Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 72; Flight Crew Total 2390; Flight Crew Type 91

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace

Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

I checked NOTAMs and TFRs prior to takeoff. Enroute I requested permission from Boeing Tower to conduct a pass through Elliot Bay near downtown Seattle going from West to East until half a mile off the waterfront then turn Northwest out to West-point at 500 FT. I was told approved as requested and conducted those maneuvers. Upon reporting clear to the Northwest Boeing Tower informed me that I was clear of the TFR and to switch VFR; frequency change approved.  None of my preflight efforts at due diligence resulted in me being aware of a TFR in the area; and frankly I'm not sure if there is anything I could do to make myself aware of every major sporting event aside from becoming a sports fanatic. I'm not sure if I'm in trouble or if these TFRs are just a means to prosecute obnoxious pilots who are trying to interfere with the event. I've read the FAA circular on Sporting TFRs and am aware of the concept; but if it is important enough to make a TFR it should be important enough to post on NOTAMs and TFR websites. Only after the fact on my Northbound departure tuning up PAE's ATIS that mention was made of the TFR.

Small aircraft pilot inadvertently entered a sporting event TFR; near BFI;  even though he was working with ATC and had previously checked the NOTAMs.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Workload; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Time Pressure; Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Briefed low level level off at gate.  On taxi out; ship phone rang in cubby hole and I couldn't reach it.  Dispatch informed us that we needed to hold on the ground for a maintenance carry over item that would expire before the completion of the mission.  We waited ready for takeoff for almost an hour with several updates from Dispatch that sounded like we were going back to the gate.  Then suddenly told to go.  Briefed again the low level level off while waiting.  Took off and did not execute the maneuver as we briefed.  Got ATC call to switch to departure control right before ALT CAP.  Noticed the FMA was not matching the calls.  I switched my eyesight to the FO's hand on MCP.  Once correct; I returned to ADI and discovered altitude was approaching 2;500 feet.  Corrected pitch to return to 2;000 feet.   ATC then assigned us 5;000 feet.  No comment was made about the altitude deviation.  Cleaned up aircraft; engaged autopilot; no further incidents.Cause - Pilot flying distracted to monitoring.  Pilot monitor error in MCP.  Pilot proficiency played a role.  This was my first flight in 2 months and second in 5 months as pilot flying.Pitched down to correct altitude.  FO contacted departure and we got an immediate climb to 5;000 feet.The main thing that sticks out is pilot proficiency.

Briefed low altitude level off thoroughly. While taxiing; received phone call to hold for Maintenance waiver issue that affected later flights. Held for nearly 45 minutes at end of runway. Got the go ahead and proceeded to takeoff. Normal Takeoff until 'Alt Cap' called. VNAV was pushed initially then immediately corrected to Speed Mode and set 200 knots. Scanned back to instruments and noticed and called out altitude deviation. Pilot flying corrected immediately. Called departure with no further comments from ATC and rest of flight was uneventful. After MCP operation; noticed altitude deviation. Made deviation call out and pilot flying corrected immediately. Pilot flying became distracted with MCP operation. Pilot monitoring procedural error in MCP operation. Pilot proficiency. Time compression. Aggressively corrected and contacted departure. No comment from them and received immediate climb to 5;000 feet.Pilot proficiency should be maintained/bettered through flight/simulator scheduling efficiency.

Air carrier flight crew reported an altitude deviation during departure and cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 300; Flight Crew Type 210

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was PIC on a Part 91 flight departing Fairbanks. I informed the Ground Controller on initial call up that my requested outbound heading was 232. When I received my takeoff clearance for [Runway] 2L the Tower Controller instructed me to fly runway heading. When he passed me off to Departure Control the Departure Controller instructed me to 'turn right on course.' I thought the right turn was unusual due to my requested heading of 232 but I choose not to further query the Controller because I assumed the right turn was to avoid traffic. Shortly after I started the right turn I noticed an aircraft directly in my flight path that had just departed runway Ski Strip 2. I started turning left to avoid the aircraft and at the same time the Departure Controller said something to the effect of '[callsign] turn left; turn left now.' I estimate the distance was no more than one or two hundred feet.

Light aircraft pilot reported an NMAC departing FAI airport following a misunderstanding of the heading clearance.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 86; Flight Crew Total 928; Flight Crew Type 182

Workload; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 5100; Flight Crew Type 65

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Approximately 30 nm from IAH and at 7000 ft we were cleared direct DPLOY; followed by direct JELLI about 30 sec later. At some point within these fixes we were given a speed of 250 kts. We told ATC that we were not able to do that; and so they wanted us to fly 'best forward speed' which ended up being about 220 knots. We completed our descent and approach checklists; and another instruction was given to cross REIGN at 4000 ft. and we were cleared for the approach for 8R. We started down on the glide slope to cross REIGN; the captain elected to completely configure the aircraft for landing approximately 12 DME.By the time we arrived at REIGN; we were at our approach speed of 130 kts we were a little high and about a dot and half to the left of the localizer. The winds were very gusty out of the south gusting to 28 kts. After being configured atc issued a speed of 180 kts and I told them that we were unable; and I responded that 150 kts was the fastest we could do; they then reissued a speed of 160 kts. I was very busy on the radios at this point; we were told to turn right; followed by another instruction to 'break the approach'. I do recall at the time that the instruction 'break the approach' was given; that the captain had asked me a question; so I thought because we were told to turn right; and the 'break the approach' that it was for us. I verified in the right turn for a heading with tower to fly. ATC then asked if we had the field insight; and we said yes. They then told us to fly a heading of 060 to join the 8R localizer; we proceeded to turn left heading 060. Shortly after they issued us for runway 09 'cleared for the approach' and to contact tower. Once we landed and cleared the runway; we were told that we needed to contact Houston Approach Control due to a deviation issue. After contacting Houston Approach on the ground; they were questioning the right turn; and we stated that we were told to turn to the right; followed by the break the approach.Once they reviewed the tape; the break the approach was given to the aircraft following us. I'm positive that I verified that the 'break the approach' was for us with our call sign and shortly after for a heading assignment; but atc never responded other than asking if we had the field in sight. And that's when they told us to rejoin the 8R localizer; shortly after; 'cleared for the visual' for runway 9.

1) 7;000 ft vectored to IAH2) Told to expect ILS 8L3) Next controller asked why we were given 8L and would we prefer 8R? Replied 8) Would be better for us.4) Cleared to descend 5;000 ft to JELLI int.5) Given speed 250kts. Replied unable.6) Cleared to descend 4;000 ft at REIGN int. and cleared for the approach.7) Given speed 220. Replied unable because starting to level off and REIGN 13.2 DME. I needed to start slowing down because the final is 2000 ft and 5.6 DME. The winds were blowing me around and I wanted to get configured and stable on the way down. I slowed to 170 to start getting configured and was fully configured about 12.0 DME. 8) Approached then said to maintain 180 or greater. Replied unable and 150 was the fastest at this time. Told to maintain 160 kts.9) At this time I was being blown to the left of course (north); about a dot to dot and a half and correcting.10) Then we heard 'break off the approach.' Turn right. Started to turn right (south) and asked for a heading. Was then told to turn to 060 which is a left turn.11) We were asked if we had the field in sight and replied yes. Told heading 060 to rejoin 8R and cleared for 8R. Then almost immediately we were asked if we had runway 9 in sight. Replied yes and were cleared for runway 9 and switch to tower. Tower cleared us to land runway 9.NOTES:After talking with the approach control manager:At #7: The manager said I should have told approach that I needed to configure early for my stable approach.At #10: The call of break off the approach was actually for Aircraft Y that was behind us. Both of us thought it was for us because the next call was for us to turn right. The manager said this came from another controller that was monitoring the simultaneous approaches. He said that the 'turn right' call included the 'to rejoin the localizer.' Did not hear the rejoin the localizer part. This is why when we started the right turn to the south (went back through the localizer); and when we asked for a heading; we were told 060 degrees which would have been to the left. That is when #11 comes into play.The manager said I needed to know their procedures of keeping my speed up at IAH. He said I should have told the controller I could not comply with the speeds. I said we did reply 'unable' and I thought the controllers had an idea of the aircraft's flight capabilities they handle. The manager said that he thought only a handful of his controllers have even seen a turboprop like ours before. He then said I also should have told the controller I needed to configure early. The manager said I caused [Aircraft Y] to go around because of my slowing down. He was concerned when I turned right and started to head directly south. That was because we were told to turn right and thought we were the ones told to break off the approach.

