Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This [report] has nothing to do with this particular flight. It has to do with every flight in which the FAA (as I understand it) requires the landing pilot to take the last break. I fly mostly [relief pilot position]; but on occasion fly as [flying First Officer]. There is one CA [I fly with] that requires the First Officer if he is to land; to take the last break. He is not popular. The vast majority of landing pilots take the second break; because for most pilots; coming to the cockpit on an all-night flight with sleep inertia prior to landing is unsafe. Beyond that; there is no pilot I know who does not think this FAA directive intrusive and silly. How can anyone external to the person in question know when and how that pilot needs rest to be best prepared for landing during an all-nighter; or any flight? This rule is a perfect example of the tail wagging the dog; and is corrosive because it pits pilots' good judgment against a regulation. Thank heavens most pilots opt to do what is right and reasonable for their bodies and passenger safety.The FAA directive needs to be rescinded.

B777 First Officer reported concern with the FAR requiring the landing pilot to take the last break due to sleep inertia.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 9200; Flight Crew Type 15

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I was a CFI giving instruction to a first-time tailwheel student in a Aircraft X. The Aircraft X [vintage aircraft] primary trainer that lacks an electrical system and therefore has no radios with which to communicate with other aircraft. The only electronic equipment onboard is a 406 ELT and a battery powered intercom to allow communication between instructor and student. We had finished the airwork/aircraft familiarization portion of our flight and had returned to the traffic pattern for takeoff and landing practice. We operate out of ZZZ; [local city]; just north of downtown. ZZZ is a busy GA airport with heavy flight school traffic; helicopter traffic; and [vintage aircraft] traffic in the form of [vintage military]; aerobatic; and vintage aircraft. The local flight school is well aware of our [aircraft type] operation and it always extra vigilant of possible NORDO traffic because we operate regularly. Worth noting is that Runway XX [north] utilizes a left-traffic pattern while Runway XX [south] uses right-traffic. This is due to obstacles east of the airport and to keep all traffic over the river rather than over the city. The weather at the time of the incident was good VFR; nearly unlimited visibility with northeast wind of 5-10 kts. The windsock unmistakably favored Runway XX [north] all day and was consistent. I had been at the airport since late morning and everyone had been using Runway XX [north] all day. When in the pattern and scanning for traffic; I noted that we were the only aircraft in the area; but a flight school aircraft was taxiing out for departure on Runway XX [north]. On approach to our first landing; I noticed the Aircraft Y holding short and appeared to be waiting for us to land. After we crossed the threshold; the Cessna taxied into position to depart. After our touch and go and on the upwind leg; my student exclaimed 'dude what's that?' I leaned around him (I was in the rear seat) to see an airplane filling our windshield. I quickly took control and aggressively turned into the downwind. While in the turn; I observed an Aircraft Z pass behind us on final to Runway XX [south]. I estimate the horizontal separation to be 1000 feet or less and vertical separation to be less than 50 feet. Once in the downwind; I observed the Aircraft Z that had taxied into position behind us execute an emergency turn off the Runway; presumably as surprised as I was to see an airplane landing on the opposing Runway with a very obvious tailwind.From the downwind; I witnessed Aircraft Z land and clear the Runway. The Cessna was still holding short; so I executed a short approach and put the Aircraft X on the ground as quickly as possible; student and self very shaken. I taxied to parking in front of the hangar and shut down. I noticed the Aircraft Z pilot was walking toward us; presumably to apologize. Instead; he verbally accused my student and me of causing a dangerous situation by not having a radio. I reminded him of the windsock and weather conditions which clearly favor Runway XX [north] to which he replied that he got his weather report from 'Center' and they told him winds were calm. He then informed me that he made several radio calls; including 'left downwind; left base; and final for XX [south]'. I reminded him that Runway XX [south] utilizes a right traffic pattern; so nobody would be looking for him on the east side of the airport. After a short discussion with the instructor in the aircraft involved; he never heard any radio calls from the offending Aircraft Z other than his last call that he was clearing Runway XX [south]. His account of the entire incident was identical to mine; as we discussed it with the event still very fresh in our minds. He has offered to provide a written statement as well.I am 100% confident that we did nothing wrong nor did we violate any FAR's. I am submitting this report purely for the need for such a close call to be documented and hopefully learned from in the future. The negligence of an irresponsible pilot nearly caused a mid-air collision; and did cause a Runway incursion. If it were up to me; some serious remedial training would be required for the offending pilot to continue to use his privileges as a pilot. Everyone makes mistakes or misses a 'RP' [right-hand pattern] note on a sectional chart from time to time; but when that minor error almost gets people killed; something should be done. His defensive and rude 'I didn't do anything wrong; its your fault for not hearing me' attitude certainly didn't indicate to me that he realized the seriousness of his actions. I sincerely hope this report can be of use to others in the future and a harsh reminder to us all of the unforgiving nature of flying at an uncontrolled field.

Vintage aircraft Instructor reported an NMAC event during landing pattern training with Aircraft Z erroneously landing opposite runway in use. Aircraft Z also cause a critical ground conflict with Aircraft Y.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 8; Flight Crew Total 1700; Flight Crew Type 500

Troubleshooting; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

During my initial climb to 5000 ft; I experienced a total loss of GPS signal on my Avidyne IFD550; IFD440; Aspen MFD and Garmin Aera 796. Flight was on an IFR flight plan in VMC. I reverted to flying V14 SGF V63 using VOR navigation from the IFD550. However; the signal loss also disabled the IFD's DME display to provide location along the airway. That required using the IFD440 to provide a cross-radial check for position along the airway. I was also able to use my Iphone 10 with Foreflight for situational awareness. That device maintained GPS functionality. Upon landing in ZZZ; all signals came back and displays were normal during roll-out and taxi. The same issue happened on the return flight around 5300 MSL in the climb. My troubleshooting including turning off the IFD440 (it was the newest radio and recently installed). Within 20 seconds; all GPS signals were normal and all devices functioned normally. I left the IFD440 off for the duration. Had this been a flight in IMC; it would have been quite a workload for situational awareness. I would likely have requested vectors to the nearest airport; but without DME; it would have increased the workload even on an ILS. I was proactive to have redundancy onboard (two radios; PFD/MFD with backup GPS; and a portable Aera 796. That redundancy didn't help in this case. A suggestion would be to provide a better awareness to pilots to discuss options/likely cause of a total loss of GPS signals across multiple devices. The airplane is currently in the shop. The likely culprit is a Garmin antenna failure. A Service Center Communique from Garmin likely applies. It reads in part:'Garmin has become aware that in some dual GPS installations; a single failed antenna can cause both systems to drop satellites. In this case; failure of one antenna interferes with but does not cause damage to the working antenna.'The two antennas were not replaced when I upgraded the radios from a Garmin 540w/430w to the IFD 550/440.

GA pilot reported a GPS failure due to an onboard equipment failure.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Initial climb out HPN RWY 16 HPN7 departure. Passing through 2000ft climbing 3000ft on the SID profile ATC query's our altitude. We reply and are informed we should have leveled off at 2000ft. We immediately leveled and descended back to 2000ft. Reaching 2000ft we were handed off to the next controller and given a climb.Charted top altitude 3000ft. 2000ft given in verbal ATC departure clearance prior to pushback. Altitude selector initially set off charted top altitude and clearance change in altitude was not caught in brief. Check altitude pre-selector with both clearance altitude and the SID not just the SID.

First Officer reported climbing to the charted SID altitude instead of the initial altitude restriction assigned in their verbal clearance.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Type 100

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

We pushed off for eastbound taxi. Taxiway K to A4 is approved for our wingspan. However; the center stripe appears to put them extremely close to boundary stripes.  Under the wrong weather conditions this possibly could result in damage to aircraft or facilities.Repaint stripe or heavily advise caution if this route is taking. Also tell Ground Operations the aircraft must be pushed further back to exit K on V.

Air carrier Captain reported the center stripe taxiing via K to A4 are too close to the boundary stripes and suggested they should be repainted.


Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

We were taking off from Runway 7R which is 12;467 FT in length. The runway was dry and we had a favorable headwind of less than 10 KTS. Approximate gross weight of the aircraft was 169;000 LBS. It was my leg. When we were cleared for takeoff acceleration was normal and the 100 KTS call out was given. Shortly afterward we get a Master Caution. I asked what it was and the First Officer replied 'it's a door light.' I decided to reject the takeoff at about 120 KTS as best as I can recall and brought the aircraft to a stop in the first half of the runway. QRH procedures were followed; the Tower was notified and flight attendants and passengers were kept abreast of the unfolding situation. CFR made an aircraft inspection and advised no damage was discovered. We were cleared to a hard stand without further incident.My decision to reject was based on the following: I started the takeoff roll at the very end of a 12;467 FT runway. When the 'reject' command was given I had used about a quarter of the runway. This left more than sufficient stopping distance even with normal braking applications. The second reason I chose the reject was that at 120 KTS I had 37 KTS of acceleration before V1 of 157 KTS. The safety issue of staying on the ground with so much runway remaining seemed to outweigh the wisdom of taking an unpressurized aircraft airborne in a congested environment with the possibility of a return after burning down to landing weight should the aircraft not pressurize. Maintenance ultimately determined the cause of the light was the failure of catering personnel to properly latch the aft entry door handle.

