Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 200

Landing at MHR we heard on ATIS that there were 35 foot barriers on each side of runway 22L; at an unknown distance from the edge of the runway.  As it turned out; the barriers did not exist.  The tower claimed that ATC had notified 'our safety department' and all was approved for us to use that runway.  Only after I received official notification from the MHR tower that I was guaranteed full length and width of the runway; did I decide it was safe for landing.  On landing rollout; although it was dark; there appeared to be some 2x4 type boards lying along the sides of the runway; and not directly on the runway.  However; if a 35 foot obstruction had been located there; it would have been very difficult to miss it.  If the airplane were only several feet from centerline; a collision would occur.  Apparently the 35 foot obstructions will indeed be placed there in the near future.

Air Carrier Captain learns of 35 foot barriers along the side of Runway 22L at MHR from the ATIS. The Tower informs them that there are no barriers; yet.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Reporting and inflight medical emergency that resulted in a diversion. About 2/3 into fight; Flight Attendant A noticed that a passenger was having serious difficulty breathing. She pressed the flight attendant call button and waived Flight Attendant B forward while accessing POB; tubing removed so passenger air was available. Flight Attendant B contacted Flight Deck with initial assessment while Flight Attendant B administered oxygen. Flight Attendant A asked passenger questions to further assess condition. The passenger mentioned that she had a double mastectomy; had just rec'd chemo (her left arm was heavily bandaged); and she was also experienced acute chest pain and nausea. Flight Attendant A alerted the flight deck to clarify condition of passenger and she had nausea prescription in her purse. Flight Attendant B pulled anti-nausea pill out of bottle and checked dosage before administering. While Flight Attendant A was communicating with the flight deck (decision to divert and Commercial Medical Consultant directive [us] to administer 4 baby aspirin or 1 adult). Flight Attendant A removed scarf; shawl; jacket and long necklace to help the passenger cool down and prevent tangling with POB lines. The passenger was clearly distressed (tears flowing from eyes; very warm). Initially; Flight Attendant B had made request for medical personnel on board; with no response. About 5 minutes into our response a larger man came forward but initially didn't say anything. Flight Attendant A asked him to return to his seat; he than casually said that he was a firefighter but did not show urgent consideration and we were in control of the situation by that time as the decision to divert had been made. Passenger did seem to get better with oxygen; Flight Attendant A secured POB to rail under-seat; and filled out medical assistance form while Flight Attendant B continued to assist and monitor the passenger's condition. She had said that her pain initially was at a 9 or 10 but had lessened to about 6 after anti-nausea and aspirin as well as oxygen. The flight deck was superb in decisiveness and support; Flight Attendant B was calm and her CRM between flight deck and Flight Attendant A (myself) was clear. We were able to assist the passenger without drawing undo attention; securing her safety and comforting her in a difficult time. The medical assistance form was given to paramedics. Just a recommendation; that is the second time; I have had to locate an item in the emergency medical kit (EEMK). Because I remembered that things are tightly packed and can be difficult to locate (I was able to remember where the aspirin was located) it reminded me that; I think it would be good for initial/recurrent training to actually view the open EEMK to not have to scramble and locate items. Particularly to note that it is important to calmly find and confirm the right items. Also; after the fact; Flight Attendant B and myself discussed the nature of the man who came forward from the back of the aircraft. He did not ring his flight attendant call button to identify himself and did not express serious concern; effort; willingness or credentials. We acknowledged that this could have been someone whose help may have been more of an interference; as well as a security threat under different circumstances. We were in front of the cabin and passengers.

A CRJ-700 Flight Attendant described the events following a passenger becoming seriously ill during flight which resulted in a diversion.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 117; Flight Crew Total 9253; Flight Crew Type 238

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Environment - Non Weather Related

Both PNS (Pensacola) and HZR (New Roads - False River) use the same VHF 121.25 for respective ASOS and ATIS broadcast. The HZR ASOS signal is stronger and prevents reception of PNS ATIS. We have received complete information only after talking to Pensacola Approach Controller.

Air carrier First Officer reported PNS and HZR airport ASOS and ATIS broadcast on the same frequency; with HZR being the stronger output.


ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft; Human Factors

Were cleared for ILS 31R and asked to maintain 170 to DATLE. Outside of DATLE; autopilot captured glideslope. After passing DATLE; I called for flaps 30 then 40. At approximately 2000 FT MSL the glide slope oscillated vertically (as if departing aircraft crossed critical area) and the autopilot increased our rate of descent. Shortly after this we received the GPWS caution 'Caution Obstacle'. I disconnected autopilot and slowed our descent rate. At this time we were visual and made a normal landing in the touchdown zone. With a heavy aircraft and a slight tailwind on final; our rate of descent contributed to the GPWS caution. Having flown this approach before it was disconcerting to receive this caution while stabilized on the Localizer and glideslope with the autopilot coupled. With the tailwind we should not have accepted the 170 knots to DATLE; which would have allowed us to fully configure prior to DATLE.

Air carrier First Officer experiences an EGPWS 'caution obstacle' during a coupled ILS approach to Runway 31R at DAL. The glideslope had oscillated up then down and the autopilot followed the glideslope; triggering the caution. The autopilot was disengaged and the approach continued to landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 15500; Flight Crew Type 4000

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

As the aircraft was leveling at 370 with the autopilot and autothrottle engaged; the Flight Attendant brought our breakfast to the cockpit. The Captain was monitoring the aircraft while I got out of my seat to open the door and retrieve the meals. After sitting back down in my seat; I glanced down at the airspeed and saw it rapidly decaying to green dot. I then looked at the airspeed window on the display management panel and noted that a speed of 205 KTS was displayed in the speed window. I made a callout to the Captain of 'airspeed.' We did not have enough thrust to stop the airspeed from deteriorating; so the Captain disconnected the autopilot and lowered the nose to accelerate. As he lowered the nose; he began a gradual descent. He then instructed me to call ATC and ask for a block altitude. As he was asking me to call ATC; Center called us and asked us our altitude and we requested a block altitude of 330-370. The request for the block altitude was granted. I was quite busy monitoring the airspeed and radio; but I believe we descended 500-600 FT to get the airspeed back and start climbing. We climbed back up to 370 without any further incident.

The First Officer reported that the Captain entered the performance data during preflight and when scrolling through the Performance Preflight pages somehow skipped over the Climb Performance page and in the following page; Cruise Performance; entered 205 KTS. As a result; when the aircraft leveled at FL370; just as the reporter was retrieving crew meals; the aircraft slowed toward 205 KTS and the Captain did not immediately see the decrease. As a result; the heavy A320 could not accelerate by thrust alone and so an altitude decrease was necessary.

An A320 Captain entered the preflight performance data and apparently skipped the Climb Performance page and entered 205 KTS as the Cruise Performance airspeed parameter which resulted in a speed loss during transition from climb to cruise.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

A B350 called me on a 090 heading. He hadn't tagged up yet but I had a primary target; so I RADAR ID'd him and asked his altitude. He responded he was out of 026. I didn't hear final descend a Hawker (apparently Tower approved a point-out) out of 050 on the downwind. When the tag on the B350 came up (the Mode C altitude had not displayed yet) final came over to me and asked if he was stopped at 030. I said no. He said he stopped the Hawker at 040. I told the B350 to maintain 030 for traffic. At that moment his Mode C displayed and he was already at 036 (maybe even 038; I do not readily recall). I told him to turn to heading 360 immediately. At the same time; final turned the Hawker to a 180 heading. The B350 had already started descending and complied with the turn de-conflicting the two aircraft. Tower should have advised final of the traffic that was still in their departure release area prior to approving a lower altitude for the Hawker.

Training on Local Control 1; a B350 had been departed [Runway] 2C on heading 090. I confirmed the B350 clear of [Runway] 2R for departure Air Commercial traffic. Final flashed point out on the Hawker on downwind. Never having seen this situation in training before; I assumed that final would be aware of the B350 as known traffic as he had been scanned and cleared for take off at least 2 minutes prior. I knew that the [Runway] 2R Air Carrier traffic would miss the Hawker and believed that the Controller pointing out the Hawker would have to know about and miss the B350 since he had been scanned into the computer and had been airborne for some time. It would be very helpful in this situation and numerous others that I have seen to get some training and/or OJT in the TRACON before and/or while training on Local Control. There is no formal classroom training here and making this type of mistake is the predominant way to learn the position.

