Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

I was working Local Control. The airport was in an unusual flow with Runway 13R/31L closed to aircraft less than 12;500 lbs with a strong wind from the East. As such; the airport was on a Runway 13L flow. This flow requires additional coordination with Ground Control (GC) as TWY D is the only taxi to/from Runway 13L; a coyote was wandering on and in the vicinity of Runway 13L; and when an aircraft weighing more than 12;500lbs wanted to depart; we had to coordinate with the airport operator and LC had to coordinate with GC for use of the Runway 13R/31L.Aircraft X called inbound from the North and requested to land. I gave instructions to the pilot numerous times but the pilot was unfamiliar; did not have the airport or traffic to follow in-sight and kept reading back and not complying with instructions. I finally was able to communicate to Aircraft X to enter a left downwind for Runway 13L. Shortly after; I cleared Aircraft Y for take-off from Runway 13R. As Aircraft Y was passing the departure end of the Runway; I observed Aircraft X on what appeared to be a right crosswind from Runway 13L (as no small aircraft could have departed from Runway 13R). I asked on frequency who was 'on the right crosswind' and Aircraft X reported crossing the extended center line of the Runway and entering a right downwind. It appeared Aircraft Y passed behind Aircraft X at the same altitude and just a few hundred feet. No NMAC reported by the pilots.Contributing to the situation was poor radar coverage; short staffing; poor planning on the airport operating behalf for closing Runway 13R/31L for 'sweeping'. My poor scan and being distracted by other factors.

HIO Tower Controller reported an airborne conflict when an arrival did not comply with instructions and came into conflict with a departure.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 1000

We had planned on doing a touch and go at 33V on Runway 22. After we had touched down we raised the flaps and began to add power. While we were rolling at about 65 mph; a pickup truck with a snow plow on the front of it pulled out onto the runway; and started coming down Runway 4 head at us. I didn't believe we had enough room to stop; so I kept the throttle in for full power and tried to get airborne so we could side step the runway. The airplane was not able to break ground effect due to the high density altitude. The vehicle drove off the side of the runway and we were able to continue down the runway for takeoff. We had made standard radio calls on the CTAF frequency.

GA instructor pilot reported that as they started the takeoff roll a truck began driving toward them from the opposite end of the runway. Pilot elected to continue takeoff and truck drove off the runway; allowing plane to continue.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Ramp Lead for [the] flight called me after the flight had pushed out because the system wouldn't allow him to finalize. I then noticed he had Hazmat in Pit 4 but had only scanned 10 bags. The Ramp Lead then stated on a recorded call aircraft batteries are not Hazmat. I then informed him that they in fact are. He proceeded to tell me he would fix the problem and hung up the phone. I think [he] noticed that the bag count in Pit 4 suddenly changed from 10 to 15; but the scanned count which is recorded on the remarks line remained at 10. Once the Ramp Lead changed the bag count in the weight field to 15; the system allowed him to finalize. I then proceeded to inform both my Lead and Shift Manager that I believed the Ramp Lead had just falsified the [load report] because it shows he only scanned 10 bags into the pit.We asked ZZZ to audit the flight on arrival; and as it turns out there were not 15 bags in Pit 4 with the dangerous goods; and as a result of the Ramp Lead manually changing the numbers he then deleted 20 bags out of the forward pit. Once the plane arrived in ZZZ the ramp at ZZZ reported both the forward and aft cargo compartments baggage numbers were wrong. There were 20 bags missing from the [load report] that were actually in the forward compartment; and in the aft compartment there was only 10 bags.

Air carrier load planner reported they believed Ramp Lead falsified loading document. Destination unload audit confirmed incorrect bag count; and Hazmat incorrectly configured for air shipment.


Piper Single Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 3700; Flight Crew Type 1500

Human Factors; Weather; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

While level at 7;300 feet in cruise; I was the pilot not flying and was heads down programming the approach to Runway 8 at RHP. The pilot flying in the left seat was monitoring the aircraft [while also monitoring for traffic.] We were level at the lowest altitude that ATC could allow due to terrain in the area and we were flying in and out of the tops of a cumulus layer. Out of the corner of my eye I saw what I thought was a shadow flash by the copilot's (my) side window. I commented to the pilot flying that I thought I saw a shadow and he stated it was an aircraft. The pilot flying stated the aircraft was close enough for him to tell it was white with brown wing tips and appeared to be a Piper Cherokee and it appeared the aircraft was climbing. At the time of the near miss we were under positive radar control with Atlanta Center and were not advised of any nearby traffic. After landing a passenger advised she thought she saw an aircraft go by. Possible causes are believed to be high terrain; possible poor ATC radar coverage for primary targets; and IFR conditions at the altitude we were at which did not allow us to see an aircraft in the clouds.

A CE560 flight crew suffered an NMAC with what they believed to be a Piper Cherokee while being vectored for an approach at ATC's minimum vectoring altitude in hilly terrain. ATC was unaware of the other aircraft.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance; Party2 Other

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

During log-in procedure [for a] Low Pressure Turbine Module; I encountered new parts in damaged boxes. Upon investigating the parts inside; I found one each; Fifth (5th) Stage Shroud Seal segment with bent/damaged sealing strip. I rejected this part; on Job Planning Card (JPC) and Holding Tag. Two days later the part was shown to me. The part had been cold-worked to straighten the bent portion of the sealing strip. No one seems to know who tried to repair this part; or what repair procedures were authorized to do it. The Engine Inspection paperwork repair calls out for sending the part to Pratt-Whitney for repair.

An Engine Shop Inspector reports a new 5th Stage shroud seal segment with a bent/damaged sealing strip for a PW-2000 Engine Low Pressure Turbine Module had been cold worked to straighten the bent portion without authorized repair procedures.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft X checked on at 160 for visual approach. I instructed the pilot to maintain 080 pilot readback 050 and for unknown reason [I] missed the readback. At this time; the pilot decided to descend abnormally fast and at some point during their descent; Tech Operations was on the phone with someone else and was asking for another radio check to test [the frequency] and I had looked away to inform them the standbys had also stopped working. As they asked for the radio check and I was turning back toward the scope; I began asking the aircraft for a radio check and that is when I saw their altitude was around 075. I second guessed whether or not I had cleared them on a visual approach as I was asking for a radio check and decided I had not. I thought by that point they were still above the next MVA so [I] decided to clear them on the visual rather than have them climb again. After they were cleared on the visual and switched radios; they continued to descend to 050 by which time myself and the Supervisor had given multiple low altitude alerts on all Tower and Radar frequencies; as well as Guard. The aircraft landed without further incident. I would recommend that controllers watch aircraft level out at the altitude they are instructed to be at. Also; when an aircraft is in a rapid descent; to reiterate what altitude you need them at. Also I would issue the low altitude alert and climb them before asking if they had the airport in sight.

TRACON Controller reported missing an incorrect readback.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

During service; passengers removed their mask in order to answer what they would like; coffee orders extended length of time in aisle; passengers who asked for coffee or tea did not wear masks while waiting for beverage to cool down. Many passengers did not abide by waiting to remove mask until FA completed their row.Remove added service; keep it simple. Remove coffee and tea at the very least. Water; coke; Diet Coke should be only offerings.

Flight Attendant reported passengers taking off their face masks to order coffee or tea and then waiting for it to cool off; without face masks on.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 1425; Flight Crew Type 1075

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Workload

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

I was in level cruise flight on an IFR flight plan talking to center when I suffered a complete engine failure. All engine parameters were within normal limits prior to the failure. I immediately informed ATC of my problem. I stated my intentions was to land at a nearby airport then corrected the name to another as I descended; center handed me off to approach. I informed them of the same intentions and they then handed me off to tower. I informed tower my intentions to first assure I could make the runway environment and then choose an appropriate runway. Tower informed me I had my choice of runways and I proceeded to the airport. Once I knew I would make the airport I set up for 35. I then realized I would be too high for 35 so I informed tower I would be landing 26. I proceeded downwind; base and turned final and landed uneventfully. I rolled out onto a taxiway where I came to rest. Rescue met me and once assured there was no risk the FBO towed my plane to the tie down area.I feel fortunate that I was in glide range of an airport with multiple runways to choose from. My decision to file for 16;000 to allow me time and distance if a problem ever occurred paid off that day. ATC was helpful as well as tower and made my job less stressful. Consideration was given to the use of the ballistic parachute but I felt if I could make the field with multiple long runways I could better control my environment.

