Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

It was my leg. Flaps were supposed to be 20. Take off roll seemed a little long; but not scary long. Rotation was smooth and normal; climb rate seemed fine as well. At FRA (Flap Retraction Altitude) I called for 'flaps 8'. The Captain said 'uh there at 8 now'. At that point we realized that we had not set them to 20 for takeoff. We continued the flight without incident.The terrain surrounding this airport was well known to us. We briefed that climb out was to be at VT until MEA of 5;700 ft. The error was not catching the flaps set at 8 instead of 20. We had at least three chances.From now on; I will not just reach over and click the flaps. I'll look at them and make sure the lever is where it's supposed to be. I print of the data so I can read it for the performance check; rather than just keep my head down and read I'll verify what's been set while the Captain does his call outs. And on the before takeoff; I'll check all the data again quickly; rather than just visually verify 'T/O config ok' on the EICAS.

CRJ-200 First Officer reports departing with flaps set to 8 when flaps 20 was required for takeoff performance. The error is not detected until the First Officer calls for flaps 8 after takeoff and the Captain reports they are already at 8.


Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Touched down on runway 9. Aircraft started skidding towards the left side of the runway. I tried to correct. Aircraft left the runway off the left side. While skidding through the grass the left main gear collapsed. Once the aircraft came to a rest I shut it down and evacuated the passengers. There were no injuries.

After touchdown the pilot of a C-402 was unable to arrest the aircraft's skid toward the left side of the runway where it exited the hard surface and the left landing gear collapsed.  All aboard evacuated without injury.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Runway's XXR; YYL and YYR were closed. Taxiway Bravo was also NOTAM'ed closed. It is common practice at this airport to use closed surfaces as runway exits. I was working Local Control and a CRJ2 was inbound. I issued him the Braking Action on Runway XXL; which had been reported as FAIR by a SW4; 30 minutes prior. I then reissued the current MU's. The CRJ2 landed without incident. I told the aircraft to turn left Taxiway Bravo and contact Ground. The CRJ2 came to a full stop on the runway and then made the right turn onto Bravo Taxiway. He contacted Ground and reported joining Alpha. Ground gave him taxi instructions via Alpha; Foxtrot with braking action report. The CRJ2 was unable to make the turn and continued straight ahead onto Bravo. Ground issued Braking Action Nil. Aircraft ended up perpendicular on the taxiway; due to the ice. Note: SW4 that had landed prior to the CRJ2 had exited at Bravo with no issues. It is a past practice at this airport to use closed surfaces as turn-offs; this has been approved by Airport Operations. It was still dark when the CRJ2 exited the runway. I can only suggest that if Airport Operations does not want us to use a turn off; then they need to specifically close a turn off; or tell us that it had not been sanded.

[Narrative #2 had no additional information.]

Tower Controller described the failure of an inbound air carrier to maneuver on a taxiway due to NIL braking action. Additional reporters; controllers; and pilots provided other variations of the incident.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 1364; Flight Crew Type 350

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was waiting short of Runway 12 for separation while a previous flight departed. There was a helicopter in a right pattern calling for approach to 12. As I waited the helicopter reported that he was going to land in the run up pad and that I could take off. The last I looked the previous departure was near where he would turn crosswind. I departed without confirming the previous flight's location. During my downwind departure and starting the climb an aircraft popped up on my ADSB about 400 ft. below. It appeared to be the aircraft that had just departed. My aircraft is usually much faster than most of the other aircraft and I neglected to take that into account as I usually do. I was apparently distracted by the training helicopter flight. In retrospect; I should have simply waited a little longer for the departing flight and announced to the helicopter that I needed to wait a little longer.

Small aircraft pilot reported an NMAC occurred during departure from MLE airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 21; Flight Crew Total 372; Flight Crew Type 25

Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification; Other / Unknown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Diverted

I was conducting normally scheduled skydiving operations in a CE-182 'D' model with numerous modifications including a higher power engine; skydiving door and wingtip extensions. My initial preflight showed 20 gallons of fuel on board. The incident occurred on the second jump run of the day as I returned to the airport. I returned to the pattern too high and was unable to safely descend to the runway. I initiated a go-around approximately halfway down the runway at 500 feet to 600 feet AGL. As I added power and pitched up the engine sputtered and quit. The propeller continued to windmill. I proceeded to the plowed wheat field south of the runway and conducted a power off soft field landing. Shortly after touchdown the engine restarted. I brought the aircraft to a stop and secured the engine. Post landing inspection of the aircraft and touchdown path revealed no damage. The aircraft was fueled and an engine run conducted prior to continued operations.The cause of the incident was poor preflight fuel planning. I underestimated the fuel burn for each set of skydivers and did not account for the amount of unusable fuel in the tanks. Secondary to this was the poor entry to the traffic pattern that ultimately required a go-around to be initiated. Future skydiving operations will start with no less than 40 gallons of fuel on board the aircraft and refueling will be conducted following every 3rd jump run. The loss of power at low altitude caused a strong initial adrenaline reaction that caused me to not secure the engine prior to touchdown; or conduct substantial emergency procedures beyond a brief 'mayday' call over the CTAF. Fortunately the restart of the engine due to my inaction helped prevent damage during the landing sequence. My lack of overall familiarity with the emergency procedures for the aircraft prevented me from overcoming the adrenaline rush associated with the low altitude event. Additionally I exhibited hazardous attitudes in the form of 'Macho' and 'Invulnerable' when I did not add fuel prior to the start of operations.

C182 pilot experiences engine failure during a go-around; after a long steep descent from a jump run. The pilot landed in emergency condition on a field and the engine restarted just after touch down. Fuel starvation was thought to be the cause for the engine quitting and restarting shortly after.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 7600; Flight Crew Type 700

Physiological - Other; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

The aircraft was cruising at flight level 430. The aircraft was about 2 hours into the flight and weighed approximately 33000 lbs and was in smooth air on top of the clouds. Both pilots felt the large cabin pressure change in their ears first and noticed the rapid cabin rate increase on the synoptic. The aircraft oxygen masks were donned and an emergency descent was initiated. The passenger oxygen masks were deployed and donned. The Cabin Altitude CAS (Crew Alerting System) was displayed. Air Traffic Control was notified; and the aircraft descended to 7000 feet while deviating around several thunderstorms. The CABIN ALTITUDE AND EMERGENCY DESCENT Checklists were completed during the descent. The highest cabin altitude was approximately 15000 ft. During the descent the following additional messages were posted; CABIN ALTITUDE; CHECK CABIN ALTITUDE; CHECK CABIN RATE; PRESSURE CMPTR FAIL. These messages were noted below 10000 feet.  ATC provided radar vectors to [nearest airport]. We had an uneventful landing. After landing one passenger mentioned discomfort in his ear.

The Captain of a corporate Falcon jet reported a loss of cabin pressurization while cruising at flight level 430. An emergency descent was accomplished and the aircraft was successfully diverted to a suitable enroute airport. The highest cabin altitude noted was 15;000 and one passenger reported some ear discomfort.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 193; Flight Crew Type 5083

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

We experienced a 'HYD G RSV Low LVL' ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor) during descent. We followed the ECAM SOP and secured the PTU (Power Transfer Unit) Off and the ENG 1 Green Hydraulic Pump off. The result was a loss of Green (primary) Hydraulics. After completing the ECAM and following up with the QRH for HYD G RSV Low LVL we continued to landing. The gear successfully came down and normal flaps full configuration for landing. The Captain made a smooth touchdown on the centerline and was able to maintain control on landing with Reverser No 2.He was able to slow to taxi speed and gently clear the runway at the high speed taxiway and come to a complete stop using alternate brakes. Tower handed us over to the Emergency Response Frequency and after about 5 minutes we were able to communicate with the Emergency Response Crash Recovery vehicles who met us at the taxiway. We shut down both engines after getting APU up and running and then had Super Tug tow us to our gate.

