completed pre-flight and fueling; stocking and cleaning of aircraft. Loaded passenger bagage and cat on board. During taxi out while running the taxi checklist when testing the Thrust Reversers (TR) the Captain stated that the TR levers felt different. The test tested normally. We then completed are flight to are fuel stop and then on to destination. We were wondering if the levers were some how installed wrong because they had under gone maintenance two days before. They just did not feel right; it was hard to get your fingers under the levers. The next day during pre-flight we called maintenance and sent pic's of the TR levers and asked if they were ok. When they called back stating that they were not right and that they needed to be adjusted. The aircraft was written up and is waiting for maintenance. After completing maintenance on the TR's they should be test to make sure that they are working correctly.

We preflighted; fueled and awaited passengers. Our passengers boarded and we taxied out of the FBO down taxiway G to hold short L. On the taxi out; I called for the taxi check and when the first flight of the day Thrust Reverser (TR) check came to; I placed my hand on the levers to deploy and something didn't feel right. (kinda restricted in space or obstructed) I couldn't put my finger on what was exactly different; but the TR's did deploy normally (successful test). I suspected that the rigging might just be more tight since the TR's had been worked on a few days ago; clearing MEL 78-XX-XX; TR's easily deployed with little pressure. We taxied on and the flight continued without incident; We stopped for a fuel and we were to continue to DEN; First Officer (FO)'s leg. The FO did a TR check; per my recommendation to get his opinion. He too said it felt strange but also believed perhaps it was tightness of the rigging. This flight too continued without incident. The following day; this something's not right feeling compelled me to take a few pic's of the TR assembly and forward to Maintenance Controllers. I then called them up; asked them to review the pic and please go out to the hangar and compare with a XL/XLS. The controller grabbed a Chief Pilot; and they compared the pic and an aircraft. The got back with me and said I was correct; the assembly; (throttle detent window) had been installed backwards. They asked me to write up the discrepancy . Maintenance then arranged a vendor at KDEN to come out and correct. We were delayed quite a bit and this impacted a pax flight heavily. I suspected something was wrong as it didn't feel correct. I believe that I trusted that the maintence was performed correctly and that lead me to disregard my suspicions. In the future; I believe I shall trust my instincts more and return to the originating point; or if enroute; seek the inspection or opinion of our mx at the point of landing before moving aircraft further.

CE-560 flight crew believes that something is not quite right during a thrust reverser test on taxi out; but the test is successful. Two legs are flown and the next morning pictures of the throttle quadrant are sent to maintenance for a professional opinion. Maintenance replies that the throttle detent window assembly has been installed backwards and needs to be corrected before further flight.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 5200; Flight Crew Type 550

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Aircraft with passengers to land on a 5;000 foot runway. Pattern saturated with 5 small aircraft flying orientation flights for students and one airborne aircraft with jumpers: no control tower. We were on vectors to do an RNAV approach to Runway 31 talking with ATC on IFR clearance. Trying to monitor UNICOM and talk to ATC at the same time became complicated so we told ATC we would cancel on the ground and received a phone number from them.Small aircraft pilots reported gusty winds with wind shear on final. Pilot flying executed a go around in the flare for a wind shear; and subsequent climb out was on UNICOM. About that time the jump aircraft reported jumpers in the air so we began to coordinate with them on UNICOM and climbed to a VFR altitude and flew back to the 10 mile point to avoid jumpers. In the rapidly changing situation with the winds; other aircraft and jumpers we spent the time coordinating with them on UNICOM rather than contacting ATC again and executing the published missed approach. Honestly; we were so busy we just didn't think about it as we should have. In retrospect we should have just cancelled in the air and ATC would have been relieved of the responsibility of us; but we didn't. When we called to cancel; they advised us to call another number to discuss our not contacting them.The winds; extreme unusual pattern activity; and a balked landing all contributed to additional tasking in the cockpit leading to safety focus first allowing the IFR regulation to contact approach control lapse.

