Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 23

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Airport; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

A Traffic (TFC) Watch Cessna had requested to proceed on TFC circuit. I approved his request with the LUNA transition. I made the appropriate point out with LCW who is responsible for the arrival traffic. The LUNA Transition is the most conservative; and I thought had built in separation. As this C172 was proceeding north along LUNA road; I noticed that a Falcon was descending below glideslope; not uncommon for a visual approach. I called traffic but had two TFC Watch Cessnas on frequency at the time; both responded; garbled; but I thought I heard one say he had traffic in sight; so clarified exactly which TFC Watch Cessna; and told him to maintain Visual separation. As the first TFC C172 proceed north bound; I noted a B737 in bound from northwest was also descending below glideslope on a Visual approach. I called traffic with the C172 pilot stating he was 'looking.' He had wanted to turn east which would have put him under the arrival. I told him to continue north to keep him west of the arrival corridor for the B737. I noted the B737 not turning inbound towards DAL but rather making more of an ILS approach (wider) without the altitude restriction. I told the C172 to turn northwest to create more space. The B737 finally turned towards DAL. In the northwest turn I did not realize that I had violated DFW Tower's airspace; I was more focused on keeping the C172 west of the arrival. I was later informed by my supervisor that there were also separation issues with both arrivals. We discussed appropriate visual separation usage and alternatives to LUNA transition for any fixed wing wanting the same transition north in our airspace. I will no longer allow the LUNA transition but rather utilize the Tower transition to totally eliminate the 'looking' situation or rather the reliance on visual separation unless protections are restored. One of the problems with being an older controller is I remember when two things were in place regarding the traffic watch aircraft and the LOA. Number 1- the LOA was written so that the most conservative transition; in this case the LUNA transition; was 'bullet proof' meaning that traffic watch could fly it and no coordination was required because the VFR aircraft was at least a mile and a half away from the finals especially for the Runway 13L arrivals which both of these were. Apparently; this LOA does not provide that Controller/Traffic Watch protection. I admit I am not sure when that protection disappeared; however; I am now well aware that there is NO protection at all. Number 2- D10 used to restrict inbound traffic to 'at or above 2;500 until established on final' or some would use 'until the mixmaster' a local point of reference; which also provided built in protection. I was aware that some at D10 to include their Support Specialist believe that no VFR aircraft have any business in Bravo airspace; and have therefore discontinued this restriction. Some also say you can not put an 'at or above' or 'paper stop' restriction on any aircraft doing an approach.My recommendations are: 1) Make a decision: if VFR Traffic watch/or other VFR aircraft have no business in Bravo; then inform the Traffic Watch and all other VFR fixed wings; and write the LOA to reflect this attitude.2) Any LOA should be written (as before) to provide built in protection. Realign airspace if necessary. Most of the subject airspace is of no impact on DFW Tower.3) If VFR aircraft should be allowed in Bravo; then reinstitute the 'at or above' restriction by D10. It worked for 15 years before someone decided Bravo was not for VFR.

DAL Controller reports difficulties with traffic watch aircraft conflicting with arrivals.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Workload; Fatigue; Distraction

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Captain had a Vmo (Max Operating Speed) exceedance after leveling off from a climb in a clean configuration at 8;000 ft MSL. The alarm and I notified him and he corrected by reducing power and slowing down. The filed altitude for the flight was 7;000 [feet] but due to terrain we had to climb to 8;000 [feet]. The change to the flight plan and what we briefed on the ground caused distractions between MFD display; ATC instructions/communications; [and] flying the plane and aircraft control.  This was during leg 5 of a 5 leg day and we were in our 12th duty hour.The cause of this exceedance I believe is due to the lack of experience the captain has with this aircraft and the challenging operations at [Company]. The lessons I learned from this is to be more vigilant with monitoring the Pilot Flying during high workload and transitions. Example; leveling off from a climb.

Air carrier flight crew reported aircraft encountered Maximum Speed exceedance in cruise.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A computer program designed to reduce fuel loads has caused weight and balance irregularities. Dispatcher had to manually check the performance landing to give to the crew due to this information not being included in the final weight and balance message. Cause; this is an unexplained company program built by non-experienced dispatchers or pilots. The intent is obvious but multiple problems including this are keeping the dispatcher from following flight progress and delaying flight releases. Safety has become a problem.

Dispatcher voiced concern regarding a new software program designed to reduce fuel loads claiming the attention required of this new system detracts from more important duties.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 780

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Flight from ZZZ-YIP after the PETTE2 arrival we received a vector in IMC toward YIP. We broke out of clouds at 3;500 MSL and advised Controller. Controller then prompted us to look for YIP with a direction and distance. Seeing an airport in that direction with a runway we believed to be 23 we believed that we saw YIP. As we turned onto final we saw that there was no parallel runway and the localizer did not intercept.  Also we saw a smaller aircraft much closer to the airport on a base leg to the same runway. We immediately broke off the approach; climbed and turned and contacted Tower and then contacted approach for a vector back to YIP. Detroit Approach advised we were lined up for ARB and gave us a vector. We then had visual on YIP; notified ATC and were cleared for the visual 23 left once more. As me made our turn toward the airport the Captain continued to turn following a localizer that had captured what we later determined was the back course. I advised him the airport was to our left. It was hard to see in the haze. But he believed that airport to be DTW. I advised ATC we lost contact with YIP and would need a vector to ILS 23 left. We safely landed the aircraft.

Corporate Jet First Officer reported discontinuing a visual approach to YIP airport when it became apparent they lined up for the wrong airport.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

While working radar received approval for Aircraft X direct to APF from the east/southeast for a Visual Approach to the advertised runway on right traffic. APF Tower approved it so I cleared and switched the aircraft. Shortly thereafter; APF Tower launched IFR Aircraft Y off Runway 14 via automatic release with no regard to Aircraft X whom they had approved on the departure end of Runway 14 and were talking to. Loss of IFR separation and a possible NMAC was about to occur without action. APF Tower coordinated on the shout line that they were stopping Aircraft Y at 1;000 feet since Aircraft X was still at 2;000 feet; and that they would switch communications of Aircraft Y to me with no mention of visual separation being provided. I asked them to put Aircraft Y on a 060 heading to avoid and climb them to 2;000 feet since their assignment of 1;000 feet was below the MVA of 1;500 feet. I received communications with Aircraft Y and it appeared Aircraft X was no factor; but was immediately faced with a traffic alert with VFR traffic inbound to APF; 1 mile from the Class Delta airspace. No resolution was provided by APF Tower before switching Aircraft Y who had to take evasive action to avoid the VFR traffic which was described to me as 'head on; same altitude; less than 1 mile.' I do not believe a loss of IFR separation occurred; maybe because APF momentarily assigned Aircraft Y 1;000 feet; an altitude below the MVA before I had to advise otherwise. A NMAC was possible with the conflicting VFR traffic resulting from the turn; which was not resolved by APF prior to transfer of communications. APF Tower needs to be educated on not approving IFR inbounds direct if they will have departing traffic which will conflict. They also need to be educated on not assigning departing IFR aircraft an altitude below the MVA (this is not the first time this has happened). Additional education on selecting headings to avoid VFR traffic in their airspace; and not switching prior to conflict resolution.

RSW TRACON Controller reported Tower released a departure below the MVA and on a conflicting heading with other traffic.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Relief Pilot; Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft was being flown by the First Officer (FO) with the International Reserve Officer (IRO) in left seat. I; the Captain; was sleeping in the bunk. I woke up when I felt some bumps than went back to sleep. Upon return to the Flight Deck the crew informed me of the Moderate Turbulence and 10 seconds of Severe Turbulence. They considered the Turbulence Sever due to the abrupt change in altitude. A drop of 100 feet than a climb of 400 feet which resulted in a Caution and Altitude Alert due to the plane climbing to 38;300 feet. The autopilot remained engaged and the aircraft returned to 38;000 within seconds. The crew informed Fukuoka Control which begin advising other traffic. Dispatch was notified and an entry was made in the logbook. I followed up with maintenance on the ground in HKG.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing severe turbulence which caused momentary excursions from their assigned altitude.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 0.5

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Aircraft X landed Runway 24 and exited at Taxiway Alpha 2. Taxi instructions were given to the Terminal ramp via taxiway Alpha. Vehicle 1 and Company (3 trucks total) were operating to the left of taxiway Alpha (from the perspective of Aircraft X) and southwest of Alpha 3. A cautionary advisory was given to Aircraft X and it was acknowledged by the pilot. Vehicle 1 and Company in an attempt to be proactive said that they'll give way to the aircraft and 'cross Taxiway Alpha' as the three trucks began crossing Alpha without controller approval. Aircraft X was forced to brake and come to a complete stop.Vehicles should ask for ATC approval before executing any operation on the movement area.

