Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Procedure; Manuals; Logbook Entry; Equipment / Tooling; Company Policy; Aircraft

Working at the terminal in training status as assigned by ZZZ training coordinator. It was brought to my attention that aircraft XXXX on landing at ZZZ1 flight XXXX had no thrust reverser operation on #1 engine. The previous evening I worked log page XXXXXXX air engine 1 hp valve fault. I was assigned to pick up this job already in progress and started by afternoon shift on gate C20. My direction issued by my lead was that this job was previously in progress to MEL for a live flight but midnight shift was given a turnover to replace the HP and PRV valves troubleshot by afternoon shift; and the aircraft flight was changed to RON status.When we arrived at gate C20 #1 Engine was open and the LH T/R was open. The move crew was already at gate C20 prepping to move the aircraft to C26. There was some discussion in planning the logistics for the job and why it was necessary to move the airplane to a different gate while the job was already started and the engine was open. As a result; the engine had to be closed to move the aircraft. As the job progressed; we reopened the engine; replaced the HP and PRV valves; completed operations checks and closed engine for run.It was discovered in ZZZ1 that the HCU for #1 engine was deactivated with a lockout pin. While I worked the aircraft I was unaware the HCU was locked out and I did not install the lockout pin in the HCU. No streamer associated with this lockout pin was visibly noted that is typically attached to the HCU lockout pin. And it should be noted that if the correct streamer associated with the lockout was used; it would have been easily discovered due to a very long length streamer. We locked out the entire aircraft in a powered down state; with flip chart placed in center pedestal noting do not flip any switch.An update to log page XXXXXXX stating locked out #1 engine T/R HDC for maintenance on HP valve was determined to only be the lockout for the HP valve as defined in the MEL 36-XX-X-X. It appears the shipset lockout pin was used to deactivate the HCU and was not removed upon job completion due to the confusion on job turnover from shift to shift; repositioning the airplane to a different gate; failure of no verbal turnover from the afternoon shift to midnight shift mechanics; and the impact of working in inclement weather.A separate log for each device locked out. The ship set lockout pin be replaced and maintained with a long enough steamer so it cannot be missed.

It was brought to my attention aircraft XXXX on landing at ZZZ1 had no thrust reverser operation on #1 engine. The previous evening I worked log 'air engine 1 hp valve fault' I was assigned to pick up this job already in progress and started by afternoon shift on gate XX. My direction issued by my lead was that this job was previously in progress to MEL for a live flight but midnight shift was given a turnover to replace the HP and PRV valves troubleshot by afternoon shift; and the aircraft flight was changed to RON status.Initially; I started this job task by looking up necessary parts prior to going to the aircraft. While looking up the HP valve and PRV there was needed clarification that required me to contact [Maintenance Control] for verification of part identification. While working with my partner; the lead and [Maintenance Control] there was approximately delay of an hour to sort the issue.When I arrived at gate C20 #1 engine was open and LH t/r was open. Move crew was already at gate XX prepping to move aircraft to XX. There was some discussion in planning the logistics for the job and why it was necessary to move the airplane to a different gate while the job was already started and the engine was open. As a result; the engine had to be closed to move the aircraft. As the job progressed; we reopened the engine; replaced the HP and PRV valves; completed ops checks and closed engine for run. It was discovered in ZZZ1 that the HCU for #1 engine was deactivated with a lockout pin. While I worked the aircraft I was unaware the HCU was locked out and I did not install the lockout pin in the HCU. NO streamer that is typically attached to the HCU lockout pin was present; and it should be noted that the streamer associated with the lockout of this device has a very long length that is easily detected. We locked out the entire aircraft in a powered down state; with flip chart placed in center pedestal noting 'do not to flip any switch.'An update to log stating 'locked out #1 engine t/r HDC for maintenance on HP valve' was determined to only be the lockout for the HP valve as defined in the MEL. It appears the ship set lockout pin was used to deactivate the HCU and was not removed upon job completion due to the confusion on job turnover from shift to shift; repositioning the airplane to a different gate; failure of no verbal turnover from the afternoon shift to midnight shift mechanics; and the impact of working in inclement weather.

Technician reported that the #1 engine HCU was locked out by the previous shift and was not documented; subsequently the aircraft flew with the lockout pin still in place.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 208; Flight Crew Total 2516; Flight Crew Type 1197

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

We were in cruise on our filed route. The Master Caution light came on and I told the Captain to identify the problem. It was a Number 1 HYD ISO VLV light. We both looked down at the Hydraulic panel and noticed the Number 1 Hydraulic Quantity gauge was showing approximately 1. I asked him to pull out the checklist and run the Number 1 Hydraulic system failure checklist. We determined that we had no quantity and no pressure. We ran the checklist. I continued to fly the airplane and run the radios while the Captain went off to call Dispatch on the SatCom. After talking to Dispatch; it was decided that we were not going to continue to our destination; but instead were going to divert where they had a 10;001 ft runway where we could safely land without flaps and normal brakes that were lost with the hydraulic system failure. I continued to fly the aircraft and [notified ATC]; telling them our souls on board; amount of fuel on board; the nature of our [situation]; and that we wanted direct to the airport and [assistance] standing by. The Captain was still off the radio and called the Flight Attendant and notified the passengers of our situation. Center started us on a slow decent out of 16;000 ft and I pulled back the power to stay under 200 kts as is required by some of the new caution lights that began to appear on the caution panel (Rudder Full Press). Captain came back after briefing the flight attendant and passengers and we transferred flight controls to him. We ran through the checklist a second time to make sure everything was done correctly and we were fully aware of all the systems we had lost due to the failure. We discussed the flapless landing and the new Ref and approach speeds that were required by the situation. We landed at 127 kts and Captain put the plane into full reverse to stop it. He put the Parking Brake on and we had vehicles enter the runway and check us for fire or damage; nothing was noted by them.Master Caution light illuminated and Number 1 HYD ISO VLV light illuminated on the Caution Panel. Alerted us to look down to the Hydraulic Panel. Number 1 Hydraulic System Failure due to loss of hydraulic fluid. Maintenance personnel would know exact cause.

During flight; in a De Havilland DHC-8-102; Number 1 Hydraulic System Failed due to loss of hydraulic fluid.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

On flight to IAH (which was severely delayed) we were close to our top of descent; but still at cruise; FL360; and originally filed on the DOOBI2 arrival into IAH. We were then given an arrival change; the new clearance was direct SWB for the ZEEKK1. I asked ATC for a descent since our top of descent was only about 15NM away. They gave us a frequency change and told us the next controller would have that for us. I then checked in with the next controller at FL360.About a minute or two later; right as we were approaching our Vertex Time of Arrival (VTA); Center says 'Aircraft Y (second digit of call sign different from Aircraft X); descend via the ZEEKK1 arrival landing west.' Already with VNAV armed; my First Officer; thought he had heard ATC say 'Aircraft X'; he then dialed in the bottom altitude of the arrival in the altitude selector and the airplane began to capture the path. I caught that ATC said the wrong flight number; but I figured he meant to say Aircraft X and not Aircraft Y; but I wanted to verify anyway. So I said 'I just want to confirm; Aircraft X cleared to descend via the ZEEKK1 arrival?' The Center Controller then came back on and said 'uhhhh Aircraft Z (first digit of call sign different from Aircraft X) descend via the ZEEKK1.' Immediately I told my First Officer to go back up to FL360 until we get the confusion sorted out; but by that time we had already descended about 300 feet. I responded and said 'okay sir; you're saying a bunch of different call signs here; who is cleared to descend via the ZEEKK1 arrival?' He then comes back and says a third call sign 'Aircraft A (fourth digit of call sign different from Aircraft X); cleared to descend via the ZEEKK1 arrival'. I then told ATC that we; Aircraft X; had started down since we thought he said Aircraft X originally. He then corrects himself and says 'Aircraft B; Aircraft B (similar flight number; but different company); descend via the ZEEKK1 arrival landing west'. About a minute goes by and then he gives us the proper clearance to descend via the ZEEKK1. Come to find out; Aircraft B and Aircraft A were both in front of us on the arrival and all 3 of our call signs were mixed up. After we received the proper clearance; we descended via without further incident.I think that all of these similar sounding call signs that we are using is a hazard. It creates mass confusion for ATC and also for pilots. It happens very frequently where a pilot will take another's radio call by mistake and/or where ATC gives an airplane a clearance meant for another flight. I'm not sure of a solid solution other than extreme caution and diligence for all pilots and ATC alike. But to truly eradicate these issues; it would take a complete change in logistics and planning. There are 9999 different flight number combinations that can be used; and we're only using a fraction of those combinations.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier flight crew reported three aircraft on the same arrival with similar call signs caused confusion for pilots and controller.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 241; Flight Crew Type 4200

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 199; Flight Crew Type 10500

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

During preflight briefing we were focused on the departure routing. The PDC; FMC; and departure plate all list different fixes. The FMC fixes are on the route; however; they're not listed on the departure plate. The fixes are on a V-airway or J-route. We both had the departure plate zoomed in on the Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) to verify the routing. We failed to note the 280 above 10;000 feet speed note on the departure. Cleveland Center queried our speed assignment when we checked-on with them from Departure Control.Make sure to review the entire plate. The fixes on the departure in the FMC can / should be fixed.

