Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

The event of a cracked; co-pilot #2 side window occurred during climb out phase of flight around 21;000 feet. We were roughly around 20-25 miles northwest ZZZ. As we were climbing to 24;000 feet the entire side window cracked all over and made a loud popping noise. There was a shockwave feeling on my chest and I felt my ears pop as well. The best way to describe this is like going to a fireworks display show and feeling the shockwave and hearing a loud bang from the big 'boomer' type fireworks. The pilot sitting next to me in the left seat heard the noise as well and visually saw the windshield but didn't feel the pressure on his chest or ears like I did. The event nonetheless caused us to react accordingly. I donned my O2 mask and we [advised ATC] and began an expedited descent to land as soon as possible at the nearest airport; which in our case was ZZZ. Once we were at a safe altitude to sustain life without supplemental oxygen I removed my O2 mask. We safely landed in ZZZ without injury to crew or passengers; which there were 3 of them. I couldn't say what caused the window to crack like that but it's the first time I've seen anything like that happen in flight. It should be noted that cabin pressure was nominal and was climbing and descending on schedule as it normally would during the climb and descent phase of flight. No cabin pressure change occurred when the window cracked in flight. Another aircraft was flown in to ZZZ to recover the passengers and continue them on their journey.Since it appeared to be a freak accident in flight to the window I couldn't say a suggestion to avoid recurrence of this event. Neither the Captain nor I had any CAS message or indication in flight that would prelude to the window cracking like it did. It was a learning experience however and did build more confidence to reacting to inflight abnormalities that one can't really train for and that it's important to keep flying the airplane number one; and number two safely and efficiently react and get the aircraft on the ground as soon as practical; which the 'cracked/shattered windshield' QRH says to do.

The flight was with 3 passengers. The aircraft had an existing MEL for Baggage Door Open CAS message. This message did illuminate prior to engine start. The FO was pilot flying for this flight. After takeoff; we felt a pressurization bump in our ears climbing through 1500 feet. A Baggage Door Seal Amber message followed. We decided to climb a little higher to see if the message would cycle. At 6000 feet; the Baggage Altitude Amber message posted. Cabin pressure was on the normal schedule and at normal rates. We climbed to 13;000 feet and requested a holding pattern to troubleshoot the problem. We decided to isolate the baggage compartment and continue the flight since the cabin pressure was normal. We exited the hold and were instructed to climb to FL240 and proceed on course. Climbing through 20;000 feet; there was a very loud sound and I noticed the right hand forward side windshield had completely shattered. [The First Officer] was slightly disoriented from this but immediately donned his oxygen mask. He stopped the climb and leveled the aircraft. I [advised ATC] on the radio and requested a descent to 10;000 feet. The cabin did not depressurize; although the explosive sound of the window shattering had us expecting a rapid decompression. We chose to land at the closest large airfield; ZZZ. I ran the radios while setting up the FMS and frequencies for the visual approach. We did not have time to run the Abnormal Checklist for shattered windshield as we were more focused with landing the aircraft safely and were not continuing the flight. I did run the Normal Checklist as usual. I quickly yelled back to the passengers and told them our situation. We landed without incident and taxied to the FBO. After speaking with maintenance about this event; it appears the problem with the baggage seal and the windshield shattering are most likely unrelated. I was told the outer pane of the window is not capable of cracking from a pressurization problem; especially with cabin pressure normal and the baggage compartment isolated. The most probable cause was a windshield heat malfunction. Maintenance said there have been; on occasion; windows shattered for a heater failure without a CAS message at all. In our case; we were not sure if the two events were related; and could not verify if the inner structural pane of the side windshield was intact due to the plastic cover blocking our access. We made the conservative decision to land at ZZZ to have it inspected.

CE-750 flight crew reported the First Officer's windshield shattered in flight; so the flight diverted to the nearest suitable airport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

During boarding time Passenger X boarded without face covering. I approached him and politely requested he comply. He ignored me and proceeded going down the aisle. He began placing his two roller bags in the overhead bin. I waited; he sat and settled in his seat and again I requested he comply and told him he needed to put his face covering; this time he did and quickly slid it down to his chin and began making a phone call. I approached him and told him he needed to wear it properly. At that time I saw another passenger who was wearing it under his chin as well. I then proceeded to make a PA announcement regarding the requirements of face coverings. FA B approach both gentleman and requested they comply and asked them to wear their mask. Passenger X again refused; at that time I notified the Captain about the problem and he went ahead and made another PA covering the face covering requirements. The Captain told me to wait 2 minutes for him to comply. Gate agent was coming on board. Upon being told by the gate agent he put it on. During demo Passenger X was still talking on his phone and again removed his face cover. Again I told him to put it on and requested he place his phone in airplane mode; he ignored me. I finished the safety demo and told him to put the cell phone in airplane mode. We waited until he finished his conversation and he placed his covering and we began the taxing for takeoff. He put his phone down; upon me sitting in my jump seat he began writing and using his browser. As he saw me looking at him he began playing with his covering putting it on and taking off.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger did not comply with face mask policy.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14.1; Flight Crew Total 934.4; Flight Crew Type 826.8

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Landing at ZZZ on Runway XX in Cessna Skylane; a strong gust of wind in excess of 20 knots crosswind component almost flipped the airplane. Full left aileron and right rudder kept the airplane from running off the runway or flipping. But there was a propeller strike as the plane came down on the right main then hard on the nose gear. The nose tire developed a leak and went flat over 15 minutes. The plane taxied back to the FBO without much vibration from the propeller and no abnormal engine sounds. [Current weather] information reported 11 knots from 060 and the Tower reported winds had started gusting and were erratic. I had 20 degrees of flaps in and manifold pressure of 12 inches on touchdown. On approach; the plane tracked the centerline of the runway with left aileron and rudder. The crab component was corrected at touch down before crossing Runway XY. With only a light touch the plane went airborne again a few feet only as it crossed [Runway] XY. Then bounced; started to flip with a large gust of wind. There was just enough control authority to prevent the wing from touching the runway but not enough to prevent the propeller strike. No damage was done to the air-frame and the engine continued to run smoothly. No injuries occurred.

C182 pilot reported that a strong gust of wind during touchdown nearly flipped the airplane. The pilot regained aircraft control and the aircraft sustained minor damage. No injuries occurred.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

Left engine failure on Aircraft X. Felt/Heard a loud BOOM/BANG. Observed a yaw to the left; airspeed was decreasing rapidly; since we were still in a climb.Unknown cause of Left (#1) engine Failure during Climb.I said: 'we just lost the left engine. You need to declare MAYDAY with center and let them know we are an emergency airplane; single engine. [First Officer (FO)] did just that. Center asked if we wanted to return to ZZZ? I said to [FO]: NO; we are only about 20 miles North East of ZZZ1. Tell them we want to land in ZZZ1. We were given a clearance lower; and a turn to ZZZ1. We ran the QRC/QRH for Engine Failure. Secured the left Engine; and landed Nearest Suitable: ZZZ1.

The Captain of an Embraer 145 reported that an engine failed during climb.


Inflight Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

[BNA] ILS 20L. Flight and majority of approach uneventful. We broke out of the clouds at about 700 feet on the approach. At the 500 feet call out; I observed a rather large party balloon along our flight path. I disconnected the auto pilot and maneuvered to the right to avoid hitting it. This maneuver was followed by a go-around due to the approach not being stabilized. I called for the go-around then we followed the missed approach. Individuals on the ground should find a better way to secure their party balloons.

CRJ-900 Captain reported executing a go-around from their approach to BNA after spotting a party balloon on their flight path at about 500 feet AGL.


Confusion; Time Pressure; Distraction; Workload

Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Weather; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

While departing TEB on a charter the First Officer and I were reviewing the departure procedures and noise abatement procedures for our runway when I made an error in my take off briefing. We were assigned the RUDDY 4 RNAV departure that requires you to cross a fix at 1;500 FT then continue the climb to 2;000 FT. While at the terminal I briefed a climb to 2;000 FT and a crossing restriction of making sure we cross the restriction at or above 1;500 FT. Upon taxi out we were held on the ground for delays and spent our time going over an ATC reroute as well as making sure the weather was suitable when departing 24. After takeoff I continued my climb to 2;000 FT too early because I was concentrating on weather cells that lined the departure. ATC told us that we should be at 1;500 and by that time it was too late to fix our mistake. They said nothing else; and the First Officer and I realized what we had done. I was in an unfamiliar airport on a charter that had complicated noise procedures combined with weather and the standard difficulties of a charter. I briefed a chart incorrectly and then went on to concentrate on the weather and route planning without reviewing it except just before takeoff. It was my mistake in the initial briefing that led me to think I was correct in my climb to 2;000 FT.

