Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Day 1Once starting down my FO noticed an oily type smell. Moments later I smelled it; too. It was not intense; just a noticeable oily type smell. This occurred occasionally all the way down to landing; including taxi in. Neither one of us where too concerned about it but we felt it was enough to call Mx. We described the events to Mx who then dispatched our contract mechanic to the airplane. A mechanic came out to the airplane and did an inspection to see if there are any leaks. He did not see anything that would cause an odor that we described. At that point we decided to start boarding. When the first three elderly passengers were seated I noticed the temperature in the cabin was 84 degrees and I decided to start the APU to begin cooling down the cabin. When I turned the APU bleed to on; my FO and I received a significant blast of oily smell. I immediately turned off the APU bleed and the APU. I instructed the gate agents to stop boarding and then deplane the three passengers who had finally settled in. I then called Mx back and explained what we encountered. It took about 3 hours for the contract Mx personnel to do what they needed to clean the packs and attempt to find the source of the problem. They asked me and my FO if we could do an engine run up at the gate to see if we could isolate if it's coming from Pack 1; or Pack 2; or Bleed 1; or Bleed 2. We ran through each scenario starting with engine 2 and then each scenario with engine 2 with a mechanic in the cockpit. We did not experience any smell. After we shut engine number 1 down; the mechanic turned the APU bleed on and we again got a significant blast of oily smell. Both my FO and I put on our O2 masks and open the windows. It seemed safe to conclude the source was the APU bleed. Mx deferred the APU bleed. Looking back; Mx did not burn the packs off after the MEL deferral as they did before to troubleshoot the problem; therefore we took the airplane with re-contaminated packs.We boarded the airplane and were on our way. We detected no odor on the taxi out and takeoff. We did notice a little bit of smell on the climb only once for a short period of time. 45 minutes into the flight at cruise we again detected the oily smell; but nothing significant. It came and went occasionally for approximately 10 minutes until we again receive a significant blast. My nose began to burn. We put on our O2 mask. I wore my O2 mask for approximately 2 minutes and then took it off to see if the odor dissipated. I could not detect the smell and my FO took his mask off. He could not detect anything. About 2 minutes after that we received another blast of oily smell at which time we both put our mask back on and advised ATC; and diverted to the nearest suitable airport. I was the flying pilot; and my FO ran the QRH for smoke/fumes during the descent.Upon landing we both opened our windows with our O2 mask off; breathed fresh air and taxied to our gate. After doing our routine post flight requirements for such an event; we left the airplane for the terminal. My FO whistled using his fingers at a young boy running away from his parents. He said his fingers tasted terrible; like hydraulic fluid. I called Mx to let them know what he had experienced to help them diagnose the problem. When we got to the hotel; my FO and I went out to dinner. I had a strong oily taste and my nose felt burned. We split the same meal together and had a couple beers. We returned to the hotel and went to bed.Day 2I woke up feeling sick [very early in the morning]. I went to the bathroom and had diarrhea; then vomited. I went back to bed feeling much better. I slept for about 2 hours and woke up feeling bad. From this point on I begin to lose track of time and can give only approximations of time and events; other than phone/text records. I called the duty manager and told him I'm not feeling good; I had a strong headache and that I threw up. The duty manager told me to call crew scheduling to callin sick and that he would start the OJI paperwork. He also told me he would get a phone number to the Nurse Line; which the company uses for sick employees and would call me back. I also called STAT-MD; spoke to a doctor and explained what happened. The doctor advised me to go to an emergency room. The duty manager called me back with the number and I told him what STAT-MD recommended. He said that's good; that he has no medical expertise and for me to do what I think is best; whether or not to go to the emergency room or call the hotline. I said ok and called the Nurse Line. While being held online for someone to answer I vomited again. At that point I decided to call 911. I told my FO what I was doing and he asked if he should come with me. I said yes; and that I would meet him downstairs in the lobby. I could not receive phone service on the elevator and called 911 in the lobby. By the time I reached the lobby I was having a difficult time concentrating while on the phone with 911; felt nauseous; walked out the front door and started to vomit several times outside the lobby door while finishing up my phone call with 911. About this time my FO appeared. The ambulance arrived and I sat in the back waiting for another ambulance to arrive who would take me to the hospital. I was feeling sick again while the EMT's were checking my vitals and was handed a bag to throw up. I vomited several times again. My FO said that it reeked like the same smell we had on the plane. The EMT said he smelled it; too. My FO asked him what it smelled like to him and the EMT said it smell like a petroleum product. The oily taste was intense in my mouth. I also began to have an intense headache. I was admitted to the hospital and it took; I believe; 3 hours for them to get the vomiting to stop and the intense headache to subside. The last time I vomited the oily taste was the most intense during the entire event. I was given a CT scan of my head because of my headache and chest X-ray of my lungs. I began to feel better that afternoon and evening; although I still had the bad; oily taste in my mouth.Day 3The next morning; I felt much better and most of the oily taste in my mouth was dissipating. The rest of the day I felt wiped out and every once in a while I would get the oily taste in my mouth and a mild headache. Returned home that evening.Day 4No headache; but have a slight oily taste in my mouth. The best way to describe the oily smell/taste: Like sucking on a penny or a coin when we were kids. [We should have] specific training for this kind of event. I heard the source of the problem was an overfilled oil reservoir for the APU; which was subsequently sucked into the APU; APU bleed system which then in turn the packs. Maybe APU oil quantities should be verified by two people knowing the toxicity of oil and the potential harm; just as both pilots verify altitude changes in the cockpit.

During descent; the captain and I noticed an oily metallic smell in the cockpit. It was different than the usual airbus smells. It did not alarm us at that time. It occurred from about 27;000 feet down to landing and was intermittent.We called MX control and they dispatched a mechanic over. During the deplaning process while I was heading out to do the post flight; a passenger was talking and triggered me to ask them if they smelled anything. They said yes; it was strong and bad. They were in row 23. I made that aware to the captain and performed a postflight. During the postflight; I opened as many hatch's as I could and I noticed the smell strongest in the yellow hydraulic bay on the A/C right. I also noticed it in the forward portion of the aft cargo bin. When I returned to the cockpit; the MX person was there. We told him all of the information that we had; he walked through the cabin and we also re-checked the hydraulic bays. He smelled something there and stated that there was a lot of anti-corrosion spray and when it gets wet; it will smell. Other than that he said the plane smelled like an Airbus. We did not enter anything into the logbook at that time. We started boarding the A/C and when the cabin became too warm; we started the APU. There were about 3 people on at that time. When the APU bleed was turned on; the smell was intense. We stopped boarding; called MX and put an entry in the logbook. Two MX persons showed up and they smelled the fumes. While we waited they consulted with MX Control. They burned out the packs. Then asked us to help them do engine runs and we complied. We were trying to determine the source of the fumes. There were none noticeable on Engine 1 or 2. When the APU bleed was tested; the fumes were intense again. While they were trouble shooting; we sat in the cockpit for a while and eventually put on our O2 masks for the rest of the engine runs. We were told we were removed from trip and limo to ZZZ1. While heading for the limo we got a call that the plane was fixed. We were notified that they deferred the APU bleed; which was the source of the contamination/fumes. The Captain and I discussed it and chose to fly the plane. Since we smelled the fumes only in descent we assumed they were only intermittent; there was no irritation; we agreed that if we smelled fumes again we would write it up again. We used an external pneumatic air cart to start the a/c and a cross bleed start from engine 1 to 2. The APU bleed was not used after being deferred. In cruise flight; 36;000 feet; we started noticing the smell again in the cockpit. The odor was intensifying. We discussed our options; deemed that we were diverting to ZZZ (~160 miles west). We also discussed how to advise the already angered or irritated passengers that we were heading to ZZZ. During [the Captain's PA] statement to the PAX; the fumes became an irritant and became the most intense we had encountered. My eyes started burning along with my throat. The Captain's throat and nose started burning. We placed our O2 masks on and sent a quick note to dispatch and advised ATC. We were cleared direct. Being the PNF; I went through the Smoke/Fumes checklist and since we didn't need to troubleshoot I performed the smoke fumes removal portion once below 10k. The A/C landed safely.Two factors come to mind here. First; I talked with MX control the next day and was advised that they had determined that the APU oil was over-serviced. Second factor: MX Pack Burn/Troubleshooting Procedures. The packs need to be burned out before returning the A/C to service. In our case they were burned out to troubleshoot and the APU bleed was determined to be the cause. After the troubleshooting and the deferral of the APU bleed; the bleed system was not cleaned or burned out prior to the A/C being returned to service. Also; in the SMOKE/FUMES removal checklist; REMOVAL of SMOKE/FUMES; if no fuel vapors: PACK FLOW HI. In this case; it may have or it certainly could make the bleed fumes worse.

A319 flight crew reported an air-conditioning smoke event during descent that was believed to be caused by the APU and the APU was deferred. On the next leg the odor became intense and the crew diverted to a suitable airport. The Captain became quite sick the next day and checked himself into the hospital.


ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Weather; Procedure; Airport; Human Factors

I listened to the ATIS information; then checked in with approach control; and accepted the plan to shoot the RNAV Runway XXL approach; with a circle to land Runway YYR. At this point the visibility was 1 1/2 miles with a ceiling of approximately 1200 overcast. Approach control vectored the aircraft for the Runway XXL approach. The aircraft was in IMC conditions throughout the descent and approach and picking up light to moderate rime ice. Approach handed me off to tower inbound on the Runway XXL approach. I checked in with the tower. Tower informed the pilot that the ATIS changed and that the visibility was reduced to 3/4 mile. The pilot requested to continue the approach to straight in Runway XXL. The tower cleared us as such. No mention of runway conditions were given by tower. The pilot descended on the approach; and saw the airport lights and runway environment at the MDA. The pilot being in a position to land continued down to the runway. I was using an extra 5kts of speed on approach due to residual ice on the aircraft. I believe that touchdown occurred somewhere in the first 1500 ft of the 3200 ft runway. Upon touchdown I realized the braking action was nil and that the aircraft sliding. I was aware that it had been lightly snowing at the airport; but was not aware the runway had not been plowed or treated in any way; and was not offered any information to that affect. I maintained directional control of the aircraft but ran out of runway surface by about ten feet striking a runway end light. The pilot was able to taxi the aircraft to the ramp without further incident. The aircraft's props were damaged. No other damage was known to the time of this report.

PA-34 pilot reported poor braking action on landing and ran off the end of the runway.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Confusion; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

At the time of the event; the FO (First Officer) was the pilot flying; we were cleared for the ILS approach; were on localizer; and were descending to 2400. Right before the FAF (Final Approach Fix); we both heard a 'pop.' The FO's attitude indicator was flagged; as was the pilot's attitude indicator. At first; we thought circuit breakers had popped; so we looked and saw none popped. A second later; we saw L AC BUS and R AC BUS illuminated; so that meant Inverter #1 had failed. The Captain took control of the aircraft; and we switched to the #2 Inverter. The attitude indicator indicated 'GYRO COMPUTER' for 5-10 seconds before those flags went away; and unfortunately; I drifted off of localizer and got to 3/4 deflection. As I was correcting; Tower called to inform us we were off course. I told them we had an inverter failure; switched to our 2nd inverter; and were correcting. They asked if we wanted vectors; and I said; 'I'm on localizer now; is that what you're showing?' She confirmed I was on localizer. We then landed.It was a system failure which caused me to drift off localizer. In the future; I will ask for vectors and go around. As for the plane; in my opinion; the root cause has not been identified; because this is the fourth Inverter #1 failure in about a month.

SA227 Captain reported an inverter failure on final approach causing them to deviate from the localizer on the ILS.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was opening up Ground Control position. I had an aircraft call me and I missed the call sign; so I asked; 'Was that Air Carrier ABCD that called?' The aircraft answered; 'Affirmative.' I noticed on the ASDE-X that the aircraft only had a beacon code showing that was associated with another aircraft I had in the 'awaiting to taxi' bay. I told the pilot of (who I thought was Air Carrier ABCD) that he was squawking companies call sign. The pilot said; 'Oh thank you I was wondering about that.' I thought that the aircraft Air Carrier ABEF may have gotten his clearance at or around the same time as Air Carrier ABEF; and he had just mixed up his squawk with his company's call sign. So I told him to squawk whatever code I had for Air Carrier ABCD; because that's who I thought he was. When we listened to the tape; he originally called with the correct call sign of Air Carrier ABEF; I had missed that call; and asked if that was Air Carrier ABCD who called and he said 'affirmative.' That's how I ended up giving him the squawk of Air Carrier ABCD. The ASDE-X showed no indications of a 'dupe beacon' which; it will do if 2 aircraft are on the same squawk. So I thought everything was fine at that point and the issue was resolved. I did not use his call sign when I switched him to Tower because he was the only aircraft on my frequency at that time. He did not read back a call sign when given the switch to Tower either. That was my fault. I should have; and always do; use a call sign; I'm not sure why I did not that time. When the aircraft was on the runway; the Local Controller cleared him for take off and only noticed the call sign difference when the aircraft was switched to Potomac TRACON; to which then; the Local Controller called over to the Departure Controller and fixed the issue. After listening to the Local Controller on the tape; the aircraft used his correct call sign of Air Carrier ABEF when they read back the take off clearance and the Local Controller did not catch the call sign error at that time. I will be and have been since; VERY careful about aircraft call signs; squawk codes and read backs. I could have done more of an investigation on the aircraft since they were squawking another aircraft's call sign and asked their destination. I am aware of how things can get confused and I have realized how important it is to make sure call sign and squawk are correctly associated with aircraft ID.

Assigned Local Control 1; overheard Ground Control 1 in discussion with pilot about wrong beacon code and call sign. ASDE-X displayed data tag of Air Carrier ABCD at Runway 19L. I cleared Air Carrier ABCD for takeoff Runway 19L. When I shipped Air Carrier ABCD to departure; I noticed he read back Air Carrier ABEF. I glanced at ASDE-X and confirmed the tag said Air Carrier ABCD. I made a quick comment to Ground Control 1 that the guy was still messing up his call sign. Moments later; the Sector at ZZZ TRACON called to question the identity of Air Carrier ABEF. They said Air Carrier ABCD was actually ABEF. He had tagged up as Air Carrier ABCD. I found the flight progress strip of Air Carrier ABEF and scanned the strip. I asked them to double confirm the aircraft's destination and they confirmed it was Air Carrier ABEF to [the correct destination]. I advised Supervisor we had a possible communication/call sign issue and that somewhere along the line some mistakes had been made on both sides. Supervisor listened to tapes from both Ground Control 1 and Local Control 1. Local Control 1 (me) issued takeoff clearance to Air Carrier ABCD and it was read back by Air Carrier ABEF; I missed the bad call sign. On shipping to Departure I caught the bad call sign but attributed it to the pilot because of the information Ground Control 1 gave to me. On review of Ground Control tapes the pilot called for taxi and the Ground Control 1 missed call sign. Ground Control 1 asked 'is that Air Carrier ABCD?' to which pilot said yes. A conversation ensued because he was actually squawking ABEF. Ground Control 1 joked that he was squawking companies call sign and assigned him the beacon code of Air Carrier ABCD. There is where the confusion started. The ASDE-X now said Air Carrier ABCD. No other call signs were used in the conversation between pilot and ground. Pilot called and had discussion with Supervisor after Center asked him to call. I missed the read back on the takeoff clearance. Pilot was not vigilant either and he never questioned that ATC was calling him Air Carrier ABCD. Remain focused at all times. In the event a situation is unusual be extra vigilant! Remind pilots that they should question call signs and anything that seems out of place!

Multiple Air Traffic controllers and an Air Carrier Captain described a confused clearance and call sign event that resulted in an unsafe condition with several controllers confused as to the identity and route of an IFR departure.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 4R

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 208; Flight Crew Type 4000

Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Flying the ENDEE THREE RNAV Arrival 4R Transition into KMDW. Received ATC clearance to 'Descend via the ENDEE 3 Arrival.' ATIS advertising approaches to 4R. Jeppesen chart for the arrival has a confusing note associated with the final point on the arrival; the BANER waypoint. The altitude at BANER is listed as 'At or above 5;000 feet.' However; there is also a note associated with the BANER waypoint that states; 'On assigned instrument approach procedure or RADAR vectors to final approach course.' After receiving the clearance to descend via the arrival; I understood our clearance to be only down to 6;000 feet as listed at the ALQUE waypoint since we were neither on an assigned instrument approach procedure or being radar vectored as stated in the note. The Captain and Pilot Flying (PF) understood our clearance to be to 5;000 feet per the altitude at BANER. When time permitted; I asked Chicago Approach Control what altitude they expected us to descend to and the response made it sound as if ATC was also unsure as to which altitude was correct. Having now asked a number of other Pilots; there is no clear consensus as to which is correct. There was no deviation because well prior to reaching any of the waypoints in question; Chicago Approach vectored us off the arrival and began assigning altitudes to us. The Controller also stated they did this routinely with aircraft on the 4R transition of the ENDEE Arrival in part due to confusion concerning the bottom altitude.While questioning ATC about what altitude they would like us to descend to can always alleviate the confusion; the procedure should be published in such a fashion as to prevent this confusion in the first place. The note at BANER is confusing and vague and doesn't provide any useful information. The note at BANER on the arrival must be changed. Removing the note completely seems to be the solution with the least chance for misunderstanding. If the intention is that aircraft remain at 6;000 feet until cleared for the ILS 4R approach; then simply remove the note since there is a 5;000A restriction at BANER listed on the approach.Conversely; if the desire is for aircraft to arrive at BANER at or above 5;000 feet even if not yet cleared for the approach; simply removing the note would again produce the desired result. Although having an at or above for the final altitude on an arrival is unusual. Until the note is changed; the only viable option is for Crews to ask ATC what altitude they are cleared to or for ATC to state the bottom altitude in the descend via clearance.

When cleared to 'descend via the ENDEE RNAV STAR to MDW; landing 4R' the flight crew of a B737 was confused as to the intent of an equivocal note at BANER; the final waypoint on that STAR/runway transition route; whether the listed 'At or above 5;000 feet' qualified as a 'bottom altitude' for their 'Descend via' clearance rather than the 'At 6;000 feet' restriction at the previous fix; ALQUE.


Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft departed for local flight and it was observed from ground by local pilots that the landing gear was collapsed to centerline under the aircraft and not in a position for a normal landing. Pilot was radioed of the situation and elected to land in the grassy area parallel to the active runway. Under control; the gear collapsed and the right gear separated from the undercarriage. The aircraft continued on the grass till coming to rest upright. The pilot was not injured; but the aircraft was damaged.

Observers reported to an Aeronca pilot that his aircraft's landing gear failed after takeoff. Upon returning to land on a grassy airport area; the right gear separated from the aircraft.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related

In our Routine Overnight Hangar we are repeatedly being electrically shocked by the aircraft while performing nightly maintenance. This has only been an issue this year. This has been repeatedly brought to Management's attention and we have been told that licensed electricians have been brought in when available at their convenience to look at the problem and [that] there is none. What is happening when the aircraft comes to the hangar for nightly maintenance. We need to hook-up a ground power [electrical] cart to supply electrical power to the aircraft. The ground power cart is hooked-up to the electrical drop located at the north end on the hangar. It is a dual hook-up cart (can supply power to two aircraft at one time). We were told that the reason we are getting shocked is because the aircraft is not grounded to the hangar floor. When an aircraft is grounded; it is to make the aircraft and what it is grounded to; electrically the same. I was personally getting shocked when hooking up the aircraft to ground. I took out my Volt Meter and found we are passing Alternating Current (AC) volts and amps from the aircraft to the hangar floor ground [connection]. This should not happen. The power cart should be supplying the electrical ground back to the power source. This is dangerous because somewhere we are not providing a way for the power cart to return all the voltage back to the power source ground and it is building up on the aircraft. [The] poor hangar wiring has been brought to Management numerous times as stated and we have been told that licensed electrical technicians have been into check out the hangar and power cart and are not able to find any significant findings. We have also been told that the licensed electrical technician believes that it is because it has been so dry and the dirt around the building grounding rod is dry; not allowing all the power to return to ground. Obviously it is still a problem even after the electricians have checked out the power source. It is a dangerous situation every night. It does not happen every night. The wiring needs to be thoroughly gone over. It is getting to the point that we do not want to work on the aircraft because we are getting shocked.

Reporter stated that for many months there have been multiple incidents of mechanics being electrically shocked when they would connect the portable Hobart ground power cart electrical cord to their ERJ-170 aircraft. He had another Mechanic take a video of the electrical spark jumping from the aircraft grounding lug to the grounding cable as he connected the cable to the aircraft. He did that to emphasize to Management the seriousness of the situation on the hangar floor. Every night they have open fuel cells (tanks) on their aircraft; including those connected to the same unsafe power cart. He and other mechanics isolated the problem to the same power cart after using a different power source for the same aircraft and not getting electrically shocked. His company finally took the power cart out of service; but has not repaired the unit.

An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports about the reluctance of their Maintenance Management to address the numerous incidents of electrical shocks mechanics were experiencing after connecting a portable ground power cart to their ERJ-170 aircraft; including aircraft with open fuel tanks.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 98; Flight Crew Type 96

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After refueling I was taxiing for departure on runway 18. After viewing the windsock; I made a subsequent transmission on CTAF that I was changing to depart on runway 36. I held short of 36 while conducting a run-up; and then announced on CTAF that I was departing on runway 36. I conducted a scan of both directions of the runway for approaching traffic. Seeing no traffic; I entered runway 36 and commenced my takeoff roll. Just prior to rotation; a crop duster turned onto final for landing on runway 18. I heard no radio calls on CTAF from the aircraft. The aircraft maintained its course for far too long for my comfort. Immediately after rotation I veered right. The other aircraft conducted a go around; and landed on runway 36. I did not observe the tail number. My ADS-B receiver did not indicate the aircraft.I confirmed that the CTAF I had entered was correct. My radio was functioning correctly throughout my flight. I noted that the pilot lounge had a sign admonishing pilots to use the CTAF. The other aircraft did not respond to my subsequent radio calls. I can only assume that they did not use a radio. I did scan the approach for both runway 18 and runway 36. I did not scan the downwind legs for each pattern (left traffic for 18 was in the sun). I did not hear an aircraft in the vicinity prior to starting my engine. It is possible that a more thorough scan of the pattern may have located the other plane.

A general aviation pilot reported a near mid-air-collision during takeoff with an opposite direction landing crop duster that was not communicating on the CTAF.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Missing sign for Taxiway J (no yellow sign with black 'J') indicating approaching J while taxiing south on A.

Air Carrier Captain reported there is a missing taxiway sign at the intersection of taxiway A and J at LIH.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Planned Runway 08R for takeoff per ATIS. Pre takeoff data for Runway 08R indicated flaps 5. Push back instructions by ramp control indicated a taxi to Runway 09L. During engine start (both) and after verifying final weights; I changed the runway in the FMC and sent for takeoff data for Runway 09L. Communicating with ground person on the push back was extremely distracting. Sounded like he did not put the microphone mask up to his face as background noise made him almost unreadable. I told him he needed a new headset. After giving disconnect headset; I said to set flaps 5; after start checklist. As we began to taxi; FO printed and accepted Runway 09L takeoff data and even said flaps 1. When we accomplished the before takeoff checklist; I think I said 1 final; 1 indicated green light; touching the flap lever; pointing to FMC takeoff page and comparing to flap indication. I may have said 5 final but somehow did not recognize the difference in the flap handle position versus the FMC takeoff page and flap indicator. During takeoff roll; flap 5 position was noted by the FO. Speed was about 80 knots. I considered it safer to continue versus reject. Takeoff with flaps 1 V speeds and subsequent flap retraction was uneventful. Bottom line is I miss compared the FMC takeoff page flap setting and the flap indicator along with a flap handle obviously in the wrong position. Not sure if the pushback crew headset distraction had anything to do with my subsequent mindset although it was the worst communication I've experienced between flight deck and push back person. Also not sure why FO did not advocate to reset flaps to 1 but ultimately it was me who missed the item during the before takeoff checklist.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported a takeoff with the wrong flap setting.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3; Flight Crew Total 144; Flight Crew Type 70

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

This evening; I decided to take off from my airport (SFZ); visit a nearby VOR; and return. It was intended as a quick; easy flight.Warning signs about the day manifested itself with a call. The WX briefer mentioned that there was an AIRMET for moderate turbulence below 8;000 as well as an urgent PIREP for low level wind shear at an airport about 30 NM away. Winds at North Central (SFZ) were 33014G21KT. These were right down one of our two runways; and I was seeking out more challenging conditions to push my personal minimums.The line worker told me 'good luck with those winds' as she was fueling my airplane. I told her that they were right down the runway and she agreed with a 'yeah; I guess so. I guess you should be okay.'After preflight and taxi; I started my run-up. I noticed that the plane was really getting buffeted on the ground by the winds and I thought to myself; 'this is rather windy.' I considered turning around but told myself that I came this far and I may as well fly; with the stipulation that if I felt uncomfortable while airborne I would return immediately. I finished my run-up and took off.I climbed to about 2;000 feet or so and was on my way to the Putnam VOR. Almost immediately after passing 1;000 feet I started to experience moderate turbulence. Shortly after the plane banked 30 degrees to the left in under a second without me changing any flight controls. I decided to abort my flight immediately.A 180 degree set me up for a 45 entry to 33. Due to the winds the plane was essentially ground-tracking sideways. The sensation was that of not flying forward but instead to the side with a massive crab. This spooked me; and this is where my questionable aeronautical decision making of taking off turning into a poor decision. My base for 33 was so unusual and I was feeling so uncomfortable with the situation that I decided to climb and join the pattern for the longer; wider runway 23. At this point; I both consciously and subconsciously just wanted to get on the ground. I was finding myself in somewhat unusual attitudes while fighting to maintain altitude; and the AWOS was now reporting winds variable between 270 and 350 13G27... a 15 knot gust factor with unpredictable winds. An experienced professional pilot may have had no problems with this; but I am not that pilot. I was determined to get on the ground but also scared. What I should have done was abort the approach to 33; overfly the field on the upwind; and reenter the pattern and try again. Instead; I decided to switch to the wider; 'safer' runway. Instead of having a gusty; wind-shear-prone approach with winds right down the runway; they were now giving me a direct crosswind with all the same wind-related problems. Keep in mind that my Skyhawk has a max demonstrated crosswind component of 15 knots; I was now becoming the proverbial 'test pilot'.Predictably; my approach was very poor. Approach speed in my 172 is 75MPH with flaps up and 70MPH with flaps down; I was approaching with 100MPH with 10 degrees in. I knew this as well and instead of going around; I said to myself 'I have 7;000 feet(!) of runway; I will float down the runway for a considerable period of time so let it float and it'll come down when it's ready.' There are two problems with this line of reasoning: I didn't have 7;000 feet; I had 5;000; and that crosswind had a slight tailwind component to it as well. As predicted; I floated for what seemed like a very long time. Finally; the wheels came down; but I started porpoising. I let it bounce a few times; hoping to let it settle; but the end of the runway was fast approaching. After four bounces I executed a sloppy go-around in which I forgot to turn off the carb heat. There's a church that we are supposed to use as a noise abatement landmark that indicates we can make turns at 1;450 feet MSL... I was at 750 feet MSL by the time I was over the church. The airport altitude is around 50 MSL.Thankfully; my trainingregarding avoiding power-on stalls and spins by not pitching up aggressively and utilizing heavy right rudder on takeoff prevented me from making a poor situation even worse. After gaining my composure I set up for a base entry to runway 33; like I should have in the first place. I was able to set up a respectable approach to 33; landed the airplane; and put in an urgent PIREP very shortly after tying down.I am very fortunate to be able to submit this report right now. I ventured forth into conditions that I thought I could handle and those conditions turned out to be beyond what I can handle at this stage in my private aviation career. I made a series of poor decisions regarding bad Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM); specifically go/no-go; subpar runway selection and sloppy go-around technique that could have very easily bent metal or worse; ended up with me killing myself. This all happened within the span of 30 minutes. I intend on talking with an instructor regarding this experience and to fix my go-around technique; and hopefully I will avoid situations like this in the future.

