Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 26

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Denver Sector X handed us off two aircraft at the same altitude on collision courses at FL350 with no positive separation ensured. Aircraft X checked on at FL350 south east bound. The aircraft that was slightly behind at FL350; Aircraft Y; was not on our frequency and he needed to be turned to avoid loss of separation. We reached out to Denver Sector Y to instruct him to turn Aircraft Y to the left (apparently Denver X took a point out) and Denver Y said he was no longer talking to that aircraft. We broadcasted in the blind for Aircraft Y. We had to turn Aircraft Y while still in Denver Center's airspace to ensure separation! Without the turn Aircraft Y would have lost separation one minute inside our airspace! This is a daily occurrence that has been going on for 30 plus years but seldom gets reported because of a lack of safety culture.

ZMP Controller reported an unsafe situation when Denver Center handed off two aircraft on a collision course.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 111; Flight Crew Total 11800; Flight Crew Type 1200

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Maintenance

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Upon landing following our first leg we observed an HPSOV EICAS message. Maintenance was alerted and [they deferred the] Right Thrust Reverser to allow continuation of flight. After departing; [trans-Atlantic] enroute to our stateside destination (while approximately 450 NM west); we received an ACARS message from our Dispatcher requesting we contact him immediately via SATCOM. Upon contacting Flight Control; we were directed to land immediately; due to a discrepancy with the deferral regarding the HPSOV EICAS message. We were informed that due to the potential discrepancy; there was a risk that the thrust reverser could deploy in flight. The Dispatcher suggested landing at ZZZZ; having done an analysis of the situation in advance of our contact. It was agreed that would be an acceptable airport; an emergency was declared with ATC; a turn made in the direction of the alternate; and center tank fuel was jettisoned. CFR was standing by; and an uneventful overweight landing (~342;000 pounds) was made approximately 40 minutes later.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

When Maintenance determined the B767-300 flight was dispatched in a condition contrary to the deferred item procedure for a HPSOV EICAS warning the flight reversed course over the Atlantic and made a timely; overweight landing at a convenient alternate.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

After completing an instrument flight training lesson we returned to the airport for landing and I demonstrated the RNAV Instrument Approach to my student. Normally; I would allow my student to land the aircraft but I elected to land the airplane myself because there was a direct crosswind of 15-25 knots being reported at the airport's surface. The approach and landing occurred without incident. However; after landing the aircraft and receiving instruction from ATC to vacate the runway; I realized that the airplane's left brake had failed. I subsequently was unable to taxi clear of [the] runway due to the aircraft's inability to slow down enough to make the turnoff. I then chose to continue rolling to [the next] taxiway where I again attempted to vacate the runway by making the left turn. The aircraft was slowed sufficiently to turn but upon applying the rudder; it did not turn enough to stay clear of the edge of the taxiway. I managed to bring the aircraft to a full stop by applying full back pressure to the yoke; essentially using the elevator as an air brake. The aircraft came to a rest on the edge of the taxiway. I was unable to make a right turn due to the aircraft's proximity to a taxiway light on the right side. I decided to shut down the aircraft and request assistance from airport operations. Due to the aircraft being disabled on the edge of the runway; [the] runway was closed for approximately 15 minutes; until my student and I were able to manually push the aircraft clear.

C172 instructor pilot reported he was unable to clear the runway as the left brake had locked up during landing roll.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

On landing/nose wheel touch down; AC pulled hard right; when max or near max opposite rudder was applied with little effect and AC still diverging right; nose wheel steering was disengaged. AC was returned to center line with rudder and differential brakes. At very slow speed we cleared the runway onto a high speed; stopped; and were towed to the gate. Fix the known nose wheel steering issues with the fleet.

EMB145 Captain experiences aircraft pulling to the right when the nose wheel is lowered to the runway after landing. When full rudder deflection is found to be ineffective the nose wheel steering is disengaged and control is regained. After stopping the aircraft is towed to the gate.


Helicopter X was 5 miles west of the field and requested a northwest arrival to the terminal. I approved the arrival and restricted a helicopter at or above 2;500 for traffic 10 miles north inbound to Runway 8; the B717 descending though 2;500. Helicopter Y was also 5 west of the field requesting a northwest arrival. I told him to follow his company and gave him the same restriction; he said he had his company in sight. Helicopter Y then asked to change to a west arrival and I approved that. Then Helicopter X asked to also change to a west arrival and I approved that. At this point Helicopter Y was number 1 to the field and Helicopter X was number 2. I failed to tell them this. From out the window it didn't look like a factor. Helicopter Y later said that his company passed right overhead and asked if there was a sequence. I should have let everybody know the sequence instead of just assuming that Helicopter X had his company in sight and knew what the plan was.

Tower Controller described a conflict event when failing to insure the planned sequence was provided to pattern traffic.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 19

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

I had climbed Aircraft X to 41;000 ft. and handed him off to the next sector. I went on to some other tasks. When I came back; Aircraft X was still handing off and about 2 1/2 or less from their airspace. I called them on the six line immediately for a handoff; and they would not answer or take the handoff. I heard them saying; 'We're on the four line.' I had the high altitude sectors at the lows; and the landline keys are in different spots than what we are accustomed to when the highs are open in their usual location. Because of this; I was more concerned about them answering me on the line I called them on; which they could hear just fine; rather than look back down at the VSCS and now try to find the 4 line. Just then; I saw a limited data block at 41;000 ft. who appeared to be traffic in their airspace; so I got off the line and stopped my aircraft's climb to 40;000 ft. and got back on the line for a handoff that they still wouldn't take. Finally; I got them on the line and they said; 'Stop him at FL370;' and then they took the handoff; after the aircraft had updated into their airspace. About 2 minutes later; I had another aircraft that had been handing off to them which got 2 minutes flying time from their boundary. I called them for a handoff on this aircraft. When they answered; they responded; 'That's a little early to be calling on that.'I had asked if we did something to upset them and explained the two minute from the boundary rule we attempt to not go past before calling for a handoff. They didn't respond. To me; they were clearly not being professional. During the shift yesterday; I had called for a D-side (Assist) due to those sectors not taking handoffs or answering the landlines during moderately busy traffic. I did not have a D-side during today's incident.

Center Controller reported the adjacent sector intentionally delayed in accepting a handoff causing the Controller to have an airspace deviation.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

While on descent; I tuned in the ATIS early as there was known weather in the area. Upon receiving the ATIS I commented on how low it was 29.39. Descending I dialed the altimeter into the standby at which time we received an excessive amount of radio static due to weather (common problem in this aircraft while in clouds). We switched radios and although a small adjustment; it does take some getting used to. We had received deviations around weather; altitude changes; heading changes; and due to the radio that was acting up; it became a high work load. Somewhere in there I had switched on the lights; we ran our flows; and then did the checklist. Moving forward; we were given 3;000 until established; then a frequency change at which point the Controller read the altimeter for good measure as 30.39 or so I heard (I do not know at this point) and so I read back the frequency and altimeter setting of 30.39 which also happened to be our flight number. The Controller said nothing and we switched frequencies. At this point we could see the ground and were both starting to get the sense something was not right. Our radar altimeters were reading wrong as we approached and we were trying to figure out what it was when we received a gear warning that matched the RA that was reading wrong. ATC then asked us if we had been advised of a low altitude alert by the previous guy which we had not. He then started to read the altimeter when we realize that although it was set correctly in the standby; somehow we had both set the primaries to 30.39 instead of 29.39 missed it despite the checklist. We immediately corrected our altitude and there were no further issues; nor any conflicts.If something does not feel or sound right should always query ATC. When I read back the altimeter and flight number is sounded odd to me and I though it was simply because they were the same.

While on descent we were handed off to another ATC frequency and the Controller stated the altimeter setting was 30.39. Shortly there after we were cleared to 3;000 FT for the ILS; when we leveled off at 3;000 we received a too low gear warning and noticed the radar altimeter was at 1;100. At that time ATC advised us of a low altitude alert and that the altimeter setting was 29.39 not 30.39. The setting was corrected and we climbed to the proper altitude and landed. How often is your flight number the altimeter setting too? With thunderstorms in the vicinity of the airport my concern was getting the aircraft on the ground before the weather impacted the field. We should have verified the altimeter setting with the next Controller since it was similar to our call sign.

