Flight Crew Last 90 Days 72; Flight Crew Total 210; Flight Crew Type 208

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

The following is a factual report of a landing incident involving Cirrus SR22T Gen 5 [and a student pilot].[The pilot]; with approximately 210 hours flight experience and approximately six hours solo experience was returning to ZZZ at the end of a cross-country solo exercise.  The flight plan for the cross-country flight was ZZZ to ZZZ1 (landing) to ZZZ2 (landing) to ZZZ; routed primarily over land with various auto-pilot navigation points and numerous visual pilotage way-points.  Departure was with full fuel; ending with approximately 50 gallons fuel.  Weight and balance on return to ZZZ [was completed]Weather was bright and sunny; winds are recorded as 4.6 kts; variable.  Tower directed [pilot] to land on runway 11.  The approach was standard in air speed; glide slope; and runway alignment.On reaching the runway; there was a propeller strike due; [the pilot] believes; to an inappropriately timed round-out and flare.  Wind is not believed to be a factor.Upon striking the propeller and the nose wheel the aircraft pitched up and may have experienced one or more porpoise movements.  The force of the propeller strike causes the aircraft to sharply roll and it quickly experienced some back and forth rolling; during which the left wing tip struck the runway; which tore away the pitot tube.The force of the wing strike caused the aircraft to yaw left to an estimated 15 to 20 degrees off the runway heading.At this point; with the aircraft an estimated five to fifteen feet off the ground; approximately level and askew from the runway; [the pilot] judged the best course of action was to attempt a go-around.  With full power applied and flaps retracting (full retraction; an error; rather than 50 percent) the aircraft successfully regained controlled flight and ascended to pattern altitude.With directional assistance from the tower; [the pilot] was able to uneventfully navigate an approach to runway 16 and land normally; followed by taxiing back to the aircraft's tie down.  Although once airborne there was no airspeed indication; through close attention to pitch and power; [the pilot] believes the aircraft was operating at proper airspeeds during every part of the circle back; approach and landing.After tie-down; a visual examination of the aircraft indicated that all three propeller blades were frayed on approximately the outer three inches.  The pitot tube was missing and there was moderate scrapping damage to the underside of the left wing tip.

A SR22T pilot reported striking the prop and left wingtip during landing.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Load planner is having hazardous material surrounded by passenger's bags to keep it secure. This poses a serious threat if we are unaware of the materials in the passenger's luggage and it ends up being incompatible materials. Please review this situation. My pilot wanted to know what aminoproplytrethoxysilane was.

Ramp Agent reported passenger bags were being used to surround hazardous material to keep it secure in the cargo compartment.


Confusion; Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

Planned flight. Weather for ZZZZ: ZZZZ 18/24-hour Forecast 32006KT CAVOK (Ceiling and Visibility Okay) PROB40 4000 BR using alternate ZZZZ1 weather ZZZZ1 18/24-hour Forecast VRB03KT CAVOK. Just after departure checked weather again. ZZZZ 18/24-hour Forecast VRB03KT CAVOK no longer required alternate. Checked ZZZZ1 in Lido and then company dashboard: VALID FOR ETD/ETA. VRB03KT 9999 FEW002. Then noticed an alert on company dashboard and found illegal forecast for ZZZZ1 National Weather Service and company: TAF ZZZZ1 VRB03KT 9999 SCT002 PROB40 FZFG VV001. METAR also showed ZZZZ1 600 meters and reporting RVR. Zero notification from Lido for either leg because Lido didn't even have correct ZZZZ TAF. Deleted alternate for ZZZZ. Reworked second leg and added alternate for ZZZZ1.Used to Lido not alerting properly for changes of weather if station is already below what Lido considers below minimums. However ZZZZ1 was CAVOK at planning. Flight Planning Support speculated that it was a time stamp issue (Even though there are similar events happening that is now called overwritten/corrupt TAF). Apparently there are again Lido weather issues.Suggest Lido begin a process similar to the one for SIGMETS not ingested correctly no matter what the root cause. Any weather data should be handled with redundancy in the process. Also alarming is the lack of communication about these ongoing problems in Lido. I double checked my email for anything about Lido weather; nothing from Flight Planning Support and nothing from Flight Control Standards. So how is a dispatcher coming on shift supposed to even be aware that these issue exist? I already know the responses of access Lido trouble tickets and other sources of weather. Not good enough. These issues should be 'pushed' out to flight control floor not something I have to hunt. Out of ordinary functions of any system used by Dispatch should require notification of the floor.

A Dispatcher reported the Lido weather forecast process apparently does not update to current conditions if an airport is already below Lido minimums during the dispatch process. A destination change to below minimums was discovered on a National Weather Service forecast.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

I observed on RADAR an AA-5 Tiger approaching my airspace from the south on the mini route which is a VFR published corridor tracking the SMO128 radial northbound and southbound. In this case; the Tiger was approaching from the south and another aircraft was also in the vicinity approaching my airspace from the south. The two aircraft were in HHR airspace and it appeared as if HHR was attempting to achieve longitudinal separation using visual separation between the two aircraft. This type of sequence occurs frequently when multiple aircraft are requesting the mini route from both directions. HHR Controller called my position via the shout line. I answered the line; and he said to watch out for the unknown aircraft because he was suppose to maintain visual separation from the Tiger and follow him northbound. The two aircraft were not yet in Bravo airspace. They were both going at a similar speed as well. I then attempted to contact the Tiger with no response. I then realized that although I thought I hung up the shout line; it didn't truly hang up and I was reaching out to aircraft on the shout line instead of on frequency. After realizing that I was offline; I hung up the shout line and attempted to reach out to from what I recall was the Tiger. I then told him to make a right 360. The wrong aircraft readback the clearance; so both aircraft starting making a right 360. The targets were separating nonetheless; so I continued to separate the aircraft by issuing a climb clearance to the Tiger to maintain VFR at 3;000. By this time; both aircraft were achieving separation both vertically and longitudinally. The unknown aircraft stated that he nearly collided with the Tiger and that they were 1 foot apart. This near miss occurred as the HHR Controller coordinated with me regarding the developing conflict. I recommend that HHR; LAX; and SMO get briefings to advise us to ensure separation PRIOR to issuing frequency changes to aircraft. In this particular situation; the HHR Controller; in my opinion; tried but did not succeed in separating the aircraft prior to issuing a frequency change. It is possible that it was a pilot deviation because the HHR Controller did state that the unknown aircraft was suppose to be following the Tiger; but wasn't doing what he was told to do. Then the same pilot from what I recall advised me that he had a near miss with the Tiger. By issuing the 360 turn; it was an attempt to turn the aircraft target that was on the east side of the airspace in order to ensure separation; but matters became worse when the wrong aircraft read the clearance back and both aircraft started making a right 360 turn.

LAX Controller described a NMAC involving two HHR departures; the second supposedly following the first. The reporter suggested that adjacent Towers insure separation before transferring aircraft to LAX for transition.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

We received a vectoring delay arriving at ZZZ due to traffic. We arrived from the north then overhead the airport we were vectored back north for about 15 miles. When we were about eleven miles NW of the airport inbound; the Controller cleared us for a visual approach to Runway XX and asked that we track the centerline of the runway towards the airport. At that point I was tracking what looked like a proper and safe descent path to the runway and our speed was under control. Due to the extreme VFR conditions my sight picture for the descent looked safe and the PAPI was between white/white to white/red. As we approached the last mountain ridge; we received a CAUTION TERRAIN advisory. I still felt our glide path was going to clear the mountain ridge; however; due to the steep vertical slope of the mountain ridge the GPWS within seconds called out TERRAIN TERRAIN PULL UP. Again; I still felt we were okay; but the radar altimeter quickly showed a decreasing AGL from 1;500 - 700 feet. I shallowed the descent rate until we were past the mountain ridge. One factor was it had been over XX years since I last landed at ZZZ. We were vectored to the airport and were not on a published approach. I had previously landed at ZZZ about fifteen times many years ago and I remembered that it is easy to end up high and fast trying to land at ZZZ; which I was trying to avoid from happening. My over confidence that my sight picture and descent rate looked like we were going to clear the terrain safely. We had the LOC DME approach loaded in the FMS; but I never fully crossed referenced the charted crossing altitudes because we were vectored to the airport. The extreme VFR conditions and smooth air lulled me into thinking nothing could go wrong with this approach.Strictly adhere to charted altitudes on a published approach plate for the airport even though we are cleared for a visual approach and it will cause our descent angle to be between 6.49 to 9.61 degrees until short final.