A flight crew reported they accidently took a clearance that was meant for another aircraft. This led to confusion for the pilots and controllers and forced several late runway changes.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

While taxiing to the runway in ZZZ; the exhaust fume odors became stronger than normal. Flight Attendant 2 and Flight Attendant 4 called from the back of the aircraft to say the fumes were VERY strong back there. I; the Flight Attendant 1; called the Captain to let him know. He said the exhaust fumes were from all of the aircraft in front of us; and that we were about ready to take off; but to call him back if I needed to. I called Flight Attendant 2 and Flight Attendant 4 and relayed the Captain's response. They said the fumes were so strong; they were feeling ill. I called the Captain again and told him; and he said that we would go back to the gate. I called and let Flight Attendant 2 and Flight Attendant 4 know; and they said they wanted paramedics to meet the plane. When we arrived at the gate; Flight Attendant 2 and Flight Attendant 4 came to the front of the plane to have the paramedics check them out; and I went to the back of the plane. The passengers were deplaned; and Flight Attendant 2 and Flight Attendant 4 were taken to the hospital. I felt okay; so I didn't go. But in the next hour or so; while I was filling out my report and debriefing with the Captain; I started to feel nauseous and I was feeling a lot of pressure in my head. In the meantime; I was talking to Daily Ops and Medic and Crew Planning. I decided to go to the hospital; too; and personnel in Ops set it up for me and; after a short while; the ambulance came to get me. When I got to the hospital; I saw Flight Attendant 2 and Flight Attendant 4. I was placed in a cloth cubicle at the hospital. After a while; I was given an oxygen mask to wear; and the medical person took my blood pressure and told me what it was. It was something like 138/96; I don't remember exactly because I was pretty confused about it all at that point; and there was a lot of pressure in my head. Anyway; I told her that was really high for me.  She told me it was to be expected because it was the middle of the night and I was in the hospital. After another hour or so; someone came in to draw blood but was unsuccessful in finding my artery. I sat there for what felt like another hour. Someone else came in to draw blood; and after digging around a bit; found my artery and drew blood. After the doctor came in later and said my level of carbon monoxide was only 3% and that they were going to release me.  I was told to put all of the clothes I wore that day in a plastic bag to take to the dry cleaners and to take a very hot shower when I got to the hotel. I did that. My head continued to feel a lot of pressure and I was nauseous and my mouth tasted funny. I woke up after about 1/2 an hour with so much pain in my hip that I almost threw up. I took another hot shower; took 4 ibuprofen; put an ice pack on it; but it still didn't go away. I took a hot bath and was able to sleep in the bathtub for a while. When I got out; I put a lidocaine patch on it and tried to go back to sleep; but pretty much wasn't able to get comfortable enough to rest The pain was constant and sporadically intense; and didn't seemed to [be] caused by any one movement in particular. The flight home later that day was difficult; because of my painful hip.  That night the only way I could rest was if I sat in a living room chair sitting up. The next day I woke up with a really bad headache; which was bad for several hours; unresponsive to pain relievers. The pressure in my head was still there. The nausea was still there. I also had difficulty keeping my balance when walking; partly because my hip hurt so much and partly because I still felt out of it.  The third day; I woke up with a migraine; which I hadn't had for several months since changing one of my medications. It was unresponsive to my prescription migraine medicine. When it finally subsided; the pressure in my head was still there; but was less. I'm finally less nauseous. And my massage person worked on my hip this afternoon and it feels like it's getting better. The insurance company called me today and said that the Company maintenance report said that there was an oil leak in the APU on the aircraft we were on.

A319 Flight Attendant in Charge reported notifying Captain during departure taxi of strong fumes odor and resulting physiological issues. Flight returned to the gate; passengers deplaned; and cabin crew received medical treatment.


Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

After Departing AGC; we encountered what appeared to be a small drone approximately 6 NM NW of AGC; directly across Heinz Field on the south side of the Ohio River. We were at 2000 ft MSL when we spotted the small 'object' approximately 200 ft off our port side. The object was silver and was reflective. It appeared to be heading on a SE course before it executed a slight left bank to the east. We only saw the object for approximately 10 sec before it disappeared behind our aircraft. I immediately notified Approach and relayed the same info. After an uneventful flight; I called Approach and basically repeated the same info that I had passed over the radio. They told me that law enforcement in that area had been notified.

A helicopter pilot near AGC reported a small UAS 200 feet away from his aircraft while cruising at 2000 feet MSL.


Light Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6.1

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I was working Local Control and recall working a trickier session than normal (perhaps it had been awhile since I had worked a busier session on this configuration). I had issued Aircraft Y a clearance to land on 12L and he was entering the left base. Aircraft X was cleared touch and go on 12R and was on a right base entry. In my scan; I suddenly noticed Aircraft X making a steep turn out the window; as if they were taking evasive action. I realized I had not exchanged traffic between the two aircraft; and simultaneously Aircraft Y was asking about the intentions of Aircraft X off his right; noting it appeared he was headed for him. I confirmed that the other aircraft was inbound on the parallel runway; and Aircraft X advised they overshot the final and were making a turn back to it. Each aircraft continued without expressing further concern.I can recall there was some complexity with local pattern traffic leading up to the event; where I was having difficulty tracking a helicopter in the local pattern that was flying patterns that were higher than normal. Aircraft Y also had an issued with their transponder and this created additional workload while they were inbound. I found it challenging at times to scan some of my traffic; as I did realize upon assuming the position that some of the shades in the cab were not in a 'normal' configuration and thus some areas were darker/lighter than normal. It was obvious when traffic was lighter later and I could make adjustments - but during a busier; complex period - I could not initially understand the lighting conditions affected by the shades were making it harder to track traffic in my pattern. The temperature also seemed warmer than usual and was distracting until it was adjusted. These environmental factors are not an excuse for overlooking traffic in this scenario (and it is my responsibility to make adjustments to either correct those factors or work through them) - but they may have played a role by making it challenging to work through a higher complexity traffic situation by putting me behind issuing a traffic advisory that I normally would have covered. Exchanging traffic sooner can help the pilots perform their duties in a VFR pattern and avoid these situations. While I usually try to be proactive and issue traffic as timely as I can; I overlooked it in this instance. I believe traffic complexity and frequency congestion - in conjunction with some environmental items mentioned above - were factors that made it more challenging to keep up and contributed to this oversight. I am reminded it is important to make environmental adjustments during periods of slower activity or prior to assuming a control position (equipment settings; temperature; shades; etc.) and have other tower team members assist with these when appropriate; in order to help prevent environmental factors adding to complexity when traffic builds.

A small aircraft on a left base to final for the left parallel runway with a light twin engine on a right base to final for the parallel runway. The light twin flew across their final towards the left runway arrival but corrected. ATC had not issued a traffic advisory to either aircraft. The small aircraft saw the light twin and asked the Tower what that aircrafts intentions were. ATC should have issued traffic to both aircraft.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The maintenance section of the flight paperwork has a 'MEL/CDL' section; a 'Carry Forward' section; and a 'Long Term Carry Forward' section. According to Flight Manual; 'carried items not scheduled to receive maintenance action for at least 30 days are classified as long-term carried items and are only listed at the end of the Log History.' However; Maintenance has a different definition of what constitutes a long term item: 'The limits for a long term item are 1;500 hours OR 200 cycles OR 100 days. These are the limits that should be reflected in the Flight manual.' The Flight manager was copied on the action item and the language was supposed to be corrected; but that never happened. Why? Where is the follow-through?There are still pages and pages of entries in the regular (short term) carry forward section that belong in the long term section. We're talking about things like fuselage dents that are years old! Why are these in the wrong section; or maybe more importantly; why are we seeing them at all? By cluttering up the maintenance paperwork with inconsequential items; we're being 'trained' to just skim over that stuff; and that's a problem because we might miss something important that's buried in there. Deviance is being normalized: The carry forward section is no longer useful because it contains too much stuff that shouldn't be there. How about we pay someone to go through these things and re-categorize them so they show up in the proper section or not at all?The answers to these questions (and many others) always seem to involve some component of 'I.T. issue' or 'incomplete programming' or 'it's a low priority on the I.T. list'. So I ask you: Are we an I.T. company that operates airplanes on the side; or are we an airline that needs better support from I.T.? When Ops responds to [reports] with comments like 'Unfortunately I have no control over the quality of the work that the IT team produces;' as they did to my [report]; that's a real problem. Who; exactly; does have control over the I.T. people?Or how about this response to my [report]: 'This was a request made by Flight operations during the initial development of the SCEPTRE logbook design specification. So when this came up on the priority list the developers made the programing change. None of the current Flight Operations team supports this change. We have requested that this be removed from the Log History. We have also requested to review the future development list to prevent surprises like this moving forward.' Again; it appears that Flight Ops is at the mercy of I.T. Do they support us; or do we support them? Who's driving the ship here?Is the ELB [Electronic Log Book] program considered complete? Have we reached a 90% status and called it good enough? What's it going to take to get the maintenance information that's presented to pilots back to the state it was in years ago? There is still work to be done; but from my perspective it appears no one is doing it.