The flight crew of an unspecified commercial fixed wing jet rejected their takeoff on a long runway due to the illumination of a door warning light; later determined to have been the result of ground personnel failing to properly latch an aft entry door.


Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

Prior to takeoff clearance; run-up was completed and no errors/problems were detected. After receiving clearance; student and I taxied for takeoff and student went full power announcing 'takeoff power set; engine instruments green; airspeed alive.' I then verified everything was correct and we started our roll. After rotation and at about 10-20 feet off ground (still in ground effect) I noticed a roughness in the engine and immediately took controls from the student. I then closed the throttle; flared; and landed on the remaining runway. At this point; I advised Tower we were aborting the takeoff. We then taxied off the runway back to operations and secured the airplane. No one was injured.

A PA28-181 engine began running roughly at about 10 feet after takeoff; so the instructor took command of the aircraft from his student; landed on the runway and taxied to the ramp.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was training on the Final Sector; the Developmental on position was working their first position after Skill Enhancement Training (SET) for this sector. SET was assigned to the Trainee to work on scan; projecting; working speed; and control judgment. This was a very complex session for anyone; but especially for a trainee struggling with training as this one is. We were working a Flight Check (FLC) aircraft; foreign and local fighters; and regular air carrier traffic. Weather was VFR; visual approaches to Runways 10L/R. There are several incidents that took place during this session; one which involved a loss of separation. Within the first 10 minutes on position; my trainee descended a flight of 2 F16s from 5;000 FT into non-RADAR airspace for a conflicting departure protected to 4;000 FT [and into a] Bonanza which I had to correct and issue a climb. FLC aircraft was running tests for the Runway 10R localizer at 1;500 FT; and had conflicting VFR traffic which my Trainee called several times and then had to issue a safety alert and suggest a turn. I was informed by Management the VFR traffic later called the facility to report a NMAC with 'a regional jet 25 feet away;' which was probably the FLC aircraft; a Learjet. The loss of separation involved the Bonanza; a point-out from another sector northwest bound through my airspace at 4;000 FT. We had a CRJ-200; on downwind vectors roughly heading 280 and 5;000 FT. My Trainee was struggling with keeping up with the traffic; and left the CRJ-200 on extended downwind. When they finally based the traffic to a heading of 010; I was so concerned with the sequence that I missed the altitude assignment. I was concerned with putting another aircraft inside of CRJ-200 since the vectors were so late. I didn't even notice the CRJ-200 and Bonanza conflict; and was informed of the possible and then confirmed loss of separation. The CRJ-200 ended up descending into the Bonanza as they were turning through their flight track; closest proximity approximately 2.8 miles and 600 FT. Separation was lost for 3 RADAR sweeps. Contributing factors to this event were added workload form foreign fighters; the trainee's lack of confidence on position due to recent struggles in training; flight check activity; traffic volume; sector complexity (conflict with satellite airport); and my fatigue. I realized that while I felt fine working sectors on my own; but I was having trouble concentrating while conducting OJTI. [I need] to recognize my signs of fatigue and be more aware of when I'm having difficulty concentrating. Bravo airspace around the airport would have limited the VFR aircraft's activity in the airport and not caused the traffic alert situation and apparent NMAC. The training team should also not have been put in the position of training a struggling trainee on a very complex and busy session. The South Feeder is also recently certified and was having a very hard time keeping up with this session; and that added to a frantic atmosphere in the TRACON that affected the performance of the Trainee.

TRACON Controller described a conflict event when his Developmental was overwhelmed with complex traffic especially for a student experiencing difficulties.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Procedure; MEL; Company Policy; Aircraft

While in cruise at FL400; I noticed cabin altitude display illuminate Amber on upper EICAS showing cabin altitude of 8300 feet and rising at 300-400 ft/min.  Aircraft was dispatched with one pack deferred; two operating. I brought up the ECS schematic to verify Packs 2 and 3 were both supplying pressure and in High Flow. They appeared to be operating normally; but I then noticed a Status message with a Pack 2 fault; cabin altitude was already 9;000 ft. and still climbing. At this point I requested a descent from ATC to FL 360.  They gave us a vector for descent.  A minute later; with Cabin altitude of 9300 ft.; I informed ATC we had a pressurization issue and needed to descend.  We were given FL390 and then a few minutes later; FL360.  Pressurization stabilized at 8;500 ft.; but began to climb again at 100-200 ft/min. We requested and were given FL 320.  I notified Operations Control via ACARS (SATCOM inop); that we had a Pack 2 issue and that we had descended as cabin altitude had been increasing. They were given our fuel and told I would keep them advised. We were at FL 280; where cabin altitude at stabilized; but showing slight increase. I recommended to divert to ZZZ along our route of flight; but they informed me they wanted the airplane in ZZZ1.  I informed ATC that we needed to change our destination for 'maintenance' from ZZZ2 to ZZZ1.  We were given proceed direct ZZZ1; about 350 miles away; where we landed uneventfully.Cruise flight when cabin altitude appeared amber on Upper EICAS.Strictly a maintenance issue with the aircraft. We had Pack 1 deferred and any issue with the remaining Packs was going to cause pressurization issues.To assess the situation; attempt to bring pressurization under control; and descend as necessary to reduce cabin altitude.  QRH was utilized to validate what pressurization reading we should have at the various altitudes.Aircraft was dispatched to pick up freight in ZZZ2; and then proceed with a Pack deferred.

Pushback; taxi; takeoff and climb were completely normal. Weather on departure were calm winds and decent VFR in the terminal area. The weather became more marginal upon leveling at cruise. On this leg I myself was the First Officer and Flying Pilot. The Captain was the Pilot Not flying. We also had a Relief Pilot on board and loadmaster.  The event began somewhat early in cruise at FL400 when the Captain noticed a cabin altitude display Amber on the Upper EICAS display. He then immediately selected the ECS page and we both were made aware of a 8;300 foot cabin and rising at 300-400 fpm. The aircraft was dispatched with Pack #1 deferred; therefore packs 2 and 3 operating normally. After diagnosing the situation via the ECS page; both packs 2 and 3 appeared to be supplying pressure and in High Flow as designed when one pack is selected off.  However on the Lower EICAS we both noticed a Status message with a Pack 2 fault. Cabin altitude was still climbing and at this point showing 9;000 feet and still climbing. At this point we agreed to suggest a decent to FL360 and were given a vector for decent. About a minute later with Cabin Altitude of 9;300 feet the Captain informed ATC that we had a pressurization issue and needed to descend now; we first were given a decent to FL390 and shortly after to FL360. At FL360 we observed the cabin initially stabilizing at 8;500 feet; but shortly afterwards began again climbing at a lower rate than previously of 100-200 FPM.  We again agreed to request a lower altitude of FL320 and ATC cleared us to FL320. The Captain then notified Operations Control of the situation via ACARS (SATCOM Inop) that we had a PACK 2 issue and we were descending with a cabin altitude still slowly increasing. The Captain requested further decent to FL280 and ATC complied. At FL280 we experienced a cabin altitude almost stable at around 8;000 feet but still trying to climb at a slow interment 100 FPM. The Captain notified the rest of the crew including the Relief Pilot and load master. The Relief Pilot was taking his rest but immediately returned to the cockpit to help in CRM and dealing with the situation. I suggested the Relief Pilot pull up the cabin altitude chart showing what the cabin altitude should be for our current altitude so we would know how far off from normal we were.  All 3 crew members talked about possible diversion airports and relayed our ideas to Operations Control. After communication between Operations Control and us it was decided by Operations Control to divert to ZZZ2 to address and fix the situation. The Captain immediately requested to divert to ZZZ2 and informed ATC as to why; and I put us on a course to ZZZ2 via ATC instructions. At this point we were about 350 miles north of ZZZ2 with plenty of fuel and sufficient weather for landing. We landed at ZZZ2 uneventfully and maintenance was made aware of the present maintenance issues.While in cruise flight the cabin altitude appeared amber on the Upper EICAS.Pack 2 was failing for unknown reasons. Pack 1 was already deferred on departure so any remaining pack issues was going to cause a pressurization issue.Crew did their job in noticing the system fault and working the problem. We were dispatched with Pack 1 deferred so any further pack or pressurization faults would cause a pressurization issue.Dispatching an aircraft with a pack deferred which would and did cause a pressurization issue when any further pressurization problems would happen. In this case pack 2 also failing to perform up to specification; therefore; causing an increasing cabin altitude at a higher level cruising altitude.

