Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Approximately 5 to 10 minutes after level out at FL410; the left engine flamed out while at a long range fuel setting and at mach .67 or .68 for maximum range. I requested FL250 from ATC and was cleared to FL250 and ATC asked if I had an emergency. I informed ATC that I had experienced an engine flameout and was going to descend for a restart. ATC asked again if I was declaring an emergency and I replied 'No; I am descending for a restart'. On reaching FL250; I completed a windmilling restart according to the checklist at which time the engine restarted normally and came up to power. Since the flameout was most likely the result of high altitude and low power settings and the engine was performing normally; I requested and climbed to FL330 and monitored all engine settings which remained normal. After landing; I had a Mechanic look at the engine and complete a normal start and power run and will have a logbook entry that the engine is airworthy.

LJ25 Captain experiences an engine flame out at FL410 which is attributed to the high altitude and low power setting. A descent to FL250 is requested and the engine is successfully started. Flight continues at FL330 and upon landing Maintenance can find no faults.


Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

Right red gear unsafe light illuminated; as well as all three amber gear door lights and gear in transit lights upon raising the landing gear after takeoff. We also noticed a loud grinding noise coming from underneath the flight deck. This resulted in our flight returning to [departure airport]. Mechanically to be determined. Aircraft was subsequently ferried to a maintenance base to determine the cause of the indications. After the gear indications were noticed; ATC was notified (emergency was not declared); as well as the flight attendant; who was asked to visually inspect the landing gear. We ran the appropriate checklist; which led to alternate gear extension; and notified ops of our situation and asked them to notify dispatch. The passengers were also notified that we would be returning to [departure airport]. At this point; the Captain noted that we had drifted from our assigned altitude of 4;000 ft down to 3;300 feet. This was immediately corrected and ATC was notified. The Captain remarked that he thought the autopilot was engaged; when it in fact was not. After we landed; ATC was called via telephone to discuss the situation that had occurred. The controller replied that all traffic was cleared from our area to accompany us while we ran our checklists; and that the altitude deviation was not an issue. He also mentioned that we were well above his MVA. From this event; I was reminded of the importance of always monitoring aircraft automation while running checklists and emergency checklists. What the pilot perceives the automation to be doing and what the automation is actually doing can be different; if careful attention is not paid. As a crew; we debriefed the event and discussed what was done well; and what could have been improved upon.

Dash-8 First Officer reported returning to the departure airport after experiencing abnormal landing gear indications after gear retraction.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

At FL260; we were assigned an arrival change. As I was setting up my charts on iPad (looking right); I became aware; due to 'bank angle' 'bank angle' and sound of Autopilot being turned off. At that time I noticed we were in excess of 60 degrees of bank; nose low (but not extreme). The Captain had taken the controls; and was hand flying recovery. It all happened fast; but I do not think I had any sensory cues that we were in bank; until the aforementioned aircraft sounds. I was a little confused on what exactly happened and was happening; but Captain executed excellent recovery. I notified ATC that we had lost 500 feet due to flight control issue; and they told us to descend to FL240; which we did. I asked Captain what had happened; and he told me he was also looking at iPad; and when he looked up; we were well past 45 degrees of bank; still on autopilot. He told me he disconnected autopilot; and executed recovery. We ascertained if there were any injuries in back of plane; and were told none.Rest of flight was uneventful; except for one of us always keeping a hand on yolk; in case anomaly reoccurred. We discussed episode; could not figure out what had occurred. Best we came up with was autopilot directed bank and did not stop; until disengaged. I had quick connection to dead head after flight; discussed with Captain who said he would write up and fill out reports. Really have no idea on why it occurred. We were both seated; no chance of accidentally bumping yoke. Cannot explain.

B737 First Officer experienced excessive bank angle at FL260 with the Captain flying and autopilot engaged. The Captain disconnected the autopilot and regained the 500 feet of altitude lost. Both pilots were focused on their iPads and did not see what initiated the event.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Type 1922

Flight Crew Total 1615; Flight Crew Type 735

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Normal ILS approach. Just prior to the FAF; while I was descending through 2;000 feet; I (PF) called for 'gear down;' before landing checklist. We first noticed a caution message of 'auto speed brakes' followed by the 'GEAR DISAGREE' EICAS. The right main landing gear did not indicate down and locked.Advised the Tower we did not get a right gear down indication and will be executing a missed. We also asked Tower if they could give us an assessment of the right landing gear. Initial missed approach instructions from the Tower were to fly runway heading and climb to 2;000 feet. Tower also advised us that during the climb out they could not see our aircraft to assess whether the gear was down.We then were vectored to a downwind leg and instructed to climb to 5;000 feet. Once we leveled off at 2;000 feet; I turned on the autopilot and told the Captain that I had the radios while he was running the QRH. The Captain then let me know he would be informing the flight attendants and the passengers for the reason of the go around. I continued the climb to 5;000 feet and followed vectors from ATC. When the Captain was back in the QRH; he mentioned how most of the landing gear controls would be on my side of the aircraft and therefore easier for me to run the QRH while he flew so we transferred controls on downwind. Not sure why the gear did not extend or if it would extend and lock down via alternate method; we [requested priority handling] with Tower and told them we may need extra time to complete our checklists and extend the gear. Somewhere in that sequence we noticed the left hydraulic quantity had depleted down to .30 (standpipe). Approach and Tower were very helpful and gave us anything we needed.The Captain flew and communicated with ATC; while I ran the QRH. I coordinated with the Captain and flight attendants to ensure we had completed all the necessary steps for a possible evacuation. I made very clear to all the flight attendants to only prep the cabin for evacuation and not to evacuate unless given the signal. I relayed the vitals to Tower (Souls On Board (SOB); time in fuel; fire trucks standby) and notified the Company of our situation. Time was a bit crunched due to weather and our fuel (9;600 pounds) when we turned for final on the second approach; so we wanted to act very efficiently throughout the process.Tower let us call our base when we were ready. We intercepted a 10 mile ILS final. Extended the gear per the QRH; and completed the checklist. Fully stabilized and established on glideslope; I did a quick review of the non-normal procedure to ensure we did not miss anything. Landed uneventfully. Released the fire trucks. Taxied to gate. After we shutdown; Maintenance met us at the airplane.

Weather: Marginal VFR; 1;000 scattered; 1;500 broken; 10 miles visibility; light drizzle; winds 210 at 11 knots. Normal ILS Approach. Just prior to FAF; while descending through 2;000 the First Officer (PF) called for 'gear down; before landing check.' Both pilots noticed the 'GEAR DISAGREE' EICAS. The right main landing gear did not indicate down and locked. Advised the Tower we did not get a right gear down indication and will be executing a missed. We also asked Tower if they could give us an assessment of the right landing gear. Initial missed approach instructions from the Tower were to fly runway heading and climb to 2;000.Tower also advised us that during the climbout they could not see our aircraft to assess whether the gear was down. Vectored to a downwind leg and instructed to climb to 5;000 feet. Stabilized on downwind; the First Officer put the aircraft on autopilot. We notified the flight attendants of the reason for the go around; and made a quick PA to the passengers.Transferred aircraft control on downwind. Not sure why the gear did not extend or if it would extend and lock down via alternate method; we [requested priority handling] with Tower and told them we may need extra time to complete our checklists and extend the gear. Somewhere in that sequence we noticed the left hydraulic quantity had depleted down to .30 (standpipe). Tower was very; very accommodating. The Captain flew and communicated with ATC; while the First Officer ran the QRH.The First Officer also coordinated with the flight attendants (ensuring they understood we wanted them to prepare the cabin for evacuation). He relayed the vitals to Tower (Souls On Board (SOB); time in fuel; fire trucks standby) and notified the company of our situation. Overall; an excellent job by the First Officer in such a short; compressed time frame. Tower let us call our base when we were ready. We intercepted a 10 mile ILS final. Extended the gear per the QRH; and completed the checklist. Fully stabilized and established on glideslope; the First Officer did a quick review of the non-normal procedure to ensure we did not miss anything. Landed uneventfully. Released the fire trucks. Taxied to gate. After we shutdown; Maintenance met us at the airplane.