B757 Captain reported that the Electronic Log Book is cluttered with Carry Forward items; causing critical items to be missed.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Our preflight and loading of the FMC was routine and seemed normal that day. We had requested via ACARS the flight and uploaded the flight plan and winds via ACARS. We then checked the route and everything seemed normal to us. Distances; as I recall never gave us a red flag that one coordinate may have been entered incorrectly. Our flight proceeded normally and the only event that seemed out of place was when ATC asked us to verify our next position after 160E. We told them and never heard anything about our flight path being off from our flight plan. We made company position reports in accordance with SOP and never heard from operations that our flight path was different from that of our filing. It turns out that our flight path deviated 120 NM from our flight plan. Somehow our coordinate of 34N160E got entered as 36N160E; causing the airplane to incur a gross navigational error. We landed at our destination without any ill effect towards the flight. We adhered to company procedures during the route verification check. It was I; the Captain; and the First Officer that accomplished this check. My suggestion is to have every crew member on duty on the flight deck when this check is being accomplished. CRM is a big part of the safety environment we try to cultivate and I think the more people involved in this route verification; the better prepared we will be.

The aircraft deviated 120 NM from the flight plan because it navigated to 36N160E instead of 34N160E. The coordinates were not accurate in the FMC and the flight crew apparently did not recognize the inaccuracy.

B747 flight crew is informed after the fact that they entered and flew to an oceanic waypoint that was not part of their flight plan. ATC noted the discrepancy in advance but did not question the flight crew.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 4350; Flight Crew Type 400

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Staffing; Human Factors

Uneventful 3 hour VFR flight from ZZZ1 at 16;500 feet.  Just after starting my VFR descent for SRQ was advised by ZJX Center that TPA Approach would not take the hand-off and told to squawk 1200. I switched to TPA Approach for SRQ airport and monitored frequency as I continued VFR descent to 8;500 feet - above the top of Class B.  After monitoring approach frequency for 5 minutes as I continued my VFR descent to 4;500 feet - above the top of the SRQ Class C; it was evident that the TPA Approach Controller was saturated so I switched to SRQ Tower.  I advised Tower that I would fly west beyond the Class C and descend to 1;100 feet - below the floor; before turning back to SRQ for VFR approach and landing. Tower worked me in perfectly on intersecting Runway 4.Although 121 traffic is down considerably; FAA now needs to assess the current flight activity - which for ZZZ Approach certainly exceeded the ability of 1 Controller to control all sectors; and add back controllers before someone gets hurt.

Pilot reported the flight was not accepted by TPA Approach Control due to staffing/workload issues. The Captain circumnavigated the area and proceeded VFR.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 229; Flight Crew Type 13000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 198; Flight Crew Type 5000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Flight was originating after overnight maintenance for electrical problems including TR1 circuit breaker (CB) and equipment cooling fan circuit breaker being popped in flight. It was a normal preflight and pushback except for a fuel discrepancy due to the previous days out of service for maintenance. After engine start we noted the Equipment Cooling Inop light illuminated and found the normal equipment cooling fan circuit breaker popped. We coordinated with Dispatch and MX for a deferral off the gate then taxied for takeoff.After a normal departure climbing through approximately 15;000 ft the Equipment Cooling Fan Inop light illuminated again. We verified the switch in ALT per the QRH and the circuit breaker for the ALT fan was still in. I did a more comprehensive review of the previous day's write-ups and realized we might be following the same failure chain as the day before. We discussed alternates; coordinated with the F/A's (Flight Attendants) concerning the previous fumes write-up; and got Dispatch on the radio to advise of our concerns. We had to radio because ACARS was also intermittent at that time. We were level at cruise when [a Flight Attendant] called to advise us there was an odor of hot electrical equipment in the aft galley and mid cabin but it was faint. We began to review the Smoke/Fumes Checklist. A few minutes later she called again and said the odor was now stronger; no visible smoke; and she was feeling a bit nauseated and light headed. I told the F/A's to secure the cabin for a [diversion]; we donned our masked in the cockpit; and I asked the F/O (First Officer) to [advise ATC] and begin the divert to [an airport] approximately 70 miles on our nose and VFR. As he began the descent I realized my mask MIC was intermittent at best so I told him to fly and talk while I ran the checklists and set us up for an approach. My mask worked to coordinate some checklist items with the F/A's and occasionally to coordinate with the F/O but mostly we were pointing and acknowledging with thumbs up or I was pulling my mask away to speak to him.  As I completed the Fumes Checklist we got a Pressurization Auto Fail light and shortly thereafter a Cabin ALT Warning horn. I switched from programming for the arrival to the QRC for Cabin ALT Warning horn. The cabin altitude was about 10;500 ft climbing slowly. I ran the checklist and with the outflow valve closed the cabin altitude immediately began a rapid descent. I went back to setting us up for approach. On downwind the left generator dropped off the bus and the F/O noticed it and asked if he should start the APU and put it on the bus. I affirmed that decision and he did so. At that point with landing numbers from the FMC; turning base to a long runway VFR I took the aircraft from the F/O and asked him to check my cockpit setup for approach. We noticed the cabin was over-pressurizing with about a 7psi differential and the aircraft at 8000 ft MSL so I directed the F/O to fully open the outflow valve and go to full cold on the packs. ATC asked us if we could slow for sequence and we said no we wanted to get on deck as soon as possible so they cleared the final and we continued in. At about 14 miles on the Localizer the A autopilot failed so I began hand flying the DECEL and we began to configure. The field was in sight. At about five miles and approximately 3000 ft MSL and glideslope intercept; I lost all my primary flight instruments except altitude and my LOC/GS indicators. I looked over and realized my F/O still had instruments and passed control to him for the landing and continued to configure.Completing the Landing Checklist we noted no green light on the flaps and antiskid inop. I decided based on the runway length and condition to continue after a quick visual check of the slats on both sides and advised the F/O to rollout with reverse and be easy on the brakes. On landing we had normal spoiler deployment but only the right reverser showed deployed despite both handles being up. I called the malfunction and the F/O adjusted reverse and maintained centerline for the rollout. After landing we cleared the runway and stopped. I decided to unmask so we could communicate and had to use the PA to get the F/A's to come up on the interphone because the F/A Call was not working. I confirmed with them that there was no smoke in the cabin and they were ok with a taxi to a gate. I then made a PA to the Passengers that we had experienced an electrical malfunction requiring a diversion for safety. I asked for their patience and told them we would taxi to a gate and begin accommodating their continued travel as soon as possible. We taxied to the gate and shut down. After the Shutdown Checklist I went to the back; checked on the F/A's; and again made a PA thanking the Passengers for their patience and cooperation in re-accommodating them.