A320 First Officer reported a normal landing followed the loss of the Green System hydraulic fluid.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

During the event; I was providing OJT for a CPC-IT on Local South. The weather had been varying between MVFR and IFR throughout the morning because of a storm system moving through. Low ceilings and low visibility are rare in ZZZ which causes a lot of unnecessary paranoia amongst management and other controllers who have never worked at a facility that experiences bad weather. Earlier in the shift; the FLM had already ordered us to stop all divergent turns that we have prearranged with TRACON in the LOA; and to provide 7 MIT on any jet traffic following turboprop or prop traffic. At the time; we were operating simultaneous dependent ILS approaches between Runway 8 and Runway 7. The FLMIC ordered the Local controllers to enforce the 2-mile stagger on final; even though he had already told TRACON that we were not seeing any traffic until they were near the ILS approach minimums. This was also against the TRACON-ZZZ LOA. According to the LOA: ZZZ Must: Assume separation responsibility for RADAR arrivals on the same or adjacent final approach within 3NM of the landing threshold. At any time; ZZZ cannot provide visual separation; the ZZZ FLMIC/CIC must advise the TRACON FLMIC/CIC and the RADAR Controller must assume separation responsibility. In the event I'm reporting; Air Carrier X was on final for Runway 7; 2.3 miles in front of Air Carrier Y on final for Runway 8. Air Carrier X was at approximately a 1.5 mile final when the FLM ordered us to send Air Carrier X around because of the overtake from Air Carrier Y on the Runway 8 final. We sent Air Carrier X around; unbeknownst to us; the TRACON finals' Controller responsible for Runway 8 had already initiated a go around with Air Carrier Y. Air Carrier X replied to our go around transmission with 'Unable; minimum fuel.' For safety's sake; I told the Trainee to re-clear him to land and told the FLM to have Air Carrier Y go around because Air Carrier X had minimal fuel and would be landing. We then observed Air Carrier Y start a climb for the go around. Had Air Carrier X completed his go around as instructed; there would have been an instant loss of separation and some sort of divergent turn would have been required. Following the incident; the FLM came over and told us that just because Air Carrier X says 'minimum fuel' and not 'emergency fuel'; it doesn't make him an emergency. I feel as though his argument is pure semantics. To question an aircraft on a precision approach short final in IFR weather as to whether or not they meant to say they are on emergency fuel is as much a safety hazard as two aircraft less than 3 miles apart in IFR weather. I would recommend that the ZZZ FLMIC review the ZZZ/TRACON LOA section regarding separation on approaches during periods of low visibility.

Tower Controller described a potential multiple go around event during marginal weather when staggered separation was in doubt and one aircraft declared minimum fuel; the reporter questioning the FLM's LOA knowledge.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 8066; Flight Crew Type 1200

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

ATC clearance was issued on the ground in ZZZ as follows: ZZZZZ 4 Departure ZZZZZ V3 MUE VECKI 9 Arrival; Maintain 10;000 feet; Squawk XXXX. Soon after getting airborne we were issued a vector 'heading 300.' We flew this heading with a new instruction to intercept the V3 to MUE. We were given another vector of '290' to intercept the V3 to MUE. This new heading navigated the aircraft over 'OKALA' intersection which our GPS was normally programmed for the VECKI 9 Arrival with an OKALA transition into PHKO. We were at cruising altitude of 10;000 feet. MEA is 8;400 feet. We made the turn over OKALA and intercepted V16 on the 075 degree radial to MUE at 10;000 feet. I refer you to the VECKI 9 Arrival which does not include intercepting the V3 between TIGAH intersection and MUE.HCF Control said we turned too early and have breached his 'HIGH TERRAIN CLEARANCE AREA and NOW ARE BELOW MINIMUM ALTITUDE.' 'TURN HEADING 300 OR YOU CAN GO DIRECT MUE.' We opted to go directly to MUE remaining at 10;000 (MEA is 8;400 feet).Our error was to turn early at OKALA instead of the controller required clearance wanting us to intercept the V3 from a heading of 290. Our altitude of 10;000 feet was above the High Terrain Clearance Area and complied with the MEA of 8;400.To prevent a recurrence or corrective action: Intercepting the V3 between TIGAH and MUE was an unusual routing since we normally go via OKALA to join the VECKI 9 Arrival; so we were reprogramming this route and were distracted from a controller request to get a radio check from Hilo. This partly contributed to us forgetting the unusual route (for us). Considering we needed to get the weather and NOTAMs into PHKO and prepare for the arrival route and the very short sector route to PHKO; we should not have accommodated the radio check request.

Air taxi Captain reported ATC issued a low altitude alert on arrival to PHKO due to an early turn.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 7700; Flight Crew Type 700

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 3300; Flight Crew Type 1400

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport; Airspace Structure; Procedure

We were on the Mount Vernon visual approach to Runway 01 at DCA. The Tower then cleared us to circle the Runway 33 and we were cleared to land. When our airplane was roughly 1/2 to 3/4 mile final to Runway 33; the Tower then cleared an airliner to takeoff from Runway 01 and to expedite as there was an aircraft on a 2 mile final to Runway 33. I was the pilot flying and I immediately said to the pilot not flying; 'they have mis-judged our distance; this is not going to work.' Sure enough; as we were established on final at about 500 FT AGL; we were told to go-around. We executed the go-around; climbed to a safe altitude and switched to Departure. We were instructed to turn to a heading of 270 at 2000 FT and were vectored back for another Mount Vernon visual to Runway 01. All other portions of flight were uneventful. This was the second go-around our small flight department has been issued by DCA Tower in 1 month's time. In fact; other than DCA; as a flight department we have not been issued or have had to execute any go-around at any other airport this year. More spacing needs to be provided for arrivals at DCA. It appears to me that at peak times there is a major push by controllers to squeeze aircraft in and out of this airport. As pilots we certainly appreciate the Controller's hard work and efforts to accommodate all the aircraft in this confined space. Unfortunately sometimes it is too congested. With all the restricted airspace surrounding the airport; it makes it very tight when airplanes are routinely going around. As we were discussing the flight as a crew on the ramp; we witnessed anther airplane executing a go-around which solidified in my mind the need for more spacing.

The Departure Controllers were sorry for the mishandling and gave a heading to the south and for us to plan on landing Runway 01 at DCA. The visual approach was executed to Runway 01 DCA and the runway was exited in a normal manner. Taxi to the FBO was uneventful and the aircraft was shut down and secured for the 10 hour or so stay at DCA. At this point; the mission was uneventful and no further actions needed. No phone numbers were given to the crew to contact anyone at Potomac Approach not the Tower. The next month; an FAA Safety Inspector contacted me to inform me of a possible pilot deviation on the missed approach that occurred last month.

A corporate jet crew reported being switched from a DCA Runway 1 Mount Vernon Visual to a Runway 33 visual. Then; ATC issued them a go around because an air carrier departing Runway 1 interfered with them.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

Applied full power for takeoff on [Runway] X; engine static RPM went to 2250 but then dropped 300 rpm and went back up. Engine abnormality. Crew made decision to abort takeoff and exit [Taxiway] X1 on taxiway 2. Wrote up the aircraft.Monitor engine instrument during all critical phases of flight.

PA-28 flight Instructor reported that after full power was applied for takeoff; the engine RPM dropped resulting in a rejected takeoff.


While inputting flight plan info into the new iPad I discovered that the VOR identifier for LMT does not display over Klamath Falls Oregon but in southern Italy. I had to use the Klamath Falls airport identifier in order to display the route. While inputting flight route into iPad using the WSI Weather App I discovered that the VOR identifier for Klamath Falls Oregon (LMT) actually displays over somewhere in southern Italy. Improper data programmed into WSI Weather program. Notify WSI so that they can fix this.

B737-800 Captain discovers that when LMT (Klamath Falls) is entered in his iPad route; only the LMT (Lamezia) located in southern Italy appears.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 135; Flight Crew Total 9183; Flight Crew Type 296

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Deiced in ZZZ; about two hours into flight received a fuel config annunciation. Ran QRC; feeding out of center tanks at the time. Fuel flows even. Fuel imbalance was 1;600 lbs. between main fuel tanks; checklist had us balance. I then contacted Maintenance Control and Dispatch via SATCOM. Decision was to continue and monitor. As a precaution reviewed fuel leak procedure. Woke the Relief Officer and had him check wings and engine. Fluid was streaming out of spoiler area along whole left wing while right wing was dry. At first we thought deice fluid but with the aforementioned fuel configuration and imbalance beginning again we chose to divert to ZZZ1 after consulting First Officers and Dispatch and Maintenance Control via SATCOM a second time. Ran diversion guide and fuel leak procedure. [Requested priority handling] and landed uneventfully in ZZZ1. Stopped on taxiway and had Operations look for fuel leak prior to taxiing to gate. Parked at gate and handled passengers and contacted Chief Pilot. Fuel imbalance at shutdown was 1;000 lbs with the left wing low.

B767 Captain reported diverting after a fuel imbalance and fuel leak were detected resulting in a diversion.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

Accelerated to 250 knots while climbing on the TECKY3 departure out of San Jose while in the Class C airspace but believe we went below the Class B shelf. First Officer was Pilot Flying and as Pilot Monitoring I hesitated momentarily before telling the First Officer to slow down while I checked our position in Jeppesen charts. As we were slowing back to 200 knots we entered the Class B airspace from below. No comments from ATC and continued on our way. Began accelerating to 250 knots above 2500 feet per setting in FMS Departure Limit page.  We had discussed the SID and the propensity for aircrews to encounter non-normal issues during our preflight threats briefing. We had also discussed maintaining 200 knots during climbs away from intended course to destination on a flight leg earlier that day. I recall seeing the 200 knots below Class B note. The First Officer briefed the FMS Departure Limit page set at 2500 feet and I missed the chance to change it.  I thought from previous experience we would remain outside of the Class B shelf. I can only surmise this was a momentary lapse in the preflight setup. Perhaps I got distracted by some Captain's duty during briefing. The First Officer said that seeing the 230 knots restriction in the SID led him to believe 200 knots wasn't a necessary restriction.  That's a reasonable assumption and acceleration to 250 knots isn't prohibited if remaining outside Class B shelf.  We debriefed the event thoroughly and had a chance to redo the departure the next day with proper speed settings.

