Workload; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 11500; Flight Crew Type 550

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

During taxi out for takeoff at SFO we were given a runway change from 1R to 28L. The First Officer took responsibility of changing the FMC to the new runway while the Relief Pilot and I took the responsibility of taxiing the aircraft to the new runway. Upon crossing the runways 1L and 1R the Relief Pilot assisted the First Officer in reprogramming the FMC for the new runway; new Noise Abatement Departure Procedure 1 (NADP1) departure and the new SID for 28L. I asked the IRO to confirm that the runway analysis for 28L was included in the paperwork in case the performance calculations for [Runway] 28L did not show up in time for departure. The Relief Pilot confirmed that we were good for a Runway 28L departure and even confirmed; with the back of the briefing card; that we were ok to use the onboard performance calculations for a runway change. Upon reaching Runway 28L we all confirmed that we were able and ready to accept a departure. Runway 28L was verified to be correct during the initiation of the First Officer's takeoff roll. Upon setting thrust and after checking the engine instruments I referenced the airspeed indicator to make my '100 KTS' call. No green lines for the V-speeds were present and after glancing at the FMC takeoff page I noticed no numerical values in the V-speed locations; only dashes. I elected to reject the takeoff because the aircraft was still below 100 KTS (around 90) and there was around 10;000 FT of dry runway left to stop the aircraft. We exited the runway at Taxiway Foxtrot; completed the RTO Checklist; and referenced the brake cooling chart. The decision was made to use a conservative number of 23 minutes of brake cooling (110 KT column) and Dispatch was notified of the situation and expected FOB for the subsequent takeoff. None of the 3 cockpit crew members can recall seeing amber 'no V-speed' warning on the airspeed indicator none of us could make a conclusion on why there were no V-speeds during the takeoff roll.

This was my first ETOPS flight and first flight with a Relief Pilot. We performed a normal FMC and cockpit setup at the gate for a 1R departure; including the extra items required by ETOPS. I went heads up to cross the 1's; then the Relief Pilot assisted me in setting up the FMC for the NADP1 VNAV climb as I had not yet performed that procedure in my limited experience on the 737. There was no line at 28L and Tower promptly cleared us for takeoff. Although I felt that we were ready for departure; I had not had the normal minute or two of downtime on the taxi to take one last look at everything like I usually do. I verified that the Captain was ready for departure due to the busy taxi and accepted the takeoff clearance.Having replayed the event many times in my mind; I am still quite certain that the speeds were correctly entered; but having received three different weight manifests in a relatively short period of time; it is possible that I missed it. However; I am certain that the no VSPD notation was not displayed next to my airspeed indicator prior to takeoff. In addition to my certainty about this; I don't see any way three pilots could miss this yellow caution message prominently displayed in two different locations. I think the most likely scenario involved the speeds dropping out at some point during the initial takeoff roll for unknown reasons.

A B737 flight crew rejected their takeoff when the Captain noted no V-speed settings were displayed.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 28; Flight Crew Total 4237; Flight Crew Type 135

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

The last time I flew this aircraft before today was [Date] a flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. The airplane was flawless.Memory items leaving the runway; pitch trim 2.1 [units]; speed brake retracted; flaps up all accomplished.The airplane remained in the hangar except for a Jeppesen update and insertion of new 32GIG SD cards pursuant to Honda Service Bulletin 420-42-015.The insertion of the SD cards are nowhere near the trim hat on either yoke and the standby trim was never activated.Today was my first flight since that date and when I pre-flighted the cockpit I noticed that instead of 2.1 the pitch trim was full nose up about 13 units at the bottom of its travel.I re-trimmed to 2.1 and to the best of my recollection the roll and yaw trim were where they should have been.There was no reason that I knew for any of the trims to have been moved and the aircraft was locked at all times.Takeoff was normal but as I climbed out and engaged the autopilot the airplane suddenly rolled right and the AP (Autopilot) disconnected.I counteracted the roll and trimmed left wing down.I was able to regain control but when queried by ATC (Air Traffic Control) I agreed to [request priority handling] and asked for an immediate return to the airport.ATC gave vectors to final and the landing was uneventful.I contacted Honda and was told that this had been reported twice before but they had ascribed it to a child in the right seat. I fly single pilot and I have no children in the right seat or anyone else usually.I explained the circumstances and Honda agreed to contact a Honda maintenance provider to have them check the trim system. I will also follow up with Honda engineering because there is not a chance in the world that I inadvertently put full nose up trim in my airplane or full right wing down roll trim. In fact the Honda Jet uses very little trim at all in all configurations. There is no pre-flight procedure or other that I am aware of where a pilot would roll trim full nose up or full right wing down.I have learned that if one trim is out of whack; make certain all the others haven't been reset out of limits by any problem in the airplane before takeoff. I also learned that electronic airplanes have glitches even the factory doesn't understand. That isn't comforting.

Pilot flying Honda Jet reported trim problems during climb out.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Light Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.5

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I shortcut Aircraft X; going to PHL; direct DQO at 11;000 because traffic was light.  This flight path took the aircraft over the top of R4001C which is active continuously up to and including 10;000 to contain the JLENS Aerostat (Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System).Upon passing over the restricted area; the Aircraft X pilot reported the Aerostat was less than 500 feet below him.  That report was confirmed by Aircraft Y pilot who was vectored around the restricted area but was asked to observe the altitude.  In fact the Aircraft Y pilot said it appeared to be at his altitude. This means the [operating agency] is not remaining within the confines of the restricted area with the Aerostat.  The safety concerns of this cannot be overstated.  The Aerostat is essentially an antenna; and the military is raising it above the restricted area.The military needs to keep the transponder on the Aerostat turned on so we can at least be aware of the altitude of the JLENS.  At least then we'll know when they are raising it above the restricted area without coordination.

A Potomac TRACON (PCT) Controller reports of a tethered balloon [Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System] that is above the altitude is should be at as reported by an aircraft in the vicinity.  Balloon does not have a transponder on it to show altitude.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I failed to issue a new clearance limit to an aircraft. The aircraft landed without incident. A C182 had been in my airspace for about 20 minutes. During that time; he requested tops; altimeter; and other weather several times. I noticed him deviating from course and asked him. He came back and requested a reroute. He then deviated again a bit; and it seemed like he was having trouble with his GPS. He asked the wind at the airport; and I issued it. He told me he was iced up and wanted to land. I gave him a heading and altitude to maintain; gave him an approach to expect; and asked him to report the ATIS. My Coordinator and I began to have a disagreement on the next action; so we argued a bit over it. The pilot started asking several questions about the approach; and it became clear that he was confused and not really sure what was going on. He did know approaches or runways; couldn't find the ATIS; etc. He was deviating wildly from the headings I gave him; so I started focusing on that while reading him the weather; explaining in more depth which approach to expect; and coordinating with another Controller. At that time; we started a runway change. In all the time I talked to him; I forgot to actually clear him to the airport. Again; he landed without incident.

TRACON Controller described a confused navigation event when an aircraft experienced icing and had difficulty complying with ATC clearances.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 213; Flight Crew Total 8040; Flight Crew Type 5998

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Other

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused

FOM (Flight Operations Manual) ACARS message at initialization says no DG (Dangerous Goods) planned. Service Info Summary says DG IS planned. Confirmed with station DG is in-fact on board. I then request Planned DG Summary be sent to aircraft. ZZZ Operations says they can't do that as everything is now automated and they can't send manually. A few minutes later a representative from the [Operations Control] arrives in the cockpit. He tries to explain that this is a known anomaly and that we are OK to continue. He explains our DG falls under the 'exemption' referenced in the FOM. I ask him for a documentation that shows the DG on board is exempt. He cannot produce one. He talks over me and tries to appeal to the rest of my crew to take the aircraft over my concerns. I inform [the Operations Control] Representative we will need a reference or the DG will need to be removed. He leaves the cockpit. I then call Ramp and ask the status on the DG Summary form. They say to call Operations. I call Operations; they say to call the Ramp. I then decide we are getting nowhere; we have a line of thunderstorms bearing down on us; and a [Out of Duty] time to monitor; and the quickest solution is to have the DG removed from the aircraft. I call Operations again and tell them I am refusing the DG and to remove it. Operations tells me they are 'not doing that today'. I then notice I have a missed call on my cell phone from my Chief Pilot. I try to call him back and that goes to his voice mail. I then call the [Duty Manager] and that call goes to voice mail. A short time later I get a return call from the [Duty Manager] who is already aware of the situation. She explains she understands the issue and supports my decision to remove the DG 100%. Finally Ramp unloads the pallet of DG and we get underway.

B767 Captain reported refusing Hazmat cargo due to a communications breakdown between flight crew and Dispatch; Load Planning regarding erroneousness Dangerous Goods Hazmat documents.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 152; Flight Crew Total 12853; Flight Crew Type 3307

This is the 3rd time I have been presented with cargo containing lithium batteries out of ZZZZ. The load manifest states that the items are 'accepted' yet when I have inquired with both load planning and DG hotline; no one can tell me what we're carrying. There is no guidance in the FOM other that a discussion about what lithium batteries may not be carried in the cargo hold. Until there is some sort of guidance I will continue to refuse this cargo.

