Testing; Work Cards; Installation; Inspection

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Chart Or Publication; Manuals; Human Factors; Aircraft

I was assigned the Anti-Skid Control Valve union filter cleaning Task Card on a Raytheon Beech jet 400 aircraft while working in the hangar for Air Carrier X at ZZZ. I performed the task in accordance with the Hawker 400/400A Maintenance Manual (M/M) 32-40-00. When I was reinstalling the lines I mixed up the aft hydraulic pressure lines to the valve. The lines were not hard to install in this way and the installation seemed right to me. I had my Lead Mechanic buy-back [verify] the work. We ended up job stopping the task; with the Brake Bleeding and Anti-Skid Control Check still needing to be accomplished. The lines still got mixed up even though the lines were tagged. I could have taken a picture of the valve before I started the task. This would probably have prevented the lines from being installed wrong because I would have referenced the Maintenance Manual (M/M) and the picture. The Anti-Skid Brake System Check in the Maintenance Manual says to push both brakes at the same time during the Check. A revision to the manual that would require each brake to be checked individually and verify proper operation probably would have caught the problem in maintenance. The Repair Station could adopt a policy of requiring a run/taxi after brake maintenance procedures. This would have caught the problem while it was still in maintenance. Graveyard shift. Gate-turn back.

I; Mechanic Y; received a [shift] turnover from Mechanic X for a BE400A aircraft. Per Mechanic X; he removed the Power Brake Anti-Skid Control Valve from the aircraft and performed filter maintenance earlier that evening. He stated removal was necessary for ease of maintenance and there was difficulty of component during reinstallation. I then asked if the valve needed to be leak checked. His answer was it had been completed. Thus; the Power Brake System already had been operated via hydraulic mule. Furthermore more instruction was stated from Mechanic X. It included a brake bleeding procedure remaining in the task due to the lack of O-rings in the Parts Department. The task stated 'Refer to MANUAL BRAKE BLEEDING' procedure. Mechanic X then went onto explain that the 'MANUAL BRAKE BLEEDING' was incorrect; and for us to perform the 'POWER BRAKE BLEEDING'. Mechanic X stated it was a common practice at the Aircraft Service Centers and [our] Air Carrier at ZZZ to perform the 'POWER BRAKE BLEEDING'. I then accepted the work. As we began working the 'POWER BRAKE BLEEDING'; we noticed the brake bleed cart [was] already connected to the aircraft brake assemblies by Base Technicians. This eliminated us from actually connecting the hose assemblies to the brakes. We went on to performing the 'POWER BRAKE BLEEDING' as stated during the turnover. During the brake bleed; I and another Technician Z opened the # 3 and # 4 bleed cart valves and examined the fluid for any air in the hydraulic fluid. We never saw any entrapped air during the bleed process. As we continued the # 3 and # 4 valves were shut off. I then asked the Brake Pedal Operator about the brake pedals being firm and he stated they felt good. The brakes also showed good and equal pressures as they were operated several more cycles. We then went on to perform a successful ANTI-SKID FUNCTIONAL TEST. Finally; the jobs were both completed in the afternoon when the O-rings were received and the brake bleed cart removed.After learning about the event; several items could be open for discussion so further or similar events do not take place: 1) The Brake Bleed Cart should have been installed correctly. EG: The # 1 Brake bleed hose and gauge should have been connected to the Left Main Brake Assembly and the # 3 Brake bleed hose and gauge should have been connected to the Right Main Brake Assembly. 2) The incorrectly installed hydraulic lines and valve connections should be permanently marked to ease the proper installation process. 3) The oncoming shift should have inspected the brake bleed equipment for proper installation prior to use. 4) If the brake cart was not already set up for use; our crew may have used vinyl tubing and drip pans to perform the brake bleed method; thus we would have physically seen the fluid directly flowing out the brake assemblies; allowing us to discover the incorrect valve installation. 5) More complete training needs to be accomplished for all team members on all multiple aircraft types for more proficient skills and understanding.

Three Aircraft Maintenance Technicians report about their involvement with a power brake anti-skid control valve filter change and power brake bleeding procedure that resulted in a gate return of a BE-400A aircraft. Flight crew noted the left pedal controlled the right pedal and the right pedal controlled the left pedal.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Avionics

Workload; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ZZZ requested Engineering Authorization (EA) for damage to APU fuel line. Fuel line [was] not available in stock company wide or Boeing. EA 332551 issued for deferral till no later than Date. Aircraft left ZZZ without documentation of any work accomplished in ATA 28 or ATA 49. Maintenance Control contacted ZZZ Supervisor Name and advised him of documentation requirements. Name assured us that the monitor in question will be generated; but was waiting on manpower.No documentation of work [was] accomplished or deferred. Program shows no items in ATA 28 for last 30 days. Have Maintenance document any maintenance items worked. Have Maintenance document deferrals; including those provided by EA from Engineering. Have all maintenance deferrals out of base maintenance worked off an internal RON work; documented per GPM (Procedures Manual) 17.02 or line per GMP 17.03.

Lead Technician reported required maintenance logbook and electronic entries were not completed prior to the aircraft operating in revenue service.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

We picked up the aircraft with MEL FWD AUX TRANSFER PUMPS BOTH INOP.I reviewed the MEL and was concerned about fuel loading Takeoff Performance System (TPS) identifier. I called load control and asked what this meant. After being put on hold for a while; they explained that this meant that the unrecoverable fuel in the FWD AUX tank should not be shown or considered as ballast fuel on the TPS and was put into Empty Operating Weight where it would stay. MEL states 1. Fuel in FWD AUX TANK is unusable. 2. The note explains AFT AUX TANK FUEL may be considered unusable and fuel may be left in it under certain conditions. We had no AFT AUX TANK FUEL; so I did not think this to be a problem. In the cockpit; I placed a second call to a load control supervisor about the Minimum Zero Fuel Weight (MZFW) not being reduced by the amount of fuel in FWD AUX tank; and he assured me this was proper since the MEL says reduce the actual Zero Fuel Weight (ZFW) and not the MZFW. However; the MEL placard does call it ballast fuel. This seemed to be a conflict of MZFW procedure; but since they are the ones to interpret the MEL; I accepted it.The next day; the First Officer spoke with another pilot; and the point was brought up that the aircraft was out of AUX fuel balance. I am not sure this is a problem since the AUX fuel and balance figure is an Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) limitation and this condition is MEL approved. Nothing about the TPS flagged this condition. I called load control twice about FWD AUX TANK fuel in this configuration including a supervisor; and no one believed the aircraft was fueled in an improper condition.The whole premise of this MEL is when the aircraft was previously in flight to have FWD AUX TANK pumps fail in flight; which means fuel will be in FWD AUX TANK with fuel exhausted in AFT AUX TANK by landing. This was the condition of the aircraft when I picked it up. The MEL talks a lot about how to handle the ZFW part of the equation; and I believe leads you down a path that this fuel loading has been taken into account. I believe the MEL note that reads some of the fuel in the AFT AUX TANK may require to be considered unusable is misleading; since by all odds; there will be no fuel in the AFT AUX TANK at this time; as was in my case. If the AFM LIMITATION still applies in this condition; I believe the MEL should clearly state that it only applies if there is no more than 400 LBS of fuel in the FWD AUX TANK. This would make this MEL only apply in a very narrow circumstance.

MD-80 Captain reported what he feels is a flaw in a company MEL procedure dealing with Forward Aux Transfer Pumps Inoperative.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 10300; Flight Crew Type 7500

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Approach to ILS following an airbus that showed approx 3 miles ahead of us on final; approach asked us to hold 180 to ZZZZZ. Our final approach speed was Vref 111. Following the airbus into the FAF; the first officer and I were discussing our separation and closure rate on the Airbus. At the FAF I called gear down flaps 20 and started to slow to 130 knots. Below 162 knots I called for flaps 30 landing checklist. About the same time tower asked us if we could speed up 10 knots. The first officer and I discussed briefly if this was possible and told tower no; we had to slow down. We were also talking about our separation with the airbus and @ 1000 feet AGL the first officer made the 1000 feet call with 5 knots fast. Shortly after we got a too low flaps GPWS warning two times. I looked over at the flap handle and it wasn't in the flaps 30 position. I made the comment flaps aren't at 30 and called go around while initiating the go around. During the go around; tower asked us for the reason of the go around. We stated unstable approach. Went back around and came in for another ILS uneventful. While ultimately we made the mistakes; approach and tower need to stop treating all aircraft the same. A light weight 757 with and approach speed of 115 knots is not the same as a max weight MD with an approach speed of 165-170 knots. Asking crews to adjust speed inside the final approach fix is unsafe and can disrupt checklists. I think that tower asking us to speed up during an important phase of the landing checklist; disrupted our attention and we missed the flaps 30 landing checklist as a crew. During a go around tower doesn't need to know the reason why immediately when crews are at their busiest. They can wait until the flight is stable on downwind.