While briefing/reviewing PALACE EIGHT Departure both Crew Members missed the speed restriction above 10;000 feet (maintain 280 knots). With VNAV selected this resulted in a speed exceeding 280 knots.Departure depiction was a bit confusing displaying LESSY (V45) at the approximate location where PF FMC review showed ALPHE to be (J70). Review of PALACE; high charts and FMC resolved apparent discrepancy. Unfortunately; we missed the 280 knot restriction in the upper right corner of the Approach plate. A better review of the SID plate would have prevented this. Normally I fully review all plates before commencing the Captain brief; however; numerous interruptions and being pressed for time prevented this. I also feel that the PF briefing from the FMC with the PM following along on the SID/approach plate contributed to this error. If I had been briefing from the SID Plate; with the PM following on the FMC; I would most likely have caught the restriction.

B737-700 flight crew reported exceeding published speed departing DTW.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Workload; Training / Qualification; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

VFR weather at ZZZ. Asked Approach for the GPS XX for practice. [They] cleared us for the approach. Leveled off at 3000 ft at ZZZZ. Captain armed the VNAV (Vertical Navigation) and I set MDA (Minimum Descent Altitude). I was distracted by trying to locate VFR traffic in the pattern at ZZZ. Aircraft descended below final approach fix altitude 2300 ft at ZZZZZ1. I believe we were at about 1800 ft. We got a terrain alert and Captain immediately turned off auto pilot and climbed to a safe altitude and leveled off. We were VFR at the time runway in sight and continued to land and captured the VASI. Cancelled IFR with Approach prior to landing. I needed to pay more attention to the approach altitudes and automation modes. Pay less attention to traffic.

ZZZ was VFR and I requested a RNAV GPS XX for practice. I used CDFA (Continuous Descent Final Approach) procedures; which we briefed. At 3000 ft; armed VNAV and set DDA (Derived Decision Altitude) to 1090 ft. Set AAD (Assigned Altitude Deviation) to 1100 ft. FO (First Officer) was talking to ZZZ traffic and Approach and I got distracted with my iPad which I had accidentally put on freeze on airport page. We got 'Terrain; Terrain' warning and I noticed we were at about 1700 ft and descending. I added power and climbed up to the slope. Landed plane normally.Not to let guard down in visual conditions and fly the plane. Watch out for distractions. Cross check instruments and not rely on automation completely.

Light transport aircraft flight crew reported receiving a terrain warning due to an unstabilized approach.


M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 3299; Flight Crew Type 3299

Fatigue; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Fatigue-final landing after 11 hours of flying. Unable to activate runway lights. Assumed lights were defective. Turned off iPad with synthetic vision due to brightness. Began approach to Runway 5 with VFR guidance from GPS. Focused on 2 bright white lights which were from a golf practice range next to Runway 5 and I thought that they were VASI lights. Golf range had 60 ft. poles with netting to trap golf balls. None of the poles had a red light. Passing through 100 ft. turned right to land on Runway 5. Discovered on taxiing that I had 120.72 instead of 122.72 tuned in to activate the lights.

M-20 pilot reported fatigue contributing to distraction and using the incorrect frequency.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 20

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Weather; Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft

I took the hand-offs on Aircraft X at FL160; and Aircraft Y at FL170. I could not communicate with them and was relaying through an Air Carrier. I should [have] been able to talk to them at those altitudes. At this point I had 1;000 FT and about 7 miles lateral separation. Both aircraft were deviating for weather to the South of their route. Lost Aircraft X in Radar and Aircraft Y informed me he was going back on course and going to rejoin the airway. I informed him Radar Contact was lost. I should [have] had good radar coverage on both of these aircraft. Aircraft X informed me he was heading 300 to rejoin the airway. Aircraft Y had a request to descend to FL160 was in light ice at FL170. I told him unable do to non-radar separation rules with his company; I offered him a climb which he did not take. I also told him the only way I could descend him is if it was an emergency. He said he would stay at FL170. I just got a [A-side] to help and got a PIREP for the icing. Shortly after Aircraft Y was in moderate icing and was unable to maintain altitude. I declared an Emergency for him and descended him to FL160. I informed Aircraft X that I was using less than standard non-radar separation. Aircraft X was radar identified and told to maintain FL160. Aircraft Y gave a DME report of 41 'West' of ZZZ but I did not correct him knowing he meant East of ZZZ. I then asked Sector X to spin Aircraft Z who was at FL160. I descended Aircraft X to FL150. I asked Aircraft Y if he was out of the icing. He was out of the icing and level at FL160. I told Aircraft Y speed was his discretion gave him the local altimeter and advised him that his company was at FL150. Aircraft Y reported on the airway but was still non-radar and got a 32 DME report 'West' of ZZZ but once again did not correct the pilot knowing he was East of ZZZ. I then issued Aircraft Y holding instructions at ZZZ as published with an EFC of XX00Z; maintain FL160. I noticed the adjacent Sector X climbing Aircraft Z to FL170 into the area of known icing. I called that sector. I asked Aircraft X his intention and he indicated he wanted the ILS to RWY 6 another aircraft I believe Aircraft Y took the call. I told Aircraft Y to expect to hold till his company was safe on the ground. Aircraft Z checked in at FL170. I informed him of the ice and about his company. He said 'I'll push south and descend to FL160.' I told him to maintain FL170 and asked him if he was requesting FL160. Then I gave him a descent clearance to FL160 and clearance to deviate south of course. I noticed Aircraft Y descending below his assigned altitude of FL160 to FL154 without a clearance. He informed me that he was in VFR conditions and would cancel IFR. I gave Aircraft X an approach clearance to maintain 150 till ZZZ cleared ILS RWY 6. He said he was descending to FL120. I corrected him and told him to maintain FL150 till ZZZ. However he still descended below his clearance down to FL146. He said I'm correcting. Aircraft X canceled IFR and I asked him to call the facility and issued him the number. I lost Aircraft Z in Radar and should [have] had him. When I asked him his radial and DME from ZZZ he said 60 DME on the 281 radial. Again [the position report] was incorrect; I knew that had to be the bearing to the VOR and he was probably on the ZZZ101R. I got a Radar hit on Aircraft Z at FL153 in a FL160 MEA. I told him to climb and maintain FL160 and gave him local altimeter. He told me he was unable to maintain FL160 at this time. I told him I was going to declare and Emergency for him. I told him my minimum IFR altitude is FL160. I issued a safety alert followed by a low altitude alert. He said he was established at FL155. Aircraft Z said I'm descending to FL150; were getting icing up here and I issued him FL150. Aircraft Y was in the clear. I gave Aircraft Y a clearance to FL140. He was below his assigned altitude at FL135; I gave him yet another low altitude alert.Better Radios [and] RadarCoverage. Better training for the pilots. No training missions with similar call signs; No training into known icing in mountains.

Center Controller reports of three helicopters that encountered icing while working them and two were declared emergencies to be able to descend.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

On climb out of ZZZ [airport] we received an ACARS message from Dispatch saying that the TRACON was closing and that we should ask ATC if we could do Tower enroute to get into ZZZ1 [airport]. It also said if we couldn't return to ZZZ. We were still climbing on the SID out of ZZZ and I was still running the after Takeoff checklist. I finished the checklist up and consulted the FO. We were both confused by this message. I went ahead and asked ZZZ Departure if they knew anything about it. They did not know anything then handed us off to ZZZ Center. I checked in with ZZZ [Center]. I responded to Dispatch asking which facility it was that was closing. They replied with ZZZ1 TRACON and that it was to be closed from XA:30 to XB:30z. After getting this response. I asked ZZZ Center if they had any information on it. They checked with their managers and didn't know anything about TRACON in ZZZ1 shutting down. I messaged Dispatch saying that we wanted to continue and see how things progress since ZZZ [Center] said they didn't know anything. The reply we received was a strong negative. Dispatch wanted us to turn back to ZZZ [airport] right away. At this point in the flight; we were half way to ZZZ1 [airport]. We were estimated to arrive in the ZZZ1 [airport] area around XB:00z and had enough fuel onboard the aircraft to hold for a while before having to go to an alternate that we would have added. ZZZ2 [airport] was close and had good weather. Dispatch didn't give us any time to explore other alternatives; so we complied with their demand to return to ZZZ [airport]. The entire time; my FO and I were trying to figure out why we were returning to the airport. The workload was high on the return. The risk for making mistakes was pretty high on both our parts. Thankfully; ZZZ [airport] wasn't busy and was able to cut down a lot of our workload by giving us a descent and direct a fix on the approach. Once on the ground I was able to call Dispatch and talk. They closed the TRACON for COVID cleaning and only gave about 20 minute notice. It sounded like the dispatcher knee jerk reacted to it and wanted us on the ground as soon as possible. That's why she didn't want us to continue. I complied because it was a safe course of action to return and because I couldn't get Dispatch to agree to continue. So this was the safest course of action that was mutually agreeable.Suggest going over delay options inflight with dispatch and to not make the decisions for the flight crew. Dispatch should seek the advice of other dispatchers and most importantly of the crew to come up with many options and narrow it down the best one in a non-time critical situation as this. Freaking out and demanding an air return is not a normal way to run an operation. Dispatch should be made aware that there are many options available to crews to stay in the air longer while saving fuel. We could have easily slowed down and held until TRACON opened again or we could have diverted to ZZZ2 [airport] and picked up some more fuel if we needed to. Both would have been faster options of keeping the operations going while being safe.