TRACON developmental described a loss of separation event when communications between the reporter and another developmental in the tower cab fail to address the impending situation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 119; Flight Crew Total 19631; Flight Crew Type 470

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Type 793

Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Both pilots had their individual radar displays ON; as a precaution for possible weather avoidance; while departing.  There were no observable radar returns. Once at FL300; I checked with ATC about any enroute turbulence; and they stated there were reports of nothing worse than occasional light chop at our altitude and altitudes above. We were cruising just above; and near; the ragged tops of a cloud layer; in smooth air. The seatbelt sign was OFF. Just prior to the turbulence encounter; I had been entering a code into ACARS regarding an inoperative TCAS (TCAS FAIL) during climb; then cruise. We experienced a moderate turbulence encounter of brief duration; lasting approximately two seconds. I turned the seatbelt sign ON; and then it smoothed out quickly. Since it was already smooth again; over the PA; I had the Flight Attendants 'check in'; as opposed to 'be seated immediately; be seated immediately.' The lead Flight Attendant informed me of 'possible' flight attendant injuries; and spilled drinks on some passengers. I asked the Flight Attendant's to update me as soon as possible; but they were busy with assessing the situation; etc. By then; we were nearing the top of descent. Based on the information I had at the time; I requested Dispatch have EMS and Inflight meet the flight; due to possible Flight Attendant injuries. I did not have enough information to determine if declaring an emergency was necessary. I specifically did not request a link to Medlink; since we were about to start our descent; and didn't have enough information to pass along to them. Also; I have used Medlink on multiple occasions in the past; knew the connection would take several minutes; and be another unneeded distraction during the descent phase of flight. Dispatch requested more info on the turbulence encounter; and I told them it was moderate; and of its approximate location. I thought I had mentioned the moderate turbulence to Dispatch previously; but was very busy coordinating with the First Officer; the Flight Attendants; and the passengers; while managing my PM (pilot monitoring) duties. I then made a PA informing the passengers and Flight Attendants that EMS would be meeting the aircraft for anyone needing medical assistance. Additionally; I let the Flight Attendants know that Inflight would meet the aircraft as well. At the time of the moderate turbulence encounter; we also experienced an approximate 20 knot overspeed; of approximately two-second duration. I sent a code for that via ACARS; and later; debriefed local maintenance about the encounter. We blocked-in; EMS met the aircraft; and attended to the injured Flight Attendants. No passengers requested treatment by EMS. I had reviewed [the weather] for turbulence prior to departing. Based on that review; and ride-reports obtained from ATC; I felt it was safe for the seatbelt sign to be OFF; and for the Flight Attendants to be moving around the cabin. After block-in; I verified the Flight Attendants were receiving medical treatment; and made sure Inflight had my file number. I then turned my cellphone on; and called the [duty manager].

There were suspected injuries to two flight attendants in the rear jumpseats; but these were considered to be mild enough to not consider a diversion.

B737 flight crew reported two flight attendants were slightly injured in a moderate turbulence encounter during cruise.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 23500; Flight Crew Type 6000

First Officer; Relief Pilot; Pilot Not Flying

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

We were informed by flight office when returning for a mechanical issue that we blew over a cargo container upon leaving the ramp area. We weighed approximately 842;000 lbs at beginning of taxi. We were pushed back from gate facing north. We started all four engines normally and were released to taxi from the ramp and given a taxi clearance by ground control. I pushed the power up to no more than 35% for initial taxi. After the airplane started moving (almost immediately) I started a left turn of approximately 30 degrees to clear a parked 777 at [a nearby gate]. I intercepted the inner taxiway (A) on this heading and turned right to join. I reduced power to idle after the turn never going above the initial 35% (max breakaway thrust recommended is 40%). I turned onto the taxiway north. We continued on taxiway A around to the north end of the terminal to the departure runway.

I was a relief pilot on this flight; seated in the second observer's seat for pushback. I observed a prudent taxi out from the gate area; in compliance with SOP.

B747 flight crew reported they were advised they had jet-blasted a baggage container across the ramp even though they stayed within SOP breakaway thrust levels.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 1100

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

We had already loaded our filed route in the FMS but; when we received no PDC; we contacted LAX Clearance Delivery and received an amended clearance. I copied 'Cleared to LIH; heading 250; FIXIT1; RZS as filed. Maintain 3;000 feet; expect FL320 10 minutes after departure plus our squawk and departure frequency.' Apparently I missed the term 'radar vectors' as part of the clearance; as I didn't write it down on the FP when I listened to the clearance or when the First Officer read it back. This was the first time the First Officer or I had seen/flown the FIXIT1 RNAV Departure. It is strikingly similar to the HOLTZ9 RNAV Departure; and in our discussions about how to fly the departure; we fixated on the numerous maximum speed 250 knot notations on the SID. We talked ourselves into departing in LNAV after looking the SID over; and also due to the fact that LAX Tower had simultaneous 737 departing traffic off of 24L. Logically; we wanted to turn away from the 737; so the RNAV depiction of a left turn was further comfort to our situation. LAX Tower did not give us any specific instructions in our takeoff clearance. We contacted SOCAL Departure and turned to the southwest as per the SID. SOCAL did not query or correct our turn and we were cleared to 13;000 feet; then subsequently to limited to 7;000 feet due to a 777 departing ahead of us on the LOOP departure. SOCAL eventually gave us direct TRESE intersection on the SID; and handed us off to LA Center. Prior to clearing us to enroute frequency for the crossing; LA Center gave us the phone number for SOCAL and said they wanted us to call them upon landing in LIH. We did so; and the SOCAL shift Supervisor indicated there were no reports in the Safety Log they maintain. We contacted the SOCAL shift Supervisor a second time at his request after he had spoken with the afternoon shift Supervisor and again no reports/action was indicated against us. This is a new procedure which neither the First Officer nor I had seen/flown before. The SOCAL shift Supervisor I spoke to indicated that it is used only when the military takes airspace west of LAX; and that our experience/confusion as to the correct procedure was not an isolated/unique problem in the two weeks that SOCAL has been using the SID. Obviously there needs to be some form of communication/clarification issued to flight crews as to SOCAL expectations when the SID is issued.  Neither the First Officer nor I had ever heard; from Clearance Delivery; instructions that included 'Heading 250 for radar vectors to the FIXIT1 Departure.' Had the clearance indicated heading 250 for radar vectors to a specific fix on the SID; no confusion would have existed. 'Radar vectors to a SID' is; at best; vague and apparently causing a lot of confusion in the case of the FIXIT1 Departure. LAX Tower did not issue a 250 degree heading in its takeoff clearance. Had they done so; that would have eliminated any confusion. They did point out the 737 off the North complex with instructions to maintain visual separation; which again lent emphasis to follow the RNAV departure as opposed to a heading since we were virtually wing tip to wing tip on takeoff. That I did not hear 'radar vectors' in the clearance nor from the First Officer's readback emphasizes the need to verify what each of us heard and what that meant. Had we both articulated what we heard; any ambiguity would have been exposed and hopefully resolved. As it was; finding the SID and then reprogramming the FMC detracted from verifying what we heard and what that meant. There is a note on the top of the SID that indicates that radar vectors may be issued to one of three fixes on the departure. We did not catch that note until airborne. Had our clearance included one of those 3 fixes we would not have flown the RNAV procedure. I would suggest conversations with SOCAL Departure to include something more specific than simply radar vectors to the FIXIT1.

Unresolved confusion between Clearance Delivery and the flight crew of a B757-200 as to the track by which the flight was to arrive at FIXIT waypoint resulted in a deviation.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Human Factors; Aircraft

I was prepping the aircraft for a Borescope Inspection of the left engine. I pulled the Engine Start Circuit Breakers (C/B) as per the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) to make the aircraft safe prior to performing the maintenance task; but forgot to collar the Circuit Breakers. I went to the cockpit to check the temperature of the left engine from the EICAS. I pulled the Breakers (C/Bs) as required by the AMM for safetying the engine for maintenance; but then got involved in removing the cowlings; shifting equipment and cooling the engine to below required minimum temperatures to enable the borescope to occur. I did not return to the cockpit to attach maintenance 'Do Not Close' C/B collars as I should have. The only response is follow procedures as outlined in the AMM. The task in the AMM states to pull the required Circuit Breakers/install safety collars.

Mechanic was informed he failed to collar the Left Engine Start Circuit Breakers (C/B) he had previously pulled while prepping an EMB-145 aircraft for a Boroscope Inspection.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Two lithium ion batteries found in equipment. One was a laptop computer with the battery attached; and another piece of equipment also had the battery still attached. None of these were declared on the Air Way Bill nor was the required labels attached to the outside of the packaging.

Ground agent reported Lithium Ion batteries were found attached to equipment during shipping.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Inside of 250 miles to DEN; we were filed for the PURRL2 STAR and DEN was landing to the north. Initially briefed the ILS to Runway 35L. Enroute to BOWEE; Denver Center advised that the southern corridor was closing and rerouted us direct to PUFFR for the KOHOE 3. ATIS said that Denver was still landing north. We then changed the approach to the RNAV/RNP Runway 35R and briefed the RNAV. During the briefing Denver once again changed the arrival to the WAHUU2 RNAV Arrival. ATIS still said Denver was landing north and we queried Denver Center and they said they expected a runway change. Based on that information we briefed the approach to Runway 16L due to the shorter taxi. Enroute to GRRUB and cleared to descend via; ATIS said that Denver was only landing Runway 16R and 17R. We changed the runway for the fourth time inside 250 miles (in this case approximately 50-75 miles from the field) and when the runway was changed; the arrival didn't sequence properly so we pulled heading and tried to go direct to KOKOO. Denver Center queried us on our heading and we told him 265 and he asked why we were on a heading. We told him the FMS was not sequenced properly due to multiple arrival and runway changes. He directed us to pickup a heading of 270 and to descent to 12000. We maintained this heading until we were passed on to Denver Approach who vectored us to the visual for 17R. It becomes difficult for all parties involved with the weather in Denver and I know that Denver Center and Approach are working hard to minimize changes once we are assigned a STAR; but four runway changes and three STAR changes are difficult even under the best of circumstances. The First Officer and I discussed what we could have done differently and we both agree that we should have been proactive in letting Denver Center know that we were having difficulties and needed a heading even though the deviation was minor. Additionally; the multiple arrival changes when vectored inside the VIA highlight the need for no transition fix on the approach.

