Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 6000

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Following a delayed taxi; Logan Tower cleared Aircraft X for takeoff on runway 27. After takeoff thrust was set an aircraft on Tower frequency declared that aircraft had snow contamination on its left inboard flap. After hearing the ambiguous radio call; I decided the safest course of action was to reject the take off. After clearing the active runway the copilot queried the Tower which aircraft had the contaminated surface. The Tower stated that the radio call was directed act another aircraft. Facing another lengthy delay taxi to the active runway I elected to return to the gate for more fuel.

I was the First Officer and Pilot Flying and the Captain was the Pilot Monitoring. We taxied out to runway 27 and proceeded to wait in a lengthy line for takeoff. Upon receiving takeoff clearance I added thrust; initiated the takeoff roll; and began my callouts. At approximately 50-60 knots; a pilot who I believe identified themselves as Aircraft Y made a radio transmission on Tower frequency stating; 'the aircraft in front of us'; has ice or snow on their wings and flaps. Due to the ambiguity of the report and safety concerns; it immediately caught my attention and at the same time; the Captain initiated the rejected takeoff at a low speed. I immediately notified ATC of the rejected takeoff and then made a PA for the passengers to remain seated. I notified Tower no assistance would be necessary and informed them that we rejected because we were uncertain if the radio transmission was about our aircraft or a different aircraft of our similar carrier. ATC responded that they were talking about a different aircraft of our carrier so we notified them that we would rejoin the line for takeoff. We rejoined the line and completed the checklists but after a second lengthy taxi and wait in line; we decided to return to the gate to refuel. Upon receiving our fuel and accommodating passengers; we departed without further incident and safely arrived at our destination airport shortly thereafter.

An air crew; after having applied takeoff thrust; heard a radio call that stated that an aircraft had snow contamination on its left inboard flap. Thinking that the call may have been meant for them; they rejected the takeoff. The call was not for them.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 10000

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Manuals; Procedure

Two aircraft departed. We departed VFR climbed as a formation to 16;500 feet direct to our final destination. We called Center at 9;000 feet climbing to 16;500 feet. I advised the Controller we were 2 aircraft in formation. We received a single transponder code. One aircraft took the code and the other remained on 1200. We spoke to Center and then Approach until handed to Tower. After landing we were informed that the second aircraft should not have crossed the ADIZ without its own code. I explained that Center gave us a single code and was aware we were a flight of two aircraft. I was the pilot of the lead aircraft. Ground Control told us they has spoken to Center and it wasn't a big deal but be aware each aircraft should have a discrete code. After clearing customs I was advised that in the future be aware that both planes should have a code other than 1200. The Customs person told me just be aware of this in the future.

C525 pilot reported the wingman did not have a discrete code that was required for the airspace they flew through while in formation.


PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 37; Flight Crew Total 283; Flight Crew Type 27

Time Pressure; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Weather

I was training a 100 hour Developmental on the Local position which was combined with ground at the time. After sitting for 45 minutes with no traffic; traffic built quickly and we immediately had 3 arrivals from radar. The Cirrus was on a downwind and the Malibu was on a 4 mile final. The Cirrus was cleared touch and go and number one and the Malibu was cleared to land number two behind the Cirrus. When the Cirrus took his base out a little further than expected; I told the developmental to tell the Cirrus to cross final and rejoin the opposite down wind. The Cirrus was not in a good spot to be in front of the Malibu and I was taken by surprise by this. I am not sure if the Cirrus actually extended his downwind slightly; or made a dogleg base; and ended up much closer to the Malibu than I thought they would be. It is possible that when I told the Cirrus to cross final he maneuvered off the normal base because he did not understand what I needed him to do. Just prior to the conflict alert (CA/CA) going off; I got them both in sight in the haze and realized they were not where I thought they were initially.As the CA/CA went off; I told the Cirrus to fly eastbound immediately; and the pilot complied as he was already turning to avoid the Malibu on 2 mile final.Well; honestly; the only recommendation I can make is that I should not let a developmental go as far as I did. This is a pretty common recommendation; from the [Safety] Briefings I have read; and it looks like I got caught in the classic trap.

I was on a VFR cross country with my student from ZZZ. We filed a VFR flight plan and picked up VFR flight-following to our destination. We were instructed to enter a left downwind for Runway 24 by Approach and then contacted Tower. Tower then cleared us to land; and I responded telling tower we wanted a touch-and-go; since we were heading right back to ZZZ. We were then cleared for the option. Once we were on downwind and abeam the approach end of the runway; my student let tower know our position (flight school procedure at our home airport); and then we were cleared for the option. I then hear tower notifying another aircraft of our position; saying we were on left base when we were still on downwind. I did not tell tower that we were still on downwind; since we were nearing our base turn. Once we were on base; I heard another aircraft cleared to land the same runway. Immediately after; tower instructed us to cross final path and enter a right base for the same runway. I read back the clearance; and looked to my right (farther up final approach path) and saw an aircraft in close proximity on final for 24. This aircraft was on collision course with ours. I immediately took evasive action; banking hard right with full power. As I did this; I saw the other aircraft bank away as well. I then was downwind again; and told tower as we joined final approach course again.I am not sure if haze was a factor; but I did not see the other aircraft until stated above. The visibility was reported at 10SM; however at altitude I would say it was closer to 4 or 5SM. Also; I do not remember our traffic alert system notifying us of any nearby traffic. I believe I followed every ATC instruction. I was not fatigued or physically affected in any way; and my student stated the same. Looking back on it; I should have questioned ATC about the instructions to cross through final approach path and enter a right base; rather than just reading back the instructions.

A Controller supervising a Developmental and an Instructor Pilot report the Student Pilot delayed the base turn which caused a conflict with another aircraft on final. The Developmental Controller was slow to resolve the conflict so the Supervisory Controller interceded.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Aircraft X was in normal hand-off status with PCTZ sector E1L.  The aircraft was on the correct code.  I was involved in separating aircraft that were stacked the wrong way and on bad routes coming from another sector within my area.  I noticed the approach controller did not take my hand-off yet and I called to make the hand-off.  After several failed attempts of reaching the controller I told the aircraft to execute a tight right 360 degree turn.  I then talked to the controller at PCTZ and they did not see the hand-off.  They saw a code and called the aircraft radar contact; but did not understand who it was or what they were doing.  I then talked to the controller about 10-15 minutes later and they said it was an ERAM issue. I should have asked for a d-side.

ZDC Controller tries to handoff an aircraft to PCT; but due to the use of ERAM; the receiving Controller did not see the handoff until the Center Controller called them.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 194; Flight Crew Total 477; Flight Crew Type 259

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

My private pilot student and I were practicing takeoff and landings with full-stop taxi backs each time. We had just announced on the CTAF frequency that we were departing on Runway X to remain in the pattern (this was our 6th takeoff on Runway X; and we had been in the traffic pattern for some time; the whole time using Runway X. There were also 1-2 other aircraft in the pattern at various times that were also using Runway X with us; without any issues.) As the student was rotating to lift-off; we heard another aircraft announce on the CTAF frequency that he was departing Runway XY. I immediately made a second call that we were taking off on Runway X and rotating at that moment; unsure if the other aircraft had heard our prior transmission. I was preparing to instruct my student to abort the takeoff; however; after a quick evaluation I made the determination that we would not have enough remaining runway distance to bring the aircraft to a safe stop. Soon after takeoff and as we approached 400 feet AGL; my student yelled out; 'Oh my God; there he is!' I immediately announced 'my controls;' took control of the flight controls; and aggressively banked to the left while pitching up; away from the aircraft. As I did so; I noticed the other aircraft directly in front of us; passing from our left to right. I estimated the other aircraft was within 100 feet of our altitude and 500-600 feet horizontally from our aircraft. I continued to fly the aircraft due north away from the airport; and safely began climbing us towards 2;500 feet. As we left I made an announcement on CTAF that we were departing the area to the Northeast; at that time; the other aircraft made a transmission; saying 'ZZZ traffic; sorry about that last one.'I believe the other pilot's disregard of our transmission (whether due to missing it or consciously disregarding it) was a key contributing factor to this incident. Upon reviewing the incident with my student and using it as a teachable moment; we discussed the importance of being vigilant at non-towered airports; making sure we listen to other aircraft transmissions; and never deciding to takeoff if another aircraft has already announced they were taking off on a cross runway. I also discussed had this occurred again; instead of simply making a second announcement I could have specifically asked the other aircraft to verify that they had heard our transmission.

