FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway YY

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

On downwind to RWY XXL at ZZZ; we began reducing speed and selected flaps 1 which operated normally.  Upon reducing speed further; we selected flaps 2 and receive a FLT CTRL; FLAPS LOCKED MISALIGNMENT ECAM message.  The slats appeared to operate normally however the flaps were locked between the 1 & 2 position.  We ran the QRH & ECAM actions and follow ups until we ran low on fuel; and landed on RWY YY uneventfully.  MX met the aircraft and we entered the discrepancy in the logbook.We experienced several issues with this event that were related to the procedures and policies in dealing with malfunctions.  Firstly; I as Captain had the FO; who was the PF; remain as PF and handle the ATC communications so that I could 'Manage' the situation; in accordance with the [Company] operational philosophy.  What this resulted in was a situation where I was so completely consumed attention-wise by the in-depth research of landing performance and checklists and notifications; that I found myself entirely removed from the 'management' of the flight and later discovered that my FO had realized this and began acting as the PIC and covered us by making the decisions for the flight that I was not aware of.  Now; you can claim that this was great CRM; but that would be ignoring the real problem of me being so preoccupied by doing secretarial work that I was removed from the situation and no longer 'managing'.  Our checklists are WAY TOO LONG and are inefficient; impractical and largely unusable unless you have hours of extra fuel to play with which we did not.  We ran low on fuel and landed without completing all the performance calculations required by the checklist.  In addition; the computed ref speeds would have had us landing in what erroneously appeared to be well below VLS; so we increased speed manually to keep us out of the Alpha Protection range which may have been inaccurate.  This resulted in lowering the pitch attitude and gave us about 2 degrees of 'flare' capability to max pitch of 7.5 degrees.  With this; it resulted in a very firm landing.The current event management philosophy of the Captain doing the busy work while the FO sits over there and glances at the autopilot flying the airplane around; is flawed.  The PF has MUCH MORE TIME AND MENTAL CAPACITY to 'Manage' since it requires very little effort to monitor the autopilot.  Doing checklists and calculations and notifications however; is all-consuming leaving no attention or time to 'Manage' the flight.  The Captain could most effectively manage the situation if he were the PF.  The Captain should then delegate to the FO the tasks of checklists; calculations; research and notifications; and this is the way I intend to handle failures in the future.  It's simply the most conservative; safest approach to dealing with problems. Furthermore; our checklists and calculations procedures need to be more concise.  If you can't complete a checklist with the appropriate performance calculations in less than 3 minutes; it's useless.  I would challenge anyone in the company to complete every checklist and calculation for our failure; without advanced warning; in less than 20 minutes. We couldn't.

A321 Captain reported flap problems on approach that required checklists that were; in the Captain's words; 'way too long and are inefficient and largely unusable.' They were unable to complete them because of their fuel situation.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 17C

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload; Time Pressure

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy

We were on vectors with Approach Control over the vicinity of Frisco or The Colony; kind of on a long extended base leg; for an expected ILS to 17C. Frequency 127.05. We were given clearance to descend to 5000 ft. In the descent; at roughly 6500 ft; perhaps; we got a TA and the yellow traffic indicator at 12 o'clock. We could not spot the traffic initially. At about 6000 ft still in the descent; we got the RA and the red traffic indicator at 12 o'clock; plus new flight path guidance to climb. At that point; the Relief Pilot identified the traffic straight ahead and said it looked to be an experimental airplane. I disconnected the automation and hand flew the airplane in accordance with the RA instructions; which directed a climb. I smoothly climbed straight ahead to about 6500 ft or 7000 ft; roughly; the Captain (pilot monitoring) notified ATC of the RA; and I returned to the original altitude and airspeed once we were Clear of Conflict. On the ground; at the gate; the captain planned to notify Dispatch. I believe we came within 500 ft of the traffic; or possibly closer; which I think was at 5500 ft at the time.When we reported the RA to the ATC Controller; she said in response that she has that traffic on TCAS; or on her radar; or something to that effect. My thought was; 'Then why were we on vectors descending into it?'

There was a lot of traffic on the inbound complex; and the controller was very busy; but it seems there should have been some radar alert at atc; so the controller wouldn't vector and descend us through a transponder equipped VFR aircraft inside the Class B airspace on active runway finals. The TCAS saved us in the congested airspace; so I highly recommend aircrews pay attention to their TCASs; especially with the increased traffic flows of the new packed complexes.

An air carrier crew on vectors to DFW Runway 17C and descending to 5;000 ft followed a TCAS RA from an aircraft at 5;500 ft. The aircraft was in Class B; known to ATC but not reported to the pilots prior to the TCAS alert.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Other Person; Person Ground Personnel

Event Description: While staff emptied a container with DG goods (ICE 9); they discovered 2 coll were not fixed.

Airline employee reported Hazmat not properly secured for transport.


Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

After starting the Number Two engine; the SMOKE warning light illuminated. The Captain directed me to call the Flight Attendant and see if he noticed any indications of smoke coming from the cargo compartment. The Flight Attendant notified me there was no indication of smoke or fire visible. The Captain called Ground and asked for the fire equipment to meet the airplane; he also called Operations and notified them we were returning to the gate area. The ground crew met the airplane and we deplaned in an orderly manner.

[Narrative 2 contains no additional information.]

A DHC-8-300 Master Caution and Cargo Smoke alerted during engine start so an emergency was declared. The aircraft returned to the gate and after passengers deplaned a faulty smoke detector was discovered.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 2500; Flight Crew Type 135

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

After receiving ATIS I called Tower let them know we had the current ATIS; we were 10 to the northwest inbound for a full stop landing. They advised me to report a 2 mile left base. At approximately midfield I announced 'below 150 mph; gear down.' [My student] moved the gear handle in the down position and announced 'green light; down and locked' and I said 'green light verified'. After turning left base I reported that we were about 2.5 [miles] out and we were cleared to land. I announced 'below 120 mph' and set first set of flaps. Then I showed [my student] our procedure was to push mixture to full (reds); set props to full (blues); throttles are set; and check green light (green). After turning final again I announced 'flaps full; Reds; Blues; throttles; Green light verified and we are cleared to land.' The plane touched down just past the 1000 foot marks and started rolling. As the nose wheel started to come down we felt the left side feel almost as we had a flat tire which was the left side hitting the ground. The right prop then struck the ground as the gear collapsed under us and we slid to a stop just beyond the 2000 foot mark. We exited the plane as quickly as possible and waited for fire and rescue; letting them know that we were OK.

PA30 flight instructor reported the landing gear was verified down with a green light; but collapsed on landing roll.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I pointed out Aircraft Y to MOT approach descending from FL260 to FL200 delaying in the M3 south and M4 south areas.  Aircraft Y was on station at FL200 in M3 South and M4 South; within the lateral confines of MOT Approach.  MOT approach departed Aircraft X.  The LOA between MOT approach and ZMP states departures will be climbing to FL230 or their requested altitude; if lower than FL230.  I took the radar hand off about 15 miles SE of the MOT airport at 100 climbing.  My thought was this would aid the approach controller in separating Aircraft X from Aircraft Y.  To my surprise; Aircraft X checked on out of 113 climbing to FL230.  Aircraft Y was now in a turn into Aircraft X.  I stopped Aircraft X.  This scenario; placed a commercial airliner in unsafe proximity to an unmanned aircraft that could not see and avoid traffic.  Minot approach is a military approach control.  I feel more complete training is needed at MOT Approach.  At ZMP; this is not considered positive separation.

ZMP Controller describes a conflict between a CRJ200 departing MOT and a UAV operating in an MOA at FL200.  MOT Departure had not restricted the CRJ to stay below FL200 until cleared to climb by ZMP but had instead cleared the CRJ to climb in accordance with the LOA without regard for the UAV.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction

I have heard from other crewmembers that the charting for CIU does not depict a significant displaced threshold for RWY34. The Jeppesen charting does not depict this closed runway; but on AirNav.com it is discussed in the airport details and it is on the NOS chart. 'VEHICLE TESTING IN PROGRESS DURING WINTER MONTHS ON SECTIONS FO CLSD/ABNDD PARALLEL TWY; SE OF APCH END RY 34. AREA MAY BE PLOWED TO BARE SFC BUT IS NOT AVBL FOR ACFT ARRS OR DEPS.' I believe the Jeppesen chart should depict this closed section of runway to prevent inadvertent landing on this pavement. Please compare the NOS chart to the Jeppesen chart to see what I am referring to. Proper charting of the Jeppesen plate would be a good start; and in the interim add a note to the 10-7 page for crews to use caution.

An air carrier pilot reported that CIU Runway 34 approach end very long displaced threshold is not charted on the Jeppesen commercial airport chart. The NOS chart accurately depicts the environment.


Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

After getting on the aircraft to fly; I did all my pre-flight duties including putting my personal luggage away and doing my safety checks. Just before we were ready to board; the flight crew including myself; was notified that someone had tested positive for COVID-19 from the inbound flight. We were later told that it was a passenger who tested positive for COVID-19. After waiting and many phone calls by the ground management as well as the pilots; it was decided ground personnel would clean the area where the customer had sat more thoroughly than just the tray table areas. The passenger was said to have been sitting in row X that tested positive. The cleaning personnel who wipe down the areas cleaned row X and the surrounding 6 rows behind it as a precaution. They then did it again because the cleaning solution being used says on the directions that it must sit for at least XX minutes on the surfaces being cleaned to properly be effective. Once the cleaning process was finished and completed; we boarded the flight and went on our way.The safety concern here is that there is no protocol for this exact situation and possible exposure. Our whole working crew and whatever ground personnel who entered the plane post flight are possibly exposed to this virus. I personally work in the affected area of the row. I sat in the row waiting for answers as to the protocols on what we were to do next. I touched all overhead bins around row X; the bathroom; bulkhead working station; and all surrounding areas that all could have been affected by this customer who tested positive. It's also not known if this customer had affected any other parts of the cabin and if this virus is on surfaces of the plane in more than just row X and the area of the aircraft that all the crew had to walk on to get on the aircraft.

Flight Attendant reported possible COVID-19 exposure from a passenger on the inbound flight. The crew used the same aircraft outbound after being notified of the positive test.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Type 8400

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Airport; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy

We were two hours late due to ATC closure (ZZZ Center). After discussing with Dispatch that we would be very close to Crew day; we launched from ZZZ to ZZZ1. Landed approximately two hours late and took off from ZZZ1 in time to land back at ZZZ within Crew day; however; upon landing (with 20 minutes to spare) there were approximately 10 aircraft waiting for a gate. I sent Dispatch an ACARS telling them that we were going to exceed our 13-hour Crew day. I was told by ZZZ Ops and Dispatch that gates were being issued 'first-come; first-serve.' We waited approximately 45 minutes before making it to a gate. Total day was approximately 30 minutes over allowed hours.

Air carrier First Officer reported being two hours late due to ATC COVID Center Closure and going over daily allowed work hours.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 20R

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 171; Flight Crew Type 770

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Cleared for the OHSEA 1 RNAV arrival for RWY 20R; with visual approaches in use. Crew elected to load the RNAV Z 20R approach for vertical and lateral reference; but later executed an ILS to 20R due to deteriorating weather conditions at the field.First Issue:During preflight planning; crew determined using the LAX 127 degree radial and ELB 227 degree radial in FIX pages 1 and 2 to reference the LAX Class B airspace structure (LAX 10-1B in SNA reference pages). Crew noted that the way point constraints on the RNAV RNP Z RWY 20R (SNA 12-21) for MNNIE and KLIPP were 210 knots or less; which matches the depiction on the approach plate (Ball note 1:210 knots maximum at MNNIE and KLIPP). However; using the fix pages above; the crew determined that both these points are under the LAX Class B airspace; and therefore under FAR 91.117; the maximum speed for these points is 200 knots.As recommended in Departure Arrival note 2; crew placed a hard speed constraint of 200 knots at LAXBB; and changed the speed constraints at MNNIE and KLIPP to 200B (less than 200 knots) to comply with FAR 91.117. However; it is extremely disconcerting that the approach plates and the database is coded to allow for a direct violation of FAR 91.117; and that direct manual intervention is required preclude a violation of FAR's.Second Issue:During the descent phase of the flight; flight was on profile and speed with LNAV and VNAV Path. Passing SIPPP intersection; ATC directed 'After TANDY; proceed direct to KAYNN and descend via the remainder of the OHSEA 1 arrival.' Crew complied with modifying the legs page; and after TANDY; the FMS vertical path showed a sudden and considerable deviation above path. The pilot flying immediately engaged full speed brakes with idle thrust; which resulted in a 2600 FPM descent rate. Passing 11;000 ft MSL; PF (Pilot Flying) began to shallow the descent rate to get below 250 knots at 10;000 feet; and directed the PM (Pilot Monitoring) to advise ATC that we would not be able to comply with the KAYNN restriction due to the shortcut. The Controller directed the flight to 'Maintain the current rate of descent to cross KAYNN at 7;000 feet'; with the obvious implication that ATC didn't care about the speed but the altitude. The crew interjected that we were unable to exceed the maximum speed limits below 10;000 and below the LAX Class B airspace. The Controller soon switched the flight to another sector; with the discrepancies never being addressed. While the above issue regarding the published arrival was disconcerting; this Captain finds the apparent disregard of this Controller for FAR 91.117 absolutely alarming. This Controller clearly has no idea that the laws of physics are not negotiable; and that what he was asking this crew to do; in the time and space allotted; was simply not possible while remaining in compliance with basic FAR restrictions; and when the crew voiced their concerns; the Controller was unwilling to even acknowledge their concerns.The next time this Captain encounters these kind of ATC directions; he will be more directive and state in explicit terms: Unable to comply.

I acted as FO (First Officer) and PM (Pilot Monitoring) flying routing to SNA. While executing a clearance to descend via RDHOT.OHSEA1; SoCal Approach instructed us to proceed direct from TANDY to KAYNN; a routing that passed through Class B airspace. During the descent to be at or below 7;000 MSL at KAYNN; the PF (Pilot Flying) began to slow to 250 KIAS to comply with the airspeed restriction below 10;000 MSL. While slowing; SoCal Approach instructed us to maintain our current rate of descent of approximately 2;500 FPM. Facing the 250 KIAS speed restriction followed by a 200 KIAS maximum speed restriction once we descended below the 7;000 MSL floor of Class B airspace enroute to complying with a 5;000 MSL required altitude at LAXBB; maintaining 2;500 FPM wasn't possible. When we notified SoCal Approach; the Controller responded saying that he required that rate of descent. We responded saying that we would descend as quickly as we could while complying with the speed restrictions.Further complicating the situation is the fact that the RNAV Z Rwy 20R approach has #1 ball notes associated with the fixes MNNIE and KLIPP that state 'MAX 210 KIAS'. The B737 FMC (Flight Management Computer) has these speeds associated with that approach as well; which could easily cause crews to fly faster than the 200 KIAS speed restriction below Class B airspace.

B737 flight crew reported being given an instruction that would violate a FAR regarding speeds below a LAX Class Bravo airspace.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft X was holding at 4;000 feet at the missed approach fix (and also initial approach fix) for several instrument approaches at. They had already executed the Missed Approach Procedure once because of weather below minimums. The pilot advised me that they wanted to try again. Since they were already established in a holding pattern published for the ILS approach; I cleared them for the ILS approach and issued the altimeter.The procedure is clear that the only route of flight allowable from holding is via the 10 DME arc to a straight-in course on the localizer. That is what I expected them to fly. I quickly redirected my attention to a sequence of three other aircraft I was trying to shoot a gap with; through a band of weather. At the same time; I had another arrival that was opposite direction; outbound from the same gap. When I was able to finally scan back to Aircraft X I noticed that they were not on the 10 DME arc; and had strayed into a 4;000 foot Minimum IFR Altitude at 3;000 feet. My first thought was that they decided to shoot a different approach; but when queried; the pilot responded that they still planned the ILS. However; their current position did not correlate to any possible point on the Approach.When questioned further; the pilot said that they were direct to a fix to intercept the localizer. They had received neither a direct clearance nor a descent clearance. Without any more questioning; I informed them that the Minimum Vectoring Altitude (technically minimum IFR altitude) in that area is 4;000 feet; and issued a 'cancel approach clearance' and 'climb immediately; maintain 4;000 feet.' The MSAW (Minimum Safe Altitude Warning) did not activate. Because there was no audible alarm; and the fact that I knew 3.000 feet was still a safe altitude; I chose to not use the 'low altitude alert' portion of the phraseology. Later; after discussion with; and as recommended by the Operations Manager; I issued a warning to the pilot.Because this occurrence was a pilot deviation; there is not much from the ATC perspective that would have changed the outcome. Undoubtedly; the pilots' workload was high; due to the missed approach and bad weather. The design of the approach is also somewhat complicated because there are variations including the arc; published holding; and an outbound course on the localizer (which they apparently wanted to fly); but they don't all connect logically. However; the pilots should've queried if unsure.

HCF Approach Controller reported an aircraft deviated from the published approach procedure and flew below their Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 1300

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

During initial climb; the primary pitch [horizontal stabilizer trim] controls were not working.  This became evident just prior to the level off altitude of 1;600 FT MSL.  The aircraft was in a nose up position.  While switching to secondary trim and waiting for the secondary trim to catch up; pitch and power were used to complete a level off.  This resulted in an inadvertent overshoot of the altitude by just over 200 FT MSL.  Once the secondary pitch trim caught up; a normal descent and landing was performed without further incident.