A320 Captain reported a track deviation occurred on arrival into DEN following multiple changes to arrival procedure and runway assignment.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Fatigue; Human-Machine Interface

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Fatigue

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were in a very busy communication with Dispatch about the ZZZ weather and possible divert plan. We were receiving dozens of ACARS pages of info from Dispatch. ATC Center; I think; gave us a decent from FL400 to FL390. I put it in the MCP Altitude window and the FO (First Officer) confirmed. I gave him the aircraft and proceeded to call dispatch. Somehow; FL380 was put in the window. The ATC controller called to confirm we were supposed to level at FL380. We bottomed out at about FL382 and promptly returned to FL390.The cause was we were extremely busy dealing with dispatch; weather and route changes and then transferring the aircraft to the FO; who had just minutes earlier returned from his rest break. All of us are rusty with the reduced flying. Wake up call is [early] in ZZZZ. Fatigue at the end of a [long] flight has everyone a bit off their game. Add in not flying much.Returning at the end of a long flight we failed to catch an otherwise normally caught error. [We should] refocus on Pilot Flying and confirming the altitude.

I had just come off break. When I sat down there were over 10 messages waiting on the com page and I was told Dispatch wanted us to divert. We were in VERY busy communication with Dispatch about the ZZZ weather and possible divert plan. We were receiving dozens of ACARS pages of info from Dispatch. ATC Center gave us a decent from FL400 to FL390. The Captain put it in the MCP Altitude window and I confirmed it. He gave me the aircraft and proceeded to talk to Dispatch. Somehow; FL380 was put in the window. The ATC controller called to confirm we were supposed to level at FL380. I immediately noticed the error; put FL390 in the window and use vertical speed to arrest the descent and start a climb back up to FL390. We bottomed out at about FL382 and promptly returned to FL390.The cause was we were extremely busy dealing with Dispatch; weather and route changes and then transferring the aircraft to me was probably not as clear as I remember; I had just minutes earlier returned from my rest break. The altitude change occurred immediately after I sat down to this hectic environment. All of us are rusty with the reduced flying. Fatigue at the end of a long flight has everyone a bit off their game. Add in not flying much.When returning at the end of a long flight we failed to catch an otherwise normally caught error. [We should] refocus on Pilot Flying and confirming the altitude. Have the FB more in on the process on the initial seat swap.

B777-200 flight crew reported an altitude deviation during cruise due to fatigue.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 9; Flight Crew Total 272; Flight Crew Type 272

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

An aircraft crossed the runway while our aircraft was on approach. Our aircraft touched down on the runway while the other aircraft was directly in front of us. We applied heavy brakes and was too late for a go around. Fortunately the other aircraft crossed the runway quickly and we were able to avoid impact. My wingtip was very close to the other aircrafts tail section.Santa Paula airport does not have a control tower. The weather was clear and there were no physical obstruction of our view. Both occupants in our craft were not injured in the incident.

GA pilot reported taking evasive action while landing to avoid collision with aircraft crossing runway at non-towered field.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 1300

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

I was inside of aircraft while being fueled by a single point fueling system. When gas gauge read full; I told the loader to stop fueling. Once fueled I departed from airport with 2 hours of fuel. As I attempted my Ag operations I experienced fuel starvation within 40 minutes of flight. I was able to safely land aircraft on highway with only slight wingtip damage from a road sign. I was able to get the aircraft off of the highway and escorted by local police to nearest farm house where I was able to refuel and make a safe take off. It was later determined that my gas gauge was giving false readings.

AgCat pilot reports departing with fuel gauge reading full; to run out of fuel 40 minutes into the flight. A safe landing on a highway ensues with minor damage to the aircraft. Fuel gauge was inaccurate.


Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

On approach we were level at 6;000 FT cleared for the ILS 16L. With the LOC captured the airplane also gave us GS* [glideslope acquire]. As the PF was setting Go Around Altitude; we both noticed the Glide Slope jump 1 dot above. The plane began to add power to climb to the Glide Slope. The PF selected a vertical descent of 300 to stop the Climb. The plane's peak altitude was 6;260 FT. We rearmed the glide path and proceeded on the approach. Initially we attributed this to a distance of 28 miles. Proceeding further down glide path we noticed descent rates of 200 to 1;400 FPM. We asked the Controller about any spurious glide slope reports for 16L. He initially responded that there were no reports of spurious glide path. The Controller came back a minute or so later to respond that Tower was crossing airplanes across the ILS critical area from 16L to 16C on the C taxiway. Makes sense. Suggest Tower write a NOTAM when they are doing simultaneous approaches with a scattered layer obscuring the airport advising us of a spurious glide path.

Although we had the instantaneous 'Dog looking at the TV stare.' Call outs were made by me the PM and action was taken by the PF the Captain. We were paying total attention to the situation and monitoring the approach on the final phase like we were supposed to do. Suggest Tower write a NOTAM when they are doing simultaneous approaches with a scattered layer obscuring the airport advising us of a spurious glide path.

A320 flight crew experiences an unstable glideslope during approach to Runway 16L at SEA. It is ultimately determined that the Tower is crossing aircraft to depart Runway 16C which is causing the instability.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

During climb; while conducting the anti-ice test; the crew noticed a burning odor; consistent with an electrical smell. The Flight Attendant reported the smell concentrated toward the front of the aircraft. After waiting a few minutes; the odor persisted; so the decision was made to [notify ATC] and divert to ZZZ. No visible smoke was detected. Identification: crew detection. Cause: possible electrical abnormality with the windshield heat. After landing; a review of the maintenance logbook showed that the aircraft had been written up for the same issue approximately 3 weeks earlier with no fault found by Maintenance. Response: [notified ATC]; aircraft diverted; Dispatch and Maintenance notified. Suggestion: according to the maintenance logbook; after the previous smoke event; there was no action other than a functional check. I would think it prudent to visually inspect the item in question to check for evidence of burning.

Upon reaching FL180 I executed the climb checklist. As this was the first flight of the day we conducted the Ice Protection Test per the checklist. Almost immediately after starting the test we observed a strong smell of electrical components overheating. While I believed the source of the odor was a result of the anti-ice system I was not sure. I called the flight Attendant who immediately indicated that she smelled it. I instructed her to walk through the cabin and see if she could pinpoint the odor. When she returned to phone she mentioned that it was coming from the front. By this point the smell had not gotten worse; but it hadn't necessarily gotten better; so we elected to divert. We never saw actual smoke and after discussing it the FO and I elected not to don mask with the thought that if it grew worse we would. We divided task and prepared the aircraft for arrival. We landed without incident and had ARFF confirm there was no visible fire before proceeding to the gate.

EMB-145 flight crew reported cabin crew advised of electrical burning smell in forward cabin area during climbout. Flight crew elected to divert.


Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Workload

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure; Software and Automation; Weather

At start of shift; we were informed that NOTAMs had not been available since approximately XA:00z due to damage to the FAA servers.  Several messages sent by [the] domestic manager to get NOTAMs by calling Airport Operations at our airports to obtain NOTAM information.  However; this wouldn't work with many international airports due to language barrier (later resolved when international NOTAM access was restored;) and even with domestic airports; the information is only good until the phone call would be terminated because without new NOTAMs coming in; we would have no way of knowing if a new NOTAM was added later.  Additionally; Center; FIR and FDC NOTAMs were not being updated either; so that information also not available as required by FAR and FOM.Consequently; I elected not to release any of my flights until the NOTAM system came back up.  I attempted to have the flights all prepped so they could be sent immediately when the NOTAM system started coming back; but I fell behind even doing that; and all 13 flights on my desk released late and took the associated delays.  Contributing to the late releases were thunderstorms approaching ZZZ during the inbound and having to focus my attention on those rather than getting flight plans prepped.  My purpose with this report is to both self-disclose the fact that I sent releases later than specified by the manual but also to raise concerns about management's solution to 'mitigate' the NOTAM issue.  The manual is clear about our requirement to check ALL NOTAMs; and merely calling airport operations does not ensure that all NOTAMs are received.  Some NOTAMS; like runway closures; taxiway closures; approach light outages; etc; may come from Airport Operations; but others may be issued by the FAA NOTAM office (FDC NOTAMs;) others are issued by the ATC centers.  It's simply unrealistic and imposes too much of a workload on both international and domestic dispatchers to be expected to call dozens of airports (9 alone on one of my ETOPS flights;) along with multiple centers to try and get NOTAM information while also dealing with thunderstorms and all of our other flight following duties.It seemed very much that the overriding concern was getting releases out regardless of whether it was legal or prudent to do so. Apparently; the FAA puts the NOTAM servers on the top floor of one of their building.  When thunderstorms moved through; the roof leaked and allowed water to soak all of the servers. Better server placement by the FAA would be a good start along with a robust backup system in a completely different location along with the necessary programming and bandwidth so that failing over to the backup system is a near-instant process rather than requiring hours.