With better CRM; and a focus put on looking for any possible areas that we could get tricked up by an unfamilair departure procedure. I believe that this would have never happened. I will be paying closer attention to the verbage in the departure procedures to make sure that nothing like this will ever happen again. Especially at airports that we do not do normal opperations.

An ERJ flight crew on the TEB RUUDY 4 climbed directly to 2;000 FT before WENTZ because the Captain was task saturated with the unfamiliar departure and weather avoidance.


Flight Data / Clearance Delivery; Local; Ground

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.9

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While working the tower cab combined; Moffett Tower called to cancel downwind extensions to the amphitheater with no reason given. I had two aircraft flying the local VFR traffic pattern and made the advisory call that base turns needed to be kept with 1.5NM of Palo Alto (which is all the airspace PAO is designated for on final to Runway 31). Aircraft X was ahead of Aircraft Y in the pattern and both were cleared for the option on Runway 31. Aircraft X landed and rolled out to the end of Runway 31. Aircraft Y who turned base tightly behind Aircraft X to stay inside the PAO Class D had to go around because the traffic would not likely have been clear of the runway prior to them crossing the runway threshold. Palo Alto has significantly more operations than Moffett field does and needs more airspace on final for Runway 31. Moffett regularly denies or takes away airspace based on their judgment on if they believe Palo Alto needs it (not based on operational needs at Moffett). The airspace should be redistributed to reflect current state of traffic at each. Palo Alto should be able to have the airspace to a 3NM final for Runway 31. It would be fair to not have a full 3NM circle on the NE side of the PAO delta as to protect the extended centerline of NUQ 32L/ 14R. But; that should still allow PAO to have a right traffic pattern to Runway 31 to a 3NM final without conflicting with Moffett traffic. A 3NM ring on the south side of Palo Alto to a 3 NM final would likely not result in any impact to the operations at Moffett. Such a redesign would significantly reduce required coordination and allow both facilities to safely work traffic around each other efficiently.

PAO Tower Controller reported problems associated with the close proximity of Moffett Tower airspace.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Flight crew detected foul odor before boarding. Captain was notified; we all deplaned; Maintenance was called. 9 hour delay while filters were replaced.

Prior to boarding at XA:30 on Date in ZZZ on Aircraft X a strong cabin odor throughout the cabin. 9 Hour delay upon landing in ZZZ1 at XM:30 cabin odor came back. [Flight Attendant suggested to] take the plane out of service and fix the issue. Possibly figure out why it's happening more often.

A320 Captain and flight attendants reported a fume event prior to boarding. Flight was delayed for 9 hours while maintenance corrected the fume issue.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 199.8; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 8270.8

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

GEELA RNAV APPROACH to PHX has incorrect altitude restrictions programmed for the GEELA waypoint. FMGC reflects a crossing restriction of 16;000 feet or above at GEELA. Correct altitude restriction is 16;000 feet or below. You must cross lower than 16;000 feet to make the next restriction on the STAR of 10;000 feet and 210 knots. If you descend on this RNAV Arrival in a Managed Descent mode; the FMGC can not comply with the altitude restrictions after GEELA.

A319 First Officer reports that the FMGC in his aircraft depicts the GEELA crossing restriction on the GEELA 6 into PHX as 16000 or above when it should show at or below.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 650

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors

First let me say our aircraft is equipped with Collins Pro Line 21 avionics. Now; our clearance was to climb via the ELANR THREE SID; which we were; and had the fix part of the SID displayed on the MFD; now keep in mind that we can't display the full chart without scrolling from top to bottom and side to side; and our speed restriction of 250 knots until advised by ATC was not in our view unless we scrolled to that part of the page or kept the cursor over that part of the plate. This plate; as well as other SIDS; at no time is completely visible at any magnification level on our MFD's; therefore the speed restriction of 250 knots until advised; totally slipped my mind. I believe Collins needs to address this issue by showing this restriction somewhere on the MFD at all times. We were scolded by ATC for something that we were totally unaware of. Another problem; I believe; is that there are too many different speed restrictions and none are consistent with one another; for instance; we fly out of the CLT area a lot and most of their SIDS are speed restricted to 280 until advised by ATC. Why not have a standard speed of 250 until advised on these SIDS.  Some of them are very complex and require attention to detail and; if speed is so critical; it needs to be shown at all times or at least made consistent on all SIDS.

The Captain of a CE-560XL; chastised by Chicago TRACON for not maintaining 250 knots until advised as directed by the ELANR SID by which he was cleared; cited the inability of the aircraft's MFD to display the entire SID without both vertical and horizontal scrolling as a contributing factor to his failure to be aware of the restriction.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

During the climb segment of an IFR flight; the cabin suddenly loss of pressure from FL340. I initiated an emergency descent to 10;000 ft simultaneously notifying ATC of the situation. The oxygen masked were donned immediately and worn until 10;000 ft. The remaining portions of the flight were continued without incident. The landing was uneventful at the destination airport.

Citation II Captain reported a sudden loss of cabin pressure at FL340.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

After the coffee pot leaked; Flight Attendant reported a burning like smell from around the forward oven. No smoke or fumes. Smell stopped after they turned the oven off. We were a few minutes from starting our descent. Since there was no smoke or fumes and the odor stopped I elected to continue with a normal descent and landing. I concluded it was most likely due to the excessive leak from the coffee maker.

Embraer E175 Captain reported a coffee marker leaking into an oven causing a burning smell.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 800; Flight Crew Type 1

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

The Breezy aircraft involved is a two place experimental tandem aircraft which qualifies as a Light Sport Aircraft. The engine is in a pusher configuration. The pilots sit forward of the wing leading edge with the seats approximately 2.5 inches above the ground. There is no cockpit enclosure. The purpose of the flight was familiarization and training. I was occupying the front seat and a CFI the rear seat. The weather at the time of the event was clear and winds were calm.I announced our intentions to taxi to the runway on UNICOM as we began our taxi. Prior to taxiing onto the runway I again announced our intentions; on UNICOM; to take off on the runway and remain in left closed traffic. There was no response to either of my transmissions. After a takeoff roll of about 1;000 FT the aircraft broke ground.After liftoff at approximately 20 AGL I saw a vehicle and two individuals on the runway approximately 2;000 FT ahead. They were not visible from the takeoff end of the runway probably due to the configuration of our aircraft. The CFI took control and landed the aircraft. We rolled to a stop about 50 FT from the vehicle.

A student pilot and his instructor took of in their Light Sport Aircraft and sighted a vehicle and two people on the runway and potentially at risk. The instructor pilot took control of the aircraft and landed; rolling to a stop some 50 FT before reaching the obstacles.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

FAR Part 91 Post Maintenance test flight at Airport ZZZZ. Shortly after takeoff at approximately 1;000 FT AFL; cockpit filled with Moderate to Heavy fumes/smoke with acrid oil scent. Level 3 ECAM warnings triggered with multiple main deck cargo smoke sensors activated. Crew and onboard maintenance technicians immediately donned O2 masks. ZZZZ Tower [was notified]; requested immediate landing Runway XY at ZZZZ. Landing completed 14 minutes after takeoff; and after ECAM and QRH procedures followed; Level 3 ECAM warning ceased within 5 minutes. Normal landing and rollout followed; aircraft observed by [ARFF] for Fire/Smoke indications; none noted. Aircraft not evacuated; taxied back to ramp with fire trucks following as a precaution. [Cause] unknown at this time; under maintenance review.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A300 flight crew reported the cockpit filled with smoke and fumes shortly after takeoff during a maintenance test flight.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 21; Flight Crew Total 488; Flight Crew Type 100

Time Pressure; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

When ferrying my airplane to EDC I elected to make the short hop VFR. Weather at [departure] was marginal but improving with ceilings 1;100 ft broken being reported by ground before taxiing out. I had been at EDC about 45 minutes earlier in my car and observed that the ceiling was 800 ft at that time. KEDC is class G at the surface so I expected to be able to get in with class G VFR minimums.After takeoff from; the ceiling quickly deteriorated as I got closer to EDC. I elected to press on but soon found myself dangerously low and receiving multiple obstacle alerts from my GPS. Rather than risk hitting an obstacle I executed a climbing turn at a high pitch angle to clear the terrain as quickly as possible. This immediately put me into IMC in class E without a clearance or flight plan. I continued my climb northbound to remain clear of any airspace until I broke out of the clouds around 2;800 ft. I then leveled off and called Austin approach for a popup clearance to execute the RNAV 13 approach into EDC. I received my clearance and completed the remainder of the flight without incident.I should have checked the weather at EDC again immediately before taking off since I knew it was marginal. Calling the AWOS would have informed me that the ceilings were too low to fly VFR. Knowing that; I should have either waited for the clouds to lift; or filed IFR from the outset. My get-there-itis stopped me from making the prudent decision of entering the system.I also waited too long to make the decision to turn around. I should have turned around as soon as it was clear the clouds were starting to lower. I pressed on hoping they would improve which pushed me dangerously low and forcing me to climb in IMC without a clearance. Turning around earlier would have allowed me to get a clearance before entering IMC.

