Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Air Traffic Control; Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

[Aircraft X] was being vectored for an ILS approach into BFI RWY (Runway) 14R by the Arrival West (1W); Arrival East (1E); Boeing Arrival (1D); and Paine (1P) sectors combined. As [Aircraft X] was being vectored traffic was issued for two VFR aircraft on 1200 codes transitioning both north and south through the localizer for Runway 14R. Due to this traffic I left [Aircraft X] at 3;000 ft. and obtained a point-out with SEA Final (1F). Despite this altitude; [Aircraft X] responded to a TCAS RA and; in an effort to protect the sea final approach course; I turned [Aircraft X] right to a heading 220. As [Aircraft X] turned southbound I observed a C172; [Aircraft Y]; being vectored for the ILS Runway 20 approach into PWT. I turned [Aircraft X] further right to a northwest heading; and measured the distance between [Aircraft X] and [Aircraft Y]. I observed approximately 3.3 miles between the two and since I had already issued the turn; I judged that sufficient separation and attempted to continue working to not fall further behind. [Aircraft X] turned slower than anticipated and caused a separation error between themselves and [Aircraft Y]. The root of this issue is the continual constant conflict between IFR jets into BFI and VFR aircraft transitioning through the localizer in both north and south flow. It is a well-known; persistent issue that has been thoroughly reported for several years. Several solutions have been proposed; but none have been adapted.The only fix for this issue is a restructuring of the Seattle Class B airspace to protect the finals in both directions at BFI. I have personally submitted redesigns for this issue that both protect BFI; and in doing so protect SEA; and allow VFR operations in and out of BFI; and are not unduly hindering to the general aviation community. If safety is truly the priority of the FAA and the Seattle region; changes will be initiated immediately. I understand the process for airspace changes take time; however; the changes will never take place if the process is not started. When the inevitable aircraft incident finally occurs; I hope that no one dies and I am not on position.

[Aircraft Y] was on vector; at 2;500 ft.; to ILS Runway 20 approach at PWT. [Aircraft X]; controlled by W Sector; was on final to Runway 14R at BFI and experienced a TCAS RA with an uncontrolled VFR aircraft. The W Controller was already at a high level of complexity and volume as sectors were combined. The BFI Runway 14R final is in close proximity to PWT 20 mile final and is also underneath the Runway 16 finals at SEA. With limited options [Aircraft X] was turned to the southwest towards [Aircraft Y] with only 500 ft. between them. There are many factors that lead to this situation. These include airport proximities; sector overload; traffic complexity. There is also the issue of lack of controlled and protected airspace in and out of BFI. This is an issue controllers have been bringing to local management for years. The workforce is metaphorically beating our heads against a wall as we are asking for help and are given zero assistance in return. The final to BFI is underneath the SEA finals so we are forced to descend large; fast turbojet aircraft out of Class Bravo airspace into a very high VFR traffic area. This leads numerous TCAS situations. Many suggestions have been brought up through established reporting procedures so I will not waste my time typing them out again. The feeling of a lack of support for change is disheartening. There needs to be change made into airspace and procedures for aircraft landing at BFI; and this should be done for both arrival directions at BFI.

Two S46 Approach controllers reported an aircraft on an ILS Approach to BFI had to be vectored away from two conflicting VFR aircraft not in communication with ATC which resulted with the BFI aircraft losing separation with a fourth aircraft on an ILS approach to another airport. Both reporters emphasized these situations are a recurring issue due to the insufficient Class B protected airspace in the SEA/S46 airspace.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 24; Flight Crew Total 292

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft

Flying Left patterns for Runway XX into ZZZ with a new student; we were on left downwind with one airplane ahead of us on base turning final. Was also aware of traffic from the east coming in. Standard call outs at this field are on base when flying patterns; also wasn't told to report anything. Pattern prior I called on left downwind. Still on downwind I became aware of the traffic coming in flying almost parallel to our course. At this time a Aircraft Y calls in; ATC misses the call; so Aircraft Y has to repeat. Unable to report downwind due to this and plan on reporting base. Still on downwind/extended downwind at this point with traffic we are following on final not yet abeam and another airplane parallel to our course at the same altitude. Before we are able to turn base due to the traffic on final an ADS-B traffic warning goes off for the traffic inbound and parallel. At this time; I believe the traffic is either on final or entering a close left base to final. With incoming traffic and another plane on final to my left practicing touch and goes. I notify ATC of the alert and using my captain's authority; execute the standard right turn for head-on traffic avoidance; believing that will take me well clear of the traffic. Traffic then mirrors my turn to the left; following my course. I begin executing a climb with the traffic nearing as I noticed I was higher; and we pass within 200 ft. of each other. I notify ATC again of what happened. Not sure if opposing traffic ever realized I was there; aircraft was ADS-B equipped; but didn't respond at all to my call nor acknowledge it. May have also been making a left turn to intercept the extended base he was initially given; as what he was flying before his correction was more of a final or shallow base entry. Afterwards; a little shaken; I may have misheard a call telling me to enter a right downwind for Runway XX. I ask for clarification; stating we are to the south of the field and a left downwind would be best for Runway XX. Get told to enter left downwind for XX and proceed to follow Aircraft Y in who called earlier in.

Instructor pilot reported a NMAC with an aircraft while in the airport traffic pattern.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

I worked a job task card on 2 aircraft about 6 months ago. On page 2 step 5 it read; route the following wires per Figure 2 with 'SPECIAL ATTENTION' given to Figure 2 sheet 3 of 4; which provided unique wire bundle routing for the wire bundle W0054 due to Fuel Quantity Indicating Systems (FQIS) requirements. W0054 must be sleeved with connector ring and grommet from the upper a Reference Figure 2 sheet 2 of 4; to connector D46061 POS23; reference Figures 3; 4 and 5. The paperwork [had been modified to read]: To be sleeved from the upper Z Reference. So that would make the 2 planes I did had about a 1 1/2 foot of extra sleeving on it.

A Maintenance Technician reported that long after he worked a task card that had been updated with a change to the instructions he determined that the amount of protective sleeve that he used was incorrect.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

While cruising at FL340 we received an ECAM indicating IDG 1 Oil Low Pressure. We complied with the non-normal procedure and disconnected IDG 1. After approximately 5 minutes; we received an ECAM indicating APU Auto Shutdown. We [advised ATC] and diverted to [a suitable alternate] where we executed a normal landing and taxied to the gate.

A321 Captain reported a malfunctioning Integrated Drive Generator and subsequent auto shutdown of the APU; necessitating an immediate diversion to a suitable alternate airport.


Workload; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

The TAF for ZZZ is NOT done by the NWS but contracted to [a company] to issue an Enhanced Weather Information System (EWINS) TAF. This shows up in our [dispatch computer] and is emailed to a conference where I can find it. The TAF does not automatically go into our airline planning tools or the flight crew packet but must be copied and pasted into our weather system in order to be easily seen by the dispatcher and for the crew to have it.An old EWINS TAF from 3 days earlier was still in the system and I failed to notice the date was incorrect. After the flight was airborne to ZZZ I noticed that an amended TAF had popped into my [dispatch computer]. I then went to compare the new TAF to the one in the system and then noticed the date was wrong on the one which I used to dispatch the flight. I also checked the flight paperwork packet that the crew used and it contained the TAF from 3 days earlier.FAR 121.601(b) before beginning a flight; the aircraft dispatcher shall provide the pilot in command with all available weather reports and forecasts of weather phenomena that may affect the safety of flight.I failed to provide the crew with the current EWINS TAF for ZZZ before departure.I sent the flight crew the current ZZZ TAF via ACARs and they acknowledged receiving it.We should have an automated system to have EWINS TAFs entered into our primary dispatch tools. TAFs should be deleted from our primary system when they are no longer valid. I would have noticed if there was no TAF in the system.I have added a [dispatch] Pop Up Alert to check that a valid TAF is in the system for ZZZ as a double check.

Dispatcher reported dispatching a flight with an old Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) that was still in the system from days earlier and not noticing it was out of date until an amended TAF popped up; with the aircraft already in flight.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Type 3702

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

On a flight out of ORD I noticed a dark colored drone flying off the right side of the aircraft after departing Runway 9R. It was shortly after takeoff and I noticed while we were climbing through about 2500 MSL. It looked strange and out of place so it really caught my attention. It was not moving fast if at all and passed several hundred yards off the right side of the aircraft.I notified departure control and they followed up with several questions. I told them the color and altitude and fix off of a ground location for them. I said that it was over the Des Plains River near some forest preserve area. We continued our flight without incident.

Air carrier First Officer reported sighting a UAV at 2;500 ft during climbout from ORD Runway 9R.


Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

NOTAMs described all taxi surfaces as poor braking. The runway was 4/4/4 with 25% ice. When taxing out of the Rochester ramp; after crossing Runway 28 on Taxiway F; we got into an area of nil braking and the aircraft skidded for about 50 feet. I was only taxing about 3 mph so I stopped the aircraft and called for a tug. The county came and spread sand over the bad areas and the tug subsequently pulled us to the departure end of the takeoff runway and the rest of the flight was uneventful.With rapidly changing weather conditions; the county should err on the conservative side and call the braking action Nil if there is any doubt. As I was listening to ground control prior to taxi; I heard a commuter airline call the airline ramp nil for taxi. This gave me an early indication of possible rapidly changing conditions.

Air carrier Captain reported skidding 50 feet on ice on Taxiway F past Runway 28 at ROC. The aircraft was subsequently towed to the runway for a normal departure.


ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft X; a VFR aircraft inbound from the South; was informed of the local UAS field that is located 3 miles south of the Twin Falls airport. The UAS field was operational at or below 800 AGL. Aircraft X was level at 5500 when he reported a remote controlled aircraft that he estimated to be 200 feet above his altitude and about 3/4 to 1 mile north to his location. The pilot of the UAS was contacted and told of the error. In addition this is the second time; within a week that the UAS operators have been too high. Twin Falls is a location with lots of land and open spaces; I recommend that the UAS Field be relocated to a different area that is not within TWF class delta airspace. In my opinion; it is only a matter of time before we have an accident due to operation of remote control aircraft within controlled airspace. I have spoken to UAS operators and they don't have accurate equipment that displays altitude information in real time. To my understanding they can attach equipment that will tell them what altitude they flew at; however; that is only after they have landed. The UAS within Class Delta airspace introduces unnecessary risk into the NAS. Please look into this issue.

TWF Tower Controller reported of a pilot that reported a UAV was 200 feet above the pilot's aircraft at 5500 feet MSL. Controller reported there is a UAS field 3 miles south of the airport and this was the second time this has happened.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 2883

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 23000

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

On takeoff after TOGA engagement the Number 1 engine accelerated to about 85% N1 which was about 10% less than the 94.1% achieved by the Number 2 engine and called for by the reduced thrust takeoff data message. The throttles were miss matched with the Number 1 engine throttle more than 1 knob width behind engine Number 2. As I advanced the Number 1 throttle to try and match thrust with the Number 2 engine I noticed the Number 1 N1 decreased while the Number 1 EGT (Exhaust Gas Temperature) increased which is the opposite of what should have happened. At that moment I made the decision to perform a low speed rejected T/O at approximately 70-75 knots. The runway was cleared about half way down using very little braking and the quick reference checklist; QRH and brake cooling tables were then consulted. I called and alerted [Maintenance] as to the situation and we returned to the gate. An ELB (electronic logbook) maintenance fault report was sent at that time.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A B737 flight crew reported that one engine did not make takeoff thrust resulting in a rejected takeoff.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 184; Flight Crew Type 173

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 325; Flight Crew Type 290

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

During a training flight conducted on an IFR flight plan in VMC conditions at 4;000 ft. another airplane appeared on the TIS (Traffic Information System) contained within our aircraft showing a heading that would cross directly in front of us at the approximate same time as us. The target showed to be 500 ft. below us and climbing. I began to make a call on Cleveland Center to request a climb for traffic avoidance but my instructor initiated a climb once we saw the TIS system report them 300 ft. below us and still closing on our track without us establishing visual contact of the aircraft. A climb was completed to 4;500 ft. and we then saw the light sport aircraft pass directly below us from right to left about 800 ft. below our aircraft while we were still at 4;500 ft. After the traffic had passed below us we immediately informed Cleveland Center of what had occurred and descended back down to 4;000 ft. During the entire situation we had received no notice of the traffic from the controller but were still in VMC therefore responsible for our own traffic avoidance. The alternate option would have been to continue at the same altitude as we had not been given an advisory from the Center Controller to climb; descend; or turn.

Instructor and student on an IFR training flight reported a traffic conflict that required them to deviate from their assigned altitude.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion; Time Pressure

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

First Officer landed aircraft on Runway 23. I then took control of the aircraft and cleared the runway at Taxiway B. As were clearing; CLT Tower advised us to EXPEDITE as they were clearing aircraft from the other side of the runway to cross behind us. I complied by completing the 90 degree turn and taxiing forward on Taxiway B. Our assigned gate was straight ahead. We were running a few minutes late so this taxi route would get us to the gate quickly. After the Tower gave us their instructions; the First Officer switched radio frequency to Ramp Control as we were expeditiously nearing the ramp due to the short distance from the runway. Making another 90 degree turn onto Taxiway M was not in my thought process as this would have slowed our taxi speed and would have been going away from our assigned gate. At no time was there any conflict with other taxiing aircraft and our expeditious taxi allowed aircraft to taxi across Runway 23 before the next arrival. The Tower Controller should clear us to go to ramp frequency when clearing Runway 23 at Taxiway B as its location is quite close to the ramp. Furthermore; the turn to either Taxiway B or M should be left to the discretion of the Captain. If that is not acceptable; then local rules should provide for taxi up B as SOP. Or next time; I can just stop after clearing the runway until everything is sorted out.

At no time did I think any of these actions were out of the ordinary or contrary to any instruction we received. Only after the fact; did I get a call from the Chief Pilot's office indicating Ground Control was upset we had not contacted them prior to going over to Ramp Control. While turning off on Taxiway Bravo is somewhat infrequent; I have seen it enough to think we were in compliance with established procedure and thought we did exactly what we were directed to do. At no time was there any conflict with another aircraft coming up Taxiway Mike and I don't recall any conflict with anyone on the outer line under control of Ramp Control either. I did not see this incident being any different than turning off Runway 36R onto Mike and being directed to contact Ramp Control. Assuming we misunderstood Tower's instruction and I am not saying that was the case; the fact that making the turn off on Taxiway Bravo comes up pretty quickly after touchdown and thrust reverser deployment; it is possible we heard what we expected to hear and not what Tower actually said. The fact that neither of us thought we did anything other than comply with the stated instructions and were surprised by the call from the Chief Pilot's office; make me think this scenario unlikely.

After an air carrier crew landed on CLT Runway 23; they exited at Taxiway B then went directly to Ramp Control on B without talking to Ground Control who became upset enough that the Chief Pilot counseled the pilots for not receiving ATC's taxi directions.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Over maximum gross landing. [I] used Captain's emergency authority FAR 121.557(c); 91.123(d). Landed at 215;000; maximum; gross for 757-200 is 198;000. Coordinated with Dispatch and Maintenance on performance and runway limit; all OK. We diverted for the loss of the right pack after takeoff.

A B757-200 diverted and landed over maximum gross landing weight because an air conditioning pack failed shortly after takeoff on an oceanic flight.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

We parked at [the] gate in FLL. The nose signalman was new.  As I lined up on the j-line he began to wave his arms. None of the arm movements were recognizable as aircraft movement signal we use or that I have ever seen in my career anywhere in the world. When we finally got the aircraft into the gate the nose signalman use the release brakes signal to indicate the chocks were in.  To indicate the ground power was in the signalman pounded hard on the side of the aircraft but never stepped back to give a hand signal. Ground crew seemed unaware of the flight deck call button on the nose section of the aircraft.At the same time the right wing signalman did not have any lighted wands. To compensate for this he used some type of electronic device; which had a white light on it to indicate it was safe.  While I am glad he took the step to as least use something lighted; the station should have enough of the proper equipment for the ground crew.After the Jetway was pulled up to the aircraft; I had the Jetway operator step into the flight deck. I asked if she was a manager on duty. She was not; but I explained to her what had happened.  Her reply was that the crew was new and she would mention what happened to the manager.It is not uncommon for people to have a slight variation in their personal signal techniques.  However; these signals were so unrecognizable as to be dangerous. The signaler needed me to come to my left and started waving both arms overhead to the right.It appeared that the crew received inadequate training and they were unsupervised.

