Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Weather; Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Procedure

I was working a sector with weather building. The warning areas were hot with numerous aircraft deviating into active military airspace. I was unaware at the time that the only plan was to depend on the military to take point-outs to work aircraft through that area. With no notice the adjacent sector said I can't take anymore northbound aircraft because the controlling facility will not take point-outs. At the time I had several aircraft within minutes of their airspace that required 90 degree turns to miss the sectors airspace. I had to reroute almost every aircraft on my frequency. This reroute put aircraft into weather and overloaded the next receiving sector. This last-minute major increase in workload resulting in Aircraft X not being issued weather. The aircraft flew through moderate to heavy precipitation and encountered severe turbulence which resulted in two passenger injuries.I have NO recommendations this will absolutely happen again. For the years I have been at ZJX; aircraft deviating into active military airspace is normal operations. Look at my previous reports and my co-workers in other areas. Numerous conditions happen in ZJX south area to overload the sectors that cause weather not to be called. After this incident I returned to the south area to see this exact scenario unfolding again. An air carrier flight was in active military airspace [requesting priority]. The only reason this is even being discussed is because a passenger was injured on Aircraft X. If an injury would not have occurred nobody would have investigated what was going on in the ZJX south area. This has been going on for years in the south area with numerous reports. Nothing will change and this will happen again.

ZJX Controller reported working numerous aircraft deviating for weather into military airspace when the controlling facility unexpectedly would not approve anymore deviations. Due to the workload the reporter was not able to issue weather advisories and an aircraft encountered severe turbulence injuring passengers while another Air Carrier advised and deviated into the closed military airspace.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 4; Flight Crew Total 7109; Flight Crew Type 3691

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Just a busy VFR final with speed 170 until 5 miles and then a scramble to get speed set and flaps configured and landing checklist done.  Seriously compounding the issue is a lack of recency in the jet (over 5 months since last flight and 8 months since having a consistent schedule).

Air carrier Captain reported an unstabilized approach and cited lack of proficiency after an extended period of time off as a contributing factor.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

The crew departed ZZZ on time after calling maintenance to reset a Rudder Trim Limiter ECAM malfunction. Pushback; start; taxi; takeoff and climb out were uneventful. Passing FL260 for a cruise altitude of FL270 the First Officer (Pilot Monitoring) identified a flashing oil quantity advisory reading and a low oil pressure indication on the #1 engine system display. Due to the aircraft's momentum and vertical rate of climb the Captain (Pilot Flying) elected to level off at FL270 as planned. Initially the zero oil quantity and low 60 PSI pressure indication were not accompanied by an ECAM message and system status indicated normal. Within a couple of minutes a series of intermittent ECAM cautions and warnings occurred leading to an engine shutdown condition. The amber ENG 1 OIL LO PR Caution illuminated first on the ECAM display. The crew responded by initiating the company non-normal checklist strategy. The Captain announced 'my aircraft' then the First Officer verified that the ECAM was not a Quick Action or ECAM exception item. The Captain elected to remain flying and also took control of the radio. It was a crew awareness only caution so the FO (First Officer) then checked the QRH for follow up items. This Caution does not direct the crew to adjust thrust settings. During this process the caution [message] cleared itself without any inputs from the crew but the zero oil quantity and 60 PSI indications remained. At this point the ECAM display was clear and system status indicated normal. Shortly thereafter the red ENG 1 LO PR warning illuminated on the ECAM display. This occurred intermittently 3 times and then cleared itself each time resulting in a normal system status display on the ECAM. Oil quantity remained at zero and pressure was now steady at 40 PSI on the system display. These intermittent ECAM warnings lasted for approximately 2-3 seconds and then cleared to a normal status for roughly the same amount of time. The next time the ECAM warning illuminated it remained steady and the crew followed the ENG 1 LO PR warning procedures and shutdown the engine. The crew notified Center and requested a radar vector descent to final for the engine out approach at ZZZ1. The non-normal indications initially occurred just prior to the ETP (equal time point) between ZZZ and ZZZ1. However by the time the ECAM directed engine shutdown the flight had progressed passed the ETP and was at a normal descent point for ZZZ1. Dispatch was called using the iPad crew phone and notified of the nature of the emergency and decision to land at ZZZ1. The flight attendants and passengers were briefed about the Precautionary Landing at ZZZ1 and the possibility of airport fire vehicles near the aircraft. After shutting down the engine and notifying ATC; the crew requested and was given a vector and descent direct to a left 10 NM base at ZZZ1. Descent and approach were very stable and normal. The Captain flew the descent and approach with both the autopilot and auto thrust on. Crew requested ARFF (airport rescue fire department) for the landing and cleared the runway for a brief inspection of the engine. On request of the crew the fire department followed the aircraft to the gate. Shutdown at the gate and passenger deplaning were normal. Note: ATC handling by ZZZ Center; ZZZ1 Approach and Tower were outstanding. Handoff from Tower to ARFF at ZZZ1 was seamless and well coordinated. Flight Attendant performance was also outstanding and the passengers remained well informed throughout the emergency. Although oil fault indications were somewhat intermittent and erratic the fact that multiple independent sensors indicated a problem caused the crew to shutdown the #1 engine when directed by the ENG LO PR Warning ECAM. After the flight; maintenance personnel initially reported normal engine oil quantity on a sight gauge even though the engine instrument remained at zero. Initially crew suspects a partial blockage or pump failure in the system without oil loss. The engine oil quantity and pressure indications were initially both alarming and confusing. As the adrenaline level increased for the crew due to the perception there would be an engine shutdown there was also a level of doubt that the indications were accurate. Low oil pressure on the engine instrument should be accompanied by a Low Pressure ECAM Caution or Warning. Why did the pressure remain steady in the amber range with zero on the quantity? This is an uncomfortable situation because our training does not address multiple oil failures without ECAM warnings. It puts the flight crew into one of those gray areas where a Captain is expected to make a decision based on the information he has on hand in a situation not covered in training. The natural instinct of a pilot is to shutdown an engine before complete oil loss to prevent a catastrophic failure. In this occurrence engine indications identified a problem well in advance of ECAM warnings. Yet crew training and aircraft procedures generally do not address engine shutdown without ECAM warning checklist direction. Should crews be given shutdown discretion in the absence of ECAM warnings and checklist? In this situation the Captain elected to continue as the Pilot Flying while the crew worked through the non-normal checklist strategy. Even though most aspects of company's non-normal strategy were performed correctly the overall pace and structure were hampered by the Captain continuing to fly. In this case the checklist strategy would have been better managed if the Captain had delegated flying to the FO. For example; when the ECAM directed the 'Engine Master Switch-Off' both pilots confirmed it was the #1 engine but the Captain positioned it to off. Procedure dictates that the non-flying pilot position the switch to off.

Air Carrier Captain flying A321 aircraft reports low engine oil pressure inflight.


Confusion; Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

We were cleared for a VOR/GPS 13L approach. The visibility was unrestricted and the winds were 180/17 G23. I conferred with the First Officer (FO) and we agreed on the RNAV 13L approach in the FMS. There was an RNAV 13L and a VOR 13L in the FMS. We even discussed the reluctance of ATC to clear us for the visual since we need to have traffic and airport in sight. I briefed a flaps 15; autobrakes 2 landing at an approximate landing weight of 127;000 LBS  following a visual hand flown approach; backed up by LNAV/VNAV. We had a 27 KT tailwind; I hand flew the approach from ASALT with traffic ahead and airport in sight. I remainded at 3;000 FT until ZADUD; Approach gave me 3 rapid speed reductions because of the tailwind and traffic ahead from 200; 170; to 150 KTS prior to ZADUD. I was gear down; flaps 15; prior to descent. While configuring; slowing and asking the FO for the flap inhibit switch; and receiving a clearance to contact Tower. The FO correctly realized that on the 45 degree track; we were left of CRI VOR and had the wrong approach in the FMS. I was concentrating on ground track vs LNAV; remaining to the right of the Long Island Expressway and following the lead in lights to runway 13L. And keep the traffic ahead insight. The FO was trying to convince me that we were off track and he was trying to change the FMS approach to the VOR/GPS 13L. I said;'We still need the flap inhibit switch; need to contact Tower; and finish the checklist. I'm proceeding visually and it's too late to change the FMC; I need you heads up outside.' We were cleared to land on 13L and turned off at Taxiway Echo. Upon debriefing the FO; I realized he felt out of the loop; and was focused on the fact that we chose the wrong approach and needed to rectify it. We were in a high workload environment and I was focused on a continuous descending visual with a tailwind turning into a gusty crosswind landing.