BHM Tower Controller observed vehicles entering a taxiway without approval causing an aircraft to suddenly stop.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

I'm not trained to do anything; just saw a strange object floating but it looked like it was lacking balance as it was swinging badly. I don't know how or where to report such incident so I came here.

Tower controller reported sight of a possible UAV.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 15

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Procedure; Company Policy; Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure

We were briefed that a new jump zone was being worked over the BNG airport. We were told 13500 Feet and below; up to 20 jumps per day; over one of the busiest VFR transition areas west of the Rockies. All of our Metroplex procedures; which includes several descend via routes; descend through this same area. The ONT arrivals in particular descend through that area somewhere between 10000-12000 feet. There is an airway that goes through that area with IFR aircraft at 10000 to 12000 feet.In addition we have another IFR route to airports (SNA; LGB) that goes right over the BNG airport IFR at 12000 feet. [A jump aircraft] called up the Springs sector for flight following at 12200 feet as it made it's climb and jump run. It just so happened that at the same time there was Aircraft X descending on the new a RNAV STAR. It was coordinated with me that they were stopped at 14000 feet as to remain clear of the jump aircraft. I had another descend via aircraft on an RNAV STAR descending out of 14000 feet. They initially go to 13000 feet and then to 11000 feet and further down to 8000 feet. I immediately stopped this aircraft; Aircraft Y; at 13000 feet; anticipating that I needed to get underneath them with Aircraft X.By the time I talked to Aircraft X I didn't feel I could safely get underneath Aircraft Y so I vectored Aircraft X on a heading of 230 and descended them to 6000 feet. As soon as they were passing through 12000 feet I turned Aircraft X back to the RNAV Arrival route. By the time I could safely descend Aircraft Y they no longer felt they could make the descend via clearance so I had to vector them off the route so they could make their crossing restriction. I wasn't busy thankfully. This is a lot of work for an aircraft that has decided to set up a jump zone in an arrival corridor. There is no Letter of Agreement (LOA); no procedures in place; no pre-planning for us as a facility; and no help from the powers that be up above us. We weren't even briefed until the morning of.Safety is a number one concern in the FAA and in this building and rightfully so. But allowing this operation to continue with no rules attached is not only completely unsafe; but it puts the controllers in harm's way as well as they will have to be moving aircraft all over the place to accommodate this person's operations. We can't even see the jump aircraft in that area because of poor radar coverage below 6000 feet. We already know that there are numerous aircraft every day that transition that pass low level because we see them pop up just west of PSP airport and just east of RIV airport. We can move aircraft to the best of our ability that we can see; but what about the aircraft we can't see and aren't talking to? We have no ability to advise the jumper when a low-level aircraft is transitioning the jump area and to give proper 'hold the jumps' calls. If this operation is allowed to continue; it is only a matter of time before a tragic event unfolds.This jump zone should not be allowed in this area. The flying public has the right to transition to and from the desert free from being in harms way. It is not fair to the poor people jumping out of planes having fun; not to know the actual danger they are in. It is not right to delay IFR passenger jets and to pose risks to them getting too close to the jump aircraft as it climbs and descends in its jump runs. If for some reason this jump zone was allowed to continue; guidelines; rules and procedures must be implemented in order to reduce risk.

SCT Controller reported a Parachute jump zone has been established which is in conflict with RNAV Arrival routes and busy VFR transition traffic.


Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Person Ground Personnel; Person Dispatch; Person Other Person

I was assigned Flight XXX leaving out of Gate X. Cargo mistakenly labeled a human remains as hazard material containing dry ice resulting in confusion during loading of the flight; inability to close the flight; long delay of Flight XXX and bringing of the flight back to the gate to off load the mislabel item . Also; the new hire did not stack the mail close enough leaving a lot of space causing shortage of space to load the bags that I have to go in to the pit to re arrange resulting in more delay of the flight. As a result; flight was over the limit by the time am ready to close it even though it wasn't showing on the scanner when I was loading.

Airline ramp personnel reported aircraft ground return to remove mislabeled dangerous goods and correct cargo loading procedural errors.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 480; Flight Crew Type 430

Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

A student pilot was flying a soft field takeoff. With the yoke pulled back and ailerons into the wind we applied power. We lifted off about 40 kts and even with crosswind correction we were pushed left very quickly. My student started to freak out. I was on the controls the entire time and called 'my controls.' He fought me for a moment and then gave me the controls. We stabilized the crosswind drift; but our main gear struck a taxiway exit sign which caused us to come to the ground and prop strike. We came to rest on the taxiway. No injuries from either pilot.

C172 instructor pilot reported a loss of control by a student pilot in crosswind conditions that resulted in a runway excursion and prop strike.


Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft

A C320 entered our sector from the South; handed off from Sector 10. His routing was DSD...SEA; which takes him over Mt. Hood; where the MIA is 13;200. Air Carrier X's altitude was 12;000. I asked if he wanted to climb to 14;000 or a reroute around the mountain. Air Carrier X responded that he wanted a reroute; so I gave him LTJ…SEA; with the intention to clear him direct SEA through the mountains once he was clear of Mt. Hood. LTJ...SEA passes through the Mt. Adams MIA of 14;300; but because there would be no frequency changes and it would be a long time before Air Carrier X would reach it; we were comfortable with the routing. When Air Carrier X neared the 34 boundary; I called him to give him a reroute. He did not respond. I tried again three times and eventually began relays through other aircraft in the area and asked surrounding sectors along his route to try to raise him on their frequencies and on guard. Management also asked other sectors and facilities to try to reach Air Carrier X. Air Carrier X proceeded through Sector 34 and had entered the Mt. Adams MIA level at 12;000 before he finally reached Sector 32; two sectors from us; and turned to avoid the mountain. It was never made clear to us why Air Carrier X had gone off frequency and could not hear calls from multiple transmitter sites and aircraft. It's difficult to say what the best solution here would be. The safe solution seems to be to either climb Air Carrier X to an altitude safe for his direction of flight or to give him a route that would definitely clear Mt. Hood and Mt. Adams. On the other hand; there's not a clear definition of how far is a reasonable distance when it comes to protecting for distant MIAs. Is it 50 miles beyond your boundary? 100? What if I had used my original plan of giving him a vector? He'd still be pointed at Mt. Adams; so is that unsafe routing? Should you provide extended or alternate instructions in the case of a NORDO; and if so; is that too cumbersome to be practical? This was a perfect example of the analogy of the swiss cheese lining up to create a dangerous situation. In retrospect; because Mt. Adams was fairly close to our Area; it would have been wiser to issue a routing to take Air Carrier X past Mt. Hood and through Mt. Adams and Mt. St. Helens. With that said; Mt. Rainier is not far past either of those two mountains; but it's far enough out that a B Area Controller is not planning routes around it. There's a balance between safety and practicality; and this incident gives me a lot to think about concerning where those two meet.

ZSE Controller described a MOCA/MVA event when an aircraft rerouted to avoid higher terrain then failed to answer attempts by ATC to establish communications.


Distraction; Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

[Our] left engine compressor stalled on takeoff between V1 and rotation. Captain flying; I was pilot not flying. Captain continued the takeoff. During each compressor stall; the aircraft would lose the knots (approximately 3) gained since the last compressor stall. Captain directed the stalling engine be pulled back to eliminate the compressor stalls. At approximately 80% N1; the compressor stalls ceased and the aircraft accelerated to takeoff. Emergency declared with Tower and appropriate QRH procedures applied. Engine left at 80% until less was required for descent to landing. [We flew a] 10 NM final flown to uneventful landing on the runway. [We] stopped on the runway for emergency equipment response; hot brakes due to landing at 141.4K. Airfied Rescue and Fire Fighters placed fans on brakes. Captain informed #1 tire was shredded but holding pressure. Captain did not want to taxi on shredded tire. Company response requested. After brakes cooled and extended delay in Company response; Captain inquired further about tire. Captain informed by ground personnel that tire was acceptable to clear the runway. Aircraft taxied clear of the runway to disembark the passengers and crew. After leaving the aircraft; the Captain and First Officer could see that the tire was not shredded but had thrown the cap which evidently had gone into the left engine. Aircraft turned over to Maintenance.

A MD-80 #1 tire shredded between V1 and rotation causing compressor stalls so an emergency was declared and the aircraft returned to land overweight. The aircraft developed hot brakes which were cooled on the runway.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

While on final approach to runway 27L at EGLL; ATC assigned us a speed of 160 knots until reaching a distance of 4nm from the runway. Unfortunately; I didn't hear the speed assignment. I started to slow prior to reaching the 4 nm point. Prior to turning on final; we had an auto throttle failure. The failure happened during the descent on base leg. We made two attempts to re-engage the auto throttles but we were unable to recover the system. When we turned and intercepted the localizer and were cleared for the approach; it was obvious we were gaining on the heavy traffic in front of us. We were 3.5 nm behind the heavy and picking up wake turbulence. I speculate this is when we were given the speed restriction. While clearing the runway; ATC asked why we started to slow to our final approach speed early. We told the tower we started slowing because we were picking up turbulence from the heavy aircraft in from of us.  I believe I missed the speed restriction because of three distractions in the cockpit. Auto throttle failure; wake turbulence and a loss of separation behind the heavy aircraft. When I heard the approach clearance; I assumed responsibility for wake turbulence separation. I was aware of the [policy] pertaining to expected speed restrictions on final. When I saw the loss of separation; we should have queried ATC about any speed restrictions.

