ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was observing a traffic situation at another sector. I received a call asking about the situation at the sector. I went to check on the situation; and saw the aircraft were already less than 5 miles and less than 1;000 FT. The Controller stated 'Less than 5 miles; but SCT Approach did it.' I asked what was being done to pry them apart. It was not until after I asked this question that the Controller keyed up and told the front aircraft to maintain FL190. At that time the aircraft were only 3.5 miles apart. The Controller should have seen the overtake sooner and taken action to separate the aircraft. I felt that he was letting it happen to 'make a point' that Socal Approach was 'jamming him.' His response to the situation when I asked him about it was also inappropriate. He should have stopped the Air Carrier X's climb 'immediately' and turned the trailing aircraft 40-50 degrees left to pry them apart. His choice of action was inadequate and carried no sense of urgency at all. This problem could have been avoided by stopping the climb of Air Carrier X much sooner. I believe the underlying cause of this loss of separation was the Controllers' poor attitude; coupled with no sense of accountability since he could just report the situation later. There is a secondary causal factor as well. Our procedures allow the Approach Control (who owns at and below 15;000 FT in that area) to climb all departures into our airspace and up to FL230 once the handoff is accepted. This practice needs to be immediately stopped. The Approach should only climb to the top of their airspace. Had this been the case; the front aircraft would have climbed above the back aircraft and the overtake would not have mattered until the Center Controller climbed him further.

An Enroute Controller observed a loss of separation involving two departure aircraft climbing into the enroute environment.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 984.42

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

All preflight; cockpit flows; and checklists were accomplished normally at the gate. On taxi out; I tested the Take-Off Warning and it indicated a configuration issue. We checked that the flaps; trim; spoiler and parking brake were correctly positioned and when we were satisfied that they were; I conducted the Take-Off Warning Test again and got a good test. I elected to continue since I felt that the transient issue had been corrected. On takeoff roll; we made the '100 kts' call indicating our entry into the high speed regime. At approximately 130-135 knots; the Take-off Warning Horn began to sound continuously. This was approximately 20 knots prior to V1. I (Pilot Monitoring) made the decision to continue and communicated that to the First Officer (Flying Pilot) by stating; 'Continue.' The Warning Horn silenced at main gear liftoff and initial climb out and the remainder of the flight was normal. I briefed today; as I always do; that in the high speed regime; I will only reject the takeoff for a fire; an engine failure; PWS (Predictive Wind Shear) or if the aircraft is unable to fly. In this situation; I was confident that the aircraft was configured correctly. I based this decision on the performance of checklists and the fact that the warning horn did not sound when the throttles were first advanced for takeoff.

B737 Captain reported continuing take-off when configuration warning horn activated at 135 knots.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Landed on runway 28 and taxied toward gate. A few minutes later after getting ENGINE COOL alert and before crossing the runway 27 left; for some strange reason I thought I shut down the right engine. Then taxied only on left engine to the gate since in my mind the right engine was shut down. Parked at the gate and after getting the EXT PWE AVAIL alert I shut down the left engine. My First Officer had to use the restroom so I told her she can go to restroom after turning the seat belt sign off. Then I started to do the parking checklist. I left to get some food and when I returned I was told that right engine was running for few minutes and ramp people told my First Officer and she shut it down. I had a meeting with [the Chief Pilots] and I told them what exactly happened. Up until now some how I still think I shut the engine down few minutes after landing. I honestly don't know what happened and I really can't associate it with any factor. I wasn't over loaded or fatigued. Just an honest mistake. My mind played a game with me since I really; really thought I shut the engine down.

After taxi in; I mentioned to the captain that I needed to use the restroom. Once he received the External Power Available alert; he told me to go ahead and he would complete my checklist. I left the aircraft and could hear him reading the checklist as I departed. I went to the restroom then proceeded to get lunch which I brought back to the aircraft. When I returned to the gate; the ground personnel were gathered around the counter with the gate agent. They said that they could not load or fuel the aircraft because the right engine was still running. I got in the cockpit and shut down the engine. The captain returned from getting himself lunch just a minute or two after me; and I told him what happened. He called the chief pilot and also spoke to the head of maintenance. In the future; I will wait to use the restroom until the checklist is complete.

B717 fight crew reports forgetting to shut down the right engine after gate arrival then departing separately to obtain lunch. The First Officer returns first and is informed the right engine is still running; which is shut down.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 76; Flight Crew Total 1019; Flight Crew Type 268

Conflict NMAC; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

My student and I performed the Practice VOR-A approach into AJO. While in contact with SoCal Approach; we made contact with the CTAF reporting a 6 mile final and 4 mile final call. After the frequency change we heard of traffic in the downwind turning base. The spacing looked appropriate when that traffic turned final and we made another call stating that we were on final behind that traffic. The traffic ahead performed a touch-and-go and we thought we were number 1 for the runway. When we were short final for runway 25; we noticed a Cessna less than 100 ft. off our nose to our 11 o'clock and slightly lower. A go-around was immediately performed to the North and a modified base to final was made to a full stop landing. [At] Our final destination a report to ATC was made.I had instructed the student to remove his instrument training device well before the incident occurred.Our position was reported several times.It is possible that; given the busy training environment; a radio call was missed; however; the student and I do not recall ever hearing the other aircraft call its position.The slightly lower aircraft was a high wing aircraft. The aircraft we were flying was a low wing aircraft.An effort to visually confirm that final was clear was made by the student and myself.

Flight Instructor reported an NMAC while on short final.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

I called Dispatch and asked to be connected to Maintenance Control. I was concerned about an MEL. I explained to Maintenance Control that I could not see how I was going to accomplish verifying that the associated engine start valve operates normally (Item Number 1) and verifying that the associated ELC (Engine Limiter Control) System operates normally (item Number 3). Maintenance control stated that the plane was scheduled to be fixed in ZZZ the [next day]; that Maintenance Technician's replaced the starter the [day before] (even though the Maintenance list showed [2 days before that]) and that this was a common write up. I again asked how I was going to verify that the systems required per the MEL operated normally. Maintenance Control said for me to board the passengers and try to start the engines and if it didn't work to then call for Maintenance. I stated that he was setting me up for failure; by boarding the passengers; pushing back and hen trying to start the engines and verifying operational at the same time. If the required systems were not operational; then I would have to go back to the gate.The Technician from Maintenance Control stated that 'I could assume that everything operated normally since it just flew in'. I asked then why do I conduct a Flight Deck Inspection per the Flight Manual? I then asked him; since the aircraft just flew in; I should just assume everything works and therefore I do not have to conduct a walk around inspection or Flight Deck Inspection? He then stated that he had 'nothing' for me. I said thanks and asked Dispatch to disconnect me from Maintenance Control and connect me to the Duty Manager. The Duty Manager and I talked and we agreed that the only way to verify that the systems worked was to conduct an engine run at the gate before boarding the passengers. The Duty Manager stated that he would coordinate with Maintenance Control and have an engine run checklist from Maintenance supplied to me.When I got to the aircraft; Maintenance was working on a 1st Class seat. I asked Maintenance control who was going to conduct the engine run with me on the ramp and he stated that the Maintenance Technician on board would be on the ramp. That Maintenance Technician; took off after he fixed the 1st Class seat and did not come back. Maintenance Control then stated that the rampers would be on the ramp and would clear the aircraft and ramp for me. I received an ACARS MSG stating that the ramp was going to wait until all equipment was clear before engine run-up (which is understandable but delayed the departure of the flight since we were boarding the aircraft and loading bags concurrently). We eventually ran the Number 2 engine and all systems operated normally. Closed the aircraft doors and departed ZZZ.However; upon subsequent review of FOM (Flight Operations Manual); I feel that the system did not operate as it was supposed to according to the company's own policies.FOM; states that: Must Operate Normally...no operational verification of specific item is required. The course of action that the Duty Manager and I agreed upon was unnecessary; I did not have to conduct an engine run to verify that the associated engine start valve; associated Engine Limiter Control System and associated Engine N3 indication was operative. However; I felt that there was no alternative given that Maintenance Control had 'nothing' for me. It was either conduct an engine run or refuse the aircraft because I did know of any other way to verify the systems were operational and Maintenance Control apparently did not know either.FOM MEL/CDL Applicability. For Maintenance Control to suggest that I should 'assume' that the system worked because the aircraft just flew in is also against the FOM; which states that: Once operating limitations are imposed by MEL/CDL; they are in effect until the item is fixed and must be considered for each flight. If I 'assumed' the systems worked and not verify according tothe MEL restrictions; then I would be in violation of the FOM.To further back up the previous paragraph; FOM states that: The aircraft must be then operated under all applicable conditions and limitations contained in the MEL; as reflected in the OPS PLACARD information included in the MRD. Accordingly; the Captain must comply with the Maintenance Release Procedures section of this chapter. Nowhere does it say that I can 'assume' everything works because it just flew in.MEL Requirements. States that: There is no need to re-verify items on the OPS PLACARD unless they would be observed through normal preflight and flight deck preparation duties. Obviously I could verify that the Engine Start 'Valve' Light operated normally by the testing of the indicator lights during my pre-flight duties but the other items on the MEL would not have been able to be verified by normal pre-flight duties.Pilot Engine Runs (Idle). The Duty Manager and I agreed to conduct an engine run at the gate and he agreed to 'walk over' to the Maintenance desk at HQ and coordinate the engine run. As previously mentioned; I received continually degrading support from ZZZ Maintenance to conduct an engine run. After reading FOM; I was supposed to receive an ACARS MSG from Maintenance Control authorizing me to conduct the engine run which I did not. I was unaware of this requirement before I conducted the engine run.According to FOM; our goal is to provide safe; comfortable; on time and efficient transportation for our passengers. Safety is the single objective that cannot be compromised. FOM: it is the responsibility of all co-workers to consider the impact of safety in everything they do. I feel concerned that I do not understand how Flight Crews can meet the restrictions in MEL without conducting an engine run; even though they don't have to. I am concerned that the MEL Restrictions should be observed through normal preflight and flight deck preparation duties and they were not for this MEL restriction. I am most concerned that Maintenance Control's answer was that I should just 'assume' that the systems worked because it just flew in. That answer flies in the face of double or triple redundant systems and procedures that airplane manufacturers and aviation safety professionals have been proselytizing for decades to ensure the continued safety of aviation.

