B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On [day 1] Aircraft was sent to hangar by line maintenance for a left wing leading edge hydraulic leak; Number 2 slat area; hydraulic fluid running down the leading edge and over top of wing during flight. Upon further inspection; slat operation; and leading edge panel removal; I discovered the Number 1 slat actuator was leaking from rear of the actuator body during operation of slats. I decided in conference with hangar Tech Crew Chiefs (TCC) to write-up the Number 1 slat actuator to be changed or repaired. I wrote up the Number 1 slat actuator; the lower wing and upper wing surfaces to be cleaned from the hydraulic fluid leak. Instead of repairing aircraft as documented; on [day 2] a Manager signed off the Number 1 slat actuator leak as: 'Performed inspection check with hydraulics power on; no leak at this time. Also check the back of Number 1 slat actuator no leaks noted.' On [day 3]; a First Officer wrote up: 'Hydraulic fluid leaking from left wing dripping off flap track canoe.'Cause: Hydraulic leak on Number 1 slat actuator on [the aircraft] was duly written up by myself; in conference with TCC; troubleshooting performed; and documented for repair. Instead of leak being repaired as required; a maintenance manager along with possible other unknown persons; 'pencil whipped' the left wing hydraulic leak and the aircraft flew out. The leak was then written up again by flight crew on [on day 3]. This unwarranted action by a maintenance manager put aircraft and flying public in potential danger; along with lost revenue and costs of aircraft being out of service again to be correctly repaired.When an aircraft is out of service and legitimate faults are correctly documented by maintenance to be repaired; they should not be 'pencil whipped' by a maintenance manager negatively affecting safety of flight of said aircraft and the flying public at large.

Boeing 787 Maintenance Personnel reported writing up a hydraulic leak and the item was signed off by a Maintenance Manager without any actual repairs accomplished.


Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Workload

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While in training on Approach; Aircraft X responded to an RA climbing into the flight path of Aircraft Y. Aircraft Y; was a VFR inbound from the East-Southeast. On initial contact I restricted him at or above 10;500 feet. Once he was 18 miles E-SE; I revised the altitude to 9;500 feet to protect for the departure corridor. About 10 miles later; on his westbound heading to enter right traffic for I noticed he descended through the restriction. At this time I had Aircraft X departing SID. I instructed Aircraft X to climb unrestricted to 20;000 feet; expecting him to climb at a better rate than the SID so he would be above Aircraft Y upon merging. I issued traffic to Aircraft Y on Aircraft X. I was then distracted by an aircraft 20 miles to the south reporting one minute prior to jumpers away; who had never called me on initial departure to begin with. Once I issued the parachute operation phraseology; I looked back at Aircraft X and noticed he had not climbed as expected and was a direct factor with Aircraft Y. I issued a 190 heading to Aircraft Y and an expedite through 10;000 feet to Aircraft X; but it was too late; as Aircraft X reported responding to an RA.Once noticing Aircraft Y descended through his restriction; I should have made him climb back up or turned him. There was miscommunication with my trainer; as he told me to just let him descend although I told him I had a departure coming off. I also should have told Aircraft X no delay through 10;000 feet when I issued the unrestricted climb. I could have turned Aircraft Y out of the way sooner as well. The skydive aircraft should not have been my priority and took my attention away from separation. Once noticing the imminent conflict I should have stopped Aircraft X at 8;000 ft. and turned away from the 8;400 feet MVA; climbing Aircraft Y instead of issuing a turn. A traffic alert was also warranted.

During the departure climbout we were cleared to climb to 20;000 feet unrestricted by Departure Control. Shortly after that the Controller issued a traffic alert at 11 o'clock and 9;000 feet. We replied that we were searching but did not have the traffic in sight. Less than 30 seconds later we received an RA alerting us to arrest the descent. The Captain was pilot flying and began a descent down to 8;500 feet and leveled off; following the RA guidance. I reported the RA to departure and notified the Controller that we got within 300 feet of the aircraft. She acknowledged our radio call and gave us a turn to the right and a climb back to 20;000 feet once we were clear of the other aircraft. The other aircraft involved was a small aircraft. It did not change altitude; stayed at 9;000 feet during the whole event; and did not even make any radio calls leading us to believe they were on a different frequency. Fortunately; the Captain complied with the RA quickly as ATC did not realize our flight paths were going to intersect. During the descent and level off our airspeed did climb to 300 kts. We did not break an aircraft limitation during the ordeal but we were below 10;000 feet at that airspeed. We were cleared through the altitude and flight path of the General Aviation aircraft while in positive contact with ATC. No corrective action was taken or recommended by ATC and we had to remedy the situation by complying with the RA. ATC notified us of the traffic but did not take any steps to resolve the situation since we did not have the traffic in sight. A turn or different clearance limit from ATC would have prevented this situation. Even had we called the traffic in sight; we would have had to deviate from the departure to remain clear of the other aircraft.

ABQ Approach Controller reported that a VFR aircraft descended below its assigned altitude and caused an NMAC.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 750; Flight Crew Type 450

On an IFR flight plan cleared direct CSN when jumpers were released by an aircraft above me. The aircraft which was on the frequency was told to be on the lookout for me at 7;000 and cleared down to 7;500. I was told to turn 20 degrees west to skirt CSN VOR which was about a mile away. As I settled on that heading the jumper plane zoomed across my nose in a diving turn not more than a few hundred yards away. In response to the instruction to level at 7;500 (which he was already well below); he replied 'I have the traffic.' I have contacted the Potomac TRACON operations center as well as the FSDO. It would appear that the pilot of the jumper plane was trying to beat his jumpers to the ground. In the process he nearly caused a mid-air and failed to comply with ATC instructions.

TB20 pilot reported an NMAC with an aircraft that had released jumpers in the vicinity of HWY airport.


Confusion; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Company Policy

The following pertains to COVID-19 clarification: Due to an observation and numerous questions; we would like to have some clarification regarding the procedures that affect technicians system wide regarding the spraying/fogging process. Cabin Deep Cleaning Procedure: What is our process regarding normal clean and a suspected COVID-19 incident? Is it the Deep Clean Process outlined in the Cabin Processing Manual? If a COVID-19 case is confirmed on the aircraft; is there any other measure we are taking? Spraying/fogging process? Various departments have posted information and have briefed their crews.The spraying/fogging process can accept various chemicals. What chemicals do we plan to use? We have been told at ZZZ; we will be using X chemical. We have concerns about aeration of this chemical with respect to the Safety Data Sheet (SDS). It is our understanding that our company needs to notify and train personnel before introduction to the workforce. This informs technicians about the health risks associated with those chemicals. If our company plans on changing the chemicals utilized in the spraying/fogging process; will an effort be made to inform the various work groups? Are we currently utilizing the process at ZZZ?Quarantined planes: What is the process? Charter flights (Recovery flights): What is the process? We recommend the most stringent cleaning process!Gate Technicians: How are we going about to inform them of an inbound risk of COVID-19 infection aboard an aircraft? Any effort to discuss and train our workforce on expectations; health risks; and procedures would be helpful.

Maintenance Technician reported questions and concerns relating to cleaning techniques for aircraft during the COVID-19 pandemic.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 700

I was scheduled to operate [multiple flights]. Upon taxi out in ZZZ we were assigned by ATC to back taxi on [the] runway to perform 180 degree turn at the end for takeoff. This was due to taxiway closures and airport construction. My First Officer pointed out that they had just previously assigned the same clearance to an aircraft before us. Since taxiway A was part of the closures and since other aircraft were given the same clearance it led me to believe that I had no other option for departure. After we were clear of the ramp and positioned on the parallel taxiway I stopped the aircraft; set the parking break and we performed all briefings and pre-takeoff checks and checklists. I then handed my First Officer my iPad opened to the [procedures] and asked him to locate the description of the 180 degree maneuver so we could review it. I told him I had only done this maneuver once in my upgrade training in the SIM and I wanted to be sure that we would be doing it correctly. After review of the [procedure] we entered [the] runway at taxiway D and began to back taxi to the end of the runway. As I began the maneuver I solicited my First Officer's input since we had reviewed the procedure together. Both of us seemingly were in agreement throughout the maneuver. Just prior to beginning my hard over turn to the right my First Officer stated that he wouldn't go much further. I commented that I had not yet reached the runway edge but then began the right turn almost immediately thereafter. My First Officer was the first one to think that we were potentially off the runway. Since the aircraft seemed sluggish I boosted the power to see if it would continue its turn. It was at this point that it became obvious to me that he was correct. I then set the parking brake. We contacted the tower and notified them then contacted Operations. We started the APU then shutdown both engines. I contacted Operations to advise them of the situation. We remained with the aircraft until the decision was made to wait for recovery assistance. At that point we exited the aircraft and proceeded to the gateway. We submitted to the drug and alcohol test; contacted crew scheduling then went to the hotel until our scheduled jumpseat.  In hindsight I should have queried ATC about any other options for departure that would not require the back taxi. As we waited at the end of the runway for assistance I noticed the segment of taxiway between [two parallel runways] appeared to be open and usable. This would have meant that we could have back taxied made the right onto the taxiway and used [the parallel runway] for departure. Additionally; I believe that seeing and performing the maneuver on Operating Experience would have been helpful and should be incorporated into our training in the future.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A300 flight crew reported a runway excursion when they attempted to do a 180 degree turn to position the aircraft for takeoff on a 150 foot wide runway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 11900