Air Carrier flight crew reports getting their flight number and the altimeter setting confused during descent resulting in descent 1;000 FT below assigned altitude. The error is detected by ATC and a GPWS flap warning nearly simultaneously.


Pilot Flying; Relief Pilot; First Officer

Relief Pilot; Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

A little over 6 hours into flight a hot electrical smell suddenly occurred in the cabin (mainly forward cabin). The pilots on break; flight attendants; and passengers were aware of the problem. We received a call to the cockpit and told of the situation while the crew began investigating the source and shutting down electrical systems. In the cockpit we checked weather for alternates and started Smoke and Fumes Checklist. The associated smoke and smell began to dissipate. Entire crew convened in the cockpit; checklists were completed. The company notified. Maintenance Control; through onboard telemetry; notified us that a recirc fan was indicating a problem. The recirc fans were secured when we accomplished the Smoke and Fumes Checklist.  An uneventful precautionary landing was made. Approximately 65;000 LBS fuel dumped in order to land below 460;000 gross weight (we landed at 458;000 LBS). ATC was notified of start and stop dump times. An emergency was not officially declared however once we asked for altitude relief on the STAR in order to stay as high as possible during dumping ATC began to refer to us as an emergency aircraft and ask us for souls on board. Passengers remained on board after landing. Aircraft was redispatched on MEL for recirc fan and flight completed.

Takeoff plus 5 hours; cabin crew detected a hot electrical smell along with a haze in the cabin around Business Class. Captain returned to cockpit and flight crew accomplished the Smoke; Fire or Fumes Checklist from the QRH. After turning off the RECIRC FANS switches per checklist fumes started to dissipate. Finished the checklist and Captain decided to divert to [an airport] which was about an hour away. Flight crew concurred. Contacted Dispatch to coordinate our diversion and contacted ATC for fuel dumping and diversion. Dumped fuel to below maximum landing weight (460;000 LBS) and First Officer made the landing. Maintenance determined cause was overheating RECIRC fan.

B777 flight crew and flight attendants detect smoke five hours into a flight to Asia. QRH procedures are complied with; the likely source (a recirculation fan) is determined and the flight diverts to a suitable airport after dumping fuel down to maximum landing weight. The fan failure is confirmed and the flight continues to destination with the fan on MEL.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 315; Flight Crew Type 14000

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 26; Flight Crew Type 2000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

Inoperative APU; second flight of the day; on time;  started the number one engine at gate; cleared equipment; pushed from the gate; asked for taxi to remote area for crossbleed start of number two engine. Stopping at designated location; the aircraft began to slightly shimmy under braking. I stopped braking then applied brakes again; shimmy did not happen again so I set the parking brake. I then grabbed the number one engine start lever and began to shut the number one engine down. Realizing what I was doing; I quickly returned it to the previous position but the engine had already shut down. We were now on battery power. I told the Flight Attendants to remain seated; then told ATC we would need a tow back to the gate and we had one radio and would need to go off frequency to coordinate with Operations. We turned IRS one and two off; and tried to explain to the Passengers what had happened. We were back at the gate in approximately 10 minutes. Started the engine and did the procedure properly the second time. The remainder of the flight was uneventful.I guess I would say it was muscle memory; the same motion as arriving at a gate; number two engine shut down; Parking brake set. I should be more deliberate in all of my actions; but it happened so fast that the FO did not even have time to react. The brake shimmy was a distraction; but that does not excuse me from my action.

This was a mistake. I didn't expect to see it once; I don't expect to see it again.

A B737-700 Captain intending to crossbleed start #2 engine from #1 bleed air; instead shut down #1 engine. With the APU inoperative; the aircraft was towed back to the gate for a second start.


Flight Attendant In Charge; Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

After takeoff; as Flight Attendant #1; I got a call from cockpit around or at 10;000 ft. about fumes/odor. He made an all call. The 2 and 4 [flight attendants] smelled something and stated they felt dizzy. They stated they all had headaches; which I said I also had gotten since we took off. I recognized the scent as something from the chemicals that maintenances uses on the aircraft on the ground; like deicing in the engines or a chemical burning off. The captain stated they were also smelling it in the cockpit. The Captain stated we'd be going back to ZZZ at that point. No passengers complained until arriving in ZZZ (they were both crew members dead heading; which noticed and recognized the original scent). Upon final descent and after preparation for landing; while strapped in my jumpseat; my throat started to feel like it was getting very irritated and scratchy. I also started to feel very light headed and dizzy; almost lethargic. My headache remained and increased in intensity. We landed and de-planed. Management met the flight; but we continued to be on the aircraft. As I did my final walk through; I notice the odor/fumes were extremely strong between the 3 LR and 4 LR doors. They burned my throat and caused me to feel like I wanted to cough. Catering came to 4L and opened the door; which dissipated the odor/fumes in the cabin. The crew de-plane the aircraft. We were escorted to Operations where we calls the on call nurse; Who referred us to an emergency room. Myself and the three other flight attendants receive treatment in the emergency room and were released. Suggestions: There should be a set protocol for an immediate lab test for specific blood gasses; levels of certain chemicals and toxins. We were stalled and left in the fumes with deplaning and calling unnecessary nurses when we were seeking treatment no matter what. The Airbus needs an investigation on these fume/odor events. This was my first and it was extremely frightening. I felt like I was almost having decompression symptoms with the light headedness.

Captain called after takeoff; before the 10;000 ft. sterile chime and asked if I smelled fumes or odor in the cabin. I said yes. I recognized the smell as deicing or fuel. It was something I'd smelled before either burning off in the engines on the ground; but never in flight. He called back and said we were returning to ZZZ. We were in flight for less than an hour. No passengers complained or let us know if symptoms at the time. As we prepared for landing; and strapped into our jump seats; something in the air whether it be a fume or odor; I couldn't tell; started to irritate my throat; cause the headache that has started at pushback to increase in intensity and I felt almost euphoric or like I was light headed. The symptoms continued as we deplaned. On final walk-through of the cabin; I noticed there was an odor/fumes in the rear of the cabin between the third and fourth cabin doors. It burned my throat and mouth causing me to feel like I want to cough and upon Catering opening the 4L door; The odor/fume dissipated. The crew of four flight attendants reported the incident to local management and or taken to the emergency room to be tested for carbon monoxide poisoning.

A321 Flight Attendant reported a cabin fumes event during initial climb resulting in health issues.


Installation; Repair; Testing; Work Cards

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Confusion; Workload; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Fatigue; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

In troubleshooting an IDG problem; I swapped Generator Control Unit (GCU1) with GCU2 on Aircraft X; a B737-700. After changing the Integrated Drive Generator (IDG) and running the engine for the Operational Check; I went on to another problem on this aircraft. The Water Tank was on MEL and needed to be changed. At the end of every night I always check the Electrical Equipment (E/E) doors. Last night I remember closing the E/E door on this plane. That bothered me all day. I came in to work tonight and remembered the GCU troubleshooting. I'm not 100% positively sure that I secured or swapped back the GCU's. Human factor: Last week I called in sick for a cold/flu. I still have this stubborn cold but I came into work this week anyway. I remember that the workload for the night was just two Overnight Checks with a Water Tank change. But Aircraft X came in later [than expected] and I was distracted with having to troubleshoot an IDG problem before changing the [Water] tank. It turned into a very long night. I think if I were not sick that I would have been thinking more clearly. I think I could have avoided this problem all together if I had felt better. Next time I will make sure that I'm physically fit for work.

Reporter stated he was working a B737-700 aircraft that was scheduled for an Overnight Check with a water tank change. But the aircraft had come in later than expected with an unexpected #2 Engine Integrated Generator Drive (IDG) that had been disconnected in flight. He had swapped GCU1 and GCU2 in the E/E compartment as part of his trouble shooting to isolate the electrical problem; than left the E/E compartment leaving the light on and the access door open; planning to return to unswap the GCUs.Reporter stated the last thing he does before he leaves an aircraft after performing maintenance is to close the E/E door. He noticed the E/E light was still on; but he was not feeling well; was very tired and just never associated the light being on with work he had not completed after changing the # 1 Engine IDG; so he closed the E/E door and went home. The GCUs were repositioned to their proper GCU1 and GCU2 position in the E/E compartment after he notified his Supervisor. No incidents occurred that he is aware of.