Instructor Pilot reported a NMAC on departure with another aircraft departing a different runway.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

This type of event happens way too often in the Ocean area of ZMA.  I have been at work before working sector 62 or 63 and the same thing has happened to me so I feel compelled to write this report. On Date there was a massive equipment failure. GDT (Radar and comm site) failed along with the GDT frequencies. The ZNY ATOP system failed also; along with the Santo Domingo ADE (Flight Plan Processing) system.Because we are only one source of RADAR coverage and only one site of frequencies at sectors 62/63; when these fail it makes it impossible to provide safe air traffic services to the flying public. The Ocean area is in desperate need of some redundancy as we are constantly in danger of losing our only source of surveillance and usable frequencies. Whether it's because of maintenance or every year during hurricane season. If these type of events happen once it's one too many. Controllers were put in harms way and took drastic measures to maintain some type of order and safety to the flying public. It could've been horrible for everyone involved. Thankfully; there was no need to be on the evening news because of a catastrophic event. We need overlapping sources of surveillance and we need more coverage and back ups for the frequencies. We feel there is a lack of attention in the Ocean area and the flying public isn't aware of the potential danger. If the airspace was over CONUS (Continental United States) we would not be asked to deal with this. We are constantly having to use landlines to speak to foreign facilities because of the failures on the MEVA's [Multi National Network System; Mejoras al Enlace de VOZ del ATS].  Please look into these issues and finally do something.

I was working R62 combined with sector 43 and 63. The GTK radar failed around XA:30Z together with all frequencies at the GTK site. I was unable to communicate with any airplanes under my control initially. I started broadcasting on 121.50 off the ZIN site; and tried to advise all airplanes on frequency 126.45 and 135.20 that we had lost the radar and the frequencies; followed by an advisory to use extreme caution. There was also a lot of weather in the sector with a majority of airplanes in sector 62 and 63 deviating.  I also kept broadcasting on 121.50 informing the airplanes to use extreme caution due to the outages; and to try to reach me on frequency 123.77 (ZIN site). I also tried reaching out to airplanes from the ZIN 126.45 site; but that frequency is very unreliable and I was unable to communicate there initially. After having re-established communications with numerous aircraft; now on frequency 123.77; I was able to take appropriate actions to separate airplanes that needed vertical separation; and re-routed some northbound airplanes to the west towards frequency and radar coverage. I established vertical separation with these airplanes. With the help of surrounding sectors; surrounding facilities and great teamwork in the area; we were able to avoid any disastrous consequences.We need a new backup frequency site that can cover the entirety of sector 62 and 63; and more importantly an additional radar/ADS-B feed that will prevent us from going non-radar. We cannot rely purely on non-radar procedures if we lose the frequency. There needs to be a push to fix these problems! Additionally; we need to make sure the backup frequencies actually work properly. 126.45 at ZIN was working horribly and could not be considered as a reliable backup frequency; especially during times it was most needed.

ZMA Center Controller reported repeated radar and communication site outages in the Oceanic Area create unsafe situations. The reporter states there are no backup systems to the main sites.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 200

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Planned trip to occur during the afternoon. Initially planned as an IFR trip but before takeoff; elected to proceed VFR to remain below the cloud bases and possible icing conditions. Flight proceeded as planned but at just over the halfway point; lowering cloud conditions forced a cruise altitude of 1;000 feet AGL. Finding this to be uncomfortable; I contacted Center to request an IFR clearance to my destination. Once granted; I climbed to 5;000 feet. I had previously reviewed icing charts which indicated that once past the halfway point; there would be no icing at 5;000 feet. Furthermore; a pilot on frequency (by this time; Approach Control); reported VMC; between layers and no icing. During descent for the RNAV approach; detected trace icing which became light rime as the approach progressed. Nearing the ground; the ice began to disappear as I encountered warmer temperatures. The airplane's handling was unaffected and the approach and landing were otherwise uneventful.With the clarity of hindsight; instead of requesting an IFR clearance and climbing; I would have initiated a 180 degree turn and returned to my departure airport or a suitable deviation airport. My airplane is not configured for icing conditions and NO ICE has to be my rule. Even though the winds aloft forecast indicated that I should have been below the freezing level; when it's close; sometimes it doesn't go your way. Won't do that again; not worth it.

PA-32 pilot reported encountering clouds and possible icing that required a pop-up IFR clearance to complete the flight.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 6626; Flight Crew Type 1100

This STAR is notorious for the multiple step-down altitude assignments given by ATC after crossing PIRYT at FL240 inbound to SBA; but today took the cake. Today I was assigned EIGHT step-down altitudes between PIRYT and KWANG; a distance of only 37 miles. Specifically; after crossing PIRYT at FL240 I was assigned FL210; then FL200; then FL180; then 17;000; then 15;000; then 13;000; then 11;000; then 9;000; before finally being handed off to Santa Barbara TRACON (who immediately issued 2;000). This was all in the space of about 10 minutes. It is already challenging enough to have to cross PIRYT at FL240 and make SBA; so one is compelled to use a high rate of descent. When issued these multiple individual step-downs; it is maddening because it seems you get each one only after leveling at the previous one; necessitating autopilot mode changes every time and providing a real rocking horse of a descent for passengers. If you as a pilot try to mitigate this by using a lower rate of descent; and try to guess how many step-downs you'll get; you end up so high over KWANG as to make normal descent into SBA difficult or impossible. (The only crossing altitude on the STAR is FL240 at PIRYT.) Arrival is a busy enough time with all the other required tasks; so injecting EIGHT separate altitude assignments in so short a distance/time really is asking for task overload; especially for single-pilot operators like myself. This can't be much fun for ATC; either; so whatever is compelling ATC to have to resort to this needs to be looked at. Again; this rapid-fire multi-assigned altitude dance seems to be the norm for this STAR; this was just the worst one I have seen yet and it prompted me to file this report. The whole purpose of these RNAV STAR procedures is to eliminate the need for this kind of thing. They're supposed to decrease the burden on both ATC and the pilot; but this one has done the opposite.

Single pilot reported ATC assigns multiple step-down altitudes in a short time and distance on the PITBL STAR.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 6500; Flight Crew Type 2170

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Weather; Procedure

Optimum Performance Descent/Arrival Procedures in MEM are brand new to both ATC and flight crews. We were flying the LTOWNE6 RNAV arrival for the first time. The flight crew and ATC encountered confusion at or near LTWONE Intersection. Operations at MEM switched from landing south to landing north right about the time we crossed LTOWNE Intersection. Two different track options exist after LTOWNE Intersection.This crew understood from ATC that we should continue on the North option (track) after LTOWNE despite the fact that MEM was now landing north. The Controller used the phrase 'North transition' which is nowhere to be found in writing on the STAR chart.This situation became a non-issue when the Controller helped clarify what was expected of us by clearing us direct to a point south of LTWONE to rejoin the arrival. We complied exactly as we understood the instructions; discussed together; and received clarification/asked questions as needed.MEM ATC and our company have been working together to reduce confusion; clarify controller phraseology; and maximize efficiency with the use of these new 'OPD' arrivals. A great example of this relates to our flight/situation. On AUG2012 a clarifying 'vital' message was received entitled 'OPD Update' that clarified the meaning of the Controller used term 'north transition.' It was also mentioned in this message that an Aerodrome (AD) change bulletin would be forthcoming.In the future; to reduce confusion; I think that ATC 'phraseology' should be limited to options on an arrival/procedure that are printed on the procedure or given in a change bulletin (especially on newly implemented 'trial procedures'). Seeking clarification from ATC is always best; but sometimes not immediately possible and things occur at just the 'wrong time' (such as the airport 'turning around').

Confusion reigned at MEM when an A300 flight crew crossed LTOWN Intersection just as the airport was turning around to land to the north. When told to fly the 'North transition' the crew interpreted that to mean 'take the Northerly' track from LTOWN. ATC recognized the error and provided a clearance back to the 'Southerly' track appropriate for flights landing 'to' the north.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