M20 pilot reported flying into IMC conditions while trying to fly beneath a low overcast layer.


Workload; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

Distraction; Workload; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

After being assigned a heading to intercept the localizer on the ILS 19 at KTEB; ATC cleared us for the approach. We were established on an intercept heading at 2;000 FT MSL. I armed LNAV and the autopilot captured the inbound course. Once established on the inbound course and approximately three miles outside the FAF; I armed the approach and the autopilot immediately captured the inbound localizer course. The glide slope indicated armed or white GS mode on the PFD. At this point; I noticed the glide slope indicator on the PFD rapidly move from full scale up to full scale down and then full scale back up again. The autopilot captured the false glide slope and the airplane abruptly pitched up from our captured altitude and began to rapidly climb in an attempt to join the glide slope from below. I immediately disconnected the autopilot and began to pitch the noise down to stop the climb. However; our altitude increased between 300 and 400 FT above the assigned intercept altitude of 2;000 FT. This occurred so rapidly that ATC never noticed the altitude deviation nor did we mention it since we were told to contact the Tower for landing clearance. The remainder of the approach was hand flow with the autopilot disengaged. As I continued the ILS approach; I noticed the glide slope indication make another rapid up and down gyration. It is my belief that these erratic glide slope indications are caused by antenna interference from airplanes as they taxi across Runway 19 on their way to Runway 24 for departure. I recommend a statement be added to the TEB Airport Risk Assessment alerting crews to the potential for false glide slope capture when flying the ILS 19 approach.

The Reporter stated that the Glide Slope was not protected because the ceiling was 1;400 FT overcast; visibility 10 miles. When they became VMC they could see aircraft crossing Runway 1 taxiing to Runway 24 for departure. Their Company now has a procedure in place which briefs pilots about the possibility of this type event during Runway 19 arrivals.

As the ILS critical area was not guarded; the GS is apt to be erratic. The pilot flying could have his hand ready to disengage the autopilot at the first sign of erroneous behavior. As it was; there was only a moments delay and it led to an altitude excursion.

A CL604 reported a TEB Runway 19 false glideslope at 2;000 FT prior to TUGGZ which resulted in an abrupt 400 FT altitude gain; most likely the result of departing aircraft taxiing to TEB Runway 24.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 2400; Flight Crew Type 1000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

We were flying 10;000 MSL; on the VXX from ZZZ - ZZZ1. Along our route we were paralleling a few cells; unsure if it was rain or snow. Closer to ZZZ the freezing level was around 9000 ft. As we continued on our route the temperatures began to drop. We were maintaining clear of the clouds until we found ourselves in-between 2 layers with no presence of rain snow. All of a sudden; we began to notice that there was precipitation in between the two layers; we attempted a 30 degree heading change to the left to exit conditions. Prior to flying in-between cloud layers; the area to the left of the VXX appeared clear. As we continued on our heading; we began to pick up ice very quickly. We continued the turn 90 degrees and started a shallow descent down. At this point ATC was requesting us to climb to 10;000 ft for the MIA (Minimum IFR Altitude) and we were unable as our performance was decreasing due to the increase in structural ice and what I assume was induction ice since we also lost about 300 RPMs. We continued a turn to 180 as ATCs vector to a west heading for lower terrain was not putting us in warm enough temps to melt off the ice and we were unable to maintain the current altitude and descending below 9;000 ft. At this point we were flying back towards the an area were mountains would not be an issue; while still continuing to descend and trying to maintain a safe airspeed. After a few minutes of flying and descending; we found some VMC conditions near a mountain top that had a very flat area. We cancelled IFR and decided to descend down into that area and remained clear of the terrain and began to circle and descend into warmer temperatures to try and melt the ice off. We circled at least 10 times and for about 15 minutes before the structural icing was off the wings. At this point; this pocket of VMC conditions was closing up and we made a decision to fly east through a corridor of VMC conditions towards ZZZ2 since it was the closest airport. After flying around the area; the only way in was following the GPS approach in. We were able fly in between layers on the course and eventually found a hole to descend down to minimums through. Once at minimums; we saw the runway and made the circle to land for Runway 24 and although we observed no more structural ice; we still conducted a zero flap approach to land.

C172 Pilot reported weather diversion due to inflight icing conditions with aircraft not equipped with anti-ice protection.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12

Confusion; Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Aircraft X was observed violating the HIO Class D Airspace after departing Starks Twin Oaks Airpark (7S3). The aircraft entered the airspace from the south to about 2 miles south of the airfield. From our control location; I noticed the primary radar return on the STARS; then looked out the window and observed the aircraft out the window. there were several other aircraft in his vicinity and I advised the Local Controller of the airspace violation. Local Controller had to make several traffic calls for the aircraft before Aircraft X finally contacted the Tower over TV Highway approximately 2nm south of the field. The pilot requested to transition northbound through the airspace.There needs to be more communication with 7S3 so that they understand the severity of the issues they are causing by having their aircraft and patrons routinely busting the Class D Airspace.  There needs to be harsher penalties; and more follow up from FSDO so that this stops. It has been going on for more than a year on a routine basis.Do we need to incorporate an LOA with this airfield and HIO? Maybe.The addition of the charted TIMBERS Transition Route may be contributing factor now as well.

ATC Supervisor reported an aircraft entered HIO airspace without a proper clearance. The Supervisor stated this is a continuing problem at this location and some form of communication needs to take place with the personnel at the smaller neighboring airport; 7S3. Per the reporter; air traffic from 7S3 routinely violate the Class D airspace at HIO.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown; Distraction

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Approaching ZZZ approx 30 miles to the south at 10;000 ft speed 250 knots. Received traffic call from ATC reporting aircraft at 12 oclock 9000 ft heading south. While looking for traffic received TCAS caution close 500 feet below and climbing. Caution quickly changed to warning with direction to climb. Executed TCAS procedures climbing over contact. Crew never visually acquired aircraft. Resumed previous clearance at 10;000 ft when called clear. Reported TCAS event to ATC. Be prepared for TCAS events in ZZZ.

Air Carrier pilot reported taking evasive action after receiving a TCAS RA.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 13500; Flight Crew Type 2500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Evacuated; General Maintenance Action

The following is a recall of the events regarding the failure of the nose gear during rollout of a CE-182RG at. This flight was a CFI-Initial reexamination. I was the FAA DPE administering the exam. A pretest and preflight briefing were accomplished and the flight test profile was developed and fully briefed. The profile was to perform normal and soft field takeoffs and landings followed by a short field takeoff and departure to the southwest practice area. Following completion of the flight maneuvers; we were to return to the airport and finish with a short field landing. The applicant completed the preflight procedure. The normal and soft field takeoffs and landings were accomplished with no problems as was the short field takeoff and departure to the practice area. Gear extension and retraction were normal. In the practice area we experienced no problems with the gear until the last maneuver when we could not get a gear down light with the gear extended. Testing of the green light bulb determined the bulb was operational. Additionally; the gear unsafe horn would activate when power was reduced. Applicant cycled the gear a couple of times and performed the emergency gear checklist. Visual inspection of the gear revealed the gear to be down and locked but still no green light and the horn would activate with power reduced. Applicant retracted the gear and headed for the airport. Approximately 5-6 miles from the airport; applicant lowered the gear and visual inspection revealed the gear to be down and locked; but no green gear light and the gear horn would again activate with power reduced. Applicant cycled the gear and performed the emergency gear checklist. Applicant left the gear down and upon entering the pattern advised the Tower Controller of our gear situation. Applicant requested a low approach near the tower so they could take a look at the gear. The tower complied with applicant's request and during the low approach the tower advised the applicant the gear appeared to be down and locked. Applicant reentered the pattern; performed the appropriate checklists; and was cleared to land. Visual inspection revealed the gear to be down and locked; but no green gear light. I instructed applicant to perform a soft field landing which he successfully accomplished. Applicant held the nose off the runway until the lack of elevator effectiveness allowed the nose gear to contact the runway. All three gear remained down and locked until we were nearing the taxiway. Our speed was relatively low at this point however the nose gear failed and the aircraft nose contacted the runway. The applicant and I exited the airplane.I cannot think of anything we could have done differently other than perhaps calling the flight school that owned the airplane and asking to speak with their mechanic prior to landing.