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Workload; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

While descending with Approach I was given a clearance to turn to [a] HDG of 110 and descend from 8;000 FT to 4;000 FT. I selected the HDG and VS modes and started a descent at the rate of 1;000 fpm. I had received ATIS Info [and] had programmed the RNAV approach. As I started the descent; I was cleared direct to an intersection that was not in my legs page and I initially could not find the intersection on the approach chart. As the aircraft descended to around 5;500 FT; the descent rate decreased but due to trying to locate the intersection and enter it into the FMS; I did not notice the descent rate change. As I was asking ATC to verify the fix; I received a traffic alert and when I finished my transmission; ATC was giving me a turn to a heading of 090 for traffic avoidance.My transmission was covering ATC as he was trying to separate the traffic. After leveling off at 4;000 FT I again attempted to enter the fix into the flight plan with no success. After asking for a heading and an altitude to sort out the problem; I discovered the auto sequencing mode had become inhibited. A discontinuity message would not allow me to enter the fix and I could not display it in the map mode. Once this was corrected I was given direct the fix for the approach. This was my first flight in this aircraft and this model of avionics. I have not flown single pilot in many years and the workload; in addition to FMS issues was very distracting. Also; while trying to verify the location of the fix; I was transmitting at the same time ATC was advising of my descent rate decrease.

The pilot of a King Air 350 experienced a heading deviation while attempting to program the unfamiliar FMS during an RNAV approach; resulting in a traffic alert.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 156; Flight Crew Total 20285; Flight Crew Type 6545

Confusion; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 730

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Human Factors; Company Policy; Aircraft; Procedure

We departed without the re-issue of Final Weights after returning to gate to comply with MEL restriction. Maintenance had found several items during walk around and told us he suspected a Forward Lavatory Flush Motor problem and had to talk to Maintenance Control. We received ACARS message not to taxi without MRD but not to delay push so I released brakes but told the pushback crew to 'hold push while we wait for the MRD' since we had received an ACARS message saying the MRD was on the way.Right after brake release we received Final Weights. 15 minutes later there was still no MRD; no sign of the mechanic and we were not able to contact Operations at anytime while on the ground. I called Maintenance Control directly to inquire about the MRD and learned they were waiting for a call back from the mechanic regarding compliance with an MEL on Forward Lavatory Flush Motor. The water had to be turned off in the lavatory; and the door blocked off. The crew tried again to call Operations on company frequency but still no contact.I then told the Push Crew that the brakes would be set; and we needed a Jet Bridge driver; so the mechanic could perform maintenance. I set the brakes; and then used the ACARS 'return to gate' prompt. The mechanic was then on and off the aircraft in three minutes to comply with the MEL. We then received the maintenance release; the brakes were released and the flight departed normally. Once at cruise an ACARS message was received stating 'INVALID WEIGHTS DUE TO YOUR RETURN TO BLOCKS. BE SURE YOU HAVE NEW WEIGHTS BEFORE YOUR NEXT DEPARTURE'. The message for Invalid Weights was received 39 minutes after takeoff. The crew thought they had the Final Weights because they came out so fast after the first brake release. After using the return to gate prompt they should have sent an Invalid Weights message over ACARS right away.

[Narrative #2 contained no additional information]

The clumsy attempt to get an on time departure while awaiting a maintenance release resulted in an extensive ground delay and a takeoff accomplished without the appropriate weight and balance data for an A319 flight crew.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 175; Flight Crew Total 6720; Flight Crew Type 190

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Upon arrival into ATL; we received a visual approach clearance after calling the airport 'in-sight'.  We were level at 3000 ft intercepting final approximately 8-9 miles from the runway.  I went heads down to the FMS to extend a centerline off the FAF and we both confirmed.  Meanwhile; the Captain started a descent visually using vertical speed and using outside references.  When I finished with the FMS I noticed we were in a descent around 2100 MSL and that we were low.  I queried the Captain on his altitude; stating we were low.  He corrected by clicking off the autopilot; and began a climb back up to the FAF altitude which was around 2700 ft MSL.  As he began climbing ATC issued and Altitude Alert.  We acknowledged ATC; continued climbing to a safe altitude; and continued safely to the runway.  Since we had visual contact with the airport and all terrain; safety was never compromised.

B737 First Officer as pilot monitoring; reports the Captain descending below the FAF altitude by 700 feet before reaching it on a visual approach. ATC issues a low altitude alert at the same time the First Officer is pointing out the deviation to the Captain.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 20

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

After hearing our tail number and cleared for take off runway 24; we entered the runway and began our take roll.  Then Tower said Aircraft X 'Hold on'.  I aborted takeoff and turned left of the runway onto taxi way A.  Then the controller claimed that I was not cleared for take off.  The run up area had 4 aircraft including two Jets all staged for take off making for a confusing take off sequence.

Pilot reports of being cleared for takeoff; then having it cancelled by ATC who tells him that they weren't cleared for takeoff.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While approaching gate under direction of marshaller to area for tug hook up for tow-in; a ground vehicle sped very close across in front of aircraft; and appeared briefly to turn toward aircraft on a collision course. I immediately stopped the aircraft hard to avoid collision and turned on additional exterior lights. We had navigation; anti-collision; and logo lights on at the time. The vehicle corrected course slightly; sped up and away. The marshaller never gave us a stop signal; nor did the wing walker attempt to stop the vehicle as it entered the clear zone. I don't think they saw them. Don't know where they were looking. If we had not been taxiing slowly and applied brakes; turned on lights I believe we would have had a collision. It was very close. I remained stopped until after checking with cabin crew for possible injuries. There were none reported.

B757 Captain experiences a near ground collision with a vehicle that cuts in front of the aircraft while being marshalled into the gate.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Fatigue; Training / Qualification; Physiological - Other

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Soon after departure from ZZZ; we were given a lower cruise altitude. All of these changes spanned the climb; cruise and descent segments; so PF accomplished numerous FMS program changes. Prior to ZZZZZ; we were given a vector for spacing - heading 290; I think - and subsequent descents and speed changes. At some point during the changes; PF lost track of things and turned toward ZZZZZ waypoint without clearance. ATC issued a turn back to heading 300. PM noticed the turn; but was in third leg since returning from five months leave; so did not intervene or call out the discrepancy as he; also; was not certain the turn was incorrect. Crew was subsequently cleared to ZZZZZ and to descend VIA ZZZZZ arrival and landed XXR without incident.  I think even the Controller lost track of all of the instructions. I attribute the error to task saturation; hunger and some dehydration. I was also a little distracted by some personal issues going on which I started to think about while we were waiting during flow control from ZZZ-ZZZ1. I think we will have lots of issues going forward as pilots come off of extended leaves of absence. I should not have let myself get distracted and dehydrated.

Air Carrier Captain reported a track deviation and cited task saturation; hunger and lack of flying as contributing factors.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 500; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 100

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

During the descent I switched the fuel selector from the left to right tank and experienced engine failure due to loss of fuel pressure. I returned the fuel selector to the left tank and never regained fuel pressure. At this time I turned towards [the airport] and notified ATC of engine problems and stated my intention to land at [the airport].  We made a safe landing on Runway 18 with no damage or injuries. The next morning we discovered that the fuel selector handle had separated from the fuel selector stem that extends into the fuel valve which was stuck in the off position.

An M20 pilot deadsticked to a safe landing at a nearby airport when the engine failed while switching tanks. A malfunctioning fuel tank selector valve was reponsible.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While on visual approach to Runway 09R at 2;000 MSL on right downwind per clearance; I was instructed to extend my downwind by the Tower Controller and that he would call my base turn. He called traffic to me at 3 miles; 2 o'clock position at same altitude and converging from right to left. I did not immediately establish visual contact with the traffic. The Controller called the other aircraft 3 times to alert him as to my position. The other aircraft never gained visual contact with me. Almost immediately after another call to me to point out the traffic I gained visual contact and received the RA to 'monitor vertical speed.' I informed ATC that I had traffic and was immediately descending to avoid conflict. Controller called the other aircraft and instructed them to maintain 2;000. I passed approximately 300 feet below the other aircraft. I resumed my assigned heading and upon clearance to land resumed visual approach and landed without incident.

Corporate Captain reported an NMAC during a visual approach to TMB airport.


Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Confusion

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action

Up almost completing my walk-around I noticed something different in the LH main gear wheel well. It was a TOWEL wrapped around the flight control cables. It was obvious that it had flown at least one leg like this; the towel was tight wrapped around the cables inside the pulley. I took a pic with my cell phone and immediately conferred with the CA. We both went back and saw it and then made the proper calls to have it looked at. At first the MX personnel stated that he could not free the towel from the cables. I went and told the CA. By then more people had arrived including a  Chief pilot; Mx Supervisor and other mx personnel. 15 minutes later MX told me they were able to finally shake the towel loose and that we were good to go. I walked back up to the cockpit and told the CA; he said we weren't going anywhere; MX had already taken the plane out of service. The Chief pilot said he said he saw no reason why we shouldn't go (this is what the CA told me he said). The CA informed him MX had taken the plane OTS before him. This was NOT a good feeling by me from I what I found; my stomach turned at the thought of what could have happened. I would like to know (based on the pic I included) what exactly these cables control. We ended up getting a newplane; were late; I missed my commute flight home by 10 minutes; but am glad this was caught. Please notify me as what exactly these cables control.Checklist for MX to use anytime a tangible object is inside the wheel well; verification by a second person that nothing has been left behind.

On his exterior preflight; he discovered towels tightly wrapped around flight control cables at the left wing root. There was also a towel draped over the control cables in the wheel well. I entered this in the AML (Aircraft Maintenance Log). I've never seen anything like this before and forwarded 3 photos to the Chief Pilot. I also asked for a Maintenance Supervisor and a Chief Pilot; if near the area; to come out and 'see this'. The towels turned out to be paper towels; but at first appearance before dropping the gear door when maintenance arrived; I thought these were cloth towels.

A MD-80 First Officer discovered towels wrapped around cables in the wheel well which maintenance was able to remove with some difficulty. It was discovered the towels were paper; but the aircraft remained grounded for an inspection.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Logbook Entry; Manuals; Procedure

Departing ZZZ for ZZZ1. E6 Logbook contained a previous writeup about a FADEC overheat in flight. I do not know if Flight returned to airport or continued. Balancing write up by maintenance said FADEC was replaced. Aircraft worked well for taxi out and takeoff; we were heavy weight with about 4.5 to 5 hours of flying in front of us. We were talking to Center passing through FL280 when we received an ECAM warning of 'ENG 2 FADEC OVHT'. This aircraft was equipped with IAE engines. We followed procedures and noted this was a crew awareness. In flight only. Procedure was to retard thrust on effected engine. We asked Atlanta to stop climb at FL290; ran ECAM procedures and noted all engine parameters were correct. I elected to slow our Mach speed to reduce thrust a little and I contacted Dispatch and was patched in with Maintenance Control and my Dispatcher. Maintenance Control had two people talking with me because the first person 'had not of this before'. While this was going on I asked the First Officer to inform Atlanta that we were talking with dispatch and may return to ZZZ. Maintenance Control told me that MAYBE a cool duct was blocked and this was causing an OVHT. ( Pilots have no way of monitoring the temp of the FADEC or its components. Maintenance Control said just reduce thrust; if ovht continued then the FADEC would fail. I told Maintenance Control that I would talk with Dispatch. Because we still had 4.5 hours remaining inflight and that may include the need to reduce thrust to idle or an engine shutdown. Dispatch said maybe drop in ZZZ2 for a new aircraft but ZZZ2 was 654 miles in front of us and ZZZ 250 behind us. I elected to return to ZZZ. Atlanta coordinated with ZZZ and we asked for 36C. All engines were running well so I did not [request priority handling]. I told them this would be an overweight landing and requested that ARFF be standing by. An overweight landing in this aircraft requires that the APU be running; this is to increase available thrust for a go-around. We elected to start the APU at 10;000 ft. APU faulted. Continued with approach and tried once more for an APU start. Again it faulted. this now leaves us to shutdown packs for landing. First Officer landing was very nice and less than 200 fpm on touchdown. Taxied in. I communicated to the Flight Attendants Several times using the ' All Call'. I kept them well informed and told them we were returning as a precautionary landing. I kept the passengers informed at all times. I felt that a continuation of this flight included to may risks that should not be included in a normal operation.

A321 Captain reported that an engine FADEC problem resulted in a diversion.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 300; Flight Crew Type 60

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

We had just finished a training mission and we were returning to [base]. We were on a southeasterly heading; 1000 FT MSL approximately 10 NM NW of ZZZ. Both pilots were on NVG (Night Vision Goggles). We had just tuned up the CTAF. We didn't hear any CTAF traffic. A few minutes later the pilot in the left seat called traffic. The other helicopter was difficult to break out from the cultural lighting and resulted in a delay in maneuvering to avoid. Once the pilot at the controls broke out the traffic; he turned left to avoid. The other helicopter was heading north and was about 100 FT below. The aircraft had approximately 200 FT of lateral separation.

MH60 student pilot at 1;000 feet on a Night Vision Goggles training exercise reports an NMAC with another helicopter at 900 feet.


Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Two passengers in XX1 and XX2.  I was having to remind them to put their masks on. Next; I had to remind them to cover their nose. One passenger seemed like he would escalate; so we opted out of the warning.

Flight Attendant reported having to remind two passengers about the face mask policy. FA backed off for fear the situation would escalate.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Working a slow but steady local session with Supervisor working GC/CD combined. Very low staffing due to COVID. Steady traffic all day; I wouldn't call it too busy though. Very last transmission of my shift was to Aircraft X.Aircraft X called on about a 7 mile final (new pilot). I cleared it to land on Runway XX right and then started my position relief briefing within seconds of my transmission.Finished the brief and my 2 minute overlap; said bye to my fellow coworkers and left. Aircraft X was probably on a 2 mile final by then.I was paged at the bottom of elevator and Supervisor asked 'Did you give Aircraft X Runway XX right or Runway XX left'? I told him I didn't remember.Turned out aircraft landed on Runway XX left instead of Runway XX right. No separation issues luckily.All they said was 'cleared to land' I didn't even realize it at the time.I was distracted; ready for the briefing to be done after a long; busy day with a skeleton crew.Expectation bias all the way; I just assumed they said XX right in their transmission.All controllers tend to get complacent in this job when everything goes right for some time; I need to stay vigilant and listen to every transmission. If I would've just listened to that pilot's readback instead of thinking about getting off position and being done for the day; I would've noticed it and I would've got verification that she was cleared to land on runway XX right and all would've been good.

Tower Controller reported communication issues with an aircraft resulted in a wrong runway landing.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

While on descent into ZZZ on the ZZZZZ arrival we experienced a BLD 1 LEAK Master Warning with associated EICAS and red inscription messages. The FO (First Officer) proceeded to run the QRH; while I asked for immediate vectors to ZZZ along with a descent to exit IMC and icing conditions. ATC granted the descent; as well as direct ZZZ. The bleed leak warning was still occurring while the FO waited the requisite 3 minutes as per the QRH. This prompted me to [receive priority] as the eventual end of the QRH procedure is to secure the engine should the leak not extinguish. As we descended out of icing conditions; the BLD LEAK message extinguished; prompting no further action from the QRH. At this time I notified the FA (Flight Attendant) with a TEST briefing as to the nature of our [situation]; that the immediate threat had passed and we would be landing normally. I also made a PA to the passengers to inform them that they may see ARFF (Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting) vehicles around the aircraft on landing. We continued to a normal landing on XXL in ZZZ and taxied to the gate with no further assistance required.Master Warning bell with associated EICAS and red inscription messages.Unknown problem in bleed system caused a BLD 1 LEAK Master Warning. Aircraft had been written up 3 days prior for same issue with associated maintenance entry clearing the write up.QRH ran; ATC advised to clear icing conditions; proceeded to normal landing in ZZZ.Possibly more in-depth look at bleed system whenever a leak detection warning occurs beyond ops check good.

On the ZZZZZ arrival into ZZZ we descended into a cloud layer and encountered icing conditions. Within 30 seconds of the anti-ice system being turned on we received a 'Bleed 1 Leak' EICAS message. As Pilot Monitoring; I ran the respective QRH associated with that message. Still being in icing conditions we decided it would be best if we advised ATC to gain priority and also since we did not know how thick the icing cloud layer was. Upon waiting the 3 minutes as stated by the QRH we exited the icing conditions and within 30 seconds the bleed leak message and inscription went away thus ending the QRH procedure. We continued to ZZZ; landed and taxied to the gate normally.

