Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 2300; Flight Crew Type 35

Training / Qualification; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure

The plate profile is confusing as it appears to direct a descent when established to cross the VOR at or above 1;300 feet and the plan view conflicts or is easily misread. The Controller [stated this] is a common mistake on this [VOR Runway 10] approach. The Controller indicated that this issue has been reported on numerous occasions.

Pilot reported a confusing depiction of a crossing restriction on the VOR Runway 10 approach plate for CLL airport.


Environment - Non Weather Related; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

TOWER BLINDS AND TOWER PESTS: The blinds in the Tower are inadequate! They do not properly block the strong rays of the sun; especially at sunrise and sunset. Flies get caught in between the blinds and the window pane and struggle relentlessly causing a symphony of very distracting and high pitches buzzing. If it were just a few flies; the noise would be bearable. But it's not. It's hundreds; and I know this because I (and some of my co-workers) take out the time when there is no traffic to vacuum the sills; stairs; floors and other horizontal surfaces their little bodies land on in our Tower. Additionally; on one day my Supervisor came in early; just to scrape flies off of our pitiful blinds. And then he graciously vacuumed them up. After he left; I sprayed the remaining flies with bug killer. Our pest problem has been addressed multiple times since I have been here at this facility. Fly paper doesn't work effectively anymore. Our Tower has been 'bug bombed'; the ceiling has been filled in with foam at least twice. But the problem is the structure! Our roof needs to be redone. We need new blinds. Why do some of [us] have to wear sunglasses in our Tower with closed blinds?  We shouldn't. We shouldn't have to chase and kill bugs. No one in the regional offices has to deal with these situations!  Why should ATC; the bread your butter supports have to deal with this too? New roof and new blinds for the Tower.

GSP Controller voiced concern regarding the tower blinds; claiming they are inadequate and also indicted the fly problem is distracting and needs to remedied.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

I was flying; at 3;000 FT on vectors for the RNAV (GPS) with a Circle to Land. After turning on to a heading of 130 degrees I selected VNAV/LNAV (before I was actually cleared for the approach). The autopilot initiated a turn to intercept the final course and by the time I realized it the jet had turned approximately 10 degrees to the right. When I did realize it I attempted to turn the airplane back to a heading of 130 degrees; at which time VNAV/LNAV dropped off. Concurrently I was cleared for the approach and while trying to re-engage LNAV/VNAV I overshot final. The Controller cancelled my approach clearance and I was given a heading and climb to 3;000 FT. Also at this time a windshear report of + 25 KTS was reported and the controllers informed all airborne of an approach change to the ILS. We were told that before any of us could shoot the ILS airspace would have to be released! We were told this would take an additional 10-15 minutes. Fuel on Board was 4;900 LBS and I elected to divert. ATC immediately did start vectoring me; however with the weather and traffic the controllers were quite busy and I felt that being in the normal lineup was not compatible with my fuel state. With my eye on the fuel I elected to declare an emergency to expedite and receive priority. What was pointed out to me after the fact that my use of the terminology 'Emergency Fuel' might have led to confusion on the part of the controllers. I was given the RNAV approach. I was again on a 90 degrees leg to final; but had not received an intercept heading to the final approach course. As we came within a half mile of the approach course I again reminded ATC that we were emergency fuel. After crossing the final and at 2;900 LBS of fuel; without an approach clearance; I initiated a right turn back to final and a descent and commenced the approach procedure. ATC had to move some traffic 3 miles in front and 500 FT below us. We continued the approach to landing and touched down with 2;500 LBS of fuel on board. We taxied to a gate and after deplaning all passengers (passenger service decision) and flight attendants (self initiated) we fueled and ferried the airplane. In the heat of the moment I used somewhat vague terminology. I was reminded that the two terms applicable for my situation were either 'Minimum Fuel' or 'Emergency.' Somewhere in between probably added to the confusion. I also talked to a TRACON Supervisor the next day about my incident. What he did explain to me is that the corporate knowledge amongst controllers was probably being thinned out (my words not his) due to the relatively new hires. He said that at his experience level of 30+ years when he hears anything containing the word 'Fuel' he's going to start asking questions of the cockpit! On the other side of the coin a controller at 6 years probably does not have the institutional knowledge and it might not invoke the same level of attention. He also said if in doubt plain spoken descriptions probably would have raised the flag sooner and higher! He actually pulled the tapes and listened to them. He was going to have the Controller at the scope that night and the Supervisor review them as a sort of training session for my situation. I was grateful to be able to speak with this TRACON Supervisor!

Flight was scheduled to ZZZ. But after an aborted approach and subsequent runway change at ZZZ; we didn't have enough fuel to wait out the runway change; so we diverted. Enroute; the Captain declared emergency fuel with Approach. Approach told us they were vectoring us for the RNAV (GPS); and then vectored us thru final. We queried Approach and told them again we were emergency fuel. They told us to turn right and intercept the LOC. We told them we were expecting right runway. Approach gave us a new heading to intercept the final for RNAV to the right and told us to maintain 3;000 FT. Approaching the final course between ZZZZZ and ZZZZZ1 still at 3;000 FT; we asked for lower. Approach said they were unable due traffic to parallel runway. The Captain said we needed lower and then exercised his Captains Emergency Authority to begin descent before being cleared for the approach or being cleared lower. At about 2;400 FT Approach cleared us for the RNAV 22R approach. No TA/RA occurred and the remainder of the approach was uneventful.

B737-800 flight crew reports the Captain's (pilot flying) early selection of LNAV/VNAV during vectors for an RNAV approach; resulting in a track deviation and ultimately a missed approach. Holding instructions are issued while the landing runway is changed and the crew elects to divert to a near by alternate. Emergency fuel is declared and the flight ends up landing with 2;500 LBS of fuel. When ATC is slow to clear the flight for the approach due to traffic on a parallel runway the Captain initiates the approach on his own; reminding ATC of his emergency status.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 236.03; Flight Crew Total 12997.73; Flight Crew Type 3880.58

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Briefed relief crew (shift change) that we received Oceanic CPDLC [Controller-pilot data link communication] to cross ZZZZZ at FL360. [ATC] would not let us climb to FL360 to comply with Oceanic. Sent message to Oceanic and they said no worries; that they would climb us after ZZZZZ. I left cockpit to go on break; upon returning from break; First Officers told me that they received a CPDLC message to climb to FL360 but called Oceanic to confirm and they said to maintain FL320. First Officers then contacted Oceanic because he was the one generating the CPDLC messages and he said to maintain FL320.

B-777 Captain reported clearance error between CPDLC Data Link Clearance and sector ATC clearance during Oceanic crossing.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

We had a death on our flight. The coach galley was secured for landing. The passenger was secured on the back galley floor. FA's B; C; and D positioned themselves to be safe and secure and continued CPR until we landed and the paramedics arrived. Medlink was contacted. It was a death that required performing CPR until we landed and the paramedics met the flight. No errors.

Flight Attendant experienced a passenger heart attack in flight which required three other flight attendants to preform CPR through landing and taxi to the gate.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors

A Mooney Allegro was cleared to land on Runway 29R. I observed the aircraft on about a 3/4 mile final and checked to see that the gear was down. I looked down to observe my wind instruments and gave the pilot a wind check; then scanned my strip bay and R-ACD. When I looked at the final again I couldn't find the Allegro in the ground clutter that is a visual background for that final from the point of view of the Tower. I expected the aircraft to be on very short final approaching the runway threshold; but I couldn't find it there. Then I realized that the aircraft was rolling out on Taxiway A. I couldn't tell whether he landed and exited the runway very early; or landed on the taxiway. There were no other aircraft or vehicles moving on the airfield at the time so no one would have been endangered if he had landed on Taxiway A. I chose not to say anything and see if the pilot said something about the landing but he didn't. In retrospect I think it would have been better to question the pilot even if I risked offending him; just in case he had landed on the taxiway. Then we would have had the opportunity to educate him on paying closer attention to the movement area markings on final. I don't have any recommendations but the view of the final for Runway 29R from our new Tower has been an ongoing issue for all of us.