Departed [Runway] 30R at SJC via the TECKY3 Departure; speed restriction at MLPTS of 230 was met; however the speed on FMS went to 250 shortly after MLPTS.  This created a possible speed violation below the Class B shelf. Set the appropriate speed and altitude in the departure limit page on FMS. Include the note in the departure briefing.  The [airport] chart for SJC does include the speed limit note of 200 KIAS while under the SFO Class B.

An Air Carrier Captain reported exceeding 200 knots underneath Class B Airspace due to confusion over a speed restriction published on the SID which is greater than 200 knots.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

We had just taken off on the RNAV departure procedure and were in a left turn. The Captain was the pilot flying and while I was completing the after-takeoff checklist at around 1;200 FT AGL I noticed thick smoke billowing out of the air vents by our legs. It was white-to-gray in color and had a unique odor to it. It smelled most like a burning fluid or lubricant; such as oil. I brought it to the attention of the Captain who began an immediate left turn back towards the airport. Simultaneously; he had me declare an emergency with ATC and state our intention of landing as soon as possible. At first; there was a bit of confusion as to which runway we would be landing on. Ultimately however; the Tower asked if we could accept [the left] and we accepted. We also called our Flight Attendant at this time to notify her of the situation and assess the condition of the cabin. She informed us there was also smoke and a burning odor in the cabin. While setting up for a left downwind I began running through the memory items for smoke/fire in the cockpit or cabin. Turning off the recirculation fan seemed to help reduce the amount of smoke. There was insufficient time to pull out the QRH and complete the appropriate items; as we were turning base-to-final at this point and the Captain called for the landing checklist. Upon landing we stopped on a high-speed exit taxiway and were immediately met by fire trucks and rescue vehicles. We were in direct contact with the trucks while on the Tower frequency and were informed to shut down engine number 1 and open the main cabin door so the firefighters could access the condition of the aircraft. By this time we had determined an evacuation was not necessary as the smoke had cleared significantly. Upon inspection of the aircraft by the fire fighters; it was determined the aircraft would be safe to taxi to a gate; with the emergency vehicles following us as a precaution. I coordinated with Operations and we were assigned a gate. We were met by fire fighting and Maintenance personnel at the jetway and subsequently de-planed the passengers without further incident. There were no injuries. The immediate turn to the left after encountering the smoke put us in the departure path of [another runway]; however ATC informed us we would be clear of any incursions at our present altitude of about 1;200 feet AGL. Additionally; the late completion of the landing checklist temporarily caused the aircraft to be less than 1;000 FT AGL while not fully configured for landing. At no point was the aircraft in an unstable approach or landing state; and the landing checklist was completed prior to 500 FT AGL.

EMB-145 First Officer reports dense white smoke billowing out of the floor vents shortly after takeoff and an immediate return for landing is requested; with only the smoke memory items accomplished prior to landing. The landing checklist is not completed until 500 FT AGL.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

At block-in; Maintenance advised that there was damage to the trailing edge; outboard upper surface of the elevator (right side). He inquired as to whether we had been deiced prior to departing ZZZ1. We had been deiced at both ZZZ1 and ZZZ2. When we went back with the Maintenance tech to view the damage; a piece of wrinkled sheet metal approximately 5x5 inches fell from the area. The mechanic said that it appeared to be a portion of a patch that had been glued/bonded to the elevator and may have been damaged or begun peeling during the deicing process thus allowing it to be further damaged in-flight. Maintenance Technician advised that he would make logbook entry as he had discovered the damage. Upon discovery; I notified ZZZ Tower of possible runway FOD and notified duty officer of event. Early indication is a possible failure of a previous repair which may be the result of insufficient inspection or damage during deicing procedures.

Air carrier Captain reported Maintenance observed damage to the aircraft elevator that may have been  failure of a previous repair.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Prior to departure; was notified by the ramp that there was damage to the right hand horizontal stabilizer. After I looked at it; Dispatch and Maintenance Control were notified and a logbook entry was made. I can only assume the damage happened on the ground because the First Officer noticed no discrepancies on his walk-around when we first picked the aircraft up. After Contract Maintenance inspected the aircraft; it was determined that the aircraft could only be ferried. We changed planes and continued to (city). If the aircraft was in fact damaged by ground equipment; the Ground Ops people should have notified us immediately of the damage.

Aircraft horizontal stabilizer damage noted by Ramper prior to pushback. I performed a walk-around prior to departure and noted no damage to horizontal stab.

A Ramp Operations person discovered a damaged B737-700 horizontal stabilizer prior to push back but the First Officer noted no damage during his walkaround so the aircraft was grounded for a ferry flight.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14; Flight Crew Total 1304; Flight Crew Type 716

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I have X years of experience flying helicopters both IFR and VFR in the area.  I know the area well.  I know the rhythm of sporting TFRs and where to find the information (usually ForeFlight). Unfortunately; COVID in 2020 has effectively eliminated almost all of the normal sporting events.  I actually thought that since fans couldn't go to sporting events that there would not be any active sporting event TFR's at all since they wouldn't meet the people density standard.  Tonight; while en-route to ZZZ1 from ZZZ2; I learned that is not the case.While following my normal routing from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2 following Interstate-number Southbound and asking for a ZZZ transition over the south field to ZZZZZ; I called ZZZ Tower to ask for the transition when the Controller asked me if I knew that I was in a TFR.  I apologized and informed the Controller that I didn't and that I didn't see the TFR on my Garmin GTN nor on ForeFlight.  Another pilot chimed in on freq and also said that he didn't see the TFR.  The Controller simply said copy and gave me the transition without mentioning the issue further.I then saw that I did not have the TFR layer on my iPad (ForeFlight) turned on. As soon as I landed in ZZZ2 I turned on the layer and sure enough there was the TFR.  I must have clipped the edge of it on my track inbound just north of ZZZ.This issue really stems from unacceptable complacency to sporting event TFR's during the COVID year and also the fact that they don't populate to my Garmin GTN via XM like normal TFRs do.  I really wish they would standardize the delivery of TFRs so that we can see then across all services.Regardless; it was unacceptable to not have fully reviewed the flight path for all TFRs prior to departing ZZZ1.  ...a mistake I won't be making again.

Helicopter pilot reported a sporting event TFR violation.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 28; Flight Crew Total 187; Flight Crew Type 37

Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing; Ground Excursion Runway

I had left at XA:30 for a solo flight. Sky was clear; no wind. After 3 stop and go landings; I proceeded north to practice commercial maneuvers for about 45 minutes; after which I performed 3 successful short-field landing. On the fourth landing (seventh landing of the day) I entered a left downwind to practice a short-field landing.I performed the GUMPS checklist about midfield downwind. I turned a normal base to final and continued the approach at about 85 kts. I pulled power to idle at the 500 ft markers and the aircraft bounced just past the 1000 ft markers touching down on centerline. The aircraft slid smoothly across the runway; veering to the right. The aicraft came to rest on the right side of the runway. After securing the aircraft; I radioed for assistance. The landing gear lever was down after securing the aircraft. I am not sure at this point whether I reacted to the initial gear up landing by trying to place the gear lever down after I had touched down; but I do remember performing the GUMPS checklist at midfield downwind; and did not hear the gear warning horn go off prior to touchdown.

A PA-20 pilot landed gear up.  He is uncertain whether he reacted to the initial gear up landing by trying to place the gear lever down after (he) had touched down; but he reports having performed a landing checklist and not hearing a gear warning horn prior to touchdown.


Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Air Traffic Control Military 30; Air Traffic Control Non Radar 20; Air Traffic Control Radar 50; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

After departure from ZZZ Airport we experience a possible elevator control problem that made it very difficult to comply with turns; altitude and speed. We were finally able to bring the aircraft into controlled flight but not after it had incurred altitude deviation. Our maintenance is looking into the reasons for elevator trim freezing causing the aircraft to go into uncommanded attitude and making it very difficult to control. This issue has been intermittent in the past and seems to be getting worse and more often an issue. My primary objective when this took place was just to fly the aircraft. The elevator trim sometimes hang up and make the aircraft go nose low and once freed up it goes nose high and it makes it challenge to say the least for both pilots to maintain & keep control. This issue must be fixed as it effect altitude hold and command bars on MFD.

Pilot reported elevator control issues and an altitude deviation.


