Installation; Inspection; Repair; Work Cards

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was assigned a Hotbond Repair to a thrust reverser inner wall here at ZZZ. I told supervisor we need an adhesive we don't store here at ZZZ. An order was placed to get adhesive from ZZZ1. The next day; the adhesive arrived at about late morning. It had shipping paperwork with it that had all the info I needed; Company Part Number (CPN); Manufacturer's number; type and class; batch number and hours out of storage. The adhesive sent is a small piece cut from a roll from a storage freezer at ZZZ1. It did not have our Air Carrier's Raw Material Control Form; that form stays with the roll next to the freezer. I had no reason to question the integrity of the material sent; it was dry; clean and well packaged. I can understand why the Raw Material Control Form was not sent; that Form needs to be near the main roll. I used the adhesive in the repair; the repair went well; finished repair and signed off [repair] that same day. The material came into question the following day; when Shop mechanics discovered the improper handling from the day before. The supervisor from ZZZ1 did not follow material handling procedures. [Recommend] Qualified personnel to handle composite material. Send our Raw Material Control Form with the piece; or a copy of it. Technical data not on correct form. Aircraft Out of Service (OTS).

Reporter stated the fan reverser for their Rolls Royce Trent RB-211 engine was punctured on the inner wall and needed to be repaired. A special sheet of adhesive was needed to perform a hotbond repair of the damaged inner acoustic composite material. The problem was the cold storage adhesive material was shipped by a Supervisor at their Maintenance Overhaul Base who was not qualified to sign-off the Raw Material Control Form or ship the hazardous adhesive material. An Inspector and Mechanic at their Overhaul Base noticed the unqualified signature on the Control Form and raised the issue of hazardous material being shipped by unqualified personnel. The adhesive can be left out of the freezer for 100-hours and still be in serviceable condition. The hotbond repair he accomplished was never an issue.

It has been brought to my attention that a supervisor in Composite Repair shipped composite repair adhesive to ZZZ for a repair on a B777-200 Engine Fan Reverser. The adhesive was not properly handled and never received the proper certification form per our Procedures Manual. Dayshift.

Two Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (AMTs) report about a sheet of hazardous adhesive material that was shipped by a Supervisor not qualified to sign-off their Raw Material Control Forms. The adhesive material was required to repair a punctured fan reverser inner acoustic liner for a B777-200 aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 17500; Flight Crew Type 9900

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

In reference to the company alert regarding Denver simultaneous RNAV (RNP) approaches; has there been any discussion addressing the threat that current RNAV (RNP) approaches to parallel runways in Denver share many of the same fixes? Please reference the FRNCH3 RNAV STAR as well as the RNAV Z approaches for 34L and 34R. Both approaches share HIMOM; MCMUL; and KUGLN; not to mention the 'Z' approach designation.  Although it's indisputably the crew's responsibility to load and fly the correct approach; there seems a real possibility; following a change in plan from 34L to 34R; the crew could have the wrong approach in the FMC and not realize it since the next several LEGS page fixes would match the desired procedure.  If only the LEGS page were looked at; both pilots might mistakenly assume the necessary change had been made. Neither the Approach Checklist nor its expanded Flight Manual text would save the crew.  It seems to me we have designed our Before Takeoff Checklist to verify the runway and SID; so why not require; on RNAV approaches; the route page match the desired approach and runway? In the case of Denver; with so much attention being given to loss of aircraft separation; this could be a real contributor. Lastly; although this example references approaches to 34L and 34R transitioning from the FRNCH3 RNAV Arrival; the same error potential exists when transitioning to the RNAV Z approaches to 16L and 16R from the ZPLYN3 RNAV Arrival.

B737 Captain reported potential flight crew confusion with DEN RNAV arrivals since they share many of the same fixes.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

We use headsets for all ground crew to push back our aircraft from gates daily to ensure safe and effective communications between ground crew and the flight crew. My suggestion is that the ground crew use headsets also during taxi into the gate before and during aircraft movements in the Safety Zone. I find during taxi in; the nose Marshaller at some point transitions from a view of the wing walkers to total concentration on the aircraft's nose and its position relevant to the J-line; thereby missing any signal from the wing walkers. Change Ground Ops standard operating procedures to require headset communication use during aircraft approaching and taxi in Safety Zone to gate.

Air carrier Captain reported safety concern with ground crew operations during taxi.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 20

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

Aircraft X was climbing to FL350; I had to stop the aircraft at FL330 for incoming flights descending to FL340. I used an auto 'A' to handoff Aircraft X to ZAB; and it auto handed off the plane to ZAB65 (owns FL340 and above). I had weather deviations going into PHX and recently had combined up with another sector (ZLA12) with sector 31. Traffic Management Unit (TMU) had re-routed several LAX landing planes into my sky for thunderstorms elsewhere. I switched the plane to ZAB65; and when I went to take the aircraft off my scope I realized it was in ZAB 91's sky. ZLA12 had to be re-opened for volume/complexity in ZLA31 sky.The reasoning for the combination was for training at ZLA09 D-side (which is where ZLA12 is normally combined). While staffing was on the low side; ZLA09 had zero planes when I was asked to combine ZLA12 at ZLA31. Training should not dictate taking safety risks. If the training is that important; then overtime should've been authorized.The auto hand off when a plane is temped at FL330 should go to the controller who owns FL330; not the controller who at some distant time in the future may or may not climb the aircraft into their sky. This would be like the approach auto directing to a high altitude sector in the center? Safety should be to protect the aircrafts current altitude; not to expedite a planes potential to climb at the risk violating airspace.

ZLA Controller hands off an aircraft to another sector. The handoff; because of a Temporary Altitude in the scratch pad area; goes to another sector. The handoff should have went to the sector that the aircraft was 'temped' at; not one that is possibly a future scope.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Our pilots called shortly after departure; around 10;000 ft. They asked if we could smell anything out of the ordinary. I could not identify any smell in the forward part of the cabin. I asked B FA (Flight Attendant) if she could identify anything towards the back of the aircraft. She could not. The pilots informed B FA that they had donned their oxygen masks as part of their procedure to identify and try to eliminate the cause. Captain and First Officer (FO) think they eliminated it by switching off pack one. We continued. During flight; just after reaching cruise altitude; we gave the pilots a break. When I went into the flight deck; I could clearly smell something chemically; wet sock smell. C FA was guarding and said he could smell something off next to the Flight Deck. Our Captain and our FO said the smell had dissipated but was still there. Just prior to decent; we (B FA and I) gave the pilots another break. The smell seemed to still be there but less than before. Upon landing; the pilots informed us the smell returned about 5 min before landing and continued through taxi in. The Captain opened his window for fresh air during taxi in. We were only on PACK 2 at this point. Maintenance came on board after deplaning passengers and ran the APU and the whole AC immediately had the chemical wet sock smell. Maintenance then went through their procedures and cleared the aircraft to go. B FA and I both experienced stomach discomfort and itchy eyes; and B FA and C FA experienced headaches. Mostly dissipated by the time we spent off the aircraft.Maintenance cleared the aircraft; they frequently cannot duplicate. Maintenance personnel should ride the jump seat after these events for takeoffs and landing to as close as possible recreate the same circumstances.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Flight attendants reported a fumes event after takeoff resulting in health issues.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 640; Flight Crew Type 400

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Carb heat was pulled on and power reduced to idle by the instructor for a simulated engine failure for training around 4;000 feet MSL. After the student ran through the checklist for the practice maneuver; the Instructor told the student to clear the engine. Upon attempted clearing of the engine; it sputtered and the instructor took control. Full power was not restored. The pilot called Tower and advised of a possible [priority] landing. The Instructor completed a safe and controlled landing in a field. There was no visible damage to the airplane and no injuries.

C172 Instructor Pilot reported while on a training flight the aircraft engine malfunctioned.


Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Other; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

During pre-boarding of Aircraft X a pre-boarding passenger had a roller bag that they told me was '80 pounds and filled with lithium batteries for her mobility scooter'. I informed the operations agent that the bag was filled with lithium batteries and that it was too heavy for me to lift alone. The operations agent called a supervisor who informed me that there was no limit to the number of lithium batteries allowed in a carry on for medical purposes as long as they're not attached to anything and they found someone to assist with stowing the bag in an overhead bin. This concerned me because if the lithium batteries were to catch on fire; because of the number of them there would be no way to contain them in the containment bags that we have available. I was also concerned because I couldn't find anything in the [manual] about weight restrictions on carry-on items; both for the safety of the employees assisting with carry-on items that are too heavy and for the weight limits on the overhead bins I found it concerning that I was unable to find any weight restrictions for carry-on items in my manual. This was a difficult situation to address because it was; I felt; too heavy to be a carry-on item but because of the presence of lithium ion batteries we were unable to check the bag either. A set limit for carry-on weight and number of lithium ion batteries allowed onboard.

