Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Procedure; Manuals; Human Factors

Customer brought aircraft to me with a complaint of high oil consumption. I performed a Differential Cylinder Compression Test with all cylinders reading in the 70's. The only problem I could find was oil on the bottom plugs in the Number 1 and Number 2 cylinders. At the owner's request; I removed the Number 1 and Number 2 cylinders and delivered them to Engine Shop X; an [FAR] 145 Engine Repair Station in ZZZ1. Shop X repaired the cylinders in question knowing the model of the engine and the model cylinders they where repairing. They delivered them to me with yellow [Serviceability] tags and I re-installed them in the original Number 1 and Number 2 position. This was in October 2012. After (4) to (8) hours of operation; the cylinders were still using oil so the owner of the airplane; who is also an Airframe/Powerplant (A/P) Mechanic; removed them to verify I had the rings installed correctly. The engine was near Time Between Overhaul (TBO) so the owner had been looking at options of a complete overhaul or just a top overhaul so he had the cylinder part numbers fresh in his mind. While we where discussing the situation over the phone in November 2012; he noticed the part numbers on the yellow tags supplied by Engine Shop X; did not match the part numbers for the engine in the Parts Manual. In researching the logbooks; we learned another A/P had installed LW-11633 cylinders on the engine almost 24-years ago. This cylinder is used on the later series engines but not approved for the 0-235-C2C. I had no reason to suspect the cylinders I removed from the engine were the wrong cylinders for the engine. The Engine Shop did not catch the problem when they repaired the cylinders and I again had no reason to suspect a problem. I re-installed the cylinders on the engine and signed the engine off as eligible for return to service. The solution to this would be to suspect part numbers of anything removed from an airplane.

Reporter stated the cylinders that were installed 24-years earlier were chrome cylinders (hardened inner cylinder walls) that were not approved for the engine he worked. Difficulties with chrome cylinders not 'Wearing in' on engines using steel piston rings was also a problem.Reporter stated that the Lycoming Manual uses a series of Parts Numbers (P/N) that were superseded by newer P/Ns that changed over time; creating difficulty tracking the correct part numbers. He had contacted a local Federal Agency about what he found; only to find out that now he is under investigation for apparently improper maintenance.

A Repair Shop Mechanic describes the events that led to the discovery that unapproved chrome cylinders had been installed on a Grumman AA1 aircraft's Lycoming 0-235-C2C engine; approximately 24 years earlier.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 7000

I was the pilot not flying and the First Officer was the pilot flying. He was hand flying the airplane when we were vectored by ATC to a heading over the terrain north of the MMPR airport to descend in visual conditions for the visual approach to Runway 22. There was a brief discussion on the altitude to be set in the altitude window but I eventually set the final approach fix altitude (roughly 2;000 FT) as the First Officer stated to me he would watch his descent over the terrain. While crossing the terrain in day VMC conditions; as the terrain was in sight the entire time and the First Officer continued a shallow descent over the terrain; the EGPWS warning of 'Terrain; Terrain; Pull Up; Pull Up' was triggered. The First Officer took corrective action; arrested the descent and after the EGPWS warning subsided; we proceeded to turn onto final; completed the VFR approach and landed uneventfully. The First Officer and I had both flown into MMPR many times and were familiar with the airport surroundings and the terrain.

A320 Captain reported receiving an EGPWS 'Terrain' warning on visual approach to MMPR Runway 22.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 216; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 5500

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Cleared for takeoff on RWY 28R at SFO; we could see and hear a helicopter hovering at approximately 150 feet on the northwest corner of the intersection of the runways; although the Tower did not notify us of the traffic. The helicopter was questioning the Tower about where he should go - although I'm a bit unclear on the questions.  We were busy with a takeoff at the time. With the acceleration of the plane and the changing point of view it is difficult to tell; but after consideration I believe the helicopter was drifting south towards our runway. After takeoff; as best we can tell; we passed within about 500 feet laterally and 200 feet vertically from the helicopter. I do not know the standards for a near mid-air in this portion of the flight and airspace; and the Tower did not mention anything. However; I have flagged this as a near mid-air on the report due to my discomfort with the event. I do not want this to happen again; it was too close for my comfort.

B737 Captain reports a possible NMAC with a helicopter during takeoff from runway 28R at SFO. The helicopter was north of Runway 28R hovering; and apparently drifting south.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

On descent into ZZZ at approximately 21;000 while in moderate icing conditions (wing and cowls on); we received a Wing Anti-Ice Duct warning message. We ran the QRH which instructs to leave icing conditions. We contacted [ATC] and said we need a lower altitude to leave icing conditions. [After coordinating with ATC; we] received a descent to 11;000. At approximately 17;000; icing conditions were cleared. We elected to divert due to ZZZ1 entering indefinite holds. We landed without further incident.

CRJ-900 Captain reported receiving a Wing Anti-Ice Duct warning before descending out of icing conditions.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

MEL; Human Factors; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy

On [date] I went out on a last minute gate call with several technicians about a panel missing on the left wing. The number 2 slat inboard slat tab cover was missing. I don't remember if I found CDL (Configuration Deviation List) card number [XXXXXX] or Maintenance Control directed us to the card. I made an entry into ELB (Electronic Log Book) stating the location of the missing tab. The chart on the CDL card [XXXXXX] lists 12 tabs in a table with a different CDL number for each tab under a heading of deferred position. The number 2 slat inboard tab would be position 4. That is why I applied or was directed by [Maintenance Control] to apply CDL XXXX. I don't remember if I or [Maintenance Control] came up with the CDL number. I see now that there is a note on the CDL card stating deferred position above refers to the quantity of the slat skin tabs missing; not the slat number. I don't see why the chart on the CDL card says deferred position and not something like number of tabs missing. This card has been revised during the last MEL (Minimum Equipment List) update and I don't know if this was current CDL card was the one I was using or the previous version. I would like to know when it was revised; when it was downloaded to the Ipads and what were the changes made to it. Unfortunately I don't remember many of the details of this gate call. Recommend changing the CDL card chart from deferred position to number of tabs missing.

Aircraft Technician was confused by 737 Configuration Deviation List (CDL) table for Slat Tab Covers.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 102; Flight Crew Total 23000; Flight Crew Type 1800

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 1600; Flight Crew Type 425

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

At 35 minutes into flight at cruise; fuel IMBAL light on right main tank illuminated. Verified cross feed valve was closed and main fuel pumps were on. Center tank fuel was 0.00. Started fuel leak- engine checklist in QRH. Suspected fuel leak and requested diversion to ZZZ which was nearest suitable airport. [Advised ATC] minimum fuel. Landed and contacted Maintenance Control. Maintenance determined cross feed valve malfunctioning. Aircraft was grounded.As an addition Contract Maintenance was instructed to stick the tanks which confirmed that there was a fuel imbalance but there were no other tests done as far as finding a leak or checking the fuel system. Maintenance stated to me that there was nothing else to test and they thought everything was fine and to take the plane to destination. I insisted on more investigation which revealed that the cross feed valve was allowing fuel to be transferred from the right tank to the left tank with the cross feed valve in the closed position. During this lengthy process the gate agents were pressing me to board the aircraft for departure. I stated that we were not finished with the testing and to hold off until I advise her. We came to find out that our Maintenance personnel were making comments to the Contract Mechanic that 'the pilots don't want to fly today' and 'they wanted to come here'. Comments like that are very unprofessional and are not conducive to a safe operation. Contract Maintenance confirmed that the cross feed valve was not functioning correctly and informed Maintenance Control.