A C-182RG nose gear collapsed during taxi after landing. The nose gear indicated unsafe; but appeared down and locked to the pilot and a Tower controller during a fly by inspection.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 19000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

During taxi in we were told to hold short of Taxiway D and give way to another Air Carrier. When the traffic cleared and we were cleared to the terminal a catering truck came out of almost nowhere; passing a truck at the stop line on the service road; and cut us off so close that the right side of the truck was obscured by the nose of our aircraft. I braked very abruptly and aggressively to avoid a collision. We reported this to Ground Control and were given a number to call the Tower.

An Air Carrier Captain made an abrupt and aggressive stop on ORD Taxiway D to avoid collision with a catering truck driven without regard for other traffic or aircraft.


Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 14.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport; Chart Or Publication

I was in the Tower for familiarity time. Aircraft X called for a VFR clearance; which was then formulated and issued. After read back; the aircraft requested and received a taxi clearance from the ramp to Runway 5. While the aircraft was taxiing; the three of us in the Tower discussed the proper identifier for [their destination]; since it is a source of confusion with the other [airports in the same city]. When we looked back at the aircraft; approximately 15 seconds later; it was observed holding at runway edge; well past the hold line. The pilot acknowledged his error and was allowed to hold there since he was the only active traffic. A moment later he advised ready for departure and was cleared. When he was switched to departure; he conveyed some sort of apology for the error and then left the frequency.This point on the airport is a well known source of runway incursions. Aircraft taxiing off the ramp in that direction have been inadvertently taxiing across the Runway 5 hold line for years and there have been multiple (dozens?) of incursions there. Incursions have involved a varied mix of experience; professional pilots; hobbyists; fixed-wing; and helicopters. The intersection has been heavily modified to prevent errors including twice reconstructing the intersection to make it less confusing; adding runway identification pavement markings; and installing runway guard lights. The hold point used to be identified as an airport Hot Spot on the diagram; but that was removed after the latest reconstruction project was completed last fall. I don't have a recommendation to make; I'm out of ideas.

AZO Tower Controller reported a Cessna aircraft held short of Runway 5; but across the hold short line. The reporter states this is a recurring problem at this location.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

While in cruise the aft flight attendants called the flight deck to report a possible faint electrical smell coming from the aft airplane left lavatory. All cockpit indications were normal. The non-flying pilot reviewed the QRH to look for an applicable procedure. The non-flying pilot reviewed the maintenance logbook for previous related write ups and found none. The non-flying pilot made frequent checks with the aft flight attendants every couple minutes to determine if the smell was getting stronger or dissipating and the flight attendants advised everything was the same; the faint smell was not improving or worsening. During the descent; the flight attendants called to report there was visible smoke coming from under the lavatory sink and they had switched off the water heater. Immediately; the non-flying pilot applied the SMOKE/FUMES/AVNCS Smoke Procedure; leading the pilots to turn off the COMM push button to deactivate the power to the lavatory and galleys; [and] continued to check with the aft flight attendants on the status of the smoke. They advised the smoke was not getting any worse. We continued to landing. At the gate; Maintenance determined the water heater to be faulty and placed the item on MEL. This was a faulty piece of equipment.

During cruise the aft flight attendants called to say that they smelled something unusual in the aft left lavatory. They said it smelled more like electrical than anything else. I asked if it was just in the lavatory or if it could be smelled anywhere else. I asked if they saw any smoke and if it appeared to be getting better or worse. They said it was strongest in the lavatory; but could slightly be smelled in the aft galley and they did not see any smoke. I asked them to monitor and to immediately let me know if it got worse. I called every few minutes to ask if it was better or worse. Each time they said that it was about the same and that they did not see any smoke. They reconfirmed that the smell was like electrical.I sent a message to Dispatch via ACARS to let them know that Maintenance should be notified as we would want to have it checked out [upon arrival]. We referred to the QRH to be prepared to react as things developed. I called again and explained that if there was visible smoke that I would be turning the emergency exit lights on and turning off all power to the galleys; lavatories; etc. I tried to get them to be more descriptive on the smell and how strong it was so that I could determine if I should start removing power.A few minutes later; during descent to land; they called back to say that they opened the panel under the sink and saw smoke. They turned off the power switch to the water heater and called me. I turned on the emergency exit lights and turned off the commercial button per the QRH. We were about 15 minutes from landing at this point; so the nearest suitable airport was [our destination]. I [advised ATC] and requested crash/fire/rescue to be notified. Throughout the whole process; the First Officer was flying and had control of the airplane. He did a great job and managed the flying and ATC while I was off com 1.CFR was lined up and down the runway. As we cleared; we asked if they could see any smoke. They did not. We had already coordinated with ATC that if there was no visible smoke on the outside and no more smoke on the inside; that we would plan to taxi to the gate to deplane. The flight attendants reported that there was no more smoke witnessed. CFR followed us to the gate and 2 firefighters went to the lavatory as soon as the main door was opened. They found only residual smoke odor under the lavatory sink and no hot spots.

Air carrier flight crew reported smoke and fumes from the aft lavatory due to a faulty water heater.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Upon gate arrival at destination ZZZ; I was informed by the Flight Attendant that a passenger asked for water; and was given a full large bottle of water. Unbeknownst to the Flight Attendant; that bottle was reportedly full to capacity with straight clear grain alcohol; the passenger said. The bottle was transferred into the custody of the Gate Supervisor in ZZZ.

Airbus Captain reported that water bottle given to passenger was actually filled with alcohol.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

At approximately XA:15Z the pilot flying noticed we were about 500 feet above our assigned block altitude FLX50-X70 and climbing at 200 FPM. This was brought to my attention; pilot flying quickly corrected the error; and we resumed cruise flight at FLX70. No other aircraft were around us and nothing was said to us by the Center Controller. Flight continued uneventfully.Ultimately both the pilot flying and I were distracted and tired. Both of us had reported in a tiredness the night before after several long tough days. Neither one of us got the amount of quality of sleep we wanted for that day. In addition; we were in an in depth discussion on current events and I believe that added to the distraction. We were in the block FLX50-FLX70 but level at FLX60 when the pilot flying communicated and decided to climb to FLX70. I acknowledged that; but failed to realize that the altitude selector was never reset from FLX60 to FLX70. Under normal circumstances I would have trapped that error; but I believe the aforementioned factors contributed to me missing this detail.This was a breakdown of SOP. Both of us are to blame for letting our guard down and not remaining diligent despite the fact that we had now flown together enough to trust each other. Sometimes it creates more errors when you trust the other person too much; it makes it easier to deviate from SOP. I believe this error was caused by a multitude of factors which have been mentioned above and to prevent that in the future requires more diligence on my part and the part of the pilot flying.

While in the block FLX50-X70; we were level at FLX60. We had become light enough to climb to FLX70 so I notified the FO that I was doing so. For whatever reason; this time I selected the climb mode without resetting the Altitude Selector first. We'd had a couple challenging days with schedules and passengers and were also distracted by a sensitive conversation about COVID-19. We agreed afterward that we were more tired than we realized. I caught the error as we approached FLX75 doing 200 FPM. The last altitude I remember seeing in my scan was FLX68; when I made a subtle mental note that we should be level in a minute. The total deviation was 500 feet and ATC never said anything to us as I descended back down to FLX70. I checked the TCAS both Above and Below on the 50 nm scale and didn't see any aircraft anywhere on the map. Fortunately we were in relatively empty airspace controlled by Center. I don't know why I didn't set the altitude first. That is certainly not normal practice for me so I guess it was the cumulative effect of being tired and being distracted by a conversation about a sensitive subject.Both crew members being more tired than we realized. Being distracted by a sensitive conversation about COVID-19. My deviation from SOP and the FO's failure to monitor the SOP.If any one of the factors of SOP deviation; conversation distraction; or fatigue is removed; it wouldn't have happened. All we can do is try to minimize these threats. Most important is the adherence to SOP; but it's the cumulative effect that got us in this case. Obviously my attention has been refocused on SOP adherence going forward.

