Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 19000; Flight Crew Type 30

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On Freeway 2 Arrival into JRF at the H-1/H-2 Interchange; HNL Approach advised us of traffic at 1130 and less than 1/2 mile and cleared us to turn left and enter a right downwind for Runway 04L at JRF; cleared us for the visual approach and immediately handed us off to JRF Tower. Tower asked if we were at the quarry (a prominent landmark but well off to our right on our course) and advised us of a B767 inbound to HNL Runway 08L. This traffic conflicted with our visual approach so I executed an immediate tight right turn to separate from the traffic. I estimate the closest point of proximity to be less than 1/2 mile at co-altitudes. JRF Tower acknowledged the evasive maneuver and then re-cleared us over midfield to re-enter the right downwind for 04L. They stated that HNL Approach had not coordinated with them regarding the [aircraft] on approach. I feel HNL Approach erred in directing us onto the visual without advising us of the conflict or coordinating with JRF Tower.

B767-300 was on approach from the West to RWY 8L at HNL. [Small Transport] was on approach to JRF Runway 4R from the North Northeast. The flight paths were projected to cross. I took over the position after both aircraft were cleared for approach. I wrongly assumed that the [Small Transport] would descend to JRF pattern altitude prior to entering JRF Class Delta airspace. I did recognize that [Small Transport] did not descend as anticipated and called traffic to B763. B763 got [Small Transport] in sight and visual separation was applied with more than 3 miles lateral separation. JRF TWR was told that visual separation was being applied. The pilot of [Small Transport] held altitude and closed the distance to B763 to 16% of 3 mile lateral separation. I have been informed by HCF Management that I misapplied visual separation because I switched B763 to HNL Tower frequency before some other form of separation existed.I realize that I did not ensure the separation that would have prevented this occurrence. I could have spun the [Small Transport] to ensure the flight paths would not cross. I could have restricted the [Small Transport] to enter class delta at pattern altitude. I could have broken B763 out when I saw [Small Transport] not descend. I truly felt that with B763 having the [Small Transport] in sight that the hazard was minimized. I also felt that I applied visual separation correctly. I will study what the 7110.65 rules on visual separation are and make sure that I know precisely what is required.Airspace/Procedure changes that would have prevented this and other situations involving [Small Transport] and Jets from conflicting in the future is to not force the controllers to pry these two types of traffic apart every day. HCF has set up SOPs that lets [Small Transport] intimately mix with large and heavy jets in Class Bravo airspace on a daily basis. There are other routes that would keep these slow moving aircraft away from the larger faster traffic. HCF refuses to recognize this as an inherently tenuous situation. Class Bravo (prior name TCA) were created to avoid just that. One would think with all the incidents involving light aircraft and Large/Heavy aircraft at HNL that maybe doing business as usual is not what is best for a safe; orderly and expeditious flow of traffic.

A flight crew terminated a visual approach after detecting another aircraft at the same altitude at approximately 1/2 mile distance on approach to the same airport.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Local Controller issued improper restricted low approach instructions to a Skyhawk and did not receive a read back. The aircraft did a touch and go and departed while a Lear was at the main intersection of the crossing runways and over flew the Lear. Local Controller should follow proper procedure for restricted low approach clearance and recognize when to issue go around instructions when loss of separation was imminent.

Tower Controller reported a loss of separation when the Local Controller failed to secure a correct read back resulting in an overflight of traffic at an intersection.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Airport; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Broke out of VOR approach Runway 9 MMQT near minimums; autopilot on with LNAV/VNAV. Approach was busy but not overwhelming. Mistook ground feature/structure that looked like a runway with a parallel taxiway (approx two miles short of runway) for the airport and attempted to line up on that 'runway' with autopilot/autothrottles disconnected. Kept wondering; 'Why does this airport look so strange?' Obviously because it was not a runway/airport. The First Officer said; 'Do you see the runway out there?' (approx 300 AGL) At the same time I looked further out and identified the runway with four red on the PAPI; we received a 'TOO LOW; TERRAIN' warning. I immediately added power to correct to the proper glide path and continued to a normal landing.

Large Transport Captain reported difficulty locating the runway at MMQT and receiving a 'Too Low; Terrain' warning.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 0

Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I had just taken over the position within 15-20 minutes of the incident. The previous controller had an issue with one aircraft not answering him. The controller got a hold of the aircraft on the standby transmitter and everything went as planned. I switched back to the normal transmitter and had no issue talking to anybody. I had turned; slowed; and based numerous aircraft with no issue. I had Aircraft X on the downwind at 5;100 ft. and issued a base turn; and got no response. I switched headset jacks and tried again; tried the standby transmitter; used a handset; and had another sector try my frequency at their position; and nobody was able to get any response from the aircraft. I broad-casted on guard for Aircraft X to turn and switch to a different frequency; and I believe I transmitted on guard for Aircraft Y who was descending via and cleared for an approach out of 9;000 ft. The heading that Aircraft X was on put the aircraft into conflict with Aircraft Y descending via RNAV Arrival. Initially there were 20 miles of space between the aircraft but because the frequency didn't work the aircraft were converging; and I projected Aircraft Y would descend into Aircraft X if something could not be done.I continuously tried to broadcast on guard and on the frequency to get a hold of either aircraft. Finally; at the last minute I got a response from Aircraft Y and stopped him at 6;100 ft. The aircraft passed directly over each other 1;000 ft. separated. I turned Aircraft X to follow Aircraft Y inbound and then continued to readjust the sequence until everything was worked out. I slowed the final down to recover and everyone landed without incident. It was the scariest moment I've ever encountered in my entire career; and I had no control over the situation. Aircraft Y called in later and said that he heard the broadcast on guard frequency and came over to my secondary frequency which enabled the situation to be handled safely. We also found out later that technicians had been working on the primary frequency and the area was not aware of it; and supposedly a line failed that shouldn't have.I don't know what can be done to resolve this as it was clearly a technical issue. Under normal circumstances the operation was completely routine; done every day; and completely in control. With the loss of the frequency for over 15 to 20 flying miles in a congested airport environment; things quickly escalated to unsafe. The only thing I can say is that based on my personal encounter with this issue; if the frequency is being serviced for any reason whatsoever it would be safer to use a backup frequency until it is complete so that unexpected outages would be less likely to occur. In addition; the saving grace on this issue was possibly the fact that the airline pilots were monitoring guard. At the very least Aircraft Y heard that there was something abnormal and managed to find their way to a working frequency in time to avoid a very unsafe situation. The fact that guard was an available option is a lifesaver; and if anything it should be stressed to pilots that monitoring guard often can be the difference in getting a hold of pilots and keeping the National Airspace System safe.

TRACON Controller reported that their frequency stopped working for several minutes; resulting in a NMAC.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A Cessna 152 called for his IFR release. I read him his clearance to ZZZ; the flight plan I had was from ZZZ1. I had him hold because of traffic at ZZZ1. After the traffic was clear; I released him. I was vectoring a Cessna 172 for an approach at ZZZ. I switched the C172 to advisory frequency and gave a position relief briefing; during my two minute overlap I noticed that the aircraft I released off of ZZZ1 was actually departing ZZZ. I then saw that the C152 had a flight plan off of ZZZ as well. This event has made me much more aware of my strip management; and to be more thorough in checking if someone has two flight plans in the system; also I will probably always have them state what airport they are departing.

TRACON Controller described an unsafe event when releasing an aircraft from an uncontrolled airport only to find two flight plans were filed off different airports and the wrong departure was being considered for the release.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 101; Flight Crew Type 951

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

During descent info ZZZZ; above approximately 10;000 feet; we detected an odor. We were just cleared to slow to 220 knots; and when the power went to idle; the Captain stated he smelled something similar to burning rubber; and asked me to check with the flight attendants in the galley. I called door 1L; and they did not smell any odors; and they verified that they weren't burning anything. As I called them I detected the odor as well. It was initially strong. Enough to get an acrid taste in my mouth. Just as quick as it began; the odor dissipated. Out of an abundance of caution; and to make myself useful; I stood up and checked our luggage and the rest of the cockpit. I checked the floors and vents for any odors and there was none. The Captain asked what I was doing and asked if I checked the luggage. We then focused our attention on the approach. On rollout we briefly detected the odor again. We discussed that we would expect a possible odor then after using the brakes and thrust reversers. After block in; the Captain asked us if we think the odor warranted any additional investigation. We all agreed the next crew should be aware; and a log entry should be entered for tracking purposes. I thought Maintenance should at least check the areas we don't have any access to. When Maintenance arrived; the first thing they asked was if we had any Hazmat. One of the employees in Operations discovered a cargo container with leaking Hazmat. A battery had leaked onto plastic; causing the smell. One of the shipping pallets was broken. We went outside and determined that it indeed was the exact odor. The ground crew unloaded all of the cargo for the inspection of the area around the damaged Hazmat. No traces were discovered. Everyone involved went the extra step to ensure the safety of the outbound aircraft. We stayed an extra couple of hours to help as much as we could.

