Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 21000; Flight Crew Type 4500

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 4600; Flight Crew Type 220

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Approach was VERY busy. Controller gave us vectors; kept our speed high and altitude at ; feet. He repeatedly told other aircraft to stand by and request nothing that he was TOO BUSY. He then turned us to ZZZZZ at 4;600 feet and said we were cleared for the approach. We noted on the LDS that the wind was 250/13. We were very high for this but attempted to rejoin. Approx 3 miles from runway we noted we would not meet stabilized approach criteria and requested a go around. The controller immediately stated that was fine and to just make right traffic; maintain 2;300 feet and we were cleared to land [Runway] XX. We stated several times that we did not wish to do this and wanted a second ILS. This is a mountainous area and a right hand pattern coupled with a 13 kt tailwind; would be a bit busy. The controller gave us a heading and said maintain 2;300 feet. We started the turn and then he came back three more times; asking us if we were headed to ZZZ. Then he came back again and said to fly the published. We were in the turn he had first given us and he changed this two more times. We requested 6;000 feet since 2;300 feet is not acceptable for the published and he said to climb to 6;000 feet. Then he yelled that he had a terrain alert and we better turn faster. We had no terrain indications and we were well into the turn to ZZZ and were climbing to 6;000 feet. He then changed the altitude two more times and settled on 4;500 feet. He then changed his mind again and gave us several different headings to fly. He asked us several times what approach we wanted and again; he told several other pilots to ask for nothing as he was TOO BUSY. We were given headings back to ZZZZZ and descended to cross ZZZZZ at the appropriate altitude of 3;300 feet. He overshot the localizer with the headings by 50 degrees but we were able to re-establish on the LOC and maintained a stabilized approach to landing. The wind was steady down the entire glide path at 250/13-15 kts. I am writing this report not because I felt that anything was violated or not followed but rather because the communication was so poor that I am unclear as to what he was expecting us to do. He gave us so many different sets of directions that I want to be sure that we identify what transpired. The outcome was successful and at no point was the safety of the flight in question. We advised him that we could not fly the published as he requested because he gave us 2;300 feet! I think that threw him and it went downhill from there with respect to communication. He had so many other people he was working with that I think it was lost in the shuffle. We were able to complete the approach and we did not show any terrain conflict. I believe his indication was not recognizing the turn we were making? Not sure. Anyway; this really accentuates the need to be cognizant of the tailwind limitation and know that any additional altitude will most likely result in a go around. We were prepared for this; but not prepared for the controller to state cleared to land; right traffic; visual XX. It was hard to get a word in to state that this was not our intent or desire and that simply flying the published missed approach would have been much safer. The frequency was too busy to get a word in and I think this heightened his workload and confusion as well.

On daylight approach; the Approach Controller was very busy and task saturated; telling several VFR aircraft to call back in 5 minutes. We were given vectors and airspeeds; and were eventually cleared for ILS RWY XX opposite direction to traffic. Winds were 250/13 at altitude (approaching landing limits); but were reported less on deck. Because we were kept high and fast; and communications were congested on Approach and Tower; we were above glide slope and fast. Captain (Pilot Flying) made the correct call to go around. I informed Tower and Tower Controller was initially confused. I repeated and he told us to enter a right visual downwind and that we were number 1 for RWY XX. I felt the altitude we were given was insufficient so I asked for 2;500 feet. I misunderstood the direction from the Captain that the visual approach was acceptable; before I understood that she wanted vectors to ILS which I requested. We were told to fly the published but by this point were too far down range to do this properly. We informed the controller of this while doing our best to comply (climb to 6;000 and proceed ZZZ). Terrain was rising and we were issued a terrain alert and told to turn right and climb. We were already in the process of doing so.  At no point was the safety of the flight in question.  We received altitudes and vectors for another ILS; which initially caused us to overshoot final. We established a stable approach on parameters and landed without incident.

B767 flight crew reported receiving a CFIT alert from the Approach Controller. Pilot crew also described difficulty communicating with the very busy controller.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

This is more of a safety report than anything else. Weather upon dispatch was forecasting low visibility so we added an alternate to the release and thus; added fuel to compensate. It should be noted that the first officer (FO) had just over 100 hrs in type and just over a year with the company. Since we were planning on performing a CAT II approach at our destination we opted to have the FO fly the leg so we would not have to switch controls during the descent. We were assigned MOD arrival into SFO. The center controller gave us direct MEHTA after CEDES. MEHTA is also a initial approach fix on the ILS 28R. We figured we would be performing a straight in ILS CAT II approach to runway 28R. We briefed the approach well ahead of time and had our checklist finished. Upon approaching MEHTA we were handed off to approach. Approach then gave us a descent; we started to descend then the controller gave us a speed reduction. Then the controller gave us a right turn off the localizer (LOC) for spacing. I commented to the controller that we cannot not descended and slow at the same time very well. The controller then gave us another turn back to the LOC just a couple of miles outside the final approach fix (FAF) and instructed us to intercept the final approach course cleared for ILS 28R. I read the clearance back and told the controller that we were too high to capture the glide-slope from the current angle. The controller then vectored us back across the LOC and gave us another decent. Then the controller turned us back to the right to intercept the LOC at a 45 degree angle and re-cleared us for the approach. The controller then gave us a further turn to intercept bring us to a 90 degree intercept about a mile from the FAF. The FO tried to use the autopilot to capture but I told him this is not going to work and that the autopilot will fly through the course. I told the controller what I told the FO just as we blew through the course. The controller then cancelled approach clearance. I told the FO to execute a go around / missed approach. Before I could tell the controller he told us climb and maintain 5000 and gave us a turn to the left. I could see that the FO was a bit overwhelmed so I pushed up the power for him and I told him I am bringing the flaps to 8 and he then called for the gear. He did a good job for a pilot with 100 hours in type. We got the aircraft cleaned up and the autopilot on. As we were climbing though about 3;500'-3;800' at over 1;200' fpm the controller then changed our altitude to 4;000' feet. I told the controller we were going to overshoot by a few. He said that's fine. I then took the controls and kicked off the autopilot because I saw that it did not capture and it was safer to do that then explain it. I leveled the aircraft off as we climbed through 4;000' feet. We got to about 4600' before we were able to get the climb energy safely stopped for the passengers / FA. We immediately descended back to 4;000'. Then reengaged the autopilot. I gave the flight controls back to the FO. The controller then re-vectored us back onto the approach. Still close in but we were already low and fully configured expecting a tight vector to final. We landed without incident and the weather was not as bad as reported. The spacing was too close and we were left high for too long. Most jets do not descend well and slow at the same time. This is what led to our being vectored off course the first time. Increase spacing and plan ahead more. Descend aircraft earlier if possible. I should have taken the controls from the first officer after the first vector off course. However; I have to say the first officer is a good pilot and has good judgment; he is just inexperienced in a jet. It won't be long until he is fully up to speed. I should have requested a go around after I saw how the controller was trying to limit spacing and keep us just about at the FAF after the first turn.

I was the Pilot Flying (PF) on an ILS approach to the airport; we received multiple vectors (including a vector directing a 50 degree intercept); speed changes and altitude changes over a short period of time which resulted in an unstable approach. The Pilot Monitoring (PM) advised ATC that we would be executing a missed approach. As we began the missed approach we were initially assigned an altitude of 5000'. As we were passing through 3800' the controller amended the altitude clearance to 4000'. The PM advised the controller we would 'blow' through the altitude. The controller's response was 'that's fine'. After several more vectors; speed reductions and altitude changes we were vectored back onto the ILS. The flight was concluded without incident. Low ceiling. Experience of the controller? Multiple vectors; speed changes and altitude changes.

CRJ-200 Captain describes a missed approach which results from poor ATC handling during vectors for an ILS approach at SFO.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 750; Flight Crew Type 500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Holding short of XXL on taxiway. Given clearance for takeoff. Student began taxi. Started drifting left. Applied right rudder. Kept drifting left. Applied more right rudder and brake. Kept drifting. Pulled power and full right rudder and brake. Instructor took controls and applied full right brake and rudder. Brake pedal went to floor. Left tire hit gravel and pulled plane to left. Spun plane 180 degree in gravel. No damage to aircraft; propeller; or taxiway lights observed.

C172RG Flight Instructor reported steering issue during takeoff roll.