Challenger Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

This seems to be a lesson I keep relearning through close calls; 'Towers don't always alert you about traffic.' I had to fly through ZZZ Class D airspace. Shortly after repeating the transition approval to Tower; I 'relaxed' and started admiring the city below me and think about a recent competition while flying south bound. I was at least 4 miles east of the airport.Aircraft Y landed [later on] but it was about to make the evening news few moments before that. I estimated that we were about 3 seconds from a midair collision. What woke me up from daydreaming was the Tower calling Aircraft Y about traffic at 1 o'clock while they are on the left downwind of XX. Tower was not talking to me but I had that feeling that he was talking about me in a very calm voice. I looked up and saw an airplane getting bigger in my windshield. I immediately replied to Tower that traffic in sight and I'm descending. I must have dropped about 500 ft. Then I continued my boring flight afterwards.

C-150 Private Pilot reported executing a successful evasive maneuver due to an NMAC event.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 17C

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

During ILS approach to Runway 17C at DFW; ATC (Approach Control) directed the crew to intercept the Localizer (LOC) for Runway 17C on a 200 heading outside of PENNY. The crew had been cleared to intercept the LOC outside PENNY at 5;000 FT MSL. The reason for the higher than normal altitude and distance out from the runway was due to an overcast with cloud tops at approximately 4;700 FT MSL and a heavy aircraft landing before us. Approaching PENNY; ATC cleared the flight for the approach and the pilot not flying was 'extending the centerline' of the ILS for [Runway] 17C. Also; the pilot not flying had failed to set the proper localizer frequency for the approach and was accomplishing that task simultaneously; while communicating the approach clearance with ATC. Note: The pilot flying did have the proper course/frequency set for the ILS 17C and had 'armed' the ILS in the flight director upon receiving approach clearance. Also; the autopilot selector switch was set to AP2 since the First Officer was the pilot flying.Approaching PENNY the aircraft was configured at Slats Ext/Flaps 15 and airspeed was approximately 200 KIAS. At PENNY or right after; the crew noticed that the aircraft was not starting down the glideslope. Attempts to 'check' the LOC frequency and glideslope did not alter the flight path. Approximately 15 to 20 seconds later; ATC canceled the approach clearance and queried the crew as to whether they had intercepted the LOC to [Runway] 17C and directed the crew to descend and maintain 3;000 FT MSL. It is noted that ATC did ask the crew if they were intercepting the LOC and the crew responded affirmatively that 'we are correcting'. However; ATC did not give the crew a heading to correct back to the LOC. The crew expeditiously complied with ATC's instructions and configured the aircraft for landing. At approximately 3;200 FT MSL; the aircraft 'broke out' of the cloud bases and the crew found themselves visually aligned between Runways 17L and 17C. The crew then asked for a visual approach to [Runway] 17C and ATC cleared us as asked. A 15 to 20 degree correction was required to safely intercept the visual centerline of Runway 17C. Configuration and stable approach requirements were met sufficiently to continue the approach and land. The remainder of the approach was uneventful.It is estimated that winds aloft at 5;000 FT MSL were 260-270 degrees at 42-45 KIAS. Also winds at 3;000 FT MSL were 250-260 degrees at 23-28 KIAS. In my estimation; the failure of the instrument approach was primarily due to one or two of three reasons: 1) The crew did not hear the proper heading (200 degrees was readback and set in the FGP) issued by ATC and failed to intercept the LOC for the approach. It could have been the crew heard the final intercept heading incorrectly; in which case; the crew would have never intercepted the final approach course. 2) Due to strong crosswinds at altitude; ATC did not give the crew a sufficient intercept heading to capture the LOC prior to PENNY. 3) Both the crew and ATC did not properly monitor and crosscheck the position of the aircraft soon enough to prevent an aborted instrument approach.

An aircraft on approach to DFW Runway 17C failed to track the localizer in a crosswind and ATC failed to issue an intercept heading. During an ATC directed descent to 3;000 FT the crew acquired the airport visually and so continued the approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 13800; Flight Crew Type 10000

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were taxiing to Runway 17 for takeoff. Upon informing the Control Tower we were ready; we were cleared for takeoff on Runway 17. After crossing the hold-short line for Runway 17; we heard an airliner announce he was on short final for 17. I; as pilot flying; had looked left to assure the runway was clear; and my co-pilot looked right to check for traffic on final at about the same time the airliner announced his position. I stopped our airplane crossing the hold-short line; but still well short of the runway. The Tower Controller started to tell the airliner to go-around; then told us to hold short; and the airliner was cleared to land. When the airliner was on the ground and clear of the runway we were given clearance to takeoff. There was no further conversation or mention of the incident.

Falcon 10 Captain reports being cleared for takeoff on Runway 17 and crossing the hold short line just as an airliner announces short final for Runway 17. The Captain quickly stops over the hold line but well short of the runway and the Tower allows the airliner to continue and land.


Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge

Physiological - Other; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

They are using a chemical to clean the aircraft and it contains some highly strong fumes. On the flight I smelled the chemicals. Once in our destination when they emptied [the] trash; I could smell it even more because they drench the trash cans with the chemicals. During boarding I got dizzy and my vision became blurred. I talked to another flight attendant and told her. I drank some water and sat down for a minute and ate some pretzels. I became even more nauseated and started to have dry heaves and eventually vomited once in-flight. I notified my Domicile in-flight and Supervisor. I notified union and was told this is a problem and they have tried to stop it for awhile now. I am still nauseated and vomiting and dizzy with blurred vision.They are using cleaning chemicals in the oven and on galley floors and in the galleys. STOP USING THE CLEANER IN THE OVENS ESPECIALLY! PLEASE!

The reporter stated that he was the only crew member to have the symptoms. Two weeks after the event he is still off sick; experiencing headaches and nausea. He could not readily identify the odor but said at times it resembled dirty socks.

An A319 Lead Flight Attendant became ill from an unknown substance during preflight and subsequently in-flight was nauseous and had blurred vision. Two weeks after the event; he is still off work with symptoms.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 38; Flight Crew Total 463; Flight Crew Type 221

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

While flying practice ILS XX into ZZZ I experienced a loss of throttle control.  This occurred when leveling off at 5;500 while being radar vectored to final approach course just outside of ZZZZZ waypoint.  I requested priority handing with Approach Control and clearance given to land Runway XX.  The engine RPM remained full power when throttle was reduced.  I climbed to gain altitude and keep RPM below redline.  Once at safe altitude and able to reach airport we begun to lean mixture to reduce RPM.  Once runway was assured and at about 200 feet AGL we pull mixture full off and preformed an engine out landing to Runway XX.  Was able to clear the runway and depart the plane.  Safety pilot Mr. X was the only other person aboard the plane.

Traveler AA5 pilot reported a loss of throttle lever control during a practice approach resulting in a successful engine out landing.


Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Declared Emergency

During climb; we received a call from another carrier jumpseater in the back. He advised us that fuel was venting out near the wingtip of the right wing; apparently from the underside of the wing. We advised ATC that we would be air returning and declared an emergency. We informed them to advise emergency vehicles that we were leaking fuel from the right side and would land; come to a stop; and have them inspect the plane prior to taxi to ensure we wouldn't be spilling fuel across the airport or around the gate area; though we expected that the fuel would stop leaking once we landed (since we suspected it was coming from the vent system). As we maneuvered; the jumpseater advised us that the venting was stopping and starting; though diminishing in intensity. It ultimately stopped. A cockpit jumpseater assisted us with the FMS and backing us up. He also helped with looking up emergency checklists and handing them to us while we handled radios and the aircraft. Passengers were advised of the situation and we accomplished an overweight landing. The plane was inspected and found to not be leaking fuel any longer. We taxied to the gate and deplaned. Maintenance found that a flapper valve located by the fuel vent had detached and that was allowing fuel to enter the vent system. There was some residual fuel on the underside of the wing and back on the flaps. We monitored brake temperature throughout the taxi-in and requested a shortened taxi route.-I thought this event went quite well. There was good coordination between the front and back. We considered landing Flaps 22; since our approach speed was 3 knots from Vfe (45); but opted out of that considering the longer landing distance and already being overweight. There was also a discussion of not using reversers with a potential fuel leak; but opted to deploy them; considering that the risk was negligible; considering that the leaking was reported to have stopped by the jumpseater; was out near the wingtip; and that stopping the airplane in it's heavier than normal state was critical. We opted to not use them outside of idle; unless conditions seemed to dictate otherwise and to ensure they were closed by 60 knots.

I learned that during an emergency allocation of duties is paramount. Not only was the high workload distributed among the crew working the flight but also to the jumpseater. All of the crew working together helps to insure that tasks do not go unattended.

An EMB-145 flight crew returned to their departure airport for maintenance when advised by a deadheading pilot that fuel was leaking; apparently from a tank vent on the right wing tip.


Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Total 2600; Flight Crew Type 584

General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

About 30 minutes into flight we received a flap fail caution message on the EICAS. Flaps had failed at zero degrees. We ran through the appropriate QRH and Airplane Flight Manual procedures. When we contacted approach we forwarded our desire to land on the longest runway at our destination; but did not find it necessary to declare an emergency. That information was passed on to the Tower who then declared an emergency for our aircraft. The Captain performed the zero flap landing without incident. After the post flight walk around the aircraft had no signs of damage and maintenance was called.

A CL65 flight crew was unable to extend flaps for their approach. ATC declared an emergency for them and they landed without incident on the longest runway at their planned destination airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 270; Flight Crew Type 3500

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Type 12000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

We were on Short final Runway XX at ZZZ. The ATIS was reporting WINDSHEAR ADVSRY. We were experiencing a mostly steady crosswind that was decreasing in magnitude as we made our descent. I was the Pilot Flying and upon disconnecting the autopilot at 500 ft.; I immediately started to drift above glideslope. In correcting; I over compensated; resulting in GPWS Alerts 'SINK RATE' 'GLIDE SLOPE' and 'PULL UP'. By this time we were in the runway environment; with what seemed like good corrections; slightly low on glideslope over the threshold. Thinking as I entered the crosswind flare I had made good corrections; we touched down in the Touchdown Zone safely. After landing we realized we should have executed a terrain avoidance maneuver with the Pull Up Warning.I was not prepared mentally to see that Warning in that context. I was more anticipating a Windshear Alert in that scenario and was surprised at the Pull Up Warning. I hesitated and followed through with the landing when I should have executed the terrain avoidance maneuver.

FO (First Officer) received a glideslope and Sink Rate Caution on final during a turbulent visual approach. As he was positively correcting; I saw a 'PULL UP' flash in the HGS; and then it was gone. I was waiting for the aural pull up cue; but it never came. I allowed the approach to continue because he was actively correcting the sink rate; and since there was no audio Pull Up Warning; I thought it was a momentary fluke of the system.After debriefing it; we decided on this report: Were we right in continuing; because there was no audible Pull Up Warning? We are not sure.

Air carrier Flight Crew reported GPWS warning on approach to landing.


Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

At FL340; in radar contact with Shannon; another aircraft was in radar also 10 miles North of us at FL370. Shannon asked if we could climb to FL380. We were able and told Shannon so. Shannon responded with maintain FL380. My First Officer responded 'climb and maintain FL380.' I started a climb and as we passed FL345 Shannon asked if we were climbing saying we had no clearance; but in the same transmission said climb and maintain FL380 there was no conflict. We continued the climb to FL380. The remainder of the flight was normal.

Upon return from my rest break; approximative 1 hour before landing; I was told by the Captain that while in Shannon Center sector; under radar contact from Shannon ATC; was a radio communication misunderstanding between the flying crew and the ATC controller about an altitude clearance; misunderstanding solved without any further issues.

Air carrier flight crew reported climbing without a clearance.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft

In cruise flight with the autopilot engaged GPS 1 and 2 displayed messages they had lost integrity and were no longer providing navigation. I immediately disengaged the autopilot and switched to VLOC navigation direct to BIL Vortac. The First Officer pulled out the Low Enroute chart to determine the nearest victor airway to navigate to. Within a few minutes both GPS units were receiving signals and were navigating accurately. I notified ATC of the issue and they acknowledged it and advised us to report any additional issues. We continued the flight and landed without incident and wrote up the aircraft.

Cessna pilots reported both of their GPS's failed temporarily.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 57; Flight Crew Total 6800; Flight Crew Type 2700

Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 5900; Flight Crew Type 700

Workload; Time Pressure; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

When arriving MQY from the South East sector; our routing has us over waypoints associated with the SWFFT RNAV Arrival but without 'flying' the published arrival as it only serves BNA. Traffic landing MQY is kept at a higher altitude consistently resulting in late descents requiring a high rate of descent such as the 17;000 feet 35 miles from the airport we experienced today. This is opposite of the efforts being made for constant rate descents. This late descent is compounded by the requirement to land on Runway 32 at MQY which is a straight in approach from this arrival path. This creates an extremely rushed approach environment for not only the loss of altitude but also a reduction in speed in preparation for an approach. Additionally; this arrival path puts aircraft directly overhead MBT which is a heavy training airfield. The combination of training aircraft combined with a high performance jet aircraft with a high descent rate creates a high possibility of an inflight collision or separation issue with aircraft that are not likely talking with ATC. The other potential with being kept high is the inability to become properly stabilized for the approach into MQY which could lead an aircraft to have a runway excursion. There is no reason that a modification to the RNAV arrival to incorporate MQY and surrounding airports to better facilitate the flow of traffic vertically and provide for better stabilized arrivals and approaches couldn't be created.

Today our aircraft was given a descent clearance from 17;000 feet MSL to 5;000 feet MSL approximately 35 miles from our destination. Rough math calculates this to be a '2 to 1' descent profile that requires excessive descent rates into the terminal area. To compound this issue; the route of flight today went overhead of MBT which has/had high volumes of flight training aircraft in the vicinity of the airport. The possibility for traffic conflicts; TA/RA's and unstablized approach conditions are high in this scenario.

Corporate Captain reported a hazardous arrival procedure and accompanying charts that require modification to conform more closely with safe air traffic control for arrival to MQY airport.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

The student was conducting his first night cross-country. We flew to ZZZ and conducted a normal landing. The landing was smooth and on centerline with no side loading. Upon landing we conducted our rollout and applied full power and were able to depart from ZZZ. On the way back; the student did a practice diversion into ZZZ1. We entered the pattern and planned to conduct a full-stop taxi back on Runway XX. Student conducted an excellent landing; smooth and on centerline; and no excessive braking. On the rollout; student began to drift aircraft towards the left and seemed to have trouble maintain centerline. I called out 'my controls' and took control of the aircraft to get back on centerline. I began to apply right rudder and was unable to correct for the drift and regain centerline. I realized that we would be unable to correct; so I made the decision to get the aircraft off the runway in case any aircraft may try to land. I placed the aircraft just passed the numbers (1) in the grass. At that point; I asked the student to look and see if there is any problem on his main gear. He said yes and the tire is flat; I added power and full right rudder to attempt to get back on the runway. I was unable and knew the problem was not a flat tire. We shut down the aircraft and I inspected the tire. I found the tire was displaced from the wheel well. Upon determining that there was no immediate solution I called Dispatch for assistance.In the future; I will check the tires before each landing in order to ensure they are in place and not flat. I will continue to land softly and ensure no unnecessary or unequal braking is applied during landing.

C172 flight instructor reported a loss of aircraft control on landing rollout resulted in a runway excursion.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Approximately 30 minutes after takeoff; we had a Level 1 alert: 'BAT DISCHARGING'. QRH guidance read to land at nearest suitable airport. We were 45 miles from [nearest suitable airport]. We contacted [maintenance]. Informed Center and landed. No emergency [situation]. No fuel was dumped. We did not land overweight.Spend more resources to repair issues which; if they reoccur; require a landing at the nearest suitable airport.

MD-11 Captain reported receiving a message 'BAT DISCHARGING' that triggered a diversion to the nearest suitable airport.


Installation; Repair; Testing; Work Cards

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While jacking Aircraft X to complete tasks [A] and [B] during visit; noted that the NLG (Nose Landing Gear) did not go to the centered position. I was able to move the NLG tires from right of center to left of center and back; but it had a lot of resistance to do it. It would not 'lock' to the centered position while fully extended on jacks.Jacked A/C to complete another task and noted that the NLG did not center with the A/C on jacks.We removed the sliding member from the NLG and found that the fluid was clear and fresh. While removing the sliding unit it was noted that the 2 pins ([Maintenance Manual 32-20-04; Fig 5; item 95; PN MS51838-107) were not installed. Disassembled lower sliding unit and found the 2 lock pins not installed. Did some research and found the NLG strut was repacked on [Day X]. The A/C came into ZZZ on [Day X+16] as a RON (Remain Overnight). We installed the pins and reinstalled the sliding member; serviced and ops check of the centering was good.The repack job cards step address installing these pins. Appears to be a failure to follow procedures.

