Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

After having a late lunch I arrived back at the [the] gate; but before I arrived there I could smell the fuel a couple of gates away. As I approached I could see what looked like a large fuel spill and the fueling company employees cleaning it up. After getting to the gate I could see it was a very large spill; but no fire department standing by. I asked a couple of safety advocates what happened and they said [Company] had a fuel spill; but protocol wasn't being followed. First no again the fire department wasn't call for such a large spill; traffic was being allowed to drive through the area including a Manager in a company vehicle; the [Company] guys working the spill weren't wearing respiratory protection as they swept and scooped up the used absorbent; because of construction a breezeway is now being used by other airlines and companies to get to other areas of the airport.I told the Supervisor there that the breezeway needed to be closed but got no response from the Supervisor who in fact was ignoring me the Safety Rep on the advice I was trying to convey to him about the situation. When I said to him have the food truck back out his response was I'm trying to get them into the gate next door that was full of working Rampers working the inbound portion of the flight; is on time that important? The fire department was called after the fact and that the [Company] guys were finishing up the clean up; so they stayed on scene for about five minutes and then left. I feel that if [Company] didn't call the fire department then the [Airline] Supervisor should have; safety is number one right (joke) does he not know that the safety of the aircraft and passengers on the aircraft is his responsibility; I guess not. I left the scene because it was time for me to get off work and file.I could taste the absorbent and I am sure the crew next door could as well and I am sorry I didn't go over and ask them how they were feeling. As for myself by the time I got to my punch out area I could still taste the chemicals in my mouth and had a headache that is just starting to subside.

Commercial Airline ground personnel reported observing multiple cleanup protocol violations dealing with large fuel spill.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 10000

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

This was flight that consisted of three legs with a [late afternoon] show time with 11 hours on duty. During flight preparation and using WSI; weather was noted along most of our route of flight. However; most of the convective activity was North and South of our route. The route was PGUM - IDDAS - YP ... The flight altitude was FL380 and 1700 feet below optimal altitude. As we departed Guam; our flight was given weather deviation to our first waypoint named IDAAS; which is 250 miles from the airport VOR. It is at this point where we will contact ZOA and proceed with Class II navigation operations. The radar was looking actually clear; so the decision was made to ask ZOA for deviations later in the flight; as opposed to just asking GUM center to call ahead for us and give us 30 miles left and right deviation. This I believe was the first mistake that was made in the flight concerning the weather ahead. However; as mentioned before; the radar was showing clear along our route. Over IDAAS is where the second threat took place. The HF radios were not doing well for us on this flight. This would continue to be an issue until we were in contact with MNL radio. With no luck using HF; having tried 4 different frequencies. A few times; we could hear them; but they could not hear us; or the other way around. It was decided that we would use the satellite phone to call ZOA. This however would lead to our second attempt of poor communications with ATC. The first two calls were dropped. The third call was answered and the report was made; however; a request for deviations was not made due again to the radar ahead showing no significant weather along our route; still mainly to the south and north of our course. As we were East of our second waypoint YP; approximately 80 miles. The captain needed to use the restroom; so a call was made to the flight attendants to set up the break. We had discussed needed deviation just prior to YP; and calls were made to ZOA; but again the HF's were just not working with us. As the flight progressed closer to YP; weather had started to build on the radar. The captain again made the call on the phone directly to Oakland Sector ATC for direct communications; and instant deviation approval. However; the call was dropped again. We agreed that we would deviate as necessary to avoid the weather; and it was about this time that the flight attendants called us to notify the cabin was ready for his bathroom break. This was my second error; this was a good time to have both heads in the cockpit; but he needed to use the bathroom. We verified our plan of action; I had my radar on 20 mile scale; and asked him to have his on the 80 mile scale. I had my gain set at two below max intensity and 2 degrees nose down. The seat belt sign had been turned on earlier. At most we expect rain and light turbulence. The captain left and the flight attendant came into the cockpit. I had the oxygen mask on; the cockpit overhead lights were off to aid in seeing the any build ups if possible. However; the moon was not full tonight; so it was a dark night if we were out of the clouds either way. I was already deviating around the weather approximately 4 miles; when a Selcal was received from commercial radio. I answered them on a previously assigned frequency. The communication was 2 by 3 at best. I was however able to request deviations left and right of course 20 miles. The request was received; and in approximately 2 minutes we received the clearance to deviate. Soon after; as I was deviating left of course upwind of the cell about 10 miles; we encountered turbulence; however it was light to moderate at worst with rain showers. We were put into a downdraft that increased our speed. I deselected the auto throttles and reduced power; however the over speed indicator sounded; for about three seconds. As the power was reduced; I was expecting an increase [decrease?] in speed to follow. However; just before this; the stall shaker sounded momentarily. I put the aircraft into CWS B for turbulence penetration. It was at this time that the aircraft lost 700 (seven hundred) feet of altitude. The wings were level at the time of this event; which lasted seconds. Soon after; a climb was initiated back to our cruise altitude. As I was climbing; the Captain called and was ready to come back into the cockpit. As he buckled back into his seat; I debriefed him on what had happened; to include the over speed and shaker. He was surprised and mentioned that in back it just felt as if we encountered light turbulence. We proceeded with our deviations and made an uneventful landing.

We had requested 30 miles deviation to the Left of route for weather. I needed to use the lavatory and left the cockpit. While I was there I felt the turbulence. When I returned to the cockpit the First Officer told me the aircraft lost about 800 feet and that he got the stick shaker twice.

Air carrier flight crew experiences an overspeed then a stick shaker with a 700 foot altitude loss while flying in the vicinity of a thunderstorm at night.


ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

It's been a very busy month of RIMPAC activities. There have been many unsafe situations and close call stories lately. They built an ATCAA corridor for fighter aircraft just west and east of Honolulu airspace; called KAELA EAST or KAELA WEST. It showed up on my SIA board as WEST KAELA FL250B290 MISC Times. I asked the Supervisor if it was hot or not. The TMC jumped in and said that it is cold; that if it was hot; it would show the times. I told the Supervisor that it would be much easier and for over flight planning to tell us the times and write HOT or COLD so we know. As I am recommending this; the TMC told the Supervisor that it was actually hot at this time. I don't know when it got activated and do not know how many airplanes actually went through it. We have many over flights; and CONUS to LIH flights that fly through there at those altitudes. TMC and supervisors need to do their job. Many incidents like that occurred due to the fact that they are not doing their jobs like they expect me to.

It has been the busiest and worst RIMPAC in all my years at this facility; too much to explain. This will just cover staffing we were promised by management that they would staff us appropriately for RIMPAC. I guess what is appropriate for us is not the same for them. On the average; they staff us with 11-12 FPLs during the en route side day watch. We have 11 positions that needed to be staffed. So how do they do this do you ask? The rob Peter to pay Paul constantly if they are a good supervisor. If they are not; the positions will not be staffed and unsafe situations occur. Most supervisors do not know; or are too lazy; to monitor positions so we have to yell for help. I did so on this day. I was working on R3; when I had 2 VFR flight (one requesting a practice VOR approach into MKK); 3 oceanic departures; a Piper requesting a Visual Approach into LUP; a DH8 requesting release less than 3 minutes from sector 4's boundary climbing into my LUP arrivals face; OGG Tower calling for a clearance for an Oceanic departure; NGF trying to get a hold of me to coordinate something; all ASP possible is HOT or some that I wasn't even told about. To put it briefly; I was busy and did not have a D-Side because there was sick leave and the supervisor would not call in an 8 hour body. So; know we were short again; they did not staff appropriately until I felt safety was about to be compromised and yell for help. The supervisor later denied that we were short but yet could not explain why I needed to call for help and pull someone off another position and plug him on my D-Side. Yes; we are extremely poorly managed and staffed! Many incidents have occurred. People are still hesitant to write reports; probably because we are too short to get time to write them. Out of frustration; I insisted on writing this.

HCF Controller described an unsafe condition when extremely busy military operations resulted in heavy/complex traffic with supervisors failing to respond as appropriate.  Reporter suggested management is not doing their job.


Island between taxiway A and ramp between spots X and Y is bordered only by sporadic small blue reflective stakes. At night they are extremely difficult to see because taxiing into the ramp via B-L-A-spot X the aircraft lights do not hit them at the right angle. On multiple occasions I've had to alert the Captain who could not see the island or blue stakes so as not to continue in the same direction from L into spot Y; the aircraft must turn a quick left-right from taxiway L in order to avoid the island.

