Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Approximately 20-40 seconds after takeoff noted smoke entering cabin near over wing exits. Smoke continued to become thicker and blanketed entire cabin; starting from ceiling to floor. Color of smoke was white/gray and light to moderate thickness. Some passengers were coughing; others were fanning themselves due to smell. Received interphone call from #4 Flight Attendant seated at direct-view near 2R and I confirmed my awareness of smoke. Advised that I would contact flight deck; and to standby. Called flight deck using emergency call; they answered immediately and reported smoke in cabin; location; color; and intensity. Advised smoke had a petroleum smell and sweet taste. Flight deck advised it was most likely the RH Pneumatic Air Conditioning Kit (PACK). They theorized it may have overheated while on the ground.Advised that I would go into cabin and report findings. Requested flight deck to make announcement to cabin once duties permitted. Completed call with flight deck; then made announcement reassuring passengers that flight deck was aware of situation; to remain calm; stay seated with seatbelts fastened; and crew would thoroughly trained to handle this type of situation. Flight deck would update us as soon as their duties permitted. While making this PA; I noticed condensation (mist) also coming from the sidewall panel ducts. I reassure passengers the 'mist' coming from the sidewalls was due to high humidity and was condensation; this was normal. I wanted the passengers to be aware of the difference to avoid additional alarm or panic. Proceeded into the cabin to check for the source of smoke.Proceeding slowly forward-aft; reassuring passengers while also noting that smoke was beginning to dissipating. As I reached row 25; only light haze/smoke. I returned to forward jump seat interphone and advised flight deck (routine call) that smoke was clearing. Flight continued to [destination] without further incident. Duration of smoke was approximately 2-3 minutes. No passenger illnesses or injuries were reported to the crew. Questioned other crewmembers discreetly on their status; appeared/stated 'okay'.During the process of making my emergency call to flight deck; the number #4 made a PA advising passengers the crew was aware of the cabin smoke and to remain calm. Further; he stated we would most likely return to [departure airport]. Understandably; the tone of his voice during his PA included a higher degree of stress/nervousness. After my conversation with the flight deck; I followed his PA to reiterate some of the same points; but made a conscious effort to keep my tone steady; reassuring; and calming. I also made no mention of a possible return to [departure airport]. On a different flight; we shared feedback with each other; including the PAs. I stated that I would have done the same thing; but with one exception. I would not have included the reference about returning to [our departure airport] since this could have caused greater distress once the Captain announced we would continue onward to [our destination]. I suggested that during any crisis; PAs should be limited to the bare minimum details; reporting only known/confirmed facts. Avoid speculating since this could reduce your creditability if those speculations don't occur. He agreed.During the emergency (after checking the cabin); I referenced the emergency procedures section to review cabin fire/smoke procedures. To my surprise (and frustration) all references to cabin smoke procedures have been deleted. The prior fire/smoke procedures included detailed instructions about how to correctly respond to either emergency since smoke/fire are usually (but not always) associated in the same emergency. The procedures included switching off the power port and In Flight Entertainment (IFE) masters. While this event didn't include an actual fire; the volume of smoke required the crew to respond with a methodical and coordinated approach. The lack of written guidance caused hesitation and uncertainty. Subsequently; I did not switch off the IFE or power port power masters since I had no specific checklist to follow.The former fire/smoke procedures were developed from research learned due to the Swiss Air 111 accident; and previous cabin smoke emergencies. While this event was unrelated to an IFE or power port malfunction; not accomplishing these tasks could have escalated the risk if it was indeed related to either component. Further; until the smoke cleared; the crew could only speculated about the true root cause; thus following the fire/smoke procedures would have been relevant to my emergency. I highly impress upon our procedures group to restore the original verbiage/check-list.Airbus Training Item: during taxi (6-10 minutes prior to smoke event); I noticed the aft cabin temperature rising on the Forward Attendant Panel (FAP) temperature gauge. At one point; the cabin registered 86 degrees. I thought it odd (since the aft cabin was nowhere near this hot); but considered a malfunction with the FAP. After the emergency; I shared my observation with the flight deck which helped to confirm a RH PACK malfunction. I suggest this observation should be sent to Airbus/Engineering. If validated; then communicate to flight attendants to better help the flight deck troubleshoot a PACK overheat event.Flight Department: I've noticed on several occasions that flight deck crews routinely set the Airbus cabin temperature controls in the flight deck to full cold. This action causes extreme fog/condensation to be emitted from the cabin A/C vents while on the ground; taxi; take-off; and cruise. I've also observed that most pilots are unaware it's not necessary to 'peg' the controls to full cold in order to quickly cool the cabin. Placing the controls at full cold only increased the level of the dramatic display of mist/fog in the cabin; causing concern by passengers. The flight attendants reported a dense 'fog' immediately after landing.Captain's Performance: upon arrival [at our destination]; the Captain quickly deplaned and did not debrief the crew; nor did he request the status of the crew's wellbeing. Additionally; checking the write-ups; there does not appear to be any mention of this event in the aircraft logbook. Is this protocol? There are several write-ups about trim air system faults. Are they related to a PACK overheat? While it's understandable the Captain may have considered the event a simple mechanical matter; thus him appearing to treat the matter lightly. However; in retrospect; it was quite an upsetting concern to all who endured this smoke event from the cabin side. To his credit; he was extremely quick to respond to all interphone calls and made a PA to the cabin very soon after the smoke was reported; very much appreciated.

A319 Flight Attendant reported smoke in the cabin near the overwing exits during climb.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Type 2500

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

After pushback in RNO we called Ground for taxi clearance. Ground told us to 'taxi to 16L via A; D; cross 16R. I read back the clearance and we proceeded to taxi. When we arrived the day before we both noticed the end taxiway and 16R were closed; and I expected to cross 16R and 16L at D and then proceed via C to runway 16L. I remember expecting to hear a hold short or cross 16L as part of the taxi instructions; but when I didn't hear either it just dropped from my mind. I think I expected to receive the clearance to cross from Tower later. As we approached D; Ground asked if we would like the intersection for takeoff. We replied no and asked for full length. Ground then said 'turn left on C and contact Tower.' We made the turn onto D; crossed 16R and as we approached 16L; we heard tower say 'Aircraft X; stop; stop'. The Captain stopped the aircraft immediately and we came to a stop short of the runway; but across the hold short line. A Cessna 172 was beginning its takeoff roll and took off on 16L as we were stopped. After the Cessna departed; Tower cleared us to cross 16L and proceed to the runway via C. We departed without incident. I should have queried the Ground Controller when the initial taxi instructions did not include a specific instruction to either cross or hold short of 16L. I knew we needed clearance to cross 16L; but when I heard taxi to 16L with no hold short or cross instructions; I just didn't catch the significance. I can only assume the Ground Controller expected us to depart from the 16L at D intersection; and that's why no hold short or cross instructions were given. When Ground then told us to turn left on C and contact Tower; I knew we were cleared to cross 16R; but since it was closed and barricaded; in the back of my mind I sort of discounted the clearance as a technicality. That may have influenced my situational awareness with regards to crossing 16L. Also; we had been instructed to turn left on C and I knew this was on the other side of 16L from where we were and didn't trigger the realization that we hadn't received a clearance to cross 16L.

Given taxi instructions to 'taxi to 16L via A;D; cross 16R'; First Officer repeated taxi instructions identically and Captain verbally repeated the instructions. On Taxiway A; before Taxiway D; we were asked by Ground if we could do an intersection D takeoff. First Officer responded with negative. On Taxiway A; right before Taxiway D; we were given taxi instructions to 'turn right on D; turn left on C and contact Tower'. Between Taxiway A and 16L; the Crew was completing the Before Takeoff Checklist. We were never given instructions to hold short of 16L. The Crew noticed on 10-9 page that Taxiway C was on the other side of 16L and assumed we were cleared to cross 16L; since Taxiway C was on the other side of Runway 16L. Captain looked left and saw a Cessna aircraft in position on 16L and started to slow down. The next thing we heard was 'Stop Stop' by Tower and Captain applied brakes; but had crossed the 16L hold short line by 5-10 feet. The Cessna aircraft took off. Neither aircraft had to take immediate corrective action. We crossed 16L; turned left on Taxiway C and taxied up to 16L; and were cleared for takeoff. Never assume any taxi clearance and query the Controller if not sure of instructions. The Crew assumed we were cleared to cross the runway since Taxiway C was on the opposite side of the runway. The Crew believes that the Ground Controller was predisposed that we could do a intersection D takeoff; and this was when things started to go wrong when we replied negative. The quick handover to Tower could have also contributed to the lack of hold short/cleared to cross miscommunication. The Crews situational awareness of checking the runway left and right before crossing led to them seeing the Cessna aircraft in position and started to slow prior to the hold short line; but wasn't enough to prevent crossing the hold short line.