B747-400 flight crew reported diverting after A/C Packs would not maintain cabin altitude with Number 1 pack already deferred.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Physiological - Other

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 ATC; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Other

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Equipment / Tooling; Procedure; Human Factors

While making a turn within the safe limits on taxiway bravo; the 100 percent Over Steer siren went off. This siren is a poor design function of the supertugs. This siren is so loud that it keeps you from both concentrating on moving the plane in a safe manner and also from hearing and communicating on both our hand held radios as well as our Air to Ground radios we use to communicate with the FAA Tower and also our own Ramp Tower. I feel this is a life and death situation due to the fact that we are crossing active runways and also moving around on active taxiways. This siren will not shut off until we lower the plane and disconnect from the plane.

The reporter stated he is part of a large Ramp crew that moves and tows over a hundred aircraft every day using equipment known as supertugs that include models from several different companies. Many of these tugs have a selector switch to set up the operation limits required to tow different type of aircraft. The Nose Landing Gear (NLG) wheel/tires are captured in a cradle and raised off the ground and secured in the aft section of the tug frame.The reporter stated an Oversteer Warning System is built into the tug's steering controls to remind the tug operator of the turning radius of the NLG and to look at the back of the tug and check for security of the cradle if the 100 percent oversteering limit warning occurs. He believes the warning system on these machines are not calibrated correctly due in part to their ground equipment mechanics have not had adequate training to properly calibrate the sensors. Many of the oversteers are unwarranted because the tug drivers have not exceeded the 100 percent limits. And yet; the Oversteer Warning System siren still goes off with a loud; shrieking; ear piercing sound inside of a small cab the operator is driving the tug from. The shrieking siren sound overwhelms the Ground Controller; Ramp Controller and tug operator's efforts to communicate with each other on the two hand-held radios the tug operators use during tow operations. The siren cannot be turned off and is a safety hazard interfering with two-way communications required to safely tow aircraft across active runways and taxiways.The reporter stated that with older models of the supertugs; a flashing warning light came on in front of the tug operator's view alerting to the oversteer without interfering with radio communications. He was recently told by one of his Supervisor's the tug manufacturer was informed of the safety concern caused by the severity of the warning siren.

A ramp crew member reports his concerns about a safety hazard caused by the 100 percent Oversteer Warning System siren sounding off inside the cab of their supertugs during aircraft towing operations. The loud; shrieking siren sound overwhelms the Ground Controller; Ramp Controller and Tug Operator's efforts to communicate with each other; especially when crossing active runways and taxiways. The siren cannot be turned off unless the aircraft is disconnected from the Supertug.


Medium Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Prior to departure the Field Condition Report (FCR) stated that PUW runway and taxiways were bare and dry and the braking action was Good.  With this perceived condition; I planned on having the new hire student (First Officer) conduct the RNP approach with landing.  When we popped out of the clouds; we both noticed that the airport runway and taxiways were not bare and dry.  They were covered with snow; roughly an inch of dry snow.  Two taxiways to clear the runway (B and C) were closed due to high snow berms and a few inches of snow on them.  The braking action on the runway and taxiways was FAIR and the ramp was POOR.  Even at 5 knots GS turning into our parking spot; we slid just a little bit. The primary cause of this event was an incorrect FCR. This compromised the safety of the operation because the PF was the FO in-training.

Check airman reports allowing a new hire First Officer to fly the approach and landing to PUW based on a FCR (Field Condition Report) stating that the runway and taxiways were bare and dry and the braking action was Good. This turns out not to be the case; with new snow and snow berms at some runway exits.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 190; Flight Crew Total 3842; Flight Crew Type 3283

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Right engine vibration indicator noted in amber. Unannunciated checklist accomplished. Slight retardation brought indication out of amber but procedure dictated diversion to nearest suitable. Diversion to ZZZZ accomplished.

B757 Captain reported high engine vibration indication resulted in a diversion to the nearest suitable airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

ZZZ was advertising the RNAV due to the ILS to [Runway] XX being out of service. The RNAV was briefed and performed. The approach was attempted two times due to not breaking out at minimums. The reported ceilings were reported at 300 feet overcast. After the second go around; we requested to shoot the ILS to Runway XY if able. The Approach Controller requested we standby and would ask the Tower. He came back and told us the ILS to [Runway] XX was now in service and asked if we would like that approach. We accepted the approach and briefed it. Just outside of the final approach fix; we were transferred to Tower. My First Officer checked on and we were cleared to land. Once inside the final approach fix; Tower asked if we were receiving the glide slope. We responded yes and the controller replied 'OK we show the glide slope in the green but it hasn't been re-certified. You can shoot the localizer approach if you want.' All indications were normal for us and we continued the approach and landed without any issues. I believe the cause of this event was poor communication with ATC. We were offered and cleared for an approach. After the fact; it seemed as though they weren't sure about giving us the approach. If faced with this again; I would execute a missed approach and get further clarification from ATC before continuing the approach.

ZZZ was advertising the RNAV due to the ILS to [Runway] XX being out of service. The RNAV was briefed and performed. The approach was attempted two times due to not breaking out at minimums. After the second missed approach; we requested the ILS to Runway XY which would have included a slight tailwind within our limitations. The Approach Controller requested we standby and would ask the Tower. He came back and told us the ILS to [Runway] XX was now in service and asked if we would like that approach. We accepted the approach and briefed it. We received vectors and were cleared for the ILS XX to ZZZ. Just outside of the final approach fix; we were transferred to Tower. We checked on with Tower and we were cleared to land. Once inside the final approach fix; Tower asked if we were receiving the glide slope. We responded yes and the controller replied 'OK we show the glide slope in the green but it hasn't been re-certified. You can shoot the localizer approach if you want.' All indications were normal for us and we continued the approach and landed without any issues. We knew the [glide path] for the ILS XX was NOTAMed OTS and because of that we requesting the operative ILS to [Runway] XY. ATC told us the ILS to [Runway] XX was now operative after we requested [Runway] XY. We were cleared for the ILS to [Runway] XX. Tower cleared us to land [Runway] XX. Once inside the final approach fix for the ILS to [Runway] XX; Tower never canceled our approach clearance or told us the [glide path] was unusable. Tower stated it was showing 'green.' We assumed this meant it was working normal. We were unsure what 're-certified' meant. Tower said we could 'fly the localizer approach if we wanted to.' We were already inside the final approach fix on the ILS and were unsure what kind of suggestion this was or what her saying implied. Because all indications were normal; we continued. If Tower was unsure that the [glide path] for the ILS to [Runway] XX was working or not; they should have never told us it was working and given us the approach. We never considered the ILS to [Runway] XX an option and we even requested [Runway] XY for that reason. If ATC realized we were cleared for an approach that wasn't 're-certified;' they should have canceled our approach clearance and told us to go around. Captain and I were unsure what 'approach is showing green and you can shoot the localizer if you want' meant. Next time ATC says something that we are unsure of; we should clarify the exact meaning or go missed.

CRJ-700 flight crew reported conducting ILS approach inside the FAF when ATC state the glideslope is not re-certified. Flight crew was not sure how to interpret ATC's statement.


Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Passenger; Person Flight Attendant

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

I'd finished my service in the first class cabin; and went back to assist Flight Attendant B with service. We were at row XX. I notice passenger in XXD bent over with a sick bag in her hand. I asked her husband if she wanted Ginger ale to settle her stomach. Flight Attendant B went back to get more water. I moved the cart to the next row when I turned a saw passenger 11C slapping passenger XXD. I immediately asked him to stop! He told me she fainted. I tried to wake passenger. I pushed the fa call button to get Flight Attendant B's attention. She got on the phone called the flight deck gave the information that she had. Flight Attendant-B then makes the PA asking for a medical professional. Passenger in YB who was an RN got up. She checked passenger XXD pulse and couldn't find it. She asked for the AED to use to find the pulse. Then she asked for BP cuff. I brought back the oxygen bottle. Passenger 11D regained consciousness. They were able to move her to the back galley. I went through the cabin taking up trash preparing the cabin for landing. Flight Attendant-B got all the information from passenger C (husband) on passenger D; and the RN. I continued to check on the rest of the cabin. We landed and EMT's came aboard removed passenger XXD; and we continued on after Maintenance replaced our equipment.