During cruise at flight level 380 (filed for 340; but climbed for turbulence avoidance); approximately 35-40 minutes into the flight; the right fuel quantity indicator amber alert imbalance annunciated. We immediately checked that the crossfeed and center tank pumps were off; the main tank pumps were on and looked back at the gauges. We noticed that the right fuel quantity was decreasing by the tens by the second and that the left indicator seemed normal. The FF for both sides appeared normal as did the fuel burn/usage and totalizer quantity per the flight plan. We determined that we should pull out the QRH suspecting a possible Fuel Leak. Coincidentally; we got a vector to the north of course; assessed our position via STA and ARPT on the ND and saw that we were 60+ miles south of ZZZ.We entered the Suspected Fuel Leak Checklist at 120.3. It starts with a condition paragraph and points to the additional information on 120.5. We went to bullet items and list on 120.5 to help ascertain the suspicion of a fuel leak or not. One of the items is an amber alert annunciated for an imbalance. We went back to step one and knowing that it was an abnormal indication and proceeded to discuss options and procedures. The Captain informed the flight attendants of the situation and asked for a visual to check for spray or leak at the engine or off/under the wing on the right side. The flight attendants informed us that they and an off duty pilot looked and everything appeared normal. Step one stated that a diversion might be needed. We were vectored back to the west and direct on our filed course as we continued with the checklist agreeing that if we decided to divert; we would ask for vectors back to the north for ZZZ as our first option.We reviewed Steps 2; 3 and 4 and confirmed that they had already been done in the initial assessment upon first noticing the imbalance alert light. At step 5; we took a time hack at 43 minutes into the flight; and the Captain wrote down the quantities of the left and right indicators. We monitored and noticed that the right indicator was still decreasing by the tens by the seconds. The left indicator appeared normal as did the fuel flows. In fact; the right FF and the right fuel usage were both slightly less than the left. Three minutes later the imbalance had changed by an additional 100 pounds and at the next check it had an increased fuel balance of 200 pounds since our initial time hack 5 minutes earlier. So now it was at 1200+ pounds of imbalance; outside of the limitations and changing rapidly. We could not determine where the fuel was going and everything indicated a fuel leak and we continued the checklist. The checklist stated that if there was an imbalance of 500 pounds or more in 30 minutes or less; then a fuel leak is confirmed.We continued the checklist while also requesting a divert and minimum fuel with ATC for priority handling and descent into ZZZ. We got vectors for a descent and to the north. The confirmation step flows us to Step 11 which is to continue the steps to shutdown the engine. After discussion of the options and the continuing imbalance; we [advised] ATC. With the increased descent rate and the thrust at idle; we continued to monitor the indicators as we paused to assess whether we really wanted to shutdown the engine or not. We still had plenty of fuel for a landing and we just wanted to get the plane safely on the deck ASAP. While monitoring the indicators; the imbalance seemed to stabilize and not continue to decrease. We determined to hold off on the remaining steps and not shut down the engine and focus on the normal checklists in preparation for landing.The Captain continued communication with the flight attendants and updated them on our divert and that we were electing not to shutdown the engine and continuing for a normal landing. He then made a PA announcement to the passengers and we continued normal checklists for approach and landing. I ran the checklists; changed destination in the FMC; changed the pressurization panel appropriate for ZZZ and confirmed that men and emergency equipment were still standing by at the airport for our approach and landing.The Captain had begun to type a message to dispatch via ACARS and decided that timing would not allow it and we would just continue to landing. I kept the QRH at the ready; ensured normal checklists and procedures were complete and that we had the ILS in the box with an extended centerline as a back up to the vectors to the visual approach.We landed; taxied off the active runway and had the emergency response crew look at our #2 engine and wing to ascertain if they could see a leak. They reported all normal and we then shutdown #2 and taxied to the gate single engine. Once parked and checklists complete; deplaning of the passengers had begun and airport emergency ground personnel met us on the jetway and wanted to confirm that we had [advised] ATC and confirm our reported SOB and FOB.The Captain then began the communication phase using his phone to call the Duty Manager; Dispatch; and Maintenance Control. He filled out the logbook and then we began the long wait while Contract Maintenance and Maintenance Control determined the best course of action.I am filing this not because I think we committed any errors; but because the scenario is interesting and can be learned from. The Captain did an awesome job taking command and control and using his emergency authority. He was directive and receptive and really fostered a team atmosphere while keeping the safety of the passengers and crew number 1 and wanting to get the aircraft on the deck ASAP after we ascertained a definite emergency and suspected fuel leak as dictated by the checklists and manuals.

B737 flight crew reports diverting for a possible fuel leak and a fuel imbalance.


Bell Helicopter Textron Undifferentiated or Other Model

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Manuals

This report is being written for my performing an Airworthiness Check in the morning around XA:00 AM and the FAA finding the discrepancy after the outside portion of the Ramp Inspection and walking around and looking through the aircraft; FAA Inspector X looked at the pitot tube. Inspector X stated that he thought the leading edge [of the pitot] looked 'disfigured slightly'. The other FAA Inspector; Inspector Y; said he thought it was just the lighting outside that made it look 'disfigured'. But on closer inspection we all confirmed that the leading edge [of the pitot tube] at roughly the 10 o'clock position; was very slightly flattened. Inspector Y asked Pilot X if he was getting any odd readings on the Airspeed Indicator (AI) and he replied 'No; everything was operating normally'. They [FAA] stated that; they are looking at pitot tubes more closely these days due to the problems that they are seeing in the pitot tubes on the EC-135s [helicopters] in the Northwest. Upon completion of inspecting the aircraft we returned to the [Maintenance Line] shed to continue the logbook and facility inspection. While looking through an older logbook for an Airworthiness Directive (AD) signoff; Pilot X entered the shed and expressed [that] he received a flight request and will need the logbook. Pilot X asked if; 'everything was all good with the aircraft' and we said 'yes'. After Pilot X stepped out the door and made his way to the aircraft the FAA inspectors strongly expressed to me that I should really check the tolerances to the pitot tube disfigurement. Inspector Y mentioned that we all know about the disfigurement now and in the event it is out of tolerances we could all be in trouble if you guys take a flight. I asked for some guidance from Inspector Y if he knew something that I didn't know and he replied that he can't tell me that the aircraft should not fly; although he emphasized again that I verify the tolerances. After this brief conversation with Inspector Y; I expressed to Pilot X that I needed to verify the tolerances before the aircraft should be flown. Upon making a logbook entry and researching the pitot damage and determined that there wasn't any limitations listed for damage on the pitot tube; the aircraft was grounded. The Maintenance Manual states the Bell BHT-407 MM; Chapter 95; Paragraph 22; Pitot-Static System Inspection: 1). Examine all of the lines and unions for correct tightness (Figure 95-4). 2). Visually examine all of the pitot-static tube assemblies that they are correctly attached and that there is no sign of chaffing; wear; or other damage. 3. Visually examine the pitot tube (1) each and the left and right static ports (2) each. Make sure that there is no obstruction or damage. Then; a pitot tube was immediately ordered and the FAA carried on with the inspection. Upon completion of the pitot tube replacement; Inspector X requested to be contacted. [Recommend] replacing all pitot tubes that have ANY damage.

Reporter stated he works for an air medevac Operator. There is only one pitot tube on the BHT-407 helicopter. Pitot heat is available. The Bell Maintenance Manual (M/M) Chapter 95 only says to 'observe for damage' to the pitot tube. Currently no limitations exist in the Bell-407 Manual requiring pitot tube replacement and he doesn't know if Bell Helicopter engineers will issue an Maintenance Manual revision in the future to include allowable damage specifications.Reporter stated that since no previous issues with Airspeed Indication (AI) had been reported by the flight crews; he hesitated replacing the pitot tube. But; without any damage specification to make a decision and the weekend approaching and short time for Bell engineers to respond; they decided to ground the aircraft and just replace the pitot tube. There have been discussions about acquiring a 'Go-No-Go' gage (tool) that can be inserted into the pitot tube inlet opening to quickly determine if a pitot tube inlet deformation is acceptable or not. The FAA inspectors noted that erosion of the leading edge opening of pitot tubes appear to be more of an issue on Eurocopter EC-135s helicopters than on Bell helicopters.

A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) explains why the single pitot tube on a Bell BHT-407 helicopter was replaced after two FAA inspectors raised concerns about a deformation noted at the pitot tube's leading edge inlet opening.


Human-Machine Interface; Other / Unknown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Ground Personnel; Person Maintenance

I received 3 pick slips from my coworker; with 3 parts left on a table. He told me that these parts needed to be sent to ZZZ. I proceeded to look at the pick slips for any kind of Hazmat tag; and none of them had Hazmat written on the pick slip. I packed the 3 parts into a box; created an [order] and left the box for the next shift because the flight was later that day. I covered this in my turn over and told my coworker to send the box to ZZZ on [flight]. One of those pick-slipped parts that I placed in the box was a portable fire extinguisher; a HAZMAT component. I know we need to be careful with all parts we send to avoid sending hazmat on an airplane. But for me; what I think we should be careful too with the information on pick slips we get from other bases. Normally; Hazmat pick slips have in the remark: 'HAZMAT;' so we are reminded that it can't be sent as COMAT (Company Material). And this pick slip only had a remark saying 'This is needed for tonight;' and that's why I thought this was a regular part. Another thing we need to be careful of is where we get the part from. We have a special section for Hazmat parts in the stockroom; but this time the part was handed to me outside of that section. I packed the part in the box without looking for where the part came from.

Maintenance technician reported that an incorrectly labeled package resulted in a Hazmat shipping violation.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 33; Flight Crew Total 240; Flight Crew Type 70

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was approaching Runway XX; entering in a standard left pattern. On final after touchdown; I got a strong crosswind from the right side; blowing me to the left portion of the runway. When I tried to correct the heading of the airplane to line up with the centerline I heard and realized that I hit a runway edge light and it bent. In my personal view I have to practice more crosswind landings; in specific with gusty winds in open airports.

C152 pilot reported a loss of control during landing in gusty conditions that resulted in contacting a runway edge light.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Weather

Weather was 1;000 feet OVC. So we shot the RNAV Runway 18 approach. We crossed the FAF at 3;500 feet MSL and initiated descent to MDA; at approximately 1;000 feet AGL we received a 'terrain- pull up' GPWS warning. We initiated terrain avoidance procedure but as we were about to change configuration. We broke out to VMC conditions and continued the landing with terrain insight.In retrospect; French Valley is surrounded by high terrain and ATC does not have radar below 3;000 feet MSL. You are it. We did not go below MDA and vertical guidance was not available until we became visual.. Without the GPWS you would have little warning that terrain was near. GPWS should be mandatory for this approach..

