Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Our [US to South America] flight was not normally an ETOPS flight. I called and queried dispatch as to why it was being scheduled to operate as an ETOPS flight and was told there was an issue with 60 minute enroute alternate airport and [the dispatch computer program] would not allow them to plan the flight outside of ETOPS as normal. I had reviewed all the paperwork including the DIL/LOG. I noticed that the aircraft had no [pertinent] inbound defects. I went to the aircraft and performed my preflight duties as normal. There were numerous distractions (i.e. misfueled) as well as others. I looked at the maintenance release and verified it with ACARS. It was the same as my paper work. I looked for the class II navigation guide and could not find one in my chart bag nor the spare bag so I completed my preflight duties from memory. I was interrupted and distracted numerous times with load planning issues and other operational intrusions. We pushed back and departed late. After we were airborne and things settled down in cruise I got my IPAD out and reviewed the class II navigation guide.  That is when I realized that the Pre Departure Service Check (PDSC) for my ETOPS flight had not been completed. I contacted dispatch via SAT phone and thankfully we were able to amend the release to a non ETOPS flight at that time. There were several factors involved with this as the trip is not normally an ETOPS flight. There must be a disconnect between dispatch and maintenance when it comes to triggering an ETOPS PDSC. (On traditional ETOPS legs an automatic gripe of ETOPS PDSC breaks the MRD and thus prevents an inadvertent departure) my flight had no such gripe. Therefore; when I was pushed for time and continually distracted and interrupted I was easily assured by my release verification that my [Maintenance Release] was good when in fact it should have been broken and I should not have been able to verify it as good.

Dispatch of a B767 flight from the US to South America was compromised by a dispatch program error requiring it to be conducted under ETOPS requirements; which was abnormal. A breakdown in normal ETOPS protocol resulted when an inspection required for such a departure wasn't completed and went undetected. Fortunately; by the time the error was noted the computer problem had been resolved and the flight was re-dispatched as non ETOPS.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 114; Flight Crew Total 1080; Flight Crew Type 1080

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Approximately 10 minutes after departing the Lead Flight Attendant contacted the flight crew and informed us that due to the fact that the 'flight attendants please be seated for departure' call was not made; one flight attendant who was standing in the forward galley was struck by an unsecured trash cart and had injured her back during the takeoff roll. The Lead also said that we did not make the same call while departing on our previous leg. We inquired about the injured Flight Attendant and were told that she was okay; but shaken up and sore. I; the First Officer told the Lead that both calls were made and that there must be a problem with the PA and that I would need to do a test call to determine the issue. On both calls I used the radio control panel with PA selected instead of using the center pedestal handheld microphone; and on both calls I and the Captain who was listening heard the calls made.We told the Lead that we should have been notified after departing the first time that they did not hear the call. We could have troubleshot the issue earlier and most likely prevented the second event from happening and also prevented the Flight Attendant's injury. Upon reaching cruise altitude I made a PA announcement in the same way I had previously (radio control panel); and both the Captain and I deselected our intercom to ensure we were truly hearing the call go out over the PA and not just hearing the intercom. We both heard the call go out; but when we checked with the Flight Attendant's they confirmed that they did not hear it. So I made a second call using the handheld microphone from the center pedestal; still with intercom deselected; and both the Captain and I heard the call go out again. We checked with the Flight Attendant's and the crew said they heard it but it was really faint. At this point the Captain sent a report regarding the PA system.Approximately one hour into the flight the Captain asked the injured Flight Attendant to come up to the flight deck to check up on her. Once on the flight deck the Captain had a conversation with the Flight Attendant; while I assumed control of the aircraft and ATC communications. The Flight Attendant became emotional when she started talking about being worried about having to miss work. The Captain was very supportive of her; asked her if she wanted him to coordinate medical attention for her upon our arrival into ZZZ; and advised her to seek medical attention if she needed it; but she declined. Upon our arrival into ZZZ; when the crew departed the aircraft; she seemed fine. She did not seem to be having any issues walking; pulling her bags; and was even smiling.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported a problem with the intercom that resulted in a flight attendant injury during takeoff.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Descending via the RNAV Arrival; we were cleared to cross ZZZ intersection at 12;000 feet MSL and 250 knots.  Approaching 12;000 feet; ALT CAP annunciated properly; then ALT HLD annunciated properly.  The nose then dropped and the aircraft continued to descend.  Captain re-selected ALT HLD mode with no effect.  Captain then rolled the Vertical Speed into a positive rate of climb with no effect.  He then disconnected the Autopilot and hand flew the aircraft smoothly back to the proper altitude of 12;000 feet.  Lowest altitude reached during the event was approximately 11;550 feet (450 feet below assigned altitude).At 12;000 feet MSL; the autopilot was re-engaged for a test.  The nose of the aircraft once again lowered into a descent while ALT HLD mode remained annunciated.  The AP TRM also annunciated at this time.  Autopilot was disconnected and the aircraft was hand flown on the remainder of the arrival and approach.  Maintenance was notified and briefed on the failure upon gate arrival.  Follow on crew was also briefed on the event and failure.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

While in a descent an MD-80 flight crew overshot the level-off at 12;000 feet because the altitude capture feature failed. They disconnected the autopilot and hand flew the aircraft to a successful landing.


Troubleshooting; Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Distraction

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Procedure; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication

Thirty five minutes after departure and level at FL330; observed numerous level 1 and 2 alerts as well as loss of all FMS navigation and way points. All system quantities and numeric values had X's displayed and all systems with L/R sides (not any engine indications) indicated that the Left side had failed. Advised ATC of our loss of primary navigation and continued our present heading via ATC instructions. We took the next several minutes to assess the alerts and figure out what had actually failed and what was a false indication. Having figured out that several indicated failures were incorrect and assessing that what had failed had a functioning back up system or wouldn't affect us either way with our airport/runway landing choice; with VMC conditions existing from our current position all the way to our destination and with several items to still address and communications to make. Our filed destination was the closest; safest airport in point of time. Given our current status we declared emergency and received clearance via radar vectors (while the #2 VOR was available for enroute navigation; given the task saturation we were experiencing; I elected to request vectors all the way in for the visual approach). We notified Dispatch via ACARS and spoke with Maintenance Control. We asked for any guidance for our given condition and was told to follow our VIA fail checklist (that doesn't exist). One piece of information Maintenance did provide when asked was that the landing gear console lights 'should' illuminate indicating a down and locked condition (they were right/had 3 green for landing). We felt that the flaps/slats and landing gear would operate normally but wouldn't have any indication (PSEU fault). With that in mind we requested a visual approach to 27R and to have the fire trucks standing by. In speaking with the flight attendants: I informed them of our status and that we would have the safety equipment standing by but to expect a normal landing and that I would let them know if anything changed. I made a PA to the passengers as well with the same message. We had to use the QRH performance section to figure Vref/app speeds as that function of the MS didn't work. Since the First Officer could manually tune the LOC/course we decided he would fly the approach and I would make the landing. Having made a visual approach to a landing and with no irregularities noted by us; Tower or the fire trucks; we taxied to the gate where we were met by maintenance personnel.It was determined that VIA 1 fail and according to the Mechanic another internal failure that had yet to be identified when I left the aircraft.

A B717 Via (Versatile Integrated Avionics) 1 failed in flight resulting in the loss of critical flight information so an emergency was declared and the flight continued to its filed destination.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 820

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

The EMAS had a land slide at the approach end of RWY 05. The end lights are gone with the slide. The threshold is displaced about 570 feet. The FAA and airport have turned off the VASI and GS to RWY 05. I submit this may be good layering but flies in the face of safety! Turn them back on; put NOTAMs in about landing long or better yet put a new VASI in. This is a black hole airport in terrain and taking the vertical guidance away is not the solution. I can see some poor guy in low visibility ripping his gear off or worse yet landing short with fatal outcomes. I wonder if the airport guys talked to any flight safety guys. I am also a former PE (Practice of Engineering) in civil engineering and I appreciate the operational problems of this airport; but nothing should take away safety devices at an airport.