Upon arrival into New York airspace; we were issued an approach clearance for GPS 13L. I was the Pilot Monitoring (PM). Flight crew became confused on which approach we were using. Pilot Flying (PF) and PM were not 'on the same page' as PF was flying a visual approach. Our confusion led to a small lateral deviation from CRI VORTAC (flyover waypoint). PF continued visually over the approach light system and landed uneventfully.Better preparation and a thorough briefing will allow the PM to better perform his duties.

The Captain and First Officer of a B737-800 suffered a breakdown in communication before beginning and approach to Runway 13L at JFK.  Confusion and a modest track deviation were the result.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 2; Flight Crew Total 6500; Flight Crew Type 5000

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Due to COVID-19 and family issues there has been a considerable limited amount of flying. Flying practice flights to regain proficiency in all aspects.Assigned a heading and altitude of 2;500 feet on departure from ZZZ. If given a change to ATC I missed the call; but do not remember hearing it. I climbed to 4;500 feet which was my flight altitude.I was told by Tower to go to Departure. Departure stated I climbed to an unauthorized altitude as there was possible traffic. Was not allowed above 2;500 feet.Miss-communication and getting back into the system after the layoff. This is why I am practicing in VFR conditions with various phases of flight.

GA pilot reported an altitude deviation during departure and cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 179; Flight Crew Total 721; Flight Crew Type 562

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

My student and I approached the MXO airport from the northeast and made our initial radio call on the CTAF. From there; we proceeded to fly to the airport to enter the traffic pattern on the left mid-field downwind position. After hearing on the weather frequency that the wind was from 010 at 6 knots; we announced on the CTAF that we would be using runway 33. We continued to update our position on the CTAF frequency all throughout the traffic pattern. Shortly after we turned final to runway 33; my student and I noticed a yellow crop duster flying towards us just a few feet to our left at the same altitude. No radio calls had been made on the CTAF by anyone other than us. After swerving to avoid the crop duster; we were able to finish our final descent and land on runway 33.We proceeded to takeoff; and made another left-hand traffic pattern. On the upwind; we noticed another crop duster taxiing from the ramp to the runways; and during our downwind; we realized that the second crop duster was also taxiing to runway 15. Again; no radio calls were ever made by the crop duster; and the winds were favoring the opposite direction runway. We continued to make our traffic pattern radio calls on the CTAF; but never heard anything from the crop duster; and by the time we were on the left base leg; the crop duster was in the process of taking off down runway 15. Seeing this; my student and I went around; abandoned the pattern; and departed the area to the northeast. These incidents could have easily been prevented by the crop duster pilots monitoring and talking on their radios to the CTAF; and watching for other traffic.

C172 reported NMACs in the pattern at MXO airport with two different crop dusters who appeared to not be using CTAF.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 800

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure

While maneuvering near Kelly Airpark on a west heading I noticed an aircraft well below and to my north that would pass below and behind me during my looping maneuver. To facilitate separation and maintain visual contact I continued the climbing portion of the loop vertically to just below a stall. The other aircraft passed greater than 2;500 FT below and more than 2;500 FT west of our position as we passed through inverted. On the way down I rolled 90 degrees to a south heading to maintain visual contact through the end of the maneuver. We leveled at approximately 9;000 FT MSL on the same heading as the other aircraft well behind it. The TIS system in my aircraft never registered a Traffic Advisory. The other aircraft did not say anything on 122.75; the frequency that we monitor in the area known for high intensity training and aerobatics. I possibly encroached on V81 coming less than 4 miles from the center of the airway maneuvering to avoid the other aircraft. The other aircraft did not appear to ever see us as indicated by their unchanging flight path. I finished the flight without incident.In the future to avoid a situation like this I feel like it would help if there was a note on the chart to monitor 122.75 in this area. All of the flight schools do this now but anyone traveling through there would also benefit having an idea of who is there before they come through.That said I will be utilizing Denver Approach Control in the future to know of a potential conflict more quickly while broadcasting in the blind my position and monitoring 122.75.

A pilot maneuvering during acrobatic flight in a high performance aircraft may have entered the V81 confines near CO15 while not communicating with ATC but monitoring the training area frequency 122.75.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted

Flying along looking for landing locations during a back country flying. Came across a set of power lines while operating at a very low altitude and airspeed while making an approach to land on a small playa/lakebed. I made the determination that it would be more hazardous to make abrupt control input and try to either climb over the lines or turn to avoid them. I elected to increase power and abort my landing on the small playa and fly under the lines. So I'm reporting this here because I think this was a hazard coming this close to an incident. A contributing factor was the sunlight at the time was at my rear and creating a glare inside my cockpit that made the power lines difficult to see. Also there was wind blowing up playa dust and the dust accumulated on the windscreen causing a distraction reduction in visibility outside the cockpit. As a result of this close call; I terminated my flight early and returned to the flying.

A Carbon Cub pilot reported sunlight and blowing dust obscuring view of powerlines; resulted in taking evasive action.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Type 25

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On downwind into DAL the First Officer (IOE) was flying and I was the Pilot Monitoring. We were on a right base to final and he was fast and unable to configure properly. We went around because we were too high to safely land. We went around and were sequenced back into a visual to 31L again. He was very concerned that he might get fast again and began to configure early. We turned final and he started down early. I was watching him to make sure that he was not going too fast. At approximately 1;400 FT MSL; Tower called a low altitude alert and I acknowledged that we were correcting. We had a 13-knot tailwind all the way down final and the glideslope did not come into view until late in the approach. We landed and taxied to the Gate. When we got to the gate; we debriefed what happened and turned the aircraft over to the oncoming Crew. I was so concerned that we might have to go around that I let my guard down and let us get low on the approach.

Cleared visual approach 31L DAL. We got high and could not continue with stable approach. Executed visual go-around and maintained VMC for vectors visual 31L DAL. As I was the Pilot Flying; on right base leg; we got low altitude alert from ATC. About this same time; the glideslope came into view. I corrected the path and landed. Next time; I will try and execute the visual approach from outside the FAF and make sure the aircraft is stable and remains that way.

Medium passenger jet flight crew; with the First Officer on IOE; reports an unstabilized visual approach that results in a go-around. On the second visual approach the aircraft is configured early and allowed to get low resulting in a low altitude alert from the Tower. The approach is continued to a normal landing.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On the SPIDR2 RNAV arrival; ATC gave us multiple step down altitudes; ignoring the altitudes prescribed in the arrival. Green Flight Path Angle (FPA) mode was used to make the descent. Outside of HEMME; we were told to descend via the arrival; so we scrolled the altitude down to 8;000. We then realized that we were at 10;600 just before HEMME; with an altitude restriction of 11;000-12;000. We stopped descending and climbed back up to join the arrival profile.To prevent the airplane from leveling off during our assigned descent; we switched the vertical mode from magenta to green. When told to descend via the arrival later; we forgot to switch it back.

Air carrier First Officer reported descending below the SPIDR2 Arrival published altitude depiction on the chart.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was working the R1 Sector and I had Aircraft Y [a] VFR DHC6 turning right base in front of Aircraft X an IFR A320 that was 4 miles in trail for Runway 10. Aircraft Y reduced speed to 80 knots so I told Aircraft X to reduce to slowest practical speed. When they were 2.5 miles apart the Tower gave me the handoff for Aircraft X because they had sent Aircraft X around. Nobody called me for coordination and when I called and asked I told them to let Aircraft X do the approach and send Aircraft Y around but they switch me Aircraft X for re-sequence. No separation was lost on this event. There have been plenty of issues with SJUT and the biggest problem that we have in approach is the attitude and lack of professionalism in handling this type of situation ending up in compromising safety. This has to change; to be a better system and to provide a better service. They give a poor service to pilots and they don't want to cooperate with us starting with their management. This has to stop; many coworkers are frustrated because no action has been taken. Safety is being compromised!

ZSU Controller described a go around event when the Tower sent an A320 around that was following a DHC6; the TRACON Controller indicating the Tower ignored the TRACON's direction.


ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types

I took the hand off on a BE10 routed direct the VOR. Around the time he checked on our frequency; we realized that he was drifting south of course; possibly due to winds? Although his equipment suffix was (/G) and toward restricted airspace; which was active. The R Controller vectored him 15 or 20 degrees right; to the north of the restricted airspace. I had some land line calls and had missed whatever happened on the frequency and with the R Controller while my attention was on other calls. I noticed the BE10 was turning back toward the VOR and updated the route line. He would be cutting into Sector 27's airspace on his way to the neighboring Center's airspace. I debated for a moment in my head whether to point him out to 27 (and hand off to the neighboring Center) or hand him off to 27. My R Controller looked at me; pointed to the BE10 and said; '27's watching him.' I nodded; and flashed the hand off to the neighboring Center. After the BE10 was in 27's airspace; the R Controller quick looked 27 and noticed they didn't have the full data block pulled up. He asked me if they had ever gotten the point out on him. I was confused and said I thought he had told me that he had pointed him out to 27. A point out was made to 27 at that time; after we had violated their airspace. In retrospect; I now understand that my R Controller had been asking me a question: '27's watching him?' I would recommend; as a Radar Associate; if you believe your R is telling you that he already coordinated something; to question it and to reiterate to clarify that that is what he is actually telling you.

Enroute Assistant Controller described an unauthorized airspace entry event when coordination with the RADAR Controller was confused.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 5100; Flight Crew Type 400

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

On IFR flight plan to ECP. Weather was rapidly deteriorating accompanied by severe thunderstorms and moderate to extreme precipitation. Aircraft is equipped with NEXRAD weather; but not on-board sweeping weather radar. Approximately 30 miles from severe reported weather (as reported by prior aircraft and confirmed by NEXRAD equipment) I attempted to change destination to CEW to avoid entering extreme weather exceeding capability of aircraft. Requested change of destination from filed destination (ECP) to CEW approximately three times over 5 minute period. ATC did not acknowledge transmission; and descended aircraft to assigned altitude of 17;000. During descent to 17;000 ATC advised to level off at 18;000. I then advised ATC that if I could get descent below 18;000 I would cancel IFR clearance and precede VFR. ATC advised 'standby' and then assigned 17;000. During descent below 18;000 I requested to 'cancel IFR' more than once to remain VFR prior to entering extreme weather and precede VFR; but transmission was not acknowledged. After announcing to Controller I was canceling IFR aircraft descended below last assigned IFR cleared altitude of 17;000. Aircraft descended to approximately 16;300 MSL at which time ATC advised assigned altitude was 17;000. Better flight planning and earlier decision making regarding a more suitable alternate would have mitigated problem. This would have given ATC and me more time to sequence and plan aircraft's intended course of action.

EA500 Captain reports communication difficulties with ATC while attempting to change destination or descend and and cancel IFR due to weather. A deviation below the ATC assigned altitude of 17;000 FT occurs prior to the Controller acknowledging IFR cancellation request.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

We had a left engine fire on taxiway just off [the] runway. I read through the Left engine fire in flight procedure on the QRC. After realizing my mistake we completed the engine fire on ground procedure. The intensity of the emergency made me feel rushed and I didn't read the QRC procedure title before following the procedure.

CRJ700 First Officer reported an engine fire during taxi. He initially used the Inflight Checklist instead of the Engine Fire on Ground Checklist.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Descending out of 18;000 feet we lost the quantity and pressure on the green hydraulic system. We accomplished the appropriate checklists and set up for the approach. During the approach; the flaps would not extend with the use of the other two hydraulic systems. After we manually lowered the gear; the hydraulic fluid in the green system indicated a return to the normal level. At that point; we conferred with maintenance control and elected to use the green system electric pumps to lower the flaps which was not called for in the checklist. The flaps extended to the full position and we continued the approach and landing without incident.

Descending out of FL180 we lost the quantity and pressure on the green hydraulic system. We ran the checklist and then set up for the approach. When we went to put the flaps out they did not extend so we discontinued the approach and we noticed that after we manually extended the landing gear the green system hydraulics now showed normal pressure and quantity. We then conferred with maintenance control and elected to use the green system electric pumps to lower the flaps which was not called for in the checklist; but because the yellow system was not working to extend the flaps and we now had full green pressure and quantity with the engine pumps now off we felt it was a safer option to use the electric pumps and land with full flaps.

A300 flight crew reported loss of green hydraulic system quantity and pressure on descent; but the system reportedly returned to normal later in the approach.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

On approach at approximately 4000 ft MSL ATC slowed us to 180 from 220. When I asked the FO (First Officer) PM (Pilot Monitoring) for Flaps 1 almost immediately we got an EICAS message of LE (Leading Edge) FLAP ASYM. We broke off the approach and circled for approximately 10 minutes while we worked the QRH. I remained the PF (Pilot Flying) and the FO ran the checklist. We managed to get the TE (Trailing Edge) flaps to 20 and setup for a non-normal landing. The FAs (Flight Attendants) were briefed; a message was sent thru ACARS to [maintenance] and Dispatch. [ATC was advised] and the fire trucks were asked to be standing by. Our approach speed was 172 KIAS; however the low speed yellow band was right at that speed; so I elected to fly at 175 to 180 KIAS. We briefed the approach and flew the ILS to RWY 25L. An uneventful landing was made using AUTOBRAKES 3 and full reverse. We taxied to the [gate] with minimal brake temp rise; one wheel on the right truck showed 6 by the time we left the (Aircraft); the others were at 5. I floated a bit on touch down due to the sight picture; speed; and darkness; but managed to exit just past midfield. All in all I think the FO and I managed the [situation] well with great CRM (Crew Resource Management); communications and teamwork. The FO did an excellent job throughout the incident.

B757 Captain reported receiving an EICAS message LE FLAPS ASYM on approach.


ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

ZWG called with a hand off for Air Carrier X; asking if I had Flight Plan (FP) information. I looked in ERAM and found none; so instructed ZWG; the aircraft was POA and to keep the aircraft coming while I had FDCS get the FP into ERAM. The aircraft was just crossing into ZMP as I was notified FDCS was entering the FP; so I called RADAR contact and communications change. It was another 40-50 NM before the FP was available; simply due to its length (International.) There was no 'error' per se in this event; but the lack of FP info with Air Carrier X flights is becoming more and more routine. Rumor has it there may be something non-standard; or at least something ERAM doesn't understand in the remarks section of the FP. However; querying the FDCS specialist about this flight; there was nothing obvious or changed. Recommendation; best option would be for NAS and NAVCANADA computers to allow the same functionality we have domestically: Add/Find of a flight. Alternatively; the moment NAVCANADA gets an error message; it would be prudent for them to contact ZMP; versus waiting until the hand off distance from boundaries.

ZMP Controller described an equipment issue when no information was available via the ERAM on an aircraft arriving from Canadian airspace; the reporter suggesting more same type functionalities between US and Canadian equipment.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 292; Flight Crew Type 1800

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 303; Flight Crew Type 6000

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

I was PF on takeoff after deicing. Weather at the time was reporting visibility of 2NM -SN; winds 020/12. My attention was outside when the 80 knot callout was made. It was about this time that I also saw a Master Caution light. I do not remember the Captain stating intention to 'continue' or 'reject; I have the aircraft.' I glanced up briefly and stated 'aft cargo door.' I believe it was at this point I might have led the Captain down the path of rejecting the takeoff. The reject was uneventful and I noted a speed of 100 knots on the airspeed indicator. After notifying ATC; we taxied off the active runway on the reverse high speed Taxiway. After calculating the RTO [energy]; we used a conservative number of a three-mile taxi which gave us a 30-minute cooling period before entering the gate area.  Neither the flight attendants nor the passengers seemed alarmed by the rejection. Verbalization of intention to 'continue' or 'reject' needs to be stated clearly and immediately. Looking back now; knowing it was only a Master Caution and around 80 knots; I would have been better off noting the indication to myself and addressing it once airborne to prevent any confusion in the future.

Close to 80 KIAS; Master Caution illuminated. The F/O called out 'aft cargo door open.' Since 80 KIAS call had not been made; the Captain assumed control and rejected the takeoff. During the reject; 100 KIAS was noted. Originally; the Captain was thinking continue but the unique timing and further input from the F/O added information which ended in a reject decision instead. Upon returning to the gate; Ground Ops discovered they had left a strap for closing the door hanging out of the aft cargo door. The reject and follow on procedures were fine and the flight departed normally later after procedures; maintenance; and dispatching. While the aircraft was not damaged; in hindsight; it would seem continuing would have been the right decision. Also; making the 80 KIAS call even if incident occurs simultaneously is important. The intent was this was a prior to 80 KIAS abort in reality 100 KIAS was noted.Train Captains to clearly verbalize intentions immediately with inputs and that they may need to stay with the decision even with other crew inputs. Practice the PNF reject duties as Captain in training. Standardize verbiage for malfunctions on takeoff possibly similar to callouts.