If our GPWS warning was not spurious; due the lack of ATC radar coverage; for enhanced safety; I would suggest not conducting this approach in IMC past DISEY and below 2;600 feet without an operable GPWS.

While flying the RNAV GPS 18 Approach to F70 a medium sized turbo jet crew reported an EGPWS 'TERRAIN; PULL-UP' on profile at about 2;400 feet; past DISEY; with an 800 feet overcast. Terrain reference was obtained as the terrain avoidance maneuver was initiated so the flight continued to land.


Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 8400; Flight Crew Type 2000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

[Enroute] everything was normal; we had portable oxygen system which was engaged. I climbed to 17;000 feet and then climbed to 25;000 feet. I observed the passenger leaning forward as the oxygen line was not long enough to reach the rear seat. I moved the oxygen bottle from between the pilot and co-pilot seat. I assume my oxygen line kinked and the passenger's was working well. I subsequently lost consciousness and the passenger moved to the co-pilot seat.With help from Air Traffic Controllers the plane was brought back down to a lower altitude; I recovered and I landed at the nearest airport where emergency personnel checked both our vitals and oxygen and all was normal.

C210 pilot reported losing consciousness at FL250 after his oxygen hose became kinked.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 2360; Flight Crew Type 300

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; MEL; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

We have an old PFD/MFD system made by a brand named Chelton. We have had numerous minor failures or malfunctions with this system; mainly related to GPS navigation. Some of the other pilots at my base along with myself have brought this system up as a safety concern in the past to others in our company. Repairs have been attempted at least once; but these problems with the Cheltons persist. However; this flight was the first time I had seen the Attitude Indicator fail on the system.There is no analog standby Attitude Indicator in our aircraft. Rather; the standby Attitude Indicator is displayed on the MFD screen directly below the PFD. This standby AI (Attitude Indicator) is displayed on the MFD by simply pressing a knob on the lower right-hand corner of that display. This standby Attitude Indicator was still functioning normally when the Primary one failed.For part of our patient-loaded leg from ZZZ to ZZZ1; the AI on the PFD gave erroneous readings; showing the aircraft in approximately a 35 degree bank to the right when the aircraft was actually in straight and level flight; and giving an audible; 'Attitude failure; attitude failure' warning. On our return leg after dropping off the patient; the PFD continuously and erratically cycled through 3 or 4 different displays; including: a correct indication of our attitude and upcoming terrain; the same right-hand bank attitude; a red 'X' in the middle of the screen; and a display where the half of the screen above the horizon was brown instead of blue. Each display would show for 2 or 3 seconds; then go to a different display. This continued for the entire flight back. I did not find a way to stop the display from doing this. Along with the visual abnormality; the audible female voice saying; 'Attitude failure; attitude failure' repeated continuously the whole flight back.I did not put the item on MEL until the following day after ferrying the aircraft to ZZZ2 to be repaired. This was to prevent the aircraft from being grounded in ZZZ; away from ZZZ2 where repairs could be more readily carried out. Honestly this was partly because of knowing that the company would probably not like for me to have written it up then (I did inform the Chief Pilot of the situation upon return to ZZZ; however). It was also partly because; while I pretty much knew this item needed to be written up; I had misinterpreted the MEL when I had read it that night; not reading it carefully enough.

Pilot reported misinterpreting MEL and applied the incorrect MEL after failures of the Attitude Indicator on the Primary Flight Display.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Unqualified technicians assigned to ETOPs (Extended-range Twin-engine Operational Performance) aircraft Ref ETOPs. GMM 03-01-05 Section E Item 2.

Unqualified maintenance technicians were assigned to work on 787-10 (Extended-range Twin-engine Operations) aircraft.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Flight arrived to fly SBONO1 STAR; and land Runway 13R due to ATIS winds reported 140/10. SOCAL approach informed flight that due to high winds northeast of field; flights were landing 31L even with tailwind. I made the decision to land 13R with FO's (PF) concurrence due to tailwind landing limit of 10 knots [in the] Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). Vectors for visual for 13R landing were 2 to 3 NM outside of SBONO1 STAR points due to SOCAL radar limitations. Flight encountered continuous moderate turbulence from 7;000 MSL to 2;500 MSL which made communications and flight more difficult. There was no weather advisory nor did the flight plan include any weather alternate for this weather at PSP. We did have ferry fuel loaded but I did not consider that for diversion at this time. Configuration to land was made early. Visibility was reduced significantly to 2 to 4 NM by blowing sand and dust up to 5;000 MSL. SOCAL approach vectors when transferred to Tower placed aircraft at a point and position where a 360 degree turn was needed to lose further altitude and line up with the extended centerline of 13R. Moderate turbulence continued from 2;500 MSL to 2;000 AGL throughout the turn; such that airspeed varied 15 knots either side of set speed and aircraft control was the primary task of PF and PM. Visual approach was attempted to 13R. Aircraft was not in a stable position to land at 1;000 feet AGL or 500 feet AGL primarily due to gusting and turbulent winds affecting set speed; so I directed a go around. Subsequent vectors were flown for a visual to 31L; with much more stable air mass and reported tailwinds now at below 10 knots (140/08). Visibility still was reduced to 3-5 NM due to dust and blowing debris. Configuration was made early again with a flaps 40 configuration and auto brakes at three. I continued to monitor the tailwind component. The last wind check was at 300 feet and I noted 140/08. However; due to the gusting winds; it is highly possible that the 10 knot tailwind limit was exceeded at landing. Normal landing and taxi to gate was uneventful with several PIREPS to Tower and SOCAL on wind; visibility and turbulence.  [Report] will be filed for same event due to possible AFM tailwind landing limit exceedance.Get better weather information; capabilities at PSP for aircrews to make informed decisions on alternates; holding etc. Include in all flight plans to PSP alternate information for LAX.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737-800 flight crew reported possibly exceeding tailwind limit during landing at PSP.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Had stable approach all the way down from 3;000 FT when cleared for the visual [Runway] 18R at CLT. Crew complied with all checklists and company SOP. We were on a stable approach to landing and while power was at idle in the flare with full flaps and less that 20 FT from ground (audible call from aircraft Radio Alt.) when wake turbulence was encountered causing the plane to balloon up and bank right a little more than 10 degrees. Made immediate call for go around and performed balked landing procedure. Captain made radio call once we were climbing and safe distance from ground. Tower instructed to climb to 4;000 FT and runway heading. Shortly after we received vectors for another approach; but asked for the center runway.

CRJ-200 First Officer reported wake vortex encounter on approach to CLT that caused ballooning and some roll. Go around was executed and the flight landed safely on a different runway.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Manuals; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Chart Or Publication

We were flying to Watertown; with a filed route of ZZZ. DWN RWF AT ATY. Over Darwin; we started out on the 211 degree course as indicated on the flight plan to our next waypoint of Redwood Falls VOR. Over the DWN VOR; ATC queried us as to why we're going in that direction; to which we responded that was our filed route.We informed him that the ATY VOR was listed as out of service on the NOTAMs. We then explained to him that was the reason for the different route than we normally take. He told us that the ATY VOR was not out of service and cleared us to proceed direct to ATY from our current position. We tuned and identified the VOR; and were able to proceed to ATY without any further issues.

A Light Turboprop flight crew was flying a route that varied from the usual routing for that city pair. When queried by ATC; the crew stated that the reason for the change was that a VOR on their usual routing had been NOTAMed out of service. ATC replied that the VOR was in service and re-cleared them to the VOR and to their destination.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

The Captain was pilot flying. Once cleared onto runway for takeoff; we were taxiing into position; and while making the turn to centerline; the engines were spooled up to about 40% N1. The Captain then adjusted his body position in his seat; inadvertently pushing the thrust levers past the position where the auto-throttles engaged; powering the engines up to full takeoff power; before we were completely lined up on centerline. This forced us through centerline and aimed towards the grass between taxiways 'X' and 'X1'. Immediately pulling the power back to idle; the Captain regained control and steered back to centerline. We then exited the runway at 'X1' which was about 1;000 feet from where we entered onto the runway; taxied back to runway; ran the before takeoff checklist and departed.Waiting until completely lined up on runway centerline before spooling the engines up past idle thrust. An additional measure that would have prevented this from happening is waiting until lined up on runway before arming the auto-throttle.