After pushing from [the gate] and placing the electrical busses to the Eng Generators; the Electrical Cooling OFF Light illuminated. We discovered the Elec Normal Blower circuit breaker was popped. The Captain called Maintenance and completed MEL Procedures for this issue. He noted that this was a repeat issue/write-up for this aircraft from the previous day. We continued on ALT Electrical Cooling in accordance with Maintenance guidance; and proceeded to Runway 1R for takeoff. On the climb out passing approximately 15;000 ft; the Electrical Cooling OFF light came on again in ALT Mode. We reviewed the QRH procedure; confirmed the Elec ALT Blower circuit breaker was in; and continued the climb to 33;000 ft. The Captain reviewed the logbook in depth and saw that the aircraft had experienced issues with Equip Cooling; Fumes in the Cabin; and TR1 failure. The Captain took time to brief the Flight Attendants of the previous issues and to be prepared if similar issues arise; as well as how to inform us if they notice odors; fumes; or smoke. We also discussed our contingencies for diverts at certain points of the flight in case needed. Soon after we were cleared to and climbed to FL 340; the F/As called to say they were smelling an odor; and one F/A was feeling light headed. The Captain made the decision to divert. He passed PF (Pilot Flying) duties to me and I informed ATC and that we required a divert. We donned our Oxygen masks and began an immediate descent to 15;000 ft per ATC instructions and turned direct to [the diversion airport]. The Captain's intercom only worked intermittently; creating a more difficult communication problem than is normal for being on the O2 Masks. I took the ATC COMMS for the remainder of the flight. The Captain began working the Smoke/Fumes Checklist and was coordinating with the F/As. We got an Auto Fail light on the Pressure Control Panel followed by a Cabin Warning horn and light; so the Captain switched to the Cabin Pressure Warning Checklist. He closed the Outflow Valve to preserve Cabin Pressure; and we continued the descent to below 10;000 ft. The Captain set up the cockpit for landing. Descending past approximately 12;000 ft; multiple caution lights came on and I saw that ENG GEN 1 was off line. I asked the Captain if he wanted me to start the APU and put Electric 1 on the APU Bus as a precaution; and he agreed to do that. After the APU was ready; I selected the APU Bus for Electric 1. None of the Electric 1 services seemed to return. As we descended through 8000 ft and on downwind; the Captain noticed the Cabin Pressure was high for our altitude so he used the Manual Valve Control to adjust the pressure. He took PF duties and directed me to review the approach set up for landing; and to begin depressurizing and cooling the aircraft for landing since we were still in Manual on the Pressure Control Panel. We received vectors and clearance to final approach; and got established on final at approximately 25 miles. ATC asked if we could slow for the arrival yet; and we responded that we needed to keep our speed fast as long as feasible. ATC approved; so we remained at 250 knots until 12-15 miles and began to slow. At around 20 miles on final; the A Autopilot disconnected and the Captain continued the approach flying manually. At 12 miles; we began configuring for landing by selecting flaps 5. While approaching glideslope intercept; the Captain's instrumentation began to fail; including the HGS; ADI; and other Navigation instruments. He saw that my instrumentation was still operating; so he passed PF duties to me and instructed me to land. We continued to configure for landing; received landing clearance and landed. On rollout while I began to select Thrust Reverse on both engines; the Captain called out that the left Reverser light was not illuminated. As I neared TR (Thrust Reverser) Detent 2 I felt a slight swerve in the aircraft and deselected the Reverse to Detent 1 and decelerated using wheel brakes. After clearing the Runway; we confirmed with the F/As if there was a need to deplane in position on the taxiway; and with their concurrence we continued to [the gate].

The reporter stated when reviewing the log book prior to flight they realized there was a lot of maintenance done on the aircraft associated with the electrical system. The reporter stated the equipment cooling fan was deferred and was operated using the alternate system; (the equipment cooling light came on again in flight and the circuit breaker was not popped). The reporter stated along with the cooling fan issue they received a report from the flight attendants of a burning smell in the cabin. The reporter stated they lost the left generator bus; so they started the APU to use the generator to power the left bus but the APU generator would not come on line to power the bus. The reported stated they donned the O2 masks when TR1 failed causing the overhead panel to light up like a Christmas tree; at the same time the cabin started losing pressurization; at which time the Primary Flight Instruments on the Captain's side were lost. The reporter stated the TR1 was isolated and could not be powered from another source. The reporter also stated when going through the QRH check list for one item another fault would occur which created a very busy cockpit. The reporter stated it's difficult to remember the sequence of events; but it was possible the same sequence of events occurred the day before which was the reason for the maintenance. The reporter stated at this time they do not know the primary cause of all the failures.

B737 flight crew reported a cascading electrical failure and fumes in the cabin.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 28; Flight Crew Total 190; Flight Crew Type 25

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Departed airport. Advised by CFI not to return to originating airport as originally planned because winds had changed and now were too high. CFI would meet me at alternate airport to fly the plane back. Upon nearing the new airport I checked in flight AWOS report. AWOS was reporting winds of 170 at 6 gusts to 14 knots. I descended for normal approach and continued to the runway. After landing; a gust of wind buffeted the airplane causing the aircraft to become airborne at low speed. This resulted in a nose down contact with the Runway with insufficient elevator authority to hold the nose off the ground; resulting in a prop strike. Once I got the aircraft stopped; I turned off the Runway onto the ramp.

DA20 aircraft pilot experienced a propeller strike during landing in gusty conditions.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 124; Flight Crew Total 15500; Flight Crew Type 6700

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

After taking off and entering IMC conditions in heavy rain. The pilots lost intercommunications between pilots; lost communications on radio one. The copilots yoke started to fall apart; which resulted in a stuck mike on the aircraft. The copilot switched to communications on radio two; the Captain was able to communicate with ATC on radio two intermittently; (I feel that P-factor with static electricity from a loose static wick or bracket connections may have been an additional problem). I chose not to continue the flight into night IMC. Due to the poor communications on Radio #2 I climbed 500 feet above an altitude assigned. (Due to poor communications) I returned to the departure airport; prior to returning I had to dump fuel to get below maximum landing weight.

LR35 Captain experiences communications difficulties shortly after takeoff into night IMC in heavy rain. The First Officer's yoke began falling apart; appeared to cause some of the communication difficulties and the Captain elects to return to the departure airport after dumping fuel.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Refused aircraft due to reoccurring problem with the flaps locking at 2 degrees with no defects found. The inbound flight had the flaps lock at 2 degrees. The maintenance corrective action was; no faults noted; operations check OK. Upon a review of the logbook; I noted that this was a reoccurring problem that had been written up on at least two prior occasions. Once I made this discovery I contacted Maintenance and asked them if they were aware of the history. Maintenance was aware. I refused the aircraft.

B777 Captain reported refusing an aircraft due to a recurring trailing edge flap issue.


Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Fatigue

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

EVENT: Rejected Takeoff (RTO) due to configuration warning.FLIGHT CREW DUTIES: CA: PM; FO: PF.EVENT DESCRIPTION: Upon lining up on runway 28R at taxiway November 5; FO advanced throttles for takeoff. Nearly instantly; crew received a configuration warning due to improper flap position. FO maintained aircraft control; retarded the throttles and applied the brakes to perform the RTO. CA advised ATC; took control of the aircraft and exited the runway; per ATC instructions. No other warnings or cautions were observed. All brake indicators were at 2 or below. Crew was resequenced for takeoff and performed the rest of the trip without incident. BACKGROUND: Prior to this incident; crew executed two legs aboard another aircraft. On each of these legs the aircraft APU was deferred. Each of the legs were notably delayed due to issues on the ground. Upon arrival back at ORD; the crew swapped airplanes and rushed to the new gate to board the incident aircraft. The crew expeditiously prepared the new aircraft for pushback and taxi in an attempt to get back on schedule. During pushback; the FO's before taxi flow was interrupted briefly and flaps were not lowered to the proper position; even though all other flow items were accomplished correctly. The taxi checklist was performed. Crew received clearance and taxied to runway 28R/N5 and while in the number 4 position for takeoff the crew performed the; Before Takeoff Checklist; to the line. Crew was cleared into position and read the; Before Takeoff Checklist; below the line and shortly thereafter; the incident occurred.While the aircraft system logic provided the most immediate and direct solution to preventing a departure with an improper flap setting; both the CA and the FO remarked to each other how neither had ever attempted a takeoff with an improper flap setting before this incident and; during a crew debrief; identified their being dehydrated; rushed; undernourished and tired as possible contributing factors that while apparent afterward; were not necessarily apparent in the time leading up to the incident.In arriving at his particular thought; the crew considered the following:1) Both of the previous legs were notably delayed due to issues on the ground at ORD. Ground crew's slow acquisition of 'start-cart' for ground air start. 2) Ramp congestion resulting in 10-15 minute sit at the gate.3) Taxi to out-of-the-way area; away from gate (at ORD) to perform cross-bleed start.4) As the delay time increased; so did the temperature on the flight deck due to the inoperative APU.5) By the time the crew departed the flight deck was exceedingly hot and the crew noted the possibility of heat related impairment as a threat during the takeoff brief and while on the approach to next airport.6) Ground ops at next airport were rushed and the crew turned the aircraft as fast as conditions would allow.7) The temperature in the cockpit was still exceedingly hot and the crew; again; mentioned heat related impairment as a possible and very real threat as they prepared to depart.8) As stated above; upon arrival at ORD; the crew swapped airplanes and rushed to the new gate to board and prep the incident aircraft.9) The crew expeditiously prepared the new aircraft for pushback and taxi in an attempt to get back on schedule however; as the crew later realized; they were now dehydrated; rushing and starting to feel the effects of a lack of nourishment.10) Additionally; prior to the incident; the FO had flown 16 legs over the past 3 and a half days and the CA was a commuter. Both had remarked how they were feeling the effects of a tough schedule.11) In realizing all of this the crew concluded; even though they performed the appropriate checklists; they; 'saw what they wanted to see;' when they looked to confirm the flap setting and noted their physical condition as a definite contributing factor.RECOMMENDATION: If a crew finds that it must; for whatever reason; fly an aircraft with a non-functioning APU; the crew MUST ensure each member is THOROUGHLY hydrated and nourished. In so doing; the crew can not only mitigate the brutal effects of an inoperative APU during a hot summer day but also mitigate the effects of being slightly tired while operating at a heightened operational tempo.