B767 reported encountering wake turbulence in trail of a heavy jet on approach to EGLL. Reporter stated he missed a speed restriction because of distractions; and wanted to slow because of the wake turbulence.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 17; Flight Crew Total 3800; Flight Crew Type 10

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

During a flight for personal enjoyment in above listed aircraft; a failure of the rear seat control stick attachment point was experienced. The aircraft was kept in positive control throughout the flight and safely landed by the front seat pilot at the departure airport. At a later date; it became apparent via studying the regulations that this failure should have required an immediate notification under 49 CFR 830.5. Unfortunately; this was realized too late to comply with the regulation. Immediately upon recognizing the mistake; I placed a call to the NTSB ROC and reported the incident.This error was due to a lack of use of this particular regulation. I have immediately begun to study and review all aviation related regulations and guidelines provided in the FAR/AIM. Additionally; I have initiated an on-going personal study program to make sure that I maintain the highest level of knowledge and professionalism as it relates to federal regulations; regardless of the frequency of their application.

The pilot of the Aeronca 7AC had the rear seat control stick attachment fail; but the pilot in the front seat was able to land safely.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 178; Flight Crew Type 178

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

I was PIC and the only person on board. On my turn from downwind to final I noticed my airspeed was at 60 so I took action to increase my air speed in the course of doing this I found that when I turned to final for Runway XX at ZZZ I was too high. I put the aircraft into a slip to get down. When I rounded out of the slip I was over the runway numbers and doing 79 knots. I should have gone around but instead made the bad decision to try to try to force the plane onto the runway. When I touched down before the mid way point of the runway I was still too fast and locked up the breaks. This resulted a sideways skid into the grass on the left side of the runway. I went 30 feet into the grass.  There was no damage to the airplane or injury to me. I taxied back to the hanger for inspection. Maintenance confirmed no damage. Looking back now I should have just gone around after I was not happy with my downwind to base turn.

GA pilot reported aircraft was too high but instead of going around; reporter decided to land aircraft resulting in a runway excursion.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; General Declared Emergency

I was working an A320 a departure off of Runway XX and RADAR identified the aircraft and climbed to 15;000 MSL. Pilot reached 3;000 MSL and advised that he wanted to level off. Asked if he needed assistance and he said no that they were checking a landing gear problem. I then asked if he could accept a climb to 5;000 MSL for MVA and airspace integrity. He said that he could climb. After a few seconds he advised that he wanted to return to [the airport]. My Coordinator was listening to the frequency and started to coordinate his return to the airport. We were in a southeast configuration so the best path to return to the airport was not clear but I turned aircraft back to the airport on a heading of 310. Then the A320 advised that he needed to return to the airport immediately and get down. I asked the A320 if he had the airport in sight; and he confirmed that he did. My Coordinator had already advised the surrounding sectors of the emergency and they cancelled approaches and emptied the final because we were going to be opposite direction. I cleared the A320 for the visual approach to Runway 29. He acknowledged the clearance and advised that he needed to make a maneuver to stabilize the aircraft. I then noticed a target coming off of the airport. The Tower was unable to stop the departure of a B737. I needed communications with that aircraft to move him out of the way. My Coordinator was on the line with the Tower trying to get communications and also issue the heading that I wanted him on of 090 which would have pulled the B737 away from the emergency aircraft. I was delayed in receiving the B737 but I radar identified him and immediately turned him to heading 070 with an expedited climb to 15;000 MSL and called the traffic. The B737 reported the A320 in sight; but standard separation was already lost. This was an emergency situation that escalated quickly. I do not know how the situation could have been prevented or handled differently.

TRACON Controller described an emergency event when a departure requested an immediate return to the airport opposite direct to the flow of traffic; the Tower then released an opposite direction aircraft.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We shot an ILS Approach to 31R at DAL down to 100 ft above mins. When we broke out we were 100 ft left of the runway. We were coupled until minimums and everything was lined up. I piloted over to land under visual conditions. Fix the ILS critical area.

The reporter stated that they broke out about 350 ft above the runway and about 100 ft to the left of the centerline. The reporter stated they just maneuvered over and made an uneventful landing. The reporter also stated they discussed this with the tower and surmised the issue may have been caused by all the flights in line to land and/or the construction taking place in that area of the airport. The reporter stated that they flew the aircraft all day long and never had a problem; just this one incident. The reporter stated that the weather was awful (cloudy; rainy and foggy) with everything combined may have contributed to the confusion.

Air carrier Captain reported being 100 ft left of the runway when breaking out of the clouds on a DAL Runway 31R ILS Approach.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 219; Flight Crew Type 2502

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

At cruise altitude approximately 100 NM from top of descent we received a Master Caution Warning and noted HYD was displayed on First Officer's annunciator panel. We looked at the Hydraulic Panel on the Forward Overhead Panel and noted ENG 1 LOW PRESSURE light was illuminated. We then looked at our MFD (Multi Functional Display) System on Lower Display Unit and noted quantity in the Hydraulic A system read 21%. I was pilot monitoring and told the First Officer to continue to fly and take over communications while I referenced the QRH. I followed checklist for Hydraulic Pump Low Pressure; which led us to turning off the ENG 1 Hydraulic Pump switch. We continued to monitor the quantity and noted that it was continuing to decrease at a decent rate. I told the First Officer of my intentions to [advise ATC] before the situation deteriorated and he agreed with my assessment. We [advised] ATC and flew direct to ZZZ. I notified Dispatch of our situation and briefed flight attendants. In anticipation of possibly losing System A we reviewed the 'LOSS OF SYSTEM A' QRH checklist. I referenced the Non-Normal Configuration Landing Distance table and asked Dispatch to also provide me a value to check against my calculation; and the values agreed. Again; this was just preparation in case we lost System A.Eventually; our quantity indicated 0%; but we still had good pressure in the system with no other warning or caution lights. Once communications had been completed and QRH checklists run and reviewed; I again took over ATC communications. We briefed the approach and again reviewed our plan if we lost system A. Except for indicating no quantity in system A; but still with good pressure; we had a normal descent and approach. We lowered gear and flaps earlier than we would normally; considering the possibility that the increased demand on the system could lead to a loss of pressure. When we lowered the gear; we noted quantity increased to 20%; where it stayed for the entirety of flight. We had an uneventful landing and taxi into the gate. We debriefed with local Maintenance. We also debriefed our performance. We felt we maintained safety; managed the emergency well; followed standard procedures; communicated and considered possibilities if the situation deteriorated and how we would handle those situations.

B737 Captain reported main hydraulic system malfunction during cruise.


On approach for landing Runway 28 at ORD during initial contact with Tower; we were informed of traffic 1 o'clock; VFR helicopter north of runway center line. Configured for landing prior to 1;000 FT AGL at approximately 1;200 FT we received an RA - 'Climb; Climb'. I was already manually flying; so I added power and started to climb; made a quick look out and saw a helicopter; to our right; at our altitude; reverse direction; go by at an uncomfortably close proximity to our aircraft. TCAS announced 'Clear of conflict' simultaneously. We informed Tower of the RA and continued the approach to landing. As the 1;000 FT stabilized approach criteria had not been exceeded and the climb command was over immediately; we continued the approach and landed. I asked Tower for a phone number after clearing the runway. Suggestions; I spoke to Tower Supervisor; he informed me of a VFR procedure for helicopters to exit the airspace east between Runway 28 and Runway 27L. He also said it was not unusual for aircraft on approach to receive an RA while on approach while the helicopter exits the airdrome. I find this an unacceptable procedure for aircraft to have to respond to an RA in this phase of flight. More importantly; this helicopter was way too close to my aircraft. I believe we were lucky as I am not confidant this helicopter had visual with my aircraft or it wouldn't be so close with out evasive maneuvers. These procedures deserve review and scrutiny. This is a near-miss incident in my opinion.