Air carrier Captain commented that CRW Runway 5 is a black hole following a landslide which disabled the ILS Glideslope; VASI; and REIL while displacing the runway threshold.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 29; Flight Crew Total 4618; Flight Crew Type 998

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Departed this morning VFR. Frequency was very congested; with aircraft and ATC repeatedly stepping on each other's transmissions. On two occasions ATC said 'everybody stop transmitting at once.' I had the impression the controller was overwhelmed with traffic; and sounded frustrated. I elected to cruise at 6500 [and] planned to climb to 7500 [later]. [At this point] ATC cleared me direct. My head was down briefly while planning my new heading and contemplating whether to descend or climb (but still on autopilot at constant altitude and heading). A TIS traffic alert showed traffic ahead; altitude +200 feet; but no direction vector visible. I began looking for traffic; seeing none. ATC frequency was very congested at this time. I saw nothing at first. Then; traffic bloomed suddenly in my visual field just above me; and practically upon me. I took evasive action (stick hard forward) and pitched down as a low wing retract passed above me; then experienced a SEVERE pitch down as I entered the aircraft's wake. It was not evident to me that the other aircraft ever saw me; no evasive action was taken on its part. ATC called me immediately afterward with a frequency change. I was still regaining control; so told him to stand by as I had just experienced an NMAC. Controller said he had been calling me repeatedly to issue that traffic; I never heard him.After leveling off; I felt a draft and observed a 2 foot lateral crack in my canopy. Loose objects (an iPad and handheld radio) had been tossed around violently by either my evasive maneuver or the other aircraft's wake turbulence; so I speculate that one of those had impacted the canopy; causing the crack. Not knowing if other structural damage had occurred; I [advised ATC] and requested immediate landing at [a nearby airport]. I landed there without further incident.It is noteworthy that I was proceeding nearly due north and the other aircraft nearly due south at the time of the conflict. We likely both believed ourselves at proper VFR cruising altitudes; underscoring the added risk of flying at those particular headings. I believe that; had I not pitched down; a NMAC would likely have occurred. After landing; local controller asked [me] to call [center] on the telephone. I spoke to a supervisor who stated that they had been tracking the other aircraft but were not talking to him. He acknowledged the frequency congestion; as did another pilot who had been on frequency at the time.

EVSS Evektor SportStar Max pilot reported a NMAC on a VFR flight at 6;500 feet. Reporter stated frequency congestion played a part in the incident.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

At approx. XA:09 while monitoring radios to assist if and where needed as ramp was closed due to lightning on or near the field I heard the crew operating PAATS (Park At Any Time System) Truck X declare malfunctioning lights and mis-park of and Aircraft X on Gate X-XX.  As this has a protected overhang I proceeded to make my way to verify and assist as I have red tagged this vehicle several times in the past.  En-route I verified it was Truck X.  Upon arriving to the gate/breezeway/overhang; I observed the crew (super-tug crew also operating PAATS  using my assigned equipment for that day repositioning an aircraft to the correct stop mark.  One operating the super-tug; one marshaling (in the open) and directed by manager (in the open) or possibly counseling said crew while the ramp is still closed.This event also exposes several crews to possible unintended COVID exposure.  Super-tug X (PAATS X)  Crew is X-X break room. Supertug Y (Me and my partner) are Y-XY [room].Had I not observed the above I would not have known my equipment was used and to disinfect again. PAATS lights on Truck X have been intermittent and is a known issue.  Though [I] was told it was addressed and on my last user check it functioned it seems to have an issue again.

Approx. XA:10 ramp closed due to lightning.  Thunderstorms called for and predicted.  No plan to staff PAATS (Park At Any Time System).  Call from Operations to close ramps and start parking aircraft.  With several gate numbers and aircraft types but no flight numbers tails or relay of information to flight crews of parking assist frequency to make contact.While Dispatch worked to get second parking assist / APU truck staffed. Management staffed second parking assist / APU with mixed break rooms (COVID precautions). 3 aircraft parked...4th unable due to equipment.  Several others missed due to time staffing/communications issues with making contact to flight crews.

Ground employees reported supertug parking aircraft issues and combining separate parking crews; which undermines current COVID-19 policies.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

During cruise at FL310 and approximately one hour into the flight; we got an ECAM for auto throttle and auto pilot off. We followed company protocol and completed the ECAM actions. Both the auto throttles and auto pilot were restored. About 5 minutes later; we received a call from the Lead Flight Attendant stating that they could smell a strong acrid smell in the mid cabin area around row 26. It lasted for about 5 minutes; then dissipated. The crew explained they had symptoms of throat discomfort and headache. We followed the QRH for Aircraft Odor; notified Dispatch; Maintenance and Operations. Approximately 30 minutes later; we got the same exact ECAM for auto throttle and auto pilot off. Following the ECAM actions; both auto throttles and autopilot were restored and continued to work for the duration of the flight. After landing; the Flight Attendants told us they could smell the same odor again for a few minutes; then dissipated. We submitted the Odor form; made log book entries and contacted the airport medic to evaluate the flight attendants. No passengers made any complaints that I am aware of. The Flight Attendants went to the hospital with symptoms of throat discomfort; watery eyes and headache. It's possible that the auto throttle and autopilot disengaged due to an EEC (Electronic Engine Control) computer failure which may have triggered a short burning or odor event; passing through the packs into the cabin. The Mechanics told us they were going to replace the EEC computer. The ECAM and the odor even happened within 5 minutes of each other but it was unclear whether or not this correlation was causation or not. Preventative maintenance would be my suggestion. We are experiencing multiple mechanical issues with our Airbus fleet. My experience is that we wait for the problems to happen. We should be more proactive in capturing maintenance malfunctions before they occur. There is maintenance software than can help with this.

Cruising at FL310; approximately an hour into the flight; ECAM AUTO FLT AP OFF and A/THR OFF.  We performed the ECAM actions and were able to reengage the Autopilot and Auto thrust shortly after.  Within 5 minutes of the ECAM; the Flight Attendants called and complained of an acrid smell from rows 24 and aft.  The timing of the 2 events led us to believe they were somehow related; and the Captain asked the Flight Attendants to call back within 5 minutes to report on the acrid smell. We also followed up with the QRH Odor/Toxic Substance/Volatile Liquid.  When they called back the smell had dissipated and that they were OK to continue to ZZZ1.  We followed up with contacting Operations and Maintenance Control when time permitted.  Within :30 min of the first event we had a second repeated event of the AUTO FLT AP OFF and A/THR OFF.  Again we performed ECAM actions; and were able to restore the affected systems back to normal; and there was no odor event in the cabin associated with the second event.  We landed in ZZZ1; and the flight attendants again informed us of a second odor event as we landed and that it also dissipated quickly.  We arrived at gate and then FA (Flight Attendant) (#1) informed us of that FA #2; FA #3; and FA #4 had throat discomfort and headaches.  We called for Medical assistance at that time and all of the FA's decided to go to hospital for further evaluation.  None of the passengers made any complaints; as I understand.  The AUTO FLT AP OFF and A/THR OFF event caused the odor event in the cabin due to the partial failure of the #1 eng EEC (Electronic Engine Control).

A321 flight crew reported flight attendant notification of an 'acrid smell' which dissipated and reoccurred. Flight continued to destination where Medical and Maintenance were requested.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 1850; Flight Crew Type 385

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

I was holding short of the runway and was aware there was traffic incoming (Last radio call was 20 miles I believe). I called and asked for position of the inbound single engine aircraft two times; and no radio call was announced. I also checked my garmin unit for ADSB data and there was none. I made the decision to announce a back taxi radio call on Runway XX and proceed onto the runway to back taxi. At about 1;000 feet left; I noticed a plane executing a go around on the runway; and flew over me at approx an altitude of 200 feet above. I then called if he was on frequency and he responded 'yeah'. I asked if he made any radio calls and he said 'no I missed the last radio call'; and asked if he heard my back-taxi call to which he responded yes. I proceeded to turn around at the departure end of the runway and depart without incident.  In summary I made 3 radio calls that were unanswered; did a visual search before entering the runway before back taxi; and checked for ADSB to see if the plane was in the airport environment before my decision to back taxi.

Pilot reported after announcing on Unicom intentions to enter runway and starting to back taxi; an opposite landing aircraft performed a go-around.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Fatigue; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload

Workload; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Technician and I were assigned a [maintenance visit] with multiple MELs to work on aircraft. I spent nearly 1 hour searching for parts that were not in pre-draw or in stock. We completed the [maintenance] and other MELs and Technician and I proceeded to change engine 1 filter bypass switch. After the installation was complete we proceeded to the flight deck to perform bite tests. All tested passed and an engine idle leak check was still required. We called Lead AMT to clear the road; I prepared the flight deck and Technician went down to the engine to observe and leak check the idle run. Once I was prepared I asked if we were clear to turn Number 1 over the handheld radio; Technician replied 'Clear.' Shortly after starter cut out on the Number 1 engine start I was told to shut down over the radio. Technician came to the flight deck and informed me that we had ingested the engine inlet plug. I completed the post engine run check list and proceeded down to the engine for an initial damage evaluation. Technician 2; Technician 1 and myself picked up the large debris off the ramp and then the three of us went to the Supervisors office to inform them of the incident. We then returned to the aircraft to complete the ramp clean up.Technician 1 and I still had an additional aircraft to work with and additional work cards assigned. I felt pressed for time; and I felt fatigued. Ramp has inconsistently installed engine inlet plugs for the last couple work days.