A319 Captain reported he observed the ground crew deviating from SOP during the aircraft parking procedure.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 112; Flight Crew Total 10905; Flight Crew Type 434

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On date; flying for a news station while in a left orbit at 800 feet on the scene of an accident for approximately 10 minutes (no other aircraft in the area); I observed an EMS helicopter identified by Aircraft Y coming head on with me. I immediately descended and banked left due to already in the left orbit to avoid a head on collision. It appeared that the EMS helicopter didn't see me until I was about a 50 degree angle from them. I did notice that they did execute a left hand bank but this was after we had already passed each other. I was monitoring ZZZ Tower frequency and air to air at the time. Before the close call at no time did I hear the EMS helicopter make any radio calls pertaining to approaching the scene. Immediately after this; the EMS helicopter pilot told me to leave the area to which I stated to him negative and that he needed to make radio calls when he is in route to and approaching a scene (due to other aircraft (Law Enforcement; ENG; other EMS aircraft) possibly being in the area). During a further investigation I acquired information pertaining to the EMS helicopter Aircraft Y. The information shown at this time it was being operated by: Company 1 but owned by Company 2. I feel that better radio calls/communications would avoid future issues.

Pilot flying news helicopter reports near mid air collision with Emergency Medical Services helicopter.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 50

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Aircraft; Airport; Human Factors; Procedure

Was conducting pilot proficiency flight. Had already conducted two full stop landings on Rwy 7. Rolled out and exited the runway at Taxiway E. On the third landing we rolled out and exited the same as before at E and was instructed to contact ground as we were returning to parking at our maintenance facility. We had exited the runway being sure to pull forward enough to clear the active runway and stopped. At this point we were informed by the Tower that we had crossed the hold line for Runway 20 and he had to have an airplane go around. I could not see the runway sign from the right seat because the sign was on the left side. I also could not see the hold line. The Captain said the hold line was just at the nose of the aircraft. It was impossible for me to tell if we were over the line due to the height of the cockpit and how narrow the taxiway was. As we pulled away we looked back and you could see there was very little space between the exit of Runway 7 and the hold line for 20. It was impossible for us to clear Runway 7 and hold short of Runway 20 due to the length of our aircraft. We had already been in this position twice and the controller never said anything. The third time he became upset and said we had crossed the hold creating a conflict. We were never instructed to hold short of 20 and it would have been impossible to clear the runway and hold short due to the spacing.

On a training flight while making full stop landings at EVB airport; we were monitoring tower frequency upon completion of a landing roll out on Runway 7; and we're give clearance to vacate the runway by a making a right turn on Taxiway Echo and to contact ground control. After the right turn on Echo taxiway; completely clearing the landing runway and then stopping; ground control informed us that we had crossed the hold short line for Runway 20. The length of the aircraft is 93 feet and in order to completely clear the landing Runway 7; we evidently crossed the hold short line without even realizing it. I feel that the runway marking/signage are completely inadequate allowing for continued possible incursions. Additionally; I feel Tower Control should anticipate a potential conflict and make the flight crews aware prior to the switch over to Ground Control.

Pilots reported that after taxiing clear of Runway 7 on Taxiway E at EVB they inadvertently crossed over the hold short lines of Runway 20. The short distance between the runways and poor signage was cited as contributing to the event.


Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

During our flight into IAH we were assigned the TEJAS3 RNAV arrival from the southwest beginning at the GMANN intersection. When this arrival is loaded from our database it only contains the vertical guidance as far as the TEJAS waypoint even though; according to the chart; there are crossing restrictions at GLAMM; BEEEP; and HOWLN. We assumed that these crossing restrictions would get loaded when we put in an assigned runway. We were cleared to descend via the arrival and put 6000 feet into the altitude alerter. The aircraft began a descent as usual. Shortly after that we were assigned Runway 27 for landing and I put that information in. I checked the points to make sure they were according to the chart; only this time I started from the runway point and worked in reverse back to the GLAMM intersection.  The points checked out ok so I assumed things were correct and returned to the radio page. What I failed to notice was that the FMS had loaded these points a SECOND time for some reason. It had us flying the original three points with no restrictions then had the points listed again; this time;  WITH the restrictions. The aircraft stopped it's descent at 13000 feet thinking it had plenty of time to get to 6000 from TEJAS since it had no other restrictions to follow. We noticed this pretty quick and started a manual decent but ended up crossing the point GLAMM about 1000 feet high.This apparent loading error also caused the guidance to revert to FPA (Flight Path Angle) mode upon reaching HOWLN and wanted to have the aircraft continue on the 058 heading. We caught this problem right away however and turned direct to SHIVV right away.Obviously I should have paid closer attention to the points and noticed that they were put in twice. I checked the NOTAMS twice ahead of time to see if this arrival had a default transition to fly like many at Houston and could not find one. I think this whole situation could have been avoided if the crossing restrictions at GLAMM; BEEP and HOWLN are loaded in regardless of which runway you are using; especially since the three points are the same for all three runways.I'm not sure why the FMS went into basic mode after HOWLN though; and I can only assume it was due to the points not being loaded correctly. I would very much like to know if this loading error was a database issue or if it might be something we did incorrectly; but I firmly believe we loaded everything as we have been taught. If this double loading of points does happen we should definitely make the crews aware before another problem can arise.

While flying the IAH TEJAS3 RNAV; an EMB-175 FMS inserted an arrival duplicate after GLAMM when the runway was assigned. The original points had altitude constraints but the duplicate did not so the aircraft crossed GLAMM high.


The workload is too high; there are complex events such as crew MOT's; weather changes; ATC programs; and maintenance events that require close coordination from dispatch to crews. Maintenance and airport operations (all aspects of ops [loads; equipment coordinator; customer service; etc.])I have submitted several [report's] along with other with very specific detail; but that is very time consuming and taxing and with the multitude of issues I could not expend that time to track this previously and continuous problem of workload.Failure to meet model; company; union and FAA agreed that the workload would have a model to follow; then company and union set the parameters which were approved by the FAA. The model was set and built into a program; that program gave specific desk builds that clearly address all safety and operational concerns. Again all parties agreed; that this would be safest option and said they follow model output. However; when that output gave a number that the company did not like (i.e. flight releases per desk lower than 'allocation of budget for headcount') the company choose to ignore and/or change the output numbers that better fit into the narrative they are projecting in their account of headcount and covering the 'shortage' in Overtime callout; which is often too little too late and does not adequately provide for the highest safety scenario.We are asked to trust the process; and the process worked; however; the players that are implementing the process need to be changed or questioned specifically on how they are implementing the tools. I know how to slow down and just work flights and deal with the increased calls that come because of that decision and I am able to maintain operational control but if corrective action is not taken soon there will be an incident.Simply follow the agreed upon process to the safe solution; and the product that it sent out; which clearly states that the workload is too high.

Dispatcher reported the company is not following the agreed upon 'dispatch workload model' and the workload is too high.


Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After takeoff at acceleration altitude I called for 'flaps 0; climb checks; pitch mode.' The PM (Pilot Monitoring) began the duties; however at the same time we were told to immediately turn right and level off at 3;000 feet as there was an aircraft that was not communicating with Tower headed straight for us. This diverted our attention from the task at hand. I suspect the PM omitted retracting the flaps accidentally and I failed to notice. Once we were clear of the traffic we were handed off to another frequency on which we were told to look for yet another aircraft in close proximity. By the time we were clear we were through 10;000 feet and due to the distractions we forgot to complete the climb check. I initially began accelerating and reached about 265 knots before I decided to slow to complete the second part of the ice test. Once the test was complete (at around 18;000 feet) I began accelerating and again reached about 265 knots before we realized the flaps were still set to 9. We slowed; retracted the flaps; contacted Maintenance and continued the flight without further incident.No real suggestions. It was human error on my part. I should have been more vigilant and will be in the future.

EMB-145 Captain reported the crew oversped the flaps during climbout when they were distracted by ATC traffic calls.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7.0

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

Sector 17 began handing off Aircraft Y at 27000 feet. I noticed an enhanced limited data block within sector 28 Low beneath sector 17; Aircraft X. I brought up the full data block and noticed it may hinder the ability of the arriving flight to descend; so I requested sector 17 to shortcut Aircraft Y to ZZZZZ intersection before accepting the handoff to allow sector 17 to safely climb Aircraft X. I descended Aircraft Y to 24000 feet as I am allowed to do by SOP. Aircraft X was handed off to sector 17 climbing to 23000 feet. Sector 17 gave a climb to this Aircraft X to an altitude above my airspace. Aircraft X came within 2.5 miles of my airspace at 26000 feet and was finally through my airspace approximately 10 miles in. No one called me with a point out for Aircraft X climbing through my airspace.It's me once again with yet another airspace violation from the Central Area at ZJX. I just sent one in on that area from [three days prior] and elaborated on how this Area has become inherently unsafe. I am going to fill out an ATSAP for every single one that affects the sector that I am working from this point forward. I understand us controllers are human and make mistakes. We all get in a bind from time to time and need an 'out' from fellow controllers. I have no issue on that. The issue is with many controllers completely disobeying our basic ways to move traffic safely and efficiently through the NAS. The basic ways are Point outs; APREQ's; etc. I'm actually very unhappy with how this has progressed in the time I have been hired by the FAA and at ZJX. I look forward to hearing from you and what steps are going to be taken for people to be accountable for not doing their job correctly and safely.