Corporate jet with passengers attempted a landing at an uncontrolled airport with heavy traffic in the pattern. Additionally; windshear conditions existed prompting a go-around. Because of the heavy workload there was a lapse in the coordination with ATC.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 23

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Aircraft X was on approach to the airport. He later called the airport in sight for a visual approach; which I gave him. At some time before or after that; Tower called and asked for a clearance from the ground for Aircraft Y; VFR to an intersection; then to [destination] airport. I tried to give him a clearance from over the intersection; but he wanted a clearance from the ground. I told the Tower Controller that I was unable to issue a clearance from the ground; as I had inbound IFR aircraft. He said no; VFR to the intersection; and I again stated that I could not issue the clearance; whether or not it was an Instrument Departure Procedure (IDP) or VFR conditions to the intersection; as both clearances start at the airport; and require IFR separation. I told him they can wait on the ground until the aircraft on approach arrives; or get his clearance from over the intersection.The clearance he got was from over the intersection. I waited until I got the call of the arrival of the first of my two aircrafts; Aircraft X; then I cleared Aircraft Z for the approach. As Aircraft Z was maybe 15 miles northwest of the airport; Aircraft Y popped up on radar; and after taking radar; I called traffic between the two aircraft.Some people think this is not a problem in our facility; and this situation was covered in an interpretation binder; but that binder was removed from the floor years ago; and out staff and management fail to issue any direction on this matter. To me this is not a VFR climb on course; where you can climb through another IFR aircraft; and being on a VFR flight plan is different from being on an IFR flight plan; whether or not you are in VFR (OR VMC) conditions or IFR conditions. One is about protecting IFR aircraft from other IFR aircraft; and the other is VFR VS IFR flying conditions; i.e. the weather!Whether the aircraft choses or is issued the instrument departure procedure; or gets to the intersection; where his routing starts; matters not; if he has a clearance from the ground; he is IFR; from the ground!

A Center and Tower Controller disagreed whether an aircraft with an IFR clearance including an initial VFR leg could be released with simultaneous IFR arrivals. The Tower departed the aircraft with an aircraft on approach.


Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Preflighting A319 MCDU at SKBO. Assigned SID was the GEPKI 2B from 31L. The Jeppesen EFB plate depicts a left turn direct GEVRO at ISESA.  The GEPKI 2B in the database depicts that after ISESA (shown as a flyover waypoint); continue heading 314 for radar vectors. We made the database SID mimic the Jeppesen SID.My concern is that rising terrain exists approximately 13 miles straight out from from both 31L and 31R in the vicinity of BOG VOR and if this inconsistency between the Jeppesens and the Airbus database is not trapped during preflight; an incident may occur. This is an ongoing problem with the Airbus FMS database and the inconsistencies are evident at other airports as well; most notably at San Salvador.  The FMS database should mirror the Jeppesen plates in every respect; every time. In addition; every SID; STAR or Approach that is included in our EFB should also be available in the FMS database.

A319 First Officer assigned the GEPKI 2B departure from SKBO reports that the FMGC database procedure does not match the charted procedure. The FMGC is altered to match the chart.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 62; Flight Crew Total 4669; Flight Crew Type 242

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

We were cleared to our destination via the LOUPE THREE Departure; BMRNG transition. After departure we were handed off to NorCal Departure and checked on. NorCal advised us to expect a left turn (the SID makes a right turn). We acknowledged; but continued to fly our assigned SID. At 1.8 DME northwest of the SJC VOR; we started the right turn heading 120 as published. Within a few seconds of being fully established in the right turn; NorCal issued an instruction to turn left heading 120. I immediately started the turn in the opposite direction. At this point NORCAL thought we had made a mistake; because we had already started the right turn; but we were never instructed to do anything other than the assigned SID. Obviously; you cannot immediately turn left while already fully established in a right turn (which was our clearance).The controller seemed frustrated. We were doing nothing wrong; but were treated as if we had just committed a pilot deviation. We politely advised NorCal that we were never given an actual clearance to turn left until we were already in the right turn.The previous departure before us was not on the correct frequency and caused a lot of extra work for the controller. I feel this was the contributing factor.At no point during the event did I feel safety was compromised. We could see the traffic conflict the controller was trying to have us avoid. At no time did we have a TCAS TA or RA.

Corporate jet Captain reported that on the LOUPE3 Departure from SJC Controller advised expect a left turn (SID shows a right turn) but did not issue the clearance until after the crew had established the right turn.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Workload; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