Air carrier First Officer reported this non movement area near Taxiway A is difficult to see at night. Reporter did not provide the airport.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Total 10650; Flight Crew Type 8800

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On final approach for landing on Runway 18 at TME; aircraft switched to Tower frequency. Tower advised crew to call a five mile final to Runway 18. Approaching the five mile call; crew noticed Aircraft Y coming from the right to left directly in front of crewed aircraft. Crew was getting ready to call the five mile distance; but instead crew executed an immediate left turn to avoid a collision and notified the tower of the situation. Crew continued left turn per tower instructions and climbed to 2;000 feet. Crew was advised to fly back towards the runway at 2;000 feet and contact Departure Control. Departure Control gave crewed aircraft vectors for right downwind and crew conducted an uneventful landing at TME. Crew was advised by tower personnel on the ground that there is no radar at the field and they depend on position reports. Crew was approaching the five mile call when they noticed Aircraft Y cut in front of the crewed aircraft. Crew asked the tower personnel if the Tower knew the aircraft was inbound then why did they not inquire the position of our aircraft before they turned Aircraft Y.

GA pilot reported taking evasive action while on visual approach in order to avoid another aircraft during final approach to TME airport.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Airport; Airspace Structure; Procedure

CLT approach was vectoring us for ILS 18L. Our last assigned heading was 270; ALT 3000. We noticed a few traffic symbols in front of us on TCAS; thinking they were going to 18C and 18R. One was 300 below us. About 1.5 miles from the LOC; ATC issued an immediate turn left heading 190 and intercept the LOC to 18L for traffic at 1 o'clock; 1 mile and 300 feet below us. As I started the turn the TCAS came on telling us to 'climb; climb'. After turning off autopilot and flight directors and started climbing the TCAS announced 'Clear of conflict'. We climbed 100 feet. So we descended to 3000 and were cleared to fly the approach; after advising ATC about the TCAS RA.

A319 Captain reported a TCAS RA on final into CLT. Pilot responded to the RA by climbing 100 feet. The resolution cleared and the aircraft landed on the assigned runway. Traffic was for a parallel runway.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Had a flight control issue on the way to ZZZZ1. [Notified ATC] and returned to ZZZZ.

B737 First Officer reported an undisclosed flight control issue resulted in a return to the departure airport.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

During walk around; First Officer noticed the fueler was absent from his position and nowhere to be seen as fuel was being pumped into the aircraft. The ground wire was on the ramp and not attached to the aircraft. This was an UNSAFE condition.Fueling Personnel follow SOP.

On First Officer's walk around; it was noted that a refueling hose was hooked up to the aircraft and was pumping fuel into it. The problem was no one was monitoring the refueling. No one was in sight. Furthermore the grounding cable was not connected to the aircraft. The First Officer looked for a supervisor to inform him of the problem. He found one and briefed him of the dangerous safety hazard this type of operation creates. The Supervisor more or less made excuses for his employee's actions. Hopefully he will be counseled on his poor adherence to procedures. That type of non-compliance with procedures while refueling aircraft could have disastrous consequences.

A B737 flight crew reported the First Officer noticed on his walk-around that the aircraft was being fueled with no one present and the grounding wire was also not attached.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Troubleshooting; Distraction; Time Pressure

Distraction; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

The first phases of the flight were all normal. The airplane had an inoperative APU; so we had to start the engine on ground power and later do a cross bleed start; despite that all operations were normal and we did not notice any abnormalities. Through takeoff and initial climb out all was normal. As we climbed through about 10;000 feet. I saw the EICAS engine oil display flash red and saw the temperature was very high. About 160 degrees Celsius and climbing fast. I asked my First Officer to check the QRH for a high oil temperature checklist. I notified ATC that we had an issue and decided to hold our altitude and reduced the left engine power to try to reduce the temperature while we found the appropriate checklist. At approximately 55 to 60 percent N1 the oil temperature continued to rise to 169 degrees. We followed the high oil temperature checklist and it led us to shut the left engine down. As the First Officer and I ran the shutdown checklists I [advised ATC] and asked for vectors to return to ZZZ airport.We planned to utilize the ILS for Runway XXL to give us every navigation advantage possible with the degraded aircraft state. We were only about 50 miles away from the airport when the event occurred and we turned around. I began to slow the airplane down to about 200 knots to give us more time to work the situation before getting to the airport. We needed more time to run the single engine descent and before landing checklist so we asked for delay vectors before the approach and flew a box pattern to finish our tasks. We finished the checklists and took a minute to stop and think if we missed anything and double check the aircraft configuration. We continued the approach with no issues.We cleared off the runway and stopped on an open area of the taxiway for the fire crews to check the engine for any issues that could be a safety issue if we parked at the terminal building. The fire department saw nothing that concerned them and we continued to taxi to the gate with no other issues.High oil temperature due to a suspected failed oil scavenge pump resulted in an engine shutdown and air return.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ-200 flight crew reported an inflight oil system anomaly which necessitated a return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 204; Flight Crew Type 560

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

BUR was apparently one of the SoCal airports that got new RNAV procedures and this was the first day they were in use. Upon departing Runway 15 we were cleared relatively early in the flight to 'climb and maintain' into the low flight levels. I do not recall the exact altitude; but it must have been 210 or 230. Because of the unrestricted climb the Captain (I was still hand-flying; FD in LNAV/VNAV mode) took out the 'at or below FL190' altitude restriction at JETHK. A few minutes later ATC amended our clearance to climb and maintain 15;000 feet due to crossing traffic.After we got the handoff the next Controller cleared us to climb via except maintain 230. At that point we did not remember to reinsert the restriction at JETHK and we must have climbed through 190 before reaching the fix. I am not aware of a traffic conflict; but the Controller issued a 'friendly reminder' that the restriction on the new procedure is due to crossing arrival traffic and therefore important to comply with in the future.Of course the main fault is with us as the flying crew; but the ATC clearance switching between 'climb and maintain' and 'climb via' seems to set one up for the mistake we made. The problem for us was that there was a significant amount of time between taking out the crossing restriction in the FMC and being switched back to the climb via clearance. Neither one of us remembered to recheck the programmed procedure. We were both wondering how to change our automation technique to prevent this error. I will try in the future to avoid making changes in FMC and using Level Change for an unrestricted climb and VNAV for 'climb via'.

We departed BUR and were climbing on the SLAPP 1 SID. Today was the first day this RNAV SID was used. When I checked in with SoCal Departure they cleared us to 'climb and maintain' either FL210 or FL230 (can't remember exactly which one it was). Since it was a 'climb and maintain' clearance and there is a lower altitude restriction at JETHK of FL190B; I deleted the altitude restriction after my First Officer verified it.Shortly thereafter ATC told us to stop our climb at 15;000 feet for traffic. After passing the traffic and then being handed off to another Controller; we were now told to 'climb via the SID except maintain FL230'. That led to some confusion in itself because the top altitude is FL230. We continued our climb with LNAV/VNAV engaged. Several minutes later ATC told us to stop our climb at FL210 which we did.Just prior to being handed off to the next Controller; we were told that in the future we are expected to cross JETHK at or below FL190. He said it was not a problem and that ATC was trying to figure out these SIDs as well.This error occurred because we were first given a 'climb and maintain' clearance to an altitude limit that was higher than the JETHK restriction. We were later revised to a 'climb via' clearance. We could have climbed the aircraft in LVL CHG mode and left the altitude restrictions in the FMC until we were sure they were not an issue and I should have been more diligent in catching the change in the clearance. Later the same day; we flew another roundtrip through BUR and were given the same clearance change as we climbed on the SLAPP1 SID. We recognized the issue the second time. This is definitely a 'gotcha' and I hope they change their procedure.

B737 flight crew reported being cleared initially to climb via the SLAPP1 to maintain FL210 then told to climb and maintain FL230 and the crossing restriction (JETHK of FL 190B) is removed. After a level off at 15;000 for traffic the crew is recleared to climb via; but the crossing restriction is not reentered.


ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

SIC received PDC clearance and set-up cockpit prior to departure. The altitude preselect was inadvertently set to 5000 feet during set-up; our PDC clearance was to 4000 feet. On departure Tower cleared us for takeoff and RNAV to SCAMM intersection; SIC was flying from the left seat. During climb out to 5000 feet the tower advised of traffic at 1:00 o'clock and level at 4500 feet. Tower did not issue a course change nor did we get a TCAS alert on that traffic. We leveled at 5000 feet and tower issued a clearance to descend to 4000 feet and contact departure.Unlike a radio issued clearance a PDC clearance has no readback provision and must be interpreted correctly. The PDC clearance should have been copied from the computer generated text to the TOLD card and in plain view of both pilots. I should not have relied on verbal confirmation during the brief. IAH Tower cleared us for takeoff and RNAV to SCAMM intersection. The SID 15R narrative and plainview shows RNAV to SCAMM intersection and cross SCAMM at or below 5000 feet. With the altitude preselect incorrectly set at 5000 feet prior to takeoff we interpreted as an initial climb to 5000 feet. The SID however does clearly show in separate text to maintain 4000 feet. Both pilots should read the PDC clearance from the initial computer generated text and compare interpretations during the brief; with special emphasis on initial altitude restrictions.

