Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

While departing ZZZ Runway X on the RVAV departure; we experienced a wind shear ahead alert shortly after rotation and after the gear was selected up. While climbing through approximately 500 feet AGL; we entered an area of moderate to severe turbulence followed by a gain and loss of 20+ knots of airspeed. Airspeed excisions were brief in nature; and climb rate decreased from near 3;000 FPM to 1;000 FPM and momentarily less while we transited the wind shear. During this time we also experienced multiple quick rolling and yawing moments that required nearly full control deflection to counter.  Both myself and my First Officer agreed that the aircraft was at times momentarily out of control. It is my recollection that the maximum intensity of the turbulence occurred from 500 feet AGL to approximately 3;500 feet AGL. Again these excursions were very quick left and right rolling and yawing motions. During the event; the aircraft energy state never decayed to a dangerous level; however; we were in a lightly loaded -700 with max thrust selected for wind shear avoidance.  Above 4;000 feet; we experienced continuous moderate turbulence and icing up to 14;000 feet; and only light turbulence above that.  There were no injuries reported; and we did not suspect any aircraft damage. The flight attendants and passengers were briefed before takeoff. Before departure; both myself and the First Officer consulted the Airport Wind System reports as well as reviewed the required wind limits for the departure. The ZZZ Tower and Dispatch were contacted to get a better assessment of what they were seeing with the winds as well.  At the time of the beginning of the takeoff roll; the Tower reported steady state wind from the south east 28 KT gusting to 38 KT. The Airport Wind System alert was not functioning; however;  [other weather station's] wind and the gust 2-6 Airport Wind System was reporting. All wind reports were within limits at the time of takeoff; and had been for most of the morning. The Dispatcher reported the 8 High Airport Wind System Alert was intermittent all morning. Both myself and my First Officer briefed the departure and took steps necessary to mitigate the perceived threats. Wind shear take off procedures and power settings were used during the take off.  After level off; myself and the First Officer consulted the FOM and we were in agreement that we experienced a situation where the aircraft was momentarily not in positive control. A pilot report of MOD to SEV turbulence was relayed to ARTCC as well as company. Dispatch was consulted at this time; and a plan was made to divert to ZZZ1 for maintenance inspection as Maintenance did not want the aircraft stuck in ZZZ2. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. Ensuring Airport Wind System has full functionality and wind profiles are working to the greatest extent possible.

Preparing for departure from ZZZ we looked at weather reports including the ZZZ Airport Wind System and PIREPS.  Nothing indicated that we would encounter anything greater than moderate turbulence as we took off from Runway X. Shortly after liftoff we encountered moderate turbulence and at about 1;000 ft AGL received a 'Windshear Ahead' alert.  We then experienced approximately 30 - 45 seconds of severe turbulence. We gave ATC a PIREP and overflew our original destination of ZZZ2 at the request of Dispatch and Maintenance control to get the plane to a maintenance base.

B37-700 flight crew reported after encountering severe turbulence and wind shear; it was decided to overfly the destination airport and divert to a maintenance base.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7.0

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airport; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Procedure

The airport is having a lot of confusion with the new Taxilane Hotel. I used Taxilane Hotel to taxi Aircraft X; and had him hold short of Taxiway Delta 1. There is a bottleneck situation that can develop in that area in front of the Tower due to the construction. After I was able to exit an aircraft onto his ramp and get them out of the way; I then taxied Aircraft X to Runway 8 at D; via Taxiway D1; A; for departure. Upon his taxiout; Aircraft X hit a sign with his right wingtip. I was watching the aircraft; who made a sharp left turn after I had specifically told him to turn right at D1. It appeared the aircraft had blown over the sign. (Airport safety later told us the plane hit the sign.) Aircraft X did not inform me they had hit anything at first. They simply said they wanted to go back to the ramp. The sign is huge and the airport positioned it right on top of the taxilane to the very south of it. The airport listed Taxilane Hotel as a taxiway. The airport safety personnel are confused on a daily basis. The written guidance the Control Tower received is that Taxilane Hotel goes up to Taxiway D1. There is no wingspan restriction. Looking out the window; I couldn't even tell the aircraft had hit the sign because the Aircraft X was in the middle of the taxilane; following the centerline like he should be. We use Taxilane Hotel and take aircraft to Taxiway D1 every day (for smaller jets/Aircraft X's). Airport safety then moved the sign out of the way and further back; knowing full well that it had been too close to the movement area. The airport superintendent just issued a NOTAM literally 10 minutes ago as I'm writing this.NOTAM: TWY TXL H between TWY C1 and TWY B2 SFC markings not standard. This is also wrong. Taxilane Hotel continues to Taxiway D1; and there's no mention of it on there. It is also painted as a taxilane up to D1. The airport staff (unit vehicles) are confused constantly; and the pilots who operate on this field call the Tower multiple times a day to ask about the new movement area. None of the airport taxi companies seem to have been briefed; even though this effects their operations daily. The NOTAMs that the airport put out are wrong. Taxilane Hotel is not a taxiway; as stated in the NOTAMs. The NOTAMs about Taxilane Hotel were also put out late and in a rush. The airport should not have a large; un-lighted sign right on top of a movement area. The airport needs to get it together. This is the second report I've filed this week because of confusion from the pilots; airport safety operators; and other controllers who work in the Tower.

JNU Tower Ground Controller reported a taxiing aircraft turned the wrong direction and struck a sign which was placed too close to the movement area. The Controller reports users and airport ground workers are confused and not clear about new taxiway markings and procedures which have not been implemented and charted correctly.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 2600; Flight Crew Type 900

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

I was at 4;000 IFR talking to approach when my SkyView display started giving me a 'Traffic Warning'. The ADS-B indicated I had traffic 3 miles out; approaching me; head on at my same altitude. When the alert showed the traffic at 1 mile; still approaching me head on and still at my altitude I turned to the right and firmly pulled the nose up. A few seconds later I saw a twin engine airplane; about 100 ft below me; right where the ADS-B was showing pass by. When I got over the 'scare' I told the controller what had just happened. The controller sheepishly told me it was a Seneca maneuvering in that area. Needless to say I let the controller know I was a little upset about what happened. I don't know if I would I have seen the traffic without the ADS-B 'point out' but being able to know where to look for traffic is a significant safety enhancement. In this case I didn't actually see it until it was extremely close. I am so glad I have this in my airplane.

Pilot reported a near-mid-air-collision with a Seneca that was detected by the onboard ADS-B system; but ATC had not advised of the conflict.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 176; Flight Crew Type 721

Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Staffing; Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather

Throughout the last several weeks at least; communication with ATC has been difficult on many occasions throughout the day due to ATC saturation.  More than usual; Controllers are working multiple sectors; combining multiple frequencies; and overall being task-saturated far more often than I am used to.  It is my perception that ATC staffing was adjusted several months ago to match decreased traffic counts associated with the COVID downturn; and now that traffic counts have largely rebounded; ATC staffing has not increased anywhere nearly as quickly.  A great example was on this flight leg; inbound to ZZZ - as far as we could tell; one Controller was working all ZZZ of Approach/Departure; leading to his absolute saturation trying to handle IFR inbounds/outbounds to/from ZZZ and several satellite airports; and being compounded significantly by a handful of VFR aircraft operating in the area.  We tried for quite some time to request a heading deviation for towering cumulus buildups in the vicinity of the STAR course; and were glad to finally get a word in before we would have needed to choose to either accept worse turbulence than we needed to or deviate from a clearance.  There is no doubt that the ATC saturation was at a level which compromised Safety several times over the last few days of flying.

Air carrier First Officer reported difficulty receiving a revised clearance for weather deviation because ATC was saturated with traffic.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 138; Flight Crew Total 9086; Flight Crew Type 8984

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

A flight was planned and conducted with a planned fuel stop at SNJ before proceeding onward. The route included …TAS; ZUN; a distance of 437 nm. Weight and balance allowed for 80 gallons of fuel onboard. Winds aloft were forecast to be from the southwest over the route allowing for the flight to SNJ to be completed in 3.7 hours using 58 gallons of fuel at a flow of 14 GPH leaving 22 gallons in reserve.Midway along the 216 nm leg from TAS to SNJ; GPS ground speed had decreased considerably due to a much higher than forecast wind aloft. Ground speed was reduced at times to below 70 kts. I was aware the fuel station was becoming critical and as the closest airport was GUP; a deviation was made to this airport. Upon nearing the airport the ASOS indicated the runway was closed. Communication with an employee of the FBO indicated the construction was about 1;000 ft from the far end of the 7;316 ft runway 24. Inspection of the landing environment while making 2 circles revealed there was no personnel or equipment near the runway on this afternoon so I declared to any traffic in the area that I would be making an emergency landing on runway 24 due to a low fuel situation. The landing was uneventful and I exited the runway at the first turnoff; approximately 2;300 ft down the runway; which was still more than 3;700 ft before the construction area would have been reached.On the ground; the fuel remaining was measured and found to be 6 gallons. It would not have been possible; once the strong headwinds and resulting fuel situation was evaluated to fly back to base or forward to ZUN or RQE. Although this airport was not on my route; and I had no intention of needing to use a facility with a closed runway; it was the only alternative when compared to making an off field landing in the desert while attempting to reach a more suitable airport. In the future; I will adjust my route to be more closely aligned with airports where a landing could be made should strong un-forecast winds present themselves.