During our descent via routing on the ROA.ALDAN1 arrival; we found a couple of issues. The route was entered over ROA VOR and proceeded normally.  We were assigned 'landing southwest' and programmed the required runway 23R transition and the 23R ILS approach.As we approached HARSH; crossing it at 8000'; the next indicated target was BUTTS at 6000'; all appeared normally.  Now the fun began.  As we crossed HARSH; the UNS-1Ew units in our airplane went right into approach mode; dumping the BUTTS intersection out of the system and showing the leg from PRSTN (on the 23R approach) to the FAF of BODLY.  The airplane - on autopilot - moved to intercept the inbound ILS course.  At this time we called RDU approach control and informed them of our issues in reestablishing BUTTS intersection and meeting the altitude restriction.  We were told; 'Don't worry about it; ...' and were told to turn to a heading for vectors to final.In researching the transition from arrival to approach we; and with the help of the Wichita teaching staff at Universal Avionics; found the following:1.)The Government printed chart does not show BUTTS intersection as a 'fly over' fix.  The routing depicted after BUTTS would lead one to believe a programmed vector would be followed automatically by the autopilot until ATC issued further instructions.2.)Reference; now; the same arrival as depicted by Jeppesen.  The BUTTS intersection is depicted as a 'fly over' fix and the programmed vector 151 degrees after BUTTS is depicted.3.)Returning to the UNS-1Ew radio the next day; we reprogrammed the arrival and the 23R ILS transition into the flight plan page.  We found the canned arrival did not indicate BUTTS as a 'fly over' fix and the 151 degree programmed vector was not included.During programming; the UNS-1 inserts a 'No Link' (flashing) in between the different sections of the routing to alert the pilot to check their work. The Instructors at [a Flight Training academy]; in teaching the UNS-1 system; always recommend deleting the flashing 'No Link' tags.  This; coupled with the coding errors pointed out above; caused the UNS-1 to 'turn anticipate' and run an intercept to the ILS 23R inbound.As we had the opportunity to speak with the teaching staff at the Universal Wichita facility on training discrepancies before; they mentioned the [Flight Training academy] instructors; although having access to all the material; staff; and nav simulators at the Universal Wichita facility; generally make no effort to continue their education with the Universal staff.  The [Flight Training academy] training scenarios are such that removal of the flashing 'No Link' would never address a situation such as we found at RDU.And; looking at the charted routing for the ALDAN1; we see the route from the ALDAN intersection to the last fix; BUTTS intersection; with short legs and speed changes bridging the 10;000 foot transition altitude.  It would be easy to say; 'Can't our pilots calculate descent rates given speeds anymore?'  Sure; while changing that speed at 10;000 feet; completing close in pre-landing checklists; working with ATC and the FBO for passenger accommodations; and keeping one set of eyes outside for the 'See and Be Seen' collision avoidance...  I think my point is made...And while complaining about cartography; the FAA has made no movement on helping IFR pilots out while operating at satellite airports under Class B airspace by printing the Class B configuration on the enroute charts.  This is the '200 knot' trap we all face as IFR pilots further complicating the 'Descend Via' arrivals; should automation fail us.

CE560XL First Officer; on the ALDAN1 arrival to RDU; states that as he crossed HARSH; the UNS-1Ew units in his airplane went right into approach mode; dumping the BUTTS intersection out of the system and showing the leg from PRSTN (on the 23R approach) to the FAF of BODLY. He believes this occurs because BUTTS is not a fly over waypoint in the UNS-1Ew units in his airplane nor on the government charts but is a fly over waypoint on the Jepp chart.


Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Upon completing the aircraft exterior preflight and entering the jetway; I noticed Maintenance was talking to my Captain and the inbound pilot crew further up the jetway. After completing the interior cockpit preflight and logbook review; I determined that the aircraft was airworthy. After arriving at the gate at our destination; the Captain said he would do the post-flight walkaround. As I came out of the cockpit; two flight attendants informed me that as the aircraft touched down on the runway; sparks flew from the outlet plug located in the forward galley; adjacent to the forward service door. At this time; the Captain returned from the post-flight walkaround and I told the flight attendants to brief the Captain on the sparks shooting from the outlet. I told the Captain that we should document this as a defect in the aircraft logbook. The Captain replied that he didn't think it was necessary; I told him that I felt it was required. After finally agreeing; the Captain returned to the cockpit to make the necessary logbook entry. While he was doing that; the flight attendants told me that the inbound flight attendant crew in previous departure airport had informed them that upon landing; sparks flew from the same outlet. I asked for clarification from the flight attendants to make sure I understood correctly that this problem not only had just happened; but happened in the same way on the previous flight. They reiterated that my understanding was correct. At that point I asked the Captain; 'Were you aware of the outlet shooting sparks?' He replied; 'Yes.' I asked him why he didn't document it in the logbook for maintenance resolution and brief me on the faulty outlet. The Captain said he didn't think it was a big deal. I was not satisfied with that answer so I continued to press him for more information. He responded that after talking to Maintenance and the previous flight crew before departure; he felt it wasn't a big deal and apparently felt that including me in this discussion wasn't necessary. I vehemently disagreed with the fact that the Captain chose to make this decision without briefing me and documenting it in the aircraft logbook for proper maintenance resolution. Had I been aware of the faulty outlet in the previous airport; I would have refused to fly the aircraft until Maintenance satisfactorily addressed the issue. In retrospect; it is abundantly clear that the Captain's complete disregard for CRM and hazardous lack of judgment caused us to take an aircraft that was potentially not airworthy.

I was involved in an aircraft swap and when I arrived at the new aircraft the inbound Captain and a Company Mechanic were discussing a minor maintenance issue reported by a Flight Attendant on said aircraft. The Mechanic had troubleshot the issue; could not duplicate it and said ops checks good. Based on the reported issue and the fact that a Company Mechanic had checked it out; I felt there was no safety issue and I took the plane. Upon arrival at our destination; our flight attendants reported the same issue so I wrote it in the logbook and then called Dispatch and Maintenance Control to report it. I remarked to the First Officer that it is odd to have the same issue twice in the same day. The First Officer was performing his walkaround while the previous Captain and Mechanic were discussing the issue so he missed this conversation. I brought him up to speed on that conversation and he mentioned the previous crew should have documented the Mechanic's visit in the logbook but they didn't. At that point in time I believed that since the aircraft was not under my control during this transition (crew swap) that it was the previous crew's responsibility to document it.I am still a bit uncertain as to who was really obligated to document it since there was a transfer of aircraft control. The Mechanic stated to the previous Captain that the aircraft was airworthy; which was my #1 concern; and then they turned the aircraft over to me. However; after giving it more thought on the layover; I believe that since the previous crew ultimately did not document the visit by the Mechanic; the most conservative and prudent route would have been for me to do so or ask the Mechanic to do so. I don't feel this is a question of safety; but rather a possible lapse in documentation.I should have discussed this issue with the First Officer because he might have prompted me to follow up with the Mechanic. At least we would have had a discussion related to the matter. It's always best to have both of us thinking about the same issue. However; it didn't cross my mind during the swap to discuss it with him since I considered it to be a resolved issue. We were an hour and a half late so I was focusing on prepping the plane for departure.

A First Officer objected to flying an aircraft with a forward galley electrical problem which the Flight Attendant alerted him about; then discovered that the Captain had known about the problem before the previous departure and chosen not to address it.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Upon discovery; a special non-routine maintenance form was generated to both document and address this discrepancy.What: left hand main landing gear truck assembly data plate missing/broken.Why: possible material defect and or fatigue causing fracture and separation from aircraft.Where: fracture of data plate occurred aft of mounting bolt.When: presumably during aircraft flight; taxi or landing; due to high airflow during landing gear extension or impact of landing gear on runway during landing phase of flight.        1) Data plate material should be evaluated by engineering for possible material strength upgrade?2) Implement the relocation of data plate to a lesser airflow area of the truck assembly?3) Initiate a fleet campaign directive?4) Initiate an emergency engineering order?5) Revision to include a general visual inspection for the verification of the installation of these data plates on all work cards pertaining to main landing gear assemblies?6) Revision to include the verification of the installation of these data plates in the service/daily check instructions?7) Revision to include the verification of the installation of these data plates in the maintenance/trip/service checks C & A instructions?8) Revision to include the verification of the installation of these data plates in the maintenance/phase checks c & above instructions?9) Initiate a maintenance alert in an attempt to inform AMTS to include the verification of the presence of these data plates during their pre/post flight walk around?

A Maintenance Technician reported the data plate missing from the Left Main Landing Gear.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 26

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Denver Sector handed two aircraft off on converging courses at FL370. We had to call them numerous times and tell them how to separate these two aircraft.

ZMP Center Controller reported ZDV Center handed off two aircraft on converging courses.


Inspection; Installation; Repair; Testing

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Avionics; Maintenance Airframe

Maintenance Avionics 6; Maintenance Inspector 1; Maintenance Lead Technician 1; Maintenance Technician 2

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals

While working on Aircraft X; I was told to use an Engineering Repair Order (ERO) X to clean a contaminated insulation blanket; that goes inside the Electrical Equipment (E/E) compartment. When I tried to pull the ERO up on the computer system; the system said there was not one available. A Supervisor had to print it out from his e-mail so I could do my job. This ERO changes the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) from no cleaning with solvents allowed on insulation blankets; to using Naphtha (a highly flammable solvent) to clean insulation blankets. When cleaning the blankets I noticed wherever the Naphtha was applied; a shiny residue was left behind. I now know there is a regulation for the burn rate for the insulation and I believe the burn rate has now been damaged.

Reporter stated the Engineering Repair Order (ERO) affects all of their Aircraft X type fleet. He was told the new ERO procedures were going to be used system wide. The ERO changes the AMM from 'No cleaning of insulation blankets' to using Naphtha; a highly flammable fluid as an acceptable cleaner of insulation blankets for the entire aircraft; including blankets in the Electrical Equipment (E/E) bay/compartment. The Naphtha fluid also affects the Corrosion Inhibiting Compounds (CIC) that has been applied to the aircraft's interior side of the fuselage. Reporter stated he suspects the shiny residue left behind on the surface of the blankets after the Naphtha fluid dries; could accelerate a fire. He also believes the burn time could be impacted due to the affects of the Naphtha fluid on the fire retardant properties of the blankets.