I was working a fairly busy and complex session at Malibu Radar. Some of the factors that assisted in the complexity were point outs to adjacent sectors; VFR aircraft having trouble staying clear of clouds; and LAX tower's coordination. The main issue with this session that has been a recurring situation is LAX towers coordination. While I was on the line with Point Mugu trying to accomplish a point out on an Aircraft Z that wasn't climbing well; LAX tower keys up in my ear and starts talking over myself and the controller at Point Mugu. I immediately told the tower 'unable' before hearing their request because it was obvious to me that they were calling to APPREQ the request they had flashing in the run down. The LAX tower controller insisted on getting answers on the line while I'm still trying to obtain a point out from Point Mugu before the aircraft gets too close to their airspace. I was left with no choice but to take control of my sector and talk over the LAX tower controller and confirm that Point Mugu had approved my point out. The point out was approved and both Point Mugu and LAX tower got off the line at the same time. This same situation happened again moments later. I had several aircraft I needed to talk to (i.e. radar identify; climb; turn on course; etc.) when LAX tower called to coordinated something else after already not complying with the LOA with Aircraft X. LAX tower keyed up in my ear once again and started talking immediately. I was already way too busy at this time to hear anything else from the tower; I just need the standard operating procedure from the tower. Before the situation in my airspace could become any more out of hand I told the tower to 'get out of my ear'. When the tower controller didn't listen and continued to talk in my ear; I ended up having to block them out as much as possible; talk over them; and continue trying to get my sector back in control. The tower ended up scrambling and stopping Aircraft Y at 2;000 feet below Aircraft X; since I didn't acknowledge Aircraft Y heading 235. Both of these aircraft were going over Gorman and Aircraft Y needed to climb above Aircraft X. So all this ended up doing was creating another problem.Tower's non-compliance with the LOA:Aircraft X was supposed to depart LAX on a 270 heading climbing to 3;000 feet unless it is previously coordinated. This aircraft departed on a 250 heading due to traffic departing SMO. Per the LOA any nonstandard coordination; should be accomplished before the aircraft becomes airborne; either verbal or via rundown patch. LAX tower operates on a daily basis by releasing aircraft for departure without getting acknowledgement from Approach beforehand in hopes they can call last minute and get an acknowledgment. In both situations during this session; neither request by the tower was acknowledged. LAX tower should have to obtain acknowledgement for any non-standard operation before the aircraft is cleared for takeoff. They also shouldn't be allowed to just key up in our ear and start talking over us. Their ability to just start talking in our ear is a risk to operational safety and a major distraction. Their need for coordination about aircraft on the ground shouldn't take priority over the aircraft we have airborne in our airspace.

SCT Departure Controller describes coordination problems with LAX Tower and the tower not following SOP.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 700; Flight Crew Type 200

Confusion; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

Second flight of the day for formation training following FAST formation practices. Three T-6 aircraft were participating in the training. My T-6 was the number two ship in a flight of three ships. We were landing after performing an overhead 360 approach to landing. I had touched down on the right side of the center line (lead touched down on the left side). I wheeled landed and was keeping the a/c on the main gear until the 2000 foot remaining mark. I then let the tail come down. The airplane felt light on the main gear and started to lift and divert to the right. I added power and left rudder for directional control. The airplane left the runway for the grass on the right side then went right wing high and started to divert left. I closed the throttle and attempted to regain directional control and bleed of speed and energy. During this entire roll out; the tail wheel felt that is was not locked. I initially though the locking pin sheared and I only had rudder for directional control. I managed to get the a/c back onto the runway and stopped after swerving left and right until stopped. Once stopped; I shut down the engine and got out to inspect the tail wheel and the a/c. It was obviously not locked. There was evidence that the aft portion of the left wing tip and aileron came into contact with the grass while the a/c was off of the runway. The airport manager closed the runway until we were clear of the runway. This was about 30 minutes duration. With the help of a mechanic; we removed the fairing and saw the locking pin was intact and we were able to move the tail wheel into the locked position. Started the engine and taxied to the hangar for further inspection. The Tail wheel would lock and unlock without difficulty. Remained locked during the taxiing to parking. It is suspected that I inadvertently unlocked the tail wheel during roll out by applying too much forward pressure and also let the tail settle with too much forward speed. This cause the float and unloading of the main gear. The damage was determined by several mechanics not to an airworthiness issue and the airplane was returned to service and flow back to the airport it is based at without incident.

A T-6 Texan Pilot inadvertently unlocked the tailwheel during landing when he applied too much forward pressure causing the aircraft to leave the runway. During one of the off runway turns a wingtip struck the grass.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 1800

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

My company president and I were taxiing out for an IFR departure to pick up a passenger. We were instructed to hold short of Runway XX at taxiway C; which we did and then remained there for a few minutes. The airport was fairly busy on this night. The ground controller then instructed us to cross Runway XX at (C); then (L) to Runway XY. I was sitting in the right seat and reported the right side as clear. The pilot flying (a non-instrument rated private pilot) began to roll and then raised a question about an aircraft he observed approaching the airport. I looked left and spotted a Cirrus on short final to runway XX. I immediately applied the brakes from my side and said; 'Stop!' I alerted ground to the fact that we were instructed to cross a runway with landing traffic to which I received an apology. We were able to remain clear of the runway; though we may have moved inches beyond the hold short line; and the other aircraft landed uneventfully.I [later] observed a similar scenario with the same controller; now working tower; issuing a line up and wait instruction to another aircraft on Runway XY with an airplane on short final. The controller caught the error and canceled the instruction; although the aircraft did cross the hold-short line by several inches.