CL-350 flight crew reported aircraft encountered terrain alert during approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 19000; Flight Crew Type 800

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

We were on our second leg of the night flying from ZZZZ-ZZZZ1. We were east of Vietnam and in contact with HoChi Minh Control both with VHF and CPDLC. We were maintaining FL350 with another aircraft flying in the same direction (Eastbound) at FL360 on our same airway. We experienced two times light wake turbulence from this aircraft and we communicated to VVTS that we were requesting 2NM right of track due to that turbulence. Both times we received no reply from VVTS control. A few minutes later (about 20nm East of position Dudis) we experienced a more severe wake turbulence encounter. The aircraft was pitching and rolling abruptly at that time. The bank was going past 30 degrees and probably more at the point.I disconnected the autopilot and initiated control of the aircraft. At that point the wake turbulence got more severe and I came out of my seat repeatedly. In attempts to perform the upset recovery it was difficult to maintain control and manipulate the MCP (Mode Control Panel). At this time it was very difficult to even read the flight instruments due to the severe turbulence. In the recovery we lost about 800 ft. and our altitude was FL 342 until a recovery to altitude could be initiated with manipulation of the MCP.It has to be said that during the beginning of the more severe event we tried several times (more than 10 times) to call VVTS via VHF requesting a right of track deviation. To no avail. Only until the Captain made a more [forceful] request did we get a reply from VVTS control. We informed VVTS of our altitude and our recovery back to FL 350. There were no events after the recovery to altitude. Flight proceeded as normal.

ZZZZ-ZZZZ1 (Pilot Monitoring) While outbound of DUDIS at FL350 on airway M771; we made initial contact with HoChi Minh (after several attempts). We began to experience light but persistent wake turbulence from another same direction aircraft at FL360. Noting the quartering tailwind I thought it would be prudent to turn on the continuous ignition. I advised the First Officer of my intent to request a 2-mile offset to the right which would keep us out of the wake turbulence (which was increasing in intensity by the second). After two failed attempts to get HoChi Minh to answer our radio call; the wake turbulence intensified to what I would consider moderate to severe chop. As I was making my third attempt to get a response from HoChi Minh; it felt as if the bottom dropped out and the aircraft dropped 200 ft. The aircraft then violently rolled left between 30 and 45 degrees of bank and began a significant descent (I did not note the sink rate). I noticed [the] First Officer promptly disengaged the autopilot and rolled wings level. We arrested the descent at FL342. We started a VERY slow climb back to FL350; while I again attempted to contact HoChi Minh. On this last radio call I included our current altitude and how we got there (wake turbulence from the aircraft ahead of us); and included our request to offset. HoChi Minh finally responded; acknowledged our climb back to FL350 and approved our offset as requested. We re-engaged the automation and the flight continued without incident.

B767-300 flight crew on an international flight reported loss of control at FL350 from a wake turbulence encounter with an aircraft ahead of them at FL360.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

During the arrival phase to MIA; (First Officer flying) we were cleared for a visual approach to Runway 9. We lost contact with the runway due to hazy conditions and the position of the early morning sun. This condition complicated the workload which degraded our situational awareness. We found ourselves high and fast.  While correcting for this condition; our terrain closure rate caused the GPWS system to activate. The Pilot Flying corrected this condition and we continued to landing.I should have anticipated the restriction to visibility and required the First Officer to more closely adhere to procedures for using the ILS for this arrival. Also; when the GPWS activated; I should have called for a go-around be performed.

During a visual approach to MIA Runway 9; an International Crew distracted by the rising sun in the early morning haze; activated the EGPWS terrain closure rate warning as they corrected for a high fast approach.


No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

[There is] minimal to no fencing around the airport property of at least 10 feet tall to keep deer off airport property to mitigate someone impacting deer while in the phases of landing and takeoff into Lonesome Pine Regional Airport (LNP). The majority of the airport has no fencing. The only fencing at the airport is that around the terminal and areas of vehicle access to the airport. The height of the fence varies between 4 feet to 6 feet tall. The rest of the airport has no fencing at all.

Reporter stated there is minimal to no fencing at LNP airport to keep wildlife out.


Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were cleared for takeoff on Runway 28L at MRY; runway heading to 7;000 FT. After takeoff the Tower advised us of traffic at 12 to 1 o'clock and stated traffic had us in sight. PNF stated negative contact. Neither of us could see the traffic. Tower switched us to NORCAL Departure. At approximately 3;000 FT a yellow TCAS target appeared to the right showing +1;000 and then we had an immediate 'descend' RA with the green box showing a steep pitch down. I pitched the aircraft forward putting the command bars in the green box. The RA cleared and we immediately had a secondary and steeper 'descend' RA which required a very steep descent and negative g to comply with the RA. As soon as the RA cleared we had a TAWS 'terrain....pull up' command. I immediately made a smooth pitch up recovering at approximately 1;700 FT; advised ATC of the RA and climbed to 7;000 FT with no further conflict. The pitch over to comply with the RA was dramatic and required an aggressive and deliberate response which frightened the passengers. The TCAS worked as it should and must be complied with; but it is unnerving pitching over at a low altitude. It would be helpful to practice low altitude/descend RA's during recurrent training.

G IV Captain experiences a TCAS RA at low altitude departing MRY requiring an aggressive pitch over followed by a terrain warning.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Type 11000

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

New departure procedure out of Fort Lauderdale VACAY 1 - Runway 10L. Departure is standard RNAV until AGERS.  Following AGERS; both the text and the plan view show vectors to FEMTO. The text for the departure states 'Track 307 for radar vectors to FEMTO...' Flying the departure; we continued on the 307 heading and never cleared to FEMTO or given vectors. We were handed off to Miami Center. We flew past FEMTO. After asking Miami Center for directions; they said they expected us to proceed to FEMTO on the departure; as depicted.  Miami Center stated that this was not the first time it happened; and that there was confusion within the Center regarding the procedures that should be followed. This new procedure needs to be corrected so that this type of procedural error does not occur.

Air carrier Captain reported a track heading deviation during departure from FLL on the VACAY 1.  The Captain stated they missed going to FEMTO during the departure as expected by ATC. Reporter also stated the Controller mentioned there is confusion with the procedure and that this was not the first time it happened.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

During takeoff on runway XYL; I performed an aborted takeoff due to engine 1 N1 rollback of approximately 10% at 70 KTS. All engine parameters were normal at our 'set thrust' call; then the EICAS; we noted that engine 1 N1 was indicating about 75%; initially set at 85.9%. The throttles were still in TOGA position; and the thrust command arc was still set to N1 target. No 'ENG TLA NOT TOGA' was present. Upon abort call and throttle reduction to idle was the 'ENG TLA NOT TOGA' CAS message and master caution. Normal abort sequence and QRH 'Mechanical Irregularity Action Chart' for Aborted Takeoff was performed. Dispatch; Chief Pilot; and Maintenance were notified. Deplaned passengers and flight was eventually cancelled.We had contract maintenance come out to resolve our engine 1 N1 rollback resulting in an aborted takeoff. It became apparent that one of the technicians smelled like alcohol. I asked the others on my crew to confirm my suspicion; and all three agreed.

EMB-175 Captain reported an aborted takeoff due to an engine roll-back.


Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Inside the final approach fix for Runway 22; First Officer noticed that we were below glideslope. The autopilot was engaged and approach selected tracking the localizer however; unbeknownst to us; the VNAV was in pitch mode. The First Officer brought this fact to my attention and I added power and began to climb to re-intercept the glideslope. Approximately the same time; I intercepted the glideslope we broke out VMC conditions and had the runway and PAPI insight. We performed a visual landing.Believing the autopilot had captured the ILS correctly; I relied too heavily on automation and failed to keep my scan going. I must keep in mind that the buttons in the flight guidance panel are myth and what displays on the PFD is truth. Meaning-- I can't rely on the aircraft to do what I command by simply pressing a button on the flight guidance panel. I must verify the plane is doing what I command by what is displayed on the PFD. I must also keep my scan going and not get complacent.

If we would have both initially verified that the Flight Guidance Controller and autopilot were indeed programmed to do what we intended to do at the top of the attitude indicator on the PFD this event would have never happened. I know to do this each [time]; but this time we assumed that by pressing the button on the Flight Guidance panel it would do what we wanted. This was the 4th ILS we had to shoot that day; so we possibly became a little complacent and our scan broke down momentarily. This reemphasized to me to never assume that when you press a button/mode on the Flight Guidance panel that the airplane will accept that function. You must always verify what the automation is doing on the PFD.

EMB-145 flight crew descended below the glideslope inside the Final Approach Fix; but corrected back to the glideslope after discovering that the VNAV was in pitch mode.


Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were asked if we had Aircraft on 3 mile final in sight and we told tower we did; he then said when he passes line up and wait at our discretion while the aircraft is still 3 miles out.  Hmm!

Pilot reports that he was asked if he had the aircraft on three mile final in sight. Pilot reported yes; and then was told when he passes line up and wait. This happened at a foreign location.


Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion

Distraction; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Workload; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

In cruise at FL320 we were assigned a descend via IVANE5; except maintain 250. I input 250kts in the descent page; deleted all speed restrictions above 250kts; CAMI'd and ensured managed speed was engaged. We had previously verified the entire arrival procedure; including all altitude restrictions and airspeeds. Upon receiving the clearance I selected managed descent; and again verified managed speed was selected. The aircraft began down; with a bracket speed around 250kts. The FMC respected the first altitude restriction of FL270 at MSTRD; upon crossing MSTRD we noticed that the aircraft was accelerating rapidly in the descent; while initially maintaining over 50% N1. We were discussing this; and observed the power levelers approach idle. We were slightly above (one dot) our descent profile. We then noticed that we had descended below the 240-260 window at MAYOS. We were approaching FL220 and would have continued a rapid descent below 220 well prior to KIYEN. We verified that Managed Speed; LNAV; and Managed Descent were all engaged. We were still indicating above profile; and well over our managed speed target. We disabled the automation; and manually captured FL220 to prevent further deviation. The Captain informed ATC that we were discontinuing the IVANE arrival; and the flight continued normally. We CAMI'd the IVANE5; as well as the speed changes. We discussed the top of descent; and anticipated a normal approach. We are not sure what caused this FMS anomaly. Ultimately; the concern over the airspeed deviation caused both of us to focus on that; allowing us to miss the further anomalies. The aircraft often has issues when an optimal profile descent (OPD) is manipulated outside of the database parameters and requires diligence. This [has] become a 'standard' practice for ATC. Deviations from established OPD procedures should be kept to a minimum.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

An Airbus A320 series flight crew reported descending on the CLT IVANE 5 RNAV they were assigned a 250 kt restriction. While in managed speed; the FMC ignored the MAYOS altitude constraint and projected missing the KIYEN altitude constraint. The aircraft had difficulty flying a modified RNAV optimal profile descent.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 229; Flight Crew Total 12300; Flight Crew Type 916

During cruise at FL360 in VMC conditions southeast of Airport ZZZ prior to descent; we noticed IAS Disagree illuminated on both Captains and FO's airspeed tapes. Initially the air speeds were approximately 6 knots difference between each other. We ran the QRH for IAS Disagree which sent us to the Airspeed Unreliable checklist. We determined using that checklist that the captain's side was unreliable. That checklist also had us reference the Flight with unreliable airspeed in the performance chapter. While referencing that; the Captain's and FO's altimeters began to disagree by approximately 300 FT. We ran the ALT disagree checklist as well and still believed the Captain's side to be faulty. Just about that time; the controller asked us to start our descent. Airspeed and Altitude differences started getting much larger after a short period of time once we began our descent. The Captains airspeed indicator started falling back to the lowest possible value of 45 knots and altimeter was off now by about 1;000 feet. The airspeed low aural warning started sounding in the cockpit. The unreliable airspeed checklist warned us of this possibility. The first officer's airspeed and altimeter agreed with the standby instruments; however we still backed up the flight for added safety by referencing pitch and power settings in the performance chapter to make sure that we had some reliable information. After starting our descent from FL360 both engine EEC ALT lights illuminated. We ran the QRH for EEC Alternate mode. Shortly after that; the Speed Trim Fail light illuminated and the QRH was run for Speed Trim Fail. Next; VNAV disconnected and we went into CWS pitch mode. We looked down at the box and noticed we had lost all performance data in the box. This explained the VNAV disconnect. We engaged level change and that worked fine. About this time ATC changed our arrival and we noticed that even though we were still in LNAV; the airplane was not tracking LNAV. [ATC was notified] and we received priority handling in the form of a heading direct to the airport and then vectors onto the visual approach for Runway XY. I was originally flying the airplane; but we quickly got so emerged in checklists and busy tasks; I decided to follow the guidance in the FOM on managing [the current condition] and gave pilot flying duty to the FO so I could run checklists and manage the [situation]. I accomplished all checklists; then called the flight attendants. I explained to them what had happened and the type of [condition]; told them there were no special instructions; and that we had approximately 15-20 minutes until landing. I then made a PA to the passengers and told them we had a downgrade of some of our flight instruments; but had the situation under control and we're working on backup instruments. I told them that as a precaution; we had requested [priority] handling from ATC and because of that as a precaution; they would see fire trucks on the side of the runway when we landed. I then texted my dispatcher and told them the situation. They copied and asked if there was anything they could do to help. I told them no thanks.  The [ARFF] equipment was rolled. Around 11;000 feet; my airspeed was still reading 45 knots and my altimeter was 1;000 feet off from our altitude. All of a sudden; the airspeed and altimeter snapped back to normal and airspeed and ALT disagree messages went away. Since the First Officer was doing such a great job flying the airplane; and his instruments could be trusted more than mine; I let him fly the approach and landing. We still were referencing pitch and power settings in the performance section of the QRH for unreliable airspeed for added safety. We landed without incident and taxied off the runway and to the gate. The probe heat was on for the entire flight per SOP and we never got a caution light saying any probe heat was INOP.

B737 Captain reported receiving an IAS Disagree warning. Crew followed procedures and flew a safe approach and landing.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 139; Flight Crew Total 11079; Flight Crew Type 1796

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

We experienced a medical emergency approximately 1 hour into the flight. The other Relief Pilot and myself were on break for roughly an hour when we were asked to return to the cockpit due to a divert and medical emergency. Once we returned to the flight deck we coordinated with ATC; Dispatch and Maintenance regarding the divert and sick passenger. It was determined by all involved that continuing to ZZZ was not an option and ZZZ1 was the best choice in order to protect the operation and take care of the ill passenger. In addition; during the divert phase of the flight (last 1:30); we were in contact with Dispatch and Maintenance to determine whether or not we should dump fuel or land overweight. After a thorough discussion; we decided to dump 100;000 lbs. of fuel. During the dump process; one of the fuel nozzles failed. It caused the dump rate to be cut in half. This added another layer of complexity to the divert. We called Maintenance again to see if they could offer any help; which they could not. At this point; the entire cockpit crew came together to brainstorm and make sure all SOP was complied with. The Medical Guide and Diversion Planning Guide were pulled out in order to ensure we had not forgotten anything. The flight attendants and passengers were briefed; and; most of all; we thoroughly briefed the approach; landing; and ground phase in order to ensure the medical personnel ability to reach the passenger in the rear of the aircraft at the gate in a timely fashion.Once we arrived in ZZZ1 and parked at the gate we were all quite exhausted due to the medical divert and high workload. At that point a representative from Flight Operations entered the flight deck and asked if we would continue on to ZZZ. We all discussed our current state and came to the conclusion we did not feel safe continuing. The Flight Operations Rep. then said they needed one First Officer as they had found a Captain and one First Officer. At that point we had been on duty for approximately 8 hours and with a proposed scheduled departure of XA:30 for ZZZ would have added an additional 9 hours of duty; resulting in a roughly 18 hour duty day; if the flight would in fact depart at XA:30. At that point I did not feel fit and comfortable continuing to ZZZ and believe it would not have been safe; especially taking into account our current state of mind and additional duty time.Ultimately; it was my desire to continue and not delay the passengers any further; however; with safety in mind it simply was not prudent to continue.

B777 First Officer reported that a passenger illness resulted in a diversion.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 1200

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Departing JYO. Part time Tower closes in the afternoon. Called Ground for clearance. Was informed Tower was closing; Runway 35 was in use and to get clearance from Potomac Approach. Announced taxi to Runway 35 on Unicom and taxied to run-up area. Switched frequencies and got IFR clearance. Was told there was inbound IFR traffic and that we were cleared to go as soon as they arrived. Traffic was on base for 35. They landed and we announced our departure for 35 on Unicom and taxied out. As landing traffic cleared runway we started our takeoff roll. As we rolled I spotted landing lights on short final for Runway 17. I aborted takeoff and stopped the plane well to the side of the runway. The approaching airplane; a Cirrus; landed and taxied off the runway. We then departed on Runway 35. I do not believe the Cirrus ever saw us. We did not hear him call position or intentions on Unicom. The wind favored Runway 35 and that was the direction all traffic had been landing according to the Tower before it closed. The runway is long and neither airplane was in jeopardy as the Cirrus stopped in a short distance and exited the runway. But had I not seen them in the distance it could have been much closer.

PA34 pilot reported rejecting takeoff after observing unannounced traffic on short final landing on the opposite direction runway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110; Flight Crew Total 8624; Flight Crew Type 4466

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Near maximum takeoff weight; had to use runway not being utilized for normal departures; packs off takeoff. Shortly after gear retraction; EICAS warning indicated left main landing gear still down and locked with nose and right main gear retracted. Completed departure procedure; pack takeoff procedure; and notified departure of gear problem. Chose to restrict speed to 250 to comply with max landing gear extension/retraction speeds. Also stopped climb at FL200.After coordination with company dispatch and maintenance via SATCOM; a divert to [an alternate] was decided upon rather than a return to [departure airport] due to terrain and possible further potential problems in the event of a go-around and having to leave gear extended.[We advised] ATC; and headings were given to [the alternate]. Due to the heavy weight; we elected to dump fuel to reduce our landing weight. Coordination and approval was obtained from ATC for the dump. After dumping we prepared for a landing. The flight attendants were briefed; and then the passengers were informed of the issue and plan. Landing distance performance data for the overweight landing was obtained from dispatch; and the arrival and approach were briefed.The landing was made at a weight of 380;000 LBS with no issues. After landing; we taxied to remote parking; shut down the aircraft; and submitted the maintenance ACARS items for the gear as well as the overweight landing. Checking the landing gear synopsis page; we noticed one of the left main brake [temperatures] was higher than the rest; so after ensuring the aircraft was chocked and with approval of the maintenance technician we released the parking brake to facilitate cooling of the brakes.