Tower Controller described a possible taxiway landing event listing the visibility form the new Tower as problematic.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Climbing out of LAX on the FIXIT 2 RNAV Departure we were instructed to comply with the restrictions on the SID and contact ZLA. The restriction at FIXIT is to cross above 12;000 FT and speed not to exceed 290 KTS. Upon reaching MUELR; ZLA assigned us a heading. Our speed at this time was 290 KTS approximately 7.1 miles from FIXIT; and complying with the restrictions. Center asked us our speed and told us we were supposed to be at 250 KTS. I brought it to his attention that SOCAL instructed us to comply with the restrictions on the departure. The flight proceeded without any further incident.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

While departing LAX on the FIXIT 2 RNAV; SOCAL Departure cleared a CRJ900 to contact ZLA and comply with restrictions; which included 290 KTS. Switching to ZLA; they were asked their speed and told to slow to 250 KTS; a previous restriction.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

The Captain and I were getting ready to push on leg 4/4; [out of SJC]; on what had become a pretty long day. The pushback crew was trying to establish communication; the Ops Agent had just given us our [information] sheet which said we had like 25 minutes left to get airborne without a waiver. We had started our first two legs each with mechanical delays; and now were roughly 2.5 hours behind schedule. I tried to get the latest ATIS for push and that's when I realized that people on Tower frequency were making CTAF calls. We were unable to get digital ATIS and had to tune it on the radio. The weather was VFR; 10 SM and clear skies. This made me scratch my head a bit as I hadn't expected the tower to close; although it was [late at night] local time so it was late enough. There were no specific instructions regarding a closed tower in the Dispatch Release and nothing in our CPDLC which I had gotten 15 minutes earlier while the tower was still open. It then occurred to me that maybe there was some info on the airport pages regarding CTAF operations. The only reference at all was regarding the curfew - all jet operations prohibited during curfew hours of [early morning period]. Delayed scheduled air carrier flights and alternate/emergency operations excluded from restrictions. That's when the Captain asserted that since we had our CPDLC clearance and departure frequency we should be good to takeoff and talk to departure. At this point I feel like fatigue was really hampering my decision making ability; because I had a little acorn of doubt in the back of my head that we needed to clarify what exactly we needed to do; but instead of discussing my doubt I just rationalized the Captain's reasoning as good enough and went with it. So we pushed back and I made CTAF calls that we were taxiing to the runway. Initially there was a regional aircraft landing; then a helicopter; and then it was quiet. We approached the hold short and we could see an aircraft on final which our TCAS showed at 5 NM. The Captain said he was going to keep it rolling and I made our final CTAF call announcing our departure saying that we were making a right turnout; but I flubbed the name of the departure. It was my leg so he gave me the aircraft and we took off uneventfully. We got the gear up; accelerated; and then at 1500 feet he gave Departure a call. Initially the Controller asked us to squawk identification and then I heard some excitement in his voice when he came back. I can't remember the exact verbiage but something to the extent of 'Aircraft X; you can't just take off into controlled airspace without a clearance...' That's when my heart sank. I kept flying the SID but I was mad at myself because I knew I had that nugget of doubt and I could have asserted myself to avoid this situation. As we checked out of NorCal's airspace the Controller gave us a phone number to call for a potential Pilot Deviation. Looking back at this situation; after having gotten some sleep; I saw a couple of factors that I believe played a role in this occurrence. First; taking off with a closed tower is something I have never done at Company. I've done it at previous jobs; but I always took off VFR and remained VFR; or got my IFR while airborne in VMC; but never from an airport with an overlying Class B airspace. At Company I have landed with a closed tower; but there were specific instructions outlined in the SIP for that airport which made it clear what we needed to do. In our situation; because of the delay; we found ourselves working late at night at an airport where we don't usually fly that late; and no amplifying instructions. I don't know why it didn't dawn on me to address with the Captain the fact that I'd never done this before at Company.Second; we had received our CPDLC while the tower was still open but nowhere along the way did we realize; or did anybody (Dispatch; Clearance; Tower; etc.) tell us; that the tower would be closed upon departure.I actually had to call Tower and ask them to resend my CPDLC because it dropped out of our box. He said ok; and did so; but didn't mention he would be closing soon. I'm in no way trying to shift any blame; but it seems that somebody could have given us a heads up. Who knows; maybe tower did try to call? I wasn't actively monitoring them on the speaker so I don't know if they did. Third; as I mentioned before; I was tired and that impacted my ability to scrutinize this situation. We had been on duty for roughly 10 hours at this point. I was up early with my family and was running on fumes at this point in the night. As we were arriving into SJC the Captain and I were discussing our fatigue level; but neither of us said that we were unfit to continue. Maybe a bit of 'get-there-itis' paired with 'we can make this happen.' I've read all the stats that are put out about fatigue; and I know they're true; but honestly I've just not had all that many situations where the effects of fatigue have caused something like this to happen to me. It's pretty eye opening and I feel like we really should have talked more about it as a crew.Fourth; I should have been more familiar with information available to me from Company publications. After the fact I have since gone back and found where this situation is discussed in the FOM. I had never read it before. While it does state clearly that we needed to get a clearance time/void time; we didn't necessarily fit the exact parameters of either paragraph regarding closed tower operations; and the airport pages had no amplifying information; but; it is something that I could have been more familiar with. Additionally; although what we did was not directly in line with the FOM; I'm still not exactly sure if/how it was illegal. As far as I know we took off from Class E airspace in VMC and contacted ATC at 1;500 feet; never entering any controlled airspace. Lastly; and I've already fessed up to this; but I should have spoken up; plain and simple. There was that little bit of doubt in the back of my brain that said something wasn't quite right here but I chose to bury it and press. Being more assertive and a better communicator could have easily stopped this bit of Swiss cheese from aligning and allowing the outcome. A call to Dispatch or to NorCal would have been easy enough; and free; and I wouldn't have to spend all this time discussing my day.

Arriving SJC was uneventful. Prior to departing SJC; the First Officer called ATC to resend our pre-departure clearance as we did not receive it via CPDLC. They resent and we received it immediately. Very soon thereafter listening to the Tower frequency at push time we realized the Tower was now closed as we were hearing traffic advisories from GA aircraft in the pattern and on the airport at SJC. For us; the Crew; it was the middle of the night. We were 11.5 hours into our duty day with one more leg to fly. Any more delays and we were encroaching on duty limits. I had searched the SJC SIP and there were no references to the Tower closing. There is a curfew mentioned from 2330-0630 local time for aircraft operations with an exclusion for delayed air carrier flights. Finding no references for departing when the Tower was closed it was my intention to depart VMC and obtain our clearance with NorCal on departure. We made Traffic Advisories for our pushback; taxi; and takeoff. As PM I contacted NorCal at 1500 feet. He was not happy to say the least. He said we could not depart without a Release. I mentioned the Tower was closed. Again it was my intention to depart VMC and obtain our clearance with NorCal on departure. He was still obviously not satisfied with this.Handing us off to OAK Center; he gave me a phone number to call for 'possible Pilot Deviation.' I called the number when I got to my hotel room. The person on the other end stated the same that we needed a Release before departure. He took my name; Pilot Certificate number; phone number; and home address. I used to do this previously at another air carrier quite frequently with no issues whatsoever. And yes it was many years ago. Once you dig it up; in our FOM states that yes we do need to get an IFR clearance (to include VOID time) from FSS; Departure Control; or En Route Center via telephone or radio. The very next paragraph same page; Departing VFR states that yes we can depart VFR provided we have VMC; maintain VMC on departure; and obtain clearance as soon as practical but no farther than 50 NM from departure airport. After sifting through the FOM in the quietness of my room I realize I should have obtained a void time through SFO Radio or other means. Clearly; in the heat of the battle; it was not so clear. The paragraph I could recall is the one that allows departure in VMC conditions and obtaining clearance with Departure Control. I would like to conclude this with my observations and suggestions. (Next paragraph-Preventative Measures) Please do not take this as finger pointing or deferring blame/fault in any way at any level. The blame /fault rests entirely with (ME) the Captain's Responsibilities.

B737 flight crew reported departing SJC after the tower had closed; but without a release form NorCal TRACON.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

We experienced an air quality [issue] in-flight. Odor detected on our flight. Smelled like oil; a smell like WD 40 detected in aft galley area and also detected throughout the cabin.

Flight Attendant reported a fume event during flight throughout the passenger cabin.


When getting the paperwork I had read the Ops alert pertaining to the possibility of receiving a 'TOO LOW TERRAIN' when landing 35R. We descended into CYYC via the EBGAL 3 arrival landing runway 35R. Traffic was departing 35L. The latest weather had clear skies and visibility of 40 SM. I had seen the airport when we were more than 25+ miles away. We had done the approach descent checklist previously and had completed the approach checklist properly. The Captain had identified the localizer for 35R and I verified it myself. We were cleared for the approach. I started the approach with autopilot on; after being established on the localizer and descending towards the runway; approach handed us over to Tower. I always check to make sure the localizer and the magenta line match up; they did match up correctly on 35R. Captain checked in with Tower and they cleared us to land 35R. Tower reported winds at 260/20G25. After turning the autopilot off; I was hand flying a stabilized approach. It seems at approximately 75 feet AGL; we received a 'TOO LOW TERRAIN' EGPWS ALERT. The ops alert was the first thing that I thought of. I continued the approach to a safe landing on 35R. I continued the approach to landing because I could positively identify our location; verify there were no obstacle or terrain hazards; and was certain we were in the correct landing configuration (We had done the before landing checklist at the appropriate time). 1. The visibility was unlimited and I saw the airport many miles out.2. I have flown into CYYC several times and was 100 percent certain that we were lined up with 35R. I could see 35L. 3. I intercepted the localizer with LNAV. 4. I checked to make sure the localizer was centered on the aircraft; which it was. I verified our heading was correct for the landing runway. 5. We had completed the approach checklist and identified the localizer for 35R.