EMB175 Flight Attendant describes an ill passenger incident and the diversion that follows to get medical attention.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Departed ZZZ after an unexpected runway change from Runway X to Runway YL due to high winds. After takeoff I was the PM and the FO was the PF. We were assigned Runway YL ZZZZZ. ZZZZZ1 departure. There was a fair amount of turbulence due to the strong westerly winds flowing over the mountains. On the departure you are supposed to cross the fix ZZZZZ2 below 10;000 feet MSL. We were climbing in VNAV Path and the FO was hand flying. We ended up going thru 10;000 to approximately 10;400 feet MSL due to VNAV not commanding the FD to level off. As the FO who was the PF was returning to 10;000 feet MSL the Controller told us to level off at 10;000 feet MSL; which we were already doing. It was clear and VMC at this time. There were no targets on TCAS and nothing was said about any loss of separation. I immediately rechecked the box to ensure the departure was there and the rest of the altitude constraints were correct; which they were. The flight continued to ZZZ2 uneventful and nothing else was said by the Controller.Last minute runway change was a contributing factor as we more thoroughly briefed the Runway X departure at the gate. The moderate turbulence on departure affected aircraft controllability and instrument scan. The fact that we departed from a field elevation of XXXX feet MSL and 10;000 feet MSL came a lot quicker than normal (flying from home base). The fact had I recently transitioned to the aircraft and have only flown less than 50 hrs since October 2020 and often go 2-4 weeks without flying.   Another contributing factor is my lack of HUD experience and the division of duties when looking thru the HUD but not having any navigational information presented on the HUD. Long sit time in ZZZ Departure airport.Take more time to rebrief a departure after runway change. Emphasize the high field elevation and how much quicker we will be at 10;000 feet MSL than what we are typically used to flying out of ZZZ1. Use the HUD for the takeoff but develop a better scan with the navigational display to enhance situational awareness on a departure procedure. Consider the use of a higher level of automation to reduce workload in turbulent conditions.

Pilot reported overshooting an altitude on departure and attributed the event to lack of recent flying and poor use of HUD.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Had no left brake after landing XXL. Pilot started drifting right and eventually gave controls up and told me he didn't have brakes. I tried pumping the brake but it wasn't working and was fully pressed. Instead of going in the grass I slammed the right brake once it was slow enough and spun the plane out. Once we came to a stop and after continuous pressing of the brake; we regained control and we're able to exit on Taxiway 1.

DA40 Flight Instructor reported his student lost directional control on landing roll after experiencing brake issues.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 1030; Flight Crew Type 220

On approach; [another aircraft] was inbound from west. He reported on base. I mistakenly flew an opposite downwind since I know the airport does not like left traffic for Runway XX (otherwise I would have flown over toward the southeast to make a left base). I decided to descend and try to stay out of the way. I did not have him in sight until I started to turn 180 degrees back for a right downwind. At this point he broke off approach and I went over to circle until he landed.

Two General Aviation aircraft approaching the airport did not establish visual contact until they experienced a near mid-air collision. They then took evasive action and one held outside the airport area until the other landed.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Flying a charter flight back to base; a little after takeoff we had an auto fail light come on. Ran the QRH and did everything that was required by the QRH. We felt nothing was wrong with the aircraft and proceeded on to destination. After we landed we were met by a mechanic and discussed what happened; our Air Carrier Maintenance notified us of what happened and found damage to the aft bulkhead. Looks like the locks broke and the pallets came out its locks.

Flew charter back to base with no cargo except 8 loading sheets in position 9. The bottom pallet was locked in position 9 with the top 7 pallets stacked on top tied with tie downs. After takeoff the pressure started climbing with the plane. The Auto Fail light came on. The outflow valve indicated closed but the cabin altitude continued to climb. After going manual as per the QRH; the valve still indicated closed and the cabin altitude was equal to the aircraft altitude. Leveled off at 10;000 feet and continued to destination. There were no other indications noted. After writing up the aircraft and talking to a mechanic; I started talking to dispatch to sign my next release. At that time I was directed back to look at the damage in the back of the plane. There was significant damage to the aft bulkhead and around the 2 aft exit doors. The pallets had broken out of the metal locks.

B737 flight crew experiences pressurization failure after takeoff on a ferry flight with eight empty pallets stacked on top of each other in the number nine position. The short flight is continued to destination at 10;000 feet. Post flight reveals that the pallets had broken lose and punctured the aft pressure bulkhead.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

I was performing an Operational Evaluation and after reaching our initial cruise altitude; we received a HYD 3 LO QTY EICAS message. My First Officer (FO) was flying and I read the QRH. I noted the time and quantity of System 3; it was 18%. I alerted maintenance via ACARS. Approximately 10 minutes later; it was 16%. I alerted Dispatch via ACARS Free Text. Approximately another 10 minutes later; it was now down to 14%. I sourced weather for diversion airports along our route and advised dispatch that a divert might be necessary if we have a leak. Losing one of three hydraulic system completely would reduce Flight Control functionality and redundancy. Approximately another 10 minutes later it was now down to 12%. Approximately another 10 minutes later it was now down to 10%. My FO and I agreed that an immediate divert and an Overweight Landing was necessary before we lost Hydraulic System 3 completely. I alerted Dispatch that a divert was necessary and suggested ZZZ. The dispatcher agreed. I [alerted] the Cabin Crew; advised ATC and the passengers. We performed the Emergency Landing Checklist and the Overweight Landing Checklist. I landed normally in ZZZ and Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting gave us the all clear to taxi to the gate. Overweight Landing vertical speed tolerances were not exceeded on landing. Appropriate write-ups in the AML were made. System 3 was determined to have a leak by Maintenance Personnel.

ERJ190 Captain reported a low hydraulic system quantity and successful divert. Captain reported post maintenance inspection determined system had a leak.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 2700

Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

After 4:30 hours of flight; we had a 2;200 LB imbalance of fuel between the wing tanks. The center tank was empty for the flight and read zero always. We never suspected a fuel leak because the fuel flow was exactly even on each engine and the totalizer and calculated fuel levels were within 100 LBS of each other. Notwithstanding the possibility of a fuel leak; the aft engine fuel cross feed valve was deferred. How can this be a legal deferral for an ETOPS flight? It seems that this was an improper deferral and we should never have accepted it. The deferral of the crossfeed valve; I believe; is possibly the culprit in our unexplained fuel imbalance. We the flight crew are not given enough information concerning MELs and the maintenance compliance with them to make safe; sound; and informed decisions before accepting the aircraft. Instead; I feel we were duped into flying a fully loaded aircraft all the way to Hawaii.

A B737-300 First Officer reported flying the aircraft on an ETOPS flight with the fuel crossfeed valve MEL'ed and subsequently developing an unexplained 2;200 LB fuel imbalance which they could not equalize.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

This is a follow-up to a previous report. Following discovery of damage to the Recirculation (Recirc) Fan Filter box support [rods] on Aircraft X and Y; I submitted the aforementioned report to recommend a repair and/or inspection procedure for the B767-300 fleet. Engineering came back with the following response: 'After discussion within engineering; our position is that neither an Inspection Program; nor redesign of the installation is warranted.'May 2012; I discovered the same support rods damaged on Aircraft Z; [another B767-300]; while performing a Galley Spill Inspection. The damage on both rods exceeded the limits in Maintenance Manual (MM) 21-25-05-6. The support rods on Aircraft A were cannibalized (robbed) for Aircraft Z. [But the support rods from Aircraft A] were also found damaged beyond MM limits. We tried to obtain a Line Engineering Authorization (LEA) for Aircraft Z to allow the damaged support rods; but were denied by Engineering.The May 2012 incident; culminating in two Out of Service (OTS) aircraft for damaged support rods; substantiates my previous concerns. The Recirc Filter Box support rods are prone to damage from containers in the Forward Cargo Compartment. Only a nylon curtain separates the support rods from a bulging container. I suspect a large number of the B767-300 aircraft are flying with damaged support rods. Suggest an ankle-high barrier across the width of the Recirc Fan compartment would protect the support rods.

