ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Encountered wake turbulence on visual approach to 23 in CLT. We were cleared down to 4000 ft. to intercept the glide slope at ATELL. We were about 1 dot below GS at assigned altitude of 4000 ft. when the airplane hit wake and rolled right past a 45 degree angle (estimated). My FO was flying; but I immediately clicked off the autopilot and rolled the aircraft level. It took a couple seconds as the aircraft reacted very slowly even with near full deflection back to the left. We advised ATC and continued the approach just above GS.[Caused by] wake from an A321 3 miles ahead of us.[Recommend] better descent clearances to avoid descending wake from interfering with aircraft intercepting GS at lower altitude.

ERJ-145 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence that resulted in a 45 degree roll on approach to CLT 3 miles in trail of an A321.


FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 3

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

I was SIC aboard Aircraft X. We flew the aircraft from ZZZ to EEO. Weather at Meeker; Colorado was VFR (clear with no clouds). I was pilot flying in the left seat. The PIC and I reviewed the EEO Notes prior to departure. Inbound; we requested the RNAV (GPS) RWY 3 instrument approach to practice for a night time arrival. Denver Center cleared us for the approach via the Rifle VOR transition. We briefed and executed the CDFA (Continuous Descent Final Approach) coupled technique . Airport elevation 6;415 FT. DDA was set to 8;210 FT. The CDU displayed a 3.09 degree glide path angle which the FMS/autopilot automatically captured. We discussed the plan view 7;754 FT obstacle depiction inside WAGOK on the final approach course and the profile note regarding 'visual segment - obstacles.' The crew also noted the 10-9 airport diagram runway information ball note 2 indicating that the RWY 3 PAPI did not provide obstruction clearance beyond 2.5 NM from the threshold. All progressed well until PETOY. At PETOY or shortly thereafter; both pilots became concerned with terrain clearance. I disconnected the autopilot and hand flew well above the VNAV generated approach path. The PAPI was acquired approximately 2NM out prior to the 500 FT call for a stable visual approach. The experience was eye opening. Approximately 20 minutes after our arrival at EEO; another [company aircraft] made its approach. On deck; discussions between both crews revealed a very similar experience. I believe that both PICs requested a [company] review of night operations at this airport. I completed simulator recurrent training recently. After completing all required events; I asked our instructor to load the EEO RNAV (GPS) RWY 3 approach into the simulator. Again; we flew the Rifle VOR transition using the coupled CDFA procedure/technique. The instructor confirmed that we set up the simulator flight deck (AP; FMS; VNAV; DDA; automation; etc.) correctly for this approach. When cleared for the simulated approach; the 9;300 FT FAF altitude was placed in the altitude pre-selector. All went well to PETOY. Nearing WAGOK and slightly above 8;720 FT we received a yellow GPWS warning and executed a missed approach. Again; the simulation was eye opening. WAGOK is 7.1 NM from the threshold. The visibility required for CAT C minimums is 3 NM. For obstruction clearance; the PAPI is only available out to 2.5 NM from the threshold. The visual segment of the approach contains obstacles. It seems to me that continuous safe vertical guidance is not assured on this instrument approach...especially at night in mountainous terrain. Our instructor shared a NOAA or government approach plate that depicts a ridge line inside WAGOK. This terrain feature is not portrayed as clearly on our Jeppesen charts. The instructor was also concerned about a safe night time approach. Along with the two [Aircraft X] PICs that operated into EEO on [date]; I now request a review of night mountainous flight operations at EEO. From having actually flown the EEO RNAV (GPS) RWY 3 approach in daylight and practiced it again in the simulator (night simulation); I am very concerned about continued night flight operations at EEO. The issues associated with this approach have caught the attention of three [Aircraft X] PICs and an instructor. This practice seems to fly in the face of the [company] safety first policy. If [company] continues with night flight operations at EEO; I also request additional training on this approach and this airport.

Medium Transport aircraft Captain reported receiving a GPWS terrain caution while on the RNAV (GPS) RWY 3 approach to EEO airport. Charting issues were cited as contributing to the event.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure; Weather

Westbound on NAT D (North Atlantic Track D) at assigned FL390 and assigned mach .82; we experienced moderate turbulence. We slowed from mach .82 to mach .80 to improve the ride. We notified Gander via CPDLC(Controller Pilot Datalink Communications) of the change immediately; and received an acknowledgment shortly after via CPDLC. [A few minutes later]; the ride improved. We accelerated back to assigned mach .82; notified Gander via CPDLC immediately and again received acknowledgment via CPDLC. Shortly after; we received a message via CPDLC; something to the effect of Next time; make request prior to change. No further communication related to this scenario. Flight continued uneventfully to full stop landing.Change in speed was effected to improve the ride in moderate turbulence. If ride and timing permits; notification to ATC should be made in advance of speed change.

A330 First Officer reported moderate turbulence resulted in a speed reduction before making the request with ATC.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Arrived at ZZZ flight operations to find COVID-19 protocols being used and social distancing being encouraged. The same protocols are in place for boarding and riding the crew buses to our aircraft. We are also encouraged to wear masks in the presence of ramp and maintenance personnel when they board the aircraft. We even found a note saying the cockpit had been sanitized at some point. So; the COVID-19 safety protocol chain was intact until we reached the cockpit. What we did not find however; were any alcohol-based wipes with which to clean our headsets or wipe down knobs; levers; seatbelts and other touch points in the cockpit. I know the cockpit was supposedly sanitized; but I am not sure that every touch point; especially the headset microphones; would be adequately cleaned by the cleaning crew. The only wipes on board the aircraft were Sanicoms and M-Zone Screen Wipes. Both of these wipes have been shown to be ineffective against the COVID-19 virus. My question and concern is why weren't there any Purell Hand Sanitizing Alcohol wipes; or something comparable on board our aircraft? When I called the Flight Safety Department to inquire about this issue; I was encourage to go ahead and submit a report to highlight this safety shortcoming.Inadequate sanitary supplies effective against the COVID-19 virus on board the aircraft to wipe the touch point surfaces on the aircraft.Replace the ineffective Sanicom wipes that are part of the cleaning crew's supplies with an adequate supply of Purell or other alcohol-based wipes that are effective against COVID-19.

Air carrier Captain reported having inadequate cleaning supplies to sanitize their cockpit equipment.


Had a RTO (Rejected Takeoff) at 50 kts; got an aural warning for flap mis-configuration; exited the runway; ran checklist; flaps were set to 1; reset to position 8; called MX (maintenance); waited 15 mins and continued with the flight.Flaps were at position 1 not 8.

CRJ900 First Officer reported a rejected takeoff due to incorrect flap setting.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 1200

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On descent the First Officer noticed that the First Officer's Display Select Panel on the center console was installed upside-down. All aspects of the panel worked correctly but due to the upside-down installation; the button to set the decision height was on the top of the panel not the bottom. After discussing this with the Captain; we determined that we would get a visual that night and we felt it was not a safety of flight issue. We continued to ZZZ which was about 15-20 miles away at this time and broke out about 4;500 FT AGL and landed without incident. Once on the ground we called the company's Maintenance Control and wrote it up and they had a Mechanic come out and fix it. The flight to ZZZ is about 30 minutes and involves two VOR's and a heading of 258. Even though it was a visual approach company policy states we have to setup an approach at night. Due to the short flight and marginal use of the panel it was not noticed until setting decision height and finding the knob not in the usual place. Although it was not in the usual place it was fully functional and the approach was set up without any issue. Some reasons why it was not noticed earlier was due to a dark ramp; very little lighting upon the center console of the aircraft; the panel looking almost identical either way it is installed (only three small buttons on top not bottom); the First Officer boarding passengers while the Captain was setting up the flight deck; and lack of use on this flight as it was a short flight on a 258 heading with a straight in approach. Due to the short flight; visual approach; and ZZZ being our destination and closest airport at the time the issue was discovered we determined it was not a safety of flight issue and proceeded with a normal landing and had it fixed by a mechanic prior to the next flight.

BE1900 First Officer discovers his Display Select Panel on the center console was installed upside-down during approach set up. The panel was fully functional and corrected by Maintenance after landing.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

While starting the right engine; the GPU went offline aborting the start. I followed the QRC for abnormal start and secured the engine. I had the ground crew remove the GPU and started the left engine on battery power. After limitation wait time; I started the right engine using generator assist. The right engine started; but the starter would not disengage. I again followed the abnormal start QRC; but while the engine shut down; the starter would not disengage. I used the right engine fire switch to secure the engine.The Encore+ QRC does not have; nor points to the more expanded abnormal start procedure that exists in the QRH. That procedure would have most likely resolved the stuck starter without having to use the engine fire switch. I did not think of this procedure as I was concerned about major damage or even an engine fire with passengers on-board. I suggest that the full engine start malfunction procedure be incorporated in the QRC; or at the very least; the QRC point to the appropriate section in the QRH should the QRC actions not resolve the abnormal start.