Reporter stated the failure involved the horizontal stabilizer trim.

P180 Captain overshot clearance limit in climb when the primary horizontal stabilizer trim failed.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 2200

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

I was Captain and we had arrived at PHL early in the morning and were parking. The arrival gate is a steep angled lead in line gate with somewhat tight quarters. Both Marshallers and Wing Walkers were present with wands but the Wing Walker on the right side was not quite aware of clearance and collision potential. Just as I was joining the lead in line to park at an angle and being directed by the Marshaller; at the adjacent gate to my right; a push crew very aggressively began pushing back a regional jet and because of the tight quarters of the gate area; he looked to be pushing the aircraft where the RJ wing would pass under my wing and this was an uncomfortable position as we were cleared in and I was not sure the Wing Walker was aware the RJ was sort of coming from behind him. It just put the 2 aircraft very close together for no reason and risk. The Ramp was not busy and had in fact just opened for business. I could not understand why the ground crew and Ramp didn't just let me park first and we were nearly in the gate and we are talking 10 or 15 seconds of delay and the whole potential for collision or just impinging on aircraft footprint would be eliminated.So as I was leaving afterward a station person came up and was apologizing to me about having to wait for a jetway driver; which is not uncommon so I said; hey it happens; we only waited 5 minutes. But you should mention to your Ramp people that the parking procedure at this gate presented a safety issue and should be coordinated a little better. Airplanes should not be over lapping. So I am waiting for the Flight Attendant so we can proceed to the hotel and up walks the Ramp Supervisor whose name I did not catch. I was a bit fatigued after all night flight. I tell him a condensed version of the parking issue and he replies: 'We don't control the ramp; another Carrier does.' So I just told him the parking procedure had 2 aircraft possibly over lapping and its uncomfortable for pilots and the marshallers should try to avoid this as their is collision potential. His response was: 'We don't control the ramp; another Carrier does.' So it seemed kind of pointless but because this is a safety hazard affecting aircraft potentially colliding due to careless Ramp Control I started giving him a little more detail of the situation as I waited for my crew. Half way through my explanation he butted in with 'Stop; Stop; Stop; Stop; Stop; Stop. We don't control the ramp; another Carrier does.' So there you have his reaction as I did him the courtesy of informing him that there is a hazard on his ramp while parking adjacent aircraft. The adjacent RJ being pushed possibly was pushed near or under my aircrafts' wing at a gate with difficult angles and not such great visibility. RJ aircraft was pushed rapidly as well so it got our attention. Ramp Supervisor seemed uninterested and actually a poor listener and communicator. I can tell you if you speak with him; I can predict his robotic response: 'We don't control the ramp; the other Carrier does'. Additionally the Ramp Tower Controller had a bad habit of responding to all radio communications with: 'Copy that.' Non standard phraseology is misleading; typically the aircraft would have to come back with: 'so is that clearance to push?'

A Captain noted that PHL Ramp personnel and controllers operate with less than standard concern about potential main line and RJ aircraft conflict and collision events.


Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 123; Flight Crew Total 3059; Flight Crew Type 2940

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

The purpose of the flight described here was an IFR flight lesson. Only my student pilot (PPL helicopter) and myself were on-board the Robinson R44 Raven 2 helicopter. We were planning to fly for about 90 min and had about 40 gal of fuel on board. Our combined weight is about 350 pounds and our weight and balance indicated that we were well within the approved limits at all times from takeoff until landing. Weather was VFR.A few minutes after a normal take-off from ZZZ; we experienced a 'low RPM' warning signal. Proper corrective action was immediately taken to remedy this (lower collective and roll on throttle) and since nothing else indicated any type of malfunction; I thought that we had a possible slow response of the governor to a light turbulence we had just flown through. About a minute after this first event; we experienced another similar 'low RPM'. At this point we decided to turn around and go back to ZZZ (we were about 6 miles away from the airport). From that point on; it turned out that the only way to keep 100% RPM was by keeping our collective low; which resulted in a slow loss of altitude. All engine gauges indicated normal operation (i.e.; in the green range) and the manifold pressure indicated about 20 inch of Hg. However; any attempt to regain altitude by raising collective resulted in low RPM (engine was unable to deliver more power). As a precautionary maneuver; we landed on the first open field and shut down the engine immediately after touch down (we noticed smoke emanating from the engine as we landed). We landed smoothly on a grass field and neither the student-pilot nor I were injured; and no damage was caused to the aircraft (except for the engine reduced capability to deliver power). I did not declare emergency as our precautionary landing turned out to be the right decision before an emergency maneuver would have been required if we had continued to fly. Our mechanic is checking the engine and; if required; we can report on the exact problem that has occurred.

R44 Helicopter Instructor reported a precautionary landing in a field due to a loss of RPM.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I was working the south side sectors of the ZZZ1 area while training on finals.  There was minimal final traffic and the vast majority of the traffic was within the sectors I am certified on.  Aircraft X was a non-radar ID SFRA aircraft inbound to ZZZ2.  I forgot that ZZZ3 airspace was open at the time and did not call the traffic to ZZZ3 approach as I should have.  There was no conflicting traffic.  I should have used an additional memory aid to remind me that their approach control was open.  It also has been challenging keeping up with busier traffic on VFR days on scopes I'm not very current on given standard COVID/winter traffic levels/others training on that position.I wish we had a better memory aid system in place for ZZZ3 being open as I think this a common mistake people often make.  Maybe we can make the airspace yellow when it is open similarly to how we do with the RXXXX restricted areas?

TRACON Controller reported an airspace violation and cited not being sure if another sector was open or not open as a contributing factor.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

It was my first time loading Hazmat other than dry ice. I received 4 boxes of category 3 flammable gas. I pulled out the Hazmat binder and filled out the form. I called the safety hotline to ensure I filled it out correctly but no one answered. I called Operations and Name answered. I sent him pictures of the form I completed and shipping papers. He verified that the paperwork was correct. I however did not realize I needed to attach copies of the red shipping papers to the form. It was been one year since training when I learned about Hazmat. Being a First Officer in the charter department; I never dealt with Hazmat. I should have reviewed the Hazmat process before I was released to the line as a Captain. I have reviewed the procedures and am aware of the proper procedures. I became aware when I was submitting the form on the pm side. I saw another Captain stapling the shipping papers to the form. I notified Dispatch of the situation. [The cause of the event was] my flight was an overflow from another aircraft so loading started last minute so there was a rush to get my airplane loaded. I should have slowed down to make sure I submitted the paperwork correctly. [I] communicated with Dispatch [regarding the event]. [I suggest] recurrent [training] of Hazmat.

C-99 Captain reported incomplete submission of required Hazmat documents.


Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft experienced loss of System A Hydraulics. Accomplished Loss of System A Hydraulics QRH procedure. Captain elected to divert and declared emergency. Dispatch notified and agreed. Flight attendants; passengers and the divert airport operations were notified. Due to landing weight of approximately 123;000 LBS we accomplished Overweight Landing QRH procedure and all parameters were followed and met. Captain performed a normal flaps 30 landing and due to inoperative nose wheel steering; aircraft was towed to the gate. Passengers and crew boarded another available aircraft and we then continued to the filed destination. Maintenance advised us that a braided hose failed.

A B737 'A' Hydraulic System braided hose failed in cruise causing the loss of all fluid so an emergency was declared and the flight diverted to a nearby airport for an overweight landing.


Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Inbound to Newark on the FQM3; we were given a heading to the left (around 080) just prior to SWEET. We were at 6;000 MSL and getting numerous civilian traffic alerts for at least 6-7 minutes straight. Our last advisory was an aircraft 1130-1200 approaching 500 FT above us. As the aircraft merged together; we received an RA due to the other aircraft now descending to around 6;000 FT (our current altitude). The First Officer immediately disengaged the autopilot and climbed in accordance with the RA instructions. At the last second; ATC gave an instruction to turn hard right to avoid traffic. We climbed to around 7;000 FT MSL and advised ATC we had received an RA. We were instructed to go back to our heading and altitude when safety permitted.

As we were climbing the Captain said he saw the traffic when we were about 200 FT above it. ATC advised us that the aircraft was told to stay at 6;500 FT (VFR) and they were no longer in contact with the aircraft. The threats came from several GA aircraft that were not in contact with ATC. These aircraft were also not following previously given instructions.

An EMB-145 flight crew experienced an NMAC with a VFR general aviation aircraft while on descent to EWR.