An SR22 engine failed in cruise at 16;000 feet and the pilot successfully glided to and landed at a nearby airport while talking with ATC.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 2626; Flight Crew Type 1060

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

Lost all electric power at cruise altitude of 11;000 feet in Baron 55.  Was on an IFR flight plan and was above clouds.  Having observed the voltage indicators as being '0' for both engines; I realized there was a good chance that the batteries were not charging and that I might be losing electric power.  That was about 20 minutes after refueling at ZZZ.  I grabbed my emergency handheld radio and attached it to my external antenna (I make sure to keep fresh batteries in my handheld radio).  I then tuned it to the frequency of the controller I was speaking with.  Within 5 minutes the panel went black and all electric was lost.  I did not try to recycle the alternator switches or change from voltage regulator #1 to #2.  Rather; I contacted the controller on the handheld radio and informed him that I had lost all electric and requested guidance to an airport so I could safely land and assess the cause of loss of electric power. The controller was very accommodating and directed me to ZZZ1.  He also called the airport to inform them of my having lost electric power and of my expected arrival there.  I followed procedure to crank the gear down (pulled the circuit breaker first) and landed safely and uneventfully.  The airport proprietor asked if I would like to have an aircraft mechanic look at the Baron; to which I responded 'please'.  The mechanic assessed the matter and concluded that I had blown a circuit for the alternators; causing the batteries to drain power because they were not charging. He charged the batteries enough so that the engines turned over and could be started.  The alternator switches had reset themselves; and the batteries recharged to the max.  Rather than continue flight and risk flying over the mountains at night; I elected to spend the night there.  The next morning the engines readily started; the alternators were charging and the voltage indicators indicated pulling a charge.  I safely returned to my home base with no problems with electric power.  Assessing the cause of the loss of electric power; I recounted that after refueling; I flooded the left engine during my 'hot start'; but before the engine quit due to flooding; I flipped the left alternator switch up.  Although I followed procedure to 'unflood' the engine prior to attempting restart; I failed to turn off the alternator switch.  I think that is when the breaker kicked (on both alternators) and prevented the batteries from charging.  For some reason; the 'alternator off' lights did not come on.  Prior to takeoff; I failed to see that no load was pulling on the voltage meters (either of them); and the batteries were therefore not charging.  Henceforth; I will make sure the alternator switches are off during the engine starting process and that I check the voltage indicators to ascertain that a load is being pulled on each side before takeoff.  Also; had I tried recycling the alternator switches during flight; and/or switched voltage regulators from #1 to #2; there is a good chance my power would have been restored in flight. I learned several valuable lessons. Glad I always carry a handheld radio. After [many] years of flying; this is the first time I have had to use it in an emergency.I called the aircraft mechanic and asked him to please send a 'return to service' logbook entry for my aircraft airframe logbook.  Upon receipt; I will make sure this entry is made in my aircraft logbook.

BE55 pilot reported a complete loss of electrical power at cruise altitude. The flight successfully diverted while using a handheld radio.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 156; Flight Crew Type 11000

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure

On final; we were informed that a helicopter was orbiting east of the field; but he had us 'in sight.'  We saw the helicopter and it seemed very close to the airport.  At about 1200 feet; we received one 'traffic' TCAS announcement and then one 'climb' announcement.  I commenced a go-around and before the gear was up; we received a 'Clear of Conflict.'  We came around for another approach.  This time I requested the outboard runway (26L) to give us more space from the helicopter.  Even with this approach; where we were lower than the helicopter; it still showed as an amber Traffic Alert dot until we were below 500 feet.  I think that if we had attempted to land on the same runway; we would have received another Resolution Alert.  I have had this problem before in California airspace; where Controllers allow a VFR 'see and avoid' aircraft to call us 'in sight;' but they are not equipped with TCAS and get too close and penetrate the TCAS envelope.  When I spoke with the Ground Controller; he stated that this same thing had happened yesterday.  Controller education that 'see and avoid' from light aircraft/helicopters doesn't relieve airliners from TCAS Resolution Alerts and to keep airline traffic separated from VFR aircraft even if the traffic calls the airliner 'in sight.

B737 Captain is advised of a VFR helicopter orbiting east of the field; with each pilot having the other aircraft in sight. At 1;200 feet a TCAS RA is annunciated and the B737 goes around.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Confusion; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Physiological - Other

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Evacuated; General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused

Procedure; Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals

After getting pushback clearance from ramp control; the lead flight attendant called to report smoke in the cabin visible with a strong odor. The following events happened quickly. I have tried to write them in chronological order to the best of my recollection. I told the push crew to cancel the push and called for the cabin fire smoke QRH. I called the FA (Flight Attendant) back to ask how much smoke there was; to which she replied that there was a haze layer in the back of the cabin. I turned off the packs and APU air to minimize possible smoke sources then turned off the APU. We opened the flight deck windows then the door and confirmed the cabin smoke had stabilized and intensity wasn't increasing so I asked the FAs to disarm the doors. I asked the push crew to ask the gate agent to bring the jet bridge back and also signaled to the gate agent to bring the jet bridge back. The FO (First Officer) called ramp control to let them know we had smoke in the cabin and requested fire department assistance then called operations to inform them and request wheel chairs and an aisle chair. I made an announcement to the passengers that we were aware of the smoke haze in the cabin and asked that everybody get off the airplane through the front cabin door as quickly as possible as a precaution. I asked that they not take personal belongings to expedite the evacuation. I shut off the APU by selecting the fire control switch to OFF AND AGENT ARM. I noticed that the smoke was stagnant so I tried to clear the smoke by closing the outflow valve and right pack to HP bleed off but then realized it could create more smoke so I turned off the pack. The fire department and maintenance personnel boarded the airplane through the aft stair and the smoke cleared. The fire department walked through with a device and confirmed there was no imminent fire danger. The crew did an excellent job communicating observations to me and executing the deplaning process without incident.Prior to the smoke in the cabin report form the FA; the APU had been running for approximately five minutes with the right pack on HP BLD OFF (High Pressure Bleed); APU air on and cross feed levers open in preparation for engine start. The smoke remained over the aft part of the cabin until after the aft stair was opened. There was a previous write up a few days earlier for an APU OIL PRESS LOW indication. After the passengers were safely in the terminal; I notified crew services and duty pilot about the incident and advised that I did not feel safe to fly the scheduled trip and the entire crew was still shaken up about the incident. I stated that I would not be able to focus on the flight and instead would be mentally evaluating the smoke in the cabin incident. Captain called me back and left a voicemail stating that he spoke with [multiple company representatives] who 'were all 100% fully comfortable with us continuing' and that I would need to contact my chief pilot if I still felt that we were not ready to continue. I spoke with [the Chief Pilot] and expressed my concern about not feeling safe to fly so soon after such a serious incident. [The Chief Pilot] supported my decision to not continue the flight. I also received a phone call from crew services asking if I was going to fly or not. I again had to explain that I was not safe to fly. Having been part of a flight crew who had to previously evacuate an entire flight on a taxiway for smoke in the cabin; I take cabin smoke; possible evacuations and the safety of the crew and passengers very seriously. I feel that in this incident with the smoke intensity not increasing; it was safer for the passengers to expeditiously exit through the main cabin door into the gate area. A separate cabin fire/ smoke on the ground QRH procedure would provide better guidance to quickly isolate possible smoke sources such as APU air or cabin light ballasts that have led to evacuations in the past. Many emails have been sent by thesafety department about the evacuation decision making process but these are forgotten and pilots who begin employment after the emails are sent; have no access to the information. QRH procedures remain on the aircraft and are repeatedly reviewed by pilots.I realize now that although opening the flight deck door provided immediate assessment of the smoke in the rear of the cabin; it also added complexity to the situation. Having a flight attendant in the flight deck while trying to manage the situation; complicated matters. Although intercom communication can be difficult; a flight attendant can correctly describe smoke intensity. A closed flight deck door would have allowed better situation awareness and decision making process from the flight deck out. Improved standard maintenance procedures are needed at our carrier. In this case; the correction action on the logbook after the APU oil pressure low write-up was; no oil pressure low indication during normal operation. A standardized checklist could have guided mechanics through minimum steps required before signing a discrepancy off. Steps such as checking oil levels and verifying no evidence of oil leaks present; would have likely prevented this incident. I realize that not every discrepancy can have a maintenance checklist; but each malfunction indication should have a specific guide that's required to be evaluated by mechanics before returning the aircraft to service. I believe that we were moments away from a full evacuation. If the flight attendants would have delayed notification of the smoke and smell; or if we would not have thought of turning off the APU air; a full evacuation was likely imminent. Smoke in the cabin has the potential of incapacitating everyone in the airplane in less than 90 seconds. Therefore; I consider any smoke in an airplane a very dangerous situation where lives are at elevated risk. After significant incidents such as this one; flight crews should be taken off immediate duty assignments in the interest of safety. We must reconsider the list of events from which operations makes the decision to remove pilots from duty after significant incidents. After expressing concern to a duty pilot about not being able to safely continue a flight; a pilot should not have to re-iterate the concern numerous times to several persons. This process of having to re-iterate that one doesn't feel safe; could end in a pilot feeling pressured into flying even after originally expressing concerns.

There was a previous write up in the maintenance logbook for low oil pressure from the APU. Maintenance later said there was visible oil on the ram doors; and this is what potentially caused the smoke in the cabin.