B777 Captain reported refusing Hazmat cargo containing Lithium Ion batteries as cargo shipment.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

On pushback from gate; ground crew asked me to set brake because they had an issue with the tow bar. It was difficult to understand what they were saying outside of normal communication procedures because the tug operator spoke poor English. The ground crew was in the process of switching tow bars when I selected the external horn and informed the crew to remove all equipment and provide me a wing walker for the turnout as I had plenty of room to accomplish the taxi out. I watched the upper ECAM and waited for the 'NW STRG DISC' message to extinguish as confirmation of pin being removed. I also received a 'wand up with pin flag in hand' signal/salute. Taxi out was normal. On climbout; Center called and said the ground crew asked them to inform me that the nose wheel steering disconnect pin was still in the nose gear. I immediately knew this was false as I had confirmed before taxi out that it was removed and also the aircraft would not be able to be taxied with the pin installed. I contacted ops on company frequency and informed them that no pin was in the nose wheel. Again; I had a hard time understanding them as their English was poor.  I then received a message from Dispatch and my understanding was they had lost the pin; assumed it was on the nose gear and then later found the pin. As a precaution; on arrival; I inspected the nose wheel and found no discrepancies. As a side note; it appeared that the tow bar being used was much smaller than normal. The tow bar they were going to swap it with was much larger.Cause - Poor English and communication.

Air carrier Captain reported communication issues with the pushback crew resulted in the flight crew being advised during flight there was confusion as to whether or not the tow bar pin had been left in. It was later determined the ground crew had lost the pin after removal.


Beechcraft King Air Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 925; Flight Crew Type 700

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

While doing my run up at on Runway 27R I heard a King Air call ground and say he was ready to taxi; but needed a few minutes before departing. The Ground Control cleared him to cross 27R and hold short of 27L for his 'run up'. Meanwhile; I was departing on 27R for touch and goes.On final I saw the King Air in the short part between 27R and 27L. Just as I was about to touch down on the numbers on 27R I experienced a severe crosswind from the left that lifted the left wing to about 45 degrees. I was able to recover without the right wing touching the surface. I then heard the Tower clear the King Air to taxi for takeoff.While climbing out I called the Tower and said the King Air caused a lot of turbulence during my touchdown. He said 'sorry about that'. Chain of EventsThe problem arose when ground control placed the high-performance twin engine plane perpendicular to the runway only 100 feet from the numbers. The prop wash from the King Air was strong enough to disrupt my flare on Runway 27R and cause a severe hazard.Corrective ActionsI suggest the tower controllers refrain from holding twin engine planes and jet aircraft between the two runways when 27R is in use. This runway has extensive training activity and would this scenario would be a hazard to students.

AA1A pilot reported experiencing an uncommanded 45 degree bank on short final from prop wash associated with a taxiing turboprop aircraft.


Other / Unknown; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Ground Personnel

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Excursion Taxiway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Weather

I was taxiing from the [FBO] hangar to gate; in preparation for boarding of flight to ZZZ. It was the first flight of the day; as all previous flights had been cancelled due to winter weather. Because all airport surfaces were covered in snow and ice; snow removal men and equipment were at work on the taxiways and ramps. After I contacted ground and requested a reposition from the hangar to the terminal; I was assigned an escort operations truck to guide me to the terminal as surface markings were nearly impossible to see being covered in snow; and snow removal equipment were busily plowing surfaces nearby. After following the operations vehicle ahead of me to the terminal on taxiway C we were quite close to terminal. The truck ahead of me was going faster than I felt comfortable keeping up with due to the slippery taxiway conditions; so there was about a 50 yard gap between his truck and my airplane. As we approached the ramp close to gate; I took in the situation going on around me. There were lots of plows; trucks; and snow blowers quickly moving about the ramp. I noticed one plow heading perpendicular to my plane; and moving quite quickly. I instinctively stopped the aircraft; just in case the plow for some reason didn't see me; or his brakes failed; as it was quite slippery on all surfaces. I'm glad I stopped; because the plow kept going right in front of me. I'm not sure if the plow did not see me; or if he just assumed I would yield to him plowing; but the Ground Controller quickly notified the operations escort truck in front of me that the plow had just 'cut me off.'The plow operator didn't respond; and continued plowing normally; leading me to believe he had seen me and just assumed I would stop for him. The plow had just come from the area in front of gate; and plowed a clearing into taxiway C; right in front of me. At this point; my escort truck was over 100 yards ahead of me; and waiting for me to follow its course. However; this course would lead me close to more moving plows and trucks; and I did not feel comfortable proceeding ahead. So I continued remaining stopped. Because there was so much activity straight ahead of me; and none to the right of me; (which is where my gate and final destination are located) I asked the controller if I could make a right turn; and taxi straight to my gate. The Ground Controller asked my escort if this was ok. The escort replied that it was ok. The Ground Controller then instructed me to 'proceed at my own risk' to the gate. I taxiied the aircraft straight to the gate; bypassing taxiway A; and hazardous snow removal equipment and blowing snow from the machines. A cape air ramp agent was awaiting my arrival with lighted wands; and I was able to park the aircraft normally.This morning; a [Company] employee notified me a 'taxiway excursion' report may be filed for what I had done [a few days earlier]. I wasn't sure what he was referring to when he first told me; then I realized that aircraft do not normally taxi between [the] gate and taxiway C. When I taxied the airplane on this course on Tuesday night; I did not realize this. It was very dark out; all ground markings were completely covered over in snow. In addition; there was no visible difference between the taxiway and ramp; as it was all just paved asphalt with a layer of snow on top of it. Because of this; I saw no threat to my aircraft or any other ground equipment; and decided it would be the safest option rather than taxiing on taxiway A; close to fast moving plows and blowers. In doing so; I did not realize I had taxied my aircraft over an area where aircraft are not normally allowed to taxi. This exact area (although not specifically marked on airport diagram) is located between the East End of the terminal apron; and the South End of taxiway C.Loss of positional awareness of taxiway and ramp during winter weather conditions; and approval from air traffic control to proceed at my own risk through an area not normally authorized for taxiing aircraft.Not being allowed permission to taxi through an area not normally authorized for taxiing. Lights illuminating an area not authorized for aircraft taxiing. Designated marking on airport diagram saying there is a no-taxi zone between taxiway C and terminal apron.

Pilot reported a snow plow cutting off aircraft while taxiing to gate.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I was working Local and Ground control positions combined.  Conditions were VFR and Rwy 13 was in use.  I had approved Vehicle X onto Runway 13 for maintenance work.  A few minutes later I also approved Vehicle Y onto Runway 13 for maintenance work as well.  I had both vehicles written down onto my scratch-pad and also had the 'Firetruck' (a local memory-jogger aid our facility uses to delineate when a vehicle has been approved onto the active runway) out and displayed on my strip-bay and had activated the RIPD (Runway Incursion Prevention Device) which is an aural aid to remind the controller there is a vehicle on the runway.  Aircraft X was inbound for the Visual Rwy 13 approach from the SW.  The aircraft was still about 10 miles out on a modified right-downwind for Runway 13 when he check onto the Tower frequency.  I told Aircraft X to continue inbound; vehicle exiting the runway.  I instructed Vehicle X to exit the runway at taxiway Echo and report off the runway.  Vehicle X acknowledged and proceeded to exit; but had not reported off yet.  Meanwhile; a fellow controller asked me to ask the pilot of Aircraft X if he could say 'Hi' to a friend/fellow controller from another facility who just happened to be a passenger on Aircraft X.  I said 'Sure; will do.'   I then got the report from Vehicle X that he was off the runway and holding short.  I de-activated the RIPD; removed the 'Firetruck' from my strip bay; and I then passed the message onto Aircraft X to say 'Hi' to the passenger/controller from the one controller who was in the operating quarters at the time.  The pilot of Aircraft X politely said they would pass the message along.  After that I said 'Thank you'; issued the wind and told Aircraft X he was cleared to land Runway 13.  About 5 seconds later Vehicle Y came on ground frequency and said they had been approved to work on Runway 13 but was now quickly exiting the runway for the arriving aircraft. I replied back to FAA Mobile vehicle with 'Roger'. As soon as Vehicle Y keyed up I suddenly then remembered that I had approved him onto Runway 13 but had forgotten to give him a control instruction to exit the runway prior to clearing Aircraft X to land.  I did another visual scan of the runway to ensure there were no other vehicles/personnel on the runway and there was not.  Aircraft X landed without incident and I taxied him to the gate.  I later discussed the incident with the operator of Vehicle Y.  I apologized to him that I had forgotten about him and informed him I was going to file an report on the incident.  He told me that is why he leaves the volume on his radio turned up when he is outside of his vehicle working so he can hear transmissions.  The reason I believe this event happened was because I was not 100% focused on the task-at-hand of working the position.  I am a developmental and I am currently training on radar.  While working Local control I was writing notes regarding the training session I had just had on radar an hour earlier in the day. While there is no additional visual/audio aid that I could implement that we already are not using as a facility (i.e. firetruck on strip board & RIPD); much of it comes down to my own ability to focus on the job at hand.  By allowing myself to focus too heavily on the previous training session I was in turn not providing 100% of my attention and alertness to the position I was working.  I believe this event has forced an awareness into me that I might have become too complacent working the positions I am certified on and a need to give 100% of myself to the job where I haven't been.