A Line Mechanic forgot to reposition Generator Control Unit-1 (GCU1) and GCU2 back to their proper position in the E/E compartment of a B737-700 aircraft. He had swapped the two GCU units during trouble shooting of a # 1 Engine Integrated Drive Generator (IDG) failure.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 409; Flight Crew Type 12500

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airport; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Upon landing I was instructed by Ground to taxi to the deice area. Abeam the deice area; heading east a series of Blue Taxiway lights; highlighting the north side; made it unclear as to entry and exit points. There was no clear signage. Some of the taxiway lights seemed embedded (L-850C) and some appeared on standard light poles (L-861T). L-861T can be as high as 14 inches. Fixture heights are specified as late as AC 150/5345-46. With no exit and exit indicators; no green guide lights; and yellow lines appearing to turn into blue lights we decided not to enter. There was no congestion issue as it was late and Ground allowed us to fully taxi around counter clockwise to our new gate. Blue lights are edge lighting and taxiing over them and between them just doesn't make sense. That whole area needs to be redesigned for night operations to include entry point signage; wide entry points; and configured with L-850C with Controller instructions that they are embedded and crossable. If Winter Operations are the concern; 14 inch lights are fine; but again; clear and wide entry points need to be defined on the 10-9 which I assume are on the east or west ends. That too should be put into the 10-9 page. This area creates hesitation with blue edge lights. I explained this to the Ground Controller and apologized for my reluctance to enter and he was understanding; once I explained my hesitancy with blue lighting and unclear signs; and yellow line confusion; etc.

Air carrier Captain reported taxiway lighting and signage at BWI airport is confusing and hard to define at night.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Toilet Smoke; Overheat; Fire Detectors & Warning

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

I was the pilot flying and my First Officer was the Pilot Monitoring.  We departed with normal procedures and call-outs. At 400 feet I; as Pilot Flying; commanded 'Heading Mode.'  At approximately 700 feet I was alerted to a Master Caution light and a LAV SMOKE DET annunciation. I was able to hear the lavatory smoke detector and was then promptly contacted by the flight attendants regarding the alarm.  Passing 1000 feet I called for 'Flaps Up. Climb Power. VNAV.' Once this was accomplished; I stated that I had the aircraft and radios and asked my First Officer to Run the QRH for LAV SMOKE DET annunciator.  I [advised] Approach Control and requested a return to the airfield.  The First officer completed the QRH procedure and the Return Checklist while we were on a left downwind leg for a visual approach. I contacted the Tower and was cleared for landing.At some point on final approach; the LAV SMOKE DET annunciator went out and the audible alarm coming from the lavatory ceased. All crew members in both the cabin and cockpit smelled the smoke.  We confirmed that we were below our landing weight limitation and then I called for the gear to be lowered and the Landing Check accomplished. We landed without incident and taxied clear.We deplaned normally and had the fire department inspect the lavatory specifically and the rest of the aircraft generally.Flight attendants informed me that they saw a haze of smoke during the LAVATORY SMOKE DET. Unfortunately this is my second [situation] with this aircraft. The last time I flew this aircraft I had a slightly dissimilar smoke in the cabin event.My previous event occurred in 2015 and can be found in the aircraft logbook.  Another cabin smoke event occurred in the same month and can also be found in aircraft Logbook.

During climb the crew was alerted to a Master Caution light and a LAV SMOKE DET annunciation. The Crew was able to hear the lavatory smoke detector.


Airport; Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

After being cleared for the Visual Approach we were tracking direct level at 2;600 feet when we received TERRAIN TERRAIN PULL UP one time. I immediately disengaged the autopilot however we were in clear; visual conditions; I decided to remain level because I had visual clearance from all obstacles. I had the terrain radar displayed and no threats were observed. The aircraft only annunciated once and then the GPWS warning cleared. We continued and made a normal visual approach backed by the ILS. We never observed any terrain or obstacle threats around the aircraft however; this airport is in very mountainous terrain. In the future when on visuals similar to this I will remain higher until closer to the airport especially at night. If I had remained at 5000 feet which was our previous cleared altitude and delayed our descent I could have prevented this annunciation.

[Report narrative contains no additional information]

A Flight Crew reported receiving a GPWS warning during a Visual Approach but continued since they had the terrain in sight and were stable.


PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 84; Flight Crew Total 1047; Flight Crew Type 417

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Took off and within 30 seconds had a sudden loss of engine power and was forced to execute an emergency landing which was uneventful. No persons or property was damaged.

PA-46 pilot reported a loss of engine power that resulted in a return to the field.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 239; Flight Crew Type 6000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Declared Emergency

We executed a go-around while approaching to land after getting an 'Airspeed Low' Warning and stick shaker. Both the First Officer (pilot not flying) and I noticed a brief illumination of the LE Flap in Transit light. We consulted the QRH and performed the procedures for a flaps 15 landing. OPC data indicated a safe landing; and we asked for clearance to land. While configured at flaps 15 and landing gear down on speed; we received the same warning and stick shaker at 500 FT AGL and performed another go-around. I flew the aircraft and the pilot not flying contacted Maintenance for additional guidance. I advised ATC we were low fuel and needed a close in vector to perform the QRH procedure. ATC was congested and I declared a fuel emergency to get expedited handling back to the airport. I called the Flight Attendants and told them to prepare the cabin; but we expected not to evacuate the cabin. We computed OPC data for a flaps 15 landing and flew an uneventful approach and landing. Both pilot flying and pilot not flying were task saturated with ATC and Dispatch while performing QRH procedures. Had our fuel state been not as critical; I would have briefed the flight attendants more thoroughly.

The Captain did another go-around and after getting established at 3;000 FT MSL; I used VHF 2 to talk to Maintenance to see if they had any suggestions to assist us with the problem. He mentioned a possible sensor failure that could trigger the indications we received. Due to low fuel the Captain declared an emergency. We ran the checklist again and flew an uneventful flap 15 approach with normal flap indications. After landing the Captain advised the passengers that everything was okay and to stay seated. We taxied to the gate and shut down normally. Fuel at shutdown was 2.9. The most disconcerting thing about this situation was the Airspeed Low and stick shaker warnings. The checklist does not mention anything about getting these after you comply with checklist procedures and attempt a flaps 15 landing.

B737-700 flight crew reported stick shaker and 'Airspeed Low' warnings on approach. After a go-around and completion of procedure another approach was executed; where the stick shaker was again alive; triggering another go-around. A third approach was successfully completed.


Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While climbing through 8000 feet ATC issued a traffic advisory for aircraft that would be leveling at 11;000; 1;000 feet above our assigned altitude. I looked at VSI and noticed that we were climbing at about 2600 feet/min and advised the First Officer (FO) that he need to reduce the climb rate.At 8700 feet EGPWS issued a traffic TA. At 8;900 feet I told the FO that he needed to level off at 10;000 and that there was 1;000 feet left to climb. Aircraft was climbing at 2;000 feet/min. FO acknowledged callout.At about 9;500 EGPWS issued an RA for 'Monitor Vertical Speed.' FO put the aircraft flight director into the green bars and held the aircraft steady reducing climb rate to about 1;000 feet/min. At 9;900 feet told the FO he need to level off now as his climb rate was increasing. At 10;050 aircraft was still climbing with VS increasing. Verified the FO's altimeter was indicating the same at which point I told the FO was flying through his assigned altitude and needed to stop the climb.At 10;100 I took positive action on the flight controls and pushed the nose of the aircraft down to arrest the climb and return to the assigned altitude. Aircraft reached a max altitude of 10;200 feet.FO stated that he was solely focused on the RA advisory command bars and maintaining the flight director in the correct portion.Fixation on RA commands and loss of awareness of current altitude by the FO. Lack of First Officers total time in High Performance Aircraft.More complicated TA/RA simulator training for new hires that simulate actual conditions of flight with assigned level offs. Current training focuses on other aircraft making the mistake and does not address how a crew member may put the aircraft into this situation.

EMB175 Captain reported he had to take control of the aircraft during climb out when the First Officer failed to level off for traffic above their altitude.


Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 21000; Flight Crew Type 430

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Shortly after main gear touchdown; nose gear touchdown was made where upon the nose gear leg broke and departed airplane. Touchdown on both mains and nose was normal. Aircraft slid on its nose to a stop on the runway. Engine shutdown and pilot and passenger exited airplane. No injuries. Local people on airport arrived within 5 minutes and assisted pilot with towing airplane to parking area on ramp. Nose tire; fork; and partial leg were intact and retrieved from runway approximately 500 feet from where the airplane stopped.