Reporter stated he is a Line Inspector and has been finding damaged/bent Recirc Fan Filter Box support rods on many of their B767-300 aircraft whenever he accomplishes a Galley Spill Inspection. That Inspection requires a Visual Inspection of the Lower fuselage areas for fluid accumulation. The last two B767-300s could not be released for service until the damaged support rods were replaced.Reporter stated there is a left and right Recirc Fan Filter Box and each Filter box has four support rods on the forward side that are inches away from the aft side of the Aft Bulkhead; in the Forward Cargo compartment. Damage up to twenty-five percent of the rod's Outside Diameter (O/D) is allowed. There are two rods approximately three feet long and two that are approximately 18' inches long. Although the base of the Cargo pallets are secured at the aft stops; they often overpacked and extend aft into the nylon curtain that separates the cargo compartment from the Air Conditioning Mix Manifold; Recirc Fans and filter Boxes. He has noticed that most of the damage to the support rods is at the lower third of the rod length.Reporter stated there are inconsistencies with their Engineering department as to when relief may; or may not be given by a Line Engineer that would allow the aircraft to continue in-service beyond the maximum damage limits. Recently; one of their Engineer's had issued an Engineering Order (E/O) to wrap damaged support rods with Speed Tape; the purpose was still unclear; but the B767-300 was released from Maintenance.  A lot of their Engineers are basically structure 'Engineers' and have little experience in Aerodynamics.Reporter stated since he wrote his report; their Engineering Department is reconsidering his suggestion to design an 'ankle-high' barrier across the width of the Forward Cargo compartment Aft bulkhead to protect the Filter Box support rods.

A Line Inspector reports he has found numerous B767-300 aircraft with damaged Recirculation Fan Filter Box support rods behind the aft bulkhead nylon curtain in the forward cargo compartment. Damaged rods were noted while he was accomplishing Galley Spill Inspections.


Thunderstorm; Rain; Turbulence; Windshear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 1000; Flight Crew Type 150

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

I was serving as the First Officer/ pilot not flying in a Falcon 50 making an approach to land. During the final phase of landing; wind shear was encountered and the landing was rejected and a go around was initiated. [The] Tower notified the crew that the left wing made contact with the runway during the rejected landing/go-around sequence. It was elected to divert to [another airport] to attempt a landing where the winds favored the runway in use and wind shear was not reported. A landing was made on safely and there were no injuries on board. Review of crosswind and wind shear procedures for the Falcon 50 will be reviewed and discussed.

The non-flying pilot of a Falcon 50 reported that ATC advised them that their wing contacted the runway during a missed approach/go-around for wind shear. The crew elected to divert to an airport with more favorable winds where a successful landing was made.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

After departure at ZZZ; we were given a left turn to the north and passed off to Approach. Coming through about 1000' AGL; we noticed a flock of what looked like turkey vultures circling at our altitude. As we continued our climb to our assigned 2000'; one of the birds maneuvered directly into our flight-path and hit the front of the aircraft. Upon impact; I requested an immediate turn-back to ZZZ (we were positioned for the downwind already).  My co-pilot; who was acting as Pilot Flying; was monitoring the engine parameters and we did not see any fluctuations. Approach asked if we required any assistance and as PIC; I deemed we did not; but needed landing priority. I noticed a burning smell from the bird possibly being ingested.  Approach passed us back to the tower and we landed with no issues. After we de-boarded our passengers; we did a quick visual inspection and determined that a large bird had entered the engine intake.  Operations; Management; and Maintenance were all contacted and the aircraft was grounded.

We took off out of ZZZ about 800' we were issued a turn to heading 360 in the turn about 1000' a large bird struck in the bottom of the prop arc in front of the engine intake. Right after it happened we smelled singed feathers and burned meat through the vents. There were no abnormal indications in the engine instruments so we decided to continue in the pattern and requested priority for a precautionary landing and remained within gliding distance of the airport at all times. After the precautionary landing we were able to taxi back to [FBO] and unload the aircraft there. On post flight inspection the was visible evidence that the engine had ingested a substantial amount of the bird after it struck the prop arc but the prop appeared to be undamaged.

PC-12 flight crew reported hitting a turkey on departure; then returning to airport as a precaution.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

At the top of descent an odor was detected in the main cabin. A Flight Attendant localized the smell to about three rows forward of the exit row at the ceiling. No smoke. No heat was detected as the Flight Attendant used her hand to feel for warmth. The odor dissipated throughout the final 30 minutes of the flight; but still slightly discernible after landing. The odor was not smelled on the flight deck. The smell only appeared in the cabin. The smell could be described as overheated plastic or maybe plastic wire insulation. The odor was written up for maintenance.

B737 Captain reported that a Flight Attendant notified them of an 'overheated plastic' type cabin odor at the beginning of descent. The odor dissipated 30 minutes later.  Maintenance was requested after shutdown.


During approach at around 5;000 FT MSL; the PASS DOOR warning light illuminated. We performed the memory action items; alerted the flight attendant and passengers to be seated away from the door and keep seatbelts on (sign already on due to landing); and ran the PASS DOOR Emergency Checklist. I advised ATC of our emergency; and seeing as how we were near landing; had Tower call our Company to inform them of the emergency. We landed without incident.

DHC-8-300 Captain notes a PASS DOOR warning light illuminated during during approach passing 5;000 FT. The Emergency Checklist is consulted and the flight continues to a normal landing.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Other

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

With this pandemic situation many airports don't have Ramp Control open and when Tower instructed us to stay with them we assumed ramp was closed and never called them since it was almost mid night; also the airport page doesn't clarify Ramp Control has to be contacted to enter the gate just for pushback and since Tower never instructed to contact anybody it makes the situation a little confusing.As we landed Tower told us to taxi to the ramp and remain on the frequency with them; we did as instructed and never changed to Ramp Control as we taxi to the gate; we stopped short of Gate XX at Spot XX noticing there wasn't any ground crew at the gate; we tried to contact operations; but they never answer the radio call; finally a Ground Agent showed up and instructed us to move over to the next terminal to Gate XXX. The Captain made a small turn and taxi to the gate with no issues.

Looking at the airport chart the labeling of the X terminal is unclear and somewhat hidden. On the ground the X terminal gates only have numbers and not labeled with X. Also I would suggest the ramp frequency be added to the ramp chart to make it clear. On landing in LGA we told ground we are going to Gate XXX and Ground Control instructed us to taxi Bravo; Echo; Alpha to the ramp. We tried to call company operations numerous times and never got an answer. Given that it was almost midnight we assumed that the ramp was closed And we were to taxi in with ground. Looking at the ramp diagram the gates are quite confusing and we mistakenly taxied to the entrance of Gate XX but it was actually the X terminal not the Y terminal. A ramp worker came over and directed us to turn around and go to other gates. We contacted Ground Control to let them know and they advised us we should have called Ramp Control. Once back on Taxiway A we contacted Ramp Control and got clearance into the gate. Ramp Control informed us that they had been trying to get a hold of us.

Air carrier flight crew reported taxiing to the gate at LGA airport without contacting Ramp Control. The crew cited as contributing factors a confusing ramp diagram and the expectation that Ramp Control was closed due to the pandemic situation.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Y was flying south in front of us quite a distance (approx 10-15 miles).  ADS-B in data from my Garmin GDL50 and Foreflight stated he was -200ft below us.  It appeared he was at our elevation or maybe slightly higher; but was hard to tell for sure due to the distance and size of the aircraft.I flew along north of PUB as Aircraft Y made a right hand turn to line up with a runway at COS.  I was thinking about wake turbulence from their aircraft; but with the data I had; we were above them and should be no factor.  A few minutes later we hit severe wake turbulence causing the airplane to violently roll to the left while losing altitude.  I reacted quickly and kept the airplane level and under control.  There were no injuries or damage; but there certainly could have been as my passenger hit their head on the interior.As Aircraft Y approached COS; their ADS-B still said they were level with us but COS would have been a couple thousand feet below.  So something is amiss with either [their] ADSB or the radar rebroadcast.

Reporter stated the other aircraft was a large four-engine transport.

Cessna 182 pilot reported encountering wake turbulence from another aircraft in the vicinity of COS airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 36000; Flight Crew Type 1500

Training / Qualification; Distraction; Confusion

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 1700; Flight Crew Type 200

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure

This was a training flight to return the student (a 1;500 hour pilot) to flight status after a long layoff due to the COVID virus. We had flown under Instrument Flight Rules from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2 to ZZZ3 to ZZZ4 instrument approaches at each airport and a full stop landing at ZZZ4.The trainee indicated that he would like to view from the air some property that he operated northwest of ZZZ4. I briefed the trainee on the procedures that we would need to follow to transit under VFR including the necessity to communicate with Air Traffic Control.On departure we were cleared 'on course' and I requested that the trainee to turn to a northerly heading to avoid the traffic at the nearby airport (ZZZ5). The student was; in my opinion; somewhat confused with trying to orient himself using an iPad device while I kept watch for traffic. We were also concerned with cloud ceiling that was lower than expected. Maintaining 500 feet below the clouds put the flight at 2;800 feet. Subsequently; we inadvertently entered the outer area of the Class C airspace at ZZZ. As soon as I realized the error I directed the trainee to immediately take up a heading that would expeditiously clear the Class C area. After clearing the area we were able to climb and proceed to our destination ZZZ1.The error that led to this deviation was my belief that the trainee understood the factors involved in VFR flight in the area. He did not. We have since reviewed the flight several times. A simple communication to ATC would have mitigated the error. A factor to consider was the trainee's use of the iPad in what should have been a total 'heads up' situation. A more complete pre-flight briefing would have kept this from happening. Additionally; these kinds of transgressions might be minimized if the entire area were to be one Class B. All aircraft would be under positive control. Risk would be minimized.