A C172 pilot reported having difficulty dealing with gusty wind conditions.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 15.3

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was working LCS2 and had multiple aircraft on frequency and was planning ahead for a few more that would be joining me. We were arriving and departing Runway 26L and 26R. I had departed a Helo from a ramp west bound and was getting ready to launch a Lear Jet. When I then noticed a low wing aircraft sitting at intersection A6 and was not passed the hold lines; so I couldn't depart. I couldn't see the call sign because he was pointed directly at me. I didn't know who it was. My ground controller didn't know who it was. I checked in on my Cherokee inbound from the North to be sure it wasn't him. He was still where I thought he was. Myself and the Ground controller reached out to the aircraft and didn't get any response. We then gave the aircraft a light gun signal. Still nothing from the aircraft. Then the pilot called me on frequency and said he was not at the right place. I told him to pull past the hold short lines and to contact ground control. The Aircraft landed opposite direction with no Mode C and without talking to ATC and didn't have a landing clearance.The sun was low and getting close to setting. So looking at Runway 8R in the scan doesn't help much because you are blinded by the sun.After review; the aircraft did not have Mode C on. When ground control asked the pilot for information; the ground controller told me the pilot thought he was at [another] airport and when he realized when he was on final for Runway 8R he just decided to land.I don't really have any thoughts on what I could have done better. I wouldn't and didn't see the aircraft because the sun was in a location that blinds you at that time of day. In addition; the aircraft didn't have mode C turned on with his transponder and made no contact with ATC.

Tower Controller reported seeing an aircraft at an intersection; not know what the call sign was or how it got there. The Aircraft had landed opposite direction without MODE-C on and was at the wrong airport.


Challenger Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

We were flying the HAMMU Arrival into IAH and were presently just south of the runway heading east on the downwind for Runway 27 at 6;000 FT. We were in and out of buildups pretty much the entire time we were below 10;000 and the lower we got the more continuous the IMC (I think the ATIS was calling broken at 5;000 FT). At a point just about abeam the numbers for 27 our TCAS went off alerting us to another aircraft. We saw the aircraft on our TCAS but since we couldn't see more than 50 FT in front of the aircraft due to dense clouds we were never able to get a visual contact. The other airplane (we were later told it was a Challenger) was descending quickly towards us and our separation was quickly diminishing. I asked Approach if they had any traffic near us and the radio got quiet. I'm guessing they were looking for the traffic that concerned us; but in that time the other aircraft was now rapidly descending and within 300 FT of our altitude and according to the TCAS within 1 SM of us at our 12:30 and still coming towards us. At this point I initiated a left turn approximately 20 degrees left of course and a descent that ended about 250 FT under the assigned altitude. I was trying to create some separation between us and this other aircraft. I was then told to get back on altitude for the departing traffic in which I quickly did after the other threat was no longer an issue. When we were on base; Approach informed us it was a Challenger and they said the other pilots had us in sight the entire time. But as I stated before this entire event happened while we were in hard IMC and there was absolutely no way that the other aircraft had us visually at any time. They might have had us on TCAS but not in sight. The Challenger accepted a 'maintain visual during descent' clearance while not actually having us in sight. The first time we knew what was happening was when our automation started to alert us; and not a heads up by ATC. I maneuvered the aircraft into an undesired state (off assigned altitude and heading) in order to avoid the immediate threat. It would have been great if I would have been given a heads up that another airplane is going to buzz my right wing during his descent. My actions were taken with the limited amount of information I had available. I'm sure there was more to the 'big picture' that I could not see; and given that information I might have done things differently. But that information was not shared earlier; so I had to make a decision in which I thought what would be the safest option and that was basically try to get the heck out of the way of the other aircraft. But if there is a plan that involves three separate parties; I think all three should know about it and be on the same page so this doesn't happen again.

EMB-145 Captain reports a TCAS event at 6;000 FT while IMC; with a Challenger jet that was descending visually and claimed to have the reporters aircraft insight. The reporter uses the TCAS display to turn away and descend without an RA command.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

Aircraft X requested one turn in holding at VECKI prior to one practice ILS 17 approach into KOA with the alternate missed approach followed by a clearance to [a different airport]. I was the D-Side so I coordinated the holding at VECKI; ILS 17; followed by the alternate missed approach climbing to 5;000. The holding and approach into KOA were accomplished with no issues. When Aircraft X checked back in with us on the missed approach he was observed making a right hand turn northbound. I notified the R-side and he asked Aircraft X what his intentions were. Aircraft X said he was on the alternate missed approach making a right hand turn to WERAK. WERAK is south of KOA at 174 degree radial 11.8 DME. While Aircraft X was northbound Aircraft Y was cleared for a visual approach Runway 17. Aircraft Z was cleared for a visual approach to follow Aircraft Y. The R-side proceeded to turn Aircraft X southwest bound away from the traffic and obstructions towards the ocean and safety below the Minimum IFR Altitude (MIA). Separation between aircraft was never lost. Aircraft X was clearly confused of what the alternate missed approach procedure entailed. Upon looking at the approach plate; the alternate missed approach is not depicted in the best manner and there is no written description to clarify the diagram.I would suggest the ILS 17 to KOA approach plate be revised to have a better description of the alternate missed approach procedure. In the diagram; there is nothing showing where the airport is and no written description of the procedure. This could be easily misinterpreted as shown in the event that was shown.

HCF TRACON trainee reported observing an aircraft deviate from the expected missed approach procedure below the minimum IFR altitude and towards arriving traffic.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Right after takeoff; received Smoke: Mid Cabin Master Warning indication.  Switched to Departure and informed of a smoke situation. Stopped climb at 2;000 feet; turned to north to set up for a landing.  We were given [another runway] as an option and decided to do that instead.  Ran minimum check list and landed.  Stopped straight ahead on the runway. Had Crash; Fire; and Rescue (CFR) do a thermal check. After getting the all clear; taxied to gate.

An A300 flight crew reported returning to departure airport after receiving a Master Warning for Smoke.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 200

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

While starting engines about three minutes prior to Class D Control Tower closure; I asked North Las Vegas Tower/Control to provide my IFR clearance for a flight plan that was previously filed. They informed me that the Tower was closing and that my clearance would be void prior to departure (since the Tower was closing). The Ground/Tower Controller instructed me to contact Las Vegas Departure Control. I stated that I would depart VFR and contact Departure Control while airborne to pick up my IFR. After departure I made multiple attempts to contact Control on the frequency provided with no response. I continued on - stepping up beneath the Class B airspace to 7;500 FT MSL - approximately 17-20 NM from Las Vegas VOR. It wasn't until this time when Departure Control finally responded. At this position and course I was headed directly toward R-4806W. It was night; and there were mountains to the north (my desired direction); which at this altitude I was uncertain whether or not I could out-climb. It was imperative to have received a more prompt response from Departure Control to have received a timelier Class B clearance or IFR clearance. This clearance would have enabled me to initiate a climb much sooner; and would have removed my reluctance to make a turn toward the mountains.

A PA42 pilot; departing VGT; wass denied an IFR clearance by the Tower due to scheduled closure in three minutes. Reporter departed VFR and was unsuccessful in contacting Departure Control initially; resulting in difficulties avoiding Class B airspace and mountainous terrain to the north.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 16; Flight Crew Total 610; Flight Crew Type 570

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Training on infield of airport. As student raised collective and applied forward cyclic he also rolled the throttle off. The aircraft had barely made approximately 30 FT AGL and Instructor was unable to recover throttle; but was able to right aircraft from the turn and maintain a level touchdown preventing a rollover. The landing skids were spread on the aircraft as designed to cushion the landing. Instructor was in contact with ATC and advised that other than landing gear all was OK. Instructor checked over aircraft; flight checked at hover and requested permission to return to hangar. Student pilot was [elderly] and this was the first flight with this Instructor. Student had repeatedly rolled the throttle off in the previous hour during hovering maneuvers. Additionally; student was wearing a rubberized glove on his left hand that he indicated he needed to help his grip. Reporter believes this may have been a factor in ability [of the Instructor] to override. The Instructor had taken into consideration the student's 2000+ hours of flight time and [many] hours of recent rotorcraft instruction to give the student benefit that he knew his limitations; which he seemed to indicate if he needed assistance. Instructions had to be repeated numerous times. Age and ability seemed to be factors; but actual flight ability seemed to be within the limits of flight with an Instructor.