B737-800 Flight Attendant reported passenger carry-on bag containing 80 lbs of Lithium Ion batteries caused concern due to weight and insufficient containment bags available to extinguish a Lithium Ion battery fire in the event of an in flight fire. Reporter further stated there is no guidance in Flight Attendant Manuel regarding weight/quantity restrictions.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 206.72; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 3715.47

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

We were flying XXX-LAX and were delayed due to the baggage system being partially inop. We did a terrific job of making up as much time as possible for the late night connections to the east coast. We arrived in LAX right at midnight and had 3 runway changes coming in as they were changing the configuration to landing to the east. I was also conducting a Qualification Line Check to finish the new First Officer on his OE. We landed on Runway 6L; rolled to the end to exit at Taxiway V. We were cleared across [Runway] 6R and then to take E; R south route to our gate. Some of our B737 have nice bright taxi lights; unfortunately this plane's taxi light was very dim. We were taxiing west on Taxiway E to make the turn on R. There are no green taxiway centerline lights on E except for some turn offs; I think either onto E or they were for turning off E. I noticed as we passed S that it looked like I had taxiway centerline lights again. However; I quickly realized that those were not green centerline; it was the blue taxiway edge lights. The Taxiway E shifts just enough to make the edge lights perfectly lined up with where centerline lights should be. I abruptly made [a] left turn to remain on the taxiway but I thought this was worthy of mentioning as it could easily be confused with centerline lights briefly. The errors I made are being overly familiar with an airport that I have been flying out of for 25 years can allow complacency with me assuming I know it well. I do not land to the east often and have not done this taxi route in a very long time. I was taxiing around 20 kts approaching the intersection; which is within SOP; however; if I had seen that a turn was coming I would have slowed down earlier. As always; when trying to make up time that is when risks increase exponentially.  Also expecting a long straight taxi allows you to think you can talk to the First Officer about upcoming items; such as switching to south ground at checkpoint 2 and contacting Ramp to inquire about gate and alley status. I did not noticed on my Jepp Airport moving map that the taxiway shifted as we were approaching it even though I had it open and displayed right next to me in its bracket.  I would suggest making this a hot spot and/or preferably adding green centerline lights through this intersection. Also; airports like ORD change their taxiway routing when landing in different directions and maybe LAX should consider this to have Taxiway T be the southbound taxiway and R northbound.

B737 Captain reported confusion over taxiway position and lighting during night taxi at LAX airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 195; Flight Crew Type 18000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

I think we have serious safety vulnerability with the current 737-800 Loading Schedule software. The main problem occurs with significant cargo/bag loads and smaller Passenger loads. My latest example was this flight with 80 Passengers and 3600 pounds of cargo/bags. The Agent informed me that she was having the Ramp Agents move all the weight to the front bin. I asked her if she was intending a Zone count. She said no. I asked the Flight Attendants to complete the Zone count for me. The Agent completed the Loading Schedule and put all 79 (later 80) Passengers in Zone 1 (as per Operations procedures). It generated a valid Loading Schedule with 5.5 trim units. I asked her to rerun the software using the Zone count. It came up out-of-limits. We had to move Passengers to make it legal and the Loading Schedule generated 6.4 trim units. The onboard computer increased the computed trim units to 6.9. The FO performing the takeoff reported that it was still heavy nose on rotation. Had we used the initial Loading Schedule of 5.5; or even 5.9 from the onboard computer; the nose would have been excessively heavy; requiring much greater than normal aft yoke travel.I am especially concerned because we have already raised concerns about this and were told that Agents have been instructed to use Zone counts with 120 or fewer Passengers. I have informally polled Agents and discovered that the policy is not clearly disseminated. I fully understand that the current policy/software is deemed legal and approved; but it is questionable on a safety standard. There are cases of short-legged; ample bellied Pilots where aft yoke travel meets belly before takeoff rotation is achieved. The software and policy needs to be changed to require a more even cargo/bag loading and more frequent Zone count so that a larger trim unit setting is generated. In my discussions with respected Agents; they acknowledge this problem and routinely move some of the cargo to the aft bin to solve the problem. My concern is with less informed Agents who doggedly load all cargo in the forward bin and all Passengers in Zone 1. This policy needs to be corrected.

B737-800 Captain described improper weight and balance calculations that can occur with specific cargo and passenger loads when passenger zone counts are not used.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I landed without clearance. We landed on Approach Control frequency. While clearing runway I realized we were still on Approach Control frequency. I heard transmissions that sounded like what an Approach Controller would say - not Tower. I asked my partner 'were we cleared to land?' My partner quickly switched to Tower and we heard him clearing us to cross parallel runway and contact Ground. we acknowledged and complied. Tower Controller then said he tried to call us a couple of times. My partner told him that Approach Control never switched us over. The last thing I remember on approach was the Approach Controller issuing us traffic over the stadium; that was it. I do not recall ever being told to contact the Tower. We were also at the end of two very long days dealing with multiple issues and worn down. in this mental state I was not sharp enough to switch to Tower on my own past the marker without being prompted to do so by ATC. It was quiet and smooth. So many approaches and landings in the last four days - it is hard to keep track because they start running together being so automatic. We were fatigued towards the end of this flight. After listening to LIVEATC.com it sounds like we were forgotten about. The Tower asked us where we were parking close to a short final; queried us again; and then again and issued the taxi instructions. Which is when we switched over and heard them. It does not seem as though they were looking for us long. I take full responsibility for landing without a clearance. I always wondered how you could land without a clearance and now I know. Contributing factors were crew fatigue and lack of ATC Comm. Normally I would query ATC about switching to Tower; or just switch myself past the marker if they are busy; but due to fatigue I did not catch it and we continued. To help prevent this in the future I will monitor my fatigue level better.

Captain reported landing without clearance; citing fatigue as contributing.


Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Our initial contact with pushback crew had working headsets. After I said in intercom: 'cockpit to ramp' he replied 'Yea'; then I asked: 'is your walk-around complete; all doors secure?' And he responded 'Yea'; I should have realized that this particular ramp agent was insufficiently trained. We pushed from [gate]; and after stopping for about five seconds I asked 'would you like the parking brake?' No answer; I applied toe brakes because I suspected they were finished pushing and again asked 'do you want the parking brake?' At this time I saw the second ramp agent come from underneath the nose to show me the strap. The tug driver then responded 'yea; brakes set'. A bit upset because of the ramp agent's cavalier attitude towards safety; I replied with our proper response of 'parking brake PARK' then I added 'am I to understand you disconnected the strap with the parking brake off?' The tug driver's response to me was 'I decided to use hand signals; the camera will show that' I replied back: ' I never confirmed your hand signal- don't know if the camera on the top of the terminal will show that....the camera will NOT show that from my cockpit position I cannot see you; and once two-way communication is established; then that is the method in which we expect to communicate'. I was then told 'you have a bad attitude; man'. Pushing without proper use of headsets; as I have just illustrated; is a safety hazard. To have working headsets without the proper training/phraseology by ramp is insufficient. Not every ramp agent is this apathetic and lazy about safety. I pay particular attention because of my past experience.

CRJ-900 Captain reported the ground push back crew deviated from proper procedures and terminology during the push back maneuver.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Our flight had just leveled off at FL250.  There was a similar sounding call sign on the frequency as well.  I (First Officer) was Pilot Flying and the Captain (Pilot Monitoring) had just started giving a PA to the passengers.  As soon as the Captain started his PA; Atlanta Center gave instructions to what sounded like [our call sign] to climb to FL280 with an expedite through FL270.  As soon as I acknowledged the clearance; I noticed we had traffic approximately 1;000 feet above us at our 11 o'clock position at about 10-15 miles.  I thought it unusual for ATC to issue us a climb clearance with traffic that close and 1;000 feet above than us.  I knew [a similar call sign] was also on frequency so I called ATC back to verify the climb clearance for [us].  They did confirm it was for us so I went into an open climb for best rate climb through FL270 with a level off at FL280.  Once we started climbing; I noticed the traffic at our 11 o'clock starting to close in on us.  As we approached FL260; ATC instructed us to turn 15 degrees to our left to avoid conflicting traffic.  With the conflicting traffic at our 11 o'clock at approximately 500 feet higher than us; I thought the controller had erroneously meant for us to turn 15 degrees right instead of 15 degrees left. I immediately asked the controller to confirm 15 degrees left due to the traffic.  Right after I asked the question; we received a TCAS RA that instructed us to descend in order to avoid the conflicting traffic. Simultaneously; ATC instructed us to descend and maintain FL250.  I disconnected the autopilot and complied with the TCAS RA instructions to descend.  The Captain came back from making the PA and searched for the conflicting traffic.  He stated that he did get a visual with the conflicting traffic passing us at the 8 o'clock position as we descended in accordance with the TCAS RA. We leveled off at FL250 without further incident.  I did not inform ATC that we were responding to a TCAS RA because I was focused on flying the aircraft and complying with the TCAS instructions.  The Captain had been making a PA and so he was not listening [and] talking to ATC when we received the TCAS RA.I believe a factor in this incident was that ATC had given us a clearance to climb up to FL280 with the conflicting traffic where it was.  We were at FL250 with traffic at approximately 11 o'clock and 1;000 feet above us.  I even confirmed the clearance was for us since I thought it odd we were given a climb clearance with the traffic where it was.  ATC should have kept us at FL250 and not given us instructions to climb until the conflicting traffic had passed behind us.I also believe the similar call sign contributed to the confusion factor.  Hearing the controller issue instructions for [us] to climb when we had traffic in front and only approximately 1;000 feet higher than us led me to believe that she may have meant the instructions for [the other flight].  I delayed the climb to confirm that the instruction to climb was for us.  If I had started the climb when she first issued the instruction; we might have avoided the TCAS RA.  I however wanted to make 100 percent sure she meant for us to climb though so that did cause a delay in our aircraft climbing.  I recommend [our company] consider discontinuing similar sounding call signs around the same hubs with similar takeoff and land times.  I have noticed many times that my flight number on a particular flight is off by 1 number from another flight operating in the same airspace.  Having dissimilar sounding call signs would cut down on a lot of the confusion for both the pilots and the controllers.