The First Officer of an Embraer EMB175 reported that they aborted takeoff because the throttles were inadvertently pushed past auto-throttle position for takeoff.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Please note that this report is about two different issues on this flight. They are related however. Shortly after takeoff from ZZZ; we received a ACARS NOCOM message and it remained for the remainder of the flight. On approach into ZZZ1; I was the pilot flying and the autopilot was on. We were in IMC and continuous moderate turbulence. We received vectors for the ILS. After we intercepted the glideslope; we experienced a decreasing performance wind shear warning and executed a go-around. During the subsequent vectors; the FO and I discussed our fuel situation and options. Since ACARS was inop; I could not immediately notify Dispatch. We attempted the approach one more time; with identical results. We once again discussed our fuel situation and options and decided to divert to our filed alternate of ZZZ2. We computed that we had enough fuel to fly to ZZZ2; shoot an approach; and land with IFR reserves. We advised ATC of our intentions and I told my FO to contact dispatch via ZZZ1 ops. He was only able to have a message relayed through ops; not talk to dispatch directly. It was then that I transferred the controls to my FO and made a call to dispatch via Company Radio. It was successful; and I was able to notify dispatch of our intentions. They advised us that ZZZ2 would be notified of our arrival. When we entered ZZZ2 approach control airspace; it was obvious that they were very busy; with a long line of aircraft visible on TCAS. We didn't immediately notify ATC of our fuel situation; since it appeared that we were going to join the line of aircraft with normal vectors. Then; ATC notified us that they were going to vector us over the airport and join a right downwind. We then notified ATC that we were min fuel; and couldn't take any undue delay. He then asked us if we could accept a 25-30 mile final. We said that we could not accept those vectors. At that point; we receive priority and landed with @ 35 mins of fuel. We believed that those vectors would have added at least 10 mins to the flight. The landing and taxi-in were uneventful.Nothing could have been done differently. It was an unavoidable chain of events; with weather being the primary factor.

CRJ-900 Captain reported diverting to an alternate because of weather considerations and a low fuel state.


Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Currently there is a NOTAM for the ILS 16 at HPN for an alternate missed approach. The NOTAM does not specify how to hold at HAARP. The approach chart has an easy to overlook depiction of the hold at HAARP. The low chart in Jepp FD Pro shows a hold on the low airway at CRALY that can be confused for a hold at HAARP. When constructing the miss as an alternate flight plan in the FMS; the default hold in the FMS at HAARP is almost identical to the hold at CRALY except using HAARP and right [sic] turns instead of the left turns at CRALY. This situation is a set up for an improper/unexpected hold.My recommendation would be to add verbiage to the NOTAM to specify the hold details or refer to the hold depiction on the approach chart. Also; like the NOTAM going into SFO on the DYAMD arrival about the chart altitude being wrong at ARCHI; why isn't the chart changed for these long term situations? Both of these NOTAMS are for months long periods and the applicable charts should be changed to reflect the current procedure rather than rely on NOTAMS for months at a time?

GV Captain laments the use of a NOTAM at HPN over a period of months to advise that the alternate missed approach procedure should be flown with a climb to 3;000 feet instead of 2;300 feet. He also noted that a holding pattern on the low altitude airways chart at CRALY can be confused with the HAARP hold.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 325; Flight Crew Type 1

Confusion; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

I was doing pattern work making left hand traffic patterns.  The landings were touch and goes.  After the second landing I requested a full stop landing and was going to park the airplane and be finished for the evening.  At 600 AGL on the base to final turn to the runway the engine power unit failed.  It was a partial power loss with no throttle response.  The engine remained at or below 1000 RPM and was not responsive to a restart after switching the fuel tanks and adjusting the throttle to see if there was any change.The airplane was fueled before departure with approximately 13 gallons out of a total of 22 gallons possible for both wing tanks.  Upon looking to see if there was sufficient altitude to attempt a power off glide to the runway I decided that the altitude was not sufficient to clear the many houses and structures between the aircraft position and the runway.  I radioed the tower and announced a mayday call on ZZZ Tower frequency.I maneuvered the aircraft to the northeast from the base leg and aimed for the darkness to which I thought was a field.  Upon an altitude of approximately 100AGL the airplane landing light illuminated the field in front of me to which I lowered the nose to be sure that the aircraft would have a sufficient landing roll to get stopped to avoid hitting any structures or immobile objects on the other side of the cornfield.  Upon impact with the corn the airplane slowed rapidly and the nose wheel hit the dirt which caused the aircraft to go airborne approximately 4 to 6 feet causing the aircraft to come to a rest on its back and had flipped over.Upon checking on my passenger to see that he was still alive and responsive we both undid our seat belts and being upside down we both came in contact with the ground.  We broke a portion of the already broken glass canopy and crawled out from underneath the aircraft and began making phone calls to 911 and the airport Tower.  Upon contact with the Tower I alerted him that we were alive and walking with minor injuries that were non-life threatening.  First responders arrived at the scene and we were both cleared of medical treatment and were allowed to leave the scene.  I was un-aware of any maintenance issues that would have caused the aircraft to be un-airworthy at the time of departure.

An AA-1B Grumman Tiger pilot experienced partial engine failure while in a landing pattern.  The engine would not produce more than 1000 rpm and he judged that he would be unable to make it to the runway.  He landed in a cornfield. The aircraft flipped over but the pilot and his passenger were unhurt.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

A CRJ was a go around off of Runway 25 and an Airbus was a departure off of Runway 19. The Tower requested the CRJ to fly runway heading; climbing to 070 which put the aircraft in close proximity of terrain. When the Tower called to coordinate a male spoke first and then a female started talking. At that point I just needed to talk to both aircraft. That forced me to turn the CRJ to avoid the terrain. My plan was to take the Airbus off the departure and use altitude with the CRJ. I had already accomplished all of my point outs to follow through with my plan. A CPC came over to try and help and told me to climb the CRJ to 080. At that point I climbed the Airbus to 070 and kept him on the departure. The Airbus had the CRJ in sight and was instructed to maintain visual separation; once the two were out of conflict I climbed the Airbus because he was approaching higher terrain. The CRJ stayed above the Airbus's wake until appropriate separation could be maintained. The Tower's idea of a fix for a Runway 25 go around and a 19 departure is not helpful to the TRACON because of terrain. Because go arounds are time critical communication needs to happen quickly. We don't have time to explain to the Tower why something won't work. In this case; I just needed to talk to both aircraft.

L30 Controller described a developing MVA/conflict event between a go around on Runway 25 and a departure off Runway 19; the reporter listing the Tower's instructions to the go around aircraft and the late frequency transfer as causal factors.


Electronic Library (other than Nav database)

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Workload; Troubleshooting; Other / Unknown; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Manuals; Software and Automation

During taxi to Runway 27. Noted taxi chart in Jeppesen and Airport Moving Map (AMM) taxi chart do not match. Taxiways J3; K3; M4; and M1 are not labeled correctly on the taxi chart but are correct on the AMM chart.  AMM chart matches the taxiways. This caused confusion and clarification with ground.  No clearances were violated. Jeppesen charts are conflicting with each other.Suggestion - Send a Jeppesen chart alert and fix the Jeppesen charts.

Air Carrier Captain reported the aircraft's electronic Airport Moving Map (AMM) does not agree with the Jeppesen taxi chart in CVG.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 15

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

It was brought to my attention as CIC (Controller in Charge) by a ZNY sector controller that Aircraft X was going to enter ZNY Oceanic airspace and operate as a Due Regard flight at altitudes F300-F500.Aircraft X was supposed to operate in a 30 mile radius at [a lat/long] point for approximately 30 minutes and would execute rapid climbs and descents. Earlier in the same day an email was received from a FACSFAC representative stating that [a] military Station was requesting the above mentioned airspace to be reserved in ZNY Oceanic airspace. The FACSFAC representative denied the request stating 'They were asking for too much airspace on short notice;' end quote. [Military Station]'s response was that the flight would operate Due Regard then.The lat/long position that the flight was going to operate was in between to very active airways; with aircraft operating in the altitude ranges F360-F430.This information was brought to the OMIC (Operations Manager in Charge) on duty and while the manager took action his attitude was that Aircraft X was Due Regard and it is the responsibility of Aircraft X to remain clear of flights.[Minutes later]; Aircraft X engaged in a loss of separation with an air carrier (Aircraft Y) at F410. Aircraft X was observed in a rapid descent from high altitude perpendicular to and converging on the air carrier's route of flight and leveled off at F420. There was 7 miles and a 1000ft between the two flights. Minimum separation in the ZNY Oceanic environment in this situation would be 50 miles laterally or 2000 feet above; 1000ft below F410. Aircraft Y was southwest bound. There was no TCAS maneuver by Aircraft Y. Most flights operate with their TCAS off while in an oceanic environment.Aircraft X operated with a complete disregard for safety and even after that event with Aircraft Y; continued to operate and was observed multiple times engaging in other close proximity events.An attempt was made to gain communications with the flight but the adjacent sector was never contacted by the flight.The same Aircraft X returned on [a later date] operating under the same rules.While I understand the principals of operating Due Regard; our primary duty is to prevent a collision between two flights operating in our airspace and I do not take that responsibility lightly! Aircraft X engaged in a gross dereliction of duty and responsibility and I feel that the ZNY manager had a casual attitude towards the event. If a military flight wants to operate at altitudes where active passenger air carriers are operating this must be scheduled so that a reservation of protected airspace can be entered into the Ocean 21 operation platform and we can reroute the flights around these military activities. Any other action would be a gross dereliction of duty and would compromise safety at all levels.