This was a training flight after a long lapse due to the COVID virus shutdown. We had done approaches at ZZZ1 and ZZZ2 and ZZZ3 with a full stop landing at ZZZ3. On taxi out for departure for ZZZ4 we discussed the Class C airspace at the ZZZ airport. We agreed that we would climb above the airspace. During the climbout; the pilot not flying was monitoring outside for traffic while I navigated using primarily an iPad. I observed some lower clouds in front of us and in my desire to remain 500 feet below the clouds; we inadvertently entered the outer area of the Class C airspace which went from 1;500 feet to 4;100 feet. My instructor; upon seeing the error; gave me a heading to expeditiously exit the airspace. The flight continued in VFR conditions to our destination ZZZ4.This incident would not have occurred if I had better prepared for the flight and if I had communicated with ATC upon departure from ZZZ. An additional factor was the 'head down' aspect of using the iPad.My instructor and I discussed the deviation on the ground and the factors leading up to it with emphasis on the rules and procedures for flight in Class C airspace.

Instructor and trainee pilots reported experiencing an airspace incursion into Class C airspace.


Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

While descending into TRI for the approach to Runway 5 we encountered IMC between 7;000 feet thru 3;000 feet; we activated wing/cowl anti-ice and were in icing conditions for an estimated three to four minutes. The approach to Runway 5 was VMC; after exiting the runway I noticed an unusually heavy amount of ice on the windshield wiper and commented on it; mentioning the tail may have accumulated ice. My First Officer conducted the post flight and confirmed tail icing about one half inch in thickness on all forward tail surfaces. Both he and I took pictures.We are told this aircraft will not ice on the vertical or horizontal stabilizer. We were in icing conditions for a couple minutes and acquired more ice than I've seen on this aircraft; probably in the 11 1/2 years I've flown it. Had we been holding in these conditions for any period of time we might have encountered a major problem.

CRJ-200 Captain reported noting a significant amount of ice accumulation on tail surfaces after landing at TRI.


Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were level at FL200 on autopilot. I was PNF (Pilot Not Flying). We were heading toward an area of rapidly building thunderstorms. PF (Pilot Flying) was using the autopilot in heading mode and was heading toward an area building pretty rapidly. I told him as we got closer I didn't think it was a good idea to go that way. He had gotten so close to the area that he couldn't just use the autopilot to make the turn so he pushed the TCS (Touch Control Steering) switch and increased bank. Before I could say anything bank angle was over 40 degrees and we were descending. He was trying to regain altitude but was not aggressive enough and ended up down 500 ft. It happened again another time and he gained altitude this time but only about 200 ft. Just as we were coming back to FL200 ATC asked about altitude. I said we had descended as we were maneuvering away from the cell but were back at FL200. Nothing else was said by ATC.I think folks get way too dependent on the autopilot. He got much too close to turn and avoid the cells using heading mode on the autopilot. When he pushed the TCS switch to fly manually he failed to arrest the descent. If he had started the turn earlier the autopilot would have turned just fine but once he saw he was too close he needed to just switch off the autopilot rather than pushing the TCS switch and fly the airplane. I think pushing the TCS switch distracted him. I also think it would be a good idea to have better cockpit communication. We were level and I was doing paperwork. He was deviating around the weather. I assumed he'd find a good path but we didn't talk about what he was thinking. I was of the opinion that we needed to deviate further but he was looking at an area that he thought would be clear. However; even if that area had been clear; by the time he could determine it was clear he would have had no other option. He would have had to go that way because he was going between two very close obvious cells. While we could have deviated farther left (which is what we ended up doing) without an issue. I will make sure we work on communication because I think better communication would have eliminated the need for the tight turn and eliminated the altitude deviation.

We were deviating around a large area of rapidly building thunderstorms. I was flying toward an area of clouds where I thought there would be a break in the clouds to our right. When I realized there was not a break; I was too close to the storm and had to make a hard 90 degree turn to the left at a steep bank angle. During the turn; I descended approximately 500 ft. before climbing back up to FL200. It was poor judgment on my part.

CE-560XL flight crew reported an excursion from assigned altitude caused by an attempt to avoid weather coupled with a communications breakdown.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We received clearance to takeoff on Runway 28L. Another aircraft was cleared for takeoff on 28R immediately after we were cleared. I would say the aircraft on 28R commenced takeoff roll 10 seconds after us. Winds were 340/20. Our departure was the OFFSHORE 9 which is an RNAV Departure. At approximately 1000 ft; we received a TCAS RA 'Maintain Vertical Speed' from the aircraft that departed right behind us. We complied with the RA and it soon went away as the other aircraft turned away to the right. We informed Departure Control of the RA. We were tracking LNAV guidance throughout the incident. I believe it is possible for this to occur with these crosswinds if the aircraft departing 28R are cleared immediately preceding a departure from 28L. If the aircraft on 28R is on a departure which requires runway heading until 400 ft; it is possible for the winds to push the aircraft into the TCAS bubble of the aircraft to the left. We were on an LNAV ground track (not drifting). If the aircraft on the 28R was on the AFIVA 1 (runway heading to 520 ft); it will immediately drift after takeoff towards the aircraft on the left.

Departures from Runways 28L and 28R at SFO have the potential for conflict and the resulting RA when a strong crosswind is blowing. One departure is an RNAV track and the other is a runway heading. The aircraft departing in heading mode does not correct for drift and may be blown close to the track of an aircraft on an RNAV departure which is corrected for wind drift.


Flight Crew Total 11262; Flight Crew Type 2095

Flight Crew Total 17445; Flight Crew Type 894

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure

We were assigned; and wrote down Dosel departure [and] cleared to 5;000 feet. The other IRO also copied the same clearance. The Dosel and the Bryson departure have a similar turn and it wasn't until passing ALBAK waypoint that the controller asked what departure we were on and issued a heading of 270. Communication at times can be an issue; PDC is an excellent way to close that weak link.

There is a problem with the way Melbourne delivers clearances and how pilots copy and interpret the clearance. Here is a typical clearance: cleared to ZZZ via dosel maintain 5000 dosel 9 departure freq 118.9. Note how the dosel fix is mentioned first and then the departure sid later which is different from the United States. This clearance crews have no problem with.Here is the clearance that gets crews in trouble departing runway 16: cleared to ZZZ via dosel maintain 5000 bison 5 departure frequency 118.9. Crews hear via dosel and assume that is the dosel 9 sid and it is not. Further for some reason the bison 5 never gets written down. Maybe because of the heavy accent and format are different. I have talked with three crews who have been charged with a pilot deviations coming out of Melbourne. All crews flew the dosel 9 and should have flown the bison 5!

Air carrier flight Crew reported a track deviation due to confusion with the departure clearance delivery format.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