B757 flight crew reported the right main landing gear failed to extend and was accompanied by a partial loss of hydraulic fluid. The flight crew executed a go-around and extended the landing gear via the alternate extension method in the QRH.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

I checked in with the first DFW Regional Controller while on the VKTRY STAR. We were assigned RWY 18R. Shortly thereafter the same controller changed our runway assignment to Runway 18L and proceed direct UDALL. We were switched to the final DFW Regional Controller. That controller was asking other aircraft if they could switch back to Runway 18R. We were not asked to switch by the final DFW Regional Controller. As we neared UDALL we were assigned heading 150 and asked if we had DFW in sight. We complied with the heading clearance; called the field; and we were cleared for the Visual Approach 18L. This last instruction had us joining the extended centerline closer to FAF HASTY. HASTY is charted as 5 miles from the threshold. We were told to contact Tower. Upon checking in with Tower; we were told to switch runway assignment back to Runway 18R. With the Captain's consent I replied 'unable.' We were asked why we couldn't switch. I replied 'operational restriction. We can't switch runway assignments this low to the ground (1;500 [feet AGL] by my recollection) without the risk of the aircraft notifying the company of some deviation.' While not explicitly saying so in my statement; I was referencing our SMS (Safety Management) and FOQA (Quality Assurance) parameters. I am aware FOQA sets the standard at 1;000 [feet AGL]; but neither the Captain or I want to risk a deviation while reloading the FMS. The Tower told us to continue. We continued our configuration of the aircraft and we were eventually given clearance to land 18L. We were told to clear the runway and join Taxiway F southbound and to remain with Tower. At the southern end of Taxiway F we were told to copy a phone number and call the Tower upon reaching the gate.The Captain made the phone call at the gate and while I was only aware of his half of the conversation; it seems that the Tower's position is that in VFR conditions:1. Side steps are to be complied with immediately; even if inside the FAF.2. Statements of 'Unable' are not allowed.3. We can do these maneuvers without fear of safety violation.We have the AIM and Title 14 of the CFR. On top of that we have Manufacturer's POH. On top of that we have our manuals. We fly the top of that stack and we certainly don't fly generic passages in FAA JO 7110 without questioning how they might conflict with SMS. It is the position of both myself and the Captain; that my 'unable' should only have had two outcomes.1. Clearance to land and taxi to the gate without further harassment.2. Instructions to go-around and expect Runway 18R after the go-around procedure.Factors which may lead to unstable approaches include: Late clearances or runway changes. Right now I have no idea if there's a Controller in DFW Tower kicking this event up the chain to the FSDO so I receive certificate action.

We checked in with the first DFW Regional Controller while on the VKTRY STAR. We were assigned RWY 18R.  Shortly there after the same controller changed our runway assignment to Runway 18L and proceed direct UDALL. We were switched to the Final DFW Regional Controller. That Controller was asking other aircraft if they could switch back to Runway 18R. We were not asked to switch by the final DFW Regional Controller. As we neared UDALL we were assigned heading 150 and asked if we had DFW in sight. We complied with the heading clearance; called the field; and we were cleared for the Visual Approach 18L. This last instruction had us joining the localizer closer to FAF HASTY. HASTY is charted as 5 miles from the thresh hold.  We were told to contact Tower.Upon checking in with Tower; we were told to switch runway assignment back to Runway 18R. Since we were approaching the FAF to 18L I told the FO (First Officer) to tell the controller we are 'Unable.'  As a company and crew we have emphasized the importance of a stable approach and the leading causes of unstable approaches; the Controller's action would have led us toward a potentially unstable approach. We were asked why we couldn't switch.  The FO replied 'Operational restriction. We can't switch runway assignments this low to the ground (1;500 [feet AGL] by my recollection) without the risk of the aircraft notifying the company of some deviation.' I have been 'asked' on extended final if I could accept a transition to the parallel runway; but never just cleared to transition as we check in approaching the FAF. The Tower told us to continue. We continued our configuration of the aircraft and we were eventually given clearance to land 18L.  We were told to clear the runway and join Taxiway F southbound and to remain with Tower. At the southern end of Taxiway F we were told to copy a phone number and call the Tower upon reaching the gate.The Captain made the phone call at the gate and while I was only aware of his half of the conversation; it seems that the Tower's position is that in VFR conditions; side steps are to be complied with immediately; even if inside the FAF. Statements of 'Unable' are not allowed. We can do these maneuvers without fear of safety violation. After we secured the aircraft at the gate I called the Tower phone number; as directed; and spoke to an individual that stated he was observing our approach. I do not know if he was a Supervisor or a controller. He asked why we would not accept the transition and I stated we were approaching the FAF after being changed from 18R to 18L and now at the last minute the controller just clears us to transition back to 18R. To configure and change or remove the localizer frequency and update FMS sets us up for an unstable approach. The individual on the phone then stated we are the first aircraft that would not accept the clearance and that they do it all the time. He stated that it was approach that flipped us from 18R to 18L due to a runway inspection and now we are delaying his departures by not accepting the Controller's last minute change. He stated we are VFR and should not have any reason why we could not accept their clearance to transition to 18R as we check in with Tower approaching the FAF to 18L. The safety of the aircraft; passengers and crew are my responsibility; if we state 'unable' the controller could do the following: Ask our intentions; clear us to land or have us go around and set up for 18R.

Flight crew reported that they were unable to change runways on short final to DFW; and the Tower Controller had issues with them not changing.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Troubleshooting; Workload; Physiological - Other

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

After takeoff from ZZZ; the FA's (Flight Attendant) reported a chemical/exhaust smell and a brief period of a haze in the cabin. Both of the items soon disappeared; but we were able to briefly smell a exhaust type smell briefly in the cockpit as well. As we started the descent into ZZZ1 and the power levers retarded to idle thrust; the odor returned and was reported by the rear FA's but without a haze report this time. The odor was faintly noticeable in the cockpit and would dissipate quickly once the power levels were returned to a greater than idle power setting. After landing and upon gate arrival; I consulted with the FA's and decided the aircraft was to be written up for a smoke/odor/fume event. The FA's met with their respective Flight Service managers and were evaluated by EMT's at the airport. The EMT's instructed the FA's to seek further medical attention. At that point; the FA's left the airport for the hospital to be further evaluated. The FO (First Officer) and I decided that we did not need medical attention. Our aircraft was taken out of service and eventually cancelled due to lack of cabin crew.The aircraft had been sitting in ZZZ for 24 hours with constant rain. My guess is certain areas that get hot following application of bleed air may have steamed off latent oil and/or other fluids that may have been ingested into the packs.[I suggest] more aircraft maintenance that revolves around preventative care of the aircraft.

Air Carrier Captain reported being notified by the flight attendants of a 'chemical/exhaust' odor after departure. The fumes dissipated after a brief period only to resume during descent. Flight Attendants received medical evaluation after the flight.


Workload; Fatigue; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

The flight was an early morning report; but there were no errors leading up to the event.  On the arrival briefing; I mentioned we use white-needles to give us vertical guidance; since the ATL 9R Glide Path (GP) was Out of Service (OTS); the Captain agreed.  While being vectored by ATC; we had a tailwind of about 12 knots.  ATC was busy trying to sequence all the early arrivals into ATL.Due to their workload; we received a late vector to intercept the localizer and we were going through the course by 1/2 scale.  The Captain disengaged the autopilot to correct this error.  While I was watching him correct course; ATC issued traffic at 1 o'clock.  The TCAS was deferred; so I dedicated my monitoring for the traffic.  ATC then gave us a speed reduction to 210 knots then descend to 3;000.  At this point; I glanced at the snowflake and saw us 1 dot above.  ATC then asked for the traffic again; but there was no contact.  We were high so the Captain wanted auto-pilot on and vertical speed to catch the snowflake.  He then asked to put a fix behind us; so I did because we were getting busy.  I should have queried him; because this caused the snowflake to disappear.  ATC then assigned a speed reduction to 180 knots and I was concentrating on why the snowflake dropped out.  Immediately; the Captain called for flaps 8 and flaps 20.  When I went to look up again; he called for gear down.  I was able to look up again quickly and my mind saw the red PAPI; but then the Captain called for flaps 45; landing check before I could process it.  I then completed the landing check and when I put the checklist back; I saw 4 red PAPI lights.  The Captain also saw this and we leveled off at 2;200 feet at BURNY.  We were able to continue normal stabilized approach to landing; after that.  Tower informed us of a low altitude alert and loss of communication with approach.The threats consisted of a very early departure time; night; ATL 9R GP OTS; and a late vector to final by ATC; being rushed.  The error was not looking visually at the PAPI outside to cross-check the vertical path.  The undesired aircraft state happened because of multi-tasking; being rushed; communication with ATC; and operations that were not normal with the glideslope out.From this event; I would make a company policy to not touch the FMS below 4;000 feet; if it was already 'cleaned up.'  Additionally; with GP OTS I would include brief items for vertical path cross-check with the PAPI more than usual.

A CRJ-200 First Officer reported a low altitude event on approach to ATL Runway 9R when the crew lost situational awareness and descended below the glideslope.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

General Maintenance Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

After shutdown checklist completed; the #1 FA (Flight Attendant) advised me that both the #3 and #4 FAs were not feeling well due to odor or fumes they experienced during approach. The #1 explained he felt fine and smelled nothing. The first officer and I smelled nothing and also felt fine. To my knowledge; no passengers complained of feeling ill. After all passengers deplaned; I spoke with FA X and FA Y. They both said they had headaches; had some throat discomfort and felt lethargic. They described they saw nothing visible during landing but smelled an odor and or fume of a Category D type. It was obvious to me they did not feel normal and appeared pale. I suggested they get off the aircraft and had a cart brought out for them to sit in outside the aircraft and requested paramedics. The station operations people called the paramedics; the FO (First Officer) notified dispatch and also requested maintenance. I made an AML (Aircraft Maintenance Log) entry and spoke to the mechanic. By this time the medics arrived and checked out both FAs. The medics strongly suggested both FAs go to the hospital. They both agreed and were transported by ambulance to the ER. They were both in the ER for approximately 5 hours. I wish I had an explanation; but I have none. The aircraft was checked out by maintenance and no cause could be determined.