Training / Qualification; Distraction; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft had MEL concerning Flap Channel B Fail. We briefed contingencies concerning slow flap operation; reviewed MEL and QRH procedures. I was pilot not flying. At 3;000 FT MSL; we were cleared the visual to Runway 23 and handed off to Tower. We began descent down to 2;500 FT and checked in with Tower; we were cleared to land [Runway] 23. First Officer commanded flaps 9. After actuation the flap control; EICAS indicated 'FLAP FAIL' caution. The flap position indicator showed 0 and was still normal white color. I told Tower we had an issue to work through and requested handoff back to Departure for delay vectors. We were cleared back up to 3;000 FT and handed off to Departure frequency. I then began the QRH procedure for No Flap Landing. Required landing distance was determined to be available on Runway 23. We discussed other relative nearby options. We had 2;300 LBS fuel on board. A major airport was within range; but arriving with just under 1;800 LBS planned and cruising for 45 minutes. We decided best to land at [our destination airport]. We briefed irregularities and threats. I then declared emergency and informed approach of our flap failure condition. We provided souls on board and fuel remaining information. I briefed the Flight Attendant that we had an irregular situation and had called the trucks; but that we felt there were no severe threats. We arranged a signal in case we needed passengers to brace. We then flew the approach and landing as planned. We touched down and rolled out without any further irregularities.Threats were system failure; irregular operations. I feel there were no errors nor undesired aircraft states.The only area I feel I could have done differently would have been to divert to a maintenance base. But I'm still confident I chose the safest choice. Benefits: passengers got where they intended; aircraft in position for next flight. Drawbacks: no maintenance. May need to fly in or drive in maintenance personnel.

An EMB-145 EICAS alerted FLAPS FAIL during the initial flap extension with Flap Channel B MELed; so an emergency was declared and with fuel considerations; an uneventful landing followed at the filed destination.


Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors

We were on final approach for Runway 28R. We had selected the FMS Bridge Visual 28R and had been cleared for the approach. As usual we were slightly high on the profile due to numerous ATC speed assignments during the approach. At 1;100 FT we were on profile with the PAPI showing two white and two red lights. We were 3 miles from touchdown and descending at about 700 FT per minute. At this point the Tower Controller transmitted; 'low altitude alert; check your altitude immediately.' This caused us to delay our 1;000 FT call and was very distracting. We replied that we were on profile and that the PAPI confirmed that. A short time later the Tower Controller transmitted 'no comment'.

A320 Captain reports being issued a low altitude alert by SFO Tower while passing 1;000 FT on the PAPI for Runway 28R.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Human Factors; Airport; Aircraft; MEL; Procedure

Flight operating from ZZZ to ZZZ1. Starting the flight; both Captain and First Officer had to study and review MEL procedures for the Main cabin door indication being in-op on the ECAM door page.  Coupled with this non-standard maintenance item; the crew also learned that ACARS for the Airbus fleet was inoperative.  This meant that the flight crew was unable to receive a flight close out; takeoff numbers; or contact Operations. Take off numbers had to be received through calling Dispatch via cellphone.  We were also requested to radio in our out and off times to Operations once airborne; adding to the pilot workload.  Once at cruise; the flight operated without issue.Upon arrival into ZZZ1 while on the ZZZZZ RNAV arrival; the Captain radioed into Operations requesting gate.  The flight crew was told to go to Gate XX.  The remainder of the arrival and approach into Runway XXL went without issue.On landing the flight crew exited runway XXL at Taxiway E.  ATC instructed us to hold short of [Runway] XXC and monitor Tower on [frequency].  The flight crew were then told to cross [Runway] XXC and hold short [Runway] XXR.  After a short hold; we were told to cross Runway XXR and contact Ground.The flight crew crossed Runway XXR at taxiway E.  Upon exiting the runway; the flight crew contacted Ground and turned right on Taxiway B and started taxiing south to the terminal.  The crew were instructed to taxi via taxiway B-G-A to Spot XY.  The flight crew was confused by this taxi instruction since it is both non-standard taxi route and the crew were unfamiliar with Spot XY. Thinking that this may be a taxi to a hard stand or cargo spot and that our gate assignment had changed; the First Officer contacted (airline) Operations again to confirm our gate. The crew were told that our gate was still XX and that the gate was open.  Both Captain and First Officer reviewed their charts to locate Spot XY.  The crew checked both the 20-9 and 20-9B charts; and were unable to locate where Spot XY was located on the airport.  During the flight crews confusion with the taxi instruction and the controller; the flight crew missed taxi way G while taxiing south on Taxiway B.  When the crew queried ATC for help and clarification on the taxi; we received no response. The flight crew elected to stop on the taxiway.  After some time; the pilots were told we missed taxiway G and to stand by. At this time; Aircraft Y was the only traffic on Taxiway B or A; and no traffic was crossing the runway.  When the Controller finally got back to the flight crew; they were angrily told to taxi via B to Spot XZ; which is standard; and that the crew needed to copy a phone number for a possible pilot deviation.  As the crew continued its taxi to Spot XZ; it had to stop again to finish copying the phone number before it could contact Ramp Control for permission to enter.  Once the crew was able to contact Ramp Control; they were told to hold on the W line at XA; another very non-standard taxi route. The crew asked what this taxi was for; Ramp said that our gate was occupied.  The crew instructed Ramp control that Operations said our gate was open.  Ramp said that Gate XB was still occupied; which was not Flight's (number) gate.  There must have been a miscommunication between [Company]'s Ramp Operations and Ground Control.  The crew instructed the Controller that its gate was XX; and was told to taxi to the gate via spot XZ. When at the gate; the flight crew reviewed all of the available taxi charts.  The flight crew were only able to find Spot XY on the Low Visibility taxi charts.  Which are not required to be out during VMC conditions.  Also; Spot XY is a non-standard point for which ATC to send aircraft.  This non-standard taxi and Operations and Ground Control not being able to communicate our gate assignment helped lead to this taxi deviation.It is in the pilots' opinion that there several factors that led to this taxi deviation. First being this was anon-standard taxi route that is not commonplace at ZZZ1 airport. Also; the flight crew was instructed to taxi to Spot XY which while also non-standard; was not on any on the standard charts used during VMC operations.  The only chart that Spot XY is published is on the low visibly taxi charts; which is not standard to be used during VMC Operations.  Giving non-standard control instruction is not conducive to safe operations and can and will lead to confusion.Also (airline) Operations was not able to communicate our gate location to Ground. This may have led Ground Control to believe that Flight (number) was supposed to be at a different gate that was occupied.  This may be what prompted Ground Control to give the flight crew the non-standard taxi route.Another factor was that Ground Control was not able to communicate in a timely manner when the flight crew was querying them for clarification on our route.  Also; when the crew was able to communicate with Ground Control; the Controller was more concerned with giving us a number and telling us multiple time of the pilot deviation.  The crew was unable to contact Ramp control when needed; and had to stop the aircraft.Further issues the led to confusion was our ACARS being inoperative.  This meant the on the ground; pilots were having to work multiple frequencies at the same time.  At the time of the deviation; the First Officer was communicating on Ground Control for the aircrafts route; [Company] Operations for clarification on our gate assignment and switching ramp control for the aircrafts entry point into the ramp.  All of this while trying to navigate the non-standard taxi route; and assisting the Captain in the safe taxi of the aircraft.Finally; when the flight was confused with the non-standard taxi route it would have been better to stop and wait for the Ground Control to get back to us with clarification on the taxi route; however long that may be.

[Report narrative contains no additional information.]

Flight crew reports that inoperative ACARS resulted in excessive workload and subsequent errors during taxi at destination airport.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 17L