B737-300 flight crew experiences an aft cargo door warning at 80 KTS during takeoff with the First Officer flying. When the Captain says nothing; the First Officer announces the warning and the Captain rejects. Maintenance found a strap hanging out of the door.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 92.5; Flight Crew Total 2343.4; Flight Crew Type 521.1

Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

After experiencing some abdominal discomfort and diarrhea I decided I was still feeling well enough to depart and climb to 23000 feet. After leveling off with the auto pilot engaged I started feeling sick and asked for a sick sack. At that time; according to the flight nurses onboard; I passed out for 30-45 seconds and woke up again. I diverted to another airport that was close and VFR and landed safely.

Air taxi pilot reported passing out during the flight in a single pilot operation.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Descending into ZZZ; we received an RA from a VFR traffic crossing our path below us at approximately 5;500 ft. MSL. We were descending to initially 3;000 ft. MSL to setup for landing on Runway XX (VMC conditions prevailed and the ATIS advertised a visual to Runway XX); but then were told to maintain 6;000 ft. MSL by Center for VFR traffic she was not talking to in our path. Hearing and seeing this scenario develop we shallowed our descent rate to level at 6;000 ft. MSL in an attempt to mitigate a predictive RA scenario. Once level and seeing the traffic was continuing in our direction; we also attempted a turn to avoid the traffic prior to the RA; however the frequency was congested and the turn was too late. Once we received permission to turn and initiated it; we ended up receiving the RA. We complied with the RA; disengaged the autopilot; and also climbed to approximately 6;500 ft. MSL to avoid the traffic showing at one point 400 ft. below us and advised Center of the RA. We were given permission to climb and; once clear of the conflict; to proceed to ZZZ without further issue.The event occurred due to a few factors coming together. The main issue is that the VFR aircraft was maneuvering without talking to ATC so as to avoid traffic. It was also a beautiful day; so there was a lot of GA aircraft the Controller was working with causing the frequency to become very congested. Secondly; the Controller should have issued us a vector or higher altitude to maintain to avoid the traffic as we never had or called aircraft in sight. We could have tried to turn earlier; but the congestion on the frequency prevented this from happening as well.I feel that this issue could have been prevented had the Controller issued us a higher level off altitude; or given us a vector once it was determined that the VFR target could become an issue. I feel that we tried our best to avoid this scenario by shallowing our descent and even requesting a turn. It just came down to the VFR traffic had an unpredictable flight path; the frequency was very congested; and once we received our clearance to turn it was too late.

First Officer of a CRJ-200 reported an RA while descending towards destination and cited the large amount of GA aircraft in the area as a contributing factor.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Manuals; Human Factors; Aircraft; Company Policy

During climb at approximately FL280; we started hearing erratic electronic popping/squealing sounds over our headsets. The Other Airline (OAL) pilot occupying the flight deck jump seat (Air Carrier Y Captain) indicated that his Audio Control Panel (ACP) was not responding to commands. His mic had been in the 'off' position. I called Dispatch/Maintenance Control (MXC) over Radio and asked for advice on how to proceed. MXC referred us to QRH page for 'unresponsive audio control panel'. In flight; the procedure was to place the ACP in backup mode; which we did. There was no change to the ACP.  MXC suggested continuing to ZZZ1 and writing it up on the ground; then ended our conversation over the radio. I continued the conversation over ACARS and expressed my concern that there was an electrical problem with ACP3; due to the nature of the sounds (sounded like electrical arcing or shorting wires); the flashing lights on the panel; and the interference with our Comm-1 and 2. I asked for MXC's blessing to pull Circuit Breaker (CB) C18; which is referenced in the 'on the ground' part of the QRH reset procedure.  MXC would not give direction to pull the breaker but said 'it is up to you if you would like to pull the breaker'. After discussion with the First Officer (FO); and confirming with MXC that ACP3 is the only component powered by CB C18; I pulled the breaker. All erratic sounds and flickering stopped. We continued to monitor ACP3 for irregularities until landing in ZZZ1. MXC explained on the ground; after completion of the flight; that they were unable to give direction not specifically provided for in the QRH. I expressed my frustration that I did not feel Maintenance was supportive enough in providing information we needed to make a decision. I had to specifically ask what components would be affected by the CB. If we were about to experience a worst case scenario - an electrical fire in ACP3 - we wasted valuable time trying to pull information from MXC; instead of MXC offering what they could in useful; relevant info. Audio Control Panel-3 (Observers Audio Panel).

An EMB-175 pilot describes his efforts to have Maintenance Control approve an inflight 'pulling open' of an Audio Control Panel-3 (ACP) Circuit Breaker (C/B) to stop erratic; electronic popping/squealing sounds over their headsets. Maintenance Control noted they were unable to give directions not specifically provided for in their QRH.


GPS; FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 22

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

While flying the approach to Runway 22 at LGA; ATC had us on a 040 downwind heading at 4000'. Abeam the field heading was adjusted to 060 then 070. ATC cleared us left to 190 and descend to 2000' to intercept 22 LOC. This heading gave us an intercept well inside the FAF with a 36 KTS undershooting crosswind. Declared field insight and was cleared for the visual. I configured immediately as I was quite high and left of a good intercept course. I turned off automation and hand flew the aircraft planning on intercepting the course and glideslope just inside the FAF. During my maneuvering I was issued a low altitude alert by tower; which is was correcting at the call. Intercepted course and glideslope at approximately 1200' and landed uneventfully.

Pilot reported receiving a low-altitude alert from LGA Tower while maneuvering to intercept the localizer and glideslope.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft

3 different 'events' for Special Use Airspace (SUA) all back to back and or adjacent airspace. Aircraft requesting (aircraft X and aircraft Y) SUA have different events with the same start/end times. Aircraft Y has the wrong event number and shows up early. This creates a coordination nightmare to delay the aircraft outside the airspace when it is active with another user. Also; Aircraft Y's wingman called for clearance and exited the airspace late.Using event numbers is cumbersome and creates more work for the controller since they have to be verified on the airspace strip and the flight plan remarks. This requires the controller to have more 'heads down' time or time looking away from the scope. Previously we used call signs for who is requesting to use SUA and that procedure was less of a workload to the controller because he or she didn't have to verify for example that aircraft Y has event ZZZ and that SUA Area is also event ZZZ and that the start time is XA:50 and Aircraft X isn't early. Sounds confusing right? I can provide more examples if need be for reasons why event numbers are more workload intensive for the controller compared to previous procedures.No overlap on events or missions start/end times. I would suggest a 10 minute gap as an example. Create a workgroup with all parties to come up with a safer procedure. Go back to the previous procedure using call signs instead of event numbers until a new procedure is in place since using call signs seems to be safer for the sector.

A Center Controller reported military aircraft in and out times and schedules for special use airspace were not correct and procedures for ensuring entry exit are unnecessarily cumbersome.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action

Airport; Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather

ORD Runway 10C was reporting breaking action fair; with winds 350@13. I touched down on speed and in the touchdown zone. I applied full braking and was slowly decelerating. The aircraft weather vaned approximately 20 degrees into the wind; I applied opposite rudder and the aircraft skidded the opposite direction. At this time a rudder SYS 1-2 INOP displayed on the EICAS. I corrected the aircraft to have the nose into the wind; and was still drifting slightly towards the edge of the runway; so I released both brakes and regained directional control and applied full braking. After the second application of the brakes the aircraft started decelerating quickly; and we exited the runway on a high speed without further event. I called braking action poor. I had run performance for this runway as low; and the aircraft stopped in that approximate distance. After getting to the gate I wrote up the aircraft and was trying to call Dispatch and Maintenance when the Director of Safety called me about another event; and I reported the conditions on [Runway] 10C to him. I then called Maintenance; and finally my Chief Pilot to inform them of the conditions in ORD. I believe they suspended operations until the runways were cleaned and the airport was turned around; due to the small tailwind (3 KTS). There were aircraft departing between arrivals on [Runway] 10C and I believe that where my aircraft began to turn into the wind is where the departing aircraft were shedding their anti-ice fluids. The runway was more contaminated causing the aircraft to be more susceptible to turning into the wind. I didn't then nor do I now believe now that I did anything wrong. I understand that the point of reporting is to track safety related issues; but I felt the event had gained enough traction through my other conversations (with chief pilots); but after I received a phone call from the FAA regarding this event I felt it was prudent to file a report. Currently we have max recommended crosswind components for different contaminations; In this case it was compacted snow (25 KTS) or water slush (20 KTS); but we don't have anything for braking actions. Our performance in ACARS has setting for good medium and low which one can interpolate to line up with good fair and poor. I had been given MU for that runway but by the time I had gotten to the runway it had been 30 minutes or more; and everyone was reporting the braking action as fair. But I was never told by what aircraft type. In major snow events our pilot group needs to do a better job of getting information to Dispatch about the runway conditions so that we can forward it to other aircraft following us.