A320 Captain reported being notified upon shutdown that some of the flight attendants on board did not feel well due to unknown fumes or odor during the approach.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 27L

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7.5

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

While working LC-3; I started crossing after an aircraft departed. I crossed one at S; N5; and T. I then crossed 2 at P. I scanned the runway and observed aircraft clear at all intersections but failed to notice the 2nd aircraft at P had not yet entered the runway. Aircraft Y was about 1000 feet down RWY 27R when Aircraft X called me and said he had not yet crossed the RWY when I cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff. I evaluated his position; which did not appear to be past the hold lines and Aircraft Y was already passing through 60 kts according to the ASDE. I told Aircraft X to hold position and allowed Aircraft Y to continue departure roll. Once airborne I crossed Aircraft X first and then proceeded to cross all remaining aircraft at the other intersections. I can't recall how I messed this up. I don't know if Aircraft X was slow to taxi or how I didn't account for the second aircraft at P.Always use procedures and patterns. I should have only crossed one at P to be consistent with the other intersections. I should be more aware of aircraft that taxi very slowly to make sure they don't get lost in the pack.

ATL Tower Controller reported of crossing two aircraft and then doing other duties. Controller then cleared an aircraft for takeoff; second crossing traffic advised Controller they have not crossed yet. Controller had crossing aircraft hold short of runway allowing departing aircraft to get airborne. Controller thought the second crossing aircraft was slow in its taxi and that is why they forgot about it.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

My partner and I were seeking clarification on how Canadian controllers wanted us to meet crossing restrictions on the arrival. We had asked for clarification of whether or not they would be issuing a 'Descend Via' clearance or not. We were told that they do issue descend via clearances but; even in the absence of that clearance on this arrival; they wanted us to meet the crossing restrictions as published on the arrival. We had been assigned 8000 FT and were at 8000 FT. I clarified with the controller that he did indeed want us to make the next crossing restriction fix between the charted lower altitudes and he advised affirmative. So we began to descend to meet that restriction. Somewhere around 7800 FT we were issued a clearance to an altitude higher than the restrictions of the next fix; resetting our descent clearance. This confused us as we were just told to make the next crossing restriction. When I asked for clarification again; the controller then explained that we only need to meet the restrictions once we have been assigned an altitude at or below the fix altitude restrictions. We had not actually been cleared to descend to cross the fix yet; which meant that in attempting to descend to meet the crossing restriction as we thought we had been instructed; we were actually in deviation from our actual assigned altitude. Confusion on Canadian descent rules for arrivals. This is an issue for pilots such as myself that do not go to Canada often enough. Now that I have experienced the scenario first hand I should be able to avoid future events such as this in Canada. However; we had received a message regarding these procedures some time ago. Unfortunately; with the number of messages and manual updates that we receive it is impossible to remember every scenario. It would be helpful to have all current Canada related notes/memo's in one place to look up before traveling there; for example. The same can be said with Mexico. At the least; for my part; I plan to ensure that I better prepare for these possible events by reviewing any info I can locate on a given location prior to flight there.

Pilot reports of confusion with Canadian Controllers and their use of Descend Via.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Our aircraft departed with a serious weight and balance discrepancy that could have resulted in a serious aircraft accident if at another airport or with a shorter runway. During final weight and balance inputs; I failed to properly confirm my First Officer's inputs which resulted in a large error of passenger inputs. Our load manifest matched up with the final weight and balance copy; and as usual I performed the fuel reliability check and started making my welcome aboard PA. At this point; my First Officer incorrectly entered 000/67 in Cabin A; when in fact it should have been 67 in Cabin A; and 89 in Cabin B. The total passengers should have been 156. Instead; we only inputted 67 half weights. This resulted in a weight difference of 26;800 pounds under planned! Unfortunately; I completely failed in my duties to confirm his inputs as it gave me a Weight and Balance (WB) solution with Flaps 1; which we were anticipating. The incorrect solution was auto-uplinked; and we proceeded as normal. This was a grave error; and I fully realize the devastating consequences that could have happened had we not had a 10;000 runway in good weather. On departure; we got a MCDU scratchpad message saying 'Check Weight.' I then looked at our printed out copy of the first page of our WB solution and discovered the serious error. I then corrected our Zero Fuel Weight (ZFW) to the planned ZFW to achieve proper speeds for cruise and landing.This event could have easily been prevented by verifying the final inputs on the Weight and Balance. I failed in my duties to verify my First Officer's inputs. Unfortunately; we rushed through the process even though we were 5 minutes early. Complacency was definitely a factor as I have never seen this issue and have been flying the aircraft for a very long time. My previous four day was flown with my First Officer and I found him to be exceptionally bright and competent as he has been here a little under 2 years with an impressive aviation carrier and experience. I was lulled into complacency by getting a weight and balance solution with a Flaps 1 Takeoff (TO)/Flex (which was anticipated). I became distracted with other duties (Fuel reliability; Welcome aboard PA; verifying passenger counts on final WB with passenger load sheet; and confirming the passenger count with the A flight attendant); and failed to confirm the final WB inputs. Unfortunately; I trusted without verifying.This is why there are two of us; and I failed in my duties. This also happened in day VMC at our home base airport. Complacency was once again a factor. I'm much more cognizant of weight and balance at [other] airports. Needless to say; this is an error that will not be repeated on either of our ends.This could have been prevented in two ways. Verify the final weight and balance inputs. This procedure is already in place. Do not allow a weight and balance solution with a margin of error so high. We got a solution; albeit a grossly egregious one. We uplinked the solution and got an [anticipated] Flaps 1/Flex TO numbers.

We had a prelim of 147 passengers. When loaded we had an exceedance of 3.3 percent of Center of Gravity (CG). I then re-entered the Weight and Balance (WB) on ACARS and I thought I entered with a split cabin to resolve the problem. I had not actually loaded split cabin; but half weights. I had entered 000/67 and /87 passenger. This resulted with a 26;800 lbs difference in the actual weight. The system gave us a solution and I did not catch the error. It allowed me upload the solution and I did not check the additional pages showing the issue. I had checked the engine out procedure and notes when I entered the preliminary WB and didn't need to see that info again. On take we noticed an unusual take off roll and got an error message on the scratch pad to check WB. We then realized my error and made adjustments so that the WB would be correct on landing. We just got complacent. I have flown with the captain before and he is extremely professional and attentive. We created a self-induced time crunch and I had not caught my error. We were lucky it happened at an airport with a 10K [foot] runway and good weather. One issue is that stations are filling out WB paperwork incorrectly resulting in incorrect prelims. AS a crew; we usually have to split cabins and move weights around so that they are properly set. I have never actually been taught the WB on the ACARS computer but have had a quick once-through during IOE as a new hire. Actually having use of an ACARS for automated WB during sim training would alleviate most errors. Also not making PAs after we get final paperwork would throw attention to checking final numbers prior to pushback. I do not intend to make this mistake again.

An A320 flight crew reported departing with a large (26;800 lbs) self-induced error in weight and balance calculations.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Serviced Right (RH) Engine Starter with Turbo 2380 [synthetic] oil to replace Aeroshell 500. Secured all ports on starter. Issue that happened is common and needs addressed. Can happen without error from anyone. Port can often times come open without being commanded. I was also not the last person to look at the starter. I performed work; but wrote up a separate Leak Check to be performed at a later time by a different Mechanic. Starter failed; causing the engine not to start. Event occurred because starter could no longer perform duty; due to supposed oil starvation from port being left open. Starter was replaced and plane made a late departure.[Recommend] starter be designed to where the port cannot come open as easily. Starter failure.

