Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 9000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was talking to ZZZ Tower and they said I was barely in the TFR at [the stadium].  I told them there was no TFR because the Stadium seating capacity was [less than 30;000].  For the TFR to be in effect; the stadium must hold 30;000 or more.  I told [Tower] that I had an email from the FAA to confirm there is no TFR.  I flew more to the South to make the controller happy.  According to my GPS; I was less than 1/4 mile in the TFR circle.  There is still ongoing debates with the [sports teams]; TRACON and the FAA whether or not there was a TFR or not.  If you read the FDC/NOTAM; it's very clear that the TFR was not in effect because of the seating capacity.

Banner towing pilot reported adjusting flight course to remain clear of ambiguous ATC warning of possible TFR penetration.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5.9; Flight Crew Total 1360; Flight Crew Type 1135

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

I am reporting my misinterpretation of the COVID relief provided by SFAR 118-1; which resulted in my acting as PIC beyond by required flight review date.My last flight review was in Month X 2018; so normally I would need another one by Month X 2020. But I saw a headline online (maybe from [organization] or another similar site) that the end dates had been extended due to COVID relief; so I didn't worry about the expiration too much - many official agencies have been extending deadlines for things like driver's license renewals etc.; and I assumed FAA had done the same.  So I flew once in Month Y and once in Month Z; the last flight being to take my plane to a maintenance shop for its annual.I then started thinking about getting a flight review; so I decided to read SFAR 118-1 to determine exactly what relief the FAA had provided and whether it would last until my plane was ready.  To my surprise; there were requirements about recent experience; type of operation; the need to take Wings courses; etc. - it was much more complicated than just an extension of time.But I determined that I did meet the requirements; provided I took the required Wings courses; I decided that both getting my plane back from an annual when it was finished; and traveling to a flight review were operations required by the FAR's and were thus permitted.  The annual took longer than expected; but I saw headlines that the relief had been extended with SFAR 118-2.  When the plane was ready to be picked up on Month C day 2; I took the required Wings courses and flew my aircraft back from the maintenance base; thinking that I had until Month C day 31 to complete a BFR.Then on Month C day 14 while preparing for my flight review later that day; I carefully read SFAR 118-2 so I could explain to the CFI how I had adhered to it. At that point I realized that while its relief should have applied to the end of my plane's annual; the delay in the annual's completion plus the fact that the FAA's further extensions did not apply to me meant that I had exceeded the relief allowed by SFAR 118.To summarize; the SFAR is new and complicated and I mis-interpreted it despite a good-faith effort to comply.I think the substance of the SFAR is reasonable now that I understand it; and although it's vague in places; I understand that it's an emergency regulation; so it doesn't seem too bad.  I think what would have helped me is a requirement that; in order to use the relief offered by SFAR 118; one of the required Wings courses should have been a tutorial on SFAR 118 itself.My flights past the Flight Review deadline were uneventful and I am of course no longer flying until my next Flight Review is complete (I started it on Month C day 14 as stated but the flight portion was delayed due to weather).  I doubt that SFAR 118 will be relevant much longer; but I think adding a Wings course the next time some complicated new SFAR comes out would go a long way towards increasing compliance and understanding.

Private pilot reported acting as Pilot In Command beyond required flight review date.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 61; Flight Crew Total 860; Flight Crew Type 163

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

At 5;500 FT the engine began running rough then experienced a significant loss of power. I attempted unsuccessfully to fix the problem with the checklist then declared an emergency with the FSS with whom I had just opened my flight plan. The FSS specialist coordinated with the other ATC facilities in the area; provided winds on the surface and helped work through the situation with me. The airplane was having trouble holding altitude and so was descending slowly. The nearest airport was a military airport and I opted to land there. I landed successfully and taxied the airplane to a parking spot. After some troubleshooting it was determined that the #2 cylinder exhaust valve was stuck open.In hindsight; declaring an emergency and landing at the military field was the right thing to do. Even though it took a lot of coordination to get the airplane fixed and out of there; we were able to make it all work and we will never know what could have happened if we had tried to go another two or three NM to the next airport.A week later; the airplane was flown home.

A C-150 pilot opted to declare an emergency and land at the nearest suitable airport; a military field; following a significant loss of power due to a swallowed valve in the number two cylinder.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload; Troubleshooting

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

This was our third leg. We also had a [deadheading] FO in the main cabin during this flight and event. I briefed all my FA's before the passengers boarded as I do each and every flight. FO did the walk around no issues noted. Logbook review noted #4 tire replaced on [date]. Later review of logbook while completing abort info noted the #2 brake assembly was replaced 10 days prior to this flight on [date]. All briefs; checklists; engine start; ramp taxi and ground taxi to Runway XXR was completely normal. Tower issued us takeoff clearance and I taxied the aircraft onto the centerline and gave [FO] the aircraft. It was his takeoff and leg to ZZZ1. He flew the leg to ZZZ2 to start the trip sequence and I flew the return leg to ZZZ.Takeoff roll; engine power setting and acceleration all normal to 80 knot callout. Immediately after that the aircraft pulled/yawed to the left and [FO] returned the aircraft to runway centerline with right rudder. Wind was down the runway so this was somewhat unusual. Shortly after 100 knots the aircraft pulled/yawed even more violently than before to the left and this time I heard some kind of noise from the left side. My initial impression was a possible blown tire or some kind of mechanical malfunction based on the sound I heard. Our FO [deadheading] in main cabin told me afterward he felt the aircraft yaw two times and heard the same mechanical malfunction noise on the second pull/yaw as well. [FO] again used more right rudder to realign the nose of the aircraft to the runway centerline and simultaneously stated out loud 'Something is wrong.' We were approximately midfield and 135 -140 knots and I elected to reject the takeoff based on the second more severe pull; sound and [FO]'s statement of the aircraft's condition. I announced 'Abort; Abort; Abort' (as I said I might say on our first leg initial brief just because that is what I have used in my aviation career) and 'My Aircraft.' The abort was instantaneous with the throttles pulled to idle. The ground spoilers deployed immediately and the autobrakes grabbed on just like a 'max brake' landing. With very little correction runway centerline was maintained during the abort procedure and brake chatter started around 100 knots on the deceleration. I elected to override the brakes due to anti-skid cycling and manually stopped the aircraft on centerline around 8500 feet down the runway. [FO] contacted ZZZ Tower announcing our abort. After the aircraft was completely stopped I made a PA to both the FA's and passengers. This was my first high speed abort in my aviation career and I am sure for [FO] and the FA's as well. We asked Tower if they could see if we had a blown left tire. They said no.  No blown tires; no hot brakes; no fluids and no damage to our aircraft [was reported]. After communicating with ZZZ OPS for a ramp/gate we [were] cleared to taxi to the ramp. The aircraft didn't move. Attempted to taxi again with no movement. I cycled the parking brake (which has NOT been applied during this entire event and never was until aircraft shutdown) just to be sure it was NOT engaged somehow. Informed Ground Control we would have to call for a tug and get maintenance assistance. ZZZ OPS was notified of our situation. During the 20 minute wait we contacted our Dispatcher about our rejected takeoff on Runway XXR. We didn't need any further assistance from him at that time. Maintenance arrived with ZZZ Maintenance Supervisor hooking up on the ground headset. He and I communicated for the next 30 minutes or more on the remainder of procedures they tried. First they confirmed no flat/blown tires; no hot brakes; no fluid leaks and no damage. They had me 'pump' the brakes while brake technicians looked over our wheels. Second they hooked up a tug and tried to push the aircraft backward to either release the brakes or remove any debris from failed brakes. No movement. Then they tried to pull the aircraft forward. No movement. We 'pumped' the brakesagain and tried a second time with the tug. No movement. Supervisor said the brakes may have failed; fused; locked or been damaged somehow. He also stated we have had many similar situations with these particular brakes in the past. I explained to him what we felt and heard during the takeoff roll. He said he expected to find some kind of failure after they performed an inspection.Supervisor and I communicated more about the AML write ups for the abort and the aircraft info that needed to be included. He was outstanding in communicating what was happening under our aircraft and later what they found with the #1 and #2 brakes. We rejected our takeoff between 135 and 140 knots; our weight was 153;000 LBS. and our fuel weight was 24;000 LBS. I rejected the takeoff because of many quick decisions. A) The aircraft yawing/pulling left (harder the second time) with the unusual noise either a blown tire or mechanical failure; B) [FOs] direct comment 'Something is wrong' justified the aircraft was unsafe to fly in my opinion and C) We were halfway down [the runway] approximately 15 knots below V1. [FO] and I were shown brakes #2 by the Maintenance personnel who already had the aircraft on jacks left side and wheel #2 off. There are 5 or 6 brake elements and the outer two could rotate but inner 3 or 4 damaged; fused or failed somehow. The mechanics suspected that brakes #1 were going to be the same. Later [name] told me that in fact brakes #1 were the same failed; fused or locked. We were called by ZZZ Chief Pilot on Duty who came down and debriefed with me. We contacted Crew Tracking and informed them we were finished for the night. [Deadheading] FO later contacted me about this entire rejected takeoff event. He confirmed to me exactly what I recalled during this abort and he told me he actually expected us to abort the takeoff based on what he felt and heard sitting back in main cabin. He also verified how professional our FAs performed and interacted with our passengers during the entire time. My thanks to [our] First Officer. He was on top of everything helping with decisions and doing most of the communications.I suspect that there was a brake failure on either or both of the left side brakes #1 or #2 during our takeoff roll based on the aircraft diversions from runway centerline in a very noticeable pull or yaw two different times as the aircraft accelerated. Also the noticeable noise that I heard from the left side of the aircraft during the second more pronounced aircraft pull/yaw. We occasionally get a rejected takeoff scenario in our [recurrent] training that may be given with a 'blown tire scenario.' I; personally; have never experienced a blown tire either. I believe we have many documented cases of blown tires with aircrews on both takeoff and landing. I also believe we have had 737 brake failures of many different kinds either during taxi or takeoff/landing rolls. We might need more discussion about the feel; sounds and expectations associated with both of these type of events because I believe most of our [Company] aircrew have never experienced either of these events as well.

