Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 6386

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency

During a maintenance test flight the pilot's ESS BUS Circuit Breaker (CB) popped removing all essential power from the pilot's and copilot's flight instruments. I conducted the QRH ESSENTIAL BUS FAILURE - DC POWER LOSS Emergency Checklist which restored all DC Essential power. I declared an emergency for electrical power interruption; advising future communications may not be available; and of my intention of returning to our departure airport.I then configured the aircraft for landing early with Gear DOWN; flaps 20 [in anticipation of a possible recurrence]. Five to eight minutes later the ESS BUS CB popped again. Upon reaching the FAF I again reset the ESS BUS CB for landing and communications and landed without further failures.

While conducting a maintenance test flight the pilot of a Lear 35 suffered the loss of DC Essential bus electrical power. Although able to regain power through QRH procedures allowing the declaration of an emergency the bus failed again enroute back to the departure airport. Another reset of the offending Circuit Breaker (CB) permitted communications during the uneventful landing.


M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 36; Flight Crew Total 3828; Flight Crew Type 2955

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Cruising at six thousand as assigned in IMC in relatively smooth air we encountered a large downdraft of building storm that was not on our NEXRAD as there was very little if any rain. ATC also did not advise of any condition such as this. Aircraft [was] put into 1;500 FPM dive and 50 degree bank. This upset the autopilot which we promptly disconnected. Upon recovery we were almost one thousand feet below assigned altitude. Advised ATC of the deviation and issued Pirep to ATC.

M20 pilot reported an upset from a building storm that resulted in a 50 degree bank and 1;500 FPM rate of descent. Aircraft control was recovered after a loss of 1;000 feet.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

As SIC PNF (Second in Command; Pilot Not Flying) I was tasked with the cockpit duties. Getting the jet / cockpit ready for flight. All that that entails. I'm good at it; I like it. Very close to 40 minutes after entering the cockpit the 'cockpit' was ready to go fly. For a trip from ZZZ to [our international destination] it takes about that length of time. I did everything; I am very meticulous. Talk is cheap; I know.  I checked the route; I checked the SID; 1500 foot altitude restriction; I set up the noise abatement profile; I set up the ETP (Equal Time Point); etc; etc; ...I use a personal checklist to make sure I set up the cockpit correctly and completely. I am positive the [correct SID] departure was in the box; positive. Now; you probably have doubt but I'm telling you it was in there; period. We were busy with passengers; luggage; etc. right before engine start. This may be important; on international flights the clearance is only available 30 minutes prior to actual departure. On domestic flights it is available an hour prior to actual departures via [Company] scheduling. I received the clearance via CPDLC and there was an INSERT MOD of PUT. I accomplished entering the mod and checked route page that PUT had inserted correctly. I accomplished this just prior to passengers arriving. Everything is fine / normal. Loaded the luggage; started the engines; taxied; and pulled onto runway; and took off. All normal. Obviously not. I had checked the full route and SID prior to obtaining the CPDLC MOD clearance. Like an hour prior. I checked the MOD as I stated; but I did not recheck the whole route; why would I.The PIC (Pilot in Command) was inside FBO doing PIC duties. We did not check route together. But that is not unusual; again I am positive the [correct SID] was loaded; 1500 foot altitude restriction (NAV /VNAV).We were cleared for takeoff rather quickly; but not super fast. I had zero reason to think that we were not 100% ready to go. The PIC had briefed the noise abatement profile back in the chocks and I added that 1900 VSI would not be necessary because we would already be in ALT CAP; level off mode. Normal for the [departure]. On departure I noticed and verbalized that I did not see ALT CAP happening and to level off at 1500 feet. The standard departure SOP has the PNF looking at the altimeter a lot; very much oriented around altitude versus ground track. The PIC called for autopilot and of course tower switched us to departure control and the PIC said something to the effect of is the SID loaded. I don't know what he said but when I looked down at the MAP display we were driving into space on runway heading. No [SID]!First: when the jet receives a CPDLC clearance with a mod does that drop out the SID? I have no idea. I have had plenty of those type of clearances but cannot remember the specifics. Two: The charts had been 'updated' by Maintenance the previous night. I had to select proper date page out of ZZZ. Maybe that have had something to do with it? When we checked on with Departure Control they gave us a heading and climb right away which is kind of normal. They also said to fly the SID next time. I stated that it dropped out of the box on gear retraction. I had no reason to believe it was not in the box. I had no other answer; that is what I thought happened. I had checked it an hour or so ago. I am positive it was in the FMS way back during cockpit set up but prior to receiving CPDLC mod clearance.I have two recommendations: The go around call of flaps 6 spoilers zero should be changed. The spoilers zero means nothing to 99% of the crews. The callout has been diluted so bad it is meaningless. What does that have to do with anything? This; as an SOP we are to verbalize the 1st waypoint prior to takeoff. Most of the time we have to hunt for the waypoint because it is 10; 20; 30 miles away... meaningless. Change the SOP to RNAV departures only. That first fix is within 3-5 miles of the runway; important. That will help us emphasize that we are doing an RNAV departure and it is a little out of the ordinary. ZZZ1 and other airports make you read back first RNAV fix in takeoff clearance. Today the PIC may have; probably did; verbalize the first waypoint but I have the [SID] memorized and since it is an everyday sop his response did not draw me in as we were taking the runway and I was busy with all the other sops. There certainly is something to having so many sops that they become diluted; lose their importance. Maybe we have crossed the line just a bit. Without question; I pride myself in knowing the SOPs. But after I have verbalized the SOP am I really giving it the thought intended. No; I probably am not. Just some thoughts. I am not trying to change [Company]; I am not bucking the [Company] philosophy (I know my SOPs); just a couple of thoughts. We screwed up; obviously; BUT when did the [SID] drop out of the FMS. Seriously; I have no idea. Do you? Was it the MOD insert in the clearance? I need to know. We may have a few too many SOPs. They may have become diluted.

Global 6000 First Officer reported a route deviation due to an undetected FMC anomaly.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 215; Flight Crew Type 5500

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

On approach our yaw damper failed. The Captain elected to attempt to reset the yaw damper; but his attempts were unsuccessful. After being distracted by the yaw damper malfunction; we continued to configure for the approach. However; we were unable to stabilize the aircraft by 1;000 AGL as required by company policy; therefore; I called for a go-around. The Captain concurred; and we executed a missed approach.During the approach; I had noticed abnormal indications on the MASI. Specifically; the low speed red checkerboard and low speed yellow tape indications were displaying at much higher airspeeds than normal. I mentioned this to the Captain; but he disregarded it and immediately began to prepare for another approach. On the second approach; the same abnormally high MASI indications occurred. Since we were not able to achieve a stabilized approach; I called for another go-around. The Captain again concurred and we executed a second missed approach. I suggested that we get delaying vectors in order to run the Yaw Damper Failure Abnormal Checklist since I suspected that abnormal MASI indications may in some way be related to the failure of the yaw damper. The Captain concurred and we ran the Yaw Dampener Failure Abnormal Checklist. Because this did not correct the abnormally high low speed indications on the MASI; we contacted Company Maintenance via the radio in an attempt to gain help in sorting out the problem. Maintenance was unable to offer advice. However; moments later; I noticed that the flaps had failed to retract fully. This led me to make the correct diagnosis of a flap failure. We completed the no-Flaps Abnormal Checklist and diverted.I should have been more assertive by insisting that we get delaying vectors in order to diagnose the abnormally high low speed indications on the MASI after the first missed approach. I unwisely let the Captain rush me into immediately beginning to prepare for a second approach rather than insisting that we get delaying vectors to slowly and methodically diagnose the problem. I believe that we both initially (and hastily) dismissed the abnormal indications as a temporary software glitch. The abnormal MASI indications also distracted our attention from the flap position indicator.

The reporter advised they ultimately determined the flap position indicator showed the flaps were extended somewhere between zero and one. He felt confident they had been at that setting throughout the event. He emphasized the crew's failure to specifically check the flap indication was in part the result of their preoccupation with the yaw damper failure for which they hadn't initially conducted the appropriate checklist and the abnormal MASI indications for which they were trying to somehow logically relate to the failed yaw damper.When asked about flap fail/asymmetry warning lights/aural warnings he stated that there are none on the 737 models in their fleets. He was; in fact; aware that at least one company flight crew had flown an entire approach with the flaps at zero with the flap handle in an 'appropriate' landing setting and that the lack of any unique warning for such a failure he believes it is likely to happen again (and; he noted; probably had).When asked about deviations from normal control input effects from flap extension/retraction cycles he advised he was not the pilot flying and could not remember whether the captain was hand flying or on autopilot. On that subject he believes that the 737 models with which he is familiar exhibit less attitude change or positive/negative seat of the pants G forces than other types when flaps are extended or retracted. He did not recall any evident and/or significantly different such changes during the episode.Upon arrival at their diversion airport the flaps were extended using the alternate; electrical system.