An MD-80; prepared to push back; was evacuated at the gate after the flight attendants reported smoke in the cabin. Maintenance believed the APU was the smoke's source.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related

I was originally told by the company none of my sick time would be used if I needed [it] due [to] contraction [of] COVID.  My sick time has not been replenished.  Due to this policy now; there has been talk in our breakroom that if someone contracts COVID [they] will not inform the company and will come to work potentially infecting coworkers.  So the possibility of our work area becoming a safety hazard is dangerously probable.  The company should do the right [thing] during this pandemic and do their part to keep employees and customers safe.

Ground employee reported concerns with COVID-19 sick leave related policies.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 910; Flight Crew Type 400

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This was a near midair collision between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y at the Denver Centennial (KAPA).Aircraft X was making right closed traffic for runway 17R; doing touch and goes. The pilot in command was a student pilot on their first solo flight. Aircraft Y was a CE-182 departing off of runway 17L. I was the pilot in command of Aircraft Z; also working in the pattern doing full stop landings. APA Tower cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff on runway 17L; and instructed the aircraft to fly straight out. APA Tower instructed Aircraft Z to 'line up and wait' on runway 17RAPA Tower then cleared Aircraft Z for takeoff on runway 17R instructing us to 'follow the Cessna'.APA Tower pointed out traffic to Aircraft X; and the pilot said he had the aircraft in sight.APA Tower then instructed Aircraft Y to turn right and fly westbound to I25; then northwest on course.Aircraft Y incorrectly reads back 'turn left'; fly to the interstate; then on courseAPA Tower corrects Aircraft Y and says 'gonna be a right turn; right turn; west of I25 Right turn'Aircraft Y doesn't answer initially and eventually asks if the last transmission was for them. APA Tower says; 'Affirmitive; in order to go to the west you need to make a right turn'Aircraft Y then reads back; 'Roger; right turn...inside of the interstate'; which is incorrect according to the clearance. Tower missed the end piece of the readback; but I will say that I was unable to make out what was said until reviewing the recording this evening.Aircraft Y asks tower to verify that I25 is the highway running north to south; obviously still confused.APA Tower acknowledges the aircraft; and says 'affirmative; I need you on the west side.'At this point; Aircraft Y; was quickly approaching Aircraft X who was now on downwind and still climbing to pattern altitude. Aircraft Y was on a collision course for Aircraft X. The radios were silent indicating that tower was unaware of the conflict. I saw the quickly closing conflict; and verifying that the two aircraft were getting dangerously close using both visually references; and ADS-B TIS display; I keyed my PTT switch and broadcasted 'Stop your climb; stop your climb Aircraft X'. The pilot acknowledged that he was stopping the climb; and had the traffic in sight. The conflict was averted; but only by a small margin. After talking to the pilot of Aircraft X after the flight; we estimate that the two aircraft were within only 100 feet or less of one another. This near accident is the result of failure of the pilot of Aircraft Y to adequately follow ATC Clearance; and failure of the tower controller to verify the incorrect read back of Aircraft Y. Additionally; the tower controller failed to realize that Aircraft Y was on a dangerous collision course with Aircraft X.A radar monitor position; with a no transgression zone; and a specific controller in charge of issuing breakout instructions during operations on the close parallel runways at Denver's Centennial airport; could have helped prevent this near accident from ever happening. Additionally; use of better control instructions such as 'fly heading 270'; rather than 'fly west to the interstate' could help unfamiliar pilot better understand the air traffic procedures at Centennial.

A General Aviation Pilot reported seeing two aircraft on a collision course so he alerted them using his radio and averted a collision.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

The inbound Captain told us that the high stage bleed APU and HUD were inoperative. we called Dispatch and discussed the operational limitations. This was our aircraft for the  entire day. The aircraft load was light and icing conditions were expected on our arrival at [destination]. MEL-PROCEDURES stated: 'A. Maintain a minimum of 60% N1 on the affected engine during flight in icing conditions. NOTE: Landing  weights below 145;000 lbs. may require flaps 40 to maintain minimum required N1 (60%) on approach. Landing weights below 118;000 lbs. may not be able to maintain minimum required N1 (60%) on approach.'  The captain and I both agreed that with the conditions that awaited us at [destination] and the concern for the safety of flight under all  flight and weather related conditions; it was best to not take the aircraft.... Dispatch concurred with our decision.

Do not Dispatch aircraft to these airports; under these conditions with these maintenance issues.... We owe it to the safety of our crews and our passengers.

B737-800 flight crew refused to accept an aircraft for a flight into known icing conditions with engine bleed air; APU and HUD inoperative.


ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Landing DFW 17L; FOD on rwy and we elected to execute a missed approach. At the start of the go-around we had 6;500 lbs of fuel. Vectored left turn; climb to 6;000; back around over the airport for a right downwind to RWY 13R. We asked for a closer runway and were denied. We mentioned that we were at min fuel (Yes; I know that is substantially meaningless verbiage) I checked fuel on final and we had 4;700 lbs but don't know our exact DME at the time.  Landed uneventfully and after a somewhat extended taxi in (holding short of 18R) parked with 3;900 lbs of fuel.I frankly do not know our exact fuel at touchdown but we may have burned into our reserve fuel (4;400 lbs or so). I was watching our fuel pretty closely but was suprised at the FOB as we parked the brake. We did not declare an emergency.As a precaution I would declare emergency fuel next time in a similar situation. A missed approach from 17L to 13R? That is about as far away as they could send us. It seems like ATC might be better aware of this type of thing. Yes; I  know they have their hands full with all the flights landing at the same time. I add fuel fairly frequently but may add more. I had not added fuel on this flight.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

MD-83 flight crew reported they landed with minimum fuel after executing a missed approach because of FOD on the runway.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

Distraction; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X had check on to Lindbergh tower's local control position and was operating in the San Diego Bravo airspace within 1 mile to 1 1/2 miles south of the final approach course. The position tag (S) dropped. Local controller noticed it; attempted to retag but it indicated 'dup ID'. SAN Local control had to retag Aircraft X using a different ID. When SAN LC check the call sign it indicated it was now being used by 2T. 2T is LAX Tower. Prior report was filed for the same occurrence and the practice of LAX Twr dropping SAN Tags to be used by them. It is inexcusable for any controller to think it is okay to remove someone else's flight plan. Ever! I was notified by the CPC that LAX was still doing this reckless behavior. LAX doing this with a carrier tag between LA Arrival and LAX Twr was the topic of a video in recurrent training. Why is it still occurring? I don't know how to be clearer. It has to stop!I recommend individual; face-to-face briefing on the proper etiquette of Air Traffic Control. How one should not remove flight plans that do not belong to that facility! The last response from LAX was that 'This conduct would no longer be condoned'. What?  When would it ever be condoned? SCT originates our LOAs. SCT could keep a master list of all call sign usage to alleviate dual use. We have tours that operate in the SAN Bravo. SCT San Diego area has sky diving. We were both attempting to use 'SKY' as an identifier when talking to our individual aircraft company's. We coordinated with each other to use different IDs; but those call signs used could be on a master list to let others know it isn't available.

SAN Tower Front Line Manager reported of duplicate aircraft identifications in the SAN and LAX Area.  Someone was attempting to use a call sign; saw that it was being used; but dropped the data tag anyways.


While on runway 16C in SEA; Tower advised us that traffic departing 16L was an early turn out and then said we were cleared for takeoff. Around 1400 feet MSL the aircraft prompted an immediate RA with no prior TA. The command was simple; reduce vertical speed. I was still hand flying so I was able to comply immediately and after about 5-10 secs the aircraft instructed us that we were clear. The flight was then continued without incident.

Air Carrier Captain reported complying with a TCAS RA on climb out from SEA RWY 16C after following traffic departing from RWY 16L.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 18

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was conducting OJT at the time of the incident; and plugged in for almost 90 minutes. Complexity and volume were high but the sector was kept under control. Aircraft Y was originally climbed to FL150; 1;000 FT below Aircraft X who was level at FL160. After analyzing; my trainee climbed Aircraft Y to FL230. Both aircraft were in a 3 mile area; and I was comfortable with his decision. Aircraft Y was assigned a speed of 300 KTS for in trail spacing on the CSHEL SID. As the aircraft got closer; and converging; I noticed that Aircraft Y's speed had slightly increased and instructed my trainee to turn him 20 degrees right to ensure 3 mile separation. My trainee also expedited the descent of Aircraft X. According to conflict alert which had activated at the sector; closest proximity was 4.093 miles; which I had written down for training debrief. Aircraft Y was then turned back to LAL and we carried on. We were made aware of a loss when I returned to work this afternoon. I immediately requested to go look at the situation on FALCON since I did remember it; and had also written own the CA mileage of 4.093. We reviewed FALCON and verified closest proximity of 4.0! I informed my Supervisor and then had our OM look at it; same thing; no loss; and 4.0 in a 3 mile area. We then proceeded upstairs to QA. QA pulled up the situation on FALCON3; and not the FALCON2 which is available downstairs to us. FALCON3 showed a loss at 2.98 miles. How is it that I am working radar; observe conflict alert closest proximity at 4.093; and not think twice about it; and then come back to work and find out it was 2.98? Am I to trust the mileage I observe and use everyday on my display? How is the data different on my display; FALCON2; and then FALCON3?Use 6 miles since I cannot trust what I see on my display.