CRJ-200 First Officer reported a rejected takeoff due to improper flap position.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency

Departed and 80 miles west; right recirc fan tripped off with associated EICAS message. QRH procedure performed. FA's [Flight Attendant] report fumes and haze in cabin.  Dispatch notified; vectors to return the departure airport. Landing; and overweight landing checklists performed.  ARF standing by; normal landing;  fire chief inspected outside aircraft;  returned to gate.

A B767 EICAS alerted REC FAN so the crew accomplished the QRH. The flight attendants then reported cabin smoke and haze so the flight returned to the departure airport.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused

Aircraft; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy

I saw a mouse in the cockpit of this aircraft. There are several things that need to be brought to attention from this issue; and the reason for this report is to provide the company and the FAA insight into this occurrence. The mouse infestation itself and the pressure given by the Chief Pilot and the assistant Chief Pilot to fly this airplane with a present safety hazard are the supporting reasons for this report. At the time the mouse was found; the Flight Attendant and I were the only people on the plane; we were waiting for Maintenance to fix COMM Number 1. (COMM 1 wouldn't transmit). Maintenance was on the plane before we walked on to this plane to prepare for our flight for an out and back. I saw a mouse in the cockpit. I was sitting facing the cockpit in seat XA; and as I went to reach for my cell phone to take a picture of the mouse; it scurried back under the instrument panel. It was sitting on my lunch box which was on the floor of the cockpit next to the First Officer's left rudder peddle. I saw it climb on top of my lunch box from near the rudder peddles; and then run off my lunch box and under the instrument panel. We refused the airplane and wrote up finding the mouse in the logbook. Mice are known to chew a lot; and to make nests near and in insulation. Cockpit wiring and insulation could be a desirable location for a mouse to nest. At any rate; who knows where/if it has made a nest and what wires it may have chewed up. (Creating an electrical hazard) Besides a horrible customer service experience (if customers saw it) it's unsanitary and a safety hazard. It needs to be properly addressed and made sure that no wires were chewed by this mouse.... One of my many concerns for this issue is that there may have been more mice that weren't seen given how fast these things reproduce. The Captain was arriving from a different flight; and the Flight Attendant and I had just boarded this plane. We had not flown this plane; but were preparing to; holding off on boarding until the Captain showed up; and Maintenance finished troubleshooting and fixing the COMM 1 issue. When the Captain showed up and was brought up to speed on the issue; she initially didn't feel that finding a mouse in the cockpit warranted a write-up in the aircraft logbook. I expressed my concern that if this plane were to fly; and two weeks from now an electrical fire occurred in flight that there would be at least a paper trail for the FAA to see that mice were an issue on this plane. The Captain quickly agreed to write it up in the logbook. I spoke with Maintenance before and after the write-up occurred for the mouse; and he said he didn't know what they would have to do to correct that issue. That's fine; but it still needed to be documented in my opinion. However; Maintenance didn't disagree with me or the Captain at any point; and that it should be written up. Since we were at the gate; and that it was a weekday; we figured that instead of calling the Chief Pilot we'd just go down to the crew room and speak in person with him. Initially the Chief Pilot (CP) and Assistant Chief Pilot (ACP) were supportive of the write-up and made jokes along the lines of 'snakes on a plane' but to the tune of 'mice on a plane'. It was nice to see that they were backing us up at this point with our decision. This quickly changed when some 10-15 minutes later we found out that there were no spare aircraft for us to take this turn out and back. The Chief Pilot then pressured us to take the plane because he thought that the 'mouse was local and not living on the plane'. He then went on to say that Maintenance removed a panel and didn't find any evidence of a mouse. Keep in mind that this 'search' wasn't long and had been no longer than 15 minutes. (How does the Chief Pilot know that the mouse is 'local'? Is he an expert in this matter?) Furthermore; the Chief Pilot said; 'you've been off the plane for how long now? 30 minutes? So; that mouse could have run off the plane.' I responded that 'That's true I've been absent from the plane for 30 minutes now; but how do you know it hasn't run off the plane?' At this point the Captain said she was now OK with taking the plane as long as there wasn't an alternate airport required for the flight release. What did this have to do with anything? I'm not sure. She said that she was refusing it on a scale of 1-10 as a 6. The Assistant Chief Pilot then came to me and asked me if I'd; 'refuse the plane two weeks from now?' I said; '...probably not. But; I don't think that an adequate search of this plane can be accomplished in 15 minutes to determine that mice aren't an issue or have caused an problems with this plane' I expressed to both the Chief Pilot and the Assistant Chief Pilot that I want to get these people to their destination. But; I wanted a different plane to do this; however. While in the Chief Pilot's Office; he asked us again if we'd fly the plane and that no mouse was found. The Captain said she'd take it. I was upset to hear her say this because we had discussed the hazards of this situation before talking to the Chief Pilot. I told the Captain and the Chief Pilot; '... You (directed to both the Captain and Chief Pilot) can throw me under the bus; but I'm not taking this airplane.' I expressed my concern for several issues: 1) If there were more mice living on the plane we didn't know about. 2) If mice had chewed through and compromised any electrical components. 3) If mice had chewed through and created any electrical shorts. 4) Sanitary concerns with having mice in the public's view. 5) What if passengers saw mice while on the flight? Would that create chaos? Not to mention a horrible customer service experience. 6) What if a mouse came out from hiding and ran up one of the pilot's legs during a critical phase of flight (such as takeoff or landing). That could be a safety hazard for sure. 7) Our planes are a breeding ground now for these things. The planes aren't clean like they used to be. Often time's food particles are left on the floor in the cabin and seat back pockets. Also; the warmth from the avionics could be attractive to nesting mice. At the end of all of this; I was all by myself as the First Officer refusing this plane and not receiving much support from the Captain; and NO support from the Chief Pilot's office. In fact; I was REMOVED off this turn to go do an AVP turn and another First Officer was assigned to work this flight. That night; I read an email from my Irregular Operation Report (IOR) that I filed. The Chief Pilot said: 'After finding evidence of continued presence of the mouse on the aircraft; it was removed from service and is being worked over by a professional exterminator. Thank you for bringing the issue to our attention.' This whole situation infuriated me; as did the response the Chief Pilot gave to my IOR report. I'm a 7 year First Officer and I wasn't given any credit to my concern in the first place. Only after expressing much concern for this issue did they conduct a more thorough search. And? They found something to show that there was a problem with this aircraft. It didn't say anything in this response about how the Chief Pilot was sorry for pressuring me to take this airplane and minimizing my concerns with the plane. Had I caved to the Chief Pilot's pressure to take the plane this plane wouldn't have been taken offline to be dealt with by a professional. And; heaven forbid something catastrophic might have happened at some point with this plane. I wasn't OK flying a plane with mice on it; and didn't want to set a precedence that it was OK to do so. I think that the support given to the crews from the Chief Pilot's office needs to be improved. I understand that we have an operation to run; and people to get to their destinations safely. Key word: safely. And; I feel the Chief Pilot's office failed to do that in this instance. I said to the Chief Pilot that if in 2007 the plane would have been taken offline and been dealt with in a more appropriate matter. So; what's different now? He said; 'We're a different airline now than we were then'. I completely agree that we're a different airline now than we were then. But; are we're dealing with safety differently now?

An EMB-145 First Officer refused to fly an aircraft after he saw a mouse disappear under the First Officer's instrument panel. The aircraft flew a round trip with another pilot and then was removed from service.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

While turning from base to final on a visual approach to Runway 13; Tower informed us that we had triggered a terrain alert. Around the time of the transmission I noticed we were between on the PAPIs to slightly low on the PAPIs. We acknowledged the transmission and said we were visual with the runway. We proceeded to get established on final and land. On board EGPWS equipment was never activated.Flying a fairly tight base to final turn that necessitated a continuous descent in the final turn.Extending downwind would have allowed a higher altitude for the base to final turn and possibly a more level turn to final that would not have triggered the alert.

While flying a visual approach on base to Runway 13 at DSM; ATC Tower gave us a low altitude alert; and said to 'check altitude.' We confirmed that we were above visual glide slope in reference to the PAPI; and continued onto final; where we intercepted and maintained ILS glideslope indications to an uneventful landing.Base turn to final approach inside FAF for ILS approach.

Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a terrain alert form ATC during approach to DSM airport.


Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Coming into ZZZ about 30 miles out in VMC we were assigned at pilots discretion down to 4000 feet; after that we were assigned another heading and what I thought was down to 3000 feet to join the visual approach in a few miles so i descended down and a few minutes after reaching 3000 feet the controller called to let us know just that the MSA for that sector was 3700 feet to which we asked for a climb and climbed back up and let him know that we would file some paper work and told him we thought we heard 3000 feet and he said something about being VMC plus the MSA altitude and he said just to give him a call when we got on the ground and we got his number. After taking down the number he cleared us for the visual in which we were high as well as close to the final approach fix and handed us off to tower. Turning final and finishing up configuration we realized we were still a bit too high  for our comfort level and standards instead of continuing we decided to execute a go around and came back around to land with no issue. Once we got to the hotel we gave the controller a call and he explained that we were in VMC conditions and he thought we might have just taken another planes altitude and that he had just noted we went below the MSA for the alert he got and there was no issues and we let him know we would file an report for our end and he said have a nice day. Misunderstanding or took another planes altitude. Asked ATC to climb to MSA and request accepted and we climbed to MSA. Nothing do exactly as we did.

First Officer reported receiving a CFIT Warning from ATC.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 13500; Flight Crew Type 2500

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Cruising at 40;000 feet we were in between tops of cells estimated at 41;000 feet.  Distance between cells 20 miles estimated.  Nothing of a return on radar to speak of.  Got a little light turbulence when we received a very hard; severe shot of turbulence.  The Autopilot kicked off; the plane rolled approx 35 degrees and a sudden loss of altitude of approx 500 feet to 39;500 feet.  I was the pilot flying; got control of the plane and was back at altitude in less than 30 seconds.  ATC inquired as to what was going on; we explained and were instructed to 'maintain 400'.  We did; no problem; and continued the flight.  Nothing more was said and this was a case of turbulence I have not experienced in over 15 years.

A Challenger 300 Captain reported encountering severe turbulence in cruise flight at FL400 that resulted in a 35 degree roll and a 500 foot altitude excursion.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 500

Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During late evening; we were conducting a commercial training flight; in the traffic pattern; performing takeoffs and landings. The student was performing a second 180 precision approach to landing. On the downwind leg to Runway 6; student performed GUMPS (landing mental checklist) at the midfield position and continued to ensure area was clear along with myself. During the previous maneuver; we had heard the other aircraft call turning 'crosswind' for runway 6 and heard no further radio calls from the 2nd aircraft. As we arrived abeam the landing point; I continued to scan the base leg area and final leg area and did not see the other aircraft or hear any radio calls announcing the 'base or final leg' for his landing. The student began the maneuver by reducing engine power to idle; began the turn and made his radio call; 'turning base to final; simulated engine out'. We still had no visual sight of the 2nd aircraft and heard no radio call that it was on final. Upon landing; the 2nd aircraft stated we had passed over him which culminated in the 2nd aircraft performing a 'go-around' maneuver. We terminated the training flight and discussed what had happened and how this type of event could be prevented in the future. It was agreed upon; that when performing this maneuver; to ask over the radio if any aircraft is on final approach to the runway before beginning the maneuver.

PA28 Flight Instructor is informed after landing that a second PA28 was over flown on final during a practice engine out approach. CTAF procedures were in effect and both aircraft had radios.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Workload; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Other

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Human Factors; Aircraft; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

System wide ADS-B and GPS failure. We noticed the ADS-B failure; which was not needed for flight; but I didn't notice that GPS was unavailable until we were taking off. The Captain then said that we didn't need it; and as we were taking off I didn't want to argue. I later looked up the MEL and learned that we did need it; Captain still doesn't realize.System wide GPS failure today; Dispatch only notified us that of the ADS-B failure which the MEL allows; but we didn't realize that the whole GPS system was down as well. By the time I realized; we were released for departure and on the runway; and the Captain said it was fine; and I thought to trust his knowledge. On the ground; I looked it up and realized we were in the wrong.If we were grounded; it would have been nice for Dispatch to tell us; as it was a system wide thing.

CRJ-200 Non Flying Pilot reported a system wide GPS and ADS-B failure.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 2400

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

While on the KEPEC3 arrival into LAS we were temporary blinded by bright lights (reflections) from the ground. These reflections; coming from the new solar power station were so bright that any attempt to look outside the plane was met with pain and temporary blindness even when looking back inside. Any attempt to see and avoid was useless and trying to find the airport during this time was painful as well. Exposure lasted about 5 minutes. We notified ATC and were told that they get a lot of complaints about these reflections.

The reporter stated that he was in the left seat and viewed the mirror reflections for only seconds then was able to get his head sheltered below the glareshield and away from the light. However even after the brief exposure; he had blue dots in his vision for about 5 minutes. The First Officer had no way to avoid the light even while not looking directly at it. The First Officer was literally blind for a greater than five minutes and neither pilot's vision was capable of detecting objects outside of the cockpit for a period of time. When the crew reported the event to ATC; the response was 'Yes; we get lots of complaints.'

A Captain flying the LAS KEPEC3 arrival near the CLARR waypoint reported his vision distortion and First Officer's temporary blindness after encountering the intense sunlight reflection at 13;000 FT.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

We were in cruise at FL370 when we both heard a loud bang from the left-hand side of the cockpit. It was immediately evident that the Captain's side-window had completely shattered. Both the captain and I immediately confirmed the aircraft was maintaining pressurization and the cabin altitude held steady. I asked the captain if he wanted me to [advise ATC] and he confirmed. I [advised] Center and requested an immediate descent to a lower altitude after explaining we had a shattered windshield and needed an immediate descent. We were told to maintain present heading and given an immediate descent to 13000. We were less than 100 miles to ZZZ as the closest suitable airport; so we asked for a diversion there and the Center controller began to work that clearance out for us. The captain called for the left windshield heat QRH. We completed that. He additionally called for the windshield damage QRH. We completed that. The controller then asked if we were able to turn right or left for traffic below us; we replied a turn in either direction was acceptable. He asked us to turn right. At this time we received a RA to stop the descent. We noted traffic on TCAS below us and to our right. We complied with the RA and stopped the descent; we visually maintained separation from the traffic who was to our right and diverging. We were then cleared direct to ZZZ. The captain three-chimed the FAs and briefed them on the test items. The captain then made a PA to the passengers explaining the situation and briefing them on our diversion to ZZZ. We were handed off to approach and completed the approach/landing segment of the flight which was uneventful. We declined emergency services with approach prior to landing and proceeded to the gate without further incident. Upon closer inspection of the windshield at the gate; the entire left side windshield was completely shattered with deep webbing that made it almost impossible to see out of. The cause was unknown. No damage or delamination/arching was noted on the prior leg flying this aircraft in daylight conditions. All crew members responded professionally and appropriately. We immediately monitored the status of the cabin pressure to ensure no change in cabin altitude. We [advised ATC] and requested and were approved for a rapid descent. We followed company procedures in adhering to emergency procedures for the abnormal situation and running multiple QRHs related to the event. We communicated openly and thoroughly to the Flight Attendants and dispatch; in addition to ZZZ Ops and exercised good CRM. The Captain did an exceptional job displaying effective leadership that significantly contributed to great teamwork that led to a safe and uneventful outcome of the flight. We were scheduled for a minimum rest overnight after this event. Crew scheduling failed to notify any of the crew members that the aircraft's maintenance status wasn't ready for a return to service; and all crew members were awake for a XA:15 report time with an aircraft scheduled departure at XF:30. The report time kept getting pushed back; despite the XA:15 start of the flight duty period. After an emergency event; better care should be offered in terms of crew scheduling with appropriate crew communication to save exacerbating; fatiguing; and stressful events with poor planning and a complete lack of communication.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ-900 flight crew reported a cockpit side window shattered at cruise altitude.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 27; Flight Crew Total 3427; Flight Crew Type 320

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

While departing Runway 24 at TEB caution lights illuminated that caused a distraction whereby the pilot flying deviated from [SID] altitude by about 500 FT or so. Once this was realized; the pilot immediately corrected the deviation and descended back to the appropriate altitude. There was no alarm on behalf of ATC other than a request to 'ident'. The pilot flying conferred with the pilot non-flying on the hazards of distractions; and better CRM will be implemented in the future.