B767 First Officer reported diverting to an alternate after one main landing gear failed to retract after takeoff.


B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; MEL; Procedure

Load Planning called approximately 2 hours prior to departure to inform that the forward cargo compartment was inop and we would restrict 9800 lbs cargo since the plane couldn't be kept in balance. I placed them on hold and told Maintenance Control that we were taking a 9800 lb payload restriction with the AC out of the departure station. He asked why and I said the forward cargo compartment was inop and he said it was an easy fix. All they had to do was pop in a panel. I asked if I had to worry about it and he said no. I then told Load Planning that Maintenance Control was fixing it and it was an easy fix by popping in a panel. Load planning then called after the flight was airborne and less than 2 hours from arrival in the next station to inform me that 2 cans were loaded in the forward cargo compartment and what happened about the fix. I questioned him and mentioned how we discussed the 9800 lb weight restriction at the departure station. He only then said that it would be fixed next and that was the intention. I reiterated that the problem was in the departure station and that's what we discussed.

Aircraft had MEL applied due damage to the forward system liner. MEL condition required forward system to remain empty. 787 Dispatch was informed by the shift manager that 28000 lbs of cargo was being held off and possibly the same amount would be held off the next segment with this placard applied. Later Dispatch called the load planner assigned the flight and informed the load planner the placard would be cleared. The load planner planned items in the forward system and the ramp closed out the flight with these items onboard. Subsequently the load planner was informed the MEL was not cleared and was planned to be cleared in the next station. I am not sure who between Maintenance Control; Station maintenance or 787 Dispatch misunderstood where the MEL was to be cleared.

A B787 forward cargo compartment liner was damaged which restricted it from any cargo. Maintenance notified Dispatch that repairs were made; so cargo was loaded and the flight departed. In flight; Dispatch was notified no repair was made.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 27.0

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airport; Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors

I was assigned to relieve the controller working Radar. I observed the controller was getting busy and my experience told me that on such a beautiful VFR day and the amount of inbound Flight Progress strips posted that the position would only get busier. I asked the supervisor if he wanted me to open another sector and he said 'No'. He said it wasn't going to get that busy. After the position relief; the position soon became complex and I needed the supervisor to coordinate for me and eventually he opened another sector.Aircraft X called me to land [a satellite airport]. He originally requested the left Runway and I assigned him the right runway due to a Medevac inbound to the left runway. I did not put in the data tag that Aircraft X was requesting a touch and go and coming back to my frequency. I failed to assign Aircraft X a frequency change to Tower. The controller in the Tower never tried to call Aircraft X. The Tower controller never tried to use the light gun to clear Aircraft X to land. The Tower controller never tried to call me at the Radar position to prompt me to change frequency with Aircraft X. Instead the Tower controller let Aircraft X land and touch and go on the right knowing this was going to be a pilot deviation. Aircraft X departed on a heading of 060 degrees and called me. Aircraft X had traffic off their left side which was a medical helicopter. The Tower controller I believe was surprised that Aircraft X did not land full stop and instead executed a touch and go. The Tower controller then turned the helicopter west and had a departure airborne off of an intersecting runway. I have no way of knowing the exact scenario that unfolded but I'm sure it was uncomfortable and likely unsafe. The Tower controller then called my supervisor on the coordination line and said Aircraft X had done a touch and go without a clearance and my supervisor asked the Tower controller if they attempted contact or tried a light gun. The answer was negative. The Tower controller in his arrogance to prove a point that I didn't change frequencies with Aircraft X caused a deliberate unsafe and reckless situation. The Tower controller in my opinion should be reprimanded for his action.The Tower controller has been known to disregard ATC procedures in favor of their own method of Air Traffic Control. This same controller deliberately and recklessly departed an air carrier jet climbing to 5;000 feet on a collision course with a Cessna at 4;000 feet that I had pointed out to him verbally and electronically this last fall. No manager seems to be willing to correct his actions. In my opinion the Tower controller should be reprimanded for his actions and be held to a higher standard than what he is allowed to get away with currently.Brief Tower controllers on professionalism and teach them to 'do the right thing' just as we were briefed in recurrent training. If an aircraft doesn't call you then you call him. It's that simple.

A CMH TRACON Controller failed to display 'touch and go' in an aircraft's data tag. The Controller forgot to issue communication change to the aircraft. The Tower Controller took no action to establish communications with the landing aircraft. The aircraft made a touch and go into confliction with a departing helicopter.


Quad copter drone passed inside 50 feet of right wing while we were limping out of SJC at 11;000 feet 8 miles southeast turning north.We need more effective Drone restrictions.

It passed very slightly high; approximately five feet above us with a distance no greater than our right wing tip. We had absolutely no time to react. From the time we first saw it to the time it was upon us was less than 2 seconds. It was a grey or white 4 rotor 'X' shaped drone. The size of the aircraft is difficult to determine; but it was definitely larger than any bird you would normally see including the largest goose. I am extremely glad we didn't hit it. Drone flying is continuing to pose a threat to aviation. In this case; it was flying at night over a huge metropolitan area. If this aircraft; and drones are exactly that; would have hit us; the results could have been catastrophic. Regulations are going to have to be put into place and enforced. History has shown us that air to air collisions do not end well.

Flight crew climbing out of SJC suffered an NMAC with a large four rotor UAV drone.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We were vectored for the ILS XX at ZZZ; upon crossing the VOR we flew the full approach. Visibility was 4 Miles overcast 200 ft. The overcast had previously been 300 ft. then dropped to 200 ft.; the DA (Decision Altitude) was 250 ft. We decided to fly the approach since the visibility was 4 miles. When reaching the DA of 250 ft. my copilot called runway in sight; I continued the descent for about five more seconds but I did not have contact with the runway ; just as I was pressing the go around button the runway came into full view. The 200 ft. overcast report was correct as far as I'm concerned. We were still in position to land so I continued the landing. After words I realized we were below the DA when I saw the runway and should have gone around. Hence this report.

CE525 flight crew reported descending below minimums on an ILS approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 9000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 5800; Flight Crew Type 1000

Upon initial taxi out; we received an ECAM HYD PTU (Power Transfer Unit) Fault message during the second engine start; we taxied to a holding area where we investigated the issue prior to take off. Following consultation with Maintenance Control; a return to the gate was coordinated with ZZZ Maintenance and Operations. The hydraulic PTU appeared to be inoperative and needed maintenance attention. Due to the late hour; Operations said the self-park system at gate X would be turned on and a ground crew would be coordinated. We taxied to the gate stop point under the automated guidance system and set the parking brake. The jetway was moved into position and the airplane door was opened to allow two awaiting maintenance technicians to board the aircraft and begin troubleshooting the hydraulic issue. The passengers remained onboard the aircraft. We remained in our seats as the technicians; on the flight deck behind us; followed their troubleshooting instructions they had brought with them. At some point in the procedures; the lead technician requested the parking brake to be released. He said we were chocked and I moved my seat forward to guard the brakes as I released the parking brake. No immediate movement was noted. The troubleshooting continued; for 5-10 minutes after the parking brake release; until it the airplane was noticed moving backwards. Then; the parking brake was immediately set. The movement wasn't noticed until the personnel on the jetway began yelling that the plane was moving. A maintenance supervisor was requested to inspect the airplane door as it appeared door 1L had come into contact with the jetway visor. The door was inspected and determined to not be damaged. Subsequently; the hydraulic PTU was determined to inoperative and needing repair. An aircraft swap was coordinated; the passengers offloaded and we moved to the newly assigned airplane.

A319 flight crew reported that while troubleshooting a hydraulic power transfer unit fault maintenance requested the parking brake to be released; which caused the aircraft to roll backwards into the jetway. No damage was reported to either the aircraft door or the jetway.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

I was flying towards PUB when about 250 miles out I encountered wake turbulence and made the aircraft fly below the selected altitude of 34;000. I was about 250 NM from PUB when the encounter happened.