A Contract Mechanic was directed to use an Engineering Order that allowed the use of Naphtha fluid; a highly flammable solvent; to clean their aircraft insulation blankets; including the blankets in the Electrical Equipment (E/E) compartment.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

I was the Captain and Pilot Flying (PF) for Aircraft X from ZZZ to Richmond (RIC) on November XX; 2020; and observed the following. During cruise flight my First Officer and Pilot Monitoring (PM) alerted me that the last time (back in July) that she flew into RIC the airplane caught a false localizer signal and turned no where near the centerline of the respective runway. Having reviewed the Weather Briefing Package; I determined that RIC would be landing to the north; and elected to load the Runway 34 ILS approach. I confirmed all the waypoints with my PM and set up accordingly. I hard tuned the localizer frequency of 110.7; set the approach course of 337 degrees; and set the minimums of 370 feet on the Primary Flight Display (PFD). We received a clearance to cross the NEAVL intersection at 11;000 with a speed of 250 knots. We met that restriction; and then got a clearance to proceed to the KAFKA intersection and pilot's discretion to maintain 2;000 feet. That waypoint was loaded and confirmed. We began a descent. About 12 miles from the airport I slowed the aircraft to 210 knots and had selected Flaps 1. We were about 3;000 feet; and I slowed further to 180 knots; with a setting of Flaps 2. We were about 7 miles from the KAFKA waypoint; and confirmed the airport was insight. I began slowing the plane to 160 knots. About 3 miles from KAFKA; and the approach mode in the armed position; the airplane selected the LOC mode on the PFD and began to turn towards Runway 2. I turned the autopilot off; and manually continued to fly towards the KAFKA waypoint to lose more altitude. The airplane was about 2;300 feet; with 1;700 feet selected in the altitude selector. I continued the approach; and we landed safely. My First Officer questioned the Tower as to why this would happen. The Tower stated that both the Runway 34; and Runway 2 localizers were operational. He said that he would inform the staff at the airport.

Captain reported aircraft turned towards wrong runway due to multiple localizers operational simultaniously.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 100; Flight Crew Type 100

Flew DJI Inspire drone into tree. I misjudged proximity to obstacle. Damaged onboard camera and rotor blade.

Phantom Pro 4 UAV Operator reported a collision with a tree during climb.


M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 1225; Flight Crew Type 475

Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Departed and attempted to raise landing gear. Received indication that landing gear did not retract. Initial troubleshooting was unsuccessful. Turned down radio to minimize distractions to further troubleshoot problems using aircraft manual. Realized that would be transiting military control area and reported to this agency that a problem was being troubleshot and that would be transiting that airspace. Heard no response and assumed that ATC was no longer active and that flight into airspace would be OK. Was able to raise gear after reviewing emergency procedures for same and continued on to destination. Only later realized that volume on radio had been turned down; and any response from ATC would not have been heard.

Mooney M20T pilot reported that the landing gear would not retract after takeoff. While dealing with that distraction he entered restricted airspace.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

While climbing out at about 29;000 FT MSL we began experiencing multiple instrument errors. The Mode Control Panel completely froze and we were unable to set altitude; airspeed; heading; or course. We also had an MEL of the fuel totalizer on the FMC. Since [our destination] was experiencing strong winds and moderate turbulence; we decided to return to [departure airport]. Enroute back; we encountered thunderstorms and had to receive help from ATC in navigating. We elected to land immediately which required an overweight landing. The Captain refused to declare an emergency. I disagreed with this decision.

B737-300 First Officer reported loss of MCP in climb; leading to a decision to return to departure airport; where they made a safe overweight landing.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

ZZZ approach needed to close for COVID cleaning. ZOB assumes control of approach airspace as part of the contingency plan. There are 2 major problems with the current contingency plan that could result in unsafe situations when this occurs. First and foremost; ZOB Controllers do not have enough training on the rules and procedures for vectoring for instrument approaches; especially ILS approaches. Yes this info is available in the 7110; but when you are working traffic it is not the right time to be constantly referencing the information. As a former Approach Controller; I trained for a long time; between classroom; lab and OJTI before I was certified to work a radar sector where I vectored for approaches. At the very least; Area X controllers without approach control experience need classroom training and several lab problems to be proficient enough to work ZZZ or ZZZ1 approach airspace.My second concern is the potential for sector overload when approach airspace is combined with ZOB airspace. Approach control service require a level of attention that cannot be maintained if higher altitude ZOB traffic is even moderately busy. The contingency plan should be rewritten to allow the Controller working the approach airspace to be a separate sector from ZOB's ZZZ (Y) and ZZZ1 (Z) sectors.Area X controllers without approach control experience need classroom training and several lab problems to be proficient enough to work ZZZ or ZZZ1 approach airspace. The contingency plan should be rewritten to allow the controller working approach airspace to be a separate sector from ZOB's ZZZ (Y) and ZZZ1 (Z) sectors.

Center Controller reported issues with another ATC facility; COVID cleaning; ATC Zero; and the contingency plan.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Upon arriving at the airport 2 hours early I pulled up the paperwork for the flight and saw that the plane had an inoperable APU. I also noticed we were going to continue to DEN with the same aircraft. We were scheduled for a 10:48 hours duty day with all things going smoothly. I texted the Captain with my concerns about flying two legs with an inoperative APU and that I wasn't comfortable with it. I finished my breakfast and walked to ops to meet the Captain. While in ops the Captain received a call and hung up and said he wasn't sure who it was but they asked if he was flying with a new guy and to convince him to take the plane. I asked for the number and called back to see who it was and he said it was the Duty Manager; so I told him I was the first officer and that I would be filing a report; at which point he asked what my safety concerns were and I said I'm filing a report and goodbye. He called the Captain back soon after and said that the first officer doesn't get a vote and to convince him to take the plane. The Captain was later paged in ops and took a call from Operations and was told the plane was loaded and ready to go at which point the Captain said the plane was refused. He called dispatch to confirm the refusal and dispatch said the Duty Manager called and told him we were taking the plane? At some point while sitting in ops someone approached me in a very aggressive manner and said 'Are you [the First Officer]? At which point I stood up and held out my hand to professionally introduce myself and he refused to shake my hand. He was extremely agitated. It was the assistant chief pilot; at which point the Chief Pilot (CPO) walked out of his office and quickly intervened by calling him into his office. After he talked to the assistant chief pilot the CPO called the Captain into his office for a conversation of which I was not privy to. I am extremely upset with this entire fiasco and felt pressured to change my position. As a first officer I felt extremely insulted and intimidated by this entire event and sometimes wonder what CRM is all about? If this wasn't pilot pushing I don't know what is. I think the fact that I am a first officer had something to do with it; as though I am not a part of the decision making process.

A320 First Officer arrived early for a two leg trip and discovered that the APU is MEL'd. He informed the Captain of his findings in the hope that the aircraft would be refused; which eventually occurred. This caused a row with the Duty Manager.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

High Speed Reject at 130-135 knots due to engine failure indication.  Aircraft yawed to the right with the illumination of the Engine Fail Light. Exited runway; ran all checklists.  All engines were still running within normal parameters.  Contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control.  They asked us if we wanted to try another takeoff.  We declined.  (This was a CA upgrade IOE flight.) Directed to Maintenance pad where line Maintenance downed the aircraft.[Reporter stated being] unsure [of the cause].  After reject; all engine parameters were normal.

MD-11 Captain reported engine failure indication accompanied by aircraft yaw during takeoff roll. Captain executed a safe rejected takeoff and returned to maintenance pad where aircraft was removed from service.


Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

During the takeoff roll (at about 75 KTS); the Number 1 Engine ITT rose to 766 C exceeding the ITT limitation of 765 C for takeoffs. I noticed the temperature exceedance and called for the abort. We executed the aborted takeoff procedure as per Company procedures; taxied clear of Runway; and proceeded to the gate without any further incidents. Dispatch; Maintenance and Operations were all notified of the return to gate and the Captain entered the discrepancy in the logbook.

ATR 72 flight crew reported that at about 75 KTS on takeoff the Number 1 Engine ITT rose to 766 C exceeding the ITT limitation of 765 C for takeoffs so they aborted; completed the abort procedure and taxied to the gate.


Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 23700; Flight Crew Type 2200

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

In cruise Miami Center cleared us direct to ILM. It was not on our route of flight. Cleared by FXE tower as follows: FLL6 Departure; Zappa Transition; PERMT; as filed. Filed to JORAY; CLB; LORAA; [and then the arrival]. We reported our filed flight plan; Miami later asked us to call the center. Upon calling; I was told Miami had issued an amended clearance for us: PERMT; ILM; LORAA. We never received this amendment from FXE tower. They cleared us AS FILED after PERMT; and cleared us to taxi and takeoff. No other communications from FXE.