My assigned work for the night was a maintenance visit with 3 MELs on an aircraft that landed at XA:00 and a heavier maintenance check on an aircraft coming in an hour later at XB:00. Technician and I planned to work the maintenance check and then the MELs. While doing my walk around on aircraft while the ramp was still downloading the aircraft Number 1 engine did not have an engine plug installed in it. After my check was done; Technician and I worked all the MELs which resulted in the Number 1 engine needing an idle leak check to be completed. So while Technician started the pre-engine run check in the flight deck I went downstairs to make sure the road was blocked and then watch for leaks. Technician then started the engine after I gave the all clear over the radio and that is when the engine ingested the inlet plug. I then called over the radio to Technician to have him shut the engine down. I then went upstairs to inform him of the ingestion. Afterwards we cleaned up the FOD on the ramp to prevent further and or other aircraft damage before returning to the shop to notify Supervisor.

Technician reported distraction and fatigue interfered with proper procedures and caused an aircraft to ingest an engine plug.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency

On approach at 2;000 FT; decelerating through 210 KTS; Captain selected flaps 1. Flap position indicator showed needle split of L(up); R(1/2) and LE Flaps 'xnsit' light remained amber.I continued to fly the aircraft and entered holding pattern as Captain consulted QRH. We identified the problem as trailing edge flap asymmetry and accomplished applicable checklists. Captain declared an emergency with Tower and requested ARFF. Landing was uneventful and after inspection by ARFF Captain taxied aircraft to the gate.

B737-800 flight crew received a flap asymmetry warning light during approach. An emergency was declared and an uneventful landing ensued.


Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

During a review and inventory of electrical power transmission towers; Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) discovered that for a number of its towers that are greater than or equal to 200 FT in height above ground level (AGL); PG&E has been unable to confirm that it notified the FAA or its predecessor agencies of the construction or modification of those towers. We consulted with an outside attorney familiar with FAA regulations and in April. We were advised that while the construction or alternation of some of these towers appears to be pre-date applicable notification requirements; many of these structures were constructed after such notification requirements took effect and it is not apparent whether the towers fall with an exception to the reporting requirements. We are now in the process of notifying (or re-notifying) the FAA of these structures and are committed to marking and lighting all of these towers in accordance with the FAA's determination of marking and legal requirements. As a cautionary measure; and in furtherance of the safety goals underlying the safety program; we hereby identify the following 80 structures that are greater than or equal to 200 FT AGL; but for which we cannot presently confirm that the construction or modification was reported to the FAA. PG&E is providing the following information regarding each tower: longitude; latitude; PG&E equipment ID; tower number; transmission line name; tower height; adjacent tower marked (with obstruction lighting and marking) if applicable; adjacent tower number and name; adjacent tower height; distance to adjacent tower; and height of adjacent tower. PG&E's analysis of our tower data indicates the following: total of 80 towers; 19 towers just at 200 FT AGL (15 of these are in the vicinity of other towers with obstruction lighting and marking). 61 towers greater than 200 FT AGL (9 of these towers are in the vicinity of other towers with obstruction lighting and marking). Our analysis shows that at least 24 towers may fall into an exception to the reporting requirement due to their proximity to other towers with obstruction lighting but PG&E is reporting these towers here to provide the best information for FAA safety considerations. The 19 towers with a design height of 200 FT AGL are below the reporting requirement of 'more than 200 FT AGL' (14 C.F.R section 77.9); but PG&E is also reporting these towers to provide the best information for FAA safety considerations. PG&E notes that 15 of these 19 towers are in the vicinity of towers with obstruction lighting and marking.

The reporter stated that the FAA has not yet been notified because the proper authority has not yet been identified because he did not want to overload the system with this volume of information. Analyst gave the reporter an FAA contact phone number to get him started.

PG&E has 80 old and new power transmission towers that are at or above 200 FT; which the FAA may not have been notified about and therefore not charted on aeronautical publications.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Approximately 35 minutes after takeoff we noticed the right engine oil quantity indicated 12 quarts. Since we had just had maintenance performed on the Left Engine Oil Pressure System (oil pressure sensor) we suspected a problem. After another 10 minutes of flight the oil quantity indicated 10; oil pressure and temperature remained constant and normal. The First Officer and I discussed returning to the departure airport or an en route stop for maintenance. I called Dispatch and Maintenance Control; all agreed return to the departure airport was best for maintenance and passenger service. Air Traffic Control approved a turn direct turn back to the departure airport. ATC approved fuel dumping in their airspace and we dumped fuel. Even with the fuel dump it became apparent we were going to land over weight so an emergency was declared. We elected not to stay airborne and burn more fuel because we did not know how long we could run the left engine before all oil was lost. On base leg and final approach the oil quantity was 3 quarts during the landing roll out while in reverse thrust oil quantity went to 0. Stopped on runway and rescue vehicles inspected aircraft. No external damage was seen so we taxied to the gate. Over weight landing info: Landing weight 329;000; Vref 152; Touchdown speed 157; Vertical speed 200 -300 FPM; Braking Thrust Reversers only till 80 KTS then medium braking to a stop on the runway. Kudos to both First Officers for their assistance on checklist and analyzing all possible scenarios of the approach landing and possible go around.

We flew back to the departure airport fast to try to land before needing to shut down the engine; with speedbrakes deployed to reduce landing weight.

During the flight following a B767 oil pressure sense unit replacement; the crew returned to the the departure airport because of oil quantity loss.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

FO (First Officer) was PF (Pilot Flying). Due to the FO struggling during the previous legs I told him to review the arrival into ZZZ; 'chair fly' it and confirm the runway in use at ZZZ while in the aircraft during the 40 minute ground time. I observed the FO struggling to understand how to find the runway in use at destination in ACARS. We briefed the arrival into XX at ZZZ on the ground; and checked legs and altitudes in the FMS. After an unrelated gate return for a Park Brake SOV Caution we departed for ZZZ. Cleared to descend via the [Arrival] the initial hard altitude of 8000 was set and we briefed the PF using the Direct Intercept Page and PM the legs page. We also again went over the speeds and altitudes and how to fly the arrival; I was coaching the next leg by leg.At 11;500 feet we were handed off to Approach; I checked in 'Descending via the [Arrival]' with our current altitude of 10;900. As Approach replied I simultaneously called 'Altitude' and Approach replied 'Cross ZZZZ above 11; above 11.' I called 'altitude.' And then 'climb.' I received no verbal response from the PF; and the descent was not arrested so called 'My Aircraft'; immediately disconnected the Autopilot and added power to arrest the descent and climbed back to 11;000. Climbing through 11;000 the PF called 'Minimums'Level at 11;000 with the situation stabilized I reengaged the Autopilot. I asked the PF if he was OK; did he understand where we were; and where we were meant to be and he replied he did. I transferred the controls back to him and continued to coach the arrival. The remainder of the flight was uneventful.PF lost situational awareness. FO has a poor grasp of vertical navigation procedures. Seems unfamiliar with the use of VNAV tools or procedures in the aircraft. Flight Standards evaluation for company procedures and Aircraft operation.

I was PF (Pilot Flying). We briefed the RNAV arrival into ZZZ on the ground; and checked legs and altitudes in the FMS. We had a 40-minute delay involving a gate return for a Park Brake SOV Caution. We departed and after climbing to final cruise altitude of 17;000 feet; received clearance to descend via the arrival. I decided to set the first hard altitude of 8000 feet (for ZZZZZ1); and begin a gradual descent for 8;000 using advisory VNAV procedures. Two 'proceed direct to' clearances were issued by ATC while on the STAR. I believe one was direct to ZZZZZ; and I don't recall the other. There is an at-or-above altitude of 11;000 at ZZZZZ on the arrival. I allowed the aircraft to descend below 11;000 prior to ZZZZZ. The CA/PM (Captain / Pilot Monitoring) called 'climb' just below 11;000. He then called 'my aircraft;' and he disconnected the autopilot and initiated a hand-flown climb back up to 11;000. ATC asked if we wanted just a descent to assigned altitude(s); but we declined. The CA/PM asked if I felt comfortable and wanted the aircraft back to resume my role as PF; and I accepted. I flew the rest of the arrival; approach; and landing uneventfully. I believe contributing factors/causes to this incident are as follows: -It was late; at the end of a long day. I did not feel fatigued when we were on the ground at [our departure airport] but I realized in flight I was a bit tired. -I had not been having a good day. I had made several minor procedural errors earlier in the day.-The STAR has a higher degree of difficulty; I believe; when coming into it at a lower altitude of 17;000.-I lost situational awareness of the altitude restrictions at ZZZZZ (bottom of 11;000 feet) while focusing on a rate of descent for ZZZZZ1 at 8;000; by attempting a more difficult advisory procedure on the descent. I felt some self-induced pressure to fly the STAR using the procedures (snowflake) taught in training; which was a mistake. My suggestions for what I would do different in order to prevent this incident.-Refocus my preparation and effort on procedures and PF/PM roles. -I would thoroughly brief the STAR and Approach on the ground at [our departure airport] since the flight is so short and the arrival is a busy one. Later airborne the [flight plan] could be updated briefly and quickly.-I would use a different procedure on the descent; namely setting each bottom altitude on the arrival and using the 'banana bar' to gauge my rate of descent; so as to not bust any altitudes.