Air Carrier landing Runway 28 at ORD described a TCAS RA event with a helicopter; ATC stating the helicopter was departing via a VFR procedure which did at times result in a RA with landing traffic.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 176; Flight Crew Type 10800

Training / Qualification; Distraction; Workload; Confusion

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 154; Flight Crew Type 6600

Workload; Physiological - Other; Distraction; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

Descending to and leveling at FL340; the Cabin Altitude Warning horn sounded. After a few seconds of identifying the nature of the horn; we donned the oxygen masks and established communication with each other. We discovered the cabin altitude had reached 10;000. In the confusion of the emergency; the aircraft had descended through the altitude FL340.  Recognizing that we had in fact a cabin altitude warning quickly; such as a warning light that is not installed on this aircraft. We could have assessed the situation in a calm; coordinated manner. Until you experience a true pressurization emergency; it is hard to describe the confusion associated with something so simple. When you do the cabin altitude warning brief at the beginning of the day; really think about the sound and what that means you are going to do. Try donning your mask someday with the headsets and glasses and 'establish communication.' It is more distracting than you think when you are just briefing it. Because of this event; the lack of a Cabin Altitude Warning light in some aircraft seems to be an oversight on safety. When you get a horn or any warning for that matter; there needs to be a visual cue associated. I strongly advise the installation of the light on all aircraft.

When we received the aircraft from the inbound Crew; they complained the cabin was hot and had difficulty cooling it down.  We were flying to XXX and then XXX so we didn't consider the hot cabin to be a problem. The plane did feel warm; especially for a -700.  Shortly after takeoff; I selected the packs to high and around the mid 20s we received a right pack trip off. We ran the QRH and reset the tripped pack and placed the packs back to auto. Fast forward an hour and we were given a descent from FL 400 to FL 340. I was commenting to the Captain what an unusually clear day it was when the autopilot disengaged and the Cabin Altitude Warning horn went off. At this time; we were probably at FL344 still descending with a clearance to FL340. The autopilot disengaging confused us and the Captain was trying to silence the horn believing it was the Autopilot Disconnect horn. It suddenly dawned on me that it was the Cabin Altitude horn and I said out loud; 'don the masks.'   We put on masks and established Crew communication. At this time; we had flown through our altitude and were around FL335. I looked at the TCAS and there was no conflict of traffic; the closest aircraft within 40 NM was 3;500 feet below us. ATC asked us to say altitude and I told him we needed lower. We ran the [checklist] and noted the cabin was indicating at 10;000 feet. In the mid 20s; the Cabin Altitude Warning horn stopped.  We removed the masks and were able to communicate much more easily. The cabin was stable and decreasing so we stopped the descent at 16;000 feet and continued to XXX.  There were no lights associated with the horn and nothing on the pressurization panel. The masks did not drop.  After an uneventful landing in XXX; Maintenance grounded the plane.

A B737-700 pressurization warning alerted at the same time the autopilot disconnected while descending through FL345 to FL340. The Cabin Altitude Warning horn confused the crew who thought for a while it was the autopilot disconnect warning. Once the pressurization anomaly was detected the descent continued to 16;000 feet and the QRH completed.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 21000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were departing TEB Runway 24 via the RUUDY 4. Shortly after take-off the Tower asked why we turned left (we didn't) and what was our departure instruction. I answered the RUUDY 4 and he said 'that's not the RUUDY 4; turn right 280 and call Departure'. I called Departure and nothing more was mentioned although I was instructed to level off at 1;500 FT. I'm not sure what happened other than the crosswind from the right may have blown us toward the 260 course. We would have intercepted as part of the procedure entered into our GPS. It looked to me like we departed and were maintaining 240 heading.

A light twin aircraft on the TEB RUUDY 4 SID was blown off track by a right cross wind; the Tower commanded a 280 heading which confused the crew who thought they were flying correctly.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 350; Flight Crew Type 2

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I was operating the banner tow aircraft within the northwest corner of the airport at 400 feet. This is what we call the banner box and we stay in this area to maintain separation from the airport traffic pattern which is at 800 feet. The airport was in east operations; winds from the east; below 10 knots.It was my 2nd flight in [this type of aircraft]; the first flight was done 2 weeks prior to this report. I was not completely comfortable with flying the aircraft yet.After flying within the banner box for approximately 30 min (no banners were used during this practice flight); I requested to join the traffic pattern to practice stop-and-go's. The tower cleared me to join the downwind leg for runway XXL. At that moment I was abeam the numbers of XXL; flying parallel to runway XXL on the north side. I begin my climb to 800 MSL and turn into the downwind leg which should have involved two 90 degree turns to the left. Instead; due to a lack of situational awareness; I make a 90 degree turn left; then a 90 degree turn to the right; as to join the downwind for runway XYR; which was not in use. I think that it should be noted that during my first flight in the aircraft; runway XYR was in use and I had been chair flying the night before picturing the airport in west operations.Now on the downwind for XYR; I see an aircraft at 12 o'clock beginning his downwind turn from crosswind (to face me head on); 400 feet below me. Immediately I begin a steep turn 180 degrees to the right; realizing that I had been flying the pattern in the reverse direction. At this point tower contacted me and asked if I understood what the downwind leg was. The aircraft that was mentioned turning downwind is now at my 2 o'clock; same altitude.Tower clears me for a stop-and-go on runway XXL; and I comply. This is a mistake; as I should have requested to terminate my flight at this point. I continue to make 2 laps of the traffic pattern. On the 3rd lap of the traffic pattern; I am on downwind; tower clears me to make a stop-and-go; number 4 for XXL; following a Piper Cherokee. I see traffic on short final and I see a PA-28 abeam me on final. I do not spot any other traffic behind this PA-28. Despite not finding the 3rd aircraft; I decide to make the terrible decision and conclude that he is the Cherokee mentioned by tower; and I begin my base turn to fly behind this PA-28. On the base leg; I again check for traffic on final and do not spot anybody in trail of this PA-28.I am on final when an aircraft reports that I have cut in front of them. Tower tells me that the PA-28 I am following is a Piper Arrow; and that I did not follow his instructions and promptly vectors me northbound. I do not know how close the Cherokee behind me got. No evasive maneuvers had to be taken by any of the planes.At this point I am told to make a full stop landing by tower and I comply. ATC never gave me a number to contact; although I definitely feel like I should have been given one.After securing the aircraft; my instructor (who was monitoring on the ground) and I decide to call the tower and apologize. We then went over my lack situational awareness which was the major factor that fueled the events that occurred during the flight.

GA pilot reported turning opposite direction in the pattern and then cutting off another aircraft.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors

My crew had started the mission via ground ambulance. I accepted the flight and needed to put on fuel prior to departing for the mission so I would have enough fuel to complete the mission. Prior to this I had [the aircraft] topped off for the flight back to base. Once landing at base; the aircraft did not fly again until Friday night when I accepted this mission. Upon accepting the mission I repositioned to the fuel farm to put on fuel. At this time I put on 51 Gallons Jet A fuel and then departed.Just over halfway into the flight I got a Master Caution indicating a Fuel Quantity Degrade and the Main fuel Tank was fluctuating by 50 to 100 KG's. At this point in the flight I was the closest to the hospital and continued to land there. When I went to turn final I received another Master Caution light indicating that I had a Fuel Quantity Failure on the Main tank and proceeded to land.Upon landing I called the on duty Mechanic and pulled out the MEL book to see if we could MEL it. The mechanic then called his supervisor and was given the go ahead to MEL the aircraft. The plan was for me to drop the patient off and then stop to top off fuel and then fly to ZZZ to have the aircraft fixed. On the patient flight my number 2 supply tank went offline about 5 min from the pad. Just before landing the number 1 supply tank indication also went away. I landed and dropped the patient and then flew to the fuel stop and landed. Called the Mechanic and told him what happened and then they decided to come to check the aircraft. While draining the fuel from the aircraft found water and other large debris in the fuel. The fuel was also cloudy and very brown in color.

Helicopter Captain reported fuel quantity failures on a multi-leg patient flight which was later determined by Maintenance to be caused by contaminated fuel.


On climbout at 28;000 feet to 30;000 feet MSL had a loud harmonic vibration at mid-cabin.  Diverted to ZZZ.

A B737-300 climbing at FL280 to FL300 developed a loud harmonic vibration at mid-cabin so the crew diverted to a nearby airport.


I was working LCC in a North operation. I had the straight out automatic releases while Local Control West had the turn automatic releases. I had the strip for Flight ABCD on the NSIGN departure (Straight Out). Without scanning the ASDE-X initially; I told Flight ABCD to Line Up and Wait (LUAW). When the aircraft responded and started to move; I was looking at the ASDE-X and noticed in the tag that it said PBO which would indicate he was on the PECOP departure (TURN) and that the call sign didn't match it was Flight AGCD. I asked the pilot which he was and he replied Flight AGCD. I went over to Ground Control; got the correct strip; got a release from LCW for the turn departure and cleared the aircraft for take off. The Ground Controller reported to me that the aircraft in question had been calling himself and answering to Flight ABCD. It should be noted also that there was a Flight ABCG. All of these aircraft ended up leaving within minutes of each other. Recommendation; Airline Company may want to consider looking through their call signs and changing those that are similar or at least those that are similar and are scheduled to depart close together.