Flight crew reported climbing 500 feet above assigned block altitudes and cited COVID-19 conversation distractions and fatigue as contributing factors.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 195; Flight Crew Total 13250; Flight Crew Type 2925

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 223; Flight Crew Type 1493

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Landed on Runway 19L at TPA after a very thorough brief to include any closed taxiways (none listed on ATIS) and the likely route to the gate. Exited the runway to the right onto the closed Runway 10/28 and immediately given directions to taxi via a right turn on November then Lima to the ramp. I was the Captain performing the taxi from the left seat. I looked to the right and saw a taxiway placard indicating 'N' and thought that this was my turn. In reality; taxiway 'N' is parallel to Runway 10/28 and curves at the west end to meet up with this runway. I actually turned onto a closed portion of taxiway 'C' which is between Runway 10/28 and 'N'. Only the short section of taxiway 'C' between Runway 10/28 and 'N' was closed with small barricades the size of curbs in a store parking lot. The barricades were mostly white in color with some red accents and had two red lights on the top. At the time of the incident; there was still daylight but the sun was setting; and the lights were not on. I assume they are activated by a photocell when it gets dark. There was a set of barricades at each end of the approximately 100 feet of closed section of taxiway 'C'. I did not see the first set of barricades and went over them but saw the second set at the other end and immediately came to a stop. At the same time that I was bringing the aircraft to a stop; Tower called and told us the taxiway was closed. The Tower Controller said he would have someone come out to assist us. As we waited; the Tower Controller said that he thought we had gone over the first set of barriers. Neither the First Officer nor I felt anything in the seconds prior to stopping; but I elected to shut down both engines at that time in case there was any damage. After ground personnel arrived on scene and completed an inspection; I was informed that we caught the end of one of the small barricades and had a bolt lodged in the edge of the #1 (left; outboard) tire. The tire was still inflated; so we were towed to our originally assigned gate without further incident.

[Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information.]

B737 flight crew reported taxiing over a barricade after incursion onto a closed taxiway at TPA. Crew reported signage in the area was confusing.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Took off from UNV Runway 6 with showers in the area. Above 2;600 ft. began a right turn. Radar began to paint moderate to severe echoes along the course line. Asked ATC for 5 degree left deviation and went IMC. Asked for an additional 15 degrees left. The plan was to return back to the right to the south east of the weather. Prior to turning right the radar began to depict moderate to severe echoes. Turbulence and rain began to intensify. Began to slow to 250 kts. Autopilot failed. Asked ATC for best action to exit weather. ATC assigned heading 360. In the turn heavy rain and severe turbulence began. Experienced a white flash off the nose accompanied by a faint electrical burning smell lasted approximately 30 seconds. While in the turn to 360 aircraft over banked up to 45 degrees multiple times with Pilot Flying counteracting the bank. Experienced 500 ft. altitude gain. Within approximately 1 minute from established on the 360 heading we exited to VMC. FA (Flight Attendant) called asking about the smell. During the event ATC was busy and very hard to get assistance from. The frequency was congested and the Controller seemed hesitant to allow deviations. After the flight the 360 heading from the controller shows not a good route. Prior to departure crew checked weather and the radar depicted light precipitation with scattered areas of moderate. It appears cells formed and intensified after during departure. In response; we slowed the aircraft asked for vectors. We used the equipment provided and followed SOPs which determined our route was ok. Quickly changing conditions were not detected after departure.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

ERJ-145 flight crew reported severe weather and possible lightning strike during initial climb.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Human Factors; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

Climbing through approximately 2;300 feet MSL we received a 'One-thousand' radio altitude callout. We reported this to Portland Departure and continued our climb. As we passed through approximately 11;600 ft. we received a 'Ten' radio altitude callout at which time our auto-throttles simultaneously disconnected. We reported the event to Seattle Center. I went heads down to report the occurrences to the Company via ACARS and failed to recognize we climbed through FL180 and failed to complete the after take-off checklist; most importantly failed to reset the altimeters to 29.92. We leveled at FL370 for less than a minute with the altimeters set to the departure airport; this put us at approximately FL367. We corrected the altimeters and completed level off at FL370. I got distracted by abnormal radio altitude callouts and auto-throttle disconnect due to 5G interference. I was pre-disposed to think the implementation would be a non-event and was surprised to experience actual interference events. I then rushed to comply with company reporting requirements; which should have waited until the next phase of flight. Suggestions - Delay the company reporting; which causes head down time until level at cruise. I personally needed to maintain better checklist and PM (Pilot Monitoring) discipline during this event.

Climbing through approximately 2;300 feet MSL we received a 'One-thousand' radio altitude callout.  We reported this to Portland Departure and continued our climb. As we passed through approximately 11;600 feet we received a 'Ten' radio altitude callout at which time our auto-throttles simultaneously disconnected.  We reported the event to Seattle Center.  We also messaged our company to report the occurrences. There were no further avionics abnormalities for the remainder of the flight.Cause - Lack of research prior to implementation of 5G network.Suggestions - Shutdown 5G until vetted carefully vetted.

Air carrier flight crew and Center Controller reported malfunctioning radio altimeters during climbout from PDX resulting in an altitude deviation. The reporters made reference to possible 5G interference.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 5700; Flight Crew Type 1200

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were given the TEB8 Departure. We took off; leveled at 1;500 FT on 240 degree heading in FMS mode. Unsure of why Controller asked; 'are you in the turn yet?' I checked compass heading was off approximately 20 degrees difference between the 2 systems. I turned aircraft to 280 degrees heading and climbed to 2;000 FT. No further problems during flight. Not instructed to contact ATC or given a phone number to call upon landing. Just wanted to make sure there was no problem with New York Departure.

An HS125-700 compass system malfunctioned after takeoff on the TEB 8 SID. Consequently the pilot failed to turn to the 280 heading until after an ATC alert.


FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 22L

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

While receiving vectors for final approach to EWR ILS 22L; we requested speed reduction from 250 knots within 5 miles of final approach course at TEB. We were assigned descent to 3;000 feet; slow to 210 knots and heading 160 to join the localizer only. We believe a second assignment to heading 200 degrees to join was blocked and was not heard by us. ATC queried our heading to join and informed us that we had been assigned 200 degrees to join and to now fly 190 knots or greater; but localizer only. No approach clearance. We were unable to get onto the frequency to request lower until after a full dot high of GS. We were finally cleared for approach from well above with a tailwind. The approach was completed within stable approach criteria but we were turned late; slowed late and descended and cleared for approach late. This caused increased difficulty in flying the approach. We both never heard the 200 degree turn to join which was questioned.

B737 pilot reported a congested ATC frequency and receiving late descent; late turn to final approach course; and late clearance to slow airspeed during vectors to ILS at Newark.


While boarding flight; a toddler who was being carried by her mother put her hand on the top of the gate podium plexi-glass; and the glass came loose and fell.  Luckily I was right there and able to catch the sheet of plexi-glass before it struck the mother or child. This could have caused injury.

Customer Service employee reported having to catch the plexi-glass sheet from the podium after it became loose from it being touched by a toddler in the arms of an adult.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

In August I showed for my pairing supposed to begin with a XA:40 showtime for a XB:40 departure. When I showed at the airport at XB:40 AM I saw that I was removed from my original trip-pairing and instead put on a longer 4 leg day starting with a turn. The pairing that Scheduling added would have been illegal to schedule according to current FAR's as it would have been over 13 hours of scheduled FDP. Instead scheduling opted to cut my showtime to just 30 minutes (a XA:40 show for a XB:10 departure...duty end scheduled at XN:25 for a total of 12:45) so that my total FDP would remain below 13 hours. That created additional problems beyond just legality concerns. My crew was never notified that I would show only 30 minutes prior departure. When I got to the gate the plane was already boarded. That violated several policies as follows: Station Policy Reference TB13-03: 'The customer Service Agent will confirm that at least one pilot has determined the aircraft is airworthy and that the required number of flight-attendants are on-board and in position for boarding to begin.' That did not happen since no pilot confirmed the airplane to be airworthy. The General Operations Manual Reference 11-3-5-1 'The Captain will assemble the complete crew compliment and conduct a predeparture briefing prior to the first flight leg of the trip-pairing and at any crew change during the trip.' That could not happen since the plane was already boarded and the Flight Attendants could not leave their stations with passengers on board in order to conduct that briefing.  Aircraft Operations Manual Reference 13.5.2.3 B.1. 'Prior to boarding passengers the first flight of the day as walk around inspection of the aircraft will be performed to assure it's airworthiness.' That did not happen since the FO did not know that I was showing 30 minutes late and since I was not there I could not have delegated it to be done by the FO anyways. By cutting my showtime to 30 minutes prior departure the company did not only circumvent my 13 hour FDP limit as set forth in FAR 117 but also created an avalanche of policy-violations and safety concerns. In addition the scheduled flight-time was over 8 hours and; while still legal according to FAR's; was still a violation of the pilot work-rules. But that will be discussed in a different venue; I suppose! Narrative About Possible Preventative Measures: Do not cut the showtime of the CA to 30 minutes prior departure.That is not enough time to do all the required preflight duties in the proper sequence as required by our manuals. Especially not to circumvent the FAR's so that the crew could operate otherwise illegal trip-pairings. If it means a flight leaves late than so be it...safety and security should always come first. And if the company does not have enough crew-members to staff the flight in order to schedule them within the FAR's limits then the flight just shouldn't operate or they should hire more personnel to mitigate such problems in the future. There seems to be a culture in this company to pressure crew-members to 'just operate the flight' by presenting them with scenarios like the one just described hoping that the crew-members will violate the very procedures that they put in place in order to avoid being called in for a carpet-dance.