B757 Captain reported being asked by ATC to speed up ten knots after the FAF at the same time he called for flaps 30. The First Officer apparently did not hear the call and the omission was not discovered until the GPWS calls out 'too low flaps' and a go-around is initiated.


Workload; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Initial taxi instructions Taxi to [Runway] XXL hold short XXL at BRAVO. Holding short tower asked if we were on frequency and cleared us to cross RWY XXL right turn on ECHO cross RWY XYR (freq clutter). Ground Control was combined with heavy radio traffic; call signs blocked aircraft transmissions overlapping (stepped on). Still thinking we were to use RWY XXL (clearance to RWY XXR was blocked after crossing RWY XYL/XZR) holding short monitoring Tower. We were instructed to Line up and wait (RWY number blocked). As we moved approximately 10 feet forward we noticed aircraft on final. Stopped. Tower advised aircraft was on about a 1-2 mile final to go-around 'aircraft on runway.' Aircraft on final acknowledged; but said there was no one on runway (frequency cluttered; Tower told aircraft to go-around a second and third time even though they had already initiated go-around). Tower then instructed us to line up and wait RWY XXL. We were subsequently cleared for takeoff RWY XXL; original runway issued in taxi instructions. Climbing out Departure Control said they did not know what happened but gave us a phone number to call. After landing at ZZZ I called. The gentleman answering said nothing of situation asked for my name; phone number; address and certificate number and said thank you. I feel the heavy traffic on combined ground control frequency led to confusion. They have two ground control frequencies and should use them when traffic is busy.

C560XL pilot reported a runway incursion due to a communication breakdown caused by heavy radio traffic.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 184; Flight Crew Type 1665

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 212; Flight Crew Type 1765

I was hand flying the visual backed up by the RNAV. Approximately a mile outside of [final approach fix] I called for the landing gear. The nose wheel and left main had a green light; but the right main did not. The (gear) door and gear light stayed illuminated. We quickly checked the light and saw that the light worked when tested. I told the Captain that I was going around. We went through the normal go around procedures and the gear went up as normal. ATC gave us vectors. The Captain let the passengers know via the PA system why we went around. I continued to fly and talk to ATC. The Captain told Dispatch through ACARS to call us. They gave us two different frequencies; but none worked. The plane does not have SATCOM and were unable to talk to anyone from the company. Due to fuel we decided to run the checklists and drop the gear manually. Gear came down and were cleared back in to [destination]. We landed without incident.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B757 flight crew reported extending the landing gear with the manual backup method after the right main gear failed to extend.


Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Declared Emergency

Approximately 200 miles from destination we were at FL260 and had just switched Centers. Aircraft started turning left while on autopilot. When unable to turn back to the right on automation the pilot flying disconnected the autopilot and flew manual. Pilot flying commented on how heavy and sluggish the controls felt. Pilot not flying informed ATC that we might have issues and please give us a heading while we sort this out. We complied with QRH Jammed/Restricted Flight Control procedure. About this time pilot not flying took control of the flight controls to get a feel of the problem. To the pilot not flying it felt very similar to manual reversion in the simulator. Pilot not flying then got a phone patch to Maintenance Control and asked for assistance to diagnose the problem. At this time the pilot flying said flight control pressures were getting worse. The pilot not flying terminated the phone patch and made an immediate command decision to declare an emergency and proceed to the nearest suitable airport. We were offered a nearby airport which we turned down and Dispatch suggested nearby larger airport. Pilot not flying briefed the (A) Flight Attendant for normal landing; nature of divert; then gave a PA to the passengers explaining precautionary landing for a flight control issue. [We] requested emergency vehicles to be on the ready; ran applicable checklists. Approach and landing [accomplished] safely and taxied in. Needed GPU; APU was on MEL. Passengers met by Agent and rebooked. I do not know why this happened. Because of the way the controls felt. Maybe the feel/centering Unit or electrical. Left flight spoiler was deployed and remained in the up position.

The Reporter stated that there was some cockpit crew friction as this event continued to develop. The First Officer insisted on diverting while the Captain would have elected to do a long slow descent to the destination. Because it was the First Officer's leg the Captain deferred to the First Officer who was exhibiting great concern for the aircraft's safety. The Reporter has made several calls attempting to determine exactly the cause and was only told a cable connected to an actuator failed and also the aileron feel sense unit was replaced.

A B737-400 ailerons became very sluggish and heavy in flight similar to manual reversion. An emergency was declared and the flight diverted to a nearby airport where an actuator cable was found failed and the aileron feel sense unit was also replaced.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6; Flight Crew Total 2600; Flight Crew Type 1200

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

On RNAV 17 approach; I was not sure I was getting vertical guidance. Attempted to reactivate approach; but the approach would not reactivate due to being inside the initial approach fix. Lost approach (except on MFD approach charts that also indicated aircraft position on charts) on GPS due to checking programming; but had limited visual of airport and continued. Received low altitude call from TRACON. Corrected altitude; but in doing so lost visual with airport for short time. Continued approach procedure and visual landing. I knew I should not to attempt reactivation of approach; but was distracted. The Garmin 530 doesn't adequately indicate that the approach is active and functioning; or is ambiguous. If the GPS more clearly indicated phase of flight and approach functioning; probably wouldn't have happened. I need to re-read manual for GPS.

PA34 pilot reports losing vertical and lateral guidance during an RNAV approach. The approach is continued using the track line on the MFD only; resulting in a low altitude alert from the Tower. In and out of clouds the approach is continued to landing.


Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

After First Officer (FO) called; 'check thrust' and before I could answer FO said; 'I can't steer it. My rudder pedals are not working.' We rejected the takeoff at approximately 20 knots. I verified that the tiller still worked to steer and that my rudder pedals did not work. We returned to the gate.

B737 Captain reported an aborted takeoff after First Officer stated he was unable to steer aircraft with rudder pedals.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 16; Flight Crew Total 410; Flight Crew Type 17

Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

There were two instances of concern on this flight:1. Vectors were provided from HHOOD to the RNAV-A approach into KTTD. This plane's GPS was a recently upgraded to a Garmin 650; with which I have very little practice beyond one approach in VFR conditions; and some time on a simulator. The tops were at about 3;000 feet.After being cleared for the approach and stated to maintain at or above 2;500 MSL over WOODD; I continued on. The GPS was set to vectors. The GPS did not increment to the next fix; and I did not know how to increment it to the next leg. The controller stated I was on course; so I just turned to follow the course; rather than asking for missed vectors while I get the GPS sorted out. Fortunately; the ceiling was plenty high; so when I broke out about 1/4 mile off course; I was able to cancel IFR and land VFR.-The biggest learning item was that I need to become more familiar with this GPS prior to flying an approach in IFR conditions. This could have been dangerous; had the clouds been lower.2. Also; on this same flight; the haze northeast of the airport was quite severe; although it was VFR. As I was eating lunch; the haze suddenly became much darker and it went to solid IFR conditions. I called and received an IFR clearance from Seattle Center. Fortunately I was on flight following; so the clearance came quickly. Lessons learned: If it is at all marginal; just get an IFR clearance. Don't try to push on into questionable VFR conditions. It was amazing how fast the haze from the forest fires just slowly became more and more dense until it was too dense to see.

General aviation pilot reported difficulty with new navigation equipment while on a RNAV approach and experiencing rapidly deteriorating visibility while on a VFR flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 157; Flight Crew Total 2966; Flight Crew Type 706

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Two previous write ups indicated FAs could feel something shaking/moving under the floor of the aft galley. I briefed the purser and asked that all FAs be made aware of this and be looking for it. Additionally I made a non rev pilot aware of the possible problem. As we pushed I got a call from the back and both the FA and the non rev CA could feel the shaking. We pulled back to the gate and called maintenance. After about an hour of trouble shooting it was discovered to be the equipment cooling fans. When the mechanic went directly to the fans; one of them was shaking and was much hotter than the other. Maintenance Control was involved and wanted the single fan made inoperative and then continue per MEL deferral. I watched closely as the deferral procedure was being efforted. It was discovered that when the problem fan was deactivated; the other fan would not operate. With two fans inoperative there was evidently no MEL data that allowed dispatch. The following is paraphrased only slightly: Maintenance Control then said 'ok; we know what the problem is now; plug them both back in and we'll get this flight out and fix it later.' Hearing that I knew I was refusing the airplane. I got the passengers off and called the Duty Manager. I also watched closely as the mechanic refused Maintenance Control. I told the Duty Manager what was going on and explained I was very angry with Maintenance Control. The Duty Manager understood and got a hold of local maintenance supervisor. That supervisor and I made a plan (deliberately apart from Maintenance Control about how to continue using the safest most conservative approach: fix the airplane. The parts were on hand so the repair started. Two line mechanics started the repair and got it done in about an hour and a half. We [pilots] timed out however; and the flight had to be delayed a day.