B737-800 Captain reported an RTO due to a brake failure/seizure.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 107.8; Flight Crew Total 6307.75; Flight Crew Type 6307.75

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 32; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 540

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Shortly after takeoff As the PF I experienced intermittent failure of both roll and pitch modes (with no flags; just the disappearance and reappearance in erratic random failures of pitch and roll indications separately) of my flight director during climb through approximately 6;000 ft. Obviously the auto pilot A disconnected and I was unable to reacquire it due to the erratic nature of the problem. Communicating to my FO (First Officer) of the issue; we recognized that his flight director appeared to be operating normally. This allowed us to use autopilot B to reassess our condition. With the auto throttle on with autopilot B the Number 2 throttle advanced rapidly approximately 5 knobs forward of the Number 1 throttle and I returned it to a symmetric condition (the auto throttle disengaged itself as well; Autopilot B still was working). While bringing the throttles to an asymmetric condition to stabilize the thrust setting the Stab Trim Light illuminated; the left fuel pump light of the center tank illuminated (approximately 22;000 lbs of gas in the center tank). We requested to level off at 16;000 ft. and 250 knots and indicated to ATC that we needed a few minutes to access a condition; that we would maintain our flight plan. We executed a transfer of controls to the FO making him the PF as he also communicated with ATC. After consulting the Quick Reference Checklist; it was clear the we had multiple failures not covered by the Quick Reference Checklist. In addition; the MA lights for both Flight Directors were alternating flashing in sequence. I Acquired the appropriate enroute Airinc VHF radio frequency from the chart and phone patched both dispatch and Maintenance Control. With no solution; both Maintenance Control and Dispatch agreed with my decision to divert back to ZZZ as opposed to continuing to ZZZ1 5 hours away in mountainous terrain with automation issues at night and a potential 12 hour+ duty day. FAs (Flight Attendants) were advised; ATC was advised (Requested priority handling and equipment requested to check brakes and tires); company was advised; and an announcement was made to the pax. We used the Landing Distance Normal Configuration chart for our aircraft to obtain landing distance as Saber wouldn't calculate for us the landing performance in our overweight condition at landing (approximately 161;000 lbs). It was my judgement to forego flying for however long it would take to burn 15;000 lbs of fuel to reach landing weight; so I opted to land overweight in light of the distance required from the chart. Once ATC cleared us on a vector heading for approach to land X in ZZZ; I assumed the PF role. Landing was inconsequential and smooth exiting X; X; holding short of X on X while ZZZ Fire assessed our brakes and tires. All normal; proceeded to Gate X.

On departure out of ZZZ; the Captain experienced intermittent failure of his flight director. Both his roll and pitch command bars would randomly disappear and reappear without any warning annunciations. Autopilot A disconnected and was unable to reengage as we continued the climb. As the Captain and I began to analyze the situation; we recognized that my flight director appeared to be working normally and the Captain was able to engage Autopilot B. A short period after engaging the autopilot; the autothrottles disengaged as a result of the Number 2 throttle advancing several knob widths forward of the Number 1 throttle. The Captain returned the throttles to a symmetric condition and the autothrottles were reengaged. We had been given a climb to 16;000 ft. and decided to maintain that altitude and our current airspeed of 250 kts. as we continued our flight plan route. The Captain transferred the aircraft control to me; and I kept the radios while he further analyzed the situation and referenced the QRG. I told ATC we were working an issue but required no assistance at this time. The autothrottles once again disconnected as a result of asymmetry and we elected to keep them off for the remainder of the flight. During this time we also notice the MA light for the flight director switches was cycling back and forth from the Captain's side to the FO side. Additionally; the left center tank fuel pump LOW PRESSURE light illuminated with over 20;000 lbs. of fuel in the center tank. Lastly; the STAB OUT OF TRIM light flickered despite any changes in pitch or airspeed. It was clear that we had multiple issues not covered by the QRG; and the Captain quickly tuned the appropriate ARINC VHF radio frequency and established a phone patch with dispatch and Maintenance Control. Since there was no clear solution for our situation; dispatch and Maintenance Control agreed with the Captain's decision to divert to ZZZ as opposed to continuing. This decision was made after the Captain and I discussed the threats involved: automation issues; night landing in mountainous terrain; long duty day. The Captain advised the FAs (Flight Attendants) and made an announcement to the passengers. He then took the primary radio back from me and requested priority handling with ATC in addition to coordinating for aircraft rescue and firefighting to meet the aircraft to check our brakes and tires since we would be landing overweight. The Captain briefed the approach and calculated the landing distance using the Landing Distance Normal Configuration chart for our aircraft since Saber would not calculate at our current weight which was approximately 161;000 lbs. I agreed with the Captain's decision to land overweight; given we had the landing distance; as opposed to holding for almost 2.5 hours to burn fuel. The descent checklist was accomplished; and the Captain took over as the PF once ATC cleared us on a vector for the ILS X. A 30-flap landing was conducted and a normal landing was made. We exited on X; X; and while holding short of X; aircraft rescue and firefighting checked our brakes and tires. With an all normal; we proceeded to taxi to gate X.

B737 flight crew reported multiple systems indicating failures; resulting in the decision to execute a return to departure airport and a precautionary landing.


Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

On ground the flight attendants reported egg/sulfur smell around Row 18 was burning their eyes. Maintenance performed test on APU bleed which showed normal. Maintenance decided to MEL rear chillers as a possible source of the smell. [We] departed approximately one hour late. Approximately one hour fifteen minutes into the flight the flight attendants reported the smell had returned around Row 18; and a 'leather' smell. Ten minutes later; the flight attendants reported an acrid smell of 'electrical'. Decision was made to divert to an airport 100 mile to our right. En route had flight attendants turn off reading lights around Row 18 and overheard lights. Odor seemed to start to dissipate. [After a] normal approach and landing aircraft left awaiting Company Maintenance. The crew deadheaded. Maintenance was not able to locate proper source of odor before departure.

The Reporter stated that he contacted his Chief Pilot for the cause of this event and was told that the odor was the result of an overheated electrical light ballast in the cabin sidewall overheating. In retrospect he felt his decision to turn cabin lights off was a worthwhile action.

An A319 flight attendant crew reported an egg/sulfur smell near Row 18 prior to flight but Maintenance found no cause. During flight; the odor returned so the Captain diverted to an enroute airport and was later told the cause was an overheated cabin sidewall electrical light ballast.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Software and Automation; MEL; Human Factors; Aircraft

The aircraft flown had 2 MELs which could not be flown with together; XX-YY-01-1 and XX-YY-02-1. Consecutively these were DU4 Inop and MCDU 1 inop. The Captain and I did not catch the discrepancy and flew the flight without consequence. [I suggest a] more thorough briefing of MELs.