B767 flight crew reported fumes on flight deck on descent for landing. Post flight Maintenance reported Hazmat cargo spill in cargo compartment.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65.17; Flight Crew Total 13177.93; Flight Crew Type 9048.62

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors; Software and Automation

I believe this aircraft had been parked due to COVID.  Apparently; when pulled out of parking; the FMS database was not updated.  During pre-flight we noticed that revision 'W' and 'X' were available; but revision 'Y' was now current.  I don't know how long this plane has flown without 'Y' database; but it is deferred now.

Air Carrier Captain reported the aircraft database was a few revisions 'out of date' and suspects the aircraft was 'parked' during the pandemic for an extended period of time.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 46; Flight Crew Total 465; Flight Crew Type 153

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 21; Flight Crew Total 590; Flight Crew Type 590

I experienced a near midair collision in the vicinity of Byron Airport (C83) in Byron; California. I was operating a C172 in the right closed traffic pattern for runway 30 at Byron. While in the right downwind abeam the 30 numbers; I initiated my descent for the approach to landing; where I discovered that another aircraft was actually directly underneath my aircraft (the other aircraft was also on downwind; but at an altitude approximately 200 feet below me and slightly ahead of me). I was operating at 1100 feet MSL. I promptly stopped my descent; while keeping the aircraft in sight; maneuvered away from the other aircraft to allow adequate separation before coming in for my landing. During the entire approach; I was able to keep the aircraft in sight. After the landing; I made a full stop and taxi back where I tried to get the full registration of the aircraft. My student told me the registration; but I personally could not confirm this. The aircraft was using call sign 'Aircraft Y' on the CTAF; which I heard myself. The airplane appeared to be a low-wing; single engine propeller plane. The airplane was last seen taxiing to the hangar area at Byron airport; where I elected not to follow them. I was at Byron airport with a student practicing landings in the traffic pattern. We were making regular position reports on the CTAF of 123.05. At the time; there were a significant amount of air traffic in the vicinity of Byron; including glider towing and parachute operations. The CTAF was noticeably congested; particularly with traffic calls from other airports. While I was on right downwind to runway 30; I was aware there was 1 other airplane in the traffic pattern ahead of me; because I had heard their radio calls and could visually see them. At some time; Aircraft Y reported they were on a right base to runway 30. Almost immediately; another aircraft (whose tail number I cannot remember) responded on the CTAF by saying that they were also on right base to runway 30 and asked for Aircraft Y's specific location. I cannot remember the response on the CTAF. At the same time; I did not see a second aircraft on the base leg. A few moments later; I made a radio call announcing that I was on right downwind for runway 30; and almost immediately Aircraft Y responded by announcing that they were also on right downwind for runway 30. I was confused because I was sure I heard that aircraft call on base just a few moments ago. I pitched the nose down to initiate my descent; and visually saw Aircraft Y barely in front of me; about 200 feet below me. I immediately took evasive action. I stopped the descent and navigated my airplane outside of Aircraft Y's flight path to the runway. At the time of the incident; weather was VFR with generally good visibility and ceilings. I had obtained the minute weather at Byron prior to entering the traffic pattern. Winds were calm. I believe the cause of the incident was Aircraft Y's decision to operate at an altitude below the TPA of 1;000 ft. above airport elevation. Additionally; I believe that Aircraft Y's radio call that they were on base was not accurate and led to confusion about the aircraft's actual position.

I was not aware there was a problem until contacted 5 days later I was landing at Byron airport CA (C83). As usual I announced 45 degree to 30 followed by downwind call;base call;final call and clear of runway 30 to taxi. I did hear and monitor other aircraft in the vicinity however no one announced they were in a downwind for 30. I was not informed on the radio before or after said incident nor did anyone inform me at anytime on the radio. I have not been told were he was relative to me so I don't know what the right of way criteria was. Basically the problem I see was a lack of communication on the radio in the traffic pattern on that day. I know I gave often and clear position calls all the way in. Also the lack of information afforded me is another issue as I can't understand the circumstances that I was unaware of.

Flight instructor and student reported a near NMAC while in the traffic pattern at Byron; non-towered Airport.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Training on sector; a C206 advised 10 NM south of the airport; he was low on fuel and requested priority. The trainee told the pilot he would get it and turned the aircraft he was to follow out for new sequence and descended the C206 from 5;000 to 3;000. Trainee then amended the descent to 4;000 due to the traffic ahead. Due to frequency congestion two partial transmissions came from the C206 apparently requesting to be turned towards the airport. Trainee descended the C206 again to 3;000 before realizing a B737 was too close behind at 3;000 and told the C206 to maintain 4;000. Both of these altitude assignments went unanswered. The C206 instead stated something like 'engine at idle and don't know if it will stay running.' Trainee did not respond to the C206; but made 2 other transmissions. I took the frequency when I saw the C206 descending and turned and descended the B737. I assumed the C206 was unable to maintain level flight since he had not acknowledged the clearance to 3;000. I turned the C206 towards the airport and asked if he could make the field. He said he could and had the field in sight. I issued a visual approach clearance and asked his condition. He said everything was operating normal. The pilot of the C206 clearly had issues. From the time he asked for priority due to low fuel until it sounded like he engine was going to quit was less than 5 minutes and 10 flying miles. He should have been able to realize sooner he may be in trouble instead of waiting until it was almost too late.

TRACON Controller providing OJT described a confused 'low fuel' event when inbound general aviation traffic indicated the need to fly toward the airport with all haste. The reporter listed the need for cleared communications between the pilot and ATC would have prevented this incident.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 6000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Company Policy; Procedure

There seem to have been major flight plan transmission errors with this flight.  Accomplished all normal international preflight planning and went to the aircraft with all flight papers in our possession.  The following problems showed up as we progressed through each phase of flight:No PDC at the gate.  Got our clearance via voice. No oceanic clearance via datalink. (Gander/CZQX).  Voice procedures used to obtain clearance.  Controller asked for additional items beyond the usual clearance request items. Cleared via track 'Y'. At 30 West (eastbound); lost ATC datalink.  Checked in with Shanwick Oceanic (EGGX) on HF.  They also required additional flight information beyond the usual clearance items.  Made one position report via voice; due to difficulty signing back on to CPDLC.  On handoff from oceanic to domestic controller (Shannon/EISN) additional information was once again requested.  At this point we received a major reroute from ATC; none of which was on our flight plan.  We queried the controller as to where we would rejoin our planned route of flight.  Her response was; 'I don't know; I do not have your flight plan.  You can ask the next sector.' At this point we contacted Dispatch via satcom.  Dispatcher stated that Dispatch is using a form of shorthand to file flight plans and that sometimes ATC facilities will reject this information in the different format. It would appear that we flew over 6400 NM with a very marginal; almost nonexistent; flight plan.

B777 First Officer describes difficulties with clearances on a flight from the USA to Europe. Initial clearance no PDC; obtained via voice. Oceanic clearance obtained via voice with many additional questions. CPDLC is sporadic and HF position reports are required. Shannon Control asks many additional questions and issues a major reroute without explanation. The Dispatcher indicates they are using a form of shorthand to file flight plans; which may be causing the difficulty.


Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related

I recently completed my CQMV after having it rescheduled twice due to the Coronavirus precautions. I have not flown since mid April and am now on reserve. Since there are so many reserves and so little open flying on my fleet; I don't expect to receive a flying assignment for some time.I am concerned about the possibility of being paired with a First Officer who has been displaced from the left seat; receives one simulator session and two legs with an LCA and is then put on reserve with no requirement to consolidate the training. The very real possibility that both the Captain and the newly minted First Officer will have gone months without flying prior to their trip together. This situation gets even worse when the Captain has been bumped back to the type X Aircraft (which he has flown previously) from another Manufacturer X aircraft; received an abbreviated training event and very little; if any; time in the airplane with a LCA with no requirement to consolidate.It would seem that these scenarios would ring alarm bells on safety management model.How is a flight crew to mitigate the threat that this presents in the very likely event that they are assigned a trip where one or both pilots receive abbreviated training to their displaced position and subsequently go months without flying?