On the above date and time; I was working as the Radar Controller (Trainee) at R67/66 while combined [It should be noted that we are still operating on HOST and not ERAM]. We had a stream of departures from RSW with speed restrictions in place to keep them laterally in trail; as well as a string of RSW arrivals on the SHIFTY2 arrival; assorted other traffic; and Aircraft X on the DEAKK Arrival. We had been plugged in to the position since awhile and later got relieved from the position; after the push of departure traffic. I saw Aircraft X on the DEAKK arrival direct DEAKK; which is not uncommon from the 46/47 sectors; depending on their traffic flow. When an aircraft is direct DEAKK; it cuts them across our departure traffic about 20 miles north of where they would be if they were on the full arrival. Likewise; it sometimes puts them in conflict with SHFTY arrivals. I had to maneuver numerous aircraft on the SHFTY and otherwise start them descending before normally doing so; as Aircraft X was coming across that corridor. Likewise; because Aircraft X was direct DEAKK; it cuts him across the departure flow as well; farther north than usual. I had a string of approximately 4-5 departures from my recollection that were all on the CSHEL departure. I issued speeds to keep them laterally sequenced. Aircraft Y was in trail behind another aircraft on the departure; and was issued 300 KTS speed restriction. When he climbed through 10;000 and started accelerating; my trainer; (also a submitter of a separate report) began to discuss the speed restriction and how Aircraft Y accelerating to 300 KTS may not actually mean he will stay behind Aircraft X. Because of this; I had initially climbed Aircraft Y to 15;000 while Aircraft X was level at 16;000. This ensured I had vertical separation until I could further evaluate the situation. After running out the vector lines to assess the situation; (this was while Aircraft Y was at 315 KTS or so glideslope); I believed that I had lateral separation so I discontinued vertical separation. I also knew that I was inside the 3 mile area. I gave the Aircraft X a crossing restriction of DEAKK at 11;000 and 250 KTS; knowing their typical aircraft performance; they would begin a descent and then a speed reduction just prior to the fix. Aircraft Y was through approximately 13;000 for 15;000 and I climbed him to FL230. I also knew that he was a generally slow climbing aircraft; but based on the previous altitude MODE C hits; I knew his climb rate and projected him to be behind and above Aircraft X. When Aircraft Y continued his climb; he also picked up a significant ground speed increase of approximately 30-40 KTS. Because of this change; I turned Aircraft Y twenty degrees right of course to ensure that we still had 3 miles laterally while Aircraft X was level. My vector lines; histories and MODE C reports all indicated that I would have lateral separation; but due to the closing rate; I wanted to ensure that I also had vertical separation; so I asked the Aircraft X to expedite his descent for traffic. He asked me to repeat this transmission; and I did; and also called the traffic to him. I asked Aircraft Y to 'report leaving 16;000'; again; as a second form of separation. I actually turned to my trainer and said 'I guess I really didn't need the altitude report. It looks good.' My trainer observed the conflict alert activate and reduce to 4.093 miles; before increasing. I also concur with this. I observed the closest point that they came on the radar display to be 4.00 miles; and believe I used the RNG BNG function to measure this. I'm not sure if I did on this occurrence; but I usually also switch over to DARC to verify the MODE C hits; if they are indeed close; because sometimes DARC receives faster updates than HOST. I knew I was in a 3 mile area and had the lateral separation required.Upon returning to work; I was informed by my supervisor that I had only 2.98 miles and it was recorded as a loss. I read all the paperwork; which was an email. It also detailed the event. Upon review of the event on FALCON 2 on a ZMA Computer; my instructor and myself observed the closest the two aircraft got were 4.00 miles and 800 FT. Then they began to separate. We; [were] perplexed by this; went to the watch desk and our Supervisor watched the situation on FALCON 2 at the watch desk with the Operations Manager present. They both agreed that we had only 4 miles and 800 FT; but that it was a 3 mile area; so we had no loss. Upon hearing this; we called QA and asked him to explain the situation with us. He said he remembered the event and that he said when he observed it on FALCON 2 it wasn't a loss; but when he went to FALCON 3; he played the event and the closest it got was 3.89 miles; and 800 FT; before increasing. But he then paused the play back; and went frame by frame backwards. While the tracks didn't move; the data block altitude updated and the distances changed. I'm not sure if this is interpolated data; but it wasn't available to us either on the control floor or on FALCON 2. My main concern is if FALCON 3 is being used to report loss events; how come our HOST system doesn't match up with what FALCON 3 is saying? My instructor also kept saying that FALCON 3 was not released to en route facilities; but that it was he used to validate our separation data. Also; is FALCON 3 configured to use the correct radar sort boxes and site? Because of the 3 mile area; it would have to be through the radar sort box of Fort Green; which if the two aircraft were on FALCON 3 at different radar sites; their positions may vary slightly.Also; why is the system that the safety office is using different from what we; as controllers; have access to and can review our sessions with? When I walked out of the control room; there was no doubt in my mind that I had 4 miles and it was no issue; but now I am beginning to question that. If this situation we had less than 3 miles; what other situations in which I've used 3 miles the FALCON 3 reports we had less than that?While this sector continues to be extremely complex; I think you'll continue to see a string of separation and airspace violations due to the outdated layout of the South Florida Airspace system; but I'm not sure what could be done to improve it without a complete redesign.

Two Controllers report of finding out about a loss of separation after returning to work. Two different types of replay instruments were used and one showed a loss of separation; while the other did not.


ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

[The A320] was a handoff from ZJX and by LOA should have had BAHAA HIBAC TRV. The A320 was BAHAA TRV and got within a mile of Sealord before he was pointed out. When I'm by myself never assume ZJX will give you every aircraft per LOA. Check every handoff flight plan. I [informed] ZJX of their error.

ZMA Controller reports a botched handoff from ZJX resulting in a late point out to military controllers at Sealord.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 2800

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

In the overall interest of partnership with Air Traffic Control; and air safety; I would like to provide some critical comments regarding NorCal (NCT) TRACON and SFO Tower. Arriving SFO received vectors for left downwind to the LOC DME 'Y' 28R. We were completely prepared for the approach; and additionally we flew the approach in a stable and predictable fashion. Approach clearance was received; then while flying the localizer on the VNAV calculated path; we received an instruction from NCT to maintain 3;100 FT. They issued this instruction when we were at about 3;050 FT; the aircraft continued slightly below; which we reported to NCT; and they requested again that we return to 3;100 FT. I climbed back to 3;100 FT. NCT then advised to continue the approach; I flew the aircraft back to the Vertical profile; [and] then reengaged VNAV to continue descending on profile. This all happened between 3.5 miles to 2.5 miles from the FAF while in Instrument Meteorological Conditions or IMC. Never was there any compromise of our ability to maintain a stable approach; however I consider this type of handling by any Approach Control facility will cause problems with many aircrews and should be addressed. I believe in most instances; the Controller would avoid causing an undesirable approach profile by providing some advance notice of a clearance modification. Also; it would be very possible; in my opinion; for some air crews to interpret this as a cancellation of the approach clearance; and then reconfiguring for a missed approach. We then switched to SFO Tower frequency just prior to reaching the FAF. We received our landing clearance; and then Tower asked us to report where we acquired the airport visually. We responded that the bases of the clouds were at 1;300 FT and we were visual with the airport. I feel that this may be the wrong time to be making unnecessary requests from a potentially tired pilot of an overseas flight during the most critical phase of flight. They could easily ask the pilot to provide the weather conditions after the flight has landed; or have Ground Control ask us. Our company expects us to strictly adhere to sterile cockpit; and I try to enforce this policy. Doesn't seem much of a sterile cockpit when we are getting a survey on the radio by a Tower Controller at 1;000 FT AGL.

Air Carrier landing SFO expressed concern regarding ATC's questioning during the final phase of flight.


Flight Engineer / Second Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

About halfway on the flight we had a total loss of A Hydraulics System. The Elevator Low Pressure light came on and followed immediately by the Rudder Low Pressure. The Captain saw his lights on the front panel also. The A System Pressure gauge and quantity dropped to zero immediately. We ran the stabilizer followed by the QRH procedures for Hydraulic Leak or Loss and closed the fluid shutoff switches. We descended to FL280 for yaw damper limitations. I attempted several times to contact Dispatch using SATCOM without success. They somehow saw we were attempting them to call and contacted us. I was able to give the basic info before we lost SATCOM again. We had several short contacts with them before landing. Reaching our destination; I used the alternate flap system to deploy the flaps and leading edge devices and then manually cranked the gear. We declared an emergency with Approach and had an uneventful landing. Maintenance pinned the gear and we were towed to the ramp. All checklists and QRH procedures were accomplished as per Company SOP.