CE-560EP Captain reported the right engine starter failed to disengage and the procedure to resolve the issue was not in the QRC.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22; Flight Crew Total 977; Flight Crew Type 880

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Weather; Human Factors

VFR flight returning to home base; which is small private field located under Class C shelf. Before the flight; from about 170 miles away in 'severe clear' VFR conditions; I reviewed the weather conditions along the route of flight and at the destination. Although overcast at the time; it appeared to be lifting and; regardless; had enough ceiling and visibility to likely permit a VFR flight home. During the flight; I was monitoring local weather conditions via on-board weather reporting and ATIS of the Class C airport nearby. Variable scattered; broken; and overcast was evident with the very recent and latest special ATIS from this Class C airport nearby reporting scattered 800; broken 12 thousand. As I approached my home base; under the class C shelf; and under an overcast; it was apparent that while the scattered layer at 800 FT being reported was correct; it appeared that the 12 thousand broken was actually more like 12 hundred broken where I was - just 8 or 9 miles to the west of the Class C airport; and the ceiling appeared lower or lowering ahead - in between me and destination just a few miles ahead. Although instrument rated; I was on a VFR flight; and not on a flight plan. Not wanting to chance a VFR into IMC incident; I elected to turn west; away from both my airport and the Class C airport; and climb through a 'hole' to clear VFR conditions above. As I climbed and turned; I came very close to the floor (2;800 FT) of the Class C airspace as I reached the 10 mile Class C ring. I continued the climb to 4;500 FT and then 5;500 FT as I turned back easterly and contacted ATC and obtained a pop up clearance into the Class C (my home base has no instrument approaches). We did the approach; broke through the clouds; and changed the landing clearance to a low approach and proceeded under visual flight rules and without incident to a landing at my home base 7 miles away. Relying on the 'Broken 12 thousand' being reported just 7 miles away should not have been relied upon. In hindsight; I should have requested the pop up clearance sooner; and certainly before being under the Class C shelf. I will do so in the future.

The reporter is not sure where the ceiling error was introduced or if the forecast had just yet to come true. By the time he reached his home field the ceiling was absent.

C182 pilot reports attempting to return VFR to home field located beneath the Class C ring of a nearby airport with a weather report of 800 scattered and 12;000 broken. Upon nearing destination it appears that the broken layer is actually 1;200 FT requiring an IFR clearance to reach the destination airport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Stores Dangerous Goods shipment - (UN1219; Class 3; flammable; Isopropanol; 3.8 Liters X 4 Pieces); four total pieces at 44lbs gross weight; was sent from ZZZ to ZZZ1 and should have terminated in ZZZ1. ZZZ2 reported that they received one of the four pieces without paperwork; proper manifesting on that flight; and notice to the Captain was not sent to the flight deck. The aircraft for both flights was the same aircraft with tail number.

Airline ground personnel reported undocumented Hazmat transported to subsequent downline station due to not being off loaded at first station.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Aircraft X was issued takeoff clearance with a right turn to 090 degrees. The pilot read back those exact instructions. Upon seeing the aircraft still on runway heading; not commencing the right turn; I repeated the 090 heading and told the pilot to contact departure control. The pilot read back my clearance verbatim. After a few go-arounds; I received a call from departure control to transfer communications of Aircraft X. I knew I did; but tried again to no avail. I called back departure control and told them that I could not raise Aircraft X. Aircraft X was east bound; but far enough to the north that they may have infringed on airspace protecting the Willis and Hancock Towers downtown Chicago. I was informed later in my shift that Aircraft X may have had an airspace/obstruction violation. It appeared that Aircraft X had not initiated the right turn when instructed.The only recommendation that I have is that Pilots comply with ATC clearances when they are issued. If they are unable to do so; advise. If Aircraft X needed more altitude or time for the turn; the pilot needed to inform me. I issued the turn when I did because I knew that aircraft would be clear of that obstruction airspace. Even when I re-issued the turn I was confident the aircraft would have been clear of the airspace. Instead; the pilot turned when they desired and left the frequency; not switching to the assigned frequency causing confusion.

I was giving up the position to another controller. Aircraft X departed MDW and climbed via the SID to 030 on a 090 heading. I went over the traffic and gave the position up. Aircraft X had not checked on and was flying directly toward the Willis Tower a 3300 MVA area. The controller that relieved me called MDW local and asked them to try the aircraft again and climb them to 033 to get them above the MVA. MDW stated that they did not have the aircraft. The other MDW controllers tried the aircraft on their frequencies and the aircraft was tried on guard numerous times. The aircraft flew within .5 miles of the actual tower at 030. This was the second aircraft that session that went NORDO on a 090 heading off of MDW pointed directly into the tower MVA.

MDW Tower and C90 TRACON Controller reported that an aircraft departed MDW and was instructed to turn and contact Departure.  Aircraft did not turn and was not on either frequency.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 240; Flight Crew Type 190

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Forgot to turn on transponder while within the 30 mile radius around Phoenix. Turned on transponder when I noticed it was off.

A small aircraft pilot forgot to turn on their transponder while flying within a 30 mile radius of PHX Class B airspace.


Physiological - Other; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

Human Factors; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related

The aircraft was late arriving. There were fumes and a very strong smell coming out of door 1L from the sanitizing spray while we were standing out on the jetway. The training that all FAs are required to complete; states we must wait at least XX minutes before entering the aircraft after spraying is completed. The agents started boarding while we were still on jetway and the customers told the agents. So the gate agents came down to ask what the problem was and we stated the fumes are too strong for us to board. We were pressured to start boarding as to not cause a delay!

Flight Attendant reported the gate agents tried to board the passengers right after the aircraft was sanitized; disregarding the mandatory wait time.


On a visual approach I had my first officer put the gear down; and called for the before landing checklist. We got 2 green and 1 red light on the gear indicator. The left main was not down; and also felt that the aircraft began to yaw because of it. We cycled the gear 3 times; and got the same indication each time. We then performed the emergency gear extension checklist; but still had the same gear indication. At this point we were about a 4 mile final; and told Tower we are having a gear issue and would like to circle somewhere to see if we can get it down. Right after saying that the left main gear popped down. We continued to land without any other incident.

SA-227AC Captain reported the left main gear finally extended after multiple extension attempts.


Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Company Policy; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

We were scheduled to fly a flight from Osan Air Base (AB). Initially; the first error we discovered with our FMC database and Jeppesen charts was that the Osan AB runways were not marked correctly with the airbase. Osan AB is constructing a new; parallel runway to their existing Runway 09/27. The construction has progressed to the point that Osan AB is now marking the existing runway as 09R/27L; and giving taxi; takeoff; and landing clearances as such. The FMC database and the paper Jeppesen do not reflect this. The Jeppesen charts are dated end of 2014 or earlier. Ironically; the performance data provided via ACARS does reflect the following choices: Runway 09; Runway 09R; Runway 27; and Runway 27L. With this as a background; the second issue (or error with our equipment) occurred.Our flight plan indicated that we were to pick up a jet route just north of the Osan AB; at the EGOBA intersection. Our clearance was for the DRAGGIN 7 Departure to 6;000 feet; expect radar vectors to NORU and flight plan route. You will note that NORU is only a 4 letter navigation fix; locally described and identified; as the SOT 025/015. NORU was certainly in our FMC database. We were initially reluctant to accept the DRAGGIN 7 departure because of the caveat that it required TACAN for transitions; but since the identified transitions were not on our flight plan; we accepted this clearance. Our Jeppesen charts for the DRAGGIN 7 Departure are dated XX/XXXX. It identifies a fix north east of the airport as ENKAS; after the DRGGN fix. We discovered; after takeoff and during our initial radio contact with Osan Departure; that the fix ENKAS was renamed EGOBA! Now we had accepted a clearance with a transition that required a TACAN. After Osan Departure explained the distinction between ENKAS and EGOBA; we entered EGOBA in our FMC and proceeded on our flight plan. There was no deviation of any flight path; no disruption of air traffic or radio traffic during this time at all.Osan AB Ground Control also instructed us to back taxi on Runway 09R due to local fighter aircraft at the end of the taxiway. Runway 09R/27L is only 150 feet wide; and we cannot make a 180 turn within that width. Fortunately; the fighters had moved and we were able to continue down the taxiway to the end of the runway.The crews need more information; as referenced on Jeppesen chart 31-1 as a note: 'refer to DOD/NGA supplementary publications for additional information.' We; the aircrew; did not have access to this information.

The First Officer reported discrepancies between the FMC database and the Jeppesen charts for RKSO.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 3500; Flight Crew Type 160

Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

I had a Carbon Monoxide alert in the cockpit. Initially I descended to 6000 feet and opened the vents. Then got light headed and [notified] Center. Then I got vectors to my divert airport and opened the door and side window for ventilation. I got really light headed with the Carbon Monoxide but was able to fly an ILS and land.