CL-605 Captain reported that FXE Tower did not notify them of an amended clearance.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 27

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 102; Flight Crew Type 13000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Flying into SAN on the BAYVU 3 Arrival; the weather was 1100 BKN 1500 OVC; temperature 18 and dew point 14. SAN was using LOC 27 Approaches. Once established on the final approach course; we were assigned; by ATC; 160 knots to the FAF; REEBO. We advised ATC we were unable to maintain 160 knots. ATC told us if we could not maintain 160; he would pull us off the approach. We advised him that he really gave us no choice and accepted the speed restriction. There were no complications with the approach or landing. The descent angle on this approach is 3.5 degrees into an airport where we have a high rate of unstable approaches. We should not be threatened with delay if we want to fly the approach at our reference speed within three miles of the final approach fix; which is required in the FOM.

Captain was PM; F/O was PF. Soon after reaching cruise altitude we began briefing BAYVU 3 and LOC 27 for a Non-Precision Vertical Speed Profile Approach into SAN. On the BAYVU 3; we were assigned 250 KIAS by Center and SoCal for spacing; descended to 15;000 ft near BAYVU; and slowed again in the descent to 210 KIAS. Downwind vectors started somewhere near LCOVE. We were slowed further to 180 KIAS; then 170. We were given a late (overshooting) vector to intercept LOC27. I could be wrong; but understood this to be intentional; for spacing. Localizer course intercept occurred just inside VYDDA. Prior to OKAIN we were 'Cleared the LOC 27 Approach; maintain 160 to REEBO.' Captain (PM) told Approach 'Unable'. ATC stated; 'If you don't accept 160 KIAS to REEBO; I will need to take you out and bring you back. Captain (PM) stated; 'Well; I guess we must accept it.' Soon thereafter; SoCal gave a breakout vector. Captain (PM) stated; 'We are established on the Localizer and will fly the approach 160 to REEBO.' ATC re-cleared us for the approach; 160 KIAS at REEBO. F/O (PF) flew a textbook approach; despite ATC. Just prior to REEBO; he immediately slowed and called for configuring to be nicely stabilized; apart from the understandable Vertical Speed deviations greater than 1000 fpm. A Company; ATC System Manager was contacted after the flight to discuss the situation. An important aspect of the successful stabilized approach was the Crew thoroughly briefing the Approach; and discussion of calling 'unable' if SoCal vectors were 'too tight' or assigned speeds negatively affecting the ability to fly a stabilized approach. Company Pilots have received frequent safety communications regarding approaches into SAN. These communications discuss limited approach continuity; poor briefings and planning; LOC 27 approach design; and SoCal's reputation of short spacing vectors and limiting speed assignments on the LOC. Flying into SAN has a greater level of risk than most Company airports. Weather and night only increase the risk of failures. Much of this risk can be mitigated. A recent 'RNAV/RNP Operations and VNAV Approaches'  briefing published by Boeing mentions that 60 percent of CFIT accidents occur on Non-Precision approaches; 47 percent during step-down NP approaches; and almost all in darkness or IMC. From the most recent Company Flight Ops Safety bulletin; SAN has twice the unstable approach rate of the system wide average. Also mentioned is the increased energy perspective; due to the FAF altitude increase at REEBO from 1800 ft to 2000 ft; causing a steeper glide path of 3.5 degrees. The article talks about the severe need for better Pilot energy planning on the arrival and with vectors; and gave an excellent discussion on energy and configuration planning. It mentions that arrivals from LYNDI on the vertical path should pass 4000 ft AGL no faster than 210 knots; that ATC may not provide spacing guidance; that ATC may attempt to 'squeeze you in' between straight-in arrivals with a turn to base; that accepting common clearances provides only five NM ground track to the final approach course; causing a turn to final inside of three NM to the threshold; resulting in a descent angle in excess of 4.5 degrees; and lastly; that stating 'Unable' to SoCal is always an acceptable response; and is the most appropriate in situations such as these. Air Traffic Control is part of the team in creating successful low risk flight operations. Company Operations Safety is working hard to mitigate unacceptable risk at SAN. Hopefully Pilots are working hard to do their part. SoCal's help is drastically needed to successfully mitigate unacceptable risk. Since our beginning; Company has a wonderful cultural reputation of doing everything we can to help ATC; system wide. Much has changed in airspace and aircraft. It is possible to continue to be on the same team; helping each other be safe and efficient. Yet; sometimes we need to mutually reassess changes that have occurred with one or both parties on the team to continue to help each other; i.e. the 'old way' may not work anymore. Equipment limitations affect how different airlines fly the LOC 27. Like it or not; Company is limited by equipment to flying LOC approaches with the autopilot in a very manual way. Some may call this procedure antiquated. Other airlines have equipment making LOC approaches simpler and far easier. Added to the equation is lack of Pilot proficiency; i.e. VOR and LOC approaches are rare. It is not unreasonable for a Company Pilot to go years without conducting such an approach; especially so for a back-course; which happens on occasion. Yet; Crews are expected [to maintain] operational proficiency. It appears Company has also removed these from simulator proficiency (waive able). Risk of failure only increases when in older equipment; weather is present; and/or at night. When Pilots already know that they are going to be pushed; then 'punished' by stating 'unable' regarding ATC speed limitations; it affects the risk they are willing to accept to get the job accomplished. In other words; Pilots willingly choose to accept the higher level of risk forced upon them by SoCal. Like it or not; fear of; or intimidation by ATC is formidable. Air Traffic Control holds a greater degree of power in the mind of the Pilot regarding approach timing and certificate action. Crews deserve to be able to have the opportunity to be fully configured; at final approach speed at least two miles prior to REEBO; to fly a stable approach. It has been said that insanity is defined by doing things the same way every time with expectation of change. Company Flight Operations Safety is 'turning blue in the face' regularly recommending Pilots change their behaviors at SAN; for the sake of decreased risk. One may safely assume that most Pilots desire to change such behaviors for the sake of decreased risk. Yet; we will never know if that is the case; at SAN; if SoCal is not willing to change their behaviors (that directly affect Pilot decisions) for the sake of decreased operational risk.1. SoCal: Please move the 'speed compression' or '160 until point' back from REEBO to a couple miles prior to CIJHI ASAP. 2. SoCal and Company Flight Operations: if possible; redesign the approach with GPS points or as an RNAV/LOC; with assigned speeds; allowing Crews the time and ability to ensure reaching stabilized criteria.  3. SoCal and Company Flight Operations: if possible; please design an RNAV approach into SAN. Similar type aircraft to SAN need to participate in flying any such approaches to ensure spacing. Having an operational RNAV approach will greatly mitigate risk; especially regarding SoCal's piece of the pie. 4. San Diego and FAA: Please consider building another runway; so that SoCal does not feel a need to increase risk to compress inbounds to such a high degree. This would also help in coordinating takeoffs; also part of the equation. 5. Company Flight Operations: If an RNAV approach is not a possibility; please consider establishing a 60 or 90 day Pilot (both seat positions) currency for these approaches.

B737 Flight Crew laments the speed restrictions (160 to REEBO) applied by SCT during LOC 27 approaches to SAN; believing that the speed restrictions leads to unstabilized approaches.


Party1 Ground Personnel; Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

During the descent; we received an ACARS message assigning us to Gate X. After clearing the Runway; FO contacted ATC Ground Control and informed the controller that we were going into Gate X. The ATC Ground Controller related that she just parked an A330 at Gate X and asked us our intentions. FO tried to contact the Ground Handler; but got no answer. He made repeated calls on the radio with the same result. The ATC Ground Controller was getting anxious because we were sitting on a taxiway; blocking other aircraft. After about a dozen calls to the Ground Handler; they finally responded on the radio and instructed us to park at Gate Y. FO informed the ATC Ground Controller of our new gate assignment and she instructed us to taxi to the gate. As we approached the gate; the wing walkers were in place on each side with illuminated wands and the marshaller was in place with the illuminated wands raised up over the head indicating he/she was ready to assume guidance. The moonless night was clear with numerous overhead floodlights illuminating the ramp and gate areas. I intercepted the gate lead in line and followed the marshaller's signals. The marshaller indicated a normal stop so I set the Parking Brake and instructed FO to shut down both engines. With most of the passengers off the aircraft; the Customer Service Agent came up to me while I was standing near the cockpit and informed me of potential wingtip damage on the left wing of the aircraft. I followed the agent outside and walked under the left wing. I saw that the left winglet was in contact with the right winglet of the other aircraft. The marshaller was present along with several Maintenance personnel with a rolling ladder positioned under the wingtips. The marshaller said that he knew that the other Airbus aircraft was not parked in the normal position on the lead-in line and related to me that is why he stopped us early (before the painted mark) because he did not want the wings to touch. I told him that it would have been better for us to wait on the taxiway instead of bringing us in to park. The marshaller agreed and apologized to me for his actions. The maintenance representative was upset at the marshaller because if they had been called out sooner; he would have stopped the downloading of the other A330 to prevent the wingtip from being lifted up and causing additional damage. At no time during the taxi into Gate Y did either the wing walkers or the marshaller signal to me that there would be a conflict in wingtip clearance or signal for an emergency stop. Neither I; nor F/O felt any bump indicating that we touched wingtips. No passenger or flight attendant mentioned feeling any bump or seeing that the wingtips were touching after parking.Per FOM; 'The marshaller is in the best position to more clearly determine wing and tail clearance. Once the marshaller begins directing the aircraft through standard ramp signals; they assume all responsibility for wingtip clearance.' I believe that we should not have been brought into Gate Y since the marshaller knew that the adjacent aircraft was not parked in a normal position on the lead-in line. Additionally; even if both aircraft were parked centered on the lead-in line; both Gates X and Y seem to have limited wingtip clearance with little margin for error in the event on either aircraft being slightly off the line. Thirdly; the wing walkers should be more proactive by signaling to the marshaller that the wingtips would or could touch each other.