An aircraft was climbed through a Controller's sector without a handoff or point out.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 5700

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

During taxi out for departure all systems and checks were normal and the Tower cleared us for takeoff. As we took the runway; I completed a positive transfer of aircraft control to the co-pilot. Takeoff power was selected and at about 70 KIAS there was a Reverser Unlocked ECAM that both pilots observed. At about 80 KIAS; I took positive control of the aircraft back from the co-pilot and initiated an abort. We brought the aircraft to a safe stop and exited the runway. There were no reported problems from the cabin crew or passengers. After contacting Dispatch and Maintenance Control we taxied the aircraft back to the gate without further problems.

An A320 flight crew initiated a low speed rejected takeoff upon receipt of a Reverser Unlocked ECAM at about 70 KIAS.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 24000; Flight Crew Type 11000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

A similar call sign on the same frequency can be a potential for taking a wrong clearance; but when there are three similar call signs the potential just escalates for all involved. This was the case we encountered last week on departure. There was a Flight XA; Flight WA and we were Flight XWA. All our departures were around [the same time]. We all contacted Ground Control about the same time. While the Ground Controller gave instructions at a rapid pace to expedite operations; the similar call signs were mistakenly answered by the wrong airplane at various times. Even the Controller got confused at one point. Fortunately; the mistakenly answered call signs were quickly recognized and did not cause any clearance deviations.

B767 Captain describes and evening departure from a large hub airport with three of his company's aircraft having similar sounding call signs and the miscommunications that ensue.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 187; Flight Crew Type 445

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 159; Flight Crew Type 159

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Having previously flown as the pilot flying into BHM just once or twice; and then in MVFR/IFR conditions; I was the pilot flying. As such; I had never personally seen the 2;049 FT tower depicted on the ILS 06 approach chart. Unfortunately; today I completely overlooked this potential obstacle when I briefed the visual approach for Runway 06 backed up by the ILS. We had been cleared down to 3;000 FT approximately 10 miles southeast of the field when BHM Approach cleared us for the visual and told us to contact Tower. I then dialed the FAF ('MCDEN') crossing altitude of 2;200 FT into the MCP altitude window; began a descent to that altitude; and proceeded direct to MCDEN. The plan was to level off at 2;200 FT some three miles prior to MCDEN and then continue slowing and configuring. At approximately 2;300 FT the Captain noticed and called out the tower; which was nearly directly in front of us; at an estimated distance of 1.5 miles; and looking nearly at our same altitude. I immediately clicked off the autothrottles and autopilot and commenced a gentle climb (we reached nearly 3;000 FT). Just after I commenced the climb; the EGPWS sounded 'obstacle.' The Captain then contacted BHM Tower; advised that we were high; and requested that we be allowed to cross then return to the Localizer from the opposite side; in order to conclude a successful approach. The Tower approved and cleared us to land. Crossing the obstacle tower; I continued configuring and slowing and; after we crossed the Localizer; a 30-degree banked turn and a 1;000 FT/minute descent allowed us to be configured; stable; and on the Localizer and glideslope at approximately 1;000 FT AGL. The remainder of the approach and landing were uneventful. Closer attention to detail on the approach plate; and to other notes and warnings provided in our [chart] package; would likely have caused me to notice; brief; and better avoid this obstacle. However; I also find it curious that ATC never mentioned what I suspect is a commonly encountered threat; at least for aircraft arriving from the southeast conducting visual approaches to Runway 06.

[Narrative 2 contains no additional information.]

An Air Carrier aircraft EGPWS alerted CAUTION TERRAIN on the downwind for a BHM Runway 6 visual and so the crew climbed slightly to avoid the tall tower but were high on final requiring delaying turns.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 14500; Flight Crew Type 7000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 3200; Flight Crew Type 325

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

On climb out from ZZZ; we experienced a very strong fumes; similar to burning tires. The Captain was the Pilot Flying and I was the Pilot Monitoring and autopilot was engaged. Passing through 18;000 [feet]; I walked around the supernumerary area to see if I could detect a source or see smoke. I saw nothing but the fume smell continued to get worse; so I returned to the cockpit and got back in my seat. The Captain and I both then said we could taste it and I started experiencing a burning sensation in my throat and mouth. We immediately donned the O2 masks; [advised ATC] with ZZZ Center and got immediate return vectors to the FAF for [Runway] XXR at ZZZ. We accomplished all normal checklists to an uneventful approach  and landing. We kept the O2 masks on until after engine shutdown and subsequent inspection by the CFR unit at the airport. After leaving the aircraft; both the Captain and I experienced a headache along with a burning sensation in mouth and eyes so we sought medical attention where we were examined and subsequently released.

Air carrier flight crew reported smoke in the cabin and advised ATC for return to departure airport.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors

Flight did a precautionary engine shut down due to loss of both oil quantity and pressure. Flt made the decision to divert to ZZZ do to drift down requirements. The issue is with [Company] flight planning system.This is the 3rd engine shutdown that has occurred within the past 3 weeks. This includes this one. I do not know if there have been others. All 3 times the Dispatcher could not get [Company] to calculate when using MEL X. All 3 times the Dispatcher had to get the chief involved to get it to work. This flight was about 10 min from landing when we were able to send the flight their final landing numbers.I was first informed of the diversion. Landing data was sent at XA33Z. Other Dispatchers helped with notifying all required individuals. It should not take a Dispatcher 25 minutes to run the information needed in an situation like this. I guarantee that if this is not fixed a flight will end up landing before a Dispatcher can calculate the required information.In fact we (Chief and I) could not get [Company] to run with that MEL and thus removed it to get it to work. The crew had asked for a landing weight of 189.0. Sabre gave 187.6 but that is with both engines working.

Dispatcher reported working a flight which had an engine fail resulting in a divert. Dispatcher had trouble using their performance software to run single engine performance numbers.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 751; Flight Crew Type 1

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were taking off from ZZZ and on initial climb out from Runway XX. There had been several prior departures before us that had used the same runway.  Approximately 2 miles from the runway we got a traffic alert on our iPads and it was descending into us. The aircraft appeared to be heading into Runway XY and was no making any radio calls.  Our eyes immediately went outside the aircraft trying to make contact with the aircraft.  We continued to climb as he was descending into us and we made a right turn to avoid head on traffic.  Eventually we were able to make visual contact with the airplane and he was approximately 200 feet above us. After we were clear of the aircraft my scan came back inside and I noticed that we were about 100 feet into the ZZZ1 Class Bravo airspace.  Immediately a descent was made out of the airspace and the flight continued.  We did not hear the other aircraft make any calls on the CTAF throughout their flight/approach.Looking back this all happened very fast; and I would have done a couple things differently.  We should have leveled off immediately and made a right hand turn.  However; in the moment we were not sure exactly the location of the aircraft.  Had we done that we would have remained clear of the other aircraft and remained clear of the Bravo airspace.

An instructor pilot departing a non-towered airport reported a NMAC with opposite direction landing traffic which had not been communicating on the CTAF.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

As First Officer; I was doing my walk around to insure the safety of the aircraft. It was windy out and it was starting to sprinkle. As I was looking up at the tail and the number 1 engine; it seemed like a rain drop hit my right eye directly. I thought it was a rain drop; however; my eye started to burn very badly right away. Ground handling was right there and I asked to be taken to the eye wash station. I got there within a minute and started to flush my eye out for 15 minutes. I asked them to let the Captain know; and also requested airport EMS (Emergency Medical Services). Airport EMS checked me out and did not see any physical damage but noted my eye was very red and a little swollen. Airport EMS also called poison control and the things I were doing were correct. I also went to the hospital. They tested my vision; it remained 20/15 with both eyes. They checked for damage of the eye and abrasion; nothing found. They checked pH levels and they were normal. The doctor mentioned that my reaction to flush out my eye did most of her work and helped immensely with my eye. The doctor said eyes heal quickly and would take 24 hours to be normal again but to keep an eye on it.The burning sensation caused me to immediately seek a eye wash station.Some liquid form of either oil; hydraulic fluid or a water down version of that; directly hit my eye. I did not see it coming and was not able to react in time to avoid it.Thankful ground personnel were there to take me to eye wash station and to relay information and get me appropriate help. Having been at a different airport; I am not so sure the outcome would have been the same because sometimes there is no ground personnel nearby. Also the Captain was able to help me immensely with getting things set up while I was washing my eye out.I think knowing where eye wash stations are nearby would be helpful but I think this was just a freak accident. What are the chances a drop of liquid hits your eye directly?