C441 pilot reported a wake turbulence encounter at FL340 resulted in an excursion from assigned altitude.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

We were in cruise at 38;000 FT. About 100 miles east of MCI; I noticed a very small vibration almost sounding like a lavatory motor that runs longer than it should. The vibration went away after five seconds. There was no anomaly noted on the engine instruments. The same vibration came back a few more times and would go away in about five seconds with roughly five minutes elapsing between each occurrence. Before the last time the last vibration came back; I asked the First Officer to ask Center for lower because I didn't like that the vibration kept coming back even thought we tried speeds from .80 to .75 in .01 increments.Out of FL360 there was a much more noticeable vibration; which we actually felt through our seats. At this point; the left engine failed; the autopilot disengaged and various alarms illuminated on the engine instrument display screen. The Engine Failure and Driftdown checklists were accomplished after declaring an emergency with Center. A single engine overweight landing was accomplished at the nearest suitable airport.After an initial inspection by company Maintenance I was informed the left engine had seized to the point where you could not even turn the fan blades. A substantial amount of melted engine parts were also found in the tailpipe.

[No substantive additional information was included in the secondary narrative.]

A B737-700 flight crew declared an emergency and diverted to the nearest suitable airport when the left engine seized following several vibration cycles at cruise.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 11; Flight Crew Total 168.7; Flight Crew Type 9.3

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 150

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Heavy vibrations were felt during the landing roll while slowing to 20 MPH or less. Thinking the source was the nose wheel; back pressure was applied to the elevator to try to stop vibrations. When doing so had no effect on the vibrations the back pressure was relieved which made the vibrations greater and back pressure was reapplied. At that moment the right main gear folded under the aircraft at a speed of 10 MPH or less.

The right main gear torque link bolt detached and the right main gear folded causing substantial damage to right engine; propeller and main fuel tank.FAA considered this to be a result of a hard landing.  I was providing multi-engine instruction to the owner of the aircraft. The landings made were well within the realm of normal landings with no side load on the gear. The aircraft had recently had an annual inspection and the landing gear had been worked on.

A private pilot undergoing multi-engine training in his C-310 with an instructor suffered the collapse of the right main gear on landing roll. The instructor believed all immediately prior training landings were well in the 'normal' range; but noted the landing gear had been subject to maintenance on a recent annual inspection.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Lined up for takeoff; captain's leg. We straightened out and captain advanced the thrust levers and hit TOGA. As the power was starting to come up; we got a master warning and configure gear steering warning on EICAS. He rejected the takeoff immediately and the warning cleared. I advised the tower that we had aborted the takeoff and that we needed no assistance. We discussed what had happened and how fast we were going at that point. Since we had shutdown almost immediately; our ground speed was probably no faster than 20 KTS.We advised tower that we were ready to go and departed uneventfully.I thought that we had gone far enough to get the gear in lock position before takeoff. Apparently not far enough in this case. In the future; I will let it roll a lot further than 30 FT to make sure before I go to TOGA.

Upon advancing throttles for takeoff; a 777 pilot reported receiving an EICAS takeoff configuration warning due to Main Landing Gear not locked for takeoff. A low speed rejected takeoff was performed.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 8; Flight Crew Total 838; Flight Crew Type 55

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

Upon landing and during rollout; went left of center line and did not have all power out (throttle not all the way back). This caused me to be unable to maintain centerline and I committed to the grass on East side of runway to avoid a groundloop or over correction. No damage; no injuries and was able to taxi back to runway and all the way to hangar without incident or signs of damage.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 49; Flight Crew Total 7490; Flight Crew Type 49

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 211; Flight Crew Total 15653; Flight Crew Type 7818

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were arriving into Newark from the south on the PHLBO arrival; and Newark was landing on 22L.  We were still south of the airport and at 3;000 feet when approach control vectored us off of the arrival to give us a right downwind heading for a 22L landing.  At this point the approach controller asked us if we had the airport in sight.  We confirmed with one another that the field was indeed in sight; and the captain told the controller that we had the field in sight.  We were then cleared for a visual approach to runway 22L.  At this point we were on a wide right downwind for the runway.  The captain said he would set in 1;500 feet as that was the final approach fix altitude for runway 22L.  I agreed and confirmed the selected altitude; and began a descent down.  Both the captain and myself had terrain selected on our NDs; and nothing indicated that we would have any issues.  As we were descending to 1;500 feet; somewhere around 1;700 feet or so we got a GPWS 'Terrain; pull up'.  At that same time the approach controller came on and told us that the minimum vectoring altitude in that area was 2;000 feet; of which we had no idea; and that we should climb back up to 2;000 feet. I had already begun climbing as the captain was resetting 2;000 feet.  As soon as I began initiating a climb the GPWS terrain warning went away.  I leveled the aircraft off at 2;000 feet; for a total climb of approximately 300 feet.  After we returned to 2;000 feet we continued with the visual approach to a normal landing on runway 22L without incident.

We were descending via the PHLBO arrival into to EWR when we were vectored off the arrival for a visual approach to runway 22L and given clearance to descend to 3000 ft. Approximately 10 miles SW of the airport NY Approach asked if we had the airport in sight. After conferring with the First Officer (FO) that we both were seeing the airport; I replied that we had the field in sight. At that time we were cleared for the visual approach to 22L. I set and confirmed an altitude of 1500 in the MCP for the planned FAF crossing at BUZZD. The FO began an Open Descent to 1500 and briefed that he would descend first and then slow the aircraft as we approached BUZZD on the base turn. As we descended through 2500 ft.; we were handed off to EWR Tower. Before checking in I observed some green terrain depictions on my ND and could see what appeared to be a dark area separating steady ground lighting out the window in front of us. Before I could contact EWR tower; they contacted us and advised us that we had descended below their MVA for that area and cleared us to climb to 2000 ft. for terrain. At this time we were at about 1700 ft. As we were receiving this advisory and clearance; the GPWS warning activated with 'terrain; terrain.' I was already setting 2000 ft. into the MCP window as the first officer initiated a climb; and as soon as we started the climb; the GPWS warning ceased. After leveling; the tower informed us that there was a ridge below us in that area; but that it was no longer a factor and we were re-cleared for the visual approach to 22L. The remainder of the approach and landing proceeded normally. The Threat in the case was obviously the terrain southwest of EWR. Our error was not being aware of that area of terrain; which resulted in an ATC low altitude warning and a GPWS activation which was a surprise to us both. While SOP would dictate performing the escape maneuver; we elected to not perform that maneuver in light of the fact that we had the conflicting terrain in sight and we had a corrective clearance from ATC for a climb to 2000 ft.; which was only 300 ft. above our current altitude. In my judgment; performing the full escape maneuver would have been far too aggressive for the correction needed and would have potentially placed us in conflict with our clearance and any overlying traffic. Instead; the FO disengaged the autopilot and auto thrust and performed an immediate; but normal climb to 2000 ft. at which time the GPWS warning ceased. It should be noted that the warning we received was a GPWS; not an EGPWS warning.Factors that contributed to our error would include accepting a night VMC visual approach clearance while 8 to 10 miles from the field; an assumption by me that terrain is not a threat in this area; so I was not concerned about the FO's descent and approach planning; and not giving more attention to the green EGPWS depiction on the NAV display. I have seen this before and I interpreted it to mean the terrain was well below us. While we did not receive any EGPWS warnings; clearly our proximity to the terrain was close enough to activate the radar altimeter based GPWS; at least momentarily.In the future I will not accept visual approaches at night unless we are established on or near the final approach course with a clear visual indication that terrain is not a factor for us. I will give more consideration to remaining at or above the airport's MSA until clearly in a position to establish a visual descent path to the runway on a visual approach. I will give more consideration to any EGPWS depictions of terrain in our path and not assume that a green depiction is a 'safely above' indication. While we did experience an unwanted aircraft state on this approach; the warnings received from both ATC and the GPWS system alerted us to our error and allowed us to correct out flight path in a timely manner.

A320 flight crew reported triggering a terrain warning from the GPWS when they descended below MVA on a night visual approach to RWY 22L at EWR.


Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

At 16;800 and climbing for level off at 17;000; we encountered wake turbulence or windshear that caused buffeting and then an abrupt left wing low condition causing autopilot to fail. Pilot flying controlled aircraft immediately but while attempting to correct aircraft attitude; we climbed to 17;400 FT. We returned to 17;000 immediately and told ATC of event. He said it was not a problem and he cleared us to FL280.

EMB-145XR flight crew reported encountering wake vortex in climb that resulted in an altitude deviation.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

First flight since new FAR 117; crew fit for duty before every flight in effect. Second leg; short turn very busy and left gate without confirming fit for duty. Stopped taxi and went to free text on ACARS to send in info. Reply back it worked. Still made scheduled arrival.

Air Carrier First Officer discovers he has failed to sign FFD (Fit for Duty) in compliance with new FAR 117 prior to pushback.


Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

I was CA (Captain) and PM (Pilot Monitoring).  Departed late due to ELAC (Elevator & Aileron Computer) 1 MEL (Minimum Equipment List).  South of ZZZ at FL390; we had ECAM for HYD (Hydraulic) G RSVR (Reservoir) LO AIR PR (Low Air Pressure).  I ran the ECAM and told ATC we had a HYD issue.  ECAM put us into ATL LAW (Alternate Law) and FO (First Officer) had to hand fly.  We asked for lower altitude and told ATC we wanted ZZZ1 and I sent ACARS to Dispatch.   I was running the COM and getting ATIS and found out ZZZ was showing 002OVC (200' Overcast) and 1 1/2 vis (Visibility).  I asked ATC if there was anything better for weather and he said the region was all the same.  We decided to go to ZZZ.  Once the COM was complete I called and briefed the FA's (Flight Attendants) and made PA to the passengers.  We decided that I would take over and fly the approach and landing. We briefed the ILS 11 Approach and the FO hand flew the Aircraft until about 15-20 mile final so I could take my time and take a few minutes to 'gather my thoughts.'  We started to configure early and we had to gravity extend the gear.  Now we were in direct law and started to fly the approach..  We saw the approach lights and continued and saw the runway at minimums.  We landed.  We taxied to the gate and briefed the passengers and deplaned.  I made the phone calls to Company; Dispatch and Maintenance.  Maintenance looked at the issue and found out there was HYD fluid all over and we had a bad O ring. They fixed the issue and we were about to land in ZZZ1 about 5 hours late.

A320 Captain reported a Hydraulic System Failure inflight resulting in a diversion.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 350; Flight Crew Total 800; Flight Crew Type 9

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

I was not present when the event occurred. I am the instructor who signed off this student for solo. The winds were calm; the student was proficient; and to my knowledge; the aircraft was well maintained when I provided instruction to him the previous day. The following is what the student told me. After touch down; the student attempted to make an early exit; and allowed the stick to return to neutral and applied brakes. This caused the tail wheel to lift off the ground and he lost control of the aircraft. He told me that his wingtip touched the ground and there may have been damage to one of the wings. He stated that he will have the aircraft manufacturer or other qualified mechanic inspect; repair and return the aircraft to service. To my understanding; the cause of the event was the student's failure to keep the stick in the full aft position; combined with excessive braking. This appears to be the result of a momentary lapse of judgement on his part. The student was highly proficient in all procedures involving taxi; takeoff and landing of the aircraft. This error was not made on any recent instructional flights. Following the procedures taught to him by his instructors (keeping the stick full aft; minimizing brake usage; and taking the next exit) would have prevented the event from occurring.

Flight Instructor reported that the student reported loss of aircraft control on landing rollout during solo flight in a tailwheel aircraft.


Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

On a position leg for a recovery of a trip; aircraft experienced a right generator failure. After the checklist was completed; and it would not reset the crew contacted Dispatch and it was decided upon to divert so that a different aircraft could be picked up to continue the recovery of the original trip. Approximately 20 NM from another airport on the arrival to [our divert station]; aircraft experienced the fuel pumps come automatically; the igniters come on; loss of power; and engine vibration; on the right engine which is the engine that had the generator failure. At that time the crew decided to declare an emergency and land at [the other airport] for obvious safety reasons. Aircraft was safely landed at [the other airport]. Upon rollout the fire trucks followed the aircraft onto the taxiway; clear of the runway. The crew was informed that smoke was trailing the aircraft on landing. Upon closer inspection after the aircraft stopped the fire crews alerted the flight crew the right engine was leaking liquid and at this point the aircraft was evacuated following a total shutdown and associated checklists. At no time was fire detected in or out of the cockpit or around the airplane. The aircraft was towed linemen back to the FBO.

CE525 Captain experiences a generator failure enroute on a ferry flight and is instructed to divert and pick up a replacement aircraft. During arrival the engine with the failed generator begins to vibrate and fails. The crew elects to divert to a nearby airport with a longer runway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 40000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

At approximately 100 KTS on takeoff; I noticed that we were doing a reduced thrust takeoff. As we were going pretty fast; and the acceleration seemed to be very normal; I elected to continue the takeoff with the notion that if there were troubles; I would push the power up. I spoke with the Load Planning Supervisor the next morning; and he stated that there is some software glitch when there is landing weight limit; and then that limit is removed. In this case; in the background where it is not readily apparent to the Load Planner; the software removes the restriction against reduced thrust. He stated that the computer will sometimes; on its own; override the input of the Load Planner; and create a reduced thrust takeoff. He seemed to think that it is when there is an original runway or other limit; that is removed due to light loads; then the [takeoff] limit becomes controlling; and the computer overrides the 'No Reduced Thrust' command; and replaces it with an assumed temp. Apparently this outcome is not apparent to the Load Planner in the normal course of business.

B757 Captain reports noticing at 100 KTS during takeoff that reduced thrust is being used with full power being the planned setting. The takeoff is continued without adjustment. Discussion with the Load Planning Supervisor the next day indicates that the load planning computer has a mind of its own.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 1; Flight Crew Total 3740; Flight Crew Type 1445

Inflight Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

I was in the right hand pattern making touch and go's. On the second circuit I heard a jet making an approach. I believe there were others in the pattern behind me. I decided to make a short approach to allow more space/time for the others and the jet.  I lined up on the extremely bright row of lights which I took for the center line and continued my descent. As I started my round off and flare I realized that I was centered on the right edge lights. I immediately initiated a go around. As I started my climb I struck one of the edge lights.  I went into a holding pattern. After the traffic was clear I made a low pass to have my undercarriage checked and then made a normal landing.   There was no damage to my aircraft.

A C172 pilot reported lining up with the runway edge lights and striking a light before executing a go-around.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 106; Flight Crew Total 938; Flight Crew Type 892

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

The following is a narrative of the flight to the best of the Instructor's recollection. Incident occurred on DATE. The exact time is unknown; but it was sometime after XX00; likely closer to XX00. The flight was a pre-solo cross-country progress check for a private pilot applicant in the flight school's 141 program. Student was given a cross-country flight route to ZZZ but was instructed the entire flight would not be completed and he would be requested to fly a diversion to an unplanned airport during the evaluation. He presented a weather brief for the route of flight during the ground portion. Following a satisfactory ground examination; local weather was reviewed; and it was determined the flight could commence.Student's pre-flight was observed and mirrored by Instructor prior to commencing flight. Student properly used checklists. Start-up; taxi; and run-up were completed within standards using checklists. Systems appeared nominal and nothing out of the ordinary was observed or experienced. Takeoff was conducted within standards; systems appeared nominal and nothing out of the ordinary was observed or experienced. Climb out was conducted within standards with checklist usage at appropriate phases of flight (after takeoff and cruise); student's leaning of the fuel system was observed to be done appropriately; systems appeared nominal and nothing out of the ordinary was observed or experienced. The flight departed the ZZZ1 Delta airspace to the North-East and the evaluation proceeded through the cross-country navigation/lost comms/lost procedure portions with a satisfactory performance by student. Systems continued to appear nominal and nothing out of the ordinary was experienced.Student was then given a scenario (told he was experiencing high oil pressure) requiring him to make a decision on a diversion location. No systems were changed; it was a simple verbal scenario. Based on the information available he elected to divert to ZZZ2 and was instructed to divert and plan to make a touch-and-go. He appropriately set up the aircraft's navigation systems; radios; etc. and procedure in-bound to ZZZ2; making appropriate radio calls along the way. His actions inbound and during the descent were observed. He properly adjusted the mixture during the descent. Systems appeared to remain nominal and nothing out of the ordinary was observed.Student completed the touch-and-go and was instructed to navigate back towards ZZZ1. Appropriate checklist usage and actions were observed during the climb back to 7;500; including leaning procedures. Systems remained nominal and nothing out of the ordinary was observed. Somewhere near the south edge of the town student was given a progressive simulated emergency. He was first told we were experiencing high oil pressure and then high oil-temp. He immediately made the decision to turn back toward ZZZ2. Thereafter he was told he was experiencing partial power-loss and RPM was reduced to approximately 2;000. Student immediately pitched for 68 kts. Thereafter student was told the scenario progressed to an engine fire. He reduced throttle to idle; called out his memory items; banked and began to dive. He was told the fire was out and he pitched for 68 kts. while turning for a simulated off-field landing location somewhere near the town. It was noted the stall horn kept coming on anytime the aircraft got even slightly slower than 68 kts. The propeller continued to turn; systems appeared nominal; nothing out of the ordinary was experienced.At approximately 1;000 ft.; when it was determined student would be able to safely reach his selected simulated off-field landing location; he was instructed to commence a go-around and return to ZZZ. Student advanced the throttle and the engine did not respond. Student was observed bringing the throttle out and advancing a second time. At that moment he informed Instructor the engine was not responding. Instructor immediately took control of the plane; ensured it was at best glide speed (68 kts.) and; given the low altitude (estimated below 1;000 ft. at this time); advanced throttle and mixture to see if engine would respond. The propeller continued to turn; but the engine did not respond. Instructor directed student to tune 121.5; then Instructor requested priority; and began to go through off-field landing/engine secure memory items while conducting what was in essence a power-off 180 maneuver to the field Instructor had selected at the outset of the original emergency scenario. Instructor did not continue to students selected field because of power lines in the area and its proximity to structures. From the air; the location selected by Instructor was a cornfield with what appeared to be a flat access road immediately in front of it; and a flat dirt-field preceding the road. It appeared readily accessible to emergency responders and several work trucks were observed near the train tracks running parallel to the field. In addition; no power lines were observed in the vicinity of the selected field. Once turning 'final'; Instructor recalls ordering unlatching of the cabin doors; but specifically instructed not to open until the aircraft came to a stop. Instructor made conscious decision to not turn off master so that flaps could be used to the slow the aircraft down as it approached the ground. The flaps were deployed prior to landing. Instructor recalls maintaining approximately 68 kts. for the longest possible period of time and that the stall horn kept activating around 65 kts.Touchdown was normal in that the main gear touched first; Instructor believes somewhere on the dirt field. Instructor continued to maintain back pressure for as long as possible; but within moments the aircraft struck either the slightly raised dirt road or the ditch; which caused the aircraft to flip onto its roof. Aircraft came to a stop. Instructor ordered unlatching of harnesses and egress from the aircraft. No serious injuries were observed on scene.Though at this point Instructor is uncertain of what caused the engine to fail; I do believe it would be wise to include a requirement in the ACS that during any simulated emergency where the engine is brought to idle; the applicant should continuously clear the engine (like what is allowed in steep spiral descent during the commercial check-ride). If that standard were included; it may have been possible to detect the issue earlier.