This airline Captain describes Crew Scheduling action that circumnavigates and violates the intent of FAR 117 on several levels with specific reference to Company Operating Manual requirements.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 38; Flight Crew Total 38; Flight Crew Type 38

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 1150; Flight Crew Type 250

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was coming back from the third leg of my solo cross-country. I was in the left traffic pattern. All the way down on final I was correcting for the crosswind to land straight in. However; once I landed there was a sudden strong gust and the airplane started turning to the left and I could not correct without upsetting the airplane. I ran into the grass on the left side of the runway near a taxiway and shut down the engine. I informed the tower and they sent out help. Flaps were set at 20 degrees for the approach to maintain better roll control.

Student failed to correct for crosswind gust on roll out from landing. Resulted in airplane exiting the runway into the grass.

Student pilot and instructor reported the aircraft exited the runway into the grass due to crosswind.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Captain tried three times for radio call due to increased; now moderate turbulence at FL280. Captain managed to simulcast each time with either other aircraft or the controller. On fourth call; we heard this from Center's male (aged-sounding) controller: 'You tried to call four times. That's why I ignored you. All altitudes light chop.' Well; obviously not. That's why we called; you unprofessional amateur. Maybe you need to retire or need some retraining on the commonly used call of 'standby.' Pretty fricking simple call that saves a lot of people on that frequency time and gives us a better idea when the people behind us will be free of the potential bodily-damage zone. This controller needs an attitude adjustment and is fortunate I was not on the radio to deliver it instantly. Pathetic. For the controller: We don't ask for different altitudes to explore previously unknown airspace; 'to boldly go where no one has gone before...'. We do it because we have coworkers behind us who are in the most injured group in the industry. Oh; did you bump your desk last week? Get hauled from your building in an ambulance with a compound paper cut? Tragic. Why? Controller needed a nap? Controller needs retirement? Controller needs to realize why his job exists - to help pilots.

Pilot reported problem with Controller not responding to calls.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Flight attendant's 1 thru 4 detected strong musty chemical smell upon final approach into ZZZ which continued through customer deplaning and while cabin cleaners were onboard aircraft. Pilots also detected the odor in the cockpit once we parked at the gate and cockpit door was open. They called Maintenance and followed their SOP's. The aircraft was cleared to return to ZZZ1. Upon final approach into ZZZ1; the same odor appeared again. It was present during deplaning in ZZZ1.

A321 Flight Attendant reported 'a strong musty chemical odor' during final approach.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

FL350 we encountered severe turbulence in IMC. Momentary loss of control led to course and altitude deviations about 30 degrees and 500 ft. We likely entered the tops of building convection not seen on radar. Given the scenario it would be tough to identify how we could have avoided the turbulence. A more thorough preflight weather briefing and communication with Dispatch and ATC could have possibly helped.

Embraer first officer reported altitude and heading deviations caused by unanticipated turbulence.


Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors

After checking in with Chicago Approach; the Supervisor asked us what arrival we were on and we stated FISSK Two. Then asked us about our transition and if we were familiar with the FISSK NOTAM. We were not so we re-reviewed (briefly since we were on approach) the weather pack and discovered the FDC NOTAM on Page 5. We were flying the charted procedure of HALIE Intersection then 292 track to HILLS. The NOTAM buried on Page 5 is 270 track to CGT then 335 heading. CGT is not even depicted on the chart! I didn't really carry on the conversation with ATC since we were concerned with flying the approach and all of my responses were very brief. It was not the time or place to be discussing our error. We proceeded to land uneventfully. After landing; I called Dispatch to let them know about our issue; so they could warn other FISSK arrivals. Bottom line; I missed the FDC NOTAM. We had a MEL issue. The weather had been bad the previous two days and today was an absolutely beautiful day causing me to lower my guard. I learned my lesson. If this NOTAM has been around for a while the chart needs to be changed or eliminated! Developing procedures and then modifying them for long periods of time is asking for safety issues! We should not be filed on this arrival until it is corrected. This should have been on the cover page of the weather pack and even on the ATIS.

On arrival into MDW; we were flying the FISSK 2. On the chart and in the NAV database; after HALIE Intersection you fly a 292 track to HILLS intersection. This is what we were doing just after HALIE. There was a NOTAM however that modified the arrival. Per the NOTAM; after HALIE we should have flown a 270 track to CGT VOR. The Captain and I both failed to remember seeing this NOTAM.The crew could have taken more time with the weather package. We both read it; but read it in a hurry. This was a pretty significant NOTAM in that it totally changed the course on the arrival. I'm NOT blaming the weather package; but if this was on the cover sheet as a highlight instead of on Page 5 it might have got our attention more easily. Flew arrival per chart/FMC database but did NOT modify it per NOTAM.

B737 flight crew reports being informed they are off track on the FISSK 2 RNAV to MDW due to not being aware of a NOTAM modification to the procedure.


TPA Commercial charts 21-1A (for CAT II) and both 21-1B have the same DH for radar (155 FT); but the barometric altitude is different.  I'm thinking one of the charts is wrong by about 50 FT and should be corrected.

Air Carrier Captain believes TPA Commercial charts 21-1A (for CAT II) and 21-1B have the same DH for radar (155 FT); but the barometric altitude is different.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 14

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6; Flight Crew Total 130; Flight Crew Type 30

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft X was cleared to land Runway XYR. Aircraft Y called for departure. The call came out of the speaker so I check to see which freq he was on. Local east and west were combined. He was on Local east freq. I cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff on Runway XYL with a right turn. Aircraft Y read the clearance back correctly. I cleared another aircraft to land. I noticed Aircraft Y was turning on to Runway XYR. Aircraft X was on landing roll. I thought it was better to let Aircraft Y continue the departure than stop the aircraft on the runway. Aircraft X exited the runway. Aircraft Y was given the brasher/twr phone number and later switched to correct freq.

I was landing with full clearance on runway XYR; just after touchdown to my surprise I see an aircraft enter XYR; and proceed to take off. At this point my nose wheel was just touching down; I had not yet applied any brakes when I first see this aircraft taxi directly in front of me. I slammed on the brakes and veer hard to the left; while calling Tower to ask if the aircraft departing on XYR is cleared to do so. ATC replies; no it is not; please exit runway. Regarding the distance between myself and the departing aircraft; I don't know for sure; close enough to shake me up for sure.

Aircraft was cleared for takeoff on left runway; but took right runway instead as another aircraft was touching down on the same runway.


Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

When I sat down at Sector 35 the Controller that I was relieving was talking with the Supervisor about something. For my relief briefing; I was told that we were blocking W157A and W159A at or below FL430; the controlling agency; SEALORD was going home; and that there was an AWACS aircraft out there working some fighters and a refueler. I thought all I had to do was block the airspace. The only other information at the sector was a sheet of paper titled; 'Mission Position Daily Log;' which had call signs; but no other useful information as far as I could discern. A couple of minutes after plugging in; SEALORD called me on the land line to hand off the AWACS aircraft. I asked for clarification. He said that the Center Missions Desk had told them that we would take the hand off on the AWACS aircraft. This was news to me. I called my Supervisor over; and told him what they were trying to do. He said; 'Yeah. We're taking the hand off on the AWACS aircraft.' So I took the hand off. The AWACS aircraft checked on; and said that the guy in back of his airplane doing the controlling was call sign ABCD. I thought that he was controlling the rest of the aircraft in the warning area. Several minutes later; AWACS aircraft calls me up for a clearance to RTB. I wasn't sure what to do. After a little bit; I cleared him back to TIK. On his way out of the area to the east; ABCD called me back and told me that a KC135 would be looking for clearance to RTB shortly; and a single F-15 and a group of F-15s wanted to remain in the warning area to work. So now; the AWACS aircraft is gone; and I don't know who is controlling the rest of the aircraft inside this warning area airspace; nor do I know what any body's clearance is inside. I've started a track on the KC135 and am waiting for him to call to RTB. But his flight plan shows him as a single ship; and I can see additional limited data blocks right with him. I can't even tell the altitudes apart. Meanwhile; I'm busy with my regular traffic in my sector; and I'm ranged out to try and see what's going on in this extra airspace. Eventually; the KC135 called up and requested clearance back to MCF. I'm reluctant because I still see limited data blocks right with him. My Supervisor and the OMIC; are standing right behind me at this point. I turn to them and tell them that I'm not sure what to do here; and ask if they had any suggestions. All I got back was blank stares. So I asked the KC135 if he was clear of the other flights. He confirmed that the single F15 and the group of F15s flights were FL270 and above. He was at FL260. They were diverging and the limits showed altitude separation. The KC135 was encroaching on another sector's airspace. I figured I had to get him on a clearance at least before he got in to Sector 58. So I cleared him back to MCF. I had no assurance that the fighter aircraft were going to remain separated; as I had no idea what they were doing; or what their clearance was. Shortly after; I was relieved for break and told my relief that there were fighters in the airspace; and to miss it. I didn't know who they would call to RTB. It was messed up. I never got briefed on anything prior. It seemed like a very unsafe situation to be put in to. I did what came to mind; but was unsure of what was really happening in the airspace. Not a good position to be in as a controller. It greatly complicated my task. And I didn't even have a D-Side! Don't put controllers in that situation. SEALORD should have stayed the extra hour to work that entire scenario. That situation should not have been allowed to ever happen.