Maintenance Technician reported Maintenance Procedure on Nose landing Gear on CRJ-200 was not performed correctly.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Observer

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

This event happened during my two minute overlap of another sector. When I gave up the position; I had slowed down Aircraft Z and had Aircraft X on delay vectors in order to provide enough room for an opposite direction Aircraft Y to depart SNA. I asked the controller relieving me if he wanted me to work out this sequence and he replied that he 'was used to working whatever'. At this point; I had set up my plan for the ODO (Opposite Direction Operation); but I had not actually released the ODO. As soon as the relieving controller (Controller A) took the position; SNA tower called asking for an update on the release; and the controller said 'released for departure; your discretion opposite direction'. Which is not the correct opposite direction phraseology. While doing my overlap I realized how time sensitive the departure was so I called SNA tower and asked them to expedite the departure because we are trying to hit a gap in the arrival sequence. SNA tower said he was taking the runway now. When I looked at the ASD-X for SNA I saw that Aircraft Y had not even began to take the runway. The SNA tower controller was giving false information. Shortly after; but before the ODO tagged up; Controller A turned Aircraft X left onto a downwind heading. This brought the airplane closer to the final and created a potential conflict with the ODO departure. As soon as the ODO tagged up; Controller A based Aircraft Z inside of Aircraft A and descended him. This was before he was even talking to the ODO. In my opinion there was inadequate spacing between Aircraft Z and Aircraft A to make that sequence work. Then the ODO Aircraft Y went NORDO (No Radio) and separation was lost between multiple aircraft. Another controller came over to take over the hand off position and help Controller A. I told the incoming hand off to hold Aircraft B so that Controller A could recover the sector and climb Aircraft Y out of his airspace and get him on course. The new hand off made the coordination and then Controller A said that he is fine and he can bring him in. He doesn't need to hold anyone. Why would he hold an aircraft? After watching the replay I saw that he had a MVA violation with Aircraft Y because he could not climb him because Aircraft B was in the way. And if he would have been held by the previous sector then that would not have been a problem. When I gave up the position I had left myself several outs. In case someone would go NORDO. This is a systemic problem with Controller A. He is an extremely aggressive controller who takes unnecessary risks. He does not protect himself in case something goes wrong. He is creating an unsafe environment in the coast airspace.He should have never turned Aircraft X towards the airport and towards the downwind. I had him pointed out with the adjacent sector so that he could be held to the west; away from the ODO departing SNA. There was a LGB arrival at 4000 ft that was above Aircraft X. Our handoff is to the next sector at 3000 ft. He should have never descended the LGB arrival to 3000 ft. Because now he has to have lateral separation between that aircraft and Aircraft X. So he can't turn Aircraft X out of the way if he needed to. Aircraft Z should never have been put on a base heading and descended before the ODO even tagged up off of the departure end. He was 'betting on the come'; that the ODO would tag up and come on frequency quickly enough that he could be turned and climbed. He was trying to force Aircraft Z in front of Aircraft A on a straight in. So that he would not have to hold anyone. Controller A does this a lot. He creates an unsafe unworkable situation and then forces the pilots to make it work. By basing Aircraft Z he is forcing Aircraft A to follow with too little separation. Then take dramatic measures to maintain what little spacing the controller gave him. My last critique is that when I suggested and the hand off initiated a hold for Aircraft B; he should have taken it. Rather than trying to recover and give himself some space and breathing room; he wanted to be Mr. Super Controller and make it work. It caused him a MVA deal. Also upon review I noticed that Aircraft Y descended from 026 to 023 when he got very close to Aircraft X. Which was most likely a TCAS.Lastly the staffing in the area was poor that morning. Another controller was allowed to go work in the back on a detail when he was needed on the floor. Staffing is also poor in the evening after a sick out; and as of now no overtime has been called in.

SCT Controller reported relieving Controller had numerous procedural and operational failures.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 109; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 552

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

As the pilot flying; I was cleared off the OAKES2 arrival and cleared direct to MITOE initially to 6000 ft for the visually approach to Rwy 30. Approach then cleared us to 4000 ft and said the airport was at 1 o'clock. We reported the airport in sight. After reporting the field in sight; ATC cleared us for the visual approach to Rwy 30. The WX was clear and the visibility was unrestricted. I flew the approach with Terrain mode selected on the radar and was aware of the terrain southeast of final approach course to Rwy 30 (as noted also in the 10-10 page). I used FLCH for the descent mode upon being cleared direct to MITOE and no longer on the arrival into Oakland. The descent rate was approximately 1000-1500 FPM and I was slowing/configuring the aircraft as we approached 5NM from MITOE. During the descent; I was monitoring the 'green arc' and clearing visually to ensure I was clear of the terrain while trying to achieve a 2000 ft MSL level-off at MITOE. I also had the ILS selected to back-up the approach; aid in the intercept and aid in the descent to Rwy 30. Approximately; 2.5 NM from MITOE; we received a momentary GPWS 'Terrain' warning as we passed over the terrain southeast of the approach course on an intercept heading to MITOE. Upon hearing the warning; I took positive immediate corrective action by disconnecting the autopilot and arresting my descent. Because the GPWS warning was momentary; by the time I disconnected the autopilot and arrested the descent; the warning ceased and we were clear of the terrain. The altitude in the radar altimeter was increasing and we were still stabilized approaching MITOE. I elected to cease the maneuver and continue normal flight profile for the approach. As we intercepted final approach at MITOE; we were configured; on speed and slightly above glide path (with reference to the ILS). I intercepted glide path just past MITOE and was stabilized for the approach. We landed at Oakland with no further incident. With reference to the CFIT escape; a full maneuver was not accomplished. Due to the terrain in question and flight profile; upon disconnecting the autopilot and arresting the descent the warning ceased. The GPWS warning was momentary in nature. We were clear of terrain and still within safe parameters to continue the visual approach. I elected to cease the maneuver and continue the flight profile for the approach. At no time did the radar display any 'yellow' or 'red' indications for terrain and we had the ridge line insight.  The lesson learned from this event is often times ATC will clear you for the visual approach when WX conditions are favorable. I could have modified my approach to intercept final further out allowing me to maintain a higher altitude over the terrain and still maintain stabilized parameters for the approach. However; due to other factors involved (note in the 10-10 page about terrain; night conditions; etc.); it would have been best remain on the arrival and ILS approach to avoid the terrain altogether.

On arrival we were cleared down to 4000 feet and cleared direct to the FAF MITOE RWY 30 OAK. At about 20 miles from field; approach asked if we had the airport in sight. FO was the PF. We confirmed that we had the field in sight and at that time we were cleared for the visual approach to 30. At that time since we were heading direct to MITOE the FAF altitude of 2000 feet was put in the MCP. Per the 10-10 page the FO and myself were aware of terrain in the area and both of us had terrain displayed; and monitoring. On our descent both of us were monitoring closely our terrain display and referencing our green arc which showed us arriving at MITOE at 2000 feet. As a secondary descent reference we had the G/S too; which showed us slightly high. At no time did our terrain display show anything but a spattering of green and never any yellow or red. As we were almost clear of the ridge we encountered a EGPWS warning of terrain and to climb. At that time the FO started to execute our CFIT maneuver by disengaging the autopilot and stopping our descent. Almost immediately after disconnecting the autopilot we were clear of terrain and no climb was necessary. We continued on our descent to MITOE and landed without issue. During this whole encounter we had the ridge line and airport insight. It is also interesting to note that ATC never indicated any low altitude alert.

B767 flight were experienced a GPWS terrain warning during a night visual approach to Runway 30 at OAK. The crew was on the OAKES2 Arrival; had been cleared direct MITOE; and cleared for the visual; but did not stay with the OAKES crossing restrictions. The warning was momentary and the terrain avoidance maneuver was barely started when the warning ceased.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation; General Maintenance Action

I went back to get more supplies for the other flight attendants and noticed that the meals at location P53 had turned off. I attempted to check the temperature of the meals and was shocked for about 2-3 seconds. The current ran up my right arm; but I was able to move away. The floor was wet from all of the ice that had melted and dripped on the floor. We tried to wipe it up as much as we could with paper towels before the shocking. My shoes were wet/slick from the moisture from the melting ice. I told my other economy crew members that we were down a cart and was I attempting to move the cart to a different position. I was shocked again at that position; so I turned off the cart and unplugged the pig tail and moved the cart to position 507. I plugged it in turned it on. I touched the cart again and this time I was shocked again with even more current running through my arms through my leg on the right side.In addition; before I moved the cart I touched the other cart next to P53 it also gave me a shock; but not nearly as large. I decided to unplug and turn all the galley control area off. The rest of my crew finished the meal service. I notified the Purser and cockpit. The cockpit verified with me that the galley controls were turned off and asked us to not use the new tech carts for the rest of the flight. I verified that it already had been done. After going back to the aft galley we saw that that one circuit breaker was out. Later another one popped out. The cockpit asked if they should include medical attention when I arrived. I said yes as a precaution because I had never been shocked to that extent before. My right side felt like I was hit in the funny bone. My right side was tingly and numb. The next day my arm was sore. It felt like I pitched seven innings in a baseball game. We landed in our crew base. A Supervisor met me but no paramedics. The galley equipment was written up. The cart was tagged. It is my opinion that the wet floors are dangerous from not having dry ice and the ice melting and leaving water in the galley. The electrical issue on this flight could've made things much worse. This galley while unplugged; but with melting ice; was not a safe place to work.