GA pilot reported diverting to GUP due to stronger than forecasted headwinds; but the airport was closed for construction. The runway was clear and the reporter elected to land due to his fuel situation.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

First flight of day for crew on a day trip. On time departure. Twenty-five minutes into flight at FL250. After pushing MCT button and adjusting cruise power. 2 minutes later speed was still a little fast so I adjusted power again and noticed that the Number 2 Oil PSI gauge was fluctuating rapidly. It was going high into the yellow and low into the yellow. I advised the Captain and we watched the gauge while checking for other abnormal indications. We decided to call Maintenance Control and get their opinion. While talking to Maintenance the pressure started to fluctuate lower now dipping down into red; and causing the Master Warning to illuminate intermittently and the PTU was turning on and off. We decided to divert. While descending through about FL240 the Master Warning was now illuminated continuously and the PSI was fluctuating but trending lower. We discussed shutting the engine down per the checklist that we had in hand but decided not to think it was an indication problem only. The oil temperature did not increase at all; all other engine indications showed normal. The divert airport was VFR and we got approval for a visual approach. On downwind to base we got our first indication that it was more than an indication problem. The Number 2 RPM was fluctuating. It came back to 1020 and then on base to final it was variable again. We landed and shut down the Number 2 engine once clear of the runway. We taxied to the gate and deplaned normal. We thought it was just an indication problem and should have been more cautious and shut down the engine per the checklist.

A Q400 oil pressure began fluctuating in cruise so the crew diverted assuming an indication issue because other indications were stable. However; they shut the engine down on landing because of RPM fluctuations.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 300; Flight Crew Type 180

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I obtained the required flight planning information from DUATS on the evening before the flight and then again on the morning of the flight. The TAF all along indicated a VFR departure at my scheduled time of departure so we confidently headed to the airport. However; when I got there; METAR reports indicated IFR conditions with low broken clouds. We therefore decided to delay the flight by an hour and waited at the airport; frequently monitoring METAR and TAF from the computer at the terminal. The following METAR indicated VFR conditions at [destination] with scattered low clouds. Outside the FBO blue sky was visible in many areas of the airport particularly towards the South (my intended direction of flight); with patches of fog and clouds in places particularly towards the north and east. We therefore decided to depart to complete our planned flight.I took off with good visibility. However; shortly after departure; I realized that the base of the fog was lower than expected and at 500 FT AGL downward visibility already started decreasing. A semi-transparent patch of fog seemed prevalent above and ahead of me. I leveled off at around 450 FT AGL and initiated a right turn on course (south) which was also consistent with the direction where I had observed most of the blue sky from the terminal. However at this time; conditions did not appear to improve. I informed the Tower that I was encountering low visibility and was going to attempt to stay clear of clouds by heading east towards the ocean. The turn improved visibility slightly with buildings consistently visible below me. This changed towards a more foggy view of the ground after a few seconds; indicating an even lower base of the patch of fog than expected. At some point ATC asked me whether I was instrument capable and I answered that I; as a pilot; was not. At this point I was very uncomfortable with my very low altitude (around 450 FT) and the marginal visibility. I could not distinguish any features laterally (horizon; etc.) and the features on the ground below me were visible but partly obstructed through a thin veil of fog so I informed ATC that I believed [I was] encountering instrument conditions. I continued navigating towards the best observed visibility by turning towards the northeast and then again towards the east/southeast; still at an altitude around 500 FT; monitoring my GPS moving map to make sure that I was not approaching any potential hidden obstacles. Tower offered me the option to return towards the airport for a landing on Runways 11 or even possibly 29. I prepared mentally for this. Considering the risks of a turn at low altitude with limited visibility (I remembered my instrument flight instructor reminding me that 'altitude is your friend'). I contacted the Tower to ask; 'Would it make more sense to climb out towards better visibility?' They asked me to standby and came back informing me that PIREPs had reported tops around 1;300 FT AGL; and approved this approach. I initiated a positive climb and within a few seconds visibility improved dramatically. I reached the end of the patch of fog with good vertical and horizontal visibility on the sky; the ocean; and [ground]. At maybe 800-900 FT AGL and after adjusting my engine settings; etc. I contacted ATC to inform them that I now had very good visibility. They asked me to confirm that I was 'on top' which I confirmed. Indeed the thin veil of fog at the end of Runway 11 was clearly visible behind me. From this point on I continued the climb and resumed normal flight direct to [destination] and encountered no further weather concerns. After this very unpleasant departure; I will certainly increase my personal minimums and apply more conservative judgment around rapidly evolving weather such as what took place here. In hindsight; I would cancel the flight outright. I would also like to take the opportunity to highlight here the exceptional quality of the support provided by ATC. They remained very composed and provided me with helpful options and advice as these events unfolded. This truly helped me remain calm and focused on the tasks at hand-aviate; navigate; communicate.

PA-32 pilot on a VFR flight encountered unforcast weather on climb out and remained at low altitude in marginal conditions until able to climb to VFR On Top and proceed to destination.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.5

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was on Local and had Aircraft X inbound to Runway 2L (the runway in use); and Aircraft Y was taxied opposite direction to Runway 20L. I had Aircraft X in sight; and recognized that there was plenty space for Aircraft Y to depart and turn on course before Aircraft X arrived. I did not scan the D-Brite to determine spacing prior to clearing the Aircraft Y. Both aircraft were VFR. The separation between the two aircraft did not meet the separation standard for opposite direction operations between VFR aircraft that is lined out in our SOP (3 miles or 1;000 feet). When I looked at the D-Brite after clearing Aircraft Y for takeoff; I realized that I did not have the 3 miles or 1;000 feet between my two VFR aircraft as required by our SOP. I felt that both aircraft were safe and did not issue any instructions to Aircraft X to regain the required distance. Aircraft Y had Aircraft X in sight and turned on course before becoming a conflict with Aircraft X.  I felt that issuing additional instructions to Aircraft X to regain 3 miles of separation would have been less safe than allowing him to continue to the airport when no serious incident would occur. Had something unexpected happened with the departing Aircraft Y that could create a conflict between the two aircraft; there was still time and space to adjust the pattern of the Aircraft X to de-conflict him with the Aircraft Y.  My actions were just a poor lapse in judgment. I should have scanned the D-Brite to ensure 3 miles or 1;000 feet separation instead of visually determining that it was safe to clear Aircraft Y for takeoff. I fully intend to comply with the SOP.My Supervisor reviewed the incident with me and wrote a record of conversation.  He said that separation was not ensured and there was no positive control because I did not give the Aircraft X additional instructions to regain 3 miles of separation between my two VFR aircraft. Again; I felt it was less confusing and safer to allow him to continue to the airport knowing that the situation would not result in a serious incident. He also said that management has decided to conduct an [System Service Review] SSR to determine if my actions resemble a systematic problem within our facility. I am not sure why this one incident has warranted a review of the entire facility.

Controller violated facility SOP for opposite arrival departure minimum separation.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

The Pilot Flying and I had a normal push back; taxi; and take off. No deviations from training or FOM/AOM SOPs were noted by me at anytime during the flight. After turning to a heading of 190 degrees; it seemed like we were on the Tower frequency for a longer than usual time (no quick hand-off to departure). I thought I missed a radio call; and more than likely switched to departure without direction from the Tower. This was my second sequence since being released from IOE. I was displaced from ZZZ1 to ZZZ and I'm still learning how the ATC system works in ZZZ . Prior to joining [Company]; I flew out of ZZZ2.  I'm still learning ZZZ's operation. I should have asked the Pilot Flying if he thought I missed a call. This would have been an opportunity for me to learn how ATC works in ZZZ.