R22 student pilot inadvertently closed the throttle when raising the collective for takeoff. Instructor pilot took control and leveled the aircraft; but was unable to restore throttle. A hard landing resulted.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 26.0

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Airspace Structure

ZMP called ZDV and alerted them to the fact that Aircraft X and Aircraft Y are going to lose separation and that Aircraft Y has a lot of speed on Aircraft X. The ZDV person says he'll take care of it. ZMP suggests that maybe one of them can take higher. ZMP Controller calls ZDV Controller and calmly asks: 'What's your plan with Aircraft Y?' ZDV responds: 'Ahhh; looks like he's going to fall behind him ahhhhh just fine.' ZMP tells ZDV that Aircraft Y has 100 knots on him. ZDV replies: 'Looks good over here; but if you want us to do something let us know.' ZMP responds: Yes; I do.' ZDV calls back and asks: 'What do you want us to do with that Aircraft Y?' ZMP replies: 'Turn him behind Aircraft X or change his altitude.' ZDV replies: 'You want us to turn him left? How much?' ZMP replies: 'Do you still have Aircraft X? ZDV: 'Yep.' Why don't you change his altitude then?' ZDV: 'You want him higher or lower?'. ZMP: 'Whatever he'll take.' ZDV: 'Roger. A mysterious voice come on the line; which we now assume is the trainer; 'Those were not control instructions.' ZMP: 'Say again?' ZDV: 'None of them were control instructions. You have to issue control instructions.' ZMP: 'Aircraft X; climb him to FL330.' There was no reply from either 'Controller' from ZDV.  A full minute and 15 seconds goes by and Aircraft Y has not started a turn and Aircraft X has not started his climb! ZDV calls and advises that Aircraft X is climbing to FL330. ZMP replies: 'Thank you;' 50 seconds later; ZDV calls and says: 'Change of plans; Aircraft X doesn't want FL330; he's going back to FL310.' ZMP replies: You're turning Aircraft Y behind him then?' ZDV: 'Yep.' The two aircraft passed 7 miles in trail with the second aircraft; same altitude; over 110 knots faster than the front! Without a turn; the two aircraft would have been 3 miles apart at the same altitude!The Supervisor was made aware of this situation and it was immediately brought up to the Operations Manager (OM). The OM's response to this scenario after reviewing it is that the ZMP Controller should have done more; that he should have reached out earlier to resolve this situation! Clearly; the OM's first priority is not safety! I have brought several [of these situations] to [personnel] and he always replies that we at ZMP should have done more. We did reach out to ZDV in ample time for them to correct their separation error and we gave them several suggestions on how to fix it in their airspace! Every phone call made to ZDV was combative; argumentative and unprofessional which could have resulted in an air disaster! We at ZMP have always protected ZDV and their incompetence! The aggression showed by the unprofessional 'Controllers' at ZDV are going to one day result in injured passengers or worse. Their job is to separate known traffic! They purposely tried to provoke and antagonize the controller at ZMP in an attempt to draw him into a defensive argument which would have resulted in two unprofessional controllers with neither one of them doing their job! Luckily; we stayed calm and professional and spoon fed ZDV basic control instructions in how to separate two aircraft in their airspace! Sadly; our OM stands firm that we should have done more. The other startling thing is that clearly the person working the 'Radar side' at ZDV was a trainee. The person training this individual was coaching him to act in an unprofessional and argumentative nature! The Trainer should be held accountable and relieved of his training duties.

A Center Controller reported the adjacent Center handed them off two aircraft on converging courses.


Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

We were preparing the cockpit for departure and were given a form for the Refueling Door Cycling Procedure. I remember reading about this and I remember that a message must be sent. I also remember there was some verbiage that needed to be written in the text field.I could not remember exactly what needed to be written.  I found the reference and read through it quickly and I missed the area that had the required verbiage. Being close to departure time and not able to locate the exact verbiage I entered the Fuel on Board figure.  As a suggestion move the verbiage into a message. Also it would be very helpful if the reminder about the entry could include the verbiage on the form given to the cockpit crew from the fueler. The procedure and information that we need is readily available on this form.This was my first trip back flying in over 5 months and I was not as comfortable as I normally would be if I was flying a regular basis.  I will make sure that this does not happen again in the future.

Air carrier Captain reported not entering required verbiage onto a form and said that lack of recent flying contributed to the oversight.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

At FL310 we had a caution 'HYD 1 LO PRESS' message. Followed QRH and the B pump did not function either. The steps led to 'Land at the nearest suitable airport' so I contacted Dispatch and discussed where to go. It was decided that we would divert to ZZZ. Because the number 1 EDP was not working and its' backup was also not working; and the fact that we were diverting; I declared an emergency. Weather was not a factor. The First Officer was the flying pilot but I decided that I would perform the landing and did so. EDP 1 failed as well as its backup. Had the B pump worked diversion would not have been necessary. Time is always a factor rushing can lead to errors. The change in mind-set can be a distraction (changing destination getting weather and other data). No undesired states occurred and the First Officer and Flight Attendant both did a very good job dealing with the situation.

En route at cruise (31;000 FT) we received the caution message 'HYD 1 LO Press'. I continued to fly while Captain ran the appropriate QRH procedure. The procedure had us turn on the 1B hydraulic pump. This proved to be ineffective; so continuing with the procedure; it required us to proceed to the nearest airport to land. Captain contacted Dispatch and together they decided; the best option (airport) for us to divert to. Captain then communicated with ATC (declared emergency); the Flight Attendant; and passengers and informed them of the situation. ATC gave us instructions and had us proceed directly to our divert airport. Since Captain declared the emergency; he assumed controls and landed the aircraft safely.

CRJ200 flight crew experiences a hydraulic system 1 failure at FL310. The 1B pump will not pressurize the system either and the crew diverts to the nearest suitable airport for landing.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

We ran the checklist and went through takeoff checklist. Went to flight idle and began our takeoff run. Co-Captain saw a CAS (Crew Alerting System) message pop up for Takeoff Config without an aural callout for no takeoff. Tried adjusting the flight idle lever and when I saw that it didn't satisfy the message I put in full reverse with heavy braking. The left tire folded first which caused the right tire to torque as well and we came to a full stop near center-line on and near the end of the runway.

PC-12 First Officer reported rejecting the takeoff when a takeoff configuration CAS (Crew Alerting System) message appeared during the roll. Two tires were damaged in the maneuver.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 197; Flight Crew Total 526; Flight Crew Type 139

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 51; Flight Crew Type 51

Deviation - Speed All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Weather conditions on the morning of the flight were clear with gusty winds out of the south. Winds were forecasted to increase later in the day as a cold front approached the region. Student was intending to go to basic training next week. The goal was to complete a 1.4 hour flight so the student could be signed out for the student's private pilot check ride. The instructor began a conversation with [a staff member] who flew the airplane the previous night on a cross country. The [staff member] indicated that there were no issues with the airplane when they flew. The student and instructor discussed what the goal of the flight was. The student and instructor discussed the weather conditions and how much time needed to be flown. A discussion about forecasted wind shear and turbulence took place. AIRMET's for those conditions were noted. The instructor talked to the supervisor and provided a briefing on the goal of the flight. The supervisor briefed the instructor on the conditions that were experienced when coming into the airport within the last hour. Airspeed was +/-10 KTS.; winds were out of the south at pattern altitude according to the PIREP provided by the supervisor.The student began the necessary checklists and started the engine. The student didn't notice any issues with the airplane during preflight. The fuel tanks were full at 40 gallons. The student and instructor briefed the flight once more and established roles. The instructor indicated he would be PIC for the takeoff and landing and controls would be given to the student after takeoff when appropriate. The instructor then began the taxi as the student completed the rest of the checklist items. The instructor stayed on the controls for the taxi until the airplane came to a stop for the run up. The run up was initiated by the student. As the run up and before takeoff checklist were completed; the student and instructor had another discussion about the wind speed and direction. The instructor directed the student to bug the wind direction and note the speed. The student bugged 180 degrees. Wind speed was 9 KTS.; gusting 19 KTS.; variable between 180 and 230 degrees. The instructor called back taxi on the CTAF and rolled out to the runway to use the full length of the runway for takeoff. The instructor then completed the 180 degree turn to depart. Takeoff power was applied and set. Static RPMs were above 2300 RPM and oil pressure was around 85-90 PSI. Airspeed came alive; and rotation was initiated around 55 KTS. and main wheels were off at 60 KTS. Airspeed began to build as the airplane crabbed into the wind. No issues with the engine were noted. As the airplane was trying to accelerate to Vy; airspeed was not building at a normal rate. The airspeed could not accelerate past 70 KTS. The airplane climbed to about halfway up the height of the surrounding trees before the aborted takeoff was initiated. It appeared that the wind had shifted to a tailwind and the aircraft was not going to gain sufficient airspeed. [The rejected takeoff] was initiated about halfway down the runway. An attempt was made to land on the remaining runway. Airspeed was not decreasing sufficiently to descend back towards the runway. Ground effect was experienced; and the airplane began to float. At that point; the instructor realized they may not be able to land on the remaining pavement. Flaps 40deg were put in about 3/4 of the way down the runway to help increase drag. The instructor realized this would momentarily increase lift and cause the aircraft to balloon. But the goal was to get the airplane as slow as possible to help with the impact. The airplane contacted the ground and ballooned up before settling back down on the remaining runway pavement. The instructor tried to brake using the toe brakes and aerodynamic braking by pulling full aft on the yoke. The airplane departed the end of the runway pavement and began rolling in the grass. As it rolled; it slowed down to roughly 20 KTS. ground speed and came to a rest in a ditch. At that point; the engine was secured; and the student and instructor were okay. The instructor made a phone call to the supervisor who came to the scene. The student and instructor exited the airplane with no issue and waited for help. The student had one injury on the knee from hitting the primer on the left side of the panel. The instructor got a cut on the hand from the carburetor heat. No other injuries were reported.  Contributing factors to the incident were the wind conditions. AIRMETs for wind shear and turbulence were active at the time of the flight; but the wind speed and direction were within limits of the aircraft. External pressure to complete the flight before a deadline contributed to the decision to go on the flight. Once power was applied and the airplane was airborne; the decision to abort the takeoff was initiated as soon as possible with the given indications. Other decisions once the aborted takeoff was initiated were done with careful consideration to reduce aircraft damage and personal harm.