Instructor Pilot reported their student suffered engine failure; resulting in an off airport landing.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Distraction

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Other / Unknown; Distraction; Confusion

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Takeoff and initial climb from DCA; Runway 01. Captain Pilot Monitoring; First Officer Pilot Flying. Pre-flight duties completed and route review completed at gate. Engine start and taxi was normal to Runway 01; before takeoff checklist completed to the line before crossing Runway 04; below the line after crossing Runway 04. As we taxied to runway; Aircraft Y was cleared to cross Runway 04 before us on another taxiway then into the box. As we were approaching Runway 01; Tower Controller asked Aircraft Y if they were ready for departure; Aircraft Y responded they needed 2 minutes. Tower asked if we were ready for departure and we responded we were ready; completed final checklist items. We lined up on Runway 01 and were cleared for takeoff. I do not recall checking FMA for NAV annunciation as we taxied on to the runway and checked final for traffic. Light passenger load/light takeoff weight. After takeoff; aircraft climb was rapid with a quick change to Departure frequency. We were at clean-up altitude quickly after takeoff. After thrust set to climb power and frequency change to departure (prior to check-in on frequency with departure) I noticed FMA annunciation was RWY TRK and we had not yet initiated a left turn for the departure. I told the First Officer to turn left; which he accomplished; initially coming left to approximately a 290-300 degree heading. I cross checked Nav Display for 1 NM circle around point PLVIA and outside references. I do not believe we entered Prohibited Area 56A or Prohibited Area 56B. After initial left turn; we then turned back to the right to rejoin the departure. A turn to point ADAXE would have required an aggressive right turn; so we turned to rejoin the departure between ADAXE and BEBLE After turning to rejoin departure I checked-in with departure control when they asked if we were on frequency. Remainder of the flight was uneventful.This was my (Captain) first flight back on the line after several months away due to combination of leave of absence and quarantine for close contact with [someone] with COVID-19. I had just completed recurrent training the week before this flight. In the pre-flight briefing the First Officer had noted that with light passenger loads the aircraft takeoff and climb would happen quickly. Given my lack of recent flying; I should not have accepted departure prior to the aircraft in front of us on the ground; even though I felt I was in the green. I was slow to notice we had not initiated left turn on the departure where I would normally expect to begin a turn; possibly due to lack of recent line flying experience; the combination of quick climb after takeoff to acceleration altitude and frequency change slowing my monitoring and recognition of aircraft not being in NAV mode. Though I did direct the pilot flying to make a left turn; if I had done so earlier we would have been able to maintain the departure track without tracking close to Prohibited Area 56.The time from takeoff to overshooting the departure turn on takeoff from Runway 01 at DCA happens fast! I would like to see a similar event during simulator training to illustrate just how quickly you can get close to Prohibited Area 56 after takeoff from DCA when combining a timely distraction with lack of aircraft going in to NAV mode. PLVIA with 1 NM ring on NAV display did assist me as a barrier for this event.

Takeoff and initial climb from DCA; Runway 01. Captain Pilot Monitoring; First Officer Pilot Flying. Pre-flight duties completed and route review completed at gate. Engine start and taxi was normal to Runway 01; before takeoff checklist completed to the line before crossing Runway 04; below the line after crossing Runway 04. As we taxied to runway; Aircraft Y was cleared to cross Runway 04 before us on another taxiway then into the box. As we were approaching Runway 01; Tower Controller asked Aircraft Y if they were ready for departure; Aircraft Y responded they needed 2 minutes. Tower asked if we were ready for departure and we responded we were ready; completed final checklist items. We lined up on Runway 01 and were cleared for takeoff. I do not recall checking FMA for NAV annunciation as we taxied on to the runway. Light passenger load/light takeoff weight. After takeoff; aircraft climb was rapid with a quick change to departure frequency. We were at clean-up altitude quickly after takeoff. After thrust set to climb power and frequency change to departure (prior to check-in on frequency with departure) PM noticed FMA annunciation was RWY TRK and we had not yet initiated a left turn for the departure. PF was focused on aircraft control since it was a light aircraft and I did notice the PLVIA circle rapidly approaching with no direction to turn by the Flight Directors.  I also noticed the route was dashed and started a shallow turn to the left primarily due to the PLVIA circle.   The PM/Captain having SA told me to turn left; which I accomplished; initially coming left to approximately a 290-300 degree heading. I cross checked Nav Display for 1 NM circle around point PLVIA and outside references. I do not believe we entered Prohibited Area 56A or Prohibited Area 56B. After initial left turn; we then turned back to the right to rejoin the departure. A turn to point ADAXE would have required an aggressive right turn; so we turned to rejoin the departure between ADAXE and BEBLE. After turning to rejoin departure PM checked-in with departure control when they asked if we were on frequency. Remainder of the flight was uneventful.I used a technique taught in the school-house of Red over Blue; Climb/NAV; Flight Dir 1 and 2 while at the gate.   I do this on every flight.  We are supposed to check NAV again prior to departure and due to the rushed situation and proficiency I don't recall either PM or PF saying anything about NAV.  We had briefed the departure in full to include Prohibited Area 56 and the EO SID.  I still don't know why it was not in NAV after takeoff roll. I had seen a technique of starting the turn regardless of the flight directors in DCA but up until now I have always used the flight directors.  In this case the PLVIA circle was a timely final barrier that prevented me from going into Prohibited Area 56 along with the PM's callout.The time from takeoff to overshooting the departure turn on takeoff from RWY 01 at DCA happens fast! I would like to see a similar event during simulator training to illustrate just how quickly you can get close to Prohibited Area 56 after takeoff from DCA when combining a timely distraction with lack of aircraft going in to NAV mode.  Keep the PLVIA circle in the 10-7 and emphasize in training; it is a critical last barrier.

Air carrier flight crew reported the FMS not flying correctly during departure and having to manually turn the aircraft to avoid a possible airspace violation.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Helicopter departed general hospital and advised approach that they were inbound to CRW.  General is located just South of final to Runway 5 at CRW.  The helicopter violated our LOA by departing on his own and came very close to the CRJ-200. We have had this problem before with multiple reports and other complaints being filed. It is rare that we are on Runway 5; so it doesn't come up very often; but when it does it is quite ugly. There are two hospitals just under final. Our airport is located on top of a mountain; so it is hard for pilots to communicate to the Tower using the current LOA. There is talk of a new LOA being in the works; but this has been a rumor for over a year and nothing has been signed. Maintenance has relocated a receiver for 128.5; but that isn't Tower's frequency nor is it mentioned in the current LOA with these helicopters. Until procedures are updated we will continue to have unsafe situations here when we are using Runway 5. Some controllers tell these helicopters to advise on 128.5 when lifting off and some say before lifting off. Yet some controllers tell them nothing at all and expect them to follow the LOA. This varied idea of a procedure is causing more confusion to controllers and pilots. The new LOA with the helicopters landing at the local hospitals needs to be put into effect. All helicopters landing at the hospitals need to be cosigners of this LOA or not be allowed to land there.

CRW Controller voiced concern regarding the handling of medical helicopter operations to local hospitals during the seldom used Runway 5 configuration.  The reporter noted the LOA provision does not cover these operations adequately.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors

We are filed to ZZZ from LAX via the CASTA4 Departure. As we contacted Ground to taxi he initially said taxi 24L but then changed his mind and said 'We'll let you go off 25R tonight. So taxi to 25R via Bravo.' No mention was ever made of a different departure procedure. And this is not unusual because the same thing happened to us the night before. So we're still on the CASTA4 which makes a right course change to 311 degrees at MKGEE. That altitude cap is usually 9000 but SoCal thought we were on the GORMAN4 and he gave us an altitude climb to 13000. So when we made the right turn at MKGEE were headed right toward his inbound traffic stream so he screams turn left to 250 and then he starts trying to tell us we're supposed to be in a 250 heading because we're on the GORMAN4. We pulled out the PDC and read it to him. He then told us there was no separation violation but they were looking into it.My question would be how is it that SoCal doesn't know what departure a flight is on. If we've been cleared via the CASTA4 and he thinks we're on the GORMAN4 we've got a major problem.I will avoid this in the future by asking the Tower Controller to verify the departure procedure if there's a runway change.