[Narrative 2 contains no additional information]

B757 A Hydraulic system failed in flight. The QRH was completed; flight descended to FL280 for the Yaw Dampener restriction and; before landing; an emergency was declared.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7.0

Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Company Policy; Human Factors; Staffing; Airspace Structure

I was working solo with heavy traffic. Moderate turbulence was reported in the descent. Due to sector saturation I had difficulty remembering to issue the ride report to several aircraft; and some aircraft flew through the turbulence without a warning. Additionally; I noticed two aircraft at 3;500 feet in potential conflict; talking to one. It was too far away to call traffic; but by the time my scan returned to that area; the aircraft I wasn't talking too was directly on top of the one I was talking too; and had climbed 500 feet to avoid.This happened because the sector was saturated and I did not have help. We need more staff so we can staff D-sides (Radar Assist) and trackers as appropriate.

Center Controller reported work overload and forgetting to issue advisories due to lack of staffing.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused

Road trip from ZZZ to ZZZ1 for Aircraft X. Found aircraft maintenance not documented by multiple mechanics. Multiple task found to be started; but not documented on [system]. Informed mechanics to document their Maintenance on [system]. Was updated by mechanics on was what was accomplished. No stories matched. Heavy wind throughout operation and possible hydraulic activation during cable tension adjustment. Documentation does not match maintenance performed. Cable tension was released without proper pins installed. Incorrect cables adjusted. Inspected aircraft and found multiple turnbuckles with broken turnbuckle clips. Cables now require replacement. Found multiple Broken turnbuckle safety clips in cabin of aircraft.Inspected aircraft and found multiple turnbuckles with broken turnbuckle clips. Incorrect control cable adjusted. Now two flight control system require confirmation of correct installation. Suspect possible third flight control system.Maintenance not documented; maintenance manual not followed. Upon realization of incorrect maintenance and documentation performed; contacted lead; supervisor; base manager for further guidance. Documented mistakes found.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Technician reported multiple failures of personnel to follow maintenance procedures during a flight control cable rigging; resulting in control cables requiring replacement on all three systems.


Time Pressure; Workload; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Enroute at cruise altitude of FL400; both pilots noted a line of weather approximately 100 miles ahead.  Upon additional observation; we determined our flight path would be well above the clouds.  We also noted two aircraft ahead on the same route; both at FL360.  We asked ATC if any aircraft ahead on our route had encountered adverse conditions or deviated due to weather.  ATC responded that no such actions or reports had occurred.  Our flight remained in smooth conditions and several minutes later entered and remained in hazy cloud conditions; thus restricting our visibility.  We noted the aircraft ahead not changing altitude or route.  A few minutes later we encountered convective; windshear-type activity which initially caused the aircraft to accelerate and begin to climb.  Almost immediately thereafter; the aircraft rapidly decelerated and began to descend.  The autopilot went to CWS mode. The PF disconnected the autopilot in order to manually control aircraft attitude. The autothrottles continued to function. The PF acted to override the autothrottles as necessary to respond to the rapid changes in airspeed. The PNF immediately illuminated the seat belt sign and; via the P.A.; notified the passengers and flight attendants to remained seated with seat belts fastened. The PNF then requested a lower altitude from ATC. ATC cleared us to descend to and maintain FL370. During the convective activity the aircraft climbed a few hundred FT; then descended approximately 1;000 FT. Our airspeed initially increased approximately ten KTS; then decreased approximately 20-30 KTS. During the encounter we experienced stick shaker intermittently and difficulty maintaining airspeed and altitude.  Maintaining a desired descent rate was also intermittently very difficult. Approximately 60-90 seconds after the beginning of the encounter we entered clear air with good visibility; no windshear-type activity; and smooth conditions.  We leveled the aircraft at FL370.  The PNF confirmed with ATC our clearance at FL370.  He then confirmed with the flight attendants their safety and that of all passengers.  He also notified ATC and company Dispatch of the location and type of conditions we experienced.  The flight continued to our destination normally. On the ground; the Captain further discussed the encounter with Dispatch via telephone and ACARS.  I would suggest a greater distance of deviation from any convective weather would lessen the likelihood of such an event.  This type of greater deviation should be taken any time convective activity is suspected or unsure. This type of greater deviation should be taken regardless of ATC reports or lack thereof. This type of greater deviation should be taken regardless of a lack of reports from other aircraft.

A B737-700 encountered convective windshear activity at FL400 which resulted in a 10 KT speed increase with a climb; followed by a 20-30 FT speed decrease and a 1;000 FT altitude loss with the stick shaker.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 87; Flight Crew Total 12868; Flight Crew Type 6600

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

During stable cruise; FL350; M.79; PF-FO; PM-CA; A/P and A/T engaged; clear skies; approaching clouds not associated with weather radar returns; approaching Continental Divide; 58NM NNW DEN; ISA +7; FMS OPT FL360; aircraft experienced a slow increase of IAS toward MMO. PF immediately disconnected A/T to control IAS. IAS continued to increase toward MMO. PF immediately disconnected A/P and slowly raised the nose of the aircraft to control IAS; MAX ALT 35250 MSL. MMO was exceeded by approximately 5-7KTS for 10 seconds. As IAS started to decrease away from MMO; PF lowered nose and recovered to FL350 engaging A/P and A/T; however; IAS continued to decrease quickly (MMO -40KTS); aircraft was now performance limited and unable to maintain altitude and airspeed. Thrust positioned at MAX CON; FMS IAS -1; IAS continued to struggle. PM notified DEN Center that the aircraft had encountered an 'atmospheric anomaly' and was unable to maintain altitude and airspeed and needed an immediate descent to recover. An immediate descent to FL340 was granted. PF was able to complete a stable recovery at FL340.Post event investigation by the PM using various sources revealed that the aircraft was flying over a 'valley area' where surface altitude gradients are particularly intense and seem not only able to produce orographic wind effects; but also intensify these effects due to a possible funnel effect caused by the valley while approaching the Continental Divide. In this area the surface altitude gradient increases more than 6000 MSL; (8280 MSL to 14255 MSL); over a span of 10NM. Surface winds; over the last 2+30 hours prior to this event averaged 27021G33.

B737NG Captain reported altitude and airspeed deviations resulted from a mountain wave encounter near DEN.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 157; Flight Crew Type 14000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

While en route to RSW; our arrival was changed for weather from the TYNEE 2 to the SHFTY 5 Arrival. JAX Center cleared us direct INPIN and descend to FL 330. We were expecting JAX to descend us soon. The radios were quiet without much traffic. A few miles after INPIN we received a call on Guard frequency to contact JAX Center on XXX.XX. I checked in with 'JAX Center with (call sign).' JAX asked for my altitude and I replied 'FL 330.' He then cleared us direct to MOEMO and told [us] to descend to FL 240. We never received another call from JAX on XXX.XX. Then we received a call on Guard to contact JAX Center on the previous frequency.I first called JAX Center on XXX.XX with no response; then I called JAX Center on [the previous frequency]. The Controller was clearly agitated and chastised us that he'd been trying to contact us since INPIN. I told him we received a call on Guard to go to XXX.XX and told him that Controller gave us direct MOEMO and descend to FL 240. JAX handed us over to Approach and the rest of the flight was uneventful.I think the issues here are internal with JAX Center. Was the Controller listening to Guard? Did he hear the Guard call from another Controller for (other call sign) to contact JAX on XXX.XX? Should we establish a new procedure for pilots to try and contact ATC on their last assigned before contacting the new frequency assigned on Guard? I can't think of much we can do in the aircraft to prevent this. I'd certainly like to know what happened at JAX Center; external to our aircraft; during this event.

Air Carrier Captain reported receiving calls on Guard frequency to contact JAX Center on different frequencies; but the Controller who responded appeared to have no knowledge of the frequency changes.


Flight Attendant Airline Total 28; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 5; Flight Attendant Total 28; Flight Attendant Type 40

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Electronic Device; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Approximately 1 hour before landing our purser made an announcement that; due to a malfunction of the entertainment system; all entertainment and power ports will be shut off; and remain off until gate arrival. Note: not unusual; we had issues with the Inflight Entertainment (IFE) at takeoff.I was informed by another crew member that there had been an electrical fire/smoke at a [first class] passenger seat; from the power port. [A passenger] said 'it was probably because 'that guy' had plugged too many things into the power port'I [did] not directly witness [the event]; nor did I know which seat was involved. There was no other indication that there was smoke in the cabin.