BE40 Captain reports exceeding the SID mandated altitude by 500 FT during a Runway 24 departure from TEB due to a caution light distraction.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70.59; Flight Crew Total 1046; Flight Crew Type 70.59

Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

I have not taken the COVID vaccine.  Because of this; I expect to lose my job in XX days or less.  I flew a scheduled trip; ZZZ to ZZZZ; on Date 1 and returned Date 2.  I am new to the [aircraft type] fleet and have XX total hours on type with XY hours towards my hours required for consolidation.In training; I was taught the importance of discussing threats before a trip with the other pilots.  My dilemma was deciding whether to tell the other pilots that I am distracted because of my upcoming termination or not to tell them.  I decided not to tell them because; having never met them before; I was concerned that this information might be perceived by them as anything from a minor annoyance with me to a possible outrage.  Prior to both flights; I addressed all my concerns and considered myself fit for duty.  Although I just recently completed training on the [aircraft type]; I am proficient in my skills.  I was convinced that should any non-normal situation occur I would be competent and able to properly perform my duties.  What I did not expect to encounter was the anxiety and inner conflict I experienced once airborne.After the flight; I was unable to go to dinner with the other pilots on the overnight because I do not have a vaccine card which is required in Country.  I felt uneasy about giving a vague reason for declining the invitation because I was uncertain about revealing the truth about my vaccination status.  While in ZZZZ; I thought about the inner-conflict that I am experiencing; anxiety about losing my job; and concern over possible discrimination by other pilots and/or cabin crew members should they become aware of my vaccination status. I was pilot flying on the return leg to ZZZ and I found it more difficult to concentrate on simple tasks especially since I am new to the aircraft.  I was also unable to sleep during my rest break and unable to eat very much due to the heightened anxiety I was experiencing.  My landing at ZZZ airport was not as good as I had hoped.  The inner tension was compounded by my uncertainty as to whether I should have confessed my vaccination status to the other pilots and what would happen to me if I made a mistake and they found out later that I did not tell them.The unexpected level of anxiety never reached a point that I would consider dangerous; but the possibility of increased errors was apparent to me.  The conflict that I experienced because I did not reveal my vaccination status at the onset of the trip was an unnecessary distraction imposed on me by the company.  In addition; I did not want to introduce an issue to the other pilots that could cause a hostile work environment.  At the end of the flight; at the gate in ZZZ; I told the other pilots that I was unvaccinated and would be losing my job soon.  I could sense their concern and as they are both true professionals; they seemed empathetic with my plight.I have not yet determined the best way to deal with my predicament and since there is no guidance from my union or the company; I will probably conceal my vaccination status on my next trip.  I would hope that there would not be any hostility directed towards me if I revealed my status at the beginning of my next trip; but considering the contentiousness of the situation I am unsure.  I believe that my training and prior experience make it easier for me to deal with these types of distractions than others.  I am very concerned for those who may be unable to effectively manage their personal problems caused by the vaccine mandate.I believe that the company's vaccine mandate has created a potentially dangerous work environment that could impact safe operations.  The divisiveness caused by the vaccine issue; the unknown side effects for those already vaccinated and the prospect of impending job terminations have culminated and become; in my opinion; an inherent risk to aviation safety.

Air carrier First Officer reported experiencing stress and anxiety resulting from working while being unvaccinated and the company requiring employees to be vaccinated.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 6; Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was working Cab Coordinator and Controller in Charge combined. Aircraft X went around RWY2. I called HCF Approach; to coordinate that Aircraft X was responding to a TCAS RA; with no traffic; and was going around RWY2. We were intending to coordinate to see if they (Approach) had any other traffic inbound next for arrival from either the South or the South West.The Approach Controller said; that they had no one from the South; and that their next arrivals they had were 3 arrivals; Aircraft Z; on a high Right Downwind; currently at 7000 feet; Aircraft Y; that was 20 miles SW; and then followed by Aircraft A. I asked; that OGG; (Maui Tower) keep Aircraft X; in our VFR Traffic Pattern; 1500 feet; and cancelled IFR; to be the next arrival #1 to OGG again. The approach Controller said OK. I coordinated with the Local Controller (LC) and said that right traffic is good for Aircraft X; and that he will be #1 inside of Aircraft Z.Then; I noticed; Aircraft Z; was continuing South Bound on the right downwind for RWY2. I then noticed that Aircraft Y was now going to be #2 after Aircraft X; and was being vectored to TEBBS fix for the ILS RWY2. I called HCF South; to coordinate and Approval Request (APREQ); to slow down Aircraft Y; Aircraft Y was showing 270 knots; between; 13DME and 16 DME to slow to either 170 or maintain slowest practical reference Aircraft X that was still in right traffic to RWY2 now entering the Right Downwind 1500 feet. HCF Approach Controller said OK. Then; when Aircraft X started their base turn; I called HCF South; to inform them that Aircraft X; was now in their base turn; reference Aircraft Y; now approaching TEBBS fix; 3000; ILS RWY2; and 10 Mile final. Aircraft Y then checked in on our frequency 118.7; the Approach Controller then answered and said; 'Is that going to FIT?' Which was confusing to me; because I thought we have been coordinating that Aircraft X was VFR traffic pattern to be #1; inside of Aircraft Z and then Aircraft Y was now after; and now was converging with Aircraft Y and Aircraft X on their right base 1500 feet and Aircraft Y was 3000 feet. I answered that Aircraft X; was flying their base turn towards the drag strip (65Z). They then asked; can you split them after Aircraft Y? Which is even more confusing; because; Aircraft X; was already on a 4 mile Right Base for RWY2; and then the Approach Controller is asking us; if the Aircraft X; can split behind Aircraft Y 9-10 mile final; and then Aircraft A in trail of Aircraft Y; which was also confusing.Then; I asked the Approach controller; do they want Aircraft Y; to go back for resequencing Runway Heading maintain 4000? They asked to break Aircraft X out; after Aircraft Y to fly Present heading and Maintain 4000 feet.Which is also confusing; because Aircraft X; is on a base leg; which I called initially to report that Aircraft X was on a Base leg; about a 280-270 degree turn; towards a 4 mile Right Base for Runway 2; flying towards the drag strip (65Z); and the current present heading would be flying towards the West Maui Mountain Range. I reminded the Approach controller; that we could not issue the Present Heading; due to the Mountains and the Right Base towards the Mountains.The Approach Controller; then told me to have Aircraft X to fly Heading 180. Which is also a bad call; because for Aircraft X; to be on a Right Base leg for RWY2; then to turn to a 180 heading; still converges with the Aircraft Y on the ILS at TEBBS fix at 3000. Then the approach controller tells me to EXPEDITE. Now we are at a place that both the LC and myself never thought could deteriorate to.Now I relay that to the Local Controller; the Local Controller is trying his very best; he mistakenly tells the wrong aircraft first; Aircraft Y; and then Aircraft Y takes the clearance. Luckily; the Local Controller catches it; and changes it. And grabs altitude between the two aircraft; Aircraft X was pattern altitude 1500; VFR. And had AircraftY fly Runway Heading and maintain 3000 feet; then had Aircraft Y maintain 4000.I then get a couple of coordination calls from the HCF Supervisors Watch Desk; to coordinate the Go-Around Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR) for Aircraft X initially; and then also; another sup calls later; to coordinate immediately about the arrival TIE to RWY2 between Aircraft Y and Aircraft X. I was still confused about the previous coordination and how we even arrived here in the first place.I also between coordinating with the Approach Controller and listening to the read back of the aircraft; I had mistakenly thought; that either Aircraft X or Aircraft Y had either had a miss read back and/or had a possible pilot deviation. However; neither was the case. But between; coordinating with the Approach Controller; catching up; and relaying this rapidly changing information to the Local Controller; and also listening to the read back of the aircraft and not hearing the read back; trying to maintain situational awareness.The Operations Manager then called me; and asked if we would be filing both MORs at Maui for both incidents. I was still trying to catch up with what the hell happened and why did everything break down so rapidly because I thought Maui Tower was on the same page with Approach and vice-versa; however; that was not the case.The coordination broke down; and I thought; the Approach Controller knew; that we APREQ that Aircraft X was going to be the next arrival; or at least the #1; to Runway 02; and then; their next 3 arrivals. If Approach didn't like our APREQ for Aircraft X to stay in our VFR traffic pattern to land RWY2 to be #1; then why did they approve it? Also; if Aircraft Y; was going to be #2; why didn't the approach controller; keep Aircraft Y; to widen out to CAMPS fix to be #2; and/or slow down like how we coordinated previously?And; if none of those was the Approach Controllers' plan; we (Maui Tower) would have been more than happy to have the first go around; (Aircraft X) to simply fly Runway Heading and maintain 4000 feet initially to be sequenced after their next 3 arrivals. Also; if Approach needed to change it; we could have simply handed off Aircraft X; when they were on the Right Downwind for RWY2; and could have been after the arrivals that Approach was working.Either way; the coordination broke down and it ended being ugly and in my opinion it was [bad] coordination. We could have totally avoided this situation from the first place.We asked initially if this right traffic pattern would work with their next arrival; and we had other opportunities to double check to see if the original plan is still working and/or if we have to make any changes to ensure separation and safety to the NAS. The way the Approach Controller approved both times I called to check in; they made it sound like they would give us room for the jet to make a VFR right Traffic Pattern back to RWY2.Also; I had expectation bias; because I trusted the Approach Controller would not have ran Aircraft Y to become a tie with our Aircraft X in the traffic Pattern. Tower still has to provide VFR/IFR; and Same Runway Separation between both Aircraft X and Aircraft Y; same large aircraft.Approach Control mislead us to believing that they would make room for us. If this was not Approach Control's expectation then why did they approve both our Aircraft X to be #1; inside of Aircraft Z; then followed by Aircraft Y; then Aircraft A.Then; if Approach wanted to change the sequence; that is fine; so now Aircraft Y is going to be in front of Aircraft Z; then; where does Aircraft X fit? #1? After Aircraft Y; after Aircraft A? After Aircraft Z? None of those options were expressed or communicated to us; so we presumed that Aircraft X was #1; inside of their next 3 arrivals.If approach controller did not tell Aircraft Y to widen; and/or slow; then why did the Approach Control send us the Conflicting; / Converging similar type aircraft to the same runway as a tie? After we coordinated earlier?We (Maui Tower) should have originally just sent Aircraft X back to HCF approach for resequencing; since they were already working 3 other aircraft I guess. And/Or; we could have had Aircraft X; on the right downwind; to extend their downwind and do a manual hand off with HCF for re-sequencing since they changed the sequence that they told me about originally anyway.Either way; I believe; both myself; the Local Controller and HCF South Arrival Approach; all had expectation bias with the coordination at the time. With the coordination; both the Local Control and myself; thought that they would make room for us working Aircraft X back to Runway 2. Maybe I need to be clearer on my coordination. Maybe HCF should consider aircraft performance; for a large Jet to make Right Traffic; VFR traffic pattern; 1500 feet; is not going to be as close compared to a C172.Did Approach have a different plan? That is fine; If so; why didn't the approach controller talk to us about changing the plan to ensure a safe traffic arrival flow to RWY2? LOA misunderstanding? Misconceptions? Misinterpretations?