EMB145 captain reports landing on Runway 10C at ORD contaminated with compacted snow with a reported braking action of fair. Full braking is applied on touch down and directional control becomes difficult with braking action nil. With the aircraft drifting toward the runway edge the brakes are released; directional control is regained and brakes reapplied with good results. De-ice fluid shed by departing aircraft was thought to have been a factor in this incident.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 5450; Flight Crew Type 1368

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircrew was cleared an ILS 16R approach at PAE in daylight VMC. At JUGBA; Seattle Approach warned us of VFR traffic; a Cessna 172; heading in a direction to cross the ILS approach. The traffic was not in communication with Approach. However; the traffic was in communication with the Tower. After JUGBA; Seattle asked us to break off the approach. We were just about to; however; the traffic turned towards the airplane; and an RA occurred. The C172 looked closer than 500 feet. We descended and turned away from the C172. Once the traffic was behind us; we resumed the flight with no other events.

B737 Captain on the ILS 16R to PAE reports a NMAC with a C172 just inside JUGBA. The C172 was talking to the Tower and the B737 was talking to Approach. A TCAS RA is received and complied with along with a turn away from the traffic.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6.3

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

I was working Ground Control and had 2-3 aircraft taxiing and just finished issuing an IFR clearance. My scan was focused on ensuring I had resolved a potential conflict between my taxiing aircraft. I then overheard Local Control (LC) issue 'go-around' instructions to an aircraft; but I did not initially know the reason or see which aircraft it was. I shifted my scan towards the finals but did not initially see an aircraft going around.I finally acquired a Cessna on the upwind for Runway 30R. Based on the LC controller's comment; I believe that aircraft was supposed to be on final for 30L; but for whatever reason; the aircraft was on final for 30R. The Cessna then went into left traffic for 30L. The CIC was in the process of completing the hourly weather observation and ATIS during the event; thus adding to their workload at the time. I can also recall the cab being very warm at the time; which was a bit of a distraction (but not unreasonable; in my opinion). This is another event emphasizing the importance of visual scanning and awareness. While I was working out my own traffic scenario; I did hear or observe an unusual situation on the finals until the go-around was issued.The CIC normally completes weather observations; and any steps that can be taken to reduce their workload to complete and transmit that observation may help the CICs maintain a better visual scan and situational awareness. There are multiple steps that presently must be taken for this observation; and improved AWOS equipment may help reduce those steps. Right now; the observer uses a combination of their own observations and the AWOS equipment to complete a manual observation. The process I use is as follows: 1) I enter the manual observation into the weather spreadsheet and save it on one computer. 2) I then have to go to the IDS-4 [Information Display System] and enter the same weather observation data into it. 3) I then have to proceed back to the other computer and fill out that same weather data into an online form; and then transmit it into the AISR system [Aeronautical Information System Replacement]. 4) I then have to verify at some point in the next few minutes that the information was transmitted successfully into the AISR system; and correct any typos or errors. 5) I then have to do the ATIS recording; and ensure that the correct observation and ATIS code was updated in the IDS-4. I recognize that the work in step 5 is required regardless of AWOS equipment. However; an upgraded AWOS that is allowed to transmit observations while the tower is open would allow us to meet LAWRS [Limited Aviation Weather Reporting Station] requirements and could reduce observer workload significantly. I believe better AWOS equipment would allow us to complete a weather observation and ensure it was entered correctly *once*; as opposed to three times as we do currently. In addition to reducing controller workload and distraction; new AWOS equipment could benefit aviation users and the NWS [National Weather Service] by reducing data entry errors that often occur when entering the observation multiple times.

BJC Ground Controller reported of an aircraft on final that was lined up for the incorrect runway that was told to go around by the Local Controller. Controller attributed the go around to a lack of scanning by the Local Controller. Controller also noted that the CIC was busy making and checking the ATIS recording.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 1760; Flight Crew Type 690

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Upon walking out to the aircraft; aircraft was already loaded with fuel.  Total fuel on board was 16;000 pounds.  10;500 pounds of fuel was in the left wing. 5;500 pounds was in the right wing which was a 5;000 pound imbalance; outside the maximum allowable imbalance per the aircraft AFM which is additionally indicated on the graph in the QRH. I did a fuel test to verify the fuel indicators were working properly and upon completion of the fuel test; the indications remained the same. Immediately; I spoke up to the PIC saying the aircraft was out of balance and that we need to balance the fuel for takeoff. The PIC told me that it was fine; he had done it before and it would be alright. I spoke up again and was waved off in an aggressive manner because he didn't not want to hear me bring that up. From the PIC; I was told takeoff would be ok and that he would balance the fuel as much as possible on the ground prior to takeoff and the rest once airborne.The Captain started transfer procedure by turning on the crossflow and turning on both left fuel pumps; while turning the right fuel pumps off.  After approximately 20 minutes; no change was noticed. By then; the aircraft was at the hold short and ready to takeoff.  The Captain stopped the transfer procedure and put the fuel pumps in the normal position for that phase of flight. At this point; the Captain dictated the continuation of the flight. The Captain decided to takeoff.  Immediately upon rotation; the aircraft banked to the left because of the imbalance.  Full right rudder deflection was needed causing a rudder limit CAS message to appear. At the same time; full right aileron deflection was also needed just to maintain the runway heading.  Additionally; I was unable to do the 400 ft altitude callout because I was focusing on the aircraft attitude and control inputs during the initial climb. I considered that the primary importance because it was so abnormal. While continuing the climb; I suggested that we disconnect the auto-throttles and pull the right engine back to idle and advance the left throttle as necessary to maintain our climb speed in order to reduce the fuel flow of the right engine; and increase the fuel flow of the left engine to help balance the fuel.  Additionally; it would reduce the thrust on the right engine allowing us to have more control inputs to the right to counteract the left turning tendency that the right engines thrust produces.  The first time I suggested that; I was told to be quiet and let him focus on flying the aircraft.  I suggested again the same thing; further explaining why we should do that.  At that point; the Captain disconnected the auto throttles and positioned them as previously discussed.In the continuation of the climb; we were told to turn left to a heading which put us on course. While in the left hand turn; the aircraft wanted to continuing rolling left and made it very difficult to stop on the assigned heading.  It should be noted; that the autopilot was not used during the climb and also not on during the majority of the flight.  One of the instructions from ATC was to level the aircraft at 16;000 feet.  As the Captain approached that altitude; I advised him the level off altitude was approaching.  He continued climbing through the assigned altitude to an altitude of 16;450 ft before starting a descent back to the assigned altitude of 16;000 feet.  The reason for this; was the Captain was concentrating on keeping the aircraft on the assigned heading/routing during the climb. No deviation was given from ATC.  Also during the climb; the EICAS screen indicated a yellow CAS message of Retrim Right Wing down which indicated the lateral axis is out of trim.  The Captain proceeded to input 5 degrees of right aileron trim; as well as 5 degrees of right rudder trim. With the trim inputs; nearly full right rudder and right aileron deflection were still needed to keep the aircraft on the assigned headings.  Throughout the flight; the rudder limit stayed on multiple times due to complete rudder deflection.  At no other point; did the retrim right wing down CAS message appear.  Once approaching into ZZZ; ATC assigned a speed of 180 kts and the aircraft was unable to do so because of the controllability [issue]. The slowest speed the aircraft could maintain was 200 kts and I advised ATC.  They had no issue with the increase in required speed; but should be noted the aircraft could not adhere to the speed because of the unsafe situation the aircraft was in.Throughout the flight; after the auto throttles were disconnected in the climb; the right thrust level was flown at idle the whole flight to ZZZ and the left thrust lever flown in an advanced position.  Additionally; the whole flight was flown with near max right rudder input as well as right aileron input near max; more than standard.  All while; the aircraft still banked/leaned to the left while flying the FMS headings. Upon landing; I was visibly shaking after the event that had just occurred.  Once the aircraft was parked; I got off the aircraft and went into the FBO.  I immediately contacted my Chief Pilot; asking if he was available to talk.  He said he was unable to talk via telephone call; but could text.  I proceeded to text him a brief summary of what just happened and asked to be crew swapped asap.  He said he would need safety reports and that there would have to be an investigation into the events before I could swap crew members.  Knowing how this would most likely get swept under the rug if I had just told the Chief Pilot; I then called our Vice President; [who] controls the daily operations at the company and overseas all crew pairings.  On the phone I told [the Vice President] I felt unsafe flying the aircraft with that Captain and needed a crew swap.  I was then told that because of where we were and the remaining flights we had together; the only time I could crew swap would be when we arrived back in ZZZ1; the following day.  After some discussion; I agreed I would be willing to fly the last remaining three trips with that Captain and crew swap back in ZZZ1 in order to minimize the impact of crew swapping would have on the company.  The only condition was that I would not be bullied and intimidated by that Captain into flying the aircraft again in any unsafe manner.  After this phone call; I then went back onto the aircraft and we continued two more flights that day.  From ZZZ to ZZZ2; then from ZZZ2 to ZZZ3 where we were overnighting.   One we arrived at ZZZ3; I again asked the Chief Pilot if it was ok if I called him once I arrived to my hotel since he was now free to talk.  When I arrived to my room; I called the chief pilot.  On the phone call; he told me that I was to not write a safety report which contradicted what he told me earlier via text message.  I told him I wanted to and then he told me the politics of doing so would not be favorable to me.  I then asked him what I should do and he said to just drop it and continue flying with the PIC for all remaining trips; even after reaching ZZZ1.   I told him I was unwilling to do that and that I would like to submit one.  At which point; he said to send only to him; not the safety director.  I told him I would send it to all the necessary people.  I got no response. Once that phone call concluded; I then called another pilot at the company to tell him what happened on the flight and proceeded to tell him how I felt unsafe and needed [to be] swapped in ZZZ1.