C172 Instructor and student pilot reported poor aircraft performance shortly after takeoff led to the decision to land on the remaining runway. The aircraft ran off the runway after landing; resulting in minor injuries to the student pilot.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Baggage pit 4 improperly loaded which resulted in fire suppression equipment being rendered inoperative\ineffective in suppressing a potential fire. Ramp personnel were advised to rearrange bags in accordance with current requirements. This is an ongoing problem that should be passed on to all flight crews immediately. Crews should be required to check the loading of the pits :10 prior to push time.

Found pit 4 to be loaded improperly with 30-40 bags touching the ceiling. Possibly more. Prior to an ETOPS flight this is particularly concerning. This issue has been getting better as of late at a lot of stations. However it only takes one time for it to not matter how 'good' things have gotten. This simply needs to be rectified within our company. It was hard to tell if the ramp crew knew the rule or just didn't care about the 2 inches. The lead ramp agent did get the pit load corrected after a quick discussion. There needs to be an emphasis put on reporting this issue when a plane arrives incorrectly loaded. That would be my recommendation.

Air Carrier flight crew reported a baggage pit was packed excessively high not allowing fire suppression if needed.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight appeared to go normally. ETOPS was used flight. I reviewed the weather and NOTAMS from the emailed flight plan. I do not have an iPad or Jepps on my computer. However; while planning for this flight; ZZZZ was utilized as an ETOPS or ETP alternate airport. However; ZZZZ had a NOTAM in which the airport could not provide the local altimeter setting: ZZZZ 04/003 ZZZZ SC AUTOMATED WEATHER BROADCAST SYSTEM VIS; ALT AND DENSITY ALT NOT AV BL 1404072004-1404302359. The local altimeter is required per the commercial chart notes for all approaches into ZZZZ (Use local altimeter setting; if not received; procedure not authorized); thereby rendering the approaches useless. Without any useable approaches; ZZZZ could not be applied as an alternate per our Ops Specs. I reviewed the approach plates for the destination and alternate airports after arriving at the airplane. I did not notice the note on the approach plate regarding the altimeter setting.   The note was probably missed because I did not cross reference the NOTAMS and the approach plates simultaneously.

A B777 crew flew an oceanic flight with ZZZZ as an ETOPS alternate; but it was not legal because of inadequate weather information.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Staffing

The flight planning system is 'UNSAFE'! It is TOO SLOW to safely and effectively perform the necessary functions for the Aircraft Dispatcher. Today I had to change alternates due to an inaccurate forecast. Some flights were airborne and some were still on the ground. Crews received the changes in an untimely manner because the computer could not calculate the changes fast enough for the crews to get the information. This slowness has gotten slower as we get busier. The ACARS portion of the system was sending 'MAS FAIL' alerts after the information was sent to the aircraft. The message was in error as the crews were receiving the information and acknowledging the messages. Because of the error the Dispatcher now has to go back and verify whether or not the crews received the information thus slowing down the amendment process for other crews. As has been previously reported; the computer is slow to change between tabs and you can easily send ACARS messages to the wrong tail. MEL retrieval has gotten even slower than previously reported. With these problems it is very difficult for the Aircraft Dispatcher to keep up with the workload and still maintain a safe; legal; effective; efficient and timely operation.

Dispatcher reported the problems with their computerized flight planning system.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 168; Flight Crew Total 12069; Flight Crew Type 5710

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 253; Flight Crew Type 2522

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On approach into ZZZ XXR ILS visual. Flaps were stuck at 5. We went around and accepted vectors in order to run the appropriate check list. [ATC was advised]. We had a flap disagree situation and while running the checklist we were able to move the flaps to 10 but that was where it stopped. We ended up using the alternate flaps checklist and landed with flaps 15. It was an uneventful landing and we taxied to the gate.

The FO (First Officer) was flying aircraft on an ILS final for Runway XXR around ZZZZZ and the aircraft was configured with 5 flaps prior to the incident. After ZZZZZ; the gear was lowered and the aircraft was slowed below flaps 15 limiting speed and the extension to 15 flaps was requested. It was noted; thereafter; that the flap indicator showed 5 flaps when the flap lever was set for 15. The flap lever was reset to the indicated flap setting of 5 by the Captain and the decision was made to perform a go around to investigate. No asymmetry was noted with flap lever changes. The aircraft was stabilized in the pattern and the Flaps - Trailing Edge Flap Disagree checklist was executed which directed the use of flaps 15 for landing using the Alternate Flap Extension checklist. The Alternate Flap Extension checklist was executed to configure the aircraft. The aircraft was landed without incident and taxied to the gate.

B737 flight crew reported a Flap Disagree on approach; used Alternate Flap extension and landed without incident.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 1600; Flight Crew Type 1550

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

I was flying with a student pilot; practicing simulated engine failure emergency procedures. Student selected Frazier Lake airport (1C9) as the landing point. We positioned the airplane directly towards 1C9 for runway 5 which is a grass runway. I scanned the area in front and right of us to make sure there was no other traffic nearby. We descended towards runway 5 and ended the practice by going around above runway 5 at about 800 ft AGL. The next day we received a phone call from another pilot who was operating in traffic pattern at 1C9 attempting to land on the hard surface taxiway parallel to runway 5. He told us that he saw us on final flying next to him only approximately 200 ft above. He made few radio calls trying to reach us but no response; because we were not on 1C9 CTAF at the time. What have caused this event was that the student was busy performing the maneuver; forgot to change frequency to 1C9 CTAF and announce our intention. I was too focused on the training but overlooked the safety aspect of the flight. The corrective action is I should have changed frequency to 1C9 CTAF and monitor it when the student decided to head over there.

C152 Instructor reported failure to utilize CTAF resulted in a NMAC on final.


Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

I arrived for work a few minutes before my shift began. I had been assigned a desk by someone from midnight shift. I'm not sure if the assignments were done by a Lead or Shift Manager. I was assigned [a] desk; which is next to [another] desk. I did not measure the distance between the Load Planner and my position. I expect it is about 6 feet; probably not any less. The Lead was assigned [a desk] with a similar separation of about 6 feet. The other 5 Load Planners working this morning had at least double the distance between them as the 2 Load Planner and the Lead at these 3 desks. The 3 of us were not happy with this arrangement. After loud complaining by several load planners for several minutes and my demanding that someone be moved; the Lead decided I could move to [a] desk which is across the aisle in the middle of 5 desks that were planned to be empty. This gave ample separation between the Load Planner and me.I don't know why this requires loud complaining. The midnight Shift Manager and/or Lead don't want to provide any flexibility in this matter; as this is at least the second day in a row with similar desk assignments with needlessly reduced social distancing. I understand there may be problems with how the phone calls 'roll' between the desks or how the teams are assigned. These issues don't seem that important at this time as our workload is very reduced due to the reduced flight schedule. These issues need to be fixed to provide a safer; cleaner work environment.

Load Planner expressed concern about Coronavirus related company procedures that resulted in personnel being seated too close to one another.


FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 9

Flew ILS in marginal VFR conditions to Runway 9 at MIA. The Runway 9 ILS glideslope exits the Class B airspace after GRITT for 2-3 miles and reenters later. Procedure is not contained in Class B. This can be observed on Class B chart at approximately 4.8 NM to INESS where intercepting the glideslope takes you below 3;000 feet; bottom of class B at that point; and shortly thereafter re-enters. This is a known airspace error and airspace is yet to be corrected to contain the approach to the primary Class B airport. Realign Class B airspace to contain entire approach.