Crew reported crossing the runway hold-short line after turning on the wrong taxiway during taxi for takeoff at Reno.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

ALTR FAIL master warning occurred for approximately 1 second during the downwind vector setting up for the ILS XX into ZZZ. Approximately 10 minutes later while approaching minimums on the ILS XX ZZZ; the ALTR FAIL master warning came on continuously. I instructed the student to go-around and fly the missed approach procedure as normal. After a positive rate of climb was established; I silenced the warning and started working on the checklist. The alternator amps were positive when I checked them. The checklist failed to bring the alternator back online without a master warning activation; so I deactivated the alternator and completed the recommended load shedding procedures with the exception of the lighting bus due to being in close proximity of ZZZ1. BATT AMPS was -7. We flew the ILS XYL into ZZZ1 due to poor inflight visibility. The flight was completed without incident; [company] was notified; and aircraft was written up.Reviewing the POH; my best guess as to the cause of the alternator failure is an alternator voltage between 30.5 and 32. The alternator was still providing power with a positive amperage indication while the master warning was active; which leads me to believe that the over-voltage relay was not tripped. Something else caused the master warning to activate. There was no burning smell or other indication of trouble.

GA instructor pilot reported alternator failure and elected to return to the departure airport.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Training / Qualification; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

This event raises serious concerns about deviation from approved standard deicing procedures. 1. De-icing before aircraft is configured for Deice. Arrived at aircraft approximately 45 mins prior to ETD. Started walk around and one deice truck had started to deice/pre-treat aircraft. I asked the driver if they had confirmed with the crew if the aircraft was configured for deice. They said no one was in the aircraft and the cargo door was closed (belly doors were opened) so they were good to go. We had been in the aircraft with the APU and packs running. After my walk around was complete I discussed with the ramp deice supervisor the necessity of configuring the aircraft before deicing. 2. On the radio; an aircraft was given their Deice report and a good to go report from a de-ice supervisor; but the aircraft next to them advised them that the top of their aircraft was not de-iced. So the departing aircraft requested to be de-iced and anti-iced again. 3. Mechanic at our aircraft told us that other aircraft were de-iced and anti-iced piecemeal and in sections. I opened our door to witness Type IV applied to outboard section of left wing when the left engine and inboard section of left wing and fuselage were not clean. I don't believe this method is in accordance with our established procedures. 4. I was told by a manager that the top of the 767 is not a critical surface. This is a true statement but the top of all of our aircraft STILL need to be de-iced when they are covered with anything other than thin frost and anti-iced when necessary. 5. Our aircraft was deiced in the blocks. During the process I asked how the truck was going to get around the loading dock to treat the left front of the fuselage and it appeared like it was an odd request. I told them 'Yes I need the all the Icicles and snow removed from the entire aircraft'. The left nose was deiced after we blocked out. The events I witnessed and conversations I had and heard over the radio create a lack of confidence that our aircraft not are being deiced properly in accordance with established procedures.

B767 Captain questioned the de-ice crew procedure to not deice the fuselage top; their piecemeal deice procedure; and reluctance to deice any surface other than flight control surfaces. The Captain directed all ice and icicles be removed.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

While on the KORRY 3 Arrival into LGA; just passing between BRAND and KORRY intersections we encountered what appeared to be a weather balloon. The balloon appeared to be about 4 to 5 FT in diameter and equally as long; it passed about 50 FT off the nose. I was the pilot not flying and in the process of preparing the aircraft for landing; setting up the landing data and getting the weather information. I heard the Captain yell and saw him duck. It startled me quite a bit as did it him. We had just passed BRAND at 11;000 FT and the next step down is 10;000 FT at KORRY with not a whole lot of time to make the restriction especially at higher speeds which ATC requested. It was so startling that we did not get down to 10;000 FT by KORRY. As soon as I realized we didn't make the restriction I notified ATC and told them the reason why; stating that the balloon had just missed us. The Controller did not seem to be concerned but I thought it was important that he know about the balloon as it was floating on the arrival. We continued to 10;000 FT then the Controller issued us a lower altitude and we continued into LGA with an uneventful landing. Prior to KORRY we had no problems meeting any of the other crossing restrictions on the KORRY 3. As far as avoiding a future recurrence; I don't know that there is much that there is much that can be done about the balloon except that it's a good reminder to always be aware of your surroundings. For the crossing restriction I suggest that you always dial in the next altitude and not 10;000 that way you are aware of your position on the arrival and least don't run the danger of getting too low. This is exactly what we briefed and did and ultimately we both just got distracted; it is certainly the closest I've ever come to another object hitting us while airborne. I would suggest to everyone to remember to fly the airplane no matter what and talk about the problem on the ground unless it requires attention at that exact moment.

An Air Carrier First Officer reported a near miss with what appeared to be a weather balloon at 11;000 FT between BRAND and KORRY Intersections on the LGA KORRY 3 Arrival.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 3500

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

After diverting into OKC contacted Dispatch for new Flight Plan and Release. Flight Plan RLS2 ZFW = 90;135 pounds. Initial RLS01 ZFW = 118;995 pounds. We had 6 passengers deplane in OKC; fuel upload approximately equal to initial RLS01 but I saw that TOGW was 28;000 pounds less in OKC than for initial takeoff. We phone patched with Load Planning and they stated new ZFW was not 91;035 pounds but 118;468 pounds; re-dispatched flight on RLS03 with correct ZFW. Flight uneventful.

A320 Captain reports receiving a release after diverting with a substantial change in ZFW while almost no actual change occurred. Load planning is contacted and the correct ZFW; almost 29;000 pounds heavier; is supplied.


Inspection; Installation; Testing; Work Cards

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Human Factors; Procedure

Provided a Conformation Check on a Work Card for removal of tools and materials and was later discovered that Speed tape was left on the Right-Hand (R/H) Static Port. The work was performed at the Line at night and I; Mechanic X; was working with Mechanic Y. The [Speed] tape was not seen during my walk around due to not having a red flag on it and Speed tape does not stand out well in that spot. A red flag should always be used when blocking any Static Port.

I did a Check on Aircraft X; an Embraer-145 aircraft and signed-off the Work Card.  Became aware that Speed tape was left over the RVSM Port. There was no damage to the aircraft; no delay; no emergency declared. Aircraft flew four legs [flights] and a pilot found it [Speed tape] on the walk around.  Communication Error on me and other mechanics.[Recommend better] communication between other mechanics. Aircraft in service at gate. Evening Shift.

Four Line Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (AMTs) including a Lead Technician; report about their involvement with an Embraer-145 aircraft that flew four legs with the Right-Hand (R/H) Static Port covered with Speed tape.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 350; Flight Crew Type 105

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Multi engine training flight. While practicing an aborted takeoff the instructor failed the left engine and student did not react properly to the engine failure and the the airplane began to veer off the runway; the instructor took controls; and was able to straighten out with the right rudder and get the power to idle. The left main and nose gear went into the grass and the aircraft became stuck in the grass. As a result the runway was closed until the aircraft could be towed off of the runway.

Flight instructor reported a runway excursion following a students improper correction for a simulated engine failure on takeoff roll.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 13; Flight Crew Total 77; Flight Crew Type 60

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

While on a local area flight; aircraft had an apparent alternator failure. COM 2 panel went blank; COM 1 panel still displayed but was unresponsive. Radio calls were not returned. Radio calls had successfully been made earlier in the flight; including position reports and interactions with other aircraft in the area. Upon diagnosing the electrical failure; I turned off all lights and radio panels but left the transponder on. I used my handheld radio to communicate with local area traffic the nature of my situation; and decided to proceed back to ZZZ to attempt a landing. Two-way radio communication was established with ZZZ Tower via my handheld radio. Permission to enter the airspace and land was obtained; at which time I successfully landed and exited the runway and ramp environment; per instructions from ZZZ ATC.

PA-28 pilot reported an alternator failure resulted in a return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Evacuated

Pushed back from the ZZZ gate X; during push back; we received the okay from ground crew personnel that we can start engine 1. During engine start of the number one engine; it was noted that we had a hung start as the N2 gauge only got up to about 31 percent. Once the Captain and I noticed the indications; we went into shutdown procedures of the number 1 engine. We did note the engine 1 ITT temperature rapidly increase; before it decreased. After shutting down the engine to prepare to restart; ground crew personnel attempted to notify us that there was a fire. However; due to faulty headsets of ground personnel; this information was hard to make sense of. At this point to confirm a potential fire; we contacted the flight attendants to check the rear of the aircraft and look out the windows to confirm the fire potential. The flight attendants did not see any flames or smoke. The decision was made to open the main cabin door; to allow the pilot in command to visually verify there was a fire threat. After the pilot in command visually inspected the area; he was able to confirm that there was a fire and we promptly called for an aircraft evacuation of the passengers and crew. Fire units were notified promptly by ground crew and notification to ZZZ Ground Control of evacuation of passengers on the ramp. The Captain and myself (First Officer) continued to do the Engine Fire (on the ground) Emergency Procedure Checklist and the Passenger Evacuation Procedure Checklist.