B737 FO on an ILS approach to RWY 35R at CYYC reported ignoring a GPWS terrain alert because the runway was in sight and an Ops bulletin warned of possible false GPWS warnings on that approach.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

On Date I was assigned a routine task card for Aircraft X task card which [to] INSPECT ALL LEADING EDGE PANELS FOR SECURITY.  I inspected all wing leading edge panels for loose and missing fasteners; and replaced 6 standard screws found in right hand leading edge panels; 2 fasteners [type 1]; 1 fastener; [type 2] 3 fasteners. All on the right hand wing. Left hand wing leading edge panels all fasteners were secure. I installed IAW SRM XX-XX-XX (Fastener installation in Composite structure - Installation references general Data.I received a phone call from Company compliance stating I did not comply with the paperwork correctly with an incorrect sign off. During the phone call [they] stated ZZZ failed to perform a bonding check on the wings leading edges. After review I have determined that I complied with the task card as stated correctly and that Maintenance Control put the wrong information they wanted to achieve on the write up. There was absolutely nothing on the task card stating a reference to use or perform a bonding check as their issue.Maintenance Control could be more clear on the actual work needed to be performed.

Technician reported that during scheduled maintenance; he replaced numerous fasteners on the right-hand wing leading edge access panels and was asked about compliance issues.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

I was Pilot Flying for a normal departure from ZZZ. Takeoff was normal; but just after the Pilot Monitoring called acceleration altitude we received the EICAS: BAGGAGE DOOR OPEN. We finished the climb flow; contacted ATC for delay vectors; and then I took over the radios as the Pilot Monitoring began the QRH. As we accomplished the QRH we noted the cabin altitude was climbing rapidly and determined we would return to ZZZ. We accomplished our remaining checklists and set up for an uneventful approach and landing. After we returned to the gate one of the ramp crew informed us he had seen that the baggage door 'didn't look right' and he had cycled the latch and closed the door again. We called Maintenance who found no defects. When Maintenance was finished; we continued our flight uneventfully. It may be beneficial to train ramp crews not to touch or interfere with a door until instructed in a return to gate or return to field scenario. After talking with Maintenance we both agreed it would have been much easier to determine the cause if Maintenance would have been able to see the door before it was cycled.

Air Carrier Captain flying EMB-XRJ aircraft reported Baggage Door Open inflight.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On a day; VFR approach to RNO just to the north of waypoint URATE as depicted on the RNAV (RNP) Y to 16L; EGPWS alerted 'Caution; obstacle.'  The FO as pilot flying altered his flight path; yet we then received 'Obstacle; pull-up!' which the FO did.  Both the hill and obstacle at 5;101 feet MSL were in sight the entire time.  We then continued for a normal uneventful landing.  Enroute; we had discussed extensively the challenges of RNO; including terrain; single runway; engine failure considerations; and higher than typical descent rates and true airspeeds; and were comfortable with our position and closure rate with the hill and tower.Cause - EGWPS will alert for terrain or obstacles for either proximity or closure rate sooner than I expected.  By being carefully studied on the terrain and obstacles in the vicinity of RNO prior to arrival; we were well aware of the tower and hill located at the location of the EGPWS alert.Suggestions - Give a wider avoidance to high terrain or obstacles both horizontally; vertically; and with respect to closure rate.

Cleared visual approach 16L RNO. Turned to intercept extended final near FAP WORTH. Had briefed and set up for RNAV (RNP) Y 16L and using it as backup to visual. Dialed in 6;400 and began descent to FAP altitude turning base to final. EGPWS alerted 'Caution; Obstacle'. As PF I verified obstacle in site and continued turn to final away from it. Soon after alert 'Obstacle; Pull up' occurred. I disconnected the AP and initiated a climbing turn away from obstacle that we had kept in site the entire time. Alert ceased very quickly and we continued an uneventful and stable approach and landing. Approach briefing had included a good discussion on RNO hazards including single runway operations; EO considerations; mountainous terrain; high descent rates and TAS. We knew where the obstacle/ hill was on the approach and felt comfortable with our position relative to it on the visual approach.Cause - The preceding aircraft was denied the instrument approach. Visuals in mountainous terrain create unique challenges. Being cleared to follow proceeding aircraft and maintain spacing may have also caused a more square pattern than desired which brought us closer to the obstacle.Suggestions - Maintain the practice of following IAP ground track even on a visual approach if not intimately familiar with the terrain. Also; be cognizant of how EGPWS tracks descent and closure rate. The warnings certainly came quicker than we expected. I would give high terrain an even wider berth.

Air carrier flight crew reported a CFTT event while on the RNAV (RNP) Y RWY 16L approach to RNO airport.


Clearance issued by Ground Control after pushback from Gate was 'Taxi south on G; hold short of J1 for flow to ZZZ.' After a long inspection of the TPA 10-9 Page it became apparent that it is labeled erroneously. The 10-9 has the inner taxiway on the ramp labeled as A. All the signage on the airport and ATC have it as Taxiway G.

Air carrier Captain reported the TPA airport inner part of Taxiway G on the ramp is mislabeled as Taxiway A on the 10-9 page.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Inspection; Testing; Installation; Work Cards

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

I was the Lead Mechanic of the gearbox change at ZZZ on an MD-80 aircraft #2 engine. On a final inspection; the Inspector and I missed an oil line that was not safetied; or the bolts were not installed. The engine run-up and leak check was good. The aircraft flew for nine flights before the line leaked oil. We drove our shop truck to and from ZZZ. It's approximately a six-hour drive each way.

During [engine] gearbox installation; Mechanic A [(there were four mechanics total)] did not install the bolts to the oil return line to the gearbox. I suggested to him; not to forget to install the bolts and continued with the installation of the fuel pump and Controller. Mechanic A did not install the bolts; nor did he advise any of the other mechanics or Lead Mechanic that he left these bolts out. The leak check on [engine] run-up was OK; no leaks were apparent. Lead Mechanic and Inspectors [approved] the engine gearbox [change]; no leaks were found.

A Lead Mechanic and two other mechanics report on their involvement with a N2 gearbox change and oil return line installation on a Pratt-Whitney JT8D engine at the #2 engine position. The MD-80 aircraft flew nine flights before the return line leaked oil.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 500; Flight Crew Type 200

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

I was cleared to taxi from the north to Runway 25 at Taxiway W (full length) via Taxiway D; and to hold short of Runway 25. I was new to this airport and the clearance across a runway to the taxiway on the other side was new for me; but I figured it out. As I approached Runway 25; the hold short markers on the ground were very faded and I did not see them; but I should have noted the above ground markers on the side of the taxiway. I thought for a minute that Runway 25 that I was approaching was actually a taxiway because I did not see the painted hold short line. However; I stopped short of Runway 25 when I noticed the Runway 25-7 marker; but I was past the hold short line. I called Ground and he told me I had passed the hold short line; and then cleared me across Runway 25 and on my way. It was a combination of an unfamiliar airport; unusual (to me) taxi clearance; and faded hold short marks on the taxiway. I did not enter Runway 25 but I did pass the hold short line. There was no near miss with any other aircraft; and none were on or near the runway. I need to be sure of the taxi instructions especially at an unfamiliar airport. It would help to have the hold short lines repainted; but I should have seen the signs by the side of the taxiway. I think it's just that I'm used to seeing both; and when one is not present or evident; I don't look for the other.

A transient pilot was cleared to LZU Runway 25 via Taxiway D; hold short at W; but because of faded hold short lines he taxied beyond the hold line.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Aircraft X was looking for a visual approach into ZZZ. The aircraft started descending on his own without a clearance. I issued a terrain alert and instructed the Pilot to climb back to a safe altitude. I notified the CIC (Controller in Charge) but they did not instruct me to issue a brasher. A low altitude alert warning should have to be manually disabled. I don't think it alerted because the aircraft was nearing his destination airport.

A Center Controller reported an aircraft descended from its assigned altitude and flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude. The Controller reported the Minimum Safe Altitude Warning did not activate.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Aircraft X was flying level at 9000 ft. and I got an MIA [Minimum IFR Altitude] alert so I told the aircraft to climb to 10000 ft. to clear the MIA. I radioed him again right after to inform him I needed to vector him for some military airspace. He started to question it so I told him he would need a vector or he would need to be VFR and enter a military training complex at his own risk. I noticed that through this he was not climbing. I told him that I needed him to climb right now and that I would also need to vector him. He started to climb but had already entered the MIA box of 9300 ft. The pilot sounded as if to be a foreigner and did not take the appropriate action as directed. He was confused and his delayed response is the reason for the loss of separation. I also should have caught the MIA situation sooner.Pilot needs to take action when given a clearance.