Airline First Officer reported lost com; NORDO; with ATC due to being unfamiliar with the local operation.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Type 8000

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Weather

While taxiing out to 08L at A8; we were number three or two for departure. We heard a Company aircraft tell Tower that with the current winds they are stating to other aircraft in their takeoff clearance that they are unable to depart. Tower then came back and said the airport winds were now variable at 6 kts. and 'Is that OK?' They said 'It is;' and from then on Tower cleared (I think) two aircraft to takeoff and called the winds variable at 6 kts. They then cleared us to takeoff; and either didn't state the winds or called them variable at 6 kts too. I can't remember; but I do remember I was paying attention to what she was saying; especially about the winds. We departed uneventfully. The next day I wake up to a text from another Company Pilot telling me I may have departed illegally. I told them I was number two or so in line when I heard that conversation take place about the winds. They said it may have been someone else then. I felt the best action is to fill out this [report] just in case; however; I don't believe we departed illegally based on the Tower's advisement of the winds.

While about number four for takeoff; a Company pilot on a different flight notified ATC that with the winds the Tower was reporting; they could not legally depart. I had not noticed what the Tower had been reporting. Right after; the Tower Controller stated the airport winds were variable at 6 and asked if they could depart. They stated they could depart with those winds. I noticed the last ATIS winds we had were 210 at 9. Both the Captain and I felt that with those winds we were legal to depart. At the time we received our takeoff clearance; the winds were still variable at 6.The following day; the Captain received a text from another Crew Member stating they believed we took off illegally. While the Captain and I both disagree with that assessment; we decided filing an [report] would be a good idea. Looking back; when we heard the winds being variable at 6; we should have requested new numbers from [Weight and Balance] with the most conservative number (260 at 6) just to be completely sure. Simply requesting [Weight and Balance] data with the new wind report would take out any question regarding this type of event.

B737 flight crew reported they may have departed LAS with illegal winds.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

After swapping into a new aircraft; I completed the lights test; as a part of my preflight procedure. I noted that the Wheel Well Fire light; APU and engine fire handles illuminated improperly (they operated normally during the fire test). I called Maintenance to come to the aircraft. When the Mechanic arrived; I duplicated the failed test and let the Mechanic know that I had the exact same issue several weeks ago that necessitated a swap of the fire control panel. The Mechanic stated that the repair would take four hours to complete. He then said the aircraft was grounded. As we were partially boarded; we began deplaning passengers. The Mechanic then noted that MEL relief was available using 33-XX-XX. I was surprised as this remedy was not suggested in the earlier occurrence. I had the Mechanic read the MEL; as I was on the phone to Maintenance Control.The provisos of the MEL didn't seem to apply to our situation. In fact; they were exactly OPPOSITE of the indications we were experiencing. Maintenance Control stated that they had 'kicked it around' with Engineering and were of the opinion that it was a result of the dimming function of the switch and thus deferrable. I unsuccessfully tried to explain that an opinion from engineering delivered via the phone didn't supersede the approved MEL in front of me and asked to be transferred to the Chief Pilot on Call. I detailed the situation with the Chief Pilot on Call and reviewed the MEL. The Chief Pilot disagreed that it was a safety issue and that the MEL was instead poorly written and didn't fully capture the 'intent'. I declined to accept the aircraft; as I still strongly feel that the MEL was improperly assigned; and accepting the aircraft with an improperly applied MEL would result in taking an unairworthy aircraft airborne.

A B737-800 pilot reported they refused an aircraft for maintenance issues even though the Chief Pilot and Maintenance tried to persuade them to take the aircraft.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.3

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

VA approaches in use.  RWY 28 L/R in use.  Aircraft X requests an ILS RWY 28R approach; not familiar with PDX.  Multiple jet arrivals mixed in.  Aircraft X was cleared for approach.  About 6 or 7 miles in trail of Aircraft X was an air carrier on a visual approach to RWY 28L.  The air carrier is over 200 knots ground speed.  Aircraft X is about 90 knots over ground.  We just started working on FUSION radar about 6 days ago.  New system for us.  Totally different than single site radar.  Anyway; when Aircraft X was about over the FAF I noticed his track was tracking south.  It did this for about 4 or five updates; then he was on the RWY 28L final approach course with the air carrier right behind him with a hundred knot overtake.  The Tower was talking to Aircraft X.  I called traffic to the air carrier; called the Tower to find out what Aircraft X was doing; and about to cancel approach clearance to the air carrier when Aircraft X's target jumped back on the RY 28R final.  Over a half mile target jump.  I watched it; everything looked good and I shipped the air carrier to Tower.  This scared me.  I am going to further investigate this with QA.  I believe Aircraft X never left the RWY 28R localizer and Fusion was screwing up and not working.  I need to see a replay on actual RADAR; single site.  It was such a big target jump.  But I don't know.  Aircraft X could have drifted south of course; but to the other localizer course the back in one or two updates. We need to find out whether this was a Fusion issue or if Aircraft X actually flew what I saw.

Reporter stated Fusion radar predicts where the aircraft might be; causing this type of jump.  Single site radar showed the aircraft never left the 28R final.  About 10 seconds of false data.

P80 Controller describes a large jump of an aircraft on final; possibly caused by fusion radar.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

After takeoff; as I was climbing through 8000 ft; I had just contacted ATC and had just completed reading back the clearance. The 'CABIN DOOR' light came on. I immediately called ATC back to let them know of the issue and that I was returning to trouble shoot the problem. As I was descending; I chose to depressurize the cabin and the light immediately went out. I landed; inspected the door and contacted Dispatch. I was unable to duplicate the issue and confirmed that the locks were engaged. Dispatch informed me that there was no need to write the issue up if I could not duplicate the issue. I departed 15 minutes later and had no further issue as I proceeded with the flight. Upon arrival; maintenance asked me about the issue and I explained the events. I was then informed by Maintenance personnel that I needed to write the issue up for them to keep track of issue and to inspect the aircraft. It has been brought to my attention that I was misled by both Dispatch and Maintenance on the proper procedures for writing up the maintenance problem. Dispatch should never get involved in maintenance issues and should always direct issues to maintenance personnel. This would give pilots the correct information and not feel pressured to stay on schedule; which may lead to a compromising safety and/or FAA violations.

SA-227AC Captain reported that on the advice of Dispatch he failed to log a problem with a cabin door.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 24

Troubleshooting; Confusion; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Denver 9 special! Number 1 of 4 in 5 days! Denver 9 sector called the WILD Sector to apreq [Approval Request] Aircraft X; Non RVSM [Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum] at FL350. WILD approved the altitude. Minutes later we received a red alert on our User Request Evaluation Tool between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y. Looking into it we discovered Den 35 had climbed Aircraft Y to FL350 and was now in direct conflict with Aircraft X. Den 9 is adjacent to Den35. Den 9 either 'flashed Aircraft Y through' their sector for Den 35 or they took a point-out. Either way Denver 9 was aware of Aircraft Y. No action was taken from the Den 9 'controller'. The WILD controller called the sector underlying his own sector (LNK) and asked controller if they had gotten a point-out on Aircraft X since he was Non RVSM at FL350 and her vertical airspace goes up to FL340. Controller replied; 'No!' He asked her if controller could accept Aircraft X at FL330. Controller replied; 'Yes.' He called the adjacent sector ONL and pointed Aircraft X out descending to FL330. The WILD controller then called Den 9 and walked him through everything he had done to achieve separation between the two aircraft. He instructed the Den 9 'controller' to descend Aircraft X down to FL330. Den 9 became argumentative and said; 'I'll just ship him to you and you can take him down.' WILD said 'No; our frequency is bad; take him down. Den 9 replied; 'I'll just ship him to LNK and they can take him down.' WILD insisted that Den 9 take Aircraft X down and separation was maintained.There are too many errors here by Den 9 to list. A couple that stand out are: 1. All conflictions were not resolved prior to transfer of communications!2. Aircraft X (Non RVSM) was not pointed out to LNK. Possible airspace violation. 3. Even after all measures were taken to help Den 9 resolve this situation; they became argumentative and wanted WILD to descend their aircraft. Denver controllers have a culture of complacency. Even when they have been told they are handing us two aircraft that will collide within a few miles outside their boundary they either don't know how to separate the aircraft or become argumentative! This is very dangerous. Our supervisor witnessed the whole event and chose not to do anything.

ZMP Controller reported an operation involving another center and the possible rules they broke attempting to transfer the aircraft to the new center. Reporter also stated the Front Line Manager observed this operation and did nothing about it.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

We had a very long flight to Airport ZZZ. We had nearly full tanks of gas; took off at maximum weight and still had very little extra fuel. We flew the flight exactly as planned; but fuel numbers slowly deteriorated over the 4+ hour flight. About three hours into the flight; we determined that we would land in ZZZ with minimum reserves. We queried ATC; dispatch; and the ACARS Econ Speeds page to verify that we were flying the most fuel efficient speed and altitude. All available data at the time showed that we would arrive in ZZZ with required fuel reserves. As we started the descent to ZZZ the numbers started to deteriorate further so we declared 'minimum fuel'. ATC said there would be no delays to ZZZ and with a lack of suitable alternates at that time; we determined it would be best to continue to ZZZ since we were half way down the arrival. About 60nm from ZZZ the FMS estimated landing with less than 2000 pounds of fuel; so we asked for priority and direct to the airport. ATC accommodated our request and we landed uneventfully; but with less than reserve fuel.