SLC Controller expressed concern regarding the similar sounding flight numbers that led to confusion with regard to aircraft identity.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I had been working Final for about 10 minutes when the Feeder stacked a B777 at 8;000 FT over the VOR for noise abatement. Instead of vectoring out an A320 from the south he stacked the A320 at 9;000 FT. This situation is unsafe due to the proximity to the final. It's to close and both aircraft have a hard time achieving a stable approach. An E120 coming in from the south was 6-7 miles south of the A320. I issued traffic to the E120 and he reported the E120 in sight. I told him to maintain visual separation and he acknowledge it. I got busy making side by's with other aircraft and didn't notice the overtake with the A320's side by aircraft. I can't remember the call sign; but issued traffic to the E120 and he said he was looking. I continued making side by's with other aircraft. I went back to the E120 and its transmission was blocked. He reported the other aircraft in sight and I told him to maintain visual separation. By that time I believe I had less than approved separation. Later [the Feeder] had [the A320] coming over [another] VOR to land on Runway 28L showing 325 [KTS] over the ground. I asked him his airspeed and he replied 250 KTS. It's standard to have aircraft coming over [the other] VOR at 210 KTS or less. It makes it very hard to slow them down and have them [at] a good altitude to be based and make a good side by. If aircraft over [the first] VOR at 8;000 FT for noise abatement then [next sector] shouldn't stack another aircraft at 9;000 FT. They should vector aircraft to the west and put them in trail at 6;000 FT. It helps out the finals and makes it easier for the pilot to have a stable approach on final.

TRACON Controller described a loss of required wake turbulence separation claiming the Feeder Controller failed to provide a workable feed given the final airspace constraints.


Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Descending on the LZARD SIX Arrival into Tampa we were told to increase speed to 300 knots or better. There was a B737 behind us. After Crossing JAYJA at FL270 approach asked us to descend to FL180; then 16;000 feet; then 15;000 feet. We complied. Before Leveling at 15;000 feet we were asked to cross OLENE at 13;000 feet and 250 knots. OLENE is depicted as an 'Expect' at 13;000 feet and 250 knots landing south. We acknowledged the request and took immediate action but soon realized that this was outside of safe operating limits. After programming a vertical direct to OLENE at 13;000 feet we got the scratch pad message OVER MAX/VERT meaning the descent angle we had asked for was more than 6 degrees. We did our best to comply with the restriction in a safe manner but were unable to notify approach before reaching the fix. The B737 behind us; given the same instruction; also unable to comply; was telling approach the same thing that we wanted to tell them; 'unable.' After crossing the fix we explained that we had done our best and approach acknowledged that we had been 'close enough.' Clearly the Approach Controller made a mistake. Slowing the B737 down would have been safer than asking us to speed up.

We were told to resume normal speed so I was slowing from the assigned speed of 300 knots to normal of 270.

Pressed by ATC to accelerate due to traffic behind and to descend via step clearances the flight crew of an EMB-175 was unable to make ATC's assigned crossing restriction of 13;000 and 250 KTS at OLENE on the LZARD STAR to TPA.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

About mid way of flight; 3rd FA (Flight Attendant) called to report a 'Polish' abnormal odor mid to aft cabin.  Reported garbage bins had same odor. Perhaps 10 minutes later; she called again to report same issue. Fumes Report was completed. Upon arrival after engine shut down same FA called to report a fuel odor in the aft galley.  At that point I wrote it up and called Maintenance. Neither pilot ever smelled a thing. There were no complaints from any passenger about odors that was passed to me. Other FA's never reported noticing any odor to me. I asked specifically about severity and all 3 times [response was] 'it wasn't that bad; I can just smell something.' I have to trust crew members feedback so in the interest of safety and caution I wrote it up.

A319 Captain reported a Flight Attendant notified the flight crew on three occasions of fumes in the passenger cabin. Upon arrival Captain entered the discrepancy in the aircraft logbook.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Around XA:00 pm local I was working Area D mids at sector X when the nightly COVID cleaning crew came through and cleaned half of our area. After they left I asked the other Controller in the area to go set up to bring the sector over to Sector Y; so when the cleaning crew comes back they could clean where I was sitting. Controller went over; opened the position; and took control of the airspace. I then went over to take the position back from at Sector Y so I could sit down and continue working; and at this time we realized that the VCSC [Voice Communication Switch] was not properly configured for the mids position. There were only 5 or 6 frequencies on the panel out of the 16 or so for Area D; and very few random landlines were available for ZZZ; ZZZ1; and ZZZ2 [Airport] towers. We had to scramble to tell other sectors to use only the frequencies that we had up; as the standard frequencies were not available. To make things worse; there was a massive push of ZZZ3 [Airport] departure traffic at this time coming out over ZZZ4 [Airport] and we didn't have the frequency they use OR the landline to ZZZ3 to tell them to use a frequency we had up. The other Controller then went over to sector A which wasn't being used but had all the correct landlines and used it to call the sectors around me including ZZZ3 and tell them to put aircraft on a different frequency. It was a pretty bad situation considering if any of those departures had an issue and had to return to ZZZ3 I would have had no way to communicate or coordinate with the ZZZ3 approach controllers. I had to work like that for 15 minutes or so until the crew came back to clean the rest of the area and we moved the position back to Sector X.This is the third or fourth time I've reported this by now; we need a massive overhaul at this point of the Area D VCSC system to get everything where it needs to be; and have management properly trained on how to format it and be able to quickly fix it when there is something missing.

Center Controller reported trying to move sector positions to help accommodate COVID-19 cleaners but ran into problems with the voice switches and frequencies not being configured correctly.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 4645

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Airport; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

While the aircraft was still connected to the tug; and with personnel under the nose of the aircraft I was being given the 'clear to taxi' signal from the ground crew. The ground crew member did not understand proper pushback procedures.

A B737 Captain reported ramp personnel gave them the 'clear to taxi signal' with other persons under the aircraft.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

One of the rear bathrooms was deferred due to toilet flusher broken. The other bathroom was being used by a very sick passenger and had been in there for 45 minutes. There was a long line of people needing to use bathroom. I looked inside bathroom that was broken and noticed that you were able to flush toilet so; I let 2 people go in that said they were in pain and needed to relieve themselves. I then called Captain and he said do not let anyone use that bathroom so closed it off. No one else used that bathroom.On an 800 aircraft and on a 5 hour flight all restrooms should be usable. If not; there should be duct tape placed around it so it cannot be opened and no one including Flight Attendant are tempted to open it and see what was wrong with it.

Flight Attendant reported allowing passengers to use a lavatory that had been placed on MEL.


We were on our descent into Seattle on the Olympia arrival with a clearance to descend via the arrival. A few minutes later we were taken off the arrival and given 'proceed direct ARVAD' by Approach Control without any new altitude restriction. I queried Approach Control that we were not given a new altitude when taken off the arrival and he said; 'None was required since ARVAD has 12;000 posted on the STAR.' SHOULD WE NOT HAVE BEEN GIVEN A NEW ALTITUDE CROSSING RESTRICTION SINCE WE WERE TAKEN OFF THE ARRIVAL? Again; when I asked this of ATC they said 'no; as long as ARVAD had an altitude associated with it.' He apparently expected me to cross at 12;000 without being told to do so without any other clarification or communication after being removed from the STAR. We then verified to him that we are now cleared to descent to cross ARVAD at 12;000 FT. All else was normal. I write this in order to receive feed back and clarification for standardization and safety sake.

Air carrier arrival into SEA experienced confusion with regard to the published altitude restrictions on the STAR and ATC's expectations regarding altitudes after issuing vectors.


Turned into gate and observed everything clear behind the lines; including jet bridge. DGS inop; marshaled towards gate. Approaching stopping point after passing jet bridge cab (which fortunately was pulled well back); I commented to FO that it seemed a more forward stop instruction than normal. After shutdown; ground crew connected headset and informed me they had parked me too far forward; on 777 spot. A tug was connected and aircraft moved back to correct spot. It then occurred to me that the engine and wing must have come very close to the jet bridge during initial parking - I cannot see the engine or inboard wing from the flight deck; and in any case was focused on the marshaller's wands in front of me. Upon leaving the aircraft; the gate agent informed me he had to retract the bridge out the way of the wing (second time that week on that gate; he said) during the taxi in. I called the Ops Manager on duty in the tower and he reviewed the tape; estimating we came within 4 feet of a collision; due to being marshaled too far forward. I asked him to save the video and then called the Chief Pilot to inform him of event.The gate agent is to be commended to the highest degree for promptly moving the bridge back upon seeing the event unfolding. We are taught: 'If there is any doubt; stop the aircraft.' In this case; I had checked everything behind the lines; and a marshaller present; and followed his instructions; there was no doubt in my mind that he would be trained properly for that gate and A319. I note that the gate has no type-specific stop markings - just letters. This is an accident waiting to happen. The red lines don't protect us if we are directed onto the incorrect stopping point.Paint the parking areas with specific types; just like even developing countries manage to do. Service the DGS to be operative in lieu of marshallers.