A B767-300 chiller shocked a Flight Attendant when he opened it to check the meals. After disconnecting and moving that cart he was shocked by another chiller which made his left side feel like a funny bone was hit. The galley floors were wet and later several circuit breakers were found popped.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

ZZZ Center was closed due to COVID decontamination on a midnight shift.  We were here to work the airspace during the closure.  Our airspace is delegated 10;000 feet and below.I received two flight plans for the two aircraft en-route from ZZZ1 Approach. The assigned altitudes were both 10;000 feet.  When the targets appeared on my scope; they were at 12;000 feet.  I called ZZZ2 Approach and coordinated 12;000 feet so the aircraft would not have to descend back down.  They approved the coordination.  I then called ZZZ1 and told them to leave the Aircraft at 12;000 feet; but in the system at 10;000 feet so the flight plan would stay in my airspace.The communication was not entirely clear that the airspace was closed prior to working the abnormal midnight shift.

TRACON Controller reported an airspace violation occurred after rearranging altitudes in the ATC system to accommodate arriving aircraft in his sector due to another ATC site closing for COVID-19 sanitation.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

First flight of pairing we received aircraft with two MELs; APU Bleed Leak Message and APU inoperative. Flew aircraft normally [on the initial leg]. Turned aircraft and preformed correct QRH for starting engines with ground air. Then we preformed a QRH cross bleed start and taxied to the end of the runway. There was a delay at the end of the runway due to F-16 fighter traffic in the pattern and we both commented on the bounced landings and tire smoke of the fighter jets. Once we received a line up and wait and takeoff clearance we exchanged controls and finished the normal checklists and began the takeoff roll. At around 80-100 KTS (I can't be certain) the Captain made a comment about the smell of the fighters and then we got a chime from the Flight Attendant. The Captain aborted the takeoff roll and regained positive control of the aircraft and exited the first available high speed taxiway. I told the Tower of our abort and asked to 'roll the trucks' I also told the folks in the back to remain seated. Once we were stopped I did notice a light smoke/haze in the cockpit. I opened my window to ventilate and the Captain asked to perform the Smoke in the Cockpit Checklist and to drop the masks in the back. Once the air cleared and the trucks showed up the Captain determined it would be safe to taxi back to the gate. He increased power and the smell came back right away. At that point we shut down the engines and had fire personnel board the aircraft. After some coordination and safety concerns about the passengers it was decided to have the aircraft towed back to the gate. After reaching the gate all passengers exited safely and the event came to a close. The APU MEL's were a distraction and the abnormal procedures always call for extra diligence. The fighter jets were a distraction and probably delayed the abort for a second or two. Outside influences can always effect what is going on in the cockpit and diligence should always be maintained. Checklist usage can never be understated. It's really all you have to fall back on. Whether or not related to the actual event the wording of 'APU Bleed leak message' MEL in not very clear in its writing.

[This was our] second segment on this aircraft. First segment was uneventful other than MEL-associated EICAS message; which we reviewed with Maintenance prior to departure. [We had a] normal turn; with the exception of APU inoperative so External Airstart Procedure was used per QRH. Taxied on Engine #2 only (until #3 for takeoff) then started Engine #1 using crossbleed start procedures for 2 minute warm-up. Several additional minutes of waiting took place due to numerous fighter aircraft at high speed/formation in the pattern. All checklists and indications normal until setting thrust in detent for takeoff. Several seconds into the takeoff roll; a slight 'smoky' odor was detected; but we assumed (verbalized) it was likely associated with multiple fighter jet 'hard' landings we had observed while holding short of runway; with little wind to dissipate smoke. The smoke then became stronger and visible just as the Flight Attendant pressed her Cabin Emergency button; and we completed the Aborted Takeoff procedure. Answered Flight Attendant call as soon as it was safe to do so and she reported smoke in the cabin. Advised Tower we were rejecting and completed checklist. Cleared the runway at nearest exit and asked Tower to dispatch Fire/Rescue as a precaution. [We] also manually dropped passenger oxygen masks as a precaution. Smoke appeared to be clearing from the cabin at idle thrust. ARFF arrived within a few minutes and we asked them for a visual inspection of the exterior including brakes; which all came back satisfactory. Taxiways were busy at the time and we could not guarantee a safe exit of the aircraft with Operations unless we got back to the gate. I briefed the Flight Attendant to ensure everyone was seated and belted for taxi and to immediately advise me of any additional smoke in the cabin. Since the aircraft taxied without event using idle thrust on Engine #2 while taxiing for takeoff; we elected to attempt a slow taxi back to our gate. When I applied slight thrust to Engine #2; the Flight Attendant advised me she detected smoke. We then advised Operations that we needed to be towed back to the gate; briefed them on keeping a careful watch for our cockpit signals; and deselected all pneumatic systems that might possibly be the source of smoke. Shut down all engines when we were certain we could make it back to gate on battery power alone. [We] coordinated with the Flight Attendant that all passengers were safe & secure; and then we were towed back to our gate with ARFF escort without further incident.

EMB145 flight crew reports rejecting a takeoff for smoke in the cockpit just as the Flight Attendant pressed her Cabin Emergency button. The smoke dissipates with the engines at idle on the taxiway but the smoke returns when thrust is increased to return to the gate. The engines are shut down and a tow in is requested.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Crew briefed the Visual Approach backed up by the ILS RWY 23. The Jeppesen 11-1 chart; dated 13 NOV 20; depicts a PAPI on the left side of the runway. Crew did not see a PAPI during the approach; and Air Traffic Control confirmed there has never been a PAPI installed on either RWY 23 or RWY 05. [Cause was] incorrect charting. Although this event was Day-VMC; the charting error could seriously mislead a crew at night; particularly if the ILS or GS is inoperative on RWY 23 and the crew is expecting a visual glide path.

Flight crew reported a chart showed PAPI installed at an MMU airport runway. When crew questioned ATC; ATC advised no PAPI has ever been installed at this runway.


ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft; Human Factors

I was completing maneuvers at 8500 MSL in the North Lake Tahoe; Truckee; California area upon the completion of which a last minute decision was made to make a practice landing followed by an immediate departure at TVL; a non-towered airport. TVL lands to the south and takes off to the north due to terrain considerations. ASOS (124.725) was repeatedly monitored; followed by a monitor of the CTAF (122.95). CTAF revealed that two business jets were some 15 minutes out; so I loitered so as to give them plenty of space; followed by which; some 20 miles out from TVL; I transmitted my intention to land. ASOS was again checked. The same thing was done 10 miles out and 3 miles out. At no time was any communication received which was directed at me; or which would lead me to believe anything was amiss. Transmissions to; and from; the FBO were received; but these were made by; and for; other aircraft. I landed RWY 16; taxied to the end; turned off; set up for the standard (due to terrain) RWY 36 departure and announced my intention to take the active and depart. On the takeoff roll; suddenly; on the CTAF frequency (122.95) a voice barked that there was a 'temporary' control tower in effect. It was too late to abort. During the takeoff and while the aircraft was getting configured; a steady stream of communication took place. Questions being asked as to tail number; and destination; and demanding I copy a 'call the tower' number when able. When; I couldn't act fast enough; I was gigged again. I then was able to take down the number. Conversation followed wherein I inquired as to why no one had advised that the 'temporary' tower was in effect; and I noted that although I had reported 20 miles out; 10 out; and 3 out and also upon retaking the active for departure; they just decided to communicate with me now even though in the subsequent phone call that followed; the tower said they were monitoring at all times 122.95. The woman I was talking to was nonresponsive. Upon calling the 'temporary'; I was told that the reason for the temporary tower being established was a [event]. I asked the same questions as referenced above and was told that no communication had been received from me at any of the 4 (claimed) on-field monitoring stations referenced above. But why then was I not contacted on the landing rollout which takes some time to complete? No satisfactory answers were offered to any of said questions. Tower told me that it does monitor CTAF as do 3 other locations on the field and that all had been checked and that none revealed any reception from me. I respectfully do not believe this. For some reason tower and the FBOs chose not to communicate. The annual for [the BE33] had been performed in June; and on the long flight home the aircraft was in constant radar contact. I experienced no problems with the radios in the aircraft. Tower seemed to imply that a problem existed with respect to the radios. I asked tower if no contact had been received on the in-bound leg; then why were my responses received and transmitted so crystal clear once tower yelled at me after I had properly announced my take-off intentions and commenced my take-off roll? Were their radios turned off or not functioning? Were their radios not; in fact; being monitored for the time in question? Did tower really check to see if the other asserted monitoring stations received the in-bound calls? Why was there no tower communication during the long roll-out upon landing when there is no reason tower did not have a visual on [the Bonanza]? No satisfactory answers were received. Is this a situation where the towers lapse is blamed on the pilot because that is just easier? Only suggestion from tower was possible defective radio in my aircraft; which I know is not so of my own knowledge through experience and use; and that of my mechanic.Suggested corrective action; if there is a temporary tower at a non-towered airport; include a reference to it in the ASOS. Give pilots reasonable notice; especially important for pilots making practice landing at airports they did not intend to land at when initial takeoff occurred. Safety first!