When their yaw damper failed on approach the flight crew of a B737-700 was distracted and; unable to establish a stabilized approach to the short runway at their destination; performed a missed approach. A second approach suffered the same inability to stabilize at which time the First Officer noted abnormally high 'low speed' stall indications on the MASI [Mach Air Speed Indicator] and realized the flaps had not extended as commanded. They diverted successfully to an airport with longer runways.


Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Flight ABB from ZZZ was 6 hours late into ZZZ1. Upon arrival; there were 4 other flights on the ground and crews were scattered serving other flights. Aircraft was delayed marshalling into gate and also for servicing until crews could finish other flights. This aircraft turned Flight CDDD to ZZZ3 and as soon as a crew was available they began loading. The jet bridge had been removed by the time the crew began uploading; but it was only about 10 minutes to complete loading due to light load. As the lead was preparing to connect his headset to the aircraft; the flight crew flashed the nose gear light trying to get the attention of the ground crew. This temporarily blinded the lead who was unraveling a cord from the comm headset. He proceeded to attach the cord when the light was flashed a second time; hitting his eyes again. He stepped away from the aircraft to get out of the light and when he went to connect the headset again they flashed a third time. This nonstandard procedure has been reported before with no feedback or remedy. Employee was unable to continue working [the] flight due to spotty vision from nose gear light.

Ground employee reported that while attempting to connect the headset to the aircraft; the flight crew flashed the nose gear light three different times directly into the crew member's eyes; resulting in vision impairment.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Previous crew wrote up the aircraft for 'Low Airflow.' The inbound Captain and F/O both stated how airflow to the cockpit was very poor on the ground and on climbout. Maintenance troubleshooting revealed a faulty left pack. We coordinated with Dispatch (Mel 21-1a 'One pack Inop. pressurized Flt.) and re-planned the flight for FL240 with additional fuel. We reviewed 'Packs Off' performance data and discussed 'Packs Off' takeoff procedures. On takeoff at 400 FT 'Right Pack' reinstatement was negligible. Pressurization was slow to nonexistent due to low airflow and the cabin was climbing off schedule. Shortly thereafter the 'Pressurization Flow' Light came on. The outflow valve had moved to fully closed with the cabin still climbing off schedule. We followed the QRH Procedures; declared an 'Emergency' and immediately brought the plane back to land. The Captain accomplished a smooth and uneventful overweight landing.

MD82 First Officer reports being dispatched with one pack inoperative and discovering after takeoff that the remaining pack is also faulty. Flight returns to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Post Shutdown checklist at ZZZ1; Flight Attendant (FA) #1 advised me that she smelled a burning rubber odor after landing during the beginning stages of taxi-in. According to her input; this was the same odor that [the] Captain; First Officer; FA#1; and [the] Gate Agent smelled in ZZZ prior to gate departure. In ZZZ prior to gate departure; Maintenance (MX) was called. After consultation; MX techs believed that the source of the odor was external to the aircraft. They surmised that the source was landing aircraft on RWY XXL. Our aircraft was just south of the touchdown point with a north wind. The jetbridge door was open. The odor was distinct but not sustained. It was definitely a burning rubber odor and not a sweaty sock odor. After consulting with MX techs on the scene; I concluded that the MX explanation was plausible. That is; the source was external and not aircraft related. I had no other evidence to refute their assessment at the time. After making inquiry of the crew; no adverse symptoms were reported by anyone. No AML entry was made. I decided to depart for ZZZ1 as planned. No odors or adverse symptoms were noticed or reported during flight. Since FA#1 reported the same smell as described above after landing in ZZZ1; Additionally; we were more than 5 miles in trail of the preceding aircraft (a King Air). Based on the new evidence; I now believed the odor was aircraft-related and not precipitated by an external source.  Therefore; I made an AML entry and contacted Dispatch. I also spoke with the Chief Pilot and the Dispatcher for [our] flight. I completed a safety report.[Caused by] task saturation. Compressed timeline due to inbound aircraft disruption. (Change of planned aircraft.) Station ZZZ wanted the flight to depart for customer satisfaction. Station managers should be instructed to not suggest possible causes for a mechanical discrepancy (ground air conditioning as the odor source... 'happening all week'). I rejected that input as the ground AC was not connected while the aircraft was at the gate. Had the ground AC been connected; I may have falsely factored that input into the go/no-go decision.

After shutdown; (Flight Attendant) FA#1 advised us of a burning rubber smell in the forward cabin; this was the second time the smell occurred and we expected it might be from the APU. Earlier; prior to departure in ZZZ; we also smelled the burnt rubber smell. The smell came and went. ZZZ Maintenance personnel convinced myself and the Captain that due to our proximity to Runway XXL touchdown zone and multiple aircraft landing; that the smell was being pushed by a north wind through an open jet bridge door and into the forward entry door. The General Manager was on the bridge and claimed they've had complaints of that smell all week. Feeling that this explanation made sense and because it came and went; we decided to continue onto ZZZ1. However after landing we found out that the smell had returned and we then felt it necessary to write the aircraft up for a burnt rubber odor. Pressure to get an already delayed flight on its way by ZZZ Maintenance and General Manager that didn't want further delays. I believe that it would've been handled in ZZZ properly if we had just put it in the book before Maintenance ever showed up. Once the General Manager and Maintenance staff realized we weren't completely sure of the problem; they found plausible reasons that the smell was coming from outside sources rather than our aircraft.

A319 flight crew reported a cabin fumes event post flight during engine shutdown at gate. Discrepancy was referred to Maintenance and Dispatch as a repeat anomaly.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

On the takeoff roll as we approached the Vr speed we started to develop a strong vibration. I could tell it was from the nose gear; when I rotated the vibration continued and then I saw what appeared to be a piece of tire fly up and over the windshield. I realized that we had blown at least one nose tire. I continued the climb and let the First Officer know what I had seen. He called positive rate; not knowing the full extent of the damage to the nose gear I elected to keep the gear down. I called for speed mode and continued.The First Officer notified the Tower that we had lost a tire on the runway and should look for debris. I requested delay vectors and advised of our situation. ATC reported back that they had found tire debris on the runway. We leveled off at 5;000 and I kept the speed at 200 knots. I advised the flight attendants what had happened and to remain seated. After discussing the situation with the First Officer we knew we had lost at least one tire. Approach offered a low approach and would see if they were able to look at the nose gear. We contacted Dispatch via ACARS and Maintenance via local radio; but the signal was very week and broken.I told ATC that we would like to try the low approach. I briefed the passengers and flight attendants. We proceeded and performed a low approach. Upon climb a couple aircraft said they could see tires. Tower informed us that they got reports that we did not have any tires left on the nose. With conflicting reports we went with worse case situation. I informed ATC that we were going to proceed with emergency landing after we burnt enough fuel to get under our max landing weight. I briefed the flight attendants and informed her that we would be bracing in case the nose wheel would collapse upon landing. I informed dispatch and maintenance again. We ran the QRH for landing with gear unsafe or unknown situations.I touched down as softly as I could on the main and held the nose off as long as possible. The aircraft had a very strong vibration and was pulling to the left. I kept the aircraft on the center line and brought it to a complete stop. We were met with fire crews and inspected the aircraft. We learned we did have one tire left on the nose. We elected to taxi slowly off the runway and pulled into the west hardstand. Operations informed us that buses were already requested and to park in the stand. We secured the aircraft and the passengers were taken off and bused back to the terminal. Maintenance was already at the plane and informed they were taking it to the hangar.From talking to Maintenance it appears the aircraft did not sustain any damage other than the failed tire.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ-200 flight crew reported that during the takeoff roll; one nose gear tire failed right at rotation speed. Flight got airborne; but after assessing the damage the Captain decided to return to the departure airport. The aircraft stopped straight ahead on the runway and shut down.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Upon receiving the aircraft in ZZZ the inbound Captain had mentioned to my First Officer that ENG 1 had a fan blade being monitored by Maintenance and that it was on a special tracking system. I had looked through the logbook and had not seen such write up from Maintenance so I was a bit confused on what the First Officer had been telling me. We proceeded to fly our ZZZ - ZZZ1 - ZZZ round trip. On our return to ZZZ I had noticed that the ENG 1 HP Vibrations were trending higher than the ENG 2 HP vibrations but were still in the green range; However; we started noticing a slight abnormal vibration coming from the left side of the aircraft while in cruise. Upon landing in ZZZ and configuring for standard taxi into the gate I advised my First Officer to shut down ENG 1; when he commenced the ENG 1 shutdown we both felt the ENG abnormally vibrate and slightly shake the left side of the aircraft; at that point I figured something wasn't normal. Once we reached the gate I elected to do the walk around and discovered one of the fan blades had an abnormal shape/dent in it. I then contacted Maintenance to chat about this monitoring system that the previous Captain had mentioned to my First Officer when we received the aircraft; they had no documentation of it. I then proceeded to write up the fan blade to have Maintenance further inspect it.