B767 Captain reports accepting an aircraft with previous write ups for shaking/vibration under the aft galley floor. The problem reappears as the aircraft is pushed back and Maintenance is called. The problem is traced to an equipment cooling fan; which Maintenance Control wants the crew to take as is and the crew declines.


Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

On short final with all checklists complete. When power levers were retarded below 1;000 lbs. TQ; the red gear in-transit annunciation on the landing gear handle illuminated. The indications observed by the flight crew were three green gear-down lights and a red illuminated landing gear handle that was in the down position. The annunciation immediately extinguished when power was advanced at or above 1;000 lbs. of TQ. After conferring with the First Officer (FO); it was decided to attempt a second attempt at landing as there was not an unsafe gear annunciation above 1;000 lbs. TQ and all other indications were normal. During the second attempt while on an approximate five mile final to the Runway; the same gear unsafe annunciation occurred under the same conditions.  The approach was aborted and ATC vectors were followed. The Emergency Checklist for Landing Gear In-Transit Indication was performed; this lead to the Abnormal Checklist for Failure of Landing Gear to Extend Normally. Maintenance Control was contacted and; with their assistance it was decided to perform the Abnormal Checklist for Landing Gear Manual Extension. After completing all checklists ATC cleared us to land. Dispatch and Maintenance advised the crew to disregard the red illuminated landing gear handle for this third approach. While on short final to 30L with three green gear-down Annunciators illuminated; the red landing gear handle Annunciator illuminated when TQ was decreased below 1;000lbs. We landed and taxied to the gate without incident.At this time...it appears that the issue was caused by runway contamination (snow; ice; sand) at the previous departure locations getting slung inside the landing gear well.

When; on approach for landing; the flight crew of a BE-1900 was confronted with the dichotomy of three green landing gear safe lights and a red gear in transit light they performed a go around; contacted maintenance; consulted and completed possibly related QRH procedures and; ultimately; opted to land with the anomalous lights; confident the landing gear was safe. The landing was without incident.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

On the upwind for closed traffic at about 400 feet the aircraft started to vibrate and Cylinder Head Temperature (CHT) indications were about to go yellow. I took the controls and noticed the Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT) temperatures were at 1;500 more specifically EGT indication number 3 and 4. I took the controls and asked to land [on opposite direction runway] and the tower allowed me to bring the SR-20 for full stop landing on [opposite direction runway].In the future I can learn to be more cautious on the potential for this event to happen and notice the signs maybe before rotation.

A Flight Instructor reported engine vibration and rising cylinder head and exhaust gate temperatures on climb out. A return to the field was initiated with a successful landing on the opposite direction runway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 32.62; Flight Crew Total 228.12; Flight Crew Type 228.12

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

We completed pushback and engine start off XX-Gate.  We then received clearance for left 270 turn due to another aircraft to our right.  As engines spooled up we identified the threat of fuel truck moving from our left but it was still distant.  We double checked lighting set.  As aircraft began to move it became clear that the fuel truck was not stopping and the Captain had to brake abruptly to avoid collision.Took Immediate Corrective Action to Avoid a Collision Incursion

Air Carrier First Officer reported a Critical Ground Conflict occurred just as the Captain began to taxi. A fuel truck did not yield to their aircraft and abrupt braking was required of the Captain to avoid a collision.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

The mandate for Ground Ops to utilize three Marshallers for gate departure and arrival operations should be applauded. However; I have noticed on a routine (albeit anecdotal) basis that most Guide Agents and Lead Marshallers do not raise their hands away from the bodies far enough when giving their signals. In fact; the pictures in the FOM; which show the proper signaling procedures; are not routinely followed. Most Marshallers and Guide Agents keep the wands at chest or waist level. The problem with this is the wands are the same color as the Marshallers' reflective vest. As a result; the wands and vests blend together; making it difficult (really impossible in low light or low visibility) to discern any signals being given. However; there is one exception--International Stations. Almost without fail; international station Marshallers display the signals as per our FOM and have wands that are a different color from their reflective vests. A second concern is the additional Marshallers are typically only standing by the elongated yellow cones on the edge of the safety area during arrival; with one exception; [station code]. At the latter station; the extra Marshallers are able to stop crossing traffic from entering the parking/safety zone. When standing by the aforementioned cones; traffic is not stopped. This is a much greater hazard/threat at our larger stations.

737 Captain reported a problem with marshaling techniques making parking and push backs more difficult and unsafe.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Flying at FL200 in IMC with light to moderate icing; we had both the cowl and wing anti-ice on. [We then received] the warning message ANTI ICE DUCT. I instructed the FO who was PF at the time to also take the radios while I ran the QRH. It instructed us to shut off the wing anti-ice and leave icing conditions. I shut off the wing anti-ice which cleared the message. I radioed Center that we needed an immediate climb. The controller was busy and did not respond right away to my call. When they did respond; they gave us a climb and inquired if we needed assistance. I told them we would keep them advised and that we were having trouble with our anti-ice system. Once above the clouds; we were able to determine ice had formed on the wings. Therefore we continued with the ice dispersal procedure as directed by the QRH. While waiting for the ice to dissipate; I requested from ATC that they not descend us until they could give us an unrestricted descent to 7;000 (an altitude I had calculated to be above freezing using the surface temperature in ZZZ of 14 degrees and standard lapse rate of 2 degrees per 1000 ft.). The controller was cooperative and passed along our request to Approach. Center asked us to slow and gave us pilot discretion on a descent. I informed ATC we still had ice on our wings and would not be able to slow. The controller then told us to maintain slowest practical airspeed. At this point; I informed ATC. My reasoning was that we still had ice on the wings that appeared to not be dissipating; and it would not be safe to slow the airplane with ice on the wings. While surface temperatures were well above freezing; IMC was prevailing across the region and we were going to need to descend back through icing conditions to land the airplane. Therefore I needed to be able to descend quickly through the clouds to reach warmer air and be able to maintain high airspeeds until there was no longer a threat of ice.ATC vectored us off the arrival and gave us the descent to 7000 when terrain allowed. Dispatch was notified via ACARS of our status. The ice was not dissipating off the wings with the QRH procedure of using high airspeed. Therefore I continued on with the next step in the QRH which instructed me to turn the wing anti-ice back on; but also to shut it off immediately when the warning message returned. With the wing anti-ice on; the ice melted from the wings. However; the warning message did not return. Once we reached 7000 feet and verified both the SAT and TAT were well above freezing I informed ATC. The flight continued through landing without further incident.

CRJ-700 Captain reported they lost anti-ice capability in light to moderate icing after responding to the message ANTI ICE DUCT. They exited icing conditions and were able to restore the anti-ice system later in flight.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

An open item; deferred; in the maintenance log for Aircraft X is that the #2 engine regularly exceeds the maximum limit of 4.0 and that [the Air Carrier] has been given a variance by Rolls Royce allowing this as ok. They did not say that when it gets to 4.5 or 5.0 then get worried. It seems to imply that the correct procedure is to wait until the engine fails or falls off. In other words; there is no training or even a suggested substitute procedure. This seems to put the pilot's license in jeopardy; as well as compromising the safety buffer margin that our passengers normally have. I was told that this engine is low time at 16;500 hours and therefore should not be having this problem; implying that is a good reason for ignoring the problem. I was told they have done all the investigation they can; including Boroscope; except remove the engine for a tear down inspection. This seems to say they currently have little or no idea what the real problem is. I was told they just don't want to remove the engine yet.We have our procedures & limits for safety guidance. When we start ignoring them; sooner or later injury or death will follow. Yes this is a rare occurrence; but this engine has reached lemon status. Take the engine off & replace it with one that works.

The Reporter stated that the #2 engine was exceeding the vibration limit of 4.0 according to the Flight Operations Manual (FOM). The Reporter stated that they reported this to maintenance; so maintenance called Rolls Royce and reported back to the flight crew that it was okay to continue in service with this even though the vibration was exceeding the limit. The reporter also stated he felt pressured to fly this airplane in this condition given the fact they had 310 passengers and Rolls Royce said it was good to go. The Reporter also stated that he encountered a vibration of 3.2 in the past and was told to divert to the nearest airport so when he sees an indication exceeding 4.0 and is told that it's okay to continue in service it kind of confusing. The Reporter stated that they could not feel any vibrations in the aircraft; it was just the indication in the secondary engine information page in EICAS that they discovered the engine was vibrating. The Reporter stated that he feels that if an indication is this high and is still good to go; then raise the limit so the flight crews are not put on the spot to take responsibility for an engine exceeding limits. The Reporter stated; as of this report the engine has not been scheduled to be replaced.

The flight crew of a Boeing 777 reported that an engine regularly exceeds the maximum vibration limits.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

It has been brought to my attention that the 737-MAX aircraft at times sits extremely tail heavy while being loaded and/or unloaded at the gate. I'm not sure of all the details with this specific aircraft; but it is a situation that is happening often according to the line technicians working the gates. According to ramp personnel that have been asked; they have stated that their operating manual does not state that the tail stand needs to be installed. The Aircraft Maintenance Manual states at the very beginning of AMM task 07-10-08-800-801 item 1. A. 'The primary function of the tail stand is to support the airplane tail in an aft CG condition during loading and/or unloading of passengers and cargo'.