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 10800; Flight Crew Type 36

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Time Pressure; Workload

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 3500; Flight Crew Type 8

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Approaching DFW from the northwest via the BOWIE2 STAR we were proceeding direct to ICKEL at 5;000 feet for an expected ILS approach to RWY 18R. Approximately 8 miles from ICKEL; ATC advised us to expect Runway 17L; maintain 5;000 feet and current heading. We deselected Nav on the autopilot and selected heading mode and immediately started the procedure of changing the FMS programmed approach from 18R to 17L. ATC issued a frequency change; we checked in on the new frequency at 5;000 feet with assigned heading. The new Controller acknowledged our check-in and advised to expect Runway 17L. We were then cleared to 4;000 feet which was acknowledged. ALT hold was deselected and a descent initiated. The 17L approach had not yet been successfully loaded; but the Controller gave us the LOC frequency which was dialed into the #1 Nav. The Controller directed us to start the descent as it looked to her that we had actually climbed. The descent rate on the autopilot was increased and the FMS finally accepted and displayed the ILS 17L approach. The Controller cleared us to intercept the localizer and to expedite the descent to 3;000 feet. Being too close to the localizer to try and select an FMS commanded intercept; and seeing that we were probably going to overshoot the 17L localizer; the autopilot was disconnected; the rate of descent was increased and a right turn to intercept the localizer was initiated. After rolling out 1 dot right of the localizer an immediate corrective left turn was started. The Controller advised that it looked like we had lined up on 17C and asked if the airport was in sight then rapidly issued vectors of 150 degrees followed by 140; and then 120; all of which were complied with. The airport in sight call was made as we rolled back right to track the localizer; intercepted the glideslope and handed over to DFW Tower. Tower check-in and landing clearance were followed by an uneventful landing. At some point just prior to the Tower handoff; the Controller called traffic at 3 o'clock high which was acknowledged with 'traffic in sight.' The traffic was an airliner whose pilot stated he was too high to make the landing and requested vectors for another approach. The Controller apologized to him and said that she had had a Pilatus pilot ahead of him who appeared to be confused.This flight culminated with the one thing I dread when approaching a busy Class B airport; a close in to the airport runway change. The FMS; which had been programmed with the initial expected runway approach well before entering the congested terminal area; must be reprogrammed. New altitudes must be reviewed; new frequencies entered; and checklists completed all while funneling toward ever more congested airspace and frequencies. Even multi-crew aircraft often find their plate full when this happens. When we felt that the autopilot was not responding crisply enough to the changes it was given; we turned it off and hand flew the course intercept and approach. I fly into DFW frequently and have had no problems except when given a close-in runway change. The problem was compounded [in this case] by our desire to maintain a higher airspeed than normal so faster traffic behind wouldn't be inconvenienced. In the future; I will fly normal approach speeds.The runway change given by ATC created higher than needed workloads and [greater] conflict potential for all involved. Such changes should be questioned earlier and amended or avoided altogether. An earlier call of 'runway in sight' and use of a visual approach clearance would have made things easier for all of us; and might have saved the airliner's approach. Sometimes controllers are too controlling and pilots do not often enough take advantage of PIC [requested options] for visuals; etc. weather permitting. During the dreaded phone call after the flight; the TRACON Supervisor said he was looking into a possible pilot violation due to a Loss of SeparationAlarm.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

The time needed to locate; select; program; assess; assimilate and brief a late runway change--from 18R to 17L--as they descended into DFW contributed to the decision by the flight crew of a PC-12 to deselect the autopilot believing they were too close for an automated intercept.  The manually flown intercept was too aggressive and a loss of separation with another aircraft ensued.


Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was training on the RADAR controller position. I accepted a hand off on a Dash 8 from Approach when the aircraft was leaving 8;000 or 9;000 FT if I remember correctly. Inside of Approach's airspace was a VFR aircraft indicating 11;500 MSL of unknown type northbound and in direct conflict with the departing Dash 8 flight. The aircraft remained on Approach's frequency for a short time before checking on; which I assumed was because Approach was issuing the traffic. When the aircraft initially checked on he was climbing out of 10;000 for 12;000. I acknowledged the aircraft and issued a climb clearance to FL190. After the read back from the Dash 8 flight I issued the traffic of the VFR northbound at 11;500. The flight responded that they were responding to an RA to which I acknowledged. As soon as the conflict was clear; I advised the aircraft that the traffic had passed behind and was no factor. When asked; the flight stated that Approach never issued them any traffic in regards to the VFR aircraft. I believe this could have been avoided had approach issued the traffic to the flight before switching him to Center frequency. In hindsight I should have issued the traffic first before any sort of control instruction.

En route Controller described a TCAS RA event between an IFR and VFR aircraft within TRACON's airspace. The IFR was handed off and transferred to the Center; the reporter notes the conflicting traffic should have been issued by the TRACON.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Pre-flight; In-flight; Aircraft In Service At Gate

The Company has issued flight attendants iPads to use on aircraft. They are now requiring that we carry it to perform our preflight and inflight safety. That is all well and good; but they require it to be near our jump seats (we have no place to store it) and on our persons during the flight (we have no place to keep it in our uniforms--presently no pockets are big enough to store it.) I think it is a step forward in the right direction; but unrealistic.

Flight attendants are now required by the Company to carry iPads to perform preflight and safety duties. The Flight Attendant reported that there is no place to store them near the jump seats or on their person.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Dispatch sent us an ACARS [message] during sterile cockpit regarding a [flight crewmember] scheduling issue. The message was received [during our approach and landing; a mere eight minutes prior to our block arrival.]Scheduling had already tried to contact me twice via cell phone/voicemail during a single round-trip and were too impatient to wait for me to call them when I returned to base; which is already [contractually] required. They even changed my schedule multiple times during the round-trip; so if I had picked up the first time and been notified; they still would have had to contact me again. They shouldn't be contacting me at all; since I'm required to contact them. Worse; they are now involving dispatchers with resources used for the operation of a safe flight during a high workload flight environment. This has been a repeated abuse and whatever punishment; if any; the company is receiving for misusing the ACARS is not enough to get them to stop.

An Air Carrier Captain expressed his displeasure at his company flight crew schedulers utilizing ACARS communications during critical phases of flight for non flight related purposes; i.e. revising flight crew schedules.


Workload; Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

I was conducting my first trip on IOE and we were descending via the IVANE2 arrival into CLT; we were approaching AMOBE intersection at 210 KTS with the autopilot on. ATC had assigned us 36R then offered 36C to keep us clear of wake turbulence from heavy aircraft. The Captain [accepted the change] and switched runways in the FMS as we were approaching AMOBE intersection. This dumped the remainder of the arrival out of the FMS and reloaded the IVANE2 and new approach for 36C [all the way back to] the initial arrival fix. The autopilot continued to AMOBE before the FMS could be cleaned up and it caused us to overshoot the turn at AMOBE instead of continuing the turn to PELOY. The Captain immediately realized the problem; disconnected the auto pilot and corrected back to the proper course. We were then given a descent clearance to 4;000 FT and the flight continued with no further issues.If we had received the clearance sooner or later and cleaned it up before of after AMOBE sequenced in the FMS rather than during the sequence to the next waypoint; there would have been no issue. There was also increased task saturation since the Captain was evaluating my performance of pilot flying duties into a busy terminal area.

We had been assigned Runway 36R. We had this approach briefed and setup in the FMS. We were at 210 KTS; autopilot on and a couple miles from AMOBE...When selecting 36C it loaded the complete arrival and approach in again with a discontinuity behind AMOBE. We ended up flying all the way to AMOBE instead of flying by the waypoint and continuing to PELOY before I could get the FMS cleaned up.It would not have been an issue if I could have cleaned the FMS up faster or put in [the runway change] after the turn at AMOBE.

When Approach Control changed their runway as the flight crew of a CRJ-200 was approaching a turn at AMOBE on the runway transition portion of the IVANE RNAV STAR to CLT the FMS recycled the entire transition portion just as the jet was passing AMOBE. As a result the turn to the next waypoint was delayed and a brief track deviation resulted.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Type 15000

Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

We were making a visual approach to Runway XXR in ZZZ. The airport was is sight; while the downwind leg and convective activity was present south and west of the airport. After receiving landing clearance from Tower; a wind check was issued and landing speeds adjusted accordingly. The First Officer (FO) was flying and called for landing Flaps 30. The Before Landing Checklist was accomplished and I did a second wind check. We discussed the new speeds and continued the approach. Shortly thereafter; we received a Too Low Flaps Warning. Upon inspection I discovered that the flaps were in the 25 detention. The flaps were moved to position 30. I considered a go-around; but elected to continue the approach as we were on speed and path and a go-around would have been into the convective activity.Obviously; this was a failure to read and verify the checklist items. While debriefing the event with the FO; we both agreed that the monitoring of the wind/ weather was a factor as we considered our performance on final. Also being in a MAX 8 was a factor as the location of the flap gauge is different than the NG; possibly affecting the visual flow of the checklist items. Other factors were the weather deviations on arrival and non-standard arrival into a visual from the north side of the airport and terrain monitoring. Passenger issues requiring Dispatch coordination and the aircraft being met by Law Enforcement at the gate. It was a very busy flight at the end of a long day.

B737 MAX8 Captain cited fleet differences; and checklist compliance contributing to a Too Low Flaps warning during a visual approach with convective weather also being a distraction.  Procedural deviation was corrected; stability evaluated and approach and landing completed.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14; Flight Crew Total 1345; Flight Crew Type 834

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was planning to land at VAY to meet some friends.  I was navigating VFR; and used radar services ('flight following') for part of the 15 nm flight.As I was turning from right downwind to right base for runway 26 at VAY; my plane lined up with runway 19 of airport N14; which is only about a mile away.  I lost situational awareness and mistakenly thought I had just turned final and was therefore lined up with runway 26 of VAY.  I landed at N14 and didn't realize my mistake until I saw another aircraft at the far end of the runway I had just landed on.On the CTAF -- which is the same frequency for both VAY and N14 -- I heard someone say something like; 'Isn't runway 1 the active?;' implying correctly that I had landed in the wrong direction for the winds.  I don't know whether the opposing plane on the runway was preparing to take off or had just landed.  We both veered left and passed by each other on the runway at low speed without contact.Once I realized my error; I continued to taxi to the far end of the runway; did a 180; and -- compounding my stupidity by not exiting the runway and regrouping -- took off from runway 1 for the one-minute flight to my correct airport; VAY.I quickly realized that I had made a number of dangerous errors.  Because 99 percent of my flights are IFR; I know that I was rusty on VFR navigation and procedures.  IFR is; most times; easier than VFR!  Since I was already aware of the proximity of the two airports; I should have been vigilant for a possible identification error.  I also should have verified the numbers on the landing runway (although the numbers at N14 are fairly well faded) and with my heading indicator.  Plus; since I had onboard GPS WAAS; I could have dialed in an approach for my intended destination and used the guidance to verify I was landing in the correct place.  Also; once I landed at N14; I should have exited the runway; shut down; and planned my next hop rather than just taking off immediately.