First Officer encountered foreign substance in eye during preflight walkaround inspection.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

First Officer auto uplinked flight planned route via ACARS.  Per standard procedure before beginning the 'Before Start Checklist' the First Officer and I pulled up our PDC clearance and observed it was exactly as requested.  We then made sure the FMC had the same routing as our clearance.  I read the routing directly from the FMC screen and the FO confirmed it exactly matched the clearance and our flight plan.  I then read the leg waypoints in order from the FMC while the FO checked them against the flight plan.  All checked properly.  This is standard procedure. The clearance was: SNA STREL4 TRM J169 TFD J50 ......Normal flight to TRM.  Unbeknownst to me the Nav system had somehow dropped out J169 and we did not recognize this. Therefore after TRM the aircraft turned and proceeded directly to TFD.  LA center came up and told us to turn 15 degrees left to avoid military airspace.  He then asked us what our routing was.  I confirmed the original routing J169 and admitted I was baffled as how our flying directly to TFD occurred.In reprising the event I still don't understand how or why J169 dropped out of the FMC.  Both the FO and I are certain we remember confirming J169 connected TRM to TFD and at no time during the flight did we make any route modifications.I pride myself on being vigilant and following standard procedure. I will redouble my efforts to confirm the connections from the SID and STAR to the Jet routes.

B737 Captain reported a course deviation after the FMC lost a waypoint in cruise.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 34; Flight Crew Total 2850; Flight Crew Type 2850

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 29; Flight Crew Total 81; Flight Crew Type 81

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Human Factors

45 minutes into the flight we received a Dispatch message that Passenger X in seat X5 has tested positive for COVID. Passenger X was traveling with 3 others which all were in row X. I contacted medlink and was disconnected. I asked my entire crew if they had any experience with this which none of them had and I hadn't either. I asked Dispatch for the name of the passenger and protocol to follow. I retried medlink and followed their instructions to minimize contact with Passenger X and get row X off before all others. We asked for priority handling. Dispatch informed us the station will meet us at the gate. Before getting to the gate we asked all passengers to stay seated with seat belts on at gate arrival for a medical situation. I opened the cockpit door to make sure everyone was complying and only Passenger Y wasn't. I said 'Please everyone stay seated' and he sat back down. Later he made a rude comment deplaning and complained to Customer Service. We deplaned row X only and met them and Customer Service in the jet way to assess Passenger X. Passenger X was a young woman that had COVID a few months ago and was 100% healthy. Customer Service followed them to baggage claim for another test. Customer Service cleared us to deplane so I made a PA explaining the situation. Customer Service informed me many people that have had COVID in the past test a false positive.

Received Dispatch message indicating passenger in [seat] X5 received an airport COVID test that came back positive. We were located about 1 hour from ZZZ.  Continued towards ZZZ; declared a medical issue on board indicating positive COVID passenger. ATC turned us into a priority handling.  Coordination through medlink provided some guidance and we were met at the gate by appropriate personnel to evaluate the passenger.  Passengers were informed of the medical issue and told of the possible positive test at the gate. ZZZ supervisors cleared us to continue our trip.

Air carrier flight crew reported a passenger who had tested positive for COVID-19 was on the flight.


Bombardier Learjet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Party1 ATC; Party1 Other; Party2 Ground Personnel

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Party1 Other; Party1 ATC; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Human Factors; Company Policy; Airport; Procedure

Observed Aircraft being towed on active taxiway with no nav lights or anti-collision lights illuminated. No person in cockpit. [Recommend] Towing procedures should be accomplished by City DOA rules. [Have] aircraft mechanics in cockpit and tow tractor with aircraft powered to provide proper lighting and available hydraulics available for braking. Transponder activated.

Three Line Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (AMT) report observing Regional Jets being towed on active taxiways without navigation or anti-collision lights illuminated and no personnel in cockpit of aircraft. Technicians note that movement of aircraft at airport per City DOA Rules; require proper lighting and activation of aircraft systems while under tow.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Here at IND we have straight in fixes to every runway; which at times of peak traffic makes running the feed to final very difficult and can cause the final to be strung out father than needed. These 2 aircraft were straight in to 23's talking to the FRB feeder position (combined with FRD). The controller flashed the aircraft as soon as he started their descent and; as is custom; I took radar as soon and I saw them flashing.  Apparently he descended Aircraft Y to 7;000 Feet on the LOC for 23L and Aircraft X to 8;000 Feet on the LOC for 23R at the same time with no paper stop. Aircraft Y dogged the descent reaching 8;000 Feet; but he had switched Aircraft X to me already. The FLM told FRB to stop Aircraft X at 9;000 Feet and upon learning of the frequency change instructed me to do the same; but he was on neither frequency.  When Aircraft Y checked on I issued traffic and got the pilot to maintain visual separation; but separation was already well below minima. Aircraft X finally checked in and and was too high for the approach and had to be resequenced into the downwind. My manager told me to issue the Brasher warning due to his lengthy time off frequency. Neither controller was offered a break after the separation loss due to low staffing and high traffic.Final Four weekend in INDY brings a lot of extra traffic; over 200 extra GA's just to the big airport. We should have started off with enough staffing to split the feeds (which was done an hour later) instead of having to call in overtime and wait for them to show up. My feeder should have at least been offered a break; instead he was there for another hour and was totally gun shy with the straight in props and tried to get 'creative' causing me to work even harder since people were nose to nose on my downwind to avoid the straight in arrival. Being more proactive with calling ZID to set up miles in trail and perhaps a slower speed over the straight in fix before they got within the last sector would also have alleviated the complexity.

I'm really not sure what happened. We were on approach frequency and we were suddenly asked to copy a phone number down for possible pilot deviation. We had no idea why there was any need to do so. I copied the phone number and gave it to my captain who was the pilot flying. Once we had landed and secured the airplane he called the phone number provided. According to the approach controllers we took three minutes to check in after the handoff with center; and because of this delay they could not provide separation from other aircraft in the area.  I don't remember taking as long as 3 minutes to check in.  It took me as long as it took for the frequency to provide an opportunity for me to do so.  I do remember there was a lot of other chatter on the frequency and having to wait for an opportunity to check in; but certainly nothing out of the ordinary. Meanwhile; approach control seemed to have forgotten about us because they left us very high on the decent to land on 23.  So high did they leave us that when I queried the delay in bringing us down further they stated that they forgot about us and would require turning us back around to loose altitude. Mixed with all this approach brought us down to about 6;000 feet and at about 7;000 asked us to stop the decent at 7;000.  We got an RA at this point due to another aircraft in the vicinity and it commanded us to climb about 300 feet to comply with the commands given by the flight director.Unfortunately I really don't know what we may have done wrong.  We kept a vigilant ear to the frequency and complied promptly with instructions as they were issued.

IND Controller and pilots of violating aircraft report of confusion while flying into IND. Controller states pilots were late in checking in which lead to a separation loss also caused by the previous controller not coordinating correctly. Pilots do not know they were late in communicating and thought the problem was with another aircraft they had an RA on.