Pushing back we were cleared to start the number one engine. While starting the engine we noticed the engine went to 30 percent N2 and N1 was hanging at 6 to 7 percent. When we were doing the shutdown procedure we noticed the ITT gauge started going up rapidly then went down to zero after we shut down the engine and had no other messages appear on the aircraft. After we shut down the engine the rampers were trying to tell us something; but their radio had a lot of static and I could not understand them. I thought they said fire; but I was not sure because of all the static on the radio. We had no indication on the EICAS of an engine fire. I had my First Officer call the Flight Attendant and check to see if there was a fire. They called back and said they could not see anything. Still unable to understand what ramp was saying; I decided to open the cabin door to visually check; and there was a fire on the number 1 engine. I ran back inside and told the Flight Attendants to evacuate the aircraft. The First Officer and I ran the Engine Fire (on the ground) Emergency Procedure Checklist. After we finished the checklist I shut off the aircraft and made sure everyone was off the aircraft.

CRJ 900 Flight Crew reported that ground crew observed a fire on an engine during start and evacuated the aircraft.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

We as employees are very concerned on the conduct and unsafe work environment that is going on at the ZZZ facility with the COVID precautions.  With many of our employees getting sick and even passing away; we have noticed the lack of safety regarding the management of COVID-19. There has been a couple of outbreaks and the company never identified the outbreak area; no Investigation on the outbreak and especially no contact tracing efforts or warnings of contact exposure. The weather is getting colder; the breakrooms are packed with no social distancing and no improvement in the ventilation. This is giving us high stress and anxiety in this work environment.

Ground employee reported COVID-19 related concerns in their work environment.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 12756; Flight Crew Type 1323

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

During cargo loading; the ZZZZ ramp loaded a pallet that contain Hazmat. When we received the planned ACARS Hazmat form; it showed the code of '12'. According to the Flight Operations Manual (FOM) there is only 11 Hazmat categories listed; so I call the [Chief Pilot] to clarify what is a code 12. He stated that there was no code 12 and he would conferred with [Operations Control] load planning. [Operations Control] load planning later said that it was a lithium battery. So here; I have a known highly flammable; high voltage; possible uncontrollable discharging lithium battery buried inside other flammable materials on a pallet in my cargo hold. Its code is not the FOM; which I interpret to mean that the company has not authorized shipment of such material AND my aircraft's fire suppression system cannot extinguish this burning item if it ignites AND we are on an 11 hour flight over water flight with any possible divert fields hours away from my route. This decision was simple; remove the battery from the pallet. But ZZZZ Ramp stated that they could not remove the battery from the pallet because it was not assessable - it was buried deep within the pallet stack.This was definitely a safety of flight issue; so I requested to ZZZZ Operations that they remove the pallet and we had an on-time departure.

While preflighting; we received a planned Dangerous Goods (DG) ACARS message for lithium batteries with an ICAO Drill Code 12FZ. However; the IATA Aircraft Emergency Response Drill Code Table found in FOM (Flight Operation Manual) only goes to Drill Code 11. There is no Drill Code 12. I advised the Captain of this; he called Station Operations and asked the DG/loading supervisor to come to the cockpit. He also called the Chief Pilot.The loading supervisor showed up immediately and told the Captain that the DG was loaded at the bottom of a 5000-pound pallet of cargo. The Chief Pilot then called us; he agreed that Drill Code 12 was not there and contacted the Dangerous Goods specialist. The DG specialist told the Captain that the lithium batteries were good to go; it was a very small amount; and that they were approved; even allowed in the cabin. He referenced FOM; under Lithium Battery-Powered Electronic Devices.FOM states that those lithium batteries are permitted in; or as; carry-on baggage. The unspoken implication was that if they were safe enough for the cabin; then they were safe enough for being loaded as cargo. Personally; I would rather have a small lithium battery torch off in the cabin where I can see it and fight it; rather than in the pit (where our fire suppression won't work on lithium) at the bottom of a 5000-pound pallet of combustible cargo.The Captain pointed out that the Drill Code and Drill Letters tell the pilots what actions to take to stabilize the situation and prevent aircraft damage or loss of life. Without the FOM information for Drill Code 12; we would have no guidance available in a Hazmat event involving the lithium batteries.The Captain declined to carry the DG. The station removed the pallet and we departed on time.Additional comments: Obviously; there is a Drill Code 12. It is relatively new; as of January 2019. A cursory search online will find references to Drill Code 12 and lithium batteries. From the IATA Dangerous Good Regulations; 60th Edition (2019); Significant Changes*; this is a change showing that the inherent hazard for lithium batteries is not - 'No General inherent risk' and a new drill number '12-Fire; heat; smoke; toxic and flammable vapor' was adopted. There are even apps showing the IATA Emergency Response Drill Codes - including Drill Code 12FZ - and the appropriate cockpit actions. It's appalling that [the web] has this information available but the Flight Operations Manual doesn't. There is absolutely no excuse for having out-of-date DG information when aircrew and passenger lives are at stake. The Drill Codes give pilots guidance in case of an inflight Hazmat emergency. Not having correct and current information on how to handle a Hazmat emergency - especially one involving lithium batteries - could result in a catastrophic hull loss and the loss of all souls on board.

B-777 flight crew reported refusing cargo due to Lithium Ion Hazmat and the documentation referenced a Hazmat code that not listed in the Flight Operations Manual.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 270; Flight Crew Type 25

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was cleared to land short final. Shortly before large jet departed. Jet wash pushed me left of center line. Upon landing I veered off rwy onto grassy portion briefly and was able to miss lights and veer back to rwy safely. No lights were damaged and no damage to plane.

The pilot of a C182 reported a runway excursion during landing following the departure of a large aircraft.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 6700; Flight Crew Type 1100

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

The right FO (First Officer) display dimmer was written up. As a result of this replaced CDU/MEL (Control Display Unit/Minimum Equipment list) 34-XX-XX.Captain side CDU IPL (Illustrated Parts List) Part number XXXXXXXX-X; the FO side Part number XXXXXX-Y.[Days later] another write up made with regards to the CDU's being different from one another and that key strokes that were bringing up different pages when selected. These were noted deficient on both Captain and FO side CDU; due to them being different units. Maintenance deferred the item per MEL 34-XX-XX-XX stating that FO side only button command was intermittent. Again during flight it was noted that the boxes were not talking to each other properly and key strokes were faulty. The item was re-written up by Captain and once again brought Maintenance personnel attention. When reporting to aircraft flight personnel stressed the fact that we needed the CDU to be either removed and replaced with matching CDU so they talk with each other or to de-energize and collar the breaker supplying power to the unit and operate single CDU allowed by the MEL 34-XX-XX-XX. Flight crew was insured that part would be available when we arrived in ZZZ and would be replaced. After arrival into ZZZ we were told that the part had been sent to the ZZZ1 base. The aircraft currently has two different CDU installed but at least the FO side has been de-energized and removed from service.

B757 Captain reported a repeating Control Display Unit malfunction followed by improper Maintenance action.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 145; Flight Crew Type 2284