ZNY Center Controller reported a loss of separation between tow aircraft in oceanic airspace.


Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

On takeoff roll at about the time I (PM) would call 80 knots; I noticed a large bird sitting on the runway. The bird appeared to be a very large hawk. The bird instead of flying away from us turned and flew right into the number two engine. There was a loud pop and the aircraft simultaneously veered slightly to the right. I glanced at the airspeed indicator and initiated a reject. We came to a very quick stop as the anti-skid cycled the brakes. The FO now PM; instructed the crew and passengers to remain seated as I informed the Tower of our situation. We taxied clear at the next intersection; which had to be Foxtrot as it put us on Yankee right in front of the high number gates. I shut number two down on Yankee as the odor in the cabin quickly became evident.We discussed our situation again and agreed to check the [performance computer] for brake temperature restrictions. We became distracted by Ground Control communications and company radio as we were instructed to return to the gate. We didn't look at the [performance computer] until we were at the gate. I remembered seeing the airspeed indicator passing through 100 knots as I pulled the thrust levers back so I had him check 120; 110; and 100 knots in the [performance computer]. 120 would have had us not return to the gate; 110 knots indicated 60 minutes at the gate; and 100 knots indicated no restriction. I am not sure why we missed checking the [performance computer] earlier as it was one of the first things that I thought of as we came to a stop.

After aligning the aircraft for takeoff; the Captain passed the controls to me and I continued the takeoff roll. As we were accelerating; we both noticed a large (hawk-sized) bird perched on the runway slightly right of centerline. The Captain and I exchanged a few words about the presence of the bird as the bird took flight and passed down our right side. We then felt an abrupt momentary yaw to the right. Later; the Captain and a ramp worker reported hearing a loud compressor stall type noise. I do not remember a noise which may be due to my noise cancelling headset. I was about to recommend rejecting the takeoff when the Caption initiated the RTO.The aircraft decelerated using the automatic RTO system. The deceleration was much more benign than I expected. I notified the Tower that we had rejected the takeoff. The Captain asked me to tell the passengers to remain seated. We taxied clear of the runway. We noticed a strong smell of burned bird in the cockpit. We performed a quick scan of the engine instruments noting no abnormalities. We then shut down the Number 2 engine and taxied to the gate. At the gate; we realized we did not check the brake cooling in the [performance computer]. We estimated the rejection speed to be 100 KIAS. Fortunately; no brake cooling was required. Visual inspection of the Number 2 engine revealed several damaged fan blades and feathers.

A B737 flight crew reported a bird strike during the takeoff roll; damaging one of the engines. The takeoff was safely aborted and the aircraft returned to the gate for maintenance action.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Z Runway 02

Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Flight departed enroute to MGGT. The Captain was the pilot flying; and First Officer was the pilot not flying. During the descent for approach; the First Officer monitored the descent utilizing Raw Data as per Company procedures. Both flight crewmembers had monitored the descent/approach phase utilizing Terrain Awareness switch. During the descent/approach phase; ATC assigned a radar vectoring heading of initially 125 degrees; and then a heading of 140 degrees. The crew was assigned to multiple descent altitudes; with a final altitude of 8;000 FT MSL. During the radar vectoring; the crew observed on the Terrain Awareness screen; that higher terrain was approximately 5 NM south of the aircraft (on the right side of aircraft). ATC assigned a radar vectoring heading of 90 degrees for intercept of the Runway 02 localizer. On this heading; the GPWS alerted the crew of terrain. The Captain de-automated the aircraft and completed a CFIT avoidance measure by climbing from the assigned altitude of 8;000 MSL to 9;000 MSL. The crew alerted ATC that we had to climb from the assigned altitude of 8;000 MSL to 9;000 MSL. At approximately 9;000 MSL; VMC conditions prevailed; with the airport visually attained. ATC assigned a heading of approximately 020 degrees; and questioned if the crew had the airport in site. The crew maintained visual identification of the airport; but due to the close proximity and excessive assigned altitude; the crew declined to perform a visual approach that was offered by ATC. The crew requested a full ILS approach from ATC; who then assigned a clearance to go direct to the IAF; and subsequently cleared the crew for the ILS Runway 02 Z approach. The crew performed a successful full approach with no further events.Prior to Top of Descent; the crew should request from ATC to remain on the assigned routing (STAR) in order to remain automated with known LNAV/VNAV points; and to also request full approaches; in order to avoid ATC errors in altitude assignments in mountainous areas. The ATC language limitations that are common in these geographical areas offers a greater opportunity for errors to occur. Maintaining en route assignments of charted courses and altitudes will enhance the safety of flight operations while conducting operations in areas of limited language abilities.

Perhaps choosing to fly the full procedure turn approach and not relying on this Controller's ATC vectors would have been a better solution. Throughout the recovery and subsequent missed approach and second landing; it was obvious that ATC had difficulty at times even understanding why we had to perform a missed approach which made me wonder if he even had altitude readouts on our flight path. His aviation English speaking and understanding was certainly not up to standards after the event as well.

MGGT ATC vectored an aircraft for the ILS Runway 02 Z but when the EGPWS alerted TERRAIN at 8;000 FT within five miles of mountainous terrain; the escape maneuver was accomplished followed by a climb to 9;000 FT and the full approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 1200

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Upon climb out of ZZZ to ZZZ1 both myself and the First Officer noted to each other an odor/smell that seemed pungent and potent. Neither of us could place it or even thought it was associated with a fire or smoke. Both of us assumed it was just a smelly aircraft that had been sitting outside. Later in the flight during cruise enroute to ZZZ1; I noticed a white stream of smoke coming from the dashboard. Specifically; it was erupting from behind the flight guidance control (FGC) where the mode selectors for the autopilot's climb and descend modes are located. Upon seeing the smoke; my First Officer and I realized the odd odor/smell was associated and determined that there must be some sort of electrical fire/issue/malfunction going on. I instructed my First Officer to put his oxygen mask (I did as well) and we performed our immediate action items associated with smoke in the cockpit/flight-deck. We declared [requested priority handling] with ATC. ATC gave us direct to the field and pilot's speed and descent discretion to 11;000 ft. We gave them the information for souls on board and fuel remaining. At this point; we were roughly 60 NM from ZZZ1. I directed my First Officer to notify our dispatcher/company via ACARS that we had [notified ATC] due to smoke in the cockpit and that we were landing at ZZZ1. After that; I directed my First Officer to run the associated checklists and run the appropriate data for landing. We continued to communicate with ATC and they aided us in giving us priority for a visual approach to Runway XXL at ZZZ1. The aircraft was being operated on the autopilot; however; during descent; the mode selectors on the flight guidance control panel stopped working/engaging and would not respond to any selection that I was commanding. Due to this; I switched off the autopilot and hand flew the aircraft for the rest of the flight. We landed with no issues Runway XXL and ATC asked us our intentions. The First Officer and I agreed that we did not need to evacuate as the smoke was slightly subsiding and we had no passengers on board. We still had our oxygen masks on and it seemed logical that we could taxi to the gate as long as the rescue and fire trucks follow us there as a precaution.  There was some confusion on which gate we would be parking at. Our ACARS data for arrival showed us parking at XX which is also the normal gate that we always park at in ZZZ1. However; after we arrived at XX; operations seemed to not want the aircraft there and requested that we park at XY instead. We left gate XX and taxied over to XY as demanded and powered down the aircraft and opened the door. Firefighters came on board and immediately noted the electrical fire smell and asked if we were okay. I as Captain made all the appropriate phone calls and documented the issue in the maintenance log of the aircraft. Contract maintenance personnel showed up to work on the aircraft. They were able to inform me that they removed the main panel in the cockpit and it showed signs of a fire and electrical burn up behind the flight guidance controller and that this is what caused the electrical burn and smoke in the cockpit. First; there was an odd smell in the cockpit noticed by both flight crew members. But the biggest form of detection was the visible plums of white smoke rising from behind the flight guidance control panel. The smoke was faint at first but became heavier and more visible as time went on.

ERJ-145 Captain reported smoke in the cockpit during climb out.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction; Confusion

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

At approximately 1500 feet AGL on final approach to Runway 26 I noticed an aircraft on TCAS that appeared too close to our aircraft. I looked over my left shoulder and acquired the aircraft visually. The aircraft appeared to be turning onto final for our runway and appeared to be over taking us. I lost sight of it as it disappeared behind the tail of our aircraft so I shifted back to the TCAS display. The TCAS display showed the target continuing to gain on us; and in fact the target appeared to merge with our aircraft and the altitude differential displayed '00'. I initiated a go-around but aborted it as I thought he might be above us. I then disconnected the autopilot and auto-thrust and executed a descending breakout to the right. After getting off the localizer I rolled the wings level and saw the target on the TCAS diverging from our path. A jump seat rider sitting directly behind me reacquired the aircraft visually and informed me he was turning back to the south. I rejoined the localizer and continued the approach and landing as we were still stable.I believe the aircraft either overshot his final approach course for Runway 25L or was cleared to land on Runway 26 and did not slow to approach speed.