A Dispatcher reported NOTAMs were not available due to equipment outage so they could not release flights. The reporter stated the dispatchers were told by Supervisors to contact airports operations to get NOTAMs but this was not sufficient and in violation of company procedures.


Work Cards; Inspection; Installation; Testing

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft X had a #2 Engine inflight shutdown to Airport Code ZZZ1 on DATE.   ZZZ Maintenance sent a crew to ZZZ1 to replace the HMU (Hydro-Mechanical Unit); fuel pump; filters; etc.Prior to the flight an operations check sheet log states the #2 Engine will not light off.   Crew reported Spar Valve circuit breaker (C/B) popped.   The aircraft was Trouble Shot and the flight crew write up did not mention the C/B popped.   Per the sign off the Fire Handle was cycled.

Technicians reported being dispatched on a road trip to replace the HMU and other components on a B737-800; they discovered a popped circuit breaker and reset the fire handle; correcting the malfunction.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS 26L

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 157; Flight Crew Type 1886

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

On approach to 26L into IAH I had an RA flag for about 5 seconds at 8;300 ft. just outside ZAPPO intersection it was only the First Officer side I reported it to ATC and no other failures or issues were noticed on the approach after. This was the second time this happened to me on this same approach; it was a different aircraft as well.

Air Carrier Check Pilot reported an erroneous RA from the First Officer's radio altimeter while on approach to IAH. The Captain stated this was the second such event and in a different aircraft.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors

After at least one frequency change in Kansas City Center; [the] Captain commented we had not heard from center for a number of minutes. I immediately looked at our navigation display and saw Des Moines about 5 to 10 miles to the North. From flying this trip several times; I realized we probably should be with Chicago Center if not Minneapolis. We listened for about another 20 seconds to the frequency and only heard other aircraft speaking; not ATC. Immediately upon confirming this with [the] Captain; I pulled up the Enroute chart on the EFB and tried to get a frequency for our location. I was able to find a list of about 30 frequencies for MSP center (we had flown by DSM at this point). We tried a few of these frequencies with no luck so [the] Captain attempted to have another airplane relay our position and get the proper frequency. After what seemed like about 10 minutes to me; and several back and forths between the relay aircraft and center about our callsign and position; we received a frequency from the relay aircraft; contacted Minneapolis Center; and pressed on to [our destination]. At no time prior to our self-discovery of being on an old frequency did we hear ATC query our position on the frequency we were on or on Guard. We heard no Guard calls period. At no time was the safety of the flight or ability to reach Grand Forks in doubt.From my perspective; ATC missed our handoff and forgot about us. I never heard our callsign (obviously) on frequency to switch to another center or hear a call on Guard. I did not consider this a safety issue. Upon further reflection; I do recall one leg of the many I flew [on this route] had us change squawks by Kansas City Center. If it was indeed this leg; which I am not sure since this is almost a week ago now; that could have contributed to ATC losing track of us. Just a thought. The one thing that could have helped is a better depiction on the Enroute chart of what frequency to be on in a particular geographic location as opposed to a whole list of all the MSP center frequencies.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A300 flight crew reported losing contact with ZKC ARTCC in the vicinity of DSM.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 73; Flight Crew Total 4644; Flight Crew Type 4644

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 68; Flight Crew Total 4122; Flight Crew Type 4122

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During Exterior Preflight inspection it was noted that the Number 2 engine was actively leaking fuel.  Maintenance was consulted and it was determined continued operation was possible providing a successful engine run was completed and the fuel leak had stopped.  Maintenance Control was contacted and approval for an engine run was approved.  I briefed the ramp and maintenance personnel on the logistics of the gate engine run.  The engine run was completed at the gate.  Shortly afterwards we received verification from the Maintenance Technician that we were good as the leak had stopped.  We were informed that the maintenance release would be processed shortly.  Two minutes later we noted on the iPad that the deferral mentioned by the Technician was processed.  As the Number 2 engine was running at the gate and I briefed that we would push as soon as Maintenance said we were good we released the brake and commenced the push.  In-flight we received a message to contact the Dispatch.  After landing a Manager mentioned we may have departed without a maintenance release.  We retained the same plane for the subsequent flight with a valid maintenance release with no maintenance action.

Pre-flight planning completed and aircraft had valid maintenance release.  Fuel leak found on Number 2 engine during walk around.  Local maintenance consulted.  Technician told us engine can be started and run at the gate and if fuel leak stopped; issue would be put on deferral; and we could just push out and continue.  Received authorization from Maintenance Control for engine run and all personnel were briefed on procedure.  Number 2 engine was started and run at the gate with Technician on the headset. Technician told us that fuel leak stopped after startup so paperwork would be completed immediately; deferral issued and we were good to go.  Flight pushed back very soon after as briefed; taxied out and took off.  Message was received in flight to contact Dispatch management upon landing ZZZ1.  Called and [was] told apparently flight departed without valid maintenance release.  We received a valid maintenance release and flew same aircraft to ZZZ2 without incident.

B737 flight crew reported they took off without proper maintenance release documentation.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter FOD

We took the aircraft after a weekly inspection in ZZZ. Logbook was in correct order. Flight was uneventful to ZZZ1. While doing his walkaround; the First Officer came back with a pair of vise grips/pliers and said he found them wedged in the landing gear; somewhere around the shimmy damper. At this time we called ZZZ1 Maintenance; but they had not touched the aircraft since its arrival about 10 minutes prior. We have to assume that the vise grips were left by ZZZ Maintenance sometime during the weekly check (my guess is that they used them to remove the gear pins/covers and set them down on the gear). The First Officer also stated that numerous panels were open but that he closed them during his preflight in ZZZ.I wish I had known that the First Officer had closed panels during his preflight; I would have immediately called Maintenance and ensured that they were done with their checks. I'm not sure if they signed off the logbook prior to actually completing the inspections or if someone just forgot to close up after they were completed. I know that opinions have changed a few times over whether or not we should be closing panels but I've always been of the belief that we should always call Maintenance when panels are open. Perhaps it's being taught differently to the newer pilots here.

An A319 flight crew after landing discovered a pair of vice grip/pliers wedged in the landing gear during the aircraft walk around. Local Maintenance stated that they had not yet touched the aircraft. The Captain concluded that the pliers had been left by the departure station Maintenance.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

A C560 was approved for a Visual Approach to Runway 11R from the southwest; position was given 15 miles from airport. Aircraft was turned over to Tower about 10 miles away; both in compliance with LOA. I had two practice VFR approaches behind the C560. I heard the D-Side answering the VRB Tower line just as I was noticing the C560 seeming to turn to the north and climb. D-Side confirmed my suspicions that something was wrong and he told me the Tower said they couldn't take him and he was coming back to us. VRB assigned a heading of 270; climbing to 2;000 FT and that was head-on into my VFR practice approaches. I descended the C560 down to 1;700 FT; then 1;600 FT and turned him back to the airport. The C560 also got an RA and descended below the MVA to 1;300 FT. I paralleled the aircraft with the Class D; slowed the aircraft as much as possible because they seemed to have a lot of pattern traffic. I then coordinated with the Tower and they took him from there. The Tower Controller called me to apologize and I understood that he got in a jam and we both agreed he should have done a go-around to the east; not back into my traffic. Procedures should be drawn up for traffic that is an unexpected go-around. Usually this situation does not happen without coordination as they get permission to spin the aircraft in case he's high or can't follow traffic for some reason. Aircraft executing an unexpected go-around should follow normal departure procedures. Secondly; we should develop a data base of errors that happen at the VRB terminal sector and VRB and FPR Tower. Then trends should be noted and isolated dangerous situations brought up in meetings between ZMA and VRB and FPR Towers. There are many questionable practices between all facilities involved.