During what appeared to be a normal landing; after the main and nose landing gear touchdown; the nose gear collapsed and detached from the aircraft.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Aircraft was hit by a runaway baggage cart and ferried to ZZZ1. The special flight permit was written to operate unpressurized and in non RVSM airspace but the aircraft was never downgraded to NON-RVSM.GMM X.XX.X under the Maintenance Control department; Note: If discrepancy prevents CAT II or RVSM operation; apply the applicable [autoland minimum] and/or RVSM MELs.I talked to the mechanics who returned from the road trip about why the aircraft wasn't downgraded to NON-RVSM and they told me Maintenance Control didn't say anything about that.Just to be clear; the aircraft did not operate in RVSM airspace; it was just never downgraded to NON-RVSM. The MELs should have been issued by Maintenance Control and told the mechanics to enter it in the log book and downgrade the aircraft.

EMB-175 pilot reported that aircraft was not downgraded correctly after ground damage to the RVSM area.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 8300; Flight Crew Type 1500

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

ATIS called wind 330 at 3 KTS. We were landing on Runway 7R trailing a B737 (unknown which model i.e.: 700; 800) that was landing on Runway 7L. I would say we were about 1 mile in trail. At around 700 FT MSL we started to encounter what we are fairly certain was wake turbulence from the B737. We changed our approach path to fly higher; and we were clear of the turbulence until around 50 FT above touchdown; within the first 1/4 of Runway 7R. At that point we encountered fairly strong wake and almost elected to go around. I believe that we were allowed to trail too close to the B737; on the parallel runway with the light winds blowing the wake towards us. Prevention: possibly look into the amount of wake the newer larger models of B737 are creating; and of course increase the space between aircraft of our class and those.

LJ35 Captain reported wake vortex encounter in trail of a B737 on arrival to ANC;and suggested that more in trail spacing was a good idea.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

During descent/arrival stage of our flight; I briefed the LOC 27 Approach and advised my First Officer that I would be fully configured to land at CIJHI well before the FAF of REEBO due to the steep angle of the approach procedure of 3.5 degrees. Approach issued vectors to final during downwind. During downwind to base; Approach requested us to maintain 180 knots until REEBO. I 'casually' obliged. In doing so; I neglected to remember that I originally wanted to be configured to land well before that FIX. I had flaps 2 and asked for gear down on base. Approaching CIJHI I realized that holding 180 knots until REEBO was not going to work because I knew I would end up 'behind the curve.' I then turned off the Autopilot and Autothrottles and leveled off at REEBO to try to slow and configure on speed. I was able to fully configure at REEBO but noticed that my Airspeed was around VLS + 30 on the descent. I extended the speed brakes but it didn't help much. After ascertaining that I was not in a stable configuration to land; I initiated a Go-Around. We then got vectored around again and configured well before REEBO. During the final approach phase before and after REEBO; I noticed that we had a strong TAILWIND of at least 20-30 knots at altitude; which I didn't notice on our previous approach. My Airspeed was approximately VLS+15 to 20 but manageable because I was fully configured. I once again turned off the Autopilot and Autothrottles and followed the FPA (Flight Path Angle) down where the tailwind dropped off and my speed slowly recovered to approx. VLS+10 before touchdown. We landed without further incident.I surmised that because we had a tailwind that it contributed to our excess airspeed and in addition to ATC; requesting us to maintain 180 knots until REEBO not knowing there was this tailwind didn't make for an ideal situation for a stable approach. I suggest that we DO NOT accept any speed requests from ATC at REEBO in excess of our final approach; fully configured speed because I feel a stable approach will not be possible. In addition to that; not knowing that there would possibly be a tailwind at that higher altitude on approach would exacerbate the situation and make a stable approach impossible to achieve.

A widebody air carrier Captain reported executing a go-around during an unstable approach because of the high speed assigned by ATC close in to the airfield.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

CDL procedure requires right-hand #4 flap track fairing has proper lubrication and re-lubricate as required. Maintenance Supervisor was notified at XA:00 by Maintenance Control to have an AMT accomplish this task. The task of re-inspection of flap track lubrication was not accomplished. Captain did not notice in his AML (Aircraft Maintenance Logbook) review that the CDL follow-up procedure was not complied with and did not notify Dispatch of the noncompliance. I had this follow up tracker turned over to me at shift change I noticed the departure station did not call or enter the item into the database. The aircraft was in flight by the time I noticed. I called Maintenance [at the arrival airport] to accomplish the procedure accomplished for the next flight. I also had Maintenance check the AML to see if the departure station did an AML entry which they did not. Maintenance did not comply with CDL follow up procedures. Flight crew did not review AML prior to departure. Suggest flight crews review the AML prior to departure they are the last link in the chain before flight.

Maintenance Controller reported that maintenance personnel did not comply with a CDL follow up procedure on an A321.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Confusion; Workload; Troubleshooting; Distraction

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Troubleshooting; Workload; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Our plane had its service door wiring damaged upon servicing in ZZZ. The wiring to the door had been repaired previously by the numerous splices we saw and lack of protective wiring sheathing. Maintenance deferred the wiring on our planes service door and disabled the ground valve and returned our plane to service. Maintenance told us all was complete for us to fly and that door unsafe indications were to be observed on our upcoming flight and that their visual confirmation of the doors being closed was the approved method of deferral. I heard my Captain get assurances from Maintenance that ALL of the exterior doors that were worked on by Maintenance were secured and acceptable for flight. We received a YOU are Green on ACARS. Our Captain asked and received visual confirmation from the ramp push crew confirming that ALL doors were closed and secured before our push. Our Captain made an additional specific request that the avionics bay door in the lower fuselage be checked after the initial all doors secured was received. Prior to our taking the runway before takeoff; our Captain had me request a delayed takeoff so he could call Maintenance on the phone and once again confirm that all of the indications we were receiving were correct and that a safe departure could be made. Once on our takeoff roll we had numerous Comp Mon indications and I was instructed to continue the takeoff. Once airborne; cockpit noise was abnormal as was the pressure in my ears; to the point that it was very hard to hear the radio and interphone. The Captain was also having trouble hearing ATC and in communicating with me as he proceeded to diagnose the issue while I flew. I took over controls of the radios and flew while the Captain referenced the QRH. The Captain instructed me to stop our climb which I did with ATC's approval. I established our altitude to that of ATC's instruction of 9;000 ft. ATC asked if we could make ZZZ1 at our altitude and gave us a heading while we worked out what we were going to do next. I informed ATC that we would be returning for a landing at ZZZ and they asked if we're would be landing overweight. The Captain ran the numbers through the ACARS and we were under Max Landing Weight. I informed ATC of that and they gave us vectors rather than a hold so we could prepare for landing. The Captain informed the flight attendants; Company and made reassuring calls to the passengers informing them of the cause of the sounds they were experiencing and that all was fine. We then informed ATC that we were ready to return; they asked what runway we would like; we asked for 18R and preformed a routine uneventful landing and taxi back to the gates. We agreed not to declare an emergency because there was no imminent danger to the passengers; crew or aircraft.I think all of this could have averted had headsets been available to both maintenance personnel and the ramp push crews. Using hand signals and gestures between the Captain and the ground personnel were in this instance inadequate. We had to rely on the visual inspection by Maintenance and ground personnel who were supposed to be confirming that the hatches that only they could see were secure; due to our electronic sensors being rendered inoperative by Maintenance. I believe had the proper repairs been performed to the wiring and not just numerous splicing to the same recurring issue none of this would have occurred.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ-900 flight crew reported experiencing a pressurization problem during the initial climb; due to an improperly secured external service door.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Manuals; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

On B737 Periodic Service (P/S) Check (and maybe other Job cards); Step 2 (E) tells to check tire Step Wear and lists Figure-1 for explanation. Figure-1 doesn't clearly explain what STEP WEAR actually is.  Note-2 seems to say that only when I see fabric; there is Step Wear; is this correct?  I've always thought when the shoulder side tread wears more quickly than the crown; that is Step Wear.  I; later the next day; had a heated argument with another Mechanic on this; and need final and clear explanation; as one of us is clearly not reading the requirement correctly. Does it mean that the outboard shoulder side of the tread must have 3/32' of an inch of tire tread left; or that either side of the tire groove; crown or shoulder; can have that 3/32' of an inch [remaining] for the tire to be good?[Recommend] our air carrier clearly explain in the PS Check and General Procedures Manual (GPM) if the shoulder side tread requires 3/32' tread or not; and also explain if the tire is serviceable with the shoulder side to be below 3/32' of an inch; if the crown side is still above 3/32' of an inch.