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Takeoff with wrong takeoff data and rapidly changing Wx Storms on the departure for runway 01 and tail winds caused tower to change departures to runway 19 at push back time. When we were number 2 for takeoff I realized we would have a wet runway with a tailwind so I asked the FO (First Officer) to setup for a max thrust takeoff. I read the reduced thrust V speeds off so the FO could input them after the speeds were deleted. We planned on a max thrust with reduced V speeds takeoff. I did not however think of getting new takeoff data and we were cleared into position to hold very soon after entering the speeds.Heavy rain began to hit the arrival end of the runway as the plane before us was cleared for takeoff. Tower called winds for the aircraft before us at 020/8. I confirmed that we were limited to a 15 knot tailwind but still did not think of getting new takeoff data for the actual winds. We were cleared for takeoff very quickly after the proceeding aircraft lifted off. The rain was still heavy; but I was able to see them rotate. As we accelerated I was expecting the rain to begin to shear off the windscreen but in fact visibility only got worse as the FO selected high on the wipers. The wipers did nothing to help. Somewhere around the 100 knot callout the rain was now very heavy and I felt it would be more dangerous to abort than to continue. Right as I was thinking this the FO said out loud 'just follow the lights.' I did acknowledged that I could see the lights.By this point we were definitely in the high speed (greater than 100 knots) regime and I was only able to see the centerline lights intermittently. I did not believe we would be able to make a safe abort by this time. It was actually a relief to hear rotate because I was then able to use the PFD. Before we changed to departure frequency I had the FO tell tower that visibility was basically nil for our takeoff in an effort to keep the next airplane from accepting takeoff clearance.Biggest takeaway for me was that I did not get new takeoff speeds before accepting takeoff clearance. After hearing winds for the aircraft taking off in front of us had a tail (020/8) wind we should have told tower we needed new numbers. We were able to get takeoff data after getting to cruise for winds at 020/8. But the Tower called wind for our takeoff as we were rolling at 020/13; takeoff data for theses winds resulted in 'T/O NOT POSSIBLE FEILD LENGTH LIMIT'. We did not and would not normally have the new takeoff data for different winds given as we started the takeoff roll. Even if we ran new data for the 020/8 wind by the time we heard 020/13 as we were rolling and it was too late to know that we were now actually runway limited. Another surprise factor was how fast the amount of rain and wind shift changed in only a moment. I was not thinking about tail winds because the airport just changed runways to avoid tailwinds. I did not feel unsafe until we were already accelerating and the water was not shearing as I have always seen. By that point I felt it would be more dangerous to attempt an abort than continue take off. Looking back I also probably felt an urgency to takeoff. We were in a line of at least 10-12 aircraft lined up to depart before the storm hit.

Air Carrier Captain reported takeoff with wrong takeoff data in rapidly changing weather.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 195; Flight Crew Type 180

We were approaching to land with an ILS approach on Runway 34 at GKY Arlington municipal airport TX; at an altitude about 2;400 FT MSL; established on localizer Heading 342. Something in the opposite direction flew really close to us; very fast; close to our left wing. The object looked dark. I could say like a 'bullet' with a light behind him. I cannot be specific regarding his [its] dimension.

C172 pilot experiences a NMAC while on approach to Runway 34 at GKY with another aircraft of unknown type; but very fast.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

ATC instructed us to cross ZZZZZ at 14;000 feet cleared for the LOC DME - E.  We started our descent and broke out of clouds at approximately 17;000 feet and visually acquired the airport.  Selected gear down to help slow down.  Then flaps 10 as we started the 'smart turn' to capture the final approach course.  Time was XA30z from MDC [Maintenance Diagnostic Computer]. This is when we got amber AP HOLDING NOSE UP and AP STAB TRIM FAIL messages.  Stab trim indicator was amber and 2.2.  SIC ran the QRH for AP STAB TRIM FAIL and AP HOLDING NOSE UP (both on same page next to each other).  We were still descending at 2;000 FPM established on LOC. Notified ATC we had flight control issue.  QRH directed disengage AP and had warning for abrupt change in control force.  Disengaged AP and had momentary pitch dip while I adjusted to control force required to hold nose up.  SIC and I quickly discussed that leveling off or attempting to climb back up would put us in a worse situation (still descending to runway). With BKN/OVC at 17-18;000 feet; thunderstorms in vicinity; and impending night plus no traffic into ZZZ continuing to land was best option. When we disconnected AP we got a PRI STAB TRIM FAIL message. We selected flaps 20 and control forces were still manageable. We requested CFR [County/City Fire and Rescue] from ATC. While my SIC was referencing the QRH; I was concentrating on keeping the descent going to get us to a flatter approach angle and not be too high as a go around might not be possible. I knew I would be close to the ridge line near ZZZZZ1 and I could see it clearly.  The 2;000 FPM descent put us closer to the terrain than I realized and we got a Terrain Caution followed by Terrain Pull Up.  I decreased the descent rate to 800 FPM; alerts went away; I could see we were past terrain now and went back to 2;000 FPM descent. Went flaps 30 to see if I could still manage the pressure. I could.  QRH had us go to Secondary Trim which worked on short final. Made a normal landing and CFR never had time to get out of their facility.  Time from first indication to landing 6 minutes.  Canceled CFR and closed IFR flight plan with ZZZ1 on taxi in. Passengers never knew and thanked us for getting into ZZZ before Sunset.Suggestions: When referencing the QRH procedures; neither of us specifically stated 'AP STAB TRIM FAIL QRH' as trained. We just said go to the QRH.  Fortunately; my SIC was spot on and had no trouble finding the correct ones. We also didn't vocalize '...COMPLETED' at end of procedure either.  Time crunch contributed to this. It would have been desirable to notify passengers in case we did have to evacuate; however; we just didn't have the time and I might have needed my SIC to help on the controls. Announcing on CTAF we had an emergency might have allowed CFR to respond quicker vs ZZZ1 ATC calling and relaying.  I'm not sure if they monitor it. We did have communication all the way to parking. Try to be more cognizant of the altitudes on the LOC DME E to be sure we cleared terrain and not let doing the visual approach override that given the waining sunlight.

CL-350 Captain reported Stabilizer Trim Failure during approach into a mountainous terrain airport.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 6

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Airport; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

Prior to winter the Airport Authority decided to close various taxiway interlinks to save time during snow removal operations. An aircraft on landing roll Runway 25 attempted to exit a taxiway was that closed and had snow piled in it.During the pre-winter snow meeting controllers opposed the taxiway interlink closures. The Airport Authority said they were closing the interlinks. Controllers asked if the intersections were going to be barricaded; the airport said no; they were just going to remove the lights and signs. This worked 'ok' when the field was entirely covered in snow; however; with the snow thawing; the taxiways look open even though snow is piled in them. According to the Aeronautical Information Manual pilots are expected to exit the first available taxiway. Even with no signs naming the taxiway; the intersection appears to be open to an aircraft on the runway; and they turn to exit. With no barricades to visually indicate the closure; aircraft attempt to exit and are put in a dangerous situation; both with their aircraft coming in close proximity to the snow piles; and by the potential traffic conflict with other aircraft landing and the first aircraft not being able to clear the runway. The amount of time saved by not clearing the interlinks over the winter was negligible; and the loss of efficiency to the controllers and the users was great; along with the dangerous situations illustrated above. It is recommended that no taxiway intersections be closed as 'standard practice.' It is further recommend that if a taxiway must be closed for any reason (snow; construction; etc); that it be barricaded as is standard practice at other airports. According to Advisory Circular 150/5340-1L Section 5.7 b (1) - closed taxiways are considered 'hazardous' and are to be marked. According to Advisory Circular 150/5370-2 Section 218 b (1) (d) (ii) 'Temporarily Closed Taxiways.  Place barricades outside the safety area of intersecting taxiways. For runway/taxiway intersections; place an X at the entrance to the closed taxiway from the runway. If the taxiway will be closed for an extended period; obliterate taxiway centerline markings; including runway lead off lines; leading to the closed section. If the centerline markings will be reused upon reopening the taxiway; it is preferable to paint over the marking. This will result in less damage to the pavement when the upper layer of paint is ultimately removed. The Airport Authority did not comply with these requirements.

Reporter states barricades were not used for closed taxiways off of the runway to indicate the closure.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway XXR

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We set the aircraft up for an approach to XXR. Once on with Approach we got changed to XXC. We got the numbers; rebriefed the approach; and set the new nav freq. We got cleared to join XXC approach and joined XXR by mistake. Once ATC asked if we joined the center we realized what had happened. I kicked the autopilot off while the captain fixed the problem and we moved over to the center outside of ZZZZZ. The flight continued with no further occurrences. What happened was in the approach phase of flight we became task saturated with switching everything and the captain forgot to change the runway in the FMS and I forgot to make sure he did it. ATC did not issue a phone number. And no other aircraft had to deviate because of our mistake.

In a CRJ-900; FO (First Officer) leg; on ZZZZZ inbound; expecting; briefed and set up for XXR knowing we may; of course; get a different runway. Upon checking on with Approach; we were given XXC so we proceeded to get set up for that. I put the new frequencies in the standby but forgot to switch the approach in the FMS. When the time came; we were both expecting the Aircraft to swap from white to green needles on its own and it did- except that XXR was still in the FMS so when it did automatically swap we didn't notice that it was not to the runway to which we were cleared.No sooner had we joined the LOC when ATC queried us asking if we had lined up with XXR. Then; without waiting for an answer; he gave us a heading and asked if we could still cross ZZZZZ as his clearance (which I/we had accepted moments before) required. The FO disconnected the auto pilot and turned left; I set up his heading and he called for HDG mode. I quickly put XXC in the FMS; we confirmed and we got the AC in approach mode; joining at ZZZZZ without further incident. ATC called when he saw us join the R side. Never replaced XXR with XXC in the FMS; the 900 automatically joined and swapped to green needles to the runway that was IN THE FMS. We had passed abeam the last fix on the arrival and; therefore; 'cleaned it up and made it big' BEFORE we became aware of the runway 'change' so we missed that opportunity to catch the fact that we were looking at the wrong fixes. I honestly don't know if I consciously was aware of this at the time but; in the NG; the green to white needle auto swapping function on an ILS is dependent on what approach is loaded in the FMS. What frequency is currently in the standby; as far as it's concerned; is irrelevant. FO switched the autopilot off; hand flew the newly assigned intercept heading while I 'fixed' the FMS. We joined the correct localizer. Even if we're past all the fixes on the arrival; maybe don't 'clean it up and make it big' until we actually KNOW our runway. That will call attention to the FMS which may have prevented this.