Training / Qualification; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Conducted a routine safe flight from ZZZZ to ZZZ. I was contacted by Gatekeeper Representative Office regarding this flight. We completed our duties/checklist in accordance with company policies and procedures outlined in the FOM and had no indication of a faulty or inoperative Over-Wing slide. The aircraft was found to have had multiple faulty/inoperative Over-Wing Emergency slides; which was discovered by Company Maintenance personnel. Again; we had no cockpit indication of these faults. The flight was completed safely with no issues.

Reporter stated the A320 aircraft had been in the hangar the night before and Maintenance had left the Over-Wing Emergency Exit Door release pin in the 'Safe' mode. No deferred items were involved with the Over-Wing Exits. The Captain was returning from reserve status. Airbus had not changed any of the door indications on the newer A320 they had flown. He and the other two crew members were just not alert to the missing word SLIDE on the ECAM page.

On the previous flight; ZZZ-ZZZZ; an issue with no indication on the ECAM of the Over-Wing Window Exits being armed was discussed and verified by the three pilots in the flight deck and checked and verified by the flight attendants; prior to pushback.  All physical checks looked normal and we all mistakenly misinterpreted the indications of the Exits being armed. The rationale being that this was a new airplane and this must be the correct indication. After a discussion we all felt that all was normal so we proceeded to ZZZZ; then returned to ZZZ the same afternoon; never even considering that there was; in fact; a problem with the Over-Wing Exits.Prior to push back in ZZZZ; all checks and checklists were performed and the Door Page on the ECAM was again checked to verify all doors were 'Closed and Armed.'  Since we were taught that the over-wing exits were 'always armed;' the three pilots in the flight deck mistakenly thought a no indication must be the new 'normal' for this new airplane. We all falsely believed that all was normal and I; as Captain; never even considered calling Maintenance for assistance. I am alarmed to find out that I indeed; unintentionally; flew an airplane with an issue with the Over-Wing Exits. We are taught that 'the over-wing exits are always armed;' but all three pilots on the flight deck misinterpreted the indication on the ECAM; which is; no indication. The no indication; or blank space where there should have been [the word] 'SLIDE'; did not sufficiently arouse our attention. Complacency.

Two pilots were informed by a Gatekeeper Representative that the A320 aircraft they had flown two trips over water on; had multiple inoperative Over-Wing Emergency slides and no slide fault indications on their DOOR ECAM page.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 218; Flight Crew Type 250

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

We were descending to 9;000 feet on ATC clearance approximately 15 miles from [airport] we were switched from ARTCC to [airport] Approach. Approach acknowledged check-in and said 'cleared for visual approach to Runway XX' at [airport]. Clearance was read back and we Pilots discussed for a moment and asked for confirmation that we were cleared for the visual to Runway XX.  ATC confirmed we were cleared for the visual.  We continued to descend and at 8;200 feet and Approach asked if we were cleared to 9;000 feet.  We responded that we were descending due to the clearance for the visual approach to Runway XX.  ATC responded that we were cleared to 9;000 feet and to 'expect' the visual.  ATC then said to continue descent to 4;000 feet.The Captain and I both heard cleared the visual to Runway XX rather than 'expect visual to XX.' The visual approach was conducted and the airplane landed safely at [airport]. Controller sounded bored and tired.

Checked in on Approach Control with previous Controller clearance direct to [fix] maintain 9;000 feet. Checked on frequency and Approach Controller cleared us visual Runway XX. I asked First Officer to verify visual clearance 'verify we are cleared visual Runway XX ?' Controller responded we were 'cleared visual XX.' Now with slow descent and busy frequency; Controller then asked if we were assigned 9;000 feet as we were now passing approximately 7;700 feet. We replied how we had verified with him; 'cleared visual.' He then said 'just descend to 4;000 feet. Then subsequently asked if we had airport (which we did throughout assigned check on with his frequency) and again cleared us visual Runway XX.

Both pilots heard ATC clear them for a Visual Approach. When descending ATC questioned them about the descent clearance. The pilot informed ATC that they had been cleared for a Visual Approach. ATC then assigned the flight an altitude and later re-cleared it for a Visual Approach.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Captain called flight attendants and asked if we were smelling anything; I thought there might be a slight oil smell. [Flight Attendant] called 2 minutes later to say he could smell something. I called Captain with that information. Captain said he thought the smell was starting to leave. When Captain first called I did suggest that they put their oxygen on. About 10 minutes into flight after conversation; it was decided to continue. After landing we asked for medical to make sure everyone was fit to fly back to ZZZ1.

ERJ-175 Flight Attendant reported slight oil smell to Captain during cruise which dissipated shortly thereafter. After landing Flight Attendant requested medical evaluation.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airspace Structure; Airport; Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors

Captain was flying pilot. We were progressing on the SWFFT ONE Arrival to BNA/Runway 31. ATC cleared us to the ONUGE intersection and to track in the Localizer to 31; which we did. An opening in the cloud base gave us a view to a Runway 31. I reported to Tower field was in sight. Tower immediately replied cleared the visual approach to Runway 31. Aircraft was level at 4;000 feet MSL and the glideslope had not even started to come down. Visually the runway appeared in front of us through the broken layer of clouds. We were getting much too high for a stable approach. I stated to the Captain something was wrong; but I was confused by what I saw outside and what the ILS was telling me. Captain called for the gear down and I lowered the gear handle. I think the Captain keyed the radio and told the BNA Tower we were too high for the runway and turned the aircraft to the left; off the Localizer. We might have lost 100 in altitude as well; but the Tower responded that we were not high and asked if we were lining up on Smyrna's runway? Captain immediately turned the aircraft back to the right and centered up the Localizer again. He quickly climbed back to 4;000 FT and followed the ILS approach to Runway 31. I responded to the Tower something like; 'Yes; we lined up on the wrong runway.' At that point; I could see BNA Airport further ahead on the horizon. We flew the visual approach to Runway 31 at BNA with no further incident. We rushed through the instrument briefing prior to our descent into Nashville. It was the first time for me to fly that arrival from the southeast and land on Runway 31. The Captain failed to mention there was a note on the approach plate about confusing MQY Runway for BNA's runway ten miles to the southeast. I failed to see the same warning too. Every approach should be given enough thought about what could happen besides the standard mechanics of Localizer frequency; inbound course; runway elevation; etc.

Narrative 2 contains no additional information.

Air carrier flight crew; cleared for a visual approach to Runway 31 at BNA; confused MQY for BNA until advised by ATC.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 71; Flight Crew Total 2236; Flight Crew Type 200

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

I was on a training flight with a CFI applicant; we departed ZZZ at XA:30 local time; and traveled down the coast towards ZZZ1. After several touch and go's; we departed the area and proceeded northeast; to the local practice area off ZZZ. The student demonstrated slow flight and a power off stall. After the completion of the power off stall; I instructed the student to demonstrate a power on stall; as he set up for the maneuver; he told me the throttle was stuck in the current position that it was in. (Roughly 2300 RPM.) The throttle could travel forward to maximum or back to the position it was being stuck in; but not lower then that power setting. After trying to troubleshoot by adjusting the throttle friction and to overpower the throttle being stuck; it was determined that it could not be fixed in air. I then contacted Approach [Control] and requested radar vectors to ZZZ. I informed Approach that we would have to pull the mixture once over the runway at ZZZ in order to land. We flew the plane to ZZZ; and landed without incident or any damage to the airplane; person; or property around XC:00. Upon getting the plane back to our maintenance shop it was determined that our airplane sustained a carburetor failure. The accelerator pump fuel needle dislodged and blocked the butterfly valve inside the carburetor throat. This in return; blocked throttle movement.

PA-28 flight instructor reported a stuck throttle due to a carburetor failure resulted in an immediate landing.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

While dealing with a First Class seat problem; I noticed but it didn't register until later in the day (after filing a related report for pulling the Circuit Breaker) that the Seat Electronic Control Unit (ECU) I was working on had 3 electrical connectors on the top; two of which had electrical connectors in them. The third; however; was not used and also did not have a cover on the exposed connector. Is that third connector supposed to have a cover? I cannot confirm; but I was told by [another] Technician that the same ECU works on the 2 and 3 seat (B777) configurations; which leads me to believe the exposed connector might be live. Contact the manufacturer or the respective engineer to determine if covers would be appropriate or necessary; and if yes; correct this during overnight maintenance or B-Check level maintenance visit.

The reporter indicated that his Company Review Board had contacted him and that they are working with Engineering and Management personnel. The Review Board has confirmed that the associated maintenance specification indicates that the unused electrical receptacle should have a cover installed.