Air carrier Captain reported concerns with lack of flying and the possibility of being paired with a First Officer who has also not flown in months.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

While taxiing Aircraft X after landing; we were directed by ramp control from taxiway bravo northbound to abeam 66 blue line to gate.  Well after starting our turn east to the blue 66 square; a truck drove in front of us southbound on the service road not yielding.  The Captain had to apply brakes to avoid a collision.  Nothing else to add. Ensure ramp personnel comply with traffic procedures.

Air carrier First Officer reported a ramp vehicle on the service road crossing the taxiway did not yield to their aircraft.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Departed on a maintenance ferry flight with a cracked THS Tail Spar in our aircraft; no documentation.  We were informed by a mechanic on arrival that this was the reason for the input of this aircraft to this maintenance facility.  We were never told by anyone...prior to our first block out.  (Coincidentally; the first attempt to takeoff resulted in a rejected takeoff at 60 KIAS for severe aircraft shuddering later attributed to both nose tires being significantly out of round and having to be replaced before we departed).  We had thought this flight to be a routine input for periodic maintenance/inspection.The implications of this event as described are self-explanatory regarding the boxes checked above as causal.Proper documentation and notification to the crew would have been appropriate.  I also think a test flight crew should have been tasked with this flight.

[Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information].

An MD-11 flight crew was alarmed to learn after landing that they had ferried the aircraft to a maintenance base for repair of a 'THS Tail Spar' rather than routine inspections. They had not been advised of the structural discrepancy.


Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

After arriving at the hotel I received an email from [the] Duty Officer informing me that upon post-flight inspection of (the aircraft flown on my last flight) it was discovered that the #1 engine pylon aft mount was discovered missing. This was my first knowledge of the event. Apparently this is a TFOA; (Things Falling From Aircraft). We were not aware of the event until being notified by the Duty Officer.

The Reporter stated that it was only a small panel that came off the pylon; not the engine mount as stated in the report.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

MD-11 flight crew reported that an engine pylon cover was found to be missing after arrival.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 190; Flight Crew Total 17400; Flight Crew Type 2092

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Passing FL350; smooth air; had a moderate jolt from wake turbulence from another aircraft.  Airplane rolled about 25 degrees right then back to the left.  Autopilot was on.  First Officer turned autopilot off to expedite climb toward FL370. Event lasted 2-3 seconds.  Flight Attendant in the back reported that she fell and hit her upper arm on the seat.  She said she was OK; but would ice it when she got a chance.  She continued her duties to ZZZ1.  No medical response required or asked for. Dispatch notified and maintenance report sent. Nearest aircraft about 20 miles away.

On climb out the ride was smooth. Climbing through approximately FL350 up to FL370 several rolling moments occurred both left and right. The autopilot was immediately disengaged and an increased climb rate was initiated. The ride immediately smoothed out and a normal level off occurred. A Flight Attendant in the rear of the aircraft notified us that she made contact with the plane. No other weather events occurred. After discussions with the Captain she noted she was okay to continue the flight. Reports were filed according to the FOM.  The nearest known aircraft was approximately 20 miles ahead and slightly higher.

B767 flight crew reported a minor injury to a Flight Attendant occurred during a wake turbulence event at FL350.


Beechcraft Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

While Holding short for a while at Runway 3 at A9 I received a clearance to line up and wait. I read back the line-up and wait clearance and taxied on to the runway. As I taxied on to the runway I somehow got the idea that I was cleared for take off; instead of line-up and wait. At the same time; a Boeing 767 was being cleared to cross the runway. When I aligned myself with the runway; I did see the Boeing 767 near the runway; but assumed it was holding short. I set take-off power and started the take-off roll. I still had visual contact with the Boeing 767 and saw that it was not holding short; but that it was crossing the runway. I aborted the take-off and notified the tower. The tower replied by saying that I was cleared to line-up and wait rather than take-off. I vacated the runway at A8 and contacted ground.

A Student Pilot in an single engine Beechcraft rejected a takeoff when he spotted a B-767 cross the runway downfield. He had been cleared to line up and wait but thought he had been cleared for takeoff.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Climbing out of ZZZ; RWY XXR on the departure we were given vectors to avoid local weather. We were in light chop and almost moderate rain passing about 12000 ft. when we were struck by lightning just outside the FOs (First Officer's) side window accompanied by a white flash and a very loud boom. We requested a level off at 15000 ft. to assess our condition and were VMC almost immediately. We followed the QRC procedures and determined that all systems were operating normally so we continued to ZZZ1. Upon landing we conducted a post flight inspection and observed an apparent contact point over the R1 door and some dislodging of the decals at the base of the vertical stabilizer. Almost immediately after the strike the FAs (Flight Attendants) were calling about it as it was heard and seen throughout the cabin. FAs reported the deployment of O2 masks in the forward galley and the FWD lav. They also reported that several (all) of the lens caps for the lights/signs in the FWD galley and Entry way had been blown off. These were reseated without any further problems.

Air carrier Captain reported lighting strike during climb; resulting in internal and external damage.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 36; Flight Crew Total 2085; Flight Crew Type 165

Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

I departed in a L39C Albatross after a weekend of flight training including an FAA part 61.58 check ride. All systems including pressurization and oxygen were functional and checked during the weekend flights. I filed IFR and flew to ZZZ1; landed and topped off fuel. After one hour I departed ZZZ1 for my home base; on an IFR flight plan. Weather brief was obtained via Foreflight and the NOAA website. While North of ZZZ2 the Controller offered direct and I accepted. Flight was at 15;000. Weather enroute was mixed but predominantly VFR.  East of ZZZ VOR cloud cover increased and I requested 17;000. While flying at 17;000 I noticed that I was focusing very intensely on the gauges; more than usual.  I checked cabin pressure (two separate gauges installed) and both reading just over 12;000 FT. At this point I wondered whether or not my increased focus on the instruments may have been due to hypoxia. I was in VMC but became anxious thinking that my judgment may have been impaired. As I was attaching the oxygen mask to my helmet there was a large cloud build up ahead and I asked for an altitude change (I cannot recall the exact request). The Controller refused; so I cancelled the IFR plan and planned to turn back and stay in VMC to get my oxygen mask on. I was able to attach the mask and maintain VFR as I began a 180 degree turn but I found that it was difficult to breathe. The valve in the mask seemed to be opening for only the first part of each inhalation. I panicked; realizing that I was probably becoming more hypoxic and my oxygen wasn't working. I checked the gauge and noted that the oxygen tank was near full. I considered performing a rapid descent as I was in VMC and I could see the ground from where I was but I could not judge the height of the ceiling at the bottom and was afraid that I may not be able to pull out in time and could impact the ground at high speed.I continued the turn to maintain VFR as I considered my options. I do not recall if I was at 15;000 or 17;000 at the time. I could see clear blue sky above and to my left. At the same time I reached to my left console and flipped on the Emergency O2 switch and oxygen began to flow continuously in my mask. I noticed that my respiratory rate was high and I remember wondering whether or not this was due to hypoxia or panic. I didn't feel much differently; but I had some relief knowing that I was breathing 100% O2. There was a large build up at my 12 o'clock and I knew I needed to stay visual since I had cancelled IFR. I selected full power and climbed to the clear; so that I could maintain VFR and continue to breathe the oxygen. I immediately contacted the Controller that I had cancelled with and said something to the effect of 'I need help...I need a vector to VFR' I cannot recall exactly what I said; I remember thinking that I was babbling a bit which I thought was odd since I am usually concise in my radio calls. The Controller was calm and immediately helpful. Just hearing his voice calmed me even more. He gave me a squawk code and said 'Squawk WXYZ when able.' The words 'when able' made me think that I must have sounded desperate in my radio call. I did manage to dial in the code and to maintain the heading he suggested and within about ten minutes I was at the shoreline and had a clear view to the airport. I then did a circling descent and landed; breathing 100% O2 the whole time except when I had to lift the mask to speak into the boom mic.About one hour later I departed with the intent of flying South along the shoreline to my original destination. As I was taxiing the Tower Controller informed me that Center wanted me to call a number when I landed and I wrote the number on my knee board. Just off the coast I contacted Center for flight following and the Controller told me that he had a message for me. I told him that I had the message and I read the number back to him. He then said that his Supervisor was 'standing by' and insisted that he read the message to me again. As I took the message for the second time I realized that my mind was racing wondering why he insisted on giving me the same message twice. It was then that I realized I was still not thinking as clearly as usual and that taking off for the second flight was a bad idea; so I told the Controller to cancel flight following as I planned to turn around and head back for landing. I contacted the Tower and made an easy landing and spent the night in a hotel. Much of what had transpired began to make more sense as I mentally reviewed the events that had occurred later that night and the next morning.Facts:I did not 'declare an emergency' even though an emergency clearly existed. I did manage to maintain flight in VMC at all times after I cancelled the flight plan. I realized that I needed to get oxygen as soon as possible and I was able to do so despite the regulator malfunction by using the Emergency bypass switch. I did ask for help once I knew that I was addressing the hypoxia by breathing 100% O2. I suspected that my judgment was impaired; but I continued to work to solve each problem as it arose. The decision to take off the second time was very poor judgment as I was not really back to my normal mental clarity but did not realize this at the time.Corrective action:I have contacted my Mechanic and will not fly the plane above 10;000 FT until the pressurization and normal oxygen mask functions are evaluated and fixed. From now on I will always test and attach my oxygen mask to one side of my helmet when flying above 10;000 FT so that I can don the mask quickly if necessary.Lessons:I should have declared an emergency immediately upon suspecting that I was becoming/was hypoxic instead of believing that I could solve the problem myself. I will continue to concentrate on recurrent training as I realized later how important it was that I had done these things in my training. I am sure that training is the reason I knew to check the gauges; don the mask; and use the bypass switch.