A B777 Flight Attendant reported the entertainment system being shut down in flight; reportedly in response to smoke and fire at a passenger's power port.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

On the RAVNN 6 Arrival into BWI; we were given a 'descend via' clearance. Passing 12;000 feet; the Controller told us to level off at 12;00 feet 'if able.' I responded that we were passing 12;000 feet right then and asked if we needed to climb back up to 12;000 feet. The Controller said; 'Disregard.' I queried the Controller to determine if we were still cleared to descend via the arrival; and he instructed us to descend and maintain 10;000 feet. Descending through approximately 10;500 feet; the Controller instructed us to turn 10 degrees left for traffic; which we did. Through about 10;300 feet; we received a TCAS RA 'don't descend.' We immediately disengaged the autopilot and leveled off at approximately 10;200 feet; and noticed on the Navigation Display that the conflicting traffic went directly under us at 10;000 feet.Had we not responded immediately and correctly to the RA; I firmly believe we would have collided with the traffic. I notified ATC that we were responding to the RA; and the Controller gave us instructions to proceed direct RAVNN and descend to 6;000 feet when able; with no further comment on; nor discussion of; the near mid-air collision or the RA. I heard one of our Company aircraft on the radio tell ATC that they also received a TCAS RA; which leads me to believe that they may have been our conflicting traffic. I think; as the flight crew; we handled the event very well. We had excellent communication and coordination; and the First Officer immediately applied corrective action to our flight path to avoid a collision. I think the Controller must have been task saturated due to the traffic volume; and perhaps lacked experience or knowledge to avoid this event. We continued the arrival and approach into BWI and landed without further incident.

B737-700 flight crew reported an NMAC on descent into BWI when an aircraft passed directly below them with 200 feet of vertical clearance.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 10

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport

I briefed the Captain on our STAR into BWI and that we could expect a Visual Approach to Runway 10 and that we would back the Visual Approach up with the ILS. Descent and Approach Checks followed. We were cleared for a Visual Approach to Runway 10 into BWI. A normal approach on the ILS was coupled with the autopilot. I disengaged the autopilot around 800 feet and hand flew the approach. I also verbally announced to the Captain that I was outside and referencing the PAPI. I maintained 'red over white' the entire way down; but began to see that the PAPI was taking me below the Glideslope on the ILS. The 'Glideslope' audible warning began to go off around 500 to 600 feet (?).The Captain instructed me to level off to allow the aircraft to get back on the glideslope. I began to slow my rate of descent; but by that time I was around 150 to 200 feet and a normal landing would occur in the touchdown zone. We landed uneventfully. The Captain and I debriefed the event and he agreed that we both saw I had the aircraft stabilized on the PAPI perfectly; but the PAPI was taking us below the ILS glide slope.

B737 First Officer reported the aircraft was stabilized on the PAPI; but was indicating low on the ILS Glideslope.


Taxiing out of ZZZ I noticed consistent left tiller was required to keep the aircraft on centerline. At the time it did not strike me as particularly unusual having experienced similarly 'out of alignment' aircraft without any kind of brake issue. We took off using no flex due to the rain and wet runway. All three of us noted the aircraft experienced unusual shimmy and vibration during the takeoff roll. Shortly after liftoff we got the level 1 alert Brake Temp Diff. At that time the brake temps on the left main gear ranged from 20 to 30. The number 8 brake showed 354; and the remaining brake temps on the right main gear were 36-46. Upon reaching cruise altitude we attempted no less than 3 times to contact the company via SATCOM. After sending an ACARS message the Dispatcher relayed that he then attempted to contact us no less than 3 times via SATCOM. Communication attempts via SATCOM were unsuccessful despite the successful preflight SATCOM link status check and despite successful data transmittal via SATCOM. I relayed the issue to the Dispatcher and asked him to bring maintenance and a SME (Subject Matter Expert) into the loop. I was concerned we had a brake dragging; and wanted everyone's opinions as to the merit of continuing to ZZZ1 vs returning to ZZZ. Via ACARS our Dispatcher advised us; 'after talking with Maintenance Control; we all agreed weight is now the concern. Lighter you are the better. Maintenance Control is digging more into the history of the aircraft. Showing some history with anti-skid on brake 7. Believe that if you came back to ZZZ; you will be heavier than you would in ZZZ1 so I would suggest continuing to ZZZ1. Company would still like you in ZZZ1 but again that is your call.' We consulted the level 2 anti-skid fail checklist for some general systems concept and we thought that the landing weight discussion had a great deal of merit. Our estimated landing weight in ZZZ1 was approximately 318;000 lbs giving us a flaps 50 approach speed of well under the Vr speed from ZZZ. Given the minimal landing distance required in ZZZ1 and the long runways I was reasonably certain I could decelerate the aircraft using autobrakes off; ground spoilers and reversers only. Approximately an hour into cruise the number 8 brake had cooled to 293 and sometime prior to reaching the ETPs (Equal Time Point) it had cooled to approximately -8 just like the rest of the brakes. Being helpful our Dispatcher contacted the ZZZ1 gateway to ask that a fire truck and tug be standing by. No more than 15 minutes later ZZZ1 Control and every subsequent Controller asked the nature of our landing gear problem and what assistance we required after landing. At no time did we ask for or require assistance after landing. Despite this the fire trucks appeared to be all lined up waiting for us and upon block in we were met with numerous questions from the controllers as to why we did not return to ZZZ. Ground spoilers; reversers; and coefficient of friction decelerated the aircraft to 30 kts before I applied the brakes. Exiting the runway the #8 brake was approximately 90 and the rest were at least 40 degrees cooler. By the time we taxied and blocked in the #8 brake had steadily climbed to 431 and the remaining brake temps on the right gear were 144-201. The left main gear brake temps ranged from 68-78.

MD-11 Captain reported a main landing gear brake issue that impacted aircraft handling upon landing.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)

Drone passed over left wing descend through 3;100 feet on IRNMN2 [arrival]. Estimating within 100 feet. Reported to ATC.

Air carrier flight crew had a near miss with a UAS while descending on a STAR.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was flying the River Visual Approach to RWY 19 at DCA; [when approximately] 4 NM from landing; we got a GPWS 'Obstacle; Obstacle' warning. I was scanning outside and inside the cockpit and did not feel we were near any obstacles that would trigger a GPWS warning. I did look down and notice that I was slightly below the advisory VNAV 'snowflake.' Captain took the controls and made a slight correction to the glidepath and course. GPWS warning went away and we landed uneventfully.On the River Visual approach to RWY 19; we fly very close to some buildings as we come down the Potomac River. It may have been a combination of being close to buildings; being slightly below the VPA snowflake; and having a momentary sink rate greater than normal that triggered the GWPS warning.

CRJ200 First Officer reports receiving a GPWS 'Obstacle; Obstacle' warning during the River Visual Approach to Runway 19 at DCA. The warning occurred at 4 NM with the aircraft slightly below the recommended altitude and at a higher than normal sink rate. The Captain took the controls and made a slight adjustment stopping the warning.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 400; Flight Crew Type 150

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Loss of oil pressure and ruff running engine after a VOR/DME Approach during the initial phase of a circle to land on Runway XX. Turned immediately towards runway and made a smooth uneventful landing.

C172 Pilot reported rough running engine with loss of oil pressure that resulted in a return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 3007; Flight Crew Type 2310

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Descending via CREDE3; we were set up and planning on RNAV RNP Z 16R with the CLFFF translation selected. Through 14-13;000 ft; Approach advised unable RNAV; expect Visual 16R. I prompted the Captain if he wanted me to reprogram the FMC to the ILS16R or leave it as is. Approaching LONGS and descending Captain reprogrammed FMC to ILS16R approach and executed before it could be [verified]. This caused the CREDE3 arrival to be dropped and the aircraft entered CWS (Control Wheel Steering). I reprogrammed CREDE3 and using HDG initiated a left turn to 355 degrees. However; by this point we had overshot LONGS. ATC assigned HDG 310 and 11;000 feet. We [continued] to a visual approach and landing. Going into Denver; approach and runway changes are expected. The biggest lesson here is the importance of [FMC route verification]; heads down on CDU in a high workload environment; and connecting a transition fix into the FMC; without clearance.

B737NG First Officer reported a track deviation occurred on arrival into DEN following a late clearance change and improper FMC loading.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 300

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Enroute cruising at 9000 feet to ZZZ1 on IFR flight plan a sudden loud banging noise began from the engine area. Noise was loud enough that I could not hear controller instruction easily. I advised ZZZ Approach of situation and asked for diversion to nearest airport with services. ZZZ and ZZZ2 were offered with ZZZ selected. Controller gave me heading to ZZZ and approach/descent instructions.I performed all engine diagnostics available and change of engine settings in flight with no apparent improvement in noise level. There were no engine readings including those from the JP EDM 730 engine monitoring system on board outside of normal parameters. Engine was still delivering power so I set up 10 mile final straight in approach.Controller did excellent job advising conditions through final approach to ZZZ. The only misstep was breaking through final approach altitude once by 300 feet while attempting to diagnose the issue. Had no problem on landing and taxi.Emergency crews were dispatched and were very concerned and professional. The system worked well and I took great comfort with the professionalism of ATC and ZZZ personnel.After landing the local mechanic found that rivets on a large inspection port between the cowl flaps had failed and the flapping metal was causing the noise. Once repaired we continued to destination with no other issues.The only action I would have done differently would have been to continue on autopilot through the descent as long as the engine was delivering power as this would have let me concentrate more on diagnostics instead of flying the airplane and attempting to insure that the engine stayed within operational parameters. This would have kept me at assigned altitude while working on the diagnosis.