Navion Aircraft Corp Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 300

Troubleshooting; Workload; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Flight was a morning repositioning flight from ZZZ to SBP. [I] used self brief and a call to Flight Service to determine if clouds in SoCal were a solid deck or layers as icing was a factor. In discussions with the briefer the briefer commented that the Graphical Forecasts for Aviation tool showed both solid clouds and layers and that it was purely computer generated. I lamented the loss of the area forecast and asked for pireps; but none were available. I attempted to get on top by climbing to 12000 ft. and that worked until just E of PMD VOR. Initial entry into IMC produced no ice due to very little moisture and was able to receive vectors around radar returns of moisture. At some point north of RZS VOR; I picked up trace rime ice and noted an indicated airspeed decay and based on aircraft performance; suspected pitot ice. I cross-referenced indicated altitude with GPS altitude and ensured it was reliable. Not too long after that I experienced a downdraft and countered with pitch; unfortunately it was enough that I got down below Vs and was mushing downhill in a power on stall with no airspeed indicator. I told LA Center I was unable to maintain altitude and requested 10k; and set about -700VSI in order to get airspeed back and level at 10. This worked until another downdraft repeated the problem; I was able to get it leveled back at approx 9600 ft. and ATC issued an altitude alert for MVA; I had already selected the terrain display on the GPS. LA handed me off to Santa Barbara Approach who had lower MVAs and I was able to stabilize at about 9000 ft. Uneventful recovery via RNAV 29 at SBP and the airspeed came back to life at about 200 ft. AGL.Bring back the area forecast. The meteorologists narrative on flight conditions beats a computer model. Decision to take off into suspect icing with an unclear forecast and no PIREPS was foolhardy for an aircraft not FIKI equipped. Loss of reliable airspeed is worthy of advising ATC; not just recognizing and dealing with it. Not wanting to divert to an airport I hadn't prepared for; in IMC was the rationale; but again; poor. LA Center did a fantastic job of getting me to Santa Barbara approach as early as possible to get [a] lower MVA and he had briefed the Approach Controller who was ready with a vector and an altitude.In both my airline and military careers we train to unreliable airspeed but we usually do so where the aircraft has plenty of performance margin. I owned this plane for 3+ years and knew what the indicators of decreasing airspeed were without an indicator but at 12k; (which is as high as I've ever flown it and near the service ceiling) there wasn't any more power to add to arrest the descent from a downdraft. Fortunately I have flown that plane deep into stalls and knew that's what was happening. I let the new owner know the pitot heater is INOP and recommended he install a separate ammeter or indicator light to show the pitot heater is energized. Because of the static sources aft on the fuselage; there were no static pressure problems.The decision not to fly was clearly missed. Pitot heaters should have some indicator of operational status. Training to know pitch and power settings for flight is a glorious thing but it's never done at the edge of the performance envelope. AoA gauge here would have made this a non-event IF it was installed in an icing resistant position. (Heated vane or pressure ports on top and bottom of wing well aft of leading edge. Stall training needs to be to [a] fully developed stall (not FAAs current posture of 'first indication'. Many old and experimental aircraft have no indication but small buffet and nose drop. In this case in the Navion; I was making about 50% rated hp and was in a full power-on stall; if I hadn't recognized it by feel; I'd have likely kept pulling aft because I knew my airspeed was bad. A bad decision to fly put me in a bad situation of my own making; in a single engine aircraft; in IMC; with no airspeed indicator; at high altitude and no performance reserve; STALLED.

Navion Single Pilot reported entering icing conditions causing altitude and airspeed loss resulting in a stall. Pilot landed with ATC assistance.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 400; Flight Crew Type 350

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Following before takeoff procedures; we requested takeoff and to hold short for our IFR release. With our takeoff clearance; came [our] departure [clearance] and [Departure Control] frequency. Upon readback; the student began moving to take the runway and crossed the hold-short line without checking final. Either following this transmission or just before our clearance; an aircraft on final transmitted; '<callsign> on final.' Shortly upon reaching the runway; we were ordered to stop and the other aircraft told to go-around. The Controller said he thought we had heard him cancel our takeoff clearance. Neither I; my student; or the pilot of another airplane holding short in sequence heard this cancellation; as evidenced by his transmission saying the same.The major contributing factor to the incident; regardless of procedural fault; was my failure to check final for approaching aircraft prior to the student taking the runway. He; as a commercial applicant; should also have checked. I believe the flight and the departure routing were at the front of his attention. I don't know why I didn't check; it is usually part of my procedure.Human Factors would include the fact that I am a CFII; but have low time; both giving instruction and in IMC. I was instructing on my first long cross-country IFR training flight with a relatively unknown student. We were distracted by reports of turbulence for our route of flight and my student was; perhaps; overly focused on the IFR portion of the flight because of fear or lack of familiarity with clearance.

A CFII and his Commercial student were distracted and failed to note another aircraft on final when they were cleared for takeoff. Although the Tower believed he had subsequently canceled their takeoff clearance; neither pilot nor the pilot of another aircraft heard any such transmission. The landing aircraft was directed to make a go-around.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 26

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Equipment / Tooling; Procedure; Human Factors

I turned Aircraft X onto the approach for 25L by saying 'Maintain 3;300 until established on the localizer; cleared ILS Ry 25L approach.' The readback sounded like 2;300 feet; so I went back and verified 3;300 feet as the altitude. It sounded like that was what he said. Subsequently; I saw Aircraft X descending out of 3;100 feet turning onto final behind Aircraft Y who was established on the 24R localizer; about 2 miles in front of Aircraft X. At this point it looked to me like Aircraft X was just turning onto the final; so he had broken the instruction. I switched Aircraft X to LAX Tower because we were on simultaneous approaches. They got about 2 miles and 600 feet in altitude away before Aircraft X was established on the localizer.The quality of radios in the LA area is atrocious. We quit using 124.9 because it was unreadable out to the east; but all of our radios have very poor quality. 132.37; the replacement radio is just as bad; but we have no other backup. When you compound this with the poor quality of the radios on the CRJs and some Embraer types; you have a big problem. This is something that is getting worse and needs to be dealt with before something happens that we will regret because we could have prevented it. I have been in the area for almost 30 years and have noticed the quality of the radios eroding. When this is combined with the lower time pilots now flying jets; it is a recipe for disaster.

SCT Controller reports of a loss of separation he attributes to the pilot descending early next to another aircraft and the radios associated to his position. The Controller has noticed a degradation of radio clearness and the experience of upgraded pilots in that area using the radios.


Fatigue; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Other

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Company Policy; Weather; Procedure; Human Factors

I was reassigned off of my regular line flying to operate a charter flight. Crew scheduling sent me to the airport in a limo.  I left my domicile late afternoon for a 3 hour drive.  Enroute I advised dispatch at 30 minutes from the airport via cell phone to make sure the aircraft had been serviced (lav; potable water; cleaned) and that a start cart be retrieved as the APU was on deferral.  I arrived at the airport with an anxious charter representative greeting me and saying they had been advised to rush to the airport only to find out that flight was not crewed yet.  They waited on me for over 3 hours.  Needless to say; the passengers were not happy.Of course nothing was done; not even a release was sent to the FBO.  The aircraft was trashed.  It had not been fueled; lav's overflowing; and no potable water.  In addition to this; for the first time I was advised by crew scheduling that the First Officer (FO) was flying in from somewhere else.  Of course; this was done only when I inquired with the Flight Attendants (FA)s on the whereabouts of the First Officer.I get everything done; the First Officer arrives an hour later and we board.  Our filed destination was calling for -FZ DR; 1 sm visibility; and 500 feet overcast.  I did have an alternate and had 20;000 lbs of fuel on board and was very comfortable with the release.   I briefed the FO; he did his preflight; and we taxied out and departed.At about 20 minutes from arrival we picked up the ATIS and it is broadcasting FZ RA and 1sm visibility and ceiling 400 feet.  We begin descent and then we receive an ACARS from Dispatch informing us that the FBO will not take our aircraft and to standby for Alternate.  I have an alternate on the release and this is when we find out that the alternate cannot handle our aircraft.  (What?  Why wasn't that found out before we took off?)  That airport was never a good alternate for planning purposes.  We are now flying around in FZ RA (the most hazardous form of icing for ANY aircraft).  I began discussing with the FO on possible alternates and suggesting....dispatch agrees....we get cleared and then dispatch comes back and says we cannot go there (this happened at least 3 times).  Then; knowing we cannot hang out in those weather conditions any longer I request a nearby small airport ZZZ; since I know we service.  Dispatch agrees; we get cleared to ZZZ and then when almost there dispatch sends ACARS saying that 'Our alternate cannot rally the troops and we cannot go there.'  By now; not knowing how much ice had accumulated and assessing fuel situation; my FO and I decide we need to land in ZZZ and decide what we need to do on the ground.  I inform dispatch and they agree to our plan.We land at approximately shortly before midnight in ZZZ.  There are no services available and we have no APU.  I called Dispatch to discuss a plan.  That's when I am advised of the icing situation at our originally filed destination and that the FBO will not take our aircraft because they have over an inch of ice on the ramp and taxiways and cannot maneuver their equipment.  Dispatch's new plan is to fly back to our domicile where the Midwest was experiencing a snow storm.  Low visibility and ceilings and not even knowing if we can get in I say that is not a good plan. I suggest hotels and transportation to get these customers to a hotel.After about 2 hours; and still stuck on the plane; dispatch said they cannot help them and they do not know what to tell me.  They say that the customers need to call a broker and find their own accommodations.  Obviously; this was not a good thing to tell your customers who were stuck on the plane.  Finally; five hours after we landed they found their own accommodations and even offered to take care of me and my crew with rooms. The team's Coach said to me; 'come with we will take care of you.  Don't you feel like your company totally abandoned you tonight?'  I was tired; embarrassed and completely humiliated at this point.  Finally; over 6 hours since landing in ZZZ; our transportation arrived and took us to a hotel.We showed 10 hours later to fly them to the departure airport.  I stayed in constant contact with the Coach the next day as he was unsure of our company being able to perform at this point.  We flew them back to their destination on Sunday night.  Once the customers deplaned; the second shift lead supervisor at [the FBO] wanted to talk with me.  He asked if I was the Captain last night and I said yes.  He informed me that he contacted our Dispatch before I ever departed for our filed destination the night before informing them that the icing was significant and that a Boeing 737 had landed and reported the braking action as 'NIL' and that there was over inch of ice covering all taxiways; ramps; and runways and that they could not receive our aircraft that night.  We are not authorized to land at an airport with braking action reported as 'NIL'.  Not to mention; freezing rain is the most hazardous icing condition to aircraft and the fact that our flight operations knew this before we dispatched really disturbed me.  In addition to this; an alternate was listed on our release that was an airport that could not receive us anyway so that made it an 'unacceptable alternate'.  My position is that if I would have known about this situation; I would not have departed but this information was withheld from me.  I trust our flight operations to do their job and provide me with pertinent information in regards to the 'safety of flight' and they failed on this evening.  My passengers; my crew; my aircraft; as well as my own safety was jeopardized on this day.  The operation should have been shut down in before we left on the first charter leg.  We could have accommodated everyone and would have gotten this team home on Sunday morning instead of Sunday night and my crew would not have had to spend the night in an airplane with no heat.I followed up with a phone call to Director of Flight Operations about 7-10 days after this happened.  I told him I would be filing a report and assumed he would look into and follow up.  I have heard nothing.On this particular night; operational control was lost and I feel that anyone who had knowledge of this event should have followed up to understand how something like this could have happened.  I gave it time and to this date I have heard nothing from Flight Operations.  If it is accurate that our Dispatch had knowledge that the weather conditions in our originally filed destination had deteriorated and that braking action was reported as 'NIL' by a Boeing 737 prior to our flight's Departure; then this flight should have been canceled before we left.  In addition to this; the original alternate should not have been used for planning purposes if we could not have safely diverted to that airport.  Since we (crew) found out airborne that the filed alternate would not receive our aircraft because of inadequate equipment; it's obvious that no one from flight operations verified that destination would be a good alternate before planning as such.  We service our alternate's airport so I as Pilot In Command (PIC) thought was good alternate and the weather that I had in my hand was adequate.  Also; the weather packet I had attached to the release was adequate to dispatch for our original destination at the time of departure.  Pertinent information (such as a significant weather change from forecast) should always be relayed to flight crews as some as practical.