After departing ZZZ we received an ACARS message from Dispatch informing us that ZZZ1 TRACON would be closed upon our arrival.  Shortly after we received another message instructing us to return to ZZZ.We received an ACARS message from Dispatch.The flight return to ZZZ per Dispatch request due to ZZZ1 TRACON closed prior to us landing.We returned to ZZZ and the Captain contacted Dispatch after returning to the gate.Suggestion - If possible; comply with Dispatch instructions.  Coordinate with Dispatch for clarification via ACARS or after returning to the gate.

Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a message from Dispatch during climbout that destination TRACON was closing before arrival.  Dispatch told crew to return to departure airport.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I was working 3 planes on an arrival finals sector. Two pilots were answering every third transmission. After trying to descend Aircraft X for the third or fourth time without a response I said 'Hello; Aircraft X descend and maintain 6000.' Aircraft X responded to that call. Then later down the final approach course it took 3 transmissions to slow the aircraft down. I told Aircraft X that it took three transmissions and he said he only heard one transmission. This comment led me to try other aircraft and when they did not respond to try the 'orange jack'; a hand set; and mains and standbys. Finally we figured out that the frequency was failing and subsequently failed. Aircraft X had to go around.Later it became knowledge that the frequency had been going in and out and since then Tech Ops keeps saying that the frequency is fixed and to use it. The frequency will work for a while and then fail again. Please send my apology to the Aircraft X crew for being 'obnoxious' as the pilot [of another aircraft] told me on frequency. I thought they were not paying attention and it ended up being my frequency failing. The frequency should not be used again until it can be verified fixed.

The reporter reported this is a known issue and in the meantime a substitute frequency is available for use.

NCT Approach Controller reported their frequency was working intermittently even though the Tech Ops personnel reported the frequency had been fixed.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Revised company procedures require us to use a new steeper climb profile. If flying an RNAV departure the autopilot should be engaged at 500 feet as per our manual. We did exactly that. Just above FRA the pusher activated and the autopilot disengaged. At FRA I selected FLC for a brief moment to gain some speed; but then I followed the company climb profile for the DEN RNAV departures; and selected VS/1000 fpm. Just 2 seconds later the plane stalled. In Denver with our new steeper climb profile it's normal to constantly see the PLI [Pitch Limit Indicator] in a calm wind day. So at the middle of the summer I'm pretty sure I wasn't the fist one who had the stick pusher activated following company procedures.The largest threat in this case is our company issued climb procedure combined with summer thermals.To prevent this from happening again I could disregard company procedures; could make a shallower climb; and engage the autopilot over 200K. If I missed something; please let me know.

An EMB-145 Captain advised his company's revised vertical navigation SOP to provide greater climb angles to comply with altitude restrictions on RNAV SIDs from DEN exceed the aircraft's performance capability and resulted in a stall.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The Dispatcher had accidentally selected improper toggle switches on computer creating a Dispatch Release without valid landing data on the release. The Dispatcher had selected inoperative nose wheel steering and contaminated runway conditions; both of which did not exist. During the enroute phase; I attempted to acquire landing data for our arrival and received an error message on ACARS indicating that no landing data could be created due to nose wheel steering inop on with a contaminated runway. We were confused because the nose wheel steering was not inop and the runway was not contaminated. The Captain contacted Dispatch via ACARS and received an amended release with the improper toggles removed. We received the proper landing data and landed without incident. The Captain talked to the Dispatcher on the ground at the gate and the Dispatcher advised filing an ASAP. In the future I will be diligent to back up the Captain by reviewing all aspects of the release even when I am the Pilot Monitoring for the flight.

CRJ-900 First Officer reported inaccurate landing data was received from Dispatch.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

In the vicinity of ZZZ VOR; ATC advised us that there was moderate precipitation and turbulence ahead; and recommended that we climb to FL340. During the climb; another pilot mentioned that the turbulence was worse at FL340. ATC asked us if we wanted to level at FL320. We did. After a few minutes; and a frequency change; the turbulence was getting much worse. We asked ATC if there were any ride reports up ahead. They said that FL340 only reported light turbulence. We climbed to FL340. After another few minutes the turbulence got much worse; and we noticed the following deviations: Airspeed from M.71 to M.79 Altitude +/- 400 feet; and bank angles of 45 degrees. Further; the autopilot disconnected LNAV; and reverted to CWS (Control Wheel Steering). I slowed to LRC (Long Range Cruise) which put us halfway between low speed warning and high speed warning on the airspeed indicator. We asked for; and received a block altitude of FL330 to FL350 and explained that we were unable to maintain altitude. The cloud deck lowered (we had been IMC at first;) and the turbulence subsided. ATC asked us how the turbulence was; and we reported that it was moderate and occasionally severe. We wrote the encounter up in the logbook; and asked Dispatch if there was anything else we needed to do or if we should file a written report. They asked if we were okay; and told us that the logbook write up should be adequate. We continued on to [destination] without further incident.

While in cruise flight we had been operating in moderate turbulence for most of the flight. Somewhere in the vicinity of ZZZ while at FL340 the intensity of the turbulence increased sharply. The plane lost about 400 feet of altitude. While the flying pilot was working to return the plane to cruise I requested a block altitude and it was approved. The plane instantly went from straight and level flight to almost a 45 degree left turn. The flying pilot returned to straight and level flight only to have the plane instantly go back to a 45 degree bank turn. Once the wings were level again the turbulence quickly resided and transitioned to smooth flight with Center. We were IMC during this event. The other altitude deviations from FL340 were smaller than the initial loss but were inside our assigned block altitude. The winds were from the SW at 150+ knots. There was no noted severe turbulence in the route of flight that morning. The event took place very quickly and was over also very quickly.

737 flight crew reported experiencing severe turbulence for a brief period of time.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

Approximately 30 min into the flight; during cruise @ FL360; the #2 autopilot clicked off; accompanied by ECAM alert the #2 INS had faulted/failed. After stabilizing the aircraft; and engaging #1 autopilot; we completed the INS Fault QRH procedure. The First Officer (FO) was pilot flying; and reported he had lost all airspeed info; the flight director; and other info on his flight display in addition to that normally associated with loss of INS. Reviewing QRH for ADC failure; many listed items were similar to those lost on the FO display. Concerned that we may have also lost the ADC; (although we did not get an ECAM alert); the FO selected #3 on his NAV switching panel to regain lost display items. In reviewing QRH procedures for a failed ADC; loss of RVSM capability was a result of failure. We notified ATC of our issues; and to be safe; elected to descend from RVSM airspace as required of a ADC failure. We inspected and found no associated CB's open. We then informed [dispatch] and [maintenance] of our issues; and requested [dispatch] to recalculate fuel burn for continued flight to [ZZZ] @FL270. Receiving the new fuel data; and comparing to our FMS calculations; continuing to [ZZZ] would have us arriving with 11;000lbs. FOD. [ZZZ] ATIS was reporting ILS 32 approaches in use due to winds. Also; we were having to divert course due to en route weather. Given all these factors; I elected to divert to [ZZZ1]; due to limited fuel reserves and the possibility of delays upon arrival at [ZZZ]. Great support from center; [dispatch] and excellent job by FO.

A300 Captain reported diverting to an alternate after loss of multiple components resulting from failure of #2 INS.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 185; Flight Crew Total 8950

Workload; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Fatigue

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

We were operating to ELP. The first error in this chain of events is when I noticed we were level at 8;000 feet at an indicated airspeed of 280 knots going direct to AGUAS. I pointed out to the Captain that we needed to reduce our airspeed immediately. Shortly thereafter we began our speed reduction we were instructed to begin a descent to 6;000 feet and cleared visual 22. At this present time we were approximately 250 knots descending and roughly 16-17 miles from the field. The Captain was utilizing speed brakes during this descent and asked for slats to be extended at 240 knots. From that point forward I tried to back the Captain up with configuring as early as permissible with respect to aircraft limitations. With that being said; while I was doing my job to back him up; I was not nearly assertive enough in my other duties making him aware of our aircraft state with regard to our stabilized approach criteria. I mentioned that we were 'high' and 'fast'; however; if I said we were 'unstabilized' I don't recall it. At the very least I can say with confidence I wasn't said assertive enough if it was mentioned. I think the Captain and myself had tunnel vision with getting the aircraft configured and on speed. I think there was some expectation bias as well that played into that we are accustomed to flying so many approaches where the FAF is 2-4 miles further out than this particular approach into ELP. Coupled with the higher altitude/higher TAS also compounded the chain of events that led to this unstabilized approach. As far as what caused the event. As crews we know that no single instance can cause the outcome of something. In this case I think we were left a little high by center control (some in part due to some ATC issues) and then on our own doing of being at such a high speed at 8;000 feet and a high altitude airport. A potential second contributing factor today was that this was only our second leg together. As is with each new trip with a coworker you try and get a feel for how they fly the airplane and when they like to configure for approach to landing. I needed to be more assertive or just ask him when would you like to slow down and configure for approach; so that we are sharing the same mental model. I also had late van in but the night prior; and was only able to get about 2 hours of sleep in the sort. It's hard to also ignore the potential effects of fatigue as a potential contributing factor. Our evening was a late duty day and we were 22 minutes late arriving.