I was the AFA (A Flight Attendant). Every part of the flight (boarding; climb; cruise; etc.) seemed to be going fine and seemed standard. When the pilots told us to prepare the cabin for arrival; I decided to look over the PAX (Passenger) manifest before tossing it. I had used it during the flight but only looked at part of it. To be honest; I didn't read over it before we departed. When I read over it toward the end of the flight; I noticed that one PAX was listed as a Special Assistance Passenger. This PAX was listed as needing a wheelchair and as blind. At no point was I aware that we had a PAX with a visual impairment. The PAX was boarded first and the person who pushed his wheelchair stowed the PAX's luggage. When interacting with the PAX on boarding; I handed him a sanitizing wipe and he seemed to have no trouble getting the wipe from me or getting to his seat; although I didn't really watch him go to his seat. At no point did the gate agent inform us that we had a PAX with a visual impairment nor did the person who pushed the wheelchair. When the B Flight Attendant asked the gate agent if we had any specials (for the PAX count form) the gate agent said we had one wheelchair. There was no mention of a PAX with a visual impairment.We did the standard briefings (announcements and safety demo); but neither of us provided a one-on-one briefing with the PAX. We were unaware of his visual impairment. After I realized our mistake on descent; I wasn't sure what to do. I had a brief conversation with the PAX; and he seemed to look me in the eye for the conversation. After I played the final descent announcement; I showed the B Flight Attendant the manifest and how it showed a PAX listed as blind. She was surprised to see it. We discussed our situation in regard to the PAX and the possibility of writing a  report.After we landed; the PAX gathered his belongings and deplaned without help. He also told the person waiting with the wheelchair that he didn't need it. He was traveling alone and without the assistance of a service animal. He only used a simple walking cane; not a red and white cane frequently used by people with visual impairments. He gave me no reason to think that he was visually impaired; but I understand that some disabilities are not apparent. When all the PAX had deplaned; I informed the Captain of what had happened and asked for advice. He said to fill out an report because we didn't do a required briefing. The B Flight Attendant and I knew that one-on-one briefings are required; we didn't know the PAX was visually impaired.I am concerned and upset that we potentially caused a safety incident with a PAX with a visual impairment. This is unacceptable. I hope to use this as a learning experience and pay closer attention to the PAX manifest before shutting the boarding door and proactively asking all gate agents about special assist PAX that we may have onboard. I say this with caution; though. We don't always receive the correct manifest; we sometimes receive incomplete manifests with no PAX information; and sometimes we don't even receive a manifest at all. While in the end; it was my responsibility to confirm with the gate agent about special assist PAX; I feel like there was a breakdown of communication between the gate agent and me. I wonder if the gate agent knew there was a visually impaired PAX on the flight. Perhaps there could be strengthened training for gate agents and flight attendants for recognizing special assist PAX. For flight attendants; also what to do if a special assist PAX is discovered during flight and certain briefings did not occur; as in our case. As stated before; I didn't know what to do in regard to the PAX.I understand the severe safety hazards not providing a one-on-one briefing could have caused if something went wrong during flight. I hope to use this as a lesson learned and not solely rely on being informed of all special assist PAX by a gate agent. In other words; I need to be more proactive; and I need to use my resources more wisely. My hope is that this can be used as a lesson for all flight attendants so that incidents like this don't happen again. We are first and foremost a safety industry; and we failed to keep to our safety standards.

Flight Attendant reported not performing safety briefing for blind passenger.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

We had to do a go-around at MMMX Runway 5R from about 500 AGL. The preceding airplane missed a turn-off. The go-around and missed were flown manually and without event. Once the airplane was turned away from terrain we reset automation; ran checklists; etc.I bring this up because the Tower issued us an immediate 30-degree right turn. This aims the airplane toward rapidly rising terrain and takes it off the missed approach course. Radios are saturated at MMMX and there are language considerations. This worked out fine. There's potential for a crew to be confused; aimed at terrain; and low. Maybe include this in videos or other products? Since we're opening an Aircraft X base; it's conceivable that Aircraft X crews will see MMMX with more regularity. Of course; there's an argument to do nothing too. Are any of these factors different from any other missed approach briefing anywhere else? My job isn't to make those decisions; but to bring these factors up to the attention of appropriate parties.

Air carrier Captain reported while on a go-around; ATC issued an immediate turn off the missed approach procedure and towards rapidly rising terrain. Pilot stated concern with language barrier and procedure could result in confusion and a terrain event.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Flt level 240 we recognized we were in and out of icing conditions with one pack MEL'd. We noticed while flying that the anti-ice system came on. Then the cabin started to rise. We descended to FL220 in order to get out of ice conditions. We donned our masks. That wasn't low enough so we continued to 18000 ft but we received a Master Cabin Warning. As we descended the cabin pressure was still rising. The Captain called the Flight Attendant and we continued down to 11000 ft to stabilize the cabin. Still in ice we further went down to 9000 ft. We worked on the diversion items and diverted to ZZZ. No emergency was declared.Our crew communications was great. We constantly were sharing for a shared mental model. The Captain had everything seem seamless and did a fantastic job!

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

EMB-145 flight crew reported being unable to maintain cabin pressurization due to one air conditioning pack being inoperative and the anti-ice system in use.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On taxi out for the first flight of the day the PIC said we're all adults here and do not need to use certain checklists; but to do it if a Fed was on board. PIC was chronically non sterile during critical phases of flight - discussing women; money; and his prior military service - and insisted on pressing and holding the erase button [on] the CVR after he was non sterile or inappropriate. PIC did not give proper responses on checklists when I insisted we use them - he rarely if ever called for one and needed to be prompted. It was also apparent he was not familiar with the company specific checklists. It seemed at times the PIC could not hear communication from myself or ATC instructions. Distraction in the cockpit was nearly constant. During the arrival and approach segment of the fourth and final leg of our day trip I had the set up correctly and had reviewed the approach. Incidentally; PIC said he briefed the approach earlier and was familiar. We were given a heading to intercept the localizer. PIC called the airport in sight. We were assigned a heading to intercept the localizer and cleared for the visual approach. I noticed PIC began a 20 degree turn away from the assigned heading and the localizer course. I inquired where he was going. He pointed out the window - 12 o'clock - and said the airport was right there. I looked up and saw he was descending toward ZZZ1 and I said so. He said I was wrong at the he was heading for ZZZ; the correct airport; and questioned whether I had the approach set up correctly. I said I had set it up correctly. He became confused and continued his descent and visual approach to ZZZ1. I noted he was heading away from the localizer course. After some hesitation he finally relented and recognized his error. He changed course to intercept the localizer to [the destination]. Still on a heading to intercept; he reached across and pressed and held CVR erase button. Within 5 seconds there was a TA. He looked up and immediately there was an RA 'Climb!' It indicated an aircraft 200 feet below climbing. He hesitated for about 2 seconds; I said 'You gotta climb!' He then pulled back on the yoke without disconnecting the autopilot. We climbed nominally - between 50 and 100 feet. Simultaneously I looked out my right side window and saw a high wing [aircraft] pass 20-50 feet below us.Finally; established on final to and descending through 1200' AGL he said he was glad I was on board for that trip and in order avoid hassle and 'unnecessary scrutiny' instructed me not to file an [report] or report this event to anyone. Then he reached over and pressed the erase button on the CVR.

First Officer reported that due to an unprofessional Captain disregarding the pilot monitoring instructions they encountered a near miss.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

On takeoff from 13R; the F/O (First Officer) was flying and commanded 'Gear Up'. Without recognition of my actions; as I was Pilot Monitoring; his first takeoff of our trip; I put the flap lever from Flaps 1 to Flaps Up. Immediately after this action; the F/O commanded LNAV as he had missed engaging it during his departure brief; and I missed it during my pre-departure cleanup of the MCP (Mode Control Panel). As I selected LNAV for him we got an 'Airspeed Low' aural warning. I immediately looked at the airspeed indicator and saw 155 with a yellow box around it. I told the F/O; Pilot Flying our airspeed was low and to accelerate; but did not recognize my error until we reached 1000 feet AGL and I went to put the flaps up. It was then I recognized the flaps were up and the gear was down. I raised the gear; the aircraft accelerated and the rest of the flight was uneventful.

B737 Captain reported inadvertently raising the flaps instead of the gear after takeoff.


Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Electronic Device

Exactly what size device can be kept out during taxi and takeoff? We used to say iPads; Kindles; and phones but now the iPads have gotten larger. Our announcements say 'hand held.' Not 'hands' held. The [company] magazine only says 'small'; lightweight devices under 2 lbs. It is getting out of control. I was verbally abused again by a passenger today. As I tried to calmly explain to him what the restrictions were; he kept stating that no one has ever told him this. (He has been flying 3 years with the same large iPad -13x11- and never had anyone tell him to stow it). He continued to tell me that maybe everyone needs to be trained. Consistency is more important. I explained that electronic devices have changed dramatically over the last 5 years. Some Flight Attendants just don't want to hear it from people like him. I was abused. Several passengers apologized for his behavior. Our Manual indicates PEDs should be small. What is small? Apple iPads are acceptable. What size apple iPad? iPads can be 8x10 inches or larger. Is that too big? If not; why does a laptop have to be stowed? I've written [a report] before on this and received no guidance. At this point; we should restrict electronic devices size to a phone. That's it. People shouldn't be hooked up and unable to hear us anyway.Direction on what must be stowed or not needs to be concise and not left up to the Flight Attendant's discretion. Passengers need to know what the exact limits are. If not; we will continue to confuse and anger the very people we are trying to keep flying with us.

Air carrier Flight Attendant reported confusion about the size of device that should be allowed to be out during taxi and takeoff.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

While turning south from Taxiway B onto the ramp I noticed a (Service Driver) type vehicle traveling west on the vehicle service road. He was traveling at a high rate of speed and I mentioned it to the First Officer. As we approached the vehicle service road the driver passed through the yield sign painted on the road and drove right in front of our aircraft. I stopped the aircraft and we watched him drive by; looking to the south; paying no attention to us. After he passed by; the First Officer called Ground and told the Controller what happened.