L39 pilot reports possible hypoxia at 17;000 FT after noting that cockpit altitude is 12;000 FT. The oxygen mask is donned but does not appear to function normally. Emergency is selected and with good oxygen flow the reporter elects to divert to a suitable airport. After an hour on the ground he elects to depart again only to decide airborne that the best course of action is to return and spend the night.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft

[We] were repositioning to BVY. The weather was overcast 500' with adequate visibility. The approach in use at BVY was RNAV 34. Shortly after passing WUSUP (the FAF) inbound; the aircraft GPS lost all signal and we consequently executed a missed approach. Upon being handed off to Boston Approach; we were vectored to LWM VOR. During this time; I pulled up the GPS Status page to see that the unit wasn't communicating with any satellites. After approximately five minutes at 3000 feet; the unit started to receive signals and it came back online. After assuring we had RAIM [Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring] a second time; we decided to try the approach again and encountered the same problem. For our third approach; we attempted the LOC 16 because I thought there was either a signal issue or something wrong with our GPS. We were unable to complete the approach due to low ceilings. After executing the missed approach for the LOC 16; I decided to return the aircraft to base unable to get into BVY and unaware of the GPS's issue. During these approaches; I did inquire to Tower about the GPS signal loss and asked if there were any other reports of a similar issue. Towers response was that we were the first to attempt the approach for the day. It wasn't until swapping airplanes that I learned of the GPS signal issues in the area. There were no NOTAMs to this effect. It should also be noted that after swapping airplanes; we did return to BVY and flew the RNAV 16 approach without issue. However; as we were exiting Runway 16 at Taxiway A; the GPS lost all signal.

PC12 Captain experiences the loss of GPS signal; inside the FAF; on two consecutive RNAV 34 approaches to BVY and the flight returns to the departure airport. Although no NOTAMs were in effect; the reporter learned of GPS signal issues in the area.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

After initiating descent in 'VNAV' using Descend Now function; out of FL390 the aircraft began to accelerate passing FL340. Speed was pulled to flight detent stopping acceleration at Mach .80 momentarily. The aircraft then rapidly accelerated to Mach .83 triggering the clacker. I disconnected autopilot and pitched to slow aircraft. Mach .78/290 [kts.] was pre-selected in descent profile. Descent winds were pre-programmed with a healthy tailwind margin. At time of the overspeed there was less than a ten knot tailwind component. This is a 737MAX aircraft. At the time of initial acceleration we were in VNAV; on speed; and on profile. At the time of overspeed we actually dipped below glide path before I disconnected the autopilot. Unknown cause. Suggest trend analysis and software evaluation to solve aircraft prioritizing glide path over airspeed limitations in VNAV descent mode.

B737 MAX pilot reported speed deviations during autopilot-controlled descent.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather

Takeoff was delayed due to a weather cell approaching the airport. There was light rain. One aircraft had just executed a go-around due to glideslope issues. We waited until several aircraft had landed with no reports of windshear and an Airbus in front of us finally took off after a several minute delay. We were comfortable that this many aircraft had taken off with no issue and noted that the cell looked very small and there was only a light wind. During takeoff roll at around 60 KTS Tower announced a windshear alert. It was for Runway 11 but before I recognized that it was the other runway I elected to abort since we were still in the low speed regime. We taxied clear of the runway; ran the QRC and appropriate checklists; and taxied back for a second departure. Several aircraft departed without event while we were waiting after our first aborted takeoff. On the second takeoff; Tower once again announced a windshear alert. However this time we were in the high speed regime in a heavy airplane and I did not see any signs of windshear on the airspeed indicator. We elected to continue the takeoff and it was uneventful.In hindsight we could have delayed the second takeoff attempt; however many aircraft had departed in the time between our first abort and our takeoff. There was no way we could have predicted two windshear alerts from the Tower; one on each takeoff attempt. In the future I might be even more cautious departing when there are small buildups in the airport area; even though this would mean I would be the only aircraft delaying departure while dozens of aircraft depart successfully.

An EMB-145 flight crew rejected their first takeoff attempt when the Tower announced a windshear alert warning. After a delay and several subsequent departures by other aircraft they were once again cleared for takeoff and; once again; the Tower announced a windshear alert. This time they were already in the high speed regime and continued the takeoff which was uneventful.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

On short final to RWY 30 at WHP I had a near-miss with a drone traveling in opposite direction; directly on RWY centerline and glide path. Drone was multi-rotor; black; with a headlight. Did not have time for evasive action and evasive action would have been limited due to low AGL altitude and low airspeed. Reported it to tower.

A single engine aircraft pilot on short final to WHP Runway 30 reported a near miss with a UAV.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 350; Flight Crew Type 10

Confusion; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Shortly after takeoff at around 2;000 ft. the right wing tip tank ran out of fuel. The engine then quit. I tried the fuel pump magnetos mixture and throttle. I then squawked 7700 and advised ATC on 121.5. TRACON then contacted me on 121.5 with vectors back to my departure airport and I told them I was unable and landing on the beach. Shortly after that it occurred to me to switch the fuel tanks so I did and what felt like about 30 seconds later the engine roared back to life. I then climbed and proceeded direct to my destination and informed the controller of what I was doing. I landed safely and talked to the police and fire department that was already waiting for us on the ground.I think the contributing factors are earlier in the day was my first time flying this aircraft type in over a year. Another contributing factor is most of my recent time is in an aircraft which does not require fuel tank switching. And the last contributing factor in my opinion is that the fuel gauges were not lit. I believe if they were lit I would have seen them in my scan and noticed the low fuel in the right tip tank before it ran out.

Pilot reported that forgetting to switch fuel tanks resulted in a momentary loss of engine power; which was restored shortly after switching tanks.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

We [aircraft X] and Aircraft Y landed on Runway 09R; the only runway open at the time.  Aircraft Y was the first aircraft. We both took a long time to taxi across the field to our ramp. Four frequency changes; giving way to aircraft being towed to gates; etc. When we were both holding short of runway 08L; at taxiway Delta; we had to wait for a landing 737; who just landed on 08L. That runway was just opened. The flight taxied off runway 08L at B10; and was directed to taxi north on B taxiway; and hold short of taxiway Delta; where both of us were holding short of the runway. We could see on TCAS that there was another aircraft on final for 08L; and it wasn't far away. Before Aircraft Z landed; the tower controller told Aircraft Y 'We'll get you across shortly'. The tower controller; I'm sure feeling pressure because of the gridlock situation he had created (B737 had nowhere it could go); cleared Aircraft Y to cross 08L; telling him to 'expedite; traffic on a 2-mile final'. We could see on TCAS that when the landing traffic was at 300 feet AGL; [second aircraft] was still crossing the runway. And he did expedite. Seconds later; we could see Aircraft Z break out of the weather over the overrun. Remember; this was a 100 foot ceiling.I asked for a phone number to call after we blocked in. I spoke with a [person] in the tower who 'just came on duty'; and said he'd look into the incident and call me back. I gave my number. To this point; no call back. He did say that they weren't going to open runway 08L until [later]; but 'they opened the runway early'.  This was dangerous and completely avoidable. The last two nights; we've landed on 09R and noticed no construction or people or vehicles of any kind on runway 08L. I realize there are many factors at play on which runways to have open during the night hours. But you know that you're going to have [multiple carriers] landing; which 08L is very convenient. Why create a situation like this; and then exacerbate it by opening the 'convenient' runway AFTER we've landed on the opposite side of the airport; so a dangerous situation is created? We taxied through 4 frequency changes; waited for aircraft being towed; held at numerous points...all in low visibility & rain; to then have to wait for traffic on the runway we should've landed on 15 minutes earlier. The potential runway incursion situation was not safe at all. The inefficiency of this is another matter. We incurred a 10 minute taxi delay.  Not being smart as to which runway to open; creating traffic congestion; and then using unsafe procedures to try to alleviate the situation.Think ahead as to who will be using your airport when; and make smarter decisions as to which runways you have open to make your operation as safe as possible.