EMB-145 flight crew reported a BLEED 1 LEAK Master Warning on descent into IMC icing conditions and after descending out of icing; the warning discontinued.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

While in the initial climb phase of flight after retracting the gear and flaps; myself and the acting second in command noticed an audible rumble and vibration in both the yoke and rudder pedals. The decision was then made to return to ZZZ in an effort to ensure safety. After an uneventful landing and return to the FBO; we discovered the right main landing gear door had separated from the landing gear itself. It appeared that a bolt had sheared off that holds the actuator between the landing gear and the landing gear door. The separation allowed the gear door to hang on the point that appropriate clearance could not be maintained between the ground and the gear door. The contact between the ground and the gear door caused the door to warp and show visible signs of contact on the end of the door.

Citation 525 Captain reported failure of a bolt retaining the main landing gear door causing the door to impact the runway.


Training / Qualification; Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action

On climbout through approximately FL200; we experienced both EECs switching to 'soft alternate mode.' As I (pilot not flying) was reading and completing the QRH checklist items as the pilot flying continued to fly; I noticed that we were rapidly approaching Vmo and no longer in much of a climb. I informed the pilot flying of this information and the pilot flying said we were about to stall and proceeded to increase power. The Overspeed Warning is going off at this point. I crosschecked with standby ASI and ALT and told pilot flying that the standby and the pilot not flying instruments agreed. I told pilot flying to reduce power. The pilot flying then consulted the HUD and said the HUD showed impending stall as well. I told pilot flying to reduce power again and repeated that pilot not flying instruments and STBY were in agreement. Around FL250; the pilot flying agreed that the pilot flying's instruments were incorrect and the unreliable airspeed appropriate actions taken. We transferred control of the aircraft since I had the instruments we deemed to be correct. We asked ATC if we could level at FL280 due to equipment issues/RVSM restrictions and they agreed and even gave us a block from FL280-283. We leveled at FL280. The following Controller upon check-in queried our altitude at which point we realized that we had not switched our transponder to report altitude from #2. We told ATC; made appropriate switch; and ATC confirmed that we were at FL280. We completed/complied with all appropriate checklists and confirmed all circuit breakers were in. The pilot not flying then contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control. It seemed that the issue trying to be resolved was that the #1 EEC could not be selected to the 'hard alternate mode;' not the fact that we had lost data inputs; possible computers; instruments and/or their capability. As the pilot not flying tried to resolve this with Dispatch/Maintenance; I (pilot flying now); began to check weather for diversion options. We still had the FMCs' navigation functioning; however; the data portion was obviously not working. Fortunately; we and Dispatch determined that we had enough fuel to continue to our filed destination at FL280. On descent through FL180; all systems began to function normally. We completed the flight uneventfully. We spoke with Maintenance and after 20 minutes or so they were diligently working on finding the problem. I couldn't stay any longer because I had to swap aircraft to fly two more legs. In respect to actions taken to prevent/handle situation; it would be beneficial if we as pilots could find out what actually malfunctioned in a far from normal 'non-normal' situation like this one.

During climb through FL200 both B737-700 engine EEC's transitioned to the Soft Alternate Mode with the Captain's airspeed indicating stall and an inaccurate transponder #1. ADIRU 2 data was functional and indicating an overspeed. Descending out of FL180 all systems returned to normal.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Just before departure; the gate agent called me out to the jetbridge to talk. She relayed a story of verbal abuse to her by one of our passengers. I asked that the passenger be paged to the front of the aircraft. I wanted to visit with him about his actions away from earshot of the other passengers. I also wanted to assess his willingness to comply with the flight crew going forward. Two PAs were made asking him by name to come forward. He did not respond or comply. Now that he has been abusive and non-compliant I went back to his seat to inform him I needed him to step off of the aircraft. With some protest he finally did.In the jetbridge he was contrite; apologetic; and soft spoken. He related that his father was on his deathbed and that he was upset and trying to get to [destination] in time to see him. I told [him] to wait a moment while I conferred with my crew. Flight Attendant Number 1 was in the front galley. As I approached her she immediately related that; while I was counseling [the passenger]; his sister in [seat next to him] had come up and spoken offensively to her. The Flight Attendant tried to reassure her that the Captain was working things out and to return to her seat. She would not; but only grew more obstinate. The Flight Attendant told her 4 times to return to her seat but she would not listen. Upon hearing this I decided that neither one could ride on our flight. They both failed to follow crew directions and had used abusive language toward the agent and Flight Attendant. Following in this pattern; they also refused to leave the aircraft until an [airport] police officer arrived on the scene.What sparked the exchange was the agent requiring the male passenger to put his rollaboard bag in the bag sizer. He reacted in anger and initially refused. He finally gave in but roughly shoved his bag in and called the agent a degrading name. When the agent relayed this to me later she was trembling. I think we can all sympathize with a passenger racing to be near a dying family member. But the reason for their travel does not justify the behavior. It may be that efforts to diffuse the behavior were not successfully deployed. Also; it would have been better to deny boarding than to remove him after the fact.

Air carrier Captain reported the removal of two passengers who used abusive language toward the flight attendants and a Gate Agent during boarding.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Observer

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

We had an unscheduled swap into a [B737] with antiskid Inop MEL. It was the First Officer's leg and we discussed the MEL issues and how they impacted our operations. After a soft touchdown I called out 'extended' out of habit then corrected myself and said 'not extended' (the auto speed brake system was part of the MEL) then manually extended the speedbrake. I then noticed that the thrust reversers were not deployed and stated 'no reversers'. By the time the First Officer recognized the no reverse condition we had slowed to around 80 knots and the reversers were never used. After landing the Tower informed us it appeared that we had a blown tire. We cleared the runway and stopped for a Ground Crew to verify that we did. The Ground Crew informed us that both main outboard tires had blown. We then had Maintenance come out with a tug and tow us to the gate after determining that it was safe to tow.Given time to reflect I feel I; as the Captain; should have flown that leg given that I had received the MEL Briefing from the Chief Pilot on Call. My after landing callouts were delayed and not as crisp as they should have been which caused a delay in the no reverse call.

The antiskid was Inop on the aircraft. We used flap 40 and had a soft landing. The speedbrake was difficult for the Captain to deploy. I applied easy braking and inadvertently forgot to use the thrust reversers. With the distractions; we both didn't realize I hadn't used the reverses until the aircraft had slowed to about 60 knots. Again; the landing was soft and easy braking. After landing the Tower asked if we'd like assistance because another aircraft thought we'd blown a tire on landing. The Captain and I where both confused and thought he must not mean us because we didn't feel a thing and all seemed normal. After we taxied off the runway the Tower said that it looked like; from another aircraft; we'd blown both tires on landing. Then Captain decided to stop on the taxiway and make sure everything was ok. Unfortunately both outside mains had blown on landing. After a Maintenance inspection of the aircraft on the taxiway; we were towed into the gate.

B737 flight crew reported two tire failures on landing roll when spoilers and reversers were not deployed in a timely manner.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

The OAPM RNAV arrival into IAH from the southwest corner post is the Tejas2 arrival and has a NOTAM for turbojets pilots to maintain mach number until descending via the arrival and then maintain 280kts when transitioning to IAS. When asked Aircraft X claimed to be at 300kts. I asked if Aircraft X was aware of the 280kts restriction and he said I had not issued it so he was not flying at 280kts. I explained the speed restriction was in the NOTAMS and the pilot then keyed up to explain to me that he was not required to reduce his speed until GMANN. I stated the NOTAM for the pilot and asked him to reduce to published speed. Upon frequency change to approach control the pilot again began to explain to me in length that he was not required to reduce speed until transitioning to IAS and that he hadn't transitioned until FL270. This is a common occurrence with pilots on the southwest corner post and creates a hazard to flight safety as is causes unnecessary frequency congestion while aircraft are in a situation of rapid congestion. Pilots have complained that the NOTAM is in a list of roughly 40 or so NOTAMS for the airport; however; that should not negate responsibility. I recommend that the speed reduction is more clearly stated or restated (to include a distance from fix to begin speed reduction or altitude) since different aircraft types transition at different altitudes. I also highly suggest the speed restriction be added to the actual STAR and not just as a NOTAM.

ZHU Controller describes problems with various aircraft inbound to IAH that are not clear with a NOTAM that has speed restrictions on it that relate to a STAR for IAH.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 450; Flight Crew Type 100

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Airport; Airspace Structure

There was aerobatic show at my home base airport. I was returning from a short cross country and switched from approach to CTAF and called pattern entry left base Runway 8 and final. Another plane took the runway while I was on short final without [broadcasting on CTAF].I climbed for a go around and [made a] left turn at mid field. I saw the departing plane on TCAS only during the go around while climbing. The departing pilot advised me over CTAF that we were within 50 FT of each other prior to my left turn. I never saw the other plane after initiating my go around.