First Officer reported that the aircraft was operated with two open MELs that were not authorized for operation together.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 665; Flight Crew Type 265

Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

Following release of skydivers at 9;000 feet MSL; I set RPM at 2;300 and manifold pressure of 15 in. Hg; the bottom of the green arc. The settings were maintained throughout the descent. I maintained a steep descent by using a side slip alternating left and right using full rudder. While in a slip between 3;000-5;000 feet the engine lost power. My first thought was that I had unported the fuel tank drain so I leveled the wings and pitched for level flight but the engine did not recover. I checked every cause I could think of but don't remember the order. The engine instruments were all in the green except manifold pressure. I knew the conditions were conducive to carburetor ice so I pulled the carb heat. I am not sure how long I left it on but when I did not hear any change in engine performance I turned it off. I alternated tanks on the fuel selector valve several times before putting it back on both. I realized I was not going to make the field so I selected a hay field and landed. I pulled the carb heat halfway out at some point on the final descent because that's where it was when I shut the engine down at the end of the landing roll. The engine was making power and running smoothly at the end of the landing roll. I am now convinced I had carburetor ice which I failed to recognize because I did not leave the carburetor heat on long enough.

C182 pilot reported an engine failure in descent; resulting in an off-airport landing.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 27617; Flight Crew Type 443

Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

I inadvertently went off left side of hard-surface runway onto grass; incurring minor fabric damage to underside of lower left wing due to contact with a runway light. I returned to the hard surface during rollout. I had performed 12 previous landings within the past 90 days. There was a slight left-hand crosswind but it was not a factor. I landed on speed; stabilized; with no bounce. The swerving started after tailwheel contacted runway. I failed to correct the swerving enough to keep airplane on hard surface.I had a front-seat passenger which degrades forward visibility. Most of my flying is solo. Stearman likes to swerve; especially on hard surface and requires close attention all the way down to taxi speed. I attribute this event mainly to minimal landing practice in past 90 days; not reacting promptly enough with correct control input and indecision about going around.

The pilot of a Stearman believed the lack of recent landing experience and the obstruction of vision due to a front seat passenger contributed to his loss of control; runway excursion and collision with a landing light after touch down.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

A few minutes after takeoff from ZZZ while climbing through 10;000 feet and in icing conditions; we got L WING A/I and R WING A/I Caution messages simultaneously despite the power being set in the climb detent. My Captain-upgrade Student kept flying and took the radios while I actioned the QRH. After a minute or two; the R WING A/I message extinguished while the left persisted. I switched pages to the appropriate QRH; and we attempted to fix the issue by opening the WING A/I CROSS BLEED but we needed to leave icing conditions. We decided this was only possible by landing somewhere since icing conditions were present from the surface all the way into the high flight levels. We chose ZZZ1 as our divert airport and proceeded to land without further incident. Once in ZZZ1; Maintenance decided to have us run engines with them and to do a system ops check; which passed and resulted in the mechanic clearing the discrepancy with a corrective action that said 'ops check good...' Skeptical of this technique; I asked the mechanic whether he thought the problem was truly gone; and how likely in his opinion we were to experience the same issue again on the subsequent flight. The reply I got was that an ops check was all he could do at this time; and that his hands were tied because the system had passed the check. Reluctantly; we accepted the aircraft and tried to proceed to [destination]; but climbing through 10;000 feet this time with ICE being sensed by the ice detectors we once again got a L WING A/I message. We turned back yet again and landed in ZZZ1 for the second time without further incident.  Operational pressure to return aircraft to service as soon as possible without proper troubleshooting. Improve maintenance tracking especially the tracking of serious discrepancies that potentially put aircraft and occupants at risk. Track repeat discrepancies; and ground aircraft that repeatedly have the same serious issues. Add levels of experienced supervision in Maintenance Control to review actions taken; and determine the airworthiness of an aircraft not just in terms of the maintenance logbook but by considering whether the aircraft is actually safe to fly. As this case clearly shows; there can be a big difference between what the logbook claims is returned to an airworthy condition; and what's really happening. As of late the impression this pilot gets is that maintenance control is willing to accept more risk and experimentation in terms of airworthiness than I am comfortable with. Add to that IMC; icing conditions; and mountainous terrain; and you might see that safety was compromised. With the current climate at this company; I do not feel comfortable refusing an aircraft that Maintenance claims is airworthy because I perceive that by doing so I place my continued employment here in jeopardy.

CRJ-700 Captain reported diverting to an alternate after receiving L and R WING A/I caution messages. Maintenance at the diversion station signed off the system with 'ops check good;' but the problem recurred after takeoff.


I submit this [report] regarding Pre Departure Clearances to give some suggestions in making the Pre Departure Clearance easier to understand; especially when receiving a route change; so that we can continue to reduce errors that are occurring related to PDC's.  Our PDC clearances come through the acars and then print in a fashion similar to this:PDC [ACR and Flight number]  ABCD  KLASB737/L  P1235161   380KLAS BTY LKV BTG [STAR]3. /.[DEST]CLEARED SUNST3 DEPCLIMB VIA SID EXCEPT MAINTAIN 190CALL 121.67 WITH GATE OR LOCATION WHEN READY TO TAXIACARS ENDNow all of the information that we need is here; however; the information is choppy and out of order [compared to a] normal clearance received via vhf radio and can include additional information that is unnecessary to the clearance from the pilots point of view.Most flight instructors and teachers are familiar with the law of primacy stating that 'what is learned first; is learned best'.  In keeping this in mind we should consider that most; if not all; pilots spend most of their formative years as IFR pilots receiving their clearance via vhf radio.  In doing that it is safe to say that the format which we receive our pre departure clearance over the radio is the best learned.  This should lead us into wanting our PDC via acars to mirror that process.  For example here is a IFR clearance over the radio:  '[ACR Flight number] you are cleared to the [destination] airport via the Sunset 3 departure BTY transition then as filed.  Climb via the sid except maintain FL190. Departure frequency is 125.4 squawk [XXXX].'  Comparing this clearance to the PDC received through ACARS and one can see the unorganized and confusing format of acars PDC.  To make matters worse in the event of a route change on ACARS sometimes; but not always; we will have two routes published one in between (-) symbols to signify the change while the filed route is published below.  How does this differ from a verbal clearance[?] ATC would not read us both cleared and filed routes we would only be read our cleared routing.  Sure we have added ATTENTION ROUTE CHANGE to possibly help us look for a change but even with this the pilots can inadvertently misunderstand the clearance.  The simple answer here is to always verify [with ATC] if we have a question but it doesn't address the actual problem which is a poorly presented clearance to the pilots via ACARS PDC.  The format in which we receive an IFR clearance over vhf radio should be the same as the way we are receiving our clearance via acars PDC.  In an effort to continue to eliminate errors can we [...] submit strong input to the FAA to push for these changes to help us in threat/error management.  An acars PDC that looks like this: [Company] Cleared via Sunset 3 dep BTY transition then As Filed (or route if different from filed) Climb via the SID except maintain FL190...Dep Freq  124.5 Squawk [XXXX] Rmrks: Maintain 250kts or less till advised.'As you can see in this acars PDC message we have received all of the necessary information in an organized and recognizable format (same as receiving vhf radio) while eliminat[ing] excess information not needed [by] the pilot and eliminating any confusion as to which route applies in the event of a route change.  I truly believe these changes would drastically reduce errors by pilots in relation to PDC's as noted in our LOSA data and [company safety] program; not only at our airline but others as well.

A B737 First Officer addressed the decades old problem of misinterpreted PDC clearances and subsequent deviations due to their ambiguous and confusing formatting.  He further provided a simple; on point suggestion he believes would eliminate the majority of such errors and make air travel safer.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

After pushback and as the flight was beginning to depart the gate area for taxi and takeoff; the aft Flight Attendant reported heavy; thick; dark smoke emanating from the ceiling of the aircraft near the overhead emergency exit lights in the aft section of the aircraft.  I asked the Flight Attendant a number of questions concerning the smoke; its location; and characteristics.  Based on the information provided by the Flight Attendant; we presumed the smoke was as a result of a ballast fire.  We contacted Operations to advise of the situation. We requested a return to the gate. We requested aircraft marshallers; a jetway driver; Maintenance personnel and Airport Fire and Rescue personnel/equipment (as a precaution).   The non-flying pilot accomplished the QRH procedure for Electrical Smoke and Fire. As Captain; I could see the gate area we had just departed was clear. I made the decision to move the aircraft out of the alleyway; in the event an evacuation would be required. I taxied the aircraft back into the gate area approximately 20-30 feet away from the normal parking position. I asked the Flight Attendant a number of additional questions about the smoke and whether he or any passengers required any medical assistance. The Flight Attendant reported the smoke appeared to be dissipating. The Flight Attendant reported that he and the passengers appeared to be OK and required no medical assistance. I gave a public address message to the passengers explaining the situation and requested that they remain seated while we worked through the problem. The requested support personnel arrived at the aircraft and the aircraft was parked at the gate. Maintenance personnel boarded the aircraft to investigate the event. Maintenance personnel determined the we had experienced a ballast fire and that the passengers; crew; and aircraft were safe.  Airport Fire and Rescue arrived at the aircraft but their assistance and service was not required.  I requested that an aft aircraft door be opened to help evacuate any remaining smoke or fumes. The aft Flight Attendant came to the cockpit and requested the use of our observer station oxygen as he stated he had inhaled a bit of the smoke. Both I and the First Officer suggested that the Flight Attendant remove himself the trip and be seen by medical personnel. He stated that he thought he was OK. He later stated that he didn't feel well and made the decision to get off of the trip. I do not know how this event could have been prevented.  In my estimation; I believe it took far too long to get the aircraft back on the gate. Perhaps company policy/procedures should be examined in this area.