The pilot of a CE-206 on in IFR flight interpreted a sudden loud banging noise forward of the firewall as a likely engine malfunction and requested a diversion to the nearest airport with maintenance services. After landing safely; Maintenance personnel discovered the noise was the result of failed rivets on a cowling inspection panel allowing it to flap; thus producing the raucous racket. An interesting adjunct event was an altitude deviation on final instrument approach attributed to distraction from piloting to troubleshooting and the reporter's self-assessment of having erred by not utilizing the autopilot to assist in flight path control under difficult circumstances.


Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; MEL

Enroute; the left pack was on MEL; we were at FL240. About 50 miles east of ZZZ VOR we got a R ENG BLEED caution message. The FO (First Officer) had the radio and controls and I pulled out the QRH. I referenced the L/R ENG BLEED tab and as reading it I could not follow the procedure because it says to select other pack. The one that was on MEL. The cabin altitude was rising about 1000 ft per min. The FO and I agreed to descend and we told ATC that we were experiencing a pressurization problem and we would need lower. He gave us a descent to 14000 ft. On our way down the cabin alt continued to rise and we got the CABIN ALT caution message when it hit 10;000 ft. We checked the ECS (Environmental Control System) page and the right pack was off. We had no air conditioning; no pressurization; an already warm aircraft (single pack); cabin temp rising; and [a suitable airport] 80 miles away.  We decided to divert. We informed ATC and he gave us direct to ZZZ airport. We turn towards ZZZ and cleaned up the FMS. At this time the autopilot disconnected. We waited about 15 to 20 seconds and then engaged it again. It disconnected again so my FO hand flew the rest of the flight. ATC asked if we wanted to declare an emergency. We said yes and gave him the standard information; souls on board; fuel on board; etc. He also asked if we needed the trucks. We said that it was just a pressurization issue and we had full control of the aircraft so; no. We sent an ACARS message to dispatch that we lost pressurization and we were diverting to ZZZ. They responded that they copy and will let them know we are coming. During this busy time I started the CABIN ALT checklist. Again; without Packs I was unable to accomplish the procedure. It says ' If CABIN ALT caution message persists:PRESS CONT switch......................................................MANManual Cabin Pressurization Control Procedure............ ACCOMPLISH (SEE THIS TAB)'.I went to the MANUAL CABIN PRESSURIZATION CONTROL PROCEDURES. And again not having the use of the Packs I couldn't complete this procedure either. During this time I also got the ATIS; programmed the FMS; set up the cockpit for the approach briefed the approach (FO was hand flying and working the radios); call in range; advise the FAs (Flight Attendants) and run all the checklists. Our hands were full. We talked about the UNPRESSURIZED FLIGHT PROCEDURE but the descent was gradual; the cabin alt was within 200 ft of the altimeter and keeping pace; differential pressure was zero; and we would have to take delay vectors to accomplish it or sacrifice some landing procedures. We opted to make a safe non-rushed approach and landing. We kept the FAs in the loop the entire time. The initial descent and after we decided to divert. We had total flight control of the aircraft and told them there was no need to brace the Pax. After landing the Tower Controller asked if we needed any assistance. We said no only to taxi directly to the gate because we had no air conditioning. He gave us that. We arrived on the ramp abeam our gate. No Rampers. We called Ops and asked for marshaling into the gate ASAP because we had no A/C. We waited about 5 mins for them.  The cabin temp rapidly rising in the 102 degree sun. When they strolled out; they had to move a baggage cart that was within the safety diamond. This was an aircraft with an emergency. It matters not what the emergency is; they should be waiting and ready. This could have turned into a medical emergency and we have nonchalant ramp personnel moseying out to an aircraft in distress.

The Captain reported being dispatched with one inoperative air conditioning pack. At cruise altitude; a bleed air malfunction affecting the remaining pack resulted in loss of cabin pressure and an inability to control the cabin temperature. An emergency was declared and the flight successfully diverted to a suitable airport. The Captain expressed his concern over a company policy of dispatching aircraft on long flights with an inoperative air conditioning pack.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was assigned to work Aircraft X for a discrepancy of 'FMC FAULTS' (Flight Management Computer Fault) that was called in on the radio by the flight crew. When I arrived at the aircraft; I was informed that the flight crew had reset the system twice and it was okay. This is not the first time this type of action has happened where the flight crews are resetting circuit breakers and aircraft systems and are not documenting the maintenance performed on aircraft as required per the FARs (Code of Federal Regulations). They are also are not accomplishing the required ops (Operational) test; system test or LMP test per the Maintenance Manual; Troubleshooting Manual; General Procedures Manual.Flight crew and MOC (Maintenance Control) are not following Maintenance Procedures. MOC are instructing flight crews to reset circuit breakers at the gate; when it is not their function and they are not qualified to perform specific maintenance task such as LMP test on LMP components and systems. They are also not documenting these discrepancies or the actions taken when they reset circuit breakers and are not documenting the maintenance references required. The Flight crews are being instructed to contact MOC by aircraft maintenance supervisors and when the Flight crew calls MOC; MOC is instructing them to reset breakers. At times; the flight crew is not aware that the item is an LMP component or system; which requires the work to be performed by a qualified LMP Technician and requires an LMP test. Which the flight crew can't perform because they're not qualified and if done by unqualified personnel the aircraft LMP status must be downgrade per the GPM (General Process Manual).Flight crew needs to enter all discrepancies in the logbook when they call aircraft maintenance for assistance and inform them of a discrepancy on the aircraft. MOC needs to stop instructing flight crews to reset circuit breakers at the gate and interrupting critical aircraft systems without allowing qualified Aircraft Technicians to address the discrepancy and accomplish all required test and procedures required per Maintenance Manual and GPM.

Technician reported that an A321 flight crew reset circuit breaker and did not document this maintenance action or perform follow-up system tests as required by the maintenance manual.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 138; Flight Crew Type 8000

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

We were cruising at FL370 and knew of a 747-800 freighter converging off our right at a higher altitude. [Center] told us about the 747 and even elaborated that it was a 'brand new' airplane. My First Officer and I mentioned to each other the implications of being behind the 747 and I had read once about its new wing design and wondered what kind of wake the plane might cause. The 747 soon was out of sight and we elected to climb to FL380 for a better ride. First Officer was flying and somewhere around FL375 we encountered the most violent wake turbulence I've ever experienced. I took control of our aircraft and for a brief moment could not stop the roll to the right. I lowered the nose because the airspeed had decrease; I had the stall bar in view (HUD) as well. I elected to descend quickly and told [Center] that we were in 'that guys wake' and they said no problem; descend to whatever we needed and also to offset to the upwind side of our route.Once we regained control of our aircraft; we checked on the flight attendants and passengers. Two or three passengers had bumped their heads and all three of our flight attendants were momentarily airborne/off their feet. We made sure a medical divert was not needed and continued to [destination]. We called Dispatch and informed them that the aircraft would be written up for a severe turbulence encounter. I communicated with the flight attendants and made sure no one needed paramedics upon arrival.Not sure I have an answer. Some of these bigger and newer aircraft (747-800 or whatever it's called and the A380) I really don't want to be anywhere behind them. Incidentally; [Center] said we were 13 miles behind this aircraft when this event took place. It was eye-opening to say the least.

[Narrative 2 had no additional information]

A B737-700 encountered severe wake turbulence in trail of B747-800 that was almost 14 NM ahead of them; resulting in strong roll to the right and loss of altitude.


Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

While operating [this] flight; we had a GPWS event. It was night under VMC conditions; and we had been cleared for the visual approach to Runway 30 into ZZZ. We descended to the appropriate altitude and started to configure for landing and as we were doing so; the GPWS event occurred. We immediately responded by pulling up; leveling off; and confirming that we were indeed at a safe altitude. We continued on the visual approach and landed without any issue.

EMB-145 Captain reported GPWS Alert on approach for a night landing.


Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Staffing

Assigned to descend via. Inside ZZZZZ assigned 300 knots. Captain used the speed window to adjust speed. Approaching ZZZZZ1; realized he was crossing low. He attempted to correct but still crossed low by what I estimate to be 500-800 feet low. I looked and realized he did not use Speed Intervention but instead had used LVL Change. ATC did not query us about the error nor was there traffic in the area.Captain new to aircraft and seat with limited recency of experience confused speed/descent modes. FO (PM) limited recency of experience involved with approach programming and communications did not notice the error.For our part better announcement and verification of MCP changes. Better monitoring during busy descent.