An Air Carrier Captain reported abnormal engine vibrations in flight and while taxiing were due to a previously reported damaged fan blade that maintenance had not documented.


Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Incursion Runway

We were instructed to line up and wait with traffic to cross down field on Runway 27R. Tower instructed a host of aircraft to cross the runway. After all of the aircraft had crossed; Tower then cleared us for takeoff. I was PM; the Captain was PF. Around 80 knots I saw a Air Carrier Y edging out onto the runway and [I] verbalized this to the Captain. Tower then said something like 'Air Carrier Y; what are you doing? Stop right there.' This; coupled with the fact that the Air Carrier Y continued moving out onto the runway was enough reason for the Captain to call a rejected takeoff (now at around 100 knots). Tower did not instruct us to abort. We safely came to a stop and exited the runway and completed the QRH and appropriate checklists. It seemed as though Tower assumed Air Carrier Y had crossed when we had been cleared for takeoff; but they had actually not even begun to cross the runway. Additionally; it's tough to see Taxiway Papa (where Air Carrier Y) while you're at the approach end of 27R. Regardless; we shouldn't have been cleared to take off or Air Carrier Y's clearance to cross the runway should have been cancelled. I do not know what happened in the Tower; but we stopped as soon as we saw it was unsafe to continue.

We were cleared to lineup and wait on 27R in Atlanta while several aircraft were cleared to cross down field. When the runway was clear; we were given a takeoff clearance by tower. (We saw no aircraft on the runway when we received the takeoff clearance.) As we passed through 80 knots; my FO/PM brought to my attention that Air Carrier Y was crossing the runway. It took me a moment to process that we had a runway incursion. I initiated a rejected takeoff at about 100 knots. My FO informed tower of our abort; and we exited the runway on the highspeed Taxiway M12. I made a PA to inform the passengers that we discontinued the takeoff due to something on the runway; to stay seated with their seatbelts fastened; and that we would go back for takeoff shortly. We completed the RTO and after landing checklists and contacted dispatch. I checked with the FA; and all crew members were good to continue. We continued the flight with no further interruptions.We thought that Air Carrier Y mistakenly crossed 27R at P without a clearance after we were given the takeoff clearance. However; it appears that ATL Tower had cleared Air Carrier Y to cross 27R along with several other aircraft while we were holding in position. About 60 seconds after Air Carrier Y was given the clearance to cross; we were given the Takeoff clearance. Neither Tower; nor we realized that there was an aircraft that had not crossed the runway yet.If Air Carrier Y was not ready to cross the runway; they should have informed Tower or not have accepted the runway crossing Clearance. They crossed the runway about 90 seconds after receiving the Clearance; and we were on the takeoff roll with all exterior lights on. Tower needed increased vigilance; and we as a flight crew could have been proactive by noticing that an aircraft had not crossed the runway yet.

Air carrier flight reported a rejected takeoff at about 100 knots at ATL airport due to a ground conflict with another air carrier crossing their runway.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

As is standard [company] B1900 block out procedure; both the forward and aft doors were verified closed by checking the visual latch indications within the viewing portals on the door. The forward door latching mechanism was lit and the latching mechanism was verified locked in place and the door correctly secured. During the before start checklist; all caution and warning annunciators appeared normal; and both door micro switch clusters produced a 'lights out' condition on the annunciator panel. All start; taxi; takeoff and initial climb indications were normal. The aircraft blocked at XA45Z and was wheels up at XA59Z. During the cruise climb phase at approximately XB05Z (estimated;) through roughly 8;000 feet MSL and roughly 15 miles downrange; I noted momentary; quick single flashing of the master warning annunciator. I scanned all warning lights; but noted none illuminated. I cautiously continued enroute; considering the light as a possible momentary glitch. The activity continued sporadically throughout the climb until well after level flight was established at 16;000 feet MSL; some 40 miles downrange. Sometime after level flight was established (and cruise checklist verifying cabin differential around 4.6 PSI;) both the master warning and the forward cabin door annunciator lit in a steady red. The Emergency Checklist was consulted; and the cabin differential was reduced to zero while a descent to 10;000 feet MSL was requested for oxygen regulatory compliance. With the differential at zero and the cabin altitude at 10;000 ft MSL; the Forward Door Warning Annunciator remained on; (the master warning had been cancelled/reset for trigger.) The remainder of the checklist; then; called for landing at the nearest suitable airport; that airport being ZZZ. I determined that ZZZ1 was some ten minutes further flying; and that to fly an approach into ZZZ (an unfamiliar airport); off of a familiar route without the benefit of a weather and NOTAM briefing in IMC was less of a safe option than continuing to my scheduled destination. I therefore elected to continue to ZZZ1 IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY.  In order to deviate from an approved checklist procedure (landing at the nearest suitable airport;) I elected to request priority handling; thus granting me authority to deviate as necessary to the extent necessary to meet the emergency.  An uneventful descent; ILS approach; landing and block in at ZZZ followed at XB56Z.I became aware through the triggering of the aircrafts master warning and warning annunciator system.Forward door micro switch cluster out of correct alignment.Followed the BE1900 [company] approved emergency checklist. Deviated from 'land at the nearest suitable airport' in the interest of safety.

BE-1900 Captain reported diversion caused by Master Warning Door Open light indication.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 04R

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Type 4134

Descending on the ROBUC1 Arrival we were approaching the JOODY intersection. We had previously been given a descend via clearance runway 4R. When we were switched over to approach control; he told us to intercept the localizer; I believe his exact phrase was 'intercept the localizer when able; but comply with the altitude restrictions'. I then went to the legs page on the FMS and brought WINNI intersection to the top and extended the course off of WINNI 036. I selected LNAV after confirming with the Captain before executing anything. I had the captain confirm we were still cleared to 6;000 feet. ATC said yes; we were cleared to 6;000 feet but to comply with altitude restrictions after intercepting the localizer; I started to wonder about what altitude restrictions he was talking about. We were cleared to 6;000 feet; and we were established on the localizer; not the arrival. We were no longer on the arrival; but established on the localizer. The only altitude restrictions were WINNI at 4;000 feet and we were cleared to 6;000 feet. I then thought maybe he wanted us to track the localizer but meet the Arrival altitude restrictions. That's not possible; but I went to the fix page and put SOFEE intersection in the FMC. We were tracking right over the top and were 9;000 feet or above. I confirmed with the Captain that he agreed with what we were doing. He said yes. ATC then switched us to a different frequency. Captain checked in and I believe stated we were on the localizer and descending to 6;000 feet. ATC gave us a acknowledgement of our check in. I don't believe he said anything about complying with altitudes or questioned us about being on the localizer; instead of the arrival Later we were given clearance for 4;000 feet and then given clearance for the ILS to 4R. Performed and normal approach and landing to 4R.  Later looking at the arrival and the approach they are about identical in their track. If they weren't identical then how did ATC expect us to intercept the localizer. The arrival says we will get radar vectors after GOSHI. ATC did not give us anything other than 'intercept localizer';.  He told us that when we were headed to JOODY. The controller should have stated when to intercept; on current heading; after GOSHI or after he gave us radar vectors.

B737 First Officer on the ROBUC1 RNAV arrival to BOS is cleared to 6;000 feet and to intercept the Runway 4R localizer when able but comply with the altitude restrictions. This does not make sense to the reporter and is not clarified prior to landing.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Non-rev seated in X3 came on board with his mask down to his chin; not covering his nose and mouth. Waited several minutes once he took his seat to see if he would place mask over his mouth and nose and he didn't. I then proceed to go over to him after making the mask policy announcement and state for him to put his mask up covering his nose and mouth. He does for the time being. Once I start my service; I notice his mask is not covering his nose. He didn't eat or drink anything throughout the entire flight. I feel as flight attendants we have enough to do in policing rev passengers and shouldn't have to police for passengers who work for the company and understand the mask policy and not want to comply. Employees trying to get away with not complying with the policy. It's getting out of hand.

Flight Attendant reported a non-revenue passenger was not wearing a face mask and had to be told to comply with the policy.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Shortly after departure; I was notified by the flight attendant that a leakage from the right wing was observed by one of the passengers. Upon a brief inspection from the cabin; I determined that we had a significant fuel leak. The leak appeared to be coming between the right aileron and the outboard portion of the wing.At that point; [ATC was advised] due to the fact I had no idea what the cause of the leak was. We turned around and landed uneventfully; where we were met by emergency personal.