CRJ-900 flight crew reported a missed crossing restriction on approach due to First Officer poor grasp of navigation procedures.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 18.5

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Workload

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Manuals; Human Factors

I was working Sector 18 Woodstown; but not actually Woodstown (sitting at Sector 17). I was to be only working the Compton and Reading military airspace; which had Aircraft Y's and a Aircraft Z in it at the time. I witnessed the Aircraft Y refueling with the tanker at FL256 with out communicating that to me. Shortly there after; Aircraft Y separated from the tanker without communicating to me; and what I assume was descending back to the fighter cap altitudes of FL230-FL240 of which he was initially cleared to be at. Aircraft Y turned at the southern portion and descended; and then I saw him at FL227 below his assigned altitude. Aircraft X; was at FL220 right underneath him. I immediately asked the pilot if he was FL230-FL240; he responded that he was. At the same time the altitudes on the data block went back to FL230-FL240. The Sector 19 Controller; who was working Sector 18's airspace (even thought Sector 18's airspace was assigned to me sitting physically at Sector 17); said that Aircraft X was responding to an RA and descended. I immediately called the traffic to the fighter jet at that time. Filed previous reports regarding the Presidential airspace over Delaware. Procedures are not defined; there is no LOA or SOP; and the workforce was not properly briefed. There are many sited violations FAA Orders associated with this unsafe operation in addition to automation issues that can cause unsafe situations with Sector 18 not being utilized correctly. Request an LOA for the procedures; and for the boundaries; altitudes; refueling operations; and reroutes to all be negotiated with affected parties and implemented correctly in an LOA. A fighter jet got too close to an airliner jet in this situation; and the pilot did not even seem to understand the issue or care. They need to at the very least stay at their assigned altitudes; and they should be communicating with us on refueling operations to avoid situations like this.

Aircraft X was level at FL220 and given the descent clearance for the PHLBO 3 arrival.  Aircraft Y was a single military fighter in COMPTON Airspace. Aircraft Y descended out of the Airspace without coordination and caused Aircraft X to react to an RA alert.  Traffic was issued to Aircraft X and he eventually continued his descent via the PHLBO3 arrival.There is much confusion on how the Biden airspace should be managed.  Some controllers work EWR arrivals while others don't.  The current assignment of airspace makes it difficult for processing hand-offs and point-outs correctly.  Although this airspace confusion had no implication on the military aircraft leaving the confines of the restricted airspace; it needs to be address for clarification and safety.  Point-outs and hand-offs may be missed.

ZDC Center Controllers  reported a military fighter jet descended below the assigned altitude and into conflict with an air carrier operating below the track. The report states the military airspace and procedures for this area [Biden] are not published or defined and the controllers have not had sufficient training to conduct this operation.


Flight Crew Total 12039; Flight Crew Type 6748

Flight Crew Total 5154; Flight Crew Type 1786

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

We arrived at the aircraft to discover a deferral sticker on the equipment cooling panel. There was no deferral number on the sticker. There was no deferral for that system on the maintenance release document. We then discovered a status message (FWD GND EXH VAL). We wrote it up via ACARS and contacted local maintenance. Local maintenance came to the cockpit and told us this was deferrable. We pointed out the deferral sticker with no deferral number on it. The mechanic removed that sticker. A new sticker was placed in the same location with the proper deferral number on it. Based on the deferral; a review of the maintenance release document and what the mechanic told us; we felt we had the proper indications for the degraded system. We departed ZZZZ on Runway XX via [a departure procedure]. This is an involved noise abatement departure requiring the attention of all three pilots. Once we were established outbound; I noticed my ears popping. More so than usual. I looked up at the pressurization panel and noticed the cabin was climbing at the same rate as the airplane. We were approaching FL100. We requested to maintain FL100. We ran the FWD EQPT VAL checklist. The valve light remained illuminated after the checklist was completed. The aircraft started pressurizing. We knew the issue was not resolved but we wanted to get to a safer altitude (away from VFR traffic and terrain) and a more fuel efficient altitude. We climbed to FL120. The aircraft was still pressurizing. We requested a higher altitude. At approximately FL190 the aircraft lost pressurization. We performed the immediate actions for a rapid depressurization. We [advised ATC] and descended to FL 100. During the descent the cabin altitude warning horn activated. The cabin oxygen masks did not deploy. We asked for a present position hold to work the issue and contact the company. The copilot was the flying pilot. I asked the International Reserve Officer (IRO) to takeover ATC communications. With the aircraft at a safe altitude and location; I attempted to establish communication with dispatch. I was unable to contact company with SATCOM. We kept getting disconnected. I switched to HF and contacted [commercial radio] and requested a phone patch to dispatch. I was able to talk to dispatch and Maintenance Control via HF. Maintenance Control said the issue could not be resolved in flight. Dispatch and I assume the Duty Manager; requested that we return to ZZZZ. I told dispatch we would dump fuel and burn off excess fuel so we could make a below max weight landing. We got clearance from ATC to dump fuel. We ran the appropriate checklist and dumped 35;000 LBS of fuel from the center tank. We still needed to burn off 30;000 LBS of fuel. We configured the aircraft for maximum fuel burn. APU on; gear down and flaps down. At some point while holding; we got an OVHT light on the equipment cooling panel. We ran the appropriate checklist and selected OVRD. This caused the equipment cooling light to illuminate. We ran the appropriate checklist for that issue. That checklist suggests we could lose avionics in 90 minutes. We made the decision to abandon the idea of making a below max weight landing. We requested clearance to ZZZZ. We cleaned up and accelerated. I went back to standby on the equipment cooling panel. The overheat light extinguished and remained off. We speculated that going back to standby and speeding up gave us our cooling back. With the airport in sight and only 10 miles away; we made the decision to do the final turns in [a hold] to burn off the required fuel to make a below max weight landing. We requested ILS approach. This is the longest runway at ZZZZ. We made a normal landing that was below maximum landing weight. We returned to the gate. All of the training we receive has paid off. I delegated authority and assigned duties to prevent myself from being overloaded. We seemed to solve one problem to only find another. What happened in the cockpit is exactly what happens in the simulator. It felt like this emergency was a non-event.

B767 flight crew reported being dispatched with FWD GND EXH VAL on MEL. During climbout the aircraft did not pressurize and the flight returned to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 515; Flight Crew Type 125

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Approaching airport from south (15 NM) heard Cessna aircraft call 10 south shooting GPS app to Runway 36. Continue north; when about 7 NM south Cessna called on GPS app at 5 miles. I called; looking for you; Cessna called he was along power lines. I called I had a visual on him. Cessna was at my 1030 several hundred feet low at a mile. I call inbound for up wind entry (overhead) for RWY 36. As I passed down the Cessna's right side high (2.0 to 2.5 miles south) I called I was passing over head; for the overhead. At midfield turned right to enter right down wind for landing 36. Pilot of Cessna came to my hanger and said I passed inside of 100 feet and he could see the rivets on my aircraft.

RV4 pilot reported passing a C172 on a practice instrument approach; at what the RV4 pilot believed was a safe distance. The C172 pilot did not think so.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Object

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

After completion of run up; and the before takeoff checklist. I called Tower; said holding short of Runway 10; ready for departure.At that moment; when Tower replies 'Clear for takeoff Runway 10.' I start positioning the airplane onto the runway; after visually clearing the final approach end of Runway 10. At this moment my clearance was still being issued; and when I hear the words 'aircraft departing from runway intersection'' my instant reaction was to look on that direction. There it was. This abrupt head movement while an unexpected double takeoff clearance from the same runway is happening; caused me to come off centerline and the propeller hit a taxi light.

A pilot reported that; after receiving a takeoff clearance on the runway; he became momentarily distracted by another ATC transmission and drifted off centerline; striking a taxi light. The aircraft then returned to the gate.


Electronic Library (other than Nav database)

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Taxiing in to the ramp at EWR; given taxi...NB A RA. The chart in our [Electronic Flight Bag] does not reflect the correct taxiways. We made it to the end of NB and found ourselves in a non-movement area. They turned us around and nothing more was said. I elected to call the Control Tower and have a chat. They said this happens all the time and I suggested some cones be placed to block aircraft from heading down to a non-moment area. Also shutting off the taxi centerline lights would have been helpful. The threat is that it seems more than a few airports we go to now have an email attached to them about something special we have to accomplish or familiarize ourselves with. This is getting to be a little complicated since we do rely on our charts so heavily. They need to be updated to reflect the correct taxiways and ramp entrances.

EMB-145 First Officer reported entering a non-movement area on the EWR ramp while following the Electronic Flight Bag guidance.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

On climb out; hydraulic green system low quantity. Complied with ECAM and QRH and secured green system hydraulic pumps. [Requested priority handling]. During cruise; green quantity continued to decrease to zero. Completed follow-on procedures for L/G gravity extension. Uneventful landing ZZZ Runway XXR. Gear pinned on runway and towed to gate. Emergency ground crew observed hydraulic fluid on right wing and right main landing gear upon shutdown on runway.