It was 15;000 scattered; and light winds. Unstable approach. I came on duty one hour prior to the flight. I had driven 2 hours to [my home airport] to jumpseat to work and had slept a few hours prior to this plus my normal 8 hours of sleep the prior morning and didn't think I was that tired at all. Felt decent. [At the next airport] I got a sleep room and also slept one hour prior to show. FO's (First Officer's) leg; we operated uneventfully and Captain departed to El Paso the same. On our descent into El Paso was started a bit late as we had some trouble with ATC communication getting the descent further into El Paso and we were vectored off course 10 degrees while descending to 10;000 feet. Getting close to that altitude we were then cleared direct to the outer marker. While turning to go direct to the marker a descent through 10;000 was caught by the FO which was caught leveling at 8;000 at 280; I thought I had set 250 in the window but was distracted I suppose; which then at that point we were about 20 miles from the marker; which normally would be crossed at 5;100 feet. By the time I slowed the plane to 250 with speed brakes; to continue the descent we were now about 17 miles out and so I needed to lose airspeed and 2;900 feet of altitude in 15 to 17 miles. We were cleared to 6;000 and the visual to Runway 22. (Looking back at this point I should have asked for a 360 and descended to altitude and started configuring early.) Instead I called for slats extend at 245 or so while descending with the spoilers fully extended. Then called for flaps 15 at around 205 while descending etc.; then flaps 20 as soon as the speed allowed; the gear had been extended and I was slowing but the 1;000 AGL height and a discontinued approach had slipped right out of my mind thinking about getting the airplane configured and landed. We; unfortunately were not ready to land until approximately 200-300 feet; meaning on speed and on path fully configured. We were configured in time I think at or above 1;000 feet AGL; the speed was the big factor of somewhere between 150-160; so 20-30 above speed.First; a 360 should have been done out when we realized to high. Second; a discontinued approach should been initiated when the criteria above and approaching a 1;000 feet was not met; and a no fault go around could and should have been accomplished after that instead of trying to save the landing. I have never done anything like this before and have operated all over this world and have always tried to be stable and follow procedures to the T. I have done at least one discontinued approach maybe two in the last year or so and had no problem doing them. Why that was not done here was that the crew was focused on landing; not exceeding limitations configurations but in that completely lost track of 1;000 feet criteria and such. This will not happen again on my watch; I have a pain in the pit of my stomach cannot believe this could happen to me. As a pilot; I always thought that; as a Captain; have always strived for that; but got caught up in the flying event of the aircraft. I must be aware of the airport elevation; high TASs and very short final approach fix. Too short to not be configured at least 3-4 miles prior to reaching it on speed. Briefing it all at altitude; which was done completely I must say; must be followed by actions. After landing I wished I could go back and do the 360; discontinued approach or go-around. It would have been better than this feeling. The short final approach of 3.4 miles from VALTR to the runway; high altitude airport; faster TAS and a long runway will play into a chain that leads to an unstable approach. Even being visual. It's better to treat this airport that AGUAS; which is 3.4 miles prior to the final approach fix to VALTR; should be treated as an end point. Meaning if not configured by AGUAS on altitude prior to or at this fix beware and be ready to discontinue this approach. Remember also; take all distances from the final approach fix and not the airport at this airport; as the FAF to the runway is at 1;250 feet or so; so you only have 250 feet to decide to discontinue this approach or not. Fly it that way. I will.

Widebody Transport flight crew reported being high and fast and not meeting stabilized approach criteria before landing.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

Upon arrival our passengers were escorted by the PIC and transported to the aircraft by FBO staff. SIC had competed the preflight activities and passengers were boarded. PIC did a final walk around. Neither crew member noted any discrepancies prior to the flight.[Airport] was the site of [a sporting event] and the airport was heavily congested with aircraft; so all taxiing was done at a slow pace. We were cleared to taxi from the [FBO] ramp onto Taxiway 'Z' and to hold short of Taxiway 'Z1'; and to expect Runway 'ZZ'. With the marshal's signal be began taxiing straight ahead for about 20 feet and made a left turn heading for Taxiway 'Z'. As we approached 'Z' the pilot flying said the steering felt a little sluggish and asked if I had checked the torque link pin. I said I had done my final walk around; but didn't notice anything abnormal; however wasn't 100% sure that the torque link pin itself was installed. I decided to make a few turns left and right to insure we had the torque link connected. In addition to the initial 90 degree turn as we began to taxi; the pilot flying made turns of approximately 45 degrees left and right. Both crew members were satisfied that the torque pin 'must' have been installed or else we would not have been able to steer the aircraft with nose wheel steering.[Airport] was the site of [a sporting event] and the airport was heavily congested with aircraft so all taxing was at a slow pace. We entered onto Taxiway 'Z'; turning left and held short of Taxiway 'Z1'. Once cleared; we turned left onto Taxiway 'Z1' and continued to taxi in line with multiple other aircraft to Runway 'ZZ' with no steering problems. We turned right at Taxiway 'Z2' and held short awaiting our takeoff clearance on Runway 'ZZ'. Once cleared for takeoff; we turned right onto Runway 'ZZ' and began our takeoff roll.As we accelerated to approximately 20-30 knots; we felt excessive nose wheel shimmy and aborted the takeoff. Pilot not flying notified Tower of the aborted takeoff and we exited the runway onto Taxiway 'Z'; holding short of Taxiway 'Z3'. Contacting Ground; we were given taxi instructions straight ahead on 'Z' and then onto the [FBO] ramp. The pilot flying taxied very slowly turning right onto [FBO's] ramp and left to parking as instructed by the lineman marshal.We secured the aircraft and the PIC exited to check the torque link. Finding the pin installed; PIC went back and informed the SIC that the pin was installed; and that he was going inside the FBO to call Flight Control and Maintenance Control. When the PIC exited again; the marshal informed him that he noticed the 'steering scissors' were disconnected; so he connected them and installed the pin.PIC notified Flight Control and Maintenance Control and described the events. Maintenance requested pictures of the torque link from two different angles with the pin installed. A maintenance technician was dispatched to inspect the nose gear assembly and the PIC made a discrepancy report in the Aircraft Maintenance Log (AML). The maintenance technician performed a thorough inspection and completed the maintenance log noting no discrepancies found. Maintenance Control and Flight Control released the flight to continue.The flight was continued uneventfully.Note: While waiting for a maintenance technician to arrive; the PIC discussed with one of the senior lineman at the front desk of [the FBO]; the torque link being disconnected; and then not reconnected by FBO personnel after repositioning our aircraft. He informed me that they typically disconnect the torque links when towing aircraft to parking locations. However; he said that they also reconnect the torque links after they move aircraft. He was very surprised and apologetic that we had this problem. He happened to be the lineman marshal who directed us on our initial movement from our parking spot. He said he was very surprised the torque link was found disconnected as he said he always checksthese links when he is directing aircraft movement. He thought ours was connected; but said he really wasn't sure as it was difficult to see in the darkness and the aircraft appeared to be turning with no problems. At my request; he double checked with the lineman who said he noticed the 'steering scissors' were disconnected as we taxied back to parking. He confirmed that the lineman had reconnected the torque link before I had gotten out of the aircraft to check for myself.If there is ever something that doesn't feel right with steering control on the ground; or a question concerning the status of the torque link pin being installed; the aircraft should be stopped and the torque link status confirmed to be ready for flight. Maintenance should be consulted before continuing.All of our Citation XL's have torque links. Some of them have torque link 'pins' while others have the torqued links connected with a 'bolt' to prevent the exact problem we had. I suggest all of our XL's have the torque link connected with a 'bolt' vs. the 'pin'.Crews must insure the status of the torque link prior to operating the aircraft. Be aware of your expectation that things are normal and make sure appropriate checks are conducted.