A BE36 pilot; returning to his home airport during an airshow; suffered an NMAC with an aircraft departing the runway as he was on short final. He initiated a go around and was advised by the other pilot on CTAF that they were separated by as little as 50 FT vertically during the event.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Given line up and wait instructions on 26L in ATL after Boeing 737 had just started to roll. After lining up was given takeoff clearance and proceeded with takeoff. After rotation and on climb out at around 400 feet received a windshear message; Captain was flying and complied with command bars and after about 5 seconds windshear message disappeared. Weather was clear skies; no weather in the area and had not been for at least 12 hours. Believe message was due to wake from heavy aircraft that had just taken off.Felt situation was handled properly and aircraft was not put in an undesired state.

CRJ-200 First Officer reported receiving a windshear message shortly after takeoff from ATL that he believes was caused by a wake from preceding aircraft.


First Aid Equipment; with Medical Kit & Defibrillator

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22; Flight Crew Total 5833; Flight Crew Type 779

The AED (Automated External Defibrillator) must be checked by the FA (Flight Attendant) on preflight. On the B737 the AED is locked in a plastic box that is not clearly transparent; and if the FA opens the plastic container to appropriately complete their checks they would have to break the seal and Maintenance would come out. The additional associated issue is that if pilots are ferrying a flight; we do not have a key to unlock the AED in the event we need to access it for a fellow crew member. My understanding is that the Airbus AED is not in a locked container. Do not lock the AED to allow for preflight checks and access to all crew members.

B737NG Captain reported that the AED (Automated External Defibrillator) is in a locked; non-transparent container; which does not allow flight attendants to check it during preflight.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 1780; Flight Crew Type 90

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Maintenance Action

We were leveling off at 5;500 MSL and my student was slowly leaning the mixture when the right engine RPM began to drop steadily. I pushed the mixtures and props full forward. The RPMs continued to drop; so I took the controls and had the student run the engine failure in flight above VMC checklist. After about 15 seconds of the RPMs dropping the engine began to shake and go to feather. The engine then failed completely and we did the engine securing checklist. I advised Departure and declared an emergency. We got a low volts annunciator; so I turned off our lights to decrease the electrical load which brought the load down to an acceptable level. We trouble-shot for about 2 minutes and determined that there was nothing that appeared to be out of order and the aircraft systems were stable. We started a descent and headed towards the airport. We landed with no incident and were able to taxi off the runway and up near the old terminal. We shut down there and contacted operations to make sure a tug was on the way. Once there they checked the aircraft and towed it back to the ramp. Maintenance checked and there was fuel and oil in the right engine. As a note; the run-up on the right engine was normal except that while testing the left magneto the drop was 80 RPMs and the right magneto drop was 150. I considered this to be within safe levels.

When their right engine began losing power the instructor and student pilots declared an emergency; ultimately shut down the failed engine and returned safely to their departure airport.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We were cleared a visual approach to 9R; and upon asking; were re-cleared to land on 9L. We had briefed the approach before the descent into PHL. Our logic was with reduced traffic we had a chance of getting it; thus shortening taxi in and saving gas. Once Tower cleared us to land on 9L; we side-stepped over to land. We conducted a visual approach because the ILS was not turned on. Runway 9L has REIL's and MALSR lighting. Runway 9R has PAPI's and ALSF-II; with the PAPI's on the right side of the runway. In between the runways; and this is the problem; there is some kind of airport structure or antennas or something with horizontal red and white lights that give the appearance of a PAPI. We were unable to distinguish what exactly it was on short final in the dark while focusing on landing. From a long way out on a visual approach it gave us the mis-perception that we were on a valid glide path; but it is not a PAPI. This caused confusion to us as a crew because it was not the picture that was briefed; the lights are in an abnormal position in relation to the runways; and there is no descent guidance whatsoever in these lights. We ended up slightly high but not so high that only a small correction was needed to execute a safe; uneventful landing. In less than perfect visibility; an aircrew might be misled into a dangerous approach. All the lights in this structure need to be red and a note on a safety page or the 10-9 or approach plate. Proper diagramming on the 10-9 would work too.

Air carrier Captain reported seeing and following a set of horizontal lights which appeared to be PAPI between two parallel runways at PHL. On short final; the crew determined these were not PAPI lights and they gave the misperception of being on a valid glide path.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

During climb out we noticed an odor in the cockpit that seemed to be like dirty socks or wet carpet. We asked flight attendants if they could smell the same thing but they said no. The captain went to the back of the aircraft to check. He could not smell it in the back. When he returned we determined that the fumes were starting to have an effect on both of us. We began running the fumes and smoke check list. We decided to divert to ZZZ. We began using oxygen. We briefed cat 3 approach and ran over weight landing check list. By this time in my opinion we both were becoming more and more incapacitated. Both of us were having problems concentrating on the tasks at hand. We were given priority handling by ATC and landed the aircraft without further problems. Emergency equipment met the aircraft when we exited the runway. We were given instructions to taxi to the ramp. By this time it seemed that we were nearly unable to follow instructions; but managed the aircraft to a gate. Fire and rescue inspected the aircraft but didn't find anything wrong.

A319 flight crew reported fumes in the flight deck. After a short time they began to experience problems concentrating and the onset of incapacitation.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.8

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

After resolving a tight opposite direction squeeze play; I breathed a sigh of relief and observed a VFR target approximately 5 miles northwest of the airport; indicating altitude 065. I heard a clicking or static in my ear like a pilot trying to transmit and made a call in the blind to see if an aircraft was on frequency inbound from the north or northwest. Meantime; I had cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff and had approved a northbound turn; potentially putting them in conflict with the unidentified inbound. Realizing this; I instructed Aircraft Y to fly runway heading and called the traffic. Finally; Aircraft X checked in; claiming they were 8 miles out - but in reality 3 miles out; having entered D airspace without clearance (I believe the full call sign might be Aircraft X; based at a nearby flight school to the north). I instructed her to enter a right downwind. I then observed the aircraft appeared to be heading right for the upwind traffic and firmly instructed the pilot to turn left and fly the downwind; also issuing a traffic advisory to her. Aircraft X appeared to be flying a very low; tight pattern as they turned downwind and I became curious if the pilot was familiar with the local airport or pattern (there was also virga in the vicinity of the airport; and they might have had difficulty seeing the airport or fighting downdrafts). As Aircraft X became established on downwind; I approved Aircraft Y to proceed on course. Based on the pilot's maneuvers; poor radio procedures; and bad readbacks; I decided the best course of action was to focus on Aircraft X and get her on the ground ASAP. To accomplish this; I had Aircraft Z (VFR practice approach) execute their missed approach turn earlier than usual to ensure they did not become a factor with Aircraft X. After landing; I instructed the pilot to make the turn on G Taxiway and contact Ground Control. I reminded the pilot a call sign was required for many readbacks; and heard her acknowledge (but also without a call sign again). I began to back taxi the next departure onto Runway 29L and then heard Ground Control make a request. Ground Control asked me to tell Aircraft X to stop and contact Ground Control; and I observed that it appeared she taxied on G without a clearance; crossing the hold bars for closed Runway 29R. I instructed the pilot to 'stop and contact Ground'; and I heard an acknowledgment. As the aircraft taxied in; I could overhear Ground Control also encountering difficulties getting the pilot to understand the route and read it back correctly.While safety was not imminently affected (Aircraft X and Aircraft Y passed well clear of each other); it appeared the pilot on the radios was not well prepared for flying in controlled airspace. While she exhibited some familiarity with procedures at times (such as providing an ATIS code); she entered the airspace without a clearance and did not seem to understand that ATC needs correct readbacks with a call sign. Though I try to be as accommodating as possible with student pilots who may be nervous on the radios; I am not convinced that this pilot was properly prepared to fly solo in controlled airspace (or if the instructor was on board; they should have intervened!) In hindsight; I was glad I made the call early on to keep the other aircraft (Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z) well clear of the inbound aircraft due to the communication difficulties.