Denver Center Controller reported observing an aircraft that received a Minimum IFR Altitude alert and climbed the aircraft but pilot was slow to respond.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 1.0; Flight Crew Type 500

We were training at the practice area that is class G with no transponder. Aircraft Y (Air Carrier) was coming in to final approach. We had traffic in sight and was watching them on our GPS; and also listing to Guam center. But Guam center did not have us on radar nor Aircraft Y had us in sight. I knew that Aircraft Y was descending; I decide to climb to avoid traffic. As we did that we came directly align with each other giving us about 4;000 feet horizontal distance; getting too close to each causing a near miss. It was VFR; but there was also clouds here and there.Having no transponder; clouds being visible; and me the pilot deciding not contacting Guam center for traffic advisory where the practice area is near the ILS path was the contributing factors.I should have contacted center for traffic advisory to help me; but also other aircraft. I also should have descended because we can never out climb an air carrier. Also; I know that the Aircraft Y will never go below the final approach fix altitude.

GA Flight Instructor with student reported an NMAC with an air carrier aircraft while training in a practice area near GUM airport. The air carrier was on final approach to GUM. The conflict required evasive action.


Air Carrier X had an IFR flight plan. The aircraft filed a different route; when I sent the flight plan via the PDC the route between the pluses was not included in his flight plan. I should have not sent this flight plan. The incident occurred when Center Controller told the pilot to precede direct a fix that I should have issued to him; and he was not aware of the change to his routing. This happens a lot. When I worked under another Center they were responsible for making sure a flight plan could be sent. If the flight plan couldn't be sent; the Center would call and advise that the aircraft had to be issued a different routing. Our current Center does not have this requirement. Put the PDC on auto send and make the Center responsible for ensuring that the routing is what they want.

Tower Controller described a wrong PDC clearance issuance; noting that the controlling Center should be the final authority in determining the clearance route.


Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

We encountered an electrical problem [during our flight]. A normal approach and landing was made. There was no damage to the aircraft. I was the Captain.It was night. We were descending through approximately 15;000 ft. and were about 35 NM northwest of the airport; and in the middle of a turn to a new course; when the electrical problem occurred. We had been cleared down to 10;000 ft. The First Officer was flying when the autopilot and autothrottles kicked off; the First Officer's FMC turned off; and many unrelated things on the First Officer's side turned off. There were many; many EICAS messages. It was very confusing.There was no previous indication of potential electrical problems. We were not in a phase of flight; such as the approach; where any electrical switching would take place. The problem did not happen with the movement of any switch or button. It just happened out of the blue. There were no yaw or pitch motions; so there didn't appear to be an aerodynamic issue. All the Captain's screens and instruments appeared normal and I could see the FMC course on my left ND; so I took control of the airplane and finished the turn. At this point I was not thinking about the problem as much as keeping the airplane on course and on altitude. There was a cloud deck below us at around 12;500-13;000 ft. We quickly determined to get ATC into the picture; get permission to level off at 13;000 ft.; get radar vectors and work the problem. ATC helped us as requested; and there were no problems there. The First Officer was right in there with suggestions and with getting our situational awareness to a good level; both with the airplane status and with our flying status. He suggested starting the APU immediately; which we did.I flew while the First Officer worked through the QRH; since I had the only untarnished instrument setup. I slowed down; and our fuel state was ok. It took us a bit of conferencing to determine what the main problem was and what we should work first. We determined that the right AC was depowered; the right generator was tripped; and the right bus tie ISOL light was on. We worked that problem first.The QRH had us reset the right generator. That worked fine and the right generator remained on the line with no problems. That problem was fixed; the right AC bus was powered; and a whole bunch of EICAS messages went away. After a Recall/Review we only had the right bus tie ISOL light/EICAS illuminated and the both Utility buses were off.Next we went into getting the Utility buses reset. The right one didn't reset; so we stopped there. We were in a freighter. We had both main busses powered; got the autopilot and autothrottles back; and the right FMC. I elected to have us fly and land the aircraft in this configuration; and the First Officer concurred. I gave the aircraft back to the First Officer for him to make the landing. We redid the descent flow; and everything was working and set as before; except the autobrakes had to be reset to the 3 setting. The autobrakes held the 3 setting. A recheck of the MCP settings found that none had changed.The field was VFR under an overcast; so I saw no reason to go elsewhere. It was a long runway; and there was maintenance there. Vectors and approach were as normal; the approach MCP selection and switching were normal except we got a No Land 3 message; as expected. The autopilot and autothrottles were working normally. The autopilot and autothrottles were disconnected at 1-2 miles and a normal landing was made. The autobrakes; spoilers; and thrust reversers worked normally. On the ground afterward Maintenance said the problem had happened before with this airplane.

B767-300 Captain reported landing safely after experiencing loss of the right generator and consequently multiple electrical busses.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 8200; Flight Crew Type 900

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

While at cruise at FL360 on L451 approaching JAINS Intersection; we encountered a line of thunderstorms approximately 150 miles long. Requested and obtained clearance from New York Oceanic to deviate up to 80 miles. We were unable to get through the line of thunderstorms at 80 miles and we were unable to contact New York Oceanic in order to obtain clearance to deviate further. We followed FOM procedures including transmitting in the blind and continued to 110 miles off course before we were able to get across the line. Finally we were able to receive clearance to proceed direct to the following way point.

An Air Carrier received ZWY clearance for an 80 NM weather deviation on L451; but needed 150 NM deviation; but unable to contact ZWY again they followed international track deviation procedures until clear of the weather.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Total 23700; Flight Crew Type 743

Confusion; Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 154; Flight Crew Total 14779; Flight Crew Type 2189

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Software and Automation; Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

On the ORCKA 5 Departure; after passing the 160 SMO radial and DOCKR below 3;000 feet. We were given heading of 030 and climb to 12;000 feet as prescribed by the SID (expect vectors). As we were climbing and turning he gave us direct 'KLIPR at or above 10;000; climb to 15;000.' I could not find KLIPR on the legs pages. I checked several downline pages; went back to page 1/9 and then checked the route page to verify the ORCKA 5. It was loaded but still no KLIPR. I told the controller it isn't apparently on our route. He spelled it out. I was moving too slow. He gave us 030 heading and told us to let us know when we are heading there. I though we were heading in the right direction but the intersection is now behind us. As I was jamming the box; perhaps KLIPR got eaten or dropped out as we passed it. It's location is right by DOCKR.  I can't figure out why it wasn't there initially as we turned. We were going through 10;000 feet easily so he then gave us direct KEGGS and to go to next frequency. The next controller gave us direct NNAVY.  Altitudes were no issue; if anything our climb rate was quicker than my cumbersome effort towards KLIPR. What could we have done better. I had expectation bias from the old Loop departure. If I remember after DOCKR you loop back to LAX at or above 10;000 feet. With this departure giving an initial vector and our climb rate much better than my 737 experience.  I was looking for KLIPR to be farther down the road than between LAX and DOCKR. I still don't know why I didn't see it because I was looking at the' top of the flight plan' legs page. I was just too slow for the expectation of the controller so he vectored us on down the line. Although I haven't been to LAX in two years I am comfortable there and fell behind unexpectedly during this event. Errors were automation Management; FMC / CDU and similarly spelled waypoints.