We received a PDC via email that rerouted us on the BNDTO2. I read the 15R/L narrative telling us to climb to 600 feet then direct SCAMM; cross SCAMM at or below 5000 feet. I set 5000 feet in the altitude window before takeoff. I did not see the script at the bottom stating to level at 4000 feet and expect filed altitude via ATC. 4000 feet was also in our email PDC; which I failed to read as I was changing our departure from the Industry to the Bandito.We need to read the RNAV departures as a crew and really search for the initial level off altitudes on the chart. Our PDC should be written on the takeoff data card in plain view for both pilots.

The secondary reporter confirmed that the 4000 restriction is now appended to the PDC although it continues to follow the clearance to fly the BNDTO SID. He does not recall whether the PDC language assigning the SID continues to include the directive words 'climb via.'

Cleared via the BNDTO RNAV SID off Runways 15L and R the flight crew of a CL604 were climbing to cross SCAMM at or below 5;000 feet per the INITIAL CLIMB text and the Graphic depiction. As they climbed through 4;000 feet they were advised of conflicting traffic and reminded they were to maintain 4;000 feet per the text under ROUTING which limits all departures from all runways.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 30000; Flight Crew Type 2500

Flight was on arrival at SDF. After an incident from last week we were hyper vigilant on changes to landing runway. Starting approximately 30 minutes prior to landing the runway for landing was changed five times. This involves extensive FMC changes to insert and verify that the now new arrival has been properly loaded. We had hardly completed one change when the runway was reversed and we had to go through the process once again. After the last change when we were given to Approach Control we asked are we still cleared on the MAUDD1 arrival. There was some hesitation and at that time we were given a heading to intercept 35R LOC and eventually cleared visual for uneventful landing. After parking the runway was reversed once again. On a previous flight after a last minute runway change which resulted in a deviation our crew was extremely vigilant on proper FMC loading and verification. This was all happening on descent and during the time in all flights when history shows the highest chance of an accident or incident occurs. There needs to be an understanding of the work load incurred every time there are changes made to the landing runway.

Air Carrier arrival into SDF voiced concern regarding the multiple runway changes issued during the descent into the airport listing the increased FMS workload needed to accommodate the changes.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I came in for my shift on dispatch desk X and found out they had closed desk Z again. I am left here by myself no one to answer phones; watch my desk when I relieve myself or heat up dinner; as the last time this happened; my phones were ringing off the hook. This is not good leaving a dispatcher without any back up!Management refuses to cover overtime; flights are redistributed. I had 20 releases; 17 flights in the air the first hour with two maintenance issues.Keep the desks open!

Dispatcher reported excessive workload and lack of relief is causing safety of flight issues and work rule violations due to COVID related staffing cuts.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 1650; Flight Crew Type 0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

This was the first flight in this aircraft for both me and the student. I was acting as instructor and had previously done training with this student to get his tailwheel endorsement. Preflight inspection was normal and full control deflections were made to all control surfaces; no problems noted.Takeoff was normal and airspeed was live; climb at 100 MPH. Ten minutes into the flight we experienced what we thought was the autopilot coming on. The ailerons became very stiff and hard to move. We turned off the autopilot and wing leveler; also tried pulling the breaker on the autopilot. All those things had no effect. I also noticed that the aircraft was only indicating about 130 MPH at 23 inches of MAP and 2500 RPM which seemed low for this type of aircraft. We were also having trouble communicating due to intercom problems.We decided to return to the airport immediately rather than do the flight maneuvers we had intended. It appeared that something was mechanically binding in the aileron control system.Final was made at 90 MPH indicated and short final at 80 MPH. The airplane inadvertently stalled several feet off the runway and hit hard on the left gear causing damage.Notes: I had flown once before in this model aircraft and found it to handle very similar to [the aircraft I own]; also the speeds around the pattern were very similar. I have over 500 hours of tailwheel and do tailwheel training in a Citabria 7GCBC. The Mustang II is an experimental aircraft; 180 HP and CS prop. I knew beforehand that the stall characteristics of this airplane were unforgiving; sharp leading edge. I believe that if we had been able to do stalls and slow flight at altitude as planned that this incident would not have occurred.

The reporter states that the cause of the aileron binding remains undetermined at this time but the stiff feel exists with the aircraft on the ground. The aircraft flight control system is all push rods and bell cranks.

Experimental aircraft instructor with student on first flight for both experiences aileron binding shortly after takeoff and elects to return for a precautionary landing. During the landing flare the aircraft is stalled just above the runway causing damage to the left main gear.


Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

At the gate the First Officer felt a jolt to the aircraft. He then performed his preflight walk around and discovered a 2-inch gash in the right side of the fuselage approximately two feet forward of the fwd baggage compartment (6 feet off the ground). He reported it to me. I was at the boarding gate retrieving paperwork and discussing the fuel load with dispatch. We inspected the gash together and then informed local maintenance; Maintenance Control; Dispatch and the station manager.

While I was in the cockpit performing my preflight duties; I felt a jolt. During the actual outside preflight I discovered a 2 to 3 inch hole about 2 feet forward of the forward cargo hold about 6 feet high. I notified the Captain.

MD82 First Officer reported feeling a jolt during preflight while sitting in the cockpit. During the exterior preflight a gash was noted on the right side of the aircraft; ahead of the forward cargo hold.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 95.4; Flight Crew Total 4400; Flight Crew Type 800

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

On the arrival we were busy on the TCAS as there were multiple targets in our general vicinity when were given 6;000 MSL. We were then given a descent to 5;000. Upon landing I was told to call the TRACON and was told I violated an altitude. After examination of the situation; we either answered a descend to 5;000 FT clearance intended for another airplane or replied to the clearance to descend to 6;000 FT and put 5;000 FT in the altitude window in error. In either situation there was a conflict with other traffic and I understand it is not acceptable. I will request a copy of the tape for my own personal use and possible training to other people in the future. To prevent this from happening in the future I will make sure to look at the altitude window and point to verify the altitude assigned and not just repeat without visual confirmation. I am personally and professionally embarrassed by this mistake.

...while we were descending to 6;000 FT we were cleared to 5;000 FT and when we were at 5;000 FT we got an RA on the TCAS and right after that we were assigned to turn left to a heading of 270 to avoid traffic.

A BE-40 flight crew experienced a TCAS RA when they descended to 5;000 when cleared to 6;000.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 8314; Flight Crew Type 5716

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While on approach RNAV XX at ZZZ; we got a GPWS Terrain Terrain. Since we were IMC we immediately initiated an escape that quickly resulted in a go-around. We notified Tower of the go-around. They asked the reason and we told them; for terrain. We were then vectored for another approach to Runway XX and landed without incident.

A320 flight crew reported GPWS terrain alert on approach to landing.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Departing ZZZ; received a No. 2 engine bleed leak message on pneumatic panel; with EICAS message. Deselected engine bleed source per QRH procedure. Continued flight after considering air return to ZZZ as bleed leak warning went out shortly after deselecting right engine bleed.  Later in flight at FL250; suddenly noticed acrid strong odor. Captain called flight attendant on interphone and confirmed some smoke and strong odor present in cabin. Decided to perform 'smoke in cockpit' memory items. During this procedure apparently Captain's mask interphone failed and he was unable to communicate with O2 mask on. Pilot Flying assumed flying and ATC communication responsibilities and coordinating descent and weather deviation with ATC. [Requested ATC priority handling]. During descent eventually Pack 1 overheat EICAS message annunciation. Smoke and odor dissipated so O2 masks removed and normal crew communication resumed. Continued to destination as no longer producing smoke and no odor detected in cockpit and confirmed by flight attendant in cabin. Landed uneventfully in ZZZ1 with good priority handling by ATC and some weather deviation due to local rain showers. [I] understand that the left air conditioning pack failed; causing smoke and odor noted.

At FL250 with right pack and bleed deselected; began to get smoke throughout aircraft. Donned masks and [requested priority handling] with ZZZ ATC. We received clearance direct to ZZZ1 from about 80 miles out and descended to 10;000'. After about 2-3 minutes; smoke dissipated and did not reappear. Uneventful landing.

EMB145 flight crew reported a fume event of smoke and strong odor in the cabin occurred in cruise following a number 2 engine bleed leak EICAS message.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 289; Flight Crew Type 10500

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 264; Flight Crew Type 264

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

We were getting ready to push; running slightly behind schedule. The Flight Attendant came up with the Passenger count napkin and I asked her to flip the cockpit door switch down. She said she would but had a Passenger issue she wanted to resolved first. A Passenger said that not all of his party was onboard. I had been in the boarding area at about push time to get the weather packet. There were no remaining Passengers in the area so I know the Agent had not shut the jet way door early. I looked at our time enroute and knew there was no way we could delay any further without being late into ZZZ1. She said she was fine leaving and told the Passenger they would have to check with Customer Service in ZZZ1. We taxied out and departed 4R. On the takeoff roll the cockpit door came open and the Flight Attendant slammed it back shut immediately. On the climb out we realized the door unlock light was still on thus allowing the door to come open. As soon as it was safe to do so the FO got up and flipped the switch. He also locked the deadbolt just in case something else might be wrong with it. We inspected the door at ZZZ1 and it worked normally.Whenever a checklist is interrupted or not fully completed you must exercise extra vigilance to make sure it gets done. I also am planning on putting the door lights in my scan just before takeoff as an extra safety measure.