Mooney 20 pilot reported a carbon monoxide alert and becoming lightheaded led to a diversion.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 174.28; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

I was the CA/LCA on the flight.  First leg of trip with new CA student.  I was PF in the right seat; acting as F/O.  On descent into DEN on LAWGR arrival.  Turbulence was forecast for descent to DEN below FL200.  Fasten seat belt sign was on and F/A were briefed about turbulence and completing their duties early.  We were about 1 min from making PA for the FAs to take their jump seats.  DEN Center had cleared us to descend via. Appropriate altitude set in MCP.  Aircraft on autopilot; in LNAV and VNAV Path; 280KTS. In VMC and at approximately FL260; we experienced what we determined to be a wake turbulence event.  The aircraft rolled left and then hard to the right.  Amber caution on PFD and verbal caution 'Roll Authority'.  I disengaged the autopilot; verbalized 'my aircraft' and hand flew roll recovery to stabilize the aircraft.  Whole event lasted less than 5 sec (my estimate).  With aircraft stabilized and continuing on lateral/vertical path; I re-engaged autopilot B.  Other than the hard rolls; turbulence was nothing more than light; if even that.  I asked the CA student to make PA announcement for F/A to take jump seats; which he did.  Less than 5 sec after engaging Autopilot B; we had a 2nd wake turbulence event.  Again; with hard rolls left and right; with 'Roll Authority' cautions.  I disengaged autopilot; verbalized 'my aircraft'; and hand flew the aircraft until stabilized.  Event lasted no more than 5 sec (my estimate).  CA student notified ATC of wake event.  ATC said we were following an A320.  ATC then cleared us to slow to 250kts.  With aircraft stable again; I re-engaged autopilot and then set 250kts in FMC descent page.  A normal descent and landing were then accomplished with no further issues.

B737NG Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on descent into DEN in trail of an A320.


Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Fatigue

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We were holding in position on Runway 18L; the Tower cleared us 'RNAV RIBZZ; cleared for takeoff Runway 18L'. I replied that we had WESTN in our FMS; and the Controller replied that WESTN was for BBKNG1 departure; and we were supposed to be on the BBKNG2. Takeoff clearance was canceled; and we were given instructions to clear the runway and contact Clearance Delivery for a new departure. After clearing the runway we discovered the FMS Nav database to be out of date. With the parking brake set the Captain swapped databases and reloaded the flight plan with the new departure. We verified the waypoints; re-ran the checklists; and departed uneventfully.I was complacent in my departure brief (this was the 4th day in a row of [same airport] out and backs); and didn't verify the BBKNG2 vs. BBKNG1. Very surprised I didn't catch the wrong initial waypoint in the FMS vs. the Commercial Chart EFB. [We] should have been more deliberate in the departure briefing.

Although I did look at the database during the setup; I missed that FEB - MAR was selected vs. MAR - APR.

An MD-10 flight crew had to refuse their takeoff clearance when they discovered they had an out of date FMS active database. After exiting the runway the retrieved and activated the current database and subsequently completed the trip without further incident.


Airport; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Procedure

I have been a controller at PIA for several years and have worked during many snow storms. Over the years we have received many MU readings from the PIA airport operation vehicles. I have learned to be able to look at surface conditions and know what range of MU reading to expect from the vehicle. It seems that no matter how bad the surface conditions of the airport/runways are the MU reading always come back 'All MU's above 40'. I have questioned the numbers with the operation vehicle before and have been answered with 'the equipment is working correctly'. I have also told our management that the MU numbers we are receiving do not fit the conditions at the time. Last night it happened again during a snow storm; an air carrier landed Runway 13 and reported braking action 'fair'. This report was before any snow removal had begun. The airport vehicle did a runway check and gave us MU readings all above 40. I asked for the numbers; they were 42 40 41; with wet snow. A Commercial Aircraft landed Runway 31 and reported braking action 'POOR' after we had received the MU's and brooms had begun working to remove the snow from the runway. Another air carrier also reported braking action on Runway 31 as 'POOR'. The Ops vehicle did a runway and MU check on Runway 4; which had not been touched by any aircraft or vehicle before the check. The MU readings also came back 'All above 40'. I again asked for the numbers and they were 63 70 55 with 'wet snow' on the runways. I believe something (equipment) or someone (training) is not providing PIA air traffic with accurate MU numbers.

PIA Controller voiced concern regarding the accuracy of the MU readings provided by the airport given the observed weather conditions.


Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport; Human Factors

This was the first of three legs planned for the day after an 11 hour layover. I occupied the pilot observer position in the left jumpseat. The crew experienced and responded to a GPWS Terrain warning during approach to OAIX Runway 03 via the ILS procedure track from GINRI (IAF). Departure and cruise were routine and uneventful. I occupied the crew rest bunk until shortly after entering Afghan airspace as I anticipated flying the last leg of the day. The initial descent from Airway M696; approximately point VUSET; was via radar vectors to a location north of OAIX and then a vector toward the southeast. ATC directed 300 KIAS during descent and we were in and out of clouds with occasional moderate turbulence and conditions conducive to icing. Turbulence subsided below FL180. During descent and shortly after being assigned the Southeasterly vector; the pilots asked to fly the ILS Runway 03 procedure from GINRI. This was approved with a clearance to proceed direct to GINRI; descend and maintain at or above 12;500 FT until GINRI; cleared for the approach.Soon after; the pilots asked for relief from the 300 KIAS and that was approved by Approach Control. Around the 16 DME arc intercept point; ATC directed 'final speed.' The pilots had already begun slowing and extending flaps and they continued that effort; ultimately selecting flaps 20 and 155 KIAS. I believe the entire descent had been accomplished with VNAV selected on the MCP but I didn't verify that and did not note the specific VNAV modes indicated on the FMAs of either PFD. After approach clearance was received; the pilot not flying noted aloud the clearance and asked to select a lower altitude on the MCP. The pilot flying responded that he would wait until we were leveled off. I was familiar with the environment; and comfortable with the discussion based on our location; clearance and the mode of vertical automation that I assumed we were in; so I did not lean forward and visually back up the crew's actions during this portion of the approach.I failed to see or hear when; who or exactly how the altitude selector was set to 7;000 but that's where it was when; at a point between GINRI and DAPUB (probably around the BGM 135-140 radial); the GPWS activated with a TERRAIN; TERRAIN; PULL UP warning. The pilot observer in the right jumpseat called 'Go Around.' The pilot flying initiated the GPWS response maneuver by disengaging the Autopilot; raising the pitch and pushing the thrust levers forward. The airplane climbed immediately. The pilot flying didn't disconnect the autothrottles initially and the power came back when he removed his hand. The pilot not flying noted the speed decreasing in the climb and called 'Speed' while he and the pilot flying pushed the thrust levers back up and disconnected the autothrottles. The airplane continued to climb and seemed to recover to an altitude above 12;500 FT expeditiously. At the moment of the warning; the aircraft was in a steady descent. I believe the lowest altitude reached was in the 10;000 - 10;500 FT range. If I had been deliberate enough in leaning forward to monitor the altitude that I could provide accurate details; I probably wouldn't need to write this report. I believe the pilot not flying announced to Bagram Approach that we were climbing due to a GPWS warning and the Controller replied that the Minimum Vectoring Altitude at our location was 11;500 FT; would we like a vector to join the localizer? With around 25 track miles to run; it seemed reasonable to continue for landing. The pilot not flying reset the CDU as necessary. The pilots re-established full automation; complied with ATC vectors and descents; and the airplane was configured for and accomplished a normal approach; landing and block in.Specific to the pilot observer in the left jumpseat: (Background) Since observing anything on the right PFD; the only one visible; is difficult from the left jumpseat due to distance; I've always emphasized backing up the operating pilots by listening to radios and copying clearances and weather so I can quickly interject on interphone to clear up any uncertainty with minimum delay during the critical phases of flight. This is clearly not adequate. 1. While all the complications of flying (speed and altitude control; navigation; configuration; radio calls; traffic; etc.) are being handled by the operating pilots; I should be backing them up very deliberately with basic instrument procedure compliance; i.e. stepping through our progress to each waypoint and the associated minimum altitude; to include verifying actual aircraft altitude. 2. I should be more attentive to backing up the operating pilots on company standard callouts. That is; understandably; one of the first things to suffer when things get busy; so that's a great place for an observer to help. Strict compliance helps prevent an altitude deviation or MCP misconfiguration from occurring without immediate identification and correction. Specific to the pilot crew in general: 1. In this case; I felt that the crew maintained a professional environment and complied with sterile cockpit protocol; but we could probably benefit from being more deliberate about establishing sterile cockpit at 10;000 FT above the ground; which would be 15;000 FT MSL for Bagram; or higher if you consider the terrain we are flying over. Many of us just focus on 10;000 FT MSL regardless of where in the world we're flying. You still aren't going to get ATIS until you are in the descent due to the communications limitations with high terrain; but wrapping up as much as possible above 15;000 MSL would help keep all eyes forward during the approach procedure. 2. I honestly have no idea how the 12;500 FT altitude constraint was deleted during this approach. The flying pilots have not been known; in my experience; to deviate from SOP for manipulating and coordinating MCP changes. I don't know if the altitude selector button was pushed after 7;000 FT was set or whether the pitch mode was changed to FLCH SPD at some point. I do know that they intended to be in VNAV; and that being the case; it would be good to have the VNAV descent page in view on one of the CDUs so that whenever we set approach minimums in the altitude selector; we can immediately verify that the appropriate altitude constraint is still active. Obviously; the selector button should not be pushed after setting a new altitude unless clearing an existing altitude constraint is desired. As a qualified pilot in an observer seat; I have no excuse for allowing this incident to occur. I really don't have a single; all-encompassing revelation to submit that will prevent a similar incident. We obviously did a poor job of avoiding and managing the distractions that could allow all four of us to miss a glaring altitude deviation during the same critical moment. The lesson for me is simply to stay engaged at a higher level when I'm on the flight deck.