A widebody air carrier Captain reported what he felt was unsafe arrival spacing by ATC at ATL.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 103; Flight Crew Total 3272; Flight Crew Type 1950

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Holding short of runway 30L at taxiway B; my takeoff clearance was 'back taxi to taxiway Alpha for wake separation; cleared for takeoff 30L'. There was a 737 departing immediately ahead of me; apparently also on the TECKY3 SID.After climbing up and around on the TECKY3; level at 5000 feet per the procedure; autopilot engaged in altitude hold mode; speed of 200 knots (under a Class B shelf) and just as NORCAL gave me a climb instruction; the plane entered an uncommanded sudden drop of 400 feet; at a rate of 1200fpm. I disconnected the autopilot and began the climb just as NORCAL advised me that I appeared to be descending.Even with thoughtful wake separation on the initial takeoff sequencing; precisely following a larger aircraft on the same lateral and vertical routing; at the same speeds; can lead to some surprises.

C25B pilot reported encountering wake turbulence climbing out of SJC in trail of a B737.


Final Approach; Initial Approach; Landing

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 198; Flight Crew Type 5684

On approach; flaps moved normally to position 15.  When we attempted to select flaps 30; flaps stayed at position 15.  We reselected 15 and then reattempted to select a higher flap setting.  The flaps stayed at position 15.We briefly discussed a go-around but decided the best course of action was to land as the airplane was stable and in an approved landing configuration.  We were familiar with landing distances from our training and knew that 10;800 feet of dry runway was adequate.I used emergency authority to reselect flaps 15; set flaps 15 ref and target speed; and to set the flap inhibit switch to inhibit.We landed normally and wrote the airplane up on arrival at the gate.

B737 Captain reported continuing approach to a normal landing after noting trailing edge flaps would not extend beyond position 15.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

While en route to ZZZ airport about 30 minutes out from the field. I was in IMC at 9000' and picking up light to moderate ice. There was an AIRMET for MOD ICE in the entire state and conditions were causing a large inversion in the region. During the flight from about 1000' AGL [after] departing through all altitude used during cruise light to moderate icing conditions were present producing clear/mixed ice. I first detected the problem when the windshield started to gather ice at an alarming rate. I looked down at the annunciation panel and the WINDSHIELD annunciation would not illuminate during cycles. Upon inspection of the panel the switch breaker had not tripped but further inspection revealed the system circuit breaker had 'popped.' I immediately grabbed the QRH as I knew there was a page for this abnormality. I referenced the QRH and read all safety box items. At that moment I contacted Center and told them my intentions. In compliance with the QRH I requested a higher altitude for warmer air above due to the inversion requesting 11000'. I contacted [Dispatch] and advised them of the situation. Based on the rapidly improving conditions and the proximity to ZZZ airport [x<20min] I elected my intentions to land at ZZZ airport. The QRH called for reset of the system circuit breaker which I did after approx 5min; greater than the suggested x>3min. This time the WINDSHIELD annunciation remained on for an abnormal amount of time not turning off until I heard the system circuit breaker 'pop.' At this point both Chief Pilots advised me to cover up one of the defrost vents to direct airflow onto the pilot window and brief me on the situation; which helped drastically clearing off more than 80% of the ice on the windshield. I advised ZZZ station and [Dispatch] of the emergency and the scrambling of emergency response vehicles for safety of the flight. When I had complied with ATC and QRH was complete I communicated with my passengers about the situation and to expect emergency vehicles in the airport environment. About 5 minutes from the IAP for runway favoring wind I was advised by Center that emergency vehicles were still en route and if available to hold if possible. I advised ATC of my souls on board and fuel available 02:23 FOB (Fuel on Board) that I was no longer taking on any more ice I was unable to climb maintain 11000' due to icing conditions and performance limitations in moderate icing I maintained '10000' wrong way;' with autopilot disengaged due to icing conditions. I wrote and read back clearance to hold at the IAF. I was notified by [Airport Operations] moment later that all vehicles had arrived and I requested to continue approach as I flew over the IAF as to reduce time in icing conditions that I had reentered. I elected to fly the approach up to the IF at 1500 FPM in an attempt to reduce ice exposure as I descended through a layer of icing and light snow. 2 miles prior to the FAF I stabilized the aircraft and continued with normal IFR stabilized approach only deviating to deploy initial flaps of 15 degrees and gear at greater than company policy but slower then Cessna manufacturing deployment limitations for both gear and flaps 15 degrees. I continued stabilized IFR approach until field in site and communicated frequently with ZZZ on declaring aircraft identification. With field in sight the field looked to be unplowed and hard to identify the runway itself so I made sure lights were on 7 click intensity inside FAF and used lights for reference of runway.  I elected to fly all speeds for approach 5-10kts fast due to moderate ice accumulation on airframe. On touchdown the aircraft drifted and I elected to not apply brakes until we had mostly decelerated due to MEDIUM-POOR braking action on the runway surface. Upon exciting the runway surface I continued taxi to stop at marshallers signal and debriefed passengers and asked if everyone was ok and needed any medical assistance. All passengers said they were OK. After deplaning I communicated with [Operations Control; Maintenance Control]; ARFF (Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting); [The airport manager]; and pax. I elected to write the aircraft up for a windshield Anti Ice system circuit breaker 'pop;' during flight. I spoke with the [Chief Pilot] post flight and elected to end flying for the day due to stressful situation in compliance with the IMSAFE checklist.  An electrical failure of the system causing the windshield to overheat causing the system breaker to 'pop' during flight. Try and request an altitude out of icing conditions earlier when a failure is detected in icing conditions.

C402 pilot reported a failure of the windshield anti-ice system in icing conditions.


Workload; Physiological - Other; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

On descent into our destination; cabin notified flight crew of smell/odor in the cabin. Flight crew did not notice at the time any odor. Captain asked the cabin crew for specific details concerning the odor so he could notify Maintenance on arrival. Captain notified Maintenance Control (MOC) through early alert; and we landed without incident. On arrival at the gate; we did notice an odor and the Captain then proceeded to write it up. I then left the aircraft as the Captain was finishing the paperwork; and told the oncoming First Officer about the incident. While waiting for the van and Captain curbside; I was called from Dispatch (OCC) to ask the Captain to call MOC; and told them he wasn't there yet; but I would. I notified him to call MOC; he said he would. Then during the van ride I called Crew Scheduling to see about a later DH; and once again I was asked to have the Captain call MOC. I told the individual that we were in the van with civilians and it might be better to talk to the Captain at the hotel instead of in front of the flying public. I then passed on the second request to the Captain and he said he would call them at the hotel.

A320 flight attendants reported an odor during descent for landing which the flight crew also detected after parking at the gate; resulting in a maintenance log entry.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 360

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 23000; Flight Crew Type 1800

Catering truck incurred on Taxiway Bravo during our taxi to Runway 10L. We had to perform a max stop in order not to hit him.

[Catering] vehicle went well past stop point; and incurred into an active taxiway safety zone. We had to do a max effort stop to prevent our #2 engine from hitting his cab.