Captain reported stopping the aircraft after a service vehicle failed to yield to their aircraft on a zipper road.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Person Other Person; Person Ground Personnel

Air Carrier Ground Agent reported DG in [passenger] baggage. One 1.89L container of Round Up weed and grass killer found by TSA during security screening of passenger baggage. Passenger notified.

Air Carrier Agent reported DG articles found in passenger baggage by TSA screening.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.5

Time Pressure; Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Working arrivals and departures on RWY 16L.  Aircraft X initiates a go around because he was too fast.  After handing off and vectoring the go around I cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff and put Aircraft Z in position; as Aircraft A was now on final.  Aircraft Y asked to verify his takeoff clearance which was done.  Aircraft Z was cleared and Aircraft A put into position with Aircraft B on a 4 mile final.  I cleared Aircraft A for takeoff anticipating Aircraft Z will be 6;000 feet and airborne by the time Aircraft A starts to roll.  Aircraft B stated he needed to go missed because he's too high.  I elected to cancel the takeoff clearance for Aircraft A shortly after they started to roll as I was concerned he may become an issue with Aircraft B.  Aircraft A then taxied back to the end and took off.  The Front Line Manager (FLM) said I was clean; and nice job.If I had put Aircraft Y in position right after the go around of Aircraft X things wouldn't have ended up so tight.  As I cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff I may have caused some confusion as I put Aircraft Z into position right behind him causing Aircraft Y to confirm he was cleared for takeoff; slowing their departure.  Additionally we were just about to go into a runway use plan which calls for the runway I was working to be departure only.  The tower FLM wanted the program to start earlier and traffic management in the TRACON didn't want to.  I think the TRACON was trying to hurry Aircraft X and Aircraft B in before the program started which resulted in unstabilized approaches and back to back pilot initiated go arounds.   I made a judgment call to cancel the takeoff clearance of Aircraft A since they just barely started to roll.

An SLC Controller reports of an operation that resulted in a go-around due to traffic on the runway and an arrival being higher than normal.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 21; Flight Crew Total 878; Flight Crew Type 641

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Upon landing at ZZZ on Runway XXR to complete a round-robin VFR flight to ZZZ1; on the rollout as I was almost slowed enough to make the turnoff to Taxiway X; I experienced a violent vibration in what seemed to be the nose gear. At the time I had the yoke pulled full back to relieve braking pressure on the nose gear and was applying braking force. When the shimmy occurred; I eased the braking force to try to minimize the shimmy. However; in doing so; I was unable to make the turn onto the exit taxiway.At the time; I was aware that there was another plane on approach to landing behind me on Runway XXR. Not certain exactly what was causing the vibration and realizing that the next available turnoff was a good distance away; my instinct was to clear the runway immediately to clear the way for approaching landing traffic.So I pulled off the runway into the grassy area and came to a stop between the runway and Taxiway Y just past exit Taxiway X. ZZZ Tower ATC advised [me] to stay where I was and that the emergency equipment was on the way. I had not declared an emergency.On inspection; we could not immediately determine the cause of the vibration because the nose gear was embedded up to the fairings in soft mud under the grass caused by recent rains in the area. That was not visually apparent until stepping onto the grass.The emergency truck arrived and determined there were no injuries to me or to my single passenger. The runway was closed to traffic pending removal of my airplane from the runway environment.The Tower contacted my landlord FBO to send a tow. The tow got instantly stuck in the mud; requiring a second tow to pull it out. The emergency crew then contacted the ZZZ Airport Manager's office; which in turn contacted an outside towing company with experience in towing aircraft.The outside tow truck was delayed for an estimated two hours due to being stuck in traffic from a football game; which had ended almost precisely as the time of this landing. He eventually arrived and towed the plane to the runway surface; where the FBO tow took over and towed the airplane to the hangar. On inspection; the cause of the violent shimmy was a blown tire on the nose gear.There was no damage to the plane nor to any airport ground equipment/structures; and there were no injuries involved.I made a split-second decision to pull off the runway into the grass believing that the safest recourse in the situation was to remove my aircraft from being a hazard on the runway.

C172 pilot reported that upon landing a violent shimmy occurred due to a blown nosewheel tire. The pilot was unable to exit on a taxiway and elected to turn onto a grassy area; clear of the runway; where the aircraft came safely to a stop.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 22300; Flight Crew Type 172.1

Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Confusion; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

During this oceanic flight we noted several anomalies of the installed Rockwell Collins Multi-Scan weather radar unit. There was no indication of an internal error of the weather radar unit and it is my opinion that this unit is representative of the operation of other Rockwell Collins Multi-Scan radar units installed on this fleet.1.) During the initial hours of the flight which was conducted in daylight hours in clear air; the radar indicated a normal display which showed no radar returns. As the flight continued into an area of lower level convective activity there was appropriate display of echo returns. Our flight then entered an area of greater convective activity and with the radar in auto mode it began to display several green isolated cells approximately 80-90 miles in front of us. We continued to monitor the horizon and did not see any sign of convective activity in front of us. For 15 to 20 minutes the same size and intensity 'phantom cell' remained displayed at our 12 o'clock with the radar in the auto mode.2.) Later in the flight; with the radar set to auto we had cells which did move toward the airplane as we progressed. However; a look out the window in clear air reveled no convective activity that could be associated with what we were seeing on the radar display. If we were in IMC conditions or at night we would be compelled to deviate around these 'non-existent' cells.3.) As the flight continued we entered a moonless night approaching the equator. While level at FL360 with the radar in auto mode and no echo's displayed within 80nm's of the airplane we entered the tops of visually unseen clouds and the flight went from smooth to 30 seconds of violently strong moderate turbulence with the airplane altitude alert going off as the airplane abruptly gained 300 feet of altitude. This is exactly the type of weather phenomena that this radar unit is designed to 'see' due to the extensive use of Geographic Weather Correlation and the Gain PLUS features of the Multi-Scan radar. Clearly neither the radar nor the two of us on the flight deck did not 'see' this coming.4.) Another separate issue with this radar is the inconsistency of operation. During the flight in an attempt to monitor the radar operation I selected the MAP mode of operation and tilted the antenna down 11 degrees. This resulted in only the right 90 degrees of the ground return arc display being show; there was no ground return display on the left half of the arc. Then we repeated these same radar settings and we were able to correctly see the full 180 degree arc of the ground return. What is causing this?Each of these issue is concerning to me because there is nothing in the flight manual; training handouts or pilot bulletins that address these issues. In speaking with crews on the line; the vast majority of pilots know that this radar is a problem. This radar is simply not able to be consistently relied upon and if these issues are not addressed it will only be a matter of time before we hurt someone badly as a result of entering weather that should have been avoided.

A Captain reported Rockwell Collins MultiScan weather radar unit weather and ground mapping performance inconsistencies.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

On approach into ATL Runway 10; on about a three-mile final; we received a wind shear caution. I hesitated on the go-around because our go-around would have taken us directly into a thunderstorm; traffic on the northern runways barred a turn across the airport; we were not experiencing any indications of wind shear and the aircraft in 2.5 miles in front of us only experienced minor fluctuations in airspeed. We both knew we were supposed to initiate a normal go-around; but I thought the placement of the weather looked like bigger threat and I did not want to fly into it. We continued the approach; turned off the automation and prepared to initiate a wind shear recovery maneuver. We encountered only minor airspeed variations. By procedure we should have initiated a go around; I thought the weather's placement was a bigger threat; so I made the decision to continue.

While on an approximately 3-mile final to Runway 10 at ATL; we received a 'monitor radar display' aural message with the associated indication on the MFD (Multifunctional Flight Display) likely due to thunderstorms just to the east and south of the airport. Although the manuals tell us that we need to initiate a go-around in this situation; we as a crew quickly discussed initiating a go-around; at that moment; may not be the best decision. At that time; we were experiencing only small fluctuations in airspeed; and due to the location of the weather to our right and straight ahead; our only option would have been to do an immediately hard left turn towards parallel traffic on final for Runway 09R; which could of put us in a conflict of traffic situation. Also; with an aircraft just ahead of us on final also only reporting small losses and gains of airspeed on final; we felt the best decision was to continue the approach; monitor the aircraft performance; and be prepared to initiate a go-around if the conditions deteriorated any further. I definitely don't like going against what the book says or what we're taught in training; but I feel like there is not a one size fits all solution to all the situations that we can encounter while flying the line. We unfortunately encountered such a situation; and I feel like we made the best decision we could in order to keep the passengers; crew; and aircraft as safe as possible.

B737 flight crew reported continuing to land with wind shear warning to avoid weather and airborne conflict on go around.