ZJX Controller described a very confused event when improperly briefed as to SEALORD activities in near by restricted areas; the reporter suggesting SEALORD personnel should have remained on duty longer for clarity.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 3093; Flight Crew Type 2000

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

Enroute IFR over ZZZ when engine stopped. Turned back to ZZZ1 and declared emergency.  After establishing best glide; ran emergency checklist.  Found fuel selector on right tank.  The right fuel gage showed 1/8 to 1/4 tank.  Placed fuel selector on both and engine restarted.  Advised ATC that engine restarted.  They asked if I wanted to continue the flight or land at ZZZ1.  I elected to land at ZZZ1.

When the engine of his C172 failed enroute on a ferry flight the pilot initially declared an emergency and configured the aircraft for an emergency landing.  He then noted that the fuel selector was on an empty or near empty tank.  When he selected both the engine restarted.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Early afternoon; aircraft was taxing from the deicing pad to the runway. I was seated in forward jump-seat and aft Flight Attendant was standing in the forward galley when the fire alarm in the forward lavatory was activated. I stowed the jump-seat and the aft Flight Attendant opened the lavatory door to assess the fire alarm. Once the lavatory door was opened I sensed a burnt smell and saw smoke rising towards the ceiling of the aircraft. I contacted the flight deck. I notified them about the activated smoke alarm and possible fire. At that point I was asked if I saw smoke to which I replied 'yes;' I was not asked more details about cabin conditions. I called again and mentioned the need to evacuate passengers from the aircraft in case conditions worsen and was told to do an expedited deplaning. I got on the PA and stated 'Remain calm; we will be deplaning using the main cabin door; leave all of your personal belongings and exit the aircraft quickly.' The aft flight attendant walked to the aft of the aircraft once communicated that we would be doing an expedited deplaning. When the aircraft came to a complete stop I assessed outside conditions and open main cabin door. We commanded passengers to 'release seat belts; get out;' 'come this way; get out; go; go.' Some passengers were grabbing personal items from overhead bins so I commanded over the PA once again 'leave personal belongings and exit the aircraft.' I turned on emergency lights and continued deplaning. Half way through the deplaning process the fire alarm deactivated on its own. Passengers were calm. Then I heard the Captain over the PA state 'evacuate; evacuate; evacuate.' Most passengers were already out of the aircraft so we finished the expedited deplaning.Once everyone appeared to be out of the aircraft the aft Flight Attendant and I did a final walk through; checking lavatories. The First Officer came out of the flight deck and helped with getting passengers out of the aircraft. After grabbing some blankets we exited the aircraft. The First Officer and Flight Attendants worked together to gather passengers together outside. Fire trucks inspected the plane and police escorted passengers into the terminal. I didn't have a jacket so I was escorted into the terminal with passengers. Captain; First Officer; and aft Flight Attendant talked to the fire department. A hidden electrical fire in forward lavatory triggered the fire alarm to go off.

CRJ-900 Flight Attendant reported smoke and odors during taxi resulting in an evacuation.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 450; Flight Crew Type 336

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

I was cleared for a visual approach to Runway 5R at RDU and was told to contact the Tower by the Approach Controller. While no one had recently landed on Runway 5R; there were continuous operations into Runway 5L including a B737 which landed approximately 4 minutes ahead of me and a MD-80 series jet which was adjacent to me when the incident occurred. I was directly on the glideslope for the ILS approximately 1;000 FT AGL when there were a brief couple bumps of moderate turbulence followed about 3 seconds later by several waves of severe turbulence which caused an uncommanded bank of my plane to about 50 degrees right bank. I immediately inputted full left aileron which had no effect as the plane continued to develop increasing bank angle. Then; the turbulence stopped and I was able to recover the plane without further incident. The whole incident probably lasted about 10 seconds. I subsequently landed without incident. I did advise the Tower of the incident after I landed who commented that he was surprised as the preceding planes 'didn't appear high.' I have landed at RDU dozens of times and never experienced anything like this. On a calm night with almost no wind; I can only assume it was wake turbulence but I was surprised to encounter it 1;000 FT in the air from a plane using a parallel runway separated laterally by almost 3;500 FT from the approach I was using. I'm convinced that if it had been much more severe; I may have become inverted and entered an unrecoverable spin.I have never heard a Controller at this airport call a 'caution wake turbulence' warning when a heavy plane is landing on the parallel runway but this experience suggests it is probably warranted in certain situations. It has made me realize that it is probably a good idea for me to always fly a dot or two above the regular glideslope to try to avoid running into similar encounters in the future. I don't think other pilots of small airplanes at RDU routinely do this but it would probably be well advised at any airport with parallel approaches and big planes on the other approach.

C172 pilot reported wake turbulence encounter on approach to RDU from a B737 landing on the parallel runway which resulted in an uncommanded 50-degree bank.


Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Toxic smell in aircraft and bad reactions to odor. Toxic smell was like burning plastic or electrical wires; smell [was] coming mainly out of air vents. Noticed smell before top of descent. Smell was strongest from about row 29 to aft galley; with strongest smell in aft galley. Was asked to smell several locations and also smell the air out of the vents to try to isolate locations where the smell was coming from. Some passengers could also smell the odor. Smell caused symptoms for me such as; headache; saying weird things 'throw your purse underneath the table in front of you' when asking a passenger to stow bag under the seat. Or; 'there's an odor in the smell' when a passenger asked what was going on. Pilots started smelling in flight deck too but was hooked up to oxygen. Decided to do land. Descent was very fast. Made ears hurt really bad; plug up and ring. Also felt short of breath during descent. After landing; left ear was very plugged and could barely hear out of it. After landing and deplaning and speeding with medics/officers; Supervisor met us. Supervisor mentioned the aircraft looked foggy inside when he was coming in. Supervisor had us fill out papers and call [medical support]; which they found us a hospital to be seen at about an hour later. Supervisor went to emergency room with us. We had several tests done after midnight. We were finally release from hospital.

Flight Attendant crew reported smells like burning plastic fumes in passenger cabin as well as experiencing health issues. Flight Attendant crew was medically evaluated by after landing.


Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

FO PFD Displayed a red X on the ALT tape at 56 KTS. We aborted takeoff on runway; returned to the gate and called Maintenance. Everything was handled per SOP. ADC malfunctioned during takeoff roll.

EMB145 First Officer reports a rejected takeoff due to a red X on the altitude tape at 56 KTS.


Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Distraction; Workload; Fatigue; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

At ERLIN we were switched to Approach. We had briefed the Runway 8L ILS PRM approach well back before descent. Once on approach inside ERLIN; we were issued the Runway 9R ILS PRM with transition...We went to set the FMS up for this and brief it and got toward KOLTT and hadn't yet executed the arrival properly because we couldn't get all the waypoints in the approach. There were two similar discontinuities in the waypoint sets and we had to go back and forth a few times to set the right one in place. By the time we had this figured out; we were east of course between KOLTT and NAVVY by full deflection. We turned back on [course] once we got it figured out and were not queried by Approach. The approach and landing continued without further incident.We set up for Runway 8L and didn't anticipate the possibility of receiving Runway 9R as an approach. Thus; we let our guards down. We need to manage that better by anticipating the possibility of not getting the approach we expect and have it ready in our minds.Anticipate and brief it so we are familiar. Know that there will be multiple discontinuities in the setup AFTER an approach is already executed.