GIV Captain reported returning to departure airport after a passenger noticed fluid leaking from the right wing.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 8; Flight Crew Total 625; Flight Crew Type 575

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

While on a Biennial Flight review; the engine lost all power and we were forced to land on a county road. We were approximately 1500 ft. AGL when the engine lost power. We found a paved county road and landed safely.

Cessna 172 pilot reported engine failure which resulted in a safe forced landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 341; Flight Crew Type 9500

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 435; Flight Crew Type 3000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Being vectored for right traffic LAX Runway 24R; on downwind leg; we were in and out of a cloud layer that was ragged from approximately 4;000 FT to 7;000 FT. While still on downwind; the Controller pointed out traffic that would precede us; but the traffic would be landing 24L and we would land 24R. We stated that we were IMC and could not make visual contact. I was vigilant of TCAS targets; but there was no obvious target that we were following. We were vectored to a base leg and given a descent. At that point; the Controller again pointed out B767 traffic and that the traffic was for 24L and we would land 24R. We had the airport clearly in sight and I had an aircraft in sight that seemed to match the position we were given for our traffic. Checking both visually and on TCAS; I saw no other aircraft in the same general area that we could possibly be following. The traffic was significantly closer to the airport than we were and was on final. We were still on base and I saw no other traffic. I told the First Officer 'airport in sight; traffic in sight'. He made the same call to ATC and we were given a final heading to intercept the Runway 24R localizer and were cleared for the visual approach. We captured the localizer with no overshoot; captured the glide slope and started a normal; even somewhat early; configuration and speed reduction sequence. At somewhere slightly below 2;000 FT; TCAS gave a 'MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED' RA. I disconnected the autopilot and swallowed the descent. At that point; I saw the B767; which was on final for Runway 24L; ahead of and lower than us; flying a parallel course. At about the same time; LAX Tower instructed us to not pass the B767. I slowed to final approach speed; heard 'CLEAR OF CONFLICT' and regained the Runway 24R glide slope. Separation was very adequate by this point; with the B767 significantly out in front of us and for the parallel runway. We were able to resolve the conflict with minimal maneuvering. I do not believe that this was the aircraft that I originally called in sight and I did not see this aircraft on our TCAS prior to receiving the RA.

[Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]

Air Carrier inbound to LAX for a Visual Approach to Runway 24R sighted the wrong aircraft with respect to sequence. Separation was not compromised.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.5

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Numerous aircraft deviated between the complexes due to weather. Aircraft X was given direct to LNDIZ prior to entering the CKB sector. CKB initiated a hand off on Aircraft X to the MOR/BRY sector in ZDC. As the aircraft neared the boundary; the 'controller' from ZDC called on the shout line to tell us to put Aircraft X over HVQ because 'his supervisor didn't want the aircraft in their center'. I asked if he could override the supervisor in this instance and he replied in the negative. I informed the R side of the situation and he turned the aircraft away from ZDC airspace. We coordinated with ZID that Aircraft X would be on the heading that they would see during the hand off initiation and that we would turn him back to LNDIZ at the boundary when he was clear of ZDC's airspace. I made a point out to the MOR/BRY sector and mysteriously a point out on the very same aircraft was fine with them and promptly approved. Moments later; Aircraft X needed to deviate for weather. The deviation turn took him back toward the original flight path that ZDC was adamantly against him following in the first place.It is not uncommon for controllers from ZDC to refuse flights from ZOB. It seems that most of the time they do so is because they are spacing and don't want the extra aircraft. It happens even when weather is involved. They can't take a hand off on aircraft routed through their airspace; but have no problem taking a point out for some odd reason. Its one thing to be lazy when the skies are clear; but quite another when weather deviations are involved. We are here to provide a service; but that doesn't seem to apply to ZDC. We've actually had pilots on frequency admit that they file routes that avoid ZDC airspace because of how bad they are. When ZDC doesn't play ball with the centers around or the pilots that they 'serve'; they run the risk of creating traffic saturation in airspace that surrounds them. That could lead to very risky safety issues.

ZOB Center Controller reported ZDC Center did not want to take an aircraft due to weather; so they rerouted it into ZID Center's airspace.  Aircraft deviated for weather and went on original routing through ZDC Center's airspace.


Troubleshooting; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During our preflight; I determined the assigned aircraft as 'unable to operate'.' A320 was replaced with another A320 aircraft. After opening the CCS Sabre Flight Plan Manager; I selected the briefing tab; checked all applicable selections; and the selected 'Print All.' The Sabre Briefing Package presented was labeled Flight XXX; Release 03. The Briefing Package contained an OFP now listing the newly assigned aircraft. However; the Sabre Briefing Package contained the DIL and log for Aircraft XXX (the previously assigned aircraft). Additionally; Release 03 for Flight XXX now included an alternate when before there was none. The Sabre Briefing Package; Release 03 did not include the weather and NOTAM information for this alternate airport. This is a reoccurring problem which has been reported several times before. I myself have submitted several reports identifying this very problem with the Sabre Flight Planning Program. Please ensure that: 1) Pilots are notified that their Sabre Flight Plan Briefing Packages may be omitting regulatory required documentation.2) Please correct this reoccurring problem with Sabre not updating the flight planning package according to changes in the flight planning process.

An A320 Captain noted that when his flight release is revised; his air carrier's revised SABRE flight plan briefing packages do not always include the alternate's weather and NOTAM information.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

After we started engines we did a Taxi Check. We talked with the deice truck to see where they wanted us to park for deice. It was still dark and there was frost on the wings. I gave the ramp agent the thumbs up that we were ready to taxi. Ramp agent gave me the chocks out signal which I had forgotten to give so I returned the chocks out signal to them. The agent then started backing up away from the aircraft with their arms held out in front of them. I released the brake and started to roll forward for the taxi. I then saw a [ramp agent] run in front of the plane with the chocks in their hands. I did not know that ramp agent was down there and had gotten stuck on the opposite side of the plane (Taxiway side) after pulling the chocks. I put the brakes on until ramp agent cleared. After that we taxied to the deice location; where the ramp agent (guessing ramp manager) let me know that I just about ran over the [ramp agent] doing chocks. I told them that I had seen [the ramp agent] and that it scared me too. I also told them that I thought the agent was giving me a taxi forward signal.Slow down. Think about the people around the aircraft. It would help to have the wands held in the x position so that there is a definite stop signal. However the way their wands were held is also a hold position signal. I do find that that same signal is also used as a line up here signal by many ramp agents and so I misinterpreted it as them wanting me to go that way. I also think it would help to have the chocks turned so that the ramp agent removing them would be on the terminal side of the aircraft giving the agent an out in that situation.

CRJ-200 Captain reported narrowly missing a ramp employee when taxi was begun before the signal was given.


Bombardier/Canadair Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10

Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 22

Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Runway

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing

Aircraft X had landed [Runway] XXR and stopped on the runway to question the exiting instructions. This delay in exiting caused the next [Runway] XXR arrival to go around. Then; an airport vehicle requested permission to inspect the runway because there's some local airport procedure to sweep the runway behind a [type aircraft]. There was a full sequence of arrivals to [Runway] XXR and [Runway] XY. Then; while the Local Controller was sorting out the Aircraft X arrival; the succeeding go-around; and the airport vehicle; Aircraft Y ([Runway] XXR) and the Aircraft Z ([Runway] XY) tied at the intersection. ASDE-X (Airport Surface Detection Equipment) alarmed; Local Controller issued a late go-around.Actual time on position may not have been a factor; rather the lack of staffing to open other positions and reduce the Local Controller's workload. There were only two of us in the tower at the time; simply because no one else was available. We had asked; and been told that we would be getting more people at XA:30z. Positions in the TRACON were also combined; and despite the fact that management had kept 3 tower-certified controllers down [in the TRACON] to 'get time'; one controller was working both the runways Arrival position; and vectoring the final to Runway [Runway] XY having to sequence in with the intersecting [Runway] XXR arrivals. The search for more controllers is on-going. What else can one do; when asking for more staffing; and being told to just wait?

I was working Local Controls combined. I had Aircraft X land Runway XXR. I told the aircraft to exit the runway at taxiway. An airport vehicle asked to check the runway behind the Aircraft X as per our SOP (Standard Operating Procedure). Aircraft X then stopped at taxiway on the runway an asked if I was sure I wanted him to clear there as he is a [type aircraft]. I said affirmative. It was then too close for the next arrival to land safely so I sent him around. I then got the airport vehicle on to the runway but had to have him exit early as more arrivals were too close. It was then that the ASDE-X (Airport Surface Detection Equipment) alarmed informing me that the next [Runway] XXR arrival and [Runway] XY arrival were in conflict. I sent the [Runway] XXR arrival; Aircraft Y; around. Aircraft Y was about to touch down when he executed the go around. I had become distracted by the situation with Aircraft X and vehicle. By the time I was made aware of the tie between the [Runway] XY arrival and [Runway] XXR arrival the ASDE-X had alarmed. I would give more space behind Aircraft X to do the runway sweep and maybe have local controls split during the push.