An A319 First Officer reported responding to an RA during climb; citing similar call signs as contributing.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During the screening of this shipment; the screener discovered undeclared lithium and flammable liquids.

Air carrier ramp employee reported that the company Hazardous Material Screener identified undeclared hazardous materials during preflight inspection.


Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were cleared to 4;400 ft on descent. We punched through a cloud layer at 250 kts with 1000 ft to level off. I observed an object off the nose; slightly right of course. Unsure what it was; [I] looked down at the TCAS to try to ID it. After being unable to; I looked back up to track it and couldn't see it. A few moments later; I identified the object as a glider; which had been flying in and out of the clouds. As we were asked by ATC to ID the field; the glider started to turn into our flight path. At this point I immediately identified the glider to the flying pilot; the First Officer. I told him to deviate around the glider as I contacted approach. The glider was not showing anything on ATC radar either. We passed the glider at less than half a mile at the same altitude. ATIS was reporting glider activity; but did not state an altitude or an exact location.I guess we could ask ATC for a more exact location of the glider. Had the glider not been violating FAR cloud clearance requirements; or had a working transponder; this would have never happened as we could have been more aware of its location and deviated earlier around it.

CRJ-200 Captain reported an airborne conflict with a glider on approach to UNV airport.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused

The Captain was the pilot flying and immediately upon rotation; there was a sudden drop of the right wing. So much so that I instinctively looked over to the oil pressure and other engine indications to make sure that our right engine did not fail. I then looked at the fuel balance to make sure that it was within limits. The left and right tanks were off by only 50 lbs. The PF had to input up to 50% left wing down trim for the aircraft to maintain wings level. Throughout the flight the same input was needed regardless of airspeed; altitude; power; and configuration. Upon landing at destination without incident; the Captain notified Maintenance Control of the excessive trim inputs required to hold the aircraft in a desirable state. The Maintenance Controller repeatedly told the Captain that the aircraft was fine and that the indications on the ED2 did not matter; 'that it was an instance of whatever it takes to get the job done' scenario as far as control surface trim was concerned. Neither the Captain; nor I felt comfortable with this information and cited our concerns in regards to possibilities of control loss in an engine failure; or PCU runaway event. The Maintenance Controller proceeded to read a service bulletin from Bombardier in regards to the aileron trim. The Captain then asked for a copy to be faxed so he and I could see this piece of paper. After that was done; we discovered that this bulletin also states that the max deviation was 31% for certification. Further; even to fly the aircraft to that extent required a ferry permit; and a concession from Bombardier. We did not have this concession from the manufacturer. The company also went on to say that the 31% certification limit was only for revenue flights. But nowhere did the Captain; nor I read that in the service bulletin. The sudden drop of the right wing on takeoff was caught instantly. I fear that if a situation arose where we needed full control authority of the left aileron; we would have been hampered by the abnormal amounts of trim (50% LWD) to maintain a wings level attitude.

The reporter states that no obvious faults were found by maintenance after the flight but that the company wanted the crew to ferry the aircraft to a Maintenance base which they declined. As of this time no cause for the anomaly has been determined.

CRJ700 First Officer experiences a sudden roll to the right as the Captain rotates the aircraft during takeoff. Once airborne it takes 50% LWD aileron trim to maintain the aircraft wings level at all speeds. The crew continues to destination landing uneventfully where post flight inspection by Maintenance reveals no obvious discrepancies in the ailerons or their trim tabs. The company requests that the crew ferry the aircraft which they decline.


Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While heading in to land at ZZZ; a black object was spotted approximately 1 mile from our nose at our altitude of 2;400 ft. Initial thought of both pilots was that it was a bird; then after noticing that it did not appear to be moving I determined it was most likely a drone that was heading straight toward us or hovering; so averted to the right at which point the drone flew past our left wing in the opposite direction approximately 500 to 750 ft. horizontal from our left wing at coaltitude (2;400 ft. AGL). The drone was determined to be a black quadcopter; approximately the size of a soccer ball; with a possible camera mounted underneath. ATC was notified; queried us for further information; and announced to all aircraft on frequency of drone activity in the vicinity of the airspace.

A General Aviation pilot reported a NMAC with a Drone.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 5500; Flight Crew Type 1200

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

We had just finished a part 91 flight for the company. We parked the airplane next to the company owned fuel farm for refueling. After deplaning the passengers and helping them get their luggage to their cars; I did a post flight walk around of the aircraft; then [the] First Officer (FO) and I turned our attention to refueling the aircraft. It being the weekend our maintenance personnel; who usually fuel the aircraft; were off duty. So that meant I; the Chief Pilot; and the First Officer (Director of Operations) were responsible for the refueling functions. The FO then took the single point fuel nozzle to the aircraft and hooked it to the fuel port. We conducted the pre-check valve test of the fuel system; closed the pre-check valves; and continued fueling the aircraft with 600 gallons of fuel. I stayed at the fuel pump to man the dead man switch to stop the fuel at 600 gallons. Then the FO unhooked the single point nozzle and I watched him holding the single point nozzle in one hand; replace the fuel cap with the other hand. Then I turned my attention to securing the fuel farm. The FO walked the nozzle back as I reeled the hose in. I then closed the door and locked it and walked into the hangar to complete some paperwork. Since I walked around the aircraft after landing I did not think it necessary to do the walk around again. We got in the plane; the FO shut the cabin door he got in his seat we started running our preflight check lists and started the engines. The FO got an IFR clearance to [destination airport]. We performed the taxi checklist; takeoff checklist; and received our release and departed ZZZ. Take off and initial climb was normal we made the left turn towards ZZZ VOR and we received authorization to climb and maintain 9000. As we climbed through 5000 I noticed a pitch change in the engine noise. Engine gauges read normal except for right Interstage Turbine Temperature (ITT) gauge which was 100 degrees higher then left ITT gauge. As I pulled the throttles back to maintain airspeed the odd sounding pitch noise changed and became more pronounced. The FO volunteered to go back and look at the engines through the cabin windows; upon his return he described damage to the right engine inlet. We elected to turn back to ZZZ and received permission to return via right or left turn. At this time we were level at 9000 feet I slowed the airplane to 200 knots; we were told to contact approach and on contacting approach we got a descent clearance to 5000 feet. I pulled the throttles back and started our descent; which is when the right engine started vibrating. The right engine vibration light came on. I elected to shut the right engine down. We [advised ATC] telling [them] that we had a precautionary engine shut down. Performed precautionary engine shut down checklist---engine vibration ceased as soon as engine was shut down. Landed without incident taxied to ramp; shut engine down; and performed after shut down checklist. Got out of the aircraft walked around to the right side of aircraft and noticed fuel door was open and the fuel cap was missing. We noticed severe damage to the fan blades on the right engine. The FO believed he had left the fuel door open; with the door open the cap came off in flight and went through the right engine. I believe this incident could have been prevented by me conducting my usual preflight walk around of the plane. I trusted that the FO had shut and closed the door; while my attention was drawn away by shutting down and securing the fuel farm. I believe the fuel door should have an associated annunciator light that indicates when it is not closed. But ultimately I should have done a walk around of the plane after it had been fueled and before we departed.

Cessna 560XL Captain reported that one engine failed during climb after ingesting a fuel cap.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

The published hold at LIINN intersection on the LIINN3 Arrival into CLT is not depicted on our Jepps plate. It is depicted on the NOAA arrival plate. During our flight from ZZZ to CLT and descending on the LIINN3 Arrival; we were given instructions to hold northwest at the LIINN intersection as published.  We programmed the FMS for a direct path to LIINN and looked up the arrival for the LIINN3 to identify the published hold.  It did not exist on the Jepps plate and we advised ATC.  They reassigned our hold at LIINN on current heading.  During a post flight review; I took a look at the NOAA chart for the LIINN3 and found the missing published hold.