MLI Tower Controller describes a situation where he almost forgets about a vehicle on the runway while an aircraft is on short final to the runway.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 141; Flight Crew Total 439; Flight Crew Type 87

My student and I were doing practice landings on Runway 27 at Carlisle Municipal Airport (4M3). 4M3 has two Runways; 9-27 and 18-36; with the arrival ends of Runways 36 and 27 crossing each other. We made our appropriate radio calls downwind; base; and final. There was no other traffic observed or heard over the radio. Upon reaching short final for Runway 27; the following occurred.My student and I were on short final to Runway 27; approximately 100-200 yards from the threshold at about 100-150 feet AGL. A crop duster was on a path to cross the threshold of Runway 27 on an approximate heading of 020; 200 feet AGL; and 300 yards to our southwest. He was to our left. Due to his approach and speed to the airport and our traffic pattern position; we were unable to spot him earlier. Upon spotting the crop duster; the only feasible maneuver to avoid collision was to keep flying the approach; descend below the crop duster; and have him fly over us. We landed without any further incident or issue. The crop duster never reported its position around the airport; and it did not do any evasive maneuver to avoid us. After flying directly over us; he continued to drop his product on the field directly east of the airport. Based on the crop duster's position and speed in relation to us; continuing the descent seemed like the only reasonable option to avoid collision. If we climbed; we would cross over him; if we turned left or right we would go straight into his path.I believe this type of issue can be prevented in the future if all airplanes working in and around airports give timely position reports over the radio. Requiring radio communication around airports; regardless of the class of airspace; will greatly improve safety. If radios cannot be mandated; then ADS-B for all airplanes regardless of airspace can also be beneficial.

Small aircraft flight instructor reported an NMAC with a crop duster on approach to 4M3; a non-towered airport.


Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

[We] noticed a great deal of glare from the western most solar generator at the Ivanpah Solar Farm. We were flying the SHEAD 8 departure from Runway 7L and experienced significant glare from approximately MINEY until approximately 20 miles east of SHEAD. The glare was significantly stronger than from the other two stations and appeared to be due to poor aiming of the mirrors. In addition to overall glare; there were spots of glare separate from the rest of the mirror farm. While we were westbound; and the glare was more of a distraction; it would have been very difficult for us to fly southbound and pick out traffic from below and/or have to stare into that light. We mentioned the glare to LAX Center. The flight continued normally after SHEAD.

An air carrier pilot climbing through approximately FL180 on the LAS SHEAD 8 RNAV SID commented on the Solar Farm glare while flying northwest between HITME and SHEAD intersections around early afternoon.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 7250; Flight Crew Type 25

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 4200; Flight Crew Type 300

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was acting as SIC on a trip from ZZZ-ZZZ1. We were at FL400 and given an initial descent to FL350 with an expedited descent through FL380. When the Captain retarded the throttles we received a caution light alerting us that we had a pressurization issue. We alerted ATC that we needed to continue our descent to 15;000 ft. The frequency was crowded and ATC did not acknowledge our request for lower. I broadcast for a 3rd time and another pilot told ATC 'Someone is [requesting priority handling]; everyone standby.' At that point we were able to convey our [request] to ATC and were issued a continued descent down to FL240. Before leveling off; we were given a descent down to our requested 15;000 ft. Once we got lower the aircraft pressure stabilized and we were able to continue the flight with no other issues. The aircraft; nor passengers or crew were damaged or harmed during this event.

I was acting as PIC on a trip from ZZZ to ZZZ1. We were cruising at FL400 when given our initial decent to FL350 but to expedite through FL380. Upon our initial descent; we had a pressurization caution. Because of our high altitude; we initiated an emergency descent and informed ATC as soon as practical. The frequency was crowded and it took several radio calls for them to understand we were [requesting priority handling]. We were then given an altitude of FL240 to descend to but were given a lower altitude of 15;000 before we leveled off. Once in the lower altitude; the aircraft pressurization stabilized and we were able to safely continue our flight to our original destination. There was no harm to aircraft or personnel in this event.

Pilot reported that a loss of pressurization resulted in an expedited descent.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Airport; Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

After being handed off by IAH Departure to Center we were given direct to our destination as we climbed through 11;000 FT. Around 13;000 FT and near Lake Jackson TCAS alerted us of traffic and a few seconds later an RA was received to descend. We complied with the descent to around 12;000 FT and; after traffic was gone; continued our climb to FL280. I informed ATC we were complying with a RA. After the RA I saw and told ATC type plane (it look like a Short 360). After RA we climb we were handed off to next sector and continued to the airport and landed.While sitting on ground operations informed us to contact Tower. We called Tower who said TRACON wanted to talk to us. The person I spoke to asked me if I saw any skydivers. I said no; all I saw was the plane. He explained that the direct clearance was given too early to us. He said they have a Letter of Agreement with a skydiving [operation] up to 14;000 FT. ATC never informed us of any traffic.

At the time of my briefing there were three aircraft departing the Houston terminal area; bound for south Texas and Mexico. During the briefing; I was told the incident flight was on frequency; climbing to FL280 and direct to its destination which is normal procedure for that flight. I signed into the sector as I heard the crew say they were responding to an RA. I immediately looked at the aircraft on my scope and saw a limited data block at 12 o'clock; 5 miles; same altitude. I called traffic to the pilot whose answer was; 'affirmative; we are in a descent.' I then called Houston Approach on the shout line to inform them of the flight's intentions. The controller at approach said; 'OK; but why isn't he on the SID.' I replied; 'We have control on departures out of 110 for turns; so we turned him to his destination.' We [later] learned the other aircraft involved was being worked by Houston Approach and was conducting parachute jumping operations in the area. The aircraft had been climbing to approximately 14;000 FT before releasing their jumpers. The Controller at Houston Approach; as well as his Manager were both unaware that Center had control to turn aircraft climbing out of their airspace. Therefore; the Controller was under the impression that the flight would continue on their assigned departure procedure and remain clear of the jump aircraft.Recently; Houston airspace was completely changed with the implementation of Metroplex. It was at that time numerous changes to LOAs and airspace design took effect. One of these changes was releasing control of aircraft when they departed 11;000 FT. It's my opinion and the opinion of numerous other controllers that training on these changes were inadequate. Every arrival and departure to Houston was changed and we received a day and a half of training. Controllers have done a remarkable job adjusting to the change but it has not been without incident. This is one of them. Clearly the controller and Management at Houston Approach missed or overlooked the change [as to] when Center had control.

Inadequate Controller training in the revised ZHU airspace was cited as a contributing factor when an EMB-145 was cleared direct to its destination through an active jump zone contrary to a revised Letter of Agreement specifying which ATC entity was responsible for the airspace under those conditions.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 8500; Flight Crew Type 300

During a VFR climb to 4;500 feet; I encountered what I believe to be a powered parachute at about 4;000 feet. I made a slight right turn to avoid the hazard and continued the trip without incident. The parachutist was in Class E airspace in VMC conditions and appears to have been complying with regulations. But it seems dangerous to have such slow-moving traffic in such busy airspace without ADS-B.

Pilot reported an NMAC with a powered parachute resulted in taking evasive action.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7.0

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Local control requested approval for an opposite direction operation for; a flight of 4 [military fighter jets] to Runway 27. It was some time before they actually departed. I forgot about the opposite direction approval. Meanwhile [Aircraft Y] was being vectored onto the ILS Runway 9 approach VFR. I cleared this aircraft for a practice approach to Runway 9 and switched the aircraft to tower. Then [the] flight of four departed. I am not sure how close these to aircraft were but way too close for my comfort. They were at least in my estimation 2 miles from each other at the same altitude at about 3000 feet. [Aircraft Y] was descending on the approach and [the flight of four] was ascending to 6000 feet. This situation was all my fault just a lack of focus on my part.

[Report narrative contains no additional information.]