Reference Procedures Manual (PM) 7-02-4. I have recently observed two very heated arguments between mechanics regarding interpretation of Tire Tread Wear limits. The topic has both times been about measuring wear on the outermost tread; the tread between the crown and shoulder. The disputes were whether the crown side and the tread side [of the tire] both require 2/32' of an inch (3/32' for B737) tread [remaining]; or more; to be considered a Serviceable Tire.My understanding is both tread sides require 2/32' of an inch (or 3/32') in order to be Serviceable.  Request answer: Are the shoulder and crown tread sides BOTH expected to be above the 2/32' (3/32') minimum in order for the wear to be serviceable?[Recommend] clarification in the Procedures Manual (PM) what the wear expectation is; as some seem to understand the PM expectation is the shoulder side [of the tire] isn't actually a 'tread' when looking at Figure 7-02-3.  Figure 7-02-2 shows both RIB and TREAD locations. Suggest replace word RIB with TREAD;  Figure  7-02-3 shows word TREAD RIB for inner treads; but nothing for the shoulder tread; suggest adding arrow and identifying SHOULDER TREAD.

Two Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (AMTs) request clarification in their Periodic Service Check and Procedures Manual for measuring Tire Tread Wear Limits on their B737-800 Main Landing Gear (MLG) tires. Also noted were the different interpretations of what STEP WEAR actually was and whether the inboard; outboard; or both shoulder side treads required 3/32 of an inch of tread remaining; for the tire to be considered serviceable.


Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Workload

Situational Awareness; Workload; Physiological - Other

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

I was Pilot Monitoring (PM). We had seen some dark areas on the Doppler for a system moving through the country over the southeastern US; and had the weather radar on.  The radar was on automatic tilt.  We were cruising at FL 390 painting nothing on the radar in smooth flight (in fact the seat belt sign was off).  Suddenly the aircraft encountered severe turbulence.  I immediately threw the seat belt sign on as the pilot flying (PF) grabbed the yoke with both hands and turned the autopilot off.  The aircraft then went 15 degrees wing down in a descent and the airspeed increased as the clacker went off.  The First Officer (FO) continued to fly the aircraft; making pitch adjustments manually and I assisted on the throttles.  The airspeed tapes 'closed in' on us quickly and soon the stick shaker went off.  The PF did a fantastic job flying out with stall recovery; but soon the clacker went off again.  In the process we lost 300 feet and I called ATC for immediate descent to FL 370; which we did.  The aircraft rolled 15 degrees to either side throughout and the PF flew very well; keeping aircraft control.  The entire episode lasted about 30 seconds and we returned to controlled flight at FL 370.  PIREP given to ATC.  I called to the back to check Flight Attendants (FA); they were startled of course but reported nothing but a very messy galley.  I had the FO make a PA; while I typed a message to Dispatch for severe turbulence.  I double-checked with FA's for how the Passengers were doing; they reported no injuries but lots of mess.  One gentleman had been in the lavatory; but no one else was standing so that worked out in our behalf.  The FA's had been thrown around but reported no injuries as well.  I then phone patched Dispatch through the Company frequency and made a voice PIREP and told them I would be doing a writeup.   The flight continued on and landed uneventfully.  Logbook writeup made and aircraft pulled out of service for inspections.   The Flight Attendants did an amazing job keeping everyone calm and cleaning up a large mess; as most Passengers had drinks spilled as well as a big galley mess.  They should be acknowledged for a job well done; especially our 'A'.  I would also like to note that we completed a series on phone 'interviews' upon landing; and were asked if we were ok to continue on.  Both of us still had a lot of adrenaline going and answered yes.  In hindsight; we should have stopped our day right there; and not even been given the option.  We had two more legs in challenging weather and made some minor mistakes we would not normally have made.  Our natural inclination is to get the job done and power through; but I don't think I would do that again.

I was Pilot Flying (PF) during cruise at FL 390; 0.78 Mach. We were flying in a stratus layer associated with an occluded front and had the Weather radar on. We encountered turbulence that resulted in 15-degree roll and stick-shaker activation. I disconnected the autopilot and pitched the nose down. The aircraft kept climbing due to the updraft; and we simultaneously heard and felt the stick-shaker and high speed warning. The Captain was quick to call ATC and request FL 370; and he kept the power up. I had to lose about 300 feet to remain at flying speed. The over speed was approximately eight to ten knots into the 'clacker'. After reaching FL 370; the Captain contacted ATC and issued a UUA Urgent PIREP of severe turbulence. He addressed the Flight Attendants and assessed that there were no injuries. The Customers were notified. The Captain notified Dispatch to have Maintenance meet the aircraft upon arrival. Maintenance subsequently pulled the aircraft out of service for inspection.There were no radar returns depicting thunderstorms in the flight path; and there were no PIREPS of MDT/SVR turbulence along this airway. The Captain and I did discuss our possible crossing of a cold front with MESO activity and thunderstorms; and we had the radar set appropriately. Had we remained at FL370 instead of FL390; we would have remained in the tops instead of (mostly) in the clear. I believe that the Flight Crew and Dispatch did the best with what we had to work with.

A B737-700 crew reported severe turbulence at FL390 which resulted in a stall recovery descent with both stick shaker and overspeed warnings. No injuries were reported but the aircraft was removed from service.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 413; Flight Crew Type 7000

Troubleshooting; Workload; Distraction; Time Pressure

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors

During crew bathroom break at FL390; I attempted to put on my oxygen mask as the F/O (First Officer) was leaving the flight deck. One of the red quick don toggles broke as I was putting on the mask. Oxygen was continuously flowing out of the broken area where the toggle use to be. I was able to stop the flow by closing the mask door and pressing the reset. I took the second observer mask to use while the F/O was out. The mask barely reached the Captains seat and also didn't allow for establishing communications in the event of a pressurization issue. I contacted Dispatch and Chief Pilot Operations Center to discuss the issue and decided the safest course of action was to descend and divert. Dispatch recommended [an alternate] and FL 190 so we would be below landing weight. Upon further consideration the safest course would have been to descend directly to 10;000 ft. We accomplished the divert and landing with no further issues.

B737 Captain reported an inflight failure of the oxygen mask toggle switch; necessitating a descent and diversion to a suitable airport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

We did not notice until airborne that we took off with a 2;000 LB main tank fuel imbalance. While hand flying the departure as the pilot flying; I made a comment about the aircraft requiring a lot of left trim. The pilot not flying looked down to see an amber FUEL IMBALANCE indication and the left fuel tank showing 2;000 LBS less than the right. TOT: 20.0 LEFT: 6.5 RIGHT: 8.5 CTR: 5.0. All fuel pumps verified on. Crossfeed verified closed. I engaged the autopilot and we ran the QRH fuel imbalance checklist. Imbalance corrected.When checking fuel quantity on the ground; double check each fuel tank; not just the total fuel on board which agreed with our required fuel. The amber light does NOT illuminate until airborne; so we can't rely on it to detect a main tank imbalance on the ground.

A B737-800 Left Fuel tank contained 2;000 LBS less than the Right Tank at takeoff. The FUEL IMBALANCE annunciator does not illuminate unless the aircraft is airborne; the crew missed the imbalance during preflight.


Upon arriving to the aircraft a note was in the remarks section to call Maintenance. Upon calling I was told; and this was confirmed via the previous day logbook; that the inbound flight experienced a 'number two Integrated Drive Generator (IDG) Oil and Fail' caution message along with the oil temperature/pressure yellow light lighting up several times in flight. The previous crew had written it up; but not carried out the MEL; so it was an open write up. Maintenance wanted me to defer this write up with a MEL; since the previous crew did not wish to complete this action the prior day. I inquired as to why no Maintenance had come to fix it overnight; Maintenance responded that there was no sense in paying for contract Maintenance to come out when it is a crew reset action. Maintenance also said that contract Maintenance is not certified to run our aircraft engines. I reluctantly agreed to do the O item on the MEL.I feel in reflection; that I should not have conducted this MEL. I came to an aircraft not knowing the full story. There is no reason why local Maintenance could not have been called to fix this. There might have been further issues no one knew off. Cutting economical corners can lead to errors beyond just economics. What if for various reasons; including fatigue; the prior Captain had written down the wrong IDG and so I by just following his write up; might have disconnected the wrong IDG. I from this point on will be insistent that Maintenance be sent to the aircraft instead of me fixing an ambiguous and open problem that has not been looked at. This is in the interest of safety.