After the passengers have deplaned; A330 Captain is informed that his left winglet is in contact with the winglet of the A330 parked to the left. The other A330 was not perfectly parked in its spot; but the Marshaller was aware of this fact.


Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

I was PIC and pilot flying and executed a low speed (<40 KTS) aborted takeoff after illumination of RUDDER SYS 1-2 INOP CAUTION MESSAGE on EICAS on the runway. [I] performed aborted takeoff and abnormal procedures as specified by EMB AOM. Contacted Dispatch referred to Maintenance Control then returned to gate. Contract Maintenance performed Rudder System Check at the direction of Maintenance Control; noted no system defects or associated messages logged in the aircraft maintenance computer and returned the aircraft to service following normal maintenance procedures. [I] departed with no further incident.

[Narrative 2 had no additonal information.]

An EMB-145 had an EICAS warning for RUDDER SYS 1-2 INOP on takeoff roll. Takeoff was aborted and flight returned to gate for maintenance.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Took responsibility for ZZZ's airspace at XA:00 Z. Aircraft X originally requested an ILS to a runway that was unavailable after the tower closed. I was R side with no D side controlling a mid configuration scope. Aircraft X set up for ILS Z runway XX ZZZ. Crossing restriction for the IAP (Initial Approach Point) was 1;700 ft. I issued my MVA of 'cross IAP at or above 020; cleared approach...' ZZZ's airspace is unfamiliar due to the little amount of time ZZZ1 is responsible for it; however; the knowledge and rules are still understood. An MSA of 030 was located between the aircraft and the IAP at the time of the clearance. Once the target flashed MSAW; I climbed Aircraft X to 030 for a minimum safe altitude and restated clearance to now 'cross IAP at and maintain 030...' Aircraft X continued the approach; reported inbound on approach; and canceled IFR in the air after ZZZ was reported in site. Continued experience with approaches involving unfamiliar airspace ownership.

We were getting ready to combine sectors to the Mid configuration. I was sitting at the scope where the positions would be combined so I called the supervisor to make the combination entry. As I began to look at the traffic I would be getting from the other sector I saw that and MSAW warning was flashing on Aircraft X. It seemed odd to me so I asked the other controller if Aircraft X was on an approach. They said Aircraft X had been cleared so I asked if Aircraft X had passed the IAF. Aircraft X had not so I told the other controller to climb the aircraft; which they did. I took track control of Aircraft X when he reached 030 and we continued the sector combination.I can not make any recommendations because I only noticed the situation and do not know any of the events that led up to the event.

Controllers reported while accepting airspace of a closing facility; an aircraft entered a higher MVA.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

We deiced and taxied to the runway for departure. We were advised by an offline pilot (via the purser) that there was snow on the left wing. I went to the cabin to do a wing check and found snow to be adhering to the inboard flap and wing. I advised the Captain and we concluded a return for additional deicing was necessary. As a courtesy (while waiting for taxi instructions) I called de-ice and advised them we would need to be deiced again due to snow on the left wing. The de-ice Coordinator told me we would be OK to go because the snow on the wing will shear off because of the Type IV fluid ahead of it on the wing. I advised him we determined it necessary to de-ice again. To make sure FAR 121.629 is complied with; FOM states 'If any frozen contaminants are trailing edge of the wing.'  I can only conclude that this step was omitted.  I am concerned that the de-ice personnel are either unaware of the de-ice requirements in the FOM or they are disregarding them.  I would like to add that I feel removing the required wing inspection and replacing it with the nose check is a mistake.  'Adhering to the aircraft; the aircraft MUST return for additional deicing.' FOM also states 'After de icing; the critical aircraft surfaces are checked by qualified personnel to ensure they are free of contaminants.' Since no more than 10 minutes had elapsed from de-icing to being alerted to snow on the wing and the fact that I found no evidence of de-ice fluid on the wing I can only conclude that the clean surface check was not accomplished properly. I am concerned that our de-ice personnel are either unaware of the requirements in our FOM or are disregarding them. I also feel like replacing the required wing inspection with the 'nose check' is a mistake.

B757 First Officer reports being informed by the Purser that a deadheading pilot has noticed ice on the wing after de-icing has been completed. The flight returns to the de-ice pad where the crew does not believe that more de-icing is necessary.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 55

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 2500; Flight Crew Type 100

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Excursion Runway

Following an uneventful preflight and flight; while landing at Airport ZZZ we experienced a loss of brakes and thrust reversers resulting in an over run of runway X.  The plane departed the departure end of the pavement into the dirt with no known damage or injury. In hindsight I believe that I was focused on why the brakes were not actuating and continuing to attempt to deploy the thrust reversers; I failed to revert to emergency braking handle.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

LR-40 flight crew reported running off the end of the runway when they experienced failure of brakes; thrust reversers; and autospoilers after touchdown.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

We were assigned Aircraft X. Upon reviewing the maintenance sheet I became confused regarding MEL #XX-XX. The original entry in the logbook and the description on the sheet were not easily understood so I elected to contact maintenance. After having a ten minute conversation with the technician about the complexities of the MEL; we both agreed that we were good to go. However; he stated that he was slightly concerned with the legality of the MEL; would look into it further and contact me before departure (we still had approximately 30 minutes before push) if he determined it was not legal. We did not hear back from him until we had pushed and had begun engine start. At this time; he informed us that it was indeed not a valid MEL. We then returned to the gate and the airplane was taken out of service. To the best of my knowledge; the airplane had flown for four days in this condition. Simplify the wording on the maintenance sheet and have a more direct description of this item in the MEL.

B737-800 Captain reported discussing the validity of an MEL with maintenance resulting in an invalid MEL in the logbooks.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Taxiing for takeoff; ECAM alerted us that #1 engine anti-ice nacelle valve had failed open.  Anti-ice off for takeoff.  Contacted ATC for taxi instructions to a remote location to work the problem. Received instructions to taxi across duty runway and hold short on the opposite side. Ran ECAM and consulted QRH which directed that a thrust limit penalty is reflected on TRP (Thrust Rating Panel). ATC cleared us to 'line up and wait'.  Replied to ATC that we were still working our problem and needed more time.  ATC reminded us of our slot time; directed us to hold short and advise them when ready.  Recomputed Takeoff data with 'engine anti-ice valve not closed' selected.  We re-briefed our takeoff performance; and told ATC that we were ready for takeoff. Received takeoff clearance; completed the takeoff checklist and made eventful takeoff.  While conducting in-range checklist; check of ECAM Recall reminded me our malfunction and made me realize that we had not consulted the MEL prior to departure.  I referenced the MEL 30-21-01-B Engine Anti Ice Nacelle Valves; which was a Flagged item MEL; requiring maintenance prior to takeoff.  Upon landing; wrote up discrepancy in AML and briefed maintenance personnel.While I do not believe we were rushing in the traditional sense; I think our knowledge of; and desire to takeoff at our assigned slot time; interfered with and broke our normal habit patterns associated with dealing with a relatively simple malfunction after block out.  I failed to recognize this break in my habit pattern; causing me to forget to reference the MEL on the ground prior to departure.I believe this type of event can be prevented if the crew will stop once more; and ask themselves if ALL required cockpit / crew actions have been completed prior to moving the aircraft.  We asked each other if we were 'ready to go'; but didn't really stop and think clearly about whether all required procedures relating the system malfunction had been completed.

The flight crew encountered an Anti-Ice system malfunction while taxiing for takeoff. After completing the appropriate checklists and re-computing the performance data; they accomplished an uneventful takeoff. However; due to pressure to meet an expiring takeoff slot time; they failed to address some MEL implications.


Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Company Policy; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

We were pushing back at that time when I should have been putting the flaps down. I was asked by my Captain if I could see the push crew to see if it was ok to start engines. At that time I thought I had put the flaps down. So I did my after engine start flow. After engines were started. We did the taxi check then flaps 20 taxi check neither one of us verified the actual flap setting. So we taxied out of the alley and taxied to the runway. I read before takeoff checklist to the line and again distracted by instructions by the checklist was interrupted and takeoff Config message not verified.The root cause of the situation was rushing and breaking up of checklists by distractions as well as complacency. I suggest stop; take the time to do the checklist properly as well as not rush through. And if reading of a checklist is interrupted by distraction; start it again.