Tower Controllers reported allowing an opposite direction operation to occur with less than required separation.  Training in the Tower was in progress at the time.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On [our] flight the aircraft had a MEL for the FMS (Flight Management System). The First Officer and I discussed the MEL and talked about flying using VOR navigation. During our climb out we had to deviate around a weather cell. As we flew around it our winds readout on the MFD (Multi-function Flight Display) showed winds shifting in direction and velocity substantially. We queried ATC to find out what the winds were for other aircraft since we were close to a convective weather cell. We determined quickly that it was our systems malfunctioning as our winds showed a 200 knot quartering headwind and a loss of ground speed equaling 200 or more knots. The autopilot tracked the nearest NAVAID but tried to correct for the wind causing the aircraft to bank unnecessarily. The pilot flying selected heading mode to stay on course. ATC queried about our course as we were off slightly. We explained that we were having unusual indications and that we required assistance. ATC complied and helped us determine which cockpit indications we could trust. We elected to continue knowing that we could calculate fuel and have enough to finish the flight. We had to calculate fuel burn because our ground speed readout was showing us at half the ground speed we were actually traveling; as confirmed by ATC; so the fuel burn for fuel over destination could not be trusted. The flight ended with vectors to capture the localizer. It was determined that the autopilot and flight director should be deselected so that it would not try to course correct for the 200 knot crosswind that did not exist on approach. We landed visually. When the aircraft began banking unusually to correct for winds aloft the flight crew began discussions of how odd the aircraft reacted to the weather. Once the flight crew realized the autopilot was reacting to faulty inputs we selected the most appropriate mode to maintain our course. We then requested further assistance from ATC and notified company via ACARS. The CRM during this event was very necessary and the First Officer did a great job working with me throughout the process. ATC facilities were very helpful and understanding as well. After discussing the event after landing causation thoughts between the crew and mechanics lead to something malfunctioning within the system that calculates air data. Personally I am very curious as to why the winds aloft readout stayed stuck at such a velocity.

CRJ-700 Captain reported requesting ATC assistance after noticing an FMC wind error that affected navigation and fuel planning.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Very foggy taxi out prior to sunrise; used appropriate LAX Low Visibility taxi chart.  Because of need to protect the ILS approach area; we were given a non-standard taxi route of Alpha to Golf; hold short of 25L. Then cleared to cross 25L and R on Golf; continue on Bravo to 25R. There are no taxiway centerline lights on Golf; and the fog was so thick that the center taxi stripe was grey washed out. On crossing 25L; the First Officer warned me that I was lined up too far left; which I then noticed; as I had been looking for the taxiway centerline marking; which could not be seen. I did a correction to the right; and asked the First Officer to have LAX Ground have someone come out and check to see that I had not struck any of the taxiway lights.  We waited at #1 for 25R until Ground reported that the area had been checked and there were no lights damaged nor anything out of the ordinary.  Checked the configuration page to ensure no tires indicated any loss of pressure; which they did not and; in consultation with the First Officer; decided to continue the flight. On arrival all tire pressures were still good; and there was no damage noted in a post-parking walkaround of the MLG. Aside from human error; I feel that for visibility this low; it is almost to be expected that poor taxiway centerline markings could lead to being off center. At some airports; the taxiway centerline is marked with a white line; and then a darker colored stripe on each side to set off the white; which will turn gray with age and use; from the gray taxiway surface.  If there is to be no money spent on centerline lights; then perhaps some paint could be used; to help make the centerline more visible in very restricted visibility?

Air Carrier Captain reports a possible taxiway excursion at LAX in dense fog while crossing Runways 25L and R on taxiway Golf. With no centerline lights the centerline stripe is reported as nearly invisible. No taxiway lights are damaged and the flight departs.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 193; Flight Crew Total 1120; Flight Crew Type 643

I was flying along the shoreline from Malibu into Santa Monica on a sightseeing tour with two passengers aboard. I had just received transition clearance from Topanga Beach down to the Santa Monica Pier; at which point I would be turning NE toward UCLA. Just SE of the Getty Villa; I saw what appeared to be a seagull and made an evasive maneuver to miss it; as it was heading directly toward the aircraft I was piloting. As it passed just below me off my left; I saw clearly what was a white DJi Phantom Quadcopter. I've seen them before; but had only notified tower; this was before I was aware of this reporting site. I immediately notified SMO Tower and they immediately contacted police units to check it out. I'm not sure if anything came about from it. I also warned several other pilots throughout the day to be on the lookout; not just for that area; but anywhere.

R44 pilot northwest of SMO at 800 feet experienced a NMAC with a drone and took evasive action.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 0.8

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airport; Airspace Structure; Weather; Procedure; Human Factors

Aircraft X checked on inbound at 13;000 feet descending to 9;000 feet. I told him to expect vectors for the ILS as that was what was being advertised and issued a heading of 130 and descended him to 3000 ft. He stated he did not want to go southeast bound because of weather south of the field. I was only showing small areas of light precipitation building 15 miles south of the field. After his request I told him an approach to the opposite runway circle to land will probably be okay but I will need time to get it approved as I was busy and a few other aircraft were deviating and one was having some radio issues. He then says he'll take a vector to the southeast for the ILS Approach. Once he is about 10 miles southwest of the field he reports the airport in sight. I clear him for the Visual Approach and call the tower to tell them of the change. I switched him to tower. I noticed him turning and figured he was either turning directly towards the field or deviating for weather since he was complaining about it before. He suddenly made a sharp left turn heading due north and descended to 1;000 feet. The low altitude alert goes off and I called the tower to issue it. They informed me he had lined up for the wrong airport. Tower handed him back off to me and I climbed him the 3;000 feet; re-vectored him for the ILS Approach and he landed safely. The pilot seemed rushed or impatient. I should have verified the azimuth and distance to the field even though he called the field in sight himself. The private airport should be displayed on the main map instead of a random roadway emergency map.

A TRACON Controller reported an aircraft descended for a Visual Approach to the wrong airport and received a Low Altitude Alert.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 16