ZMA Controller described a conflict event when an IFR inbound to VRB was unexpectedly turned out by VRB Tower into other inbound aircraft. The reporter suggested more formalized procedures for this type of occurrence.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft X is inbound to SQL airport which is located in Woodside Sectors airspace. LICKE sector works the SQL IFR approach into SQL starting at AMEBY which is on the boundary of LICKE and Woodside's airspace. LICKE sector has to accomplish up to three point outs with the SQL IFR approach; point out to the TOGA sector; point out to the Woodside Sector and depends what altitude the approach crosses AMEBY point out to NUQ tower.Aircraft X is inbound to AMEBY for the RNAV Runway30 approach to SQL. Toga point out has been accomplished the Woodside point out is in the process of a point out via automated point out procedure. Woodside calls the LICKE sector and instructs LICKE to spin Aircraft X once and then bring it in and they WILL TAKE THE POINT OUT at that time because they released a SQL IFR departure. LICKE sector instructs Aircraft X who is on an approximate 320 heading to turn left to a heading of 180. That's when I relieve the LICKE controller. A moment later I see the SQL departure depart SQL; I instruct Aircraft X to go direct AMEBY for the approach. We spun Aircraft X like the Woodside sector instructed us to do. Aircraft X made a left turn to AMEBY and made the 360 route that Woodside instructed. When I saw Aircraft X was direct AMBEY I cleared Aircraft X for the RNAV approach starting at AMEBY fully expecting Woodside to accept the point out like they stated they would. Aircraft X was approaching Woodside's airspace again and has yet to accept the automated point out. I am not sure about the sequence events next. Woodside sector calls for coordination on their SQL departure. Woodside stated they are going to take the departure eastbound into Aircraft X the SQL arrival. I gave instructions as a receiving controller to take the aircraft south to go behind Aircraft X. So Aircraft X can continue inbound for the approach. The instruction seems to confuse the transferring controller. I then clarified to take the aircraft over OSI VOR and depart Woodside on a 110 heading which is a standard route to alleviate the confusion. Coordination ended at that. Woodside has yet to take the Point Out on Aircraft X. I call Woodside to accomplish a manual point out. Woodside refused to accept the point out because of the SQL departure in which I already gave instruction to resolve the conflict. I felt Woodside was being obstinate in refusing to take the point out. All conflicts were resolved and there was no other conflict to let Aircraft X continue inbound on the approach and for the Woodside controller to accept the point out. Instead of delaying the Aircraft X aircraft again I told the Woodside sector that Aircraft X was continuing inbound. We spun Aircraft X like Woodside instructed and anticipated that Woodside would accept the point out like they instructed. Woodside then refused to take the point out and the airspace design around AMEBY does not leave us many options to hold in our airspace that close to the IAF. Aircraft X continued the approach; landed going through Woodside's airspace without a point out with no other incidents.This conflict is with two different sectors in two different areas of the building. One sector works the departures that depart opposite direction head on with another sector in another area working the arrival into the same airport which is SQL. It causes confusion; there is a break down on who is doing what.I suggest the SQL arrivals and departures are worked by the same area and same controller; this would alleviate the coordination between two different areas. SQL airport in located in Woodside's airspace and JEFNY an IAF for the RNAV approach to SQL which is in Woodside's airspace. I recommend that the IFR arrivals be routed over JEFNY and be worked by the Woodside controller this way one sector and one area can work out the delay or sequence for the opposite direction departure vs the arrival. It would no longer have the confusion of coordination control instruction and accepting point outs.

NCT TRACON Controller reported about confusion; an airspace violation and constant problems associated with an airport where one sector works the arrival and another sector works the departure.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 33; Flight Crew Total 97; Flight Crew Type 97

VFR flight en route 5500 ft direct [eastbound; to the destination]; incident happened near shoreline near ZZZ (exact distance not recorded.)Requested VFR flight following. Happened approximately 5 mins after the handover from [hand-off between TRACON controllers]. Both ATC facilities advised traffic. Pilot had traffic in sight the whole time but had no knowledge of the other aircraft's make/type; speed; intention; direction. Pilot exercised extreme caution. The other aircraft was not in communication with the same ATC frequency and was probably on an incorrect VFR altitude.ATC did not advise avoidance action; and I was not able to estimate the vertical distance until in close vicinity. It was eventually made aware to me at a close distance that the two aircrafts were on converging courses. The other aircraft passed 200-300 ft over my aircraft.I should have followed right of ways rules earlier to avoid potential hazards but the other aircraft was clearly on an incorrect altitude (cruising at 5500 FT on 180-359 heading). This flight is one of my very first flights after my PPL [Private Pilots License] check ride and my second night x-country. This will indeed be a very important lesson for my future flying.

PA-28 pilot reported NMAC during cruise with aircraft who was possibly on incorrect VFR altitude.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 100

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Flight was from VNY east bound. VNY tower cleared me for takeoff on runway 34L and told me to fly straight out and BUR tower will call my turn east. I took off and flew straight out and after a while I asked if I should switch over to BUR tower so they could call the turn. I asked this because I felt I was a bit too far north. VNY tower told me to stay with them for a bit and they would hand me off shortly. After a minute or so they asked me to contact BUR tower for the transition through their airspace.I switched over to BUR tower and checked in and told them I wanted to transition through their airspace and was waiting for the turn instructions. At this time I had a lot of radio interference and I think I missed an instruction and/or a squawk assignment. I asked for repeated instructions and I could not hear them even with a squelched out setting on the radio. I switched to my second radio and it was no better. Somewhere in all this communication I thought I heard them say to fly to a highway intersection that I thought was off my right side about a 060 degree heading. I told them that that was the heading I will fly. This occurred just south of the VALEY waypoint. All of a sudden I was out of the area of interference and I could hear other airplanes and the controller. I was instructed to fly a 120 heading and this would keep me out of the WHP Class D airspace. I am not sure if he boosted his signal or if I just happened to fly out of the interference area.I flew the 120 heading and as a flew I saw on my iPad with foreflight that I was about a 1/8 mile southwest of the WHP class D dotted blue line. I know that there can be a difference between what a controller sees on his screen and what I see on mine. As far as I am concerned I did not fly into the WHP class D but I am not sure what a controller may have seen with a little bit of map shift. I saved a screen shot with my iPad of our position. We were not in the class D space.I don't know what can prevent this. Maybe there is a dead spot near that area? My radios worked just fine on a 22 hour trip just a couple of weeks ago and they worked fine the rest of the day with SoCal and other facilities. Of course it would be nice of the VNY controller could just give us a heading to fly after departure and then make a hand off to BUR tower with information forwarded but it seems like they don't like taking the time to do that. It is standard for them to have us call BUR tower on our own and explain what we want. Also it would be nice if the BUR tower would just give out a heading instead of assigning freeway intersections; I am not too familiar with all the freeways....But that is not really the issue here; I think it was just some sort of radio interference/dead zone.

M20 pilot departed VNY on Runway 34L and questioned the departure instructions issued by the Tower when radio interference made communication with BUR Tower difficult. The interference suddenly disappeared and clear instructions were received from BUR Tower; but the reporter believed he came very close to WHP Class D airspace.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 93; Flight Crew Total 3928; Flight Crew Type 1271

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Work Refused

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

The Dangerous Goods form showed what I considered a large amount of Dangerous Goods. It was a little over 4;500 pounds of drill code 9L substances in 3 shipments; and another shipment that had less than a pound of drill code 8L. Two shipments of the 9L substances were the exact same amount down to the hundredths of a pound. The large quantity and the appearance of a possible duplicate shipment caused both [the First Officer] and me to raise an eyebrow. I called the dispatcher who connected me to the Hazmat desk. I was told by a supervisor that these amounts were wrong and that the paperwork was wrong as well. But; [the supervisor] didn't know for certain what to do and suggested someone in operations would need to figure it out. This began a series of radio and phone calls that led nowhere. No one knew anything about the hazmat; no one wanted to figure it out; and no one really cared. I called the Chief Pilot and had to leave a voicemail. I talked again to the dispatcher and asked to escalate the need for help to the next level on his end; and maybe even to the ops director. At this same time I'm getting more erroneous information from ZZZ ops that was basically a wordy plea to try and get me to leave without a resolution. I finally decided to oblige this request as it seemed the only way we were going to depart. BUT; only after ALL the Dangerous Goods were removed from the airplane. ALL of it was removed. It took a pay loader 3 trips to get it all removed and when they were done the final weights message showed a 12;500 drop in TOW. Which makes me wonder: what did it really all weigh? I wasn't sure if this decision was the greatest one; I would rather had accurate data and confident coworkers assuring the accuracy; but I didn't have any of that. There was no one that knew anything accurate about this shipment that could verify anything. At that moment we got a call from the Chief Pilot. He said he had been working the problem for about a half hour; could not get a hold of anyone who knew a thing about the DG on our airplane; and was in complete agreement with our decision to take it all off the airplane. He remarked that he was shocked at this; I told him we were both quite shocked as well. We were about 2.5 hours late to [our destination].

B767 Captain reported Hazmat documents provided to the flight crew contained numerous weight and description errors. After making multiple attempts to correct the issue without resolution; the flight crew refused the Hazmat shipment and the flight departed safely.


ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types

Departure strip printed and I retrieved for an A320. Pilot checked in climbing to 3;000 FT on runway heading. I observed the primary target off the departure end; established RADAR contact with the aircraft; and instructed it to climb to 15;000 FT and turn left heading 360. I meant to ask the pilot to make sure transponder was on; but did not. I got busy with other departures and arrivals and forgot about the primary target aircraft. Pilot called back about ten minutes later to verify he was supposed to still be on my frequency. I expanded the RADAR scope range and asked the pilot to turn the transponder on; the A320 tagged up about 30 miles beyond Approach airspace boundary; level at 15;000 FT. I called Center to perform a late hand off; Center accepted the hand off and I switched the aircraft. Recommendation; be more alert.