The crew got low hyd pres & quantity on the green system. Loss of nose wheel steering. Company ATC and Maintenance Control coordinated the tug and arrival for the flight.

A300 flight crew reported loss of Green Hydraulic System on climb out and returned to departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 220; Flight Crew Type 138

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Excursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

I was operating my Piper PA-28-180 at ZZZ. Gross weight was 1;875 lbs and balance was within range per the AFM with just myself and 34 gallons of fuel onboard. Wind was calm and outside air temperature was 94 F (34.4 C); altimeter 29.98. Taxiway B was planned as a takeoff abort point. Calculated takeoff distance over a 50 feet obstacle was 2;250 feet.Engine start; taxi and runup were normal; before takeoff checklist was completed. I received clearance and began a takeoff from Runway XXR. RPM and airspeed did not rise as expected. I made a decision to abort the takeoff and pulled power back to idle. After moderate braking the airplane entered the smooth gravel overrun area. After receiving clearance from Tower; I performed a 180 and taxied the aircraft back to the ramp under its own power.Based on my evaluation of a low power condition I flagged the aircraft as unairworthy and turned it over to my A&P for maintenance.

PA-28 pilot reported the RPMs and speed were not rising as expected during takeoff roll resulting in a rejected takeoff and a runway excursion.  ATC was advised and assisted the pilot in returning the aircraft back to the ramp.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 137; Flight Crew Type 135

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

I was on a Bay tour of the Golden Gate Bridge area. Upon completion of the tour; I flew eastbound toward Berkeley at 1500 feet. When north of the Alcatraz; I suddenly saw another C172 flying westbound at the same altitude in a path that is about 500 feet north of me. Flying in opposite direction meant very little time to react; and I quickly banked right to give us some more distance. There was also a TFR in San Francisco; so I was careful to stay north of Alcatraz to not violate the TFR. I was on flight following with Norcal but did not receive advisory from ATC about that traffic; and do not think the other aircraft was on frequency. I felt the encounter was a bit too close for comfort. Some reflection in hindsight: do [a] better job in visually scanning for traffic; do not assume other VFR guys are on frequency or ATC will always advise traffic; be extra cautious at sightseeing hotspots; especially when there is TFR that might 'funnel' traffic; do not back myself into a corner against the TFR or Bravo boundaries.

C172 pilot reported an airborne conflict with an opposite direction C172 in the vicinity of Alcatraz Island.


All emergency equipment on 737 is shrink wrapped. Difficult to access. Emergency Medical Kit (EMK) is tamper resistant; need sharp object to access equipment.

B737 Flight Attendant reported emergency equipment in this fleet is shrink wrapped and is difficult to access.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 3400; Flight Crew Type 200

Was flying a Garmin G3X Touch system showing the map screen. Displayed on the screen was SAV with extended runway centerlines. Runways 10 and 28 were correctly identified; Runways 1 and 19 had the labels interchanged. I believe this constitutes hazardous; misleading information.

Small aircraft pilot reported mislabeled SAV airport runways 1 and 19 on the Garmin G3X database.


Aircraft; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

An F15 was doing supersonic speed run; the flight was on RVSM; and up at 430B550; when almost finished with the run pilot called and said something that couldn't quite be heard because an aircraft checked in. So we ask for them to repeat. The aircraft called back and declared an emergency and said he was going direct [to his] destination. I got on the line with the sector below us after PVD'ing the aircraft to them and advised that the F15 had declared and emergency and was going direct to his destination. The R-Side had told the aircraft to descend and maintain FL360 and was trying to get a response from the pilot. I PVD'd the aircraft to the lowest sector in our area and called to advise of the emergency. Sometime during these coordination's the pilot advised that they had an engine fire and they where at or leaving FL230 and the supervisor was called. He was military and on UHF but because we were in the ultra high sector we didn't have access to the Military Approach UHF or the line to Military Approach so I could call and coordinate with about the emergency. We need Military Approach UHF frequencies to give to the pilot but we didn't have access to them or a line to the Military Approach on our sector.

Enroute Controller described an emergency event experienced by a military aircraft; the event hampered due to lack of both needed land lines to adjacent Approach Control facilities and UHF frequencies.


We had just leveled off at cruise altitude. I looked into the Captain's manual bag and noticed that the QRH looked to be 'too thin'. In fact it was missing a multitude of pages. Checked the FO QRH and found it to be complete. The previous day on a different aircraft the FO QRH was missing the same pages. Our Dispatcher was contacted and he arranged for a complete QRH to be brought to the aircraft prior to the next departure [the day prior]. The Dispatcher was alerted and made arrangements to have a QRH brought to the aircraft upon our arrival. There was a major revision to the QRH this week. It seems that the pages that were being replaced were removed. The new ones were not put into the QRH. Was this an assembly line error? Were these the only two flight kits to have an incomplete ship set? An immediate check of all ship sets should be completed in order to make sure that QRH manuals are complete and up to date.

Air Carrier captain discovers incomplete QRH's on two consecutive days while examining the aircraft ship sets in cruise.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Software and Automation

While on the initial descent into OSU airport from the southwest; Indianapolis Center issued a clearance to maintain 14;000 ft. and then descend via the JAKTZ.1 RNAV arrival landing west. As PNF (Pilot Not Flying); I was working the radios and responded that we could maintain 14;000 thousand; but unable to descend via the JAKTZ.1 because we are landing OSU and there is no descend via instructions on the current Jeppesen Chart for that airport. Controller sounded confused and then issued an alternative clearance. Since the new arrivals into the Columbus area became effective a month or so ago; we have experienced multiple issues with routing and descend via clearances from both; Indianapolis Center and Columbus Approach Control. Concerns exists as to whether the pilots and controllers are referencing the same information; the overall design of the new air traffic procedures; and training. Suggestions; seek comprehensive user input prior to redesigning air traffic procedures. Enhanced communications prior to releasing new air traffic procedures. Proper training prior to effected parties.

Light Turbojet First Officer report the pilot crew was assigned a STAR but there was no descend via or transition route for their arrival airport OSU. Reporter stated they have experienced routing and clearance issues since the new STAR recently became effective.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30.50; Flight Crew Type 7.6

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

The weather was VFR and clear. Winds were Calm. The purpose of the flight was for pleasure and trail dragger proficiency. Prior to the flight I reviewed the mechanical logs and learned of a squawk related to the fuel selector valve. I decided it would be prudent to review the squawk with the mechanic and front desk. They advised me that the squawk had been checked and verified that it was not an issue and the aircraft was airworthy. I did my pre-flight checks and checked the fuel selector valve. The engine started and operated normally. After receiving ATIS and clearance from ground I taxied to the run-up area. During the start-up I paid particular attention to the engine operation. I noticed no abnormalities during the run-up. I contacted the tower and asked for and received clearance for takeoff. In the initial climb out and crosswind turn I started to notice that I was losing power intermittently; about 300-500 RPM's. I was concerned that the airplane might lose power completely. As I turned downwind; it felt like the engine was being starved intermittently. I decided to continue in the pattern and land. I told the tower that I was having an issue with the plane and would like to land with a short approach. They gave me the choice of either runway and I was cleared to land. I landed towards the end of the runway. The landing was uneventful without any damage to the plane or myself. I asked the tower for clearance to taxi back to the FBO. They approved and I took the plane back and parked it.

Pilot reports renting a Citabria with a previous write up concerning the fuel selector and is assured by the desk that the selector has been checked and released by Maintenance. After takeoff intermittent power loss is noted and the pilot returns to the departure airport after notifying the Tower of his problem and intentions.


Training / Qualification; Workload; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Shortly after breaking out of the clouds (approximately 800 ft.) while on the LDA Z 19 approach we received a low altitude warning from DCA Tower. We did not receive a GPWS indication in the flight deck. After passing BESSE we began our descent to 770 ft. as per the CDFA procedures at 800fpm. At approximately 5.4 DME from IVWH (1.4 miles from WEVPU) using Predictive Monitoring I detected we were just a little low (approximately 1300 ft.) and mentioned to the PF (Pilot Flying) to slow the descent rate so as to cross WEVPU at 1100 ft. The PF complied; however the time it took for me to state this; the time it took to the PF to take action; and the time it took the aircraft to respond allowed the passing of WEVPU slightly below 1100 ft. We continued the descent and shortly thereafter broke out of the clouds at approximately 800 ft. At this point we received the low altitude warning from Tower. At that point we were both looking for the runway and had a good visual conditions. Realizing we were low and slowly descending I asked the PF to disconnect the autopilot; hand fly; stay over the river; maintain current altitude; which took the PF some time to comprehend and take action. The PF then maintained altitude or a very slow descent until we had proper VASI indications. In the future I plan to fly all LDA Z approaches myself. This approach is challenging and things happen fast. Having to coach less experienced pilots during the approach and conduct other PM (Pilot Monitoring) duties is completely task saturating. The more I fly this approach the more I believe it should be a Captain only approach. I would also like to add that within 15 to 20 minutes of our beginning this approach there were 2 or 3 special ATIS reports as the ceiling was dropping rapidly. This should have (and will be in the future) an indication for me as the Captain to transfer controls from the FO (First Officer) to myself.