Air carrier flight crew on approach selected the incorrect altitude for the existing autoflight mode and the aircraft descended too low in an area of mountainous terrain just south of the airport. The flying crew initiated an escape maneuver following receipt of a GPWS Terrain warning. Of particular note was the reported reminder that the sterile cockpit environment is more appropriately described as 10;000 AGL vice MSL.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 4600

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Prior to an intended flight from POC to ZZZ; I parked at the self-serve fuel pumps to refuel. After chocking and grounding the airplane; I was stung on the wrist by an unseen/unidentified insect. Because I have been stung multiple times on several prior occasions without experiencing any adverse effects; I was not concerned; and fueled the airplane. After securing the fueling islands equipment and retrieving a receipt; I began to feel light-headed as I walked back to the airplane. Almost immediately after that; I began to develop tunnel-vision; so I walked to the empennage in front of the horizontal stabilizer and placed one hand on the empennage and the other hand on the horizontal stabilizer to brace myself. My father was with me; and at this time he noticed I was very pale and asked; 'Are you alright?' I told him; 'Yes; but I have a really big head-rush.' That is the last thing I remember. According to my father; I fell flat on my face so hard the ground shook. I estimate that is was only about 3 or 4 seconds from the onset of light-headedness until loss of consciousness. I estimate that it was about ten (10) minutes from the time I was stung until the moment I was able to discern the light-headedness.Had my system reacted to the sting much faster; and I could have easily passed out while refueling from up on the fuel island's ladder. Had I not decided to purchase fuel at POC I could have easily passed out during taxi; takeoff; or flight. Until this incident; I did not believe I was allergic to anything. It would not have occurred to me that an insect sting could be a safety of flight issue unless the person stung either knew they were allergic; or had never been stung before. I would advise any pilot that does not believe they are allergic to insect stings to delay departure at least half an hour after being stung.

The reporter stated he did not know what kind of insect had stung him. He stated that it took approximately 10 minutes for him to feel the onset of the headrush and light-headedness and not more than 15 seconds after that to experience unconsciousness. He stated that paramedics were called and after initial treatment he was taken to the hospital for further treatment. He stated that medical personnel at the hospital were unable to determine the type of toxin he had experienced.  He did state that medical personnel at the hospital told him that he had suffered anaphylactic shock and that his blood pressure had fallen to 60/40. He stated that if he had been stung and continued at a normal pace without the delay on the ground to refuel; he would have likely been airborne at the time he experienced the head-rush and unconsciousness. He hypothesized that the sting may have come from an Africanized bee with a more potent toxin than he had been exposed to previously. He suggested that this was a safety of flight issue. He also suggested that pilots be informed that if stung by any creature prior to departure; the departure should be delayed by at least 30 minutes to evaluate one's condition.

GA pilot reported being stung by an unseen; unidentified insect while fueling his aircraft at POC. Light-headedness and loss of unconsciousness occurred shortly thereafter and required hospitalization. He recommended at least a 30 minute delay for pilots who may be stung by an insect prior to any departure.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

My company call sign code ABC confuses ATC with another commuter Air code ABD. To whom it may concern; please allow me to share a serious safety concern in regard to our ATC call sign ABC; as it turns out many co-workers including myself experience that Air traffic controllers all throughout the US and Canada have trouble confusing our code ABC with another commuter code ABD (The last digits being different but similarly shaped.) This poses a serious threat to the safety of our airline especially in the heavily congested airspace that we routinely operate. ATC continues to call us Company Y instead of Company X and vice versa. Recently we were taking off from La Guardia; NY where the Tower again cleared us for takeoff using the Company Y call sign. We replied to correct the problem with ATC. However this continues to happen on a daily basis. Recently cruising through an enroute sector a different controller called us by our original call sign. Every Company X pilot replied with the current call sign to be correct and legal. Also Company Y operates out of many of the same airports that we do and they sometimes use the same 4 digit flight number preceded by their code ABD. As a professional that looks out and seriously cares about the safety of all our coworkers; company as well as all those who operate in the same airspace I have the obligation to express this concern. Having previously flown for nearly 12 years at XYZ Airlines before joining ABC; I can testify that when the ABC air call sign was introduced on the frequency at the busiest airports of our nation; not only air traffic controllers were confused but also fellow pilots from other airlines. More than a suggestion I can assure that our old unmistakable call sign never gave anyone confusion on the radio nor visually when we are instructed to follow Company X on a taxi instruction. Pilots of other airlines without a doubt associate ABC with Company X.

Regional jet Captain reported that controllers throughout the US and Canada have trouble communicating; confusing his code ABC with another airline code.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 130; Flight Crew Type 30

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Prop RPM runaway led to blown engine cylinder in flight. Landed safe normal landing on runway at ZZZ.Upon inspection of the aircraft; the cause of the problem seems to be the P5000 oil drain that was installed the morning of the problem. It was clearly struck (presumably by the nose landing gear) and the quick drain was activated and all engine oil evacuated the engine while in flight. This was signed off by a certified A&P Mechanic that same morning as part of an oil change service. It is clear that the gear was NOT swing tested; and there is an existing AD (Airworthiness Directive): 14 CFR Part 39 Amendment 39-4222; AD 81-11-02 R1.I figured this out over the subsequent 48 hours after the landing. It is clear that the mechanic who performed the work was not diligent in checking the ADs or the application of the oil drain for the PA-28R-200.I decided in the afternoon to take a flight later in the same day. The weather looked great with VFR conditions and fairly light winds across the region. I preflighted my aircraft and found all to be in order. I flew to ZZZ. The flight was normal and uneventful and I landed on Runway XX at ZZZ airport. I then preflighted the aircraft for the second leg of the flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 and found all to be in order. I did a normal run-up procedure and subsequently flew to ZZZ1 where I landed on runway YY and parked in front of the main terminal where I could see my aircraft from the on-site barbeque restaurant. The flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 was normal and uneventful.  I planned my return flight to ZZZ. I decided on 3;500 feet for my flight altitude. I preflighted the aircraft and found all to be in order and noted (as my two previous flights that day) 6 quarts of oil indicated on the dipstick. I taxied to the run-up area near Runway 15 and did a run-up with normal results. I made a normal take off from Runway 15; retracted the gear; turned left crosswind; then turned left downwind (for YY) and departed to the southeast. I flew to the south of the ZZZ2 Class C airspace and made my altitude 3;500 [feet].  Conditions were VFR with great visibility and nearly calm winds. I obtained the AWOS for ZZZ noting 'winds calm' and I had the field in sight. I was inside of 10 nm of my destination of ZZZ and was descending from 3;500. I noted no air traffic in the ZZZ airport area per my foreflight ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast) in. At about 7 nm out and 3;000 feet the propeller RPM began climbing sharply well beyond 2;600 RPM. I tried to change the prop and throttle settings to get the prop RPMs back under control and I had no success getting the RPMs out of the red.  This continued for a short time (well under a minute) and I distinctly remember a bang; and then smoke began to fill the cabin. I opened the small window to my left in an attempt to clear the smoke and I continued to fly the plane. I still had electrical power and I still had the airport ZZZ in sight. I decided I would fly the familiar pattern I had flown earlier that day to land on runway XX. I switched the audio panel to transmit on COM2 as I already was monitoring channel 121.50 on my second radio. I then transmitted a mayday call with my tail number; situation of smoke in the cabin; altitude; location just east of ZZZ airport; and my intention to land at ZZZ airport. Coast Guard responded on 121.5 acknowledging my call and confirmed that they had me at 2;000 feet and 5 nm east of ZZZ airport. I continued to fly into the downwind leg for Runway XX. I transmitted again confirming my location; that I had the field in sight and that I should make the field. Out of an abundance of caution I requested that fire and rescue be dispatched to ZZZ airport. I noticed that I was getting partial power from the engine; and I lowered the gear. I flew a normal pattern and landed normally on Runway XX. When I pulled the power to idle upon landing; the engine stopped running. I rolled out and steered the plane safely off the Runway and onto the Taxiway where it finally stopped rolling. I transmitted again on 121.5 informing that 'Arrow XXXXX has landed safely at ZZZ airport with no injuries; repeat no injuries' I also stated that I would be shutting down the radio and exiting the aircraft.  I then opened the door latch; 'Time to get out!'  I turned off the electronics; mags; master; and turned the fuel to OFF and I exited the plane. The smoke I was experiencing in the cockpit was now coming from under the cowling; but was becoming less and less. It was clearly oil that was touching the hot surface and then making smoke. Once several minutes passed and it was clear that there was no danger (smoking had nearly stopped completely); we pushed the plane into a parking spot/tie down on the ramp so the Taxiway would be clear.