CRJ-900 flight crew reported lining up for the wrong runway.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was training on the TOGA sector. Aircraft X departed and immediately checked on with a RA alert for a helicopter the Tower had called traffic on. Because of the RA he said he could not climb. After the traffic was about 3 miles behind him I told Final Assist (FA) to ask him if he could accept a climb now. He said negative that he was still getting the RA and refused to climb. A few more miles went by and I told FA to give him a low altitude alert and the MVA. A mile later he still would not climb so I keyed up instead of the trainee and told Aircraft X that he needed to climb because of the MVA and instructed him to fly present heading and gave instruction to climb to FL050 no delay and issued traffic I observed to him. At the time the traffic was about 1 o'clock and 4 miles. They were converging at a rapid pace and with the him just beginning a climb I knew he was over the freeway so I turned him North heading 360 a vector for him climb which was below the MVA. It was a matter of safety and after pulling up the Emergency Obstruction Video Map (EOVM) and the GEOG map to see the freeways the risk of collision was greater than the terrain. He turned North and continued the climb to FL050. He then said that he wanted to return to SJC because his equipment had malfunctioned. He later told the LICKE controller that his proximity alert was stuck on so it was like the traffic was directly over the aircraft and that he was refusing to climb. It wasn't until later when I insisted that he climb because of terrain and traffic that he finally began a climb. Because it was an equipment malfunction with the aircraft and not procedures there are no recommendations that I have for this event. The only thing that might have been helpful would have been if the Tower would have held on to the aircraft until the traffic was not a factor and ensured separation before shipping the aircraft. As it was he checked in with the RA so there was nothing we could do at this point. Additionally the LICKE sector was very busy so our options were limited with what we could do with the Aircraft.

NCT Controller describes an aircraft departing receives a RA immediately on initial contact. The controller then tells the aircraft to climb; the pilot refuses. Miles later the aircraft is not climbing and due to the MVA the controller issues the altitude again to climb. The pilot realizes there is an equipment problem  with the TCAS and returns to the airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 1600; Flight Crew Type 30

Confusion; Fatigue; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

While enroute I started to perform my required 'Friday-checks' checklist; going through item by item. The checklist calls for a weekly fire-test.  The first item is to pull both fire handles. As I pulled them I noticed a sudden loss of performance on both engines. My gauges indicated that both of them flamed out. I pushed the fire handles back and started to troubleshoot. I determined that my right engine was still operational. Meanwhile; the aircraft was losing altitude but it was under my control.  I advised ATC about my situation and they told me there was an airport ten miles away along my route. I was familiar with it- an uncontrolled field by the highway. Being a new pilot on this airplane under these circumstances I decided the best course of action was to secure the inoperative engine and land as soon as possible. With my right engine operational I was able to stabilize the airplane and started a VFR descent. I completed my emergency checklist; then declared an emergency with ATC as a precaution and performed a safe single engine emergency landing on the airport. After securing the aircraft I contacted Flight SFervice and my company. As I mentioned I am a new pilot on this airplane; having just completed my upgrade training one week ago. During the flight training this part of the checklist was never mentioned and the checklist was not available in the training aircraft. On the checklist the fire test appears to be among the in-flight test items. This event was the result of me following the checklist that I believed I was supposed to perform. Had I received the proper training; I am sure this situation could have been avoided.

The reporter fleshed out some of the questionable details of the original report; particularly why he had performed the Fire Handle check while airborne.  The primary additional factors were his recently completed training regimen and the fatiguing effects of scheduling practices at the company.  The Reporter stated; his systems training had consisted of an 'eight hour firehose' indoctrination spaced over two days.  He believed; however; that his systems knowledge was adequate and he had passed his oral with no problems.  He again mentioned that the 'Friday checks' checklist had not been on board during his flight training and his Check Airman had done them 'by memory' and had failed to include the Fire Handle test.  He reiterated the confusing aspects of the checklist as to when the Fire Handle test was to be performed and commented that the checklist is being revised; in part because of his event.  He believed he would not have made the fundamental error of checking fire handles in flight had he not been fatigued by repeated early morning get ups and confused by his first ever exposure to the checklist itself.  Ultimately; he decided not to attempt a restart and continue the flight inasmuch as--due his lack of experience in the aircraft; his fatigue; the demands of the solo nature of the operation combined with the trauma of his situation--he was sure he had 'already lost [his] job' and wanted to just get back on the ground safely.

While conducting company required periodic aircraft systems tests while in cruise; the Pilot of a BE99 inappropriately pulled both engine fire handles as directed by the company supplied checklist. Both engines flamed out and only the right engine restarted when he repositioned the fire handles. He secured the left engine; declared an emergency with ATC and diverted to a nearby non-towered airport where he landed safely.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

We were cleared to circle to and land on runway 33. ATC also added that there was a low level helicopter and that the helicopter had us in sight. At the Wilson bridge we turned to the northeast to set ourselves up for a landing on runway 33. We continued normally and started our turn to final.when I saw an opposite direction helicopter very close to our altitude; but slightly below us and climbing. I was about to initiate the go around regardless of the TCAS when we got the RA. As we started the go around I saw the helicopter make an aggressive descent. We were given a turn to the east and a climb to 2;000 feet which we complied with. After that; we cleaned up the plane; setup for another approach; and landed on runway 1 without incident. Once we cleared the runway; ground control asked me if I wanted to call the DCA tower supervisor for an explanation of what happened. I gladly accepted. The tower supervisor I spoke with told me a few things that explained what may have happened. Number one; he said that the helicopters operating in that area should NEVER be above 200 feet. According to him; the helicopter was at 800 feet; clearly not where he was supposed to be. He also explained that ATC may have taken their eyes off the helicopter for a second because they would never expect those helicopters to do something that egregious. That seems plausible given the fact that I've never seen a helicopter in that area at that altitude. He suggested that it was most probably a deviation on the part of the Pilot of the helicopter; and a loss of aircraft separation that was also the fault of the helicopter pilot. Helicopter pilots in and around DCA should adhere to ATC instructions.

ERJ-175 Captain reported an airborne conflict with a helicopter on approach to DCA.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Upon leveling at FL240; we experienced a complete failure of AHRS [Altitude and Heading Reference System] system number 1; followed by multiple PFD & MFD screen failures on the Captain's flight instruments; along with an associated FD flag; and YD 1 INOP status message. I was the pilot flying at the time; and assumed manual control of the aircraft. Without any attitude or heading reference on my PFD I transferred the flight controls to the First Officer who still had working AHRS on his side; he would remain as Pilot Flying for the duration of the flight. We determined this as a time threat and created a plan of action. The airplane had just been on a mechanical delay; where they replaced the number 1 AHRS unit; so we knew it had some history on it. We decided to run the QRH for 'Attitude And Heading Reference System Failure'. After completion of the checklist; we were still unable to reengage the aircraft's autopilot; but were able to display AHRS #2 data on the Captain PFD. ATC was notified of the system failure. Dispatch was contacted; and after talking to the controller advised that they would like us to [return to departure airport] as opposed to continuing. The flight had been planned with round trip fuel so we had enough gas to make it back; and have a fallback alternate; and still over 1000 pounds of extra fuel.  We coordinated with ATC for a return. Both the Flight Attendant and the passengers were briefed as well on the situation and the decision to return. Upon initial flap extension; we received a STAB TRIM & MACH TRIM caution message. The QRH was run for the STAB TRIM Caution message; and initially resolved. Upon further extension of the flaps to 45; the STAB TRIM Caution message reappeared; the QRH was run again for the reappearance of the STAB TRIM Caution message; and directed us to use STAB TRIM CH2 for landing. We landed uneventfully; and the aircraft was written up and pulled out of service for maintenance. Mechanical Failure of AHRS unit. Despite having replaced the AHRS unit; it obviously did not solve the original maintenance issue; as we had it fail completely on us in flight. Not sure how to prevent this from recurring...It was a faulty AHRS computer/system.