A general aviation pilot reported confusion that led to landing at the wrong non-towered airport; resulting in a ground conflict with another aircraft.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 14.9

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors

DFW Approach Control (D10) started a handoff to me on Aircraft X when I was working Local Control East and North combined.  I saw Aircraft X scratch pad that the aircraft wanted a downtown tour of the Dallas skyline.  I called the D10 controller to inform him that Aircraft X cannot proceed with a downtown tour in the North flow (RY 31L/R) operations per our local standard operating procedures.  The D10 controller said 'since when'.  I told him it's been in effect for the last four or five years.  His respond was 'Oh; come on' and he hung up on me. The D10 Controller took back the handoff and allowed Aircraft X to proceed into my airspace for the downtown tour; without prior coordination or a point-out.  I had another Aircraft Y who was on the Letter of Agreement (Dinner Tour) and is allowed to maneuver close to the Downtown Dallas Skyline.  When Aircraft Y started his southeast bound turn to parallel the finals to Dallas Love Field at 1;500 feet (Safe Operation) he was in conflict with Aircraft X; who I was not talking to.  I called the D10 controller to get Aircraft X out of my airspace; since Aircraft Y was only 4 miles northwest of Aircraft X at 1;500 feet on converging courses.  The D10 Controller completely ignored my multiple calls to get his Aircraft X out of my airspace. After 'screaming' over the landlines; I did observe Aircraft X making a turn towards the southwest to leave my airspace and avert a conflict with Aircraft Y.In my career of working in multiple Centers; approach controls and towers I have never seen another controller blatantly disregard another Controllers request and arrogantly violated another Controllers airspace. About 45 minutes earlier I had a D10 Controller handoff another small aircraft for the downtown tour over DFW.  I told him; I could not accept the handoff due to our local standard operational procedures not allowing downtown tours in the North flow.  He seemed unaware of our local procedures but complied with my explanation. I recommend that when Dallas Love Field management implement new procedures all surrounding facilities and customers know about our new procedures.  I had a Bonanza depart off the Addison airport (6 miles North of Dallas Love Field) requesting a downtown tour of the Dallas skyline during this same session; working local control as stated above.  Once again; I told the Bonanza pilot I could not approve his request due to our local operating procedures.  The Bonanza pilot told me 'Since when'.   Once again; I had to apologize and inform him it's been in effect for four or five years. To correct this problem in the future; and avoid further conflicts between controllers and pilots; Dallas Love Field management must inform adjacent facilities and pilots of our new procedures.  No more thinking management can put these major procedural changes in a read and initial binder and expect controllers in both facilities to remember the new procedures.  Many times new controllers at the new facility have no idea what was in the read and initial binder years ago. To ensure new major procedural changes are implemented correctly and avoid confusion to the users. Management must put these new procedures in a Letter of Agreement and not a read and initial binder.  Controllers can't remember everything they have read in a Read and Initial binder years ago. But controllers do look at the Letter of Agreements to refresh their memories.  For the pilots to remember our new operations we need to update the 'Facilities Directives' or 'Green Book'.  I realize it would be difficult for management to classify every procedural change as major or non-major.  But we owe it to our new controllers and customers the latest up to date information so everyone will be on the same page. Last but not least someone in management needs to talk to the D10 Controller and explain to him his actions are not acceptable and completely unprofessional.  This is one 'FAA' and we must allwork together to make this the safest system possible.  The FAA cannot afford or allow individual controllers to deliberately break the rules at their own discretion and not suffer the consequences for their actions. Just listen to the tapes and everyone will hear the blatant negligence of one arrogant D10 controller.  It's obvious some controllers do not think rules apply to them.

DAL Tower controller reports of an airspace violation by a D10 controller. The D10 controller then has his aircraft become a conflict for the DAL controller's aircraft. The D10 controller wanted his aircraft to be able to do a downtown tour; but due to the runway configuration at DAL it was not approved.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 83; Flight Crew Total 17407; Flight Crew Type 48

Distraction; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 53; Flight Crew Total 7297; Flight Crew Type 449

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Air Traffic Control; Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

The Captain was hand flying the aircraft on the ZZZZZ RNAV Departure off of Runway XXR from ZZZ; climbing to FL 190. ATC issued our flight an intermediate level off altitude of 10;000 ft. Approaching 10;000 ft. and about to level off; our flight received a TCAS RA to 'Maintain Vertical Speed;' due to an aircraft that appeared to be descending towards our aircraft and crossing our flight path. The Captain complied with and performed the TCAS RA maneuver. Then; the ATC Controller and what sounded like an ATC Supervisor intervening; issued instructions to the other aircraft to turn and climb immediately. At this point; our flight's TCAS RA changed from a 'Maintain Vertical Speed' to a 'Descend Now.' The Captain complied with the changing 'Descend Now' TCAS RA maneuver. Once the radio communications cleared; the First Officer was able to inform ATC of our TCAS RA. As a result of our TCAS RA maneuvering and the ATC issued turn and climb instructions to the other aircraft; the other aircraft appeared to pass our aircraft forward; above and to the right at less than 500 ft. Our flight then continued to ZZZ1 without further incidence.

Departing ZZZ on the ZZZZZ ZZZZZ1 transition; we were initially cleared to FL190. Passing 8;800 ft.; we were told to stop our climb at 10000 ft. The Captain was hand flying. At 9;800 ft.; we received a 'maintain vertical speed' in a climb RA. ATC gave the conflicting aircraft; a light twin; an immediate climb and turn to the east. The traffic was pointed out to us and I responded; 'Roger. Aircraft X TCAS climb.' I then spotted the aircraft (conditions were VMC) but was unable to tell ATC due to radio congestion. As the conflicting aircraft began to climb away from us; we received a course reversal to 'DESCEND. DESCEND NOW' RA. The Captain followed the guidance. ATC gave us a frequency change and I read back the clearance and added 'TCAS descent' and changed frequencies. I estimate we passed within 500 ft. as the aircraft passed above us and to the right; turning away from us. The flight continued without incident to ZZZ1.

B777 flight crew reported an NMAC during the departure climb


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Mid shift. MSN Approach and Tower close at 1100L/0500Z. I was anticipating approach calling to give me the airspace. I had Aircraft Z on frequency descending for MSN. I noticed MKE Approach had Aircraft X about 5 miles in front of Aircraft Z. I called MKE to have them slow Aircraft X so I could a sequence started. I descended Aircraft Z into MKE airspace about 3 miles before their boundary with mine. MSN called and I took the airspace. They had Aircraft Y on final and the pilot was told to cancel on frequency with Center. In the meantime I vectored Aircraft X on a 360 then a 180 heading to build space between him and Aircraft Z. Aircraft Z was approaching the final approach course and I still hadn't received a cancellation from Aircraft Y. I reached out to Aircraft X to attempt Aircraft Y on company frequency and then I called the OMIC desk. He inadvertently hung up on me the first time. He called back and I passed the information. He asked a question and paused. I wasn't sure if he hung up again or what happened so I became distracted by this and didn't watch Aircraft X close enough. He clipped a portion of MKE approach and RFD Approach without any coordination. Aircraft X did not come near any other aircraft; it just entered the adjoining airspace. Aircraft Y finally called and cancelled and I was able to get Aircraft Z and Aircraft X into MSN. A few minutes later...The MVA just west of the final approach course for Runway 36 at MSN is 036. Aircraft A checked on inbound for MSN direct to PACOV. I had control from FARMM sector and RFD Approach. I'm certain I descended Aircraft A to 036. I turned the aircraft to a 270 heading to build space between JIA and SKW (2 weeks earlier Aircraft A had to go around twice while inbound to MSN and I didn't want it to happen again). I gave Aircraft A direct PACOV and moved my attention to the MSN arrivals I had next in line. When I got back to Aircraft A the aircraft was descending out of 032. The MVA in that area is 031. I asked Aircraft A to verify altitude and assigned altitude; it responded that it was just leveling off at 030. I issued a low altitude alert and climbed it 031. The pilot and myself questioned each other. He thought I issued 030; I thought I issued 036. I have not listened to the tapes so I'm not sure which is correct. There are always MSN arrivals that land right after MSN closes. Traffic has seemed to pick up in the last month or so though. 3 out of the last 4 mids I have had 8-10 aircraft scheduled to arrive at MSN within the same 15 minute span after they closed. MSN is a one-in; one-out airport once they close. I cannot clear another aircraft for approach until the previous has cancelled. This makes for a complex workload. It would also help immensely if MSN Approach stayed open for another 30 minutes. It would provide a much better service to the aircraft.