TRACON Controller described an airspace incursion event into an adjacent Center sector when departure traffic; without a transponder; went unnoticed by the reporter after initially being RADAR identified as a primary target off the runway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 129; Flight Crew Type 679

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Pushed back [in] DEN. Single engine taxi turn to east. Night time taxi with SOP taxi lighting utilized; and two pilots clearing area before taxi. Subsequently; a pickup truck continued to approach and refused to yield to aircraft movement underway. I quickly stopped aircraft; so as to ensure no potential for loss of separation between aircraft and vehicle. While preparing to recover taxi operations and to taxi again; second vehicle; this time a catering truck; proceeded to pass closely in front of aircraft. This was after additional aircraft lights were selected for increased aircraft visibility and obvious taxi intention at night. Reported two vehicle issues with Ramp Tower; including second catering truck number. Ramp Tower advised this sort of event had happened multiple times that evening on the ramp. This event caused distraction during an otherwise busy departure.

Air carrier Captain reported that a pickup truck refused to yield to the aircraft on the ramp; resulting in a ground conflict.


Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft; Company Policy

First Officer's Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) deferred. After arriving at aircraft we found the EFB removed from the First Officer's side. The First Officer had no way of accomplishing the performance data from his seat. We called Maintenance and asked for a [performance laptop] and were told there are none available. Our choices were 1) Captain do the performance data for takeoff; 2) call Dispatch or 3) First Officer kneel behind the Captain's seat and do the data on the Captain's EFB. Choice 3 was the quickest way to accomplish this and to make an on time push. In order to try to maintain the preflight as standard as possible; the First Officer did the data from behind my seat; went back to the right seat and then I handed the EFB (with a too short cord) to the First Officer for the performance briefing. This is awkward to say the least. During the taxi we were asked to do an intersection takeoff and I would have had to get off the taxiway; set the brake and do the data. We did get clearance for a full length runway takeoff. At our arrival airport we had to go into holding for reports of severe windshear. No problem with the performance data airborne; but it would have been better if the First Officer was able to do the data for flaps 20 and I could have stayed focused on the conditions at the airport. This could be viewed as an annoyance that caused non-standard procedures up until this point. The real problem was departing the airport and while wind shear conditions still existed. I want data based on the actual winds called by the Tower. The Captain should not have to run the data under these conditions. We don't train to just go with what data we have in windshear conditions. Flight Operation Manual also states that cell phones are not permitted from block out to block in. Trying to get performance data from Dispatch on ACARS when I need it immediately puts an unreasonable burden on the Captain. There was not another company aircraft we could have asked for the data. I also understand we are not going to have the [performance program] loaded in the iPad's due to costs. Do not defer the First Officer's EFB if a [performance laptop] is not available. I realize the MEL may not get changed; but at the very least; Maintenance could use 'best practices' to only defer the Captains side. The EFB's should have been swapped. Put the [performance program] on the iPad's.

A300 Captain laments being dispatched with the First Officer's EFB MEL'ed and removed from the aircraft requiring all performance calculations to be done by the Captain while airborne.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 118; Flight Crew Type 3917

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Parking check complete flight deck ready and waiting for ground crew to call. First call from tug driver (male) indicated ground crew was ramp ready. I replied standby we will obtain clearance. Ramp cleared [flight] to push and disconnect at the top of the alley. I contacted the tug driver and said brakes released cleared to pushback disconnect at the top of the alley. 30 seconds expired and ramp queried as to why we were not pushing back.I attempted to call the tug driver with no response. The driver left the tug and headset with an active clearance. I attempted to call them with no contact. We cancelled the push and set the brake. The tug driver obviously was replaced by female voice. She indicated she was ramp ready. I indicated to her in the future to communicate with flight deck before you leave.She replied in an extremely hostile manner. Her words were unintelligible. When she calmed down I attempted to review with her the roles and procedures and she became hostile again. We contacted ramp to send a supervisor and a replacement driver as she was hostile. The supervisor assumed the role as lead and the tug driver position. We pushed and continued without further incident.

B-737 flight crew were ready for pushback. The pushback crew originally reported ready; pushback clearance was received; and the Captain was unable to contact the pushback crew. A different voice came on from the pushback crew and responded hostilely when reprimanded by the Captain. The Captain requested and received a replacement pushback crew.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Total 15558; Flight Crew Type 7132

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Procedure; Equipment / Tooling; Environment - Non Weather Related

During the GEFFEN 1C Arrival/ILS X RWY 26; we experienced intermittent GPS/ADS-B Signal Interruption due to NOTAM military operations present in the Tel Aviv FIR. Just as we were about to intercept the RWY 26 localizer; we had a Nav Unavailable RNP. Since we were in VFR conditions with 8 miles visibility and the airport area in sight; we continued to intercept the localizer and proceeded to a normal landing. There was some map shift note as compared to the localizer course raw data.

Captain reported experiencing intermittent GPS/ADS-B signal interruption during ILS approach.


We had initially requested the RNAV (GPS) Y RWY 05R to practice for proficiency. I thought it'd be a good idea in light of NOT a lot of KIND traffic. Upon a ATC radar vectored visual approach; backed up by a practice RNAV (GPS) RWY 05R approach; I had disengaged the autopilot at NO less than 500' AFE or nearing 1220' minimums or 5;000/1 for LNAV/VNAV. What happened next shortly after autopilot disconnecting was that the aircraft seemed to drift slightly to my right. The surface winds were about 050/6 (maybe from 040 - negligible). So; it appeared that there may have been 1 - 1 1/2 units of rudder trim already imputed. I trimmed towards neutral or 0 with the rudder trim control. The aircraft's bank angle was such that a slight or small right bank had developed (5-10 deg.?). Anyway; my goal at this point was to stop any drift towards the right of RWY centerline. So; applying left aileron control yoke pressure; it felt as if resistance was felt strongly enough to where the aircraft was now NOT responding to my inputs to correct and bank towards the left; slightly. My next measure was inputting some small incremental; left wing down aileron trim which definitely helped in my quest in that left small drift correction. Then did it seem as though the left aileron started responding. However; it still didn't seem quite as it should be. As if something was 'fighting' me on these inputs. The FO never had any hand on the control yoke as he had later stated when we had discussed it at the gate. I did write this condition up in the logbook. Furthermore; I had a lengthy conversation with two maintenance techs. I merely told them I had never experienced such a flight control sensation issue as this. I had given them as much information as I could assist them in troubleshooting this; as well as the pertinent details in the logbook write up. We did uneventfully touch down on or very close to the runway centerline. Nothing was ever said or communicated to Tower or Ground controllers about this issue. I was focused on flying the airplane safely and not wanting to induce any critical distractions this low to the ground. The FO and I debriefed this extensively while parked at the gate. I merely explained to him what I had experienced since he had very little feedback; other than what I had told him.

A B757 Captain; hand flying a practice RNAV (GPS) approach for proficiency development noted drift and bank conditions he attributed to an aileron or other roll control anomaly; advising roll control never felt 'quite as it should be.'


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Working Local Control position on an 8R/17 configuration. Arrival from the southeast Aircraft Y is direct the field descending to 050 on a northwest heading inbound for the visual to 8R. Aircraft X is taxiing for takeoff on Runway 17 first fix PMM which is a southwestern heading. I call down and coordinate with the Radar Controller asking if he would like me to put Aircraft X straight out (runway heading) or turn him right direct PMM which is outside of my departure gate; he tells me to leave him straight out. I clear Aircraft X for takeoff Runway 17 climbing to 040. About 30 seconds later the Radar Controller APREQs (Approval Request) a right downwind for Aircraft Y; and I approve the request since I had just coordinated a departure rolling off of Runway 17 and he is aware of that departure climbing to 040 via the SOP. I then re-coordinate asking the Radar Controller if he would like me to put the departure on a heading (240). I am told that he will not put Aircraft Y in front of my departure. Aircraft X is in the takeoff roll and I notice on the D-BRITE (Tower radar device) that Aircraft Y is in a westbound turn now for the downwind. As soon as Aircraft X was airborne I called that traffic (Aircraft Y) and he reported the aircraft in sight. I then told Aircraft X to maintain visual separation from Aircraft Y and climb maintain 040 and contact Departure; Aircraft X read-back the clearance. After the event I learned that Aircraft Y also had Aircraft X in sight. But both aircraft responded to a TCAS RA (Resolution Advisory).More precise communication between local and radar could have been used. Also once I saw the situation developing more I could have verified previous coordination with radar.

Grand Rapids Tower Controller reported a loss of separation due to poor coordination.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 3300

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 3200

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Rapid decompression led to a rapid descent to an altitude appropriate for loss of pressurization. The landing was uneventful.

A loss of pressurization while in a climb required the flight crew to initiate a rapid descent to avoid the need for supplemental oxygen. The crew coordinated intentions with ZZZ Center and leveled at 12;000 ft. MSL. We proceeded to the nearest suitable airport to assess the situation and have Maintenance fix the problem. Once it was fixed; we continued to our original destination.