Air carrier pilot reported an airspace error with regards to the Runway 9 ILS approach to MIA airport.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Hazmat was found in ZZZ on XX month 2021 while conducting the facility inventory. Looking at the [Cargo Record] it looks to have arrived in to ZZZ on the evening of XX/month -1/2021; so it looks like it may have arrived off flight from ZZZ1. The piece is noted as UTL [Unable To Locate] on XY month -1 2021 in ZZZ1 as per the remarks. This is a Class 3; Packing Group III; Flammable Liquid n.o.s (1-Methoxy-2-Propanol; 4-Chloro-a; a;a-trifluorotouene); UN1993; PI 355; with 0.1L in volume.

Air Carrier Ramp Personnel reported missing Hazmat cargo located during facility inventory.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We were level at our cruise altitude of FL280. ATC issued a descent to FL240. The PNF selected the new altitude in the altitude preselect and we each confirmed the new altitude as per company SOPs. I (PF) reduced thrust slightly; selected VS mode; and rolled in 300 fpm down. My technique is to initiate a shallow descent for the first 200-300 feet; then increase the rate of descent to a normal target of 2;000 fpm down once the aircraft has started down. I find that this creates a comfortable transition for the passengers and allows me time to smoothly set a target power setting for descent. After selecting VS and 300 fpm down; the aircraft began a slow climb; which I thought would soon reverse itself. Going through 28;200 ft I selected ALT to capture the altitude and stop the climb; but the aircraft kept climbing. Passing through 28;300 ft I disconnected the autopilot and pushed the nose over. In order to keep from plastering the passengers on the ceiling I smoothly transitioned from a climb to a descent; which resulted in us reaching a maximum altitude of 28;500. There was no traffic in our vicinity so I wasn't concerned about an immediate conflict. I quickly returned through FL280 and continued the descent to FL240. I reselected the autopilot on and the rest of the flight was uneventful. I have been flying this airplane for 16 years and it has a tendency to abruptly pitch up during descent if it senses the airspeed is too close to redline. In this case I was cruising at .76 with the redline at .80; which is usually enough of a buffer for a normal descent. I suspect the autopilot pitched up to reduce airspeed and to avoid a potential overspeed condition; but I'm not sure why selecting ALT didn't capture our current altitude. This is about the worst case of altitude control I have seen with this airplane; but it is something that all of our pilots are aware is a potential issue. The autopilot has been checked numerous times by different maintenance shops over the years and no faults are ever found. I think it is a built-in protection that just doesn't work very well; poor design.

This aircraft has a known issue where it occasionally pitches up during descent as if the autopilot is trying to protect itself from an overspeed. We typically stay 10-15 knots from the barber pole at all times to avoid this situation. Neither pilot has ever seen this particular issue when first initiating a descent. Collins equipped Hawkers never have these problems.

Hawker 800 flight crew reported the autopilot started to climb after the crew initiated a descent. The problem was caused by a built-in speed protection feature of the autopilot.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Type 12

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

On Final approach to Runway XX a Cessna Citation 525B was observed approx 200 ft directly overhead; overtaking my position.The Cessna took evasive action; climbing and turning West. I continued my descent; and turned southbound.Tower had initially instructed me to enter a base leg; later revising my clearance to proceed directly to the runway numbers. I was given a landing clearance; and advised that there was traffic on base that would be entering a 1 mile final. While one mile from the airport a Citation Jet was observed descending approximately 200 ft directly overhead on a northwesterly heading. Multiple position reports were requested and given to the tower from 5 miles. GPS was used to verify the accuracy of the position reports.I do not recall any traffic alert from the tower. My passenger advised that he did hear an alert from our ADS-B 978 receiver at the time of the near miss. Our aircraft was also equipped with a 1090ES transponder; along with a compliant position source that was transmitting position at the time; and is ADS-B compliant.The Citation Jet was returning to the airport after a go around precipitated by birds on the runway.I discussed the incident with the Cessna pilot and called the tower via telephone to discuss the incident. The Cessna pilot advised that he was also given a landing clearance; and was not aware of another aircraft that was cleared to land prior to him. The controller advised that he misjudged the speed of the Citation as he was not accustomed to visually judging the speed of aircraft as he normally worked in a radar equipped tower. The tower was a temporary facility.Had the controller possessed at least an iPad with an inexpensive ADS-B receiver such as a Garmin GDL-39 he would have had access to position and speed information.

Sport Cruiser pilot reported a near midair collision with a Citation Jet while on final approach.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Workload

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 176; Flight Crew Type 11000

Time Pressure; Workload; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Human Factors; Airport; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

Descending via ANCHR3 Arrival into DEN expecting Runway 35R.  Several approach clearance changes inbound (runway changed from 16 to 35) changed to ANCHR Arrival.  We reprogrammed the FMC and set up for the ANCHR3 followed by visual approach to 35R backed up by the ILS. Approaching DOGGG; we were cleared for the RNAV RNPZ approach to 35R.  We quickly pulled up the new approach on our EFB and I intended to enter the 35R RNP Z approach into the FMC but inadvertently selected the 34R RNP Z approach without realizing it.  I quickly briefed the points while selecting .3RNP; but we were VMC with the field in sight; being instructed to slow to 170 knots getting traffic point outs and configuring with gear and flaps to slow down.  The first two points are the same for both approaches (DOGGG and MSIMS) before the 34R approach continues W across the 35L approach corridor to a final on 34R.  We didn't catch the error and continued to configure.  As we approached the centerline for 35R; it didn't appear that the plane was turning so I disengaged the autopilot and took over visually to not overshoot continuing to a normal landing.  In retrospect; I believe the end game visual approach closely tracked both vertical and lateral course of the RNP approach.  However; there was traffic on final to 35L and if we had not noticed the error and intervened; we could have easily caused a conflict

Approaching the Runway 35R centerline on the base leg; the First Officer (Pilot Flying) realized that automation was not turning us toward the runway. He disconnected the autopilot and made the turn so as not to overshoot. We received a 'Traffic TA' Alert and saw that the traffic for 35L was 300 feet lower. I realized at that point that the FMC must have been programmed incorrectly and quickly reprogrammed RNAV [RNP] Z Runway35R. The remainder of the approach was flown manually and uneventfully.

An air carrier crew entered the FMS ANCHR3 arrival and to expect Runway 35R RNAV RNPZ but mistakenly entered Runway 34R. After a TA alert; they flew the remainder of the 35R approach visually and landed uneventfully.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 1600; Flight Crew Type 220

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

IFR flight from SSI the weather briefing showed a convective sigmet across the route of flight. No icing airmets were shown for the route. The plane is not equipped for flight into icing; it has only a heated pitot tube and windshield defroster. The radar showed isolated cells with light to extreme precipitation within the area of the convective sigmet. The precipitation cells seemed far enough apart to navigate in between them with help from ATC. After reaching the assigned altitude of FL190 I advised ATC that I needed to deviate to the right (west) because of a cloud build up ahead of me. I got clearance for 15 degrees to the right. The controller advised me that I could have more than that if needed. After another 20 NM I entered IMC conditions which seemed fairly thin and did not look like a build up. I requested FL210 which got approved. During the climb I encountered heavy precipitation and very fast clear ice build up. The airplane is not equipped with anti icing equipment. Within 30 seconds the leading edge had about 1 inch of ice accumulated. I advised ATC about icing and precipitation. I got permission for deviation to the east and 11;000 FT; below freezing level. At this time the autopilot had flown the plane almost into a stall - the angle of attack indicator turned completely red and I got the warning in the head set. I disengaged the autopilot and pushed the nose down and turned to the east. The precipitation lasted only about 1 minute. Reaching 18;000 the airspeed was built up again and the fast clear ice build up had stopped. I advised ATC that I did not need to descend to 11;000. I got FL190 climbed to FL190 and stabilized the plane and engaged the autopilot. I entered VFR conditions shortly after this. I had about 1 inch of ice on the leading edge of the wing which looked now like rime ice. I advised ATC that everything was under control and that the flight would be continued. The ice on the wing disappeared slowly in the VFR conditions in the sun.

Lancair 4 pilot reports entering icing conditions climbing from FL190 to FL210. The ice build up is rapid and the aircraft is not equipped for flight into known icing condition. A descent is quickly requested and granted as the aircraft is running out of airspeed. At 18;000 FT the airspeed has built back up and no more ice accumulation is experienced. Reporter continues to destination with almost one inch of ice on the leading edge that slowly melts.


M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Airport; Procedure

Two pilot training mission was launched out of ZZZ1-ZZZ2 in Aircraft X then Direct to ZZZ.  The winds at ZZZ 010 @ 7 kts.  We decided to land runway XX and enter right traffic as published.  On approach; we did not see any other aircraft on TCAS.  We made radio calls starting at 5NM West; to join midfield downwind after crossing midfield.  We made additional radio calls with no response on the overhead; downwind; base; and final for runway XX.  Upon turning final; we noticed nothing abnormal and continued the final decent.  We entered the flare and during the flare; saw a landing light approaching on the centerline opposite direction on Runway YY.  We immediately began a go-around and offset to the east of the centerline and climbed out to rejoin the pattern missing the other aircraft by roughly 100 feet. Aircraft Y; that was on the runway did not make any known radio calls or take evasive action.Additionally; at no point did we get a TCAS warning from our system.After landing; we made contact with the other pilot who explained he had the frequency input incorrectly into his radio and claimed to have been making calls without response.Aircraft Y's lack of calls and long straight in approach over the lake instead of flying the pattern made them hard for us to spot.