In cruise flight the Captain's AHRS system went out and his FPD and MFD displays went blank and came back several times. The Captain also got a FD flag and we got a YD 1 inop status message. Captain did [a] great job working the problem and had me fly the airplane while he communicated with company; ATC; FA (Flight Attendant) and pax (passengers). We decided to return in coordination with the company. On approach we also received stab trim and mach trim caution messages and ran the QRH and followed its guidance and landed without issue.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported returning to departure airport after experiencing loss of the Captain's AHRS system.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

First Officer and I were cleared to taxi to runway after getting De-Iced. We were cleared for takeoff. I called for the before takeoff checklist and we lined up on the runway. We performed a static takeoff doing a clearing run of the engine before releasing the brakes. The plane rolled down the runway and at around 100-110 knots I noticed the ART fire out of the corner of my eye. Around that same time there were multiple very loud 'BANGS' associated with a very violent shimmy. The N1 indication on the number 2 engine was dashed out. First Officer called out 'Right Engine' and I called for the abort. We did the appropriate rejected takeoff profile and once the plane was under control we exited the runway. During this time I asked the First Officer (FO) to call to the back to make an announcement and talk to the flight attendants. The flight attendants told us there was heavy smoke in the cabin.  Without hesitating the First Officer immediately asked if it was increasing or going away. They informed us that the smoke was dissipating. I called tower and asked for fire rescue to meet the aircraft. Tower asked us to switch to Ground Control at this time. At this point I said something along the lines of 'ok take a breath what do we got; what do we need to do?'  We took time to identify what was going on. I noticed the oil quantity on the #2 engine was at 0 and immediately shut it down. I called for the QRH for rejected takeoff. We completed that checklist and then I called for the Low Oil Pressure QRH.  Once that was completed we taxied back towards the gate. Fire Rescue asked us to hold off pulling into the gate until they could verify the integrity of the aircraft. They quickly gave us the ok and we proceeded to the gate.Once at the gate I made an announcement to the passengers explaining what had occurred and apologized for it happening. I instructed them to collect their things and head into the terminal where they would be warmer and more comfortable. When I opened the flight deck door I had a very hard time seeing the back of the plane due to the smoke. The fire department went around the aircraft as we were deplaning with a thermal camera to verify there was no fire. I called dispatch and let them know that we had an [a situation] and I would call them back with the details.Around this time the flight attendant came up holding her chest complaining of having a hard time breathing. I immediately sent her to a paramedic where they administered oxygen and took her vitals. Once the passengers were off the aircraft I shut it down and secured it. The First Officer and I went outside to assess the damage. We immediately noticed the nose bullet of the engine sitting in the cowl. It had completely broke off and seemed to be wedged under the fan blades.  There was visible damage/dents around the inside of the engine cowl. We also noted oil accumulated under the engine and all over the nacelle. We went back inside where I checked on the flight attendant and we gathered the crew together to make sure everyone was ok. We had a debrief with each other to see where we could have done things better; if they noticed anything else; and discussed the event. They all did a fantastic job. I couldn't off asked for a better crew to handle the situation.This was an unpredictable event that I am not sure could have been prevented. I guess better Maintenance practices and inspections of our equipment could help prevent it. The plane had a service check the day before. From the pictures it looks like all 15 screws that held the Nose bullet on cracked the same way. Maybe when the Maintenance team does their morning checks they could look for stress fractures or signs of wear and tear on these screws to verify they don't need to be replaced.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

MD-80 Engine failed during takeoff roll. Flightcrew rejected the takeoff and returned to the gate to de-plane passengers.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 338; Flight Crew Type 12000

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Climbing to FL380; ARTCC cleared us direct Hastings (HSI) and capped our altitude at FL340 due to an opposite-direction [A380] aircraft; which was passing at an angle overhead slightly from the left to the right at FL350. Directly ahead of us was a building line of thunderstorms; which appeared to top FL340. Shortly after the other aircraft passed overhead; we were cleared to climb to FL380. We were approaching the weather quickly; so we opted to begin our climb right away. Just prior to passing FL350; we encountered moderate turbulence from the wake of the other aircraft; lasting about three seconds. We continued the climb to FL380. The fasten seatbelt sign was on and all passengers were seated. The Flight Attendants were beginning service. The A Flight Attendant reported that no passengers or Flight Attendants were injured. ATC was notified of the wake turbulence encounter.ATC could have turned the other aircraft parallel to opposite-direction traffic; and avoided crossing our future climb flight path.

B737 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence climbing through FL350 from an opposite direction A380 at the same altitude.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 228; Flight Crew Type 6000

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

On the ZZZ Arrival; we were told 'maintain 250 knots;' then it was reduced to 230 knots. This resulted in us being slightly high on the arrival and approach. All altitude restrictions were at or above. As the Pilot Monitoring (PM); I acknowledged another speed assignment of maintain 180 knots until ZZZZZ fix; cleared for the approach. The Pilot Flying (PF); two miles from the fix; slowed to 145 knots to prevent being high and fast. So; he chose to slow then descend fully configured to correct to glidepath. We did not inform the Tower of the speed deviation. Tower called out traffic just prior to the fix and then asked our speed. Due to the traffic call just ahead; we had thought he was going to say we needed to slow but when I told him we were at 145 he told us we were in non-compliance of the speed restriction. Due to safety reasons; we slowed to comply with our stabilized approach criteria but we did not coordinate that with Tower.

Without informing ATC; B737-700 flight crew slowed below last assigned speed in order to descend fully configured in a stabilized approach.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Today upon preflight we found the same maintenance write up from the day before still existed with just the batteries on. I called Maintenance and spoke with a Maintenance Controller who I verbally confirmed the AOG (Aircraft on Ground) with followed by the appropriate write-up which was exactly the same as the day before (Left T/R flashing) with battery power only visual inspection confirmed the TR (Thrust Reversers) was stowed. Approximately 20 minutes after the AOG was sent in I received a phone call from Maintenance Controller.He was rather annoyed in his tone with me. I explained to him the problem we had. Also that I questioned the Maintenance performed. They could not duplicate the problem and presumed the crew caused the problem by improperly moving a switch or improper sequence of the controls. This was stated in an email sent to us from [second] Maintenance Controller. This is absolutely false and wrong. The failure occurred upon power up yesterday batteries only. We landed and shut down with no problems. We have over 20 years of flying experience in the cockpit and it's insulting to the crew we were somehow responsible for his failure.That is not the end of the story. [Maintenance Controller 1] then rudely asked if we were on the plane and we were he then asked 'is the red TR switch still flashing?' I said yes it's still flashing. I also said we had a Maintenance page showing record of failures in the cockpit. The page showed the TR fault multiple times. Still rudely asked me to go up and push the Red TR button. I complied after informing him of the info already sent in. He said 'Just push the button tell me what you see' I complied as he was becoming very negative and hostile in his tone with me. After pushing the Red TR button he requested the button now remained solid RED. [Maintenance Controller] now rudely said 'Push the button again...tell me what you see?' I did as he instructed and pushed the solid Red TR button and it began flashing Red again and informed him of what it was doing. [Maintenance Controller] replied 'Great' and slammed the phone hanging up on me.I'd like to know why this kind of unprofessional behavior is accepted? Safety first. We did our jobs and were treated with a complete lack of respect. At no time was our reply or interaction with Maintenance out of line or unprofessional. That is not the case with [the Maintenance Controller]. I hope he will be sat down and spoken to appropriately about his behavior. This is not who were are and should not be tolerated. My Co-Pilot witness the entire phone call I had with [Maintenance Controller] as it was on speakerphone.

CE-680 Captain reported multiple repeat failures of the thrust reverser indication system; causing a delay and discussion with Maintenance Control.


Flight Crew Total 9593; Flight Crew Type 5455

Flight Crew Total 9992; Flight Crew Type 6026

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors

Pushed back from gate onto taxiway. No marshaller just single tug driver. After brakes set and cleared to start never received 'Aircraft disconnected; by-pass pin removed' from tug driver. Engines were started; flaps set to 15; APU shut down; controls checked and before taxi checklist accomplished. Got clearance to taxi; turned on taxi light; released parking break; throttled up slightly for taxi. Almost immediately felt a shudder; quickly applied break and reset parking break. Realized at that point what had happened (attempted aircraft movement with tug still attached) and confirmed tug driver uninjured. Ground control cleared us to remain in position until a maintenance inspection confirmed nose gear safe to taxi back to gate. Back at gate; nose gear inspected and eventually flight continued.