Corporate pilot reported the aircraft took off; at the direction of the Captain; with a known fuel imbalance that resulted in extreme aircraft controllability issues.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

In ZZZ we attempted to start number two engine using APU air and it spooled up abnormally slowly; and I noticed that the EGT seemed to lag. At 45% N2 the start stagnated and decayed until a 2.5% N2 decrease and Engine Fail indication on the ECAM. We stopped the start; then following guidance in our paperwork; we started number one (which also stagnated a little bit but then started normally) and then attempted a second start on number two using cross-bleed from the number one engine. We allowed the engine to spool up to 25.7% N2; then added fuel. At starter cutout; the engine hung again; dropping to about 43.2% N2 and hanging there before slowly spooling up to about 43.8% N2 when it timed out for the start and Engine Fail was indicated on ECAM again. Our Quick Reference Handbook said we could attempt a second start after the first hung start; but that maintenance action was required if the second start failed. At that point we requested a tug and BTB to our parking space. This is where Maintenance Control got involved. At first they suggested that we defer the APU bleed; however it was obvious to me that the air was not the problem (we used a separate source for each start); so I told him the APU bleed deferral was not sufficient. Then he suggested that a problem with the Integrated Drive Generator might be causing the hung start and suggested we defer that; and I agreed it could be tried. As part of the maintenance action during start the Inetgrated Drive Generator was disconnected and deferred; and the Airworthiness Release in the log book was signed off; then we continued getting the jet started and were on our way. During the flight the APU was running as required by the deferral; and at 36;000 ft. it automatically shut down. I attempted to start the APU; and on the second try; it started. I requested and descended to a lower altitude of 30;000 ft. and the APU operated normally for the rest of the flight. If I had not been able to start it; I would have had to advise ATC and divert. I wrote up the APU under a P code for momentary or transitory malfunction. In ZZZ1; maintenance checked the APU for any failure codes; did the repetitive inspection for oil quantity for the Integrated Drive Generator deferral; and signed off the APU. The FO (First Officer) and I discussed the situation and agreed that the APU was not malfunctioning and may have had a momentary problem with operating at high altitude. We accepted the jet for the leg to ZZZ2. With a fresh Airworthiness Release in the log book; we started the number one engine first; then started number two using cross-bleed at the request of maintenance. The number two engine came close to exceeding time limits; but did eventually spool up. We were filed for 33;000 ft.; and at that altitude the APU did the same thing--it shut down--and we were able to get it started again on the second try. We requested and descended to 29;000 ft. for the remainder of the flight. Again; the APU operated normally from there on; and again; I wrote it up with a P code for the shut down. I also made a comment in the logbook about the number two engine start; even though our flight paperwork said that comments for a successful start were not needed. There I made a note that the EGT from fuel introduction to the point where the start stagnated; then started to spool up; seemed abnormally low and was at least 50 degrees cooler at 45% N2 than the other engine. The stagnated start was evident from fuel introduction until after started cutout when it became apparent that the engine was not ready to continue the start on its own. The Integrated Drive Generator has nothing to do with the EGT during start. I suspect something else is going on here; perhaps a Electronic Engine Control problem with the fuel mixture at high altitude; or a sensor malfunction. On further reflection; I feel that the deferral of the Integrated Drive Generator was inappropriate for the problem we had; and I should not have accepted it. It created a problem where we could have been forced to request priority handling and divert. It is likely that whatever is wrong with our engine starts does not pose a safety of flight risk once we get the engine going; so it makes no sense to do a deferral that could compromise safety. Until this is figured out; the guidance needs to be specific and it needs to go out to everyone in the maintenance and crew pipelines and it should be operations friendly. My recommendation is that everything in the fuel system be checked in case it is causing the starting problem for cold engines at high altitude. I think that the bleed system is less likely to be the issue because of the low EGT I saw during all four start attempts on that engine. I also recommend that maintenance be able to attempt at least one more start before the aircraft is taken out of service; and that crew get more guidance concerning the problem. 'Maintenance action' is not enough to let a Captain know what to expect or what to accept. I also have felt for a long time that our systems manual has been scrubbed of a lot of detail about systems with which we do not directly interact; so we are less able to make informed decisions and instead have to rely on experience. That will not always save us from making the wrong call. Everyone in this situation acted in good faith; and I am not writing this report to cast any doubt on anyone. I only want to point out a safety issue that we can avoid in the future.

Pilot reported application of the wrong MEL complicated the flights unnecessarily.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 7; Flight Crew Total 112; Flight Crew Type 34

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Airport; Chart Or Publication