B757 Captain reported that he was concerned about the proper procedures for an MEL item that required other systems to operate normally.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 179; Flight Crew Total 14504; Flight Crew Type 11042

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The EWR 19-4 approach plate describes a rejected landing procedure in very small-print at Note #2; a non-intuitive location that is often overlooked by many pilots when briefing or trying to accomplish a go-around.

B737 Captain discovers that while the Bridge Visual Runway 29 at EWR has no missed approach procedure; it does have a balked landing procedure hidden away in note 2.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

It was Day 6 of a 7 Day [assignment]. We were conducting a passenger flight [to] BED. The crew had been on duty since XA:00. We departed during daylight VFR conditions and proceeded to BED. The sun went down; we entered IMC and freezing precipitation and didn't break out of the clouds until Boston Center began vectoring us for a visual approach to Bedford Airport at 9000 feet. 20 miles from the field they cleared us for a visual approach and directed us to enter a right downwind for RWY 29. I saw the field and lined up parallel on the downwind to RWY 29. I began my base turn at the appropriate interval and as I rolled out of the right turn; I immediately lost situational awareness of where I was in relation to my position and the runway. I responded to my FO that I had lost the runway and he pointed out that I was still in a turn and heading away from the airport. I stopped my turn and descent and leveled off. I regained my situational awareness after a few seconds and proceeded to the runway without difficulty in a stable condition and landed without event.Scheduling of the day had a lot to do with the fatigue factor of this trip. I began at XA:00 that morning after a min turn the night before. We had a maintenance issue with the aircraft that morning and the company decided the split the crew up. I got a new FO and sat in [departure airport of the first leg] for an additional 6 hours. At the last minute the company threw a 3 leg trip on us with planned 45 minute turns between each leg. Day 6; min rest; poor food quality; and constant pressure by the company finally caught up with me on the downwind leg into BED. It hit me immediately. The sun went down and so did my situational awareness. I never felt or saw it coming. Better scheduling and less punitive scheduling.

C680 Captain reported losing situational awareness on a night visual approach into BED; citing fatigue from a difficult scheduling assignment as contributing factor.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Software and Automation

After an unplanned diversion to ZZZ; we did not deplane since it was a short wait for our departure to ZZZ1. ZZZ Center closed from XA:00Z-XB:30Z for COVID cleaning. Because we did not deplane no passengers or bags left the aircraft. When completing the manifest we were unsure of how to get the clearance and passenger count without the station uploading via ACARS. I called Dispatch to help with some of the numbers like cargo weight and passenger zones. With Dispatch I could get weight for cargo but not zones; for passengers we were able to get the zones. I told the ground crew that if they could figure out the cargo bag count then we would be good. They tried to look into it but they were unable. So with Dispatch's help we got our manifest and had good numbers. After we left the station uploaded a new passenger count and later discovered the new passenger count from the station was about 300 pounds less than our original manifest.The main cause was the fact that the station couldn't upload an ACARS passenger count because they did not scan passenger tickets; everyone stayed on board. This caused an unusual hurdle where we had to figure out a way to get the numbers. But after we got it from Dispatch the station's last minute help with an ACARS upload caused a mix up with the passenger count and weight discrepancy.I should have printed the manifest before starting the new flight on the FMS. We need a way to maintain the passenger zones and cargo report since we don't have paper reports anymore. The close out report only has the total adults and children but not their zones; and the cargo only has total weight and not which bags go where.

After an unplanned divert to ZZZ we did not offload because it was a short wait for our departure to ZZZ1. The divert was a result of ZZZ Center going ATC Zero causing us to delay our arrival to our original destination. While completing the manifest we contacted the Dispatcher to get the numbers from our previous flight as they had dropped from our FMS. With Dispatch we were able to get the cargo weights and passenger zones. After we left the station uploaded a new passenger count and we discovered the new passenger count from the station was 300 pounds less than our original manifest.The main cause was the fact that the station couldn't upload an ACARS passenger count because they did not scan passenger tickets; and we no longer have paper PINs in the cockpit from the initial count.We should have printed the manifest before starting the new flight on the FMS.

Air carrier flight crew reported that a passenger count and weight and balance error occurred at the diversion airport because the count could not be uploaded through ACARS. The crew stated the flight had to divert due to an ATC Zero Center closure.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Upon takeoff; the landing gear would not retract on system one position detection. Switched to system two and the gear retracted. At 1;000 feet AGL; the captain called for 'autopilot one command' (on) and the autopilot would not engage due to the Captain's flight director being inoperative. With this event; pitch trim one was inoperative also. Engaged autopilot number two successfully. Departure called to inform us that they were not receiving altitude reporting from our transponder. We tried both transponders and were not successful in fixing the problem. Neither transponder was able to transmit our altitude to ATC. Climbing through approximately 15;000 feet; we received further warnings of Total Air Temperature (TAT) inoperative; monitor ADC1. There is no solution in the QRH to fix this issue. Climbing further through 18;000 we got further warnings of Captain/Standby/First Officer pitot probe overheat; requiring us to turn those probes to 'OFF'. At that point we were above the freezing level so we contacted ATC for an immediate descent and return. We descended below the freezing level of approximately 14;000 down to 11;000. We coordinated with maintenance control and our dispatcher to return. As we were overweight to land; we held at 11;000 to burn off enough gas to put us underweight to land. Thunderstorms in the area; landed in mostly visual conditions on the ILS.

A300 pilot experiences a failure of the landing gear to retract after takeoff on system one position detection. On system two the gear retracts but autopilot one will not engage as the Captain's flight director is inoperative along with his pitch trim. Autopilot two is successfully engaged but other anomalies begin to appear and the crew elects to return to the departure airport after burning off enough fuel.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Time Pressure

Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Incursion Runway

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Departing Runway 28R rolling down the runway at about 100kts noticed an aircraft entering the runway from right to left and not stopping. I maneuver the aircraft to the left of the centerline to avoid a collision with the said aircraft. Once cleared returned to the centerline and departed.I think the other aircraft missed its turn and entered the runway.

A full-length take off on Runway 28R would have been safer.

An air carrier crew reported taking evasive action from an aircraft which mistakenly entered ORD Runway 28R; during takeoff.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Flying westbound from JWARD intersection; east of mountains just to the west of SNA; descending into SNA on the DSNEE4 arrival; cleared for the visual Runway 20R at SNA; FO (Flight Officer) flying pilot. Got terrain terrain; pull up; pull up at 5800 ft. MSL. Complied with warning; then normal approach and landing into SNA.Cause: Neither pilot thought we were low. Had mountains in sight. FO's first time into SNA; first time on DSNEE4 arrival contributed to lack of awareness. Captain briefed prior that SOCAL approach will keep airplane high on profile making it difficult to descend into SNA on a normal profile. This brief probably contributed to FO wanting to descend early. Captain had mountains in sight and thought clearance was going to be OK. Suggestions: Don't clear airplanes for visual into SNA when airplane is still east of 5600 ft. mountains east of SNA. Also make chart say keep 7600 ft. until west of mountains.