Ground employee reported that the procedure manual does not call out for the use of a tail stand when loading and unloading passengers and cargo from a 737 MAX aircraft.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

After takeoff; during gear retraction; we heard and felt 2-3 loud bangs and thuds with associated yaw and shutter of the aircraft. Initially; we considered a landing gear tire might have blown or it was retraction problem due to gear in transit timed with [another] problem. Once gear was fully retracted; a series of bangs and shutters occurred again and during our global assessment (Nothing displayed on ECAM); we noted a spike in temperature on engine 1 EGT as corresponding to the problem. [We suspected] compressor stalls. Reducing the power on engine 1 to idle eliminated the problem and the engine ran normally. We immediately [requested priority handling] with ATC requesting the ARFF equipment; as well as a box pattern back to XXR (longest runway); leveled at 4000 feet MSL; maintained configuration at 180 knots. We ran all appropriate checklists including: Engine 1 Stall in flight with Engine Parameters Normal at Idle; Non-Routine Landing; and Overweight Landing. We made an initial and landing imminent announcement to the flight attendants and passengers. During the initial series of compressor stalls and after the engine was stabilized at idle neither the flight attendants nor any passengers reported any other engine problems such as fire; smoke; vibrations; etc. Once everything was complete we flew the ILS XXC approach to a normal touchdown and landed to a full stop on the runway so that ARFF could look over the aircraft before we taxied uneventfully to the gate. Weight at touchdown was 3;000 to 4;000 pounds over the max with a 200 FPM touchdown. After shutdown; we made 2 logbook entries (Compressor stall after TO and Overweight Landing). We debriefed the Chief Pilot; Maintenance; ARFF Chief; Gate Agent; and Passengers. We saved all paper work; photos; and contact information.An Airbus Pilot jump-seater was very helpful with event CRM. Possible failure factors included heavy weight; TOGA takeoff; and a warm day stressing the engine. In addition; APU had been on MEL for 8 days adding to engine fatigue and stress with ground air and cross-bleed starts; and it was the aircraft's first flight of the day (even with ample warm-up time). Following policies; procedures; flows; and checklists all while maintaining positive aircraft control in an un-rushed manner using all available resources and thorough CRM led to a safe resolution to the engine failure on takeoff. [I recommend] better and more prompt APU maintenance; and the use of non-TOGA flex takeoffs on longer runways in hot and heavy takeoffs situations.

Shortly after takeoff; during gear retraction; we noticed a loud thud or two. Initially; I thought it was a problem with landing gear retraction; since it started while the gear was still in transit. Shortly thereafter; the noise occurred again. A spike in engine temp was noted during the sounds; and the spike immediately disappeared. The EGT over-temp readings were happening too fast (and clearing so fast) that no ECAM message was triggered long enough to stay up. Once power on the #1 engine was reduced; the engine ran normally at idle. We requested priority handling and leveled off at 4;000 feet. ATC began vectoring us back for a visual approach to the longest runway; XXC. We requested ARFF to inspect the plane on landing. Flight attendants; passengers and Dispatch were advised of the situation and our intentions. All appropriate QRH procedures were complied with. Non-normal landing procedures were complied with. Overweight landing procedures and landing distance assessment were completed. A straight-out heading was requested and approved in the event of a missed. An uneventful approach and landing was conducted. After stopping on the runway; we requested ARFF to inspect the #1 engine for damage. No damage was noted and we continued to the gate. I'm not sure that this event was preventable. The only unusual thing about this aircraft was the deferral period for the APU. I think it had been deferred 8 days ago; which is quite a lot of external air start cycles and cross bleeds. Just speculation; but if this malfunction was associated in some way with a bleed air valve; the fact that the APU was deferred so long-and all the associated unusual starting procedures (perhaps external air starts) could have been a factor. It might be something to consider from a maintenance tracking perspective. I hear that we are seeing more inflight engine problems lately. I think APU deferrals should be as short as possible for a variety of reasons.I have a feeling that this event may have been associated with the APU deferral. I think emphasis should be put on deferring them for a shorter time and routing planes in need of APU work to a Maintenance facility sooner. In no case is a week deferral reasonable or necessary. (I don't think any troubleshooting had even been attempted to get the APU operating again.) TOGA Takeoff could have been another contributing factor; as we are asking a lot of the engines in hot weather.

A321 flight crew reported a possible compressor stall on the number 1 engine shortly after takeoff which resulted in a return to the departure airport.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

On short final Flight Attendant called cockpit notifying crew that Flight Attendant jump seat was stuck in the locked and stowed position. Jump seat Flight Attendant sat in the lavatory for landing.Short final; sterile cockpit; high workload.Debrief with crew the importance of making cockpit crew aware of any malfunction in the cabin.

EMB-145 Captain reported the Flight Attendant called them during sterile cockpit on short final stating the jump seat became inoperative. Flight Attendant sat in lavatory during landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 33; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 550

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft; Human Factors

ATC gave us a block altitude between 8;000 FT MSL and 12;000 FT MSL between two radials northwest of TXK VOR. We were asked by Center to remain within 25 miles of the TXK VOR. We then set up; on the pilot's EFIS display; a visual picture of this area using the Navigational equipment on board. These instructions defined an area in which we could perform the required maneuvers for an FAA Type Rating Test. About 5 minutes later; the Controller angrily told us we were 31 miles from the TXK VOR and were guilty of drifting outside of the assigned area. Our onboard display showed our position well within the required 25 miles. We finished our training and returned to TKI without any further discussion with the Controller about distance from the TXK VOR.

DA2000 Captain is informed by ATC that he has drifted outside the designated airspace while doing maneuvers for a checkride. The on board display; which had been programed by the crew to remain withing the designated area; indicated that they had not drifted out.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 207.95; Flight Crew Total 4454.65; Flight Crew Type 653.70

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 3483; Flight Crew Type 897

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

I was the Captain on Flight XXX to ZZZ. Flight was uneventful until final approach into ZZZ. During the ILS approach to [Runway] ZZC; as we lowered the landing gear; we heard what sounded like two small explosion/bangs in the back of the aircraft. The first EICAS message we noticed was a GEAR DISAGREE. The right main gear and the nose gear showed green down and locked while the left main gear did not. We coordinated with ZZZ Approach Control and went around from the approach. Shortly thereafter; the EICAS L HYD QTY light came on and we verified a loss of all left hydraulic quantity and then a L HYD Pressure EICAS appeared. I was flying the aircraft. There was a considerable amount of vibration so I elected to keep flying the aircraft while the First Officer started running the checklist for the unsafe gear indication to include an alternate gear extension followed by the hydraulic quantity and pressure indications. We quickly talked to the flight attendants and gave them the info in the TEST communication procedures. I told them to prep for evacuation as I did not know the status of the left main landing gear combined with the vibration and very loud explosive noise during the gear extension. A short message was sent to Dispatch and we requested Tower to notify the Company. ZZZ Tower asked if we wanted to flyby down the runway to see if either they or another aircraft on the ground could see if the left gear was extended or not. I gave an initial PA to the passengers and told them we were working on an issue and going to do an approach by the runway to allow the Tower and other aircraft to tell us what they see. We accomplished that and the aircraft on the ground said it appeared that the gear was extended. We did not change our configuration at all during the go-around or subsequent approaches. (Gear down and flaps 20). One of the checklists (Gear Disagree) said to land with flaps 30 and the other L HYD said flaps 20. We stayed at flaps 20. Landing distance was not an issue. After the second go-around we asked for a short approach as fuel was becoming a concern. We talked to the flight attendants again and told them we were going in for our approach and landing. I made one more PA to the passengers. The Tower had the fire trucks in place. The left main landing gear down and locked green light remained off throughout the landing. We landed on [Runway] XXC and stopped straight ahead on the runway. We kept the passengers in their seats. The landing and rollout was fairly smooth which made me think the tires blew well before landing. Two of the four main tires on the left truck were blown with the other two intact. The Fire Department contacted us directly on the radio. They remarked that there was significant amount of hydraulic fluid near the left gear. Once they cleared the airplane; Operations sent buses to the aircraft and the passengers disembarked. All passengers were fine with no injuries to passengers or crew.Initial inspection by Maintenance stated that a hydraulic actuator piston failed under pressure and may have sent metal into two of the tires as they were leaving the wheel well creating the two loud bangs.The entire crew attended the flight attendants debriefing in the inflight conference room at ZZZ. The flight attendants did an outstanding job throughout. Their professionalism was apparent throughout the event and greatly helped the passengers to remain calm and attentive.

B757 flight crew reported a loud bang and an unsafe gear indication on approach.


Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

An A&P or IA who changed out the tail-boom on Helicopter X in 1995 made an arithmetic error when he calculated the number of hours until the tail-boom needed to be replaced again. AFTT = 2385.6; Retire Hours = 2100; 2385.6 + 2100 = 4485.6. His entry was 4685.6. This went undetected for over 25 years until it was time in November of 2021 to change it out again. The error was noticed by the owner but not until he was going over the number of hours remaining until it needed to be changed out. By the time the error was found; it was 156.3 hour past the retire time of 4485.6. A ferry permit was obtained; an IA inspected and signed off the permit; an entry was made in the logbook and the helicopter was successfully ferried to ZZZ on Date.

Helicopter owner reported during an inspection of the aircraft's maintenance records an arithmetic error was found concerning the replacement of the Tail-Boom.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

I was picking up trash in the main cabin. The C [Flight Attendant] came to me and asked to verify the presence of a suspicious odor in the aft cabin. I followed her back and once I got to row 30; there was a very intense smell of burning electrical / hot plastic. I called the flight deck and relayed what we were smelling; and they asked us to locate a source if possible. I went back to the aft cabin and asked how the B [Flight Attendant] and C [Flight Attendant] how they were feeling. They were lightheaded and feeling 'woozy.' We began a search for the source. We suspected a device was going into thermal runaway; so we began asking passengers if they had any laptops; iPads; etc. Some passengers were asking if we were investigating the burning plastic smell. After checking devices and in-flight players in the area; we noticed no smell in overhead bins; and the odor was strongest on aircraft left; rows 29-33; coming out of PSU air. The same smell was also coming out of the aft galley; a/c right; [and] vent. I called the flight deck back and they began working checklists. The B [Flight Attendant] and C [Flight Attendant] at this point were getting more lightheaded; and developing headaches; and I could tell I was becoming lightheaded the longer I was in the affected area. I called the flight decks to relay symptom development with the B [Flight Attendant]; C [Flight Attendant]; and myself. At this point; the Captain said they could smell it in the flight deck and decided to [advise ATC]; diverting to ZZZ. We closed affected areas' PSU air vents and began preparing the cabin for arrival. I informed passengers of our diversion on our final sweep of the cabin. When we landed; the smell was still strong; and the pilots began isolating systems until we were cleared to taxi to the gate. Two passengers were treated by medical personnel at the gate (one for an anxiety attack and another for chest pain). In flight Supervisor met the aircraft and assisted us through the evening. We (flight attendants and pilots) requested medical evaluation and were transferred to hospital for further evaluation and testing.

Flight Attendant reported electrical burning fumes in the cabin; followed shortly by cockpit crew also reporting. Flight diverted and requested medical assistance at gate.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Experienced an event on Sector 16 that perfectly illustrates the East Specialty's variety of attitudes toward positive coordination of altitude. I experienced a sequence of events that was very frustrating based on long history and experience with the East.First; north of the ZZZ area; I noticed Aircraft X handing off to me from within Sector 70s airspace with FL270 hard displaying in the data block. After some time; it appears they decided to verbally coordinate this with my D-Side; so I took the handoff and moved on.Then; east of ZZZ1; Aircraft Y began flashing to me with FL280 showing in the data block while he was still descending from the 30's. No coordination was made; I'm sick of getting in to pissing matches with the East over this; so I just took the handoff and inserted a temp 290 altitude until he checked in and I issued FL280 (he came over only descending to FL290).Then the 3rd issue occurred very shortly thereafter; and was the one that finally caused me to file this report. North of ZZZ2 VOR; Aircraft Z began handing off to me with FL280 in the data block while he was at FL300. He was 'over' sector 15's airspace at the time; so I assumed that FL280 was the altitude he was descending to. He checked in level at FL290; not descending to FL280 as I had assumed.I reported the situations to my [supervisor].This is a constant; continual problem with the East. It has been going on for literally years and years; as they have their own concept about how air traffic operates. They lack professionalism to the core and do not appear able to comprehend the English language as organized and published in the 7110.65 and 7110.149.  They do not modify their behavior based on concrete evidence and clearly published rules; and no one cares enough or are able to motivate them to change their behavior. There is no accountability. It will cause an issue some day because they will just assume another controller knew what they would do. They'll [expletive] about someone else applying a valid procedure; showing they know full-well what the procedure is; and then turn around and fail to execute the same because they feel like their piss poor interpretation of the rules is somehow valid (and I assert they do this knowingly and willfully).I assert that the number of reports of this matter is far below the actual frequency of occurrence; for a variety of reasons. I've tried to report in the past on this issue and nothing happens. I see instances fairly regularly when I work traffic and just don't feel motivated to file anymore. Then; you have to assume that someone receiving poor data block coordination cares enough to report it in the first place; and I know for a fact most of the controllers don't actually care enough to file. They'll [expletive]; sure; it's always fun to dog pile on the east; but to actually try and do something about it happens rarely.Lastly; and the icing on the cake for this situation; and just proof of the East's general unprofessionalism; NE of ZZZ2 VOR; Aircraft A at FL300 apparently flashes to me; well outside my airspace (40-50 miles; beyond my range). I receive a phone call from 15; first asking for me by name; then telling me that Aircraft A is descending to FL260. I didn't know who the aircraft was; I thought possibly he was coming from a high sector above me; so I'm scrambling to pull him up. He tells me he just wanted to make sure there wasn't any 'confusion.' I had typed the CID (Computer Identification) to try and pull the aircraft up; unknowingly taking the handoff. It wasn't until after I expanded out that I saw the aircraft being reference and I saw I had taken the handoff.I know that I catch crap at this facility from people that see me as just trying to follow the book and be correct about working traffic. I get that I'm the Safety Rep; and my reputation is that of following the book; apparently to a fault. I let a lot of [expletive] pass; if only because continually [expletive] basically changes nothing at this facility. But the automated coordination of altitude data in data blocks is not something I can stay quiet on. But nothing changes; and I expect fully that I will be pissing in to the wind with This report as well. When I leave this facility; at least I can say I tried to get things fixed.I'm just sick of it; and the lack of change at this facility is a major motivation toward my desire to leave permanently.I reported this to my QC manager directly as well.Actually identify on an individual basis the controllers in the East who continually; willfully; and without consequence or accountability clearly violate written procedure that has been clarified and explained to them numerous times and ignored time and time again. Nothing will change though. I'm done.

ARTCC Controller reported individuals in certain areas of the sector do not follow procedures correctly.  This behavior has reportedly led to confusion and airspace violations.


Time Pressure; Workload; Distraction; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure

When established on the BONHAM 6 arrival and landing north; if given a runway change; the selected runway defaults to the entire arrival west of BYP. This creates a discontinuity on your route flown and will disengage LNAV. This anomaly creates a navigational interruption and is compounded when you receive frequent runway changes. While on the arrival; we were assigned Runway 35C then 35R then back to 35C all west of KARLA intersection. Fortunately; we stayed on the arrival using heading.I believe this discontinuity anomaly when you select a runway should be addressed and revised. But I also suggest in the reduction of runway changes while close to the Airport.

When established on the BONHAM 6 Arrival (BYP.BYP6) and landing North if you put in a runway change it will default to the arrival West of BYP regardless of your position on the arrival. This will create a discontinuity. We were originally assigned ILS 35C by ATC. Within a few minutes they assigned us ILS 35R. A few minutes later they again assigned us ILS 35C. The last two runway assignments were given West KARLA on the arrival. Each time we put the new runway assignment in the FMS it created a discontinuity west on BYP during a critical phase of flight.I would suggest that the arrivals be put in the FMS with the option of a North or South landing. This would allow the arrival to be clean with all points needed to fly the arrival. These points are not associated with any runway assignment. This would allow pilots to make the changes in the box in regard to ATC runway assignment without changing arrival routing.

ATC issued a B737-800 three BONHAM 6 North Arrival runway changes and with each runway change LNAV disengaged and the arrival defaulted to west of BYP which required a complete arrival rebuild for the new Runway 35.


Cessna Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

After takeoff from ZZZ; I went to pull the power back into climb power. Upon doing so I noticed severe engine roughness with the left engine; and the throttles were split several inches. I applied full power as I thought the left engine was going to quit. When I contacted departure; they advised that an Airport Operations vehicle witnessed billowing black smoke from the left engine as I entered the clouds. I left the power full as any time I brought the power back it felt like the left engine was going to quit. I notified ATC. They vectored me for the ILS XX; when i did bring the power back to fly the approach and land; the engine was smooth and did not quit. As a precaution I had the airport fire trucks come over and make sure there was no sign of fire or further smoke upon landing. They advised they didnt see anything unusual. I then taxied to the gate and wrote the airplane up.

Light Twin Cessna Captain reported an uneventful air return due to left engine severe engine roughness during initial climb.


Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted

We flew the ZZZ RNAV Y Runway XX approach twice and went missed approach both times due to weather. After the second missed approach Approach Control did not have a clear plan to start using the ILS Runway X and we did not have enough fuel to wait any longer; so we diverted to ZZZ1; which was listed as our first alternate on the Dispatch release.ZZZ-ZZZ1 is a very short flight in busy airspace; requiring a lot of attention and setup in the FMS. After a few minutes I sent a text message to Dispatch notifying them that we were diverting to ZZZ1. We then received several text messages from Dispatch regarding the need to discuss and agree to a diversion airport; amend the release; fuel remaining; and contacting ZZZ1 station.Our text-based communication system is slow; tedious; and simply takes too much time and attention away from higher priority tasks of flying and navigating the airplane during a very busy time. It was extremely frustrating that Dispatch seems to think we should just drop everything we are doing and engage in a text conversation with them; hunting and pecking on a keyboard; instead of getting set up for an approach and flying the airplane in a busy terminal area.We landed in ZZZ1 and parked at the gate and I spoke to Dispatch on the phone. We were not able to communicate with Dispatch in a timely manner to discuss our diversion and amend the Dispatch release.Dispatchers rarely get to witness from the jumpseat missed approaches and diversions in busy airspace; so I don't think they realize how slow and impractical it is for pilots to text with them during very busy situations. Dispatchers should recognize that some diversion situations are much busier than others and limit their communication to simple messages such as 'We see that you are diverting; contact us when you can.'

EMB-175 Captain reported that a text conversation with Dispatch resulted in a high workload during a diversion.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 6706; Flight Crew Type 2706

Workload; Time Pressure; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 4597; Flight Crew Type 4163

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Company Policy; Staffing; Procedure; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

Advised via ACARS of potential tail tip condition on arrival in DEN. Advised flight attendants of possible delay of jet bridge for offloading paxs and we would leave the seatbelt sign on until safe to deplane. On parking at [the] gate; First Officer saw the tail stand off the right side of the aircraft. Jet bridge approached as soon as ground power was established and engines shut down. It seemed too quick for my comfort; so I kept the seat belt sign on; and went to talk to the gate agent. Gate agent was unaware of tail tip situation; so I went outside and down the jet bridge to visually confirm the tail stand. I did not see it in place yet; so spoke with ramp person. He said they were moving it in place at that time. When it was in place I went back to flight deck and turned off seat belt sign. Maybe ramp procedures allow the jet bridge to come up to the aircraft as the stand is being positioned. I was cautious wanting to make sure it was in place; as the procedures have changed a few times recently.

A Boeing 737 flight crew reported that a tail stand; used to protect against a tail-tip situation; was not installed by the ground crew in a timely fashion.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Rejected takeoff due to failure to rotate at 105 kts (after V1). No amount of pressure on the yoke would cause the nose to lift.  The flight control check was done before and after the event. Was satisfactory both times. Trim was set. Notified company and write up was completed. This is a high cycle airplane which may have been a factor.

Reporter stated that the control problem was found to have been caused by tape that was left on the Inner Spring mechanism of the elevator trim system. Reporter said that the tape was in place because the aircraft had been in long term storage and that tape removal was on the maintenance job card; but had been overlooked. Reporter stated that the restriction on the Inner Springs could not be felt during the ground checks; but definitely affected the elevator control at speed.

Dash 8-100 flight crew reported executing a high speed rejected takeoff after being unable to rotate. Satisfactory flight control checks were reported to have been accomplished before and after the event.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Workload; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were filed and cleared to fly to DFW on the BRDJE 1 RNAV ARRIVAL. At the time DFW was landing south. Before leaving a ROUTE-LEGS check was accomplished including all the airspeeds and altitudes on the BRDJE 1 ARRIVAL. Descending into DFW and after departing SEEVR; the Controller called and asked us to verify that we were on the SEEVR arrival and I looked down at the PDC and told the First Officer (FO) to respond that our clearance was on the BRDJE arrival. The Controller then issued instructions to descend to 12;000 feet as quickly as possible and started giving vectors in order to get us down and in sequence to land on Runway 17C. After talking through this with the FO; we realized another controller had told us previously when we were in the descent; that after SEEVR; to fly the SEEVR 1. We looked down at the NAV display and saw that we were heading to SEEVR and wondered why the controller would say that. I wondered if the controller wanted us to descend via the arrival. So the FO queried the controller and asked if he wanted us to descend via and he said no; just fly the SEEVR ARRIVAL. Seeing the SEEVR fix on the display; it did not register to either me or the FO that the controller was; in fact; changing the arrival.I realize that we did not get the message that the controller was changing the arrival from the BRDJE 1 to the SEEVR 1. Because the route-legs check had been accomplished back before we left we did not notice that it was a Landing North arrival when DFW was landing south. But having said that; this problem started all the way back before we even left the gate.First: We were filed on the BRDJE1 when DFW was landing south. We have seen on so many flights where the dispatcher has filed us on one arrival landing one direction when we know the airport is landing the other direction. Enroute; we hear other flights talking to FT Worth Center trying to change the arrival enroute and they're told to wait until they get to DFW. Second: We did everything we could to ensure the filed routing was correct in the FMS; including doing an airspeed and altitude check on every fix of the arrival into DFW. Most of the time I tell the FO that we will check all of those points sometime prior to the actual arrival about 45 minutes to an hour away. That would have more likely allowed us to catch this error. Third: The SEEVR 1 and the BRDJE 1 both have the SEEVR and BRDJE fixes which from a human factors perspective is just asking for trouble. I think this is an issue that needs to be changed. Fourth: If the controller had said; 'This is a change from the BRDJE 1 to the SEEVR 1' we would have more clearly realized what the controller was trying to say. Finally: If we would have taken a closer look at what the controller said to us approaching SEEVR we may have caught this error. But we did already realize that what the controller had said was slightly odd and we queried if he wanted us to descend via and he said no. We are constantly striving to be extremely vigilant on these new arrivals. Both the FO and I expressed a desire to not be someone who made an error and despite our best efforts; we just did not catch this. The controller was great and very quick to remedy the situation and get us back where we needed to be.

Both the Captain and I are very careful and conscientious people. We had spoken earlier about some human factors classes at the schoolhouse and how some things ATC says should be RED FLAGS for your present situation. When ATC assigned me an arrival I was 'already on' I thought he meant altitude. That was my RED FLAG that ATC was assigning us a change. I missed it. DARN IT!If ATC would say the words 'Change to your arrival routing' I would have caught on or better yet PLEASE stop using the same intersection names on these arrivals. That has thrown me off several times when trying to pull up an arrival in my iPad that has a fix named the same as another arrival. Co-Locate two intersections with different names if you need to; but having too many boys named 'Jim' in gym class is not going to be a gem of an experience. I just made that up; but I hope you get the point.

An air carrier crew cleared to SEEVR intersection was confused about their DFW STAR because their arrival changed from the BRDJE 1 RNAV to the SEEVR 1 while enroute and SEEVR is a shared waypoint.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During the relief briefing I failed to brief the relieving Controller that Aircraft X had made an instrument approach to LWA and that MKG Approach was still waiting for his cancellation. 15 Minutes later South Bend Approach called asking about the block that we had established over LWA. My relief said that they would find out about it; and a few minutes later South Bend called to inform us that Flight Service had called them with the cancellation.I will be more vigilant about aircraft that drop off the scope and still require my attention. I was training at the time; and the scope setup that the trainee uses is different than mine. On my scope setup; I have the dropped aircraft tags appear right over the LWA and BIV airports so that I am reminded that I need to get their cancellations. I also put the strip in a spot at an angle in the bay so that I remember to take care of it; or brief the status. Since these things are not done by everyone; I missed the information and it was not passed to the next controller.

MKG Controller reports that he forgot to let a relieving Controller know that an aircraft had just landed at an airport in their jurisdiction; but did not cancel IFR.  Relieving Controller did not know about this until quired by another Controller as to why the airport airspace was blocked.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 26000; Flight Crew Type 400

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Climbing out in IFR conditions I lost GPS signal to my KNS 750 which skewed my G5 heading. I was given a heading and had to check my magnetic compass to comply. My GPS signal came back after about 5 min. I don't believe their was any separation issues. I landed and called my mechanic and told him what happened. He thinks with the RAIM (Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring) that we have to ground the control surfaces. He has only heard of this one time before. I told him that I will not take that plane up again in IFR conditions without fully going through the panel.

C182 pilot reported temporary loss of GPS Navigation system during IFR flight.


Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

During the approach we were using icing speeds plus a 6 knot addition for head wind and using 36K card for speeds. There was a relatively small margin for error between approach speed and flaps overspeed. First Officer mentioned that he was fixated on the speed and missed several step down fixes due to speed fixation and he was watching GPS DME rather than LOC DME for the step downs and was confused on the non-precision approach. I was trying to help with calling out next altitudes and was distracted with new information that another airplane gave about ceiling height while we were inside the FAF. At the MAP I called MAP and the First Officer called maximum power flaps 15. I raised the flaps to 15 and set the power and watched for positive rate. After maybe 5 seconds with no positive rate indication; I noticed that we were still pitched to a level pitch. I said pitch up then we got a GPWS 'Terrain' message so I pulled on the controls and said you need to pitch up. He did pitch up very slowly and I was watching him to make sure that he continued to pitch up and missed the positive rate call. He noticed the gear down and pulled it up and we almost instantly got a clacker. He immediately pulled the flaps up and the clacker went away very quickly. Neither one of us noted the airspeed at the time of the clacker. We diverted and became saturated with preparing for the return flight after landing and I forgot to write up the flaps overspeed. I wrote it up on the next leg. The First Officer mentioned that it would have been more helpful if I had called out the step down fixes rather than the next altitude. Overall the First Officer did a good job considering my failure to make multiple callouts throughout the approach and the missed. I allowed myself to lose situational awareness and become distracted at a critical point in flight. The First Officer and I have discussed getting together on a regular basis and practicing abnormal procedures. I need to be more assertive and take the flight controls when I notice that we are getting too far behind. I really feel that I should have said 'my controls' and flown the missed approach when I noticed that we hadn't pitched up. Up to that point everything wasn't perfect but was within a satisfactory margin. That was the point where the culmination of small errors started to erode our situational awareness resulting in a flaps overspeed clacker. I also should have debriefed with the First Officer immediately after landing rather than waiting to get home which would have eliminated the fact that I flew an airplane that needed the flaps to be inspected to become airworthy.

Briefed the approach for BC localizer including icing speeds plus additional 6 knots for strong headwind component of 19 knots making a very small buffer between approach speed and flap overspeed. Began descent and approach at proper distance; properly configured and stabilized on altitude and airspeed prior to crossing final approach fix. After crossing final approach fix I initiated descent using autopilot to first step down fix. I heard on the radio a flight telling Tower that if they had not used the RNAV approach [LPV DA 200] they would not have seen the runway environment. Tower then verified with us that we heard the report. Captain and I discussed that we wanted to continue this approach because it had the lowest minimums with acceptable wind. After this discussion I came back to the GPS to verify distance until next waypoint; became confused; glanced at the approach plate and then Captain called for next lower altitude. I was overly fixated on airspeed control due to +/- 5 knot variations with tight approach and overspeed spread with the step downs and level-offs. Captain then called missed approach point and I called for max power flaps 15. I set power levers and pulled back on yoke with no change in pitch. The Captain called for climb and pitch up. Confused at why the airplane was not climbing I pulled more and after a few seconds added trim up to relieve the pressure which then disengaged the autopilot and we began to climb with the Captain assisting on the yoke. Due to the poor climb out sequence; standard calls of positive rate/gear up; acceleration altitude; and red bug were missed which meant gear and flaps were left down and 15 degrees respectively. In the climb as we were approaching 160 knots I noticed the gear was still down and we were close to overspeed so I immediately raised the gear which then caused the airplane to accelerate which then caused flap overspeed chime to come on. I then raised the flaps immediately and we continued the diversion. After thinking about sequence of events; I realized the autopilot was still engaged due to my failure to push the go around button as I called for max power/ flaps 15 at the missed approach point. This is why the airplane would not climb when I pulled on the yoke and until I disconnected with trim. More thorough briefing on step downs and how they will be identified and called out during approach for non-precision approach. More practice on missed procedure callouts. Better situational awareness and keeping instrument scan moving. Brief push go around button when briefing missed approach.

ATR42 flight crew describes a LOC BC approach in icing conditions and turbulence; using an approach speed close to flap limit speed. The flying First Officer becomes confused; identifying stepdown fixes with GPS DME instead of LOC DME. At the MAP a missed approach is initiated but the go around button is not pushed and the aircraft remains in level flight until the trim switch is used; disconnecting the autopilot. The gear remains down and flap overspeeds occur. The flight diverts to an alternate airport.


Inspection; Installation; Repair; Testing

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

I Removed and Replaced (R/R) the Fuel Flow Transmitter on the Left-Hand Engine (# 1 Engine). This was due to an Engineering request that it be replaced since there was a history of high fuel consumption. When the Task was completed; I performed an Engine Run to [do] Operational/Leak Check of the engine. No faults were noted. The aircraft flew ZZZ to ZZZ1 with no faults. Upon landing on the return ZZZ1-ZZZ trip; when the Thrust Reversers were deployed; the Left-Hand Engine shut down. When the aircraft was inspected; it was discovered the gasket for the [Fuel] 'In' tube at the Fuel/Oil Cooler had failed. I had replaced the same gasket the night before as part of the Fuel Flow (F/F) Transmitter replacement. At this time I am not aware if this is the result of a gasket failure or procedural error on my part.

Reporter stated the Fuel/Oil Cooler is mounted on the right side of the combustion case on GE CF6-8 engines. He had to remove a fuel line (tube) that ran from the Fuel Flow (F/F) Transmitter to the Fuel/Oil Cooler in order to replace the F/F Transmitter. The metal gasket he installed between the 'In' tube coupling flange on the fuel line and the Fuel/Oil Cooler housing flange has an 'O-Ring' type seal on both sides of the gasket. When Maintenance opened-up the CF6 Engine cowling after the engine had shutdown on landing; a small amount of fuel was noticed on the engine. But; when the Engine Leak Check Run was performed; fuel was spraying everywhere.Reporter stated a piece of the 'O-Ring' seal was missing from the metal gasket; but he doesn't know if one; or both seals were cut; or missing a seal section when he installed the metal gasket. The B767-300 did fly two legs without any known problems prior to the shut down. He noted that having the engine shut down on landing was a better situation than having the seal fail on Takeoff with a potential engine fire. A new gasket was installed; Engine Run accomplished; no further leaks.

A Line Mechanic reports the left engine on a company B767-300 aircraft had shutdown on landing when the thrust reversers were deployed. A metal gasket he had installed between the fuel/oil cooler housing and the fuel 'In' tube connection to the fuel/oil cooler had failed.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 6800; Flight Crew Type 550

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

On the initial climb I noticed fuel gauges showed lower than during the preflight; then I noticed the left generator inoperative light on that was followed by flickering of the PFD and MFD displays on both pilot and co-pilot sides.  I informed the Co-Pilot to tell ATC that we were heading back and to lower the landing gear.  ATC asked if we wanted to declare an emergency; we declined.  When the Co-Pilot attempted to lower the gear the panel lost all electrical power and communication was lost.  I shut the master and generators off and reset them back on.  We regained electrical power out of both generators.  We advised ATC that we had regained electrical power and they asked our intentions.  We advised them that we would continue to our destination.  ATC gave us vectors to the north and we started the turn except that PFD's were still getting aligned and magnetic compass was spinning.  Seconds later we regained heading information in our PFD's and resumed the flight.

King Air Captain experiences a left generator inoperative light on; that was followed by flickering of the PFD and MFD displays on both pilot and co-pilot sides.  The Captain instructs the First Officer to lower the landing gear which apparently kills the entire electrical system.  The electrical system is successfully reset and flight continues to destination.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

FA B and FA D repeatedly requested all passengers in the same party to lift and secure face coverings. Passengers would only cover up when flight attendants walked by.

Flight Attendant reported a group of passengers were no compliant with face mask policy during flight.


Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

We were performing a Maintenance flight; and during the initial climb after takeoff passing through 1;000 feet; we started a right turn to a heading of 270. As we started our right turn the engine developed a compressor stall.  We leveled off; declared an emergency with the Tower; and requested delay vectors to run the checklist.  After completing the required QRH checklist; we requested the longest available runway; we accomplished the climb; in-range; and landing checklists; returning to our departure airport.  We operated the engine at reduced power following the QRH checklist.  We experienced vibrations followed by loud bangs; with a delay the EAD finally posted a R ENG COMP STALL followed by ENG R SYS FAIL MSG. The landing was uneventful with the fire trucks standing by; after we had requested an inspection of the right engine. The fire truck reported no visible damage. The taxi in was normal with no additional problems with only the R ENG COMP STALL msg.