Passenger loads should be looked at with extreme detail and caution especially with a strong winter jet stream and perhaps dispatch should assign lower cruise altitudes if the headwinds aloft are extremely strong. Extra fuel needs to be added for west bound flights especially when flying against a strong jet stream.

ERJ-170 flight crew reported landing at destination with less than minimum reserve fuel on their four hour plus leg.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 3557

Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

I was on approach for a tight space landing between another balloon and a very small tree in a parking lot. My speed was 5mph or less. I was planning on landing close to the tree in the parking lot. On approach the basket went into the tree which caused the balloon to swing forward and I contacted the other balloon envelope with my envelope which caused my balloon to bounce off and to the east. At this point I was committed in the landing could not fly on. The balloon crossed over a brick wall and struck a house mid-level [and] slid down the wall to the ground. The suspension cables caught the roof tiles and broke a few. I tossed my crew the drop line; I heated the balloon and the crew pulled me off the house and out of the back yard into the parking lot and I deflated my balloon. No damage to either balloon or basket. Also no injuries to any person. What I believed caused the problem is a few things. Tight quarters landing. Contacting the tree and swinging forward. Fly on to a larger area to land.

Balloon pilot reported landing in a constrained area resulted on contact with several objects and another balloon.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

There is a large crane extended high enough for an aircraft to strike.  It does not have any flags or lights on it.  [The company] is keeping it extended all hours of the day and night.

Reporter states a large crane in the Fort Worth area extends high enough to be a hazard to aircraft and does not have any flags or lights on it.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 44; Flight Crew Total 2380; Flight Crew Type 2270

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Yesterday our small plane had just come out of annual. Because we were planning a trip that might involve instrument conditions; I wanted to test-fly it first. I requested VFR in the pattern; 2 rounds. I was given right upwind departure. There were about 5 other planes that the controller was working and he seemed occupied. (I had a long wait at the hold line because the controller stated that their primary radar was down). When I was [beyond] the approach end of runway; I queried the controller if I had permission to turn across the base; and he responded 'yes'. I then turned right (at pattern altitude) and was now abeam the end of the runway to my right. At this point the controller cleared me for the 'option'. Now here is the problem: I spend very little time doing pattern work and I'm not very fluent in maneuvering in the pattern if it doesn't involved a straight-forward landings. In this case; I didn't want to practice landings (that's what 'cleared for the option' meant to me!); so I continued across the base and entered a right downwind where I almost immediately saw another [aircraft] to my left and about at my altitude. He notified the controller before I had a chance and I was vectored around after I requested to land as I was quite shaken. I'm fairly sure that I've been allowed to go around in the pattern; and; although I was terrified going against the flow of traffic; I thought that I was doing what he wanted me to do. I will never do this again and when I hear the words 'cleared for the option'; I will always now know that it means 'turn toward the runway!'

The pilot of a C182 became confused with the instructions by ATC and turned into other traffic operating in the pattern.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Our aircraft was equipped with AHRS and per company policy we are required to take off in DG mode; with no flags; heading slewed to the known magnetic heading on runways with known magnetic anomalies. Runway 13 at LGA is one such runway and we followed this procedure prior to taking the active runway. During climbout I believe we had at least one EFIS COMP MON master caution while on an assigned heading. Shortly thereafter; and still on climbout; we were assigned direct to a fix. The heading flags and EFIS COMP MON messages had disappeared. When we selected NAV mode we were still climbing and the aircraft appeared to be going to the fix. When the aircraft continued to turn past the fix I asked ATC for a heading instead and we used our standby compass for guidance. We briefly leveled off and; with no flags present; I compared our PFD compass headings to the standby compass and switched us back to MAG mode one at a time. When I reached over to switch First Officer (FO) switch to back to MAG mode it was already in that position. I asked ATC to reclear us to the fix. When we went back to NAV mode the course depiction started turning quickly which; to me; indicated an equipment malfunction. I then instructed my FO to go back to heading mode. We were also back in the climb and I asked for another heading to the fix. I also mentioned to the controller that I would not be able to work on the issue until we were straight and level. He handed me off to the next controller; who was aware of the issue but queried for further details and I told him we were having a problem with our gyros and asked him to remain on a heading on the course. Once we were leveled off again; I consulted the QRH even though we had no flags or master caution at the time. At this time; our standby compass and PFD headings were all indicating the same course. I asked the controller to give us a heading to the next fix and when NAV mode was selected the navigation system was on course and we had no further issues. I should have asked the first controller for a level off but he seemed stressed and anxious to get us out of his airspace so I asked him for a heading instead; thinking that would temporarily solve the problem even though I know that a standby compass is not correct until we are in straight; level; unaccelerated flight. I am used to this procedure but the AHRS system has often caused complications in cruise flight when departing from runways with known magnetic anomalies; regular EFIS COMP MON caution messages; further distraction for the crew during high workload periods; aborted takeoffs. It would be extremely helpful to have these systems replaced with IRS equipped aircraft.

When taking off we were in DG mode and both DG were aligned with the runway prior to take off. At around 8;000 while in level flight the captain (pilot monitoring) switched both DGS to MAG mode. As this was done both heading indicators began to spin rapidly; at the same time ATC assigned us direct to a fix and a climb. We put the changes in the box and began the turn. It was about 10 sec later the captain and I began to sense something was wrong. Our heading indicators were displaying heading 90 degrees apart and a red MAG flag then appeared. At that same moment ATC reminded us to go direct a fix. Captain switch back to DG mode and tried to align the DG with the stand by compass. This was taking too long because the heading were now more the 90 different. We asked ATC for a heading to the fix. They then tried to give us different fixes thinking it was a problem with our database. We said the were flying headings only (from standby compose) until we could get this sorted out. ATC assigned a heading that took us 30 sec to get to because of the nature of the stand by compass. After 5 to 6 heading changes form ATC we were finally paralleling our course by about 2 miles. there was a 150kt cross wind that was making it very difficult for ATC to assign good headings to fixes. I kept the controls and took the radios and the captain got out the QRH. The Checklist required level flight so we flew headings off the standby until reaching our cruising altitude. After leveling we ran the checklist and were able to get the heading indicators align in MAG mode. We requested a fix and the FMS navigated the rest of the rough correctly. This is the 3rd time something like this has happed off [this runway]. This was by far the worst occurrence. The other 2 times when switch to MAG mode the heading indicators spun 360 degrees. We were able to switch back to DG mode with no problems and continue with no ATC involvement. I don't know what we can do to solve the hardware problem but if it has happened to me 3 times in the last year it must be happening to others.

CRJ-900 flight crew reported a heading problem with the AHRS system on climb out after a night departure.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

This was the first leg of day two of a three day. Great FO (First Officer); and we flew the whole month together. Although we were both experiencing continued fatigue and cumulative sleep loss all month due to chronic flight cancellations and re-routes; we both determined that we were fit for duty. All preflight duties were normal; uneventful and not rushed; and we departed on-time. Taxi and takeoff were routine and uneventful. During departure; at approximately 2;000 feet MSL I engaged the A Autopilot and we both confirmed LNAV and MCP Speed on the FMA's (Flight Mode Annunciators). Shortly thereafter; we both noticed that the control yokes appeared to be deflected approximately 4 degrees to the right. I then attempted to 'trim-out' that deflection with right rudder trim; which took approximately 3.5 degrees.We also verified that the engine instruments were all normal and symmetrical as well as the fuel (we were feeding out of the center tank at the time). The aircraft was tracking the LNAV courses satisfactorily at all times; and we were in and out of various scattered-to-broken cloud layers throughout the departure; complete with the usual multiple; frequent frequency changes. We discussed; coordinated and analyzed our situation among ourselves throughout the departure and climbout; we both agreed that the aircraft was in a satisfactory and safe condition; but that there was something unusual with regard to the position of the control yokes and the amount of rudder trim required. We elected to continue toward our destination initially while we continued to evaluate what we were seeing; we discussed numerous suitable airports we could divert to if we decided it was necessary.We continually discussed our observations as well as our options and also our mutual concerns about how the aircraft might handle with landing flaps selected. With the autopilot disengaged; balanced fuel tank indications; symmetrical engine thrust; the aircraft required three degrees of right rudder trim and one degree of right aileron input; and that still resulted in a slight drift (skid) to the left. There was never any abnormal indication with the trailing edge flaps nor the LED's (Leading Edge Devices); no asymmetry and no disagreement; all indications matched flap handle position(s) at every phase/setting; from flaps 10 to 5 to 1 to UP on departure; from UP to 1; 5; 15; 25 and finally 30 during approach. Dispatch forwarded to us an updated TAF for ZZZ1 that indicated we could expect marginal conditions (at or near CAT 1 ILS minimums); 1/2 Mile visibility; OVC 002 hundred ceiling; FG and SN. We became increasingly concerned about that expected weather at destination while feeling conflicted with the desire to get our Passengers to ZZZ1 as well as our ZZZ1-based Cabin Crew as this was the end of their pairing.The FO and I agreed that it was inadvisable to continue to ZZZ1 and the marginal weather there; given that there was some unknown defect and therefore; degradation; with the aircraft. We advised Dispatch that we had an abnormality with our flight controls and that we were going to divert to ZZZ; which was 125 NM off our right wing with VMC conditions and light winds right down the runway in case of any further escalation of the problem. We informed the Cabin Crew of the situation as well as the Passengers and proceeded to ZZZ. Our approach and landing were uneventful and we taxied to the gate. Upon arrival and standing underneath the right wing; we could visually see a 'control rod' protruding through the top of the flap track fairing; commonly referred to as a 'canoe.'Having no further information about this event currently; I am assuming this was simply a mechanical failure; it was not visible to the Crew nor from the cabin.