A319 on taxi in was marshaled too far forward almost hitting the jet bridge. Electronic parking system was inoperative.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Upon arriving at the aircraft I began my first flight of the day preflight actions in the cockpit and my First Officer left the cockpit to do a preflight walk around inspection. He returned rather quickly and advised me that there was a significant fuel leak/spill underneath the aircraft. I immediately shut down the APU; had external power removed; and instructed my flight attendants to stop what they were doing and exit the aircraft as soon as possible. I then went outside of the aircraft to see what was going on. When I arrived I observed a ground crew from the fuel vendor company who had already set up the apparatus that is used to contain fuel spills. I observed a significant fuel spill that was approximately six feet in diameter. I also observed a steady stream of fuel actively leaking from the fuel sump underneath the center fuel cell. [The mechanic] was holding a tool and beginning to work on stopping the leak. He was able to stop the flow of the leak fairly quickly. I then asked the mechanic what was the issue. He stated that it was in fact the fuel sump that had caused the problem. I asked him if he intended to write that up in the AML. He said no and he stated that a write up was not necessary. I told him that I disagreed and that I intended to write it up myself and so I did. The same mechanic completed the sign off process and we were eventually cleared by Operations to continue. The rest of the flight operation was without any further issues. This is completely unacceptable. There is no way that any certificate holding professional should ever allow something like this to go undocumented. This lackadaisical approach to maintenance and safety is an outrage. This should not be tolerated and it speaks volumes about the approach to maintenance and safety that unfortunately I am seeing far too many times as the extreme; undue pressure builds on this beleaguered workforce to meet operational metrics.

CRJ Captain reported a steady stream of fuel was leaking from a fuel sump.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

With battery in the override position; APU door open; APU not running. Noticed white smoke followed by flames coming out of the [APU] tail pipe. APU fire bottle was discharged; did not extinguish flames. Fire Dept. shot dry chemicals followed by foam to extinguish flames. No fire warning in cockpit at any time.

Reporter stated the Gulfstream G-200 (Astra Galaxy) had been totally dark (no electrical power) for 20-30 minutes. They were waiting in the cockpit for fueling to finish because they are not allowed to start the APU during fueling operations. Fueler saw bright puffs of white smoke coming out from the APU tailpipe that erupted into flames. Later; after the Fire Department applied Dry Chemicals and foam to extinguish the fire; Maintenance removed the Honeywell APU which was immediately sent back to Honeywell for assessment before company mechanics could determine cause for the tailpipe fire. Since then; he has not heard any information from Honeywell regarding the incident.  Reporter stated this was not the first time an APU tailpipe fire has occurred on company G-200 aircraft. His air carrier has since developed a QRH APU Tailpipe Fire Check procedure. The APU tailpipe exits at the end of the aircraft's fuselage; not underneath or on top.

Captain reported he was informed by a Ground Fueler during fueling operations that white smoke followed by flames were coming out of the APU tail pipe on their Gulfstream G-200 (Astra Galaxy) aircraft. The APU door was open; but the APU was not running. No Fire Warning in cockpit. Discharge of APU fire bottle did not extinguish flames.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Aircraft X advised me that they might not make the inland restriction. I made the necessary point out and approval request. I instructed Aircraft X to climb and maintain 140. Aircraft X departed ONT and climbed 3;000 feet in approximately 5 NM; and with that rate of climb Aircraft X would meet all the MVA's (Minimum Vectoring Area) on the route. However; Aircraft X then slowed the rate of climb; climbing approximately 1;000 feet over the next 5 NM. When I observed that Aircraft X had reduced the rate of climb; I immediately turned the aircraft away from a higher MVA. I issued the turn and the aircraft began the turn before entering approximately 1/8 nm into the higher MVA; so I issued a low altitude alert as Aircraft X entered a 060 feet MVA at 055 feet MSL. After Aircraft X was above the MVA I cleared the aircraft to inland and Aircraft X flew the SID without further incident. I will issue a DVA (Diverse Vector Area) until the aircraft is above the MVA.

SCT Controller reported a widebody aircraft on departure procedure could not meet climb rate; resulting in entering a higher Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

An Embraer was on instrument approach at 3;000 FT. Numerous pilots began to report wind shear conditions on final. The Embraer requested Runway 15; however the airport was actively departing Runway 33. Pilot of the Embraer became irate and demanded Runway 15 and stated he intended to declare an emergency to get Runway 15. The Arrival Controller vectored other aircraft out of the pattern and flow and the Embraer on downwind for Runway 15 and coordinated with Tower to stop departures off Runway 33. When the Controller asked for emergency information (souls on board and fuel remaining) the pilot tried to retract the emergency and stated he did not declare. This was a disruptive and a possibly dangerous action by the pilot to circumvent orderly arrival and departures by other aircraft. Numerous aircraft were delayed due to this pilot's actions.

TRACON Controller expressed concern regarding an air carrier arrival that demanded other than the runway in use for wind considerations. The air carrier declared an emergency to obtain it and once approved; tried to rescind the emergency declaration.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 350

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Finished maintenance on my airplane. Others in pattern so I went flying. While airborne; I heard others on the same frequency at a nearby airport. I decided to fly over there; too. 3 of us in the pattern; one full stop. I made a full stop; too; and decided to have lunch. There were no markings indicating field closed when we arrived. When we got ready to go; there were yellow 'x's at each end. There were persons preparing to fly kites at the airport apparently because the warm weather had made it unsafe to have the event as scheduled on the lake; on the ice. The other pilot spoke with the event coordinator and she told him she would stop the event long enough for him to takeoff. He departed before I arrived back at the airport. I called FSS to determine that there was a NOTAM in place and who had filed it. I got the initials of that person who was the airport manager. While searching for the airport manager for permission to takeoff; I discovered the event coordinator who related the previous takeoff circumstances. She told me it was fine for me to takeoff also and she would stop activities briefly for me as well. I took off from the far end of the airport. An individual on a golf cart was at that end; on the edge of the runway; about 500 feet from the end. I took off left of centerline to give him clearance. As I was passing him I banked slightly toward him to keep him in sight and to regain centerline. I used short field takeoff techniques so I estimate I was more than 100-200 feet above him when I passed. Evidently; I made him nervous because he mentioned on the radio that I had passed over his head. In retrospect; I should have stopped and shut down to coordinate with him. Further; I have been flying for nearly 60 years; including military and airlines and routinely asked permission to use closed airspace or facilities. But after the fact; I am unsure whether this person's permission and actions constituted legal permission.

PA-22 pilot reported being unsure about the legality of taking off from a closed airport.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 115; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 215

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency

We had reached our cruise altitude of FL340 while still communicating with Center. We were cleared direct to ZZZ intersection and then were handed off to Center shortly after. We made successful contact with them. We then received clearance to fly Direct ZZZ1 intersection then Direct ZZZ2 intersection for the ZZZ Arrival. Some time passed when we noticed a quiet radio. I made several calls on the radio with the frequency present on our radio and got no response. I consulted the charts and found a frequency for Center for our current location. After tuning in 1XY.XX we discovered Center had been looking for us. We checked in immediately which was acknowledged by the controller. A short time later we were requested to call a phone number provided to us for a possible pilot deviation.After successfully landing with an inflight emergency; the pilot flying made the phone call as requested. We were informed of the following: we were switched from 1XX.XX to 1YY.XX -and we acknowledged; We never checked in on 1YY.XX; ATC tried contacting us without success; Several attempts were made by ATC to contact us without success; After contact was successfully reestablished on 1XY.XX; a total of 26 minutes of lost communication had elapsed; No conflict had resulted from the event.When we as a crew debriefed how this event could have possibly occurred; we thought of some possibilities and factors that could have caused this error [including little traffic and the possibility of mishearing/not hearing a frequency change].In the climb to cruising altitude; I noticed the left engine (#1 engine) appeared to have a higher ITT with a lower N1 speed than the right engine (#2 engine). This observation did not alarm me as there is usually a discrepancy between engines. After reaching cruise altitude; I performed the standard CRUISE checklist. The #1 engine appeared to have the same discrepancy. I performed a trend monitoring sheet on both engines after an hour of flying. This is when the performance of our number 1 engine became a little concerning but not too alarming as oil pressure and temps were observed to be slightly higher than usual but well within limits. At this time; I brought up my concerns to the other pilot. We adjusted the throttle of the #1 and observed oil pressure near the top of the green arc on our gauge; but well within limits. We reviewed past trend reports that were in our flight book and definitely observed higher than usual temps in both the oil and ITT and higher than usual oil pressure (All were within limits). We discussed possible causes including the possibility of faulty indications. We documented our observations with photos taken with an I-phone with the intention of notifying our maintenance personnel upon landing. We continued to make adjustments with the #1 throttle to keep the indications well within operating parameters and closely monitored all gauges in the cockpit. We reviewed checklists in the attempt to find a remedy for the unusual indications. Did our attention and focus become too narrowed to one aspect of the flight causing us to not complete the radio handoff? Very possible. Was there some sort of radio failure or signal interruption during this time? Possible; but unlikely. Any one singular factor or possibility or any combination of them could have led to this occurrence to have happened. As a note; upon descent the oil pressure became erratic and the cabin rapidly filled with smoke. We initiated emergency procedures and were successful in cutting off the engine; securing it; eliminating the smoke; and landed without incident with only the #2 engine operating. Also; upon debriefing; we will attempt to devise new techniques or procedures to eliminate the possibility of communication mistakes with ATC or faster recognition if one is to occur.