B737 flight crew reported that the cockpit door flew open during takeoff.


Upon landing at GGG; the winds were gusting to 30 knots; and we had 10 knot loss short final. The First Officer (FO) landed smoothly but long trying to counter the effects of the wind. Construction was taking place along taxiway Golf and the exit at November was closed. At taxiway Bravo there were several ground ops vehicles giving the illusion that Bravo was closed as well. The FO slowed the aircraft prior to runway 36 as we waited for the tower to give us taxi instructions; but the tower was busy with a back and forth transmission with another aircraft that was inbound to the airport. The transmissions continued long enough that we taxied and tried to exit runway 36 un-commanded by the tower onto runway 31 and exited at Lima for the ramp. It was at this time that the tower informed us that they considered this to be a runway incursion and a pilot deviation; and to call the tower.The only choice that we had was to stop on the runway prior to runway 31 and wait for the transmissions to cease between the tower and the other aircraft and ask for taxi instructions from the tower.

Corporate Jet flight crew reported a runway incursion after landing at GGG due to construction and communication issues.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 2265; Flight Crew Type 785

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

While [we were] cruising at 10;000 FT MSL; contacted Center for vectors to final for the ILS to Runway 5. Both flying and non-flying pilots thought the Controller gave a heading of 305 degrees and a descent to 3;500 FT. Clearance was repeated back to the Controller with no correction to the clearance by the Controller. Aircraft was turned to 305 degrees and a descent started to 3;500 FT. Approaching our assigned altitude the Controller informed us that our assigned altitude was 4;200 FT. Low altitude alert! All too common case of miss communication; if a repeat of a clearance is required by the pilot then the Controller should verify the clearance as correct or incorrect.

A C90 crew read back a Center vector clearance to 3;500 FT so while descending got a low altitude alert and ATC stated they were cleared to 4;200 FT but had not corrected the pilot's 3;500 FT readback error.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 215; Flight Crew Total 18705; Flight Crew Type 1755

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This has been an issue recently highlighted by the Chief Pilot; and finally I was able to take photos; although blurry; it clearly shows the CFR trucks in the barn and unmanned.  During back taxi in PTRO we taxi right in front of the CFR barn.  We noticed the CFR trucks were still parked inside the barn and no one was around or near them.  In a previous FOM it stated that the local CFR must be manned in proper PPE and at the ready upon our arrival and while on the ground; especially while fueling with passengers on board.

Air carrier Captain reports that his company operations manual requires that the local CFR must be manned in proper PPE and at the ready upon arrival and while on the ground. This does not appear to be the case at PTRO; but the Chief Pilot does not agree.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

We were dispatched to an airplane having an Amber Alert on runway. The aircraft brakes locked up for an unknown reason causing the Aircraft to come to a complete stop at the 6000 ft. marker on the active runway. Upon arrival the passengers were helping each other down from the door 1L on the aircraft. The city dispatched air stairs that are incompatible with the ERJ145. The fire department eventually had a medium A frame ladder that was shorter than the door to access door 1L. There were passengers carrying bags as they crossed the open field between the runway and taxiway foxtrot where the busses were staged for the passengers. The major concern was that the passengers did not have a safe way to exit the aircraft and not causing possible injury and harm to the passengers. It is a known fact that all driving air stairs are too high to access ERJ145 doors. Having passengers jump down 5 ft. or more because that is not proper evacuation stairs or a process in place. The Amber Alert System has flaws. Not recognizing that the ERJ145 has unique requirements for emergency evacuations. Created by the non-standard height of the door compared to most all other mainline aircraft of those that have their own doors self-contained like the RJ200/700. The ERJ145 has no self-contained stairs or safety slide for passengers to access in the event of an emergency like happened today when the brakes locked up and sparked and caught fire.

A ramp agent reported the ERJ145 does not have air stairs nor a safe way to deplane while on the ramp and away from a jet bridge.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

It all started at XA:00 when I woke up and the first thing I do is looked at the weather and aircraft MELs for [our] flight. The weather in ZZZ1 was less then a mile and 001 overcast until XE:30 local. Not improving until XF:30. The aircraft MEL most concerning was both localizers inoperative. The lowest minimums were for the LNAV XXR which took us down to 1000MSA and 440HAT. I called Dispatch around XA:15am and told him that it's unlikely that we'll be able to get into ZZZ1 until XE:30-XF:30 due to the ceilings at ZZZ1. At first Dispatch told me that they would delay the flight for 30 min and I was okay with that. I then received a call from Dispatch around XA:20 which I was told the RVR was rising and they were not going to delay the flight. I told him okay and that we would get to the airport on time and that I'm not departing until I know the weather would be good enough for us to land in ZZZ1. When I got to the airport I called Dispatch to come up with a plan. At this time visibility and the ceilings were too low for us to depart. Dispatch then put me on a group call with the new pilot help desk in which we agreed that the visibility was too low for us to depart and that the visibility was too low at ZZZ for us to return so I requested a takeoff alternative. The takeoff alternative that was given to us was ZZZ2. After a little research the visibility was fine at ZZZ2 but the ceilings were lower than we were able to use given our MEL and that was in my mind a bad takeoff alternative. I then called Dispatch to get a new takeoff alternative and mid discussion the phone was disconnected. I tried calling back and I was directed to a message telling me to check the number I called because it's been disconnected. Being concerned that my [cellphone] plan somehow had an issue I tried from the FOs (First Officers) phone but the same thing happened. I'm truly hoping this was not malicious on the Dispatchers part and that we were having actual phone problems.I then received an ACARS message with a new takeoff [alternate] of ZZZ3 which was better. Around XC:45 the forecast improved at ZZZ1 saying that at XD:00am the weather would improve to 2SM and 600 overcast. Great! We can do that. We boarded up and started getting ready to go. The problem is that while the visibility improved the ceilings dropped. I called Dispatch again and this time the phone rang but no answer. I then called a different desk and it was answered by Dispatch but I was immediately transferred back to my original Dispatcher. When he answered I tried my best to tell him that I know the visibility was good to depart but all I wanted was a PIREP from one of our crews that had just landed to tell me when they saw the runway. It was obvious that he didn't want to hear my concerns because he didn't allow me to talk and he once again sent me to the pilot help desk and then left the conversation. I then asked the same question via ACARS in which he did respond saying that people were seeing the runway at 300 agl. That's too low for us because of our MEL. The only message I received after that was from a supervisor saying that RVR holding at 6000 and you're good to launch. No kidding!  They didn't care at all about my concerns. I ended up calling ZZZ1 Tower myself and they confirmed 300agl is the breakout point. I also planned with ZZZ1 Tower to give them a call before we depart so that they could plan on us needing to land XXR which I did. When the ceilings lifted to 005 broken I called the Tower to let them know. Dispatch was no help. When we got to ZZZ1 we saw the approach lights at the last second to legally land.  I found myself overwhelmingly doing things that the Dispatcher and I should do together. I've never had a problem with dispatch until today. I hope it was just a bad day and not a new pattern. I rely on Dispatch for help and today was not okay. We found it very difficult to communicate with Dispatch. At one point all I wanted from Dispatch was a PIREPfrom our crews that were landing in ZZZ1 to find out what altitude they were breaking out at ZZZ1. The Dispatcher obviously didn't want to work with me so he passed me off to a pilot help line and left the conversation. That was absolutely no help. Everything that happened we did correct and by the book. Dispatch and the pilots should work together for the safety of the flight. This was the first time that I've felt that Dispatch was not wanting to work with me.

EMB140 Captain reported Dispatch failed to provide assistance with weather and flight support requests.


Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

During climbout we lost the green hydraulic system. I ended up flying the aircraft and doing the radio's while the captain did the checklists. Stainless steel hose in the wheel well split.

An A319 lost Green Hydraulic system pressure during climbout.  The flight returned to the departure airport.


Workload; Physiological - Other; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Just after departure on the climb out we noticed an odd smell followed shortly by the presence of smoke/vapor. The Flight Attendant also called with the same in the cabin. We [requested a] return the departure airport. On the way back we ran the cabin smoke QRH and the lavatory fire QRH since it also went off. [We] had the Flight Attendant check for any indications of the source but found none. The smell seemed to start after we switched to engine bleeds so we started the APU and switched to APU bleed air and the smoke/vapor started to dissipate. After landing we had the ground crew check for any external indications but they found none. With the smoke/vapor dissipating; we taxied to the gate and deplaned.The odor did not smell like smoke but a semi sweet toxic smell that is hard to describe. The smoke/vapor never got thick to where it impaired vision.

We had a hard time communicating with the O2 masks on due to a possible malfunction with the microphone in one of the observer masks.