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Aircraft X; conducting; as I understand it; air sampling research over the front range of the Rockies in the vicinity of Denver; was flying north-south lines west of the city. These lines take it across busy departure and enroute corridors at an altitude that puts it in potential conflict with eastbound departures out of ski country airports; as well as east and westbound enroute aircraft. Because of its proximity to the Denver International Airport; the airspace is complex; at the time of the event both aircraft were less than five miles from a point at which four sectors intersect. This area requires frequent coordination between those and several other sectors in near proximity. Most of Aircraft X's route was contained in Sector 61's airspace; so I think Sector 7; at which 61 was combined; kept communications with Aircraft X and pointed the aircraft out to the other sectors. I received a point out on Aircraft X; but did not request specifics about what the aircraft was doing as we had seen these operations for a week and knew in general how they operated; although; please note this point; the aircraft does not adhere to flight planned lines and; as I now know; can be unpredictable. I don't know; even had I requested details that I would have been prepared for what Aircraft X did. Aircraft Y departed ASE; a ski country airport; eastbound to TEB. The aircraft's route took it just north of Sector 14's boundary with Sector 5 before it entered Sector 34's airspace just north of Sector 61; with Aircraft X northbound in 61's airspace. Sector 5 cleared Aircraft Y to FL330 below a westbound aircraft at FL340 and handed off to me. I took the handoff and immediately initiated handoff to 34; utilizing Automated Information Transfer procedures; as we often do in that area; thinking Aircraft Y would not clear the opposite direction in time for me to issue further climb before 34's airspace and avoid conflict with Aircraft X. Aircraft X; in the meantime; turned northeast and appeared no longer to be a factor. I will also say that I expected Aircraft X would proceed further north then he did in the end. Aircraft X was nowhere near his flight-planned route line; being some sixty miles north of a line that went south; then west and north; and Aircraft X was northeast-bound away from it. At this point; with Aircraft X northeast bound and Aircraft Y climbing better than I ordinarily expect; it looked as though there was no reason to keep Aircraft Y low. I stopped the handoff to 34; requested control for climb from 5; referencing the opposite direction traffic; and issued clearance to FL390 when it was no longer a factor. Although I had kept the data block on my scope; I was not watching Aircraft X carefully as he was now some ten miles from my airspace; northeast bound away from it. Aircraft X took a hard left turn and the two aircraft were nose-to-nose with Aircraft Y leaving FL343 for higher. I did not see the conflict until conflict alert activated; at which point I cleared Aircraft Y to turn left heading 360 and descend and maintain FL340. I received no response; so I transmitted again; this time instructing Aircraft Y to turn left heading 360 and 'start turn now.' Given that Aircraft X appeared to be in a hard left turn to proceed south on another line; and that I wanted Aircraft Y to respond immediately; and that our altitude information lags the actual altitude; this seemed the likeliest course to keep the aircraft apart. Aircraft Y read back the turn clearance; although the compliance was not as expeditious as I could have wished. Possibly because he was climbing it took time to configure the aircraft for the turn? [In the] meantime; Aircraft X appeared to take no action whatsoever to mitigate the situation; and continued to join and fly a southbound line. When I turned Aircraft Y on course he acknowledged and stated he had seen his traffic on TCAS. By this time he was in 34's airspace and I was too busy to pursue the matter further so I issued frequency change to 34 and continued working. I do not know; therefore; what role TCAS may have played in this event. Neither pilot appeared to respond to a Resolution Advisory or take any action other than as instructed. I don't know if Aircraft X was even aware of the situation; or if sector 61; or whoever was working Aircraft X; took any action. I did not have time to coordinate with another sector as the situation; being a head-on conflict; occurred in a very short time. 1) Aircraft X's difficult-to-predict movements create problems in predicting conflicts. Conflict probe in EDST becomes useless.2) Traffic was moderate; mostly concentrated in the middle of the sector; with complaints about ride conditions at all altitudes. Between the concentration of the traffic in a small volume of the airspace; including what; under other circumstances; would have been a beautiful 'field goal' involving four aircraft at FL360; complexity was moderately high and my attention was necessarily drawn to the center of my sector; away from the eastern corner where the conflict was developing.3) After review; I have to say I think 61 failed to perform a required point out that likely would have brought my attention to the situation. This is not to absolve myself of culpability in the event; but 61 pointed Aircraft X out to me when the aircraft was well south of my sector northbound. Once the aircraft turned northeast and headed away from my sector; it was far enough (about ten miles) that another point out would have been required once it turned back toward my boundary. I retained the data block on my scope; as mentioned above; for obvious reasons; but it would have been within the scope of my operational responsibilities to have dropped it.4) I was alone on the sector. I think the workload was enough to justify a D-side; although I don't know how easy it would have been to assess that in prospect rather than retrospect.5) Aircraft Y may not have responded to my first instruction because it was 'stepped-on' by someone asking about rides. There was some frequency congestion due to traffic volume and ride conditions.6) As I don't know exactly how TCAS may have played a role in the event; I don't know; for instance; if it may have delayed Aircraft Y's response to my instructions.7) I am old; and wonder if age related decline might be a factor. I have not experienced a spate of such incidents or any obvious signs of serious derogation in my control abilities; but; as this is my first operational error in over twenty-five years as a controller; I have to consider the possibility this is a sign of lessening awareness. Certainly; as I have gotten older I have noticed a greater impact from our irregular schedules on my alertness and sense of well-being.8) Four sectors; 5; 14; 34; and 61; were watching both aircraft; and none apparently saw the conflict before it started flashing on the scope. The complexity of coordination between sectors in that area may have inhibited full communication.9) Had I followed my original inclination and handed Aircraft Y off to Sector 34 at FL330; no untoward event would have occurred. Aircraft Y would have remained at that altitude for another forty miles or so until clear of Aircraft X and then gotten higher.10) Its possible getting more information when Sector 61 initiated the point out would have altered my decisions. I don't know how involved the Controller was in ascertaining Aircraft X's course or in exercising positive control over the aircraft's heading; so I can't assess how useful the information would have been.11) A timed climb or vector north would have ensured Aircraft Y remained clear of Aircraft X regardless of how Aircraft X flew. At the same it may have seemed like over-controlling; but; considering Aircraft X's unpredictable behavior; it would have been safer.12) Sector 61's using proper point out procedures likely would have prevented the loss of separation. This is a good demonstration of why those procedures exist in the form they do. It also brings up an important issue: Point out procedures have become sloppy in general; particularly in areas where they are frequently required; with some controllers attempting to use hand offs as a substitute for calling with point outs; or sending a data block with no verbal coordination. I wonder if this event is an example of laxity arising out of a general sense that the formality of proper point out procedures is unnecessary. On the one hand; we need to be able to support missions like Aircraft X's. On the other; we operate in an environment of positive control; in which aircraft operating in an unpredictable or random manner need to be contained in protected airspace or kept well clear of other aircraft. Aircraft X would mitigate the risk of this operation if it filed an accurate flight plan the aircraft could actually follow; and ensured that the pilot did follow it. The flight plan could be structured in such a way; using way points; as to make it modifiable during the operation without excessive disruption to Air Traffic Control. As it is; with a flight plan that appears not to include provision for the aircraft's airspace requirements in turns; and pilots who do not seem to be bound to follow their flight plan in a rigorous way; we have a random operation occurring in the middle of busy airspace at a very inconvenient altitude. Assuming such an operation continues without modification; treating it as such; like; say; random refueling; will cause controllers to give Aircraft X a much wider berth and separate from it by altitude or vectors wide; as I ought to have done. Controllers need to be rigorous in their coordination and application of proper procedures for transfer of radar identification. This is the usual ongoing issue. It's possible a d-side would have distributed the workload and allowed me to see the developing conflict sooner; or would have seen it her/himself; thereby avoiding the loss of separation. Workload contributed to this event; although; as I say above; I don't know that it was obvious at the time.

ZDV Controller reports of a conflict at altitude between two aircraft causing a loss of separation.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

For some reason; this company is building pairings that violate their own policy on safety and fatigue. This is a relative new practice and is unprecedented in terms of forcing unsafe human factors on the pilots.I spoke to a scheduler about this and was told; 'well; you're legal for it'. I tried to explain that being legal was not the point of my phone call. Being safe and fit for duty was.These red eyes built into the middle of a pairing are unsafe. That's a strong word but 100% accurate.I just finished one of these and have never been so exhausted in my career. I had every intention of calling off 'too fatigued to fly' on the last day of the pairing. But; as it turned out I was in a hotel that was well designed for daytime sleep and I got three hours which allowed me to finish my trip while maintaining an adequate degree of safety. Had that not been the case I positively would have called off fatigued.Dangerous fatigue reoccurred on the drive home from the airport. I nodded off three time (split second) while driving. I pulled over and napped in a parking lot. This all happened as the direct result of the construction of this pairing. But it's not unique. There are many pairings that now have red eye legs in the middle. These pairings are built looking only at legalities and ignore all human factors. Inadequate rest has residual effects and cause mistakes to be [made] in the airplane. Even if they are small ones; like missing a radio call; they are the direct result of fatigue.Each pilot handles the decision individually. Unfortunately for me; I made the incorrect decision and kept pressing on when I know I should have called off 'too fatigued'. That's a tough call to make for a professional pilot. [On this assignment] the first leg was an evening leg to [our destination]. We arrived at the hotel at XA:30 EST only to learn the hotel restaurant and bar were closed for renovation. We were hungry so my FO (First Officer) and I left the hotel to find a restaurant a small distance away. We returned a little after XC:00 EST [early morning].The construction noise started at XG:30 AM local and lasted continuously until XS:00 local. After two hours I called the front desk and spoke to the manager on duty. I explained we needed to sleep during the day but he replied there was nothing he could do. The hammering and saws continued non-stop until after our departure time for the red eye leg.We flew [two more legs] and landed at XE:07 AM EST. When wheels touched down we had been awake for nearly 29 hours without opportunity to sleep. We both discussed calling off too fatigued but decided to try to force some rest. We were expecting street noises to be a problem but the new hotel is actually perfect for daytime sleep and we got through it. I don't know why but there are times when being overtired actually interferes with sleeping. I got 2.5 hours of sleep and my FO reports he got 6 hours. We departed that same day at XR:25 local for two legs getting back to [home base] after midnight.Although this is a specific case; the general point I am making is that these red eyes built into the middle of a pairing are unsafe. They violate company policy as stated in the [company manuals and training courses]; and they force the pilot into a tough decision when inserting the Fit for Duty prompts; a federal requirement. And scheduling says you are FAR 117 legal. They have no clue how these impact the body.Falling asleep at the wheel on the drive home has gelled the safety issue in my mind and caused me to pledge to myself that I will never do this again. It may not be convenient for company if I call off [fatigued] but next time I am faced with these circumstances there will be no decision to be made because the decision has already been made. Safety first.

A320 Captain reported extreme fatigue resulted from his three day assignment that included a 'red eye' leg on day two.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

We were ready to push off the gate and the tug driver attempted to contact us via his headset. The headset he was using was intermittent. With lots of static and some squealing. He seemed distressed about the improperly working headset and seemed concerned about pushing as soon as possible. Apparently there was another aircraft in range for the gate. Once communications were established. We completed the before start checklist and called ramp for pushback clearance. Ramp cleared us to push back to spot 14. I instructed the tug driver to push back using standard communication. 'Cockpit to ground brake released cleared to push spot 14'. He responded with some short statement like roger. A few moments later the aircraft began to move backward from the gate. Everything appeared normal. Then there was some broken static and voice on the headset. Followed by the tug driver screaming into the head set 'set brakes!!! Set brakes!!!! Stop!!!!' I immediately applied aggressive braking to stop the aircraft and set the parking brake. The tug driver told me 'the tow bar was faulty'. I forced him to go get a properly functioning headset which he did. That only took a few minutes. After asking him to clearly explain what happened. I discovered the tow bar was not properly secured to the nose gear. The aircraft had been allowed to roll backwards unattached to the tow bar and tug. I insured no one on the ground had been run over and the First Officer communicated with the ramp controller to insure we did not strike any vehicles.I contacted the cabin crew to see if everyone was ok. One of the Flight Attendants had been thrown to the floor when I stopped the aircraft. She had hit her head on an armrest and was applying ice to it. Otherwise she was ok and no one else was hurt. The tug driver and operations supervisor told me this had happened once before recently and were trying to talk me into re-attaching the tow bar and pushing back. After a few moments to reflect. We decided to call the Dispatcher and get them involved in the decision process. They conferred with Maintenance Control and we collectively decided to return to the gate. Have the landing gear inspected by maintenance and insure that the tow bar and crew were operational and safe for another pushback attempt. Once these actions were completed we pushed back and continued the flight without further incident. There needs to be a shift in focus in our company. It seems clear to me that the overwhelming pressure to push on time has effectively forced the ground personnel and operations leaders into making mistakes that can easily become serious injuries. We need to train our personnel to put safety above all else. Including on time performance.