ERJ-170 Captain reported he was asked to depart with a maintenance item that was carried over from the previous night because of a contract Maintenance cost issue.


Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

On initial takeoff and climb; I noticed that airflow in the cockpit was surging. I remembered that in January 2015; there was a write-up in the Aircraft Maintenance Logbook (AML) regarding a problem with both engine bleeds. When I looked in the Environmental Control System (ECS) page; I noticed that bleed 1 and 2 output was erratic and rapidly surging from 0 to 78 psi. I contacted local ZZZ Maintenance over the radio. I sent a message to dispatcher and copied Maintenance Control. The rate that the cabin was being pressurized was erratic. I made the decision to return to ZZZ due to safety concerns that we could lose pressurization at our cruising altitude (FL380). I sent a message via ACARS to the dispatcher [about] the diversion. No emergency was declared. No overweight landing performed (landed at 93;000 lbs. which is 4;000 lbs below maximum landing weight). I made an entry on the AML upon gate arrival in ZZZ. Erratic pressure output of both engine bleed 1 and 2. Captain EMB190. Air turnback.

Reporter stated the ERJ-190 uses an EICAS alerting system. After he returned to their departure airport; mechanics had asked him if he noticed the pneumatic cross-bleed valve was open during the erratic rapid surging? The thought by Maintenance was; if the Cross-bleed was open; then possibly the bleed valves on each engine were fighting each other; causing the surging. The only indication he had occurred during their takeoff roll when he noticed a Pack 1-2 EICAS message that happened very briefly and went away; no fault messages appeared. At the same time he did hear a surging noise that sounded like a window was open. As they were climbing he could feel pressure bumps as the surging increased. He decided to return to their departure airport. The ERJ-190 does not have a Fuel Dump System. Reporter stated the ERJ-190 aircraft uses a System Logic approach in the pneumatic system that opens and closes pneumatic valves automatically through an onboard Air Management System (AMS) computer that gives priority to the APU Bleed valve. Flight crews can switch to the opposite Pressure Controller; but do not have a 'Manual' control feature that allows pilots to manually adjust cabin pressure. Maintenance did perform a lengthy cabin pressurization check; suspecting the AMS computer; but ended up taking the aircraft out of service; the Corrective Action fix was unknown. He was given another aircraft and departed.

A Captain reports that during initial climb he noticed the airflow in the ERJ-190 cockpit was surging. Both engine bleeds were erratic and rapidly surging from 0 to 78 psi. Crew returned to departure airport due to concerns for losing cabin pressurization at cruising altitude of FL380.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Routine Inspection

Dangerous Goods cargo not secured in Cargo compartment 5. Two packs of flammable liquid stacked on top of each other. This is a serious fire hazard!

Air Carrier Ramp Personnel reported Hazmat cargo transported and improperly configured for air transport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport

The taxi signage at BOG (SKBO) airport is not coincident with our taxi diagrams. The airport is under plenty of construction and there is both incorrect and no taxiway signage. Even with up-to-date Jepps and a review of NOTAMS; the taxi diagram labeling is useless. Taxiways are either renamed or covered in black tarp; making it impossible to determine which taxiway is which. ATC gives you taxi instructions which include a hold-short somewhere prior to the runway. Without any relevant guidance or diagrams we had to ask for progressive taxi at every intersection. An operations alert should be included to all pilots operating to/from SKBO to warn of no taxiway guidance.

The reporter stated that the airport is fairly large with two long runways. When taxiing at night it's difficult because the taxiways are not lit and many of the signs are covered. The reporter also stated that when you ask for progressive with the language barrier it becomes difficult to understand the instructions especially when the taxiways do not match the charts. The reporter stated that even during the day; after the controller gives you which taxiways to take; it is difficult to figure out which way to go because the charts do not match the airport taxiways. The reporter also stated that there was construction at the time of the report so perhaps many of the issues have been resolved.

None of the taxi signs in Bogota (SKBO) are represented on our 10-9 taxi chart. Some signage is blacked out. Both our Jeppesen plates were up to date. The few NOTAMs that were issued are very confusing and difficult to read and understand. It's impossible to decipher the NOTAMs while a taxi operation is taking place. We actually taxied by another aircraft that we were supposedly to give way to. Never got the clearance. Extremely dangerous to operate in Bogota. Had the same problem when we arrived. Exited the runway and was given taxi instructions. We had no clue where to go because the signage was not correct. Asked for progressive taxi instructions to the gate. What a disaster.

B737 flight crew reported there is both incorrect and no taxiway signage at SKBO. None of the taxi signs are represented on the taxi diagrams.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 153.12; Flight Crew Total 4916.47; Flight Crew Type 4916.47

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather

We were on the arrival and assigned a hold due to the weather at our destination. We held for 1 hour. All runways were closed and nil to poor braking was reported. After the 1 hour holding delay we were cleared for the approach to ILS10 C. The First Officer and I discussed the situation and our fuel status and our options. We confirmed our plan with dispatch and decided to continue to ZZZ. On the first approach; we were vectored off to give spacing with a heavy international 787. After a delaying vectors we were once again recleared for the approach. We were assigned a speed of 160 knots 15 miles from the runway. We complied. Approximately 1 mile from the field; the Tower instructed us to go around due to loss of separation. We went around and stated we were now in a minimum fuel state and could except no more delays. ATC vectored us back for a second approach. The weather had deteriorated more to 1/2 mile visibility and slush covered runway at reported depth of 1/8 inch completely covered. We opted to perform a flaps 40 Cat 2 autoland per the approach plate. On the second approach at approximately 300 ft. from touchdown; the Tower instructed us to immediately go-around stating the preceding airplane had slid off the runway. We performed a second go around and immediately diverted to ZZZ1. We were at our minimum fuel and decided that was the safest course of action. We did a 3rd low IFR ILS Autoland into ZZZ1 and it was uneventful. We contacted Crew Scheduling about what they wanted us to do. Their first plan was for us to refuel and fly back to ZZZ. We stated that we thought we were close to the end of our duty day. Scheduling then said that they wanted us to sit on the plane and wait for a possible inbound crew then deadhead to ZZZ. The First Officer and I discussed this and decided it was best to get some crew rest at that point due to the long and very difficult flight we encountered. We felt we were extremely exhausted and not functioning with very clear thought process and our communication skills were degraded. We decided that to layover at ZZZ1 was a safer option. We believed that continuing to work in an exhausted state of mind and body would not be beneficial for the airline.

ZZZ closed all runways for landing due to poor to nil braking action. We held in holding pattern for slightly over an hour; RIGHT when we hit bingo fuel and needed to divert; they opened up one runway for approaches/landing. We were the first aircraft cleared out of hold and to descend via RNAV arrival. On approach descending on glideslope; ATC decided there wasn't enough spacing between us and the preceding heavy and vectored us off approach to go back around to try again. We decided to give it one more try; and at around 300 ft. on 2nd approach; Tower instructed us to go-around; that preceding aircraft went off runway. At this point; we were min fuel and could not try again. [We were] worried that the runway would again close for awhile; so we decided to divert to ZZZ1. I knew the Captain had not slept well at all the night before and noticed he was at times slow to process some things; I myself also missed some things and didn't perform my go-around procedurally as well as I normally would. Parked at the gate we were pretty fried and decided it'd be best for us to call in fatigued.