B777 flight crew reported they began to taxi before the tow bar was disconnected.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Air Traffic Control Military 9; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 2550; Flight Crew Type 1250

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On an ILS approach to Runway XX we were cleared for a touch and go. We received no further warnings about traffic overhead the field; but I did hear tower talking to traffic south of the field and giving them our position. Tower cleared them to enter left downwind and I assumed it was for Runway XX as well. We opted to take a low approach only and go missed at 200 ft. AGL because my student was flying the aircraft from the aft cockpit. On the climbout Tower said 'I cleared you for a touch and go for traffic.' As the IP (Instructor Pilot); I looked out and saw a light civil passing left to right directly overhead at 2-300 ft. above us in the downwind for Runway XY. I took the controls from the student leveled the jet and proceeded upwind before executing climbout instructions. The Tower called me once on the ground to discuss what evolved and I explained to him that I would have still had a 500 ft. pass with the traffic given the jets typical climbout performance. I also was unaware that the traffic would be overhead and he needed me to remain clear of traffic.

Military flight crew flying a T-45 aircraft reported an NMAC during approach to landing.


Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication

Reference Non-Routine Work Card (NRWC) C13XXX.  Both the left and right Elevator Gear Tab outboard crank fitting to pushrod bolt heads installed [facing] inboard. I Removed and Reinstalled (R/R) both the left and right outboard gear tab bolts with the heads facing outboard. I generated this NRWC because of the problem that I had with Aircraft Y; Reference NRWC C12XXX; and I was still under the impression that the bolt head should be installed facing outboard which I was incorrect. Improper installation. Hangar: Routine Overnight Maintenance (RON).

Reference Non-Routine Work Card (NRWC) C12XXX. Both the left and right Elevator Gear Tab crank fittings to pushrod outboard bolt heads installed [facing] inboard. I generated this NRWC because on the right hand outboard gear tab to crank fitting to pushrod cotter pin was rubbing against the outboard fairing of the aircraft. To correct the problem I turned the bolt around so that the bolt head was outboard on both gear tabs which I now believe to be incorrect. [Need to] pay attention to detail. Hangar: Routine Overnight Check (RON).

An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) removed and re-positioned the attach bolt on the left and right elevators at the Elevator Gear Tab outboard crank fitting to pushrod connection on a B717 aircraft; to correct for the bolt end cotter pin rubbing against the aircraft fairing.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Human-Machine Interface; Workload; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

On [our] flight to SBBR during the descent into SBBR Brasilia Approach Control assigned the flight to execute the IRULI1 arrival to ILS Runway 11L. When accessing the FMC to load the ILS 11L approach and arrival; the ILS 11L could be selected; but no IRULI1 arrival can be attached to the ILS 11L. Our EFBs were then checked and found no IRULI1 arrival exists for Runways 11L/R either. The IRULI1 arrival does exist only for Runways 29L/R in both the FMC and EFB. The FMCs and both Captain's and First Officer's EFBs were up to date and current. We advised ATC (Brasilia APC) that we did not have the IRULI1 arrival data to Runway 11L and requested vectors for the ILS 11L approach. ATC advised us that the IRULI1 for Runways 11L/R does exist and we should have it. Both the FMC and EFB did not contain an IRULI1 arrival to SBBR Runways 11L/R. We received radar vectors for ILS 11L and landed uneventfully.

An air carrier flight crew was issued the SBBR IRULI 1 Arrival to Runway 11; but no transition from the arrival to the Runway 11 was listed in either the FMS or EFB; so a radar vector was provided.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6; Flight Crew Total 362; Flight Crew Type 31

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After preflight; run-up; ATC 'cleared Aircraft X for departure; then turn right on course; wind 220 at 6 kts; altimeter 30.11. Do you need radar flight following?' My radio reply; 'Roger; flight following is not required.' Turned right on course at 800 feet Indicated Altitude (500 AGL) and descended to 3;000 feet. At 3.9 nm East of JVW; descended to 1;500; switched frequency to JVW UNICOM frequency of 123.0 and made radio call 'Raymond-Williams; Aircraft X; 3 miles east entering a 45 degree into a left downwind for runway 12.' Observed another aircraft departing runway 12 turning left cross-wind. I did not hear any radio calls from the other aircraft with normal airport ID; aircraft ID or pattern positions. Immediately received a radio call from the Aircraft Y pilot 'Aircraft X; did you know that was a near miss of 50 feet?' My radio reply 'no; I will extend my left downwind.' Altitude was increased to 1;500 feet IA (1;200 feet AGL) on downwind course 30. After clearing the pattern on my downwind leg; I received a second radio call from the other aircraft pilot 'Aircraft X; where are you going?' My radio reply 'extending my left downwind to clear the pattern.' After 1 mile west of the runway end; made a 180 degree turn; clear of the traffic pattern and back to enter a left crosswind for runway 12. Made normal pattern radio calls 'Raymond-Williams; Aircraft X; left cross-wind for runway 12; left down-wind for runway 12; left base for runway 12 and final for runway 12' for three takeoffs and landings with no other aircraft in the pattern. After completion; departed the pattern to the North making radio call 'Raymond-Williams Aircraft X departing the pattern to the North.'

GA pilot reported a NMAC while entering the traffic pattern at JVW with another GA aircraft that turned crosswind.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

When the flight attendants first boarded the aircraft; in ZZZ; there was a strong musty odor. FA1 told the Captain; who said it was not something to be concerned. The odor persisted until we reached cruising altitude then went away. It returned when we started descending in ZZZ1. When we arrived at the gate; the smell was very strong: musty; like when you first turn on an oxygen bottle; but much more pungent. When we arrived at the gate; it was really strong. FA1 went outside of the jetway; to get some air. The ZZZ1 cleaners said they smelled the smoke when they first entered the jetway. The gate agent said she smelled it; too. To her; it smelled like a crayon which was burning. The Captain smelled and thought it might have been coming from the air conditioner. He said to tell him if it persisted. The odor lingered after take off; until after we reached 10;000 feet; then it dissipated. It returned again; as we started descending in PHL. The Captain wrote it up. FA1 felt a little lightheaded.Fixing the air conditioner or ventilation system before putting the aircraft back in service.

A319 Flight Attendant reported an intermittent strong musty odor;" fumes event which lasted throughout two legs flown."


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Procedure; Manuals; Company Policy; Aircraft; Human Factors

I was working Local Control; the Controller in Charge (CIC) took a phone call on recorded line. The person on the line asked if he was [our Air Traffic Manager (ATM)]. The CIC stated 'no'. The caller then stated that the ATM had told him to call this number prior to departing his drone. There was zero prior coordination with the controllers. The caller stated he would remain north of a particular road and be below 300 feet. The CIC asked them to notify us after they were complete with their operations. We found a binder in the tower; in the back of the cab; that has the drone procedures. We found the drone pilots Authorization Request that was denied. He was then issued a waiver that stated he was to remain below 75 feet. Based on our grid and how close to our airport this was going to take place; he should not have been granted approval in the first place.There was also an email between the pilot and the ATM where the pilot stated he would be climbing to at least 100 feet and up to 300 feet on one. This is completely against the waiver the pilot received. The ATM would've known about this. The flight path of the drone put them in direct conflict with departures and was especially a conflict for two aircraft I had doing pattern traffic. This was very unsafe. It would have been nice to know about a drone that's in direct conflict with aircraft in my airspace. There should have been notification that this was going to take place. There should also have been someone instructing the drone pilot to adhere to his 75 foot restriction.

DAY Controller reported a drone pilot operated a drone in violation of their Authorization Request.


Cessna Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 9; Flight Crew Total 837; Flight Crew Type 8