B737-700 Captain reported a flight control problem inflight requiring excessive trim correction.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

On initial climb out in moderate turbulence at 280 kts; FO (First Officer) side windshield wiper moved halfway down the windshield into an un-parked position while the wiper switch was selected in the off/park position on both sides. The Captain contacted maintenance who guided us to MEL XX-42-1. After reviewing this MEL we followed the guidance and slowed the aircraft to 250 kts and did not exceed it for the remainder of the flight. We notified dispatch and ATC of our operational restriction and they accommodated us. MEL XX-42-1 is associated with malfunction of the windshield wipers and directs crews to restrict airspeed to 250 kts should a wiper become stuck in an un-parked position. Normal operation in the SOP makes no reference to this limitation (only lists 250 kts as an operational speed) and therefore a pilot would not know about it unless they had experienced this malfunction before. The SOP should be revised to include this limitation so crews are aware of the correct action should this malfunction happen to them in flight.

First Officer reported windshield wiper failed out of park position; causing a reduction in performance penalty that the crew was unaware of.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 500

Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Upon arrival to the aircraft I was told the aircraft was topped off with fuel. I even asked twice if they indeed topped it off with a yes answer each time. I hooked up the battery; checked the oil; went into the cockpit and turned on the battery master to get the air conditioning running and noticed a significant indicated fuel imbalance; not being too concerned at the time because the Premier has a known issue with faulty gauges. I went out to the fuel tanks and verified that there was fuel noticeable in the fuel tanks. I did see fuel up to the neck in both tanks and in the cup. I continued with preflight preparations and decided to look one more time because I felt another look was warranted because of the significant indicated imbalance issue [and] this time the owner was present for the inspection. I removed the suspect fuel cap (left side) and saw fuel in the cup and up to the neck. I thought nothing more of the issue because I have personally seen issues with the premier fuel gauges in the past and I did see fuel up to the neck. I didn't feel pushing the flapper inside the tank was necessary because a long time FBO employee assured me it was topped off and being dressed to fly I didn't feel the necessity to put my hand in jet fuel because there was fuel present on both the wing and the ground accepting it was indeed full. I continued with the flight accepting it was a faulty gauge. I got cleared for takeoff from Runway XXR and immediately after takeoff the aircraft was uncontrollable using normal control inputs. Using differential thrust and speed I was barely able to keep the aircraft flying. I requested a return to the field not knowing at the time why the aircraft was rolling to the right so violently. I successfully managed to get the aircraft back to Runway XXR using all means necessary without incident. I suspected a floating spoiler or flap asymmetry. Upon further investigation and after pushing the left hand fuel flap down I suspected a fuel problem. I called the fuel truck back over and had them top off the aircraft keeping note of how much went in each tank. 11 gallons went into the right and 189 gallons into the left. I had almost 1300lbs fuel imbalance. The cause of the incident was a SIGNIFICANT fuel imbalance caused by the fuelers. The take away from all this is push the flap down inside the fuel tank and make sure it wasn't a false fill. This incident could have ended a lot worse. The Tower was a huge asset in this event. After talking with the fueler I was told he fueled the left hand fuel tank and fuel was spilled running over the wing and onto the ground leading the fueler to believe the tank was indeed full. IT WAS NOT! great care and patience are needed when fueling a Premier jet.

Pilot of a Beechcraft Premier jet reported loss of directional control after takeoff. After regaining control and returning to the airport; a fuel imbalance of about 1300 pounds between the main fuel tanks was discovered.


We were climbing out on the departure approximately 4 miles south of FFZ climbing through 3;300.  The Student in the back right seat reported seeing a bright red circular drone about 3 feet in diameter pass approximately 50 feet below us on the right side.  I did not see it personally but we reported it to FFZ Tower with location and description.  It was a bright red in color.

A PA-44 crew reported a NMAC with a drone beneath PHX Class B airspace after departing FFZ.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working Ground Control at the time of the incident; I just finished giving an air carrier taxiing instructions to their gate. A little after I was done giving the taxiing instructions is when I noticed that a B767 was just reaching the departure end of Runway 27 and a B737 was on landing roll on Runway 27 rolling past B7 Intersection. When I finally noticed what was happening it was too late to do anything. Traffic at the time was slow and nothing was going on. The Local Controller froze up and never said anything about what was going on; never asked for help or said this is going to be close. Nothing was said to get are attention onto what was going on. I honestly don't know what to say or recommend here. The Local Controller was just recently qualified on the position. The entire time during training the Controller struggled and was already well past the allotted training hours. The Controller was on an extension and was down to the last few hours of an extension when qualified WITHOUT a recommendation from the training team. Whenever anything gets abnormal; busy; or uncomfortable this Controller freezes up on position. This Controller is afraid to work traffic and is always trying to get out of working the position. On the day of this incident this Controller asked others to take the Local Control time scheduled. I don't believe that remedial training or classroom will have any effect on this situation. It's not a matter of if but when this is going to happen again.

Controller witnessed a loss of runway separation event; indicating the Local Controller froze up; failing to acknowledge the developing situation.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

I operated Aircraft X ZZZ-ZZZ1-ZZZ; we encountered the dirty sock smell on both legs. [Days later]; I operated Aircraft X again; ZZZ-ZZZ2-ZZZ encountering the dirty sock smell again descending into ZZZ2. The logbook indicated the dirty sock smell had been written up multiple times!

EMB-175 First Officer reported a 'dirty socks' odor on multiple flights on same aircraft.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Total 4300; Flight Crew Type 1000

I was acting as an IOE instructor; observing a pilot new to the company perform single pilot operations in the Metroliner. He was acting as sole manipulator of controls and was PIC (captain) for the flight. There was revenue cargo on board. The winds were calm at the uncontrolled airport so both runways were an acceptable choice. We elected to depart VFR because the ceiling was very high and our COM does not require us to pick up a clearance on the ground. As we were taking the runway; the Captain was very busy performing all of the single pilot operations to get the aircraft configured for takeoff. I was observing and rating his performance. As he was distracted by configuring the aircraft; I heard another aircraft (a King Air performing medevac services) call on center frequency for their clearance. They were at the other end of the runway. The captain of the Metroliner I was in had already made several radio calls on CTAF that we were taxiing out to the opposite runway; and he made a call that we were taking the runway for departure. He was not aware of the King Air until I informed him. I also made another radio call on CTAF advising that we were departing on the opposite runway. The King Air had not taken the runway yet; so we lined up for takeoff; but as the captain finished the last few configuration items; I saw the King Air take the runway. I told the captain to exit the runway. As we did; the King Air departed. The King Air pilot said a few minutes later on CTAF that he was not ever aware that we were there and I do not think the captain in my airplane would have been aware of the King Air had I not informed him because he was flying as a single pilot; with his head down and lots of distractions as he configured a fairly complicated aircraft for takeoff. I never heard the King Air make any calls on CTAF; I only heard him talking to center. It is possible; however; that we were 'stepping on' each other on CTAF. If the captain in my airplane had been done with IOE he would have been alone that night; and very likely the two aircraft would have had a head on collision on the runway or just after takeoff. I discussed the events with the captain of the Metroliner (whom I was training) and we agreed that taking your time and trying to build a larger picture of situational awareness regardless of the time pressures of the job are paramount. And in all honesty; if I had been single pilot (alone) that night I'm not sure I would have been aware of the King Air until it was too late either (although I like to think I would have been slightly less distracted with aircraft configured because of my higher level of experience and would still have heard them call for a clearance on Center). We also agreed that once we were aware he was there; we should have held short to see what he would do since we weren't in positive communication with him. But once again; we took the runway first after making several radio calls before and after the King Air pilot had received his clearance and we believed that he heard them. Since we never heard him say he was taking the runway; we thought he was waiting for us to depart in the opposite direction.