Regional Jet Captain reported issued LIINN published holding on the LIINN3 STAR is not depicted on Jeppesen plates.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 52; Flight Crew Total 190; Flight Crew Type 190

I was on final approach to Runway 25; aircraft in front of me was 100 feet AGL setting up to land on a street. The aircraft in front of me did not have the runway in sight; I started doing S turns to create space in between us. The aircraft realized he was not lined up with the runway and decided to go around; I then did a right 360 to prevent a midair collision. After completion of my 360 I made a straight in approach to land on Runway 25.

C-172 pilot experiences a NMAC during a visual approach to Runway 25 at MRI. The aircraft he was following in the pattern had lined up with a street and realized the mistake at low altitude causing the conflict.


Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Captain's (CA) departure; noted right bottom rudder failed to test first time during flight control check but tested second time but felt stiff according to CA. During takeoff roll CA rejected takeoff at 130 knots (V1 was 133) and we cleared the runway and complied with the appropriate checklists. CA indicated that rudder felt stiff initially and then was almost non-responsive when speed was increasing.Possible hydraulic issue with rudder.

MD-11 First Officer reported a high speed rejected takeoff due to an apparent unresponsive rudder.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

On approach; flaps 45; the autopilot kicked off so we executed a missed approach.  On the missed we noticed some control pressure irregularity but got the aircraft under control and decided to try it again without the autopilot.  On the second approach at flaps 45 we got a STAB TRIM runaway.  The First Officer (FO) ran the Immediate Action items and QRH for STAB TRIM runaway.  The aircraft was difficult to control in a flaps up configuration.  Weather was starting to move toward the field. At this point we decided to divert and declared an emergency. While enroute we communicated to the Flight Attendant (FA) the situation and time remaining. Landed flaps 20 degrees per QRH with no further issues.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

CRJ-200 flight crew reported they got a stab trim runaway and chose to divert to a more suitable airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 8700; Flight Crew Type 160

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Ground Incursion Runway

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

We were inbound on IFR FLT plan; executing the ILS Approach to Rwy 35. I had cancelled IFR at (FAF) and made a radio call on CTAF '4 mi So.; straight in 35; full stop.' I saw the yellow and white Citabria (I think); taxiing to Rwy 35 as I was making that radio call. As we reached ¼ mi. final; he apologized but continued takeoff. We did a go around and as we turned downwind; the Citabria passed under us west bound. On downwind; we encountered a flock of large black birds and while avoiding them failed to make a base turn radio call; so I called 'L. base turning final' instead; just as my student started that turn; within seconds; I observed a Cessna; taxi out onto the Rwy. I called the female pilot; advising we were on final and the plane pulled to the left side of the displaced threshold and stopped; so I told my student to land long and continued. Just as we went over the Cessna; she radioed she was 'taking off 35.' I yelled at her; 'we are right over top of you.' But heard no reply. After landing and as we cleared the Rwy; I heard her advise she was departing east bound (Right turn? In L. traffic pattern?) And then she apologized; she thought she had time for takeoff even though she heard us call turning final.

SR20 Instructor reports a Citabria taking the runway as he is about to land at an uncontrolled airport and goes around. On the next approach a Cessna pulls onto the runway as he is about to land. After words are exchanged the approach is continued to a landing over the Cessna.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 28; Flight Crew Total 616; Flight Crew Type 417

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

While hovering in the parking circle on the ramp just southwest of the hangar; my student and I had been cleared by Tower for an RNAV departure from the ramp (this departure flies over the ramp parallel to Runway XX before turning north-west to parallel Runway XYR during the initial climb). We hovered out to the taxi line; did our before takeoff check; and started our ground run (maybe 1 minute between clearance and beginning the ground run). As we rotated for the climb - over the ramp about abeam Taxiway XX - a helicopter crossed the ramp and Runway XZ/XX directly in front of us; at the same altitude; paralleling Runway XYR. My student was on the controls and correctly flew a quick stop maneuver to avoid hitting the other helicopter. We were able to return to a hover and taxi back to the parking circle without further incident.I believe a lack of communication caused this situation. After we were cleared for the departure and before we started our ground run; I heard part of an exchange between Tower and another helicopter I presume to be the aircraft we had to avoid. Due to communication with my student; I don't know what was said in that exchange; though I suspect it was a clearance to take off from the news helicopter's ramp by flying parallel to Runway XYR. I didn't hear tower alert either us or the other helicopter that we would be in close proximity. If tower had alerted either of us; we could have coordinated so that we were not flying departures at the same time in the same place.

Helicopter instructor reported an NMAC during takeoff with another helicopter.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 17; Flight Crew Total 203; Flight Crew Type 199

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Enroute from SFRA Paleo Gate to Tipton Airport FME; at 1400 ft. MSL; below the 1500 ft. BWI Bravo floor.  Turbulence increased significantly enroute from the shoreline to FME and caused my aircraft to briefly ascend into Bravo airspace and back down.  Potomac [Approach] contacted me on 132.77 and indicated that I had popped up into the Bravo and back down.  I apologized.  The Controller indicated it he understood; but advised me to remain clear of the Bravo. My altimeter setting was consistent with the setting I received on entering the Paleo Gate.  I believe it was 30.11.  I descended to 1300 ft. MSL to avoid repeating the incident. I continued the flight to FME and landed without further incident.

Cessna 150 Student Pilot reported Class B airspace violation due to turbulence.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This is now the 4th Practice Approach (PA) issue we have documented in the past 30 days. ZZZ1 (TRACON) continues to not coordinate PA according to our LOA. They are introducing risk to the NAS by leading pilots to believe they are cleared for a PA and creating uncertainty. LC (Local Control) would have time to anticipate and better accommodate this pilot if ZZZ1 would have simply coordinated this procedure. Due to ZZZ1 not following their requirement in the LOA they are jeopardizing safety and not providing a good service to the flying public. We must get the answers to the following questions before we can move forward. Why did ZZZ1 issue a Practice Approach Letter to Airmen (PALTA) about 3 years ago? What are the reasons for it not reinstating the PALTA? Why was the workforce not briefed or trained on this change? What are the pros and cons of not having a PALTA?On (date); our General Manager signed the now expired PALTA in question. There were many requests from HQ for PA clarification and interpretations on this very topic throughout the past decade.Since the LTA expired on date; we have gradually started to see a thread of confusion among pilots and controllers. The very purpose of having a PALTA was to prevent this from happening. This has led to misinterpretations of many rules within the 7110.65 and the 7110.3. ZZZ ATCT has compiled over 10 falcon replays over the past 10 months that references this very trend and ZZZ2 ATCT has been experiencing similar issues as well. I would like those who review those replays to listen to the disappointment and frustration from the pilots. We are wasting their valuable time and not providing them with the best possible service. It must be clear there are only 3 possible separation rules that can be applied when handling a PA request. These rules are not to be applied by CPC choice at any given moment. 2 out of the 3 rules are defined on whether or not there is an effective LTA that lists your facility. With that being said; CPC and pilots must be trained and aware of these differences. Separation Rules (7110.65) a.1 [states that] IFR aircraft practicing instrument approaches must be afforded approved separation in accordance with Chapter 3; Chapter 4; Chapter 5; Chapter 6; and Chapter 7 minima until the aircraft lands; and the flight is terminated; or the pilot cancels the flight plan. For this argument we have not discovered any issues when complying.[Section] a.2 [states that] where procedures require application of IFR separation to VFR aircraft practicing instrument approaches; IFR separation in accordance with Chapter 3; Chapter 4; Chapter 5; Chapter 6; and Chapter 7 must be provided. Controller responsibility for separation begins at the point where the approach clearance becomes effective. Except for super or heavy aircraft; 500 ft. vertical separation may be applied between VFR aircraft and between a VFR and an IFR aircraft.The issue we have is some CPC are still following a.2 and some a.3. We must train our workforce on which they are to follow; which is dictated on whether or not we have an LTA. We can't allow them to apply a mixture of both these rules. For 2 years our effective LTA has dictated and conditioned pilots; instructors; students; examiners; and CPC that we must follow a.2. This basically implied to all users that they were going to be treated as if they were IFR doing a VFR PA. This was implemented to give VFR pilots and instructors the full experience so they can perfect the instrument approach procedures they are trying to practice. Various air traffic incidents have indicated the necessity for adoption of measures to achieve more organized and controlled operations where practice instrument approaches are conducted. Practice instrument approaches are considered to be instrument approaches made by either a VFR aircraft not on an IFR flight plan or an aircraft on an IFR flight plan. To achieve this and thereby enhance air safety; it is company policy to provide for separation of such operations at locations where approach control facilities are located and; as resources permit; at certain other locations served by ARTCCs or parent approach control facilities.We need to understand that a.2 is simple for all users involved and reduces risk to the NAS. Not to mention it provides a great and safe service to the flying public. The experience we afford the users when utilizing a.2 enhances safety; achieves a more organized and controlled operations where practice instrument approaches are conducted.[Section] a.3 [states] where separation services are not provided to VFR aircraft practicing instrument approaches; the controller must instruct the pilot to maintain VFR; advise the pilot that separation services are not provided; and provide traffic information or advise the pilot to contact the appropriate facility.The implementation of a.2 and the LTA requirement was to detour facilities from using this rule if they have existing resources. This rule creates confusing and is why we are now seeing unsafe trends since our LTA expired about a year ago. Some CPCs are following this rule and are lead to believe that no coordination is needed because they are not clearly them for the approach as they would when utilizing a.2. Some CPCs are still following a.2 and some are doing a mixture of both. We must train our workforce on which procedures must be followed when handling PA. We also need to brief the flying public as well. If ZZZ1 is not going to reinstate the LTA; all the LOAs with the towered airports listed in the LTA must be amended with detailed procedures on dealing with PA approaches; which include coordination requirements. I'm certain Mission Support would support my argument that we should follow a.2 and reinstate our LTA to achieve more organized and controlled operations where practice instrument approaches are conducted. The volume of VFR traffic in the ZZZ1 is on an upward trend and the last thing we need is uncertainty. We also must ask ourselves; why do most all other major approach control facilities in the NAS choose to issue a PALTA to enhance safety? Having the ability to issue a PALTA was given to us to migrate the very issue we are now having. By not choosing to issue a PALTA; ZZZ1 is jeopardizing safety by not creating a more organized environment where PA are being conducted. We understand that the approach control ATM has the discretion on whether or not they need to issue a PALTA however it is important that the workforce understands why they are making this decision. Especially when the data shows that we are now having mass confusion among pilots and CPC. A PALTA will mitigate this confusion immediately. Choosing to not reinstate an LTA on the sole purpose of pilot and CPC complaints is ludicrous and negligent. We did not see this chaos when the LTA was effective.   Over the past 2 years ZZZ ATCT has noticed and documented a trend with PA and other facility are starting to notice as well. Our workforce and all the users involved deserve the best possible service and training. Why are we choosing not to provide pilots with a.2 service and waste their valuable time with a subpar service (a.3) instead? I'm asking that the national recurrent training team design a course on this very argument.