B737 Captain reported he was advised by aft Flight Attendant of smoke in the cabin. The Captain asked for CFR response and the smoke that appeared to be from a ballast quickly dissipated.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft X was inbound to OPF from the northwest; they requested Runway 12. I got them down to 020 to get under MIA approach traffic and put them on a vector southwest-bound for sequence. I then turned [them on a] 100 heading to intercept the localizer because there was a VFR at 019 a mile west of the localizer heading northwest-bound. The area where this happened is usually a hotspot for VFR traffic in the way of descending IFR traffic. Right as Aircraft X was about to intercept the localizer; the VFR turned north right into his path. Aircraft X was about to turn southeast on the intercept and the VFR was 100 ft. under him - if Mode C was correct - so; my immediate thought was to climb Aircraft X to 025. There was traffic; Aircraft Y; westbound in the downwind about 6 miles away at 030. I tried to climb him to 035; but was stepped on by Aircraft X saying he had the VFR in sight and no factor. I told Aircraft X to descend back down to 020 for the approach and called the IFR traffic. I then climbed Aircraft Y to 035 and called the traffic. Due to clouds; visual separation could not be achieved. As lateral separation was lost; altitude started to correct. The area this occurred is a hotspot for VFR traffic. There aren't many ways to safely descend IFR traffic down to 020 when getting them into OPF; but it has to be accomplished to get under inbounds to MIA descending to 030. The pilots who are VFR in the area need to be more alert and aware that there is usually jet or turboprop traffic.

MIA TRACON Controller reported a potential loss of separation between two aircraft at a hotspot for VFR traffic near the OPF airport.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 650; Flight Crew Type 497

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I was performing landing training with a student. On the upwind leg of the landing pattern there was a garbled call on the radio which sounded like somebody asking about traffic at ZZZ. I asked calling aircraft to repeat. The aircraft came back and asked if there was any traffic at ZZZ. I responded 'one aircraft in the traffic pattern currently on upwind'. My student and I saw the traffic at our 2 o'clock traveling in the opposite direction to us; parallel to Runway XX which we had just taken off from. We continued to fly our pattern; left downwind followed by a left base. We made our traffic calls on downwind and base. When we were on base we heard a call saying Aircraft Y base to final. We looked around and could not see another aircraft; so proceeded with caution. We turned final and called the final; still looking for the traffic but did not see anything. We landed and at the end of our landing roll we saw a Cessna exiting the runway. The Cessna did not have a functioning rotating bacon or white tail navigation light. The green navigation light was functioning. The pilot of the other aircraft got on the radio and said 'so you landed while we were still on the runway'. I responded with 'Do you know that your beacon and your white light are out; we could not see you'. The other pilot again said 'you landed while we were no the runway. I asked 'did you hear that your lights are not working; we did not see you and you were not making radio calls?' The other pilot follow-ed up with a rude response so I did not engage him any further. I wanted to tell him that ZZZ has a left pattern to Runway XX and he had flow what seemed to be a right pattern; without a functioning beacon or white light and not making radio calls.

Flight Instructor reported another aircraft entered the traffic pattern against traffic flow. The other aircraft did not have all required external lights working and landed while the instructor was still exiting the same runway.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

As I was receiving a position relief briefing Aircraft X requested to proceed direct to HUBUK which is the eastern fix for the T-style RNAV 30 approach into AQH.  The controller I was relieving cleared the aircraft direct HUBUK and we completed the position relief briefing.  AQH airport is on the western coast of the Kuskokwim delta and the terrain is fairly low and flat and I am very familiar with the RNAV 12 approach to AQH and the fact that 025 is the TAA (Terminal Arrival Altitude) for this approach so I thought nothing of the fact that the aircraft was proceeding direct HUBUK at 030.  When I took the position I asked the aircraft to report 30 NM from HUBUK to establish him in the TAA and verified that the pilot had the weather and NOTAMs.  When the pilot reported 30 NM from HUBUK I cleared him for the RNAV 30 approach and advised him to change to advisory frequency over HUBUK.  Approximately 20 NM from HUBUK the MSAW alarm went off and the FLM (Front Line Manager) came over to verify if the aircraft was okay.  I said he was fine since he was in the TAA for the approach; he asked if we had looked at the approach which we hadn't.  When the MSAW alarm continued I checked the MIA (Minimum IFR Altitude) charts and saw that the aircraft was at 030 entering a 042 MIA area.  I then asked my A-side to open the approach plate which was when I realized that the TAAs for the HUBUK transition for the RNAV 30 were 067 until 20 NM from HUBUK and then 052 until HUBUK.  I tried to contact the aircraft to climb him but there was no response and soon thereafter the pilot contacted me on another frequency and asked if they needed to be at a higher altitude for the approach.  I advised him affirmative and cleared him to climb to 042; which was the MIA; and then cleared him to climb and maintain 052 until 20 NM from HUBUK and re-cleared him for the RNAV 30 approach.We recently had a change to the sound of the aural alarm for the MSAW alert and even so it has been an incredible nuisance as the alert sounds quite often and is rarely necessary.  This has been an on-going problem at ZAN as controllers have tended to become complacent about the MSAW alarms; myself included.  Fortunately our FLM has remained steadfast in his dedication to the investigation of all alarms to verify that there is no issue since he is aware of the complacency issue.  Fortunately; this time it was necessary!  Something needs to be done to decrease the number of false or unnecessary MSAW alarms so that we are more attentive to the alarms.

ZAN Controller reports of issuing an altitude he thought would be safe for an aircraft. Moments later the MSAW alarm went off and the Front Line Manager (FLM) came over to investigate. The Controller then checked the approach plate and discovered that he was wrong and attempted to contact the pilot to have him climb. Contact was not made. The pilot later called and asked if he was supposed to be higher and the Controller then climbed the aircraft and cleared it for the approach.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On taxi out; we couldn't get ACARS so we were holding short of runway 8 while we did a radio close out. After we got our numbers; we informed tower we were ready for takeoff. An A310 was on short final. After he landed; the Tower Controller asked if we had the other airplane on final in sight; a 737. We said yes; and she said 'Line up and wait; be ready'. We started to line up and wait; and she then said; 'Hold short of runway!'. We told her it was too late; and she made [the 737] go around. We were cleared for takeoff; everything else was uneventful.After we got in the air and started talking about it; the first officer mentioned he heard her say 'after landing traffic; line up and wait'. I didn't hear the 'after landing traffic' part; but he assumed she was talking about the A310 that was just rolling out. I did mention it was kind of tight; and I was surprised they were doing it; but I've seen much tighter spacing in [another airport]. We could have gotten airborne before [the 737] landed; but that's not what happened. I don't know why other countries allow verbiage like 'after landing traffic; line up and wait'; it does nothing but create confusion; and in my opinion; should be stopped immediately.

NEVER NEVER accept that type of clearance that tells you to line up and wait BEFORE the traffic has crossed the threshold. The U.S. does not use this type of clearance for good reason. Why this is allowed is foolish. Especially with the circumstances we were in where a plane had JUST landed and we thought that that was the plane to line up and wait after. [I] might want to send email to the pilot group on this one.

A319 flight crew taxied onto the runway in MDPC; resulting in a conflict with a landing aircraft because they misunderstood the clearance.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 132.97; Flight Crew Total 2442.13; Flight Crew Type 1206.35

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

Cruising at FL250 we received a CAB PR EXCESS CABIN ALT ECAM. We donned our oxygen mask; initiated a priority descent and advised with ZZZ Center. We leveled off at 10;000 feet. I called the Purser to assess the situation in the cabin. The passenger oxygen masks did not deploy. We made the decision to divert to ZZZ and I completed the brief with the Purser and made PAs to the passengers. We landed uneventfully and taxied to the gate.