B-777 crew performed a max effort stop while taxiing in order to avoid a catering truck.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Equipment / Tooling; Staffing; Human Factors; Company Policy

Workload.  Planned daily in 8 hours.   Our workload sheet reflects a time that is generally 45 minutes before the calculation time of the release.  This is the case domestically.  I worked desk XX in the office and the following list is the times my worksheet reflected that I was within 45 minutes of the flight plan being calculated.  XA59; XB00; XB00; XB00; XB00; XB05; XB40; XC00; XC00; XC10; XC11; XC20; XC25; XC25; XC40; XD05; XD42; XD45; XE05; XE10; XE10; XE28; XE55; XF05; XF06; XF10; XF10; XF20; XF45; XF50; XF00; XG10; XG30; XG30; XG45; XG55; XH18; XH39; HI00; HI00; HI45.This safety report is concerning workload.  The job of a dispatcher is not data entry.  Looking at that list of times does not give a single opportunity to breath for a moment.  I was also given 2 [maintenance check flights] flights which can eat up considerable time conferencing the crews and keeping up on the ETD;s.  There was severe turbulence reports across the plains states as well as moderate reports across the entire country.  We receive hundreds of messages in a given 8 hour shift to sift thru.  There were atc reroutes.  SFO had heavy rain and winds with a flow program.   SNA had rain in the forecast which causes a landing weight issue if wet.  LAX had a chance of thunderstorms and rain that was moving into the area.  There were sigmets constantly being updated.   DFW had storms possible in the forecast.  [My Air Carriers] dispatchers work more than 1 fleet type which means more things to keep up with as they are all different with each having their own unique characteristics.  Looking at the list of times above there is not one moment to look away and gather ones thoughts on a good day.  There are very rare perfect days.  If you happen to have one; the list of release times above are still too much and that is without mentioning the city pairs that are being worked.  Phone calls; radio calls keep you busy.  I didn't even mention that instead of the 42 releases assigned to the desk that day I probably did them all 2 to 3 times as changes in the chop and weather forecasts was constantly changing.  There are many other things that come up that one has to address. I listed just a few of them on that given day.  The dispatch floor needs more desks in the domestic and international divisions.  Instead of opening these desks and covering them however they need to; the management team does not seem to want to address the workload issue until the dispatchers [of my Air Carrier] are integrated in with the [merger company] dispatchers.

Air Carrier Dispatcher mentioned workload exceeds available resources to safely dispatch and monitor flights.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Filed for PHLBO arrival into EWR. Kept getting FMC complaints about steep descent after DQO. Used to getting complaints after SOMTO; but not DQO? Anyway; tried adding some various speed restriction to DQO and SOMTO to see if it would stop the reoccurring message. Normally fixes SOMTO. In this case no speeds seemed to satisfy the FMC; so settled back to what I would normally use for speeds of 300 at DQO and 270 at SOMTO; and accepted FMC repeatedly giving steep descent after DQO message.Both Captain and I were watching automation and very actively calling out FMAs throughout the flight; which probably allowed us to catch the sudden steep descent in reasonable time.We were cleared to descend via the PHLBO and had 8000 altitude set in MCP and in normal VNAV descent. Everything had been fine for two flights on this airplane and was fine on this descent until DQO. I was in descent mode set at 310 knots; I had a slow down to 300 set at DQO as previously mentioned. As we approached DQO DECEL point at what was supposed to be a level off at 20;000; the flight director suddenly went nose down and the aircraft started to dive. The VNAV suddenly switched to what I recall as being over one thousand feet above glide path? The Captain caught the action first and disconnected autopilot. He gave the aircraft back to me and we easily recovered the aircraft to a level off at DQO at roughly 19;200 feet. DQO was supposed to be 200A. The computer suddenly seemed to catch back up and recover a normal VNAV path for the STAR. We reengaged automation while watching closely and continued on the arrival; approach and landing. The next weird part was when we passed MERSR; four points passed DQO; the FMC came back; again; with a steep descent after DQO message.

B737 First Officer reported a malfunctioning coupled auto flight system during approach resulted in an altitude deviation.


Embraer Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Manuals; Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication

We removed the Nose Landing Gear sliding tube; replaced the internal seals; reinstalled same and serviced. After servicing; we performed gear swing for Operational Check; no defects noted and aircraft was returned to service. Upon first flight rotation; landing gear failed to retract and aircraft returned to the field. Maintenance was performed in the Hangar. [Contributing factors] yet to be determined; Nose Landing Gear assembly removed and replaced.

Removed Nose Landing Gear sliding tube; replaced internal seals; reinstalled same and serviced Nose Landing Gear.

Two Mechanics report an Embraer ERJ aircraft returned to field on the first flight after they had removed the Nose Landing Gear sliding tube; replaced internal seals and performed gear swings. The Nose Landing Gear would not retract after takeoff.


People / Populated Areas; Private Property

Flight Crew Total 700; Flight Crew Total (UAS) 7

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fly Away (UAS); Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Aircraft Automated Return to Home (UAS); Aircraft Lost / Unrecoverable (UAS); Aircraft Lost Link (UAS)

Aircraft; Software and Automation; Equipment / Tooling

Loss of signal - return to home initiated - drifted further away - regained controlled - next thing I know it crashes down - lands on building roof - no injuries no damage to property.

Part 107 crew had a lost link with the UAS. After attempting a return to home (RTH) function the Crew was unable to regain control of the UAS which crashed shortly after.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing

I was working the Satellite sector.  I had several aircraft in my airspace on two frequencies and constant shout line communication. I was delivering aircraft to the adjacent sector at even altitudes (correct direction of flight).  ZZZ Tower tagged and coordinated a VFR aircraft with an alternator issue as what I deemed could be a possible emergency; but I was not in communication with the aircraft.  A separate target not tagged indicated 4;000 feet. To prevent a possible conflict I climbed the multiple aircraft I was delivering to 6;000.  This altered the altitude we usually deliver aircraft in that sector.  I received a arrival to ZZZ at 5;000; knowing I would have to separate my arrival from the aircraft with the alternator issue not on frequency I started the aircraft decent earlier than usual. I cleared the ZZZ arrival aircraft to ZZZZZ; the initial approach fix. I descended an arrival aircraft to Runway X based on the lateral course ZZZZZ offered.  The aircraft made a very slow course to ZZZZZ.  Realizing the conflict I issued heading to diverge the courses.  Shoutline; multiple frequencies; workload and reduced staffing all played a role in this error.  With reduced staffing during this pandemic; we are working with less of the manpower we are normally afforded.  While commercial traffic is down general aviation has remained solid.  We need to staff based on the demand.

TRACON Controller reported an airborne conflict and attributed it to staffing levels due to the COVID-19 pandemic.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

We departed Runway XXR in ZZZ. The takeoff roll and initial climb out was normal. Shortly into the climb we heard a loud banging noise and felt the airplane shuttering with the noise. No messages showed up on the ECAM. Engine indications for the number one engine were showing high EGTs and surging indications. Above 1;000 feet AGL we reduced power to idle on the number one engine and the noises stopped. We requested priority with ATC and requested vectors to return to Runway XYC. We shutdown the number one engine and completed all ECAMs. I flew while the CA (Captain) looked at follow ups; notified the FAs (Flight Attendants); the company and prepared for an over weight landing. We made a safe landing on Runway XYC and came to a stop on the runway. CFR (Crash fire Rescue Equipment) inspected the aircraft and told us there was no fire smoke or flames and that the plane looked good. We exited the runway and taxied to  Gate XX and parked without further issue. We had good weather; a great experienced CA; and ATC did a great job of working us right back around for a safe landing. I think our training department gets the credit for these events being successful. Although stressful and startling; the control and safety of the aircraft was never in question thanks to the great training.

I was the Captain on Aircraft X from ZZZ to ZZZ1 on DATE. We had X passengers and Y crew members aboard.  Conditions in ZZZ at the time were CAVU with light and variable winds and departures were being conducted to the north. Takeoff was planned with Config 1 Flex on Runway XXR. I was the PF (Pilot Flying) and we had a normal takeoff. At approximately 2;000 ft. MSL; a loud; constant banging was heard from the left side of the aircraft resembling a jackhammer followed by strong vibrations. No ECAM or other alerts were present; and all engine parameters seemed normal. Both engines were producing normal thrust as I called for a straight out to 3;000 ft. climb with ATC. Upon global assessment; I and FO (First Officer) determined that we were experiencing possible compressor stalls on the #1 engine. I instructed him to slowly reduce to #1 engine to idle as I advanced the #2 to MCT so we could climb now to 4;000 ft. I [requested priority handling] and transferred aircraft control to FO and instructed him to coordinate with ATC for a return to landing in ZZZ Runway XYC. I then proceeded to brief the Flight Attendants on what happened and for them to plan for a precautionary landing with no evacuation in approximately twenty minutes. Next; I made a PA to the passengers stating that we an engine issue and we would be returning to ZZZ and to expect to see safety vehicles inspecting us when we landed. When I returned; FO pointed out that the oil level was 2.5 qts and dropping on the #1 engine. After a brief discussion; we both determined out an abundance of caution that the best course of action would be to shut down the #1 engine and secure it to prevent any further damage. I did this as FO was flying and started the APU. Ran all applicable checklists and did a quick landing data assessment. I assumed PF duties and landed on Runway XYC in ZZZ without incidence and stopped on the runway. After setting the parking brake; I made the PA for the passengers to remain seated. FO coordinated with CFR (Crash Fire Rescue equipment) vehicles for inspection. All clear signal was given by CFR and then I taxied under ships power to the gate in ZZZ.Compressor stall and loss of oil pressure in number one engine.