When climbing through 1;000 feet during a maintenance test flight; the right engine of a B717-200 developed a compressor stall. The crew leveled; reduced power on the malfunctioning engine; declared an emergency; and returned to land.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 86; Flight Crew Total 7340; Flight Crew Type 3514

Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 51; Flight Crew Type 51

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter FOD

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

When I pulled up the initial flight plan for Aircraft X Date I noticed an inordinate number of maintenance issues; so much so that I added 500 lbs. of fuel to cover possible extended ground operations that come with a pneumatic ground start to start engine 1 and follow on crossbleed start to start engine 2. Existing deferred items on the aircraft included: APU Bleed Air Supply System inoperative; Engine 2 Fire Loop B inoperative; AC External Power Ground Power Control Unit inoperative; One latch for hydraulic hand pump inoperative; Maintenance status message DAR displayed on lower ECAM screen; Fuel Center Tank Pump 1 low power (Auto Fuel Feed System Inoperative).Ultimately; the APU was not available to provide pneumatic air to heat the aircraft; but was required to provide electrical power since the external power receptacle was deferred inoperative. It was extremely cold out (-9 C) and a hot air cart had been connected to the aircraft prior to our arrival to heat the cabin due to the inoperative APU bleed. When we got to the aircraft 'Green Reservoir Lo Air Pressure' was displayed on the upper ECAM screen. I reported it via Maintenance through ACARS and followed up with a phone call to Maintenance Control. Maintenance was called out to service the green hydraulic system. Boarding had already begun; so I elected not to stop it at that point. After this maintenance issue was sent I noticed the actual fuel on board was 18;400 lbs.; as opposed to the 9;800 lbs. that was planned for in Release 1. Dispatch was informed and Release 2 sent. I pulled it up and signed it; then finished my cockpit flows. Once this was completed I updated the passengers on the status of the flight and the maintenance issues we were working.At this point; getting ready to block out as soon as maintenance was completed; we noticed no air cart for the pneumatic air start. We contacted Operations and coordinated to have a cart positioned for the air start. The Ramp Lead came up on the flight deck to coordinate the start; and we briefed the procedures. The Mechanic came up to check the status of the Low Air Pressure on the Green Hydraulic system; and it was still showing Low Pressure. I contacted Maintenance Control again while the Mechanic was on the flight deck; and he was then told to contact Maintenance Control for additional steps to take to correct the problem. This took another 20 to 30 minutes; during which time the passengers were updated again.The Mechanic was finally able to correct the low air pressure on the green system; and we got a clean Maintenance Release Document (MRD) at around XA45 local time. At this point we were an hour late for departure; and we were concerned with passenger connections. Some passengers had already opted to get off of the flight; and others were asking about it. At about that time the new MRD started printing so we quickly verified it and made sure it was correct. With Maintenance completed we had the Gate Agent close the boarding door and pull the jetway. We completed our final checklists and established communications with the ground crew. When they said they were ready we advised Ground Control of the pneumatic start on the gate. The QRH procedure for Ground Pneumatic Start was followed. I coordinated with the Ramp Lead on the headset confirming they were ready for #1 engine start. With confirmation we asked for air on #1. The start went normally until the engine reached idle rpm; at which point we felt abnormal vibration and shut it down. After we shut down the Ground Crew advised us we had ingested the heater hose into the #1 engine. I assumed when I asked the Ground Crew if they were ready to start the #1 engine that the area was clear and the heater cart had been pulled and stowed. This turned out to be a very bad assumption.

Prior to arriving at Aircraft X; nose number X in ZZZ; the Captain and I discussed our Operational Flight Plan for Aircraft X on Date. It was -9C and the aircraft had an inoperative APU bleed system; therefore; we would need low pressure ground air in order to heat the cabin and flight deck. Upon arriving at the aircraft; during the preflight the captain discovered the 'Green Reservoir Lo Air Pressure' message on the ECAM; so he contacted Maintenance Control regarding the hydraulic issue. Initially the Captain elected to stop the boarding process; but Maintenance assured him that the process would only take about fifteen minutes. The passengers then continued to board while we worked with Maintenance on the hydraulic issue. Maintenance took longer than expected to resolve the issue; and at this point the aircraft was completely boarded. When the Ground Crew asked the Captain whether we were ready to disconnect the low pressure air; the Captain replied that we would continue to need the low pressure air in order to provide heat to the passengers; as we were not finished working through the hydraulic maintenance issue. After Maintenance resolved the hydraulic issue; we were ready to continue the flight once we were back in service. During my Pilot Flying briefing; I briefed the operational threats associated with our flight this morning and we discussed the importance of slowing down and making sure everything was done correctly. We would need a high pressure air cart in lieu of the APU in order to start the first engine. I used the Ground Pneumatic Start Supplementary Procedure from the Flight Manual to start engine one. Upon reaching idle; we noticed an abnormal vibration and the Captain turned the engine master to OFF. We then received a call from the Ground Crew advising us that engine number one had ingested the low pressure air hose. After we shut down the engine; we debriefed; contacted Maintenance and safely deplaned the passengers with no further event.

Air carrier flight crew reported after starting the number one engine there was abnormal vibration due to ingesting the hot air heater cart hose. They shut down the engine and deplaned passengers.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Strong burning smell like hot wires shortly after departure. Since bleed air (heater) was on; my first step was to turn bleed air off assuming that is likely engine fumes. The switch would not turn off air; and hot air continued to enter and smell persisted. Thermostat control also would not change the air flow. Since the smell was abnormal and stronger than a common smell of TKS entering the engine (the TKS system was not used); I elected to return to ZZZ which had airport fire facilities and was only a few minutes away. In the event that were was a fire or something was about to catch fire; I elected to request priority handling and executed the in cabin fire checklist. Upon landing at ZZZ; no further indication of fire was present and I meet the airport fire on the ramp. Their investigation did not find anything that was or had been burning. Aircraft was secured on the ramp for inspection by a mechanic.

C-208 Captain reported a burning odor during initial climb resulting in a return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 95; Flight Crew Total 13293; Flight Crew Type 10124

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 0; Flight Crew Total 758; Flight Crew Type 758

As pilot monitoring; first officer was receiving a Line Check for a requalification; due to a lapse in currency due to COVID-19 pandemic.During the takeoff roll; I checked all airspeed indications on both sides of the cockpit per SOP.  At 100 knots entering the high-speed regime; I observed my airspeed indicator (Captain's); was now reading zero airspeed and there was an orange flag.  I realized the airspeed indicator had failed and I called out the reject and took positive control of the aircraft.The auto brakes activated in the RTO function and we cleared the runway and followed SOPs.The aircraft [was taken] out of service for further inspections.  There were no injuries to either crew or passengers and no damage to the aircraft.

While departing on the takeoff roll; the Captain initiated a rejected takeoff.  Once the rejected takeoff was initiated; I radioed Tower; advised of the reject and asked for vehicles due to possible hot brake conditions. I then addressed the passengers and asked them to remain seated. The rejected takeoff was initiated above 85 kts (because the RTO brakes engaged automatically) but prior to the 100 kt callout.  The Captain appropriately exited the runway and advised me that he had a witnessed a faulty airspeed indicator display which is why he elected to reject the takeoff.Once clear of the runway; and stopped on the taxiway; we initiated the Rejected Takeoff QRH/QRC procedures.  Once complete; we made proper notifications to the cabin crew; ATC; dispatch and company.The entire event was handled very professionally and efficiently by all involved.Once at the gate; the passengers were all booked on a later flight to ZZZ1 [airport]; the aircraft was removed from service; and the airspeed indicator was replaced.  The Captain and I operated the same aircraft back to ZZZ1 the next morning without issue.

Air carrier Captain reported the airspeed indicator failed on the Captain's side during takeoff roll resulting in a rejected takeoff.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure

We got a call for a Main Landing Gear tire showing cord. We arrived as the passengers were starting to board. My partner started jacking the plane & I serviced the tire. We removed the old tire; swapped them out; and everything seemed to fit fine. We loaded up and went to the parts department to get another tire. It was then that we discovered our mistake and immediately called our lead to try to stop the plane; but it was too late.We went straight over to parts to swap out tires; entered our info on the computer; and realized what had happened.If I knew exactly why; this never would have happened. As we were leaving; another mechanic was using our truck to service a CRJ 900 tire. We arrived at the CRJ 700; feeling a little pressure to get it done quickly; as the passengers were boarding as we got there. I serviced a tire; we swapped it out; and got out of the rampers' way so the plane could be pushed back. The only difference in the two tires is the shoulder width at the hub; and we didn't catch it. The lead on duty was immediately contacted; to see if we could keep the plane from taking off; but it was too late.I need to be more vigilant in learning the new company policies on the color coded caps on the tires for identification purposes; and double check that I'm on the correct CRJ in the future.

This event happened on the ramp during routine line maintenance. A main landing gear tire assembly needed changed on a CRJ 700. A CRJ 900 main landing gear tire assembly was installed on the aircraft. Once we had finished changing the tire we were returning it to our stores department; when it occurred to me that we had used a CRJ 900 tire assembly.We arrived at the aircraft inspected the tire determined it needed changed so I began jacking the aircraft and then proceeded to remove the tire assembly while I was doing this my partner was inflating the new tire assembly in our work vehicle and brought it out to the aircraft. Then we both proceeded to install the new CRJ900 tire assembly on the aircraft; which fits perfectly so no suspicion was raised. Once we realized what had happened we immediately notified the supervisor in charge at the time. Be more vigilant of the CRJ 700 and CRJ 900 tires because they are very similar.

Maintenance installed an incorrect tire on a CRJ-900 aircraft.


Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Guest noted with vented mask enroute. Was advised of the policy change which prevents those vented masks. She indicated she was a doctor and was explaining the venting technology. I apologized and referred to the policy. If the station catches these prior it would reduce the in-flight workload.

Flight attendant reported a passenger was wearing a vented face mask which is not in compliance with policy.