It was night; last day of a 4 day trip; last leg of a 5 leg day. Tired; and ready to go home. The main threat was the time we were given to get everything in. Once we received Runway 9R we were very busy trying to get it correctly loaded. At this same time we were given a descent to 9;000 FT from 12;000 FT. So we were in a descent and trying to load it up. We had probably 1-2 minutes to get it in before KOLTT. Unfortunately with the discontinuity and confusion over fixing the continuity the first time we flew pass our proper course while in the turn to NAVVY.

ATC assigned the ATL Runway 9L KOLTT RNAV after the crew briefed the Runway 8L ERLIN RNAV and during the descent to 9;000 FT a track deviation occurred while the crew hurriedly entered the FMS arrival change which generated numerous route discontinuities.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

There was a [Deferred Maintenance Item] for the aircraft weight and balance system. During preflight; my FO (First Officer) noted that there was no expanded green band in the CG window. The FMC called for a stab trim setting of 3.6. It was in the green band; but very close to the edge of the green band in the CG window.During takeoff; sometime after 80 kts.; I saw the STAB CONFIG warning message; which I ignored. Shortly after that; I heard the Audible Warning; along with the Warning Light. I rejected. We stopped a long way from the end of the runway. We did not recall the speed at the time of the reject. Tower called us and asked if we needed assistance. We told him that we didn't; and that we were taxiing back to the blocks. After clearing the runway; we looked up the Brake Heating chart and estimated that we were in the Caution Zone. I taxied slowly; and used the brakes as little as practical. One wheel went up to a heat index of 5; and we got the BRAKE TEMP EICAS message and ran the checklist. During the taxi in; that wheel went down to a 4; and it was at a 3 when we blocked in.During taxi in; we noted that the FMC was now calling for a stab trim setting of 4.5. After blocking in; while talking to the Duty Pilot; I told him about the FMC stab trim change; from 3.6 during preflight; to 4.5 while taxiing in. He said that he had heard of this before. He asked us to run the performance again; and the FMC displayed a stab trim setting of 4.5.After blocking back in; I called the Dispatcher and told him that with my rest before the flight; the late hour of the flight; and my stress level after the reject; which I would be needing to go back to the hotel and rest before further duty. I ended up calling fatigued after we were done working with Maintenance on our aircraft anomaly.Fix the aircraft weight and balance system; instead of delaying the Maintenance item by putting it on a [Deferred Maintenance Item] status; or load the plane so it is not close to the edge of the CG range.

B747 Captain reported a rejected takeoff when the STAB CONFIG warning message appeared.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Human Factors; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related

After wearing a mask for several hours; I get severe headaches.  I believe in washing my hands and not touching my face.  Wearing a mask and watching others; everyone touches their faces more than ever before.  How is this healthy?  It is just like the CDC stated in March that we should not be wearing masks because we would touch our faces too much and stuff (germs) would be on masks.  It is so unhealthy for a healthy person to wear a mask.  It drops off our nose and anxiety sets in because if someone sees and takes a picture; airline may fire us.  Then I touch my face to move it back up.  Not to mention; I have to change masks at least 10 times due to talking/shouting because no one can hear me and my mask is wet.  I also feel uncomfortable not knowing who my flying partners are and especially my cockpit crew; as I cannot see their face.  This is an obvious security issue. Airline needs to accommodate those who cannot wear; especially the disabled.  The CDC even states that wearing a mask during the fires in California wouldn't help because the particles are too small and would get through.  Guess what?  Corona particles are even smaller; so therefore we are being lied to about masks; they will get through obviously as well.

Flight Attendant reported several concerns with having to wear a face mask.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

I was descending Aircraft X AND Aircraft Y as per LOA with L30. Nellis pointed out the Aircraft Z and Aircraft W as VFR. I questioned whether or not their aircraft would be going through my arrivals and they questioned it with; 'Don't you know where FYTTR is?'. I should have referenced my two aircraft but I already know that it would be for nothing. Aircraft Z and Aircraft W are in a flight status that basically ignores all commands by the controllers working at Nellis. So I stopped my traffic and had to apreq to L30 my aircraft violating LOA. There have already been numerous requests and an airspace change to avoid military aircraft cutting through the arrival aircraft in this area and nothing is changing significantly for the long run.

ZLA controller describes a situation that is ongoing where VFR aircraft worked by another facility are going through arrival aircraft flight path.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 1400; Flight Crew Type 750

Confusion; Distraction; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object

Aircraft was being used for tailwheel instruction.  Taxi was being performed.  Upon turning on taxiway; brakes were applied in an attempt to maintain directional control; there was insufficient braking to maintain direction or stop the airplane.  This resulted in striking small sign with prop after engine was stopped.

Flight Instructor reported that during a student taxi lesson in a tail wheel aircraft; directional control was lost and the aircraft made contact with a taxiway sign.


Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was pilot not flying; Captain was pilot flying. We were originally cleared to MCO via the PIGLT4 RNAV STAR; direct [to] OCF [thence via the OCF] transition. Shortly thereafter; we were re-cleared direct OTK and remainder of PIGLT 4 arrival. After about 2-3 minutes; the Controller inquired if we were direct to OTK. Initially I replied we were but after review of our course; it did not quite make sense. The Captain reprogrammed direct to OTK which required a 15-20 degree heading change and resulted with OTK as the only active waypoint. We had followed the normal verification process before the original execution; however; somehow the selection of several abeam points between our present position and OTK resulted in a course error that went unnoticed.Sometimes the selection of abeam points are so close together; it can cloud the actual 'cleared to' fix. A more thorough and careful review and verification on my part is essential!

Next time I would expand the map to a larger scale to verify the new course change in addition to checking the course in our normal procedures.

When ATC changed their clearance from direct to OCF; cleared for the PIGLT RNAV STAR to cleared to OTK for the STAR the flight crew of a B737-800 failed to confirm their reprogramming of the FMC and a track deviation; caught by ATC; resulted.


Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Total 8431; Flight Crew Type 2569

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We arrived at the aircraft and were informed that on the inbound segment a passenger had lost a cellphone and it was behind a panel in the cabin. Maintenance in ZZZ was planning to defer this and send us back to the mainland with the phone lodged in whatever location it was in. After a brief discussion the Captain and I both felt this was unacceptable due to the risks posed for a Li-ion battery fire. We could not ensure the phone and battery would be safe from damage where it was and if it caught fire might be impossible to extinguish or retrieve to put in the fire bag as provided. All of this was magnified by the fact that we'd be close to 3 hours from any suitable airport should this occur at the critical point. We insisted the phone be located and retrieved before departing on the ETOPS segment. To me it seemed counter intuitive to having all this training on Portable Electronic Device (PED) fires; providing us with gloves and bags to store devices should they catch fire; but insisting that we launch across the water with no nearby diversion alternates with a PED that could not be retrieved or dealt with should the worst case occur. Maintenance ultimately found the phone and we departed.

First Officer reported  a passengers' cell phone became lost in cabin on inbound flight creating a potential fire hazard. Maintenance ultimately retrieved prior to departure.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

While in cruise with the autopilot on we were asked if we had the new STAR into COS. We did and ATC told us to expect that soon. We were given a pilots discretion descent from FL340 to FL270. I had not begun my descent. I started briefing the arrival and descent planning. In the middle of this we were cleared direct OZZZY which is on the STAR and that at FL270 to descend via the arrival. We were over LAA when cleared. I selected HDG on the FGCP while I loaded the arrival in the FMS. We were heading 310. I correctly loaded the arrival in the FMS and selected direct to OZZZY. The track to OZZZY was 300. I failed to select LNAV on the FGCP so the aircraft remained on the last heading. I continued with my arrival briefing and about the time I was finished briefing ATC asked if we were direct OZZZY. Realizing what happened we told them we were now turning direct OZZZY. ATC told us to turn to heading 290 immediately for traffic. He also told another aircraft to turn to a heading because of us. When I looked at the TCAS it was set to 20 mile range and I could see an aircraft but it was between 10-20 miles away and only blue in color. Shortly after ATC instructed us to proceed direct OZZZY which we did. The flight ended without further incident. The threat was present when we were given and accepted a new route. ATC asked if we had the new STAR which we did and so he cleared us via that. We anticipated and started briefing the entire procedure but only ended up being cleared to OZZZY and one waypoint after that remained on the arrival. The error present was the lack of verifying the aircraft was navigating according to the new flight plan. I selected HDG while I loaded the new route but did not select NAV after the route was loaded. I verbalized the new route and what to expect for the arrival but I failed to verify the airplane was navigating and the Captain failed to cross check after confirming the new route that we were in fact navigating on that route.

EMB145 First Officer reports a track deviation after being cleared direct to a fix and entering it into the FMC but failing to select NAV on the FGCP. ATC detects the error and issues headings to the reporter and another aircraft to avoid conflict.