Local Controller describes situation where a new pilot causes problems flying into the airport and then taxiing to the ramp.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft had MEL XX-XX-XA (Slat/Flap System - Flap Subsystem) for FLAP FAULT Status message. Operations were discussed and conducted in accordance with AFM Supplement (performance Penalties for Operations with Airplane Systems Inoperative).Flaps Halfspeed performance penalties were observed on take off performance numbers. Taxied out for takeoff with no unexpected cautions; warnings or advisory messages. Normal take off performed Runway XX ZZZ1. Climbing thru 500-600 feet AGL 'FLAP FAIL' Caution Message Posted. QRH items were accomplished - Flaps had failed in the Take Off Position (8). ATC was advised that we would stop climb at 10;000 feet whilst Dispatch and Maintenance advised of the issue & formulate the best course of action. An emergency was not declared but the nature of the issue was given. Dispatch was contacted initially via ACARS; given the failure and fuel onboard; then subsequently via ZZZ Radio.After discussions with the dispatcher and calculating the fuel onboard all parties were in concurrence to continue to ZZZ. Requested for the Dispatcher to call ahead and have ZZZ ensure the longest runway was made available for the landing and to provide any assistance to facilitate 'short cuts' and weather avoidance to ensure arrival with sufficient fuel. Final cruise altitude was 14;000 feet and speed was 220 KTS to comply with the flap speed restriction and a 10 kt buffer for turbulence associated with weather. ATC was advised and provided assistance in find the shortest way around weather and direct to points on the arrival into ZZZ.Passengers were than advised via PA due to a performance issue that presented itself on the climb out of ZZZ1 the aircraft will be limited to 14;000 feet and a slower speed than flight planned causing our arrival time to be approximately 15 minutes after scheduled arrival. Additionally Airline was aware of the issues and would be watching and looking at any possible misconnects and proactively make any re-bookings if required in ZZZ. Flight Attendants reported no issues with the passengers and everyone seemed to be in good spirits.Thirty (30) Minutes prior to arrival flight attendants reported a strong 'mechanical/electrical' smell beginning aft of the wing root and extending back towards zone 6 in the cabin. Dispatch and Maintenance was advised; flight attendants asked to monitor and advise of any changes and systems were monitored via the various system pages for any indication of further subsystems degradation to which none was found.Flight was vectored to join final for Runway XYL ZZZ. Items in QRH (prior to landing) were accomplished aircraft landed with no issues; exiting Taxiway X and parking at gate XX in ZZZ.

Climbing out of ZZZ1; immediately after take off; received the 'flaps fail' caution message. Completed QRH and made the decision; with Dispatch and Maintenance input to continue to ZZZ. Flight was limited to 15;000 feet and 230 knots due to the flaps being stuck at 8. A much less fuel efficient route; so we required shortcuts when the weather would allow just to make sure we had plenty of fuel. With approximately 30-45 minutes left in the flight the flight attendants reported a mechanical or electrical smell.  No smoke was observed.  We discussed diverting to another airport but our options were limited since we had to increase our landing distance and roll.  Discussed the fact that the smell was probably associated with the failure and no other indications to suggest a fire so we continued to ZZZ.  Landed on the longest runway in ZZZ without any issues. The training received in the sim helped me be well prepared for a situation like this.

CRJ-900 flight crew reported a 'Flap Fail' message during initial climb followed by Flight Attendant notification of an odor in the cabin. Flight continued and executed a safe landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 7; Flight Crew Type 65

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

While attempting to flare I encountered a severe crosswind that forced the plane off the centerline. I overcorrected resulting in wheelbarrowing and then skidding off into the grass just off the left side of the runway. The plane received minor damage to the front oleo strut.

Pilot reported loss of control during landing when a crosswind pushed the aircraft off center line and the pilot's corrective actions resulted in runway excursion.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 37; Flight Crew Total 330; Flight Crew Type 240

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Staffing

As I was approaching from the northwest to an airport with parallel runways; intending to land on the eastern of the two runways.  The Tower closed early because of COVID-19; and traffic was using Runways XXL and XXR.  I elected to fly a left downwind to land on Runway XXR; partially because there was traffic to the east of the field that was planning to fly a right downwind to XXR; and I did not have visual contact it.  I landed uneventfully; but in hindsight; it would have been better to follow the proper pattern by overflying the field; and descending to join the right downwind for XXR.

GA pilot reported flying the incorrect pattern after the Tower closed.


Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Flight Attendant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure

During the preflight I discovered a Circuit Breaker (CB) for the potable water system open with a red collar. No inop or deactivated label was present by this CB and no documentation in the logbook could be found regarding this CB so Maintenance was notified. After Maintenance researched the aircraft's history no reason could be found for the CB to be open so the Mechanic closed the CB and signed off the corresponding logbook entry I had written. It is unknown how long this aircraft had been operating with this CB collared.Second; I was informed by the Purser that the aft galley had no electrical power so the utility bus switches were cycled to reset the system and I called a flight attendant in the aft galley to confirm if the galley had power. I was told the power was on and no mention was made of any open CB. I informed the Purser the aft galley power was on. Much later and just prior to departure I was informed that that the forward galley had no electrical power (in spite of the fact the First Officer had requested a cup of coffee some fifteen minutes earlier prior to departing on this all night flight). My experience and intuition dictated an inspection of the forward galley where I immediately discovered two forward galley CBs open. Again Maintenance was notified. The Mechanic informed me that earlier he had opened both the forward and aft galley CBs for reasons I do not fully understand but not related to any aircraft airworthiness or mechanical issue. The Mechanic reset the forward galley CBs and normal galley power was restored.Third; I then needed to confirm the aft galley was powered and if any crew member had reset the aft galley CBs. Power was normal and when asked directly about open CBs a flight attendant admitted that a flight attendant had reset the CBs. I asked him to come forward and we stepped onto the jet bridged where I discretely counseled him that he must never reset a CB and always inform the Captain of any CB that might be found open. The flight soon departed and upon arrival at our destination; as the crew deplaned; I asked three of the flight attendants what they believed should be done if they find a CB open. Their confident consensus was that they could reset the CB one time while on the ground and that notifying the Captain was not required. I informed them of the correct policy but they persisted that their rules allowed them to reset a CB. I further explained the policy was for safety reasons and that I was not authorized to ever reset a CB. I encouraged them to research the issue.It appears many flight attendants may not understand our CB policy and their responsibility to inform the Captain of aircraft discrepancies. Specifically; I recommend an immediate system wide electronic message to all flight attendants reminding them of the CB policy and their responsibility to inform the Captain of all maintenance related issues. Additional periodic training also seems to be required for all flight attendants. Note: On other flights; I have had flight attendants bypass me WHEN I'M PRESENT to inform Maintenance of an issue and only later do I happen to learn of the problem; and have been told by flight attendants pre-departure that: 'you can write it up when we get to our destination' as if they have that authority. Initiative by flight attendants to notify appropriate agencies for support should not be discouraged when the flight crew is not present but they should be reminded that they still have the responsibility to insure the Captain is informed.

A B757-200 Captain utilized the occasion of finding an open and banded Circuit Breaker (CB) during preflight to address what he believes to be diametrically opposed understanding of undirected CB operation between flight crew and cabin staff. He further addressed what he believes to inappropriate direct flight attendant/maintenance interface without prior consultation with the Captain.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Aircraft; Procedure

One of our tow pilots noticed the RH elevator was bent down outboard of the outer hinge approximately 5 degrees during preflight. We had our maintenance vendor troubleshoot the defect. It was determined that the incorrect elevator was installed. The elevator installed was for a 150 hp PA-25 and has a lighter spar. The elevator had been installed some time ago. The two different types of elevators are almost identical and hard to tell apart.

The pilot of a PA25 glider tow aircraft noticed damage to the elevator. It was later determined that the incorrect part was installed on the aircraft.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I performed O2 mask test on the ground before the flight. While climbing through FL350 for FL370; I pulled out the O2 mask. Oxygen started flowing uncontrollably as if the emergency oxygen knob was turned on.I checked to make sure the emergency knob was in correct position and verified it to be working and not stuck. The 100% oxygen tab was also seemingly functional. As high pressure oxygen flow continued; we consulted the QRH; which directed to close the mask doors and engage the shut off tab; which is the tab used for mask/microphone test on the ground. This step stopped the oxygen flow; but the oxygen supply to my mask was cut by this action. We had 650PSI O2 left. After further consulting the QRH and discussing with FO; we decided to ask our flight attendant to pass the portable O2 bottle to us; requested descent to MEA (FL180; then 15000; followed by 14000 and 11500MSL) and continued to destination.  Reflecting on the event; and imagining a scenario when the mask would be needed due to rapid decompression  and malfunction like this happened; following our memory items; could have resulted in crew incapacitation. Our memory items call for masks to be donned and crew communication established before starting descent. Given the same malfunction; and assuming First Officer donned his mask; constant oxygen flow from Captain's mask would have been extremely distracting; and unless a decision was made to start the descent immediately the oxygen bottle content would be depleted very quickly; or if the flow was stopped; the Captain would have an inoperative mask.  I believe a training outlining how to handle a scenario of O2 mask malfunction during decompression; particularly emphasizing the method of quick O2 cut off to malfunctioning mask; and possibly using observer's mask if no observer is present may be useful and lifesaving.  Speculating further; it may be also useful to go over a scenario when one of the crew members initiates an emergency descent; if the other crew member can't don the oxygen mask for whatever reason during decompression event.

EMB-135 Captain reported a malfunctioning crew oxygen mask prompted a request for a lower cruise altitude.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Environment - Non Weather Related

While on approach to BOS 33L at about 300 AGL EGPWS TERRAIN; TERRAIN aural alert was received. The runway was in sight and VMC existed. The aircraft was configured for landing and was on glideslope and speed for landing. This was an obvious GPWS malfunction and the approach and landing was continued. Subsequently the next day on a different aircraft we received the same warning to 33L. My First Officer had the same issue the prior week on a different ship. In discussing this issue with several other pilots; three said they had the same problem to both 33L and 15R. In IFR conditions this would cause a go-around at very busy airport with complex airspace.