A319 Flight Crew reported compressor stalls and oil loss on the number one engine and elected to do an in flight shut down on the affected engine and return to the departure airport.


Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

First flight in the morning departing Runway XXR out of ZZZ. We have received a takeoff clearance direct ZZZZZ intersection. On the rollout all engine indication seemed normal as I was asked to 'set thrust'. As soon as we reached a positive rate and gear was in transition mode; we felt a bang associated with a slight shake. 3-5 seconds later we felt louder bangs and ZZZ tower notified us of 'sparks' coming out of our engine. I acknowledged the call and asked the tower to standby as the captain and I were analyzing the situation.The ITT on the right engine showed a high temperature momentarily; but as soon as the captain reduced the power on that engine; the ITT went back to the normal operating range.Leveling off at 3;000 feet; we decided to request priority and return to ZZZ by requesting radar vectors to the longer runway (XXR) anticipating a possible engine failure. Meanwhile we kept monitoring the engine gauges. Everything seemed to be normal and there were no indications of engine damage nor caution/ warning messages; however; we continued with caution to the field.The Captain contacted the flight attendants and they advised him about hearing and feeling the 'bangs' yet no smoke or fire was present in the cabin. The number one priority at the moment for us was to get back and land as soon as possible as we were not sure about the possible external or internal damages that those bangs might have caused. I contacted tower and made sure to have fire trucks waiting for us down the runway. Shortly after landing; we stopped at the runway and asked fire trucks to inspect the engines. There were no signs of damage so we continued to the gate.As of now we are not aware of the exact cause; but we're expecting it to be a mechanical malfunction.

Air Carrier First Officer (PNF) reported engine bangs and the right engine ITT momentarily going to a high reading. All occurred shortly after takeoff. The aircraft returned to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 34; Flight Crew Total 150; Flight Crew Type 80

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

I experienced an in flight loss of power resulting in an off-airport landing in a pasture. The aircraft; a Cessna 182Q; sustained damage secondary to brush in the pasture; but there were no injuries. Prior to takeoff; I performed a pre-flight examination of the plane; including sumping both tanks for fuel irregularities; without identifying any abnormal issues. The plane was filled with 65 gallons of fuel for a flight just over 3 hours that should have used no more than 45 gallons of fuel. Fuel supply was checked prior to takeoff. I left without incident during climb out and established an uneventful cruise at 11;000 FT. My fuel flow at that altitude was stable at 10.5 gallons in cruise. At this point in the flight; I had selected fuel flow from the right tank as the plane tends to draw more fuel from the left tank when the selector is set to both tanks during takeoff/climb. Shortly after handoff from Center to Approach; my fuel flow computer started to show fuel flows that varied between 22 and 35 gallons/hr; although the engine showed no signs of change. I was watching my standard gauges to try and assess if the fuel flow was a broken flow transducer or a real fuel flow issue. I felt; even at a flow of 30 gallons/hr; I should have considerable time to determine the problem prior to needing to land. In working through this problem; I switched my fuel selector valve to the opposite (left) tank without change in the abnormally high fuel flow. I reset the fuel flow computer circuit breaker without change in fuel flow. At approximately 3 minutes after noticing the problem; I lost all engine power when attempting to richen the mixture. At this point; I established an approximately 70 KT descent; notified ATC of my situation and tried to restart the engine. I attempted full throttle; full rich mixture; carb heat; and selected both tanks. Despite turning the magnetos on and off; I could not restart the engine and was forced to land in a pasture after heavy traffic on highway made a road landing too dangerous. I am concerned that my mis-management of the fuel flow problem may have potentially led to the loss of engine power. I am concerned that my manipulation of the fuel tank selector valve; either by accidentally over-rotating the valve to an incorrect setting or by simply limiting fuel flow during a high flow state may have been the precipitating cause of the power failure. If I was to face this situation again; I would opt to land at the nearest airport and troubleshoot the situation on the ground.

C182 pilot lost power and landed in a field after trying to troubleshoot some fuel system anomalies. Unclear whether the aircraft was out of fuel or if operator error caused power loss.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 23

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I was working Local and had cleared Aircraft X to land Runway XX. On approximately; a 1 mile final Aircraft X advised me that they were going around. I asked Aircraft X if they wanted to cancel and stay in the pattern or go back to Center. They said they would cancel and stay in the pattern. I then told Aircraft X 'when able; turn left and make left traffic Runway XX - maintain VFR.' Aircraft X read back 'left traffic; VFR.' Approximately 1/2 mile off the departure end of Runway XX Aircraft X was advised of traffic 4 miles south descending out of 048 and again told them to make left traffic. I look to see what my other traffic was doing then took a quick glance at the radar. All at the same time I went to look for Aircraft X and Aircraft Y out the window while I was issuing instructions to separate the two aircraft because I had noticed that Aircraft X had drifted to the right of the centerline. Almost at the same time both aircraft advised that they were responding to RA's. At this time I said 'Oh CRAP;' although bad timing it was because my glasses fogged up so I could not see anything and not for what was going on out the window. My glasses were fogging up all morning due to my COVID mask.After both aircraft passed each other Aircraft X was given instructions that his altitude was at his discretion and that there was additional traffic 7 miles ahead moving SSW. Aircraft X then started their turn for left traffic and were given a clearance to land when they were at midfield. After landing; Ground Control asked Aircraft X to call the tower so we could collect the information needed to fill out the report.I don't feel that there is a need to change policy or procedures. I do feel there is a need; especially me; to better follow the procedures; SOP's and policies already in place.

Local Controller reported an airborne conflict between two air carriers.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Airport

On very short final approach to Runway 1L at LAS; Crew noticed several strobe lights off the left side of the aircraft coming from the street adjacent to the airport. Strobes were distracting to the Crew. Crew landed normally. Crew notified Dispatch. Crew notified LAS Tower. There was no further incident. Local events need to be aware of factors that affect aircraft safety in the close proximity of air traffic. Distracting factors for off airport events should be mitigated.

An Air Carrier Captain on short final to Runway 1 at Las Vegas reported strobe lights from a street event were a distraction.


Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft X on V25 descended below the MEA and Minimum IFR Altitude due to the downdrafts. At the lowest the aircraft descended to 7200 MSL. The aircraft turned around and headed towards lower terrain. Eventually the pilot cancelled IFR and continued on to his destination.

ZSE ARTCC Controller reported an aircraft encountered downdrafts which pushed the aircraft below the Minimum IFR Altitudes on the airway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 234; Flight Crew Type 6500

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was pilot flying and I had set up a three mile final and a three degree glideslope in the FMC for a visual to Runway XX in VMC. Upon joining final approach I called for gear down and flaps to 15. When the flaps extended we received a brief Gear Warning horn that silenced. I looked as the green gear lights appeared on the console then checked overhead and saw 3 green lights. I continued to configure to flaps 40 and get stabilized. Upon the 500 FT call; we received a GPWS warning of Too Low Gear. It caught my attention and I said that I would go around while beginning to push up the power levers. The Captain pushed in on the gear handle and the warning immediately silenced showing six green lights (three in front and three overhead). He said to continue and land. I saw no indication that the gear was unsafe and continued to a safe landing. We exited the runway and taxied to the gate without further incident.Well; from now on if I determine that a go-around is in order; I will be a little more insistent that we execute the maneuver. The indications in the cockpit in those seconds gave me confidence that the gear was down and locked; so when the Captain said land I followed his instruction. I just felt that my initial decision to commence the go-around would have been more prudent. I also learned to ensure the gear handle is pushed in all the way when selected down.