A distracted CRJ-200 First Officer failed to set takeoff flaps before taxi and complacently completed the remaining checklists so that a rejected takeoff followed the Takeoff CONFIG WARNING.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Evacuated; General Maintenance Action

As the First Officer; I performed the post and pre-flight walkarounds. I did not notice anything abnormal during the inspection. Three people actually performed inspections on the aircraft after we landed as we had a bird strike during out roll out upon landing and they all reported nothing abnormal with the aircraft. The aircraft had an MEL item of a low speed flaps. This will be of significance later on. The Captain gave me the next leg. Since I am relatively new to the company and this was my first time in and out of this airport I noticed how rough the runway was during the takeoff roll. During cruise flight Center advised us that 'another aircraft had spotted a tire on our departure and that it was the shape and size of an air carrier tire.' The Captain and I looked at each other; slightly confused. I asked Center if it was a full tire; partial pieces; etc.The Captain contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control via ACARS while I flew the aircraft and spoke with the Center controllers. The Captain also scrolled through the MFD system pages and found nothing to be out of normal parameters. We referred to the QRH for a blown tire but the procedure was not applicable to our situation. We also decided to declare an emergency as a precaution against the unknown. The Captain notified the flight attendant of our situation and then advised the passengers via a PA. When we were handed off to Approach Control we declared an emergency and requested a low pass. Descending through 10;000; the Captain assumed the controls and flew the low approaches. Because of the MEL for the low speed flaps; we elected to fly the low approach and subsequent landing at flaps 22. After the first pass Tower stated that; the gear was down. I asked if they could see the conditions of the tires. They stated that they looked to be in 'good' condition. We then went back to Approach Control and they gave us some conflicting information from what the Tower gave us. As a result we elected to do a second low approach. During this low approach; there were two aircraft with other airline pilots on the ground as well looking at our gear. They all stated that the gear was in good condition. At this point; we decided to land. We touched down in the touchdown zone and the Captain deployed the thrust reversers as we rolled out. I did notice that the landing roll was longer than I had previously experienced. Upon exiting the runway; the Captain stopped on the taxiway and emergency vehicles responded to our location. We checked the brake temperatures and decided that there was no danger to the passengers. The emergency responders were not spraying down the aircraft trying to put out any fires. We started coordinating with Operations and the city to produce buses and stairs to deplane the passengers.

After they were advised of tire parts on their departure runway the flight crew of an E145 declared an emergency; performed two precautionary fly-bys for evaluation by ground personnel and and landed at their destination with CFR standing by. The passengers were deplaned on the taxiway and bussed to the terminal.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

During routine inspection noted nose strut leaking hydraulic fluid. Once Nose Landing Gear [NLG] Oleo [strut] was removed for a rebuild we noticed that the repack kit only contained two set screws of a different size. The upper bearing that was installed had four set screws. Upon researching the Component Maintenance Manual Illustrated Parts Catalogue for the correct part number installed NLG we found that the bearing installed was not the correct part number. Take enough time to do proper part number research.

Maintenance reported that the Nose Landing strut on a Cessna 560 was leaking hydraulic fluid.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14; Flight Crew Total 2173; Flight Crew Type 329

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Attempted (most time loss of power) off airport landing on county/ranch road 2 miles north of ZZZ. On left base as I raised the nose to reduce airspeed; engine surged to near full power and I overshot the road. Made a 180 degree turn to return to the road; but altitude not sufficient. If engine power is available only part time throttle to idle or ignition off.

Pilot reported complications when attempting an off airfield emergency landing due to engine failure.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 215.78; Flight Crew Total 4078.08; Flight Crew Type 4078.08

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Person Ground Personnel; Person Dispatch

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

We received the preliminary dangerous good report for dry ice to be boarded. Prior to push back; we received the final dangerous goods summary XA:21Z. We pushed backed; started the engines and taxied. Nothing was said to us by Operations or Ramp Tower Personnel. When we were number one at [spot]; the Ground Controller said to us; 'I understand you have to go back to the gate; make a right turn and contact Ramp Tower.' We replied that we had not heard we needed to go back to the gate but that we would contact Operations. Upon contacting Operations; we were told that the dangerous goods were loaded incorrectly and that we needed to return to the gate. We taxied back to gate and shut down the engines. I contacted Operations to try to gain insight into what exactly was wrong with the way the dangerous goods were loaded. I was told that the dry ice was loaded but [Company] policy states that bags must be surrounding the dangerous goods and the bags were never placed around the dangerous goods. About that time ANOTHER final dangerous goods report appeared on the ACARS printer. The same employee (number XXXXXX) certified that the HAZMAT was loaded correctly. Odd that the same employee certified the HAZMAT was loaded properly the first time; when it was obviously not but again certified that it was loaded correctly the second time. The cargo doors were closed; we started engines and departed without further incident.

B737 Captain reported gate return to correct configuration Dangerous Good loading errors.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Enroute from SAEZ north bound at FL340. Contacted MAIQETA SVZM FIR controller for authorization to climb to FL380. Told to stand by. Controller called back and said to climb to FL380. I read back clearance. FO (First Officer) selected 380 in MCP. I looked at map display on my panel and saw a TCAS target 900 feet above me approximately 20 miles out. I told the FO not to climb and reset 340 in window. I contacted MAIQUETA and told them in no uncertain terms that I am not climbing and will maintain FL340 due to traffic ahead. Controller responded back stand by. I put all my landing lights on to illuminate my aircraft as did the opposing aircraft. The aircraft at 350 was Aircraft Y south bound on airway. I think I heard Aircraft Y come on guard and say 'Aircraft X; this is Aircraft Y' on front of you. In a moment Aircraft Y passed directly over top of us as the controller in what seemed to be a panic voice said 'AIRCRAFT X MAINTAINTAIN FL340 DO NOT CLIMB!' I responded back calmly that we did not climb and are level at FL340. A few minutes later he re-cleared us to climb to FL380. I can only assume that the controller was not aware of our position relative to the opposing aircraft 1000 feet above us; coming directly at us. Communications is so poor in those sectors that instructions often get misinterpreted from both the controller and the pilots. When I asked if we were radar contact I never got a response. I can't exactly answer why this occurred but I can tell you 100% why a mid-air collision did not occur. Proper SA (Situational Awareness) and using the tools and training provided to our pilots contributed to the safe outcome of this flight. Offsetting from the airway would definitely add another layer of protection. Using max external illumination for climbs and descents in South American airspace where communications is marginal at best.

Air Carrier Captain reported ATC error when issued a climb clearance; into opposite direction traffic 900 feet above; and stayed at present altitude to avoid conflict.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Type 2000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

While trying to clear Runway XL; the Tower Controller told us which taxiway to take. I could not understand him and asked again. I understood the second transmission; and we cleared the runway. Once clear I asked him where he wanted us to go. He gave instructions and then tried to explain why he gave a specific taxiway. We could not understand that transmission nearly at all. I then said; 'Sir; I can't understand what you're saying; your transmission is very muffled.' He then came through perfectly clear and then said; 'it's the mask;' or something to that effect.

Air carrier First Officer reported communication difficulties with the Tower Controller due to the Controller wearing a mask which possibly muffled the transmission.


PMC; Performance/Thrust Management Computer

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Normal preflight duties were completed. Upon notification through ACARS that performance weight and balance loading data was available; I tried to load the data into the FMC. Only part of the data would load. Incorrect cruise altitude data loaded; and no temperature data; nor N1 data; nor V Speed data; nor flap setting data would load. We attempted to reload it several times. I noticed that the enroute cruise altitude was incorrect; and given that; I looked at the entire flight plan route. We were filed on the with an enroute altitude of FL220. This was all loaded correctly into the FMS; but the first altitude on this STAR at point of ZZZZZ intersection has a published crossing altitude of FL240 to FL300. I recall that Dispatch filed us at FL220 for a cursing altitude; and that is what was entered into the system. Since the minimum crossing altitude on the STAR at ZZZZZ intersection was FL240 to FL300; the performance weight and balance system would not load or take our cruise data into the FMC. When I deleted the first crossing altitude restriction on the STAR at ZZZZZ intersection (FL240 to 300) on the LEGS page; then and only then would the performance weight and balance system load into the FMC. This is not really in accordance with procedures; and not something we normally would know or even be trained to know. Bottom line; if the filed cruising altitude is below any altitude restriction on the field and loaded STAR; performance weight and balance DATA WILL NOT LOAD INTO THE FMC.   This performance weight and balance system limitation needs to be examined; addressed; and or corrected; and the information distributed throughout Flight Ops. I am sure I am not the first one who has stumbled across this; but probably the first one who has written in about it.