Crew noticed an odd smell followed by smoke/vapor in the cockpit. They donned their oxygen masks and returned to the departure airport. The smoke dissipated when they switched to APU bleed.


Cessna Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 135; Flight Crew Total 6040; Flight Crew Type 460

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Descending on the SETER4 arrival into ONT; we were given a vector direct PETIS from about BANDS. Shortly after making the turn to direct PETIS we were informed by SoCal that there was a target on the screen with no altitude or type and was not talking to them and he gave us a more westerly heading to avoid the traffic. About a minute or so on the westerly heading he had informed us that the primary target popped up on radar at which time I started looking outside and looking at our TCAS to see if there were any information. Nothing was showing on the TCAS and I saw the airplane in a turn from west to north wing up and level off northward. Both the [Second Officer] and I called out the traffic to the captain and he said that he had the traffic. My first instinct was to fly behind the airplane and keep him in my sight and to keep us separated. The captain then turned to the right bringing us to a parallel or less flight path at the same altitude. It appeared to me that the Cessna was conducting flight training maneuvers. The captain then leveled off the airplane and the Cessna was at our twelve o'clock and closing fast. The [Second Officer] and I started telling the captain to take action and he was not making any correction to avoid the traffic. Both of us had to tell the captain to descend immediately and I was reading myself to take control of the aircraft and the captain did start a slow and steady descent and the I watched the Cessna passing us going northward clearing us approximately 50 feet above us and about 250-300 feet off the right wing. I informed ATC that we had cleared the conflicting aircraft and gave the type; unable to make out the tail number we continued the approach to landing at ONT.

Air Carrier First Officer reported an NMAC during arrival to ONT; and the flying Captain failed to make a timely turn to avoid VFR traffic.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Data / Clearance Delivery; Ground; Local

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 11

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Aircraft X; a local pilot was returning from a 15 minute local flight. I cleared them to land and the instructor said 'going around' abeam the numbers. I instructed them to make left closed traffic. Aircraft X was executing the left crosswind turn when I heard them say something garbled. I asked them to say again and I heard 'lost our engine coming back'. I cannot recall if I recleared them to land; but did ask if they needed assistance. I then reached for the crash phone. Aircraft X was able to land on the remaining length of runway and stopped just short of the end of the runway. Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) units and Operations were dispatched and I maintained radio communications with the pilot; who stated they were not hurt. I notified TRACON; the airport; and later my Air Traffic Manager. At the time I was alone in the Tower working all positions combined. Traffic was light; but I recalled another controller back from break to assist me while I finished the proper paperwork.It is not unusual to be working alone at this time since there are only 2 controllers left and we need breaks. I have a personal connection to this particular pilot and wanted to be sure they were okay; which is why I reached for the crash phone first; and cannot be sure I re-cleared them to land. Additionally; I would like to suggest a more streamlined; facility specific checklist for incidents.  The paper checklist is very convoluted with lots of form numbers etc. My main priority was to get the ARFF dispatched; notify the Operations and worry about the pilot and aircraft; then get to the checklist and paperwork.

PSP Tower Controller reported an aircraft in a traffic pattern that lost their engine and potentially landed without a clearance.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

During approach; I was acting as the PF and SIC. At about 400 feet or so the elevator controls [felt] a little stiff. I used the electrical trim but there was no relief to the stiff feeling of the elevator control and the aircraft wanted to pitch up. I found myself using my full strength to bring the nose down but the aircraft continued with a high pitch attitude. I mentioned it to the Captain and we exchanged controls and he found himself also having to put full force forward to prevent the aircraft from pitching up. We did a go-around. We did a left downwind turn for [the] runway; during the turn the aircraft was not very controllable and the Captain attempted to use the backup trim but there was no forward pressure relief. The Captain had to use bank angles greater than 45 degrees to keep the nose down. We also found that the aircraft was more controllable with the flaps up; perhaps do to the downwash that initially gives a nose up moment with flaps extended; so we decided to leave the flaps retracted as we did not want to aggravate the situation. We performed a visual approach with no flaps. We did an expedited brief to cover the increase Vref speed with no flaps and the runway length. Upon touchdown we both got on the brakes and proceeded to taxi to the FBO without any further incident.

The First Officer was going above glideslope on short final. I advised [and got the response] 'it's not me; it's a control issue.' We transferred controls. I was unable to correct increasing pitch. Did my best to keep aircraft from stalling and tried to find out what was wrong. I first thought it was flaps; then trim; but it was all I could do to maintain flight.

Reporter stated that FOQA data showed the aircraft was mis-trimmed excessively nose-up on the approach by the pilot flying.

EMB-505 flight crew reported executing a go-around after experiencing elevator control difficulties on approach.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On arrival to Changi Airport after listening to ATIS; we anticipated the ILS to Runway 20C since Runway 20R was closed. During our initial descent; Singapore Arrival told us that Runway 20R had opened and gave us vectors to intercept the localizer. With heading selected; I activated the secondary flight plan that had Runway 20R loaded. Since we were over 20 miles out; the pilot flying directed me to hard tune the localizer. Approximately 15 miles from touchdown; Approach directed us to change to Runway 20C as there was debris on Runway 20R. As we began an immediate left hand turn; I asked the PF if I could activate the secondary flight plan. He replied 'yes;' and I activated the secondary flight plan while communicating with ATC and verbalizing to the PF the new minimums and missed approach numbers for Runway 20C. During this time I failed to hard tune the LOC to Runway 20C; incorrectly assuming it would auto tune upon activating the secondary flight plan. The PF subsequently realized that the new localizer was not tuned; directing me to hard tune it. This delay led to overshooting final followed by a right turn to come back to intercept the now-correct localizer. The remaining approach and landing was uneventful. Incorrect prioritization; lack of specific communication; and failure to verify an FMS input all led to this event. When the runway was switched back to 20C; my first priority as PM should have been to hard-tune the new localizer first; then activate the secondary flight plan; and finally; once established on final; re-brief the minimums and missed approach numbers. Also; verifying the localizer identifier on the Nav display would have led to quicker recognition of the need to hard tune the new localizer; preventing an overshoot. Though a very challenging event; better communication between the PM and PF would have aided the situation. When the possibility exists to have a runway change in close; it is imperative to pre-brief the requisite steps and priorities required; especially in the case where auto tuning of the localizer will not occur after being previously hard-tuned. Also; this would be a good training scenario.

Air Carrier flight crew experiences two runway changes during approach to WSSS. After the second change the ILS frequency is not tuned in a timely manner resulting in an overshoot. A normal landing ensues.


ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Was vectored by ATC to follow in trail of an A319; 7 miles ahead. We were not notified of this. We encountered unexpected wake turbulence from aircraft ahead. Flight Attendant bumped head against aircraft fuselage. She notified her [superiors] and was instructed she could continue her duties and to monitor herself.[I would suggest] more spacing for following aircraft in clean configuration.

EMB-145 First Officer reported a flight attendant bumped her head during a wake turbulence encounter from the preceding A319.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

On our descent at approximately 28;000 FT the pilot not flying saw smoke entering the cockpit from all visible vents and below the windshield. We immediately downed our 02 masks; smoke goggles and declared an emergency. ATC gave a clearance for an emergency descent to 12;000 which was initiated promptly. We were immediately given a vector to the west directly to the closest airport. The pilot not flying was running the QRH. I; the pilot flying; noticed the inside of the windshield appeared unusual prior to the visual smoke. Much of it was covered in frost. I have never seen a windshield appear like this so quickly. After the smoke; then I suggested it could be the windshield heat. The pilot not flying then deselected the windshield heat and the smoke subsided. We landed safely. I feel as if we worked well together as a crew. All the memory items were followed and checklists were run per the QRH! Unfortunately; this is the SECOND time I have experienced smoke in the EMB145.

EMB145 First Officer experiences smoke entering through the cockpit vents passing FL280 during descent. Oxygen masks are donned and the QRH complied with before diverting to an airport closer than the destination airport.


Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 52; Flight Crew Total 997; Flight Crew Type 75

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

New engine overhaul installed; 5.5 hours were flown locally before the extended trip was taken. 40-45 min prior to arrival at my destination; a reduction in fuel pressure was noted. Low boost pump was engaged and it appeared to mitigate the issue; although full normal pressure did not appear to be achieved. 30 minutes prior to arrival at my destination ATC started my descent sequence; no abnormal issues were noted north and through the Class Bravo area. ATC vectored me into the Corridor for the approach to ZZZ. As the aircraft was dropping below the Class Bravo on the descent being set-up for the approach to ZZZ at 5000 ft and 10 miles from ZZZ at lower MP and RPM; fuel pressure went from 60-80 LBS/HR to 0 LBS/HR and the engine started running rough and was proceeding to quit and the aircraft started to descend; low boost pump was ineffective. Notified ATC of the issue. ATC notified me of landing locations and distances. I selected [a suitable airport] within gliding distance and a 90 degree turn to the runway from my current position at the time. ATC wanted to know if they should dispatch equipment I indicated unlikely as I had the field made. Started to diagnose the problem; when I depressed and held the high boost pump fuel pressure on the gauge started to rise and the engine began normal operation. I notified ATC of the situation and indicated I had enough power to complete the flight to ZZZ. ATC indicated they had not completed the process and would cancel. I continued the flight to ZZZ and held the high boost pump until the field was made.I went out to the field [the next day] and removed the aircraft cowl to investigate the problem as it did not appear to be or respond like the known T210 vapor lock issue. Upon inspection I discovered the bolt for the engine mixture control and cockpit mixture control mechanism missing and the mixture control lever in the down or in or near the idle cut off position. There is no spring or other mechanism to hold the mixture control mechanism in the up or full rich position. Aircraft and engine vibration causes the control arm to move to the lean or idle cut off position. Subsequently sought out a maintenance facility on the field to correct the discrepancy.