A Technician noticed that a B767 ECU Seat had an exposed connector. A Company review of the finding noted the unused electrical receptacle should have a cover installed.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Enroute to MEM we did the LTOWN 6 Arrival verification and approach brief.  The Captain {Flying Pilot} said we are starting to get high; ask for lower. Before I could ask; Approach gave us 'descend to 240'.  The Captain selected OP DES and we started down. While in the descent we were given 'direct LTOWN; descend via the LTOWN 6 Arrival north transition'.  The Captain entered 3;000 in the altitude alert window and we confirmed '3;000'.  The aircraft was in the managed descent mode and speed and I remember seeing the magenta dot showing us below profile and descending at 1;000 FPM.  This is normal until the aircraft gets back on profile or hits an altitude constraint.   I got distracted {explained below} and Approach called and asked what altitude we were descending through and I told them 7;600 feet.  I immediately looked up and saw that we had not reached LTOWN and the altitude window was 10;000 feet to 16;000 feet.  Approach advised us to maintain 7;000 feet.  Somehow we ended up in the OP DES or V/S mode and the aircraft was descending to 3;000 feet and ignoring the constraints.While on the arrival my EFB generated a message 'software failure'.  This had happened on the ground earlier and while trying to fix the problem I found a note saying to try turning the EFB off and then back on.  It worked and required all the data to be downloaded back into the EFB.  On the LTOWN arrival I was doing the same procedure to restore the EFB when Approach called to check our altitude.  This had taken me out of the loop. I had the paper charts out for MEM and should have left the EFB alone so I could better monitor the Arrival.  We had the aircraft for 5 legs that day and it continued to fail numerous times and I left it alone.  I also feel that situational awareness is lessened when we are taken off the full published arrival since it is briefed as a full procedure.  There are also Airbus software anomalies that occur when the arrival is changed yet I don't know if that was a problem in this case.

I was the Captain flying the aircraft on the LTOWN 6 RNAV Arrival to MEM. Arrival verification complete. ATC had us a little high and asked for descent; given FL240. Started open descent to catch up on profile. Then ATC gave us Direct LTOWN and cleared LTOWN 6 RNAV. Set altitude to 3;000 feet which was the final altitude fix DINKE. The aircraft had been on profile but it got off profile and we did not catch that fact. The aircraft descended to approximately 7;800 feet MSL. ATC called us and asked what arrival we were on and then cleared us to 7;000 feet.I think being high on the profile and having to ask for the initial descent was the beginning of the event; then being cleared on the descent profile direct to another fix; LTOWN; compounded the error that as a crew we did not catch. I feel that any and all of these RNAV arrivals should have one fixed crossing altitude at each fix and ATC should leave the aircraft on the ENTIRE ARRIVAL. All of the problems that are happening I believe are due to the multiple altitudes over a fix instead of one hard altitude over the fix and also ATC vectoring the aircraft off the RNAV approach and then rejoining the RNAV arrivals.

A319 Flight Crew reports descending below the LTOWN crossing restriction on the LTOWN 6 RNAV arrival to MEM. The crew had been cleared direct LTOWN but for unknown reasons the managed descent was lost after selection or was never selected.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 7300; Flight Crew Type 7300

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I [was] on an IFR flight plan.  I lost my vacuum pump shortly before reaching [the] VOR.  At first I thought I could manage using the magnetic compass but I am a single pilot without autopilot and became overwhelmed with trying to follow directions being given me by [the Controller].  I explained I was unable to comply with a quick change in course to a VOR [because] I was unfamiliar with [the] route.  I found myself talking over the Controller's instructions trying to explain my situation which only made matters more confusing because I wasn't hearing the instructions being given me and they weren't hearing my responses.  I told them several times I had lost gyro compass but apparently that was when they were also broadcasting to me.  This resulted in the Controller asking what was wrong; thinking I might be a student pilot.  In order to get the proper attention of the Controller I finally asked if I needed to declare an emergency for him to have time to talk to me and help me with vectors.  He asked what the problem was and finally heard me declare that I had lost gyro and needed time to respond and vectors to [destination].  At that point he agreed so he dedicated the time needed to get me to [destination] safely.The conclusion I draw from all this is I should have recognized the Controller was dealing with too many planes to be able to give the attention to me needed for safe flight.  I should have gone ahead and [advised him] when the communications became confusing so the Controller could spend the time needed on me.  In the future I will not wait so long and I recommend that pilots in training need to be made aware that any time they need the immediate attention and help of a Controller they should not hesitate to [speak up] so he is able to focus on your needs.

PA-28 pilot reported difficulty complying with ATC clearances while trying to navigate using the magnetic compass after losing his vacuum pump.


Embraer Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

On the ILS 4L into JFK descending on the glide path we encountered severe wake turbulence. Captain was PF [pilot flying]. The aircraft began to roll slightly left; then snap rolled hard right 45-60 degrees. We were about 2.5 in trail behind a 767 going to 4R. A go-around was called for as well as steps to counteract the beginning of an usual attitude. TP/GA button was pushed; but we were hit with such a hard force I believe I pushed the throttles to max power; which is the reason we received the EICAS ENG TLA Not TOGA. At this point I had rolled back wings level and was climbing; so I called for flaps 2 and gear up. Pulled the throttles back and reengaged the autopilot and auto throttles and hit flight level change and started to speed up. We were given runway heading and 3;000 feet as instructions. Cleaned up the remaining flaps. During this event we had received multiple EICAS messages. At the top was AOA limit fail; followed by Shaker Anticipated; and lastly Windshear Fail. During this time ATC was asking if we needed any assistance. At this point; we had not run QRHs so we said not at this time; but we will let you know if anything changes. ATC didn't give us a whole lot of time to gather what all we had going on; but I figured we were still in controllable flight with no noticeable abnormalities; but wanted to run the QRHs first. We made announcements to the passengers and briefed our FAs to what was going on. While running each QRH; the Shaker Anticipated QRH has you derive landing speeds at flaps full from the QRH. After running the QRHs we asked to be vectored back in to land again. Ongoing discussions between me and my FO [first officer] had led us to making the decision to have the equipment rolled because while we didn't notice anything out of the ordinary we couldn't be sure that was going to remain that way as we were in a landing configuration when the event happened. We informed our FAs [flight attendants] that there would in fact be equipment standing by but it was nothing more than precautionary. Vectored back around and landed uneventfully via the 4R ILS. Stopped on the taxiway; an announcement that the equipment was going to check us for any damage. CFR checked our aircraft for damage and said they didn't see anything that would impede our ability to taxi and park at the gate. After landing we had also received an additional 2 EICAS messages; ADS probe 4&2 fail. We taxied; parked and deplaned uneventfully. Upon completion of the post flight walk around; the FO had found the protective tape on the E&E compartment as well as speed tape on the right side of the aircraft from a repair had been peeled back. Logbook entries and Maintenance calls were made. I also called the TRACON and spoke to them; and they believed that because of the winds it was possibly an Airbus A380 that had landed a few aircraft earlier and that they have had the issue in the past; and that they were going to restrict the 380 left side only for the remainder of the day.

Embraer jet Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on approach to JFK with possible sources identified as a B767 or an A380 landing . Captain regained control and executed a go-around.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

After [the] throttle [was] advanced for takeoff; aircraft behind us reported a fire coming from the right engine. Tower asked us if we heard the report and we replied no. He said the aircraft behind us reported we had fire coming out of right engine. We asked if he still saw it; he said no then quickly changed his response to an emphatic 'YES; YES!' We had no indications of any abnormalities in the cockpit; but I decided to reject the takeoff based on this observation. We had Fire Department meet the aircraft and no fire or other abnormality was noted and we had them follow us back to the gate. Logbook entry was made and we deplaned passengers to another aircraft and made our way to [destination].

B737-700 Captain reported rejecting takeoff due to fire coming from right engine.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Aircraft X was on vectors for HIO ILS RY 13 approach. I issued the approach clearance after vectoring them through the final for in-trail spacing. I got a good readback for the clearance and altitude to maintain. Approximately 2 minutes later I noticed the track jump; but since we use FUSION radar with only two primary radar inputs I assumed it was related to the radar. When the track did not return after a few seconds; I verified they were on the approach. I realized they were off course and descending through the MVA so I issued a Low Altitude Alert and climbed them to 040. They descended to 030 in a 035 MVA before climbing back up. I canceled the approach clearance and issued vectors to re-join the approach. They flew through the localizer again; and after I corrected their heading to join I issued a new approach clearance.I believe flight training was in progress and the weather was IMC. I don't know what caused the aircraft to veer off course; I'm just glad I caught it.