Confusion; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

CFI and I departed ZZZ for survey work near ZZZ1 airport. This imagery project required us to be below 117 kts ground speed at 1;000 feet AGL. CFI was instructing me on how to fly survey lines following their FMS system. Because the aircraft was so slow; the gear warning horn was activated. CFI pulled the circuit breaker. After completion of this project; we headed for other projects to the east. We were cleared into Class Bravo airspace and started our pre-coordinated survey work. CFI handled all radio calls at this point as he instructed me on flying the lines. After completing this project; we started another which ran north and south; and was located east of ZZZ2 and ZZZ3. About half way through our project; we were instructed to make a left turn to the north by ATC. CFI asked if instead we could head to another project northwest of ZZZ4 since clouds were interfering with our current project. This was approved by ATC. After completion of this project; we landed at ZZZ4 for fuel and to reevaluate the weather. After we departed ZZZ4 we headed to one more project. This project was flown at 1;000 feet AGL and had a speed restriction to be below 120 kts groundspeed. CFI pulled the circuit breaker and I did not hear a gear warning horn. I did not recognize that he had pulled the breaker at the time. Upon completion of this project; we headed back to ZZZ. I was being instructed on power management. I did not descend fast enough for the straight in approach to Runway XX we were assigned by Tower. On about a 1.5 mile final; we were hundreds of feet too high and our speed was 180 kts. I said 'I need to level off' because I wanted to slow to 160 to put down the gear. CFI said 'No you need to get down now' and pushed the yoke forward into a steep descent which I then continued. CFI began adjusting power; activating speed brakes; putting flaps down and the gear handle. He was also telling me to get on center line. Seconds before touchdown; there was a call on the radio 'Go around; go around; go around'; however; I knew it was not CFI saying it and neither of us knew who was saying it or that it was directed at us since we were focused on landing. The airplane touched down around on center line and slid a few hundred feet drifting to the left side of the runway. CFI and myself had both failed to identify that the gear was down and locked. The gear warning horn and gear circuit breaker had been pulled by CFI without my knowledge. We exited the plane without any injuries. The Fire Department came and investigated to find that no one was injured and there was no risk of fire. This was only my second day of flying with [Company] as part of a three week training program. Prior to my employment [Company]; I had no prior experience with aircraft [type]. I feel that there are many things that contributed to this but it could have been avoided. Below I have listed things that contributed or would have helped avoid this occurrence. - Had the circuit breakers not been pulled; I think we would have had a much better chance of identifying the gear was not down. - If there were established procedures for when a circuit is pulled for a project; that both pilots are required to verify it has been pushed back in before landing. - If more time was given to review the POH; checklist and flows for the aircraft. - If either CFI or I were completely in control of the aircraft rather that splitting responsibility. - Double checking to make sure there were three green lights indicating the gear was down and the front wheel was seen in the mirror.

Aerial survey pilot not follow procedure and landed gear up.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.0

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I had an aircraft depart southeast bound from the airport. I knew the pilot was a new pilot and let the Radar Controller know that the pilot may be returning after departure. The clouds were scattered at 1;400 feet; but got pretty thick and hazy and eventually went broken or overcast at those same altitudes. I instructed the pilot to fly a heading to avoid an arrival and later issued another heading thinking this would convince the new pilot to return for landing. Once the pilot indicated they wanted to maintain an altitude below the clouds I let them go to Departure Control on course thinking they were happy with the weather. A few minutes after around five or six miles east of the airport; the same pilot requested an IFR clearance to go above the clouds. The Departure Controller didn't ask if they could 'maintain terrain or obstruction clearance' or maybe if they were IFR equipped and capable. The controller issued the clearance and to climb. The aircraft was at 1;600 feet and the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) for that area was 2;200 feet with a 3;000 feet. MVA nearby. That said; the conditions of the day were changing rapidly and might have been ok but in my opinion; the clouds were growing thick. Reasonable assurance for a climb to the MVA probably wasn't an option for the pilot.Controllers should take care with aircraft that literally say; 'I want to climb above these clouds; can I get an IFR clearance?' and then immediately clear them without asking some questions first. This same person wouldn't have done any such thing if there was another IFR aircraft around or if they were in the MVA. I think they were caught off guard. Maybe just some training on MVA and IFR separation or something new for us Midwestern controllers would be simulations in mountainous terrain to get out mind thinking about the MVAs.

Tower Controller reported an IFR clearance was issued by Departure Control to an aircraft below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS 26R

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion

Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

On approach to the Localizer 26R First Officer (FO) hand flying; intercepted final on a dog leg slightly high with flaps 15 selected. Captain recommended getting the gear down. FO called gear down; flaps 20.  FO called for flaps 25 set speed. Captain was calling tower. The 1;000 foot call by FO; stable. 1;000 feet per minute rate of decent. On landing; FO had to brake hard to bring aircraft to a stop. After turning off runway; FO began cleanup and as flaps were selected up; FO noticed that the before landing checklist had not been completed and the flap handle was at 20. The landing was done with flaps 20. The Captain; FO or relief pilot did not notice that the checklist was not completed or the final flaps 25 had not been selected.Possibly adding to the 1;000ft 'stable' required call; that the checklist is complete.

First Officer (FO) hand flown visual approach to 26R was controlled and normal till the last segment; although we were generally high and fast; which is also normal for a this airport's approach set up. We should not have delayed gear extension and were rushed to make a stable window at 1;000 ft. The captain was focused on being stable at that point and completely missed a more important verification of landing configuration. The captain called unstable with corrections in process and at 500ft noticed a short deviation sink rate below 1;000 ft. Either pilot should have called for a go around; but we continued to a controlled; safe landing in clear conditions instead. After landing; the FO noticed the flap handle in the 20 degree slot instead of the briefed 25 slot.Although it is very difficult to do; I should be more geared towards calling go around even though I trust experienced FO's with more time in aircraft than myself. I know better than to get target 'fixated'. This experience for me is not likely to happen again.

All three B777 pilots failed to notice Flap 20 set for landing even though the First Officer; flying pilot; call Flaps 25. The Captain missed the earlier Flaps 25 call but a 1;000 feet stabilized approach call is no longer required.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 1450; Flight Crew Type 110

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Upon landing on a touch and go on runway XX at ZZZ airport; I verbalized 'flaps up'; but the student immediately raised the gear lever. Upon seeing this I immediately reached for the landing gear lever and returned it to the down position; however they had brought the lever half way up before I could stop them. The nose gear then collapsed onto the runway and the aircraft came to a stop on the center line. I then secured the aircraft and all occupants vacated the aircraft safely with no injures.I believe what causes the issue was the student's lack of experience and apparent confusion about who was controlling the flaps and landing gear. Factors that I feel could prevent a recurrence:Don't practice touch and goes in a complex multi engine aircraft. Be more clear as to who will be operating what controls because the student was instructed to feel the movements of the yoke only during the touch and go and essentially 'watch and learn'. On second thought; I would also be more clear on what the student should not operate. Additionally; more ground training on the operations of a complex aircraft and landing gear lever / system could be given to ensure the risks involved in such operations and how to mitigate them during flight training.

Instructor pilot reported that during a touch and go training evolution; when flaps up was verbalized; the student raised the landing gear selector lever and the aircraft settled on the runway.


Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Approximately 4 minutes before scheduled departure; with the doors closed and Jet Bridge pulled; the tug driver called me via the interphone and told me that 'Operations is requesting that [you] release the parking brake.' I asked him why Operations requested that. He seemed very confused and I could hear him talking to someone else and telling that other individual that the Captain was asking him why. He repeated his request that Operations was requesting that I release the parking brake. Again; I asked him why. He had no information. I then told him that per SOP; we are not allowed to release the parking brake until we receive a pushback clearance. He handed the headset to someone who he claimed was the Ramp Supervisor. The ramp supervisor then repeated the same statement; that 'Operations is asking you to release the parking brake.' Yet again; I asked this person the same question; 'WHY?' He finally told me that they were trying to get the on-time departure. I reminded him that their request was a violation of SOP and that he was wasting time and putting an actual on-time departure in jeopardy. He then started mumbling and I was unable to understand anything he said. He eventually gave the headset back to the pushback driver.  During the pushback; it was clear that the driver was unfamiliar with our callouts and SOPs. He never cleared me to start engines. I had to ask him as he was starting to disconnect his headset if we were cleared to start.  I am sure that this [safety report] will come as no surprise to you. I have been flying in and out of ATL for three years on the 737. The outsourced ramp is so outrageously incompetent that it boggles this Captain's mind as to how it is allowed to continue. I have filed more [safety reports] on incompetence and lack of SOP at ATL than any other topic. Today's incident was just another in a long line of buffoonery from ATL outsourced ramp. I find it hard to believe that even the Ramp Supervisor attempted to blatantly violate our SOPs and seemed confused when I pointed that out to him. After three years of writing [safety reports]; it is clear to me that [Company] does not care enough to do anything about the incompetence in ATL. At least you will have a nice stack of [safety reports] for when someone is finally hurt or God forbid killed by their malfeasance.I spoke with the employees in Operations about the ramp. They told me that they are well aware of the incompetence and that they do not train the outsourced ramp crew. They did not know who is responsible for training and SOP compliance in ATL.

B737 Captain reported numerous deviations from SOP by outsourced ramp employees at ATL.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1600; Flight Crew Type 300

I and my student were doing an IFR training XC to 71J. Upon descent through the overcast layer we were direct to the field for the visual approach to land. We announced our position and intentions for Runway 12 at ten miles out; on base; and on final. During the initial turn to final; we announced that we were going to execute a right 360 degree turn (for spacing and altitude adjustment; as well as sightseeing on a construction sight). An Apache helicopter passed within 200 feet below us while we were mid turn. We continued the turn to realign with the runway. The Apache continued on his heading; then turned momentarily to parallel our path before resuming course.

PA28 instructor with student on visual approach to 71J reports a NMAC with an Apache helicopter which passes 200 feet below the reporter. The reporter was executing a 360 degree turn at the time to loose altitude and gain spacing on other traffic.