Reporter stated he was performing an 'Entry into Service' Job Card on a new CRJ-900 aircraft his Air Carrier had just received. Part of the Servicing requires draining the existing oil from the Starter. There are two; One-Quarter (1/4) turn plugs on the bottom of the starter that are used for different reasons. One for completely draining the oil and the other during a 'Fill and Spill' procedure; where the other one-quarter turn (1/4) 'Overflow' plug is removed. Oil is then poured into the Starter through an upper fill opening that also uses a 1/4-turn plug. Once oil reaches a certain height inside the starter; an internal Standpipe will allow excess oil to drain out of the starter through the (1/4) one quarter turn Overflow plug. He believes the Standpipe should keep a certain amount of oil in the starter even with the Overflow plug not reinstalled.  Starter oil is replaced every 500 Flight Hours on the GE CF34-8C Engines. Reporter stated the one-quarter turn plugs have been a problem because they are not very secure. No safety wire is used to secure the spring loaded plugs which looks like a pin with an O-ring and two small ears for locking. When he was told the starter had later failed; due to oil starvation; because he had alledgedly left the Overflow plug hanging from a lanyard on the starter; he questioned how oil loss could have occurred even with the Overflow plug not installed; since the purpose of the internal Standpipe was to maintain a set level of oil in the starter.  Problems with loss of starter oil that later require starter replacements; have also occurred on CRJ-700 aircraft. The same GE CF34-8C Engines and Honeywell starters are used on both CRJ-700 and -900 aircraft. The CRJ-200 use CF34-3 Engines with a completely different designed starter utilizing crush washers on the plugs and safety wire. When he mentioned the issue to other mechanics; many have said they were very familar with the same problem. Reporter stated that just because a new aircraft arrives; does not mean that all the engine components are new. The engines are built up using parts that may have sat on a Parts shelf for two years with time still remaining before overhaul is required. He wants to see the Starter Manufacturer improve the locking feature of the One Quarter turn plugs.

A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports about the inadequate locking design of One-Quarter turn oil plugs used on GE CF34-8C Engine Starters that have resulted in oil starvation and starter failures. The engine and starters are used on CRJ-700 and -900 aircraft.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

These are 'WAVEY Shuffle' departures originating from KHPN..CMK..BETHA..HTO..BEADS..SWL.J174./. When these flight plans populate the URET as proposals; this is the routing depicted. When the hand off is accepted by ZBW Sector 32; the routing changes to KHPN..BEADS..SWL.J174. Sector 32 Controllers have been briefed on a mutual understanding that these aircraft will be DIRECT BEADS on initial contact after hand off from N90. These two particular aircraft were never given direct BEADS by the previous controller and were preceding DIRECT HTO when queried. The difference between HTO and BEADS can be as much as a 40 degrees depending on the angle the aircraft enters our airspace. If aircraft are left DIRECT HTO (ESE bound); they are climbing head on with descending JFK arrivals on the PARCH1. We expect them SE bound DIRECT BEADS. Recommendation; 1) Fix the automation. N90 Controllers do not see the update that Sector 32 gets via DIRECT BEADS in the computer. I queried the delivering Controller and he said his routing showed HTO..BEADS. I told him we are expecting them DIRECT BEADS. This is a made up route forced upon ZBW with no LOA or briefing. N90 controllers are unsure; we are unsure. 2) Put into writing; the procedure (DIRECT BEADS); and make sure each individual controller at both N90 and ZBW sign off on the procedure.

ZBW Controller described a confused routing event initiated by N90 noting the procedure in question should be formalized and contained in an LOA.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Workload; Physiological - Other; Troubleshooting

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Unable to control cabin altitude; [expedited] descentIn cruise FL430; 'CABIN PRESS LOW' Red CASS message illuminated; cabin began to climb 400-600 FPM; Ask for and received lower altitude. Performed checklist; when unable to control cabin rate of climb; [advised ATC] and began [expedited descent]. Regained limited control of the cabin at FL180; continued descent to 12;000 ft. and diverted to suitable airport ZZZ. Approach and landing uneventful.

Gulfstream IV Captain reported a pressurization problem that resulted in an expedited descent and precautionary landing.


Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

After takeoff on climb out started getting a #3 engine vibration. Watched engine indications up to cruise vibration worsened. We received an Engine Vibration Monitoring (EVM) amber boxed indication on the # 3 engine it stabilized around 4.2. Complied with QRH checklist contacted maintaince control and decided to return. Engine indications on #3 were lower N1 and Higher N2 along with 60-70 degrees higher EGT.

Climbing out after takeoff; I noticed that the N1 on #3 Engine was lower than #1 & #2. As I attempted to advance throttle; I noticed that N2 was already up to the limit at 110%. We continued to monitor the #3 N1 and N2 until cruise. The First Officer (FO); as the Pilot Flying (PF) also noted a a very slight vibration during climbout that disapated during level off. After level we observed the #3 EVM COMP with an amber box indicating 4.0-4.6; with a peak at 5.1. We also observed; at cruise power that #3 N1 was slightly lower than #1 and #2; EGT was 70 degrees higher than #1 and #2; N2 was 5-8% higher than #1 and #2 and Fuel Flow (FF) was was 1;000-2;000 lbs. higher than #1 and #2. After consulting the QRH and Maintenance Control; we opted to return. We briefed precautionarly shutdown if we observed the indications worsening. We auto landed and shutdown #3 engine during taxi to our gate. After block in; maintenance informed us that the compressor section was trashed; will definitely be an engine change.

MD-11 Captain notes N1; N2; EGT and vibration anomalies on engine number three during climb out. Fuel flow was also higher and after consulting with maintenance Control; the crew elects to return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 11; Flight Crew Total 105; Flight Crew Type 70

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A near-miss with a landing aircraft occurred at Bradford Regional Airport during takeoff. Wind was calm and there is no preferred runway at BFD. I had taxied to Runway 32 and completed my pre-takeoff checklist. After scanning the airport pattern and announcing my intentions to depart the airport to the north on Runway 32; I performed my final takeoff checks and took the runway. During rotation; my passenger called out conflicting traffic on Runway 23; and I sighted the aircraft slowing and approaching the runway crossing; about 1000 - 2000 feet in front of us. I elected to continue the takeoff instead of trying to brake; and we passed over the aircraft by about 200 feet with about 100 feet horizontal from directly beneath us.After finishing the departure; my passenger and I immediately troubleshooted the situation; verifying that the radio volume was turned up because we had not heard any radio calls from the conflicting aircraft. We found that the radio has been in a lower position; but did not verify the exact level in our haste to ensure radio communication. We did not hear any radio calls post-incident from the conflicting aircraft; but did hear other traffic at BFD later in our flight. It is a distinct possibility that the conflicting aircraft had no radio or did not make position calls; but cannot be said conclusively due to the uncertainty of our radio volume level.After reviewing the situation; I have determined that the root cause was the failure of the crew to ensure that the radio was at an appropriate volume prior to departing the airport. As an environmental contributing factor; it is not possible to see the end of Runway 23 from Runway 32's hold short line; as well as the end of the downwind; base; and final leg. This is due to high-density; tall trees surrounding the airport. If I or the other pilot had been flying a no-radio aircraft; it would be unlikely that this incident would have been avoided as I would have not seen the landing aircraft.As a pilot; my corrective action is to add squelch checks prior to every departure at an uncontrolled field and build a habit of verifying my radio volume level regularly. I also recommend that it be considered to remove trees near the end of Runway 32 to allow proper scanning of the airport pattern on the crossing runway.

C172 pilot reported a conflict with another aircraft on takeoff at BFD. Reporter cited poor radio procedures and trees on the airport property as contributing factors.


This was only the latest example of S56/ZLC not giving priority handling to a Medevac aircraft. I was told by my Supervisor the aircraft must go over FFU (30 miles south of SLC) and make the subsequent 90 degree turn to the north for 'sequencing.' I called S56 Jordan Sector as he approached asking for more direct routing to the airport. I was again told no; he must go over FFU for sequencing. Other aircraft were a factor but I would have been happy to sequence them behind the Medevac aircraft but; as usual; S56 and our TMU and Management have a different take on what priority handling means. This happens all the time! Medevac aircraft familiar with the practice are often forced to cancel IFR in questionable conditions to get their patients to the SLC airport faster. I recommend we follow the regulations and give Medevacs priority handling all the time; not just when convenient.

A ZLC Controller reported the lack of priority given to Medevac aircraft within the ZLC/S56 airspace system; giving examples of the non-adherence to existing regulations.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14; Flight Crew Total 104; Flight Crew Type 104

I was on an Instrument flight with my instructor when we decided to fly the RNAV XX at ZZZ which is an uncontrolled airport. My instructor was making final calls for runway XX on the CTAF while we were descending towards the runway; we hear no response so we continue with our descent. On final my instructor tells me to take off my foggles and go visual; at that point he asks me if what he's seeing on the runway is another plane or not. I looked and sure enough it was coming straight for us departing on runway YY. We were at around 1300 ft. when we noticed and decided to bank right where we missed him by what I would assume was less than 200 ft.[No one] was injured in this but my instructor and I were pretty shaken up. I think this problem arose from the lack of communication from the departing aircraft. If they had said their intentions then we would have known they were departing and would have made proper actions to get very clear out of their way. I also believe that it was in part that the AWOS was reading calm winds. This ends up making it so that the runway does not have a predominant headwind causing pilots to just 'pick a runway'. These I believe are very dangerous and could result; and have resulted in accidents before.I think one way to mitigate this would be to have something in the chart supplements; or making a regulation that forces a directional runway to be used at a non-towered airport when winds are reading calm which makes it so everyone is using the same direction (like what we do with VFR magnetic heading altitudes). Or I believe that you should have to use comms while at non-towered airports as well. I believe that these being implemented would make aviation much safer and I wouldn't have to worry about someone crashing head on into me at my local non-towered airport.