P80 controller vectors aircraft onto final and notices the track jump. Controller thinks the jump is related to FUSION radar. Issues another heading and the aircraft finally gets on final after third attempt. Aircraft enters lower MVA due to not turning correctly.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 8500; Flight Crew Type 1000

Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We departed from TEB on the TEB8 departure. After takeoff; I engaged the autopilot coupled to NAV to fly the SID. As the aircraft was leveling at 2;000 FT MSL; we both noticed the airplane was turning the wrong direction from the required turn and I engaged heading to arrest the turn. While I was busy with the heading control; the aircraft accelerated to approximately 220 KTS and since we were under the Class B airspace; I immediately powered to idle to slow the aircraft to 200 KTS and resumed the SID. The rest of the flight proceeded uneventfully.

The Reporter stated that the takeoff that day was to the north and the aircraft had not yet started the turn to the west when the tract deviation started. The Honeywell FMS had acted oddly on the several other flights this crew had with this same aircraft and the Reporter is uncertain why it turned the incorrect direction. The crew reviewed the programming at cruise and found the information was entered correctly for the departure they were on.

A CE560XL turned to an incorrect heading after the automation was engaged on the Runway 6 TEB 8 SID and while the Captain was correcting the track error the aircraft accelerated to 220 KTS.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure; Manuals; Logbook Entry

Aircraft went into service with all passenger O2 (Oxygen) test stop buttons deployed. I worked on Passenger Oxygen Masks Inspect Zone 231 and Zone 232. I inspected masks; cleaned them; and closed oxygen panels. Test stop buttons were in stowed position at the end of my shift.

B737 Technician reported that aircraft was released for service with passenger oxygen test stop buttons deployed.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 57; Flight Crew Total 993; Flight Crew Type 70

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I attempted to put my tent in the cockpit of an open cockpit aircraft. However; when I taxied to get fuel I realized the tent caused an unacceptable risk to flight; limiting the control movement. I...lashed [the tent] to the N-Brace of the plane. I was concerned about the safety of flight and asked an FAA examiner for advice. He advised me to balance the external loading. Following that advice; I secured a camp style chair to the opposite side to balance the drag. I was not aware at the time that attaching external loads may be a problem. I was not advised that a problem may arise just by attaching any load outside the cockpit.

Pilot of an Experimental; Amateur-Built biplane secured a tent to the N-Brace on one side of the aircraft. Upon the advice of an FAA examiner; pilot 'balanced' the external load with a camp chair secured to the opposite side.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

I was training a Developmental on east departures during a south flow late night shift. We observed a target depart Runway 18R--a westbound departure runway--instead continue south then turn southeast. This put the aircraft in confliction with our departure off Runway 18L. I immediately overkeyed my Developmental trying to get hold of our departure so I could turn him away from the traffic cutting in front of him. Our flight was not on my frequency; however the 18R departure did check on with me; and I immediately turned that straying aircraft away from my traffic.Memphis should terminate the use of the RNAV SIDs; and start using issued headings off the airport. Let the Departure Controller issue the clearance to join the cleared RNAV SID. Don't rely on the pilot to go to the right initial fix. If they programmed their FMS wrong they're in a critical phase of flight and in close proximity to other departures. By the time a controller notices the wrong heading; the aircraft may be switching frequencies and might go to the wrong frequency. Maybe distracted by the wrong heading and trying to correct; or getting a TCAS RA from the traffic they cut off.

An 'eastbound' MEM Departure Controller took prompt action to redirect a 'westbound' air carrier departure off of Runway 18R who had apparently programmed the wrong RNAV SID and was conflicting with the reporter's legitimate eastbound departure aircraft off Runway 18L.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 7; Flight Crew Total 2200; Flight Crew Type 40

Time Pressure; Distraction; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Due to time constraints trying to get a final flight in before the check ride; the student rushed his pre-flight and forgot to remove the tow bar on the front of the plane. I failed to notice it. We did an hour and a half of flight to work on is instrument rating. We landed and parked before we noticed the tow bar was still attached. Thankfully there was no damage to the plane or propeller. Contributing factors included early morning flight. Perceived time constraints and the fact that usually the plane is on the line before we fly.

C172 Instructor reported the tow bar still attached to the aircraft nose during the post-flight inspection.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 280; Flight Crew Type 250

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Landing practice at ZZZ. All applicable aircraft lighting was on. Level at 1;100 feet in the right downwind. Just after calling position in the downwind a Cessna crossed left to right in front of us at the same altitude overflying the airfield. Aircraft gave a radio call asking if we had a radio. We replied affirmative and that we had been making all applicable radio calls for an untowered airport. Radio was functional as confirmed with a radio check and the fact that we had been sequencing with other traffic at the field for an hour prior to that.

C172 instructor pilot providing training at a non-towered airport reported an NMAC.


Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

During a very busy and complex traffic period I issued an air carrier a descent clearance to get below traffic and land at ZZZ. At the time that I issued the clearance it appeared that I had lateral separation and that there was enough room for the air carrier to descend from FL370 through a business jet at FL360. The sector was too busy for me to go back and reassess the descent rate and the lateral separation. My D-side and I were extremely busy and did not use these tools; the polygon/Halo. The frequency was extremely congested with two sectors being combined. My D-side was extremely busy keeping up with manual coordination and hand-offs to and from a foreign facility; dealing with ADE and verifying all the redundant information with multiple duplicated information. I was busy separating and controlling numerous other situations and missed this one conflict. The Center NAS Monitors displayed the Traffic Flow Management System (TFMS) was red for at least 30 minutes and I had over 21 Data blocks and over 25 aircraft on frequency. My D-side had a page and half on the En Route Information Display System (ERIDS) and a bay full of strips as well as a stack on the printer.I would recommend;A. Improve Automated Data Exchange (ADE) and ICAO flight plan filing to reduce the workload of sectors dealing with ADE. Having to verify numerous accounts of inaccurate; duplicate or erroneous information during peak traffic; put an insurmountable amount of extra workload on sectors dealing with ADE.B. The Supervisor should walk around the sectors and observe the volume on the ERIDS; the number of strips in the bay and coming off the printer and not just rely on the Center NAS Monitors; and Traffic Flow Management System (TFMS) displays. The sectors should be split early enough to reduce frequency congestion during peak traffic which allows for a smaller range on the radar display; so you can see closely all traffic situations.C. Distribute the workload and complexity.D. Reduce the coordination for the D-side. Assign an A-side assistant to help the D-side so the D-side can assist the R-side and not have all the down time coordinating and stuffing strips; and dealing with ADE issues. Assign a tracker to assist the R-side.

ZMA Center Controller descended aircraft in too close proximity of another aircraft due to the fact that he thought he would have lateral separation. Sector was busy and Controller did not have time to re-check the separation.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A Certified Professional Controller (CPC) was relieving another CPC in Local Control 1 position. Position was briefed and completed. The new CPC told the C172 to exit the runway and contact Ground Control point 3. The pilot was clearly unfamiliar with both the area and airport; which was relayed to the CPC outside of the relief briefing however; was clearly evident from the pilot's remarks on frequency. The CPC reiterated that the C172 contact Ground Control. The Local Control CPC then told the PA28 to LUAW (Line up and Wait). The C172 stopped well short of the hold lines. The Local Control was told by me and the other CPC (during the 2-minute overlap) that her runway was fouled. I'm pretty sure; but not certain; the Ground Control CPC also told Local Control that the runway was also fouled. I turned my attention to Ground Control and the C172 to get the runway clear; so the Local Control could get the aircraft rolling because there was another airborne aircraft on base. Next thing I saw was the PA28 rolling about 1;000 FT down the runway. I immediately told the Local Control that the runway was fouled; the Local Control said it's too late now. The other CPC was still plugged in with the CPC on Local Control 1. Why didn't they stop the take off clearance? I asked if Ground Control had established 2-way with the C172 yet; the answer was negative! As the PA28 was departing abeam the C172; called Local Control and started asking questions. Local Control 1 told the C172 to cross the hold line because the runway was not usable; yet the CPC cleared the Cessna anyway. Not get distracted when this CPC is working Local Control; or any position in fact. This CPC has a history. Even the other CPCs are feed up with his/her antics. There seems to be little regard for quality of service by this CPC. I realize I'm just venting right now; but I take pride in the job I've done for so long and this CPC is not only undermining the position but the profession!

Tower CIC described a runway conflict event when the Local Controller failed to respond to the cautions being given by other controllers on duty. The reporter noted a lack of quality service provided by this individual.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Flight attendant complained about access to door L2 for egress and could not get clear view from window on door due to headrest. Also could not access door assist handle for opening due to seat position.Right start wake up check was being accomplished when crew questioned the L2 door emergency egress.Suggest access to emergency door L2 be re-evaluated due to obstruction from seat forward of door. This is not the first time concerns raised by crew.

Maintenance Technician reported concern from Flight Attendants of Cabin Seat installation blocking emergency egress.