PA-28 pilot reported smoke in cockpit on descent following loss of engine oil. Pilot landed safely.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Type 4500

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

At 200 ft. AGL on climbout we entered wake turbulence from the 757 in front of us. The aircraft rolled to the right and we continued to climb just right of course. 0.18 was shown on the MFD. Winds were 150 at 07 and we were LNAV to RONII. Before we could get back on the track; ATC assigned us to heading 070 and stated we were south of our track. In our next radio call we stated what happened and the Controller cleared us to continue the departure. I feel increased separation from 757's would mitigate these occurrences from happening.

B737-700 First Officer reported a track deviation occurred on departure from ATL when the flight crew was distracted by a wake turbulence encounter.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

I had just taken possession of Ground Control with flight data/clearance delivery combined because the FD/CD Controller was on his way home sick. A rescue vehicle called to relocate from the base of the tower over to the west end of the airport. Initially; I told the vehicle to hold short of the crossing runway (Runway 21) as I was busy helping to sign out the controller going home. Runway 21 being active had already been coordinated with me for an inbound landing. After working on the computer I turned to notice the vehicles approaching Runway 21 at Taxiway alpha and forgot why I was holding them there; and told them to cross the runway. I saw that we had an aircraft on final and instructed local to send them around while the vehicles were crossing. He did so and the aircraft circled for Runway 21 and landed safely.I should have been more aware that I stopped that aircraft for a reason. Had I moved back to my working position at ground; I would have seen why and used the placards and info written down in front of me as a reminder to leave them where they were (already holding short of the runway for an inbound).The shift was very short-staffed and I was being used for staffing and relief to support the operation. I was not anticipating losing another body to sick leave on an already short shift.

I called GC to call RWY 3/21 HOT per the TUS SOP. GC was in the middle of a clearance read back from an airliner. I looked over and quietly stated 'Runway 21 HOT' as the pilot was reading his clearance back to GC; GC read back '21 HOT'. Aircraft X was cleared to land on RWY 21 and very short final (2 minutes later) I saw 3 fire trucks crossing RWY 21 at Taxiway A. GC (the supervisor on duty as well) stated out loud 'Send that guy around' and I complied with the instruction; sending him around. Aircraft X landed without incident after one trip around the pattern.I won't state '21 HOT' when someone is listening to a clearance. I will watch vehicles even when not on my frequency; workload permitting.

TUS Ground and Local Controller reported a runway incursion due to Ground Control conducting other  functions as the FLM.  Ground Control crossed vehicles with aircraft on short final due to being distracted.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 2500

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On Climb out from ZZZ enroute to ZZZ1 I noticed traffic on my Ryan TCAD that was approximately 2NM and 2;000 FT above. Since the floor of the Class B in this area is 4000 FT MSL; and the traffic was approximately 5;000 MSL I stopped my climb at 3;500. This gave a separation of 1;500 FT altitude from myself and the traffic reported by TCAD. After the traffic dropped off of the TCAD I resumed a slow climb to 3;900 at which altitude I stopped because I had another 1 or 2 NMs left before clearing the outer boundary of Houston's Class B. I engaged the altitude hold on the autopilot to check the ZZZ2 ATIS and the ZZZ3 ATIS to verify altimeter settings.The reason for the ATIS check was that the other aircraft was showing 1;600 FT higher instead of an 'even' 1;500. Obviously ZZZ2 was using a different altimeter setting that ZZZ.  I looked over after selecting the appropriate frequencies and noticed my altitude was indicating 4;020 FT MSL and that the autopilot had tripped off. I was within 1 NM (still inside) of the Class B boundary and when I reset my altimeter to ZZZ2's reported altimeter. I was then indicating 3;960 FT MSL. I was indicating 4;020 but in fact I was at an actual 3;960.  A check of my other altimeter and TCAD altitude showed 3;900.  I was at all times; outside of the Class B.  I use the recommended Class B flyway altitudes and began my climbout just a little early.I never broke the 4;000 FT floor of the Class B; but I also acknowledge that I should be a little more patient when leaving the recommended flyway altitudes. There was no traffic in my vicinity after clearing the TCAD reported aircraft.  I should have stayed at 3;500 until clearing the Class B boundary.  The most important report that I can give is the fact that the Rockwell Collins APS 80 flight control system gives no aural warning when it disengages by itself.  I have had the same problem with all Collins autopilots I have flown;over the course of my career. APS 80; AP 105; 108; and 106's.  I once was three miles off course in another airplane with an AP 106; while setting up a FMS due to the AP 106 disengaging and since there is no warning; not made aware of it sooner (you can only know by looking at the small annunciators-diffficult to see in daylight).

A SA226 pilot operating under Class B Airspace reported that the Rockwell Collins autopilot disengaged without issuing a warning which almost allowed the aircraft to climb into the Class B as he checked ATIS altimeter.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 62; Flight Crew Total 1789; Flight Crew Type 103

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Departed ZZZ for ZZZ1 for repositioning. After takeoff on initial climb; the terrain alert sounds 'loudly'. 'TERRAIN' 'PULL UP' 'PULL UP'. This was a surprise and a distraction; I was told to climb to 2500/Heading 140. I had the autopilot on and engage and all instruments were reading accurately. However it was disturbing to be in IMC/Dark and getting this type of alert. Flying the Plane first; I was unable to switch to Departure in a timely manner; and dealing with this alert; I passed my altitude and continued climbing; as she keep saying pull up. I was finally able to contact Departure who was aware I was having trouble; as I told Departure Tower-to let them know I was having trouble and unable to call at this moment. Settled level 4000 and still on assigned heading; and all was fine again. No more alerts; until descent into my destination airport. It started again descending through 3000. As I was confident in the instruments I ignored the alerts; but it was still a distraction. After landing; and calling Field Service; we discovered it was not the plane at all! It was my device that had an EFB Garmin Pilot; that was bluetooth to my headset that was giving me the alerts. My lesson: Pilots need to verify that portable EFBs that are bluetooth connected to headsets are properly workings or not turned on. Although I regret passing my assigned altitude; and delaying my contact to Departure. My #1 priority was to fly the plane; and talk later. I was able to do this. I will however; always check my portable EFB and turn it off when not using it. I hope this lesson will help other pilots.

SF50 Pilot reported erroneous terrain alert on departure due to improperly configured portable EFB resulting in altitude clearance deviation.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Workload

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

On the JINGL 4 arrival between JAREM and BEPAC; we were level at 7000 feet. We were given a TA (traffic alert) by our TCAS. I changed the scale to identify the target and discovered that he was within 10 miles at our altitude and coming straight at us. Within a short time atc issued a traffic alert and told us to turn south (right hand turn) and said he was not talking to the other aircraft. Within seconds we received an RA (descend command) and we did; a moment later atc issued a descent to 6000 clearance. As we made a turning descent I looked up and to my left and saw a small twin engine light GA aircraft pass above and beside us off the port side of the aircraft. Once we were clear of the conflict; we were recleared to BEPAC and told to maintain 6000 ft. Had we not reacted; I have no doubt that a collision would have occurred.I believe this occurred mostly because of the other pilots actions. He was cruising west bound at an odd altitude (7000 feet) and evidently flying VFR (not talking to Miami anyway) but not flying VFR altitudes (altitude plus 500 feet). At least he did have a Mode C transponder on and operating.When the FAA and the NTSB investigated and attempted to remedy the high profile collisions between GA aircraft and airliners like [San Diego collision 1978] and [Cerritos DC-9 midair] they redesigned airspace from Terminal control areas to Class B; C and D. I believe the intent of the design was to keep airliners above 10;000 until within 30 miles of the airport and then enter the class B from the top keeping the aircraft protected due to the clearance required to enter the airspace and the positive control over traffic once inside the controlled airspace. Often times today we are forced down early to accommodate ATC and high density airports. FLL is in Class C airspace but is arguable a pretty darn busy Class C based on the number of airline operations and the amount of training and VFR traffic in the area. I know the other solution to potential mid airs is transponders and TCAS but below 10;000 feet transponders are not required in Class E airspace which is what we were operating in at the time of the incident. Had it not been for this guys transponder and our TCAS I'm sure we would have had a collision. I am not an air traffic controller and cannot begin to imagine walking a day in their shoes but I do believe that creating or allowing procedures that put airliners in high density airspace that is not under positive control or at the very least requiring transponders; we are likely gravely endangering the traveling public.