A Falcon 2000 flight crew; after struggling with a loss of communications with ATC enroute to the U.S.; suffered erratic oil pressure in the left engine and had the cabin fill with smoke as they approached their destination. They declared an emergency; shut down the engine which eliminated the smoke and landed uneventfully thereafter at their planned destination.


Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

This report concerns another overdue aircraft; the aircraft was not in the position that the flight plan predicted; but nobody was aware. Since the advent of URET/CCLD [User Request Evaluation Tool/ Core Capability Limited Deployment] (or whatever it's called now); controllers have become more reliant upon the machine's notification of any overdue aircraft; having a more passive relationship with the data presented and awaiting any alerts. When I assumed the sector the relief briefing went well and everything seemed in order. As I assumed the sector; I ensured I was caught up on the current traffic situations and then began checking URET for other traffic. There was little traffic so I quickly came to Aircraft X; still showing [unknown] track control (probably an approach control facility); but the route display was NW bound @ 50; curious; and then I noted he left NDZ for MGM by way of AR; probably not. There was no overdue notification on the flight plan. Noting that the flight plan had already progressed my sector and was supposed to be halfway through Helena-Low; I called the previous sector (UBS-lo) to inquire and have him check back for the aircraft. I stood up to see my partner's URET on Helena-low and there was no overdue notification there either; I told him I had called UBS-lo. I printed out a flight strip on Aircraft X and gave it to my supervisor; telling her that he was overdue. She came by to tell me that Aircraft X was on the deck at MGM; and someone removed strips on the flight plan. The situation was easily remedied once someone took action.Although this lack of action on overdue aircraft happens frequently; and that is a safety issue that needs to be readdress. I'm curious which sector (if any) ever received an overdue notification on this aircraft that didn't show up at the predicted location & time. My sector and Helena-low received no overdue notification on the flight plan. Controllers rely upon the good help of URET; but often overly so. Every aircraft/flight plan requires our awareness (where is he going/landing? when will he want to start down? does this flight plan make sense?). RUNDE is in Arkansas and RUNOE is on the GPS3 @MGM; probably a simple Base Ops typo that the transferring controller could have caught. Some people tell me; 'Well it's probably a flight plan error.' 'You don't guess he's really traveling that way do you?' We're not paid to guess. Ensure you know where your pilots are and where they're going. Thankfully this pilot wasn't in a peanut field (this time).

ZME Controller reports of an overdue aircraft that he becomes aware of. Controller checks information and finds later that this aircraft is at a different airport than he expected. Controller noted that two fixes may have helped the automation problem; RUNDE and RUNOE.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

While enroute to MSP we were given revised routing from MSP Center: present position direct BITLR; WILDD3 RNAV STAR; PRESS transition. Approach briefing by the First Officer (pilot flying) was for [Runway] 30R. On check in with MSP Approach; initial runway assigned was [Runway] 30L. I requested [Runway] 30R. Not expecting to be given [Runway] 30R; I began [reprogramming] the FMS to [Runway] 30L. Two minutes later; approximately 10 NM from BITLR [while] at 300 KIAS and 10;000 MSL; Approach advises to expect [Runway] 30R. I go back to FMS to reprogram [landing] [Runway] 30R. As we approach BITLR; I notice the aircraft is not turning towards PRESS (which is next waypoint in FMS after BITLR). The pilot flying recognizes we are not following the programmed route and reaches for heading bug to manually turn to the desired route. I realize this will take far too long for the aircraft to respond to the autopilot and take control of the aircraft. I disconnect the autopilot and enter a 35 degree left turn to get back on course towards PRESS. Simultaneously; we were given a descent to 7;000 (we are still at 300 KTS/10;000 FT). Due to over tasking; I mistakenly start descent to 7;000 before slowing. I catch the error at 9;500 and immediately pull level to slow. We overshoot course to press by 2.5 miles due to the high speed. At this point; I am sure MSP approach control sees what is going on and gives us a vector of 250 to intercept the localizer for 30R. Once established on heading and slowed I call for auto pilot on and transfer controls back to the first officer. Approach and landing are uneventful.This is the second time I have witnessed this problem with the Collins FMS. As the ac is approaching a fix at a high speed and the active runway is changed (NOT the current routing) the FMS will not follow the route as entered in the FMS. This occurs even though the routing in the FMS has not changed (just the runway has changed or is being changed when the aircraft approaches a waypoint it continues on the heading it was flying prior to hitting the waypoint. The annunciator still shows FMS when this occurs even though it is not following the route; it is as if the FMS is in heading mode.The first time this happened to me was under almost identical circumstances while on approach to CVG; I thought it was just a burp in the system. I think there is actually an issue with the software or possibly the FMS processor cannot keep up when entering changes in the FMS while approaching a waypoint. I have only seen this occur while in terminal mode.

An air carrier aircraft inbound to land northwest at MSP via the WILLD STAR flew past BITLR instead of turning toward PRESS as required to land on Runways 30L or R. FMS reprogramming of two late runway changes likely contributed to the event.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Work Refused

After returning to the cockpit during an intermediate stop; I noticed an unmarked; unlabeled cooler on the cockpit floor. I asked the First Officer what it was. He said that the gate agent had asked if the Captain would take it to our destination. It had medicine for her son's cancer treatment that one of the gate agents had forgotten to take with her on the previous day's flight. I went up to the gate to talk to the gate agent. The agent said that it was cleared to go by the Manager on Duty and had been brought to him by the FAA. I asked him if he had checked the FAA inspector's credentials. He said no. I informed him that we would try to find out more info on the cooler. I sent a message ACARS message to System Operations asking if the package met all TSA and FAA requirements. They said that it had gone through TSA and was 'good to go' per an individual in station operations at the direction of the Manager of Customer Service who was on her way to talk to me. When she arrived I asked if the cooler met all TSA and FAA requirements for transport. She said it was cleared by the TSA. I asked her again if it met all FAA requirements and she interrupted me and took the cooler off the aircraft. We left gate about 45 minutes late.I am not sure why any unmarked; unlabeled package/cooler would ever be in cockpit. I understand the urgency to get the medicine to a fellow employee's cancer ridden son ASAP. However; this cooler had NO bag tag; NO freight tag or any other evidence that it had gone through screening. The cooler APPEARED to contain several frozen gel packs that I was under the impression were not allowed through passenger TSA screening. So how did it get through passenger screening? Even if it did get through screening it was an unescorted; unchecked piece of baggage. The owner was not a passenger on the aircraft. I felt very pressured to take the cooler by the customer service managers. The Customer Service Manager; in particular; became very impatient when I was trying to talk with her about the situation and interrupted me when I tried to tell her that System Operations was sending us information via ACARS. She grabbed the cooler and got off the aircraft in the middle of the conversation.This cooler could have been an explosive device; etc. There was a serious breakdown in security procedures when this cooler was simply placed in the cockpit. I was under the impression from the continuous airport PA announcements in the terminal that one is never to carry another person's bag on the aircraft. That is exactly what happened here. Our FOM has some guidance for human tissue transport (which does not apply in this case) that says it can be in the cabin if it is escorted; but must be in the cargo compartment if it is unescorted. At the very least this package should have been shipped through the Air Freight Office and place in the baggage compartment after all hazardous materials (if any) were declared. I do not appreciate being put in the position in which these managers placed me. The cooler should have been inspected and shipped via appropriate commercial means if it was urgently needed. Does no one remember 9-11?Finally; I wonder if it was simply placed in the cockpit of the later flight.