C210 pilot with a freshly rebuilt engine reported a reduction in fuel pressure approaching the destination. The low boost pump was engaged and appeared to mitigate the problem. During descent pressure began to drop again and high boost pressure was used to keep the engine running to landing. Post flight inspection revealed a bolt securing the mixture lever was missing allowing the mixture to move on its own to near idle cut off.


Beechcraft Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 21.6; Flight Crew Total 2213.5; Flight Crew Type 26.2

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

During climb out after second power reduction right engine lost power. During the immediate action drill on right engine left engine lost power. Regained power in left engine by full throttle and fuel booster pump on. Engine was surging. Same for right engine and for each fuel tank. With power reduction on final both engines lost power. Landed aircraft coasted to taxiway but initially could not get clear of runway. Was able to restart left engine and occasionally right engine with full throttle to get to ramp.

Reporter states that the aircraft had not been flown in a long time and that maintenance done on the fuel tanks in preparation for this flight had stirred up 50 years of contaminates that got into the carburetors.

Beech 45 pilot experiences power loss on both engines after takeoff; but is able to keep both engines running with full throttle until the field is made.


When Aircraft (AC) was ready to leave.  I was the push back operator.  Crew cleared me to push and wing walker gave me the all clear signal.  Commenced push.  During the push and after traveling ten feet.  Noticed a white 4x4 pickup moving at a fast speed on a path to pass behind the AC.  By the time I noticed this. The truck was already in my path of push.  I had to let off the gas immediately causing a jolt to the AC.  I then explained to the crew what had just happened.  When the truck cleared we recommenced the push.

During aircraft pushback; the tug operator noticed a pickup truck about to pass behind the aircraft and stopped the pushback.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance; Party2 Other

Human Factors; Procedure; Manuals; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft

I was in the forward avionics bay on a B777-200 aircraft and noticed a dried coffee stain in the right-hand (R/H) tunnel area. Apparently; there was a leak from the forward galley into the Lower-41 at one time. The B777 doesn't have any specific reference to address a spill into the lower lobe from the galley. Maintenance Manual (MM) 53-01-01-4 (which pertains to floor board removal and installation) clearly states the dangers of water penetration but there are no references I can find in the B777 Manuals that provide guidance how to handle this scenario.B767 MM 05-51-13 provides detail instructions on how to answer water penetration into the lower lobe. Hence; there is no individual interpretation on how to handle a galley spill on the B767 fleet. I believe the B777 [fleet] should have a similar galley spill reference written in the MM.

Reporter stated he was in the Right Forward Tunnel of their B777 checking on an expiring MEL deferral during a flight Turn-Around Check. He noticed a coffee stain on the catwalk (floorboards) of the Right Tunnel and determined the fluid had come from the Forward Galley above him. The stain did not indicate the fluid had migrated or traveled beyond the catwalk. There are electronic racks alongside the catwalk; wire harnesses and insulation under the catwalk.Reporter stated they threw water on the Forward Galley floor to see if any fluid would leak down into the Tunnel area. Although no leaks were noted; they did find old sealant with large cracks inside the trash compartment next to the galley carts along the trash compartment floor and sidewalls. Not uncommon for fluid; including coffee; in the trash compartment container to leak through the container onto the compartment floor and drip down into the Lower lobe area. The general feeling was that the trash compartment was the most likely source of the coffee stain. Mechanics re-applied PRC sealant around the trash compartment floor. Reporter stated they did perform an inspection in the Tunnel area prior to departure; similar to what is required for the B767 aircraft if fluid penetration is noted. But the lack of specific language in the B777 Maintenance Manual (M/M) regarding what to do 'after' fluid penetration into the Lower lobe tunnel area has occurred; is a concern. He has not heard from company Engineering about a revision to the B777 M/M addressing the missing procedures.

A Line Mechanic reports about the lack of any specific reference in the B777 Maintenance Manual (M/M) providing guidance on what to do 'after' fluid penetration into the forward Main Equipment Center (MEC) tunnel and lower lobe areas has occurred. Mechanic noted the B767 M/M does provide detailed instructions for similar galley spills.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; General Maintenance Action

While on 7-mile final for Runway 30L at MSP at 3000MSL/160 KIAS; the PITCH TRIM ASYM local alert and CCAS FLT CTL caution lights illuminated. The crew discontinued the approach and coordinated with ATC for extended vectors to run the appropriate checklists. Crew referenced QRC and QRH and accomplished PITCH TRIM ASYM and PITCH TRIM INOPERATIVE QRH checklists. Attempted one reset of popped POS IND circuit breaker unsuccessfully. Crew [requested priority] with ATC and flew an uneventful approach IAW (in accordance with) QRH guidance.Following debrief with Chief Pilot; it was relayed that the suggested course of action would have been to not attempt a reset of the trim indicator (POS IND) circuit breaker.Recommend emphasis in initial/recurrent training addressing circuit breaker guidance with respect to trim malfunctions.

While on a 7 mile final for Runway 30L at 3000 ft. msl and 160 KIAS; the PITCH TRIM ASYM local alert and CCAS FLT CTL caution lights illuminated. The crew discontinued the approach and coordinated for extended vectoring to run the appropriate checklists. Crew referenced QRC and QRH and accomplished PITCH TRIM FAIL and PITCH TRIM INOPERATIVE checklists. Attempted reset of popped POS IND circuit breaker unsuccessful. Crew [requested priority] with ATC and flew an uneventful approach IAW (in accordance with) QRH guidance landing.The pitch trim ASYM local alert and FLT CTL CCAS message occurred and autopilot disconnected.The pitch trim failed in clean configuration at 160 kts.A debrief from the Chief Pilot Included advice to not reset a circuit breaker for a flight control issue or a breaker in flight. After a debriefing by the Chief Pilot; I was reminded told of consequences of resetting a circuit breaker if not specifically addressed by the checklist. Recommend training addressing circuit breaker resetting during trim malfunctions

Flight Crew reported pitch trim system failure on final; requiring a go around.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Just prior to landing; a piece of metallic trim light cover fell from the overhead bins where they meet the fuselage nearly striking the passenger and BIA in [Seat Number]. A quick reaction by the passenger in [Seat Number] to hold up the trim prevented any injuries. Passengers in [Seat Number; Seat Number; and Seat Number] held the trim up during landing and taxi to the gate. Upon turning off the active runway; I notified the flight deck of the situation and we continued to the gate. I was unable to remove the trim fully as it was still attached on one end. Upon arrival to the gate; while holding the trim in place so the passengers could move out from under it; the trim detached fully from the ceiling. Red Coats met the plane and the First Officer escorted the passengers in [Seat Number and Seat Number] up the bridge to them. No injuries were apparent or reported by passengers. Metal wear of trim fasteners... (as discussed with Maintenance who met the aircraft).

Flight Attendant reported Overhead Bin Trim Piece on CRJ-200 fell down during flight; no injuries reported.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On a functional check flight for aircraft coming out of heavy maintenance. We had completed climb; high altitude; and descent functional checks and had entered holding at 16;000 feet to complete the low block checks. The first check was the alternate/secondary flap check. Flaps/slats operated normally during the alternate extension to 20 degrees. Once at 20 degrees; the alternate system is turned off; the center hydraulics is turned off and the normal flap handle is moved from 20 degrees to 30 degrees. The aircraft senses the loss of hydraulics and is supposed to drive the slats and flaps to the selected position. The slats drive first. The slats sense a skew or jam and did not drive out. This resulted in a SLATS DRIVE message. As pilot monitoring; I called out the failure and then positioned the flap handle to match the current flap position of 20 degrees. We [notified ATC] for the flight control failure and made a 20 flap landing with crash; fire; rescue standing by because of the increased airspeed for the landing. There had been noted corrosion issues with the slat rollers on our 787 fleet. The lubrication cycle has been halved in an effort to address the issues. We are still seeing corrosion with the rollers. Boeing as manufacturer and airline operators need to investigate possible replacement of slat rollers with materials that won't have the corrosion issue.