A320-200 Captain reported GPWS terrain warning activation on descent into destination in mountainous environment.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Mechanical diversion. While running the after takeoff check; we received an anti-ice bleed duct master warning. Takeoff was a bleeds open; wing and e/I on takeoff. Wings selected on roughly 30 seconds prior to takeoff clearance. PF (Pilot Flying) was the FO (First Officer); [and] I gave the radios to him to complete the Quick Reference Handbook. The wing valves ended up closing on their own; followed by the wing l and R anti-ice cautions as expected.Running the Quick Reference Handbook; the first step was to close the wing valve [and] then assure the warning goes out; which it did not. Message continued to persist. Checking the EICAS synoptic page showed a confirmed closed wing valve on both sides and a red line on the fuselage left-hand side. Putting [my] systems knowledge to work; I was fairly confident that this was a double failure of the fire loops on that section. We had no other indications at that time; smells; odors; hot spots in the cabin; or any other mechanical abnormalities.Continuing down the Quick Reference Handbook; [we] verified that we were not going to be in any icing. We were stuck at 15;000 in order to keep the TAT (Total Air Temperature) at 10 °C. We got PIREPs of negative ice tops between FL170 - FL220. We attempted to climb at Vmo. TAT dropped to 8 °C at FL190; followed shortly by an ICE light indication. I requested a descent back to 15;000. This was all while waiting for Dispatch; Maintenance Control; and the Duty Pilot as they were working with us over ACARS. We attempted a call over AIRINC but were too low.At this point; I suggested [to] divert. Although I had diagnosed this as a most likely fault; there is still the risk that bleed air [was] leaking in the belly. Dispatch suggested ZZZ; which had recover abilities and Maintenance. I was content after checking the weather and the routing kept us in reasonable proximity of ZZZ1 and ZZZ2 plus other central airports in the event we needed to land immediately.30 minutes out at the time of deciding; ATC was advised of the situation and did good in helping us out with information. They didn't understand SAT (Static Air Temperature) vs TAT and thought we were [in a] much worse of a situation. I advised them that we were fine; explained it to them and moved on. All of the nearby airports had a high layer cloud that would allow us to get down without icing concern. Going north on the flight planned route; we had a snow storm that was impacting the nearby areas and would have been unable to continue to that area without ice protection.I advised the flight attendants part way through that we were dealing with the mechanical [problem]. The forward Flight Attendant heard the aural and was patiently waiting. Once the diversion was for sure with a destination in mind; I advised the passengers. Mood was understandable and the fact that we had a plan in place already definitely helped. The Quick Reference Handbook definitely lacks guidance in the event the 'should' doesn't happen in this event. Presumed to be a malfunction of both loops of the dual loop system. Diverted to ZZZ.

CRJ-900 Captain reported receiving an anti-ice bleed duct warning; resulting in a diversion.


Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Manuals; MEL; Human Factors; Aircraft

Maintenance Control received a ACARS (Aircraft Communication And Reporting System) message from Aircraft X in regards to TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance System) being INOP (Inoperative). ACARS MESSAGE: 'TCAS INOP - NAV WITH ASSOCIATED ATC/XPDR2 AND ADS-B RPTG 2'. I sent the flight crew a ACARS asking if the fault only dealt with the TCAS. They responded yes. I sent them a ACARS:1MSG FROM [Maintenance]CAN YOU PLEASE PLACE INOP STICKER; NEXT TO TCAS CONTROL PANEL AND PULL CB K10 ON THE 121VU PANEL AND WRAP A INOP STICKER AROUND PULLED CB.' I also sent them via ACARS the MEL which [Maintenance Control] was going to use for that fault. The intent of asking the flight crew to pull and collar a CB (Circuit Breaker) is more of a heads up that there is more that has to be carried out for this particular MEL. There is no expectation by [Maintenance Control] of having the flight crew perform this in flight. We at [Maintenance Control] do not expect the flight crew to pull and collar any CB in flight. The intent is to have the flight crew preform this action once on ground. This is a common practice at [Maintenance Control]; and when the flight crew responds back; 'WILL DO'. We at [Maintenance Control] take this as they will accomplish this task as part of the MEL once on the ground. There is no rush on the part of [Maintenance Control]; because the system is already inoperative.I believe that adding 'accomplished this action once on ground only'; would definitely help in preventing any unwanted CB pull in flight. Also by adding a note to the MEL's which have CB pulls in their procedures that CB are not to be pulled while aircraft is in flight would also be a great help.

Air Carrier Maintenance personnel reported an incident suggesting that the MEL be revised to clarify instructions to flight crew.


Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

Cleveland Runway 24R departure. While on takeoff and climbout; the First Officer's radar altimeter remained at 0 to -5 ft until reaching 3;700 feet MSL or approximately 2;500 feet AGL when it read correctly; then decluttered off our PFD. The Captain side radar altimeter read correctly the entire takeoff and departure. Departure Control was notified of the anomaly.Since ATC was notified; I planned on writing up my incident report at the hotel on the overnight from notes I had taken about the anomaly after takeoff. The radar altimeter operated normally into the next station. I have made an incident report regarding the radar altimeter suspected 5G anomaly.

Air Carrier Captain reported the First Officer's radio altimeter malfunctioned on climbout from CLE and cited 5G interference as possibly contributing to the event.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

We were cleared for takeoff. We set takeoff power and started our takeoff roll. At around 80 KTS the center runway red warning lights came on indicating another plane was on the runway. We queried ATC and they aborted our takeoff.

Air carrier First Officer reported the Runway Status lights indicated traffic on the runway and after asking Tower about it Tower cancelled their takeoff clearance.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

We were called out to aircraft for a #1 hydraulic system quantity low. Serviced the #1 system in accordance with Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM). We noticed Skydrol leaking out of the #1 engine drain port. Opened the #1 engine cowl and found the #1 Engine Driven Pump (EDP) to be leaking when the engine was motored over. Proceeded to remove and perform deactivation procedures of the #1 EDP in accordance with AMM. After completion of the deactivation ran the #1 engine for leaks and no leaks were noted. Aircraft was then dispatched with a #1 EDP deferred.Aircraft was dispatched with a #1 EDP [deactivated] and was diverted due to #1 engine loss of engine oil resulting in engine shut down.It would be better if the AMM would be more detailed in the leak check procedure.

A Maintenance Technician reported that following the deferral of an engine driven hydraulic; the aircraft experienced an inflight engine shutdown due to the loss of engine oil.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Due to ACARS weight and balance I directed the ramp lead to move the one and only bag from the aft cargo compartment to the front and to add 500lbs. of ballast to the front cargo compartment. On rotation we noticed a slight nose up pitch tendency but dismissed it as normal for the aft CG limit. On arrival; the First Officer (FO) discovered that the 500lbs. of ballast had been placed in the aft cargo compartment.

The CRJ-700 Captain noticed a pitch up tendency during takeoff; and discovered after landing that 500 pounds of ballast was improperly loaded in the aft cargo compartment instead of in the front cargo compartment.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Encountered severe turbulence during cruise portion of flight; near convective activity. There were two passengers on board. Prior to circumnavigating convective activity; we put the seat belt sign on; verbally requested [passengers] to fasten their seatbelt's including shoulder harness and visually confirmed compliance. Approximately 30 minutes later; we encountered severe turbulence and after stabilizing the aircraft after the event found one passenger belted in the seat and the other on his back in the aisle of the aircraft. After attending to the passenger and unsure about his condition we declared an emergency and landed at the closest airport with acceptable weather so the passenger could be attended to by paramedics. It was determined that he did not have serious injuries and was released. The passenger later stated; 'It is my own fault. I should have listened to you.' There is nothing a crew can do if a passenger decides to unbelt for comfort against the crews instruction and is hiding doing so under a blanket. I am certain that this Passenger will always be belted in from takeoff to landing from now on.

Passenger on a C560XL did not comply with flight crew's request to fasten seat belt and shoulder harness and was injured when the aircraft subsequently encountered severe turbulence.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 3500

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

During the approach portion; we were given vectors to the final approach; as we were given our final altitude of 2;800 feet to intercept the ILS; we then intercepted the localizer and began our glide slope descent when all of a sudden we encountered severe turbulence and lost altitude in a rapid descent. By the time we started the missed approach; ATC came on the frequency and gave us an altitude alert even though we had started our climb and went missed. My First Officer and I had discussed this on the ground and came to the conclusion that we might have encountered severe turbulence from the previous aircraft that had landed in front of us; a B737. What we've learned from this is that although human factor takes a few seconds to recognize a situation as such; perhaps a quicker reaction towards the turbulence to a missed approach could have been better; also I think ATC was good to promptly advise us of the situation

Light transport Captain reported executing a go-around on approach to MKE when they encountered wake turbulence in trail of a B737.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 27