Tower Controller reported miscommunication with TRACON concerning practice approaches.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 49; Flight Crew Total 1760; Flight Crew Type 186

Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Flying aircraft owner and their family from ZZZ to ZZZ1 with stop in ZZZ2 for fuel. The aircraft has a history of both alternators needing work to maintain operation. Everything at startup and the run-up were normal; with no sign of issues. About 30 minutes into the flight the alternator 1 annunciator light started flickering. I noted the annunciator and checked all the other gauges; both steam and digital. At this point the battery; main bus; and essential bus were all showing 28 volts. Even the ammeter showed almost neutral on the battery; alternator 1; and alternator 2.  So despite the flickering annunciator I decided to continue. I monitored the annunciator to see if it would get any worse. At this point we were roughly 1 hour and 30 minutes from ZZZ2.About 25 N.M. north of ZZZ3 I was talking to Approach. This is when I noticed that the digital display of the Main Bus started dropping from 28 Volts down to 20 Volts. The alternator 1 charges this bus. Simultaneously; the alternator 1 annunciator light illuminated and stayed on. I then utilized the POH page 3A-10 to make the corrective actions to fix the alternator. I followed each step in the POH including resetting the alternator 1 circuit breaker. Nothing worked and the digital display indicated the main bus voltage continued to drop to 16 volts. This is when I decided to divert and return back to ZZZ. If I could not make it to ZZZ then I would use one of the many airports under me.I notified approach that I do not need to declare an emergency yet; but I would like to update my destination for ZZZ. I also told them that a loss of radio communications could be possible (since the avionics are on the main bus). The controller cleared me direct to ZZZ. The controller wanted to verify that we were having an alternator/generator failure. I affirmed that it was an alternator failure and that I was unsure how long we would have left with the battery. He then asked me if I would like to cancel IFR and go VFR. Since it was clear skies and excellent visibility I decided to cancel IFR. The controller received my IFR cancellation and started to ask me about the aircraft. I was unable to receive the latter part of this transmission. All the avionics; the transponder; the MFD; the autopilot; all the steam engine gauges; the fuel gauges went completely inoperative. The only instruments that remained operational were the PFD; backup steam airspeed indicator; backup steam attitude Indicator; and backup steam altimeter. I realized that the electric trim was now inoperative; as well as the flaps. At this point I turned off all switches; and both master battery power switches. The engine continued to run due to the magnetos.I used my EFB applications to navigate with pilotage and dead reckoning northbound to ZZZ4. I chose this airport for the long runway. After losing the fuel gauges I did not want to risk extending the range back to ZZZ since my calculations showed we would be below VFR fuel minimums. I verified the landing distance with no flaps. I verified I had plenty of fuel to divert to ZZZ4. I verified the weather; altimeter setting; and NOTAMs. I approached the airport above pattern altitude to spiral and search for traffic. Once I verified there was no traffic in the pattern I entered the left downwind for runway XX. I made a successful no-flap landing using only three quarters of the available runway.Once I parked and shutdown the aircraft on the ramp I called Approach. They had called the flight school owner to see where I was and if I was okay. I returned their call and assured them we had landed successfully. I do believe proper maintenance action needs to be taken for a healthy electrical system on the aircraft. This is purely a mechanical issue; and can be resolved with detailed mechanical inspection and labor to address the issue. I believe all my actions taken; regarding aircraft systems; navigation; aircraft control; performance calculations; airspace; were all completed in a very timely manner; with efficiency; and good ADM.

SR22 pilot reported the aircraft had a complete electrical failure but the pilot was able to perform a successful diversion and landing.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency

After leveling at FL300; Flight Attendant contacted cockpit via inter-phone to report strong electrical fumes in the vicinity of the mid galley. First Officer was PF. I delegated aircraft control and radios to him; and I consulted QRH. The checklist was accomplished down to 'Depowering IFE'; 'Utility Buses'; and 'Recirc Fans.' A short time later the Flight Attendant reported back that the fumes became stronger. An emergency was declared and an immediate divert initiated. I requested that ATC notify the company due to task saturation and proximity to landing airport. We landed safely overweight at 203;500. Passengers were deplaned and ARFF began their investigation. All pertinent logbook entries accomplished.

[This report contains no additional information.]

The flight crew of a Boeing 757-200 was notified by a Flight Attendant 10 minutes after level off of a metal/electrical burning odor mainly in the center galley area of the cabin and the condition was worsening. An Emergency was declared and the aircraft diverted to a near by airport; and landed over-weight without incident.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

After takeoff at approximately 1;400 FT; a Master Warning and tail compartment temperature high warning light was observed. We accomplished the memory action items and declared an emergency. We advised ATC that we would like to return to [departure airport] for a landing. We completed checklist items and returned for an overweight landing. Our landing weight was 133;000 lbs. The emergency fire trucks checked the tail compartment area for heat and advised us that the only detectable heat was coming from the engines. We returned to the gate and deplaned the passengers.

[Narrative 2 had no additional information]

MD-82 flight crew reported TAIL COMP TEMP HIGH light shortly after takeoff. They ran the procedure; declared and emergency; and returned to departure airport.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 44; Flight Crew Total 795; Flight Crew Type 515

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted

I was flying a direct IFR route to ZZZ. ATC instructed to descend and maintain 4500 feet. When I adjusted the throttle; the Manifold Absolute Pressure (MAP) decreased to 12 and I lost power to the aircraft. The engine was still running although at very low idle with no ability to move the throttle lever. I immediately informed ATC and diverted towards [the nearest] airport. I was still approximately 12 miles away and began the failed engine checklist with intentions of landing on a straight roadway. Upon pitching for best glide; I went through the failed engine checklist to notice the throttle was stuck. I manually forced the throttle forward and the plane immediately responded with full MAP. Seeing that the aircraft had restored full power; I then redirected back to my original destination without further incident. I landed safely and informed ATC of my arrival.

PA32 pilot reported experiencing a loss of engine power when the throttle was reduced for descent. The throttle appeared stuck but the reporter was able to force it and restore engine power.


Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Fatigue

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Work Refused

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

[I] called in fatigued for a field standby. [I] had just flown a 2 day trip; early departure both days. The layover on the West Coast resulted in very limited sleep. I slept possibly 3 hours. Two major factors affected my sleep that night. One was the air conditioning system; it would not keep the fan running as programmed. Every time it turned on it 'clunked.' Also had neighbors who routinely entered and exited their room several times until just before my wake up time. They were also extremely noisy. I tried to compensate by wearing ear plugs for both issues; but the end result was still no sleep. The next morning I compensated for fatigue with coffee. I had a 3 hour 28 minute layover at the first destination. But due to the coffee and substandard rest facilities in our operations area; I was unable to get any rest with a nap. I completed the trip and went home. Shortly after arriving home and right before bed I was contacted for a late morning field standby on what would be my day of duty. After the assignment I made the preparations for driving back to the airport in the morning. That night I was still wound up from the coffee I had during the day (I don't normally drink coffee) and had trouble unwinding. After about 3 total hours of fitful sleeping I made the decision to call in fatigued just before morning twilight.