B787-800 Captain reported a slat drive malfunction during a functional check flight. Captain also noted there appears to be a corrosion issue with the slat rollers on 787 aircraft.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft X was level at FL350 and was flashing to ZLA 32 the sector the aircraft was going to be entering; ZLA32 called me and gave the control instruction; 'Aircraft X descend and maintain FL330.'  My response of 'Roger; Wilco; show it.'  I then gave the control instruction to the aircraft. The problem comes then with the fact that the aircraft was entering ZLA33's airspace with the descent clearance and ZLA32 had the hand-off; they had to show the new altitude because of the problem with the fact that ZLA does not share the idea of taking hand-offs back and entering new information rather they feel the needs to OK information into all sorts of data blocks.  The aircraft was never handed off to ZLA33 and I shipped the aircraft to the sector that it would be entering.ZLA should conform with the rest of the centers in the FAA and understand that their idea of ok functions are not needed to keep safety.  These so-called controllers in ZLA are horribly inefficient and obviously unsafe because they have all these extra procedures in place because of having so many deals; both with airspace and aircraft. There should also be directive in the .65 about who is responsible for progressing hand offs in cases like these. I am under the idea that because the ZLA controller issued the control instruction they are responsible for the progression of the hand off as well as all coordination.

ZLC Controller reports of an altitude change that he is not able to modify on the radar screen because another ATC Center has control of the aircraft.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft X; ZZZ-ZZZ1; on decent into ZZZ1 at about 7;000 feet the gear warning audio went off 'landing gear-landing gear-landing gear' in a very loud tone in both headset and speaker. A quick troubleshooting of the system showed #2 radar altimeter 0 feet to -5 feet and #1 normal for 7;000 feet (hidden) no CAS message or other evidence of a fault. Left us with no direction for check list. We tried selecting the gear override switch but that was of no help silencing the audio. In my 35 years at this airline I have experienced many in flight emergencies including 5 engine failures however never in all those experiences has it been so hard to concentrate on dealing with the problem with the continued very loud 'landing gear-landing gear' over and over with no way to turn it off. It was also very evident to the forward flight attendant and most likely front half of the aircraft passengers. When we have a fire we get multiple warnings but we can silence the audio warning wile we work the problem. The other part that bothers me from a safety standpoint is we have two radar altimeter systems #1 and #2 if both are in agreement that's one thing but in this case only one was faulty. We should not get to this level of alarm during a disagreement or miss-comparison. I propose that we find a solution or fix so in the future crews can have an option in some way to silence this type of warning after they have acknowledged the problem. In our case we lowered the gear to silence the warning; this might not always be the best course of action.

Captain reported extending the landing gear to silence a continuous Landing Gear aural warning.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 103; Flight Crew Total 5400; Flight Crew Type 1700

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I would like to preface the event with what I believe to be a chain of events and distractions that led to the improper input and subsequent flying of the incorrect SID for the departure from Charleston; SC. (KCHS). The flying pilot is new to the airplane and needed to get left seat time so the first two of three legs were to be flown by him. Our plan was to arrive one hour before our departure from KCHS with eight passengers. No fueling would be required. We left earlier to arrive at KCHS thirty minutes earlier than planned.  Weather at destination was IMC as forecasted but still good enough for an approach. While enroute; weather became low IFR which was not in the forecast. During the approach briefing; we discussed the weather at our alternate; ZZZ; which was quickly deteriorating as it was VFR during our enroute phase of flight. Our briefing included the approach; missed approach procedures per the approach plate and the review the aircraft missed approach procedures as a review to the new pilot. ZZZ weather became IFR as we were being vectored for our ILS 33 approach into KCHS. We attempted an ILS approach to runway 33 followed by a missed approach. We then proceeded via radar vectors to our alternate; ZZZ; to fly the ILS approach to runway 09. I called our scheduler via SAT Phone and advised to contact the passengers for them to prepare to drive to ZZZ for pick up. I said I would call back if anything changed. Flight time from KCHS to ZZZ was roughly 8 minutes. We attempted the ILS approach but the weather quickly diminished and we were not able to 'break out' at minimums. A missed approach was carried out followed by our request to hold via radar vectors in order to wait for the weather to improve and discuss alternatives. We had originally planned for no fuel uplift at KCHS so we were fueled to continue to our next destination plus alternate airport contingencies. During our holding; we had four hours fuel remaining. We were told by ATC that they were just informed by Weather Service that the weather would not improve for at least another hour. I called our scheduler back to advise the passengers to stay in KCHS until further notice. During our holding; we overheard a King Air attempt an ILS approach into runway 33 followed by a missed approach. He was notified the RVR improved for runway 15 and he requested vectors for ILS 15. The King Air landed and reported 'breaking out' at minimums. Upon hearing of the King Air's success; we loaded and briefed the ILS 15 approach and then requested vectors for ILS 15. The approach was successful as we also saw the runway at minimums followed by a successful landing. The taxi to parking was low visibility. Upon parking; the time was now our original planned departure time. I notified our scheduler we had arrived. All eight passengers were waiting in the lobby and we now had an unscheduled fuel uplift for our next leg. I asked the flying pilot; since it was his next leg as well; if he was ok the prepare the cockpit and oversee fueling while I went inside to attend to passengers; bags and pay for services. He agreed. After my business in the FBO was complete and the fuel truck safely away; I brought the passengers to the plane and loaded their bags with some assistance of the flying pilot. I will note that during cockpit preparations for the next leg; the flying pilot informed me he left the flight deck during that preparation to assist the fueler. Before engine start; I noticed the V-speed were not posted on the PFDs. I verified on the FMS 1 Perf Page that the correct information was entered and it was. I reentered runway 15 and corresponding data for a runway 15 departure but the V-speeds still did not post. I then checked the MFD drop down menu and saw the Takeoff Speed setup was in MANUAL instead of AUTO. Once switched to AUTO; the V-speeds posted. I will also note that in my runway selection in the FMS; I did see the Allendale (ALD) transition so it was my understandingthe PLFMD1 SID was loaded. I was not briefed by the flying pilot but it was stated we were cleared 'as filed.' After engine start and taxi request; we were assigned runway 22 instead of 15 as per the ATIS. I then had to re-enter Perf Data for the new runway. During my entries; no SID entries were made or changed; only runway. Visibility had improved considerably for our short taxi from the FBO to runway 22 [21]. Taxi time was around three to five minutes. We accomplished the required checklists and briefings and the SID was discussed briefly regarding fix and altitude requirements and I verified that 4;000 was set in the Alt Sel Window for the Flight Director. I did not reference the FMS as I was looking at the SID plate and then referencing the checklist. We were cleared for takeoff after maybe two minutes of hold short. Tower said 'clear for takeoff; fly the PLFMD departure.' I acknowledged with a read back and we departed. It should also be noted that both RNAV SIDS begin with 'PL' which can add confusion. (These SIDS are pronounced 'PLUS MUD' and 'PLUS TO.') At the pre-determined altitude; the aircraft began its turn but went left instead of right. We were then handed off to departure control and I checked on.  The flying pilot may have entered the wrong departure frequency in the standby radio which we use as reminder/reference. I received no answer. Something did not look right to me at this second. I looked at the SID plate and noticed the frequency was different. I immediately realized the wrong SID was loaded in the FMS. As I stated before; I saw the ALD transition loaded in the FMS back on the ramp. I did not question it as it was our exit point from the SID. I quickly called ATC on the correct frequency. They soon realized as well and advised us that we were on the Northbound SID instead of the Westbound SID. I acknowledged and advised I was ready to copy a re-route. We received a couple of vectors and a frequency change then cleared direct ALD. There were no traffic conflicts. Both ATC and crew were very professional and orderly in their actions in quickly correcting course flown. The day in question; the tower said 'cleared for takeoff. Fly the Plus Mud Departure.' When we departed again from KCHS [on a later flight] with the same clearance; we were simply 'cleared for takeoff.' There does not seem to be a standard. It is my belief from the lengthy description above; that the high workload from the morning's flight environment with three approach attempts; pressures of departing on time for executives whom have never flown with our company before; the unscheduled fuel uplift; the distractions that affected the flying pilot in the initial cockpit setup during fueling procedures; PFD/MFD functionality issues concerning V-speed postings; the last second runway change followed by a short taxi; contributed to the incorrect departure SID entry and failure to correctly identify the incorrect entry. Even when all SOPS and checklists are followed; it is still entirely possible to make a mistake especially during a high workload environment. This event has been discussed by myself and the flying pilot over and over to try and understand the sequence of events that may have led to this omission. It has also been discussed with our Chief Pilot as well. We all agree that due to the high workload and pressures that morning that the proper thing to do is to slow procedures down and take your time. Re-check the details and look things over one more time. I do believe this type of event is common and flight departments; no matter the size and type of aircraft flown; need to discuss and review events like these to prevent the same pitfalls from happening to their crews as pressures mount during unplanned flight operations. This event has been discussed with the crew and Chief Pilot. Corrective action was administered in the form of event review and suggested future recommendations should such high workload flight occur again.