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Manuals; Procedure

My Front Line Manager came back from the watch desk with a plan that I draw a line with the draw feature from the southeastern shelf of the [Restricted Area Airspace] to the Approach Sector boundary. This new 'airspace' was given to my sector from 11000 feet to 23000 feet not by me but commanded by my supervisor. I didn't agree to it; since my knowledge of ERAM (ARTCC Computer Software) is that it is illegal to just draw lines on our scope to give airspace to another sector. This is because of lack of the 'autopop' feature because ERAM wouldn't know of the airspace change. I wished to take point outs like we do every day in the control room. I said I didn't want to draw the line but was forced to draw the line by my Front Line Manager. I then said I wanted to be relieved because I think this procedure is illegal. I was relieved shortly afterwards. [Adjacent sectors] whose airspace adjoins were not told about the 'airspace change.' Flow Control Reroutes were not utilized when it should have been for these situations if management thought that point outs were too much workload; which in my opinion; they were not. Or maybe it was because [TRACON] didn't want to point out or hand off the deviating aircraft.Do not have the Operation Managers and Front Line Manager's making plans behind the scenes that completely disregard safety and the mandates of the FAAH 7110.65. I felt like 'what is wrong with point outs?' From what I know; we are not allowed to draw lines on the scope for airspace changes. It goes against the safety culture we are trying to create. Why force two controllers from different sectors to work differently than the norm? First; to take care of point outs Radar Assists should have been in place if this was a problem. This was not done. Furthermore; if it was deemed Radar Assists wouldn't be enough to mitigate the perceived problem; then Trackers can be brought in. When other sectors that surround the 'new drawn airspace' are not told about it this creates a safety issue. For example; another sector may point out an aircraft to my sector but if they are not aware all of my airspace is not mine; then they would violate the newly acquired airspace. Let's say an arrival was deviating east and another sector was working the aircraft northwest bound. Am I supposed to explain every detail of the new airspace configuration? I might say 'point out approved' thinking they knew about the airspace deal but in reality they might not know. They would descend the arrival; unknowingly putting the aircraft in conflict with departures that are transitioning Northwest bound through my old airspace; not knowing that my sector had aircraft climbing through there. I would not be required to have data block on my scope if I gave that new airspace away. The aircraft would automatically appear on my scope because that's the way ERAM is designed. They would turn into nuisance data blocks; therefore creating workload. I'd rather have the point outs. The other controllers were still pointing out the aircraft to me because they felt the same way. They also filled out an ATSAP report.

A Controller was told by his supervisor to temporarily change his airspace and create the boundary on his radar display with the draw feature. The Reporter felt this was a violation of rules and unsafe as there was no coordination for an airspace change and the radar software was not adapted to accommodate the supervisor's airspace change plan.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

During the final approach into the airport; as the captain asked for flaps 45; the airplane began to experience a sudden decrease in airspeed. The wind gust caused the autopilot to disengage and the stick Shaker to go off. As the captain assumed control of the aircraft and applied power; we received a windshear alert. Immediately the captain called for Max trust and followed the escape guidance. As the alert ceased; we advised tower of the go-around and windshear alert. We got vectors and came back around for another approach.Primary cause was the convective activity around the airport; and the windshear that caused a decreasing airspeed indication.When flying an approach into gusty conditions make sure to apply plenty of airspeed correction.

CRJ-200 First Officer describes a windshear encounter during approach to MKE with the Captain flying that results in stick shaker activation as flaps 45 are selected. The autopilot disengages and max power is called for. As the alert ceases the Tower is advised and the go around is continued and vectors received for another approach.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Airport; Weather

Aircraft X was inside of a quarter mile final on the ILS Runway 31C approach. I turned around for a second to tell the supervisor about the visibility getting better on final when the supervisor noticed an airport vehicle going onto Runway 31C. At that point I issued a go around to the aircraft and to climb and maintain 3;000 ft. MSL and turn right to a heading of 110. I also let the aircraft know the reason of the go around. They were able to respond in time and were re-sequenced for another approach and landed without incident. I understand it was snowing and airport markers are difficult to see. I suggest airport vehicles be more vigilant of their position on the airport before moving anywhere. Driver refresher course recommended.

ATC approach controller reported issuing a go-around clearance to an aircraft on short final due to a vehicle reported on the runway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 1500

Aircraft had 'anti-skid' status message for normal and alternate system appear approximately 10 minutes prior to scheduled block time. When we received the original weight and balance the performance data sent was for a thrust setting assumed off of a D-2 power setting. The mechanic subsequently deferred the anti-skid/auto brake system which would then require a takeoff at Max Thrust. The Captain called the dispatcher to keep her in the loop; to add the deferral to the release; and to have her send new performance data based on the new MEL. This aircraft has an older ACARS unit requiring 'free text' to make a new takeoff performance report. I entered the takeoff performance report for max thrust because the dispatcher said she was having trouble/unable to send the data to us with the new MEL applied. The performance data that was sent back from my free text takeoff performance report request for a MAX takeoff did not have the MEL for the anti-skid included. The Captain discussed this with the dispatcher and dispatch took in excess of 20 minutes to gives us a 'live' calculation since they were somehow unable to send the new performance data over the ACARS with the associated MEL taken in to account and displayed on the performance data screen. The performance data given to us over the phone with the MEL applied from the dispatcher for the 'live' calculation was almost identical to the data sent via the ACARS that did not include the MEL. We blocked out almost an hour and a half late due to this issue and made an uneventful flight to ZZZ. Last night; the Captain informed me that he had followed up on this issue and contacted dispatch to discuss the 'live' calculation given to us. The dispatcher told him that they had 'no idea' how to include the MEL in to a live calculation. This was very unsettling to me and made me realize why the performance data/V speeds were almost identical to the data without the MEL applied. With the autobrakes/antiskid deferred it would make sense to me that the V speeds/ flap settings should be different and more conservative (lower V1 and/or Flaps 15) than without the MEL applied on a wet runway due to increased stopping distance in the event of a rejected takeoff. I feel we may have inadvertently used the wrong performance data for takeoff due to an incorrect 'live' calculation; thus the reason for this report. The landing data request prior to landing in Minneapolis appeared to be correct and the MEL was displayed on the ACARS. The Captain indicated to me last night after following up with dispatch that the dispatcher he spoke with (not our dispatcher for our flight) told him that they were able to apply the MEL to a landing data request; but not a 'live' calculation for takeoff. Dispatch needs to know how to send takeoff performance data via ACARS or given via 'live' calculation with performance limiting MELs applied when the aircraft status changes from what is originally planned so crews can takeoff with the correct data/speeds.

B757 First Officer reported that an anti-skid MEL issue was not able to be included in a takeoff performance data calculation which caused the crew to takeoff with incorrect data.


Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting; Workload

Shortly after departure from ZZZ I went to switch to the app to check on turbulence. At this point I noticed that my iPad screen was completely frozen. I could not change anything and had to reboot my iPad to get it back functioning.  I would not have been able to switch to the complex engine out procedure had we had an engine failure!I always only have flight related apps running in the background while flying to help prevent this from happening. Didn't work this time. We need new iPads. Now; I understand this is expensive but our old iPads are starting to become a safety hazard with apps locking up all the time. It's not uncommon for the Jepp app to lag and require closing and reopening. That's a quick fix; rebooting an ipad in the middle of an engine failure is not

Air carrier Captain reported that the electronic tablet was not functioning properly and required a reboot. Reporter stated it was not uncommon for this to happen.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 19

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I was working OGC (Outbound Ground Control). Heavy volume on both OGC and IGC (Inbound Ground Control) due to earlier thunderstorms with the airlines trying to catch up to their normal schedule. Aircraft Y requested taxi from Gate X to Runway 28R-N5. I taxied him [directions] to hold short of A10. A few minutes after taxi IGC told me that Aircraft X; who was pushing from Gate Y; believed that Aircraft Y had clipped his wingtip. I parked Aircraft Y on [position] short of N while the issue was investigated; and he later taxied back to the ramp.This facility needs more staffing so that during high volume times supplemental positions can be opened to relieve frequency congestion.

I was working Inbound Ground Control (IGC) during a very busy session; we had a ground delay program in all day and the program had recently ended so it was very busy and almost all arrivals had occupied gates. Gate X called me for pushback.  I had extreme frequency congestion and several airplanes both taxiing and parked; and Outbound Ground Control (OGC) was also very busy; knowing it would be very difficult to coordinate with him and not having much time to spare to coordinate; I looked out the window and saw a natural gap behind Aircraft Z; so I authorized the pushback after Aircraft Z. Since I was so busy; I don't remember how much time passed before I heard someone say stop on the frequency and I asked who needs to stop? Then maybe a few seconds later Aircraft X said he thought Aircraft Y clipped his wing. I have not had an opportunity to review the replay or listen to the tapes; so at this point I don't know if the pushback was delayed at all after Aircraft Z passed; or how much time elapsed between that and the incident.a. At this airport we should not be responsible for gate push backs onto or through one of the busiest taxiways in the world. It's an outdated concept. Over the last year or two IGC has become much more congested with aircraft and frequency congestion. This is partly due to the fact that arrivals landing 27R that have occupied gates used to be much easier for the North Tower to park. Since then we have lost the Tango Pad; the Scenic Pad has become smaller; and the standard taxi route from 27R is not as conducive to parking gate-waits. This all contributes during busy rushes to more aircraft on frequency for IGC. This is the reason we should not have to stop what we are doing to coordinate with another controller; who may be just as busy; to push an aircraft onto taxiway Alpha or Bravo. The following gates should be eliminated or changed so that they don't require stopping the movement area at the world's busiest airport: [Gates listed]b. If we aren't going to change the gates; maybe we can add [gate] to the same memory aid we have for [two gates] to make coordination easier during very busy traffic.