A319 flight crew reported a pressurization malfunction during cruise. The flight diverted and landed uneventfully.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On the CL650 there is a 35% sensor which is accessed from the tail of the aircraft thru the hell hole - no tail tanks are opened and no wet bladder panels are opened or removed.Per our GMM (General Maintenance Manual) the only thing which is RII (Required Inspection Item) under the Fuel Chapter is access panels.  The sensor is not an access panel; 6 bolts and an O ring are only things which are removable.  The MM just calls out for an ops check and a leak check. Would this sensor be consider an access panel? Would this be a RII item?

A Bombardier Challenger 650 Maintenance Technician reported that there is some confusion identifying a required inspection item for the fuel system.


Workload; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

At XA:44; the Company asked the Dispatcher to divert an airborne flight to another location for operational necessity. The Dispatcher ran an inflight scenario and sent the appropriate ARTR for new burn; new destination; new alternate and route. The Dispatcher followed up asking the crew to 'send the diversion message and new ETA when able'. At XB:05; the crew sent back the diversion message which cancels the original flight and creates a new flight with the new city pair. (The new flight usually shows up in XXXX in the 'XXXX1' desk and then has to be moved to the dispatcher's desk.) At XB:12; the Dispatcher notified the shift supervisor that the flight had 'self-diverted' and the new flight needed to be moved to the Dispatcher's desk. At XB:35; the flight arrived at the Dispatcher's desk--approximately 23 minutes after the Supervisor had been notified--during which time; operational control was lost. The Dispatcher was able to maintain visual flight following via the software and communicate with the flight via communication software; but was unable to make further changes to the route during this time. (The crew subsequently took a direct routing.) There were numerous computer outages / updates taking place through out the day; making operational control via secondary means; difficult at best.  Supervisor had just come on duty and had not logged into the computer before relieving the previous supervisor. He then got into a backlog of issues including this one. Supervisor should log in and familiarize himself with today's operations and issues before relieving the previous supervisor. Review with the Supervisor the importance of moving a diverted flight in a timely manner so that operational control can be maintained by the dispatcher. Schedule important computer outages / updates for a day that is less busy (IE a weekend).

Dispatcher reported operational control of a flight was lost and explains how it occurred.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days .4; Flight Crew Total 473; Flight Crew Type 150

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

I took off out of ZZZ uneventfully. After several minutes a 'whooshing' sound developed very lightly in my headset. I tried to see if any instrumentation had an indication that aligned with the rhythmic sound in my headset. With no further indications of problems (no warning lights; no ammeter issues; no vacuum or oil pressure issues; I continued on to ZZZ1.After receiving ATIS at ZZZ1; I called the Tower at 9.2 miles out to notify them of my intention to land at ZZZ1.I was asked to report a 2 mile left base for Runway XX. At 4.2 miles on my GPS (approximately 2.5 miles out from an extended base leg; I notified Tower that I was on an extended base to Runway XX. With no traffic in the area; ZZZ1 Tower cleared me to land for Runway XX.Almost immediately after I received the clearance to land and I acknowledged it; my instrument panel start to show signs of a power failure with the blinking of both my nav/comm radios and the loss of power to my portable avionics via the auxiliary/cigar lighter adapter. In an attempt to locate any issues; unplugged the adapter and left the portable avionics unpowered. I toggled the switch to the rotating beacon and began powering down the nav/com radios one at a time. Nothing improved the situation. The power plant continued to generate power; so being cleared to for landing and having the runway safely in sight; I continued my approach. I tried to put in flaps and noticed the motors sounding sluggish; so I stopped after 15 degrees of flap. The approach was normal and I landed safely on Runway XX at ZZZ1. I turned off the first taxiway that was to my left about halfway down the runway and moved off the active and stopped with my tail safely off the runway. My instrument panel and nav/com radios were completely dead. I have two portable radios and found that the batteries for both portable units did not contain enough charge to power the radio. I took out my cell phone and opened up the AOPA Airport app to see if I could locate the Tower phone number; but it was not listed. I kept looking at the Tower but my relative position to the Tower was skewed and without moving the aircraft further; I could not see the Tower for any light signals. My destination was [Company] to drop my plane off for an avionics upgrade; so I did have the phone number of [Company] on my phone. I called [Company] and asked him to contact the Tower and let them know of my dilemma. He said he would and I told him that I was going to cross the main taxiway and get on the service taxiway so that I would be in a position of less potential traffic conflict. I immediately proceeded to the service taxiway and proceeded to [Company] without delay.Upon arrival; [Company] indicated that he called the Tower and let them know of my issue.Things I learned that I need to do before my next flight...1. Always research the phone number of the Tower and have it close at hand 2. Test both portable comm radios before take off to assure that both are operational3. Study the FAR/AIM for loss of communication procedures when on the ground[Company] looked into the issue and found that the voltage regulator had failed and the recent start of the engine had caused the battery to drain and not be able to supply enough charge to keep the instruments alive until landing at ZZZ1.

Pilot reported electrical failure on approach to landing.


Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 40

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

I was cleared for takeoff and for a left downwind departure by Tower. After initial climb and after crosswind/downwind departure I was going to meet up with another aircraft southwest of the airport. Tower asked if I had the other aircraft in sight; and I responded 'affirmative.' Tower told us to contact ZZZ Tower; as that was our destination. I changed the frequency in my radio but had not contacted ZZZ Tower yet. Shortly after that I thought to myself 'If I'm going to catch the other aircraft; I better speed up.' However my hand was still on the throttle; and the throttle was pushed all the way in. I looked at my manifold pressure gauge and was only indicating 20 inches of manifold pressure. I jockeyed the throttle a few times with no change in engine power output or manifold pressure. At this time I was about at a 45 for left base for a landing at ZZZ. I flipped the frequency back to ZZZ Tower and requested a 'Priority Landing; please!' That was obviously granted. I made a turn for the numbers and had enough speed to lower the landing gear and two notches of flaps. On final approach I glanced at manifold pressure gauge and saw 15 in Hg. I landed in the middle of the touchdown zone and on centerline. As I cleared the reverse high speed runway exit my prop came to a stop.An hour later my mechanic arrived and removed the cowling and confirmed a throttle cable breakage.

C210 pilot reported a return to departure airport after noticing loss of power due to broken throttle cable.


Confusion; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors; Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Procedure

Aircraft X was inbound on an ILS approach to [Runway] 16R; on short final he unexpectedly went around. Our procedure with a go around on an ILS approach is to do the published missed approach. I called the Valley Sector at SoCal Approach and they concurred. The Local Controller told him to execute the published missed approach and the plane appeared to be doing so. He turned southeast bound and was given the Departure frequency; and the frequency change. Shortly after the Valley Sector yelled on the line that they need to talk to Aircraft X so I said we'll try again and the Controller switched him again. At this point we observed the plane flying through Burbank's Class C at 2;500 MSL; flying northbound towards Whiteman airport and elevated terrain. Valley calls over again and we switch him again; this time the pilot responds to the change but then calls back a second later asking again for the frequency. At this point I tell the Controller to give him 120.4 the Filmore frequency which is the tag he was listed under on the radar scope. I called Filmore to ask if they had him as he was flying at 2;500 FT seemingly into a mountain; they said no; I asked Valley and they did have him. I told them they need to climb him; they did and re-sequenced Aircraft X with traffic. On his next approach he transmitted that he had issues with his flaps; that's why he went around.The published missed approach isn't really helpful; in most cases it makes the situation worse. He flew right into Burbank's airspace and then into Whiteman's airspace barely missing traffic. In most cases aircraft are visual approaches and thus we don't have this problem but there has to be a better missed approach procedure then to turn them into another Tower's airspace.

VNY Tower Controller reports of a missed approach that doesn't get on the correct frequency quickly; which causes the aircraft to violate a Class Charlie and fly towards mountainous terrain.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 8

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Type 12000

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

On approach to BUR Runway 8 with weather at mins; the azimuth swung full deflection in both directions at mins. I have noticed this during VMC ops and it seems to be a common (as it happens every time) issue. ATC was involved. I have since flown into BUR and again witnessed the issue. If this is not addressed at the source; suggest [company pilots be advised] and suggest we hand fly the approach when weather is critical.

B737 Captain reported the BUR Runway 8 ILS LOC signal was unreliable and stated he has seen this anomaly several times.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 11; Flight Crew Total 1830; Flight Crew Type 1138

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Troubleshooting

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Departed with Flight Following. Tower cleared me to contact Approach with suggested heading of 270. I turned to 270 but saw that would take me into Class B; so I turned slightly to the right while awaiting contact with Approach. Shortly thereafter; I was advised to turn to heading 320 which I think I acknowledged and complied with. I was further advised to 'turn to heading 320 now' because of an incoming Citation. I rechecked my heading as 320; but I do not remember how or if I verbally responded. When ATC said something to the effect of turn now or I'll send you back I realized something was off. I checked my magnetic compass and realized then that I had not set my heading indicator properly during my preflight. Once corrected I was able to properly follow ATC instructions. Basic training has always been to set heading indicator prior to taxi and then double check once on runway prior to takeoff. Corrective action on my part is obviously to do a better preflight. That said; once ATC realized I wasn't responding properly; instructions to 'turn 30 degrees right' would have resolved the issue as well.