B737-900 flight crew reported diverting following two missed approaches and then calling in fatigued due to the long stressful flight.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 2300

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Weather report indicated clear skies and visibility >10 miles using local soaring BLIP (Boundary Layer Information Prediction) maps. I did not get the TAF for APA which was 22 miles north as I was planning to fly glider local within 5 miles of CO15.  AWOS on field indicated Skies clear; winds from south at 10 kts; ceiling unlimited; Temp/DewPt 38/10 when I took off. There was a frontal type cloud approximately 10 miles to the north at takeoff.  Field elevation 7040. Tow pilot took glider to south of field approximately 4 miles to 12;000 MSL. I released from tow and did several maneuvers taking about 5 minutes and losing 1;000 feet. I noted a cloud coming above me and that the frontal type cloud had come much closer approaching from the NNW. I did several further maneuvers to lose altitude to the south of the airfield. I turned to the AWOS frequency which was reporting winds from the north and ceilings of 3100 feet. A call to the tow pilot who was returning to the field indicated that visibility and ceilings were deteriorating to the north. I turned to the north back to the field at high speed (130 kts) with the intent of coming in under the clouds and entering the pattern at 1000 ft AGL to arrive in 2 minutes. As I proceeded north; forward visibility deteriorated significantly so that I could not see the field although I could ground references. I descended at high speed 130 kts to 500 feet AGL toward the field following power lines which ran toward the field. There was now visible snow or ice on my wings but I wanted to keep the airspeed high in case there was unnoticed accumulation. I went through the Before Landing Checklist and briefed the passenger to tighten seat belts as we may have to land off the air field. A call from the Ground Operations Director to me stated they did not have me in sight and the field conditions had deteriorated with a snow squall over the field coming from the north. I stated I did not have the field insight and I estimated my position as 1/2 mile south of the field at 500 ft AGL. At that time; I had slowed to about 100 kts holding at an altitude where I could still see ground references trading airspeed for altitude. I did identify a potential off-field landing site known to me from a previous successful outlanding by another pilot. Seconds later; I identified a road and landmark used as the entry point for patterns landing to the south at our airfield although I did not see the runway (no lighting). I turned to the east with planning to do an extended base leg to the runway or the airfield landing north since the snow squall had moved from the north. Immediately after turning east; I saw the runway through the snow squall and called a base leg for the north runway. I was at 300 feet AGL about 80 kts. I pulled out the spoilers and slowed to 70 kts for possible icing with my calculated normal landing speed of 54 kts. I was till at 300 feet AGL and turned final with reduced forward visibility due to snow; but adequate ground and slant angle visibility to see the end of the runway. I could not see more than 1000 feet down the runway however. Snow was blowing over the runway; but there still no snow or ice on my wings. As I crossed the approach end of the runway at 100 feet AGL; I slowed to 54 kts. The flare; touchdown and rollout were normal. I saw people coming to the edge of the runway on a taxiway (my planned stopping point) to help retrieve the sailplane when I was about 500 feet from the taxiway. The rollout and stop were normal with normal braking. Upon exiting the sailplane after it came to a stop; about 1/4' of snow had accumulated on the wings in 30 seconds; but there was no ice. The snow was light; dry and fluffy. Upon landing; the ground crew informed me the AWOS had a 7 minute delay in broadcasting and that another pilot had looked at the TAF for APA 20 miles to the NNW at that time and forecast snow flurries about the time of my takeoff.Lessons learned -1) Delay or stop takeoff if visible unexpected weather is apparent; even if AWOS reports winds blowing the opposite direction2) Even when flying local; obtain TAF of fields in 30 mile radius3) Recognize a delay in the AWOS broadcast and use trend information accounting for the delay. I did listen to the AWOS at least 4 times during the flight; but did not account for the delay4) Land off field in clear weather is probably a better option than proceeding to an airfield with compromised visibility.5) Postpone a flight if weather appears marginal.6) Communicate with ground personnel to augment AWOS information in deteriorating weather conditions - this is key for single pilot resource management.

Glider pilot reported encountering IFR conditions during VFR flight due to sudden weather deterioration.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 1214; Flight Crew Type 1000

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I am writing this report to report a near miss situation in the standard traffic pattern for Runway 27L at Gillespie Field. My student and I were practicing traffic pattern operations at SEE. After checking upwind ; crosswind; downwind; clear we made a left turn into the pattern for Runway 27L. When my student looked to check the distance from aircraft to [the] runway; he also looked back and noticed that there was another aircraft right on our tail - same altitude; less than 100 feet behind us - same altitude. Tower advised that [he] was too close to us and told them to offset to the south for spacing. Aircraft Y offset to the south towards our 5 o'clock position and we got cleared to land #2 for Runway 27L.

Instructor pilot reported an NMAC in the pattern at SEE airport.


Fatigue; Other / Unknown; Physiological - Other

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We requested the Continuous Descent Operation (CDO) 1 Arrival to Runway 24R. ATC cleared CDO-1 Arrival descend to 4;000 FT. Contacted Arrival advised on CDO 1 Arrival and she didn't change anything. Changed to next Controller. Just inside EVIAN; Controller asked if we were going to TOMO with 080 heading. Flew the 080 and was told to fly the TOMO arrival. Could not get the arrival in quick enough then asked to fly 360 heading. Then direct to MAYAH. Cross MAYAH at 4;000 FT. After landing and debrief realized that the confusion was how the CDO-1 is written in one area of the plates and the BECKY Arrival is written in the arrival plates. What we read and briefed was strictly what was written in the box notes for the CDO-1. KARIN-BECKY-EVIAN-MAYAH and the altitude requirements. After EVIAN we were proceeding direct to MAYAH and the BECKY DELTA Arrival was expected. ATC never mentioned fly the CDO-1 for the BECKY DELTA Arrival. Both of us had developed the start of a cold while on the trip and both had terrible sleep periods. Having the procedures in two different places in the charts. A very poor explanation of these procedures. This is kind of a cut and paste method for a CDO [Continuous Descent Operation] arrival and should be listed on one page and used in the FMC as a database arrival. I have flown this CDO before; but did not notice the page being written like this. This page was changed in MARCH 1; 2013. Do not accept this arrival unless it is written and put in the FMC database like every other arrival.

B777 Captain reports confusion attempting to fly the CDO 1 route to Runway 24R at RJBB. The altitude restrictions and the fixes listed for the CDO 1 are interpreted as the route instead of flying the CDO 1 route (SUC Y53 to BECKY) then the BECKY DELTA arrival. Fatigue and a developing cold were cited as factors.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 4; Flight Crew Total 4519; Flight Crew Type 4

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 173; Flight Crew Total 13311; Flight Crew Type 5524

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

General Maintenance Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

I was pilot flying; [this] was my second flight of my First Officer Initial Operating Experience; and to be my first landing in a Boeing 737. I was hand-flying a visual approach for a flaps 40 landing. There was a crosswind from the right of about 5 knots. The approach was on glideslope and on localizer; and I was learning to fine tune my power corrections. Around 200 feet above the ground I transitioned the aircraft into a 'slightly low' indication on the Precision Approach Path Indicator. I was not looking to 'grease' the landing; but to have a landing that I could use as a basis for understanding and continue to learn from.During the landing I focused on reducing the threat of a tail strike. I entered rudder to counter the crosswind and retarded the thrust levers so as to be at idle before touchdown to prevent a bounce. I did not use enough back pressure on the yoke in the flare and landed flat at +2.5 degrees pitch attitude. (according to a printout from the aircraft computer) This led to a hard landing on. During the taxi-in the Captain instructed me to call the flight attendants to make sure everyone was okay and that the oxygen masks did not fall. They told me everyone was okay and the masks did not drop. A maintenance discrepancy for a hard landing was inserted into the aircraft logbook. Only after de-planing were we told there may have been injuries during the landing.I briefed that this was my first landing in a Boeing 737. I had the threat of a tail strike in my mind during the approach. I did not want to over flare and float during landing and I also thought we were higher off of the ground than we were which affected my flare (sight picture). I think a flaps 30 landing for the first landing in the aircraft may have been a better decision than flaps 40.

Flying pilot failed to round out/flare causing hard landing. First Officer and I were paired to begin his IOE. Nothing abnormal noted at 1;000 and 500 foot calls. Just inside 500 feet I noted low power setting of 49% on N1. I instructed First Officer to increase power. I'd previously briefed N1 target for flaps 40 stating that we will be light and may only require high 50s for N1. About 250 feet; First Office reset aim point and established a 3 red over 1 white glide path on the VASI. The power setting that First Officer increased to seemed to be holding aircraft on speed as we approached the overrun. Aircraft callouts of 50; 40; 30 began just prior to the threshold as expected. I don't remember if I verbally stated to begin round out/flare; but realized this was not occurring about 20 feet. I attempted with my left hand to arrest descent rate; but felt resistance. We then landed hard with little to no flare. Digital Flight Data Management Unit (DFDMU) pitch at touchdown was 2.5.At some point just after touchdown I took full control of the aircraft. I don't know exactly when; but I asked the First Officer why I was unable to pull yoke back. He did not know. I'm not sure if his grip on the yoke prevented me from pulling back. After clearing the runway; I asked the First Officer to call the flight attendants to make sure all was okay and no oxygen masks deployed. The flight attendants indicated all was okay to the First Officer. As we taxied to the gate; I instructed the First Officer to look up the code for a hard landing. I also said we needed to call maintenance. As the passengers were all off and the flight attendants were off; the lead flight attendant; said she needed to speak with me. At the 1R door threshold; she told me that all four flight attendants had neck injuries.