The following narrative describes events that occurred over a very short period of time; perhaps only a few minutes in total. It is my sincere intention not to cast blame; but to offer an explanation for what happened from my biased point of view as the PF (Pilot Flying) on Aircraft X. Our flight began normally from LAX; with the exception that we were pushing back about 45 minutes late due our aircraft's late arrival into Gate 77. Preflight duties were performed fairly routine; but under some time pressure to complete everything thoroughly but as quickly as we could in an attempt to make up some of our delay. This time pressure was self-induced; as no other employee was pushing us for an on time arrival in ZZZ. Red flag #1. During the pre-departure cockpit preparations; we received notice that the passenger boarding was complete; followed shortly by ramp informing us that they were ready for the parking brake release and pushback. At this point I gave a cursory PF brief from the briefing card we all carry - too cursory. Red flag #2. Taxi and takeoff were normal from Runway 25R on the ORCKA5 Departure. I was manually flying; enjoying only my second flight as PF in over a month. We switched from Tower frequency over to SOCAL Departure; and shortly after checking in we received instructions to continue climb I believe to 5;000 feet and turn left to a heading of 030 degrees. Quickly after that we were given further climb to 12;000 and direct to KLIPR.  At this point things went wrong; rapidly. The Captain; as PM (Pilot Monitoring); couldn't find the KLIPR intersection on the legs page; and informed ATC that it did not appear to be on our departure. SOCAL spelled out the intersection phonetically; and then I think confirmed that we were on the ORCKA5. Things were happening fast. While hand-flying; in the turning climb; I tried to locate (unsuccessfully) KLIPR on the 10-3 page displayed on the iPad. Red flag #3.At this point; I should have turned on the autopilot to assist with the FMC and MCP inputs; as I could detect the stress and frustration in the Captain's voice in being unable to find KLIPR on the legs page; or on the departure plan view. Red flag #4. In my divided attention between flying the aircraft and searching for KLIPR on my iPad; I failed to find it as well. I was looking too far down the flight segment to see that the this waypoint is located right off the departure end of the 25s at LAX. This was the key moment; I think; and the last opportunity to correct the error. All I needed to do was put on the AP (autopilot); join the Captain and assist with the repair. But I did not; at least not immediately. The Captain inserted KLIPR on the legs page; got my confirmation; and executed the entry. When I had looked at the route modification; I thought it was correct. The waypoint showed in the correct direction (I thought) but much further down line than it should have; off the scale of my selected range on the navigation display. Red flag #5. Passing around 10;000 feet I engaged the autopilot at the Captain's urging to finally get back in the cockpit as a crew and together correct the problem. I engaged LNAV; but we were not turning fast enough for ATC and the controller gave us a new heading of 010.  I'd like to add at this point that our controller was patient; helpful and professional throughout our fiasco. The only way he could have helped us more is if he teleported into the cockpit and handed us our crew meals. Somewhere in the fray I had suggested that we reload the departure and that would bring KLIPR up; and now the legs page had a discontinuity and we had lost the LAS transition. Also we were given further climb; and now the KEGGS intersection to get us back on the departure. It was at this point I saw we had not been heading to KLIPR at all; but to 'CLIPR'! How did I miss that?! I had set up that problem by not giving proper confirmation of the legs page entry; having not used proper procedures (see Red flag #5). Further climb; and now direct to NNAVY were issued; but we first had to reload the lost LAS transition. After that was competently accomplished; our 'helmet fire' was apparently extinguished; and we were switched to the next Departure Controller. He gave us direct Las Vegas; and kindly spelled 'LAS' in the clearance for the lost crew.What followed was probably a good 2 hours of discussion and self-examination of what went wrong and why. I believe that two primary factors set us up for these errors. The first was my too-brief departure review. This was the first time the Captain had been on this departure; and only my second. Although we both verified the FMC route and legs page; and had confirmed the proper altitudes; we were not familiar with all the new (to us) waypoints; such as KLIPR. A more thorough review on the ground was paramount; and I failed to do it. The second was my desire to manually fly the aircraft during what rapidly became a complex departure. At the first sign of things getting too busy; it became mandatory for me to engage the autopilot; and thereby engage my brain in helping eliminate the threat. I failed in that regard. Adding mistakes such as 'CLIPR' vs. 'KLIPR'; was due to my attention being more in the HUD than on performing proper FMC verification procedures. That was entirely on me. I still have no explanation for why KLIPR was not on the legs page. I had displayed on my CDU the Takeoff Ref page; and did not give due diligence to the ND or the legs page on the Captain's side. What I saw was '_ _ IPR'; and a magenta line in the direction I wanted to go. Not good enough!  Additionally; in my attempt to find KLIPR on the Jepps I zoomed in and slid the page right-to-left; taking the desired waypoint right out of sight. Using the autopilot undoubtedly would have enabled me to do this search more thoroughly. We had only seconds; it seemed; to prevent this entire undesired event.

Air Carrier pilots reported they could not program the SID correctly and flew off course. The reporters referenced a fix with the same name but starts with a different letter exists in the NAS.


Flight Attendant Airline Total 2; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 7; Flight Attendant Total 2

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

After push back during the safety demo. A passenger rang a call light in the last row. Flight attendants paused the safety demonstration and I went to see about the passenger. A woman sitting grabbing her bags stood up and said she needs to get up. I asked what her issue was and she just repeated herself then asked to get off the flight. I informed the other flight attendants and we contacted the captain. The plane went back to the gate to have the woman deplane. She retrieved her bags and began making her way to the back galley. I directed her back to the front where she walked off and the captain stopped her to ask questions. He asked for her boarding pass and where she was coming from; if she had checked bags etc and she was hesitating to answer. We looked up her information and found that she was traveling from Frankfurt and did have checked bags. The captain asked if we were comfortable keeping her bags on as it was a domestic flight and we declined. Her bags were unloaded before we departed again. This was the second instance of a situation like such in the same day. There seems to be a pattern with passengers asking to deplane at the very last minute with little to no explanation as of recent. Crew members were uncomfortable with their luggage remaining on board. I believe situations like this; airlines should be required to make sure all bags on board are accounted for when a passenger exits and also have checked bags removed whether international or domestic. I submitted a separate report for another situation like this on the same day; different flight.

Air carrier Flight Attendant reported that after push back a passenger requested to disembark the aircraft without claiming their luggage.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While cruising at 0.82 Mach at FL350 with an FMC calculated optimum altitude of FL370; aircraft experienced unforecasted severe turbulence with the autothrottles immediately becoming disconnected and the airspeed immediately accelerated to approximately 320 kts. 0.85 Mach (5 kts. over VMO Max speed). As Pilot Flying; I manually managed the throttles to avoid any further overspeeds and requested that Pilot Monitoring coordinate for a descent to FL330. This request was made and we received a 'Standby' message. [Two minutes later]; the airspeed fluctuations became more severe and the autopilot had trouble maintaining altitude. I then advised the Pilot Monitoring that I was initiating a descent to FL330 and to advise Gander that were doing so prior to receiving ATC clearance. The PM sent this message to Gander that were descending due to severe turbulence and as we were descending through FL33.5; Gander approved our previous request for descent to FL330.

The plane was in cruise at FL350; the aircraft entered abruptly into severe turbulence without warning. The auto-throttles disconnected and the airspeed accelerated into the barber pole (approximately 3-5 kts. overspeed) for approximately 2-3 seconds. Followed by an abrupt deceleration and continuous vibrations of the aircraft. Previous cruising airspeed was .82M. The PF (Pilot Flying) was manually controlling the throttles to the best of his abilities. We then asked for FL330 via CPDLC. The aircraft was becoming extremely hard to control at an appropriate airspeed and altitude. We received a Standby message. [Two minutes later]; the aircraft began to enter constant severe turbulence and the decision was made to descend immediately to FL330 for the safety of flight. I advised Gander Radio that the decent to FL330 had been initiated due to the severe turbulence. We received an approval to descend to FL300 at approximately FL350. No other deviations were noted. We called Gander Radio to issue a Pirep and contacted the Dispatcher or subsequent Pireps and reports.

MD-11 Flight Crew reported encountering severe turbulence which resulted in evasive action for safety of flight.


Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Shortly after coasting in; approximately 1 hour and 20 minutes before estimated time of arrival; a message was received from flight control to increase speed if able due to advancing weather front that was potentially going to arrive at SDF near our estimated time of arrival. We were already advancing our airspeed to the maximum allowable based upon altitude and conditions and informed flight control that we would be unable to increase much more than our current speed. Just prior to the handoff from Indy Center to Lexington Approach Control; we asked ATC if we would be able to coordinate with Lexington a parallel track heading that would allow us to parallel the incoming front and proceed northeasterly so as to comply with flight controls request that we alter course towards Cincinnati and then look for a way to penetrate the weather from the Northeast side; working our way north and west and approaching Louisville from the back side of the front.We coordinated appropriate vectors for that plan of action; however as we drew closer to the Louisville terminal area; ATC opened runway 29 for arrivals and was vectoring traffic for Rwy 29 RNAV approaches. ATC asked us if we wanted to do likewise and given our earlier coordination with flight control to work northeasterly as previously stated we originally said no. However; upon further study and looking at the weather approaching slower than expected to the terminal area we made the determination that one approach might be possible if we commenced it immediately. A clearance was received to prepare for the RNAV Rwy 29 approach with vectors immediately to the initial approach fix. Listening to arrival traffic; we were particularly interested in the intensity of the weather arriving in Louisville; and what if any potential existed for windshear or heavy rain. We received no windshear advisories during the initial approach segment; however once established on final and inbound descending to the minimum prof altitude; we did receive a confusing statement from Louisville tower that quote: 'aircraft ahead reports 30 knot gain of airspeed on the ground'. We believed this to be in error and that what they were trying to inform us was a 30 knot increasing headwind on short final. The Captain and I both reiterated the need to be aware of potential for windshear on this approach and even coordinated early with ATC that in the need of a missed approach; we would like to fly a heading of 220 and 5000 feet. ATC instructed us that in the event of a missed approach to actually fly heading 120 and maintain 5000 feet. Commencing the approach nearing 1200 feet AGL; we had visual contact with the airport and all associated lights. As we drew closer; we noticed via both weather radar and visually outside the cockpit a solid squall line which seem to be just west of the airport and according to ATC moving very slowly. The Captain disconnected the autopilot in an effort to have better manual control of the aircraft during the final approach phase.We began to notice as we approached the 1000 ft. mark that we might possibly be unable to establish ourselves within the stabilized approach criteria by then. Almost immediately and coincidentally with initiating the decision to execute a missed approach procedure; we received a windshear warning from the aircraft windshear automated system. The Captain initiated the windshear avoidance procedure advancing thrust through the overboost bar and pitching the aircraft to the flight directed command pitch limit. Unfortunately we had already initiated a missed approach procedure; the Captains initial command of Go-around thrust/Flaps 28 was being accomplished which was not appropriate for the later received windshear warning. We elected to leave the aircraft in a flaps 28/Gear down configuration as to comply with windshear procedures at that point. Placing the aircraft in a climb headed towards 5000 feet and maneuvering the aircraft in a sharp left  turn; to avoid the advancing whether; we encountered a severe windshear with increasing performance that advanced our indicated airspeed very quickly past 200 knots indicated and through 250 knots indicated. In addition; we were unable to reduce thrust because the windshear advisories in our FMA (Flight Mode Annunciator) had not yet been extinguished; producing a level of energy; which also carried us through the 5000 feet clearance limit given by ATC. At approximately 6200 feet MSL and an actual heading of 080 (unsure exactly); the FMA annunciation extinguished; (possibly somewhat lower; but our energy state was too high to safely recover the aircraft until well after passing 6200 feet). We then attempted to bring the aircraft back to 5000 feet; established on airspeed of 220 knots as previously briefed during the initial approach. We were unable initially to comply with both the heading and altitude clearance issued by ATC and did not maintain configuration during the full windshear procedure as previously mentioned. During the abrupt maneuver to safely get the airplane away from the ground; and away from the advancing weather; ATC queried us on at least two occasions as to our altitude airspeed and intentions. Due to the maneuver we were delayed in communicating the handoff from tower to departure and making them aware of our deviations.Establishing the aircraft on a 120 heading and 5000 feet the overboost bar had removed the auto throttles further complicating communicating our intentions to ATC. We recognized this and I ran the appropriate checklist to get the FADECS back to normal and reengaged the auto throttles. We then coordinated with both ATC and flight control for weather divert and a change of alternate airport to Indianapolis. Further coordination with Cincinnati approach control; Indianapolis Center; and Indianapolis approach; allowed us to make a solid weather divert that was uneventful. After more than two hours on the ground coordinating with flight control; [Operations]; and ground personnel; we then departed for the short flight back to Louisville.

Air carrier flight crew reported encountering windshear conditions while on approach; executed the escape maneuver; and diverted.


During preflight we noticed a streak in an unusual spot on the underside of the wing.  Upon further inspection we noted that the streak was in fact fuel.  The location of the fuel leak was concerning to us as it was coming from a riveted area normally painted over and seamless.  I am submitting this [report] in case this is something that is of a systemic nature.

On preflight a fuel leak was noted on the bottom of the right hand wing.  Fuel leak was accompanied by what appears to be corrosion.  Maintenance control was notified of discrepancy.  Airplane was written up.  Maintenance control called it a fuel stain.

CE750 Flight Crew reports discovering a fuel leak on the bottom of the right wing during preflight.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

DTW was in north flow. After pushback; we contacted Ramp Control for further instructions. We were told to taxi to Spot 5 and contact Ground Control. We taxied west to taxiway K; then south toward what we thought was Spot 5. After receiving taxi instructions to runway 4R; Ground Control notified us that we had taxied onto an active taxiway (K) without a clearance. We thought that the North Ramp consisted of the area leading up to the median separating taxiways K and Y.This event occurred due to lack of attention to detail. The chart for the North Ramp (10-9D) clearly shows that Spot 5 is located on 'Taxilane' E rather than Taxiway K. Furthermore; Gate notes; as well as text on the Company Departure page indicate the necessity to contact Ground Control prior to push back from those gates; as their proximity leads directly onto an active taxiway. We also noticed airport markings on the ramp area between the North Ramp and the movement area - these markings were difficult to notice from our starting location.I think that it would not be difficult for a crew that is unfamiliar with the DTW North Ramp to make a similar error in the future. An illustration on the North Ramp chart 10-9D of a line demarcating the North Ramp from the movement area would have helped to prevent this occurrence. Likewise; a cautionary note in the Company pages to supplement the current text would be helpful.

Departing DTW. After pushback was instructed by ramp control to 'taxi down to Spot 5 and contact ground...and spot 5 is abeam gate D-18.' Ramp control never specified to use taxiway(s) E or K. Spot 5 was not visible from pushback location. Taxied to the closest taxi line after push back which was taxiway K. Stopped abeam D-18 and contacted ground control. Received taxi instructions but was also advised we had taxied onto an active taxiway. Both taxi charts 10-9 & 10-9D DO NOT differentiate where the ramp ends; and where the active taxiway begins. In fact; upon taxi in after landing; ground control advised us to 'enter the ramp at XX'....while we were still taxing on taxiway Y. To us; this left the impression that both taxiway(s) E and K are under ramp control. A clear noted boundary between ramp and taxiway K are needed on both the 10-9 and 10-9D pages. Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Air carrier flight crew reported misunderstanding Ramp Control's taxi instructions and taxied on an active taxiway without clearance from Ground Control.


No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

The reason for this report is in regard to the air filters that we have at work. I am looking to see if we can have HEPA filters in the workplace because of the spike in COVID-19 that we are having in ZZZ. These filters will help out a lot with this virus. If the aircrafts have them I believe it's just right to have the airport with them; as well as break rooms and offices. We still have many people at work that don't wear their mask; sneeze out in the open and cough. I witnessed this in the office environment I'm currently in.

Air Carrier office employee reported the office area for work would benefit from the installation of a higher-grade air filter to combat COVID-19.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Company Policy

[I was] discussing some of the risk filters the government is using at the hospital as patients arrive.  Obviously along with questions about symptoms; they are asked about contact with anyone that has traveled to many countries our pilots still fly to.It occurred to me that our [training] group will all be a yes to that question and if any of our pilots end up positive for the virus; we as a group could end up being the perfect spread mechanism to a larger number of [company] pilots and employees.I politely don't shake hands anymore but more directly we as a fleet should consider a moratorium on the use of O2 masks in the training devices.  I am not personally that worried but smart actions would seem prudent.

Air carrier First Officer suggested a moratorium on the use of oxygen masks in the flight training devices in order to minimize the possible transmission of COVID-19.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 60; Flight Crew Type 60

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was doing pattern work at ZZZ between XA:00 and XB:00. The airfield had a large amount of arriving traffic during the hours I was flying. After a touch & go on RWY XX; I was asked to extend the upwind before flying a right pattern. About mid-field on the downwind; tower requested a left-360. After my first 360; I was instructed to extend my downwind. A second plane [Aircraft Y] was approaching the airport from the northwest. Aircraft Y was asked to 'make a right 270; keep it tight and get ready to line up behind a [jet]'ATC then asked me to widen out my downwind and look for Aircraft Y making the right 270. At this point it was at my 11 o clock; 3 miles. About 5 seconds later I was able to identify the aircraft; let tower know that I had them in sight and was preparing to line up behind them. About 15 seconds later; tower called me up again; asking 'Aircraft X - extend it out a little bit; actually just follow behind and I'll call your base you will have to follow a jet behind on final'. I read back and confirmed.About 30 seconds later; tower called me up again; 'Aircraft X just so I don't get you too far from the field; make a left 360'. I read back the instruction and began my left 360. At this point; I was already thinking about Aircraft Y as I was planning on how I would get back on the downwind and line up behind them. I believe Aircraft Y was just about to finish its right 270 as I was about 90 degrees into my 360. I was able to spot and track the plane on Foreflight with Sentry; but since I had to make a 360 I lost visual when I initiated my turn. Tower; likely receiving a traffic alert called the other plane to make them aware of me: 'Aircraft X about a mile south making a left 360 - he has you in sight'. I do not think he asked them to confirm that they had me in sight and I can't tell from the live-ATC recording whether they read it back. The added statement 'he has you in sight' was extremely dangerous and could have been fatal. Yes; I had the traffic in sight when I was heading toward it and planning to get behind them; but once I started my left 360 there was no way of maintaining a visual with the other plane since I was now heading the opposite direction. I immediately recognized the potential conflict and started looking both outside the plane and on Foreflight trying to spot and track the other plane's relative position. The other plane did not make a 270 turn; but instead kept turning toward the airport/runway i.e. cutting into my path.As I was about 270 degrees into my 360 turn tower called 'Aircraft X - as you are coming out of that 360 turn do you still have Aircraft Y in sight?'At this point; I was already banking hard left in a steep turn trying to pull away from the converging traffic that I saw coming closer toward me. Turning right was not an option as it would have put me in the middle of final with jets arriving. I do not think the other plane confirmed whether or not they had me in sight. If they did; they flew way too close to me for my comfort and should have initiated an avoidance maneuver. In response to tower's question I responded 'Aircraft X unable' because I had to focus on flying the airplane away from the other traffic. We then passed by each other with much less separation than I feel comfortable. The other plane heading toward the runway; and me pulling hard left to the North-West; initiating a climb up to gain altitude. It is hard to tell exactly but horizontal distance could have been less than 500 feet Vertical distance was virtually the same. It happened very quickly. If I had not realized the potential conflict and mitigated by tracking on foreflight and pulling hard left this could have been a really really bad situation. The biggest mistake here; in my opinion; was ATC communicating to the other plane that I had them in sight AFTER I started my 360. There is no way one can maintain visual during such a maneuver while also flying safely and ATC shouldunder no circumstances make that statement. I also think that having two planes completing maneuvers in a way where their exit paths can conflict (right 270 and left 360) in close proximity should be prohibited.There were multiple safer options here. Aircraft Y could have flown a proper base rather than cutting it short onto final. I could have been asked to fly west; or I could have been asked to fly another 360 right after the first one. The fact that ATC changed its instructions relative to how I should fly behind/around the other traffic 3 times in a minute indicates to me that they were not planning ahead but rather responding to/running behind.In the future; I will call out if ATC tells other people that I have them in sight when I don't (i.e. after starting my left 360). I am also surprised nobody (tower/the other plane) complained about how close this was. I am glad to be back on the ground.  I hope this helps keep other people safe in the future!