ORD Ground Controllers reported a possible wingtip incident between two air carriers; and referenced the complexity of the movement area as a contributing factor.


Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Other / Unknown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Procedure

This event occurred on a ferry flight. The aircraft had flown prior to this leg and had been on the ground for 1 hour. On takeoff an amber ADC # 1 Comparison Monitor Alert came on both pilots PFD's. I was Pilot Flying (from the right seat) and took the radios and called for the checklist. We ran the checklist which directed us to revert on the Left side. The rest of the flight was uneventful. Upon landing the Captain called Maintenance Control to write up the faulty ADC. I was interested so I listened to the conversation my partner was having with Maintenance Control. A lot of questions were asked and my partner answered them honestly. At the end Maintenance Control said you have a choice you can either fly it again and 'see if it does it again' or you can write it up. We opted to write it up. It is obvious to me that the Maintenance Controller viewed this as a nuisance condition and felt that it was likely it could or would not be duplicated. I have been on this airplane for some time and I knew this was not a nuisance condition. This is only the second time I have seen something like it since I have been on the airplane. After writing it up we went to the hotel. I felt that Maintenance Control may be right and they wouldn't duplicate it but I rationalized that at least a mechanic would have looked at it and more importantly it was documented so trends could be evaluated. Still we both felt that Maintenance Control was putting pressure on us to fly it and we felt that we were not being 'team' players because we said we wanted to write it up. The next day; to our surprise; another Encore was on the ground and after seeing the paperwork we realized we were assigned to it. Unfortunately the nose door was found broken during the preflight and it would not lock; latch or open so we had to go back to the aircraft we flew yesterday. Turns out that we must have had a bug strike on takeoff the previous day because the sign off says that Maintenance found remains of a bug in the left side pitot tube which they had to clean out using tools. Moral of the story is; had we succumbed to the pressure that Maintenance Control was laying down and 'taken one for the team' we would have dis-enfranchised the 4 owners we flew the next morning because we would have not likely known until takeoff that we still had a problem and due to those pesky limitations on the aircraft we would have not been legal to depart. Also the company would likely not have positioned a backup aircraft into our departure airport. GOAL - We need to have the conditions that are truly 'nuisance' documented and we need to have Maintenance on the conditions that are not nuisance. We are only hurting ourselves otherwise.

A CE560 alerted ADC #1 Comparator Monitor on takeoff because of an insect impact into the pitot tube. Maintenance Control requested the crew not document it because it was most likely a nuisance alert.


Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors; Manuals

Company Engineering started the practice of making available PDF versions of the Component Maintenance Manual (CMM) Engineering Orders (EO) for field use; instead of putting the information in the Boeing Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC).  These Engineering Orders are generally used for cabin furnishings/galleys/seats and the like.  The web page that is used to deliver this information to the Mechanic contains Aircraft Effectivity and links to the effective Engineering Orders.Some of these are for obsolete equipment that has been long removed.  The overall layout of the site is very confusing and has erroneous links/labels; and within it; is a link to another EO site with a different presentation; different labels and erroneous labels/links for those Engineering Order manuals. I fear that someone is going to mistakenly put the wrong part on the wrong seat/component.  The chances of an actual unsafe condition are low; but there is greater probability of an FAA violation.  The mistakes seem to be only with the presentation [display] of the Component Engineering Orders.  The data contained within seems to be OK. The trick is getting to the correct EO to begin with. The problems I am aware of are in the B767 and B777 index of the web page.I have tried for over a year to get someone to update the information with Engineering requests; no luck. I hope that someone can convince Engineering and [Technical] publications to get together and correct how this information is presented and correct the effectivity problems.  The new B777s are on the way with all new cabin interior; it would be nice to have a solid foundation to deliver this new data.

A Technician describes a practice started by Engineering of making available a PDF version of their Component Engineering Orders (EO) for field use; instead of putting the EO information for their B767/B777 aircraft in the aircraft Manufacturer's Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC). The web page presentation has been very confusing with erroneous links.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Type 1900

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Type 6000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Visual to 27 at SAN using RNAV Z. Ceiling was BKN015. Crew briefed visual procedures at altitude but was informed that ATIS had changed late in the descent; crew adjusted minimums to account for the updated ceiling. Earlier I had queried the Captain if he preferred flaps 40 for SAN and he said he wanted flaps 30. Vref was 141 knots; wind component added 6 knots for a VTARGET of 147 knots. Captain configured early and we were stable at 1;000 feet AGL with a slightly high VVI (Vertical Velocity Indicator) due to SAN Runway 27 3.5 degree approach and the high weight and subsequent high approach speed.  We were visual at that point; I think we broke out at 1;000-1;200 feet. Every time I crosschecked the speed and VVI; the Captain was stable; with the knowledge that the 3.5 degree approach and speed (as mentioned in the Safety Alert) would result in VVI rates over 1;000 feet. I was crosschecking radar altitudes and glideslope guidance more than I usually do; but this is my personal habit for SAN. As I did the normal 'in and out' visual crosscheck; nothing seemed amiss. Directly over or slightly after the parking deck on short final; the Captain slightly adjusted his visual aim point as is common technique at SAN. My eyes were outside at this point. We both heard a 'sink rate...'. I don't know what the second phrase was; as the Captain acknowledged the first sink rate forcefully and almost instantly. I quickly looked inside and I think I saw 'pull up' on the bottom of the PFD for what seemed like an instant. I can't be certain; however; and it can't be understated how fast it went away if indeed it was there. I looked back up and we were two red and two white on the PAPI; slightly fast; and Captain was in what looked like a good position to land. We made a safe landing and applied moderate braking and exited the runway. In the postflight; the Captain and I disagreed about what the second term was at the aural system annunciated. He thinks he heard 'sink rate; sink rate.' I actually don't know what the second term the aural system annunciated was; as I didn't hear it clearly due to the Captain's acknowledgment of it. I do think I saw a very fleeting 'pull up' on the PFD; but I can't be perfectly certain; and Captain is adamant that we didn't get the GPWS warning; only the sink rate caution. I want to be clear that I understand the limitation with regard to the warning annunciator. In hindsight; I can see now that a go-around could have been a prudent decision even though the aircraft appeared to be a safe and normal position for short final at SAN. I want to highlight this issue for a few reasons. It bears repeating that phase of flight; temporal distortion; and flight deck confusion can all conspire to create a situation where two trained and alert crew members can see different things. The other thing I want to highlight is how heavy -800's; going into SAN; can potentially be affected by a flaps 30 approach. I don't know why we don't have recommended flap settings for certain situations. We've all been flying light aircraft for almost a year now and perhaps it would help to remind crews about heavy aircraft with higher approach airspeeds and subsequently higher VVIs in higher altitude environments or steeper approaches like SAN.

On approach to SAN when transitioning outside; we briefly received a sink rate call. At the gate; the First Officer was unsure if it was just a sink rate call or sink rate pull up. I adjusted sink rate and landed normally.

B737-800 Flight Crew reported on an unstable approach receiving two cautionary messages the were missed by flight crew.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3; Flight Crew Total 7651; Flight Crew Type 91

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

I completed 3 touch and go at ZZZ. I had turned out to the NE climbing through 1;500 feet and heading about 059 degrees when I noticed a vibration. I turned slowly back toward the field (about 239 degrees) and tried to isolate the vibration by slowly retarding the throttle. During this time I heard a bang and my windshield was covered in oil (I was not able to see through the windshield). I immediately shut both ignition switches off and turned master electrical and boost pump off. I then proceeded to slide the canopy open to see out. After I got the canopy open I saw ZZZ and got the aircraft trimmed and set at best rate of descent from 85 mph to 65 mph and preceded to ZZZ. I had to do s-turns to get down to safe altitude for final and landing at ZZZ. After roll out and post inspection revealed the Spinner/Prop/Flange missing. On further investigation; revealed the crankshaft sheared.