A CRJ700 Captain reported that on two consecutive days; in different aircraft; the EGPWS TERRAIN TERRAIN warning activated at about 300 FT AGL on final to BOS Runway 33L.


Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Made an emergency landing airport. Trouble with right rudder control. Landed without incident.

The Reporter stated that a post flight investigation determined the rudder cable had departed a roller in the after fuselage. It was repair and appears to be an isolated event.

A light sport Sea Ray amphibian pilot reported that the rudder control cable departed an aft empennage roller and made right rudder movements difficult so he declared an emergency and landed.


ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Aircraft were opposite direction and hardly flashed at all when in direct conflict. Most of the Conflict Alert (CA) flashing seemed to be after the aircraft had passed; not before. At around 5 miles; tail to tail; they stopped flashing. Find out why the CA function operates intermittently or too late or not at all in some cases.

ZSE Controller voiced concern regarding the functionality of the 'Conflict Alert' (CA) system; noting the CA operates intermittently; too late or not at all.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

The aircraft had been sitting for a great length of time so it was decided the aircraft should be test flown prior to its first revenue flight. During the initial checks; the radar system failed the test cycles; so the discrepancy was noted in the logbook and maintenance was performed (approximately one hour). All other checks were satisfactory. Taxi normal. Initial takeoff normal 80-kt call normal. At approximately 110 kts I noticed my airspeed indication had blanked. Taxi was indicated in the window. I glanced to the right the FO (First Officer) indications appeared to be normal. We were rapidly approaching V1/Vr 135 kts so I elected to continue. V1/Vr was called and I rotated at a normal rate after the nose wheel left the ground my airspeed tape reappeared; however; the indication was approximately 90-100 kts with visual stall indications. No shaker. Positive rate was called and the gear was raised. At about 100 feet. I transferred control to the pilot monitoring. I had IAS comparator in the PFD and multiple levels one and two alerts. SEL Manual Feel Sel Fadec ALTN (3). A combination of those alerts drives the user to 'Refer to Emergency Non-Alert procedure- AIRSPEED UNRELIABLE.' I called to the pilot in the OBS seat to get the QRH out. I was also handling multiple radio calls. Notified ATC that we had issues with airspeed indications and erratic altimetry issues and to keep us within 20 NM of ZZZ and that we would be returning to ZZZ. The FCP was blanking on numerous occasions we were cleared to 10;000 ft however the altitude window would blank on occasion. Between 6;000-7;000 feet we were trying to ascertain what readouts were accurate as the right-side airspeed was giving erroneous indications altitude readouts seemed erroneous as well. Captain side was reading 90 kts FO side 270 knots standby 230 kts. I asked for a ground speed readout from ATC 380 kts was the response. Then as we leveled at 10;000 feet my airspeed and altitude indications returned to normal as did the FOs. We returned to ZZZ with no other issues. Blocking in Maintenance noted two ADC failures generated by the CFDS below 300 feet.

MD11 Captain reported that at approximately 110 knots a loss occurred of both ADC computer/inputs below 300 feet.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 8200; Flight Crew Type 2100

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Due to heavy traffic volume at the MIA FBO; remote parking operations were in effect. This required all large corporate jet operators to use the Northeast cargo base area. Upon repositioning from the Northeast cargo area to the FBO for passenger pick up; we were instructed by Ground Control to taxi on Lima to Zulu and hold short of [Runway] 8L. As we pulled out of the Northeast cargo area the flow of traffic (yellow painted lines) [taxiway lines] has you heading south to exit the area. This lined us up directly for Taxiway L11. As the non-flying pilot I was heads down running the Taxi Checklist. Almost directly after exiting the Northeast cargo area; Ground Control gave us an immediate clearance to stop and hold position. When I looked up I noticed that we were on Taxiway L11 heading for the Runway 8R (an active runway at the time). At no point did we violate the safety area of Runway 8L. Without Ground Control's call to stop and hold position I can see a potential situation develop where a pilot would taxi across an active runway (8L). Upon further examination we did not notice any taxiway markings or signage that would help anyone avoid this in the future.

GLF5 Captain describes a near runway incursion at L11 and Runway 8R. The clearance from Ground Control was to exit the Northeast cargo area and taxi via Taxiway L. Ground Control caught the error in time to prevent the incursion.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Near GRIDR intersection; ATC called other traffic at 13;500 feet; we were at 13;000 feet climbing. [We] got the RA; descended initially; then climbed; had the other aircraft in sight when we were instructed to climb again; [and] notified ATC.Controller did his best to keep us clear. We were in an Airbus 321; 186;000 lbs; were vectored off the ZZOOO2 because we could not make the climb restriction.In conjunction with ATC; construct STARs [that] a heavy Airbus 321 can make.

Climbing out of SAN on the ZZOOO2 RNAV departure; we were given headings after ZZOOO because we could not make the crossing at JORRJ at 14;000 feet. After gaining enough altitude we were sent direct GRIDR. ATC gave us a traffic alert of small aircraft at 11 o'clock. Had them on TCAS at 500 feet above; [and] as Pilot Flying; I increased climb rate per the Captain's suggestion to avoid a conflict. When the traffic was 100 feet above the TCAS triggered a descending RA; so I applied the required maneuver since we did not have a visual (weather was CAVU); then RA reversed to a climb RA so I complied with that. At that point; we had a visual on the aircraft and we resumed our climb as they passed off the wing. Notified ATC of RA. Two aircraft going over the same point in tight airspace.

A321 flight crew reported the aircraft's poor climb performance led to a vector off course and an airborne conflict. Captain suggested designing STAR procedures that heavy A321 aircraft could comply with.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Dirty sock smell on descent passing 6;000 ft.

Air carrier flight crew reported a fume event during descent for destination airport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

While on the LOC 27 Approach into San Diego; the Tower told us that we would break out right at minimums. Concerned about getting down; I left REEBO at 800 to 1;000 FPM descent to the Derived Decision Altitude (DDA). The base of the layer was ragged and just prior to the DDA I saw the PAPI appear; disappear; and reappear. At DDA; I had the PAPI and immediately noticed an area of lower visibility north of the runway. I called 'landing'. Concerned that the area of lower visibility may move over the runway; I allowed the aircraft to descend at the higher rate of descent than I had started from the FAF. With it being daylight and the terrain and obstacles insight; I was lulled into focusing on the area of low visibility. This was apparent when the First Officer correctly called 'airspeed' when I allowed the airspeed to drop more than five knots below target. I corrected; but was still focused on the area of low visibility. Then we received the alert 'Terrain Too Low'. That got my attention and I corrected immediately. At the same moment of the alert; I saw the PAPI had turned four red. I brought the aircraft up to the PAPI glide path and the rest of the approach and landing was uneventful. The area of lower visibility stayed to the north of the runway and never became a factor. The first thing I did wrong was forgetting my first priority to fly the aircraft. The second thing I did wrong was [that I was] too lulled into a sense of security by having the terrain in sight. The third thing I did wrong was to focus on the area of low visibility which caused me to lose focus on the first two priorities. I allowed myself to be distracted. Ironically this area of focus; the low visibility never became a factor; yet it brought other more serious factors into play. Fly the airplane!

[Narrative 2 had no additional information]

A B737-300 flight crew reported receiving a GPWS alert for terrain on approach to SAN.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Upon taking my Oral and Practical exams for my Powerplant certificate; both of which I passed; I forfeited my permanent Airframe certificate to my DME (Designated Mechanic Examiner) and received my temporary Airframe and Powerplant certificate.I noticed an email addressed from an Aviation Safety Inspector from the Salt Lake City FSDO; in regards to my new Airframe and Powerplant certificate application that he received from the DME. Concerning evidently that my permanent Airframe certificate did not have a signature on the back. Honestly I do not remember if the back of my certificate was signed or not; nor with what it could have been signed with. Perhaps done with pencil or a poor ball point pen to which later was rubbed off with dirty mechanic hands dealing with greases and solvents throughout the work day.I am not sure I was aware that the signature was required or that there was even a location for one on my certificate. I later noticed that none of my credit or debit cards are signed and neither was any of my other airmen certificates.If this is important I have had a lapse in instruction and was unaware of the necessity and importance. Perhaps an advisory circular would be helpful to the aviation community. If the lack of a signature on the back of airmen certificates could completely invalidate the credentials of the holder it seems like an important topic.