Citation flight crew reported experiencing loss of pressurization during en-route climb.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

Upon standing in the aisle at my demonstration (demo) position; I looked at the Exit signs as the demo played. I noticed something odd as the video stated there are Exit signs at all door and window exits. There were extra Exit signs on my airplane. At Row 11A-C side and Row 36A-C there were Overhead Exit signs. There are no exits at these rows and I have never noticed signs there before. It was written up during flight. Could I please get an explanation for these signs. In the event of an emergency I feel this would cause confusion and have passengers in rows with no exits in the event of a dark environment.

Reporter had no additional information but speculated the aircraft had just come out of a Maintenance Check where a seat plan was used which did not accurately reflect the aircraft's configuration and subsequently an incorrect maintenance procedure was completed. The signs did not have Left and Right arrows; just EXIT. This aircraft is the only one reporter has seen with this configuration.

A B757-200 Flight Attendant noticed Overhead Cabin EXIT signs at Row 11 A-C and 32 A-C where no exits exists and speculated Maintenance had used an incorrect seat plan while the aircraft was undergoing maintenance. Concerns also raised that passengers may pile up during a darkened environment at seat rows with incorrectly located EXIT signs.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 107; Flight Crew Total 6500; Flight Crew Type 350

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Confusion; Fatigue; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Excursion Ramp

Company Policy; Procedure; Weather; Airport

After flying the approach I taxied toward the FBO. I was planning on remaining away from the fuel island. The Marshaller was standing by but on the other side of the island (other side of bright light). With nonstandard lighted wand signals and with a yellow line I elected to circle the island to the right at a controlled speed. The right main gear exited the asphalt into the grass by a distance of 5 feet. Understanding the situation; engines were shut down and passengers deplaned with the door been on the left side and over asphalt. The past days had been rainy and the wheels were deep in the grass.That morning we picked up passengers and parked facing west away from the Fuel Island. We were marshalled in that position. That evening; in darkness and rain reducing visibility; the marshaller came on the side of the FBO planning on parking the plane facing North; but the signals (lighted wand) were confusing. With a yellow line in sight; I proceeded around the Island. This line was a marking for refueling purpose. It had all the characteristic of a taxiway centerline. At no time did the Marshaller prevent us from making forward motion.A better study of the layout and briefing for the taxi portion of the flight would have alleviated the risk experienced. The yellow line was confusing. Double red line would be more appropriate for the protection of the fueling area.

Air Taxi Captain reported a ramp excursion due to confusing Marshaller instructions and taxiway markings.


Air Traffic Control Military 8; Air Traffic Control Non Radar 1; Air Traffic Control Radar 8; Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This is linked to a human factors issue with air traffic controllers assuming more responsibility than before. Aircraft are now being managed instead of being controlled; a lot of trust is being placed in a fallible system and by eliminating the 'controller' aspect of descend via's there is likely to be a serious event. Per the LOA ZLA sector 19/20 (specifically) is not allowed to handoff aircraft to the HEMR [Hemet Radar] position with altitude stacks yet they continue to do it; sometimes without an Approval Request (APPREQ). I don't know if this is a safety culture issue or a training deficiency.The DSNEE RNAV arrival from the North and the SIZLR (while procedural separated) can cause the HEMR controller to spend more attention than what should be required to ensure the aircraft will comply with the altitude restrictions which keeps them separated. This extra attention to the North; combined with airspace changes which causes the HEMR position to look at more airspace than before; the controller is more likely to miss a conflict either aircraft to aircraft; or an aircraft transitioning the jump zones in the Southern portion of their airspace. This issue also ties in with the issue mentioned above about leaving aircraft high or stacked from the North and the SIZLR. If an aircraft is high on the DSNEE (which I have seen multiple times) is will be in direct conflict with the SIZLR arrival.Examples provided below:I was relieving a controller from the HEMR position during a period of heavy/complex traffic; ZLA 19 called on the shout line 2-3 times but we were too busy to answer. After I assumed responsibility of the HEMR position a KAYOH arrival and a DSNEE arrival were coming from the North. I took radar on both aircraft and then realized that the [DSNEE arrival] was high on the arrival. [The KAYOH aircraft] was at the appropriate altitude but [the DSNEE aircraft] was left high to overtake and was at FL210 over CARZZ (I shouldn't have taken the handoff). [The DSNEE arrival aircraft] was 2500 feet high at ASPEN.[A 737] was on the DSNEE arrival and [another aircraft] was on the SIZLR arrival; [the 737] looked high at first glance and appeared to be in direct conflict. I used the MIN function and the aircraft were going to be within a mile of each other at crossing points. I called ZLA to ensure [the 737] would meet the crossing restriction prior to taking the handoff (ZLA ensured [the 737] would meet the restriction). Even though each aircraft complied with the crossing restrictions it caused me to place unnecessary attention on the situation which could have resulted in aircraft coming together in the Southern portion of my airspace. Making the crossing restriction at CARZZ 160 instead of at or above 160 should help alleviate this problem.Working with March Approach and getting them to take more airspace in the Southern portion of HEMR (maybe 070 and below) so that HEMR is not tasked to work all the VFR transitions below 070. This would relieve the workload and frequency congestion for the HEMR controller which would allow them to more safely and efficiently work the IFR aircraft on the new Optimization of Airspace Procedures in the Metroplex. If an agreement to give March more airspace can't be reached then HEMR should have the ability to be split. There should be a new position in the EMP area; staffing an assist doesn't always help due to frequency congestion.

SCT TRACON Controller reported new RNAV Arrival procedures are causing increased workload.


Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The purpose of this report is to report a LAANC portal that is not operating properly which contributed to a possible airspace incursion by our UAS.At location  Number 1 (030- degrees at 2.0 NM from PXR VOR); the PIC requested a LAANC airspace waiver through the AIRMAP program. On the 'Flight Briefing' screen there was an amber banner that stated 'Authorization upon Submission' notice. The PIC then pressed the blue 'SUBMIT FLIGHT' button and a screen balloon appeared stating 'Success - Your flight plan has been submitted'. The AIRMAP program then displayed a map screen and a Flight Time banner appeared with a clock running just above a bottom blue banner labeled 'END FLIGHT'. We then flew twice at this location for a total of 23 minutes.We repeated this process at a location Number 2: Tempe Town Lake Marina located at 078 degrees at 1.9 NM from the PXR VOR. We flew at location Number 2 twice; totaling 15 minutes.While the PIC was operating the drone; I was auditing the flight by looking at AIRMAP on my phone and did not see the flight displayed.I alerted the PIC and he immediately terminated the flight. We tried several times to submit new flights on the PIC's phone; and on my phone; with the same results: AIRMAP processed the waiver requests; displayed normal indications that the waiver would be issued; and then started the flight timer. However; when selecting the flight plan details for previous flights; a red Waiver Not Approved banner became visible even though normal screens appeared when waivers were approved and the flight timer was running.At this point; I contacted a person that is involved in the local Aeroscope security network and he advised me to use a different LAANC provider.We relocated to location Number 3: 076 degrees at 1.5 NM from PXR VOR and used the Skyward portal. We immediately received authorization and a waiver number at this location; even though it was a [few] miles closer to PHX.We suspect that all four flights at locations Number 1 and Number 2 may have been flown without FAA Approval.Therefore; our UAS Operations Manual will be amended to require the FAA Waiver Authorization number be recorded on our flight manifest prior to takeoff.Additionally; we have contacted AIRMAP to repair their iPhone app.

UAV operator reported a possible airspace incursion occurred in the vicinity of PXR.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Prior to my flight I was approached by a Check Airman and he told me to pay close attention to fuel due to the fact that on several flights he and several other pilots experienced actual Critical Fuel (CF) trending less than flight planned Critical Fuel. I advised my First Officer of the discussion I had with the Check Airman and we decided to pay close attention to detail on our fuel burn. At the gate we called fuel at 70;000 lbs. Ramp fuel on flight plan was 70;166 and minimum release was 67;846. Fuel on Board (FOB) reduced to 69;822 prior to engine start. Fuel over Destination (FOD) on flight plan was 19;100. MCDU FOD showed 18;100 prior to engine start. Enroute to ZZZ at top of climb we noticed that our fuel over destination showed 17;100 and FOB showed 37.2. Flight plan critical fuel was 37;396. Actual critical fuel was showing less than planned.We sent an ACARS to dispatch to inform them that we were showing less than critical fuel on our MCDU than what was reflected on the Flight Plan. Dispatch responded via ACARS with 'copy critical fuel; dispatch.' We sent them a second message again and asked them what plan of action we should take and then we got no response. We decided to SATCOM Dispatch directly and explained the above scenario. Dispatcher decided to try running scenarios in his system [to] recover some fuel. He tried removing alternate but it didn't reduce our planned CF enough to reflect what we were going to have. [He] then took our actual ZFW which was less than planned and it gave us a new CF of 37;298. It was the best he could do. It was better than our original on the Flight Plan so he sent us a re-analysis reflecting our new CF of 37;298.At that point we improved somewhat on our CF which was 37;200...still close. We decided to call [a company flight] up ahead of us and asked them what their Critical Fuel Situation (spread) was and what their winds were at FL410. They said that their CF was fine and that they had a stronger tailwind of 45 kts versus what we had at our altitude which was about 28 kts. Big difference and I asked them if we could take their altitude to improve our fuel and they obliged. We simultaneously asked for our change of altitudes with ATC and we were granted a climb to FL410 while they descended to FL400. Upon reaching FL410 our CF estimate improved to 37;300 and finally increased to 37;500.Looking back and reviewing our Flight Plan had we took off with min take off fuel of 67;846 with our Flight Plan ETP accumulated Fuel Burn of 30;400; that would leave us with 37;446 at ETP which is only 50 lbs more than the Flight Plan CF of 37;396. This fuel margin is extremely tight. In post-flight discussion with Dispatchers; they advised me that they are being told to reduce the 'fuel margins' and cannot increase them unless the Captain requests for more fuel. I think the cause is the pressure put upon the Dispatchers to reduce fuel allowances to save money. This is now causing greater concern about the SAFETY of our flights (regarding fuel) and placing a greater burden on our pilots insist that the fuel loads be more scrutinized even more than ever.