An A320 First Officer called in fatigued for airport standby on his third duty day because on the previous two nights he was not able to get fitful rest.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 87; Flight Crew Type 87

[Took] off on Runway 17L to join the right hand pattern for touch and goes on 17R. Tower let me know that there was a plane in the pattern above and to my right - I saw a plane turning towards the downwind; so I waited until he was no factor and turned till I was also on the downwind.Tower asked me to do s-turns in the pattern (I'm assuming for distancing). A little less than midway; someone made a radio call asking about the plane above them. While in a slight westerly s-turn; I looked down and saw a Cessna at 10-11 o'clock about 150 feet horizontal and 75 feet vertical flying the same direction I was.Naturally; I turned easterly and slowed down; keeping my eyes on this plane the whole time. He went west and boosted his speed; until he was much further ahead of me.I don't know [if] he was behind the plane I saw and I cut him off by turning for the crosswind too early or if he was entering the pattern at the mid-field downwind and got really close. Tower made no mention of our distancing.

C172 pilot reported a NMAC in the pattern at APA airport.


Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 2300

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were dispatched with MELs 27-61-1 and 27-62-1-2 [deferrals]. These relate to the Auto Speedbrake System with Load Alleviation. Part of the Dispatch Procedures requires that the Speedbrake lever is moved [by Maintenance] in its full range to ensure the Load Alleviation System (LAS) is not restricting its travel. Under the remarks and exceptions [in the MEL]; there is a comment to ensure that full range of travel exists. However; there is no requirement under the (O) section that we [flight crew] accomplish this task. During our flight we were asked to expedite our descent. I extended the Speed Brakes and encountered resistance at the 50% position. This is normally the position to which the LAS would return the speed brake lever if we exceeded certain weight and airspeed parameters. We were below the applicable weight (not to mention that the system was deferred); so this was an unexpected restriction. I was able to move the speed brake lever beyond 50% if I applied roughly 30 LBS of force; but it would snap forward when I released it. The exception to this was [the handle] would stay in the fully extended position if pulled fully aft. We speculated that the MEL maintenance procedures may not have been properly performed; or that the [LAS] restriction would be removed upon landing.After landing; the Load Alleviation System (LAS) restriction was still in place. I overpowered the LAS and fully extended the speed brakes. The rollout was uneventful. After block in; a mechanic discovered that; indeed; the LAS actuator was extended and was restricting the travel of the lever. If we had been going to a short runway and had not extended the speedbrake lever in flight; the first indication of an abnormality would have been at a critical time. If we would have had to perform a Rejected Take-Off (RTO); we probably would not have had the same stopping performance. Because of this; I recommend that the MEL remark about ensuring full speedbrake lever travel; that we attributed to the Dispatch Maintenance Procedures be put under the (O) section. I strongly encourage making it an explicit operational crew requirement to ensure this event doesn't happen again.

Before departure; we reviewed applicable MELs 27-61-1 Speed Brake Load Alleviation System (LAS) and 27-62-1-2 Auto Speed Brake System. I specifically concentrated on the Operations Procedures (O) section and Operations Limitations section. Upon arrival the Captain needed speed brakes for descent and when applying noticed excess force required to apply past 50% deployed. Upon landing when deploying speedbrakes; the same thing happened. Maintenance at [our destination] determined the excess force portion of the [LAS] system was not de-activated in the process of complying with the MELs. The Captain filed an event report to suggest the flight crew verify normal speed brake operation for this MEL. We then realized both MELs in the Remarks and Exceptions section has a note to verify speed brake handle forces are verified normal from full down to full up position; but that neither MEL has this step in the Operations Procedures; which may have contributed to our not checking this prior to block out from [our departure airport].

Two pilots reported MEL (M) Maintenance Procedures 27-61-1 for Speed Brake Load Alleviation System (LAS) and 27-62-1 Auto Speed Brake System deferrals on a B767-300 aircraft were not properly complied with causing restricted Speed Brake lever movement in flight. Pilots recommended an (O) Operations Procedure be added to MEL for lever movement verification. The excess force portion of the LAS System had not been de-activated in the process of complying with the MELs.


After entering Class II airspace after radar service terminated we had a dual FMC failure. I immediately went back to the last VHF frequency we were working and the Controller still had us on radar. We entered a holding pattern and completed the QRC. We did not pull and reset the CB as was optional in the checklist. Right FMC recovered after about 5 minutes. The left FMC did not recover. We coordinated with [Dispatch; Maintenance; and Operation] and passenger advocacy. We all agreed the best course of action was to continue to destination.

B747 Captain reported continuing to the destination after experiencing dual FMC failure. One FMC was successfully recovered.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Evacuated; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Declared Emergency

The flight had progressed normally through challenging conditions that included light to moderate turbulence and icing through areas of embedded shower activity. While enroute we began a descent from FL190 due to icing conditions at altitude. At this point we detected a strange odor that was accompanied by a blue haze on the flight deck. The Flight Attendant advised the same conditions were developing in the passenger cabin. An emergency condition was immediately declared with Center with the intention of diverting to a nearby airport. The flight was immediately cleared direct to the airport; descend to 4;000 feet. During the descent; all checklist items were completed; passengers were briefed; Operations and ATC were notified of the plan to land and stop on the runway for further evaluation of the situation. As Pilot Flying; I had suited up my oxygen mask and communicated with ATC while the PIC consulted with the Flight Attendant and Company Operations. After being handed to Approach Control; the flight was cleared for an ILS approach to Runway XX. Tracking the localizer inbound; all checklist items were completed and a normal landing was completed. Once on the ground; the aircraft was brought to a complete stop. Emergency crews standing by then evaluated the aircraft and gave a thumbs up indication. As it was being determined that the aircraft could be taxied; the Flight Attendant advised the Captain that the smoke conditions in the cabin had not ceased. The Captain then ordered an evacuation. The Captain shut down the engines; and then went to assist the Flight Attendant in directing our passengers out the airstair exit. I advised ATC that we were evacuating the aircraft on the runway and I completed the emergency checklist as the rest of the passengers exited the aircraft. I then consulted with the Captain; he indicating all passengers were off the aircraft and I advising him that the aircraft was fully depowered. We then exited the aircraft and joined the emergency ground crews outside the aircraft.

Later the Flight Attendant found out that we were on the news all ready; even while we were on the runway. Then she advised me that another Flight Attendant had reported the same thing weeks before. Later I even found out that we might have had another event. That makes four. Pushing to fly or ferry broken aircraft without any correct checkout is still a problem that needs to be addressed!

When the DHC-8 flight crew and Flight Attendant all detected strange odors and haze the flight diverted to a nearby airport.  After landing the Flight Attendant advised the conditions in the cabin were unchanged the Captain ordered an evacuation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 40

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Attempted to load approach into Garmin 3000 touchscreen controller. Slight turbulence caused pilot to touch load/activate button. This single action changes navigation mode; auto pilot guidance; and flight plan screen. Several pilot actions are required to undo the situation; allowing aircraft to leave the designed STAR until either reverting to manual control or completing to navigation system corrections. Perhaps a function that undoes the last command would be valuable.

Pilot reported turbulence caused them to activate the wrong button on their Garmin 3000 navigation screen which caused them to lose their current navigation modes and flight plan screen.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

I was Captain on [flight from] ZZZ to TXKF. I have extensive Caribbean experience but had never operated into TXKF. I was thinking 'I wonder what we use for alternate' as the weather was 700 OVC; winds 200/25g35 (TXKF has only one runway 12-30). Forecast was for 1500 BKN winds 200/30 with heavy rains forecast at arrival time. Flight Plan showed landing with 2:15 mins of fuel. Couldn't find anything in the [overseas operations manual] about TXKF so I called dispatch. He stated that we operate under an exemption (2 hour exemption which I later found in the FOM). I told him I was unfamiliar with this exemption and I didn't like the sound of it because TXKF is very isolated and what happens if the runway becomes unusable; i.e. another plane becomes disabled; crashed etc... I asked what the closest airport would be in this scenario and he said Norfolk ORF. I then asked for a fuel burn and time from the MAP at TXKF to ORF with our current winds aloft. The answer was 1:58 to ORF. I then stated that I would not accept 2:15 worth of fuel in this scenario; but all we could add was :13 otherwise we would exceed our max landing weight unless we started bumping revenue. So if I was on final and a plane became disabled or crashed; unless I immediately headed for ORF I would be in REAL jeopardy of running out of fuel once that decision was made. Furthermore; if we were dispatched with solely the 2 hours required and this happened we would have only 2 mins of fuel to play with before we would be swimming on our way to ORF. I called my best friend who is a CAPT and they fly to TXKF in an A319 which can carry enough fuel to TXKF; back to [their departure airport] +45 mins without bumping revenue. A 737-800 cannot do this due to the landing weight and I submit that this is the wrong aircraft for this leg; plus it is UNSAFE. Here's a scenario to think about: nowhere on the Flight Plan is the time or fuel to ORF notated; so let's say a captain blindly accepts the 'two hour' exemption dispatch and on final another aircraft crashes. They will go around and then hold; try to get hold of dispatch; but when the decision to divert to ORF is reached its meaningless because they never could have anyway as they only HAD TWO MINUTES TO PLAY WITH. In my scenario with adding fuel so that I landed at Maximum Gross Landing Weight; I still only had 30 mins worth of fuel with the BEST CASE scenario. Add in a hold and decision making time and the reality of ending up in the Atlantic is very very real.