Tower Controllers reported a landing aircraft on short final was sent around when the ASDE-X alarm alerted the Local Controller to conflicting traffic landing on an intersecting runway. The Local Controller working both Local positions combined due to a lack of staffing was distracted by a previous arrival stopping on the runway causing the Controller to have to send a subsequent arrival around.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 1500; Flight Crew Type 60

We were beginning to descend from our cruise at 2;500 ft. when Aircraft Y descended on top of us from head on. I hadn't seen the airplane until it filled my windshield. We quickly put Aircraft X into a descending left hand turn because Aircraft Y was slightly to the right side of our aircraft. The plane did not appear to have seen us because they didn't make an effort to turn or climb. It is not uncommon for [university] airplanes to appear completely clueless about whats going on around them. I believe the main cause of the issue was pilot traffic scanning; and maintaining focus outside the cockpit while flying visually. We did not have an ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast) transponder on board so if they were relying on their ADS-B traffic system to show where we were; then it would not have worked. I don't know why I hadn't found it until as late as it was because I was actively scanning for traffic; and the student I was flying with is a seasoned aviation professional as well. I have already had a conversation with our flight school about staying aware when we are out flying; and will further remind everyone at our next staff meeting.

Flight Instructor reported a NMAC resulted in taking evasive action.


Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

I was working all the locals combined up at Local Control 3 due to a closure on 19L. It was the arrival bank. I had a Local Assist. PCT was landing 19C and 19R. Because of construction on the high speed exits of 19C/1C PCT can't run reduced separation on 19C. So PCT has been told they need to give IAD at least 3 miles between arrivals to 19C. The arrival bank was just starting to get busy. PCT had just started landing 19R. I noticed that the PCT Final Controller had about 8 arrivals they were working and the Final was not split. I had an arrival (RJ) to 19C with an A320 close behind and overtaking the RJ. I was talking to the RJ; but not the A320. Both aircraft were in my airspace. The FLM heard me comment to the Local Control Assist that PCT needed to quickly slow and switch the A320 or that 'this is not going to work.' The RJ needed to go down to the 3rd high speed to exit due to the construction. The FLM said he would call PCT and advise them they needed to comply with the restriction on 19C final. I advised the FLM that I was still not talking to the A320. At that time the RJ was 2 mile final and the A320 was maybe 4 mile final. I noticed that the A320 was starting to 'S turn' on final. I then noticed that I had 2 arrivals to Runway 19R. I was talking to the 1st 19R arrival but not the 2nd. I kept trying to reach the A320 on the frequency to no avail. The Local Assist Controller called the Final Controller and told them to switch the A320. The RJ landed 19C and I advised them to hurry down the runway as I was not talking to the A320. The Local Assist told Final to clear the A320 to land 19C. At that time I believe that the RJ was still on the runway. The RJ then cleared 19C just prior to the A320 landing 19C. I never cleared the A320 to land 19C. The A320 cleared 19C and called me on Local. I switched the A320 to Ground. I advised the FLM that the A320 landed without me giving him a clearance. I told the FLM he needed to call PCT and make sure they cleared the A320 to land 19C. The FLM called PCT and PCT advised that they did not clear the A320 to land 19C. As all of this was going on; I had the same thing happen on 19R 2 minutes later with another air carrier not talking to the Tower until 1 mile final with a preceding arrival still on the runway. If the above 2 incidents were not enough; later I was working Local Control 1 during a departure bank. We were north departing 1C and 30; landing 1C/1L; 1/R was closed. An A380 landed 1L and was holding short of 1C at W3. I had numerous aircraft awaiting departure 1C and a 1C with the A380 and depart 1C prior to the next 1C arrival. I knew I would slow up the 1C arrival or 'S' turn him if I had to. I reached out to the aircraft on 4 mile final 1C to advise them to slow. They were not on the frequency. I advised the FLM that I was not talking to the aircraft on final 1C. I advised the A380 to cross 1C with no delay. I told the A380 that traffic on the runway was waiting for them and that there was traffic on final I was not talking to. The view out the window was getting worse. I started to worry about if it was going to work and what I was going to do if the arrival never checked in. The A380 cleared 1C and now I am panicking. I am still not talking to the aircraft 1 1/2 mile final 1C. I have an aircraft LUAW on 1C and if they are not cleared for an immediate takeoff I will lose separation. But if I clear him for takeoff and the 1C arrival goes around 1C because he does not have a landing clearance; what is the go-around going to do? Fly runway heading and my departure will climb into him from underneath him? I cleared the 1C LUAW aircraft for immediate takeoff and advised him I was not talking to the 1C arrival. Finally the 1C arrival checked in short final. I cleared him to land and just had legal separation. Why does PCT put me in that situation on a DAILY basis? I have to base what I am doing with aircraft on the assumption they are going to switch people to the Tower. Thisissue of PCT not switching aircraft to the Tower is beyond unacceptable. If it is because they are to busy with the Final all combined up then they need to split the position sooner. PCT needs to comply with the restriction they are given on Final. PCT needs to split the Final position sooner. A new LOA needs to be developed that requires arrivals to contact the Tower prior to entering the Tower airspace.

IAD Controller described an on going unsafe condition chronicling several late frequency changes from PCT making landing/takeoff decision very difficult.


Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

At FL180 we got a Master Caution light. We also had the Number 1 Rud Iso Vlv caution light [and] the Number 1 Rud Hyd caution light. We pulled out the Emergency Checklist [and] followed the ISO VLV Checklist. We had approximately 8 quarts of Hyd fluid. We declared an emergency and informed the following people of the situation. ATC; Dispatch; Ops; [and] the FA. We made a zero flap landing; turn off the runway and parked the aircraft on the taxiway. The firemen inspected the aircraft and we were towed to the gate. There were [no] injuries and no damage to the aircraft.

DHC8-100 Captain experiences a loss of hydraulic fluid at FL180 and declares an emergency. Flight continues to destination for a no flap landing and is towed to the gate.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 0.6; Flight Crew Total 41; Flight Crew Type 41

Distraction; Fatigue; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Other

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Unintentionally flew drone in ZZZ Class B airspace without authorization for 12 minutes.How the problem arose:1. I assumed authorization of an LAANC request without verifying a text authorization was received.2. A one minute miscalculation caused the LAANC rejection of flying at night. Sunset was at XA:23. Thirty minutes past sunset was XA:53. The request was submitted at XA:09 for a 45 minute flight which puts the request end time at XA:54; one minute past the 30 minute window following sunset.How it was discovered:After the flight I realized I had failed to check for a text message with authorization before takeoff. I found no text message on my phone. I even tried and failed to find a place to view my LAANC request history online to ensure the request had been authorized. In the AirMap app used to make the request; I found the rejected LAANC request in the Flights menu area. Not an area I normally review prior to a flight because it always appeared empty. I thought maybe a bug in the AirMap app or I just didn't understand the purpose of the section. Now I know; after some experimentation; it takes my app a great many seconds to populate Flights. While it loads data the AirMap app displays the message 'no current flights.' I assumed this meant it only displayed currently active flights. Wrong assumption. If you wait long enough it loads all your past requests. And that is how I found the rejection with the reason of flying at night right at the top of the list.Contributing Factors:Fatigue and rushing. Sunset nearing; losing the light. Soon people would be nearby and I did not want to risk flying over them. The scenario made me anxious and nervous and caused me to rush.It had been 3 months since my last LAANC request so I was out of practice using the app.My Conclusions:1. I should have recognized I was rushing and fatigued and slowed myself down or stopped altogether.2. I should have waited until I positively laid eyeballs on a text authorization and known exactly where to find the request status in the app if the text message is not received. Now I do; it's in the Flights menu.3. Had I discovered the rejection I could have easily re-entered with a reduced amount of time. The request would probably have been approved without issue. Of course there could still be other conditions that would cause a flight to be rejected.4. Reviewing AirMap operation; I believe I simply missed or misread the AirMap messages warning that my submission would be rejected. I believe now that I incorrectly pressed continue rather than cancel when asked if I want to continue the flight. This is why the flight timer started and I assumed an approved flight. Poor assumption.Remediations:Training. I have reviewed the AirMap app and believe I understand where my errors occurred and why. I will also look for a detailed training for the AirMap app to see if there are other information and safety features I am unaware of to prevent any future incidents. Authorize flight in advance when possible rather than at the scene immediately before the mission. This allows the request in a neutral environment and time for reflection and adjustment. I did not know until now how to authorize a flight in advance in AirMap. Moving forward I will use that feature.Self-evaluate for fatigue; nervousness or anxiety; etc before flight. Adjust pre-flight procedures. 1. Do not rush. 2. Self evaluate mental state (How are you feeling - BE HONEST). 3. Double check all LAANC request input parameters. READ all AirMap app prompts thoroughly.4. Submit LAANC request. 5. Verify LAANC authorization received in text message and in AirMap Flights menu section. 6. Unpack drone equipment. 7. Perform pre-flight equipment checks.