A330 Captain on an oceanic flight reported a low fuel situation developed when they had less than forecasted tailwinds. Flight requested a higher altitude with better winds.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We were flying from ZZZ to ANC and we were CPDLC. We had been step climbing as our optimum altitude increased and had been at FL380 for probably about 20 or 30 minutes. We had been mostly smooth at that altitude with just a few occasional bumps. Just about 60 to 80 miles south of PADQ we received an ATC message to contact Center.At almost the same exact time we entered into an atmospheric wave and our airspeed began fluctuating. I was the PF (Pilot Flying) and the CA (Captain) was the PM (Pilot Monitoring). The CA switched to the given frequency and attempted to make contact with Center. At this time we received another message from CPDLC saying that communication with them had ended. After multiple tries and unable to reach Center the CA tried using guard. There was still no reply.At this point our airspeed fluctuations had increased to going between almost barber pole and almost low speed yellow band. I had disconnected the auto throttles in an attempt to not over speed. Our route of flight at this point was not on a published route and we saw no one on TCAS so the CA said (and I agreed) that we should descend. We descended down to FL360. This altitude was much smoother. During the descent we continued to try and contact Center and were trying to look up a different frequency. The CA was about to send Dispatch a message when a Company flight answered us on guard and gave us the frequency that they were on; but that still didn't work. Finally Company asked Center what frequency we should be on and passed it on to us. It was close to but not the same frequency as what CPDLC had given us; leading us to conclude they had given us the wrong frequency.Once in contact with Center we told them what had happened. They told us we could maintain FL360. We gave them a pilot report of moderate to severe atmospheric wave with +/- 15 to 20 kts. The flight proceeded without further incident. After landing the CA called Dispatch and informed them of what had happened.I believe we acted appropriately for the given situation. The CA used his [PIC] authority the aircraft flying safely and to keep from exceeding any airspeed limits.The lapse in communication seems to be due to being given the wrong frequency as well as being unable to reach Center on guard while simultaneously being disconnected from CPDLC.

Air carrier flight crew encountered an atmospheric wave which caused large fluctuations in airspeed and necessitated a descent.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

During our visual approach to BFL we had to execute a go-around due to LA Center giving us information that we did not expect. It was late and the Tower was closed as well as BFL Approach Control.  On about a 10 mile final in VMC to Runway 12L; LA Center told us that we could change to advisory frequency and contact them on the ground to cancel IFR; which of course is completely normal. He then reminded us that Runway 12L-30R was closed. This caught us by surprise since there were no NOTAMs indicating this closure. I asked him to confirm which runways were closed and he again stated 12L-30R. We executed a go around to review our information. There were many NOTAMS in effect that we had already read and reviewed; but nothing about the runway closure. Runway 12R-30L was unlit and unusable. I sent an ACARS message to Dispatch asking them about any closures while ATC double checked their information. I also called BFL operations to see if they knew anything. We did another low approach this time to Runway 30R to see if there were any indications of a closure. There were none. As we were climbing out a Sheriff's helicopter was departing BFL. They spoke to us on the radio and told that they had overflown the runway and confirmed that it was open and safe. Dispatch replied to our ACARS and confirmed that there were no NOTAMs indicating that 12L-30R was closed. Operations had spoken to Airport Police and they confirmed that the runway was open and safe. Given all this information we made the decision to continue and land in BFL on 30R. An uneventful landing was made.[The cause was] conflicting information regarding NOTAMs between flight release; Dispatch and LA Center.

The NOTAMS said nothing about a runway closure. LA Center was the only source that indicated that 30R/12L was closed. It was after hours and we could not verify with Bakersfield Tower; but there was no mention of a closure on the recorded ASOS.

Flight crew reported ATC was confused about which runway was closed at BFL.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Type 15500

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related

The chart for the complex special procedure for an engine failure departing [Runway] 8L on the RATPK Departure from LAS airport shows a turn at 12.7 DME LAS to the heading of 050 degrees or continuing on the SID depending on altitude. The issue here is 12.7 DME aligns with FLAAR which is a much further point on the departure.  The turn point seems to be more closely aligned with SCAAR; which is different point on the SID for departing [Runway] 8R.  I note that point to show the location difference; not to say what the point should be.  I believe the 12.7 DME is the error on the chart and should be closer to 4.9 DME. Additionally; the BLD 325 degree radial shown is incorrect as that also aligns with FLAAR and not the turn point.As charted there is no way to identify the correct Engine Out Decision point as shown. The chart appears to be way off in terms of where FLAAR; BLD Vortac and the Engine Out turn point are located.  This procedure should be removed until corrected.  Unless we are supposed to fly to 12.7 DME; then in that case; everything beyond the turn is shown incorrectly. So that makes me suspect of all terrain shown on this chart as well.

Pilot reported the chart for the complex special procedure for an engine failure departing Runway 8L on the RATPK Departure from LAS airport to be confusing and possibly incorrect.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 4.2; Flight Crew Total 1118; Flight Crew Type 802

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On right base; I was cleared to land number two in sequence; following traffic in front of me. As I turned final; I had no visual of that traffic. I asked the Tower where the traffic landing in front of me was. Coming down the glideslope; I saw a TCAS target in front and slightly to the left of me on my MFD indicating what looked like a mid-air about to happen. I called the Tower to ask where the aircraft cleared in front of me was and he said he was just turning final; consistent with my thought that a mid-air was imminent. As I still had no visual on that aircraft; I announced to the Tower that I was making a climbing right 360 to avoid the traffic. I made a tight 360 so as not to interfere with traffic in the pattern. As there were perfect VMC conditions; I could see where I was going in the turn. The Tower then said make it a 340 turn; not a 360. When I was at the 340 mark or so; I asked if I was cleared to land; as there was no traffic in front of me. I then received the clearance to land. On landing; Ground Control advised that it was a possible deviation for making the 360. My reason for deviating with a 360 turn was I never had a visual on the traffic in front of me but made my judgment on the basis of the TCAS target. As Pilot in Command; I felt the plane was in imminent danger; that immediate action was required and that failure to do so would put the lives of me and my passenger; plus the lives of the other pilot and passengers in mortal danger; especially with the Tower handling so many other calls. The number of planes in the pattern added to the delay in communications with the Tower. Also; because I was in right traffic and the plane cleared before me was on the left turn to final to the same runway; I never did have a visual on the plane cleared before me. I was not advised the plane I would be following on final would be turning from a left base in front of me; or I would have been looking there for that traffic. I feel that the controller may have not kept sufficient separation between me and the traffic he turned to land in front of me. My opinion is that if the controller had been more forthcoming with information in this situation; this may have been avoided.

A pilot reported they made a turn off their final approach course for converging traffic on a base leg.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 749

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 8

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

As we were climbing to 34;000 we received the Right Pack off indication and the associated [alert] messages. We were right in the tops of the clouds and requested a climb to 36;000 to try and get in the clear sky. We had been flying with the Left pack in the off position; due to the cockpit noise levels. As soon as the right pack off indications happened we immediately selected the left pack back to auto. Shortly after this; but before reaching 36;000; the left pack off indications posted. Bleed pressure for both systems now read zero. At this time we began an immediate descent to 10;000 feet and continued the pack off checklist. We determined that the nearest suitable airport to us was ZZZ. There were thunderstorms in the area; which required some deviating; but the temperatures were high enough that anti-ice was not required. We set up for and briefed the ILS at ZZZ and landed without incident. We informed Center; Approach and Tower that no further assistance was required.

Climbing through 34;000 ft MSL; received Right Pack Off EICAS and Right Pack off Light. At 36;000 ft received Left Pack Off EICAS and Left Pack Off Light.

B757 flight crew reported the flight diverted due to loss of both Air Conditioning and Pressurization Packs and landed without further incident.