SR-20 pilot reported an NMAC event during final approach to a non-towered airport. All required radio position reports were completed with no traffic responses received. On final; fight crew made visual contact with an opposite direction departure and executed an evasive maneuver.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This [report] is to prompt investigation for Aircraft X which was returned to service without completing a [fault identification] procedure for high engine oil consumption in ZZZ. It includes modification of previous engine oil servicing records; failure to complete maintenance tasks; pressure from [Maintenance Control management] to return the aircraft to service; and failure to follow [the procedures manual] (and thus FAR) procedures. The attached timeline shows a summary of events regarding Aircraft X. On Day X an item was created with a 10 day limit to perform an inspection due to high oil pressure on the right engine.On Day X+4 it went out of service in ZZZZ after an oil service was performed in which the right engine required 18 pts - exceeding both the servicing quantity and spot consumption rate limits of GPM 8.08. An external leak was found at the starter gearbox pad and corrected in POP. The aircraft operated the following day; Day X+5; [on a multi-leg route]. During the day [an inspection order] was created to do a follow up leak inspection. This is not typical and the reason for the request is unknown to me. It then went out of service again the night of Day X+5 in ZZZ1 after oil servicing again showed high consumption on the right engine. This time due to spot rate only (3.191 pph) as quantity added was within limits (9.67 pts). [An inspection order] was created to accomplish [the fault isolation procedures] for the high oil consumption. The starter pad was reworked; this time by mechanics brought from [another hub's] engine shop on a field trip. A leak at the gearbox hand crank pad was also resealed. [Engineering Authorization] was issued to supplement the [maintenance manual] procedures involved. The aircraft was returned to service. On Day X+10 in ZZZ an oil service was performed in which both engines showed a spot consumption rate beyond allowable limits. An [inspection order] was created for each engine to be inspected prior to flight and the aircraft removed from service. The [procedures manual] flow chart led mechanics to return the left engine to service and the [inspection order] closed. The right engine followed a different path in the flow chart and required more inspection. The OTS (Out of Service) event lasted the remainder of our night shift; through the day shift; and through our night shift again.[Early morning] on Day X+12 the [Maintenance Control] asked [the engineering department] for approval to add time to the [inspection order] created for the high oil consumption so they could operate revenue and route to ZZZ2 for repair. [The engineering department] (when we were off-shift) replied that they would not agree to that - offering only concurrence for 1 flight cycle on a maintenance ferry flight. Day shift happened. When arriving for our night shift on Day X+12 we observed Aircraft X in [the system; logged as] OTS in [a different airport] for a pitot probe/heater failure. We reviewed the open items on the aircraft in [the system] and saw a new [inspection order] written to accomplish an inspection of the right engine for oil consumption and high oil pressure. (The original [inspection order] for oil pressure inspection was still open and had been extended multiple times). It was also noted that ZZZ had documented coking found in the engine during the incomplete inspection. The previous [inspection order] for the right engine high oil consumption had been signed off in reference to the newly opened item. No allowance exists in the [procedures manual] flowchart to discontinue or defer any corrective actions during the accomplishment of the [fault identification procedures]. An e-mail from [the engineering department] was sent that allowed another day for the high oil pressure inspection. Other e-mails may exist; but were not in the 737 tech services inbox at the time of our arrival on shift. We also found that the previous oil servicing in ZZZZ had been adjusted from 18 pts added down to 0 pts; with a note that the oil was not serviced; that it had been replenished due to the external leak. Review of the aircraft routing showed the aircraft scheduled to RON (Remain Overnight) in ZZZ1 during the current OTS for the pitot probe then operate revenue on Day X+13 with a RON in ZZZ3. The existing [inspection orders] would be out of time in ZZZ3 so a routing request was sent to [dispatch] to request the RON be changed to ZZZ2 only. [Maintenance Control] was contacted and told that we reviewed the new items on the aircraft since leaving it this morning; and that we do not feel the aircraft was signed off in an airworthy condition. The oil consumption [inspection procedure] had produced findings which were not addressed and had no authorizing document to allow for a deferral.I was not on shift at the time and may only assume that it was because; as we are always told by the [Maintenance Control]; that 'We need the airplane.' I can't believe that the [Maintenance Control manager; the engineering department; those on shift in Maintenance Control; and the AMT's] signing for these documents in ZZZ would cave to the pressure of management to 'give' them an airplane - knowing that a procedure had not been completed after inspection resulted in a finding. Also; how the determination was made that external leaks don't count as oil servicing is also a horrible precedent to set. External leaks often are the cause of a high oil consumption notification and subsequent inspections/corrective actions and is a part of the [fault identification procedures].It's bigger than me. I was not directly involved with the improper return to service; but I will say that I would not have created the new [inspection order] or changed the oil service history without some type of approved data. It appears that the persistence of management to move airplanes is starting to weigh on the operation.

Maintenance Technician reported that an aircraft returned to service without accomplishment of proper maintenance procedures.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I was the pilot monitoring; the FO was the pilot flying. We were coming in on an arrival from the northwest and were switched to a more southerly arrival. We decided we'd get the approach to Runway XYR and ended up being assigned Runway XZL anyway. My assumption is that there was a gap for Runway XZL arrivals and they were squeezing us in. We were kept high and fast for almost the entire arrival. The FO made a comment that he would start slowing if he didn't hear from approach soon and they assigned us 210 knots shortly after. The arrival was stable up to the point we were cleared for the visual approach without any altitude restrictions. At the time we were at 5000 ft MSL. Once cleared for the visual; the FO set the altitude alerter to 2900 feet. To meet the altitude and speed reduction the FO had the spoilers deployed at full. I asked him if he wanted me to put the gear down and he declined. He was slowing to 200 knots and I could see that he was getting himself into trouble staying too high. At 200 knots he asked for flaps 8. I switched to flaps 8 and he turned off the autopilot and began a hurried pitch down to catch the glide slope. The air speed rose to 210 knots and I told him we needed the gear down. He agreed and I put the gear down. He immediately asked for flaps 20 and I told him we needed to slow a bit (we were still at 210 knots). I was concentrating on the air speed to give him flaps 20 immediately at 200 knots.He was continuing to slow and I was watching for 180 knots to give him flaps 30. Around this time approach called us with an altitude alert and I looked up and saw 4 red lights on the PAPI. The FO responded by increasing power and beginning to pitch up. It was somewhere around this time I realized (or was alerted; I can't remember) that the spoilers were deployed at full. I said 'spoilers' and raised them. He began to level off and I could see we were still below glide slope and had 4 red lights on the PAPI. I told him to keep climbing and he complied right away. He reached the correct altitude but was having some trouble tracking the localizer and I saw that we had no approach capture. I reset the automation to the give him an intercept and re-armed the approach so that he could just follow the flight director. At some point we went to full flaps outside of the final fix and the approach was stable and on speed reaching 1500 ft AGL. We landed on Runway XZL without incident and; after a circus on the ramp; made it to our gate about 30 minutes later.The most glaring threats were an inexperienced FO combined with an unusual approach into ZZZ being kept high and fast and landing on a runway not normally used from that arrival; especially given how busy it was. I believe the error that contributed most to our low approach was the spoilers being fully deployed followed closely by my poor monitoring. I was so fixated on the airspeed that I was neglecting the altitude of the aircraft. I forget that visual approaches into ZZZ are routine for me; but not for new FOs. My subconscious incorrectly assumed the FO was handing the attitude of the aircraft without any problems. It should not have taken an altitude alert by approach to make me aware of our mistake. The undesired aircraft state was being high; fast; and spoilers deployed for too long. I believe this incident falls mostly on my shoulders. I should have been more vigilant in my monitoring. My FO had about 150 hours on the aircraft and I had assumed his previous aviation experience made him more comfortable on the CRJ than he was. In hindsight; I should have been more considerate of his history since he hadn't flown much in the years prior to joining [carrier]. I need to be more proactive with FO's when I can see threats coming. We did discuss the threats of being high and fast before it was an issue because I could see it coming but it wasn't enough just to talk about it. I don't believe we busted any altitude assignments since we were last assigned 5000 feet and cleared on the visual approach without an altitude assignment further out than usual. My biggest take away from this incident is to be more aware when flying with both experienced and inexperienced FO's. It can get away from us quickly and the ability for pilots to get it back under control varies widely. Once everything was settled; the FO did a great job completing the approach to a landing.

CRJ-200 Captain reported the aircraft became high and fast on initial approach then too low. After ATC advisement and adjustments; the flight landed normally.


Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft TA; Automation Aircraft RA

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While on the HILEY2 arrival into MIA the Captain (pilot not flying) requested the ILS to either 8R or 9L for operational needs (as the airplane needed an autoland). A few moments later while level at 14;000 feet; we were assigned the ILS 8R and vectored off the arrival to a heading of 220 and given a descent. With the autopilot flying; I selected 220 and heading select; then dialed in the altitude I thought I heard (12;000) in the altitude window and selected FLCH. The Captain questioned the altitude with me because he felt he had heard the controller give us 10;000 feet. We both agreed we should probably verify this discrepancy but the frequency was too overloaded to get a word in edgewise. Additionally; the Captain was confident that the altitude was in fact 10;000 feet because he had read the altitude back to the controller and the controller did not bother to correct him. So between these two things working against my better judgment; I then selected 10;000 in the altitude window.As we descended through approximately 11;000 feet; we received [a TA] for traffic. I could tell from the screen the traffic was climbing but was unable to visually identify the traffic in the night sky. About the time we reached approximately 10;600 feet we received [an RA] at which point I turned off the automation and hand flew the airplane; performing the escape maneuver per the RA guidance. Within a few seconds the RA was averted and; while I was never actually able to visually identify the other aircraft; it didn't appear that any imminent danger had occurred. The Captain immediately informed the controller of our TCAS avoidance situation and the controller advised there was no problem as the aircraft was below us at 10;000 feet. This; of course; confused us a bit since our aircraft had descended to as low as 10;300 feet during the RA maneuver; and now we were unsure if we were still expected to descend to 10;000 feet or not. Then the controller came back to us and instructed us to climb to 11;000 feet which we did. I feel this is a classic case of a busy controller/radio frequency combined with some confusion in the cockpit about ATC instructions which; in hindsight; should have been verified with the controller prior to descending below 12;000' despite the radio congestion. Frankly as I think back on this incident; I'm not sure if the controller had initially given us 12;000 feet; 11;000 feet; or 10;000 feet. Either the 12;000 feet or 11;000 feet altitudes would have been the 'more correct' altitudes to keep us clear of this traffic; and if in fact we were given the 10;000 feet altitude; then I feel this was given to us in error. Regardless of any errors on part of the controller; we as a crew could have done a better job to verify. The good news is that the system worked as it should; and TCAS did its job; along with proper training in RA maneuvers.

[The report narrative contained no additional information.]

When the flight crew of a B757-200 disagreed as to their cleared altitude and was unable to get through a busy TRACON frequency to verify it they opted to take the PNF's recollection and continued their descent to 10;000 rather than the 12;000 understood by the First Officer.  A TCAS RA occurred and was complied with in the vicinity of 10;600.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 17800; Flight Crew Type 800

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

[Cruising] at FL390; we observed that a continuous door warning light showed on the annunciator panel (CWP). It was not flashing and no master caution light was showing. I went to check the door and I did not see any red light. I looked at the inspection window and the ball eyes and the second ball eye down was down half way on the right side; but no red light was showing.My SIC felt insecure and went back to check it and returned saying one of the balls was not centered. We descended to an altitude of FL290 and worked the checklist. After completing the checklist; I went back to check again and one of the eye balls was little bit down on the left side; but I still did not see ANY red lights ON. In my opinion; one of the locking pins was not making a connection with the sensor which would likely cause the door warning light to show up on the panel. Further; my opinion was that a safe landing could be made at our destination followed by a check to establish the reason for the door warning light indicating a potential problem.When I returned to the cockpit; we were already descending to [an alternate] and I was unaware that my SIC had already decided to land without asking me for my opinion as his PIC. I remained professional and did not override the decision to [divert and] land that my SIC made to avoid confrontation with the passengers and confusion on the radio. Having many years and thousands of hours of experience dealing with similar situations; I did not see a reason to land in this instance and inconvenience the passengers who would then have to find alternative transport.After landing; I then learned that my SIC had in fact requested clearance to land there. Following the landing; we as a crew should have diagnosed the problem which influenced my SIC decision to land. Following our arrival and while on the phone with the flight operation and maintenance personnel; to my surprise my SIC was already hiring a car for the passengers to head for [destination]. I asked the SIC where he was going. He replied he had vacatioin the next day and left without further explanation. I went back to the aircraft to start APU and the door warning light was no longer ON. The safety of the aircraft was not compromised and a safe landing [at original destination] was entirely feasible. My SIC was insecure and took matters into his hands without consulting my opinion.

CE-560XL Captain reported his First Officer made a decision to divert for an entry door problem without consulting the Captain.


Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport

The Captain said here is the approach end of 8R; but not the runway. I didn't say anything at that time because I was trying to figure out our position on the Company page so I could give him an accurate answer. I looked up and we were just passing the 8R approach sign and hold short line when Ground said hold your position and contact Tower. Tower cleared us to takeoff from that position we taxied up to the threshold for Runway 8R and departed. First [threat] was change of runway which cut our taxi from 6 minutes to 2 minutes. Taxi also changed from no hold short crossing runway or approach; to multiple possible ones. [We needed more] communication with Ground to understand the new instructions. Our workload [was high] with engine start; checklist completion; and taxiing. Communication is number one between crew and ATC. Taxing without knowing where we need to hold short. I learned that I need to request to hold our position with the Captain and ATC if needed when I'm not incomplete understanding of the taxi instructions. Clarify with ATC anytime there we are not sure of a hold short even if it is an approach end. Also on very short taxi to hold at push back get the engine started and do the taxi checklist before we start moving. That will allow me to be more of a help on taxi.

We pushed back from the gate at ELP. We called for taxi and it was to taxi to Runway 8 via Kilo. The 8 approach was almost immediate and we could see the Kilo signs and knew Runway 8 was in the distance. I don't remember a hold short instruction. I was taxiing slowly as it was confusing. Once we were just past the 8 approach hold line; I alerted the First Officer of the uncertainty; he immediately called Ground. They told us to contact Tower and they immediately cleared us for takeoff; runway heading. Nothing else was said by them. Better situational awareness on my part would have greatly reduced the threat. Yes; I looked at the Company's airport page; but what I didn't realize is that we were so close to the runway approach hold short line. The ATIS was also advertising two other runways (west bound) for takeoff. My mental game plan was for a long taxi. Instead we were starting up engine 1 immediately; not during a long taxi. This was a diversion of attention and situational awareness. Stop; regroup; and change the game plan or taxi plan. At some airports; we are not allowed to stop and sometimes we transfer this behavior to all airports. This is where I should have taken my time and got reacquainted with our new departure runway (which was right ahead of us and now a few miles away). We had no time constraints-weather; etc-to rush us.

A flight crew departed their ELP gate and cleared to taxi to Runway 8R when they expected a long taxi to Runway 26 and almost immediately entered 8R at K; surprised at how close the runway was to the terminal.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

While preparing for departure on my third leg of IOE; we had a crew consisting of myself; the Captain and two RFO's (Relief First Officers). (One additional; since I had not met the requirements to be an independent crew member). The Captain and I were in the seats having completed the pre-flight items; up to the before start checklist to the line; and were waiting for the Final Weight and Balance data.  A few moments later we received the chime for the Final Weight and Balance data; and began to review it. The Captain heard the door being closed and told the second RFO; who was in the cockpit; that he didn't want the doors closed yet. The second RFO asked if the Captain wanted him to go back and stop the RFO who was closing up. The Captain said yes. As the second RFO went back; I heard him say 'hold up.' The Captain and I went back to looking at the final when the second RFO stuck his head in the cockpit and said 'we just blew a slide'.A few moments later the RFO who was in the supernumerary compartment came up and said 'I can't believe I just did that.' He proceeded to say that it was totally his fault; there was no malfunction and he just made a mental error.At that point the Captain began contacting the appropriate people to start working the problem.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier flight crew reported an inadvertent slide deployment of a door during preflight procedures.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Type 3351

Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 198; Flight Crew Type 2621

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

FO (First Officer) flying approach to XXL called for flaps 2 while decelerating through 190 kias  and received F/CTL FLAPS LOCKED ALIGNMENT FAULT ECAM. We performed go around and advised ATC. We retracted flaps to zero which we should not have done; but I was flustered as was the FO and I were afraid he would over speed the flaps. Retracting them did not make our situation worse however. Ran through ECAM and QRH for the appropriate condition with the assistance of a jump seating [company] pilot who was also a Captain on the Airbus. The jump seater had us rush into the QRH before running the ECAM which caused some initial confusion for us as to what slat/flap situation we had; but we got it sorted out. We performed runway landing performance distance calculation and reviewed flaps abnormal landing profile. [Coordinated] with ATC and asked for equipment to be standing by. Gave flight attendants TEST briefing. I did not ask them to prepare the cabin for an evacuation as I was confident we could easily stop on the long runway at ZZZ as the performance calculation showed; but for special instructions I did ask them to review [evacuation] procedures in their heads just in case. Made a PA announcement that we had a flap irregularity and would be making another approach at a higher airspeed than normal and that they would see emergency equipment standing by as a precaution. Had jump seater send ACARS message to dispatch advising of situation. I took over as PF (Pilot Flying). ECAM and QRH guidance had us put the flap lever to position 3 for a slats 3 flaps 0 landing. Configured before descent on approach as recommended by abnormal flaps landing profile. Used autopilot down to about 700'agl. Firm touchdown near 1000' markers and brought nose gear down quickly. Used medium auto brakes and full reverse that allowed us to only use a little over half the runway before stopping.Once passengers disembarked at the gate I asked the FO if he felt okay to continue with next scheduled leg to ZZZ1. He said he did feel well enough as did I. When the [Chief Pilot] asked if we wanted to continue I told him we felt well enough to continue with the next flight. About half way to ZZZ1 we both felt like we should have not flown the next leg. When something like this happens you have an adrenaline rush that lasts for some time; but when that goes away you feel totally drained. Not to mention you are replaying the events in your mind which is a distraction. I thought to myself; if another emergency had occurred on the next leg would I handle it as well as I could in the condition I was in? The answer is no. When these events happen crews should not even be asked to continue. They should be removed automatically with no questions asked. They are not in a good position to judge their fitness for duty after an event like this. This needs to change.