After being cleared along the arrival into HNL airport; my aircraft; was cleared to land initially on per the published procedure. As the Tower became aware of another aircraft's intent to land; a PA28; permission was also granted for this aircraft to land at HNL. To make traffic flow more smoothly; the controller amended my clearance from the right runway to now land on the left runway. The Tower controller then cleared the PA28 to land on the right runway.With me now landing on the left; there was no confusion about the simultaneous parallel runway operations that were to then be taking place. With that situational awareness; I initiated a transmission to the tower controller; '[call sign] understands other traffic will now be landing. Right; we will be landing Left.' Knowing this situation in advance; I was cognizant that a runway hold-short/cross instruction would likely be necessary after landing given that the parking ramp was located on the other side of the runway.As my suspicions were confirmed; the tower controller exercised a command for my flight to 'exit runway via echo and hold short for landing traffic'. Acknowledging this instruction; I replied with the appropriate read-back and complied by stopping the aircraft short of the first hold line on the taxiway. After being given permission to proceed by crossing the right runway the controller advised that he believed I had actually crossed the hold short line and that it was the first line I should have held at.The subsequent PA28 landing was then instructed to initiate a side step maneuver and land the left runway to prevent a possible runway incursion. Despite being told that I crossed the hold short line; the indications on the pavement clearly indicated the first hold short line was the correct holding position by the white lettering on a solid red background which I had; indeed; held at by completing a full stop before the line.From the Pilots perception; an unnecessary hazard was created by possibly confusing the inbound piper pilot to sidestep. With the two hold short lines being positioned so close together as to notify pilots of both runway entries; I believe it may have appeared from the controller's perspective that my aircraft was positioned; in such a way; so that it looked as if I had crossed the holding position without actually doing so. Given the context that I; the PIC of [my aircraft]; notified tower on two occasions of our awareness of the inbound parallel traffic and further confirmation of the holding instructions; the misconstrued position of my aircraft being located over the hold-short line was not indeed true but nevertheless created an undue hazard by the tower controller then executing a last minute change to another aircraft on final approach.To prevent such future incidents; it is the pilots recommendation that the holding positions be separated in such a way so that both; one; The tower controller can avoid confusing which hold-short position an aircraft is actually stopped at; and thereby issuing unnecessary further instructions to other aircraft. And two; so that pilots do not actually confuse the two holding positions by way of their proximity to one another. Whether these issues are created by the tower misconstruing the position of an aircraft relative to a holding line or the pilot confusing the two holding positions; both would benefit from better separation of these runway markings.It may also serve well to install runway cross alert lights; a tower notification system of aircraft crossing a holding position via a 'trip wire' type of alert systems; and also the controller providing a 'heads up' verbal instruction to notify inbound pilots prior to landing of possible close proximity holding instructions for the parallel runways. When exiting runways; particularly when they are positioned close together so that landing aircraft will not be clear of one active runway before entering another active runway; it may serve to the pilots benefit if they have this forward notice. This is especially true when considering pilots who may be unfamiliar with simultaneous parallel runway operations that are immediately next to one another.

C172 pilot reported being told by Tower that they had crossed a hold short line. The reporter does not believe he crossed the line.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 5153; Flight Crew Type 3

Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Spent the morning examining and flying an experimental Smyth Sidewinder. The aircraft was being purchased by a friend.  ASOS reported wind 310 degrees 19 gusting to 27. Started the approach in light turbulence. On touchdown; the aircraft made a sharp turn to the left. I was unable to keep it on the runway with full right rudder and braking and struck a sign along the side of the runway.

Smyth Sidewinder pilot reported losing directional control on the landing roll; departed the runway; and struck a sign.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 3068; Flight Crew Type 2802

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

A week before the incident; I noticed fluid around my left (pilot side) brake. I notified my mechanic. [A week later] I called my mechanic and he told me the repair had been done. I then pre-flighted the plane; including brake check; and began to taxi along the hangar row towards the taxiway leading to Runway XX at ZZZ. At approximately 100 yards; before reaching the taxiway; the plane began to veer to the right. I applied normal pressure on the left brake to correct the direction of the plane. My foot went to the floor (brake failure). I continued to apply pressure on the left brake 3 or 4 times; to no avail. I then pulled the power and applied pressure on the right brake; the only brake working. I managed to slow the aircraft to approximately 2 mph before impacting [a] hangar door. I do have a witness who came into the cockpit and saw my left brake/rudder pedal to the floor. There were no injuries.

Beechcraft Bonanza V35 pilot reported the loss of one brake during taxi led to contact with a hangar door.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 24000; Flight Crew Type 6392

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Taxiway

First Officer was preoccupied with personal shopping on-line before push back. He had a tendency to put in the minimal effort during the whole trip. When we got the pushback; he was behind the whole way out. (I am a little too conflict averse; and should have confronted him earlier about this problem).Anyway; we were going to have to deice; ramp was wet; but not icy; so I planned to taxi to deice pad on one engine. After First Officer got #2 engine running; I asked him to call for taxi and to request a left 270 turnout rather than starting with a turn into the operating engine. He was having trouble copying the clearance and deice frequency; and never did ask for the left 270; so I finally keyed the mike and asked for that myself.Started west to hold short of H at the west end of the ramp; where I stopped as instructed. First Officer was still back at the gate and I was basically solo. He still had not copied the deice control frequency; and was now looking for it on Jeppesen FD Pro while I patiently waited. Second frequency he tried worked; we were told to taxi to the C1 pad for deice. Here is where I made my mistake. We 'always' deice on the Bravo Deice pad; I had both hands full of airplane; saw that C1 was at the left end of the pad; and turned left toward the deice pad [we normally use] to the spot at the left (South) end of the pad. Ramp hollered at us that we were supposed to turn right into the 'Charlie' deice pad. I was able to make a 150 turn back to the right on Hotel; and into the correct pad.Ramp and Iceman were having a discussion that I was the 7th airplane that day to turn the wrong way; and suggested that Iceman emphasize in their instructions that it would be a right turn into the Charlie pad. I was a bit overloaded and basically taxiing solo without much help from my First Officer; but much to my chagrin 'expectation bias' bit me in this case.

B737 Captain reported taxiing to the wrong de-ice pad at DEN because of workload and distraction issues.


Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

After takeoff; the Captain - pilot flying - engaged the autopilot at 500 ft. and the aircraft immediately started to level off [and] then tried to descend. He disconnected the autopilot and returned the flight path to a climb. During that time we got a GPWS 'Don't sink' aural warning. Upon later investigation we figured out what had happened. The first point on the SID; GG511. has a speed restriction of 230 kt. which was loaded in the FMS. It was his intention to load 230/005A to command 230 kt./500ft. or above at GG511 but it was inadvertently loaded as 230/005 so the FMS wanted 230 kt. at 500 ft. at GG511; when the autopilot was engaged it tried to capture 500 ft. The rest of the departure and flight were uneventful. [The cause was] a mistake loading the FMS. [I suggest to] properly load the FMS and better cross-check from the pilot monitoring - myself.

Air carrier First Officer reported that a mistake during the FMS programming caused the aircraft to descend when the autopilot was engaged after takeoff.


Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Prior to the flight; I downloaded the release; and programmed the FMS what I thought was according to the PDC given flight clearance. When entering the JAKIE 4 Arrival; I did not see point 'CUBIM' as a part of the arrival. It is in small print; and I simply missed it. I interpreted the clearance that we were supposed to go from CUBIM to JAKIE direct; but there is a CUBIM transition that I incorrectly missed and did not select as a transition. Once enroute to CVG; we passed CUBIM going direct JAKIE. ATC asked us why we had not turned; and we were confused as to what he was asking. We were apparently supposed to fly the CUBIM transition which included several other fixes between CUBIM and JAKIE. We were given a phone number to call. After landing; the Captain called; and the gentlemen he talked to said that this has happened multiple times in the past; and that they are trying to figure out why the clearance is being incorrectly applied. The Captain and I followed company procedure and reviewed the clearance; prior to pushing from gate in ZZZ; but we clearly both misinterpreted the clearance. From this event; I have learned that it is paramount to ensure all transitions are input into the FMS; and that if I believe the clearance is to a point in the middle of the arrival and not at an initial fix; that I need to double check that there is no transition that is being missed. Suggest to Jeppsen that all initial points on arrivals be in large font. This is not an excuse for me missing it; but rather what I believe to be a causal factor in the error.

Air carrier First Officer imputed wrong information into FMS during preflight planning and neglected to add an intersection as part of the arrival.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

We inspected the logbook after a lengthy maintenance delay for an unrelated open item. Item 9; dated [two days prior] read 'Offside FM control displayed on left ND and status message AP 1 inop.' The item had been written up at the gate before departure and was deferred by Maintenance with the following entry: 'Checked and appd for deferral. Placarded #1 autopilot inop per MEL.' Aircraft flew 6 times after that write up. The First Officer and I reviewed the Mel 22-01A (as cited in the logbook) and complied with it fully. Shortly after takeoff I realized that both NDs needed to be in the same range to avoid the 'map not available' display on the captain's ND. Further investigation revealed that FMGC 1 position indicated all dashes. We now suspected that the logbook incorrectly addressed an autopilot 1 failure; not a failure of FMGC 1. Thinking that Maintenance misdiagnosed the original problem we called Maintenance Control and discussed the situation. Together we decided to perform an FMGC manual reset. The reset was successful and all systems; including the original AP 1 inop status message operated normally. If in fact if the FMGC was the problem then the aircraft should have only been permitted 3 flights on deferral.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

A321 flight crew discovered that an MEL issued two days prior for a autopilot #1 failure was actually caused by the failure of the # 1 FMGC. Maintenance is contacted and an FMGC reset procedure is performed successfully returning all systems to full operation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 2000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy

I'm writing this to highlight systemic issues with my airline's fuel planning policies that manifested itself on this particular flight. We were flying on a perfectly fine VFR day. I had realized prior to signing the release that our planned arrival fuel was lower than I like; but I accepted it because the company has been pushing for lower fuel quantities over and over. Had I asked Dispatch for more I am certain that I would not have been successful.Once in cruise ATC asked us if we wanted to speed up to .78 to jump in front of another aircraft or take a short vector and slow to below .76 and follow. Knowing our fuel wasn't ideal I elected to slow and conserve fuel; 400 miles out. We monitored the fuel at every waypoint and the closer we got the more we realized we were going to be tight. We continued and as we got vectored for the approach I considered declaring MIN fuel with ATC; but right as I was going to we were cleared for the approach. Any further vectors and we would have been fuel critical. Upon touchdown we had 1;700 lbs total on board. Our reserve fuel was 1;358. Going through training on this aircraft we were told explicitly that you never want to land with less than 2;000 lbs of fuel on board. Dispatch planned us to land with 1;954. Let me be clear - this is not an issue I have with the individual Dispatcher involved but rather the system in place that is pushing Dispatchers to plan flights to land so extraordinarily low on fuel. Numerous phone calls with Dispatch have reinforced this. I sent an ACARS to our Dispatcher yesterday when we realized we had a problem and the response I got was 'I'm just following protocol'. The protocol is wrong and it needs to be addressed. We were 3 minutes of vectoring away from declaring an emergency; this on a perfectly clear VFR day. Weight was not an issue. Takeoff performance was not an issue. The only issue is the organizational pressure to dispatch flights with minimal fuel. Had we needed to go-around for any reason we would have landed with less than 1;000 lbs of fuel. The talk in the crew room these days is about how the company is dispatching our flights with so little fuel available and how the pilots are being pressured into accepting it whether they feel comfortable or not.We noticed this in cruise when we began monitoring fuel burn. This issue was caused by operations pressure [on] Dispatch to load flights with minimal fuel. We accepted the reality; slowed the aircraft to conserve fuel; and contemplated alternative action. Suggestions: stop this dangerous practice of dispatching flights with the bare minimum amount of fuel. It's a dangerous game to play and it's bound to backfire sooner or later.

Air carrier Captain reported concern about the airline's policy of dispatching flights with very low fuel reserve.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Runway 25 is so rolling and bumpy that we thought the Captain made a bad landing. It was not until we took off on runway 07 that we realized it was the runway! I feel that this runway is so bad that we should not be using it for our operation. The perpendicular runway is just under 4;000 ft so we were not allowed to consider it.Our company should not use this airport/runway until it is inspected for weight bearing and levelness by the FAA and/or [Company].

Corporate jet First Officer reported Runway 07/25 at WST Airport should be considered unsuitable for their aircraft due to the rolls and bumps on the runway.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 16.5; Flight Crew Total 620; Flight Crew Type 48

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

I received my taxi instructions from Ground to taxi via Charlie to Runway 34. I mistook Charlie for the apron and crossed it and continued on along one of the Runway 34 access ramps. I crossed the runway hold lines not looking for them there and did not realize it until I had passed about 10 feet. I stopped short of the runway and called Ground.  Ground told me to do a 360 and turn on Charlie as I was originally instructed. I observed an airplane that was on final and landing on 34 going around. In the runup area for 34 I was instructed to call Tower which I did this morning. I was told that an incident report was filed. This incident was definitely due to my error in crossing the hold short lines without clearance. I was hurrying my departure a bit wanting to depart VFR before the weather worsened. I do not fly into Tower controlled fields too often and my comfort level with communications could be improved. I guess what I have learned is when in doubt ask and above all do not cross runway hold short lines without permission.

An aircraft on final had to execute a go around when an M20 pilot; unfamiliar with the airport and uncomfortable with radio communications; inadvertently crossed the runway hold short lines.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Type 1450

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Descending into ZZZ we were getting vectored off the arrival for an approach. The First Officer (FO) flew through a small buildup that seemed fairly benign. Unfortunately there was enough vertical development to create an automatic moderate turbulence report. I didn't want to dictate how the FO flew the arrival; but thought we should have deviated a few hundred yards around this little cloud. While I expected a little turbulence; I certainly didn't think it would be that strong. On debrief; the FO seemed unaware that we didn't have to fly directly into the cloud and could have maneuvered a little.

A319 Captain reported First Officer flying into turbulence resulting in an injured Flight Attendant. First Officer was unaware of option to deviate clear of cloud


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Type 10500

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Other

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; General Maintenance Action

We were ready to push back from Gate XX in ZZZ for our flight to BWI. After all pushback procedures and communications were accomplished by us; [the] crew; and the Tug Driver; I asked if we could release brakes and the Tug Driver told me it was okay to release the brakes. After the brakes were released; I confirmed from the ZZZ SIP [Ramp Control] that a pushback call was not required; and just as I was about to tell the Tug Driver that he was cleared to push; the aircraft started to be pushed back. At that point I figured we had an aggressive veteran Tug Driver who knew we didn't need a pushback call and just started to push us back. After about 20 ft. into the push; the Tug Driver stopped the push. At that moment it appeared to us that the push was misguided and the tail was being pushed toward the top of the alley; Spot 4; and not the usual tail into the alley. Thinking we just had a push gone wrong; the Tug Driver then communicated to us that he would have to pull us back into the gate and recommence the push from there. After the second push was complete and the Ground Crew was released; we taxied to the runway for an uneventful takeoff and flight to BWI.Two hours into our flight; we received several ACARS messages from Dispatch and finally a phone patch. We were informed that ZZZ Operations were concerned about our pushback because it appeared; after reviewing video; that our nose wheel was turned past the 90-degree position and well beyond its limits. Dispatch asked us if we noticed any anomalies while taxiing or taking off. We replied that everything appeared to be working normally with the nose wheel and nose wheel steering. Dispatch told us to use caution when landing and taxiing in BWI and to call them when we were safely at the gate. After an uneventful landing and taxi to the gate; I called Dispatch. I was told that the initial 'misguided' push in ZZZ was no push at all but that the aircraft was actually pulling an unmanned tug into the ally. After drifting back about 20 ft.; the Tug Driver realized what was happening and he jumped on the tug and brought us to a stop. This is where the tug and towbar were pulled off by more than 90 degrees drawing operational concerns from ZZZ Maintenance.As you can imagine this came as quite a shock to the FO (First Officer) and me and raised several questions. For the Pushback Crew: Why would the Tug Driver tell me it was okay to release the brakes with an unmanned tug? Why weren't the brakes set in the tug? Why did it take over two hours to find out what happened and that a nose wheel limit had been exceeded. For me; myself: What could I have done differently to prevent or realize something was going wrong? I can't answer for the ground crew but for myself; applying some of the same techniques we use in the cockpit to other operational groups would have helped. VVMI comes to mind. Once the plane started to move without me saying 'cleared to push' would have been a good time to verify that the Tug Driver was actually pushing us back. The note for Gate XX on the ZZZ SIP [Ramp Control] about keeping the brake set until ready for pushback should have acted as a warning to be extra vigilant. Additionally; although I usually can't see the tug during pushback and I don't put my hand on the tiller until clearing the ground crew off; I will probably start putting this in my scan during pushbacks.Ground crew should actually be ready for brake release if they clear the aircrew to release brakes [and] have the brakes set and the tug manned before chocks [are] pulled. Aircrew should not accept aircraft movement until verbalizing cleared to push.

B737-800 Captain reported a communication breakdown between Captain and Tug Driver regarding brakes release for pushback from departure gate and resulted in improper pushback movement.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

During a repositioning flight in the descent phase; about 20 nautical miles from our destination; and passing through 10;000 feet; both the pilot flying and I noticed the Master Warning Light flashing without any associated annunciator light illuminated. A few minutes later; we noticed both Right Thrust Reverser Arm and Unlock lights gradually illuminate. The pilot flying ran the memory items and called for the related checklists; which were completed while approaching the airport terminal airspace. The decision was made to shutdown the right engine as a preventive measure in case the right thrust reverser did fully deploy. The single engine visual approach and landing was successful and uneventful. Due to the mechanical nature of the problem; I don't have any recommendations.

A BE-400 Master Caution light illuminated along with the Right Thrust Reverser Arm and Unlock lights so the checklist was completed and the engine was shutdown during descent to preclude full deployment.