UAV pilot reported flying and not realizing authorization had been denied.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 8700; Flight Crew Type 4616

Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 169; Flight Crew Total 13164; Flight Crew Type 1463

Workload; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

We were on first flight of four day trip. Flight from ZZZ [in] night IFR conditions. We were climbing on RNAV Departure. Captain was flying; I was Pilot Monitoring. Autopilot was on approaching 12;000 feet climbing to assigned altitude of 16;000 [feet]. I heard a thump then felt the aircraft yawing. Engine display showed engine 1 (left) had failed. Captain turned off autopilot. We [requested priority] with ZZZ Departure. Captain said he would fly and I was to work the ECAM for the engine failure. Once aircraft was stable; Captain turned the autopilot back on. I followed the steps of the ECAM as the Captain coordinated with ATC and then talked to the flight attendants; he then made a PA [public announcement] to the passengers. Once the ECAM complete; I referred to the QRH ENG1 Fail Checklist to ensure all steps were accomplished. The APU was started. We discussed attempting a relight as there was no indications of engine damage. We did [it] unsuccessfully. During relight attempt; we saw No Fuel Flow and ENG Stator Fail ECAMs. I then started working the ENG Shutdown Checklist per the QRH. I discontinued that checklist to load the return to ZZZ and approach to Runway XXR; the captain briefed the approach. We discussed the overweight landing procedures as our gross weight was approximately 150;000 [lbs].The Descent and Landing Checklist were accomplished as the aircraft was configured normally for a visual approach to Runway XXR. Approach and landing were normal; we rolled out and taxied clear of the runway. We made a PA announcement for everyone to remain seated. We communicated with the fire rescue vehicles and they could see no damage so we continued to taxi to the gate. The passengers deplaned normally through the jet bridge.

[Report Narrative contains no additional information.]

A320 flight crew reported an engine failure during climb that resulted in a return to the field.


Flight Attendant Airline Total 9; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 3; Flight Attendant Total 9; Flight Attendant Type 100

Safety Related Duties; Deplaning; Boarding

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

This A/C (Aircraft) had been in maintenance prior to us getting this A/C. They said it was for a pressurization problem.  We boarded the A/C and flew to ZZZ. We taxied in; arriving at the gate; the Captain gave me the signal to open the A/C door by turning off the seat belt sign. I got out of my seat belt stowed my jump seat. Unlocked the door and tried to push it open it seemed like it was stuck (we have a few A/C that the door is hard to push open) so I pushed even harder when it finally started to open I could hear this sucking sound coming in around the door. I knew then that I was going to be sucked out the door. I was trying to grab onto anything my hands could find; which was the wall next to me and try to scramble backward with my feet as not to be sucked out. I open the flight deck door and asked the Captain what's going on; I was almost sucked out of the A/C. He checked the gauges and said (oh God) the plane didn't depressurize; I'm sorry are you okay? I told him I hurt my arm.

CRJ-200 Flight Attendant reported almost being sucked out of the aircraft after arriving at the gate and trying to open the cabin door. The Captain said the aircraft did not depressurize.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Physiological - Other

Physiological - Other; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

At FL340; noticed the smell of fuel in the cockpit. Complied with QRH procedures. [Advised ATC] and landed at ZZZ without incident. Fuel Fumes from unknown origin. Fix the aircraft.

At cruise alt 34;000 feet; we noticed a smell of jet fuel in the flight deck. It was intermittent at first on the First Officer side and then suddenly got stronger throughout the flight deck. We donned the O2 masks and complied with QRH checklists. Diverted to ZZZ. ATC was advised. No odor was smelled in the cabin at first; but half way through the descent; the flight attendants started smelling a fuel odor in the aft cabin and galley. Upon landing at ZZZ [Runway] XXL; we stopped on the runway and had the aircraft checked for a fuel leak prior to taxiing to the gate. As the aircraft was being checked out; the aft flight attendants reported the odor/fumes increasing in intensity. When asked if they believed an evacuation was necessary; they said no. We eventually taxied to the gate and deplaned all passengers to avoid any unnecessary additional exposure to possible fumes. Multiple announcements to passengers were made throughout the event by the cockpit and cabin crew. After all passengers were deplaned the flight deck and cabin crew jointly debriefed at an empty gate. It was determined that nobody needed medical attention. Fumes event; cause unknown. [No suggestions; as it was an issue with the aircraft. Other suggestion is that it did not occur to the flight attendants to don their PBEs although they were exposed to potentially toxic fumes. I also did not - until after the incident - think of reminding them. Should be stressed more in training that flight attendants also need to protect themselves with PBEs during fume events not just smoke events.

Air carrier flight crew reported at cruise the flight deck and passenger cabin began to smell of fuel. The crew completed the QRH and diverted.


Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

I noticed the aircraft had not flown for two days and had been written up for right engine stalls and loud bangs on climbout; however; Maintenance had signed it off. We accomplished all Before Start; Push; Taxi; and Takeoff checklists normally. As we retracted the gear after takeoff we experienced what felt like a large bird smashing into the left side of the nose; one loud bang. All engine instruments where normal and we continued climbing. A few moments later; around 7;000 MSL; there were three or more loud bangs accompanied with a slight yaw. The First Officer was the Pilot Flying and immediately applied the Engine Limit/Surge/Stall Immediate Action items.All engine indications normal. We kept the engine running and leveled off at 10;000. I reported our issue to Departure and requested vectors to the ILS Runway 35L. We had just briefed and shot that ILS on our inbound flight. The flight attendants were very concerned about the banging noise and knew something was not normal. They had rung the flight deck and after I had communicated with Departure I answered their call. I informed them the right engine wasn't performing normally and we were going to return to [our departure airport] and make a normal landing. 'All is good and I'm about to make a PA.' I briefed the passengers and advised we would make a normal landing and I would speak to them again when we arrived at the gate. I also made a quick call to airport Operations and informed them we were returning; so they could start the process of getting us a gate and contacting Dispatch. The First Officer was doing a very nice job flying the aircraft and after we looked at the Engine Limit/Surge/Stall Checklist in the QRH we decided to leave the engine running and run the One Engine Inoperative Landing Checklist just in case we had to shut down the engine. At some point we received an Off Scheduled Descent master caution and I ran that checklist as well. The controllers initiated an emergency for us and started vectoring us for an ILS 35R. I entered that approach into the CDU and briefed it. The weather was 300 overcast; visibility one mile in fog. After running the landing data; all the appropriate checklists and briefing the approach; I took over the Pilot Flying duties; shot the ILS 35R; made a normal landing; and taxied to the gate.On a return to the departing airport an Off Schedule Descent light is expected. More information in the QRH would be helpful to ensure the landing pressurization is correct. Our original destination altitude was 750 FT (MSL) and we landed back at our departure airport which is several thousand feet higher. When all the checklists were run and the approach briefed; the aircraft was still pressurizing to 750 FT. We selected manual opening the out flow valve after discovering this problem while taxiing in.

Concern is that myself and 'C' flight attendant were told directly; 'Probably should not be telling you this; but this aircraft had been in maintenance last 2 days and was pulled out of service for exactly same emergency situation that we just had and had to divert and return to gate. Fuel leak in engine housing causing visible flames from passengers in cabin and extreme turbulence from engine stopping/restarting/back-firing.'Would like to know who serviced this aircraft? What was found? Was it even fixed? Definitely feel test flight should have been done before sending pax and crew out on first flight after this happened

A B737-700 crew experienced compressor stalls on climbout and return to the departure airport. The aircraft had been signed off as airworthy after a previous flight had experienced compressor stalls.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 9.4; Flight Crew Total 1050.9; Flight Crew Type 426