An air carrier pilot at 7;000 FT on the FLL JINGL 4 RNAV Arrival received a TCAS RA descend advisory caused by VFR traffic westbound at 7;000 FT. During the evasion; MIA TRACON issued a descent to 6;000 FT. The reporter saw a light twin pass above to their left.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Person Ground Personnel; Person Other Person

Notification received 2 days after event. [Load Control] received a [Cargo Order] for Flight XXXX. [Cargo Order] stated '2 [priority] shipments showed held off but the 2 were actually loaded on flight by the Ramp.' DSTG (Departure Staging Guide) remarks for pit 4 reflected [priority package] however only 5 bags were contained in the weight field. DG (Dangerous Goods) was held off although it was scanned off by ORD from pit 4. This created a weight error as well as undocumented and unsecured DG issue. On the upside; the DG was RDS and H7E.

Commercial Airline ground personnel reported notification of mishandling of Dangerous Goods shipment which was erroneously loaded on aircraft and incorrectly configured for air shipment.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 32

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

During descent to RAP from southwest we were cleared direct HELTA (IAF ILS 32). Due to heavy precipitation in vicinity on HELTA we were vectored west from it to avoid the weather. After clearing the weather; we were given descend to 7;000 feet with heading of 080 to enter base leg. Once we got closer to final approach we were given heading 350 to intercept localizer; descend and maintain 5;300 feet until established and cleared for the approach.On approximately 11 mile final when capturing LOC at 5;300 feet we received TERRAIN caution and then TERRAIN PULL UP alert. At that point I disconnected autopilot; applied GA thrust and started climb. After clearing the warning CA (Captain) notified ATC about the problem and leveling off at 6;500 feet we were given vector to the west. After engaging autopilot; CA evaluated our fuel situation (over 4;000 lbs fuel remaining) and asked for vectors for another approach. We were given heading approximate 150 and descend to 5;300 feet. During descent we had another EGPWS alert. I disengaged autopilot; applied GA thrust and started immediate climb. CA notified ATC and autopilot was engaged leveling off at safe altitude.We asked for vectors to intercept localizer at higher altitude and closer to HELTA. After intercepting LOC at more than 6;000 feet we were able to intercept GS and continue approach to landing without further incidents.

Air carrier pilot reported receiving a ground proximity warning twice while being vectored for an ILS Approach.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

While enroute to GTF; the CA (Captain) who was PM (Pilot Monitoring) requested direct DATSA with Center in order to set up for RNAV (RNP) Z RWY 21. As we neared DATSA; Approach Control gave us a vector towards the northeast for sequence. After a few minutes we were given a vector towards the southeast and the controller asked if we still wanted the RNAV Z Approach. We said yes.  He gave us a clearance direct to 'DRIFT'. I pushed DTO (Direct To) and used the FMS to fly direct to the fix DRFTR (I thought the controller was simply using a different pronunciation of the same fix). Shortly after; the CA realized that there was another fix on the approach: DRYFT; which was not in our flight plan in the FMS since we had used DATSA as our IAF. He queried the controller who confirmed that he had cleared us to DRYFT. At this point I had the airport in sight and  we requested a visual approach. We were cleared for the Visual to RWY 21 and performed a stable visual approach.The lesson I learned is to listen more carefully to the spelling of the fix the controller is giving us and not just assume it's the fix that sounds close to what he said. I recommend that one of these two fixes DRFTR and DRYFT be changed to something different. These two fixes are close to each other on the approach and the spelling and pronunciations are similar enough to cause confusion.

Air carrier Flight Crew reported two fixes with similar names close together.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Type 200

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Operations reported that we taxied before deice was completed. Deice process underway; First Officer (FO) was communicating with de-ice crew and responded to 'deicing complete' radio call. We both saw a deice truck drive away on the service lane. Multiple deicing events were taking place on same frequency. Performed cross bleed start; called for taxi; cleared left and right; and to follow Company traffic off left.Tower informed us to call Company and return to gate. Company said they needed to re-deice us as it was not complete and that we taxied while deice truck was still spraying. We responded that we acknowledged deicing complete as well as saw a truck drive away. In discussing the incident; the FO and I thought they may have confused tail numbers as the frequency and ramp were very congested. Completed deicing and departed uneventfully. All checklists and FOM/AOM procedures were followed. It is now obvious that we took a similar call sign deicing complete call and assumed that our Crew was clear based on the truck we saw on the service road. Also; the FO cleared the right side for taxi just before the truck came around the corner of the wing. Suggestions for avoiding future miscommunication errors include requiring a visual wave off from Iceman as is required from Pushback Crew and a dedicated frequency per truck so as to avoid other call signs.

Deicing began with 19 minute holdover time. Similar Company tail number communicated with [the de-ice crew] on our frequency and this went unnoticed by Captain and First Officer (FO). Captain communicated to FO concern about duty day. During deice operations; Captain called Scheduling for verification of Crew duty day limitations and FO now had MDW Ground Operations and [the de-ice crew] frequency responsibilities. FO unfamiliar with other Company tail number mistakenly replied for clean aircraft complete; and then switched off or had turned down [the deice] frequency as Captain finished his call with Crew Scheduling. Captain immediately debriefed FO on his call with Scheduling. Captain and FO ensured remainder of checklists are correctly applied as well as non-typical cross bleed start for number two engine (three plus minutes before we moved aircraft). FO communicated with MDW Ground and received ground taxi instructions to 22L. MDW Tower gave initial instructions to position and hold. As we taxi out; Tower told us to clear the runway and contact Ground. Once clear; Ground told us to contact Company operations. Company operations communicates that we almost hit a deice truck. A brief radio discussion occurred and that we were not completely deiced. We complete deice evolution and proceeded to destination.

The flight crew departing MDW inadvertently accepted a 'de-icing complete' transmission intended for another aircraft and had to be recalled prior to takeoff to complete the de-icing process.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 24; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 2500

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

ATC added GIVES waypoint prior to DJB in our flight plan in our PDC. On climb out ATC gave us a right turn direct GIVES. We initiated the right turn and looked for GIVES in our FMS flight plan but could not find it. Asked for the waypoint and ATC gave us the spelling and we continued our right turn direct to GIVES. ATC gave us a phone number and asked us to call on the ground. ATC stated that no deviation or loss of separation occurred. This was my first trip since the transition and first time seeing and using the new PDC format with no training on it. In the section that changed our flight plan it read 'CREW ALERT: ATC CHANGE GIVES DJB.' Being unfamiliar with the new PDC format and the CMH area I read GIVES has a word not a waypoint; i.e. ATC is giving you direct DJB. Speaking with ATC on the ground they told us that they had been seeing this problem a lot when they give GIVES on the departure out of CMH. A change in the name of the waypoint could make it obvious in our PDC's that GIVES is a waypoint and not something else; training or information on new PDC formats before using them could help avoid issues like this as well.

Air Carrier First Officer departing CMH reports receiving a route change via PDC that states 'CREW ALERT: ATC CHANGE GIVES DJB' and does not realize that GIVES is a waypoint.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 99; Flight Crew Type 2941

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 201; Flight Crew Total 5500; Flight Crew Type 1959

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

With one [air carrier] flight going missed and diverting to Gray and several wind shifts and runway changes; we were now on downwind for 35L at Austin. Following another [air carrier] flight; another wind shift occurred and [the airliner] went missed. We then asked for a turn back to the north side of Austin. With the autopilot on and in a left turn; we hit; what at the time we called; severe turbulence. It only lasted about a second. The autopilot and auto throttles kicked off; we lost a few hundred feet and got a bank angle alert. I took control of the aircraft; rolled the wings level and continued heading north. It took a few moments to regain our situational awareness after the jolt we had just experienced. We put the flaps up and got the speed and altitude back under control. All systems and flight controls functioned normally. We [advised ATC] and initially wanted to divert to Gray. We checked with the flight attendants for any injuries and they reported none. After messaging Dispatch; it was decided that the best course of action was to return to ZZZ. I again checked with the flight attendants regarding injuries; still none to report. I made a public address announcement to inform the passengers that we were returning to ZZZ. We made a normal landing and taxi into the gate. At the gate; I again asked the flight attendants if there were any injuries and again; they had none to report. I spoke with Dispatch and [Flight Operations] via phone to fill them in on what happened. I believe it is possible that we encountered a lightning strike and not severe turbulence. I believe that I forgot to tell the flight attendants about [advising ATC] and notifying passengers that emergency safety equipment would be standing by.