A&P mechanic reported failing to sign the back of his previous certificate; resulting in an email from the FAA.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 218; Flight Crew Type 12500

Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure

At 500 FT AGL on final to Runway 12L in STL; we received a PWS warning (GO AROUND...WINDSHEAR AHEAD). The weather at the time was partly cloudy with no convective activity in the area. Approximately five seconds after receiving the PWS warning; the weather radar went into test mode. The pilot not flying and I briefly discussed the situation and I made the decision to land with no objection from the pilot not flying. After parking at the gate; I called for the Maintenance person at STL and described to him what had happened. He stated that this was a common occurrence at STL and there was nothing wrong with the aircraft so no logbook entry was made. The Maintenance person stated this was a known problem and 'they' (I don't know who 'they' are) recently flew an aircraft around STL to try and isolate the cause of the erroneous PWS warnings; but were unable to find the cause.

The reporter stated that he has not personally seen or heard of this type anomaly occurring before it happened on this flight. The PWS warning symbol identifying the supposed weather event was at the aircraft's eleven o'clock about five miles. The reporter did not see anything which would cause that warning to activate.

At 500 AGL on final approach; we got a windshear go-around warning. There was no convective activity in the area and no windshear warning. The Captain and I talked about it and he elected to continue the approach and landing without incident. Five seconds after the initial warning; the radar went into test mode automatically. After the landing; the Captain contacted STL Maintenance to check out the radar and he was told that erroneous windshear warning has happened multiple times before.

A B737-700 flight crew reported an EGPWS Predictive Windshear Warning (PWS) while on short final for STL Runway 12L; but because daylight VMC conditions existed without convective activity; the approach was continued.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

We were assigned the obstacle departure Rwy 24 SBD. The departure reads 'Rwy 24 climbing left turn. All aircraft climb direct PDZ VOR.' After discussion we understood the departure to be a climbing left turn while climbing for terrain clearance then after the turn direct PDZ. After departure (while in a left turn) departure control queried us about our heading. We stated we were in a left turn per the obstacle departure. He said we had overshot the direct turn to PDZ it didn't require a full circle then direct. We were given a heading for PDZ and proceeded as directed. The rest of the departure was uneventful. There was no traffic conflict or terrain warnings. A note in the guide describing the procedure might make it more clear. From Rwy 24 it's really not a climbing left turn rather a left turn DIRECT to PDZ. It's not a complicated procedure however the high terrain near the airport led us to make more of the turn requirement than was needed.

Our clearance was to depart runway 24 via the Obstacle DP out of KSBD. We both looked over the Obstacle DP and agreed we were to make a climbing 360-degree left turn to PDZ. On TO; the controller informed us that we should have just made a slight left turn and gave us a right turn heading back towards PDZ. When I made the turn; I received a 'bank angle' which I immediately corrected. No other problems were encountered.

B757 flight crew reported a heading deviation due to confusion flying the SBD Obstacle Departure.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 50

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 2500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During the takeoff roll at approximately 100kts my seat; FO (First Officer) seat; slid all the way back. The Captain called for the reject and we performed a rejected takeoff. FO seat slid back beyond ability to reach controls.Seat not secured in place properly.It was an abnormal situation; both pilots deemed it unsafe for flight; and rejecting the takeoff was the safest action.

[Report narrative contained no additional information]

EMB145 flight crew reported rejected takeoff when First Officer's seat slid back.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Equipment / Tooling; Company Policy; Airport

We had a group traveling and we were missing 3 of them. I told the group that the three that are missing will be rebooked on the next flight. We went down to close the aircraft door and as I was walking up 3 customers opened the door from gate room to jetway and started running down. I stopped the passengers and escorted them up to the gate room and assisted the customers. The issues here are NOT with the customers. As they should have not have opened the door the bigger issue is that the jetway door opened for them. I don't feel safe with these doors on the jetways. If these customers were irate and difficult this could have turned very poor with me. I have called building and maintenance and they have been to numerous gates and never finding a problem. [This gate] continually has problems with the jetway door. [The gate] jetway auto leveler used to go off continuously and called building and maintenance many times for that issue. I am writing this [report] because these are small problems that can potentially lead to much bigger problems. If I enter a door I have the expectation that it will be closed and locked behind me. [Company] is taking this issue to upper management but we really need the doors fixed on the pier.

Air carrier Customer Service Representative reported passengers were able to open the door from the terminal to the jetway; and that other doors at the airport have similar problems.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 4800; Flight Crew Type 2800

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

After an uneventful flight while on base leg for a visual approach the First Officer called for flaps down.Shortly thereafter an asymmetry became apparent and the flap sync caution light illuminated and the outboard flaps indicated stuck at approximately 3/4 deflection. We abandoned the approach; ran the checklist and attempted; unsuccessfully; to restore flaps to the mid position. After doing so failed to solve the problem we declared an emergency and asked for a diversion to a more suitable airport. After contacting Approach we started setting up for the approach. At this point we began getting concerned about our fuel state and asked Approach to expedite and eventually called minimum fuel. Upon receiving a wind update we decided to change runways to one which had almost a direct headwind of 14 KTS. At this time we cycled through the flaps again and were able to obtain the must symmetric position possible which indicated from the cockpit as forward flaps mid; inboards mid; and outboards at about 3/4. From the cockpit we could see that the right outboard flap was mostly retracted (could only see outer portion) and the left outboard appeared mid. We flew final at 145-150 IAS to touchdown. Fuel on touchdown was approximately 570 LBS. After landing the flaps were left in their last position and the trim was returned to neutral. Post flight inspection revealed damage to the right outboard flap and a very asymmetric deployment of that flap.

[Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]

A P180 flight crew abandoned their approach; declared and emergency and diverted to an airport with more suitable runways when they suffered and extreme flap asymmetry condition requiring full aileron trim and deflection to control roll and heading. The approach and landing were made at an increased speed commensurate with their ability to maintain control.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Confusion; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Aircraft X was on a Visual Approach to Runway 33 and cleared to land. On short final; pilot executed a go-around due to wind shear. Due to the lack of a Diverse Vector Area (DVA) at BUR; the only instruction that we are allowed to give an aircraft in this situation is to make left traffic back to Runway 33. The instruction forced the aircraft to violate the Class D airspace at both WHP and VNY airports; and there was no positive separation with the VFR aircraft within those Class D areas.We need DVAs at BUR so that we can vector IFR aircraft who are on missed approaches and have a procedure for getting them back to TRACON. This situation is dangerous. Before it was deemed illegal due to not having a DVA; this procedure would have been handled by issuing the go-around aircraft a 270 heading and a climb to 4;000 (SID instructions). This flight path keeps the aircraft away from all Class D airspace and allows the aircraft to be handed off back to TRACON; allowing the aircraft to be safely re-sequenced into an appropriate spot. We need to be able to do this again.

BUR Tower Controller reports of lack of procedures for go-around aircraft which often leads to airspace violations and possible losses of separation.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

In cruise; smooth air; radar was being manipulated to monitor weather as there was scattered activity from after takeoff including deviations and avoidance. Near ZZZZZ we encountered unforecast and unexpected moderate turbulence with a heavy rolling motion while the radar picture showed no convective activity with multiple setting monitored. Two minor passenger injuries; one bumped head in lavatory and one small burn due to spilled coffee occurred while seatbelt sign was off due to previous smooth air. Two minor flight attendant injuries; bumps and bruises resulted in stiffness and soreness but they were able to continue their duties. Preflight weather evaluation including turbulence forecast and radar evaluation showed no adverse weather or Sigmets in or near incident area overwater.

B737 Captain reported minor injuries to multiple passengers and flight attendants after encountering unexpected moderate turbulence.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 500

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

While making the RNAV Runway 31 Approach to SUN; I spotted the runway just prior to initiating a missed approach. The reported visibility was 3/4 mile but the in flight visibility was significantly better. There were no clouds and hence no ceiling. I advised the Controller that I had the airport in sight and would circle to land. He told me that I could not land since the visibility was below minimums. I responded that that wasn't true and that I could land since I had good contact with both the airport and the surrounding terrain. In an effort to be helpful he then issued a Special VFR clearance. I continued my circling maneuver and landed uneventfully. After landing he asked me for my estimate of the visibility and I estimated it at 1 1/4 mile. It actually must have been much better since I could see the entire runway even on my base leg. My concern and the reason for the report is that it was very distracting to have this conversation at a very flight critical moment and to have to quickly determine if the Controller was correct. Since circling minimums were published and the visibility appeared adequate; I believe I made the correct decision. I know the Controller was also trying to be helpful by issuing the Special VFR clearance but my understanding is that I didn't need it and that it must be requested by the pilot. Again; although the Controller was clearly trying to help me; it was very distracting to have to have an unnecessary conversation at that moment. If this possible situation were to arise again; I would advise the tower controller of my intentions well ahead of time so that any difference of opinion could be resolved at a less critical time.

General Aviation pilot on an RNAV Approach Runway 31 to SUN described some apparent confusion on the part of ATC regarding the minimums required for the procedure; adding the Controllers questions were very untimely.