On approach to XXL into ZZZ we experienced a flap lock malfunction. We executed a go around to address the issue. I flew the airplane and operated the radios while the Captain and an Airbus qualified jump seater completed the QRH. The Captain [coordinated with ATC] and asked for emergency personnel be ready on the runway. On completion of the QRH the Captain took over as flying pilot and landed the aircraft without any issues.

A320 flight crew reported a flap locked alignment fault.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

I was assigned to research/troubleshoot/fix an overboard cool fail caution message. I un-deferred [reactivated] the auto-pressurization system per MEL 21-24-6b. But in the time I had available; I could not duplicate the original discrepancy or determine what would have caused it. I re-deferred the system; described the troubleshooting steps I had done; and let the crew-leader carry the discrepancy forward to Maintenance Control. The next morning the pilots could not pressurize the aircraft in-flight and had to return to the airport. Day-shift mechanics found the overboard exhaust shutoff valve safety-wired in the OPEN position instead of closed as the MEL requires. Cause: Other than the research I had done that night; I was not otherwise familiar with the system. So before touching the airplane; I read the MEL 21-24-6b and the referenced Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) sections (tasks 21-24-00-040-806 and 21-24-00-040-808). On my notepad; I wrote that deactivating the overboard shutoff valve required it to be safety-wired in the OPEN position; and that deactivating the inboard shutoff valve also required the OPEN position. It is very clear on the MEL in the remarks section and the maintenance procedure section that the overboard exhaust shutoff valve must be CLOSED; so I am not entirely sure why I wrote it down in my notepad incorrectly. I do clearly remember reading the AMM references. Looking at it now; I see the AMM mentions both; but the 'closed' wording is on the second page. I must have missed that in my quick reading of the AMM and just seen the 'open' on page 1. At the time; though; I believed my notes were correct; since I had written them right out of the AMM. Since I had all the information I needed from the AMM; I did not take note of what position the valves were in before cutting the safety wire and un-deferring the system. After troubleshooting; I was unable to find the original cause of the discrepancy; but instead found a similar message: INBD COOL FAIL status message came on when passenger door closed and service door open. Later; I found that this message was by design; so I should have signed off the discrepancy as could not duplicate. But at the time; I thought there must be something wrong with the passenger door micro switches. We were out of time; so I pulled and tagged circuit breakers and returned the valves to the deferred positions. I had my notepad with me in the avionics compartment and was diligent to check the valves in the mirror and verify they were both in the OPEN position as my notes required before safety-wiring them there. As I was finishing this; I learned that the airplane had to be back at the terminal. I chose to not do the pressurization check; as I felt I was only putting the airplane back in the same configuration it came in with. This is where I did not fully understand the deferral process. I did not understand that I was doing an entirely new deferral process; separate from the previously deferred status. So I thought of the pressurization check as something that was good to do; not required. As we were already late going to the gate; I chose to skip it. But if I had done the pressurization check; it would have been obvious that the valve was in the wrong position. Apparently; there was a miscommunication between the Crew Leader and I over whether I was done with the aircraft; since as I was closing up the avionics bay door; mechanics were already there to take the airplane back to the terminal. We were behind schedule. The discrepancy had already been signed by the Crew Leader and carried forward to Maintenance Control before I could double-check the corrective action I had written previously. This is why at the beginning there is a name and a random part number. This was a note from a fellow mechanic to me; which I was going to remove before I signed off the discrepancy. But before I could clean up and double-check the text; the discrepancy was already signed off; and the aircraft released. I was out of routine. This incident could have been easily avoided; had I done the pressurization check. I have learned that every step in the AMM and MEL are important. And those steps that seem unnecessary are usually necessary as a cross-check; even if for no other reason. Double-checking my notes would also have helped; since regardless of my misreading the AMM; it would have been obvious from other available paperwork that my notes were wrong. This would have been less likely to happen if I had been working with a trainer or another mechanic who knew the system better. But I was overconfident in my ability to figure out a problem on my own. This was partly an overreaction to my 3-month probationary evaluation where I was told verbally that I was not accomplishing enough work each day; and was asking too many questions. Ever since then; I have been attempting to only ask the trainer for help once I have explored all other options. Incidents are usually a chain of events; and this one certainly was. I recognize the gravity of the situation that occurred; have researched how I believe I made the mistake; and have taken steps to prevent this from happening again.

Following troubleshooting; the AMT deactivated the system again; but safety wired the valve in the incorrect position.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

While flying the QUABN3 STAR; ATC gave us a hold at ONDEC Intersection (Intersection on the QUABN3 BOS STAR) due to the fact that a snow plow had gotten stuck on the runway in BOS during the snow removal process.  When we left the hold; ATC cleared us direct to UROWT and the QUABN3; and we continued on to BOS.  Nothing happened during the flight; no FAR's or SOP's were broken; and no speed or altitudes were busted.  The flight was uneventful.However; my issue is with the name of the UROWT intersection and possible hear back/read back issues. When spoken; this intersection; UROWT; can be also be heard as 'Your Route'; as in Cleared direct XYZ; the rest of YOUR ROUTE is unchanged.....instead of UROWT; (Spoken as 'YOUR OUT).....particularly with a Boston Controller's accent. So; UROWT and YOUR ROUTE; are very similar; in fact; so similar that it could create hear back/read back issues.  Since neither ONDEC nor UROWT were not on our original flight plan; we did have a little misunderstanding between pilots as to the ATC clearance.  However; we did rectify the situation and the flight continued uneventfully to Boston. Therefore; to prevent any hear back/read back errors; may I suggest that the name of this intersection; UROWT; be changed to prevent any possible hear back/read back errors.

B757 First Officer reports being cleared direct to UROWT on the QUABN3 arrival to BOS which causes confusion in the cockpit due to the way UROWT is pronounced by the ZBW Controller (your route) and believes it should be changed.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Evacuated

Normal takeoff off climbing out [of] 5;000 FT. Smoke smell on flight deck. Performed memory items and declared emergency requesting immediate return. Flight Attendant confirmed haze and smoke smell in cabin. An overweight landing to a full stop [ensued]. CFR inspected aircraft no fire found. Aircraft towed to gate. Potential fire and smelled smoke. Aircraft are aging and with that potential problems are bound to happen. Increased maintenance vigilance on fleet type.

Aircraft was undergoing oil checks by Maintenance at the maintenance hangar prior to boarding but no documentation provided for reason aircraft was under the control of Maintenance. The Cabin CD Player was inoperative (chronically noted as inoperative multiple times and signed off multiple times). Engine one oil level showed 9 quarts and I asked Maintenance why no oil was added when minimum oil level for dispatching is 8 quarts. Maintenance said it was within limits and no need to add oil. On taxi; Captain headset cut out multiple times resulting in having to change headsets prior to takeoff. In the climbout prior to smoke event; Captain headset again cut out momentarily. Headset cutting out was noted previously in logbook and signed off by Maintenance as ops check good. Normal takeoff configuration with engine bleeds on and packs on with ALT T/O thrust. Climbing around 5;000 FT strong burning smell noticed in cockpit; unknown origin. Smoke goggles/crew oxygen masks on. Flight Attendant called to warn of strong burning smell and smoky haze in cabin. Emergency declared. Landed overweight. CFR approached aircraft. Emergency Evacuation checklist initiated; main and service doors opened; and evidence of smoke dissipated. Maintenance towed aircraft to a gate. Passengers deplaned and reported no injuries. I am unable to determine where the burning smell came from and why this event happened on a scheduled passenger jet. Aircraft was undergoing oil checks by Maintenance prior to boarding but no documentation provided for reason aircraft was under the control of Maintenance. Chronic maintenance corrective action is 'unable to duplicate and ops check good.' I would suggest that a scheduled passenger airline; who owes its passengers the highest duty of care; look into the volumes of references available to them by the manufacturers instead of hoping the problem is not encountered again. Pilots are already telling Maintenance there IS a discrepancy. Change out the component or delve further into the problem to fix it.