An Airbus Captain on final to PHX Runway 26 reported another aircraft apparently overshot the Runway 25L centerline; which resulted in an extremely close airborne encounter.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 255; Flight Crew Total 27000; Flight Crew Type 510

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Attendant

Was in the bunk; on my break. IRO called on phone and reported FAs said they smelled electrical odor vicinity of B zone galley and also a grinding/motor noise. IRO on duty investigated and then; when IRO went back in flight deck; phoned me in the bunk. I got up and investigated. There was still a very slight odor; but the grinding/motor noise was imperceptible. As I was walking around the cabin doing further investigation; all video monitors froze. I then went to the flight deck with intention of de-powering the IFES and to SATCOM Maintenance Control. Just as I entered the flight deck; a status message labeled 'IFES Cooling Fan' illuminated. Through a process of vetting the problem with Maintenance Control and working a QRH procedure; we isolated the problem to the IFES Cooling fan and de-powered the IFES [In Flight Entertainment System]. The electrical odor was completely gone and flight continued to destination without further issues.

B777 Captain is informed during his break that the flight attendants have reported an electrical smell and a grinding noise in the mid galley. During investigation the IFE System shut down. As the Captain entered the cockpit a status message; labeled IFES Cooling Fan; illuminated. The system is depowered and the flight continued to destination.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were climbing [and] flying runway heading; when the Departure Controller cleared us on course. 'RNP' was now displayed on both Primary Flight Display's / Attitude Direction Indicator's (ADI). The course to our first fix was displayed as approximately 275 degrees. We initiated a turn to approximately 240 degrees to intercept. The course line was continuously moving away; maintaining a 10 NM intercept; with increasing map shifting; and the displayed distance to the fix was increasing. The controller asked if we were deviating; and we said yes; as there was a build in front of us. After deviating for the buildup; it became apparent that the GPS position was not reflecting our position accurately; or the position to the next fix. We advised the controller we were experiencing a navigational malfunction; and requested a heading to the next fix. We were issued a heading of 180 degrees. We were flying approximately 260 degrees at the time; as verified by ATC. As we were issued the new heading; the wet compass was checked and agreed with the heading shown on the display. We manually selected the VOR frequency and proceeded directly to it via NAV 2 off of the assigned vector; initially navigating with use of the Radio Magnetic Indicator (RMI).We looked in the QRH for a procedure for a FMS failure as it pertained to our current situation; but there wasn't one. We checked the circuit breaker panels and noted all were in appropriate positions. We plotted the route on the Jeppesen enroute charts; and checked that the operational service volumes of the VORs along our course were adequate. One exception was noted; and this was remedied by an amended clearance onto the arrival in our destination. We requested the Center controller contact our filed destination airport to verify they would accept us into the terminal airspace.At this point; we contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control. The connection was extremely poor; but we were able to relay our situation; and get confirmation that at FL280; the remaining distance; time; burn; extra and fuel remaining was more than sufficient to continue to our filed destination (landing fuel 8.0).As the flight progressed; the GPS began to slowly correct its position. Its latitude was never off by more than a mile; but longitude was; at its worst; 310 NM east of our actual position. The disparity continually lessened as we reached approximately 400 NM into our flight. Near the midpoint VOR the latitude/longitude were compared against the Jeppesson charts and found to be accurate; and further verified at the next VOR. The GPS was then used to supplement the VOR navigation for the remainder of the flight.We landed without incident.We were climbing [from departure airport] ATC asked if we were performed any/all recommended preventative measures to ensure the reliability of the navigation equipment.

A MD-80 flight crew determined a GPS and or FMS malfunction after takeoff resulted in a large track deviation. As the flight progressed; the 310 NM error gradual decreased to zero.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related

The problem continues on several G200 aircraft. The 1;000 feet to go audio warning cannot be heard with the company provided Telex 750 headset. The Telex 850 headset offers some noise canceling abilities and the tone can be heard a little better when this headset is available. The other pilot had his own noise canceling headset and had no problem with any of the aircraft audio alerts. I received a phone message which indicated that this ongoing problem has been sent to the Chief Pilot's office for a solution. Without a noise canceling headset the aircraft's alert system is compromised and situational awareness and safety is reduced. Recommend a viable noise canceling headset be provided immediately for the G200 so that all aircraft audio alerts can be utilized.

A pilot reported that the 1;000 feet audio alert cannot be heard on the G200 aircraft without a noise canceling headset.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 5650; Flight Crew Type 740

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

General Maintenance Action; General Evacuated; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Procedure; Manuals; Logbook Entry; Aircraft

Upon landing touchdown I applied [brakes] to slow the aircraft then shortly thereafter I realized that I didn't have brakes or nose wheel steering. The aircraft was heading off the right side of Runway 4 and nothing I did could change the aircraft direction or slow the aircraft. I elected to emergency shutoff both engines feathering the props and preparing for runway departure.  I pulled the elevator aft to put more pressure on the aft gear and coasted to a stop just outside the runway safety zone in the mowed grass. There were no injuries to passengers; nor damage to the aircraft or airfield. I was met by Airfield Safety who help me get a tug for the airplane and he took my information for all reports.  The airplane was towed to the FBO and remained there until I returned on date.  I returned to the FBO with my normal maintenance personnel and we determined that the cause of my issues was electrical.  The aircraft was made safe for a flight to ZZZ1 where further inspections could be preformed. The mistake I made was not getting a ferry flight permit before flying the airplane to ZZZ1.

Pilot reported not obtaining a Ferry Permit after loss of electrical power caused a runway excursion.


On take-off at ZZZ; we experienced a loud 'Bang;' yaw and shudder at around 110-130 knots. This was followed by an 'Eng 2 Fail' on ECAM. My Captain executed a high speed reject. I notified the tower and they rolled the emergency equipment. He notified the passengers to remain seated. After inspection by the fire department; we taxied back to the gate on one engine. I am only guessing; but apparently a stall on the #2 engine caused its failure on take-off. However; at the time it happened; we were both convinced we had blown one or more tires. Then the engine fail ECAM came up and we started to put it together. There was no way to avoid this event. The Captain executed a perfect high speed reject. The aircraft remained on the runway centerline and he notified the passengers immediately.

A321 flight crew reported a rejected takeoff due to an engine failure.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Inbound aircraft arrived late; and we met inbound crew at aircraft. There were two open write ups on aircraft from crew; one was auto land the other was the Controller Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC). The CPDLC was written up as inoperative in air and ground. The mechanic took the logbook and stated that it would take him 'some time with the plane as he was unfamiliar with the CPDLC system.' We verified that the CPDLC system was inoperative. Approximately one hour later the mechanic stated that he was still working on the write ups. Now nearly two hours after departure; he was no closer to telling us what his plan was. He stated that he would run some tests. He and another mechanic conducted tests on the various data links; and noted the HF had an issue. Several times they came in and stated that the ZZZ mechanics were 'screaming at why I wrote this up.' I reminded him that we did not write this up...we received the aircraft with two open write ups. That said; the CPDLC system was clearly inoperative. I made numerous calls to the ZZZ flight operations personnel. I was repeatedly told the following: 'CPDLC is like a cellphone...you don't need this so why you concerned about it...this is a not a maintenance issue and should never have been written up and you are delaying the flight with a ridiculous issue.' All of these comments were both condescending and inappropriate. We were told countless times that perhaps we were unclear on how to use the system and simply were not initiating it correctly. This too was insulting and completely incorrect. At one point the flight ops individual asked for the First Officers (FO) phone number to call him and instruct him on how to use the system! I worked with the dispatcher and we both agreed that the MEL did not provide any clear guidance on deferring this system. It simply was not addressed. The mechanic stated that this was NOT a part covered or required by the MEL. I was told by the ZZZ maintenance personnel that 'this is not a maintenance issue; this is an issue between you and the dispatcher!' They said; again; it was like a cell phone and we did not need it. Flight ops then tried to point us to the [manual] and said we did not need the system and to just leave it alone. We pointed out to the maintenance folks that the only reference to this system could be found in the ACARS section. The MEL addresses the idea that the ACARS can be deferred; rendering the CPDLC system inoperative and clearly notes that many functions of the ACARS may be operative. I was rudely told that 'we do NOT defer operative systems'. This is untrue since part of the system was inoperative; i.e. the CPDLC; and this would have made for a legal deferral. The dispatcher and I were in complete agreement that this would be an acceptable remedy to the open write up. Instead; after we had been sitting in the plane for nearly five hours; the mechanic came back with the log book; this was the first time since our arrival to the plane that we had been privy to the logbook; and had written the following: 'performed CPDLC operational check per B767 AMM 1. Ops check well.' This type of sign off is used for corrective action that indicates an operational piece of equipment. This was NOT the case. The CPDLC system remained inoperative. I stated this and was told that he did his checks and they were good so he felt it was ok. I reminded him that it said REJECTED and was inoperative. His response was that it was not his problem. I called flight ops and the dispatcher. The dispatcher and I were NOT ok with this and wanted the ACARS deferral since this would represent a legal way to indicate that the system was not working and was being deferred in accordance with the MEL. Flight ops gave me the cell phone analogy yet again and kept asking us why we were even questioning this as they said it was not a required system. I advised them of the ACARS deferral option and they told me to write up what we saw; i.e. REJECTED indicating inoperative CPDLC and they would get with maintenance to get the ACARS deferred. They let us sit for another 30 mins and returned with a refusal to defer the ACARS. I was then called and given the cell phone analogy yet again and told that they do NOT defer operative systems. Again this is incorrect but he told me we needed to move the airplane. I stated that the mechanic had incorrectly stated in the logbook that the system was 'ops checks good' and that this was incorrect. He stated that he would provide us with a written statement directing us to depart and that all applicable maintenance procedures had been complied with; resulting in an Airworthiness Release (AWR) for the aircraft. This is what I received via ACARS:' Air Carrier X/ MAINTENANCE HAS ACCOMPLISHED APPLICABLE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES AND HAS PROVIDED AN AWR. DUE TO INABILITY TO LOG ONTO CPDLC / [flight] IS AUTHORIZED TO PROCEED USING VOICE PROCEDURES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AOM.' The dispatcher required this statement as well in order to refile us and provide a [flight plan]. He and I felt that the write up had not been properly addressed. The mechanic then put the following as corrective action for the write up I documented indicating the REJECTED and inoperative CPDLC: 'CPDLC system checks good per 767 AMM'.Again this is indicative of corrective action remedying the issue and this was NOT the case. The system remained inoperative. Please reference the following from FAA Advisory Circular 120-70C: 'A revision to the OpSpecs includes specific authorizations; training and maintenance programs; manuals; operational procedures; minimum equipment lists (MEL); and other such areas necessary for safe and effective use of data link communications.' This advisory addresses the idea that CPDLC systems are not merely 'cell phones' but are aircraft communication systems whose functionality must addressed in the MEL. I completely agree that this item was not required for the flight and had no impact on the safety of the flight. The issue I had with this was what I believe to be the improper sign off by maintenance on an item that they stated was functional while it clearly was not. I do not believe that the logbook corrective action was correct and that the MEL effectively addresses this issue or system. We departed for ZZZ more than five hours late with a deferral for the auto land and a downgrade to cat 1. The CPDLC system was inoperative; but our logbook indicated it as 'ops check well.' More than four hours time was spent without any real input from us with the mechanic performing various checks and then leaving to go speak with ZZZ. We spent the last hour trying to obtain a deferral that we felt addressed the CPDLC inoperative status.