As we preflighted the aircraft for AUS; while in ZZZ; we knew there was a small line of weather moving south over AUS. After pushback; the Dispatcher sent a message via ACARS indicating that they were trying to call us on Operations because they wanted to hold us on the ground. That was already our plan and had just contacted Clearance asking about ground stops. Clearance informed us that it would be a 15 minute update. We pushed back as normal; and on time; with the intention to free the gate since the weather appeared to be a non-issue. It was apparent that in less than 20 minutes the weather would all be south of AUS and after a brief hold in the run up pad for [the runway] we would be released to depart. While in the pad; we set brakes and secured both engines. Multiple public address announcements were made by us and the cabin crew. The Captain and I both heavily monitored the weather waiting for it to move south of Austin. As it did; I called Ground and asked for an update. I don't recall exact wording; however; it was basically that multiple aircraft have been released and ground stop was over. They said it's possible enroute delays could occur. We were tankering fuel and had roughly 13;000 pounds.We departed; and stayed low (between 10-12;000 feet). There was an overcast layer of clouds above us with rain. Areas of continuous light and moderate chop for most of the cruise portion. Along the way; we continuously monitored airport weather conditions for AUS. Once we checked on with Austin Approach we heard at least two other aircraft in front of us attempting to land in AUS (landing south). Shortly after; we heard missed approach and break off instructions due to the wind shifting nearly 180 degrees. Now; these other aircraft were discussing vectors to ILS/Visual 35L. We planned the same; but one of the greatest challenges was trying to get a word in with ATC. As the weather moved south of the field we did not want to continue on a long downwind (southbound). It did not look good out the window. We eventually told ATC 'If you're going to vector us around for a while; we want to stay north of the field'. After discussing our options and current weather; the Captain and I decided to follow an [air carrier] flight with vectors to a visual/ILS to Runway 35L. On downwind; at 210 knots (I believe; and Flaps 1) 4;000 feet we experience what I would define severe turbulence and potentially a lightning strike(s). It was violent. The autopilot disconnected; we were in control wheel steering; altitude fluctuated by hundreds of feet as well as airspeed fluctuations. In addition; a moment of high bank angle. The Captain flew the aircraft manually as we turned north and told ATC we needed out of the area immediately. We also determined that we needed to [advise ATC]. We were physically shaken up; unsure of injuries (including ourselves) or damage to the aircraft. Originally; we were going to land immediately; however; the decision to change plans to go to ZZZ became a better option as information about lack of injuries and damage became apparent. We continued to ZZZ; deviated around weather and landed uneventfully. ARFF followed us to [the gate]. Between time of incident and arriving at the gate we made 3 calls to the cabin asking about the condition of the plane and also injuries to anyone. Every time the answer was everyone seems fine and nothing abnormal.

B737 flight crew reported experiencing moderate to severe turbulence and a possible lightning strike during vectors for landing at AUS.


M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

CE750 on the visual approach talking to Tower.  Indicating 180 KT.  M20 on parallel downwind indicating 120 knots. Turned the M20 due north for base to follow the CE750.  Issued traffic then got caught up with oSther duties.  When I looked back the M20 was indicating 180 KTS and the CE750 had slowed to 120 KTS.  I cleared the M20 for the visual approach to the south runway.  M20 did not have the CE750 insight.  I saw the wind was 120@15 figured the turn would slow the M20.  The M20 did not slow.  I issued traffic again but the M20 still did not have the CE750 insight.  I cancelled the M20 approach clearance and broke him out.  I known there was a loss of separation. I miscalculated the winds. I thought they would have helped slow the M20; but I was wrong.  I should have recognized the situation quicker and broke the aircraft out sooner.  Needed to be more proactive than I was.

Tower Controller reports a loss of separation between a CE750 and a M20 during as planned visual approach but with the M20 pilot unable to visually acquire the CE750. The approach speed of the CE750 had decreased 60 KTS and the M20 had increased 60 KTS; which was unexpected.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Aircraft X was landing LAX over Gramm intersection on the RIIVR arrival.  We were Time Based metering to LAX and the controller at R20 issued a speed of 250 knots to follow another aircraft I was working over Konzl.  Aircraft X was about 2;000ft high over Gramm because of the speed reduction.  The controller at Feeder vectored Aircraft X into my airspace; 19; without a point out. The controller vectored Aircraft X past the localizer; which is against the LOA. The feeder controller called R20 and told him he needed the aircraft over Gramm at the Altitudes in the LOA. The FLM for arrivals area at SCT also called our FLM to tell him we need to have the aircraft make their restrictions.  The R20 controller told the feeder controller something like OK or WILCO when the coordination took place.We have been having major problems with Arrivals Area.  This morning we had several unsafe situations because of last minute calls from Feeder to spin aircraft.  We also could not get ahold of them on the line this morning after repeatedly attempting and finally; sector 20 went into holding because of the unsafe situation Feeder was placing us in.  Many controllers are aware that certain crews that work Arrivals area are more jumpy and maybe not as comfortable with high volumes of traffic so we get spun more frequently from that crew.  We attempt to accommodate a 'staggered' flow over KONZL/GRAMM in order to avoid being spun; which is not in the LOA.  I am aware that not all controllers do this; but I feel most controllers would rather try to give approach what they want and not have to spin several aircraft. If a controller at SCT feels that the LOA is not sufficient for flow control or doesn't meet their needs; there are ways to fix this.  This needs to be addressed in another manner; not at the sector.

ZLA controller describes situation where SCT arrival Controller vectors an aircraft into ZLA's airspace without a point out.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

Maximum weight takeoff. TOGA power was applied. Just prior to 80 KTS; there was a very loud bang and the aircraft began to turn left on the runway. As Captain; I rejected the takeoff. ECAM indicated left engine failure. Aircraft behind us reported a large flame had been seen from the left engine; but that had lasted only briefly. Flight Attendant also reported seeing the flame; but no fire visible after we stopped. We were very near the fire station; so we elected to leave the runway and have the fire crew inspect the exterior of the plane. They reported no leaks or other evidence of damage. We informed Dispatch and local Operations and then taxied back to the gate. Maintenance reported that the turbine disks were destroyed. Passengers were deplaned. We were given another aircraft to complete the flight.

An A321 Captain rejected a TOGA power takeoff after the left engine turbine section failed which triggered an ENG 1 FAIL ECAM.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 102; Flight Crew Total 4528; Flight Crew Type 389

Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Upon reaching our cruise altitude of FL240 on this flight the Auto-Pilot disconnected; and the Captain (who was Pilot Flying) noticed that the left generator 'BUS OFF' light was annunciated (indicating that the left generator was not being powered by the left engine). The Captain asked me to refer to the QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) for left 'BUS OFF'; which had us connect the left bus to the operating APU. Shortly thereafter; an 'ELECT' annunciator appeared on recall; and the Captain noticed a 'LOW OIL PRESSURE' annunciator for the left CSD (Constant Speed Drive). The Captain pointed to the left CSD; and asked me to refer to the 'Low Oil Pressure' checklist. At this time; the Captain was contacting our Company Dispatch on SELCAL to inform them of our situation; and whether we should return to our departure airport or continue to our destination.As there are two QRH checklists for 'Low Oil Pressure' (one for low oil pressure related to the Engine; and the second for low oil pressure related to the CSD) I mistakenly referred to the incorrect checklist for low oil pressure in the Engine. This low oil pressure checklist for the Engine called for us to perform a shutdown of the left engine. The Captain advised Center that we will need to return to our departure airport. As we were descending from FL240; and given a heading for our return back the Captain questioned whether we did indeed perform the correct checklist (as it seemed odd that we would need to shut down the engine; based on an electrical issue such as what we had with our left CSD failing). I confirmed that we ran the 'Low Oil Pressure' checklist within the 'Engine' tab; and he immediately stated that 'that was the wrong checklist'. I agreed with him that we had indeed performed the wrong checklist; and that the correct checklist would have been 'GEN DRIVE LOW OIL PRESSURE'.Upon both of us agreeing that the incorrect checklist was performed; the Captain asked for me to refer to the correct checklist of 'GEN DRIVE LOW OIL PRESSURE'. We ran that checklist; which called for us to disconnect the left CSD. Upon completion of that checklist; the Captain called for me to refer to the QRH for restart of the left engine we had shutdown. The restart occurred without incident; and we had both engines operating.The Captain advised ATC that we were indeed able to restart the left engine. We continued our descent in VMC; and performed a normal 2-engine approach to landing. Upon touchdown; and as we taxied off of the Runway; ATC asked if we would need any further assistance; and the Captain declared that we would not. We taxied back to the gate without incident.Upon shutdown at the gate; the Captain and I agreed that there was a lack of communication amongst the two of us in dealing with the situation in-flight. The Captain was indeed pointing at the left CSD when the problem occurred in flight; and I should have not rushed myself into referring to what was the incorrect checklist. We both agreed that we should have been more methodical; and less rushed; into addressing the problem. Fortunately; we were able to determine a mistake had been made in performing the incorrect checklist; and did run the correct checklists once that determination had been made. As well; we were able to restart the engine; and continue the flight without incident.We both learned immensely from this situation that when an abnormal condition arises; that we both need to be more methodical; focus entirely on addressing the situation; and do not become distracted with other; less important tasks.