Pilot reported they were cleared to cross a runway with another aircraft on short final.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 15

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

While being vectored for a visual; I was cleared to 3000 and descended to 2500 while trying to figure out a gyro failure which shut down my HSI; RMI; Autopilot and Flight Director.....I was highly distracted!

PA23 Pilot reported he descended below his assigned altitude while troubleshooting a gyro failure.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During Hazmat inspection one of the DG pallets was loaded horribly unsecured. Multiple Liquid flammables; corrosives; 'this side up's'; were not properly secured to prevent falling or tipping. The hazmat rep was asked to properly secure loose items for re-inspection. It took THREE (3) re-inspections (total of 4 inspections) before the pallet was suitable. Whoever loaded the pallet paid no attention to securing loose items on the pallet. Feedback to the hazmat pallet build up that DG must be properly packed secure. Also; the hazmat rep on the plane did not have good tools to adjust the loading. Spare ropes; nets; packing materials; etc; would have made his retying down much easier.

B777 First Officer reports discovering an improperly packed dangerous goods pallet during preflight. Three reinsertions are required before the pallet is acceptable for flight.


Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 38000; Flight Crew Type 400

I reported to Tower 5 miles north; inbound to land. The Tower instructed me to report mid-field downwind; 'your choice right or left downwind.' I said I would report right downwind. I heard no other traffic on the frequency. Just as I was approaching mid-field downwind and about to report downwind; a small aircraft flying opposite direction flew directly overhead; approximately 100 feet above me. At that point the controller cleared me to land. The controller then told the other aircraft; 'sorry about that.' I spoke with the other pilot afterwards; he said he was breaking in an engine and flying orbits near the airport as cleared by the controller. As far as I know; we were the only aircraft in the Class D airspace at the time. The other aircraft was close enough that I could hear his engine as he passed overhead.

GA pilot reported a NMAC during final approach to ONM airport.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

After departure aircraft was being hand flown and trimming normally. Early in the climb the 'speed trim fail' illuminated momentarily then extinguished. This happened two more times. I was the pilot monitoring and reviewed the QRH procedure just in case. We continued to an initial altitude of FL330. At that point the auto pilot failed to engage and the 'speed trim fail' light illuminated and stayed on. We descended to FL270 to comply with non-RVSM requirements and informed ATC while attempting to contact dispatch. Dispatch sent us a new flight plan showing arrival fuel of 4.4. The ride was fairly bumpy and the [destination] weather was not optimal in case of a diversion. We had just flown over [an airport] where the weather was mostly clear. We coordinated with dispatch and diverted. Upon reaching the gate maintenance was standing by as required. After a lengthy system test; all checked normal. Maintenance had discovered that the stab trim cutout for the auto pilot trim was in the 'off' position. Both guards were down with the main electric trim switch was in the on or normal position even though both guards were down. The plane had come from the hanger after completing a PCU (Power Control Unit) replacement. Switches were not placed back to the normal positions per their checklist. Further; during the pre-flight check the first officer missed that the switches were not in their normal 'on' position. I had failed to notice the guards in the wrong position as well. Lesson learned; take a little extra time pre-flighting especially coming from the hanger. Supplemental note in QRH about checking that both trim cutout switches are in the proper position.

As the FO (First Officer); I was flying. Takeoff and initial climb was normal. Soon however; the yellow 'Speed Trim' light came on. After a few seconds; the light went out. This happened three times during climb. The QRH was referenced and the procedure for a Speed Trim light instructed us to 'Continue Normal Operations'. At approximately 17;000 ft.; I attempted to engage autopilot B. It would not engage. No warning lights were on at this time. I attempted to engage autopilot A and both CWS (Control Wheel Steering) systems. None would engage. Trim was operating normally. We stopped climb at FL270 letting ATC know we were now non RVSM compliant. We got a new flight plan showing us landing with 4;400 lbs of fuel; well below acceptable mins. In addition; we factored in that we would be flying through some significant weather with no autopilot. At that point; the Captain decided to divert. We coordinated with ATC and landed without incident. Maintenance met us at the aircraft and proceeded to complete their autopilot checks. The mechanic found the Autopilot cutout switch in the cutout position. After completing maintenance checks on the system; the system passed the tests. The aircraft had just gone through some maintenance operations on the yaw damper system. Maintenance personnel informed us that as part of their procedure; the Autopilot cutout switch should have been placed back to normal following the yaw damper maintenance. Nonetheless; I missed that the switch was in the cutout position during my pre-flight check. After maintenance cleared the aircraft; we proceeded without incident. Change Speed Trim procedures to check the autopilot cutout switch.