SA227 Training Captain describes a narrowly averted takeoff from opposite ends of the same runway by his aircraft and a King air.


Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

I briefed a practice RNAV 36L visual approach at MCO. When cleared for the visual approaching AMEBE at 3000 feet; flaps 5; 180 knots; I selected LNAV with Auto Pilot on. I then selected 500 Feet in the altitude window and VNAV. The aircraft captured LNAV and started to climb. After trying to figure out why it was climbing I disconnected the AP at 3250 feet to hand fly the approach. While getting the gear down and flaps extended tower asked if we could take a visual to 36R at approx. 1800 feet. I accepted and moved over. While the First Officer was looking up the ILS for 36R we missed the call/extension to 25 flaps. At the 1000 feet check we saw the flaps at 20 and executed a non eventful Go Around; approach and landing.When doing a visual and accepting a visual to a parallel runway both pilots should stay heads up until the landing check list is complete; then if time permits look up and tune the ILS.

Causes leading to the unstable approach:1. Autopilot and auto throttle system commanding an inappropriate climb in a critical phase of flight causing Pilot Flying to make large corrections and reverting to hand flying prior to plan.2. Runway change on final causing increased workload and distraction from the planned approach.3. Discussion of new checklist; (order and sequence).Bottom line; the RNAV approaches are problematic to say the least. When an experienced crew has aircraft control issues while trying to practice an RNAV approach in VMC and has these kind of results the system is flawed. VNAV in general does not work well in our 757s. Working 'OK' sometimes is not 'OK' in aviation. Attempting VNAV descents on SIDs and watching the airspeed exceed SID limits time after time proves the system is unacceptable for use. The school house says 'try it on the line; it works great'. On the line; we know that's not the case. I am concerned that our next accident or incident is going to be the result of a failed RNAV approach.

A B757-200 flight crew reported executing a go-around after an unstabilized practice RNAV approach.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

After application of takeoff thrust on Runway XXR; the left engine generator failed. The takeoff was rejected below 40 kts. Rejected takeoff procedures were followed as per flight manual SOP. No injuries or aircraft damage occurred. Maintenance [Technical Support Maintenance Control] was notified via voice and discrepancy was reported via ACARS. A return to the gate was necessary. Aircraft was taken out of service for Maintenance. Another aircraft was provided for flight to ZZZ1.

B757 Captain reported a rejected takeoff after the Number 1 engine generator failed.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 5500; Flight Crew Type 1500

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Distraction

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace

Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

The home base is under the 3;600 ft. ceiling of Class B; so I chose to begin training to the southeast in a section that had a base of 6;000 ft. I planned to use 4;000 ft.; which gave 2;000 ft. of vertical clearance. We began training while heading southeast to remain outside the 30 mile veil. I remained at 4;000 ft.; while working with various configurations. In the course of that flying; we ended up a long distance from home base; so I had the student turn back toward the general area of the home base; a direction to the northwest. Due to the area typically having high general aviation traffic; I used the traffic avoidance screen of the Garmin 650. This has the advantage of removing ground clutter; and more readily identifying conflicting traffic. It has the disadvantage of removal of the airspace information. It was while we were travelling northwest; and doing maneuvers; that I saw our home base out my window and recognized that we had traveled into the 3;600 ft. section of the Class B. I immediately descended below 3;600 ft. and turned away from the airspace. As I reflected on the situation I see the following factors. I realize that my choice to use the traffic (ADS-B) screen was a factor. When we departed home; I specifically used the map screen to note the Class B boundaries and remain clear. It was after we cleared the Class B veil to the southeast that I switched to the traffic avoidance screen. Selected altitude. Normally; I use 3;000 ft. as my training altitude. Because we were doing stall work and abnormal configurations; I opted for more altitude margin. I deliberately chose to work outside the Class B for this reason.My airspace situational airspace was reduced. Since my flight altitude was beneath the 6;000 ft. ceiling of the particular section of the Class B; I was confident of my margin of airspace vertically; for our return. However; as we turned on one maneuver; I saw home base out my window and immediately realized that I had traveled; horizontally too far to the northwest; and had horizontally penetrated the 3;600 ft. section of Class B. I switched from the traffic screen; to the map screen; and verified my airspace incursion. I will most likely not use the traffic screen; going forward. I will remain on map screen. It may be a bit more difficult to see potential conflicting traffic; but it will keep airspace information on screen. With airspace always on screen; my airspace situational airspace will remain high; as will my margin.

Flight Instructor reported loss of situational awareness during training maneuvers; resulting in a Class B airspace incursion.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Cleared for the WLEEE 5 Arrival and expect the RNPZ 17L Approach. The First Officer briefed the arrival to join the approach at XWING for the RNP Z; but did not close the route until we were about to cross XWING. The automation error on both pilots was due to our misunderstanding of ATC instructions and anticipation of approach clearance from XWING. By the time we both realized our automation error; Approach Control directed us to turn right and climb to 3500 feet. We were vectored for the ILS 17L Approach to landing. On landing we called ATC on the phone and discussed what happened. Verify with Approach Control what their intentions are when we reached the IF for the approach/point on the WLEEE 5 arrival.

B737-700 Captain reported a track deviation occurred when the flight crew failed to properly program the FMC.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12.2; Flight Crew Total 547; Flight Crew Type 300

Workload; Training / Qualification; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

During the cruise phase of flight; I encountered an oil pressure warning. I notified ATC who vectored me without incident back to my home airport. I did declare an emergency when asked by ATC. I was conducting a local IFR flight in order to maintain experience. Weather was VMC; broken at 2;000 FT with calm winds; so the conditions were great for some light IMC time.In March; I had conducted a flight review with an instructor where we had performed advanced IFR training such as partial panel approaches. At the time of the Flight in August; I was under the impression that this March flight review was an IPC whereas in fact my last IPC was in November 2012; so although I had done 6 IFR approaches in the 6 months (3 with an instructor) prior to August; I was actually not in compliance with FAR 61.57.

A non current IFR pilot on an IFR flight plan for currency declared an emergency because of an SR-22 oil pressure warning and discovered his lack of currency after landing.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 2800; Flight Crew Type 200

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

The decision was made to land in a corn filed as I was getting low on fuel and daylight.No injuries and only very minor damage to the aircraft.

With low fuel and fading daylight; Citabria pilot elects to land in a corn field with minimal damage.


Workload; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Confusion

Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency

During arrival/descent we experienced 'L Bleed Duct' Warning message. First Officer was pilot flying and I ran the QRH. As described in the QRH the bleeds closed and the cabin altitude began to climb at a nominal rate. We were at approximately FL240 at this point and requested expedited descent.  At that same moment continuing the QRH; a flight attendant called and said there was smoke in the cabin; apparently emanating from the rear lavatory and the smell was very bad. We immediately declared emergency with ATC [for expedited clearance to our destination]. ATC was notified of the nature of the emergency; bleed issue and smoke in the cabin. QRH for Smoke/Fumes removal was executed. Further communication with the flight attendants indicated that the smoke smell had dissipated and that it was essentially smell; not actual visual smoke. This appeared consistent with the indications in the cockpit and also that we experienced no smell or smoke in the cockpit during the entire event. I told the flight attendants to prepare for an emergency landing shortly as a continuing precaution; and then briefed the passengers. Also notified ATC that we had the situation stabilized. An expedited but uneventful ILS was completed to landing. Upon clearing the runway; we had the ground emergency units inspect the aircraft to verify our condition. They reported nothing abnormal; we then proceeded to the gate. There was not sufficient time to notify Dispatch during the incident given the close distance to the airport and cockpit workload. Dispatch and Maintenance were notified on ground as soon as it was practicable. Following the event the flight attendants reported not feeling well.Cascading deteriorating conditions involving multiple QRH procedures during a high stress/workload could easily lead to confusion. Things can become a blur and it is important to force yourself to slow down and resist the tendency to go too fast especially when navigating multiple and linked QRH procedures.

There were several threats such as high workload environment; multiple QRH procedures; weather in and around the destination was IMC which increased the workload factor in the emergency.Every emergency is different but I think you should always take a step back and analyze the situation instead of just reacting. Furthermore; I also think you should always evaluate your performance after the emergency to improve yourself as a pilot; which is what I'm always striving to do.