A320 Captain reported a break away from the tow bar during push back; requiring the aircraft to be stopped abruptly when the tug driver called for the brakes to be set; with the aircraft in motion.


Service; Boarding; Safety Related Duties

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Passenger X (seated in X1) boarded the aircraft with a small cup of coffee and a bag of cheez-itz. He took an excessive amount of time sipping the coffee and eating the snack; keeping his mask off for most of the flight. Whenever I passed through the cabin I would notice his mask off and when I approached him he would take a sip of coffee. He had his mask off this way from the safety demo to the initial descent. When we started our initial descent I walked through the cabin to collect trash and he appeared to be asleep with his eyes closed and his mask off. I woke him up and instructed him to wear his mask over his nose and mouth.  He seemed to be doing everything he could to circumvent wearing his mask properly the entire flight.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger circumvented having to wear a mask by eating and drinking throughout the entire flight.


Windshear; Turbulence; Hail; Rain; Thunderstorm

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 2500

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We departed ALM on the CRONA2.CNX departure. After being cleared to 17000; it became apparent that thunderstorms had moved over the departure route and that deviations would be necessary. We were told that deviations right of course were approved. Most of the weather was located to the right of us so we asked for deviations left and/or higher. We were informed that we were unable to deviate left due to military airspace and unable higher; due to military airspace. We entered a small area of what appeared on the radar to be moderate precipitation but was in fact an area of moderate to severe turbulence and precipitation. We repeatedly asked for higher; or deviations to the left due to weather. The Controller denied the requests; giving us only clearance to enter into weather that appeared more severe. We could see that the weather off to our left was clear.We were handed off to another Controller [who] upon asking; gave us a deviation to the left. We turned left to avoid a very large storm directly in front of us. Turning to the right would have put us into equally severe weather. Upon making the left turn; the Controller informed us to return to the previous frequency. On calling back to the previous frequency we were again told that there would be no left deviations and an 'immediate 040 degree heading' was ordered from the Controller. This would have put us directly back in conflict with weather that could have damaged the aircraft or caused injury or death to the occupants. The Controller was argumentative and insisted that we turn immediately back towards the storm. At this time; I took the radio and informed the Controller that we were going to turn to a heading and if I needed to declare an emergency; that I would. We asked for a number to call to have a discussion with a ZAB supervisor.

Corporate jet Captain reported using his Captain's authority to avoid thunderstorms during climb.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

This flight was a planned departure from ZZZ to ZZZ1.  Weather was overcast; rainy with relatively calm winds and temperatures decreased during preflight from around 10C to 4C prior to departure. Pushback was delayed due to ramp congestion but only delayed takeoff slightly.  The Captain was operating as Pilot Flying (PF) for this flight.  The First Officer was Pilot Monitoring (PM).  Takeoff was uneventful. The departure was flown autopilot off.  While heading toward ZZZZZ and climbing at 280 KIAS; sometime after passing FL180 and climbing to FL230 in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC); Boeing 737-800 aircraft experienced extreme airspeed indicator swings on both sides of the cockpit.  Indications wildly fluctuated between 300 KIAS down to 180 KIAS.  The PF asked the PM if his indications were normal and the PM responded that his indications appeared erroneous as well and he had an airspeed disagree indication. The pitot heat was verified ON. The autothrottles started to chase the airspeed fluctuations and were subsequently turned off.  PF maintained the climb power and pitch angle and asked the PM to get a higher altitude from ATC.  ATC responded with a 'standby for higher' response.  The PM attempted to select Vertical Speed and it would not engage.  All vertical guidance was unavailable.  The PF asked the PM for a groundspeed and the PM responded that he did not see one.  There was no groundspeed on the Captain's (PF) side as well.  The Standby Flight Instruments were difficult to read as they had been dimmed for the takeoff and now the sun was coming up. Simultaneously; we were approaching a turn from ZZZZZ to ZZZZZ1.  PF elected to maintain wings level and continued straight ahead as to not compound the problem by turning in IMC conditions with obvious airspeed errors.  Since the sun was just rising we could see the top of the weather was very close. As we approached FL230 we continued to climb and notified ATC.  ATC cleared us to FL380.  After reaching an altitude; probably FL240/FL250 in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) the aircraft returned to nominal limits.  The flight continued under VMC to ZZZ1.  The aircraft flew normally after the event and landed safely.  Discrepancies were noted in the Aircraft Maintenance Logbook (AML) and maintenance personnel were debriefed by the Captain. Recommend a third air data inertial reference unit (ADIRU) on the B-737 so the bad ADIRU can be removed from the equation during a failure and still have a comparator feature.

Early morning departure out of ZZZ to ZZZ1. During climbout on the SID just after passing through the transition through FL180 I noticed we had lost the flight director and a yellow 'speed disagree' flag on the PFD (Primary Flight Display). I then looked at the MCP and VNAV/LNAV was off. Tried to re-engage and it wouldn't due to the PFD flag. About that time I noticed the speed had dropped from 280 KIAS to about 260 KIAS and we were off course having missed a slight turn on the SID. The Captain then said his was not right and asked me what mine said. I had said mine didn't seem correct either. Then he asked me what our ground speed was and I looked and mine was blank; not showing and wind/GS/TAS. At that time I told Center that we were having a problem with our instruments since we were off course and altitude. He came back and gave us present heading and FL230. The Captain then asked me to see if we could continue our climb since we weren't far from being on top of the weather; I asked and was told to stand by. A few seconds later Center gave us FL380. At this time I notified ATC having noticed we were getting further off our heading and the situation was getting worse. As we started to climb everything came back; air speeds matched; flag went away; was able to re engage LNAV/VNAV and flight directors. Few seconds after that we were on top in VMC. Everything came back just as quickly as we lost it. We were cleared to our next fix and resumed normal operations. We discussed our options and mutually decided that since there was clear weather for the rest of the way to ZZZ1 and everything was working that it was best to continue rather than turn back into the weather and return to ZZZ. The rest of the flight was uneventful and sent an ACARS message to let Maintenance know we would be writing the aircraft up when we landed. We landed in ZZZ1 and the Captain made the entry in the logbook when we got to the gate.

B737-800 flight crew reported Air Data Computer malfunction inflight.


On descent into CMH; autopilot trim warning illuminated on CAWS panel followed by the audible tone indication for a runaway autopilot trim. The pilot flying felt pressure on the control yoke indicating control pressure not being free from the control servo manipulated by the autopilot. He then disconnected the autopilot using CWS and the pitch trim trigger on the control yoke. The audible tone sounded when the autopilot disconnected. The autopilot annunciator light extinguished on the autopilot mode panel and the autopilot CAWS (caution) did not illuminate. The pilot flying did not feel the control pressure pitching the aircraft down relieve with the autopilot turned off. The pilot flying ordered and I executed the trim interrupt procedure in the QRH. Upon completion of the QRH procedure for pitch trim runaway; pitch trim was adjusted using primary stab trim. No additional system faults were experienced.

A PC-12 flight crew received a runaway autopilot stabilizer trim warning; followed the QRH procedure and completed the flight successfully.


Workload; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

Workload; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Manuals; Procedure

We were assigned 6;000 FT and in cruise configuration enroute. While at 6;000 FT; we reduced our power settings to the holding configuration to maintain spacing with the passenger airplane which was ahead (about 5 miles) and above us (at 8;000 FT). As the passenger plane was cleared for the visual approach and below our altitude; I instructed the First Officer to increase our power setting back to normal cruise. As the throttles were advanced; the right engine was unable to develop the appropriate power for the throttle setting. I took over the aircraft controls from the First Officer and advance the mixtures; propellers; and throttles to their full forward position. The right Manifold Pressure (MP) only reached 25 inches at full throttle while all the other engine instruments for that engine were in the green but lower than before. I asked the First Officer if he saw white smoke coming from the right engine which he responded that he did. I assumed that the right engine had blown the turbocharger. The right engine was running rough and we were still seeing the white smoke. I decided to shut down the right engine because I did not know how much oil was lost and I was concerned about a possible fire or having it seize up in flight. I executed the memory box items and gave the QRH to the First Officer to read and double check. I advised ATC that we had shut the right engine down and had lost 200 FT. I climbed back to 6;000 FT. I elected to continue to our filed destination because it was about 15 NM away and had emergency services (this was the only airport in close proximity that I knew 100% that had them available on the field). ATC cleared us for the visual to Runway 32 and we landed with out any difficulties on the remaining engine. Upon reflection; I lost the altitude when reached down to get the QRH. I should have engaged the autopilot after I had shut the right engine down to hold altitude and heading. This would have prevented the altitude loss and allowed me accomplish what I needed to.