The Captain of a Cessna 560XL reported they rejected takeoff due to a nose wheel shimmy. It was discovered that the nose gear scissors were disconnected.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 143; Flight Crew Total 21454; Flight Crew Type 5936

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 680

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

I was scheduled to fly with a student transitioning from the A320 First Officer (FO) to B737 FO.  The student called in sick and the new FO was a short call on reserve. We were 29 minutes late off the gate due to an ACARS issue that was effecting data flow system wide.  We were holding for hard copies of weights; take off data and runway data when the system came back on line slowly. Normal taxi out and take off except we requested anti-ice on for takeoff due to snow on runway still.After take off and on the climb out we experience a pressurization malfunction. The cabin 'altitude horn' sounded around 13;000 feet in the initial climb out. We reached an altitude of about 14;500 feet as we declared and emergency and where issued a decent to 10;000 feet by ATC. Our 'CABIN ALT' and 'DIFF PRESS' were fluctuating wildly up and down.  Level at 10;000 feet the DIFF PRESS gauge showed 8.6 PSI and a CABIN ALT of 27;500 feet. The Cabin Alt and Diff Press gauge was of no use but we were able to control the CABIN CLIMB gauge with the manual position of the pressurization controller and toggle switch.After we complied with the ORH procedures we made the decision to return. Our aircraft state presented a 'Altitude Horn with forward panel  light' followed by a Pressurization 'Auto Fail' light on both AUTO and ALTN modes and an 'Off Schedule' decent light.  On the return it was discovered the Equipment Cooling Exhaust 'OFF' light had come on too; for both normal and alternate positions.  We never got to make a pilot logbook write up due to maintenance so quickly taking the logbook off the flight deck.  They said that they would handle that specific write up when I told them I had not put it in the logbook yet.Upon discussions with flight attendants it was decided to have EMS services available at the gate upon our return.  The Flight Attendants (FA) said the cabin had become quite hot with several customers complaining about their ears and would like EMS to meet us. The FA's were given the T.E.S.T. and updated several times as well inbound.  Several PA's to the customers from the flight deck and FA's positions where made.We requested a 15 mile final to the ILS in visual conditions to allow for a slow and gradual decent to the airport.  The approach and landing where uneventful.  We had to wait for our gate due to it being occupied.  Ramp did mention that the EMS crews were already at the gate; so they decided to hurry the Aircraft on the gate off and made us wait for a few extra minutes.

I was a reserve called at XA00 for a short call. I arrived at the gate an hour prior to departure. I did the preflight which was uneventful. Upon entering the cockpit I started my duties for setting up the aircraft but noticed that the aircraft was not loading the information through ACARS properly. I advised the Captain of this and said I would load the box manually while he discussed the problem with dispatch. Dispatch informed us there was a company wide computer problem and that they were working on it. After a period of time ACARS started functioning properly and we were able to push slightly late. Taxi and takeoff were uneventful but the captain and I decided to use engine anti-ice for the takeoff since the runway still had patches of snow on it. On the climb out passing roughly 14;000 feet the cabin altitude warning sounded. Upon looking at the gauge it made no sense since it was gyrating between a cabin altitude of 7;000 feet and 35;000 feet and a cabin differential which was moving up and down constantly. We immediately decided the best course of action was to stabilize the cabin and declare an emergency. I immediately started a slow descent to 10;000 feet from 14;700 to keep the cabin reasonable while the captain pulled the QRH turned the pressurization switch to man and ran the appropriate checklists. Following the QRH procedures would only stabilize the cabin in Manual mode as the alt pressure gauge was giving an erroneous reading of diff psi 8.7 with a cabin alt of 23;500 feet and an actual plane altitude of 10;000 feet. We both decided that the best course of action would be to immediately return. ATC agreed and we were given priority handling for vectors to the ILS. At this time we were notified by the flight attendants that some passengers were experiencing discomfort with their ears and head. We then asked for a 15 mile final turn in so as to descend at a slow rate for cabin safety and comfort and notified ATC to have paramedics meet us at our gate. We finished the appropriate checklists and landed uneventfully. Even though we had to wait a few minutes for our gate to open up once at the gate we were met with the paramedics and all passenger and crew who wanted treatment were taken care of.

B737 flight crew experiences a cabin altitude warning horn passing 13;000 feet during climb with the pressurization control panel displaying false indications of cabin altitude and differential pressure and actual cabin altitude oscillating up and down. Pressurization is controllable in manual but the crew elects to return to the departure airport due to passenger ear problems.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Type 15700

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

During descent we were given a clearance to depart ZZZ [VOR] on heading of 230 and descend to 8;000 feet.  Concurrently another Company aircraft; (Flight ABC) was given a descent clearance to cross 15 SW of ZZZ [VOR] at 8;000 feet.  They were subsequently given a frequency change.  At ZZZ [VOR] we took up a 230 heading. At approximately 15 SW of ZZZ [VOR] at 10;000 feet; the Controller asked if we were going to comply with the 8;000 feet restriction 15 SW of ZZZ [VOR].  I told him no; we were already at that point and we had not been given that clearance.  The Controller believed he had given us the same clearance as (Company Flight ABC).  He then gave me a frequency change and no further mention of the erroneous clearance.

On the ZZZZZ 5 Arrival into ZZZ [airport]; approaching ZZZ [VOR] ATC gave us 'Depart ZZZ [VOR] heading 230 descend and maintain 8;000 feet. We were complying with the clearance and a few minutes later ATC questioned if we were going to make it to 15 Miles South of ZZZ [VOR] at 8;000 feet. We advised that that was not our clearance and ATC issues the clearance of cross 15 miles south of ZZZ [VOR] at 8;000 feet; however; upon issue of said clearance we were already at 15 miles and at 9;000 feet; so we advised that we were unable. Of note; visibility was poor and ATC radio was highly congested with numerous VFR traffic.  I think our call sign just got confused with someone else. We did hear a (Company Flight ABC) also get a similar clearance before the confusion occurred.    I think the airspace was just too saturated and the congestion is what caused the mistakes.  We were never issued that clearance; nor did we ever read it back.

Air carrier flight crew reported ATC gave them a clearance meant for another company flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 720; Flight Crew Type 270

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

I was piloting the helicopter.  My [co-pilot] was in the co-pilot's seat and operating the FLIR system.  We had already been in the air for approximately 35 minutes when we made our way to the area of [location X]. We made several orbits at 1800 ft MSL which were uneventful.  When turning northbound on our last orbit; the LOW ROTOR RPM light and MASTER CAUTION light illuminated; the LOW ROTOR RPM horn began to sound; the SAJEM digital engine instrument panel lost functionality; and we lost all hydraulic assistance of the flight controls.   The engine was still audible; but given I was unable to determine rotor RPM and didn't know if the engine was truly running at 100%; I decided to perform a power on auto-rotation. I began a downward; right-hand; controlled spiral to purposefully lose altitude and maneuver the helicopter away from the heavily populated areas of [location X].  I established a glidepath and trajectory with a football practice field that is located close to [location Y].  At approximately 500 feet MSL; my night vision goggles (NVGs) fogged over due to the abrupt change in temperature from the cool night air of 1;800 feet MSL to the humid and muggy air at 500 feet MSL.  I was unable to see through my NVGs and was forced to rely on the peripheral vision of my right eye (I did not want to take my hands off of the controls to raise my NVGs) and my co-pilot who was telling me whether or not we were clear of obstacles.  At or around 20 feet MSL; I began establishing the helicopter for a RUN-ON landing. The ground on the practice field was very saturated due to heavy rains which have been soaking the grounds for days.  The skids did not slide; but instead; stuck into the ground and only moved forward about 5 feet.  This equated to an almost sudden stop of the helicopter.Both myself and my co-pilot were able to walk out of the helicopter.  The helicopter did not suffer any damage from the landing.  It has been determined that the malfunction is possibly a sheared shaft (inside the main rotor transmission) that runs through the main tach generator; the hydraulic pump; and into the main rotor transmission.  The main rotor transmission is being removed and will be sent to an offsite maintenance facility to disassemble the main rotor transmission for inspection and repair.

Helicopter pilot reported performing an autorotation to a landing after losing hydraulic assistance of the flight controls.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 9500; Flight Crew Type 400

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Ground control gave us a clearance to taxi via B; B2 and cross Runway XY at B2.  We headed south on B; turned right (west) onto B2 to cross runway XY.  As we were on B2 crossing runway XY; I heard ground controller state 'aircraft on B4 stop; hold position; aircraft on B4 stop immediately.'  We were on B2 but I had been listening to other calls on ground and no one should have been on B4; so I thought he might be talking to us (this took less than one second) and as I continued to scan ahead I saw a helicopter north bound on runway XY low level. (I believe the helicopter had come from his base eastbound; overflew taxiway A and then turned low level northbound on runway XY).The pilot flying and I both hit the brakes immediately as the helicopter passed in front of us. Probable cause of near collision; ground controller gave a us taxi clearance with runway crossing instructions; the tower controller gave the helicopter a clearance to depart north bound on runway XY and failed to realize we were taxiing.

A Check Airman in a Cessna 172 reported that when as they started to cross a runway; a helicopter flew at low level in front of them causing a NMAC.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 23000; Flight Crew Type 6000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

We were cleared from holding at OCK and told to hold 220 KTS which we did; shortly thereafter we heard ATC asking flight behind us in the hold if they could take 27L LOC approach which they accepted. We were vectored for a relatively short EGLL approach slowing to 180 KTS assigned; and then given a heading to intercept the 27R LOC cleared to descend via the glide slope. Shortly thereafter [we were] told to hold 160 KTS to a four mile final. At approximately 5.5 miles we were closing in on the aircraft ahead of us and encountered wake turbulence. I decided to start slowing to prevent further closure and to mitigate the wake turbulence. At 4 mile final we were at 150 KTS IAS with winds aloft at 2;000 FT variable 300 - 330 degrees at 30 to 42 KTS. ATC had not provided adequate spacing and said they had to vector that aircraft off the final. When we landed the Tower Controller ask us if we maintained our speed on final and not knowing what they were getting at; said yes we were; they then said paperwork would 'need to be filed' whatever that means? Because we were close to the Outer Marker and having to aviate; navigate; do landing checklists; we were not talking to Approach Control; we contacted the Tower at the 4 DME final and were not cleared to land until 400-500 FT because the aircraft ahead of us was still on the runway!