GA pilot reported experiencing a NMAC that resulted from ATC sequencing 3 aircraft for landing by using 270- and 360-turns.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

My FO (First Officer) and I were the only ones on board. The Flight consisted of a takeoff; climb to 4000 ft and landing at ZZZ. VFR conditions.On final approach into ZZZ during our 10min flight we had an ECAM message ENG1 CTL SYS FAULT 'Avoid Rapid thrust changes' Then a red ECAM message flashed up briefly 'N2 limit exceeded'. We were low and busy landing and the message did not stay long enough to fully read and elected to land the airplane.After touchdown and reverse deployment the engine started surging and I noticed a pulsating orange light in my peripheral vision. There were no aural or visual fire warnings; no related ECAM messages. I stowed the reverse as I determined deploying them was the last I did before the engine started surging. The FO confirmed with the tower that our left engine was on fire and pulled the fire handle on engine 1 and engaged Agent1. After stopping the aircraft the fire marshall confirmed that the fire was extinguished and we shut down engine 2. Tires were ok and we were towed to the maintenance hangar.

A330 flight crew reported getting an ENG1 CTL SYS FAULT and an N2 limit exceeded ECAM message on final approach.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Logbook Entry; Manuals; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

Previous afternoon shift [had] completed oil service on both engines at terminal and notated in logbook. On two aircraft that I recall; while working the night shift; Aircraft Y and Z; there were multiple sequential tasks [(work cards)] that I signed-off with a line and single signature/employee # on the Periodic Service (PS) Check as Previously Accomplished (PA); and referenced the actual logbook page in the signature block in what I thought was per our Procedures Manual (PM) XXXX. Unfortunately; I didn't notice that Procedures Manual XXXX.11.G; specifically excluded [signing] PA from the actions that are eligible [to use] to sign-off sequential tasks with one signature.The next day; while reviewing other parts of the PM; I noticed this conflict. This is a new process; with many confusing and conflicting bits of information as to what is supposed to be done when a previous person performs maintenance set forth in a work card later assigned to [another Mechanic]. In the near future; a Separate Check (SC) will be issued every time Oil Service is requested/required; and this situation may become more confusing and potentially cause more possible Non-Compliance issues like this one... First: I would suggest that Previously Accomplished (PA) be removed from the Procedures Manual XXXX.11.G. exclusion; as the requirement to cite WHERE the [Maintenance] action was accomplished [as noted] in Procedures Manual (PM) XXXX.10.A; should be usable through multiple sequential [Sign-off] blocks.Second: a thorough examination of the processes; that caused this error and other sources of confusion; be done and a structured process be implemented and explained to the work-force [Maintenance employees]; either via E-training and/or Shift-meetings.

A Line Mechanic reports about a new and confusing sign-off process in their Procedures Manual (P/M) that does not allow a Mechanic; assigned a Periodic Service (P/S) Check Card; to sign-off multiple sequential tasks with the reference 'Previously Accomplished' (PA); after a previous Mechanic has already performed the same maintenance that is required in the assigned Task Cards.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

IMC night; aircraft configured with gear down; flaps 10 on very tight vectors to ILS 08 localizer. [We were] cleared to descend to 2;300 on QNH 981 mb. Autopilot on; HDG selected; descending in FLCH from 5;000 to 2;300 MSL. I failed to select local altimeter at the transition altitude of 4;000. Because I didn't look to confirm what button I pushed. My crosscheck failed to pick up the amber STD altimeter alert. The autopilot did what I had set up and descended through our assigned altitude since my altimeter setting was incorrect. I was monitoring the descent and [believed I] still had approximately 200 FT to level off. The Captain caught the deviation; assumed control of the aircraft and initiated a go-around; simultaneous with an ATC altitude advisory. We reentered downwind and I landed uneventfully. My failure to transition to local QNH at transition altitude and the crew failure to run the Approach Check at transition altitude were causal in this deviation.Follow SOP; back each other up; especially during night IMC when task saturated.

Passing Transition Level 040 pilot flying did not make Transition Level call. I made Transition Level call and changed my altimeter to 981 mb. At this time while waiting for pilot flying to call for Approach Check a lot happened. We were intercepting LOC final and descending with a high rate of descent with gear down and flaps 10 because of the late let down. At this time realized the airplane was not going to level off at 2;300 FT; the assigned altitude. I took control of the aircraft disconnected the autopilot and climbed back to 2;300 FT. I will admit I was task saturated. I did not make the Approach Check call which would have mitigated the situation. Pilot flying later stated he pushed the TFC EFIS button rather than the STD Transition Level button. In the future especially with a low altimeter setting and a low Transition Altitude if cleared to an altitude below our Transition Level hitting the button and having it set would give more time to do the Approach Check and attend to the flying of the aircraft. I take full responsibility for this deviation.

A B747-400 flight crew descending for landing at a foreign airport which utilizes a very low transition altitude of 4;000 MSL descended below their cleared altitude when the pilot flying failed to reset his altimeter to QNH passing the transition altitude.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 15

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Aircraft Y was cleared to land Runway 16R and was short final. Once Aircraft Y was on landing roll I instructed the pilot to exit the runway and contact Ground point seven. I then instructed Aircraft Z to line up and wait on Runway 16R. Aircraft Z advised me that there is an aircraft already in position on the runway. At that point Aircraft X advised me that he was lined up on Runway 16R. It was at this point that I realized that Aircraft X may have been in position on Runway 16R while Aircraft Y was landing. I told the CIC (Controller in Charge) that a runway incursion just happened and the Jet may have landed over that aircraft. I instructed Aircraft X to turn left and exit the runway. Once Aircraft X was clear of the runway; I cleared Aircraft Z for take-off on Runway 16R. We need a new Tower. It is very difficult to see small aircraft on the runway at the full length.

VNY is in a single runway operation. I was the CIC monitoring the operation. Local 1 was working the aircrafts in question. Aircraft X was at Runway 16R requesting a VFR departure clearance. The Local told him to standby and continued to work. SCT had cleared an aircraft for a visual approach from the east downwind over top our traffic in the east pattern and switched him instead of sequencing him with the VFR/IFR arrivals that were already on final. This would have forced the Local Controller to break off all his slow moving VFR props for an IFR jet. I then called the Final Control and said we cannot accept that aircraft. He said he did not have him on frequency and hadn't spoken to him. It came from the other sector. The Local Control told the aircraft to climb to 5000 ft. and had them overfly the final and airport. He then gave them back to SCT. Meanwhile; someone else at SCT began to call on the line asking why we couldn't accept the aircraft. I picked up the line and so did the Local Control. The Local Controller began to explain and then continued to work. I began to discuss the situation with the FACREP (Facility Representative) who was in the tower and answering phone calls. During this time Aircraft X called up again and said; 'Aircraft X; line up and wait runway;' as the tail end of his transmission was clipped by another aircraft. The Local Controller once again told him to stand by. By this time Aircraft Y was short final; landed and rolling out. The Local Controller told another aircraft to line up and wait. The pilot of that aircraft said Aircraft X was already in position on the runway and that Aircraft Y had overflown him. No one in the tower saw Aircraft X on the runway. No clearance had ever been given to Aircraft X. For his size; color; and distance from the tower to the runway approach end he blended in with the tree line behind him at the edge of the airport. Aircraft Y never saw them as well. The issue with SCT was a distraction which contributed to me not catching the aircraft on the runway.SCT is to be required to sequence visual approaches with existing VFR traffic already established on final. Additionally; SCT already hands off data information to VNY Tower using the STARs. For visual approaches; if the Tower does not accept the handoff SCT shall take the aircraft for the full approach and not try to slam them into the airport. Just because it is an IFR jet does not mean they get priority over VFR props. Also; it unacceptable to clear aircraft for a visual approach jet and switch them to the Tower descending and turning toward VFR traffic established on final and expect the all the VFR traffic is to be broken off to make way for their jet. This is an issue that continues to happen even though the Tower has told them it is not ok. SCT continues to expect a reason as to why we cannot accept the visual approach instead of looking at the radar and seeing why. The traffic on final is visible on their radar scope. If the Tower says they cannot accept it; which is the end of the discussion.