B737 First Officer reported being unable to load some data into the FMC which was caused by the cruising altitude being below the minimum crossing altitude of one of the arrival fixes.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 3900; Flight Crew Type 750

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Rejected takeoff at 110 kts due to loss of #1 engine instruments caused by a DAU (Digital Acquisition Unit) 1A failure. Once clear of the runway we ran the QRH and then called Dispatch and Maintenance. While on the phone with Maintenance the DAU 1A failure EICAS message went away for less than 5 minutes and then returned for a short time and once again went away. We taxied back to the gate and deplaned. I wrote the aircraft up for a rejected takeoff due DAU 1A failure EICAS message. The aircraft has a previous history of this problem with the associated DAU. The first failure was [about 10 days ago] which was then repaired and working until [four days ago] where the 2nd failure occurred and was fixed. This was the third time in less than 10 days [where] it caused a rejected takeoff or a return to the field. Contract Maintenance came out to the aircraft and reset the breakers for both IC600 computers and during the 2 hours we were at the gate the EICAS message DID NOT return. My crew and I then agreed to ferry the aircraft as long as the EICAS message stayed away. While doing my scan I noticed all #1 engine instruments [were] amber colored with dashed lines and rejected the takeoff. DAU 1A Failure EICAS message. Rejected takeoff followed by a return to the gate. My only suggestion would be that everything associated with the DAU 1 be replaced. They already replaced the DAU and the IC600; so whatever is next will hopefully fix it for GOOD!

EMB-145 Captain reported rejecting the takeoff at 110 kts after receiving an EICAS message for DAU 1A failure.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 27

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was assigned to relieve the controller working Radar. I observed the controller was getting busy and my experience told me that on such a beautiful VFR day and the amount of inbound Flight Progress strips posted that the position would only get busier. I asked the supervisor if he wanted me to open another sector and he said 'No'. He said it wasn't going to get that busy. After the position relief; the position soon became complex and I needed the supervisor to coordinate for me and eventually he opened another sector. In the meantime; Aircraft X called me for landing. He originally requested the left runway and I assigned him the right runway due to a Medevac inbound to the left runway. I did not put in the data tag that Aircraft X was requesting a touch and go and coming back to my frequency. I failed to assign Aircraft X a frequency change to Tower. The controller at Tower never tried to call Aircraft X.Tower never tried to use the light gun to clear Aircraft X to land. Tower never tried to call me at the Radar position to prompt me to change frequency with Aircraft X. Instead the Tower controller let Aircraft X land and touch and go on the Runway knowing this was going to be a pilot deviation. Aircraft X departed on a heading of 060 degrees and called me. Aircraft X had traffic off his left side which was a helicopter. Tower I believe was surprised that Aircraft X did not land full stop and instead executed a touch and go. Tower then turned the helicopter west and had a departure airborne off of an intersecting runway. I have no way of knowing the exact scenario that unfolded but I'm sure it was uncomfortable and likely unsafe. Tower then called my supervisor on the coordination line and said Aircraft X had done a touch and go without a clearance and my supervisor asked Tower if they attempted contact or tried a light gun. The answer was negative. The Tower controller in his arrogance to prove a point that I didn't change frequencies with Aircraft X caused a deliberate unsafe and reckless situation. The Tower controller in my opinion should be reprimanded for his action.This Tower controller has been know to disregard ATCT procedures in favor of his own method of Air Traffic Control. This same controller deliberately and recklessly departed an air carrier jet climbing to 5000 feet on a collision course with a Cessna at 4000 feet that I had pointed out to him verbally and electronically this last fall. No manager seems to be willing to correct his actions. In my opinion this controller should be reprimanded for his actions and be held to a higher standard than what he is allowed to get away with currently. Brief Tower controllers on professionalism and teach them to 'do the right thing' just as we were briefed in recurrent training. If an aircraft doesn't call you then you call him. It's that simple.

CMH TRACON Controller forgot to coordinate an arrival aircraft's intentions or issue communication change to the Tower. The Tower Controller made no effort to establish communications with the aircraft or to reach out to the TRACON to coordinate. The aircraft made a touch and go into confliction with an intersecting runway departure.


Dassault-Breguet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.5

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

I was working a satellite sector and had an IFR release off of ZZZ airport for [Aircraft X]. [Aircraft X] was filed for a west bound SID climbing into the flight levels. When [Aircraft X] departed I got an automated point out with Departure Control which was combined at Arrival Sector. The automated point out was approved. I climbed [Aircraft X] to 16000 ft. and sent the aircraft on course. A few seconds later; Arrival sector called me on the landline to combine Departure Control and Arrival to me. During the brief I was told about a VFR PA31 (Aircraft Y) conducting a photo mission at 11500 ft. I was briefed that they were working southwest to the northeast. I failed to see that [Aircraft X] and [Aircraft Y] were on converging courses. [Aircraft X] was climbing; at what I thought; was an expeditious pace. The Arrival controller called me on the landline while doing his sector briefing overlap and asked if I was watching [Aircraft X] and [Aircraft Y]; which I was not. At that point; the Mode C of [Aircraft X] was 11000 ft. and the two aircraft were right at 3 miles apart. I told [Aircraft X] to expedite their climb for traffic; and at that point; [Aircraft X] stated that they were descending for a TCAS RA. [Aircraft X] said that they have the aircraft in sight and are descending. I did not issue a traffic call or traffic alert since [Aircraft X] stated they had the aircraft in sight. I issued traffic to the photo mission aircraft; [Aircraft Y] twice; but [Aircraft X] responded both times thinking I was talking to them.My supervisor stated that the two aircraft got 2.1 miles and 500 ft. apart. I yelled out that I had an aircraft respond to a TCAS RA; but the Supervisor did not hear me; and I did not make sure that the management knew. The pilot then climbed back to 16000 ft. and I transferred communications to Center. When the aircraft was in their destination TRACON's airspace; I was told that the pilot told the approach controller that he almost had a near midair. The pilot called our TRACON and did not mention a near midair; and my supervisor explained that I made a mistake and missed the traffic.Better situational awareness on my end. I was not sure how far the photo mission flew before they turned around; so I need to clarify that during the briefing.

TRACON Controller reported NMAC with two aircraft within their sector.


Flight Attendant (On Duty); Other / Unknown

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

I noticed the assist bottle at door 1L lower than minimum recommendation. I then looked at all 4 doors which also were lower than required for aircraft airworthiness. I contacted the captain to contact mechanics and verify pressure on all doors. C/S (Customer Service) came onboard and asked if he could board. The pilot; not putting two and two together said yes. I interjected and said that they may have to fill door 1L and it was the only egress door available. The pilot agreed and we held boarding until mechanics could verify pressure on all doors. Initially; the mechanic came onboard and began to tell me that it was not my job (onboard - as he wrote on the release later). The mechanic (who in my opinion was not familiar with the system; dismissed the issue (implying it would take over 2 hours to fill all bottle - when I know in fact; it takes about 10 minutes for each bottle; by saying all doors were good). Something that is not only irresponsible; but criminal and his license should be suspended for dismissing some sensitive item and signing off on an item in which was not good to fly. At that time; the captain with knowledge of aircraft maintenance; became intrigued as new to the Airbus (previous Boeing pilot). He asked me and I explained how the temperature gauge and the table all plays a part on determine which level each door bottle should be. He then grabbed his calculator and a flash light and proceeded to examine the door himself. He then looked at all 4 doors and agreed that they were below minimum. Since the mechanic at this time had already signed off as good to fly. The captain called maintenance and advised that they needed to bring him the table indicating the aircraft was good to fly. About 1/2 hour later; three mechanics came on board with the specifications on the doors. The pilots and mechanics discussed the gauge and soon it was clear that ALL 3 mechanics did not know how to read the gauge and were seeing pressure above of what it was - I have pictures. The pilot noticed that they could not agree; and drew a picture of the gauge and proceeded to explain how the mechanics were not reading the gauge accurately. They did not agree and left the aircraft. Not saying anything; when the captain inquire they did not respond. Later on; the captain called [operations] again and had to refuse the aircraft. The mechanics never came back. A problem that could have been resolved in 1 hour was now over 105 minutes later. Pilot from the pilots' office came in and the captain explained the problem. Later the captain asked the first officer to look at the gauge and see if he would agree with the needle marking. The first officer looked at the gauge and also confirmed that in fact the needle was what it was told to the mechanics. Ops found us another plane. What transpired next is not only irresponsible but also criminal. By now C/S; and Ops had changed shift and this is the only thing I would say made they think the aircraft was air worthlessness. Ops scheduled the aircraft to fly to [another destination]; now; mechanics had already signed off on the aircraft and done nothing else but disappearing. Customer Service were new and they had no idea on what was going on. The captain told the new captain of the problem. But since we left; we can only hope the new pilot convinced the mechanics to fill the assist bottles. Later we checked and found out that the aircraft left. We did not know if it was fixed or left be. The negligence of these mechanics caused a chain reaction of failures that could cost someone's lives some day and for that reason all three should be reprimanded for their negligence and lack of knowledge on this aircraft.

Mechanics and Captain disagreed about the gauge display for the exit doors' pneumatic charge. Different aircraft assigned.