CRJ-900 Captain reported receiving a low altitude alert from DCA Tower on the LDA Z Rwy 19 approach.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

I was working Camrn/Lendy position in the Kennedy Sector of the NY TRACON. We were in the middle of our daily afternoon push and I was feeding Final position the SOP feed for Runway 22L/22R approach. We were busy so we had just put ZNY Camrn Sector; and ZNY Water Sector in a hold and were running traffic from ZNY Lendy Sector. I had numerous IFR traffic on my frequency all descending to the same altitude on radar vectors assigned by me to put in line to feed the Final Controller. I received an extremely loud high pitched tone through my headset. I yelled 'OW' and the Final Controller then looked at me and said 'you heard that too?' I told him I did and we both then realized our frequencies were no longer working. The other two positions in the area did not receive the tone and their frequencies kept working. At this point; I called the Lendy Sector and told them to hold because we lost frequencies. I then proceeded to try our backup jacks and backup frequencies. I was able to get my frequency to work and then proceeded to stop aircraft descents so that I had altitude between all aircraft. The Final Controller's frequency still wasn't working; and neither was LGA Final Controller's; which is a big deal due the finals being right next to each other at the same altitude. Since Final still didn't have a frequency I began to spin the aircraft in my airspace. The Rober position also took some aircraft from me to spin in their airspace so that I had no planes at the same altitude. In the course of planes being vectored; altitudes maintained; I may have entered LIB SOUTH and ZNY airspace; although it did not cause a loss of separation between any aircraft. I don't know why we lost frequencies; but if they figure out why; maybe they could change it so that LGA FINAL and JFK FINAL are on two different sources so that they don't lose them at the same time. The proximity of the finals is dangerous enough as it is.

While working a busy afternoon push of arrival traffic; the reporter received a loud tone in the ear. The tone may have been associated with instantaneous frequency loss. Reporter separated traffic but may have violated adjacent airspace.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

We got Bleed 2 Over-Temp red EICAS messaged. We ran the QRH and after the issue did not resolve; we decided to return to ZZZ. After spending 30 minutes on the ground getting the filter to Bleed 2 cleaned as that's what they thought the issue was; we departed again for ZZZ1. Our configuration on takeoff was Bleed 1; APU bleed; cross-bleed open; Pack 2. Climbing through 9;000 ft.; the same issue of Bleed 2 Over-Temp occurred. We ran the QRH and after opening the APU bleed; we got the Bleed 2 temp to drop into the white margin. We tried multiple configurations on the pneumatic panel before we came up with that solution. We noticed the airplane was not pressurizing; and we got the 'Cabin Altitude High' alert at FL190. We told the controller we needed lower [and] he responded; 'Give me a minute.' As I started to feel lightheaded and dizzy; I knew I didn't have a minute; so I [requested priority handling] and used the Pilot in Command authority to get a lower altitude and we returned to ZZZ for the second time. They manually closed the Bleed 2 Valve; and we opted to stay at 11;000 ft. and go down to ZZZ2 and over to ZZZ1. The rest of the flight had no further issues; and we landed in ZZZ1 around XA:30.[The cause was] bleed system issues and PACKS being inoperative. A lot of this situation required trial and error and reconfiguring the pneumatics panel so there are not many preventive measures we could have taken.

EMB-135 Captain reported the aircraft having bleed air problems and failing to pressurize properly; with the pilot potentially being affected by oxygen deprivation as the aircraft climbed to higher altitudes.


Troubleshooting; Workload; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

I was pilot flying; my CA (Captain) was pilot monitoring. After receiving instructions from Approach to slow down to 170 KT until a 5-mile final; we got an IDG (Integrated Drive Generator) fault message. The CA pulled out the QRH and tried to address the issue. Shortly after; we got a multitude of issues. We notified ATC and we agreed that we would be safe to land. Slat flap fail; AT/AP (Autothrottles/Autopilot) disconnect; and more. Suddenly we lost all screens and everything went black. The RAT (Ram Air Turbine) deployed and I had to continue flying using the Captains PFD (Primary Flight Display). The CA [requested priority handling] and was cleared by Approach to land and swap to Tower.CA told the FAs (Flight Attendant) we were making a precautionary landing. Tower said they had the trucks rolling and landed as best we could normally. We dropped the flaps on schedule and noticed that the Slat Flap Disagree persisted. The CA then took over the controls with ample time before the 1;000 feet call and I swapped roles to PM. We notified ATC that we could not verify [if] the gear and flaps were down. Luckily; Tower notified us that another plane verified they were down. We landed uneventfully and taxied to the gate under our own power. No passengers were hurt; only the first row or two knew something was abnormal due to the RAT vibrations; the rest of the passengers were unaware of the incident. [The cause was an] internal electrical malfunction at a time of high workload. Potentially go-around and troubleshoot If issues happen on final.

EMB-175 First Officer reported an IDG failure during initial approach which led to a complete electrical failure and RAT deployment.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

While descending to FL240 we were cleared to descended via the ZZZZZ X RNAV Arrival.  I selected 11;000 feet.  Approaching ZZZZZ Intersection I noticed that we were in open descent.  I disconnected the autopilot and leveled off at FL238 and then started a climb back to FL240.  Cause- While level at FL350 ATC cleared us to FL240 with a restriction to descend below FL310.  I selected open descent to meet the restriction.  After being cleared to descend via the arrival I did not select the managed mode.I need to increase vigilance when flying with people coming back from leaves for both PF and PM roles.

Air carrier flying pilot reported an altitude deviation during arrival and cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

First Officer (FO) Flying. Entered overcast at approximately 800 AFE [Above Field Elevation]. I reached up to turn on engine anti-ice. Received call to contact Departure. As I contacted Departure; I looked at airspeed and FO was rapidly accelerating through 200 KTS. He had not called 'Flaps Up' (it was a Flaps 1 takeoff). I stated 'Bring your nose up; flaps are coming up now.' As I retracted flaps; I stated again; 'Bring your nose up; you are still accelerating.' Cleaned aircraft up; but shortly after flaps were retracted; got a short duration 'Flap Overspeed' ECAM. Debriefed FO on Flap retraction SOPs and limitations. I was definitely distracted looking at anti-ice; temps; and contacting Departure. In that time; I should have been more aware of FO's profile and our airspeed. FO had recently received a company letter and seemed very distracted over the course of the whole 3-day trip. Overspeed max airspeed wasn't noted; but I expect it wasn't more than 5 knots. Entered into AML and ZZZ1 Maintenance performed an inspection and returned the aircraft to service. We flew the aircraft to ZZZ2 shortly after. FO's distraction with possible furlough; I had just returned from 3 weeks off. 3rd leg of trip and I felt like I was single-pilot for a lot of our trip. I've got to pay more attention to my flying partner when I'm getting task saturated to ensure this doesn't happen again.Should have discussed departure and cleanup procedure in more detail with FO.

Air carrier Captain reported a flap overspeed on departure climbout.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

During preflight duties; ramp personnel motioned for me to come down to the ramp; as there was a fuel spill. When I got onto the ramp; I observed a large stream of jet fuel coming from the R main fuel tank overflow. I estimated there were 20-25 gallons on the ramp. Ramp personnel were attempting to contain the spill. I notified Maintenance; and Operations. I stopped boarding.When I returned to the cockpit to enter this discrepancy in the [log book]; I was surprised to find that there was an entry for the previous day; regarding a fuel spill on the ramp. The corrective action of this was that the fuel spill was cleaned up by contract personnel. I entered the discrepancy into the [log book]; and waited for Maintenance. It appeared to me that something occurred in the fuel system that caused the R main tank to be overfilled; causing the excess fuel to be vented overboard.Maintenance personnel arrived; and I explained the issue. The technician seemed to indicate that he may defer the R main tank quantity gauge; refuel the tank; and pump a known quantity into it for our flight. This seemed odd to me; as the R main quantity read 8800 pounds; which would be a proper indication for an overfilled main tank. Maintenance attempted to transfer fuel from the R main tank to other tanks; but when this was attempted; the R main tank; which had stopped venting fuel; began to vent again. Maintenance took the aircraft out of service.There seems to be a very obvious push to get the planes out on time; regardless of maintenance status. In my case; I wanted someone to explain to me in a satisfactory manner; why this aircraft was behaving this way. It appeared that Maintenance was blaming the fuel venting on some fuel pressure issue with the fueling cart/truck. As far as I was concerned; there was an issue with the aircraft that needed to be addressed. Fortunately; Maintenance took the aircraft out of service.