The First Officer called for landing gear down; flaps 15. I accomplished both then focused outside to confirm our position and landing runway. The warning horn sounded briefly but went out and I responded 'haven't heard that in a -700 before' (that should have been my first clue.) At 500 FT we received a 'too low gear' call. I immediately looked at the gear indicators and handle position. There were three green and three red. I wiggled the handle and the red lights went out. The First Officer and I both looked at the overhead panel to confirm three green indications. On the initial 'too low' the First Officer started to call go-around but the condition was fixed before he finished. I asked if he was OK with our situation and he stated 'yes.' I said continue and we landed with no further issues. I missed the three red lights because I got focused outside on a visual approach to an unfamiliar runway. This is no excuse for missing my cross check; but is simply the reason I was distracted.

When the flight crew of a B737NG received a 'too low gear' EGPWS warning at 500 they pushed in the gear handle and immediately got three (six total) green lights and proceeded with an uneventful landing. Some disagreement surfaced in the reports as to the decision to continue vice go-around.


Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Air Traffic Control Non Radar 8; Air Traffic Control Radar 26; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 3600; Flight Crew Type 1500

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I am a retired ATC specialist and flight instructor. The wind aloft was from the southwest at about 20 knots giving us a ground speed of 115 knots. I was providing instruction to a student in a Cessna 152 and we contacted ZZZ tower to transit the Delta airspace. Our track was 014 degrees to our destination. I had the student advise the tower we would be at 2;500 and passing 1 mile east of the airport. Controller instructed to advise of any altitude changes. As we neared the airport the controller said 'no delay thru the arrival corridor.' I told the student to respond with 'roger.' When we were 1-1/2 miles southeast of the airport the controller said to 'expedite thru the arrival corridor.' I advised the controller we were a C152 and we were doing the best we could. The controller instructed us to turn eastbound for traffic inbound on the RNAV approach. We complied and turned. The controller called traffic to a Falcon jet as a Cessna at 12 o'clock; 4 miles eastbound at 2;500. Realizing the traffic was us; I scanned the sky quickly and spotted the traffic just to the left of our nose. I turned the aircraft to the right and observed the jet climb slightly and pass off our left side very rapidly. I called the traffic in sight and was told to pass behind the traffic before turning northbound. I acknowledged the turn. The controller then advised us to remain eastbound for additional traffic inbound on the RNAV approach 5 miles to our east. I saw the traffic and replied I would not do that and continued northbound to clear the final approach course. I advised that what had just happened was the worst service I'd seen in [over 20 years] of ATC experience. The controller then said I was 'outside of class Delta; frequency change approved.'Appalling does not begin to describe this situation. Although the controller meant to keep us south of the approach path with the eastbound turn; it was a) begun too late to keep lateral separation; b) did not take into account the wind drifting our flight path; and c) had the controller simply allowed us to remain at 2;500 MSL (1;500 AGL) our flight paths would have crossed about 1 mile east of the airport with my aircraft north of the final approach course. Additionally; when the Falcon jet would have been 1 mile east of the airport his altitude would have been around 400-500 AGL (providing for a 3 degree glide path) which would have maintained 1;000 feet of vertical separation when only 500 feet was required between an IFR and VFR aircraft.The poor judgment displayed by this controller was atrocious. Four different actions could have been taken if the controller was worried about separation. 1) A left turn to put us over the airport; 2) leaving us on course; 3) looking for and applying visual separation by either the pilot or controller; or 4) a right turn to keep us south of the approach course. The fourth option; done in a timely manner; would've worked. However; any of the other three would have been better. I have been flying for [over 40] years and that was the closest I've ever been to another aircraft while airborne.

C152 flight instructor reported an airborne conflict with a Falcon jet that was poorly handled by ATC.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 416; Flight Crew Type 5000

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Upon being cleared to line up and wait on Runway 24L at LAX; the Captain and I started a clock to note the time of takeoff roll for a B777 departing just prior to us. When we were cleared for takeoff; we verified a full two minutes had elapsed. The Captain said he would plan to lift off prior to and climb above any remaining wake left by the B777. Winds were light from the southeast and noted. The Captain verified that I agreed we were safe to depart (given the B777 ahead). We took off without incident. Climbing out of approximately 1;800 FT MSL; we suddenly entered remaining wake (assumed from the B777). Nearly full control inputs were required from the Captain to maintain relatively level flight and to reduce our climb rate in order to fly out of the wake. The turbulence lasted approximately ten to fifteen seconds. ATC was notified. The plane and passengers only felt a moderate type of turbulence. While all common sense and procedural items were complied with; perhaps an ATC or pilot requested early turnout after liftoff (to avoid trailing the heavy B777) would be appropriate. I certainly don't intend to allow my aircraft to be in any potential wake path again.

B737-300 First Officer reported encountering wake turbulence from preceding B777 on departure from LAX.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 213; Flight Crew Total 17404; Flight Crew Type 1418

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

While shooting the 09R RNAV approach; ATC directed us to abort the approach and go around for drone activity near the landing runway. We executed the missed approach; entered holding until the airport was clear of the drone activity. Also; during our base turn to final; prior to our go around; we came within 1/2 mile of a Para glider at our same altitude near the VUSAG waypoint.

B777 Captain reported ATC assigned missed approach due to drone activity near the landing runway.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

As I approached the non-towered airport the active runway was 10. Winds were calm. Two other aircraft left the pattern and I remained in closed traffic for Runway 10. On my third landing; which was short field practice; I landed and was about to lift back off when I noticed an aircraft on short final for 28. I had been announcing my intentions for each turn in the pattern on Unicom for all three landings. I had received responses from other pilots in the pattern when I first arrived so I knew my radio was functional. I called to the aircraft on final and got no response; he/she had not made any radio calls. I taxied to the south side of the runway to allow room for them to land because I was not near an exit. The landing aircraft was a small piston single; I'm not sure which make. It had two small vertical stabilizers on the ends of the horizontal stabilizer. They landed and taxied off before we met one another. When the aircraft cleared the active I announced my intentions; took off and departed the pattern for my home airport. We were never closer than 1;000 FT; but had circumstances been slightly different we may have made the news.

Following his third closed circuit landing on Runway 10 at a non-towered airport the pilot of a C152 took precautionary evasive action for an aircraft landing opposite direction; the pilot of which had not followed recommended CTAF communication procedures.


Confusion; Distraction; Physiological - Other; Troubleshooting; Workload

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; General Maintenance Action

On the climb out; no issues presented itself. It wasn't till we passed through FL240; that we noticed the aircraft had an excessive amount of nose up trim. The autopilot was engaged at the time. The aircraft; aside from the trim; acted normally. We chose to level off at FL410; in case we lost the Mach Trim computer. At cruise; the autopilot held the aircraft level; but trim was still full nose up.We tried a numerous amount of trouble shooting and nothing worked. On descent; the autopilot descended the aircraft; but the trim then went full nose down! I pulled back on the yoke so the aircraft wouldn't nose over. This is when the Flight Guidance Computers (FGC) failed due to pilot input overriding autopilot. We went to manual and I had difficulty flying the aircraft with full aft trim. Weather at our destination was around BKN030 and getting worse.Landing was a bit challenging. Fully configured the trim was full nose down. I had to put an excessive amount of back pressure to prevent the aircraft from nosing over. Landing was accomplished safely and the problem was reported to maintenance.

A G-IV crew reported an excessive nose up trim during climb and cruise. During descent; the aircraft trimmed full nose down causing flight computer failure with the pilot's excessive yoke pull. Flying manually in the landing configuration; preventing a nose over was challenging.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Distraction; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Climbing VFR out of ZZZ enroute to ZZZ1 by way of FRETS Intersection; to VPLSR and the Special Flight Rules VFR corridor. Already on with VFR Flight Following on March Approach. Climbing; about to level off at 6;500 feet ; on a flight path towards FRETS which took me north of Lake Elsinore and the glider and parachute drop zones; I saw a skydiver immediately at my 12 o'clock; same altitude; under canopy (full canopy extension). As I saw him aggressively attempt to change direction with his canopy; I simultaneously banked my airplane aggressively to the right; which seemed the only evasive option; while also concerned more parachute jumpers may be above me; drifting down. I successfully avoided the parachute jumper; and saw no others. It was the closest mid-air; aircraft or otherwise; I have encountered. ATC gave me a vector to turn right to a heading of 360 within 90 seconds of the encounter I had with the jumper. I had not relayed anything to ATC. I obliged with the turn; and eventually was given on course heading a couple minutes later. After reviewing my charts countless times and my flight track/path upon landing; I still see I was well clear (I was both north and northeast of both areas) of the published glider and parachute areas.

Small aircraft pilot reported a NMAC with a skydiver.