An ERJ-190 Captain describes the event surrounding his charter flight being illegally dispatched to an airport with NIL braking and freezing drizzle; then diverting to a third airport because the alternate was not suitable.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Take off was uneventful. At 1:23 hours into cruise our crew had completed the water walk and the first beverage/retail cart service.  B Flight Attendant and D Flight Attendant were collecting trash and recycling as they were working towards the aft cabin area close to row 25; several guests around row 20 stated they were smelling something burning.  Another guest at row 18 stated he smelled smoke.B Flight Attendant and D Flight Attendant did not smell anything.  The C Flight Attendant was called to the cabin and did not smell anything at that time. B Flight Attendant and D Flight Attendant continued picking up trash and by the time the cart returned to the back galley; guests were ringing their call lights and waving at the crew to come to their cabin area. At that time B Flight Attendant; C Flight Attendant and D Flight Attendant rushed out to the cabin and there was a very strong smell of burning electrical/smoke.  A Flight Attendant came to the aft cabin after hearing all of the call lights and could smell the burning/electrical fumes from row 10. The B Flight Attendant; C Flight Attendant and D Flight Attendant had begun to open the cabin bins to search for a burning item. There was no sign of smoke in the cabin. Row 15 and 16 stated that the burning/electrical smell was coming from the vents. C Flight Attendant called the flight deck relating the situation. A Flight Attendant continued the conversation with the flight deck; the flight deck started working on their checklist and instructed the cabin crew to monitor the situation and report back.At that time B Flight Attendant had obtained the battery containment bag; the cabin crew walked through the cabin examining each overhead bin and asked the guests in the mid cabin are to check their electronic devices to feel for heat or to look for smoke. At that point our flight; had 27 minutes to our half way point. A Flight Attendant was informed by the Captain that the recirculating system was being turned off and to conform with aft cabin crew that no fire or smoke was present. Our cabin crew continued to monitor fume/smell. The electrical/burning smell was still present; no smoke or fire witnessed.Guests at this point were very frightened; several were crying; one person was suffering from an anxiety attack. Our cabin crew was instructed to suspend service until the determination of returning to [departure airport] or continuing to ZZZ was decided.The flight deck continued through their check list while communicating with [Duty Officer] via satellite phone. A Flight Attendant requested that the flight deck make an announcement to calm the guests. The flight deck acknowledged; and A Flight Attendant was informed that while working on the checklist the PA would come shortly. The decision was made to turn off seat power; check galley ovens; and coffee makers. No burning/electrical smell from the ovens that were being used nor the coffee makers in the front and aft galleys. Cabin crew and guests could not find anything hot to the touch or signs of smoke. At this time A Flight Attendant entered flight deck to communicate face to face. There was a guest in the forward lab; the D Flight Attendant guarded white the flight deck door opened and A Flight Attendant entered. At that time; another request for an announcement to the guests was requested. The flight deck discussed with A Flight Attendant the steps on [the] checklist. A Flight Attendant responded; no smoke or anything hot to the touch had been located and that the burning/electrical smell was dissipating but still slightly present.After 15 minutes; the decision to continue onto ZZZ was made by the flight deck and [Duty Officer] unless the smell resumed. Cabin crew continued to monitor cabin and guests. Comforting those that were crying; scared and panicked. We resumed service. The flight deck had called to use the lav and A Flight Attendant entered and the Captain would make an announcement for the guests; The A Flight Attendant asked the Captain to walk the cabin and answer questions and speak to the Jump Seat Pilot in row 32. The [jumpseat] pilot confirmed the fume event. The cabin crew continued to do our best to comfort and calm guests and told them if they smell something or see anything to ring their call lights.Service resumed for the remainder of the flight; cabin crew all felt light-headed and had headaches throughout the flight.Deplaning was uneventful; many guests thanked the Captain and the cabin crew for their professionalism ad for keeping them safe. Many hugs and handshakes. Maintenance arrived and started the recirculating system and the electrical burning fumes resumed. The crew moved the debrief out into the jet way.Captain and cabin crew debriefed for 30 minutes after flight. Captain asked if cabin crew thought the situation warranted turning around to land in [departure airport]. Captain was not aware that B Flight Attendant felt that the flight should have turned back to [departure airport]. Captain then explained the steps of turning back and diverting to [departure airport] versus continuing on to ZZZ.At this point; the cabin crew was physically and emotionally exhausted and the flight deck continued to answer questions. Our crew went to the company officer and sat with [Supervisor]. [Supervisor] filled out the Fumes Event Check lists. He also spoke with crew scheduling and had the D Flight Attendant move to a deadhead and removed from the remainder of her trip. The 3 remaining crew were removed from their trips to get some much needed rest and recover from this stressful situation.

Around 2 hours into the flight after our initial cart service I (Flight Attendant D) was out doing trash with (Flight Attendant B). When we went by with the trash cart a passenger in row 17 (or 18) stopped us and told us she thought she smelled smoke. She asked us if we could smell smoke. Both of us tried to smell what she was smelling and could not smell anything. We summoned (Flight Attendant C) for a third opinion and she could not smell anything either. When we finished with our trash cart the same passenger came running to the back and tapped me on the shoulder and told me to come smell again. When I turned around the entire cabin was looking at us and waving at us and ringing their call lights. All of the flight attendants came into the cabin and there was a very intense odor starting at row 15 to around row 25. It smelled like an electrical fire or smoke from overheating electronics. Flight Attendant D; B; and C opened all the bins and started asking people if their devices were hot or smoking. We couldn't find anything in the bins. Flight Attendant C went to the back and called the Captain to inform him of what was happening. Flight Attendant D went to the front to inform Flight Attendant A what was happening. Flight Attendant B grabbed the battery containment bag just in case we found anything that was on fire. There was no sign of smoke in the cabin. There was no smell in the front of the cabin or the back galley. We couldn't find any heat source.The guests told us that they could smell the odor coming from the air supply system. At this time the Captain turned off the electrical outlets; the entertainment; the galley power and the recirculating system. He told us to let him know if the odor continued and to continue monitoring the cabin. We told the guests to tell us if they smelled anything new or different. At this point there were several guests having panic attacks; crying and in need of assistance to help them calm down. We suspended service and did our best to help those guests that needed re-assurance.At this point it had been about 15 minutes after the event. The Captain had not made an announcement yet because he was still trying to decide if we needed to turn back around or keep going. The guests were panicking. The Flight Attendant A and Flight Attendant B asked the flight deck to make an announcement. After the decision was made to keep going the Captain made an announcement about the status of the flight and the decision he made to continue on our way to ZZZ. At this point the smell had dissipated and we couldn't smell anything.Service resumed; no smell was detected for the rest of the flight.All four flight attendants felt light headed and struggled with headaches for the remainder of the flight. Flight Attendant D and Flight Attendant C and Flight Attendant B had irritated eyes and Flight Attendant D and Flight Attendant A had irritated throats.The rest of the flight was uneventful but everyone was very anxious. We landed in ZZZ and most guests hugged us and shook our hands; saying thank you.Maintenance came on board and started checking the systems. We smelled a slight odor again once he turned on the air supply system. We moved out to the jet bridge and de-briefed with the Captain. We discussed how we all handled the situation and what we could have done better. We discussed what was happening in the flight deck and in the cabin. There was no supervisor at the plane when we disembarked.As a crew we went down to the inflight offices and got a hold of [Supervisor]. He de-briefed with us for another hour and we went through all the details. At that time we were all emotionally and physically exhausted. We were removed from our pairings and [Supervisor] filled out an air quality report for us and called Scheduling to deadhead me (Flight Attendant D) back to my base.