An A319 Captain was unwilling to carry an improperly vetted and labeled cooler; allegedly containing cancer medications for a fellow employee's son; that had been inadvertently left behind when the employee left on the previous days flight. An eventual confrontation with a customer service supervisor ended abruptly when the Supervisor refused to discuss the Captain's concerns further; grabbed the cooler and exited the aircraft.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12

Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Software and Automation; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Airspace Structure; Manuals

Aircraft X is the lead aircraft in a flight of three conducting midair refueling at FL260.  Aircraft X flight is non-RVSM (Reduced Vertical Separation Minima) due to two of the aircraft being non-RVSM compliant. The Controller at ZLC17 initiated a radar handoff of Aircraft X flight.  ZLC17 did not request approval for the block altitude or non-RVSM compliance. In addition; ZLC17 made no effort to coordinated the type of formation; or the distance in trail of the aircraft in the flight. Aircraft Y is enroute at FL290.  ZLC17 initiates a radar handoff for Aircraft Y. The flight path of Aircraft Y is in direct conflict with Aircraft X flight. I did not take the handoffs on either of aircraft because they merged shortly after entering my airspace.  ZLC17 transfers communication of Aircraft X flight without the acceptance of a radar handoff or coordination.I call ZLC17 on the landline and ask how we are going to separate the aircraft they are handing me.  At this point Aircraft X flight and Aircraft Y have violated my airspace without a radar handoff being accomplished.  I direct ZLC17 to climb Aircraft Y to FL330 immediately.  ZLC17 indicates they are not in communication with Aircraft Y; as they were performing a 'flash through' even though the targets were going to merge. After ending the landline communication; I ask Aircraft X flight if they can accept FL300 for traffic.  Aircraft X indicated they could accept the new block but it would take them some time to climb as they were in the process of refueling.  I assigned Aircraft X FL300. This still would not have provided me positive separation due to Aircraft X flight being non-RVSM; but I wanted to get at least 1000 feet of vertical separation because I was not in communication with Aircraft Y.  I also assigned Aircraft X a vector away from traffic as soon as they were able to maneuver.  Shortly after these control instructions Aircraft Y checks on frequency; without a radar handoff; climbing to FL330 and on a vector for traffic. These control instructions were issued by ZDV32; who was still in communication with the Aircraft Y.  After assessing the altitude and heading will ensure positive separation; I clear Aircraft X flight back on course in the Aerial Refueling route with their previously assigned altitude of FL260. Once vertical separation is achieved; I cleared Aircraft Y on course.Separation was never lost. Aircraft X flight and Aircraft Y were nearly 30 miles inside my airspace with no radar handoff and no coordination. This is blatantly reckless behavior from ZLC17. This is not a simple mistake. This is willfully ignoring requirements of the 7110.65. These targets were going to merge and they took zero action until I prompted them. There is a clear error chain in place and thankfully were we able to act in time to avoid a loss of separation or worse. ZLC acts in a careless and reckless manner every single day.  They will not answer the shout line and they do not request approval for block altitudes or IAFDOF (Wrong altitude for Direction of Flight) aircraft.  They knowingly and willfully violate the FAAH 7110.65 every single day.  We report these omissions and nothing gets done.  No one is ever held accountable. Today; the recklessness and complacency of ZLC nearly caused an accident. This will continue to happen until someone at the FAA has the courage to punish controllers that are either unqualified; careless and/or purposefully reckless.

A Minneapolis Center Controller reported Salt Lake Center allowed aircraft on converging courses to enter their sector even though they did not take the handoffs. The Minneapolis Controller also reported Salt Lake controllers routinely disregard published procedures and rules in the FAAH 7110.65.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 2900

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted

Filled VFR from ZZZZ to MMTJ. I was on with Mexico approach who told me contact MMTJ tower. I contacted Tijuana tower and they told me to report 3 miles out. I reported 3 miles out. They said I was cleared left base runaway 26r. I asked say runway assignment. They said 26r. I responded you mean runway 27? He said runway 26. I again responded 3 more time you mean runway 27? The tower said contact this frequency. So I did. The frequency was brownfield SDM. Brown tower then cleared me to land runway 26r. Before Tijuana tower handed me off I told the tower he was making a mistake. I really had no choice but to continue for runway 26r at Brown field. Any deviations I would have tried to make would have caused a traffic conflict as there were multiple targets on my TCAS. I felt as pilot in command; the safest course of action was to land at Brown field. I did not have a EAPIS (Electronic Advanced Passenger Information System) filled.

BE200 pilot reported filing a VFR flight plan to MMTJ from further south in Mexico. When MMTJ Tower was contacted for landing; the instructions were to enter a left base for Runway 26R. MMTJ only has Runway 9/27 and after several queries the reporter was switched to SDM Tower and cleared to land Runway 26R. No EAPIS had been filed for landing in the USA.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft X entered BTV radar east airspace from the west at 9000 ft. I informed the pilot to advise me of any approach request he might have and to descend and maintain 7000. Aircraft X requested lower altitude after a few minutes due to light ice accumulating. I then gave him the MVA altitude of 6500. I noticed he was not able to maintain his altitude and I gave him a further descent and a vector away from terrain depicted on the EOVM (Emergency Obstruction Video Map). I then noticed Aircraft X was turning towards terrain northwest bound and instructed him to fly northeast bound on a heading of 040 and asked 'how he was doing'. Aircraft X was able to get below the clouds and out of icing conditions away from terrain shortly thereafter.

BTV TRACON Controller reported that an aircraft being vectored at the MVA was not able to maintain altitude due to icing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 294; Flight Crew Type 4900

We had taxied to the hold pad on Taxiway R holding short of 22L. The button to call the flight attendants quit working and we researched the MEL from that position. Once completed; I advised MDW ATC that we were ready for departure. We were told to hold short of 22L and I acknowledged. About two minutes later; Tower told us to pull all the way up to the hold line; which I acknowledged. We had another couple of feet to the line and the Captain moved up all the way as instructed. About a minute later; the Controller said to move all the way up as there was no more 'position and hold' and that 'we would be cleared from that point.' The Captain and I were not sure what he meant as we were as far forward as we could go unless cleared to cross; line up and wait; or cleared to take off. The Controller stated again in a raised voice to; 'Pull all the way up. If you want to depart you have to play the game!' I asked if he wanted us to enter the runway in confusion since we had been told to hold short. He shouted out in a rapid pace to turn right heading 100; 22L cleared for takeoff. We departed and; upon landing at our destination; I listened to the recording and became convinced that he did want us to cross the hold short line and pull up to the white line indicating the start of Runway 22L. Of course neither the Captain nor I were not going to do that under any circumstances without the proper terminology being used to enter an active runway. ATC should never ask pilots to cross the hold short line to expedite departures even if they aren't allowed to use the line up and wait procedure. Hopefully; pilots are not doing this even with the pressure put upon us to cross the line. Tower asked us three times to pull up to edge of runway past hold short line.

MDW Air Carrier departure voiced concern regarding ATC's instructions reference taxiing up to the hold short line and/or runway edge line.


There have been concerns of runners/vendors and other vehicles positioning/waiting for [aircraft to arrive]; and Self-Park at [adjacent gate] not picking up the threats (they had a fault issue on it yesterday). Granted; they shouldn't be waiting in the [safety zone]. However; I believe this does highlight a threat if a wing walker is not present and the flight crew park the aircraft using Self-Park as per their SOP. Multiple [safety reports] have been filed on this matter to no avail.

An aircraft arriving into gate XX on self-park last evening. The crew could not meet the aircraft. However [other ramp workers] were staged on the left side; inside the [operation zone] waiting for the arrival. The self-park did not give the flight deck information there was an obstruction in the [envelope].

Ramp employees reported concern about vehicles and personnel staging in the gate area; but not clear of the operations zone.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

On taxi out of PKB I noticed an issue that I thought worthy to bring to [your] attention. We were issued a taxi clearance to runway 3. Our clearance was to taxi to 3 via E; G; H; cross 10/28. As we were taxiing down G taxiway I noticed a single hold short line which was prior to the split of F and H and had two runway hold signs. One of these signs was for 10-28 and one was for 3-21. I looked at the approach path and there was a Cherokee on short final for runway 3. I stopped the airplane and queried ATC. I said that I wanted to confirm we were cleared to cross this hold short line; meanwhile the Cherokee was landing and rolling out; to which he replied; 'cleared to cross runway 10-28'. I looked ahead and did not see another hold short line for 3-21 and I said that it appears this hold short line is for both runways. At this point the Cherokee had passed the intersection and ATC said cleared to cross and taxi to 3. He made a comment about how he could understand my confusion. I think that the controller has to clear the aircraft to cross both runways in order to cross that hold short line and I think that should not happen with an aircraft rolling out or on short final for one of the two. I feel like the issue needs to be clarified. If I am wrong I also would be happy to understand how so. I did check Google Earth and it appears the same as I remember it. Thanks.

Light Transport Captain reported being confused by PKB ATC procedures and a single hold line in the vicinity of Runways 10/28 and 3/21 at Taxiway G.