ZAU Controller reported difficulties with an airport closing and IFR traffic into the airport after the nightly closure.


Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Logbook Entry; Procedure

The logbook advised us of a placarded Start Valve Light. We understood it to mean that we were to do the procedure. We could start the engine ourselves and do the procedure. The procedure called for normal engine start except after start we had to verify that the pressure had returned to prestart level to indicate that the valve had indeed closed. The engine started normally and we saw the pressure drop back to the prestart level; so we thought the valve had closed and everything was fine. However; the pressure fell to zero after turning the pack on and we returned to the gate and shut down the engine. Maintenance showed up and said they were supposed to start the engine. We had not seen any Maintenance personnel prior to this. After rereading the MEL we discovered we had read the wrong section. We were in 80-1 and the placard was on the next page 80-3. The indications matched for 80-1 so we did not realize this mistake until after shutdown and talking to Maintenance. Maintenance changed the start valve and the engine started and operated normally. There were no other problems. The flight was uneventful.I have several suggestions as a result of this event:  1. More care to ensure that we are indeed on the correct procedure. 2. Have the company fix our aircraft and not have the logbook so full of placards. This aircraft had 5 MEL deferred items on it. Every aircraft has MEL items on it causing extra workload. 3. If maintenance action is required prior to departure; it would help if that were annotated on the flight plan. 4. Better coordination with Maintenance. We did not talk to Maintenance prior to departure. They were nowhere to be seen when we departed; which was about 2 minutes early starting the push and on time starting the engine. 5. Have the company stop blaming pilots for maintenance delays and threatening legal action against us. During this event; passengers were accusing us of breaking the aircraft on purpose. We are being coded with delays for 'additional checks' when there are placards. I was blamed for a delay three days prior to this event. This environment is increasing stress; increasing distractions and compromising safety.

[Narrative 2 contained no additional information.]

The flight crew of a B737-800 inadvertently utilized the wrong MEL placard when dispatched with the left engine start valve deferred. Only after noting zero pneumatic pressure after turning on the left pack did they realize the start valve had never closed. Maintenance replaced the valve.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 108; Flight Crew Type 1978

Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On approach to RJAA for ILS34L; ATIS reported surface winds (approximately) 310/24G28. Earlier; aircraft on both 34L and 34R had reported wind shear with +/- 10 and +/- 15 knots; respectively. This information was also on the arrival ATIS. We had an approach speed for Flaps 30 of 147 with a wind correction of +15 for a reference speed of 162. Passing approximately 500 AGL; a performance increasing wind shear occurred with the IAS noted at 175; right at the flap limit speed for Flaps 30. Throttles were reduced to correct the deviation; but at no time was idle thrust selected. By 300 feet AGL; speed was approximately 165-170 and fluctuating. Passing 200 feet AGL; we were on Glideslope with PAPIs showing one white and three red. We were within speed parameters for a stabilized approach and in a safe position to land. At this time the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) gave several warnings of 'Too low; terrain'. At this time; we verified our configuration and noted the Flaps indicated 25 degrees; but the handle was in the 30 degree detent. Without delay; we executed a go around.The go around was uneventful and we were sequenced back to final with minimal delay after declaring 'minimum fuel' with approach control. Passengers were put at ease with a reassuring PA. The following approach had similar conditions; but reactions to the expected performance-increasing wind shear resulted in airspeed deviations of no greater than 10 IAS. The resulting approach and landing were uneventful.I would have expected 'Too Low Flaps' for this condition. I am not sure why we got 'Too Low Terrain'. Either warning would have given the same result; but we would have had more clarity on our issue with the more appropriate warning.

Air carrier Captain reported experiencing gusty wind conditions which necessitated a go-around followed by a successful second approach and landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 46; Flight Crew Total 327; Flight Crew Type 46

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

After touchdown the aircraft bounced once about a foot and settled back to the runway with the right main gear touching first; followed by the left main gear about 2 seconds later; then nose wheel. The aircraft was heading to the left side of the runway and this point I over corrected to the right which caused the aircraft to veer to the right and go off the right edge of the 30 feet wide runway. The aircraft traveled approximately 100 feet and I corrected back onto the runway with the aircraft under control. I slowed the aircraft and taxied to the end of the runway; back taxied to the turnoff normally. The edges of the runway have a gravel strip about 2 ft wide and then mowed grass. The runway itself is asphalt. There are no runway lights at this airport. There was no damage of any kind to the aircraft or the runway.To the best of my recollection my approach speed was around 75 knots with 30 degree flaps. Touchdown was just past the numbers on center line. Wind was reported just prior to landing as 160 at 8 knots.My conclusion to this incident was excessive speed on landing and failure to control the aircraft on roll out. Contributing to it possibly was the fact this was the 4th landing I had ever made in this aircraft which we had recently purchased. Each preceding landing; the control of the aircraft on roll out seemed to be degrading. An inspection of the steerable nose gear has been scheduled. Also to the best of my knowledge; my feet were not on the brakes during the roll out.

C182 pilot reported loss of directional control after touchdown resulting in a runway excursion.


Workload; Training / Qualification; Physiological - Other; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

During approach ILS/30L had thunderstorms and rain in the area; but no negative PIREPS or SIGMETS. Noted 10 KT tailwind on final with Tower calling 15 KT quartering headwind. Discussed go-around possibility with First Officer; at 500 FT - with runway insight - Tower called with 'Wind Shear Alert for Runway 30L.' We executed a go-around and were directed to turn 170 degrees and climb to 4;000 FT. During the turn; we saw the aircraft 18 degrees nose up; full go-around power with 0 VSI for approximately 5 seconds at 1;800 FT MSL. The First Officer started the 'Wind Shear Chant' with VSI; Radio Altimeter and Airspeed Callouts. As we passed through this area; we entered an updraft and the aircraft started to climb quickly. Passing 3;500 FT MSL; the First Officer called out 3;000+ VSI and I noted that 'ALT CAP' was illuminated on the FMA and the yoke was pushed all the way forward by the autopilot. As we passed 4;000 FT MSL with about 2;000+ VSI; I disconnected the autopilot and exerted more forward force to stop the climb at approximately 4;400 FT MSL and return to assigned altitude. ATC was notified and said 'no problem; no traffic in your area.' We proceeded to a holding pattern and waited for that rain area to clear before completing a successful approach about 40 minutes later.

[Narative #2 contained no additional information.]

A MD-82 Captain executed a go-around at 500 FT after Tower alerted WINDSHEAR ALERT and during the climb experienced a zero VSI with 18 degrees nose up; followed by a 3;000 FT plus FPM climb with nose down.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

We were told to line up and wait. [A] 757 took off in front of us. We were then cleared for takeoff within approximately 1 minute behind the 757 and given an assigned heading. We were approximately 500 feet; but less than a thousand and encountered wake turbulence. The Captain had full left aileron to counteract the roll and we were unable to turn to the assigned heading until we were out of the wake. We advised ATC that we were in the preceding aircraft wake turbulence. We were then advised by ATC to contact Departure.

B737-700 First Officer reported encountering wake turbulence shortly after takeoff from LAX behind a B757 that required full aileron deflection.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After a nice initial very light touchdown in the first 3000 feet of the runway; the speedbrakes did not auto deploy and it took me a couple seconds to realize that I had to manually deploy them. This meant that I was delayed getting reverse thrust and manual braking; resulting in me using more than typical braking energy. This was a hot day; 91 degrees; and a high altitude airport. By the time we got to the ramp we had hot brakes of 6 on the left side of the aircraft.We had briefed a higher than normal descent on the approach 3.1 degrees and knew that speed control was very important on final. I had to use speedbrakes several times during the approach to help control speed and I had placed them back in armed. However; after we lowered the gear approximately 10 miles from the airport; the FO had started the landing checklist and they were armed at that time. Then I used the speedbrakes one last time to slow for final flap extension. I am convinced that I failed to return them to armed after this last extension in flight. The result was that it took me a couple of seconds after initial touchdown to manually deploy them and I wasn't able to get into reverse thrust and braking until further down the runway than I would have liked. I also thought I had to exit abeam the landing threshold for another runway; but I could have rolled down to the end (approximately 1000 feet) and used a little less braking than I did.I believe that we should have restarted the landing checklist after I used the speedbrakes; so as to ensure that they were returned to armed. I also think that this shows why it is a good practice to fail the speedbrakes in the sim for annual training; so that we realize quickly that they have not auto-deployed. The Airbus incident in the Philippines is proof of how important this confirmation is!