A SR22 Instructor Pilot reported a NMAC with opposite direction landing traffic at a non-towered airport.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Fatigue

Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Climbing out of MKE this afternoon; we broke out around 5;000 feet. When we broke out; we were looking right into the sun. I used my right arm to shield my eyes; but it was still difficult to see the instruments. The FO asked me if I wanted the autopilot; but I declined because I wanted to get the aircraft stabilized in the climb. I was decreasing the pitch to accelerate to 250kts. After I got the plane to 250kts; I was going to ask for autopliot to get my sun shade; but Departure called us then and cleared us up to 10;000 feet. I heard the clearance and kept climbing. When the FO was done reading back the clearance; I asked for autopilot on. He turned it on. Neither of us realized that the airplane had captured at 5000 feet; he hadn't set 10000 feet yet; and I hadn't asked for a vertical mode. He said; 'Autopilot on' and I turned to get my sun shade. I got it in place; looked down at my instruments and the FO said; 'We're descending.' We had been at probably around 6500 when he turned the autopilot on. When he said we were descending; I bumped the stab trim to disable the autopilot and got the plane climbing again. At that point; we realized we still had 5000 feet bugged and no vertical mode. We corrected those problems and re-engaged the autopilot and continued the flight.It's hard to pinpoint the root cause of the event because there were so many causes. We were both struggling to see in the glare of the sun in our eyes. We had task saturation because we were trying to fly the plane in that challenging situation while reading back and complying with a new clearance; and also trying to get the autopilot on. We were both tired. I made several minor mistakes that we caught right away after that on this flight. We were tired because almost every leg of this trip we had to fly an instrument approach past the final approach fix; and almost every leg had some kind of issue (MX; security; passenger deplaning; etc).Very simply; regardless of the flight conditions; after having the autopilot engaged; verify the aircraft flight path before turning away to take care of other items (like getting the sun shade).

CRJ-200 Captain reported an excursion from cleared altitude due to fatigue; distractions; and lack of autoflight mode awareness.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

On departure lost Number 2 Pitch Trim; Autothrottle; 1 and 2 Autopilots and FO (First Officer) Flight Director. Number 1 Pitch Trim already deferred. Also; MEL that restricted us from RVSM airspace. Performed ECAM/ QRH procedures and could not reset Pitch Trim or Autothrottles. No autopilots were recovered and only manual trim available. [Received priority from ATC] as a precautionary measure. Returned to departure airport ZZZ. No further problems noted. Uneventful landing.Cause - System malfunction of Pitch Trim and Autopilots.Suggestion - Will await Maintenance final action/correction.

On departure at acceleration altitude we had Pitch Trim 2 fault. Pitch Trim 1 was already deferred. The ATS (Autothrottle System) lever also tripped off and I had FD2 flag on my pad. After the aircraft was cleaned up and the after takeoff checklist completed. I selected my FD switch to get FD1 on my PFD (Primary Flight Display). We accomplished the ECAM. Neither Pitch Trim 2 or ATS off reset. We ran the pitch fault QRH. It was no help. We elected to [advise ATC] and land in ZZZ.Cause - Pitch Trim 2 fault with Pitch Trim 1 deferred already.

Air Carrier flight crew reported loss of Pitch Trim and Autopilots after takeoff resulting a return to departure airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

Workload; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport

Crew was descending into ZZZ Airport at about [night] time. Weather revealed winds 350 with good visibility and MVFR conditions. With the higher winds out of the north; the crew elected to fly the RNP Approach which requires the PAPI to be operational to fly the approach. A review of the NOTAMs revealed this would not be an issue; though the REIL was out of service to this runway. Icing conditions on the approach prompted to crew to conduct a flap full landing with ice numbers. Additionally; Tower mentioned that they would be closing just prior to our arrival. The Captain; myself; briefed the autothrottles would be disconnected on the arrival; with the autopilot off once established inbound. I disconnected the autothrottles and left the autopilot on as briefed. We continued to configure through the landing checklist and saw the runway on the approach. Once we rounded out on final; I disconnected the autopilot and began slowing to our approach speed when the lights at the airport clicked off. I briefly shallowed the descent anticipating the possibility of a go-around and had my First Officer turn the lights to high which failed to bring the PAPI back online. Being VMC and within required company parameters for a safe approach; I inquired to my First Officer if he was comfortable with continuing under the conditions which he was. I corrected descent angle and the flight landed without any further incident.This was the flight crew's first time flying this approach; my first RNP approach in a while; and my fourth night landing in about 2.5 months. This RNP Approach requires the PAPI to be operational to use. With there being no PAPI NOTAM; it was determined that it would be appropriate to fly it. After we had landed we found that the Tower; attempting to enable the pilot controlled lighting; had inadvertently switched all lights off. This was corrected with my First Officer turning the lights back on but the action failed to turn the PAPI on. The ATIS had called for gusty winds out of the north but; once we were established on final; I noticed we had a quartering tailwind at 15 kt. which caused me some confusion. The light issue and shifting winds prompted me to shallow out the approach due to the possibility of a go-around. However; with the airport lights on minus the PAPI and in VMC conditions; I figured the safest course of action was to continue given the fact that we were within parameters required to continue the approach and land. My thinking was a go-around late at night; in mountainous terrain and icing conditions with a possible changing weather pattern; may not be the best idea given we were still within tailwind parameters and touchdown requirements for landing. To me; this incident illustrates how important it is to appropriately manage [non-forecasted] distractions; especially during high workload phases. Additionally; it's imperative that we strive to remain current even during prolonged periods of stagnation.When weather is in vicinity; ensure [that] the most accurate weather is obtained from Tower if necessary. Relay concerns of airport issues to ATC or go-around. Be wary of Tower closures near arrivals to airports. A reminder that higher elevation airports present unique challenges which must be reviewed and briefed prior to flying into them. A reminder to chair fly approaches to destination airports; especially if the approaches you intend to follow are unfamiliar. The importance of maintaining appropriate approach currency. Speed management and adequate monitoring during all flight phases. A reminder to fly the airplane first and; if mounting distractions cause confusion; go-around.

I briefed the descent and approach with Captain; Captain as pilot flying. Reviewed FMS approach briefing card. Verified all NOTAMs and approach requirements per the chart and current ATIS. Both First Officer and Captain acknowledged Runway End Identifier Lights were inoperative; [but was not] not required for approach clearance. Received approach clearance from Approach. Tower closed while just outside the FAF with acknowledgment from Tower on Tower frequency of no traffic in the area on frequency and no issues to report from the last reported ATIS. Broke out from IMC to VMC conditions before the FAF. Acknowledged 'runway' by First Officer and 'landing' by Captain. Clicked the CTAF frequency 5 times by [the] First Officer to assure lights would remain illuminated while on final; [as] requested by [the] Captain. Runway lights removed from view while just past the FAF.Then; [the] First Officer clicked 5 times on CTAF frequency again; after [the] Captain asked about the runway lights turning off; both runway lights illuminated again. Moments later we both acknowledged that we didn't see the PAPI to the left. CA (Captain) asked if I found the circumstances to land safe versus a missed approach late at night and snow in the forecast. [We] agreed it would be safe to land given the real time circumstances. Upon landing with no issue; Tower Controller got on CTAF frequency to apologize that they configured the runway lighting incorrectly; which is why it turned off momentarily. The First Officer reported the PAPI was also not working when lights returned. [The] ATC Controller reported on CTAF; 'That is weird;' and would be reporting it to airport operations. Great example in how reality and goal for safety require pilot judgment.

E175 flight crew reported that as the Tower Controller was closing up the Tower; had inadvertently turned off the runway lights; resulting in a non-functional PAPI lighting system while the crew was on approach.


Gulfstream Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Incursion Runway

While taxiing from the southeast ramp; westbound on taxiway 1; Ground Control issued us the following clearance; 'Aircraft X; taxi to Runway XXL via [Taxiway] 2; cleared to cross Runway XY; give way to Aircraft Y on [Taxiway] 3.'  As we turned southbound onto Taxiway 2; as I was looking right to clear for crossing the runway; the Captain brought the aircraft to an abrupt stop and I noted a 767 taxiing westbound on Runway XY.  Luckily the Captain saw them before we hit them.   We queried Ground Control about the conflict and we noted that the 767 crew remarked; 'That was a close call'.  There was never any mention of giving way to a 767 taxiing westbound on Runway XY in our taxi instructions. Human Factors breakdown.

While taxiing to Spot X on Taxiway 1; Ground issued the following clearance just prior to reaching Spot X:  'Aircraft X Taxi to Runway XXL via [Taxiway] 2; cleared to cross Runway XY; give way to Aircraft Y on [Taxiway] 3.' As I turned the airplane onto Taxiway 2 (north side of Runway XY) to cross Runway XY; I had to yield/stop uninstructed to give way to a 767 aircraft taxiing on Runway XY westbound from my left to avoid a taxi incursion with that aircraft.

Pilots reported a ground conflict with an unknown aircraft while looking for ATC issued traffic.