VNY Tower Controller reported a runway incursion due to communication breakdown with TRACON and other traffic.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On Downwind for runway 35C flying the BRDJE arrival passing approx 4;000 ft; ATC cleared us to 3;000ft and asked us to expedite the descent. Upon reaching approx 3;150 and on base leg; ATC advised us to maintain 3;500ft stating that this was the Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA). We confirmed that we had been cleared to 3;000 ft and the controller acknowledged that clearance had been issued by mistake. We climbed to 3;500 and made the visual approach and landed without incident. All crew were at stations.

On downwind for ILS 35C/visual approach; we were complying with a 'expedite descent to 3000' clearance issued by [ATC]. At approximately 3150 feet; controller issued 'climb to 3500 feet for MVA' (this occurred as we were midway through base turn). This clearance put us back at the base of the clouds which thinned as we headed north 'cleared to intercept the localizer'. Shortly thereafter; we called 'visual' and landed without incident. Tower issued an altitude (3000 feet) clearance below his MVA in error. He corrected his clearance to 3500 feet. We maintained compliance with both. Will continue to comply with ATC approach clearances in safe conditions.

B777 flight crew reported descending to altitude assigned by ATC; which was an error and below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude. ATC Caught the error and issued crew a higher altitude.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6; Flight Crew Total 237; Flight Crew Type 237

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

I received a NOTAM through AOPA member services about a TFR. I read the NOTAM and understood the TFR would be in effect from XA:30 through XD:15 local time.I understood the TFR extended to a 30 NM radius from the CHS VORTAC. I read that flights at RBW would be affected. I used a NM plotter and sectional to measure the distance from the CHS VORTAC to RBW and found that RBW was just outside the 30 NM radius. Thus; I assumed only flights arriving and departing to the east of RBW and penetrating the 30 NM radius was required to use the ATC services.Previous TFRs at CHS; had not included the RBW airport. I departed RBW approximately XC:35 local to the west. After flying westward for approximately 15 minutes; I turned back toward RBW.With a Garmin GPS and distance measuring from the CHS VORTAC; I carefully flew the pattern at RBW to ensure I did not penetrate the 30 NM radius for the TFR; and I landed back at RBW approximately XD:00. When I arrived at the FBO; I received a call from ATC informing me of a possible violation.It is my belief that I did not violate the airspace and I used due caution to avoid it. If I misunderstood the intent of this TFR; I sincerely apologize. I would never want to create an unsafe condition.I respectfully offer this observation; this TFR was ambiguous in that the airport I used (RBW) was not included in the 30 NM radius; yet the NOTAM stated it would be affected without clarifying how it would be affected. I would offer this suggestion. If an airport is mentioned in the NOTAM; clearly include all the airspace around that airport in the restricted airspace area. Thank you.

GA pilot reported researching a planned TFR and believe was successful in avoiding it; but was advised by ATC of a possible pilot deviation.


Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Family seated in Row XX traveling with an infant in the car seat. Father was seated in XX3 with 2 small children in XX1 and XX2. Mother sat in XX4 and put car seat into XX5. After takeoff the Mother moved back one row leaving the baby in the car seat unattended. She was also sleeping without a face mask. D FA woke Mother to tell her that she needed to put on her mask and also talked to the Father and told him that the Mother needed to sit in the row with the baby. She explained that there was a safety concern that should there be a decompression there was no one within reach of the baby to apply the oxygen mask. The Father spoke to the Mother; but she refused to return to her seat with the baby.Baby in car seat was unattended for most of the flight.  Safety concern as baby in car seat was unattended while the Mother slept in the row behind the baby. Unable to get the Mother to return to the seat next to the baby. Family needs to agree to wearing masks and being responsible for their baby before they are allowed to fly again.

Flight Attendant reported a mother leaving a baby in the car seat and sitting in the row behind the infant.  Mother refused to wear a face mask and return to row where infant was.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 13R

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Type 15000

Workload; Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Pilot Not Flying; Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Type 210

Confusion; Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Weather

We initiated a go-around during an ILS to Runway 31R in Dallas [Love]; due to an errant glideslope signal which placed the aircraft below glidepath and triggered an obstacle alert from the GPWS. The approach was being flown uneventfully by the autopilot. At approximately 1900 FT MSL; the glideslope indicator made a rapid downward deflection of approximately 1.5 dots; pitching the aircraft nose down. This was followed by a GPWS 'Caution Obstacle' alert triggered by the building that lies on the approach course; and is charted at 1049 FT MSL. We were in and out of the clouds in MDT rain and visually acquired the building ahead; noting that we were still well above it. I commenced a go-around and was immediately handed off to Departure Control. I told the Controller that I suspected that an aircraft on the ground had penetrated the ILS critical area and triggered the glideslope fluctuation and to please advise the Tower as we were unable to do so during the missed approach. The Tower Controller told him that an aircraft had indeed been taxied into position on the runway as the weather was above 800 FT ceiling and two miles visibility; which are the requirements for protecting the ILS critical area. The ATIS was reporting a ceiling of 1300 FT broken; 2000 FT overcast and visibility of four miles in heavy rain and mist. The second approach was uneventful and we landed four minutes late. During taxi in; I gave the Ground Controller the reason for our previous missed approach.

I called out the obstacle (a high-rise tower) in sight; but because we were still in IMC (there were clouds below and beyond the obstacle); the Captain initiated a go-around. It appears that aircraft in the ILS critical area caused our incident.

ATC cleared on aircraft onto DAL Runway 31R. That aircraft interfered with the ILS glideslope and caused an aircraft on final to pitch down and receive an EGPWS alert. The crew executed a missed approach.


Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Physiological - Other

Ground Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Day VFR landing on runway 28L (new runway for FLL) visual approach. At approx. 2 miles from landing I noticed a very unusual approach end to runway 28L. It seemed like a very large and tall fence at the approach end of the runway. I was concerned and asked my copilot if what I thought I saw was correct; he wasn't sure. Neither one of us had landed on this new runway before. On closer examination it become clear that it was a very tall sea wall approx. 65ft tall surrounded by sand that made it look much taller. Crossing the threshold and just starting to pull the power to idle we received a GPWS warning that both of us thought was 'glideslope' initially. Now just prior to touchdown we realized it was warning was 'TERRAIN'. With the power now at idle; and DAY VFR I thought the safest course of action was to land. Of course there was no terrain ahead of the aircraft and we considered it a false warning. I think the large sea wall and the drastic vertical difference in terrain just prior to landing fooled the GPWS into the alarm. I remember several years ago on an approach plate into Charleston West Virginia that read 'you may receive a false GPWS warning do to terrain'. I think this is a similar condition.The runway is also sloped significantly downhill (even more so than runway 23 in CLT) that may be a contributing factor.Add to the approach plate that a GPWS warning may be triggered do to the 65 feet sea wall at the approach end of runway 28L.

An A321 flight crew landing in VMC on Runway 28L at FLL received a GPWS Terrain warning as they crossed the threshold; closing the throttles for landing.  The reporter suspects the 55 foot raised elevation at the approach end of the runway and the 'seawall' type structure supporting it contributed to a false warning.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 7; Flight Crew Total 1280; Flight Crew Type 120

I was flying visual by myself learning new autopilot and running it thru the ILS 35 approach sequence but visually. Lots of traffic in the area (at least 3-4 planes). I was making radio calls and position reports and other were also; but it was hard to keep track of everyone. Note BJC was not supporting practice [approaches] due to ATC limits and I think more were flying up north than normal.  Right traffic for [Runway] 28 crosses 35 runway.  I was watching a plane doing touch and go patterns on 28.  I went thru the missed procedure (visually) a little earlier than minimum. I was climbing out on 350 heading; but another plane also crossed from my left and I didn't see [it] until late and until I had climbed to its altitude.  I don't know if it was in pattern or traversing the area.   I was climbing and turned steep left. They also turned steep to their left.  My attention was split mostly outside and but some inside to sequence the AP.  I believe I had right of way; but if there is a collision; it won't matter. I had traffic on my iPad and panel.  But with so many close targets it wasn't useful. Had I not started climb early; I would not have reached pattern altitude so quickly. Also; even if not under the hood a safety pilot is a good idea in congested areas.

Pilot of a light twin flying practice approaches reported an NMAC with another aircraft in the vicinity of GXY airport.