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B767-300 flight crew reported the speedbrakes did not automatically deploy on touchdown at a hot; high altitude airport which resulted in a longer rollout; heavier braking; and hot brakes.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 536; Flight Crew Type 361

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

ZZZ; taxied from FBO to runway XX (announced movements on CTAF). Holding short of runway XX; switched to Center frequency. Third leg of the day; from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2 (via ZZZ3; ZZZ). Called Center to pick up IFR clearance. Center told me to standby. No word back after 3-4 min; so I called Center again. Once again told to standby. OAT was around 97 degrees; engine idling and oil temps starting to climb (a distraction/concern). Center finally called back (around 8-9 min from initial call) and gave a quick clearance - as filed; code; released and call again airborne. I read back the clearance. Typical chain of events; with hot weather; delays getting clearance; idling for a long time at the runway... So once released I taxied across the hold short line without calling again on CTAF. I checked final; and then the runway and noticed another plane on the runway at the other end (business jet; lights on).  I immediately did a 180 and exited the runway - the plane at the other end was apparently already on the roll and departed well above us. Runway is 5;950 ft; so we were never very close...but clearly could have been a problem had I continued my takeoff roll.When I was on with Center; I was not simultaneously monitoring the CTAF frequency - so I never heard the other plane announce their departure. I also didn't switch back to CTAF and announce after being released so they didn't have any indication I was taking the runway. I should have been monitoring CTAF the entire time; and of course announced my intentions before moving.Factors include: multiple delays reaching Center; rising engine temps and concern about timing with Center; last of three long legs that day (one leg with weather over the Rockies); single-pilot (one non-pilot passenger); and probably allowing communications with Center to feel like a tower situation (release treated as takeoff clearance). Winds light. We had landed runway XX on the way in (as had other planes) - so wasn't expecting a plane to depart from the other end (but probably fit their direction of flight).Probably wouldn't have happened if I had departed VFR and picked up clearance in the air (stayed on CTAF on the ground); but I knew Center was reachable on the ground and figured I should just get clearance first. Should have monitored CTAF at the same time for situational awareness.

Pilot reported taxiing onto the active runway without announcing their intentions on CTAF and observed a business jet on takeoff roll. The Pilot immediately exited the runway; with the jet passing overhead; well above.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Approximately ten minutes after take off; we got a master warning light and an emergency DC bus failure indication. The Captain declared an emergency and we completed the appropriate QRH checklist. The Captain elected to return; and we were cleared for a visual approach. Shortly after; we noticed that we also had a total anti skid braking system failure as well. We requested to side step to the 13;000 foot runway due to the anti skid failure. The Captain landed the plane approximately 1;000 pounds overweight and taxied to the gate uneventfully.

Approximately ten minutes after takeoff; we saw the 'DC EMER BUS OFF' warning light illuminate. We then completed the 'DC EMER BUS OFF Light' emergency checklist. We selected the Emergency Power Switch to 'on' to reinstate emergency DC power to the Captain's instruments and radios. We declared an emergency with Departure Control and immediately returned for an uneventful overweight landing (131;900 pounds landing weight). After landing; we taxied to the gate.

MD83 flight crew experiences a 'DC EMER BUS OFF Light' during climb out. The Emergency Power Switch is selected to on to reinstate emergency DC power and the flight returns to the departure airport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Procedure

We were on day 3 of pairing. It was scheduled for 7:42 minutes. Leg one took us over-block by nearly 45 minutes prompting us to keep an eye on our max flight time of 9 hours. Next leg we were over by :14 minutes. Upon arrival; we checked our schedule and the block time was changed from 1:41 to 1:30; a difference of 11 minutes. We sent an ACARS message to our Dispatcher asking why it was different and he had no idea why. He said 'I have not touched a thing' I then asked 'So Scheduling lowered our block time without talking to our Dispatcher?' and his reply was 'no one has told me anything honestly.' It seemed very fishy that our block time was changing the closer we got to our 9 hours scheduled block time. I find it very hard to believe that the block time for that leg should have been lowered in the conditions we had. There were EDCT programs and delays up and down the northeast and deicing conditions in the Northeast as well. How could that warrant a lower block time? I didn't complain about it then because I knew our block time was going to be over that and it would have been changed back to the actual time anyway. They then changed our block time on the next leg from 2:54 to 2:52. We blocked 2:59. If we had any extra delays on the ground on our final leg we would have timed out. To us it looked like Scheduling was changing our block times to look legal. I have heard that the schedulers could adjust the times after talking to our Dispatcher and finding actual winds and conditions for that flight; but our Dispatcher did not talk to them. The conditions in no way warranted under blocking anything. I am glad we made it in the MAX 9 hours but as you see it was close. If there is to be a change in our scheduled block time; we need to see proof from our dispatchers so we know what was done was legal. I have heard of schedulers reducing flights by up to 25% in the past keeping people legal by 1 minute. I hope the FAA can review this matter and make the right decision. If this is legal; we as the PIC; need more information so we know where they came up with their information

An ERJ-175 Captain reported that Scheduling change the actual flight time on this day with adverse weather at nearly all stations so as to keep the crew below 9 hours.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

During descent into LAS on the SUNST4 arrival and passing through 14000 feet;we received a MASTER CAUTION with the associated EICAS message of PKNG BRK NOT RELEASED. We requested a hold and were given point IPUMY at 12000 ft. We ran the associated checklist; resetting the parking brake. The light remained on and we elected to land at LAS with emergency response on standby. We attempted to contact Dispatch and Maintenance via Operations Frequency (they were unable to transfer our calls) and via AIRNC (no response on frequency). We finally sent an ACARS message informing Dispatch of our plan. We notified the FAs (Flight Attendants) of our plan and we were not anticipating an evacuation on the ground. I made a PA to let the passengers know of the issue. I also cycled the parking brake one final time to try to reset the light. We notified ATC that we were [requesting priority handling] and requested emergency response in case of blown tires.During the descent; the MASTER CAUTION went out. We elected to maintain [priority handling] since did not know the issue with the brakes. I also verbalized I did not intend to use reverse thrust to prevent adverse thrust and FOD ingestion.On landing; we did have a slight drag on the right side of the aircraft; but was notified by the ground responders that all four tires were intact. We taxied to the gate with the trucks following and deplaned as normal.The following flight was canceled due to this brake issue becoming a trend (previously noted on an earlier flight but the light reset prior to checklist usage per an AML (Aircraft Maintenance Logbook) entry.

Captain reported Parking Brake EICAS warning annunciation during landing approach.


Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Environment - Non Weather Related

Flight was a functional flight check to investigate vibrations reported by multiple crews on [the aircraft]. Maintenance had accomplished multiple maintenance repairs. They showed me all their documentation as well as a balanced AML and the spotting message. The IOC Duty Chief Pilot walked me through FM; and Dispatch and [Maintenance Control] briefed me on the spotting message. [The] Maintainer gave us a thorough walk around and briefing on what we would be looking and listening for. We then could not sign in on CCI due to our location at CLT. My sharp copilot FO (First Officer); called IOC and had them talk us through signing in through our smart phones.We finally taxied about 38 minutes late. Climbout was normal but busy as my FO was Pilot Flying; and I was coordinating with ATC for an altitude and route that would allow us to run the tests. The filed route by Dispatch would not work. We were both coordinating with the Technician on the jump seat as we investigated the vibrations. Just about top of climb; FL300; I noticed a printer message. Much to my surprise; it was a reassignment from tracking; or additional flying as it is now called. [The FO] and I ignored it and almost on cue the vibrations and noises started as we were leveling off. We flew the rest of the [Flight Check]; compiling with ATC and [the Maintainer's] requests; and landed uneventfully. I realize that IOC Scheduling is in crisis mode most of the time. However; tracking MUST NOT ever reschedule or add flying to pilots on a functional check flight. These flights are NOT the norm for line and reserve pilots and can be very busy and even stressful. I was behind due to multiple delays as mentioned above. Before we even started engines; I told [the FO] and [the Maintainer] we would NOT rush. DO NOT RESCHEDULE OR ADD FLYING TO [FLIGHT CHECK] CREWS.