B737-800 pilot reported right main tank overflow fuel spill during preflight.


Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

While at cruise; the First Officer discovered that the oxygen mask harness at his station did not inflate when the triggers were squeezed and did not retract when released. The mask did provide oxygen flow but did not cradle the head or face making the mask ineffective if used hands free. After some discussion; the crew decided the best course of action was to stop enroute and have the mask replaced rather than continue to destination. We notified Dispatch and Maintenance Control via ACARS; made a logbook entry; and diverted to a nearby regular airport. Maintenance Technicians met the aircraft on arrival and replaced the mask. We then departed to our scheduled destination without further incident; arriving about 45 minutes behind schedule.Preflight procedures need to be changed to require the oxygen masks be removed from their containers to ensure they are working properly. Had a smoke; fire; or pressurization event occurred; the First Officer would not have been able to use his hands other than to hold the mask in place. Donning the Observer mask would not have allowed him to reach the flight controls.

When the First Officer's O2 mask harness failed to inflate for donning B737-700 flight crew diverted to a nearby airport to have it replaced.


ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

We were operating ZZZ1-ZZZAfter Looking at the weather for ZZZ the winds were clearly favoring Runway X. We were cleared to ZZZ [VOR] via ZZZ1 [VOR].  We briefed and planned for Runway X and we were expecting the RNAV to Runway X especially since that approach has ZZZ1 [VOR] as a transition.When we got close enough and got the local ATIS; they were Broadcasting that they were using Runway YY.  According to the Captain's crosswind calculator; we would land with a slight crosswind and a 4 knot tailwind. If we used runway six we would land with the same crosswind in the opposite direction and a four knot headwind.  When the Captain questioned ZZZ approach about this; the Controller told him that they were using YY and that they had multiple departures and they could not offer Runway X. He did offer [Runway] ZZ as an option; but both me and my crew member opted not to take ZZ being that is a short runway and points directly at a mountain range and we were going in at night. So we accepted Runway YY.We were being vectored for the RNAV to YY into ZZZ. We were coming up the east side of the airport and were told to expect to be turned inside of ZZZZZ waypoint and expect the RNAV GPS for YY.This was a night flight and there was no light from a full moon or anything like that; conditions were good; visibility was unrestricted and there were no measurable ceilings.We were given a vector of 360 and maintain 4;000 feet. This vector would cross us over the mountains.  Our altimeter setting 30.18. When we arrived at the gate; we verified that all three altimeters were set correctly and that they were set to the current altimeter setting that was being broadcast by the ATIS.As we were crossing the mountain range we received a terrain alert; 'terrain - terrain pull up.'I was flying and immediately put the power to the detent and pitched up 5-10 degrees and initiated a climb.The Captain immediately notified approach control of the terrain alert and the fact that we were climbing.  He told us to maintain 5;000 feet and turn direct ZZZZZ.  The captain asked for a parallel vector in the opposite direction to give us some space as we were basically over ZZZZZ and attempting to make a right turn and go directly to ZZZZZ would be simply flying in circles.  The Controller gave us a parallel vector in the opposite direction of the inbound course; and then told us to go direct to ZZZZZ when able.  He seemed rather annoyed and short with us.At this point the Captain started to get annoyed with the Controller because the Controller gave the distinct impression that he just wanted to hand us off and be done working our flight.  The Captain notified him again about the terrain alert and that they may want to consider using a higher altitude in the future.  He made mention that they do it all the time and I think he said something about our equipment and that the next Controller would talk to us about it.  Again; he seemed annoyed.At this point I was established on the approach.  The Captain told the Controller that we were established on the RNAV GPS YY; he cleared us for the approach and handed us off to the Tower Controller.  We flew the rest of the approach without incident. We landed under normal conditions.We taxied in and everything was completely normal.  We parked at the gate and nothing was said.  The Captain waited until we completed the Parking Checklist and the aircraft was stable.  He then contacted the tower and asked them if they were notified about the terrain alert.  He told me that he got the impression that if he hadn't called them; they wouldn't have attempted to contact him.Based off of the actions and instructions of ZZZ approach control it seems that they do not understand or appreciate the risks that aircraft take flying around the high terrain in and out of   their airfield. ZZZ controllers should put more effort into helping aircraft safely operate in and out of ZZZ airport. Especially at night and in poorweather.

EMB-145 First Officer reported a terrain alert occurred while the aircraft was crossing a mountain range as vectored by ATC. The crew notified ATC and received vectors to the approach which was completed normally.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

The left air conditioning pack was deferred. On climb out; passing through 4;000 ft.; we got an EICAS red warning message R BLEED DUCT which changed to amber after about 10 seconds. We ran the QRH and returned to CLT unpressurized. We contacted the company; cabin crew; and ATC.Likely the increased demands on the remaining air conditioning pack with climb thrust.

CRJ-700 Captain reported an EICAS red and amber warning that resulted in an air return.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Both aircraft were on vectors for VOR Runway 23 practice approaches. Aircraft X was turned base (320 heading) and descended from 3;100 FT to 2;100 FT. Aircraft Y was 4 miles in-trail of Aircraft X at 3;100 FT; on the downwind heading (heading 060.) When Aircraft Y was turned onto final (final course heading 240) he was still in the descent to 2;100 FT. Aircraft Y was still on the downwind heading at the same time as Aircraft X was turned final. The separation was lost as the two aircraft passed laterally (final and downwind) due to a tight downwind to final. When I realized that Aircraft Y was going to be too close to Aircraft X for IFR separation; Aircraft Y was turned 'out' to a heading of 070. There were multiple other approaches and IFR student pilot training going on throughout the sector with multiple other aircraft on vectors and/or approaches.

TRACON Controller described a loss of separation event due in part to vectoring traffic for an instrument approach on a tight downwind.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

During boarding; the passenger originally seated in X2 moved herself to exit row XYA. I was in the back; waiting for the aisle to clear so I could close the overhead bins and brief exit rows. I noticed the customer was in the galley speaking with the forward FA. I wasn't sure what her seat was; so I waited for her to go to her seat before I started walking forward and closing the bins. She grabbed her bag from row X and then sat in XYA; the exit row. I just assumed that was her assigned seat at the time. I closed the bins all the way to the front. I noticed a pilot commuting in row Z who had his mask around his chin and wasn't eating. I requested he put his mask back up and he did. The man behind him in X4 had his mask completely off; so I asked him to put it on and he did. When I asked that guy to put his on; another customer across also pulled theirs up; so I didn't have to ask that third person. I don't recall where the third person was sitting; I only remember they sat in [the area] on the left side of the aircraft. They put their mask up before I asked; so I didn't think much of that.I was quite annoyed that I had to remind so many customers to put their masks up. I briefed the exits like normal. After the door was closed and I did my compliance checks; other flight attendant motioned me toward her before the safety demo. She said that the woman who moved to the exit row was originally seated in [in a different area]; and that many customers had their masks off in that area; so she requested to move else where; and that's why she moved. I told other Flight Attendant that I did notice a lot more than usual with their masks off or down; especially in those first few rows of [that area]. Especially the [commuting] pilot and the guy behind him. Other flight attendant said the woman said something about a crew member not wearing a mask. There were a few flight attendants commuting; too; but they all had their masks on that I knew of. Later; inflight I spoke to the woman who moved; and I apologized and told her that it was not okay that they weren't wearing their masks; and that I did tell them to put them on and they did. She said she was especially appalled that a pilot wasn't wearing one; and said she was traveling to see a family member and was stressed enough. I gave her [a voucher] and offered her wine or beer; which she would have gotten in her [original] seat anyway. She seemed calmer and thanked me a lot.Later; I spoke with the [commuting] pilot and reminded him the importance of wearing masks around customers; and that one did move herself back because he wasn't wearing his. After I told him the first time (before door was closed) to put it back on; he kept it on except when eating or drinking. The man behind him; however; I told twice more (three times total including before door was closed) to put his mask on. Once inflight when I was collecting trash and he was sleeping. He had his mask all the way below his chin; near the collar of his shirt so that it didn't even look like he had one there. And another before landing; when I was doing my final compliance check. There was another guy in main cabin who fell asleep twice and I had to shake him awake and remind him to put his mask up; but his was covering his mouth; it just wasn't over his nose. I checked on the customer in XYA again and told her I spoke with that pilot again; and he has complied with mask requirement since the door was closed. Hopefully he just forgot and takes the mask requirement seriously. I only told him once; so I'm not sure how long he had it off or if he was eating before and just forgot to put it back on. I spoke with flight deck before I spoke with that commuter because our paper work and guest service tool app did not say there was a non-rev seated in Z4. So I asked FD if maybe he was listed as jumpseater; which didn't make sense because there were enough seats for all the non-revs to get on and he had higher priority. So I told FD about the customer complaint about that commuting pilot. When I spoke with him; he said he asked gate agent for a seat without the bulkhead; since he was originally given seat A3. So it seemed the woman who was seated in Z3; was swapped to A3. And the pilot was moved to Z4. I'm not sure exactly.