Air Carrier First Officer reported an altitude deviation and cited the Captain being new to the aircraft and both pilots' lack of flying contributed to the event.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

After putting down gear handle at FAF; right main gear light did not indicate down. [We] had time to discuss next actions with crew for [a] go around [and] notified ATC of [the] situation and intentions. [We] climbed to safe altitude and entered hold over VOR. [The] crew discussed next actions; [and] cycled gear to [the] same result. [We] discussed next actions and plans between [the] flight crew. After [the] decision to blow down gear; [we] briefed ATC on plans and intentions and [requested priority]. [We] briefed passengers on [the] situation and safety procedures. [We] executed [the] checklist for gear not coming down. Procedure were successful and indicated all gear down. [We] notified ATC of intent to fly-by [for] visual confirmation of all gear down then proceed back out for a full-stop landing and shutdown on runway. [We] executed the plan. After successful landing; [we] evacuated passengers and gear [was] inspected for safe towing. [The] airplane [was] towed to maintenance facility.

CE-560XL First Officer reported difficulties in extending the landing gear.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We were descending into ZZZ with Bleed 1 deferred and expectation of some turbulence and showers as a weather system was passing through the area. It was night; but we could see the tops of the clouds at around 13;000 feet. As we entered one of those clouds; we got ICE CONDITION and STALL PROT ICE SPEEDS; followed by the full complement of engine and wing anti-ice systems turning on. A minute or two after; we got the EICAS message 'BLEED 2 Fail;' which left us without any pressurization system. I was sitting right sight conducting Captain training; and the Captain candidate wanted to run the QRH; so he delegated flying and radio responsibilities to me and ran the QRH; which I felt was appropriate. As he was looking up the procedure; we also received the message 'A-I WING FAIL;' and asked which procedure I wanted to run. I called for the BLEED FAIL QRH first; as systems logic would suggest that the A-I system had likely failed due to lack of any Bleed supply. A quick look at the A-I synoptic page also showed that values were only closed; not failed. I also figured that the remaining bleed had probably kicked off due to high demand imposed by the ANTI-ice system and PACK systems; and that a quick reset would likely be successful; and fix the A-I problem as well. While he ran the QRH; I quickly assessed our larger problem; which was that we were not pressurizing and at risk of picking up icing without protection. We were descending through approximately 12;000 feet into ZZZ; but the cabin altitude had already been dropped down to 1;400 feet; and was climbing at only a couple hundred FPM; so we were fine there. Plus; we had the APU as a backup in the worst case the Bleed reset didn't work. The ICE CONDITION EICAS message was not present; nor did a quick check with my flashlight out the front window indicate we were picking up more icing. It was pretty warm out; and I suspected the icing we had picked up was just in the tops of the sporadic cumulus clouds we had just seen. So I waited to see the outcome of the QRH resets before addressing the icing risks further. Seconds later; the Captain candidate finished the Bleed Fail QRH; which was successful; and pressurization was restored. He then followed the A-I Wing Fail QRH to a successful reset; and our icing protection was also restored. After those QRH's were complete; we were back to normal operations; and duties were returned. We landed shortly thereafter and wrote both irregularities up in the logbook.

EMB-175 Captain reported a bleed air system failure on approach that was fixed by a system reset.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 6700; Flight Crew Type 55

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

DOD Contract Mission supporting military training and was enroute to the ZZZ MOA operating under public use. Aircraft X cleared on heading 350 and descended to FL190 to enter the ZZZ MOA at altitude. Traffic called out off the nose opposite direction FL200 Aircraft Y. Center queried Aircraft X on altitude. Pilot glanced at altimeter and noted 19;140 and the response from Aircraft X was; '19.1 correcting.' Pilot was given a phone number to call with Center upon landing regarding a possible pilot deviation. Upon further discussion with the Center supervisor; Center indicated a loss of separation 700 ft/3.9 NM between Aircraft X and an Aircraft Y. Review of the aircraft Garmin recorded altitude data indicated an altitude of 19;235 MSL at [time] (approximately 7 seconds before the reported loss of separation) with an altitude of 19;181 ft at the Center time of separation loss. Pilot human performance considerations include simultaneous discussing weather (frequency management) for the mission on the other radio; potentially taking scan away from direct altitude scan while also transitioning pilot's visual lookout externally to pick up the Aircraft Y opposite direction traffic. Lack of autopilot / altitude hold mode was a contributing factor but not a substitute for basic air work altitude hold at FL290.

Military pilot reported an airborne conflict with opposite direction UAV.


Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Inbound to MSP we were cleared to descend via the MUSCL 3 RNAV Arrival; 30R Transition. We loaded the ILS 30R and selected the TRTEL transition. We flew this routing uneventfully and about the time we were turning final we were instructed to maintain visual separation with the parallel traffic; which we did. We were not made aware of any deviations during the flight and made an uneventful landing. A couple hours later I received a call from ATC and was informed of a pilot deviation and loss of minimum separation with another aircraft. He stated that after reaching TRTEL intersection he expected us to continue our present heading and NOT commence the turn to SOGGY; and because of that they lost minimum separation with traffic on the parallel (the aircraft we were told to maintain visual separation with).The approach plates were just changed effective January 5th to allow selecting a transition from the last fix on the STAR (TRTEL) to the selected ILS approach. Because we were told to descend via the arrival and given a specific runway for a transition we were under the impression that we were to fly the full transition to SOGGY after reaching TRTEL. After talking with ATC on the phone he explained there is confusion both with ATC and pilots for this particular issue; but that he expected us to just continue our present heading after reaching TRTEL; even though we had been cleared a specific runway transition and had not been assigned any radar vectors. He stated we should have only flown the transition to SOGGY if we had been cleared for the ILS PRIOR to reaching TRTEL. Two days ago on the radio; a pilot specifically asked about this and was told by ATC that if they are assigned the runway with the descend via clearance that they do expect us to fly the full transition. If ATC does not expect us to fly the full transition for the runway they assign to us during the descend via clearance and just to continue on our present heading after reaching the last fix on the arrival; that must be made clear when issuing the clearance or it must be made clear on the notes of the arrival itself. Clarification should be given to both ATC and pilots on what is expected.

The reported stated that they did not have clearance for the ILS approach and that TRTEL was his clearance limit. He advised that numerous pilots and controllers during this initial stage were confused if they were cleared for the approach or not. In this instance the reporter stated they were not cleared.

Nearly 2 hours after our arrival and release time I received a call from company crew support connecting my Captain to me. He informed me that he had been contacted by ATC about loss of separation on our arrival into MSP on the MUSCL3 30R Transition. As he explained it from his conversation with ATC; reaching TRTEL intersection we were expected to continue straight ahead. Having been given the 30R transition prior to TRTEL with ILS30R and ILS30L advertised on ATIS I had selected ILS30R from TRTEL in the FMS; and reaching TRTEL commenced the turn to SOGGY intersection. The NEW arrival effective 5JAN ends at TRTEL and states 'Expect RNAV; or ILS approach or Radar vectors to final; with no heading to continue. The NEW approach to ILS30R from TRTEL intersection is connected directly to the arrival. We were not given a heading to fly and had been cleared to 'descend via the MUSCL3 arrival 30R transition'. The Captain stated that ATC said our turn at TRTEL caused a loss of separation. We had been given traffic and advised traffic in sight and were then cleared for the ILS30R. The arrival and approach were normal with no deviations.Having been cleared to 'descend via MUSCL3 30R transition' I had selected the ILS30R from TRTEL intersection. Not receiving a heading or other direction from ATC; reaching TRTEL we commenced the turn to SOGGY on the ILS30R. We had been cleared to 4000' and were descending. After acknowledging traffic inbound for the parallel runway we were cleared for the ILS30R to cross SAMMZ at 4000'. On further examination of the MUSCL3 arrival chart; lacking radar vectors there is no charted indication or guidance to continue present heading (such as at DOLEE or COZZZ). There is clearly confusion between us and ATC over expected flight path reaching TRTEL. Without RADAR vectors; my understanding of the charted procedures is to continue the flight path from TRTEL on the 30R transition (make the turn via the connection to SOGGY) but NOT descend until cleared for the approach. This is what we did.Clarification is needed of the expected flight path. For example; in KDEN if flying the KIPPR4 arrival; 16L transition; reaching KIPPR the flight path continues to HAYLY; this is the transition; KIPPR is the IAF. Descent does not commence until cleared for the ILS16L OR otherwise directed by ATC. This is the same procedure as the NEW charts in MSP; yet ATC expects something different; and I am unsure of WHAT; as that is not information provided. This is a new procedure in MSP and extreme caution and awareness is needed by ATC and pilots.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported being assigned the MUSCL3 Arrival Runway 30R transition at MSP. Later he was made aware that a loss of separation occurred while turning final. The Controller explained he was expected to maintain heading after the last point on the arrival since he had not been cleared for the ILS.