Experimental aircraft pilot reported an uneventful forced landing due to Prop Assembly failure.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

While operating [a flight to] PHF we had a unique situation happen. While on approach we were cleared to JAWES and cleared for the ILS 7 Approach. Around JAWES we were switched to the Tower and told to report 4 mile final. We overheard tower give an E2 Hawkeye a touch and go clearance. While on final; another E2 Hawkeye called in for the overhead pattern. We were given our landing clearance shortly after and told to disregard the report; about a 6 mile final. Approaching about 200-300 feet AGL we heard one of the E2 Hawkeyes report over the numbers for the break. I diverted my vision slightly higher only to see the lights of an E2 right in front of us; which was not there on the entire approach. We continued down the glide slope and landed. After clearing the runway; I told the first officer I don't feel comfortable having an E2 overfly us on final; estimated aircraft altitude between 300-500 feet AGL; without some kind of heads up. He agreed and we continued to the gate.After arrival into the gate I called ATC and asked for a phone number to call to talk to them. I contacted the controller as we left the airport and told him I don't think having an E2 overfly a passenger aircraft on final was safe. If we had to abort a landing we can climb very fast and the closure rate would set off a TCAS RA at low altitude and could lead to further issues. The controller just wanted to say it's normal procedure; and being only 1 aircraft landing [while] the other is in the overhead pattern at 2;000-2;200 feet there isn't a conflict. They regularly do this for aircraft departing as well. I see less of an issue with aircraft departing because one cannot conflict with the other as fast. He also says Tower pays visual attention when doing these operations but I see this difficult at night. The military is used to flying in formation and close proximity so what they deem safe isn't necessarily safe for us. I contacted [the] Chief Pilot following ATC conversation to see how he felt and what possibly to do about it.I recommend that having an aircraft fly over the extended centerline and overfly another aircraft on final not happen. If this needs to be done have the aircraft in the overhead offset to one side of the runway and not follow and pass another. If a passenger aircraft is on final this practice should stop or have the overflying aircraft not pass the arriving airliner. As well as advise the crew so it can be briefed and not surprised.

CRJ-200 Captain reported being uncomfortable with the procedure in place at PHF airport that allows military aircraft to be vectored over arrivals at low altitudes.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 89; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 917

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

When preparing for pushback at ZZZ; the ramp called ready and asked if we could release the brakes for aircraft capture. I replied that I could not and asked if the ramper was familiar with the fact that we are not allowed to do so until we are cleared to push. She responded that yes she was; but that her superiors told them to ask for brake release early so that they can get the on time. She said this is a consistent message from her leadership.There is no reason why we can't release the brakes for aircraft capture prior to receiving the push clearance. The capture process takes some time anyways and it would be helpful to have it complete when actually cleared to push.Flight Operations and the ramp department need to come to agreement on the procedures here. We are constantly asked to release the brake prior to being cleared to push; particularly in ZZZ.

Captain reported that it is unclear if company policy allows brake release to be done prior to receiving clearance to push.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 800

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

I departed on a flight to OJC. [On] Kansas City Approach [I] started a VFR descent into OJC at about 150 KIAS. At approximately 4;000 FT MSL and 10 NM west of OJC [I was] on the 250 radial traveling direct to OJC heading 070. The airplane was on autopilot. I saw in my peripheral [vision] a yellow aircraft at my 10-11 o'clock going south; co-altitude on collision bearing. I had to take aggressive action unloading the aircraft and the yellow aircraft went directly over us at no more than 500 FT; and I would say it was more like 300 FT. I also fly F/A-18s in the military and have a lot of formation experience and know that it was closer than 500 FT. After the adrenaline wore off I called Approach and they said I was their only contact. Keep in mind this was JUST outside the Mode C veil from MCI (OJC250010); and since the other aircraft was traveling south I can only assume he was just inside the Mode C veil moments prior; so either he wasn't squawking Mode 3C or their radar was inoperative. I also asked OJC Tower if they had any contact on their radar and they said their only other contact was a Pilatus 10 NM southwest of IXD.Contributing factors: long flight; I was focused on the approach and landing; not having the best visual lookout. I'm not sure I would have seen the airplane had it not been painted bright yellow. Having had a couple very close passes flying F/A-18's; I truly believe my wife; daughter; two dogs and I would have collided with that aircraft if I had not kicked off autopilot and unloaded at the last second. Get better radar in the terminal area of Kansas City. This is not the first time I've had a close pass with another aircraft in almost the same spot. I find it totally unacceptable that 33 NM from MCI at 4;000 FT two aircraft almost collided and approach didn't see anything.

The pilot of a high performance single engine aircraft reported a NMAC with an experimental on approach to OJC. ATC reported they were not in contact with any other aircraft in the area.


Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Odor on aircraft when APU bleed selected on. Maintenance opinion was that odor was caused by rain water mixed with fluid on side of plane were being brought into APU intake and causing odor. After engine start odor was less but still there. At take off odor became very strong; eyes nose and throat burned. Went on O2 and returned to field for overweight landing. Paramedics met crew and took to hospital for tests. On going odor problem with aircraft pack system.

An A319 crew declared an emergency; donned O2 masks and returned to land after a strong odor caused burning eyes and throat.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 4; Flight Crew Total 530; Flight Crew Type 224

Other / Unknown; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway

On final approach; an early flare caused a hard landing; blowing the right tire and causing the plane to veer off the runway hitting a small sign with the left wing. No injury to pilot. No damage to runway/airport equipment; except a small sign knocked down.

Bonanza pilot reports a hard landing causing a tire to blow and a runway excursion.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 31

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Weather

For at least the third time this year; I sat down at [this sector] with weather and an array of hot military airspace and saw immediately that I was going to be going down the tubes! I mentioned to the CIC [Controller in Charge] (we have very few Supes [Front Line Managers]) that the situation called for TMU [Traffic Management Unit] to restrict ORD northbound traffic. He said he would watch it. What followed was an air traffic free for all; with aircraft flashing HO [Hand Off] to me that are level at FL230 at BAE VOR; which must be climbed to miss the airspace. Every single aircraft deviating; asking about rides; routes; reports; [and] making PIREPS. There was; as far as I know; no attempt by TMU to actually manage traffic. My sector may not have been red; but anyone who actually knows this job could have seen how dangerous this sector was; and yet aircraft were poured out of ORD without restriction. Eventually; the CIC restricted the military airspace which helped. I ended up violating [another sector] at ZMP perhaps half dozen times; and they violated me. We handed off aircraft with incorrect data blocks simply because volume made it impossible to properly amend a DB [Data Block] before two other guys started talking about deviating. In their defense; when the airspace is hot; SAW works many MSP departures north of the airspace and it was into this stream that I drove my traffic; virtually all deviating; all stopped at interim altitudes; and sometimes with incorrect data. It was incredibly dangerous and as I said previously; this is at least the third or fourth time this year it has happened to me. It is my opinion that when military airspace is hot in the north area; there be a standard restriction on ORD north departure of at least 20 miles. When there is weather in addition; it should be 30 miles.

Chicago Center Controller reported an unsafe situation relating to weather; traffic volume; and airspace.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 15500; Flight Crew Type 5200

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

While climbing out of DCA on J149 to ROD on our way to our cruise altitude of 380; Washington Center said she showed us routed on Q72 to Hacks. We were on J149. We replied that we were on J149. At that time; I looked down at our PDC which had; indeed; included a revised segment via Q72. During setup; we both missed the revised segment on the PDC. For many years; the PDC format from ACARS had the filed route on top just below the XPDR code; followed by the revised segment; followed by remarks at the bottom.  Recently; the revised segment and filed route were reversed; with the revised segment on top; followed by the filed route. When we both looked at the PDC; we both looked at the filed route; thinking we were looking at the revised segment. Since it agreed with what we had put into the FMGC; we thought we were good to go. Two things contributed to this error. First; the reversal in the PDC format; and second; the high frequency of times where we have revised segments that are exactly as we are filed. This is what we both thought we had on this flight.

While climbing to FL380 on J149; Washington Center queried us if we were on Q72. We replied that we are on J149. At that same moment we looked at our PDC and confirmed that there was a revision and we both missed it. We let the Washington Center know that we had missed the revision. She cleared us directly to HAACK intersection and the rest of flight was uneventful. There was no inflight incursion. In the past month I've noticed a flip flop on PDC format. The revision was on the bottom of PDC and now it is on top. Also for many years since inception ATC publishes a revision but in reality it is a mere copy of original clearance and we get into a habit of now paying too much attention to the revisions. A better way to illustrate revisions might be order. Both of these factors contributed to us missing the revision.