PA-28 pilot reported they were not complying with ATC assigned headings because they had not set their heading indicator properly before takeoff.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted

While on first break crew got low oil pressure EICAS message while at FL360 during cruise phase. They followed ECL (Electronic Checklist) shutting down affected engine and notified ATC. ZZZZ was on nose with long runways; VFR weather so it was our nearest suitable airport. Accomplished overweight landing checklist; calculated non-normal landing distance in addition to all checklist previously done. Landing was uneventful. Oil system failure on right engine.

B787 pilot reported an oil system anomaly which resulted in an engine shutdown and landing at alternate airport.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

During cruise at FL320 ECAM showed HYD Y sys lo and quantity indicated zero. Accomplished ECAM actions in accordance with checklists and advised Dispatch and Maintenance Control. Elected to continue to ZZZ. During descent on autopilot aircraft abruptly pitched down; autopilot disconnected and ECAM momentarily showed HYDB + Y sys lo pr.Recovered aircraft from pitch down and [Requested Priority Handling] with mayday call. The ECAM HYD B 'self-healed' and disappeared from ECAM display. We used the 7700 ACARS feature to notify Dispatch. Apparently; it did not work according to our Dispatcher. Accomplished non-routine landing considerations checklist; coordinating with cabin crew and ATC. Did not re-engage autopilot for the remainder of the flight and hand flew the approach. There is a discrepancy between ECAM and the manual on turning on Y system engine pump during approach. We chose the ECAM guidance and turned on the pump after configuring.We expected only one reverse on rollout; but had indications of normal reverse on both engines. Taxied to gate with [Crash Fire Rescue Equipment] following. Terminated emergency with ground after shutdown. On post flight; First Officer found fluid covering the bottom of the airplane; in the left wheel well and on the left main landing gear. During the van ride to our layover hotel; the Flight Attendants told us a burning mechanical smell in mid cabin occurred soon after the pitch down.

A319 First Officer reported loss of hydraulic fluid and an associated pitch down resulted in a priority landing.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

While on approach we encountered icing conditions on the approach. Warning system started going off. Approach asked us to slow multiple times but since unreliable airspeed was on Captain's side we were correcting airspeeds on his side then started getting more bells. We started to complete QRH but we were being directed at the same time trying to figure out which side was correct. We informed Approach on the problem and completed verification of the problem side. We transferred controls to FO side and completed the approach and landing with no further issues. Threat icing conditions; Threats close proximity on approach to final approach fix; Threat trying to run QRH and verifying good side while on close final; Threat airspeed indicating 160 and really doing 260. [Lesson] learned from this would be to cancel approach clearance; get vector heading and work the problem with more time and the controller not yacking in your ear continuously after making him aware of our discrepancy in airspeed; and him to continue to issue slower speeds to us; while continuing the approach.

CRJ-200 First Officer reported icing conditions resulted in Captain's airspeed indicator errors.


ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

A320 taxied out with an associated Data Block on the ASDE-X. When I asked CD for a flight progress strip; I was told that the old flight plan had been removed from the system and a new flight plan had been filed. I checked the ASDE-X and the A320 was on the old beacon code and not the new code. Had CD not been aware of the situation I could have taxied the A320 out and the flight would have departed on the old code and clearance in this case; the filed route was the same. I have seen this before; when a proposed flight plan is removed from the NAS; the data is not removed from the ASDE-X. I believe this is a serious flaw. Last summer I was working LC when a flight departed on an old clearance (different route) and did not discover the problem until the flight was airborne and had to ask the Departure Controller to fix the problem. When a proposed FP is removed from the NAS; the data should be removed from the ASDE-X. I can see no reason that this is not the case.

DEN Controller voiced concern regarding the ASDE-X equipment noting that beacon changes are not updated to reflect the correct aircraft/flight; adding that changes in the NAS equipment should be reflected in the ASDE-X logic.


Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

We were assigned a crossing restriction to cross ZZZ VOR at FL180. I watched my copilot adjust the altitude selector and program the FMS. I reprogrammed the angle of descent and was certain I selected VNAV myself on the mode select panel. We were the only aircraft in the sky last night so everything was silent. We were just cruising along when I started wondering about our next ATC handoff. That's when I noticed we were crossing ZZZ VOR still at FL310. VNAV had apparently not been selected. I immediately initiated a descent and as soon as the descent was establish the controller; sounding a little confused; gave us that frequency change I had been waiting for.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

BE40 flight crew reported a failure to begin a descent when cleared for a crossing restriction on the route of flight.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure; Manuals

I was working the departure sector; RHV Tower was calling for an IFR release. SJC was on runway 30 configuration; but RHV was on Runway 13 configuration; which is odd. RHV was reporting winds Variable at 5 knots; as well; not an indication of strong runway 12 winds. I was working normal traffic; but was paying extra attention to the Final controller's traffic because he was working busy and complex traffic with a RHV IFR arrival and many SJC arrivals. My release off of RHV is dependent upon the SJC final traffic. I coordinated with the Finals controller that I was going to go with the release between a gap of 2 SJC arrivals. With the relatively light winds and the major airport in the area being in a Runway 30 configuration; and with most of my attention being focused on Final's traffic; I had forgotten that RHV was departing runway 13. So I released the departure with the mental image of a RHV 31 departure and developed my plan accordingly. About 15 seconds later; I realized that RHV was on runway 13 and I called RHV and told them to hold the departure. RHV replied that the airplane was already airborne. A veteran controller who saw the situation advised that a left turn to a heading of 290 may be my best option; instead of a right turn that the aircraft normally does. I am very familiar with the airspace and terrain in that area; and I knew that although the MVA in that area is 3700 feet; a tight left turn would have been better than a right turn directly into/under a descending B737 into SJC. I told the aircraft to turn left heading 290; which is a Minimum Vectoring Altitude violation; but I wanted to get him away from the SJC final traffic and the incoming opposite direction RHV arrival and into the Diverse Vectoring Area (DVA) on the northwest side of RHV. Once he was in the DVA; I could vector him according to the DVA. Of course the easy answer is to have controllers remain constantly vigilant on which runway configurations are in use. Memory lapses do occur; people make mistakes. A benefit to the entire operation would be to have a few procedures where RHV traffic is procedurally separated from SJC traffic; at least in some form. As of right now; the RHV arrival course is not separated from the SJC arrival course; and RHV departure procedures are not separated from SJC arrivals; and can almost immediately come into direct conflict with SJC departures. It is a difficult situation to work around; and if procedures could be developed to have a procedurally separated RHV IFR departure procedure from at least SJC departures; and a RHV arrival procedure that is separated from SJC arrivals; the traffic situation in the South Bay would be much more efficient (no more final approach speeds from 15 miles out for SJC arrivals; and RHV departures would not have to hold on the ground for 5-10 minutes) and MUCH safer. The MVAs and the proximity of the traffic dictates that you are either working very inefficiently; or relatively unsafely with respect to RHV/SJC arrivals and departures.

NCT TRACON Controller reported releasing a departure from RHV without recognizing the runway in use was the opposite direction from what the controller planned. The controller had to vector the aircraft below the minimum vectoring altitude to avoid arrivals to nearby SJC.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

Aircraft was pushed into catering truck on push back from gate. Failure of wing walker to stop tug driver before wing tip struck the back of the catering truck. Catering truck being over the clear line at the gate. Low visibility due to heavy rain; high winds; and darkness. I have no idea why the personnel working could not do their jobs. It is a simple task to signal the tug driver if the wing is going to contact something.

The weather was horrible. Heavy rain and wind. We had to wait a while to get a crew out for pushback. It was late; I'm sure they were fatigued and beat up from inclement weather they had been dealing with all day.

A319 flight crew reported contacting a catering truck during pushback from the gate.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 143; Flight Crew Total 654; Flight Crew Type 654

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

[In flight] we experienced a rough running engine. [We] notified Tower that we were making a precautionary landing in a parking lot. Landed the helicopter and inspected for anything out of the ordinary. [We] called company Maintenance to take a look at the aircraft. Company owner and Maintenance arrived and owner flew the aircraft to [home base].