OGG Tower Controller reported confusion during a go-around and Approach Control attempting to sequence traffic back into the arrival flow.


Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

We were on a Part 91 ferry flight. On climb out we noticed the ground idle annunciation light was illuminated which we concluded was not normal as the ground idle is on a squat switch and shouldn't be on in flight. We further discussed other system items which would possibly cause the issue. In addition we noticed that the takeoff V speeds were still showing on the airspeed indicator which should have been cleared out after takeoff. ATC cleared us up to FL390 and we were crossing our first fix. We tried cycling the ground idle switch during this time and were in the mid teens. The ground idle annunciation remained illuminated. Shortly after this the Captain noticed that our cabin was not pressurizing; as the cabin altitude was not increasing nor was the cabin rate increasing. He selected the cabin rate knob to high to try and get the cabin to pressurize. Shortly after; the cabin rate immediately went to approximately 6;000 fpm. He said lets get our oxygen masks on. We put them on and at this time we were at approximately FL220. Suddenly the master warning illuminated along with a cabin decompression annunciation. He disconnected the autopilot and leveled off and said lets advise ATC. I advised ATC and requested a return to our origin. ATC gave us a descent to 10;000 ft. with direct to the airport. Once we accomplished memory items for cabin decompression and emergency descent we ran the emergency checklist and returned with no further issues. I believe we handled the situation appropriately by advising ATC and going to a lower altitude and returning to our origin airport. Once we reached 10;000 ft. the cabin decompression annunciation extinguished and we landed with no further issues.

Cessna V/Ultra Pilots reported a malfunction of the air/ground squat switch and unable to pressurize the aircraft.


Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 ATC

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors

We were making our turn over ZZZ VOR and joining ZZZ1 when Center inquired about our routing to ZZZ6. We informed that we were cleared as filed via CPDLC. What was on our paperwork was ZZZ ZZZ1 ZZZ2 ZZZZZ ZZZ3 ZZZZZ1 ZZZZZ2. He was showing us after ZZZ going to ZZZ5 and the north wind route. He filed us direct ZZZ4 ZZZZZ1 ZZZZZ2. At the gate in ZZZ the route that loaded was the southern route not the north one over ZZZ5; which matched what was on our paperwork Release 2. When we got our CPDLC and it said as filed; we executed and flew. After the conversation with Center we ACARS'd our Dispatcher. who took over from the one who planned our flight. He said that Revision 1 had north route over ZZZ5 and Revision 2 of the Release had the southern route. Not sure where the confusion in routes happened; but we executed and flew what was on the latest revision we had; when we were issued our clearance.

B737-700 First Officer reported discrepancy between CPDLC clearance; and ATC clearance.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

[We were cleared via the] RACYR Arrival to IND. During the descent we were given a PBD [a waypoint defined by its bearing and distance from a charted/named waypoint] of '10NM prior to KELLY at 250K and 10;000 feet.' We put that in the box and LNAV'd to that position. That took us off the magenta line of the RACYR Arrival to Kelly Intersection; as RACYR was behind us; and made a new magenta line to the PBD. I took that clearance to mean: '...proceed directly from our present position to the PBD.' As we were proceeding to the PBD; ATC asked us to clarify the clearance we had received; and then notified us to call their Quality Control for a possible track deviation. This could be prevented by ATC just letting us fly the Arrival as published; with a 'via descent'; and making a standard fix of KELLY/-10 at 10;000 feet and 250K; on the published arrival; as it is the standard clearance every flight coming from the west. I took the clearance; when issued; to proceed from our present position to the PBD because we were being positioned for the visual to 5R. I believe ATC issued a clearance to proceed to an issued PBD.ATC has these crossings restrictions made up--but not published on the arrival--and the crews have to get into heavy FMS work in the final stages of letdowns on the arrivals to runways where we are left high and hot; scrambling to get down and slow down.

When cleared to cross a point 10 NM prior to KELLY intersection while inside RACYR on the RACRY STAR to IND the flight crew of a B767 programmed and executed a 'direct to' the PBD fix and apparently created a track deviation as a result per an advisory from ATC. The reporter took umbrage to ATC's common practice of assigning such clearances; which require significant heads down time to program and execute; rather than revising the STAR to include the restriction.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 23000; Flight Crew Type 8000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Being vectored for the ILS 19L. Just coming up on BERKS; instructed by Norcal to descend and maintain 2100. Selected 2100 in MCP and; per SOP; altitude was acknowledged by First Officer (FO). I read back altitude clearance to Norcal and we began descent to 2100 feet. Concurrent with this; as we turned onto the localizer; we receive a FUEL L WING TANK LO LVL ECAM. I complete ECAM while FO continues approach. We both acknowledge that 2100 is below the published 2800 for the segment between BERKS and SHAKE and resolve we are clear of terrain and communication from Norcal was clear and unambiguous; as was our readback and that 2100 must be the minimum vectoring altitude for that segment of the approach. Reaching 2100; Norcal asks us to confirm our altitude. I respond '2100'. Norcal says 'cancel approach clearance and climb to 2900'. I acknowledge clearance and we climb to 2900. Norcal then reclears us for the ILS19L shortly prior to SHAKE. Landed uneventfully.

We were being vectored on to ILS 19L from right downwind at 5000 FT. From base we were given a heading to intercept LOC inside BERKS intersection and told to descend to 2100 FT. After reading back the intercept clearance and the clearance to descend to 2100 the LOC was intercepted as we started down. Soon after; we got an ECAM indicating a low fuel level in the left wing tank with the appropriate to-do list. It was determined that the ECAM was simple enough to complete and continue. Upon completion of the procedure and leveling at 2100 FT; ATC asked us to 'say altitude.' We were then instructed to climb to 2800 FT and continue inbound. Clearance for the ILS 19L was received and the rest of the approach and landing was normal.

A320 flight crew reports being cleared by NCT to descend and maintain 2;100 feet approaching BERKS during an ILS 19L at SFO. This is below the approach segment altitude of 2;800 feet but was clear and unambiguous and the readback was not challenged. This altitude is not correct and NCT issues a climb to 2;900 feet.