B737-800 Captain reported being concerned with the amount of fuel on board in the event he had to divert from TXKF.


Confusion; Fatigue; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 143; Flight Crew Total 2739; Flight Crew Type 455

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Fatigue

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On descent into Frankfurt cleared to descend to 6;000 feet. Transition level was FL070. The controller advised the crew that the altimeter was 998. 29.98 was read back to the controller at least three times without correction by the controller. Once passing through FL070 both the Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring (PM) set 29.98 inches in their altimeters. The controller noticed the aircraft was descending below 6;000 feet and advised the crew to set 29.47 inches. The aircraft descended approximately 350 feet below it's assigned altitude. The crew on this flight had experienced a maintenance delay [on departure] and had extended their duty day in order to complete this flight. Two factors contributed to this altitude deviation. First the crew was fatigued due to the delay and secondly the controller not specifying the altimeter setting in millibars or correcting the improper altimeter read back by the PM.

During the descent into Frankfurt and while being vectored; ATC directed a continued descent from FL080 to 6;000 feet. The transition altitude was 7;000 feet and the controller stated the altimeter was 998. The Pilot Monitoring (PM) read back 2998 and the controller repeated? Altimeter 998? The PM again read back 2998. Both pilots set 2998 and the Pilot Flying (PF) continued the descent to 6;000 feet on autopilot. Approximately 30 seconds after the aircraft leveled at 6;000 feet; the controller asked if we had set the correct altimeter of 998. The PM read back 2998 for the third time. The controller stated? Altimeter 998 or 2947.? At this time; both pilots realized the error and adjusted the altimeter to a millibars setting of 998. The PM read back 998 or 2947. The aircraft was approximately 400 feet below the assigned altitude. The PF disengaged the autopilot and immediately climbed to the correct altitude then reengaged the autopilot. Contributing factors included a very congested radio frequency; heavily accented English by the German controller; and the altimeter was not stated on the Frankfurt ATIS.

An air crew descended below assigned altitude after passing the transition altitude. They confused the altimeter setting of 998 millibars with 29.98 inches.


Pilot Not Flying; Check Pilot; Instructor

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

While performing a flight review with a private pilot; on touchdown after the second landing the left wheel became locked; causing the plane to veer off the runway into the grass. After inspecting the plane; it appeared that the wheel fairing had come loose and caused the wheel to lock. At the time; the private pilot was acting as pilot in command and was in control of the aircraft.

Instructor; performing a flight review; reports a runway excursion during landing when the left wheel fairing comes loose and locks the wheel.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Aircraft X was a VFR looking for an IFR clearance into MRY. I attempted to clear him unfortunately the pilot had issues with the read back so I cleared him with a slower pace. That gaffe clued me into the possibility they might not be as proficient as they would like. When I noticed they were below the MVA I canceled their approach clearance and proceeded to climb them.I should have issued a low altitude alert first before canceling the clearance and climbing the aircraft.

NorCal TRACON Controller reported a communication problem with a pilot; and then realized the aircraft was below the MVA.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 61; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 300

While in cruise flight at 7;000 MSL immediately after exiting a cloud; I observed a glider descending into my altitude in a slight left bank and then roll out on the same heading as my aircraft. When I first spotted the glider; I was approximately 600 to 1;000 FT behind and slightly to the right of it. He was moving slowly.I was rapidly gaining on him and within seconds of a collision. I disconnected the autopilot and entered a hard right bank trying to maintain a visual on the glider as I did not know if he had seen me or what his next maneuver would be. As I rolled out past him; I realized we had missed colliding by approximately 200 FT.The main reason this incident occurred was the pilot of the glider's lack of maintaining VFR. The glider was 'dancing with the clouds' and had likely been in the clouds at some point. At the time I spotted him; he was clear of the cloud but was not maintaining required VFR cloud separation distances. Had I been distracted for any reason or been in a faster aircraft; a collision could have occurred that would have probably resulted in the deaths of all involved and potential injury or death to others on the ground.ATC advised they did not have radar contact on the glider. Additionally; there were no NOTAMs filed indicating glider activity at the SCD airport. The AFD does indicate that glider towing operations exist on weekends in a 3 mile radius of the airport below 6;000 FT. ATC was not aware of any glider activities at the airport at the time of occurrence.Had a NOTAM been filed; ATC would have likely vectored me away from the area but the main problem here was the glider pilot's lack of adherence to the rules and safe operation.

As he exited clouds on an IFR flight a C182T pilot experienced an NMAC with a sailplane operating in close proximity to the cloud cover. The reporter believed the sailplane pilot to have been in violation of required VFR separation from the cloud system.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 27; Flight Crew Total 81; Flight Crew Type 21

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

I was taking off Runway 10. Another aircraft did a low approach on Runway 35 and was clear of Runway 10 as I started my takeoff roll. I made my radio call for takeoff on Runway 10. Shortly after takeoff; I see a TBM ahead and to the right of me; on short final for Runway 35. I was able to stay low and well clear; passing underneath the TBM that did a low pass on Runway 35. There is enough space for simultaneous operations of Runway 10 and Runway 35 but I expected to pass OVER landing traffic on Rwy 35 and in this case found myself UNDER traffic that was doing a low pass. I made two errors. I thought the first plane was the one doing the lowpass (announced). When I cleared to the south prior to takeoff; I was focussed on the first plane and did not look long enough to see the TBM approaching behind him. I don't think smoke played a part in my missing the second aircraft. I think the TBM was moving quicker than expected.There were many IFR HOLDS and missed approaches being performed to the south. I think the addition of the low passes added complication to the IFR and VFR traffic in the area and would have been better avoided. I did a fullstop taxi back because I was not comfortable fitting a touch-and-go into the traffic.

General Aviation pilot departing from a Non Towered airport reported a NMAC with an aircraft conducting a low approach on an intersecting runway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 7; Flight Crew Total 32; Flight Crew Type 32

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 380; Flight Crew Type 40

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Evacuated

We were accomplishing some pattern work; and did 6 touch and goes.  On the final landing; after landing; the aircraft went into an uncontrollable left-hand skid/veer - pointing the aircraft toward an area of construction consisting of an approximate 10 ft drop-off.  My instructor took control of the situation; preventing a prop strike; and/or a potentially harmful situation.  Safely landing the aircraft on the other side of the construction area after going past the drop-off.  No one was injured in the event. Initially; the aircraft received a damaged nose-wheel pant and was able to be towed to its hangar for inspection.  Due to the limited damage; this was deemed an incident by the instructor and not an accident; no substantial damage was caused to the airplane.

I was giving dual flight instruction to a Student Pilot that was part of our flying club. We were working on pattern work and had a plan to do touch and goes for an hour. We had done 5 touch and go's and his performance had been completely satisfactory. This was going to be the last touch and go for the day and as we were coming in; it was a very stabilized approach and landing until 3-5 seconds after touch down. We had landed on the left half of Runway 1-19 and had about 10-15 more [feet] to the left before we were off the runway. The nose came slightly right and then extremely fast the nose was pointed 45 degrees of the runway to the left. I think what happened was this was the Student Pilot's attempt to correct for the initial drift error of the nose to the right. The overcorrection was so much to the point [it] was unrecoverable by me. When it happened; I pulled the power as we were too slow to attempt a takeoff and I applied full right rudder and right brake to get the airplane to come back to the right onto the runway. It seemed to have no effect and I believe the Student Pilot had frozen his leg on the left rudder/brake; so I had no effect until it was too late. We traveled 20 ft. or so to the left of the runway going approximately 50 miles per hour and I had put considerable back pressure in to keep the nose out of the ground. There was a mound of dirt followed; but an immediate 15 foot drop off we were going towards. We ramped up the mound and we're back in the air and glided about 150 feet further where the airplane came to a stop in some mud. I shut the entire airplane down and we got out to survey the damage. The only visible damage [was] to the nose wheel fairing. There was no substantial damage caused to the aircraft or any other part. I believe that this was unavoidable as soon as the Student Pilot overcorrected for the initial nose drift just due to the violence of the action he took. We both walked away without a scratch and there was visibly no damage to the aircraft. We then had the airplane towed back to its hangar where it is currently.

Instructor Pilot reiterated what happened on flight.

Student and Instructor pilots reported an incident where the aircraft landed and them became uncontrollable in a skid.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

During the climbout the #1 ENG OIL PRESSURE warning light illuminated. We shut down the #1 Engine and returned for a landing at the departure airport. We taxied to the gate and deplaned with no further incidents.

[The report contains no additional information.]