An aircrew experienced a CSD (Constant Speed Drive) failure and mistakenly used the wrong checklist to remedy the situation.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Normal takeoff and initial climb from Runway XX at ZZZ. In the left turn to the north for our first fix; we received the Caution chime and the 'FUEL CH 1/2 FAIL' message illuminated. It remained on for approximately 10 seconds then went out. We commented 'that was odd' and then it illuminated again with the chime. It cycled this way 2 more times before we got to 5000 feet; and as Pilot Flying I called for the QRH checklist for FUEL CH 1/2 FAIL. Pilot Monitoring read and performed the checklist while I talked with ATC; stopping our climb at 5000 feet (we had been cleared to 10) and getting a vector to stay in the local area while we ran the checklist. The QRH instructed that we land at the nearest suitable airport; and ZZZ was less than 10 miles away so the decision to return was easily made. While Pilot Monitoring was running the QRH; the Caution message returned and remained on throughout the procedure.I advised ATC we would be returning and requested vectors to final for Runway XX; which they provided along with a descent. In the descent; as Pilot Monitoring was finishing the QRH; I made an announcement in the back that we would be returning to the airport for a fuel distribution problem. The Flight Attendant called up and I apologized for not calling her first and gave her the details. (We talked later and I told her she did the right thing).Pilot Monitoring finished the QRH and we monitored fuel; slipping the aircraft as required to try to maintain fuel balance. During our climb to 5000 feet; the fuel had gone from balanced to 300 lbs difference in less than 2 minutes. By the time we finished the checklist; the unbalanced condition had worsened to 500 lbs; and by slipping the aircraft we arrested the imbalance trend. We remarked that we needed to get on the ground. I asked Pilot Monitoring to grab the landing numbers as we turned Final but he had already done so and he bugged the numbers as we contacted Tower and were cleared to land.After finishing the QRH; the status message 'FUEL CH 2 FAIL' appeared and the Caution message disappeared. I slipped the aircraft most of the way down final in order to keep the fuel from becoming more unbalanced. We landed without incident. By the time we landed; the aileron trim was required to be almost to the right wing down limit in order to keep pressure off the yoke. Total time from takeoff to touchdown was less than 15 minutes.We had no time in which to send a message to Dispatch. I recall considering sending a message and asked Pilot Monitoring to do so at one point; but then said something like; 'Never mind that there isn't time we will be on the ground in 1 minute and I'll call them.' If we had been further from the airport by 5 minutes; we would have had time to send a message. However; since we were on a wide downwind when the Caution message appeared and the fuel balance degraded so quickly; it would have been unsafe to delay the landing while sending a message via ACARS. After landing; Pilot Monitoring and I as well as the jump seater all commented that the aircraft was leaning to the heavy side; so it was apparent this was not an indication failure. [The cause was a] Fuel System failure.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ-200 flight crew reported returning to departure airport after takeoff due to a Fuel Channel Fail EICAS messages and being unable to maintain normal fuel balance.


Workload; Time Pressure; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

While on the way to LGA direct ETG; we were given a heading 160 degrees right and told to hold at MIGET on the arrival as published. When the Pilot Monitoring told the controller it was not on the arrival and asked for further clarification; ATC simply repeated as published. After a second query; ATC indicated that the fix was on an IFR high chart; and directed us to look there without telling us requested information (inbound course). Being compressed in time getting to the fix; we initially had difficulty using the iPad for high charts; making sure to select routes and fixes without other information and making sure to zoom in at the right amount without too much. We saw 57 for an inbound course and selected this. After a parallel outbound entry and inbound to the fix; ATC cleared us a heading on course to continue to LGA. After landing; the First Officer continued to reassess the flight and noticed that the inbound course was actually 109; but this was partly obscured by the blue flight plan course line. 57 was the distance between fixes on the high chart.ATC's lack of clarity [on] where to find the published holding and their decision not to simply state an inbound course along with leg length and turn direction caused undue workload in a compressed time frame. My lack of familiarity with using Jeppesen high charts and the fact that the inbound course was covered by the flight plan blue line made it difficult to find the correct course.The Jeppesen program is not often used. Using a program like ForeFlight which shows actual high charts and not digital charts that redraw and change based on zoom sounds better in theory; but in practice; makes it an unfriendly tool to use. In the future; I would be more insistent to ATC that we need better directions and also take more care in analyzing the chart.

Enroute to NYC; we were given routing instructions and told to expect holding at MIGET. We slowed to min drag speed and were given a turn of nearly 180 degrees back to MIGET. We were told to hold over MIGET as published with right turns and 20 mile legs with an expected further clearance time an hour after entering the hold. We were told that MIGET was on the arrival and were unable to find the published hold. We asked ATC for the inbound radial and they again said as published. We again stated that we didn't see the published hold. Someone; another aircraft or a Supervisor; advised that it could be found on the high enroute chart after turning on the fixes. We finally found the published hold and observed the inbound radial as 57 degrees. After reviewing after the flight; I observed that 57 was a distance on the airway and the inbound should have been 109. The 109 on the chart was very hard to read because it appeared under the blue highlighted route. We were under a high work load at the time; communicating with ATC; Dispatch; flight attendants and passengers; setting up the FMS; and didn't catch the error.We did not receive clear instructions from ATC. After asking ATC to clarify; they again stated the same instructions as previously given. We finally found the hold in the chart.

CRJ-900 flight crew reported a track deviation occurred when they were assigned a hold and could not find the inbound course in their iPad's ForeFlight chart program.


Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Distraction; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

On the ground before departure; we were advised that there was a smell in the Cabin prior to Boarding. We thought it might be fumes from the external power cart; and tried it with the APU Off. (Smelled more musty to me though). It was better after a short period of time. After starting engines; we again checked with the Cabin and they said that no odor was present and all was Normal. After reaching cruise at FL380; the Flight Attendants (FA)s called to inform that they had an alarm in the mid galley. They smelled an odor that they thought might be electrical. The Flight Attendants were very concerned and one was in tears. I believe this alarmed the passengers greatly and we elected to divert as a precaution. This was based on the Smoke Detector in the M2 Lavatory activating and the previous odor issues. Smoke was never present; only an odor that could be viewed as possibly electrical or oil in nature. I never really did smell the odor and relied on the other crew members.We selected the Utility Buses OFF initially as the FAs first advised alarm was coming from the Galley; and left them OFF until landing. We deduced from the alarm that it was a Lavatory; which was confirmed by the relief pilot.   The relief pilot was on break and we advised the FAs to have her check out the Lavatory. She did smell the odor but never saw smoke or a heat source. The First Officer was pilot flying; and I was pilot monitoring. The relief pilot returned to the cockpit and took over company communications; as I returned to ATC communications.  Since we were nearly on top of the divert airport; we elected to expedite the descent and landing rather than running a checklist to try to isolate the possible odor source.      The landing was uneventful on Runway 8 after conducting a Visual Approach. We were under Max Landing Weight and the landing was normal. Since the odor had dissipated and the smoke alarm had silenced; we taxied to the hardstand. Company personnel met the flight and the Fire Department personnel made a check of the Suspect Lavatory. I wasn't as concerned as much about the Lavatory as I was with the odor and the ability of the Smoke Detector to detect something amiss.

A B767-300 flight attendants reported a cabin odor along with an activated mid cabin lavatory smoke alarm. The odor was either electrical or petroleum in nature; but no smoke was seen.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 134; Flight Crew Type 1351

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Other

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

This aircraft had flown through moderate mixed icing between 2000-5000 feet into ZZZ and the pilots landed and elected to put the flaps up without knowing if they still had ice on them. They sat on the ground about 30 minutes waiting for their gate to open. We were the outbound crew for this aircraft and the pilots told us when they deplaned that they had flown through the icing but believed most had melted off on the ground. The temperature was around 28F. When we boarded the plane the APU was running and powering the aircraft for both electricity and air. We started to smell fumes and realized the ground deice people had started to deice without coordinating with us or the outbound crew. The aircraft was not configured for deice and we believe the fumes were from the deice fluid entering the bleed system. We called them and told them to stop the deice until we configured the aircraft for deice.

A320 Captain reported a fume event during preflight a gate due to a communication breakdown between flight crew and ground deicing personnel.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

During a session; I had three aircraft inbound to BAX airport. Two were IFR and one VFR flight following. The two IFR aircraft flew instrument approaches to BAX. I forgot to ask all 3 aircraft if they had the weather and NOTAMs at BAX. I have been working 5 days on and 10 days off due to reduced staffing levels. Additionally; I have not had to give an aircraft an approach clearance in a long time. There were no BAX [NOTAMs] to issue aircraft; but I still did not confirm they had the weather for the airport.I felt unsettled after the session; wondering if I may have missed something when providing approach control services to aircraft. I looked up the requirements in the 7110.65 after the fact. Thankfully; all aircraft were fine; but I failed to be prepared for the task at hand. Knowing my skills may have diminished due to long periods away from the job; I am more aware to anticipate situations that I may be lacking in knowledge. I will be aware of this and seek to refresh myself on procedures I may not normally see often before they occur.

ZOB Center Controller reported forgetting to ask 3 different aircraft if they had weather and NOTAMs for their landing airport.