B737-800 Flight Crew reported a speed trim light indication and an inoperative autopilot during climb. Fuel concerns; weather; and the inability to operate in RVSM airspace prompted the crew to divert. Maintenance discovered that the Autopilot cutout switch was in the cutout position and had been missed during the preflight inspection.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party1 Maintenance; Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Maintenance; Party2 Dispatch

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Workload; Confusion

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Company Policy; Human Factors; Aircraft

During the last part of servicing; approximately 15-minutes prior to departure; aft Flight Attendant notified me that a part had fallen apart in 4-Left (4L) Door. I went to 4L Door and inspected the door and discovered that the 4L Gust Lock bronze/copper colored two part ring had broken in half and slipped down. I actually removed the ring before it slipped down more. I called for Maintenance and notified Dispatch we had a major problem that would cause delay or cancel the flight. Local Contract Maintenance arrived and inspected door for function and Arming/Disarming. I observed all testing. The door functioned perfectly; except for the Gust Lock ring being broken. There was no part available [here] and after contacting Maintenance Control; as I suspected; no authorization in MEL to fly aircraft with passengers. Passengers were removed as arrangements made to assist in their further travel plans. We remained on the aircraft as Dispatch said we would fly aircraft back to the U.S. as a ferry flight under our current Flight Number XXX. We thought that was odd as neither pilots had ever flown ferry flight under normal flight numbers. In any case the message etc. did not arrive in time and the crew timed-out on duty day. We went to hotel and later notified to show up next day to fly the ferry flight to [the U.S.]. Reported to [same] aircraft; a B757-200; completed preflight/had paperwork for flight and new Customs form which also showed that two flight attendants had elected to remain behind and deadhead on their own back to [the U.S.]. Total on board: four. Inspected logbook; no action on 4L Door as there was no part and no deferment as there is no authorization in MEL. Logbook had the first entry by Local Mechanic voided after submission to Maintenance Control. The second entry noted 'aircraft has been inspected and found to be in safe condition for Maintenance Ferry from ZZZZ to ZZZ to complete repairs to 4L Door Gust Lock. This Ferry Flight authorized by message. Best I could tell we had all the proper approval for safe flight to [the U.S.]. I agreed with Dispatch flight plan for fuel even though we were considerable less fuel but we were also very light as ferry flight and scheduled for FL400. I electronically signed release and we closed all doors and armed doors for ferry. [We] pushed off hard stand; received clearance for flight while taxiing; as is normal for this airport. Received close-out from Load Control and flight was within all normals. Takeoff/Checklist completed and we took-off normally and climbed unrestricted to FL360 which later was changed to FL400.During climb out and above FL200; received message from Dispatch: it stated question....in logbook does it show the 4L Door lock that was broken as being repaired? Maintenance Control is wondering as no one from [our departure airport] contacted them to tell them the aircraft was ready....thanks. I looked at Co-pilot with disgust and told him; 'Well this is going downhill fast'. I will note at this time the local [Contract] Mechanic had been awaken at his home by Maintenance Control to change the [previous] logbook entry to the current entry in logbook page for ferry. Through a series of ACARS messages back and forth; I determined that there had been a total breakdown in communications between Dispatch/Maintenance; Maintenance Control; and Local Contract Maintenance. I was requested to call Maintenance Operations on arrival at [our destination] which I later did after clearing Customs and collecting all paperwork I could. Arrived [at our destination] uneventful and above fuel planned. Later; after clearing Customs; I contacted Maintenance Control and Maintenance Operations and a discussion evolved about the whole event. I determined there was confusion on the flight being a ferry flight for repairs (I do not know if the special permits were filed or if we complied with notifying [our departure airport] for special permission to ferry flight. I had assumed so as we were release by Dispatch for flight. I found total confusion on the status of the aircraft from the three shifts involved: evening/night/day shifts of Maintenance Control/Maintenance Operations. This confusion was also apparent in Dispatch on what proper procedures should have been filed. It was stated that the lock-out of the flight had not been properly executed so as to prevent Dispatch from releasing the flight; which I assume is a joint responsibility of Maintenance Control/Maintenance Operations and Dispatch/Operations Control; or the assigned sub-parties of each command chain. We have Standard Procedures that have worked well in the past; but it may be result of our downsizing procedures causing a heavy influx of new personnel into bid positions in the levels of command for each Maintenance Control/Maintenance Operations and Dispatch/Operations Control that the ferry procedures fell apart. I believe that a new checklist in the Part One Manual should be set up for Domestic ferry and International ferry so that the pilot in command has a good picture of all the requirements and can confirm that all parties have truly signed-off on the flight. Additionally; the normal customary practice of having a past-down log between each shift of work; of what is going on/work completed/what needs to be finished fell apart and suddenly did not occur. Let's get back to normal business practices-follow the details. No damage to aircraft occurred in this incident nor was there risk of injury to crew; but it is concerning that the knowledge of the entire correct ferry procedures/coordination did not happen on this flight. Electronic checklist Maintenance Control/Maintenance Operations and Dispatch/Operations Control and checklist for pilots should be established and the standard lockout of flight by Dispatch until a formal message from Maintenance is in hand in all ferry flights. [This] appears to be some type of failure to communicate Maintenance Control/Maintenance Operations to Dispatch to lock-out flight. Two different shifts were getting conflicting information on how to fly ferry flight for maintenance. [This] appears to be breakdown in internal abilities to handle coordination of ferry flight from Maintenance Control/Maintenance Operations and Dispatch. Confusion on whether a ferry flight has had repairs; which was impossible; due to no part; ferry flight was flown to base for repair.