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I was preparing to depart Runway 35 at CON on an IFR flight plan. Weather in Concord was CAVU; but I expected possible IMC during the let-down; so I stuck with the IFR. My accepted clearance was from CON; direct CON VOR; V93 [southwest bound]; then as filed. When I called for my release from CON; the Controller asked if I was able to remain clear of terrain and obstacles northbound. This is phraseology I am familiar with when departing uncontrolled fields in mountainous areas; so I thought it was a little odd to ask in this case; but I thought that perhaps ATC procedures had changed. The published Obstacle Departure Procedure (ODP) at CON calls for a climb northbound to 1;300 FT before turning on course; in this case it would be to the VOR. Since the ODP would keep me clear of terrain and obstacles; I acknowledged with an affirmative. In fact; since the ODP provides for terrain and obstacle clearance in all directions after reaching 1;300 FT; I thought the question was superfluous; but I did not question the Controller; (which I should have). I was released and again told that I was to maintain my own terrain and obstacle clearance northbound; and there was Mooney traffic inbound from the northwest. I read that back and indicated I would keep my eyes peeled for the Mooney. I thought his comments were emphasizing the terrain and obstacle clearance; and that 'northbound' referred to a general direction I would be headed on the first part of the ODP; having departed on the northbound runway; and did not perceive that as direction to fly heading 360. I also thought the Mooney must not be IFR; because in the past I have been held on the ground at CON for any inbound IFR traffic to clear. So I thought the Mooney reference was simply pointing out VFR traffic in the area; just as traffic is pointed out to IFR flights operating in VMC all the time. After takeoff; I executed the ODP; including the turn to the VOR. Upon initial call-up; I was asked to confirm I was northbound. I indicated that I was not; and began a turn back to the north. The Controller then instructed me to instead fly heading 210 for traffic. There was no indication from the Controller of a conflict. After a few moments; I queried the Controller for clarification; explaining that when I was asked about remaining clear of terrain and obstacles northbound; I did not interpret that as direction to remain on a northbound heading. The Controller explained that in order to release me and NOT use the published departure procedure; they had to confirm that I could remain clear of terrain and obstacles in the direction of travel; and that by asking that question and my accepting terrain and obstacle responsibility northbound; they assume I would have continued northbound and that they would call my turn. After I thanked him for the clarification; the Controller indicated no problem; so I assume there was no loss of separation. There was no further discussion on the matter. Clearly; I misinterpreted the intended departure clearance; and fortunately there was no real harm done; this time. I interpreted 'Can you remain clear of terrain and obstacles northbound' as 'Can you remain clear of terrain and obstacles while northbound on the ODP; having departed the northbound runway'; whereas what was being asked was; 'Can you remain clear of terrain and obstacles if you were to continue to fly northbound and NOT use the ODP'? I thought the emphasis was on the terrain and obstacles; and I did not understand that they were asking me to abandon the ODP. In retrospect; I did accept a clearance to remain clear of terrain and obstacles northbound; so it is reasonable that ATC would assume I would do exactly that. What will I do in the future? 1. If ATC provides direction that I find unexpected for the situation; question it; especially since it was mentioned more than once. In this case; if I had questioned the use of the terrain and obstacle clearance phraseology; we probablywould have sorted it out before takeoff.2. Listen carefully to the words coming out of my mouth; I did accept a departure clearance to remain clear of terrain and obstacles northbound.3. If; when acknowledging the ability to remain clear of terrain and obstacles I had said something like; 'yes; the ODP takes care of that; so no problem'; the Controller would have been tipped-off that I did not understand his intent. So; don't be too verbose but don't be afraid to add enough detail to convey your understanding.4. If the Controller says or asks something that sounds superfluous; do not assume that I know why it was asked; and ask why. What might ATC have done differently?1. If my release had contained the phraseology 'fly heading…' or 'for traffic; fly heading' or 'fly northbound for now and we'll call your turn'; that might have been a bit clearer. Whenever I depart controlled fields and there is a desire from ATC to deviate from the published departure procedure; they say; for example; fly heading 360; Runway 35; cleared for takeoff. 2. When they asked about remaining clear of terrain and obstacles northbound; if they had explicitly indicated that was in lieu of the ODP; that would have also made it clear; but I think from their perspective; they essentially had done that. 3. If my actual clearance; had been amended to 'Radar vectors to CON VOR; fly heading 360 for now;' that too would have done it. I have one last thought. During my request for clarification; the controller's description of the ODP was either customized to this situation; or it is different from mine. In his clarification; the controller said the procedure calls for a turn to the VOR; but the procedure reads 'climb to 1;300 before turning on course'; without specifying the VOR. I wonder if this difference in interpretation of the ODP may have also biased my thinking and the Controllers thinking in different ways such that we thought we were on the same page; but in fact were not.

PA28 pilot reports misunderstanding his IFR clearance departing CON. An ATC question about maintaining terrain clearance northbound is interpreted as just that; a question and not a clearance to maintain runway heading after takeoff.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 1450; Flight Crew Type 20

Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

I was on the inbound leg in a Cessna 404.  The previous day; I wrote up a maintenance discrepancy regarding slight bending to the nose gear doors.  The gear doors were checked; straightened; and the discrepancy was cleared.  While I was preflighting the aircraft; the gear doors appeared airworthy.  The flight was routine up until final into my filed destination.  As I lowered the gear; I received lights indicating my two main gears were locked; but the nose gear light was not illuminated and the gear unsafe light was illuminated.  After cycling the gear about four times; I requested a go-around and vectors away from the airport.  I next attempted to get the gear down by again cycling the gear and putting a load on the aircraft with steep turns and abrupt pitching up.  Consulting Operations and other pilots on company frequency; we came up with no other ideas to get the gear down.  Following the checklist; I attempted to get the gear down with the emergency nitrogen system.  Pulling the handle; I heard a 'clunk' but still the nose gear failed to extend.  While I was waiting for further assistance from company; I began to hold over the VOR.  Receiving input from company; I continued to attempt to lower the gear with 'G' maneuvers.  It was getting dark; and efforts were futile to lower the gear; I declared emergency and requested direct to a nearby airport for landing.  On my way; I attempted to lower the gear by putting the hydraulic circuit breaker back in and cycle the gear again; still with no positive results.  After a low approach and Tower indicating the mains appeared to be down and nose appeared to be up; I departed the area to the southeast to again attempt to get the gear down by maneuvers.  Visibility was deteriorating due to smoke and darkness was falling; so I returned to the divert airport.  Another low approach and Tower informed me that the mains appeared to be down and the nose appeared to be up.  On final I stabilized the approach and prepared for landing.  Configuration on approach was gear selector down; flaps T/O-APP; props 1;900 and landing lights down and on.  Coming down to the runway; I reduced power to idle; and in the flare; pulled mixtures back to idle cut-off; turned off mags; master and alternators.  The aircraft touched down on the mains and I lowered the nose to the runway.  As the nose touched the runway; I continued to hold the yoke full aft; did not use brakes; but kept the aircraft on runway centerline with use of the rudder.  As the aircraft came to a stop; I exited the aircraft through the crew door.  As I exited; emergency response was there to ensure that I was uninjured; which I was; and the aircraft was not in any additional danger; which it was.  Only minor damage was done to the aircraft; bent props due to ground impact and slight damage of the lower nose

A C404 Pilot declared an emergency then landed with the nose gear retracted after extensive attempts to lower it failed. Only minor damage to the nose and bent propellers were noted.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We had originally planned and briefed the KIPPR5 Arrival and the ILS approach to Runway 16L into Denver. Our arrival was later changed to the ANCHR4. We then set up and briefed this arrival and the ILS to 35R; which was the expected approach based on the latest ATIS. When contacting Denver Approach; we were assigned the RNAV (RNP) Z to 35R. In the course of flying this approach; we were assigned several non-standard speeds which further increased our workload. Because of this; we did not notice that there was an extraneous vector leg after MSIMS which was a remnant of the ANCHR4. The plan view on our displays showed MSIMS and the radius to FRONZ; which appeared to be the active course. When passing MSIMS we did not make the turn onto the radius and instead continued straight ahead briefly. We noticed the deviation immediately and were about to contact Approach when they called us with vectors to a visual approach; since they had also observed that we were off of the planned course. We were vectored onto final approach for a visual to Runway 35R and landed without further incident.

B737 First Officer reported a track deviation occurred on the RNAV (RNP) Z Approach to 35R in DEN when the FMC was programmed improperly following a late clearance change.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport; Airspace Structure

ZZZ1 to ZZZ as we approached ZZZ at 5;000 feet we got vectors for the visual approach XXR far out over the mountains shortly after we got cleared for the approach. My FO (First Officer) called for 3;500 feet set in the altitude selector. After setting 3;500 feet my FO started a descent from 5;000 feet and with only flaps 9 selected and a descent over the mountains and the RA hit 1;500 feet triggering a 'Terrain; Terrain; Pull up' Call out over the audio system.Cause - Distraction amongst pilots and Air Traffic Control juggling multiple frequencies and low altitude.Suggestion - Better situational awareness and speaking up.