HU-269-C Instructor pilot reported experiencing a rough running engine; so a precautionary landing in a parking lot was performed.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

I was working the Rocket sector when I was told by my supervisor to give Aircraft X 'Slowest practical speed'. I have seen tremendous safety issues with this over the last few months so I asked; 'From Traffic Management Unit (TMU)? Is he following someone?' The supervisor responded with 'I don't know'. I called TMU from the console and asked what the speed was for and they told me it was to help with spacing to DFW behind Aircraft Y. At the time Aircraft Y was in Gadsden sector's (R3) airspace and Aircraft X was entering the same airspace. I told him I would make sure Gadsden knew to provide the required spacing. I did. I told my supervisor that I wasn't going to give the speed and voiced my concern about the extremely dangerous situation that can be created when TMU gives control instructions without seeing the traffic picture. He responded with; 'I don't care; its above my pay grade.'  I will continue to report this situation. It is extremely dangerous for TMU to give control instructions from the front. It is also dangerous to have a supervisory culture that is flippant about safety issues that are brought to their attention in good faith. TMU should never give separation instructions to a controller regarding two aircraft in the same  or adjacent sectors. They are not controllers; they are coordinators.  I have seen several near deals/collisions from these instructions being sent out. It also is a tremendous disservice to the pilots and flying public. If TMU says 'give [Any] Aircraft slowest practical' and I give it; it may be 4 or 5 sectors or more before someone questions it and resumes the aircraft. Meanwhile; you have slowed an aircraft to Mach .62 for 300 miles and delayed the flight. Further; by doing this; you cause a ripple effect that can delay the entire air carrier for the day. I am not saying it isn't feasible every once in a while but this is happening daily.  Several times per day.

ZTL Controller reports of being told by  Front Line Manager (FLM) to slow a specific aircraft to the slowest practical speed. Controller doesn't do this and coordinates with another sector.  Controller states Traffic Management Unit (TMU) should not be giving control instructions.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 174; Flight Crew Type 9000

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We came across a very unusual circumstance that put the pilots in a tight spot. Both the First Officer and I deadheaded to fly the same aircraft back to the originating airport. During taxi-in we heard a strange noise from the over wing. While at the gate and after clearing Customs we had a pack trip off. After two resets; it was evident the PACK was broken. By this time the aircraft was fully boarded. After a lengthy discussion with Maintenance MX and Dispatch we concluded that the PACK would be MELed and we would return. The difficult part of the decision came due to the fact that extended overwater operations required a minimum altitude of FL 250 and the maximum altitude of the MEL was FL250. Flying west required an even altitude like FL 240. If we fly at any altitude less than FL250 we would have to hug the coast and make a fuel stop on an international flight with Flight Duty Period (FDP) for the Pilots coming into limits.Along the coastline there was a large line of thunderstorms complicating the route. Dispatch was able to contact ATC and pre-approve us for FL250 wrong direction. The First Officer and I discussed that if for any reason like ATC or weather that required us to change altitude over the middle of the Gulf; we would climb knowing the single pack operation could support a higher altitude.Once we checked-on with ATC Center and more than 100 NM from land; he demanded that we fly at an even altitude. We argued for a few minutes; but he was not giving in. We climbed to FL 260 and alerted Dispatch. Dispatch made some phone calls; and ATC Center cleared us back down to FL250 just two minutes later. We continued at FL250 until we were over land then descended to FL 240 and landed without incident.This was a situation that had very few options that everything needed to be perfect in order to be legal. Flying at FL 240 or FL 260 would have made us illegal but never unsafe. As a Crew we were comfortable with the decision; but it was unfortunate we had to make a decision to that would put us in violation of a regulation or procedure.

During flight in a B737-700 the crew climbed to FL260 when they were restricted to FL250 due to a single pack operation.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 5500; Flight Crew Type 2100

Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency

Shortly after takeoff; the aircraft propeller RPM fell to about 450 RPM. An attempt was made to try to feather the propeller and there was no control of the propeller. The Tower was advised that immediate landing was required. The Tower cleared me for landing. While on base to final; the Tower cleared another aircraft for takeoff. The aircraft delayed the takeoff roll and the Tower kept commanding the aircraft to vacate the runway or takeoff immediately. The Tower then instructed me to go around. I advised the Tower that going around was not an option as I could not safely execute a go around (I was fully configured for landing and had a propeller that was creating drag). The aircraft on the runway finally took off and I landed while that aircraft was on the upwind. The Tower advised the aircraft on the upwind that he may have committed a pilot deviation.

A C421 propeller RPM dropped to about 450 after takeoff so the pilot attempted unsuccessfully to feather it and when unable made an emergency return to the airport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related

We were assigned to operate to ZZZZ1 at night. On both nights Dispatch wanted us to fly to ZZZZ1 in violation of company policy stated in the FOM. On both nights there was volcanic activity in the vicinity of ZZZZ1.  The volcanic ash was emitting from the volcano east of ZZZZ1 and the ash cloud was traveling west. On the second night explosions in the caldera were reported and the seismic monitoring equipment and webcam went off line. At no time when Dispatch wanted us to launch could we have complied with company policy. The ash charts we were provided had truncated cones due to the ash merging with cloud cover and did not provide a prediction of the location and limits of the ash cloud. On the first night we spent over 5 hours on the aircraft before going back into rest. On the second night we spent over 12 hours on the aircraft as we requested updated information and verification from management that they wanted us to violate company policy. The cavalier manner in which safety policies are being ignored could lead to tragic consequences.

Air carrier Captain reported that his company attempted to have them fly to an airport which was in close proximity to the ash cloud of an active volcano in violation of the Flight Operations Manual.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 7100; Flight Crew Type 440

Troubleshooting; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Weather; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Airport; Aircraft

Medevac flight en route to ZZZ to pick up a patient. I went to load the RNAV D approach. The GPS Data base did not have the current fixes that were listed on the approach plate that I had. I was using an Ipad with the current charts and had a Jepp binder of plates for back up. Around 40 miles from ZZZ I checked the weather on the GPS (The AWOS was not coming in at my altitude yet). I loaded the RNAV D approach and noticed the fixes in the GPS were different from the fixes on my approach plate. I then looked at the other GPS approaches in the GPS and noticed they had the wrong fixes as well. I then loaded the VOR approach.I requested through Center (ATC) direct to the ZZZ VOR for the VOR Approach. ATC instructed me that the ZZZ VOR was NOTAM'd out of service. I did not remember seeing a NOTAM about this during my preflight planning. I informed ATC that I was receiving the VOR and that it was identifying with the proper Morse Code. I then asked them how long the VOR was out of service. I was instructed that it would be out for another day and a half. I asked to go into holding over the ZZZ VOR and used the on board GPS for the hold. During the hold I discussed with ATC the fixes I had for the two GPS approaches into ZZZ. They did not have any of the fixes that I had in my GPS.I held for 15-20 minutes while discussing with the nursing staff what they would like to do. We discussed a couple of options and decided it was best to return to [the departure airport]. Upon returning I discussed with Maintenance the issues I was having with the GPS and a write up was entered into the maintenance discrepancy log. The initial screen in the Garmin 750 Showed the database current. As maintenance ran through the system they found that there was an update loaded and activated a few days before its effective date. When a new database is loaded in the Garmin 750 there is a different initial page which allows the pilot or mechanic to activate a new database even before it is effective. If a new database is activated prior to the effective date; there is no way to revert to the old database. (The new database activation screen did NOT show up when I turned the GPS on. It would be really nice to have on the initial page of the Garmin 750 the effective dates for the database. It would also be very helpful to be able to revert to the previous database should an update get activated early.When I got back into the office; I pulled up the FAA website for NOTAMs and there was no NOTAM listed in ZZZ for the ZZZ VOR. I then went to [the website] where I flied my flight plan and saw there were no NOTAMs listed for the ZZZ VOR.

A pilot had issues with the NAV database in the GPS system. There were also discrepancies as to the functionality of the arrival VOR. The pilot elected to return to point of departure because of these issues.


Flight Crew Total 14056; Flight Crew Type 10861

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Approximately 1.5 hours into the flight; crew was alerted by CDU message 'FUEL DISAGREE - PROG 2' and observed 3;600 lb difference between Total and Calculated fuel quantity. Fuel leak was suspected and QRH checklist referenced. Center tank fuel had just been exhausted. Slowly increasing fuel imbalance between left and right main tank and visual inspection of left engine confirmed fuel leak. Decision was made to divert to [a nearby alternate]. ATC [was advised] and diversion requirements communicated. Diversion coordinated with Dispatch and cabin crew; passengers advised. Landing performance data obtained for overweight landing and appropriate checklists referenced. Uneventful landing.