A319 flight crew is informed by ATC that they are off course. It is determined that the PDC clearance via ACARS was misinterpreted and a revised segment was not entered in the FMGC.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 14200; Flight Crew Type 54

Training / Qualification; Workload; Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure

Procedure; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Pilot exceeded TOT limits during engine start. The aircraft was then flown with an unknown mechanical irregularity. The first start attempt was made with the main fuel switch in the OFF position. The engine started but did not reach operating RPM before flaming-out. The pilot reconfigured the aircraft and restarted the engine. The TOT indication began flashing after engine start. The pilot mistakenly thought the aircraft had not experienced a hot start because of similarities between the TOT gage and the torque gage. The pilot interpreted the TOT flashing display as an impending hot start and only discovered the actual hot start after consulting with Maintenance Control upon landing. The engine required a hot section inspection; but there was no damage found. Contributing Factors: 1) TOT and Torque both flash. One indicates an actual exceedance; the other an impending exceedance. Each has a different action required. 2) Night conditions with poor cockpit lighting. 3) Limited experience in the aircraft. 4) Minimal flight training during indoctrination. 5) VERY minimal systems training. 6) Attention was diverted from the TOT during start to ensure the main rotor was turning at 25%. 7) Failure to use the checklist. The company's expected standard is to be in the air within seven minutes of receiving an EMS flight request. That includes getting the aircraft out of the hangar; checklist completion; and engine start. Corrective Action: 1) The Bell 206L3 being flown has no over torque or over temp protection. More time should be spent during training to ensure the pilot has a COMPLETE understanding of the TOT indications and their significance. 2) Less emphasis on getting in the air in seven minutes and more emphasis on using the checklist.

Bell 206 pilot attributed failure to recognize a hot start to Temperature and Torque gauge similarity; poor cockpit lighting; limited experience in the aircraft; requirement to monitor rotor RPM; failure to use the checklist; minimal training and time pressure.


Ice/Rain Protection System Indicating & Warning

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted

While on descent we encountered Rime Ice and activated the wing Anti Ice system. ECAM generated a Wing Anti Ice. System Fault message. We complied with the ECAM actions which included exiting icing conditions. Icing was assumed to exist all the way to the ground based on reports of low ceilings and light snow at our destination so we opted to climb and divert to our filed alternate. We did not declare an emergency since ATC allowed us to climb immediately out of icing conditions and the wings appeared to by ice-free based on visual inspection.We advised Flight Attendants; passengers and Dispatch via ACARS. They did not respond immediately; but while on final approach to we got a request from Dispatch to consider two other airports. Due to prevalent IMC in the region and our fuel state we opted to continue and land at since it was VMC and our fuel state might not support delays to analyze the feasibility of reaching another alternate without entering IMC or icing. The station personnel were VERY helpful in dealing with a large aircraft they were not trained on and additional passengers they had not planned for; and should be commended. After several hours; Contract Maintenance was able to defer the Wing Anti Ice system in the 'on' condition and we were able to proceed to our original destination.If the company would prefer that crews divert to somewhere other than the filed alternate they should communicate that in a timely manner or ideally in advance. Fuel often precludes lengthy analysis of multiple options. Either file for the 'preferred' alternate in the first place or add an additional 'preferred' alternate to the release; in addition to the legal filed alternate.

An Air Carrier pilot reported while on short final to their filed diversion airport Dispatch requested they divert to a different airport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Routine Inspection

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; General Work Refused

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy

When unloading airmail from Aircraft X staff discovered potential DG. The parcel has not been forwarded from ZZZ1; but is hold back until further notice.What is your opinion of the cause?It could be an old box reused; but we have to react on those label.I do not understand how this could be sent without any attention when it was placed on the pallet.What is your suggested corrective action?Please inform staff not to put boxes like these on pallets.

When unloading airmail from Aircraft X staff discovered leaking oily substance from a parcel.The parcel is military mail; and it is not long ago we have had the same problem.The parcel was removed from other airmail; but have leaked on 3 other parcel. We will hold back the parcel at our warehouse until further notice.What is your opinion of the cause?It is potential dangerous with leaking oily substance in aircraft and shipper must know not to send oil like this.What is your suggested corrective action?Please inform shipper not to send parcel like this on passenger aircraft.

Air Carrier Ramp personnel reported undocumented 'Hazmat labeled cargo' during unloading.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

In cruise at FL350 Level 1 SYS 3 Air Off alert. Ran QRH and was messaging Dispatch to check weather and if they wanted us to continue with Wing Anti Ice unavailable. Checked weather at ZZZ1 ZZZ2 ZZZ3 about that time we got a Level 3 Manf Number 3 Fail alert. ZZZ was nearest suitable airport.

Returned to cockpit to find Captain working a QRH problem. We had an Air System 3 Off alert at cruise; a Level 1 alert. The air system schematic showed our manifold 3 in red and the MANF light red on the overhead. We were discussing the listed consequences. Not to pressurize the manifold if it was failed and lack of anti ice. We would have needed anti-ice to continue to destination. As the Captain was continuing to work through the QRH we received a momentary manifold fail. The manifold fail called for a diversion to the nearest suitable airport. We reviewed the weather and the captain decided to divert to the closest and it had VFR weather.

MD11 flight crew experiences a Level 1 SYS 3 Air Off alert at FL350; followed shortly by a Level 3 Manf Number 3 Fail alert. Crew diverts to the nearest suitable airport.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

I've had four Flaps 1 departures in the last four days; which is cool; because I get why we are doing it. It provides less engine stress because if you have adequate runway; it reduces your takeoff power significantly; BUT it also causes a significantly longer takeoff run. So; every takeoff in the last three days we hit the proceeding aircraft wake turbulence around 400 feet; and continued to stay in that wake turbulence till one of us made a turn away. B737; Airbus...etc wake can be quite disturbing but manageable; but if that happened behind a heavy; that might be more than disturbing.So; in the past; where a normal flaps 5 departure; we were probably all rotating at similar points; and the 737 was climbing maybe even above someone's low level wake; now; at flaps one; we're rotating most likely PAST previous aircraft rotation point and hitting their departure wake; fairly consistently; when it is at its strongest; low level; low speed; and heavy.Without any condescension at all; I'm guessing nobody thought about how a longer takeoff roll might impact initial rotation and climb into wake turbulence at high volume departure airports. Since the new performance software seems to lean in the direction of Flaps 1; if there's an available runway; this might increase controllability issues or worse on a more frequent basis.Flight dynamics; TERPS criteria and engine performance are not my expertise. I don't have a solution. I really like the new software. Maybe suggest that in high traffic airports; when there are multiple close in departures in affect; where low level wake turbulence could be a concern; the crew use their judgment to possibly run Flaps 5 data; and if permissible; run change triangles prior to departure? Only thing I can think of.

B737 First Officer expressed concern about using Flap 1 takeoff procedures; because with the longer takeoff roll a wake turbulence encounter is more likely.


Workload; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Time Pressure

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

After level-off at 35;000 ft. got a ECAM ENG ADV indication. #1 ENG Oil Temp was 168C. Followed QRH Supplemental Advisory for PW HI OIL TEMP. Oil quantity was good; no secondaries were observed; reduced power to Flight Idle; observed no reduction in temperature. Addressed QRH ENG HI OIL TEMP procedure which indicated imminent shutdown with conditions we were observing; temperature continued to rise and peaked at 176C. We were approaching ZZZ; decided to do an immediate divert with the intent of landing before engine shutdown became compulsory. Coordinated with Dispatch and [notified] ATC; landed at ZZZ. First Officer did an excellent job positioning and preparing aircraft for landing.

Hi Eng Oil Temp #1; got initial advisory at cruise. Leveled off 35;000 ft.; 168C. Followed QRH Advisory which led to Eng Oil Hi Temp QRH procedure. Temperature peaked at 176C; showed 36C to 40C hotter than #2. Engine during descent at flight idle. ATC was notified; did not shutdown engine.

A300 flight crew reported abnormally high engine oil temperature in number one engine. Flight immediately diverted prior to having to shut down the engine.


Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While serving as PM (Pilot Monitoring); on the ground in ZZZ the CA (Captain) briefed me on the flight which included the weather and a chance for turbulence. While on initial climb through 16000 ft. ATC asked about our ride saying we should be getting some cop to turn. We were in smooth air until after going from ZZZZZ to ZZZZZ1; which was a reroute given by ATC. Both our weather radars were on and returning very little to no echos. At fl360 crossing bills about 50nm ahead was a very small patch of green on the weather radar covering the 12 o'clock to 1 o clock position and less than 15 miles in size. We were on a 210 heading about and the CA instructed me to ask for a 245 heading which I did and which we got with little to no delay. The CA then informed the FA (Flight Attendant) of possible turn in about 5 to 10 and to be seated by then. The passenger sign was still on. Once reaching the green area depicted on the radar; the ride started to toughen and the radio became statistic. From here the event started and I have no real clue as to what exactly happened. I know the following things then occurred in a very short and possibly overlapping manner. I noticed the CA using the TCS to turn the aircraft more west; a visual indication of possible ice formation on the windscreen with no auto anti-ice activation. And then shortly the sound of the AP (autopilot) disconnect with the autopilot fail EICAS but the YD was still engaged. At that point the CA instructed me to turn the anti ice on.Our ride was pretty bad. A heavy turbulence and chop although I was in my seat with just the lap belt and was not using the grab handle or being pushed against the seat or seat belt in any direction. The CA then stated to ATC he was in severe turbulence and needed to descend to FL340. We got some static from the precipitation and the CA continued to assume control of the radio saying he needed a descent to FL340 and a west turn. ATC told him to proceed. We hit one pretty good bump with him in a right turn and decent with the FD still showing a correction to the up and left.The CA got on the radio and stated mayday mayday and that he was in severe turbulence and descending to FL340 and turning to a 270 heading. I noticed the aircraft in a descent rate up to 4500 fpm with chop and no shaker or visible PLI. Bank was about 20 degrees and pitch no more than 10 degrees. During the CA's maneuver and transmissions with ATC I received no instructions; no communication and no feedback of the aircrafts state...not even the CA talking to himself out loud which would have been more useful than what I received. Within 30 seconds we were in the clear and the ride went from a moderate turbulence to a constant light chop with occasional moderate to then just light chop. The CA was still descending through FL340 and I questioned him on that. He stated he was correcting. ATC was asking him for a PIREP and he was trying to describe to event while still flying manually and below our assigned altitude. The CA turned on the AP and set the airplane up to re-navigate to our next fix and had the aircraft in alt hold mode while still being at FL334. I again quarried him and then ATC actually asked and he again took the radio and said we were correcting. After that we pretty much reassessed the navigation state of the aircraft and continued without incident. The CA called the FA and asked in any injuries had occurred and she stated no. The CA then sent all messages to Dispatch Maintenance through the ACARS.A lot happened in a very short confusing time frame. Zero CRM (Crew Resource Management) or crew communication. No proper assignments of duties. The aircraft was defending at one point greater than 4000 FPM. We had turbulence and poor radio clarity. Threat of weather radar limitations. CA assumed PF (Pilot Flying) and PnF (Pilot not Flying) roles just becauseHonestly I don't know how much there is to learn since I really don't know what exactly happened. I feel that the event was mostly pilot induced the CA basically just took over and tried to do everything; most likely interfered with the AP causing it to turn off and then assuming all communication with ATC; hand-flying and by using the glare shield PTT also no less. I only turned on the anti ice called EICAS messages aloud and stated an altitude deviation with zero response at all during the event. Debriefing the event was equally frustrating as the whole flight I felt all I received was a defending conflicting account of how bad the turbulence was and a throwing of the CA 20 years experience into every counterpoint of my discussion with him.I kept telling him I was more disappointed in the lack of communication and his radio hijacking then the actual event. I didn't feel like a pilot; I felt like a passenger. All I kept getting was that he felt it was so time critical that he had to articulate his requests directly with ATC; apparently to the point of using a mayday (which was a first for me) I asked him why he could not simply said aloud what he was doing and I can then tell ATC.He agreed that there was a definite lack of communication but then continued for the remaining flight and two legs after that defending his position that 'in my 20 years I just saw how bad that could have been.' The I've been around longer attitude was there and he admitted to being aware of that; but still continued to pursue that as his main defense.I just don't see a way we could have seen the turbulence event coming any better; but there is a huge need for improvement to how a crew handles such an event in real time.

Fully aware of weather enroute. Minimal convection noted. Absence at the time of departure of WST's. No Turbulence SIGMETS at the time of departure. Between ZZZZZ and ZZZZZ1; detected weather which required right deviation. Weather was 40 nm ahead. Deviated right to heading of 245. Radar tilt exercised between -1 and -2. FL360 for ride and tops. In and out of tops. No errant PIREPS. Deviations occurring. On new path; airborne weather radar indicated no echos. Returns faded and cleared display as we went further west. Began to encounter sudden and continuous moderate turbulence. It was near SEVERE; but not necessarily so; in my opinion. Condition's deteriorated rapidly to low KIAS (200) and PLI GREEN. I had intentionally kept the airplane at a slower speed as I knew we might encounter some level of rough air/ie precaution. This likely facilitated a slow down in IAS. As such; I selected CLB thrust as I felt this was necessary to maintain safe speed. Further; I requested immediate descent to FL340 for airspeed maintenance and hopes of a better ride. Also; it is my opinion that moderate to severe ice was encountered. I manually activated ANTI-ICE. This likely deprived us of further airspeed maintenance; but likely was necessary to prevent ice accumulation. Radio chatter began to increase. As such; I declared a 'mayday' call in order to advise ATC immediately that we needed his attention and use of the frequency. At times; radio static was severe on both radios. Our encounter ranged in altitude from FL 360-to FL 340. Further; we turned right further to HDG 275. All the while; I knew we were on the back edge of IMC/VMC conditions. I do not believe we had altitude deviation as we were cleared to descend. I know of no traffic conflicts.The cabin was briefed prior to this event. This applies to the passengers as well. Upon assessment; no injuries and all occupants were belted. The fact that it might have been bumpy was not a surprise. The near SVR turbulence was whoever a surprise.To be clear; we were both fully aware of where the weather was and briefed as such. Flying in the proverbial debris area of convection. Undetectable turbulence. PLI. It would seem a wider berth was necessary. However; I am certain we avoided all echoes by more than 20 miles. I feel there was nothing to do in order to avoid.

Air carrier flight crew reported poor CRM when they entered an area of severe turbulence.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 240; Flight Crew Type 80

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related

There was a NOTAM for balloons in the vicinity but not one that said there would be balloons surrounding the airport making it impossible to land. Not just a few balloons but [almost one hundred] to be exact. I had to make unusual attitudes to land to avoid collision with any balloons. My wing tanks couldn't take the unusual attitudes and my engine quit just a few hundred feet from the ground. I had to make a quick landing and avoid the balloons.Just as a note: I started making position calls 25 miles out; and every 5 miles to 10 and then each mile. Not one of the [many dozens of] balloons replied. I know the frequency was good and my radio was good; because the ground crew at the FBO came out to watch me land dead stick. They then complemented me on the landing. To launch [close to a hundred] balloons all along the perimeter of the airport fence and not make appropriate notice is asking for an accident. I fueled and departed and notified several other aircraft in the vicinity and of the congestion and understatement of the NOTAM and they diverted.

Extra pilot reported maneuvering around hot air balloons near the destination airport led to fuel starvation on final approach.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Dispatched with MEL 32-XX-XX ECAM Brake Temperature Indication(s). [Aircraft Release] showed #2 ECAM Brake Temperature Indication Inoperative.Later discovered enroute that maintenance had entered an update to the work in progress for the #2 ECAM brake temperature indication including ECAM Brake #1; #5 and #6 temperature indications to the list of inoperative indications. It is my belief I dispatched with the incorrect MEL description. I should have had maintenance include the additional inoperative ECAM Brake Temperature Indications prior to accepting the aircraft. Post flight I discussed the issue with 2 line mechanics; Maintenance Control and the Duty Officer. All maintenance personnel believed that because the MEL allows us to dispatch with one or all indications inoperative; the maintenance work update was sufficient to update the MEL and it does not matter that the MEL did not include the #1; #5 or #6 ECAM Brake Temperature Indications into the MEL description. My Duty Officer was like me; unsure.The question arises if it is legal to dispatch with an MEL and later add updates to include more inoperative items under the same MEL but with no change to the initial description. My heartache to this approved procedure is that these maintenance updates can be pages long. Pilots want to know in the MEL description what is broken so they can adequately brief their MEL operational procedures. If a maintenance update is made that includes additional items to that MEL; I believe the MEL should be updated to include all items in the description. Before I left the aircraft; Maintenance did agree to include the additional inoperative items in the next Aircraft Release. I later checked and they complied with my request.

Captain reported that aircraft MEL was modified after takeoff; calling into question whether the aircraft was dispatched legally.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

We pushed out on time and starting taxiing. We ran checklist and procedures as normal and didn't notice anything out of the normal. We took off and turned to heading 180 as instructed. Once in the turn Tower told us that there was some fluid coming out of the right wing and it was clearly visible during takeoff. We immediately requested to level off and Tower said 'maintain 6;000'. Shortly after; they also gave us a frequency change for further assistance if needed. I asked the Captain what he wanted to do and he said 'we are going to do a precautionary air return to [departure airport]'. I contacted Departure with altitude and our intentions to return; they asked for souls and fuel onboard even though we did not declare an emergency. I also stated that the reason for the return was a possible fuel leak and the return was precautionary. We also requested delayed vectors so we could analyze the situation; run any required checklist and set the airplane ready for landing. We ran the QRH on 'Fuel Leak'; and after only noticing that the right tank was consuming fuel at a faster rate than the left one; we started to get the airplane ready to land. Captain also asked for any input our jumpseater may have had; but he had nothing to say except to ask the Flight Attendant to check the top of the right wing for any abnormality. We brought the airplane down to the ground safely. We landed and came to a complete stop for the Fire Inspector to do a visual check. The Fire Inspector told us that is was ok to continue to the ramp shortly after. Captain contacted Maintenance Control and the issue was left in their hands.

EMB-145EP First Officer reported Tower informed them of a fuel leak shortly after takeoff. Flight returned to departure airport for a precautionary landing.