EMB-145 Captain reported receiving a terrain warning on final approach.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

A storm front had just passed and medium crosswinds were on the ATIS (290/12/gust 15) and we were taking off 35L.  An MEL existed (Engine A/I Valve partially Open) that required a Max Power Takeoff. We were cleared for Position and Hold. I maneuvered the aircraft to the takeoff position. Moments later; we were cleared for takeoff.  The before takeoff checklist was completed and Max Power initiated. The aircraft began rolling toward the right edge of the runway; while full left rudder was not altering the direction of aircraft to sufficiently avoid exiting the runway (narrower than normal runway 75 feet).  I discontinued the takeoff around 40-50 knots.  We reported our actions to Tower and exited the runway.  We accomplished appropriate checklists and then discussed what happened and what might have contributed to the event. (15-17 knot crosswind from the left; Max Power (P-factor); narrow runway; the Check Airmen said he thought the nose wheel; while in position and hold; was not aligned straight with the runway). After discussing factors; we decided to be more aggressive with rudder and the crosswind; as well as; more awareness of the direction of nose wheel prior to initiating take off power.   On the second takeoff attempt; aircraft still went right with full left rudder. However; once airspeed was 60-80 knots; rudder authority became significant enough to control direction of aircraft and safely continue the takeoff.My assessment of why this happened was primarily attributed to the narrower than standard runway.  Runway 35L is half as wide as most of the runways that we normally operate on. Therefore; the distance from centerline to edge is 37.5 feet vice 75 feet. With the factors present crosswind; Max Power; narrow runway; the sensation of exiting the runway prior to rudder authority was significantly greater than on a runway that is 150 feet wide.

B757 Captain reports a rejected takeoff when aircraft begins to veer right with full left rudder on a narrow runway. A second takeoff attempt is successful.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 3500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

On Date at approximately XA:34 enroute from ZZZ1 to ZZZ we received a smoke baggage fire master caution warning at 35;000 ft. on the C track between ZZZZZ and ZZZZZ1 intersection. Smoke began to fill the cockpit and cabin. We determined the cause to be environmental and no fire was detected in the baggage area. We tried to isolate and clear the cabin using the smoke removal procedures but were unsuccessful. We then advised ATC; off set 2miles right of course (slop) and started a descent to 10;000 ft. where we could start the depress procedure to clear the cabin of smoke. In the descent to 10;000 ft. we established communication with ZZZ2 radio; squawked and via CPDLC with ZZZ3. After reaching 10;000 ft. we were able to shut down the environmental system and clear the cabin of smoke. The crew and passengers were on supplemental oxygen during the descent until level off at 10;000 ft. We were able to proceed direct to ZZZ. With no further action. We reestablished communication with ZZZl Center and advised them we were no longer an emergency aircraft and requested priority for landing in ZZZ. We then requested direct ZZZ airport. There were two crew; and two passengers onboard. No injuries or significant damage discovered. We were able to land safely in ZZZ with no emergency services required. I was asked to call upon arrival and gave a statement to ZZZ Center/FAA/FSDO.

Air Carrier Captain reported a fume event during cruise. Flight crew completed depressurization procedures which dissipated smoke and the flight continued to destination.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Time Pressure

Distraction; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

I operated the flight that night. We were cleared for the visual approach and cleared to land Runway 6. We completed all checklists prior to landing. The aircraft touched down on Runway 6 at a normal speed; Vref or so and was firm in nature. Airbrakes were deployed and indicated normal. I felt a light brake grab and the Captain called out 'good brakes' as per SOP. After a few moments I realized that we were not decelerating properly and the Captain was in some distress trying to apply the brakes. He reached up and attempted to disarm the antiskid and the airplane seemed to lurch and momentarily grab. He then tried the secondary brake system with no change in performance; he then commanded me to assist and try my brakes. I pressed my brake pedals and found some braking action to be (1/4 of normal at the most) and found that I had to press extremely hard to get that amount of braking action. We then saw the end of the runway coming with a significant cliff/drop off directly off the end of the runway and we had considerable speed left. The Captain turned the airplane to the right with an attempt to stay on the taxiway area as we knew that there was flat ground in that direction. We departed the runway with the right main gear only prior to the intersection in attempt to make the turn. That slowed us down considerably and the Captain was able to continue the right turn. We departed the north side of the taxiway with all 3 wheels and hit several taxi lights. The Captain continued to turn right to avoid the cliff. The aircraft decelerated in the mud to a controllable speed and with the continued right turn we ended up on the parallel taxiway. We let Air Traffic Controller know of our emergency; that we were OK and the aircraft appeared to be OK; but that we had departed the pavement and damaged several lights.

On landing; aircraft braking appeared to be good. 1;000 FT down the runway; it was apparent that there was insufficient braking to stop the aircraft on the runway. I turned the anti-skid off; no help. I went to Number 2 brakes; no help. Based on training received; I went back to Number 1 brakes and requested PM to assist with braking. This slowed the aircraft; but not enough to make a normal exit off of the runway. At this point; we were approaching the end of the runway; after which there is a drop-off to a road. Trying to further slow the aircraft; I began a slow right turn; which brought both right main tires just off of the pavement. I estimate our ground speed at 60 KTS at this point. This slowed the aircraft; but our momentum carried us across the runway end taxiway and onto the grass. Continuing our right turn; we contacted four taxi lights. Being on the grass; we slowed further; and continued that right turn back onto the taxiway. At this point; we were slowed to an estimated 5 KTS; and I chose to engage the parking brake. The aircraft stopped. We shut the airplane down; and contacted the Tower to advice of our situation; and that we were OK. We contacted Operations; and then had the aircraft towed to the ramp. Our post-flight walk around showed no obvious signs of damage to the aircraft.

During landing neither F-20 normal nor alternate brakes operated normally so near the runway's end; the Captain turned the aircraft off the runway across a muddy grass area; contacting several taxi lights and the re-entering a taxiway where it stopped with little apparent damage.


Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

The Number 2 and 4 Flight Attendants (FA) called to report strong odor in aft galley. I continued boarding while the Number 1 FA went in to speak with the Captain. She returned and said we were to continue boarding. I could hear the aft FAs calling Captain while we stood in entry area. The Number 1 would go in to cockpit to get updates from the calls. A deadheading pilot then came from the back of plane and went to the cockpit to speak with the Captain. There was some question about it being a urine smell and perhaps the cleaning of the lavs. We had neared the end and I walked through closing bins; etc. As I got to row 25 I smelled a very strong and pungent dirty sock smell. I went to aft galley and told them it was a dirty sock smell and where I began smelling it. I asked them to relay that info up front. The Number 2 and 4 wanted the Captain to come and smell because they disagreed with that assertion. I had returned to the front of aircraft and the Number 1 and Captain went to the back. When he returned he seemed perturbed that the Number 1 was not immediately behind him and wanted to close up. I said I would close the remaining overhead bins. The Number 1 returned and we departed. First; I believe we should have stopped boarding and deplaned the passengers and crew until the cause/type/potency of odor could be established. Following the operating procedures for deplaning at the gate would have allowed a quicker review of the situation and the concerns for safety until a definitive answer could be established while removing passengers and crew from a potentially harmful exposure.

We commenced the boarding and Flight Attendant #2 and I walked to aft galley and both smelled a noxious odor. I called the Flight Attendant 1; three times and she in turn told the Captain. He said 'it is probably a leaky trash bag or rotten food.' Flight Attendant 2 called the Captain directly and he again blew us off. We had a deadheading pilot also go to cockpit to relay information and when he got back; he said the 'theory is that it is a leaky trash bag'. We had been on the aircraft for 4 hours prior to this event as we brought the aircraft in from ZZZ. The fumes were coming out of air vents in galley and aft lavs and was going into c zone. 33 minutes after we first notified Captain; at the end of boarding; he came to the back and said 'I don't smell anything; we are going to ZZZ1'. With that; he turned and walked back to the front. Yes; the fumes had just dissipated by that point; 33 minutes later. There was no interaction; NONE. He obviously did not care about the noxious fumes in the aft section of aircraft. For 33 minutes; he continued to disregard every attempt to tell him what was happening in the back. He's a Check Airman; really? He's supposed to be the best of the best. I felt like my safety was jeopardized and I would never feel safe flying with him again. What if I reported smoke; would he say it is stale cigarette smell on someone's shirt? The one important bit of information he might need might come from the most junior Flight Attendant or even a new hire. In this case he had 4 very senior Flight Attendants and disregarded all of us when we made 5 attempts to get his help in telling him about the noxious odors. Captain obviously needs some intense CRM training. Maybe giving a check ride to another pilot and trying to manage fume events are just too much for him. It obviously was.

A321 flight attendants reported a communication breakdown with the Captain regarding cabin odor during boarding.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Shortly after landing gear retraction we heard a loud banging noise coming from behind the cockpit and L1 (Lavatory 1) door area. The noise was heard by the L1 flight attendant and could be heard in first class; it became louder and faster as we accelerated. We decided to return for a precautionary landing. We told ATC and they gave us vectors to give us time to complete the checklists. We landed under max gross landing weight. Upon arrival at the gate the ramp crew found the patch cord and wireless box still plugged into the aircraft.

MD-82 flight crew reported a loud banging noise due to an open communication panel shortly after gear retraction.