Air Conditioning Distribution Ducting; Clamps; Connectors

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Shortly after departing the Captain (PM) selected ECS [Environmental Control System] to Hi-Flow due to a warm cockpit; which is fairly normal for hot weather. At FL180; climb checks were completed with normal pressurization. Just prior to entering Oceanic Airspace; at approximately FL270; the Captain deselected ECS Hi-Flow to allow for a normal in-flight airflow to cockpit and cabin. Very shortly after this deselecting; the crew noticed that ECS airflow was nill and that the cabin was climbing above a normal schedule. A very brief discussion was had about the abnormal cabin pressure and rate of climb; which was approximately 1;000 to 1;300 fpm with the cabin now climbing through 8;000 feet and the cabin altitude display in amber. ATC was contacted and advised that we had lost our cabin. They promptly cleared us for an immediate descent and turn us towards our planned Depressurization Alternate. The aircraft reached approximately FL300 prior to initiating the descent. The cabin continued to climb; peaking at slightly over 14;000 feet as we descended to 7;000 MSL. The rate of cabin climb was somewhat erratic; but not excessive at about 1;000 to 1;300 fpm. When level at 7;000 we discussed about burning fuel prior to landing since the situation was stabilized and no urgency was felt to land immediately. The First Officer maintained the radios and flew while I contacted the company to advise them of the situation. They asked if we could safely divert to another nearby station since they were working another G-200 at that location. The crew agreed and we changed our destination with ATC; proceeded directly there and landed without incident.Maintenance found a clamp on the ECS line was NOT installed as required. I suggest we inspect other G200 aircraft which have had ECS maintenance at that facility as well as other G200s with suspect airflow.

A GLF-2 flight crew suffered loss of pressurization as they approached cruise altitude. They descended promptly and diverted to a nearby airport where maintenance crews were available. Maintenance determined an ECS clamp had been improperly installed.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 23; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 13

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Aircraft

I went flying with a fellow pilot in our club airplane.  During the preflight inspection we observed that the stall warning was not working.  We consulted both FAR 91.213 and 91.205. There is no minimum equipment list for this airplane.  We determined that the stall warning was not required equipment.  We continued our flight and we made an entry in the club's squawk reporting system.  Later; another club member informed us that we should have grounded the airplane. He pointed out that indeed the stall warning is required equipment according to the POH.  It is not listed under any section labeled 'required equipment'.  It was listed in Section 6 weight and balance. In this weight and balance section there are coded letters next to equipment that have particular meanings.  The stall warning is listed with the letter code that indicates it is required equipment.Well; I learn or re-learn something new every day. This indeed is a learning experience. Doing research I learned a few other sources - in addition to the POH W&B section - that need to be consulted for required equipment.  Type certificate data sheet at www.rgl.faa.gov; and any STC's for the aircraft.

PA-28 pilot reported operating the aircraft with the stall warning inoperative contrary to the required equipment list.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Aircraft called an adjacent Controller having encountered IMC conditions VFR at 700 MSL. He was incapable of IFR flight. At the time I was an over-overlap on another position and was told to go assist this adjacent Controller and did not complete overlap with required two minutes because they had an emergency. The aircraft was vectored to a nearby airport which was BKN007 at the time with two miles visibility. With no other choice to ensure safety; the aircraft was told to proceed visually into the airport; and was switched to the Tower; despite it being solid IMC; eventually landing safely. Providing clarification as to what should be done in these situations. Basically he received an emergency SVFR clearance that the pilot never requested. Compounding the issue was a language barrier with the pilot which is a common occurrence with training aircraft in the area.

A VFR aircraft encountering IMC conditions was directed to a near by airport without the issuance of a legal clearance given the current weather conditions. The reporter suggested increased controller training.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 58; Flight Crew Total 4866; Flight Crew Type 2612

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Upon initial departure from EWR; Aircraft X was forced to return to gate due to a cargo loading issue. During the taxi out we knew we had DG (Dangerous Goods); but could not ever get confirmation from the station. They ultimately blamed their technology. Ultimately cargo was verified and the close out was completed. Departure from the gate was accomplished with the confirmation that no DG was loaded. Final weights were delayed due to a computer issue on the second departure (block in one day; block out the 2nd day). Once final weights were delivered; the flight departed. The First Officer requested a final weights manifest for the flight for comparison purposes against the original (which was never delivered). Only after the First Officer made this request did the final DG summary print out. This results in a situation where the flight crew is not accurately informed of actual cargo loaded; and more importantly; we had no idea we had DG on board.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B767 flight crew reported that inaccurate Hazmat cargo loading information resulted in a return to the gate.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

On the HLYWD1 arrival to LAX we encountered turbulence; shortly after the aircraft began a roll to left more than 30 degrees of bank. I disconnected the autopilot upon realizing that we were likely experiencing wake and getting worse. I stayed above the glide path of the aircraft in front of us. The pilot monitoring inquired with ATC to see what type of aircraft we were following. Confirmation from ATC that we were following a Boeing 777 approximately 8-8.5 miles ahead; the pilot monitoring asked if we can stay higher on the arrival due to a wake event with that aircraft. ATC gave us step down altitudes and eventually a runway change to remain clear of further wake. During the descent contact was made with both Flight Attendants and one Flight Attendant said she was injured. No passengers were injured; the Captain handled further actions with coordination of the Flight attendant injury and crew scheduling.

EMB-170 First Officer reported a Flight Attendant was injured during a wake turbulence encounter 8 miles in trail of a B777 on arrival into LAX.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Distraction; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft X departed PHL 27L. I radar identified aircraft and climbed to 12000. Aircraft Y was 20 southeast of PHL eastbound at 11500. Traffic was issued between both aircraft. Aircraft X responded to RA and climbed 300 feet.Once again; TCAS issues instructions to aircraft established in standard VFR/IFR separation and creates an UNSAFE situation. Separation standards for ATC and TCAS must be the same!! How many times must this be reported before somebody does something? If this report program cannot solve this problem; then what is the point of reporting it? I don't want to hear that the airlines want their own standards. The FAA's mission is to provide safe air-travel for millions upon millions of passengers.

PHL TRACON Controller reported an unsafe event that was caused by a TCAS Resolution. Controller wants standards looked at and possibly changed.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 400

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 6

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

On the ground at OAK we were cleared to taxi on C to cross 28R and 28L at B. We were told to expedite our taxi due to an airplane on a four mile final. At the runways; the signage was unclear and we could only see c and a signs. My copilot had me turn onto the taxiway between the two signs thinking it was bravo; and the ground controller told us we had turned on A. He asked if we had crossed the hold short line; my copilot mistakenly answered no and he told us to hold our position. Immediately my First Officer restated our correct position and the controller told us to continue our taxi and requested the aircraft on final to go around.After we continued on A; we could then see the B sign to our right. Because of its placement between the two runways; it's not immediately visible from C unless you turn 90 degrees and face perpendicular to the runway. It is maybe 100 yards away from where you would expect it to be so it's not surprising that the supervisor advised they see problems like what we experienced a thousand times a year; and are hopeful to get better signage.

The Cessna missed B at Runway 28R (due to poor/no signage to indicate B) and crossed the hold bars of RWY 28R at A while a twin Cessna was about 1.5 miles out on final on a visual approach. To [significantly] reduce the possibility of this scenario and more serious ones like this from occurring I think a raised 'Taxiway B' sign would improve the chances of this happening a lot less.

When a Citation flight crew was cleared to cross runways 28R and L at OAK on B they mistakenly turned on A.  The flight crew and the Ground Controller agreed that poor signage was the major contributing factor; the Controller stating they see similar events 'a thousand times a year.'


Testing; Repair; Installation; Work Cards

Situational Awareness; Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors

At shift change; [I] received a gate call for a B737 aircraft with numerous items to be addressed. Last item; due to wheel well fault; had to change Fire Control Unit (FCU). Called for paper work; pulled FCU; verified proper Part Number (P/N) to Stores. Part arrived before paperwork arrived. And being pressed for time; had pulled circuit breaker prior to removal; and thought powering down aircraft would negate any electrical power to FCU. Swapped out FCU's and preformed operations check; operations good; then discovered light plate was missing. [I] powered down aircraft battery switch to 'OFF'. While installing light plate had to slightly move APU and #2 engine fire handles for installation of light plate. [I] verified discharge [of fire bottles]. Pilot refused to take aircraft or have an MEL issued for [crew] oxygen (O2) at 1;000 PSI for jump seat riders standing by. [I] serviced O2 to full level. Finished all other maintenance items except FCU; and were at least 30-minute into [departure] delay. Aircraft temporarily taken out of service; and all involved sent for drug and alcohol [tests]. Suggest [that] regardless of delay; wait for paperwork to arrive to start job.