A319 Captain reported aircraft vibration and noise due to unknown cause during a flight check following a difficulty in signing in for duty and an attempt by Scheduling for additional flying.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; General Maintenance Action

I was the captain and the pilot flying. On our descent passing through 18;000 ft; we made our initial PA announcement to have all of the passengers seated for our arrival and turned the seatbelt sign on. There was a layer of scattered white puffy clouds with tops at 13;500 and bases at 11;000 feet. There was not any convective activity in the area and nothing in the ATIS about severe turbulence. When we reached the cloud layer; we encountered severe turbulence sending one of the aft flight attendants into the ceiling. Two of the passengers also hit the plastic panels above their seats because apparently they were not wearing their seat belts contrary to the illuminated seatbelt sign being on and the announcement from the flight crew members that was previously made. We then called and talked to the Lead Flight Attendant to check everyone out and she then had called us back to tell us that one of the aft flight attendants was hurt. We then called ops and requested an ambulance. We then told ATC about the severe turbulence we had just encountered and also asked for an ambulance and then asked them for a short base turn to get the aircraft on the ground. We then landed the aircraft and taxied to gate. The paramedics met the aircraft to check out the injured flight attendant and determined that she needed to go to the hospital. The two passengers walked off the aircraft and never asked for any medical attention from us.With that being said; I made four entries in the aircraft log book:1.)The aircraft encountering severe turbulence and speed between 280-340 and lasted 6-8 sec straight and level flight. 2.)O2 panel was damaged in row XX ABC.3.)Side panel damage in XX ABC 4.)The tray table was damaged in Row XY seat E.

A320 Captain experiences severe turbulence during descent; upon entering scattered white puffy clouds with tops at 13;500 feet; at a speed of 340 to 280 knots. Two passengers and a Flight Attendant are tossed into the overhead; with the Flight Attendant requiring medical attention.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.0

Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was working Local position during a relatively slow period. Aircraft X came over to me on a visual approach on the inbound leg of the approach and the aircraft was west of course and descending slowly on the approach. The aircraft remained high on the approach and slightly west of course the entire time but appeared to be correcting. When the aircraft reached short final the ASDE (Airport Surface Detection Equipment) alerted with a taxiway alert. As required; I instructed the aircraft to go around at which point the pilot said unable we are single engine. I simply said roger and waited until the aircraft was safely on the ground to explain to the pilot why I had instructed him to go around.There are several issues with this scenario. First is the lack of communication. The lack of communication keeps valuable information from the people that need to know when something odd is going on; one of which was me; the Local Controller working the aircraft. The second issue is there was never an emergency called for the aircraft; my understanding is the aircraft did want to declare an emergency. We as air traffic controllers have the ability and should had declared for the aircraft. If an unplanned engine shutdown does not call for an emergency; I am not sure what would. In the event of an actual crash; the time it would had taken the airport fire department to reach the aircraft could had been used fighting fires and saving lives instead of traveling to the crash site. The third issue with this scenario is the ASDE alert for the taxiway. This feature is new and still has some issues; it does not allow for any approach other than a straight in. And most general aviation traffic on a VFR day on a VFR approach do not make perfect straight inbound legs. I could tell out the window that the aircraft was not aligned with the taxiway. The tolerance for the go around alert are too tight and needs to [be] addressed. When I instructed the aircraft to go around; luckily he said unable and continued in to land. I give this pilot credit for continuing; a lesser pilot who blindly follows ATC instruction may had performed a single engine go around which could had lead to a catastrophic event; resulting a torque roll which is a very real possibility in a light twin aircraft. So in my eyes there should had been an emergency called for the aircraft and the communication should had been better between the Tower Supervisor and the controllers; and the ASDE alert for the taxiways should be addressed.

Tower Controller reported an aircraft which they had not been notified had an engine out; refused their go around instruction for a false ASDE alert.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 1000

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

A near midair collision occurred while in the traffic pattern. I was cleared to take off after [a] Cessna and was told to follow traffic. I took off and turned to John Wayne's standard 15 degree offset heading while climbing to TPA. Around 500 feet AGL I realized I no longer had traffic to follow in sight. I heard the Cessna request a short approach and ATC approved [him] for a short approach and clearance to land [Runway] 20L; after this I assumed that the traffic to follow was downwind and that I would have visual contact if I turned towards crosswind and downwind. As I was in the turn ATC asked me if I had traffic to follow in sight still. I reported back that I no longer had traffic in sight. ATC then told me to just fly a wide downwind for spacing. At this point the Cessna reported that [they] needed to make a right turn to avoid me. This whole time the Cessna was not in my visual; so they must have been beneath us and out of line-of-sight. I can only speculate on how exactly we converged as I had zero visual reference at this point with the Cessna. The Cessna and I continued flying the pattern together with no further incident but I did notice this Cessna was not flying the standard 15 degree offset on upwind and seemingly a little lower than TPA. I am unsure if this was an attributing factor to the loss of separation we encountered.

PA28 Instructor Pilot reported an NMAC in the traffic pattern at SNA airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 1500

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

During pushback from the gate; rechecked the ATIS and discovered that there was a runway change from 26L to 8R. Started the engines and entered the new runway data into the FMS and briefed the Captain on the new SID procedures for 8R and the proposed taxi route (Papa to Mike) and the Hotspot at the intersection of Papa and Mike. The Captain acknowledged the runway change; the new SID procedures; the new taxi plan; and the location of the 8R hotspot. Received taxi instructions from Ground to taxi to runway 8R via Papa and Mike taxiways; for runway 8R. Approaching the hold short line for Runway 8R; I noticed that the Captain was still progressing at a somewhat rapid pace and advised him of the need to hold short at the first set of hold short lines just in front of us. The Captain replied that he had flown into and out of Miami numerous times and was confident that the second set of hold short lines; further in front of us; was the appropriate hold short line for Runway 8R. As I saw no safety issue involved in proceeding to the second set of hold short lines; I deferred to the Captain's judgement; having flown into and out of Miami only a handful of times and never before having taken off on Runway 8R. While holding short of the improper hold short line; Miami tower cleared us for takeoff on 8R and subsequently added that the next time we taxi to runway 8R to make sure that we do not cross the 8R hold short line; which was behind us. I believe the primary human factors event that caused this runway incursion was task saturation. Learning of the runway change during the pushback/engine start procedure caused a number of critical steps to be accomplished in a (self-induced) short amount of time. Changing the flight plan; re-entering the performance numbers for a new runway; re-briefing the SID procedures for that runway; and then briefing the new taxi route; caused us not to brief in great enough detail the importance of the hotspot at the end of our taxi route. I believe if we had started off with the Runway 8 brief at the gate; as opposed to while taxiing out; that the outcome of this taxi would not have resulted in a runway incursion. [My company] has been very good at explaining to aircrews the history of runway incursions on this runway and the importance of extreme vigilance in taxiing to this runway. Although I had never taken off from Runway 8R; my antennae were up because I had done a lot of prior reading from numerous [company] publications on the importance of holding short at the proper set of lines. With all this prior knowledge; I felt it would be intuitive when I reached the hold short area as to which set of lines would be proper to hold short of. Even though I did tell the Captain that I felt we needed to hold short of the first set of lines; I relied on his judgement that the second set of lines was proper. In retrospect; I should have shown him the documentation in both the airport diagram and the Company pages that clearly states that the first set of lines is the proper hold short point for runway 8R.

Air Carrier First Officer reported advising the Captain to hold short at the first set of hold bars approaching Runway 8R on Taxiway M at MIA. After continuing across; the Tower informed the crew that they had crossed the hold line then cleared them for takeoff.


Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Workload; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

At cruise enroute; we noted the fuel slowly feeding from the main (wing) tanks with the center fuel pumps ON. During a 16 minute period; we burned a total of 1;900 LBS of fuel. All should have come from the center tank. In fact only 1;200 fed from the center tank and 700 LBS fed from the wings (mains). We ran the QRH procedure 'fuel not feeding from center tank'. Using the checklist; we discovered that leaving the left main (wing) tank pumps OFF while leaving the center tank and right main (wing) tanks ON allowed us to use center tank fuel and maintain fuel balance between wing (main) tanks. We calculated that we could make our destination with reserve fuel and alternate fuel even if the center tank fuel became unusable. We continued to the filed destination. We contacted Dispatch and Maintenance via radio. Dispatch calculated we would be within both Center of Gravity (CG) and Zero Fuel Weight (ZFW) limits with arrival fuel of approximately 3;500 LBS in center tank and 7;000 LBS in each wing tank. We declared an emergency since we had a problem with the fuel system even though we expected a normal landing. We briefed the Flight Attendants. I briefed the passengers on the PA to assure them in case they noticed emergency vehicles near the aircraft following our arrival. We made a normal approach and landing. We terminated the emergency following landing and made a normal taxi to the gate.