Air Carrier Captain reported an acceptable entry in the aircraft logbook regarding CPDLC being inoperative.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

During descent into DFW we were cleared direct to SEEVR and told to descend via the SEEVR arrival but to maintain 310 knots. We set in the bottom altitude for the window at SEEVR of 13000 and began our descent planning to cross SEEVR at 14000 to avoid leveling off. As we neared SEEVR ATC changed our clearance to cross SEEVR at 13000 and comply with the speeds at SEEVR then continue the arrival. We slowed to 270 knots and thought we were set up to cross SEEVR at 13000 but just before turning I noticed we were too high and just as I noticed ATC gave us a heading and an expedited descent to keep us clear of a skydive aircraft in the area.

Flight crew of large turbojet aircraft reported an issue with an ATC clearance to meet an altitude restriction.


The waypoint shown in the MCDU flight plan is misspelled according the departure plate. Way point CCLYD on the BRYCC1 departure is spelled CCYLD in the MCDU flight plan. Needs to be reissued and spelled properly.

A319 pilot reports that the CCLYD way point on the BRYCC1 departure from DEN is misspelled. The FMC spells it as CCYLD and the Commercial Chart shows CCYLD. (CCLYD is correct.)


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Type 9821

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Two wake turbulence [encounters]. One on initial climb following a [heavy] B777 on takeoff. Upon ascertaining we would be following a 777 in T/O sequence; I stated to the FO prior to taking the runway that I will only go ahead with ample separation. At throttle up we had approximately 12 miles behind the 777 ahead. On initial climb; after the turn to 236 degrees at approx. 5000-8000 we had several clear ripples of wake turbulence. Estimating the climb gradient of the preceding traffic we maximized the climb and adjusted the path (widening turn back to LAX VOR). Upon passing LAX VOR turning eastbound; as we climbed through approximately 20;000 feet; the preceding aircraft was approx. 2000 above our altitude and established 24-26 miles ahead of us. I stated again to the FO the possibility of wake; and at that second experienced SUBSTANTIAL wake turbulence. Not a rolling moment (yet) but a very strong buffeting and noticeable wake experience. We advised ATC we will be turning to offset from our current track due to the wake. For expediency I clicked off the autopilot and turned approximately 30 degrees to the right with ATC almost simultaneously agreeing and advising for the turn. I was more proactive than ATC. No conflict was stated by ATC; however his response to us was very drawn out; lengthy; and slow. We needed to change track behind the heavy ahead ASAP. Our action prevented any further disturbance. SCT was the controlling agency; between LAX and DAG VOR.

B757 Captain reported two wake vortex encounters in trail of a B777 departing LAX.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 50

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Crossing terrain elevation at 3000 feet on my way to ZZZ1; I experienced an engine reduction of power followed by complete loss of power. Prior to departure at ZZZ; the fuel was drained and found to be normal. The airplane gauge read 1/4 tank enough for one hour of flying. ZZZ1 was expected to be a 20 min flight in VMC. I contacted ZZZ1 Tower and declared a fuel flow problem. I entered 7700 into the transponder as per instructions from the tower. I knew I was near a grass strip and other safe landing areas. There were no towers or other power lines in the immediate area. I flew a straight in approach. My airspeed was adequate to approach and make a safe landing. I landed and was met by emergency responders. I called the Tower when on the strip and let them know I was OK and there was no damage to the airplane. I removed two gallons of fuel from the airplane. I flushed new fuel through the carburetor. I drained the fuel tank and carburetor twice. I added a total of seven gallons to the plane. I completed a full power run up for one and a half minutes. I was confident any contaminants were flushed and the engine was making full power. I left for ZZZ1 and contacted the Tower when 500 and climbing. I landed at ZZZ1 with no problems or issues.

GA pilot reported a complete engine failure that required a dead stick landing to an off-airport location.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 3400; Flight Crew Type 135

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

At Hayward Executive Airport; HWD; the aircraft was operated with 2 crew members; a Pilot Flying (PF) and Pilot Not Flying (PNF). The PNF was making all radio communications and doing the pre-takeoff checklist. On taxi-out to assigned Runway 28L; crew elected to use entire length including the displaced threshold. Hayward Ground Control said something to PNF about displaced threshold and hold short line. The communication was confusing and slightly garbled. The hold short line for the displaced threshold was on an extended taxiway in a very non-standard location; Z1; and was not very prominently marked. The markings were faded with no warning lights. The pilot taxiing inadvertently went past the hold short line; causing a runway incursion. When a hold short line is in a nonstandard location; I recommend that it be very prominently marked; even with caution lights as used at some airports to alert pilots of its location. It appears to be a problem at this airport.

Corporate jet Captain reported crossing hold short lines that were faded; not prominently marked; and in a nonstandard location at HWD airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 1200

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Equipment / Tooling

Flew with some friends to a nearby airport early in the morning to do a pre-buy on an aircraft. After completing; I departed. I had an iPad with Stratus interface as Charting and VFR GPS. Departed Runway 27 and proceeded south. Made an attempt to contact Center for flight following at 2;000 MSL or so no contact; preceded south while climbing; [and] tried again at 3;500 MSL or so no contact. Tried some other frequencies no avail. AT this time I went to check sectional for frequencies and realized the iPad had overheated and screen had gone black. I then returned to the airport CTAF frequency and asked for a frequency for Center. Was given a frequency of 124.2. Made contact and was given a squawk code. Soon afterward was told to make immediate left turn to 140 and that we had entered a restricted area. Disengaged autopilot made immediate turn left; was told shortly thereafter to resume own navigation. Checked compass; adjusted HI; corrected Heading to 156 on course to my destination. Another call came to make a turn to 140 that we were back in restricted area. I made a left correction again and apologized to controller. In reflection the Stratus Device was on dash next to the compass and may have been interfering with its reading. After clearing the restricted area again within moments I used my the Nav App on my iPhone to get a correct bearing and establish ourselves back on route while I had my no pilot passenger get me proper paper sectional out for reference so I could concentrate on flying. The rest of the flight went on without incident. Lesson Learned: Unfamiliar location and equipment requires much more planning.

A PA-32 pilot using an iPad and Stratus interface had an aircraft compass malfunction and an iPad overheat shutdown resulting in a track deviation into a Restricted Area while contacting ATC. The compass precession may have resulted from the Stratus' glareshield location.


Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Loading one piece XXX lbs of freight; I stopped power-stow to check and had 1/2 to 1/4 inch clearance. It was dark and my glasses were foggy due to wearing mask and I could not see bolts protruding from freight which scratched cargo door.

Ramp Agent reported damaging the aircraft during cargo loading because the agent's eye glasses were fogging up due to the face mask.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 52; Flight Crew Total 12537; Flight Crew Type 952

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; Human Factors

This was a morning IFR flight to pick-up 2 passengers and return before weather declined. I delayed departure for a few minutes because of nearby lightning activity to the South. I took off at XA:50 local; from ZZZ airport; in VMC; under Class B airspace; and contacted ZZZZZ Departure Control on frequency XXY.Y. Controller cleared me immediately through Bravo (before I even reached the 1200-feet MSL base of Bravo airspace) and assigned a squawk code. During initial climb (1;300 feet) I noticed  slightly higher cylinder head temperature readings; but I attributed that to the relatively hot/humid weather conditions. I reached down to ensure the cowl flaps were fully open; which had been confirmed twice before via the checklist and I discovered that during the initial climb the manual lever had crept half-way to the closed position; instead of remaining to the set 'fully open.' I reopened; but I noticed the lever wouldn't stay in the dedicated detent.Around 1;400 feet ATC came back with the clearance (as filed) and instructed direct ZZZ VOR after reaching 1;600 feet and 'climb to 6 thousand' which I believe I acknowledged. Airplane was put on autopilot (HDG and FLC modes). I reset the altitude preselect; hit direct NAV to ZZZ VOR as I was going through 1;600 feet and I proceeded to fold a piece of paper and use it to jam the lever in the open position. Around XB:01 I leveled-off; removed the paper 'jammer;' closed the cowl flaps; and confirmed cruise power (except for finalizing mixture leaning until TAS would be near 168 knots). The Controller seemed not very busy and there was no nearby traffic on my Garmin 1000 display; which I had set to Normal scan and a 12 NM range. I was satisfied that the air was smooth and completed the cruise checklist; set a VNAV reminder; pending mixture fine tuning. About 2 minutes later Controller asked me to confirm altitude. I replied that I was level at 7 thousand (my 'filed' altitude) and he mentioned that I was given 6 (which I believe I had also acknowledged) and proceeded to say that he needed to hand me off to ZZZ approach at 6 or 8 thousand and he offered me the choice. I apologized for the occurrence; I accepted 8 thousand and proceeded with the flight without any further incident. There were a few caveats that led to this event. Although I try to stay current my level of activity (as a contract pilot) has diminished to about 54% as compared to last year's similar quarter; thanks to COVID-19; which has affected how 'sharp' one can be/stay. Departing under Class B in VMC requires looking outside for traffic while establishing 2-way communication with ATC; this is routine out of ZZZ; but if combined with a distraction (cowl flaps) had made it very easy for me to 'inadvertently and unconsciously' scroll the altitude preselect button one more 'click' (to 7 thousand) while acknowledging 6 with ATC. Perhaps the early morning wake-up had taken its toll upon me; or maybe an anticipation of establishing cruise at the filed altitude of 7 thousand; numbed my brain to the point that even when the altitude buzzer went off while going through 6 thousand (for 7); no red flags were raised. I constantly read all kinds of available aviation reports; including those with scenarios that lead to altitude excursions; hoping that I would become a better pilot and more aware to avoid similar sets of circumstances; yet here I am having failed my own ongoing efforts.

Corporate pilot reported leveling off at the wrong altitude while being distracted with the cowl flaps.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 19400; Flight Crew Type 9400

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Person Dispatch; Person Ground Personnel

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Company Policy

Shortly after takeoff we got an ACARS message that there were new weights to be used and again Dispatch ACARS'ed us to say that the ramp loaded an extra 1;500 LBS of cargo and did not advise Load Control. Based on the old numbers we took off 1;500 LBS too heavy. The good news is that we elected to use Runway 28L for safety (166K to weight) and it would have flown off on one engine. However; Runway 1 L/R would not have worked and might have put us in the bay (1L/R had us bleeds off max and no extra margin). Our crews trust the Company to give us the most accurate data. I have no idea how I could have been more vigilant other than weigh every bag myself. As an aside; we were to be dispatched ACARS inoperative (cross country; heavy weight and en route weather) and we had to fight to get it fixed. The fix took about ten minutes. If we didn't have the ACARS; we might have used the one's based on the skimpy data; not real time.

An Air Carrier aircraft departed SFO Runway 28R and was notified after takeoff that the weight and balance was 1;500 LBS light which meant a Runway 1 takeoff would have been dangerous at their high gross weight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 2; Flight Crew Total 110; Flight Crew Type 60

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

On landing the airplane I started to slide on what I assume was an icy patch of runway as I tried to stop and slid off the left or north side of runway. I did a 90 degree slide coming to rest in snow just off runway with nose pointing West. I immediately called Tower and shutdown the engine. I was towed out by FBO and assisted by airport operations. The runway was shutdown while I was towed and airport operations informed Minneapolis Center. There was no damage to airport property or to the airplane.

PA28 pilot reported loss of aircraft control on landing possibly due to ice; resulting in a runway excursion.


Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

This scenario involves the FRDMM ONE arrival into DCA; an arrival that has numerous altitude parameters and several defined speeds; obviously designed for a VNAV capable aircraft. With all programming confirmed and forecast winds loaded; we were vectored off the arrival three times and assigned different altitudes and airspeeds then directed to rejoin the profile and set up for the River Visual from the north to Runway 19. ATC needs to appreciate that the VNAV system calculates an energy optimized descent profile and when disrupted requires pilot intervention to re-establish. Additionally; the protocols for altitude protection are different when on the VNAV path and when using other descent options. Shifting back and forth between the two is labor intensive and increases the risk of violating an altitude/speed restriction. In our case the weather was VMC but the addition of weather avoidance considerations would have added another challenge to the process. We did a great job complying but found ourselves continuously programming; resetting parameters; and confirming we would be able to comply with the next restriction- two of us fully engaged for 20 minutes. It will only be a matter of time before a ball gets dropped. If cleared for a descent profile this complex; do not mess with it. If an aircraft must be asked to leave the profile; don't ask them to return to it. I will not accept this amount of mixed descent requirements in the future.

B737-800 Captain detailed the problems that arise when VNAV equipped aircraft are vectored off the arrival and subsequently asked to return to the published arrival.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Aircraft X was inbound from the south. Sector Controller called me and said Aircraft X wanted to do the approach from [fix] which was 'new' to me since they always do it from the south. Aircraft X checked on and requested to start his approach from [fix] that is 22 miles to the northeast of the Airport. He was 30 miles south and the normal approach for the RNAV (RNP) is over [fix]. This approach is only 'specific' to this company's flights and doesn't follow our traditional RNAV Approach. Furthermore; we as a work force in my area weren't briefed when the aircraft was added.As I said it is common and standard for this flight from the south to start the approach over [fix]. After some conversation this pilot still wanted to start his approach over [fix]. I was reviewing the approach in between transmissions and talking to others in the area about the strange request. I continued to review the approach and the [fix] area is actually under all the missed approach wording and is not visible. There is a box that I surmised is a brief of the procedure over [fix] that shows what I depicted was a hold/procedure turn and expected the pilot to do this on his own since he was due south and there were no intermediary fixes to get a 90 degree turn to intercept.About 20 miles south of [fix] I asked the aircraft if he had airport in sight and he said 'affirmative' but wanted to continue north to the [fix]. So; with the aircraft heading northbound away from the airport I cleared Aircraft X to maintain 15;700 (my MVA) until [fix] and cleared for the approach. About 1 minute later I noticed Aircraft X turning right and started a descent and my mind was trying to understand what I was seeing. I quizzed Aircraft X about what he was doing and stated; 'I didn't see you hit [fix]' and asked if he could see the ground and maintain his own separation. I panicked and didn't say the right thing. Aircraft X assured me he was on the arc and that the airplane made a 'smart turn' and all was okay and I let him proceed on the approach. I terminated his radar even though it was lost as we were talking or maybe before....not sure! Looking back; I believe the pilot put in a different fix or the FMS turned the aircraft all by itself and started a perilous descent. Fortunately it was VFR and I am not sure what happened but it scared the daylights out of me as I was trying to figure out the data I was seeing and making sense of it. I am not a Pilot and not sure what he did. I ran this scenario by other veteran controllers here and they agreed he should have not started descent and the sharp intercept angle until he was established over the fix he requested. We should have verbal briefings about [company] special approaches and if that what I saw about the fix is a holding pattern or procedure turn. There were several of us in disagreement. Company needs to be alerted that this pilot did not establish himself on a portion of the approach before descending. In hindsight; I should have cancelled the clearance and climbed the aircraft to stay at or above the MVA since the pilot missed the requested fix. I just need some clarification on this whole thing and what I can do to ensure I don't ever go through this again; nor any of my colleagues.

ZOA Center Controller reported clearing an aircraft for a company specific approach procedure but the aircraft did not comply with the procedure as depicted.