Reporter stated the FCU he was referring to was actually the Fire Control Panel (FCP) on the P-8 Center Control Pedestal in the cockpit. The original problem started at the gate when the flight crew could not get the B737 aircraft's wheel well warning light to illuminate during their preflight fire warning test. After trouble shooting the fire warning system; he decided to replace the FCP. But the replacement FCP came without the lighted faceplate; which required the transfer of the faceplate from the removed unit to the replacement FCP. That's where their maintenance problems really started.Reporter stated that in the past; replacement Fire Control Panels (FCP) came with the lighted faceplate. But a company decision had been made to not include the lighted faceplate as a cost savings measure. The faceplates are generally heavily gummed up around the edges from old; sticky fluid residue and grimy dirt. The lighted plate has to be removed carefully; not bent and pried; from the FCP or the faceplate will break. Reporter stated when they realized the lighted plate had to be transferred over to the replacement FCP; they decided to go ahead with the transfer; because the paperwork was slow in getting to them. But IF they had the paperwork; they would have seen the Maintenance Manual directions that stated: to either disconnect the electrical connectors on the bottom of the FCP unit; or disconnect the aircraft's battery cables. They had not done either. The electrical connectors on the FCP are very short and difficult to reattach.  Instead they thought that with the battery switch in the 'OFF' position; DC power would be removed from the FCP. But that was not correct. Even with the battery switch 'OFF'; and the electrical connectors still connected; the lighted faceplate was directly connected to the battery 'HOT' BUS through the lighted faceplate's metal contact ring and the FCP unit. So when he moved the APU and #2 engine fire handles on the FCP; to reposition the lighted face plate; the fire bottle squibs fired and discharged the bottles. No damage to the APU or Engine occurred because they were not running at the time. Aircraft was back in service within two hours.

A Line Mechanic reports the APU and #2 engine fire bottles were inadvertently discharged; even with the battery switch 'OFF'; when he was transferring a lighted faceplate from a malfunctioning Fire Control Panel (FCP) to a replacement FCP on the P-8 Center Control console of a B737 aircraft.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Workload; Time Pressure; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure

During the GPS outage which cause 8 Aircraft to be grounded. Bombardier provided a SRSPA to have a -011 installed on [company] Aircraft with the breaker pulled. A CFI and a MEL (Minimum Equipment List) were created on the same side Number 2 due to the breaker being pulled per the SRSPA. I emailed the CFI first then followed by the MEL. - The CFI was for action outside the MEL; the MEL was for being called out in the SRPSA. During the final paperwork the Bombardier inspector only submit the MEL paperwork. The fact there were two FF-1 for one system. It was due to the lack of communication between the BAS Tech; BAS Inspector; and [Maintenance Control]. During all of this I forgot to import the on base CFI FF-1. All the safe guard which I had used before failed in this instead. The only way to prevent the CFI must be left open; in the work scope and an open item in the work scope to prevent missing items.

Technician forgot to accomplish maintenance procedure.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22; Flight Crew Total 593; Flight Crew Type 189

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Incursion Runway

Upon touchdown on Runway 15L; port-side tire blew and pulled the aircraft to the left. Aircraft departed runway into dirt area between runway and taxiway. Aircraft sustained no damage other than blown tire; and no damage to objects on the ground occurred. Aircraft was towed to maintenance facility where tire was changed.Tire was relatively new (less than two years old). Likely cause of blow-out was harder than usual landing and/or excessive speed and energy upon touchdown.

Beech Sierra pilot reported a tire failure on landing that resulted in a runway excursion.


Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Ground Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Procedure; Human Factors; Software and Automation

During preflight we received our weight and balance info from Dispatch via ACARS. We noted that something didn't seem right with the fuel breakdown. We had 111.9 lbs of total fuel but the fuel breakdown showed 5;600 in the left and right tanks with 0 in the center. When we called the Dispatcher to ask; he agreed that the fuel breakdown should have read 56;000 - 0 - 56;000. That is a 100;000 lbs error that could have easily caused an accident had our departure been at XA00; or if it had occurred in the middle of one of the many fatiguing sequences that we fly; and we missed the error. The correct weight and balance changed the takeoff CG by 4 units. I'm unfamiliar with the exact process so I cannot say [cause].This isn't the first time in recent history that this has happened. I'm not sure if something in the process of generating the weight and balance has recently changed or if everyone in the company is starting to get as fatigued and worn down as the pilots are. I'd suggest that the powers that be take a step back and rethink the process. Maybe add a step that addresses this problem specifically. Also; make the crews more aware that this is happening. Maybe add a line in the weight and balance that includes total fuel. In our case; a total fuel of 11;200 lbs is blatantly erroneous and another step in alerting the crew to the error.

Captain reported getting an incorrect ACARS fuel weight from Dispatch.


Distraction; Physiological - Other; Workload; Time Pressure

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

At top of descent; approximately 120 miles from our destination; the 'A' Flight Attendant called the cockpit and reported that there was a pungent chemical smell in the forward galley; lavatory area. She reported that her eyes were burning and the smell was getting worse. I got a faint smell of the fumes; but the First Officer did not smell anything out of the ordinary. As Captain; I directed the First Officer to don our oxygen masks and we expedited our arrival into our destination. During the descent; the 'A' Flight Attendant reported that the smell was progressing to the forward passenger cabin. At that point; I contacted our Dispatcher via ACARS to alert them of the noxious fumes. After landing; we contacted Operations via radio and coordinated maintenance. After all passengers were deplaned; I wrote up the fumes event in the logbook; and filled out the Aircraft Cabin Air Quality Report; coordinated maintenance. The crew then went to the Medical Center for medical evaluation. The Company is aware of quite a few aircraft with fume events. As to my knowledge; the Company is trying to find out the cause of these fumes. The company is working on a solution to the fumes events; [they are] trying to figure out where the fumes are originating and what is the cause of the fumes so a permanent fix can be achieved.

An A319 developed a pungent chemical smell in the cabin at the top of descent; so the crew donned oxygen masks to escape the fumes and sought medical attention after landing.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14; Flight Crew Total 200; Flight Crew Type 75

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

I was on a local flight from KSGR to [intended destination] I had requested flight following and was given a squawk code prior to departure from KSGR. I was instructed to remain clear of the Class Bravo Airspace by the KSGR Tower and then instructed to contact Houston Approach. Upon contacting Houston approach I requested an altitude of 3;500 feet (which would have potentially taken me into Class Bravo airspace) and a direct route to [my intended destination] with Flight Following. I was cleared to 3;500 feet and given a few vectors then told to resume own navigation and was cleared direct to [my intended destination]. About half way to [my intended destination] my passenger was not feeling well so we decided to abort the flight and return to KSGR. I informed approach that we wanted to return to KSGR and was asked to make a right 180 degree turn and then cleared direct to KSGR at or Below 3;000 feet the controller made a comment that I was 'right in the middle of the approach corridor to Houston Hobby' I do not think I actually breached the class Bravo airspace without permission or without being vectored into it by approach however I do not remember actually getting formal permission to enter the airspace. The channel was busy and I may have missed it. I just wanted to be on the safe side in case I inadvertently misunderstood my clearance. At no time was I told by ATC that I was in violation of the airspace nor was I asked to contact anyone upon the conclusion of the flight. I returned back to KSGR without incident and terminated radar services with the KSGR Tower.

A Cessna pilot reported a possible HOU Class B airspace violation while receiving ATC Flight Following service.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

En route; copilot heard popping noise followed by white smoke coming out of the cabin lighting controller in the cockpit. I grabbed the checklist for smoke in the cockpit and determined that amount of smoke was insufficient to don the oxygen mask and goggles. The screen would only spark and emit smoke when moved. I [requested priority handling] and asked for a descent and a vector to the nearest suitable airport. ATC gave us a descent and told us to proceed direct ZZZ. We ran all appropriate checklist for our descent and landing. We transfer controls from the copilot to me and the landing was without incident. We taxied off the runway to the south ramp as directed by the Tower. Emergency personnel met the airplane and determined that no emergency actions were needed.

En route to ZZZ1 during cruise phase of flight; I heard a popping noise and observed sparks and smoke coming from wires in the cabin lighting controller screen. Name (Pilot Monitoring) [requested priority handling] while I (Pilot Flying) initiated an immediate descent as instructed by ATC. The screen would only emit sparks and smoke when touched or moved; and we determined that the small amount of smoke was not necessary for us to don oxygen masks and smoke goggles. During the descent; Name completed the 'Smoke/Fire/Fumes' checklist and we were vectored to ZZZ for the straight in Runway XX visual approach. Prior to the approach; Name and I transferred controls; as we were in an overweight landing condition; and I completed the approach and landing checklists. The landing and taxi were without incident.

CL-605 flight crew reported the Cabin Light Controller failed and began to emit sparks and smoke. The flight crew descended and diverted to make a precautionary landing.