A CE560 Captain describes the events leading up to the wrong RNAV departure being loaded into the FMC by the flying First Officer prior to departure from CHS. The PLMTO ONE was loaded instead of the PLFMD ONE.


ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

On the Janny 5 arrival into BUR on radar vectors off of wabbit. ATC vectored us to cross over the hills/mountains at 5;000 ft. The aircraft gave an aural 'terrain pull up' message and then promptly went away. I saw the RA come down to 1400 ft. which would have caused the warning as the aircraft was in a clean configuration. We were in VMC conditions.Crossing the peaks of the hills/mountains on radar vectors in the clean configuration at 5;000 ft. caused the warning.Maybe the MVA needs to be raised in that location to prevent RA's from occurring. We need 2;000 ft. separation from terrain in mountainous areas and the RA will set off the terrain warning in a clean configuration when less than 1;500 ft. above the ground.

Air carrier Captain reported receiving a GPWS terrain warning on descent into BUR; and recommended ATC use a higher altitude for arrivals over terrain.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

During pre-flight of Flight ABCD ZZZ-ZZZ1; Flight Attendant informed the Captain that the sink was empty of water and a note had been left in the lavatory informing of the issue. Noting that potable water is not available at the outstation; the Captain made the decision to depart as scheduled to meet on time arrival at ZZZ1. Upon arrival at ZZZ1; crew noted that ground operations did re-fill [the] potable water tank. Crew was unaware that the lavatory sink itself was inoperative.

Flight Attendant notified me of a note in the lavatory stating that there was no water in the lavatory sink. The Flight Attendant said she could not get any water to dispense from the sink. I made an assumption that the reservoir was empty; and that was the reason why it was not working. I made the decision to continue with the flight knowing that ZZZ did not have the capability to refill the reservoir. Thinking we could have it filled in ZZZ1. I was notified later in the day that the sink in that aircraft was inoperative and it had caused a delay on the aircraft's next flight. [I] was given a call and counseled about having potable water in the aircraft lavatories due to COVID-19. I regret the decision that I made as Captain. I just wanted to get the passengers to their final destination. I should have complied with Standard Operating Procedures.

Air carrier flight crew reported they departed with an inoperative lavatory sink.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 173; Flight Crew Type 11000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 237; Flight Crew Type 7500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Just as we were completing the pushback with brakes set; my First Officer was completing the start of #1 engine. As I was clearing the Ground Crew off the headset; I noticed the flashing of the #1 Engine Start Valve Open light. Just as I called for the Start Valve Open QRH Checklist; I then noticed that the Master Caution light had come on. After a brief scan; I saw that the Engine #1 Overheat light was on. Just as I was starting to recite the immediate action items for the overheat; the #1 Engine Fire Warning light and bell came on. We shut down the engine using the immediate action items in the QRH Engine Fire Checklist. We had to discharge both bottles to get the fire warning to cease. We ran the checklist and I called the Flight Attendants to have them visually check the engine from the cabin to see if there was smoke or anything unusual. Nothing was observed. While I was communicating with Flight Attendants; my First Officer requested CFR via Ground Control to assist us in verification that in fact there was no fire and that it would be safe to proceed to gate. Prior to CFR arriving on scene; a Company Ramp worker gave us the thumbs up meaning that there appeared to be no fire present and just a moment later an Airport Operations person also gave us a thumbs up. Shortly thereafter; the CFR Crew arrived and inspected us and used a thermal imaging device to verify that there was no abnormally high temperatures present. After we received the all clear; we proceeded under our own power via engine #2 to gate. As we were getting inspected; we sent an ACARS message to Dispatch and made an announcement to the Customers that we would be returning to the gate shortly. After parking at the gate; I called Dispatch and debriefed both Dispatch and Maintenance Control. I then logged the discrepancy into the aircraft logbook and spoke directly to the Contract Mechanic who came to the aircraft. I also debriefed Chief Pilots on Call. Irregularity Report was filed after the incident.I don't believe you can ever prevent an incident such as this; but you can try to prepare yourself mentally for the unexpected. Quite honestly; I never thought I would see an engine fire on a start like this and there was a moment of thinking is this really happening; especially since all of the annunciations and warnings came very rapidly at a time when there is distraction with the pushback and associated communications. I was thankful the fire warning ceased as the consideration to evacuate would have been essential if we had an actual fire that would not go out. Good crew communication and coordination in a situation like this is paramount; and I am grateful Company embraces this philosophy in our training programs. I have played this scenario over and over again in my mind to ensure that I can learn from this event so that I can improve my communication and leadership skills as a Pilot with our great Company.

B737-700 flight crew reported engine fire indications during pushback shortly after they started the engine. The crew fired both bottles and returned to the gate after fire was verified out.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Normal takeoff from Runway 22R in KEWR.  International flight.  After gear lever was positioned up; we got an EICAS message Gear Disagree and Gear Doors.  We completed checklists for both but could not get the EICAS messages to go away.  Coordinated with Chicago Dispatch and New York TRACON while attempting to solve problem.  We then [requested priority] with New York Approach Control and returned to Newark Airport.

Everything about flight was normal and SOP (except that Ctr ADP Auto position was deferred) until gear retraction. Gear was placed in 'Up' position and after about 30 seconds we get EICAS messages GEAR Doors and Landing Gear Disagree. At first; I thought the issue was related to the Ctr ADP (ADP switch was in ON position) and that gear was just slow to retract. Gear synoptic showed nose and right gear to be UP and left gear was in transit. When it became apparent that there was some other issue; I instructed the FO to maintain 230kts in clean configurations while continuing to climb. We could definitely feel that there was something in the slipstream. As this was happening the two International Relief Officer were reviewing both QRH procedures for the malfunction. There was discussion as to what we thought was happening and our options. The QRH procedures didn't really lend themselves to troubleshooting; but mentioned max airspeed with gear down. We did slow to 180kts in attempt to get gear up and doors closed per QRH. SATCOM call with Dispatch and Maintenance lead us to try and cycle the gear. Gear handle was put in down position and a DOWN indication was received; but GEAR DOORS message was still there. After consultation with Maintenance; Chief Pilot; and crew; it was unanimously decided to not raise the gear for fear of not getting another DOWN indication. [Priority was requested] and uneventful landing was   accomplished.

B767 flight crew reported EICAS gear anomalies on departure resulted in a return to airport.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Fatigue

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

We pushed back from the gate; requested taxi and were told 'taxi to Runway 8R via ramp.' No taxiways were assigned. I completed the engine start and immediately went into the taxi and before takeoff checklist/flows. The Captain taxied out and crossed what he thought was the approach holding line for 8R not realizing that doing so took him onto the extended threshold of 8R. After I finished the checklist and flows I noticed we were on a threshold and questioned him. He said no this is the approach area and the runway starts ahead. At exactly that time the Tower called and advised we had taxied past the hold short area but that it was no problem and that we were cleared for takeoff. Nothing further was said by the controller about the occurrence. The flight continued with no other issues.We were both tired from early wake up calls on the last leg of day four. This was a VERY short taxi from gate to runway and I was preoccupied running all the needed flows and checklists to get plane ready for takeoff. 90 percent of that time my head was down or occupied on flows. It is also a VERY confusing area transitioning from the ramp to the runway. [There are] very confusing markings in that area.Due to very short taxi and knowing this is a confusing area on the ramp we should have completed checklists/flows as much as possible prior to commencing taxi so that both sets of eyes could be focused on the taxi.

While the First Officer was occupied by checklists during a very short taxi to Runway 8R at ELP the Captain taxied across the runway hold short line without a clearance. No conflicts resulted and the Tower cleared them for takeoff. The First Officer reported fatigue as a contributing factor.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Physiological - Other; Time Pressure; Distraction

Flight Attendant Airline Total 28; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 10; Flight Attendant Total 28; Flight Attendant Type 50

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

During takeoff I noticed an acrid/dirty sock smell; I mentioned to the captain as we began to rotate. During initial climb the fume began to get worse. Somewhere around 1000 feet I put my oxygen mask on and that is where I noticed a blue/gray fume/smoke coming from the vent above my oxygen mask case. Captain declared PAN PAN PAN and I took over communications as he began the QRH procedures. We landed back in [departure airport] and proceeded to the gate. Once passengers were off the aircraft I noticed I was not feeling well nor were the other crew members. EMT services were requested and the Captain and I were transported to the local hospital.

Just after take-off a strong; burning odor was very strong in the aft part of the aircraft. Within minutes; the CA (Captain) called and informed that we were returning to airport with a precautionary landing.On taxi-in; two F/A's (Flight Attendants) in the AFT had strong headaches immediately. FO (First Officer) and FWD FA were nauseous. FO was flushed; vomited and almost passed out. He was taken to the ER by paramedics. All 3 FA's were transported by Company to ER.

A319 pilot and flight attendant reported strong; incapacitating fumes in the cockpit and cabin immediately after takeoff; necessitating an immediate return to the departure airport.