During descent a CRJ-900 EICAS alerted L BLEED DUCT and about the same time a flight attendant reported a bad odor and smoke from the aft lavatory. An emergency was declared; the QRH completed and the flight proceeded to the nearby filed destination.


Workload; Training / Qualification; Physiological - Other; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

Flight was scheduled for flight in late afternoon; but due to late inbound flight it left a few minutes late. My crew and I had brought this plane in and had no issues with the aircraft. It was parked at gate X and boarded for the next flight. I did the walk around and found nothing wrong with the aircraft. The aircraft was on APU power as the external air was not hooked up to provide cooling. The GPU was also hooked up; but not selected on. Just after main cabin door closure we heard a loud bang in the front of the aircraft (around the battery compartment) and the screens went into an alternate mode (some black; some red x; EICAS had a ton of messages). It wasn't electrical emergency or SG1 out mode; it was a random configuration of abnormal screen indications; and was reminiscent of what happens when the GPU is selected in and externally pulled; though it was not selected in; nor was it pulled. My Captain shut the aircraft completely down; including the batteries and APU and the aircraft went into electrical emergency mode and stayed there. It was not until the bus ties were closed that everything went blank. We then called Maintenance out to the plane to trouble shoot. The Mechanic came out and spent about 15 minutes on the plane; resetting everything and then said it is fine; Ops check good. I told him that there was a loud bang from the fore avionics/battery compartment area and he went down to look at that and said it all checks good. From there we briefed the departure to include a possible return to field if anything abnormal occurred and we departed. About 15 minutes into the flight; we were given a climb to FL230 and passing thorough about FL190 we heard the loud bang again from the front of the aircraft and then began smelling electrical smoke. Both the Captain and I immediately donned our O2 masks and declared an emergency with Center and asked for a descent to the closest airport due to smoke in cockpit and possible fire. We were told the closest and we began an emergency descent to the field. The Captain took the aircraft and the radios; while I set us up for the approach; ran the EPC; the QRH and normal checklists. We briefed the Flight Attendant of the situation and told him that we were landing and to prepare the cabin; though there was no need to brace and we would let him know further if we need to evacuate. We landed and had fire trucks meet us at the aircraft to determine if there was indeed a fire; which they did a heat test and stated there was no sign of. Upon landing the Captain told the people that we made a precautionary landing and we did not expect a need for evacuation; but that we would tell them if that changed and if that was the case; it would be out the main and service doors. Once we were sure there was no threat of fire we had customer service agents meet us at the aircraft with stairs and I made an announcement to the passengers that we had made a precautionary landing due to smoke and that there was no threat of fire at this point so we would deplane them at this time and bring them into the terminal for further information. Threats included the precursor situation at the gate; though it Ops checked good; it was a very unusual situation. The O2 masks had poor audio and it was difficult for us to hear one another as well as for ATC to understand our transmissions. In addition; the divert airport is no longer in our approach plates (it's in the brick); so it took longer than I would have liked to have set up the approach. Everything happened so quickly; though you do go back to your training. I think it is very important for the company to continue practicing abnormal situations like this in recurrent simulator events to get your mind thinking outside the box should something like this occur again in real life. In hindsight; I probably would not take an aircraft displaying this sort of abnormal situation again at the gate and instead request another aircraft.

Sometime before reaching 10;000 FT the Captain asked the First Officer to change roles from pilot flying to pilot not flying. The reason for the change is that the Captain felt that under the circumstances the pressure on both crew members to perform up to this point was very high and that changing roles would benefit any areas that may have been overlooked or forgotten. All checklists were completed and landing on the runway was accomplished. After landing Captain taxied the aircraft onto the ramp started the APU and shut down the engines. The Fire Department then secured the aircraft and made checks for any hot spots or areas that may have been damaged. None were found. After deplaning the passengers from the aircraft the First Officer made visual inspections of all panels and skin to see if any damage had occurred. None was found. After about 10 minutes of run time on the APU the aircraft again went into essential power and started to duplicate the same sequence of events that we experienced at the departure airport. Threats: Discovering just what the problem really was. Smoke inside the cockpit; loud bang like and explosion somewhere inside the aircraft; shaking of the entire aircraft when we heard the sound. Is the situation greater than the capacity of the crew to handle the emergency? Approach plates [were] not in our Commercial Charts subscription; having to locate information.Errors: Having difficulty in programming the FMS for the approach to the airport loose-leaf approach plates in the brick. Our 'hands' were full trying to organize the cockpit; get information in a timely manor to troubleshoot; communicate; and fly the aircraft.We were suspicious of the 'reset' done by Maintenance. Its not that I didn't trust what they did but with our experience flying these airplanes the sound of the relays kicking in was defiantly louder than normal. After we started the engines and proceeded to takeoff I briefed the First Officer that we may have an emergency because the problem may not have fixed. So we were on notice that we may encounter something down the road.

A low bang emanated from an EMB-145 nose area electrical compartment with the loss of electrical power as the aircraft prepared for departure. The aircraft was shut down; Maintenance reset systems and the flight departed; but the crew declared an emergency and diverted after the same event occurred during climbout.


FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 4R

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I was Pilot Flying; we were being vectored for the ILS 4R into Newark. Approach told us to turn left heading 120 descend and maintain 2000. Next instructions were turn heading 090 direct GRITTY when able. Later; when he was clearing us for the approach he noticed we were passed 3000 and asked why were leveling at 2000. We told him that was the altitude assigned. He continued to clear us for the approach; and landed with no further incidents. Approach was clearing other aircraft down to 2000 so he may have meant to give us 3000 but cleared us to 2000 in error. There was no loss in separation. Possible solutions always verify ATC instructions if unsure; both Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring confirmed we heard descend and maintain 2000. But the frequency was very busy so instructions can be easily misheard.

Pilot reported receiving conflicting altitude assignment clearances from ATC during vectoring for approach into EWR.


Time Pressure; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Time Pressure

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We noted that the HYD1 system fluid level was getting low and then dipped into the orange arc; accompanied by an associated EICAS advisory. This is not an unusual event due to a quirk in this aircraft's hydraulic systems; and initially we simply noted it for [Maintenance Control] to fix once we were on the ground. However; as we continued to monitor it; we noticed the level continued to drop; which is not so usual. As it dipped further into the orange arc of that gauge; we began to review the consequences and options in the event that the HYD1 system actually failed; particularly in regards to getting the gear down. As the level continued to get lower; we decided we needed to simply get the aircraft on the ground as soon as possible; rather than wait for a potentially worse situation and actual emergency to actually develop.Having already notified ARTCC of the developing situation; we decided to err on the side of caution and [request priority handling] that would allow us to fly direct to the airport and land on the closest available runway which was XXR. This entailed a slight tailwind; but well within limits and preferable to spending more time in the air and risking an actual hydraulic failure. Rather than risk running out of fluid pressure for the gear; as we eventually slowed below 250 kts; [and] prematurely lowered the gear while we judged that we still had the pressure and fluid for it. Previous consideration with this was given to how much extra fuel burn this would entail; and we delayed this until well within the adjusted fuel range of the airport. At that point; gear was lowered about 15 NM out; the flight actually proceeded and landed normally without further incident. The FA (Flight Attendant) was kept apprised of the situation but no announcement was ever made to the passengers since nothing developed to a level that warranted making them concerned about their welfare.After parking at the gate; both the CFR (Crash Fire Rescue) Chief and Maintenance reported hydraulic fluid leaking from the number one left engine. Maintenance's initial investigation suggested that the main engine pump had developed a leak.CRM played a crucial role in this event and proved its worth. I want to commend the FO (First Officer); for providing numerous suggestions and feedback as we discussed options and how we may have to deal with various consequences. He was proactive in researching and providing information such as the increase in fuel burn rate due to lowering the gear early. All options and possibilities were thoroughly reviewed and discussed and the decisions made only after thorough consideration. The emergency was; ultimately; only a preventative one; and apart from a [Company] Captain in the back; none of the passengers were any the wiser. Early and preventative action by all the crew not only meant that we were prepared for all contingencies but that we never had to enact any of those scenarios and the flight landed normally before anything any developed into an actual emergency.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

EMB-140 flight crew reported a drop in hydraulic fluid quantity in the Number 1 HYD system; later attributed to a leak in the associated engine driven pump.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security