I began to apply cruise power when vibrations and asymmetric power was noticed. The right engine manifold pressure was reading much lower than the left; near the 25' range along with significant vibrations. At this point; the Captain took controls of the aircraft; and executed the engine failure memory items. Power was not restored; and the vibrations were still present; so the Captain elected to secure the right engine; which I supported. During the securing of the engine; 200 FT in altitude was lost. After the engine was secured; a climb was made back up to 6;000 FT until cleared lower. After the memory items were complete; I began verifying with the QRH and continued with non memory items. The Captain did notify ATC of the engine malfunction and subsequent shutdown; however he did not expressible declare an emergency. We continued the flight and landed without any further incident. Airfield conditions were good; and the visual approach into the airport was conducted without further incident.While the engine failure may not have been avoided by any additional crew intervention; a declaration of an emergency with ATC should have been conducted. As the First Officer; I should have requested the declaration of emergency.

A C402 right engine turbocharger failed in flight so the engine was shutdown; the checklist completed and the flight continued to its nearby destination but no emergency was declared.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Regional Approach: 'Flight XXX maintain 250 knots until further advised; I will call your speed reduction'Regional Approach: 'Flight XXX maintain 220' (we were about 15 miles out but it was the intercept angle that was suspect; normally in DFW they clear you for a visual but still give you a heading--which is what I was expecting)Regional Approach: 'Flight XXX maintain 180 to a five mile final cleared visual approach 18L' (problem was they had us on a 80 degree intercept)FCP altimeter setting inadvertently set to 1000 ft. Regional Approach: 'Flight XXX low altitude alert--check your altitude' (I know the formula for their computer is calculated not only on a hard altitude but also descent rate--ours was high)I had already realized we were not capturing the intended altitude of 2300 ft. (we were intercepting about a mile inside of UDALL) and was leveling off immediately before they even called us at or above 1500 ft (flight path; airport an runway all well in sight); but we had a high descent rate in an effort to get down and slow down. All visual cues were in sight while continuing but we were still fast due to the 220 and trying to slow before the turn which led to a slight overshoot but not severe. Pushed managed speed to slow to Vapp but airplane was not slowing for some reason (already had Gear Down and Flaps1). Discussion ensued on if approach was activated; etc. I disconnected Auto Thrust and airplane slowed nicely but not being accustomed to flying without AT anymore and did not have a good feel for it and we got slow--once again I immediately corrected but we did get the speed caution at the same time I was aggressively correcting but we did not approach a stall (Alpha floor was not reached or we would have seen TOGA which would have resulted in a GO Around). Stabilized approach parameters (VFR) reached prior to 500 ft. 'Stable' callout made and landed. Should have requested an extended downwind and not accepted the assigned speeds with an 80 degree intercept. Fatigue certainly a casual factor--inconsistent rest for all night flying.

We checked on with Regional Approach around FL190; and were given a clearance to maintain 11000. Below 10000; Approach told us to maintain 250 knots until further advised; they would call our speed reduction and that we were number one for the airport. A few minutes later we were given clearance to 5000. Open descent and flight spoilers were used to descend the aircraft. Around 14 miles from the airport we were told to maintain 3000 and reduce speed to 220 knots. I reported the field in sight; and we were cleared for the visual 18L. Approach told us to maintain 180 knots until a five mile final. Usually when cleared for a visual; a heading is given to join the final. I noticed we were on an 80 degree intercept heading to join final. The aircraft was then configured to flaps 1 and the gear down. I noticed we had a high descent rate in an effort to get down and slow down. Managed speed was selected; the autopilot and auto thrust were turned off; and the aircraft began to slow to final approach speed. The aircraft leveled at 1000 AGL so final flap selection could occur. Approach reported a low altitude alert and for us to check our altitude. I reported that we were leveling at 1000 AGL. As the aircraft leveled; the aircraft announced 'Speed'; this was immediately corrected and Alpha floor was not reached. The airport remained in sight the entire time; a slight overshoot occurred but was corrected immediately. Final flap selection was accomplished and the aircraft stabilized prior to the 500 ft callout. The aircraft landed in the touchdown zone. I would [suggest] asking for an extended downwind [next time] and to be more aware on visual approaches.

A321 flight crew reported becoming unstabilized during approach after being asked by ATC to keep their speed up. When managed speed was selected the aircraft did not slow down; so the autothrust was selected off. At 1000 AGL; ATC issued a low altitude alert and the aircraft announced a low energy warning. The aircraft was stable by 500 feet and a normal landing ensued.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

I loaded Hazmat and loaded 15 items. Went to close out and didn't let me close out the flight. The Load Planner said there was 14 bags and 1 quick pack. We treat quick packs as bags; so I thought I was okay. So the plane came back to the gate and I moved 1 bag from the front and put the bag in the rear of the plane. Then the pilot asked why he didn't receive an ACARS message about the Hazmat. My Supervisor called Load Planning and the freight planner and Zone Control and no one had an answer why Hazmat didn't send a message to the pilot. That's why the aircraft took a long delay.

Air carrier Ramp Lead reported aircraft ground return to correct Hazmat cargo for air shipment.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Staffing; Company Policy; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

There was a sudden loss of radar feeds to the facility. All the radar feeds except one were lost at the same time. We also lost our land lines to Center and Tower. One of the radar sectors had to immediately give their airspace to Center since they had no radar feeds. The other radar sector gave the airspace to Center after about 20 minutes. When I came into work the next day the situation was still not resolved. In the last few years this facility has constantly experienced radar failures. From what I gather it's a line issue. I've been told there is no longer a tech assigned to the radar site where we experience numerous failures a year.

A TRACON Controller reported radar went out of service unexpectedly and that it is a recurring outage.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I was flying from home at FL220. I was given a pilot descend to 10;000 feet. I was on the autopilot and I began the descent with a couple of down pitch trims on the trim wheel. I turned on the overhead dome light and opened my flight bag to get my iPad out. Soon after; the controller told me to contact Center. My eyes came back over to the control wheel and instruments. At that point; I saw that the attitude indicator showed an extreme downward unusual attitude. I immediately brought my power to idle and I believe started initiating the recovery at that point. I did not understand how it happened because the autopilot had been on and there was no aural tone that went off saying it had disconnected. The next thing that happened was that I began using the co-pilot attitude indicator to complete the recovery. When I was recovered; I was at least 90 degrees off course pointed to the east and at a rough altitude of 17;000 feet. I canceled IFR shortly after that. I believe that the auto pilot began a descending right turn without me knowing. I also believe that the combination of having the dome light on; and turning toward a darker section of terrain led to not catching the autopilot going off course. It was my first full blown unusual attitude recovery. It was a very large eye opener. More vigilance to autopilot monitoring may have caught it a slight bit sooner.

The pilot of a PA31 was surprised by an unusual attitude while on an IFR flight plan when the autopilot became unexpectedly disconnected.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 96; Flight Crew Total 10179; Flight Crew Type 1609

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 8100; Flight Crew Type 4100

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

I was the Captain and the pilot flying. The aircraft was in level cruise at FL330; .79 mach with AP1 engaged in ALT HLD and autothrottles in mach mode. Flying in IMC conditions with a SAT of approximately -52. We were flying a route coordinated with Dispatch to avoid weather. We were well clear of any convective activity and the ride was slightly choppy. The First Officer said that he needed to take a biological break and exited the cockpit. Suddenly the aircraft started descending and accelerating. The ECAM started producing audible and visual alerts. The Captain's airspeed indicator read about 80 knots and the First Officer's 300 to 320. I immediately disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles; transitioned to the standby ADI and airspeed indicator; and then hollered for the First Officer to return. He immediately returned. I leveled the aircraft between FL300 and FL310. ECAM indicated an IAS/ADC disagreement. It also indicated NAV ADC failure. I selected Captain's ADC INST to number 2 per the ECAM procedures. Instrument readings were improved after instrument switching and I engaged AP 2 and autothrottles. Overall the First Officer and I both felt like the aircraft was under control; then we received a heading change from ATC. Using the heading select turn knob we selected the new heading. The aircraft started banking for the turn and I felt what I believe was initial buffet. I disconnected the autopilot autothrottles and leveled the aircraft at 280 knots on the standby instruments. We declared an emergency with ATC and ask them to inform the Company. I observed that the SAT was reading -27; I felt the reading was erroneous but turned on the engine and wing anti ice to be safe. The First Officer informed me that ZZZ was the closest airport. I asked him to obtain the METAR using ACARS; weather was 10 miles visibility and 9;500 foot ceiling. We told ATC that we were diverting to ZZZ and started descending. I elected to descend at 280 knots and about 1;500 to 2;000 FPM to keep the aircraft stable and avoid large changes in pitch; attitude and thrust settings. We set up the FMC and nav radios for the ILS; briefed the approach; ran the approach and landing checklists. After landing we taxied to parking and secured the aircraft. I completed a through logbook write up and extensively debriefed the mechanic.