I came in for the late shift. [I] was told that the operation was normal except that there was an aircraft ferrying [to the U.S.] in the morning once it was 'Returned to Service.' I then took over the desk. After setting up my desk; I pulled up the routing for Aircraft X; a B757-200 and saw no information stored; nor set up message. More evidence in my mind that we were simply ferrying the aircraft back to [the U.S.] once it was returned to service. The aircraft showed an Estimated Time of Release (ETR) of early morning local time; not a decision indicating it would probably have a good chance to be Returned to Service for departure ten minutes later. No paperwork existed on my Dispatch Desk; either in the form of the set-up message or a position message from Maintenance. The lack of any paperwork indicating this was a maintenance ferry lead to the non-compliance. During the evening I did this release; with my other flight releases; as an in-service ferry to return equipment to base. A few minutes after the flight departed; the Operations (Ops) Coordinator came to me and asked if I wanted the flight transferred back to my desk. Upon doing the release I never noticed that it was not on my Dispatch Desk. I saw that it was assigned to the Aircraft Desk and I transferred it back to Dispatch Desk. The routine visit from the Ops Coordinator again reinforced to me that this was a ferry to spot equipment and not a maintenance ferry. Generally the Aircraft Desk is the first entity in Dispatch to know about a maintenance ferry; per an Operations Control Office memo. Having never received a call during the night from Maintenance Control/Local Maintenance or the flight crew; I double checked the 'Aircraft Out of Service' list to ensure that the aircraft was 'Returned to Service'; knowing that communications from some stations are sparse. I noticed that the aircraft was still showing 'Out of Service'; with an unchanged ETR time. I called Maintenance Operations Person X; and spoke about having this aircraft shown as 'In Service'; as 'the ferry was already flying.' He was caught off-guard; asking why it was flying when he had not yet received word from Local Maintenance that the aircraft was 'good' to ferry. I was now as equally shocked; asking if this was a maintenance ferry requiring an authorization message. He responded by saying it was indeed. My partner sent Aircraft X an ACARS message while I continued to speak with Maintenance Operations Person X about how and why this event had occurred. He said that the ferry was set up the previous evening (before either of us started our shifts); but he could not find any paperwork on it. It was also not listed in the request file for ALL extra flying. The matter became even more unclear. In the meantime; Aircraft X responded back to Dispatch by saying; after we asked if there was an entry in the logbook from Local Maintenance about fixing the aircraft; 'R U KIDDING? Maintenance sent authorization to ferry aircraft for repairs; no parts in [departure airport]'. He then added; 'Maintenance Control WOKE MECH UP AT HOME LAST NIGHT; LOCAL; TO CHANGE LOGBOOK ENTRY FOR FERRY FLIGHT.' As a result when the flight crew got to [the airport] in the morning; they too were under the assumption that the aircraft was back in service and able to ferry to [the U.S.]