Another airline flight attendant introduced herself to me; the Captain; as a jumpseater and took seat in the airplane. Shortly before closing the doors we received the passenger count from our flight attendants. They counted 149 passengers; which included the jump-seating employee. When our FA's do the count it matters not whether it is a paying passenger; a non-rev or a jumpseater. All they do is count bodies on the plane. When the FO called customer ops to run the weight and balance he was informed that the system showed 152 passengers on board. After confronting station personnel with the discrepancy they re-counted their tickets and finally confirmed our count of 149 people. We ran the weight and balance and departed shortly after. When I checked the delay comments that were left by the station personnel on the next day I was shocked by what I read. In order to get the count corrected they removed the jump-seating flight attendant from the passenger manifest. This is a copy of their comments pasted straight from the delay comment box:'FA advised agent that they had 149 PAX on board after all PAX had been on board for over 30 min. Agent at the gate had 150 boarding passes counted multiple times at the gate. Not only did she count them but so did XXXX and myself. We believe that they were not counting YYYYY (Their Jump seater per their discretion) So we unchecked and unboarded her.'There are several things wrong with this comment:1. We had 149 passengers on board including the jumpseater. She was physically on board all the way.2. We did not forget to count anyone; as we only count bodies on the seats and do not differentiate who's who.3. In order to make the count correct in the system the station personnel removed her administratively from the passenger manifest by letting the computer think she was removed from the airplane (unchecked and unboarded).4. We took off with her still being on board without knowing that the station personnel had removed her from the flight to make the count seem correct.There are several huge problems that I see with this:1. The passenger manifest was altered and falsified to get the count correct; albeit with the wrong passengers on board.2. Had I crashed the airplane with no survivors nobody would have notified the family of the jumpseater since as far as the paperwork was concerned she was never on board.3. Since we had 149 passengers including the jumpseater; yet she was not part of the official passenger manifest then I must ask who was the 149th passenger that we show on the passenger list? Since the jumpseater was not counted in the system; yet the body count was correct with her on board; then the station must have counted a passenger that never was on board. Not only is that a security risk; but imagine the same crash and burn scenario. We would have notified a family of the passing of one of their loved ones believing he was on our plane when in fact that person never boarded. It is beyond my comprehension what risks the station personnel are willing to take to dispatch a flight to avoid a delay. Instead of taking the time to get the count right they rather prefer to manipulate the system; falsify passenger manifests and create unnecessary security risks. I guess since they are not flying on the plane they just don't care. Well; I do! This was not an accident or bad training. It was done on purpose to cover incompetence. My previous employers would fire someone who intentionally disregards security and falsifies official documents.

MD-80 Captain checked delay remarks on a previous flight and discovered that to get the passenger count to agree with the tickets; the Station Agent administratively removed a jump-seating Flight Attendant from the count even though she was onboard.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

We are not provided with proper sanitary equipment. No sprays or wipes; they give us 2 sanitary wipes for tractor work area equipment and also they are talking about consolidating piers putting people closer to each other.

Ramp employee expressed concern about Coronavirus related company procedures.


Airport / Aerodrome / Heliport; Aircraft / UAS

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS); Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Police / Security Involved

As I was leveling off at my assigned altitude of 6;000 ft just above the base of a scattered layer of clouds I saw a large black and silver object in my peripheral vision. I was able to catch a quick look at the object as it passed off my left wing. I would estimate the distance as having been approximately 10 ft from my wingtip. I had just exited a cloud when the object appeared; so there would have been extremely little time to take evasive action if it had been a bit further to my right. The object appeared to be a quad-copter style drone; and as previously mentioned it was black and silver/chrome. I immediately reported the object to ATC; and a nearby law enforcement aircraft went to investigate the area. The object did not strike my aircraft and the flight was completed with no further issues. Recommendation: Stricter enforcement of drone operation rules; perhaps drone manufacturers should include a pamphlet in each box describing the dangers associated with busy airspace.

Air carrier flight crew noticed and came within 10 feet of a UAS while at 6;000 feet.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 21; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 5500

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 2020; Flight Crew Type 10

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

We were cruising at FL400 when right engine rolled back. Turned ON ignition; engine would not re-light; [advised ATC]. Requested descent to FL300. Donned oxygen mask. Engine restarted about FL310; leveled at FL300. Requested a nearby airport for landing. Next day; drained several times some fuel from each wing tank sumps about 1-2 gallons each to find about a cup of water in the right fuel tank. No water was further found. Restarted both engine to find all is normal. Mechanic's belief is [the] water interrupted the fuel to the engine to cause a rollback.

G1159 flight crew reported the #2 engine rolled back in cruise flight at FL400. Engine relight was successful after descent; and after landing about a cup of water was found after draining a few gallons from the right fuel tank.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Routine Inspection

Aircraft; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure

This is to report on aircraft configuration.Aircraft X arrived ZZZ With #2 ENG inboard T-R sleeve completely missing both Kruger Flap fairing and deflector. They were never installed and the plugs were in place.

Technician reported that the Kruger Flap Fairing and deflector were not installed on the thrust reverser translating sleeve and the blank off plugs were in place.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Ramp; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Multiple aircraft were inbound to the D8 alleyway. The first one did not immediately go on their gate; causing the aircraft in-trail to back up and block Taxiway D. While these aircraft were impeding onto Taxiway D; buses were backing up; facing eastbound at the top of Terminal 2. These buses; I believe; were waiting to go into the D8 alleyway; but held out due to the stopped aircraft. After several minutes of the aircraft blocking the taxi lane; one bus; identified as Bus X on the ASDE-X; drove into the middle of the D taxi lane eastbound across D8 and toward D7 at a high rate of speed. Simultaneously; Aircraft X was taxiing parallel to this bus on E toward D7 and was going to 'double-back' at D7 onto D short of D8 due to traffic. Once I noticed the erratic bus; I keyed up to Aircraft X and suggested they hold position due to a 'rogue bus on the taxi lane that I was not [in] communication with and I was unsure of their intentions.' Aircraft X reported the bus in sight and stopped. City Operations also heard this transmission and reported they were enroute to see what was going on.Bus X then made a 180-degree turn in the middle of D at the D7 intersection and proceeded to drive westbound on D to the area they had just come from. I advised Aircraft X that the bus had appeared to clear the movement area and they could continue their taxi. Operations intercepted Bus X at this time toward the south end of the D8 alleyway; but I have no further information on how this incorrect use of the movement area was handled.This example was just another instance of buses continuing to operate in a manner that's completely contrary to the LAWA's Airport Rules and Regulations. Buses should not be operating on taxiways or in the middle of the D taxi lane at any time. I am once again recommending that the FAA address this critical safety issue with LAWA. The answer that I previously received to [a prior report] that the situation has been remedied is not the reality. While it may be the case that LAWA addressed the discrepancies with the bus drivers; they need to now police and enforce their policies because the rules are absolutely not being followed and users operating on the north complex are in jeopardy as a result.

LAX Tower Controller reported a rogue bus breaking regulations and causing problems on an airport alleyway.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Fatigue; Physiological - Other; Training / Qualification; Workload

Other Ineffective training due to scheduling induced fatigue

Other Over an extended training curricula

I am in training for 737 NG Captain. I was a 737/300 Captain in the past. Additionally I am coming off of the 747/400; so both the aircraft and the box are familiar. My partner is coming off of the A320 with no recent Boeing glass experience.The training has been sufficient for myself. However I have observed that the Airbus First Officers in our class have been more challenged. This is relevant because of the timing of our training. Our initial training sessions were all scheduled for a [very early morning] brief. Obviously training conducted [very early morning] will not be as sticky as training that is not conducted in a Window of Circadian Low (WOCL). We completed all four training events in WOCL.This was followed by a brief in normal hours then a Systems Evaluation. Two days off then a travel day to [the training facility]. In [the training facility] we are training in the simulator with motion off for FTDB events. All of our periods are scheduled from [late night to early morning]; another WOCL. In the first three periods it has been my feeling that we are getting some training value up until about midnight local time; followed by a rapid degradation in performance. I notice this in my partner; the instructor; and myself.It would be an interesting exercise to observe a video of our training sessions. It would be classic study in the effects of sleep deprivation on performance. I believe that it would clearly show that very little training is being accomplished. Performance is degraded and tempers are short. If you want to discuss this further we can do so privately.Last night we returned to the hotel around XA:00 am. I was unable to sleep until about XB am. I was woken promptly at XF am by the sound of maids working; doors slamming; and people talking in the hall. This was my third consecutive night with approximately 4 hours of sleep. I was able to get a nap 2 days ago; but yesterday and today was unable to sleep due to ambient noise (airplanes; maids; etc).I am absolutely too fatigued to train. In addition I am starting to get physically ill from lack of quality rest. To add insult to injury the rest of my training schedule is more of the same; all [late night to early morning] SIM periods. I have concerns about the quality of training for myself; and my crew under these conditions. I request that steps be taken to mitigate the threats posed by this training schedule. At least for me; six days in a row of this; followed by only 2 days off; is unrealistic and not conducive to quality training. My crew and our customers deserve better.

A B737NG Captain in training expressed concern over his debilitating training schedule conducted almost exclusively on the back side of his body clock in either midnight or predawn conditions.