Flight attendants reported a strong burning electrical odor in passenger cabin which was also noticed by the passengers. Flight crew preformed the fumes QRH procedure and landed uneventfully at destination.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Type 2978

At cruise flight; our Wi-Fi stopped working. I then saw that I was unable to access the Pilot Mobile app. Since I do not routinely copy the flight plan to iBook or acrobat (we are not required to do this); I was unable to access the flight plan. I've lost Wi-Fi before but not had this problem. Maybe it's a 737max thing. My First Officer had a copy on iBook and airdropped it to me. Later we were able to restore the Wi-Fi and I could login to pilot mobile but the [flight plan] was not there anymore.

B737NG Captain reported the aircraft Wi-Fi was not working in cruise; which affected the ability to access the flight plan on the iPad.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Workload; Confusion

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 16.1

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Workload; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was working CIC (Controller In Charge) at the time of the event. It was the [late morning] departure push; and I had opened the second ground control (GC) in anticipation of over 100 operations in the coming hour. Aircraft X had exited 28L at Tango; LC (Local Control) then crossed Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z on Twy T and K; respectively. I watched all three aircraft come to a stop in the K/T/B intersection; with Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z unable to clear 28L. GC1 (Ground Control) was very busy with several aircraft without gates; numerous outbounds and the added complexity constraint of having part of Twy Zulu closed; necessitating complex staging to having repositioning aircraft cross the 28s. I walked over to LC and told him to send Aircraft A around; which was on short final Rwy 28L. LC had a southbound VFR transition; Aircraft B in the missed approach corridor; so myself; LC and LCA were watching that to ensure the missed approach and the transition were separated; I was also continuing to watch when 28L became clear from the previous arrivals that had stopped. The controller being relieved at GC2 noticed the non-acquisition in the upwind for the 1s. At this point I had stepped back to start logging the missed approach. I looked at the radar and initially thought there was only one target; since they were so close together; in fact; neither of the departures (Aircraft C and Aircraft D) had acquired. I was monitoring LC and not RC; so I did not hear the coordination between LCA and CI-1. LCA and LC had difficulty discerning which aircraft was which. LC first reiterated the departure procedures that each aircraft should have been on. He then instructed Aircraft C to turn right 30 degrees; which that aircraft did not acknowledge until the second time LC issued the turn. At no point did the STARS Conflict Alert sound with the two upwind departures.I could have kept CD (Clearance Delivery) open to have an extra set of eyes in the tower. However; that person had already worked for an hour; would have needed a break during this push anyway (otherwise would have exceeded 2 hours time on position); and there was no one else coming up from their break due to our short staffing. I could have suspended transitions at the beginning of the departure push; which would have precluded the go-around traffic conflict in the air with the Aircraft B from occurring; and hopefully would have meant someone would have seen the upwind departure conflict sooner. Ultimately it's up to the pilots to fly their planes. They should not be so dependent on their cockpit automation that they don't notice themselves that the aircraft turned left on departure instead of right; as per the SID. The old adage I learned in flight training applies here: Aviate; Navigate; Communicate. It appears the pilots of Aircraft C didn't do any of those three things very well. Had the STARS CA sounded with the upwind pair; perhaps someone would have noticed what was happening sooner. Overtime should have been scheduled or assigned to provide adequate facility staffing.

I was monitoring GC2 during the post position relief briefing. I noticed that LC had crossed Runway 28 Left at T and K with an aircraft having just exited at T from Runway 28 Left. The next arrival was Aircraft A about a mile and a half final. I leaned over to LC and said watch the intersection of T and K at B as the aircraft probably would not clear. Very quickly after LC looked in the direction; the CIC came over and said to send Aircraft A around that it would not work. Next; while watching Aircraft A climb out; I noticed a non-acquisition on a Runway 1 departure. I leaned over in between LC and LCA as as I said 'no tag'......I added an 's' to make it plural. There were two untagged targets right on top of one another; and as I brought this up; LC started to tell Aircraft C they were supposed to be on the TRUKN SID turning right. I did not hesitate and said as clearly as I could 'Turn Aircraft C right heading 040 and say immediately.' The Local Controller did so. Then a moment later they said to turn right heading 030. The aircraft began diverging at this point and I left the tower cab as my overlap was complete. This was the worst loss of separation I have personally witnessed as I do not imagine Aircraft C saw Aircraft D; but had a TCAS RA event; as they leveled at 1600 feet for quite a while; while directly underneath and that may very well be the only reason they did not physically collide. I spoke to the Local Controller post event downstairs and suggested that if something like this were to happen again; separate the airplanes first then explain that the aircraft should have been on a different course for the SID they are on.

SFO Tower controllers reported a loss of separation. One of the reporters told the Local to turn one of the aircraft to get them separated.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 18900; Flight Crew Type 2500

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Student was flying his third lesson [for the] Instrument Airplane rating. We were west of our airport and the weather went from broken to overcast. We were on top so we filed an IFR with flight service; called ATC and picked up the IFR code. I was giving the student headings and altitude for the GPS approach to our home base. ATC controller saw the present position to the inbound fix was perfect and cleared us for the approach. A few minutes later; the student allowed the airplane to descend and I told him to correct altitude but he was a bit slow flying the airplane. We became 200 feet low and climbing when a different ATC voice advised we had a low altitude alert. I told ATC we were correcting and we were very short time back at 2;200 feet. This was the student's first IFR approach to an airport. When the approach descent was started a few minutes later we were VFR and we canceled the IFR. The student then proceeded with the approach to a normal (but cross wind) landing. I should have taken the control away from the student and climbed the 200 feet but he already had the nose up; but he just didn't climb as fast as I wanted him to do. I briefed the incident after we landed and he is well aware of being low on an approach and now knows what a 'low altitude' alert is all about. SAFETY.

A pilot; on his first IFR approach with his Flight Instructor; descended prematurely which led to a low altitude alert call from ATC.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

The Captain on this flight did not wear a mask during the flight. He gave a briefing to the flight attendants and also did not maintain 6 feet spacing. He willingly and knowingly put me and my family and the families of my flying partners in jeopardy.  Company is required to provide a safe and healthy work environment for their employees; but they are not enforcing their own policy when it comes to pilots. People like this are slowing the recovery of the virus and are causing more furloughs than necessary. Flight attendants tell passengers all the time to put their mask on but then they see some pilots come on board without one.  This puts the crews in a very awkward position.  On this flight; there was not a bathroom break however if there was; I would not have gone into the cockpit without both pilots having a mask. This is not an isolated incident. This happens quite frequently. This issue is causing a breakdown in communication between the cockpit and cabin.

Flight Attendant reported the Captain did not wear a COVID-19 type mask during the flight.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Upon rotation on takeoff; I noticed the stall barber pole was higher than normal and the low speed awareness cue was equal to to it. There were no messages and no faults displayed on the MDC. We took off at the appropriate flap setting and the FO's (First Officer's) display appeared normal. We elected to request expedited handling and to return to field to mitigate delays and to make sure that a larger problem did not exist. To prevent the stall protection system from falsely activating we turned off the captain side stall protection switch; ran the STALL FAIL caution message QRH; applied the safety reference and landing distance additives; and landed on runway XXC in ZZZ. We parked at gate XX; deplaned; and were reassigned a new tail.

Captain reported unreliable airspeed and stall protection system indications and elected to request expedited handling and an air turn back to a successful precautionary landing.