Pilot doesn't understand how SoCAL [SCT] doesn't know if he is on the GORMAN4 or CASTA4 departure. Aircraft turns northbound and controller vectors it back to a 250 heading.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 107; Flight Crew Total 11058; Flight Crew Type 322

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

While flying a level 360-degree turn (for a compass calibration test); we briefly noticed (for a few seconds); an acrid odor that quickly stopped. We terminated the test and headed southwest and climbed from approximately 7500 MSL to 8500 MSL. Examining the instruments; I noted that the amperage and the battery voltage were fluctuating (within the green band). [A few minutes later]; we began to smell a 'solvent type' odor. The ammeter reading increased to 44 amps; the battery volts increased to 19.8 volts; and the electrically powered fuel indicator failed. We began an immediate descent; and all electrical switches were turned off. A few moments later; we began getting smoke in the cockpit from behind the instrument panel; and we began a high-speed emergency descent. This was followed by a dramatic increase in smoke density; making it difficult to breathe; and reducing visibility in the front cockpit to near zero. We opened the canopy in order to evacuate the smoke; and landed on the nearest available road. After landing; the smoke continued from behind the instrument panel; [and] I applied Halon to the area. After exiting the aircraft; we determined the smoke was coming from the battery compartment. We applied the remainder of the Halon; and then poured dirt into the battery compartment to extinguish the fire.The time from the initial odor/high electrical reading; until landing; was approximately 4 to 7 minutes. Battery Type: EarthX ETX 680 (approx 2.7 hrs of use). Alternator/Voltage Regulator: BoschEFIS/Engine Instrumentation: Dynon Skyview HDX

RV-8 pilot reported landing on a small road after the cockpit filled with smoke from an electrical system problem.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 26.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure

Traffic was complex with terrible turbulence and sequencing and a moderate amount of aircraft. The RADAR side had a D-side (Radar Assist). Denver had two aircraft that they handed off to us at 33;000 feet on collision courses. Because of the distractions of bad turbulence; sequencing and other ATC duties we didn't notice until the conflict alert went off that these two aircraft were going to lose separation right at the ZDV/ZMP boundary and collide 9 miles inside our boundary! As soon as both aircraft came over to our frequency and still ten miles inside ZDV airspace; we turned both aircraft in opposite directions to achieve positive separation! Then; we had to call ZDV and get control of Aircraft X to descend him still inside ZDV airspace because the aircraft needed to cross paths. I'm not sure if ZDV intended to put these two aircraft together; because these aircraft would have collided if there was a stuck microphone; NORDO or any other reason we lost communications.   These acts of ZDV putting two or more aircraft together has got to stop before lives are lost! These instances are becoming more frequent.

ZMP Center Controller reported the adjacent Center ZDV sector handed them off two aircraft on converging routes at the same altitude.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.5

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft X departed SVFR off Runway 23 westbound. I noticed Aircraft X tracking back to the airport about 30 minutes later and reached out to him. He told me he would like to try and find a hole in the overcast as he had done earlier for departure. I cleared him on a SVFR clearance inbound for MMU from the west. Aircraft X tried with no avail for about 10 to 15 minutes to find a spot to descend through. At this point he was holding about 5 miles north to northwest of MMU airport just outside the Class Delta. I was keeping him advised of inbound IFR aircraft. At one point Aircraft X wanted to try to get into Caldwell (CDW) but I was told from the working Tower Controller there that he would have to get approval from N90 TRACON for that. After that I tried to have the pilot contact N90 Approach in the hope they would be able to pick up an IFR clearance to MMU. Aircraft X called me back saying they were too busy and could not help him. Me and my Tower CIC tried multiple times to help get this aircraft over to N90 for additional service with no luck. Eventually Aircraft X [notified ATC and declared minimum fuel] and needed to come in now. I relayed this information with the help of my CIC so N90 Approach could take the next arrivals out further for this operation. I cleared Aircraft X into the Class Delta again SVFR from the north and provided services to the ground as best as I could. Upon checking the airfield lighting I found out we did not have control of the airfield lighting as airport ops had taken control of it. I was unaware of this as there were no NOTAMs for this and no notice was given. I later found out that the approach lights were most likely not working as well. This was unacceptable as we were close to minimums at the time of his approach. Aircraft X confirmed he had ground contact and I issued a clearance to land on Runway 23 which he accomplished without incident. [Recommendation would be] having the ability to get ahold of N90 Approach in a timely manner to help an aircraft in distress get an IFR clearance.

Tower Controller reported an aircraft declared minimum fuel to be able to get into an airport that was underneath an overcast layer.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Other SEA

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 8300; Flight Crew Type 3500

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 20

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors

Initially reported to Tower my position and I was cleared to enter the right downwind. Adjacent to the Class D boundary common with the Class D airspace boundary with the adjacent airport; I was given a traffic advisory of a small aircraft inbound. I had that aircraft in sight and reported so. I was then instructed to 'Turn left and follow that traffic' I refused the left turn as that would have taken me into the adjacent airport Class D; so reported 'negative left turn; I am turning right and following the [small aircraft]'. When approaching there were three planes on the right downwind for the runway. Aircraft Y who was cleared to land short approach with a long landing; the small aircraft I was following and myself who was cleared to land number 3.Shortly after that; something caught my eye in my right peripheral vision. As I scanned it was an airplane broadside to me; northerly heading; at the same altitude as me; in a slight climb. As a collision was extremely possible; I took evasive action by chopping power and nosed over going negative G to miss the aircraft. I contacted the Tower of who was that airplane and why was he in my vicinity and not called for traffic. Controller went into meltdown about who was who and who was where. By this time the small aircraft I was following had landed. I did not follow the previously issued landing clearance to land number 3 behind the small aircraft; but rather followed this mystery plane which was finally identified as an X type plane who had been in the left closed traffic pattern doing touch and goes. Apparently; this plane made a right pattern after takeoff and went right into me on the right downwind. Controller and any supervisors should be watching that aircraft comply with the proper traffic patterns; and if there is a deviation; notify other aircraft that such non-compliance could create a traffic conflict.

Due to a staffing shortage; the other two controllers in the cab were both Supervisors; which one was on Operational Supervisor and the other on Ground Control. [This was] an abnormal configuration at this time of day. Aircraft Y had been in the pattern with minimal traffic before I took the local position. Aircraft A reported inbound from the northwest. Aircraft A seemed unfamiliar and I provided him extra assistance. When Aircraft X checked on; inbound from the northwest; I had him follow Aircraft A as I preferred not to give Aircraft A more instructions than I deemed he could handle. Aircraft Z checked on inbound from the south. TRACON called with a direct for Aircraft B. I instructed Aircraft Y to extend climb straight out to a point and make right traffic to avoid Aircraft B's expected left downwind entry at a high rate of speed.The Supervisor stated that Aircraft C was inbound from the east for a hospital. I asked if Aircraft C was coordinated by TRACON or did I miss the check in. The Supervisor said TRACON had coordinated it. The Supervisor and Ground Control continued to debate with each other the intention of Aircraft C; the background noise can be heard in the background. Traffic on final needed to extend downwind; and thus; created a problem with Aircraft C's trajectory to cross the runway final. I asked the Supervisor to find out Aircraft C's intentions. Aircraft X reported a near mid-air collision with a small aircraft which was not the correct aircraft. This prompted me to verify Aircraft Z's position. Aircraft Z confirmed his position. Aircraft X mistook Aircraft Y; as Aircraft Z. It was at this time that I realized Aircraft Y had turned in front of Aircraft X. I allowed my attention to be drawn away from my pattern. I appreciate other controllers/ supervisors willing to provide assistance; but because all the information was not known it added another distraction to the operation.Aircraft C ended up entering the airspace without coordination. Aircraft C contacted MRI as he exited MRI airspace. Do not expect aircraft to fly the left and right downwind the same. Extend aircraft further if necessary. Tell aircraft to extend further out even if it extends the pattern. Do not allow others in the cab to distract you. Other controllers and supervisors' assistance is needed in the cab and appreciated. If; however; you do not have all the known information; before distracting the local controller; confirm with the appropriate facility/ sector the intentions of all aircraft.

A Tower Local Controller and pilot in the pattern reported a NMAC when one of the aircraft turned in front of an aircraft the Local Controller intended for it to follow. The Tower Controller reported as this was occurring another aircraft entered the airspace without the proper coordination.