. The Local Contract Mechanic had apparently made a balancing [sign-off] entry in the logbook as well; indicating to the Captain that the flight was good to operate.By this time I had also been up to the Aircraft Coordinators position; neither [of us] could find any paperwork regarding Aircraft X; be it a set-up message or an authorization message. I was told that the ferry was set-up the previous evening and there was no authorization message. One of the morning Aircraft Coordinators then looked in the request file that shows ALL EXTRA FLYING and he could not locate Aircraft X in the file for the current day; or previous day. By this timeI was relieved [shift change] and went home; intending on doing a report when I came back to the office the following day. Later I received information from a co-worker telling me that the Captain called him after arriving [in the U.S.] on Aircraft X and said that there was indeed an authorization message issued. It was attached to logbook page. This created even more confusion over what I thought had simply been a ferry to get equipment back to Base. Now I learn there is an authorization message (at least according to the crew; yet Maintenance Operations told me there WAS no authorization message during my preliminary inquiry at the office). In retrospect; having done [Aircraft] Releases based on looking at all of my OUT stations; and being told by the previous shift that the aircraft would be ferried to [the U.S.] after it was repaired; I did not for a moment believe that office memo (which I am fully aware of and aware of the procedure); was viable in this instance. Please note that the memo is for ETR Updating to support Ferries Requiring Authorization Message. With absolutely no information on my desk indicating otherwise; in the flights history; or on the Aircraft Desk; I had no way of knowing this was a ferry that required an authorization message. In retrospect; as stated above; there actually was an authorization message in the logbook. Based on that; the procedure; although not handled per the office memo; was indeed released with appropriate maintenance paperwork.This situation was created in my opinion by several factors; any of which being different; would have resulted in a different outcome: A) Not taking my verbal turnover at face value. Of note should be; that the Dispatcher I relieved was not the Dispatcher assigned to work the flight. That Dispatcher left an hour before my evening shift started. B) Not having any paperwork on my desk regarding the ferry (i.e. Set-Up message or Authorization Message). C) The lack of any information stored in the flights history; which was checked by myself two times earlier in my shift. D) The lack of information regarding extra flying. E) The lack of knowledge of this flight by the Operations Coordinators on my shift. F) The lack of information by Maintenance Control. G) The lack of a call by the flight crew. In summation I still don't know what really happened regarding the ferry flights paper trail. The complete lack of information regarding the creation of this ferry cannot be overstated. Knowing I had the ferry; I of course released it. I ALWAYS check for information regarding ferry flights and functional check flights. Information regarding Maintenance Control flights always seems to be stored in history and hard copies presented to Dispatchers; as per the Office Memo. In this case I interpreted the lack of information to mean this was a ferry to spot equipment to Base. I realize that Office Memo was issued to put into place a procedure to avoid this sort of situation happening again (per the memo it was implemented because this very thing has happened before). Apparently another gap in the system has been disclosed: when advised that a ferry is on his/her desk; the Dispatcher can still go and release it-regardless of it being on one desk or another. Working the Caribbean [flights] I have become immune to looking at the desk assignment; as I release flights for three different desks routinely from this quad. I presume at the time of release; the ferry was assigned to the Aircraft Desk. Sadly I did not see that it was not assigned to Dispatch; had I; this would also had prevented the occurrence.