Flight Attendant reported that many passengers; including a commuting pilot; were not compliant with the face mask policy.


Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

We took off for ZZZ on time. I was PM (Pilot Monitoring). On climb out; the Captain said the trim was not working. I tried my electric trim; nothing. We configured the aircraft. Captain engaged the autopilot and we were both intent on monitoring whether or not the autopilot could trim. STAB OUT OF TRIM illuminated. We ran the STAB OUT OF TRIM QRH; which directed us to the STABILIZER TRIM INOPERATIVE QRH. After telling ATC we would like to remain at 16;000' and 250 knots to work a problem; we began to work through the checklist. Once we got to the DEFERRED ITEMS; we made the decision to return. We ran the [performance] numbers for flaps 15 and included the Non-normal Checklist. We both looked at the data before we sent it; but believe we might have missed the correct landing weight due to not manually correcting the fuel numbers in the [performance calculations]. We landed without difficulty or anything appearing abnormal; other than the smaller flap setting. We ran the brake cooling numbers and I realized the numbers came back for 120;000 pounds. I then resent brake cooling numbers for 132;000 pounds; which is 4;000 overweight.During a flight control abnormality; or any abnormality; it would be nice to have something included in the procedure for checking for correct [performance] numbers. There is enough to contend with to remember every detail that is unusual in something we use everyday like [the performance calculation system].

B737 First Officer reported elevator trim failed on climbout and returned to land.


Confusion; Workload; Communication Breakdown

On approach to SNA approach controller issued a descent for the approach. While descending controller issued vectors for us to intercept final for an approach to LGB. We immediately realized his error and did not accept the vectors. We advised him we were going to SNA. Controller then instructed us to climb and gave us new vectors to SNA.Controller became confused and thought LGB was our destination.

During the descent we were then given a left turn away from the field to a heading of 270 deg. We did not start that turn and at that point we DID question the controller. He then said he was actually vectoring us to LGB. Once realizing his mistake he climbed us back to 3;000 feet and the rest of the approach was normal. He apologized to us for the mistake. I never had it in my mmd that ATC would be sending us to the wrong airport. What I learned from this was never to blindly trust ATC. This was a classic HF DLR/DFR and we should have questioned the clearance sooner.This was an ATC error; and an HF error on the crew's part. I should have questioned the descent to 1;600 feet recognizing that the Glideslope Intercept Altitude (GS INT ALT) at SNA is 2;200 feet; that they rarely give a visual to that airport; and that there is terrain north of the field. Only when they turned us the wrong way did we finally say something.

An aircraft with SNA as its destination was being vectored to an LGB final when the crew finally questioned the Controller who had become confused about the flight's destination. The flight was climbed and returned to SNA.


Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Standard taxi 'East route' for Runway 25R at PHX Jeppesen page contradicts itself. Hold Short column says 'D' and beneath it says 'Do not hold short unless instructed.' Recommend reformatting to align with other airports (Example: DFW standard taxi routes leave the hold short column blank if only expected to hold short of runway--Jeppeson). Consider deleting the comment; 'Do not hold short unless instructed' or moving it to the remarks column.When given the East Route leaving PHX we stopped short of taxiway delta; checked in with the PHX Tower Controller; and he advised us we only need to hold short of the runway but stated; 'the last 100 aircraft stopped short of Taxiway Delta.' Obviously the pages are not clear to many pilots. The Tower Controller requested we get it clarified. Poorly written standard taxi procedures. Standardize PHX pages with other airports considering human factors.

Air carrier pilot reported the standard taxi chart at PHX airport needs reformatting to conform with other airport standard taxi charts.


Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

We were following a Heavy 777 and were getting a little wake from it. I changed from VNAV to LVL change to climb at a higher rate to get above the 777. We were supposed to be at or below DARRK at 12;000 feet. We crossed it at about 12;500 feet.

B737-700 Captain reported overshooting an altitude restriction departing LAX after encountering wake turbulence from a preceding B777.


Installation; Inspection; Repair; Work Cards; Testing

Maintenance Avionics 9; Maintenance Technician 6

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure

[Working] on a [merger] B757-200 aircraft [and using Air Carrier Y's] Work Card for a Number 1 right-hand forward windshield replacement with an attached Service Bulletin (SB) 757-30-0019 Work Package; Step-4; to change the window heat wiring. The work was accomplished by me and another Technician who installed a nut improperly on Terminal Block TB5038 and could not comply with all of Step-4 until window was installed. I complied with pining block on J1 and J5 once the window was in place. I complied with the sign-off of Step-4. The Work Card provided no partial sign-off for Step-4; which states [to] change the window heat wiring. Notified Supervisor of more training [needed] on Air Carrier Y's paperwork and for more detail of Work Card steps for multiple technicians working on single steps. Improper torque of terminal block nut TB5038 by Technician and single sign-off for Step-4 of the Service Bulletin (SB) 757-30-0019 Work Card.

An Avionics Technician reports about the installation of a First Officer's forward windshield on a post merger B757-200 aircraft. Difficulties using the merged Air Carrier's Work Card Package that had only one sign-off for Step-4 of the Service Bulletin (SB) 757-30-0019 window heat wiring harnesses; were also noted.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 202; Flight Crew Type 7000

Taxiing up to the taxiway; about 75 feet out; I saw a catering truck approaching from the left. I was watching that it slowed and it stopped outside prior to safety zone. I was continuing the taxi when another catering truck was approaching at high speed from the right. It was clear that the vehicle would not stop; so I applied heavy breaking to stop. I do not believe we would have collided; but it was closer than I was comfortable with. Given recent events; this driver was operating rather recklessly. Ground equipment drivers need to respect the right of way of aircraft and slow down.

B737 Captain reports having to make an abrupt stop approaching his gate due to a catering truck approaching rapidly from the right.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency

Just prior to descent the Captain's Windshield shattered at FL350. The weather conditions were dropping at our destination due to approaching blizzard coupled with zero visibility on the Captain's side so we declared an emergency. We initiated our descent and approach immediately into our destination and the First Officer landed the aircraft without further incident.

An A300 Captain's window shattered at FL350 in cruise so an emergency was declared and the First Officer made the landing as blizzard conditions approached the airport.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

I am reporting an unsafe situation we as an aircrew encountered on the flight back from ZZZ to ZZZ1.We had an APU failure and lost at least one of our packs; so we had no air conditioning inflight and the temps in the cabin became dangerously high; I knew once we got off the ground and we were climbing out that the situation was going sideways; so I formulated a game plan and as soon as we reached altitude instead of using the cart I just pulled every tray of water I had on the plane; it was at that point Flight Attendant who was deadheading on the flight immediately came to the galley and introduced herself and asked what she could do to assist me and I just told her jump in and start handing out water and asked her to make ice packs for 2 moms that were on board.One was an expecting mom around and her husband were seated in X12 and an infant and mom in Y3 the expecting mom became pale and very hot and I was really concerned for her and her unborn child's safety and the infant and mom in 6 were red and very warm.What little bit of ice we had that hadn't melted we fashioned ice packs after emptying the Purell packets out of the zip lock bags they were in for both moms and we together pulled every bottle of water we had on board passed them throughout the cabin until we ran out; our flight crew were miserable as well as the flight became very unbearable.At one point I became so dehydrated NAME sat me in my jump seat and handed me one of the large bottles of water we had left onboard and made sure I was hydrated while she attended to pax needs and then I swapped out with her so she could hydrate as well. The teamwork was amazing and I am so grateful to have had her assistance.We kept everyone calm and hydrated as best we could until we got on the ground in ZZZ1; while I was tending to landing prep Flight Attendant deadheading went ahead and filed her report inflight for me so I could tend to the pax.Together we were able to keep both moms and their babies born and unborn safe the flight deck was very concerned and called me to ask if we needed medical personnel to meet us at the gate but I told them no that everything fine but if the situation changed I would advise as soon as possible.In closing the conditions onboard when we lost the pack was dangerously hot and it was definitely a test of my training but like I said as soon as so realized we had a problem I already had a plan in place to deal with it.

Flight Attendant reported temperatures rose to high levels during cruise and endangered passengers because of an air conditioning pack failure.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 6000

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On Approach to ORF; aircraft slowed to 180 so that aircraft could get configured for approach and landing into ORF. A few miles from OM controller asked aircrafts airspeed. Crew responded 180 Knots. Controller seemed annoyed and instructed crew to maintain 180; which they did to the outer marker as ordered by ATC.If the aircraft had maintained the maximum speed of 250 to the outer marker; they would have been unable to safely configure the aircraft for landing and would have put the passengers and crew at risk. Moreover; they would have been operating the aircraft in a reckless manner which is not only immoral but illegal as well.

Pilot reported of slowing the aircraft below controllers requested speed. Controller got mad. Pilot reported they needed to slow to get the aircraft configured to land.