B757 flight crew reported diverting to a nearby alternate after confirming a fuel leak from the left engine.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 160

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Climbing out of DAY on the Dayton 6 SID; as we passed 10;000; the Center controller said just maintain the SID speed through 14;000 then resume normal speed. To this the Captain and I looked at each and said 'what SID speed?!' Our SID charts were up (our company uses Jeppesen on iPads) and displayed so we made quick work of re-scrutinizing the chart and saw that towards the bottom of the chart in the plan view a small; fairly nondescript text box saying 'Aircraft filed over CVG VOR MAINTAIN 250KT until advised by ATC.' We had barely started to accelerate and ATC never said a word; so I am pretty sure there was no violation; nor loss of separation. My reason for writing is this; we are one month away from it being 2019; over one hundred years and counting of aviation and still our charts are terrible!! Standardization is severely lacking. Our company advises us to review the four corners of a chart so as not to miss out on any notes. Well this note is not really in one of the four corners; nor is it bolded or put in red font like other speed restrictions are. Even the initial altitude (5;000) is not very conspicuous; which it should be---take for example the SIDs in ATL. This is beyond ridiculous. Every pilot and/or crew is presented with a number of threats when sitting on the ground preparing for a flight; distracting you; throwing you off your normal patterns; besides the fact that we traverse hundreds of airports each with their own multitude of nuances every year. Briefing departure should not be a 'Where's Waldo' challenge.

Air carrier First Officer reported not recognizing a charted speed restriction on departure out of DAY.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

While climbing out we could smell something that was like burnt plastic. The lead flight attendant called and said he could smell something as well in the forward part of the airplane but not in the aft part. We followed company procedures; using the QRH to trouble shoot but after a few minutes the smell went away. We were not able to determine where the source of the smell was coming from or what dissipated it. After landing we contacted Maintenance; Dispatch and Operations. After Maintenance looked at the aircraft they determined that there were no mechanical issues.

Right after takeoff; on initial climb; the smell of burnt rubber was smelled profusely in the cockpit. The forward Flight Attendant called stating that he smelled it as well. After about 5 minutes; the smell dissipated rapidly after 10 minutes the smell was completely gone. We ran the appropriate checklists for odor. There was never smoke; just odor. I did call ZZZ Tower to ask if there was any FOD reported; in the thought of a blown tire. They came back with a; 'negative; no reports.' Cause: We never found a reason as to why the reason occurred. Maintenance was called and met us at the gate in ZZZ1.

ERJ flight crew reported a fume event during initial climb that was also detected by Flight Attendants. The fumes dissipated during trouble shooting.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

During pushback the load close out was received by the crew. The Flight Crew discovered an RA (Restricted Articles) selection 'yes' in the FWD cargo bin. The CA (Captain) was not delivered a [Dangerous Goods Form] for HAZMAT prior to departure and was not notified of any RA. The Flight Crew asked the ramp personnel if any RA had actually been loaded into the FWD cargo bin. The ramp crew said there was a RA in the FWD cargo bin. The CA requested to be towed back to the gate to have the RA removed or to have a [Dangerous Goods Form] delivered to the cockpit. The ramp crew returned the aircraft to the gate; removed the RA then the flight departed.

ERJ-190 First Officer reported Restricted Article onboard without proper paperwork being filled out.


Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Environment - Non Weather Related; Staffing

Was advised inflight by ZZZZZ controllers that they were unable to contact ZZZ Approach controllers. ZZZ had closed one hour early due to their reduced hours; however; there was no NOTAM in our flight plan that advised of the early closure. In addition to there being no NOTAM; ZZZ had also failed to 'release' the airspace over to the Center before going home. As a result; ZZZZZ could not clear us for an approach into the airspace. We were issued holding instructions until someone in ZZZ returned to the airport to release the airspace. Initially; ZZZZZ seemed unsure if ZZZ was even open or not. I told them that they had indeed closed based off of the remarks section of the AWOS. I knew that ZZZ closed at XA00 local based on recent flights. Plus; the airport itself (Runways and taxiways) would close later due to the construction that takes place at night. However; because there were no NOTAMs for either closure this time; I thought that they would be open. We had no alternate; as the weather was good; and as such had limited time to hold. Fortunately; we eventually got clearance to proceed into ZZZ.ZZZ ATC failed to release the airspace to ZZZZZ prior to signing off for the night. As a result; we were held until the airspace could be released. In addition; there were no NOTAMs noting the early closure of the ATC facilities at ZZZ.

Air Carrier First Officer reported unable to land and entered holding due to the shortened hours of Approach Control at the destination. The destination Approach Control had failed to release the airspace before closing.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 73; Flight Crew Total 586; Flight Crew Type 65

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Routine Inspection; Aircraft In Service At Gate

I was performing my daily preflight inspection before my flight when 3 FAA guys approached me and said they are here to do a ramp check; so I told my Captain that the FAA is here so he could go talk to them. About 1 hour passed by and I went up to one of the FAA guys inspecting the plane and asked 'is everything all good on the plane and will we be able to fly' and he replied 'that's up to your Captain and company if they would want to continue the flight to airport ZZZZ'. So I walked over to my Captain and asked if everything was all good to do the trip to ZZZZ and he told me 'Yes everything is okay with the plane and I've called dispatch and we're good to go'. So thinking he was on the phone with the company which he didn't tell the company about the slip of items that needed to get fixed nor did he tell me. By the time we landed in ZZZZ my chief pilot called me and asked me why we flew with open maintenance items; I reply back 'The Captain told me everything was good and dispatch approved to go on this flight'. The Captain really just told them that there was a ramp check and nothing about the items they wrote down that needed to get fixed. So the company and I had no idea that they wrote items down and that the plane was grounded. If knowing that the plane was grounded and the flight was not approved I would not have gone on that flight and would have notified maintenance and my chief pilot on the issues they wrote down. The lack in communication from the captain created an issue that the company and I could have handled by just saying no and cancelling the flight if knowing that there was maintenance items that needed to be fixed. From me being a flight instructor and a professional pilot I would have told him that we couldn't continue the flight due to the issues written down about the aircraft.

The crew of an SD-3 flew a trip with open maintenance items.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was the PNF and; at the gate; briefed the departure off of runway 25L in LEBL. The departure requires an 80 degree turn after takeoff for noise abatement. Company [procedure] mandates that the first turn airborne be hand-flown before engaging the autopilot. We departed behind a Heavy A340. At 500 feet; the first officer requested the heading change. I delayed responding to his request because of two factors: I felt we were too slow to initiate that turn as we were very heavy; and; as we initially climbed; we had encountered turbulence; thus at our heavy weight and slow speed wanted to make sure that we would have adequate speed and altitude before continuing the turn.[Suggest] choosing a different runway. Take the full 2 minutes behind a departing heavy.

B767-300ER Captain reported deviating from cleared departure track at LEBL because of lingering wake turbulence.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

After normal engine start; I instructed the line personnel to un-chock the airplane and disconnect the GPU. The lineman disconnected the GPU; he then returned to the front of the aircraft and instructed us to shutdown. After shutdown; I spoke with the lineman and was informed that 'the GPU had caught fire and damaged our aircraft'. Upon inspection; it appeared that the GPU plug had overheated and caught on fire. The damage to our plane was inspected and pictures were taken. The pictures were shared with maintenance and there was agreement that there was no structural damage; except possibly for one pin on the external power receptacle. The external power was deferred. I was given contact information for the FBO's station manager; and; at maintenance's request; I requested a written statement from the FBO personnel. The station manager contacted his supervisor and he was instructed to not provide us with any written statement at this time.

As he prepared to taxi; a FBO Lineman notified the BE-400XP Captain the GPU plug into the aircraft overheated and damaged the aircraft's ground electrical connector. The connector was deferred by Maintenance.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Incursion Runway

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

While attempting to land on Runway 17R at DEN; a B737 taxied in front of the landing runway on Taxiway ED; which is also Hotspot 1. We did not see the aircraft until about 100 ft. AGL; at the same time Tower directed us to go around. We flew right over the top of the taxiing aircraft. We executed the go around normally and came back around to land uneventfully.

We were on final approach to Runway 17R in DEN. At approximately 200 ft. AGL; we saw an aircraft taxiing in front of us on Taxiway ED - we were low enough that we could see its livery illuminated by our landing lights. After we flew over the top of him; we were directed by Tower to go around at about 100 ft. AGL. We executed an uneventful go around; came around and landed on Runway 16R. The area of Taxiway ED in question is designated as an incursion hotspot on the chart.

Flight crew reported a runway incursion on final approach that resulted in a go-around.