Air carrier Captain reported deviating from assigned airspeed on arrival to EGLL when he encountered wake vortex and chose to increase spacing.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Attendant Airline Total 28; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 4; Flight Attendant Total 28; Flight Attendant Type 25

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

Approximately 30 minutes after takeoff I was working the aft end of the beverage cart as Flight Attendant #2. Flight Attendant #1 summoned Flight Attendant #4; who was working the forward end of the beverage cart; to come up front. Upon receiving information #4 hustled back to tell me our pilot was ill and we would be landing soon. As we hurried back with the beverage cart we felt the airplane begin a fairly steep descent. Flight Attendant #1 made a P.A. apparently letting the passengers know we were landing. I however could not hear what was said due to the very loud cabin noise that is typical on the MD80 aircraft. We did our safety checks and took our jump seats. It felt like we landed approximately 15 minutes after I received the information regarding the emergency. A medical team met our flight and our First Officer was immediately taken off. Our Captain made a P.A. explaining the medical situation and then left so as to accompany the First Officer to the hospital. The most troubling issue for me was not being able to hear the P.A. In fact I did not realize that a P.A. had been made at all due to the extremely loud cabin and engine noise that are part and parcel of working a MD80 aircraft.

MD80 Flight Attendant describes an emergency diversion to obtain medical attention for an ill First Officer.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 8000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Departed with full wing fuel and 4.5k fuel in center tank. Both center pumps were turned on. At level off at FL340 noticed Fuel Config EICAS message; center fuel was at .2 so turned pumps off. Noticed Fuel Config Eicas message remained on. Upon examination of Fuel Panel; noticed that there was 35.5 in left tank; and 39.5 in right tank. Total fuel indicated correctly for fuel used. It appears all center fuel was consumed by right engine. We then balanced fuel and flight was normal from that point on. System was written up in logbook.

A B767-300 pilot reported that center tank fuel was used primarily by the right engine leaving the amount of fuel in the wing tanks unbalanced.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was instructed by the CIC (there was no FLM on duty) to relieve the Radar North (RN) Controller; as he wanted leave and it was to be approved. As I plugged in to monitor the position; I could see that there was moderate traffic with a little complexity. Both RADAR sectors that were open were running arrivals to intersecting runways; as well as some arrivals to other satellite airports. The Controller working RN seemed overwhelmed and confused. I observed the RN Controller gave a BE36 a heading to avoid a TBM8; who was on vectors to Runway 28. At this point; I assumed that the RN Controller had given adequate vectors to both the BE36 and the TBM8 to ensure some sort of separation (lateral; passing/diverging courses; etc.); so I initiated a relief briefing. The briefing was convoluted; but I felt it was best to go ahead and get the Controller off position; as there was nothing more that he could do that would be productive. Upon relieving the RN Controller; I proceeded to clean up the sector. As the relieved controller was doing his 2 minute overlap; he said 'watch those two guys;' pointing to the BE36 and the TBM8. At this point; the TBM8 was level at 5;000 FT and the BE36 was climbing through 5;800 FT +/- 100 FT. I am not sure if there was 3 miles lateral separation or not at this point; but there was certainly not 1;000 FT vertical between the aircraft at that time. Within seconds of him pointing out the possible conflict; vertical separation was achieved anyway. There was nothing I could have done to alter the situation; as other matters in the sector were far more pressing and no action I could have taken would have expedited/maintained separation. As such; I took no action and chose to let the situation resolve itself without causing unneeded alarm to the pilots.I have several opinions/ideas; reference this scenario: 1. The Controller that I relieved is unsafe. I don't say this lightly; as this sort of poor sector management and panic is commonplace when he works traffic. As he is only 4 or 5 months from mandatory retirement; I doubt that any recurrent training or skill enhancement would be productive. However; his experience could be useful in administrative duties. I am sure he would probably be relieved to be off the boards; and our staffing is such that it would not be difficult for management to make this happen. 2. Increase the number of FLMs in the building from 3 to 4. Often; CICs seem unwilling to give their co-workers/friends orders concerning how they work traffic. I believe this could have been a contributing factor in this scenario; as the CIC knew that the RN Controller was having difficulty working; but was reluctant to tell him what to do. Having more FLMs would reduce the number of times when CICs have to run the shift and monitor the operation. 3. Don't pressure the relieving controller to take a position that is not 'cleaned up.' It would be helpful if our local management would encourage this. Often; we are pressured to relieve weaker/overwhelmed controllers because they cannot keep up with what is going on. Rather; it should be that people help the weaker controllers to get their sector under control first; and then once things are resolved; the relief briefing can take place. This would be a much safer method; as well as one which would probably help to build up the skills of controllers who need skill development.

TRACON Controller described a probable loss of separation event when trying to relieve a controller who was overwhelmed; the reporter suggesting increased FLM coverage and delaying position take overs during these conditions.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Logbook Entry; Equipment / Tooling; Aircraft; Procedure

During push back; the tug driver informed me that the tow bar shear pin had broken.  This had occurred in a benign and gentle manner; without any perceivable noise or vibration on the flight deck; or abnormal movement of the aircraft.   I set the parking brake and called ZZZ line maintenance.  I explained the situation; and asked if this required an inspection or logbook entry (we were on a MAX) and was told 'no' on both counts.  My first officer looked up 'tow bar breakage' in the FOM; and read to me the section that states 'an info only write up shall be made and the flight may continue as long as no aircraft damage is suspected'.  Unfortunately; that paragraph applies to the 737-NG; but not the MAX.  The aircraft should have been inspected; a discrepancy written up in the logbook; and subsequently signed off.Maybe a reminder in the form of a bulletin; for both pilots and mechanics; or a brief mention in the next quarterly CBT (Computer Based Training) to emphasize the difference in policy for the MAX.

Captain reported a broken shear pin on the tow bar during push back and was incorrectly advised that a log book entry was not required by maintenance.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

When Number 1 for takeoff we were given a 10 minute takeoff window. We delayed a bit to recalculate some takeoff data then proceeded to takeoff. The PIC (Pilot in Command) was handling the clearance and radios. We thought we were still in the 10 minute window but later found that ATC thought we were 2 minutes past our void time. After takeoff we experienced an unsafe gear indication with a red Gear Fault light; also we showed a Hydraulic Press annunciator and a Stab problem light. We kept trying to contact Departure on the radio then finally determined that we had COMM 1 radio failure. When we finally got ZZZ1 on COMM 2 and then we received priority and requested a return to ZZZ. We ran the emergency checklist and were able to get the gear down and locked which also apparently fixed the associated hydraulic problems with the stabilator. We then landed at ZZZ. I feel that the late contact with ATC from which they may have deduced a void time departure was due to the abnormally long time from takeoff until radio contact. Obviously the long time was due to multiple emergencies and NORDO on COMM 1.When given a controlled takeoff: Write it down in Zulu time and confirm this Zulu time with ATC to ensure we are all on the same page; looking at the same Valid time.

This report is for Aircraft X. This landing gear [situation] during initial climb-out from ZZZ at dusk was coupled with a COMM 1 radio failure and possible late takeoff (after clearance void time). I was the PF (Pilot Flying) for this event.Prior to takeoff; we were issued a clearance void 'if not off in 10 minutes' clearance from ZZZ1 Approach (via cellphone call). Both myself & my trainee (Captain in training) thought we were within the 10 minute time frame. We were informed post-flight that in fact we had departed 2 minutes late.After takeoff; and call of 'positive rate' by my PM (Pilot Monitoring); I called for 'Gear UP.' He subsequently raised the gear. The 3 green gear indicator lights extinguished normally. However; the red UNLOCK indicator light remained illuminated. At this time; I started the turn toward our assigned after-departure heading of 090 & continued the climb to our departure assigned altitude of 5;000 feet MSL. I requested the PM to contact Departure. I purposely kept the aircraft at 160 knots during this maneuver since we had not raised the flaps due to concentrating on the gear [situation]. The PM was unsuccessful on COMM 1 in contacting ATC (ZZZ1 Departure). We then realized we were NORDO on the COMM 1 radio. I then tried them on COMM 2 via [frequency] & their Approach frequency of [frequency1]. I was successful on the COMM 2 radio & [received priority] due to unsafe gear indication; hydraulic pressure & stab mis-compare annunciations/malfunctions. Then the PM took the radios back. By this time; we were heading 090 & level at 5;000 feet MSL. We remained at 160 knots since the gear was still indicating UNLOCKed & the flaps remained at our takeoff setting of 7 degrees.Subsequently; we completed the appropriate 'Landing Gear Will Not Retract' checklist; & requested vectors for landing via ILS XX ZZZ. Thereafter; we landed without incident with a normal approach & landing.Landing Gear would not retract normally after takeoff during initial climbout & COM 1 radio inoperative.To prevent late takeoffs at an uncontrolled field (such as ZZZ) after Clearance Void Time issuance; insert a step in the checklist / SOPs to WRITE DOWN the actual clearance void TIME & require SIC (Second in Command) (PM) verify that exact TIME BEFORE brakes released takeoff.