EMB145 flight crew detects smoke climbing out of 5;000 feet which is also reported by the Flight Attendant. An overweight landing ensues and the passengers are evacuated. No smoke source is found.


Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors

I received notification of an event. When reviewing the playback with management none of us could determine the loss of separation when the event occurred. An A380 departed SFO Runway 28 routed to LIN VOR. The A380 was initially climbed to 10;000 and vectored northbound offshore in accordance with noise abatement. The A380 was then turned direct LIN VOR and climbed to 15;000. The B737-800 departed SFO Runway 01 routed over LIN; initially climbing to 10;000. The B737-800 was issued another altitude of 8;000. The B737-800 was vectored to a H350 for in trail spacing behind the A380 and climbed to 9;000. When the A380 left 11;000; the B737-800 was climbed to 1;000. The playback reported 4.8 miles and 800 FT 'wake remnants' of the A380 were speculated to be the cause of the separation alert. Controllers have no tools; nor during busy times should be required to know; when and what altitude the aircraft were all along the route. We have no tools that are used to determine any type of wake remnants; nor do we have the ability to remember the altitudes. I challenge any one to work a busy session and remember the altitudes of all aircraft 10 miles prior and all along the route. We work with real time altitudes and real time position of the aircraft.

NCT Controller was questioned regarding an alledged 'wake remant' separation loss; the Controller claiming no tools are avaialble to controllers to identify these types of occurrences.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Staffing

The event occurred because Greenville-Spartanburg (GSP) is working a busy airport with one controller utilizing all three frequencies. This is a major safety of flight issue as multiple links in the safety chain were broken that day. If the sharpness of the crews from Air Carrier X and Air Carrier Y had not utilized full four ear policy and patience it could have been an issue. The actions taken by the ATC operation in GSP are uncalled for and unsafe. If this is overlooked there could be fatal consequences in the future. There are a few local airports in the area of Greenville-Spartanburg that are non-towered. If the Tower Controller delayed any further for us to be handed over to Departure; we could have had a collision or RA with an unknown aircraft all due to the unsafe actions of one controller handling a workload bound for a minimum of two personal.I was in command of Aircraft X. The Greenville Tower had one controller working all three frequencies: clearance; ground; and tower. This was a busy morning with Air Carrier Z; Air Carrier X; Air Carrier A; and us to ZZZ all departing at roughly the same time. When we called for our clearance on the delivery frequency; we noticed there was some bleed over as the controller was issuing take-off clearances. We had to repeat our request for a clearance but were given it with no issues.  I released the brakes and we called for push shortly after. Air Carrier X also called for push after us. In the middle of our push back the controller called on the ground frequency to inform Air Carrier Z of a delay for them. The two began to have a conversation on ground of a game plan to be made. As their conversation occurred our ramp crew disconnected the tow bar and gave the wave off for an all clear to a taxi. I noticed Air Carrier X had pushed off gate and we were pushed off with our nose in the direction of travel to only exit with a head on collision. We finished our 'After Start Checklist' and cleared the area to begin our taxi. I switched on our taxi and nose lights and noticed Air Carrier X did the same. With the controller and Air Carrier Z conversation occurring to what was now a clearance being given with a read back to follow there was no way for me or Air Carrier X to have confirmation one was waiting for the other. There was dense fog and low visibility on the ramp that morning. Tower does not control the ramp and a courtesy call is requested. The weather was so bad we had a take-off alternate of ZZZ1 that morning. It was a frustrating situation as Air Carrier X and I could barely make out the 2nd half of each other's aircraft; so it was a game of chicken. I tried to call over the radio and speak over the clearance being given but it did not work. Ultimately; I turned off my lights to give Air Carrier X the right of way. As we began our taxi to Runway 4 Air Carrier A called clearance to get their clearance to Houston (IAH) and that now was being broadcast over the ground frequency adding to the safety issue that no one moving on the aircraft surface could talk to each other. The Tower issued Air Carrier X their take-off clearance and told us we were next. After we got our take off clearance; we began the take-off roll with no issues. As we continued our take-off climb Carrier called the controller over the ground frequency. All we heard was the controller responding over the tower frequency meaning he was working all three frequencies still. This delayed our hand off to Departure and made us uneasy as the tower radar could not see our path beyond a certain mileage. As we checked in with GSP Departure we were given an instruction to contact Center as our time had been too long and radar services with GSP could not be utilized further.This told me the GSP airport controller took too long to hand us off and impeded the Departure Controller from doing their job properly. We did not have sufficient air traffic control separation all due to the unsafe practices of the GSP airport and Air Traffic Control operation at the airport of GSP. GSP needs to hire another controller! There must be at least one person working Ground and Delivery while another separate controller works Tower. The operation in GSP has been compromised and it is scary to think that the unsafe actions are acceptable to those working in the ATC system. If this issue were to happen again; I'm worried it could turn out like the Tenerife airport disaster with KLM and Pan Am but scraping metal on the ramp or taxing into each other.

Air carrier Captain reported after push back on the ramp at GSP airport; they were on a head-on direction with another air carrier. The Tower Controller was reportedly working all positions combined causing frequency congestion preventing the flight crews from receiving clarification as to which way the aircraft should taxi to resolve the conflict.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Passenger neglected to comply with airline's mask policy; resulting in passenger being removed from the aircraft. The aircraft was still at the gate when this event took place and after the passenger was removed; the flight departed to its destination without further incident.Forward FA asked me (CA) to speak with non-complying passenger about our mask-policy. After speaking with the passenger; the passenger complied and agreed to properly wear the mask. After a few minutes; the FA complained again that the passenger was not complying with the policy and that the passenger was getting aggressive towards the FA. The station manager was involved in this incident and a decision was determined to remove the passenger from the flight.

Captain reported a passenger was not complying with face mask policy and was eventually removed from the flight.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 109; Flight Crew Total 9765; Flight Crew Type 1276

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

The trip was to fly one passenger 130 miles to a sleepy; hardly used airport with a contract control tower. It was a Sunday morning with little or no traffic; the weather was CAVU everywhere; and the winds were calm. It should have been a simple flight.The takeoff; climb; enroute; and initial descent portions of the flight were uneventful. As we continued our descent and the city came into view; the confusion set in. My co-pilot; a young; experienced flight instructor just learning the ropes of the charter business and a good pilot; reported he had the field in sight. The picture didn't fit for me; and I suspected he was seeing the second (and largest) airport at our destination city. I kept scanning visually for our destination airport; but could not find it. We maintained the same basic ground track as I continued to look; and we were now about 2 miles from the airport my copilot had in sight. I finally convinced myself that my co-pilot was right; and we accepted a visual approach to the very obvious former air base. The approach controller immediately turned us over to the control tower; who immediately instructed us to fly a right hand base; and cleared us to land. We had maintained our altitude (2;000 AGL) while looking for the airport and now found ourselves high on the approach. I chopped power; put out gear and full flaps; and we s-turned through final in order to get down. The landing was uneventful. And we were at the right airport.As we rolled out on the runway; the controller in the tower asked us to explain our deviations on final. He said we had failed to turn final on time; and that we had busted his separation with a VFR flight crossing thru his class D airspace. I explained the fact that we were too high; and needed the s-turn to make it down. He was obviously upset; and let us know it. His displeasure came as quite a surprise to me. I did not see our s-turn as a significantly large excursion from that of a normal base and final. Rather; since I was cleared to land; I considered it my prerogative to maneuver as necessary to ensure a safe landing. As I look back on the situation; I wonder if the controller was in a situation similar to where the car you're following takes a lot longer than you thought it would to turn into a driveway; and now you've got to break hard or turn out to get around him.With all of this being said; there is one important lesson I have taken from this incident. I had been lulled into thinking this was going to be a very easy flight because I had flown into this city and this airport dozens of times before. The only problem was that those dozens of times before I had flown into the OTHER airport. The co-pilot loaded the correct airport into the GPS; and we flew directly to it. My assumption regarding our destination airport was wrong. I had the wrong airport. No wonder it didn't fit the picture! This whole thing could have been avoided by one very simple action by me. It's called better pre-flight planning. Since this incident occurred I have made a vow that going forward; regardless of the simplicity of the flight; I will make it a part of my pre-flight planning routine to verify the destination airport; and to study the relative position of that airport with respect to other airports near my destination. I'll gladly trade a few minutes of extra preparation to eliminate the confusion I experienced looking for the wrong airport and/or avoiding a potentially more disastrous event.

The pilot of an air-taxi operation allowed himself to become distracted; searching visually for the lesser used of two airports in close proximity. This caused him to be high on approach; and the subsequent S-turns on final approach were questioned by ATC since they had caused a separation issue.