A MD82's fuel transfer system did not properly pump fuel from the center tank to the engines until the wing tank boost pumps were turned OFF. Because of the fuel and CG imbalance an emergency was declared for landing.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Speed All Types

The event I am reporting actually occurred after I left the D-side position; but I made other controllers aware of the aircrafts involved about 10-15 minutes prior to the event. There were two aircraft; one VFR and one OTP that were operating en route at the same altitude; 085. I told the Controller I briefed that I was watching the aircraft because they were about 10 miles apart and same altitude and the back aircraft was a little bit faster (about 20 KTS or less). The Radar Controller ran a route line to illustrate where the aircraft were going. About 10 minutes later; the Radar Controller was relieved by the Controller that relieved me on the D-side; combining the two positions since traffic had started to die down and the R-side had been in for about an hour and 30 minutes. At about that time; a little after; the two aircraft got within a mile at the same altitude while they were in Sector 42's airspace; but talking to Seattle Center Controller. No traffic calls were made by either of the R-side controllers and the VFR aircraft said that he was going to file a 'near mid-air collision report.' The session leading up to this event was characterized by heavy traffic; VFR and IFR; multiple approached being made; and a newly certified R-side Controller. I am a CPC-IT here at ZOA; I am certified at both the D-side and R-side positions of this sector. The sector is characterized by mountainous terrain; lots of military use airspace; and a mix of IFR inbound/outbound from the Bay Area; as well as numerous VFR's maneuvering and flying through. This sector is complex; because the VFR's become a huge responsibility; along with all the other things going on for IFR aircraft. Also; a lot of aircraft will opt to go VFR on top (OTP) to avoid re-routes and altitude changes for the terrain. I think that this sector and Sector 40 both are very different from other low airspace that I have worked; due to the VFR complexity; and there need to be specific outlines for responsibilities concerning VFR and OTP aircraft communicated to controllers.

ZOA Controller describes situation where two aircraft come close to each other and one of the pilots declares a NMAC.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 142; Flight Crew Total 5006; Flight Crew Type 1759

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused

During preflight departure checks. Flight attendant informed the Captain that a passenger's cell phone was accidentally dropped in the sidewall next to a window seat. Maintenance was unable to retrieve the dropped cell phone. According to the maintenance MEL the item/issue could be deferred. However; most cell phones contain some type of lithium ion batteries which have been known to cause a fire hazard in certain atmospheric conditions/environments. Operating a Class II NAV/ETOPS flight with no immediate diversion options should a fire situation arise presented a situation the Captain was not comfortable with. Therefore; the decision to declare 'Unable to Operate' was made; and I as the First Officer fully supported.

B757 First Officer reported passenger Lithium Ion Battery powered cell phone dropped in sidewall of passenger cabin.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 7; Flight Crew Total 4311; Flight Crew Type 382

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Departed W41 (Crisfield; MD) planning to [a nearby airport] VFR. Shortly after departure I contacted Patuxent Control Tower and asked if R4005 was hot. Tower said 'not hot.' I acknowledged that transmission and proceeded direct to WHINO intersection; my filed SFRA Flight Plan entry point into the SFRA airspace. I climbed to 6;500 feet crossing the Chesapeake Bay. About 8 miles southeast of WHINO; Potomac Approach Control gave me approval to proceed direct [destination]. Shortly thereafter; Potomac Approach Control told me [I have a phone number] to call upon landing pertaining to a possible airspace violation. After landing; I called and talked to a controller at Patuxent Approach Control. He asked me if I was familiar with the restricted airspace in the Patuxent area; in particular R4005. I advised him yes and that I had called the Control Tower and they told me that R4005 was 'not hot' and I proceeded direct to WHINO. He advised me that the R4005 was active above 3;500 MSL (it is usually surface to but not including FL250). He told me there was no issue and no action would be taken. He was not aware of my radio call to the Tower. Upon reflection; contacting the Approach Control would have been appropriate as; apparently; the Tower Controller was not aware of the status of the restricted area. It would have been helpful if the tower controller had directed me to contact approach or verified the status of R4005 with approach before responding. If R4005 was cold Approach Control most likely would have given me flight following across the Bay; which would have also been a good idea.

Pilot reported of violating a restricted area. Pilot called Tower near restricted area; ATC advised Restricted area was not hot. Pilot continued on course. Pilot then was advised after landing by approach control that he had violated restricted area in question.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 3500

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Came in for landing with Memphis center. Was given bad vectors inside of the FAF (this wasn't the first time Memphis has done this late at night with [a lot of traffic] coming in) to within 3 miles of heavy aircraft in front of us and told to do a rapid descent to 3;000 and then a few seconds later told to also slow down to 170 knots and then cleared for a visual approach without being asked if we had the airport or aircraft in sight. I was so upset and looking for aircraft outside and in at the TCAS that I flew past the center line and I think even past the parallel runway centerline before correcting back.Although we had the airport in sight. I wish I had refused the visual and made ATC give us better vectors even if it meant coming back around for a stable approach.Most centers won't vector you in that close to aircraft or past FAF like Memphis approach does and I consider it poor ATC of aircraft assuming that everyone will be visual and vectoring an IFR aircraft inside of the FAF or too close to other aircraft.

EMB-145 Captain reports being vectored to a visual approach inside the FAF and too close to a heavy jet during a night approach to MEM.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 4025; Flight Crew Type 450

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew

I checked the weather and NOTAMs for my flight. There were no NOTAMs stating there would be any personnel or equipment working on or in the vicinity of any airport surface. The freight arrived and it weighed just over 2;800 LBS putting me 100 to 200 LBS under gross takeoff weight. It was loaded and I blocked out after the Tower had closed. I made all appropriate taxi calls on Tower frequency stating that I was taxiing to Runway 33 for an east departure. My colleague was returning from another flight so I announced I was holding short of Runway 33. Immediately after my colleague made his radio call that he was clear of all runways I made my radio announcement of my intentions to take off of Runway 33 and do a left turn out for an east departure. My colleague said later that he heard my radio call and wished me a good flight; which was the only other radio transmission that I heard other than my own. The weather was such that I did not need to use CAWI [Continuous Water Alcohol Injection]; but being just under gross takeoff weight and having up sloping terrain off the departure end of 33 and CAWI was available to me; I opted to use it anyway. Upon taking the runway and putting the propeller speeds to high I didn't notice anything unusual except for a lighted airport maintenance truck parked off to the right of Runway 33 safety area which remained stationary throughout my takeoff roll. My first indication of a problem occurred just after reaching V1. As I neared the intersection of the crossing runway; a person in the middle of the active runway that I was using shined his flashlight at me. Without hesitation I pulled back aggressively on the yoke to clear the obstacle. As I passed approximately 25-30 FT above the obstacle I saw there was an unlit truck parked on the active runway with three people (all wearing vests) one on the nose of the truck; one on the tail; and one just outside the door of the truck. After completing my after takeoff and climb checklists; I transmitted my departure to the east. Upon my return I reported the incident to my Dispatcher and followed up later by reporting it to our Chief Pilot. I did clearly see at least one truck with their beacons lit out of the runway safety area in the grass. I didn't know there were three trucks until the following morning when I was discussing the incident with my colleague who was also flying that night. If I would have heard them transmit their intentions or if I would have seen a beacon on the active runway prior to entering it or prior to starting my take off roll OR prior to passing the point of being committed to the take off; I would have not taken off. There were no NOTAMs informing me that I should have been looking for personnel or equipment on or near the runway. I believe a contributing factor was timing in that we may have both transmitted our intentions at the same time blocking each other and neither of us was aware of the other's intentions of taking the runway. Posting a NOTAM would have made a large difference. The only sure way of preventing this occurrence is to have a 24 hour operational Control Tower.

SA227 pilot reports narrowly missing an unlighted truck parked on his departure runway at night; after the Tower had closed.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue

Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy

We were pushing back and the Ground Crew was using a non tow-bar type tug. It's difficult to see the tug from the cockpit. We were cleared to start engines and we started both. We were not aligned with the taxi line when the Pushback Crew paused movement. We only heard static from the Ground Crew over the intercom. The Captain never stated; 'parking brake set.' Again; we were not aligned with the taxi line so as we began rolling forward; it looked like we were being pulled forward. Again; this type of tug is not very visible; however I looked right and saw the tug was backing away and I immediately notified the CA (Captain); who applied brakes immediately and stopped the aircraft. We still barely managed to communicate with the Ground Coordinator because of radio static but he did remove the steering bypass pin and we continued with operations.The Ground Crew needs to verify that their headsets are working properly. Not being able to hear them very well with all the static is partially responsible for the breakdown In communication. I also have an expectation that the tug driver will line the aircraft up on the taxi line; which did not happen here and so we didn't immediately notice that the aircraft was rolling forward on its own.

First Officer reported problems communicating with ground crew during a pushback.