A DHC-8-100 #1 engine LOW OIL PRESSURE alerted during climbout so the engine was shutdown; an emergency declared; and the flight returned to the departure airport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter FOD

Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors

When I arrived at the aircraft I noticed a large amount of FOD; not only in our Gate Safety Zone; but also in adjacent safety zones.  Winds were about 10 knots from the south.  Some of the larger soft FOD (paper) was blowing from Safety Zone to Safety Zone (moving north).  I immediately communicated with one of two Ramp Agents with my request to have him initiate a FOD walk down.  He was in the process of socializing with the other Ramp Agent near the forward cargo bay; and he responded to me by saying that he would do the FOD walk down 'later.' The Ramp Agent was not disrespectful.  However; there seemed to be a total lack of 'situational awareness' and lack of a 'sense of urgency' to collect FOD from the Safety Zone and Ramp.  If each Ramp Agent took responsibility for his/her Safety Zone and immediate surrounding area by collecting FOD; the FOD would not then migrate into other safety zones; ramp; taxiways; and runways. (Runway XX was shut down the other night after we landed for FOD on the runway - large white plastic bag).  This Ramp Agent's attitude is typical of many of the ramp agents' attitudes.  What is lacking is good leadership; proper training; and hands-on supervision to ensure the job is being accomplished.  There is a great deal of apathy and laziness at this airport.  In the two hours prior to departure; I observed no attempt; whatsoever; on the part of the ramp agents or ramp supervisors to pick up the large amount of FOD on the flight line.  Rather than call a Ramp Supervisor; I retrieved a white plastic trash bag from the aircraft forward galley; and picked up all the FOD from the Safety Zone.  The process took less than 10 minutes.  During my FOD walk down; I retrieved over 70 pieces of FOD (hard and soft).  Six bag pieces; one black zip strip; one stone; four plastic baggage tags; three pink transfer tags; one company rush tag; two metal baggage keys; 14 baggage zipper pieces; three metal washers; one metal nut; two lock pieces; one metal cylinder; one metal rivet; one paper clip; an aluminum ruler; five red stir stick pieces; nine miscellaneous paper pieces; two sets of hearing protection; one golf tee; two plastic loops; one blue plastic gum pack (empty); one Equal packet; one baggage claim tag; one M&M Peanut bag; one nylon string; one metal triangle bag piece; one crushed Motts tomato juice can; one aluminum can top; one Downline Destinations report; one Transfer Report; one Inbound/Outbound Report; one Local Manifest Report; one Utz Cheese Curls pack; one 8x10 color photo of Air Force One; and one GKN Pack slip/Commercial Invoice.  Most of this FOD came from our own airline operation.  It is not migrating from some other place.  During my FOD walk down; I witnessed FOD blowing from this Safety Zone into the next Safety Zone then into the one after that; etc.  Some have made the argument that Ground Operations is overworked and understaffed; and; as a result; they do not have the time to do a proper FOD walk down before every jet arrives in the Safety Zone.  That assumption was not valid today.  Gate ramp agents had two hours in which to conduct a proper FOD walk down.  Either we have a solid and consistent FOD awareness program or we do not.  The answer is that at ZZZ we do not!  We can continue to believe that; if we look the other way; everything is fine.  The fact is that 70+ pieces of FOD found in one Safety Zone (much of the FOD appeared to have been there for quite some time) is not evidence of an effective FOD Awareness Program.  Station Leadership needs to have a hands-on approach in solving this problem.  Training needs to be done to teach our ramp agents how to conduct a proper FOD walk down every time.  A FOD walk down cannot be done while sitting on the tug; talking to a friend; texting on the cell phone; etc.  A proper FOD walk down is completed by getting a plastic bag; hands out of the pockets; walk from the front to the back of the safety zone; eyes on the deck; picking up every piece of FOD; place it in the bag; every time before a jet arrives or departs the Safety Zone.  Supervisors need to enforce the FOD Awareness Program.  Please help us to prevent damaging our engines from preventable FOD ingestion.

B737 Captain reports an unacceptable FOD situation in the gate area prior to aircraft arrival.  Ramp personnel are asked to correct the problem but are unwilling to do so in a timely manner.  The Captain then picks up the FOD on his own.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 12300; Flight Crew Type 5800

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 800

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport

[We] approached JAC using ILS 19; weather clear and more then 10 mile visibility. Runway appeared clear and dry. Briefed Approach and landing runway using [Commercial] Flight Charts [we] referenced airport diagram for JAC. Diagram shows available runway landing of 6;300 FT. Diagram depicts A1 Taxiway at the end of the runway. Nowhere does the diagram show an overrun area extending beyond the usable runway. The assumption is the full length of the runway that would be visible is available to the end and the pilot would then exit on to A1. Upon touchdown within the first 500 FT of the runway; a smooth transition was made and thrust reversers deployed and moderate braking was applied. Landing and rollout was completely as expected and taxi speed was achieved within the first 5;500 FT of the runway. The remaining roll was continued with the expectation that a turn to the left would be made at the end of the visible runway. As we continued to the end we noticed the left side taxiways were covered in snow. There was no clear cut visual indication of where A1 began. The taxi diagram shows a wide taxiway area at A1. The assumption again by the [Commercial Chart] diagram is A1 would be at the end of the pavement. We noticed ramp personnel waving us to come in as we became parallel to them. The ramp area extends beyond what we learned is the end of the runway; I stopped the aircraft and looked hard to see that a taxiway was barely visible (due to covered in snow) off my left side. We needed to make a 180 degree turn as the clearest section appeared slightly behind us. When we asked the Tower for a 180 degree turn the Tower queried us if we were OK. We didn't understand his question at first as the landing through rollout was smooth and as expected. Upon further inquiries; we were advised we had overrun the end of the runway. We could not understand this as the diagram clearly depicts just the usable runway with a left turn on to A1 at the end. Again; on the chart there is no pictorial of any overrun that would look like a continuation of the runway. This clearly led us to continue taxi down the runway looking for A1 at the end. Additionally; once we were notified of the overrun; we had to look very hard to notice runway markings. The runway from threshold to end has very light/gray markings that blend into the environment. There is no clear indication of the overrun until you are already upon it. There is no damage to the aircraft or any indication we exceeded the runway. We did not enter the runoff area beyond 40 FT. We were at taxi speed when we apparently entered the area. The runoff area is a smooth transition from the runway and again appears to be continuous. We were advised another aircraft had a similar issue just 24 hours prior. The ATIS did not mention anything about any issues of rolling out to the end or possible overrun issues. [Commercial Chart] should show in there airport/runway diagram the overrun area. Apparently this is an issue at this airport. Runway markings need to be improved and advisory message included in the ATIS and or Tower instructions prior to landing. [Commercial Chart maker] needs to accurately depict the runway and environment.

Much to our surprise we looked down and could barely make out the very faded runway end and blast pad markings. There was no change in pavement texture; color; or grade. The blast pad area was also plowed and clear of any snow appearing to be dry and part of Runway 19. The [Commercial Chart] Airport Diagram indicates no pavement beyond the runway and A1 Taxiway. Taxiway A1 is depicted as a very wide taxiway and ending abeam the southern end of Runway 19's pavement. The assumption by the crew was that the runway ended at the end of the pavement as depicted on the diagram. The crew did concur on final approach that the runway markings were extremely faded on the clear and dry runway pavement. I would like to make a strong suggestion for the airport to repaint all runway markings that will be clearly visible by all.

An Air Taxi crew taxied on the JAC Runway 19 overrun because the Commercial Airport Diagram did not depict an overrun and then faded markings gave the overrun the appearance of a Runway continuation.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I assigned Mechanics to change tires on 737 aircraft. I called to delay loading bags/cargo and boarding passengers. Management wanted to load passengers & cargo during tire change process; with aircraft on axle jacks.I expressed concern; referencing clear WARNING in AMM 7-11-03 for 737/757/767 &777; AMM 07-12-00 for S80 & A3XX. AMM says to not load cargo; management wanted to board passengers on aircraft. I explained that passengers are usually much heavier; and move for/aft changing weight/balance and center of gravity as they walk; increasing risk of damage or injury as expressed in AMM. Manufacturer and AMM clearly see a serious shifting weight hazard of loading Cargo and boarding passengers during aircraft on axle-jack operations.General Procedures Manual (GPM) 4.05 clearly states for other than axle jack process; don't perform cabin movement functions (clean; cushion change-out; catering; etc.); but is unclear with GPM 4.05.1.C exclusion what the safety requirements are with an axle jack.[Suggest] Remove seeming contradiction/exclusion in GPM; as it places employees; passengers and aircraft in unacceptably (per Boeing) risky situation. Update and clearly state in GPM 4.05 that no loading of cargo; passengers or catering is allowed during axle-jack process; to ensure; as GPM 4.05.2 states; 'the highest level of safety to preclude any damage or injury'; as described by Boeing.

Maintenance reported that Management wanted to load passengers and cargo on a B737 while at the same time the tires were being replaced.