CE-560 flight crew reported loss of multiple systems after takeoff resulting in a return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 21000; Flight Crew Type 737

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Flight attendants asked passenger to wear mask.  Initially complied but kept removing mask.  Called for Customer Service.  Customer Service agent asked passenger to wear mask.  Passenger removed mask as soon as agent walked away.  Customer Service Supervisor called.  Passenger removed.

Air carrier Captain reported a passenger was removed from flight due to non compliance with face mask policy.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

General Declared Emergency; General Evacuated

Approximately 15 NM from ZZZ and deviating through a line of thunderstorms; we smelled an odor of electrical burning. I called the flight attendant to check the cargo compartment; she called back that she didn't see anything in the cargo compartment but there was a strong odor of an electrical burning smell in the galley area. We [advised ATC] and elected to continue to [our destination] instead of returning. I sent an ACARS message to Dispatch [of our situation]; contacted ATC and requested direct to [our destination]. We called company on inbound frequency and informed them of the nature of our emergency. We informed the flight attendant the TESTS information. We told ATC we were going to stop on the runway; evacuate the passengers; and requested runway 13R. We did not complete AOM procedures as there wasn't enough flight time remaining needing to prepare for the approach; landing; and evacuation. The approach and landing were normal. We stopped on 13R and initiated the emergency evacuation. CFR was at the aircraft as we were stopping the aircraft; they had a ladder available and assisted deplaning. There were three minor injuries; none requested medical assistance. Passengers were corralled in the grass area next to the runway and returned to the terminal in buses.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

EMB-145 flight crew reported smelling an odor of electrical burning. They advised ATC of their situation and evacuated the aircraft after landing; resulting in several minor injuries.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 6100

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

We were being vectored from downwind to base for Runway YY. We were slowing preparing for a visual approach and I called for flaps 1. The pilot monitoring; First Officer; selected flaps 1. The LE SLAT DISAGREE EICAS message and light illuminated. We told the Tower and they gave us vectors around the airport so we could work the problem. I was the flying pilot. I called for the LE Slat Disagree Checklist and the First Officer worked the problem. We also verified the non normal landing distance for flaps less than full. We declared an emergency and asked for Runway XX because it was the longest. The Company was contacted via ACARS in the short time available about our emergency. We completed the non normal checklists and landed on Runway XX without incident. We were able to taxi on our own to the ramp without further assistance. We talked to the Crash First Rescue Commander on a discrete frequency and told him we no longer needed assistance. The non normal was written up in the logbook and maintenance was notified. The First Officer did a fantastic job of managing the checklist and situational awareness during a very busy phase of flight.

[Narrative 2 contained no additional information.]

A B757-200 LE SLAT DISAGREE EICAS alerted during landing preparations so an emergency was declared. During a vector delay the LE Slat Disagree Checklist was completed; followed by a normal landing.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

We were cleared for the visual XXR at ZZZ; on an extended left base for the runway. Descending around 5;000 feet; configuration of the airplane was FLAPS 22deg when the Landing Gear was Selected Down. At this moment we got the WARNING message 'LG/LEVER DISAGREE'; and the LDG GEAR nose gear dashed red indication instead of the green DN. My Captain called ATC to inform of the situation and that we had to abort the approach and get alternate instructions. At this moment I was still pilot flying. I disconnect AP and starting climbing and following ATC navigation instructions. My Captain asked for the QRH and started to run the QRH procedure for this warning message. We re-engaged the AP and when we were established on the altitude and heading per ATC instructions; the Captain finished this checklist which was leading to the next checklist which is Abnormal Landing Gear Extension. Consequently; the Captain ran the Abnormal Landing Extension QRH procedure; with no success to clear the Warning message. Therefore as guided by checklist; the Partial Or Gear Up Landing procedure was next. At this moment the captain took over the controls and was talking with ATC. He also informed the Cabin crew of the situation. At this point the Captain requested ATC to perform a low pass over the runways to confirm the nose gear position. I started to run the Partial or Gear Up Landing procedure. We got vectored back to the runway XXL for the low pass and ground personnel indicated that they see nose landing gear apparently down. After going around we were vectored back to the runway XXL. I continued on running [Partial Or Gear Up Landing] checklist. Radio calls were both made by captain and myself. Captain informed cabin crew and passengers of the situation. We were then cleared for landing on XXL with special Control Tower frequency. Emergency equipment was available and waiting for our potential nose gear collapse upon landing. We completed the before landing normal checklist and the Captain did a very smooth landing holding the nose gear up as much as possible. I controlled the thrust levers at 60 kt to stow the reversers. The nose gear did not collapse and the situation was under control. We taxied back on runway XXR with emergency trucks following us. Passengers deplaned and maintenance came over. Informed that the nose gear was not fully locked down. It was impossible to insert the nose gear pin.

ERJ-135 First Officer reported receiving a 'LG/LEVER DISAGREE' message on descent due to an apparent nose landing gear down lock issue.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

The First Officer was flying. We were turned right; off the GRNPA arrival; to a heading of around 280 and cleared the visual approach to Runway 01R in LAS (behind traffic). The vector took us directly over the top of Henderson airport. When descending through 5;100 the Controller said 'do not descend below the Class B (floor is 5;000 there).'Right after that we got a monitor vertical speed TCAS RA for an aircraft right below us over the Henderson airport. Within five seconds the Controller advised we were below her minimum vectoring altitude and 'correct your altitude immediately' or some words close to that. I may have the order of events wrong. All three events happened within about 20 seconds. We leveled off at 5;050 FT until turning inbound which put us a little high over GALNE the FAF for the RNAV 01R approach. Altitude over GALNE is depicted as 4;000. We were able to make a stabilized approach with flaps full. The fix outside GALNE is KIBSE and its altitude is 5;100 FT. Altitude wise we were right where we needed to be. Crews are not given Minimum Vector Altitude charts. Only the Controller has those. At no time was there any yellow or red showing on my terrain mapping which was on at the smallest possible scale. Nor was there ever a terrain call out from the GPWS. This night visual approach from the southeast is a bad idea when vectored over the Henderson airport; too much chance of an RA. No idea why the Controller felt we were too low for the terrain. I looked the next day on departure to the south and it looks flat to the west of that airport for at least a few miles. It is true that any terrain and obstacles are mostly unlighted but they are primarily southwest of Henderson when on a base leg. The terrain is irregular however.I think we need a charted RNAV visual approach built similar to the one built for Runways 19R/L. It should have suggested altitudes and speeds and configurations for each point (see the RNAV visual for 19R/L). In this way we remain clear of all terrain and do not conflict with their MVA chart. The charted base leg should be south of the Henderson airport traffic area. The aircraft will be on glideslope and on speed and everyone knows what to expect. I will no longer accept visuals approaches at night to those runways until a charted procedure is published. I will only accept the ILS 01L or the RNAV 01R. It is way too stressful to have 2 Controller warnings and a RA on a visual approach. Lets get an RNAV visual built to Runways 01L/R.

An A320 crew on a visual approach to Runway 1R at LAS was instructed not to descend below the floor of the Class B; encountered a TCAS RA for traffic at HND; and then were advised that they were below the minimum vectoring altitude and told to correct their altitude immediately. The reporter suggests night visuals from the southeast over HND are a bad idea.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

We were on a visual approach to runway XYC at ZZZ. We were told to maintain 180 KIAS and contact tower at the FAF. About 2 miles before reaching the FAF; we were configured with only flaps 20 and became distracted by a Traffic Alert that looked very conflicting to our approach path. Once we contacted tower; we were advised of the helicopter traffic that was transitioning; and we finally were able to get a visual on the helicopter. However; I (pilot flying) made no attempt to continue configuring the airplane for landing during that time we were focused on the traffic alert. As we reached 1;000 feet AGL; I asked for the gear down and flaps 30. At 900 feet we were still at slowing from 170 KIAS with the gear still in transition and only flaps 30.I initiated the go-around and smoothly transitioned into a climb. At this point; tower was instructing us to turn right to a 220 heading and maintain 4;000 feet. I was hand flying (a mistake; in hindsight); and the First Officer (FO) was setting up the Flight Control Panel (FCP) for those parameters; all the while; never announcing a 'positive rate' call due to task saturation. At this point I called for the gear up and we were at approximately 200 KIAS with a positive trend vector. Due to the speed; our nose gear did not retract; so it was followed by a 'Gear Disagree' warning message. Our speed was approximately 210 KIAS. As soon as we slowed to 200 KIAS; the gear retracted and the message went away.We then continued back to ZZZ with a normal approach to landing.The event was primarily caused by a distraction at a critical phase of the approach.There is one factor that is normal for operations in ZZZ: a high speed assignment with a small window of time allowed to configure prior to 1;000 AGL. The coup de grace was the traffic alert at the most critical part of the approach; and my inattention to flying the airplane; but rather focusing on locating the traffic.There are two parts to my suggestions for preventing this situation.First; during the approach; I should have focused on flying; while delegating the FO to look for that traffic; being aware that in ZZZ; you only have about 800 feet to slow from 180 KIAS to and fully configured and final approach speed. Secondly; during the go around; I should have queried the gear up when the FO--who was already task saturated--forgot the 'positive rate' call.It is my VERY STRONG suggestion for management to change the 'positive rate' call to the Pilot Flying (as it used to be). Missing it by a task saturated Pilot Monitoring may have a tendency to snowball into further missed items.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported a go-around due to a late approach configuration while they looked for helicopter traffic.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Sea