A pilot and Dispatcher describe how breakdowns in organizational communications led to a B757-200 being released for a ferry flight without Maintenance Control; Maintenance Operations; Dispatch and Flight Operations having a clear understanding of the aircraft's status. Ferry flight was due to a broken door Gust Lock at Door 4-Left.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 4400; Flight Crew Type 2300

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While cruising at FL370; our routing took us from MCB to MUURY. Upon reaching MCB; I noticed the aircraft turning beyond the proper course. The reason for this came from the pilot's side FMS navigating to MURRY. The pilot's FMS was coupled to the autopilot. We took corrective action immediately and returned the aircraft on course to MUURY. In the turn; we disconnected the autopilot to expedite our return to the flight planned route; and we lost about 100 FT in the process. As we started our corrective turn back toward MUURY; ATC queried us to make sure we were heading to MUURY and not MURRY. The copilot's FMS was programmed properly; showing a course discrepancy in the turn over MCB which wasn't obvious because of the close proximity of the courses to MUURY and MURRY from MCB. The flight plans on both FMSs were checked against each other but the misspelling of one waypoint was overlooked.

An Air Carrier crew cleared from SWB to MUURY had erroneously entered MURRY in the FMS during preflight; so after passing SWB the aircraft turned northeast toward MURRY verses southeast. The distance from SWB to MUURY is 133 NM; to MURRY is 482 NM. The MUURY to MURRY distance is 381 NM northeast. Two other MURRY waypoints exist; one in Australia; another in the Hong Kong FIR.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 900; Flight Crew Type 460

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors

Equipped with Garmin GTN750/GDL-88 with full ADS-B in/out capability. The Traffic Information Service (TIS)/ Flight Information Service (FIS) status flags both showed the system functioning with full capability. The weather page of the 750 showed TAFs/METARs/Winds etc and the Last Update status field said 'less than 5m'. I was using Seattle Avionics' FlyQ software on my iPad. It was updating via cellular modem but did not have a connection to a non-certificated ADS-B capability. VFR northbound on V25 [at] 8;500 feet enroute LTJ VOR then west through the Columbia George then north home to BFI. Clear flight conditions with lots of smoke at lower altitudes due to many forest fires. In contact with Seattle Center for flight following.'[Aircraft X]; Seattle Center; will you be going around or above the TFR North of Madras.''Center; what TFR; there's no TFR on my FIS-B.''[Aircraft X]; Center; yes there is a TFR. Please advise...'I opened my iPad and the TFR was on my FlyQ. Imagine my surprise. I went to the GTN750 map page and scanned around and other current TFRs were visible but not this one. I checked the FIS status and it was still 'less than 5 min.' Using the FlyQ moving map; I navigated around the TFR.Continuing northbound near LTJ the same thing happened with another TFR. It was present on my iPad but NOT on the Garmin; yet other TFRs were present on the Garmin. The FIS Last Update still said '< 5min'.I spoke with the local FSDO this morning and they couldn't explain it.

A pilot with sophisticated navigational equipment was surprised to be advised of a Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) by ATC. For unknown reasons; it was not depicted on his primary GPS/Multifunction display.


Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

While at cruise at FL410 we lost the right generator. I pulled out the QRH and began running the generator failure checklist. When we got the generator to reset; we had a CUR Limiter [current limiter] light and a Mach Trim light. We had initially declared an emergency but when we were able to reset the generator; we requested a diversion to a nearby airport for a precautionary landing. Approximately 40 miles out we received an ELEC amber message. At that point we were on Battery power and declared an emergency. When we landed; the right engine was turned off first and we had power. When the left was shut down; we lost all ship's power.

A Learjet crew diverted to a nearby airport utilizing battery power only when they suffered an otherwise complete loss of electrical power.


Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

There was a rapidly closing gap between two large areas of precipitation on the east and west sides of my sector. Aircraft X called and asked for 35;000 FT. I told Aircraft X that there was traffic off the left wing and to their 12 o'clock; both deviating through the same weather that Aircraft X was in. Aircraft X reiterated that they needed lower and I called traffic on the 737 at their 12 o'clock; asking them to wait two minutes. They then said that they had to descend now; and I told them that I could not authorize a descent. Aircraft X then descended to 35;000 FT; and Conflict Alert went off. I asked Aircraft X if they were declaring an emergency; and they said yes. I asked them if they could hold at 35;000 FT; because I didn't know why they were descending and there was additional traffic ahead at 27;000 FT. I then handed off Aircraft X and switched them to the Wilmington-35 controller's frequency. The pilot made a decision based on factors that they didn't share with me; and I told them repeatedly that I could not authorize their descent.

ZDC Controller described a loss of separation event when traffic descended without clearance during multiple weather deviations.


Service; Boarding; Safety Related Duties

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload; Physiological - Other

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Passenger refused to comply with mask policy. Flight attendants requested compliance numerous occasions by making announcements and directly communicating with the passenger. The customer continued to ignore flight attendant requests. I personally asked for compliance and so did the other FA working the aft cabin. The passenger was angry with the flight attendants and stated we singled him out. This is a setup for failure and flight attendants are going to get hurt as a result. The mask policy needs to be reassessed and other policies need to be implemented to protect the flight attendants from situations like this one. At one point the passenger was fast asleep with the mask off. The passenger was outwardly defiant and had no intentions of complying with anything we asked. I am not here to be mask police we are safety professionals. The company has to come up with a better policy to protect us. This is creating a hostile work environment because I am fearful that the passenger could retaliate with physical violence. This was a horrible experience.

Captain reported a passenger was non-compliant about wearing a mask.