We were well clear of any convective activity and the ride was slightly choppy. I decided it was a good time to use the bathroom before our turn and descent for landing; and asked the Captain if he agreed due to the slight IMC chop and weather on our left flank. He agreed and I exited the cockpit. As soon as I had closed the door of the head I felt a sudden descent begin and had to grab for something to hold on to. I heard the autopilot kick off and the Captain yelled for me to return to the cockpit; which I immediately did. ECAM was producing various audible and visual alerts. The Captain's Primary Flight Display Attitude Indicator was blank and the speed tape was all red showing approximately 80 knots and the First Officer's showed approximately wings level; nose level; 320 knots; 20 knots into the barber pole. The Captain had disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles and transitioned to the standby ADI and airspeed indicator; and was attempting to fly level at approximately FL320. He immediately instructed me to declare an emergency as I strapped in and put on my headset. ECAM had a full page of malfunctions and procedures displayed with the primary one being an airspeed and ADC disagreement. It also indicated NAV ADC failure. The Captain had me pull the tab and activate the Emergency Warning Cancellation button to clear the noise. I utilized this button several times during the next few minutes. The Captain was concerned about airspeed and we agreed that 280 KIAS on the standby ASI's and my PFD speed tape was a good target so we began slowing to that. I believe that both my speed displays were close to each other. The Captain observed that the SAT was reading -27; and had me turn on the engine and wing anti ice to be safe. The focus was then back to ECAM which instructed us to confirm airspeed and then switch the Captain's ADC INST to number 2. The Captains PFD then mostly matched (FD's did not seem to match exactly) the First Officer's and we engaged AP 2 and autothrottles. We communicated with ATC and stabilized on a heading and altitude. We were given a left turn and selected the new heading with the heading select knob. As the aircraft reached about 20 degrees AOB we felt what the Captain announced as initial stall buffet. This was very disconcerting because now we weren't sure if we could trust the airspeed indications we had. The Captain disconnected the autopilot; autothrottles and leveled the aircraft at 280 knots on the standby instruments. We confirmed our emergency with ATC; asked them to inform the company; and told them we would need to divert to an adequate landing field immediately. I noticed that ZZZ was the closest airport on my NAV display and announced that it would be a good choice. The ATIS weather was 10 miles visibility and 9;500 foot ceiling. We told ATC that we were diverting to ZZZ and started descending. All descents were at 280 knots and about 1;500 to 2;000 FPM to keep the aircraft stable and avoid large changes in pitch; attitude and thrust settings. I set up the FMC and nav radios for the ILS; briefed the approach; ran the approach and landing checklists. Aircraft appeared to fly normally on approach and First Officer FD tracked the ILS properly. After landing we taxied to parking and secured the aircraft.

A300 Captain experiences an ADC failure at FL330 with the First Officer on a bathroom break. The autopilot pitches over; attempting to maintain Mach number which is decaying on the Captain's instruments. The First Officer returns to find the airspeed 20 knots into the barber pole on his side. The airspeed is stabilized at 280; an emergency is declared and the flight diverts to a suitable airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Type 20000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Our departure had been delayed due to a Maintenance write-up by the inbound Crew. They reported that the First Officer's (FO) airspeed indicator had malfunctioned during descent; and the Electronic Engine Controls (EEC) had reverted to Alternate (ALT). Company Maintenance spoke with Maintenance Control; and determined that both problems were caused by water collecting in a drain from the pitot/static system. The Mechanic assured us that they had drained the water and fixed the problem; so the write-up was signed-off and we departed. Climbing through 11;000 feet; the same malfunction occurred: FO airspeed failed; and EECs reverted to ALT. Additionally; whenever we leveled off; Air Traffic Control (ATC) reported that our transponder was reporting that we were 500 feet high. Both my altimeter and the Standby altimeter read the correct assigned altitude; but the FO altimeter read 500' high as well; matching ATC's readout; regardless of which transponder position we used (one or two). Because the weather at our destination was 1/2 mile visibility and 200 feet overcast; I did not want to attempt an approach there with malfunctioning flight instruments. I therefore elected to divert; where the weather was VFR; because we could not be assured that we were flying at the correct altitudes. As we descended; the FO airspeed returned to normal; after descending below clouds around 15;000 feet and the EECs also returned to normal. A normal approach and landing was made; and we were given another aircraft to continue.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

After being assured by Maintenance that an issue was resolved the same problem occurred during climbout. The First Officer side had an Altimeter disagree and the Airspeed disagree on his display panel; the Captain's side was all normal and the Standby instrument read all normal. Air Traffic Control notified them that the altitude was 500 feet high. The only accurate instrument was the First Officer's Altimeter. During descent the First Officer's airspeed indicator returned to normal.


Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Airspace Structure; Aircraft

The aircraft assigned was placarded FMS inoperative. While certainly not optimal for our flight to the northeast; MD-80's are certified to navigate with VORs and I viewed losing this tool as an inconvenience. Just about the only Controller who seemed aware of our limitations was the departure airport Tower; who gave us the heading listed on the departure. Everyone else was surprised that we were unable to accept direct clearances to intersections or VORs that were out of range. Specifically; when we approached within approximately five minutes of the ZZZ VOR (which for the last quarter of a century has been remarkable for its miserable function) we notified ATC we were unable to receive it and requested an amended clearance. [By the way; ZZZ VOR was on our flight plan and we saw no NOTAMs concerning it.] ATC gave us something we could work with; but a similar problem occurred later on the arrival. Again; as we approached within an estimated five minutes of ZZZ1 VOR; we notified ATC of no signal and that we were VOR only. They hadn't realized that; but; 'Oh; yes. I see that now.' We received another heading and made our way to the airport; finishing out the flight uneventfully. [There was a note on the flight plan which stated; 'Radar required between the intersection and ZZZ1 VOR due to VOR restrictions.' We didn't arrive over the intersection and it didn't say that the entire NAVAID was out of service. In any case; we expected that if ATC needed something special from us; they would let us know.] On the next leg back; we were again planned over the ZZZ VOR. This time we let the Controller know we could not accept it and; just for information; how long has it been out? 'Years'; was the reply. Controller after Controller seemed unaware of our equipment code; even though when asked if it was on their strip; they all admitted; 'yes'. My recommendation is that no MD-80 be dispatched to the northeast without a functioning FMS. Next; our flight planning software needs to be reviewed to find out why inoperative [and] un-NOTAMed NAVAIDs are included in flight routes with non-RNAV equipment. And; finally; we all need to realize that the day of non-RNAV backed VOR navigation is over. The entire system is simply no longer able to efficiently [or even safely] accommodate it.

An MD-80 crew dispatched with an inoperative FMC had to notify ATC about enroute navigation deficiencies near unusable NAVAIDs because controllers did not see the flight plan code indicating a lack of Advanced Navigation Equipment.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

We were cleared for takeoff. It was my First Officer's (FOs) leg. The takeoff power was set and all engine parameters looked normal; and the plane began to roll down the runway. Around 70 kts; I heard 3-4 dings; from the cabin; (my flight interphone also happened to be on) and I heard 'there are flames/ fire out of the left engine' from one of the flight attendants. We did not have any cockpit fire warnings nor any caution indications at the time.I decided to make a low speed abort on the runway. I made a PA and told the Passengers; 'This is the Captain; remain seated; remain seated; remain seated'. We then turned off to the right on the first available exit and I requested Tower to send the fire trucks out to inspect the engines and aircraft. There were still no engine fire indications.The Fire trucks inspected the engines and airplane and notified us they did not see any fire or damage to the aircraft. We were then eventually towed back to the gate. My FO did also do an aborted [takeoff] brake temp chart calculation; as required. I did keep the passengers informed status and that we were going to be towed back to the gate. I did send an ACARS message to dispatch with the main takeoff abort details that had just occurred.After reviewing this aborted takeoff event; I did not declare an emergency with the Tower - but I probably should have.

At the start of the takeoff roll flight attendants witnessed flames coming out of one engine and informed the Captain. The Captain elected to do an immediate abort at low speed. The flight returned to the gate.


[I] worked four on; one off; five on. On the fifth day--at the end of pairing--Scheduling tried to reassign me. It was already a 12 hour duty day with a three hour sit included. [I] had to fly with new first officers which made my work load much higher. I didn't get much sleep the night before either (Day 4). Fell asleep late and woke up twice from passing noises. I was burnt out and was not going to operate any airplane when that exhausted.Long duty day; new first officers making work load higher; numerous MEL's on planes; not a good night's sleep all contributed to me being fatigued. Just part of the job.

An E-145 Captain refused a reassignment to additional flying following a ten day period that included only a single day off.