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 11200; Flight Crew Type 5000

Distraction; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Workload

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Flying south of the Class C airspace; and under Class B airspace at about 1200 feet I got an ADS-B collision alert for an aircraft approaching from a 7 o'clock position. I adjusted course to increase separation. The other aircraft appeared to adjust its course to intercept mine as its altitude decreased towards mine. I adjusted course again to make mine almost 90 degrees to my original 270 heading. The aircraft's course depiction followed and appeared to be closing. I made a rapid descending 180 degree turn to visually locate the airplane. I immediately located the Cessna who did appear to be following me. After my turn and descent avoided risk of collision; the aircraft then turned north and entered Class C airspace. I noted my position was very close to the Class C boundary and immediately turned back away to avoid entering the airspace. I did not enter Class C but was uncomfortably close. As I proceeded to get further separation and continue in a generally westerly direction I noted the airplane turned again and appeared on a parallel path but at a higher altitude.  As it was faster it eventually passed heading towards another Class D airspace. This type of event has happened before; but rarely; when other aircraft seem to interested in the slow flying SeaRey. It seems to be happening with increasing frequency now that ADS-B is more commonly in use. The hazard of aircraft locating and inappropriately following other aircraft has not been addressed. Masking aircraft specific ADS-B information would eliminate some of the close curiosity encounters.

A pilot of a amphibious kit airplane reported another aircraft intentionally tried to fly towards them to look at their aircraft.


Pulled into gate shut down engines and aircraft went dark. The front and back totally due to the APU not being started. Also no dome light; no VHF #1 and APU would not start! Only battery off light came on #1 battery when both batteries were switched off then on! Alarm went off below in nose wheel well. The only light was IRS on battery light. Ground power was connected in about two to three minutes. The APU started normally and power was normal on the aircraft again. About an hour later the Captain called Maintenance Duty Manager and asked for tech support on the Airbus 330. They were advised of all of the above. He said would go back to the aircraft and write it up if they thought it needed to be done. He was put on hold and told aircraft had no history of electrical problems; no aircraft alerts or notifications and that a write up was not necessary. He said I am good with it if you are. He just wanted Maintenance to know if they thought it was a valid write-up. Maybe batteries never connected back to battery bus? Check electrical switching for faults.

An A330 lost all electrical power; including items that should operate on battery power only; when the engines were shut down without APU or ground power available. After ground power was connected and all electrical systems return to normal.


Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

[It was] a beautiful albeit very hot day. VMC descent from 13;000 to 8;000; south of LAS vectored off the KEPEC3 STAR we were just a few miles west of 0L7; Jean airport. Near CLARR; before KEPEC we were given a vector of 010. Next instruction from ATC was turn left 080; caution numerous gliders in the area (not exact verbiage). I began to turn left; perhaps 20 degrees; but as I was looking at our TCAS I indeed saw numerous (4 at least) targets at altitudes within 1;000 FT of ours. They appeared to all be climbing. I thought it a very poor idea to continue to 080 as that would put us head on with them and we were within 5 miles and closing; of them all as it was. My nearest threat I saw was on TCAS just off our left about 300 FT below us climbing into us about 2 miles away. I leveled off and turned back toward the right to 010. Next I continued our descent. We were at 11;000. We communicated this change to ATC. Next I saw visually a glider on our right that was not showing up at all on TCAS; but was quite clear out the windscreen. He was approximately 300 FT below and about 500 FT horizontally and turning hard left; to miss us I presume. I could see that we would not impact so stayed our course and descent profile so I could perhaps be a predictable target to any other gliders in the area. We continued into LAS and landed. I will guess that the glider we got close to may have seen us earlier and thought because we were turning to the east continued along his path initially. When I chose to turn away from all the traffic on my left and came back to the right where we had previously been; the non squawking glider probably made an evasive maneuver to miss us. I am quite shocked that it would be normal operating procedure to vector an aircraft into the path of known and squawking glider traffic. The vectored 080 heading and the descending clearance would have kept us in a dangerous position whereas a cautious; maybe more conservative vector north could have kept all aircraft in a much safer position. I do think that in this particular event the non squawking glider that was indeed the real threat to us was not a byproduct of anything ATC did. We were all operating legally and when in VMC; see and avoid is everyone's responsibility. However routing air traffic through known glider operations areas makes zero sense to me. Does ATC warning of numerous gliders in the area at our altitude make the consequences any less damaging? It is a terrible shame that ATC has their hands tied regarding ride-alongs. They are much needed and need to be brought back the way it was prior to 9/11. Get them in the cockpits so they can see what the reality of their instructions really are.

An A319 Captain on the LAS KEPEC3 near CLARR Intersection reported taking evasive action from a series of gliders while descending VMC from 13;000 FT to 8;000 FT. Some gliders had transponders; some not.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 28

Troubleshooting; Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

This is a known event reported by the Tower Front Line Manager (FLM) using an internal worksheet for aircraft identification problems (attached). In this instance; two aircraft with identical call signs (Aircraft X); one an arrival and one a departure were airborne at the same time.This is the third such occurrence this month by [airline name removed] at IAD (in addition to 8 others since [date removed]). Each has been reported to FSDO; The airline. Feedback from the Principle Operations Inspector (POI) is that there is a difficult relationship between the FAA and this airline and since no regulation has been violated; the FAA cannot do an enforcement action against them.  Meanwhile; this unsafe situation continues.Please review the attachments.  You have my permission to share this report.1)  Airlines must be held accountable for educating their dispatchers to change call signs of the outbound leg if the inbound has not yet arrived. We don't see duplicate call signs with the major air carriers. Why can't the dispatchers for the regional carriers perform to the same standards? A simple fix; change the outbound flight's call sign to Aircraft X-A. If a regulation needs to be made; then let's write one.2) Another FSDO's APOI for [different airline] has had success in getting that airline to modifiy their procedures to prevent duplicate IDs.  [This other] Dispatch manager has offered to help Aircraft X's Airline with the issue. The Other FSDO APOI is also pursuing other avenues with his airline contacts.  Even as I write this; I've just heard where reporting FSDO had a telcon with [airline of Aircraft X] on this issue yesterday.  Aircraft X Airline is reaching out to [the other airline] to see if their procedure will work for them.3) Both TWR and RDR teams handled this situation very well; pre-empting a stop on departures.

IAD support specialist reports of a flight inbound and outbound to/from IAD that is using the same call sign at the same time. He reports this has been happening for over 7 months and nothing has been done about it.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Aircraft X was departing an uncontrolled airport. There were several VFR aircraft flying in the vicinity. Ceilings were approximately 2;500 ft. Winds were 130/09. All of our airports were operating in an east configuration. Aircraft X was departing and climbing out. I noticed what appeared to be an unidentified VFR aircraft established on the ILS for the opposite direction runway. I called traffic to the departing aircraft. They did not see the opposite direction inbound. I turned the departure to a 180 heading below the MVA to avoid a mid-air collision as the climb and descent rates of both aircraft were comparable and would have both been at approximately 1;500 ft. at the same place and time. The departure turned and continued to climb without incident. I questioned the pilot on whether the VFR aircraft had made any announcement of their position and intentions on the UNICOM frequency. The pilot stated he heard no announcements. The VFR aircraft never changed course which led me to believe he was not aware of the departure. I tried to raise the VFR aircraft on the guard frequency as it continued practice approaches; but was unsuccessful.

TRACON controller reported vectoring an aircraft below MVA to avoid conflict with a VFR aircraft not on frequency.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 820

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 10

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Distraction

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Air Traffic Control

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On approach to PNE using the RNAV (GPS) Runway 6 approach we mistakenly started descent from WAMCA instead of JUNIA which was the final approach fix. The Controller issued a low altitude alert and that was followed by the GPWS terrain warning. The pilot not flying called out that we have not reached JUNIA yet and I initiated a climb. Upon reaching JUNIA we descended to the Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) and continued the approach. Upon seeing the airport visually we were too high to execute a safe landing and went missed approach. On the return we executed the ILS Runway 24 approach and landed.

On the RNAV (GPS) Runway 6 approach at PNE we descended to the Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) prior to the FAF. Human factors issues to include; lack of awareness; distraction; and lack of assertiveness played a role. ATC was queried and the approach continued to a missed approach. Factors affecting quality of human performance included lack of proficiency; knowledge; and stress.

CE-650 flight crew reported they received a low altitude alert from ATC and a Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) terrain warning when they descended below charted altitude on the RNAV GPS approach to PNE.