BE33 pilot reports an unplanned practice landing at TVL. CTAF procedures are employed and two business jets are allowed to land before the reporter. The landing is completed and the aircraft is taxied clear in preparation for takeoff on the reciprocal runway. On the takeoff roll; a temporary Tower Controller comes on the CTAF and advises that a temporary Tower is in operation.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 1900; Flight Crew Type 450

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 200; Flight Crew Type 20

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

[We] taxied to the runway for departure. When out of usable runway; my student selected gear up. The gear did not appear to move and there was no low-frequency noise of the gear pump.  The gear indicator lights continued to show green down and locked.  The 'gear unsafe' light illuminated; indicating a disagreement between the position of the gear selector and the gear itself.... I took the controls and selected gear down and then attempted to bring the gear back up.  There was no movement of the gear this time either....  I told Tower that we were having a problem with our gear and we were going to need to stay in the pattern to troubleshoot.  My biggest worry was that either on the initial selection of 'gear up' or my second attempt we had unlocked the gear and it would collapse when we touched down.  I knew we had three green lights (indicating that the gear was down and locked) but I wasn't willing to trust them completely - the gear system had already let us down once. We did an initial flyby of the Tower so that they could check our gear and then orbited east of the field while we spoke to Maintenance on the ground.  After discussion; they asked us to do another flyby but felt that that it would be safe to attempt a landing.... I requested that Tower get the trucks rolling and we performed our flyby.... The landing was uneventful. The gear stayed locked. We taxied back to our maintenance hangar and my student and I debriefed.  Maintenance determined that the squat switch had been improperly installed and the aircraft thought it was still on the ground even after takeoff.  At no time was the gear ever unsafe - it was fully down and locked the entire time.

Narrative 2 contains no additional information.

PA44 Student Pilot raised the gear handle on takeoff; but the gear remained down with three down and locked indications. Instructor Pilot took control of the aircraft; lowered the gear handle and; after a fly-by for visual verification; landed without incident.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; General Maintenance Action

Shipment X going to ZZZ in container X was found with one package with an Excepted Quantity" label; but was not declared on the MAWB (Master Airway Bill). This is a violation of Dangerous Goods Regulations. 'Dangerous Goods in Excepted Quantity' must be shown in the "Nature and Quantity" portion of the MAWB."

Air carrier ground personnel reported a Hazmat procedural violation regarding missing required information on MAWB.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

Climbing through 3;500 FT the landing gear and flaps were retracted and the After Takeoff Checklist was complete. The First Officer selected Climb 1 Thrust and announced doing so; I acknowledged. Shortly after as the autopilot accelerated the aircraft to 250 KTS; the ICAS message 'FUEL 2 LO LEVEL' appeared. The First Officer was assigned to continue flying the aircraft and to operate radio communications while I read aloud the QRH Procedure. I sent several ACARS messages to Dispatch informing him of the situation. The ICAS message (FUEL 2 LO LEVEL) was no longer indicated; there were no indications of any abnormalities on any aircraft systems. We continued on route and advised Dispatch that we considered the ICAS FUEL Warning to be erroneous; and of our intention to land at ZZZ; our nearest suitable airport at that time. Dispatch concurred. We requested expeditious routing and Emergency Equipment standing by. The flight attendants were briefed of the status and to plan a normal landing. We suspect the warning was erroneous; this aircraft has a history of erroneous indications /warnings; however; we chose to deal with the situation as if there was an actual low fuel issue to be extra cautious.Given the numerous erroneous indications/warnings associated with this aircraft; I suggest that all the electronics be thoroughly inspected for faults.

After evaluating the receipt of a FUEL 2 LO warning light aboard an EMB-190 with a history of erroneous warnings; the flight crew opted to divert to the nearest suitable airport despite the history.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

There are no available safety masks for us to use. Respirators are unavailable as well. There are no cleaning products available. Our stock has been sent to other stations leaving us with none and at stores; window employees are wearing respirators in front of their computer. Why is our health and safety not a concern? Yet the group is quick to point out vest or seatbelt infractions. These items should be readily available at all times. This needs to be resolved immediately.

Reporter was concerned that there weren't safety masks or respirators available for use.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 40; Flight Crew Type 40

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

During the visual approach; I used right aileron and left rudder to correct for the right cross wind component. The right main tire touched down first then the left. After touching down; I felt the plane was unstable. I continued to pull back the yoke to decrease airspeed and triple checked power was idle. Aircraft began to skid to the right off the runway into the sand. More left rudder may have been one way to fix the issue to get back onto center line to prevent skidding to the right.

Student Pilot reported a runway excursion occurred after losing directional control on the landing roll.


Single Engine Turboprop Undifferentiated

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 113; Flight Crew Total 1600; Flight Crew Type 125

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Approaching the Onida airport ATC gave me a descent down to 4000 feet; from cruise. 15 miles from the airport I called the field in sight 3 times on the center frequency with no response. I then called out on 121.5 3 times; again with no response from ATC. I switched to advisory and began my visual approach; keeping 121.5 in standby to listen on. As I descended through 3000 feet on final ATC came up on guard advising me of a low altitude alert and to contact them on 125.1; which was not the frequency I had been assigned. I broke off the approach and contacted them. They asked what my intentions were and I stated I have the field and sight and would like to conduct the visual. They cleared me for the approach and I completed the approach.

Corporate pilot reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC over Guard frequency while on a visual approach to 98D airport.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 19000; Flight Crew Type 25

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

On HONIE 8 arrival as we checked in with ATL TRACON we were informed that ILS PRM approaches were now in use (not stated on the ATIS) and we were given a runway change. As pilot flying I re-programmed the FMS - I made all of the changes and pushed enter - while waiting for the FMS (Note: the FMS is slow on the MD88 when making changes) to re-compute we passed the fix on the arrival and the FMS went into heading hold as the fix was now behind us. I went into heading select and turned to maintain the STAR; while I re-programmed the FMS to proceed direct to the next fix - the FMS took what I thought a longer than normal time to process and I pointed this out to the First Officer who then had us go direct to the next fix using his MCDU. The FMS re-calculated and we proceeded direct to the next fix. During all of this we drifted right of course as we were right over LGC. ATC asked if we were joining the arrival. I am not sure how far right of course we were; but I do not believe we were significantly off course. There was no conflict with other traffic. I am new on the aircraft and my familiarity with FMS operation is still developing. In the future I will wait to make changes if I see I will be close on a fix given the MD88 slow processing speed.

An MD-88 Captain; new to the airplane; had difficulty programming the FMS for a change in their arrival clearance to ATL and a track deviation resulted.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 329; Flight Crew Type 12000

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Passing approximately 16;000 feet; ZZZ Center asked if we were climbing. We answered 'Yes; climbing via the ZZZZZ 4 SID; with top altitude FL230.' ZZZ Center asked if we were given 14;000 feet as our top altitude. We answered 'No.' Flight continued normally. After further conversation between pilots; the Pilot Monitoring realized that the initial clearance was to climb via except maintain 14;000 feet. Pilot Monitoring incorrectly set 23;000 feet on the MCP after VNAV was selected during climb. 23;000 feet is the top altitude as published on the ZZZZZ 4 SID. PF did not correct the error. On subsequent check in with ZZZ Approach and ZZZ Center; the Pilot Monitoring said we were 'climbing via'; not 'climbing via to 14;000 feet.' ATC did not correct or question; until separate transmission from ZZZ Center passing 16;000 feet as stated.

B737-700 Captain reported a miscommunication resulted in them overshooting a cleared altitude departing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 86; Flight Crew Type 10583

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Just prior to pushback on our flight from ZZZ-ZZZ1 (within five minutes or so of scheduled departure time); we received an ACARS message that Dispatch was aware of HAZMAT on board--with Zulu time and initials. This confused me because: 1) I had not seen Dispatch do this before for HAZMAT; and 2) at the time; we had seen no HAZMAT paperwork. I turned around to query the Ops Agent; and just then; she handed me the NOTAC with a single line item regarding [radioactive] HAZMAT material and told me that she had just received it. I read the paperwork; signed both copies; and indicated that I had done so in a replay message to Dispatch. We then departed. After that leg was over; now flying from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2; I found my copy of the NOTAC--and was about to throw it away--when I started to think that I may have missed something. Sure enough; on further review; the first step for this type of NOTAC; as directed at [Section] of the FOM; requires the Captain to ensure that the Dispatch Release has been amended (if needed) to include a note regarding the presence of HAZMAT cargo. Our Dispatch Release did not have any such remark. Presumably; the Zulu time and the Dispatcher's initials should be included in the note that I should have added as a pen-and-ink change.

B737-800 Captain reported receiving NOTAC and a handwritten amendment to the Release just prior to departure. The handwritten release amendment was not in accordance with company policy.