A Boeing 737 flight crew reported experiencing a hard landing due to an insufficient flare technique at touchdown. As a result; several injuries were reported.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Vans Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 0.5; Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

I was working Ground Control and Controller in Charge position. I was over seeing the operation when I noticed the Cessna on landing roll when the RV was almost over the threshold on the same runway. I ordered the Local Controller to send the landing RV around. The Local Controller refused. I again ordered the Local Controller to send the RV around because there was not 3;000 feet between the Cessna on landing roll and the landing RV. Again the Local Controller refused.  Runway separation was lost and a runway incursion occurred.This is a controller judgment issue not a system issue. This controller continuously puts aircraft under his control and other controllers aircraft in danger on a daily basis. Nothing is being done about it. I recommend decertification.

An ATC Controller in Charger reported the Local Controller refused their instructions to send an arrival around due to insufficient runway spacing between subsequent arrivals.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 11; Flight Crew Total 273; Flight Crew Type 200

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I decided to go flying in my Cessna 150 to practice some landings. The air was calm and temperature was a little warm but not yet hot. The preflight and run up were normal. I took off; flew the pattern and had a good landing. I powered up for my next lap. The airspeed was alive and close to rotate speed when I noticed a nose wheel shimmy. I increased back pressure to take some weight off of the nose wheel. The plane rotated and took off; but the shimmy continued. I thought; this is a motor problem. I was still accelerating and climbing so rather than try to force the plane back on the runway and try to stop I continued to climb straight out. I wasn't climbing very well and at about 200 feet the climb stopped. There was no safe place to land straight out so I began a very shallow left turn; maybe 10 degrees bank. I radioed [local] traffic; told them I was having engine trouble and to clear all runways I was attempting to return. They acknowledged and said the runway is clear. My thought was; I'm above all obstacles; if I can maintain 200 feet and can make it. Of course; the plane started losing altitude during the turn. By the time I was lined up on the highway; which parallels the runway; I was at about 100 feet. I stopped the turn in the hopes of gaining some altitude. I wasn't gaining and the stall horn was chirping. I looked about 20 degrees to my left and there was the runway. But there was no safe place to land between me and the runway and it would have meant another 20 degree turn. As badly as I wanted to land on the airport; I knew this would be my fatal 'I can make it' error many pilots make.I radioed local traffic again and told them I would be landing on the highway. I now focused on the highway. This stretch of [road] is two lanes in both directions with a large grass center with a dividing barrier. I have often thought to myself; if I am ever forced to land on the highway to not line up on the white line. My right wing might hit a highway sign. Instead; I set up on the fast lane. My right wing would be in the slow lane and my left wing over the median where there are no signs. There were no cars in front of me but I couldn't see what was directly below me or behind me. I didn't want someone driving up underneath me so I nosed down for a little burst of speed.I leveled at about 20 feet hoping someone behind me wasn't texting while driving. I glanced over at the oncoming traffic and saw bulging eyes and open mouths. I made a flaps up landing on the narrowest runway I've ever landed on; the width of a single car lane. I came to a stop in the slow lane and shut down. Avionics off; master off; key off and removed.I climbed out of the aircraft and turned around to look at traffic. Right behind me was a fire truck. They were returning from putting out a small brush fire and saw the whole thing. I gave them a thumbs up and went to the back of the plane. Pushing down on the rear of the plane; I rotated it 90 degrees so the tail was off the highway with the wings parallel to the highway. I rolled it back to clear the traffic lanes then sat down on the tire to call my wife; also a pilot. Poor thing was at the airport and had watched the whole thing. I wanted to let her know I was down and safe.Looking back; had I not been wearing active noise reduction headsets I probably would have heard it was an engine problem and aborted the takeoff. Once off the ground I didn't panic. Fly the plane. I knew the location of all my nearby emergency landing areas at that end of the runway. As I was turning first up was some long straight shallow sewage ponds (not my first choice). Next is a grass field then the highway. I didn't get sucked into the 'I can make it' mindset. I trusted in the skills I had been taught; what the aircraft was giving me.

C150 pilot reported a loss of engine power that resulted in an off-field landing.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Workload; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Confusion

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted

After starting engines; BLEED 1 OFF and BLEED 2 OFF advisory messages were illuminated on EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System). The PIC and I acknowledged them; looked them up in the QRH; and discovered the uninformative 'Crew Awareness' line associated with them. We continued with the after start checklists and taxied to the runway. During my Before Takeoff flow; I noted the continued presence of the two messages on the EICAS; but did not consider them significant; as the AOM (Aircraft Operating Manual) only instructs pilots to consider yellow and red messages during the Right Pilot Before Takeoff flow. After takeoff; it became immediately evident that the airplane was not pressurizing properly. Further; upon activation; the anti-ice system was indicating inhibited when it should not have been. On the ECS (Environmental Control System) synoptic page; we noted that both PRSOV (Pressure regulating Shutoff Valve) valves were white and indicating OFF or CLOSED (no green line extending past the valve icon and the line in the valve icon perpendicular to the bleed air flow line).The PIC contacted the company and we arranged a diversion to ZZZ; where a suitable recovery could be made for our passengers. The flight progressed uneventfully; though unpressurized at 6;000 feet until our descent into ZZZ. As I began descending; a loud; vibratory swishing sound filled the entire airplane. It seemed constant no matter descent rate or airspeed. As we leveled at about 4;000 feet; the noise slowly faded away. It reminded me of the sounds that usually accompany a lavatory fill cap that has come loose; but a little bit louder and with a severe pressure bump in the ears.The QRH concerning white advisory messages in the Phenom is extremely uninformative and unhelpful. In any other airplane I have ever flown; advisory messages in the QRH are at least accompanied by a few things to consider or some explanation as to what is likely occurring within the given system. While it may be obvious that a BLEED OFF message means that the BLEED is off; this is not an entirely abnormal condition in the Phenom. Often; due to the air conditioning system on the ground; BLEED 1 and BLEED 2 cycle on and off automatically during ground operations. I have checked the EICAS many times during my Before Takeoff flow and noted BLEED OFF messages and thought nothing of them; as the PRSOVs always open and begin pressurizing the airplane and providing other bleed systems shortly after takeoff. The AOM normal Before Takeoff procedures prohibit a takeoff with yellow or red messages displayed on the EICAS unless associated with a known inoperative component; but this section says nothing about white messages or what to do if they are displayed.Even the MEL manual for BLEED OFF says vaguely; 'Not Applicable'(?). No dispatch conditions; no MEL procedure.Three of the most important reference manuals indicate that everything is fine with the BLEED system when very clearly everything is not fine. I wish that I could better explain the likely cause of this event; but I am still unsure of exactly why the system behaved as it did. With BLEED switches in the AUTO position; the system logic should have been controlling the BLEED valves; but in this instance; it failed to do so.

EMB-505 First Officer reported unable to pressurize aircraft after takeoff; forcing flight to divert. Pilot also indicated that the QRH was of little help.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Procedure

I took over the D87/89. The sector was busy with weather deviations and volume. Sector 81 had performed coordination with the previous controller with Aircraft X westbound; the aircraft was coordinated at FL350. Also Aircraft Y was coordinated at FL390 with a left weather deviation 30 miles left of course. Both aircraft were to progress over the same waypoint ANTIG. Both aircraft were CPDLC and ABS-B equipped. I got an Aircraft Route Progression (ARP) message on Aircraft X and I processed the message and the message stated he was reporting at FL390 however was supposed to be at FL350 I noticed the aircraft was still in the radar sector so I deleted the message noticing that the aircraft was coordinated at FL350 and I just thought that the aircraft had not been given a descent clearance yet. I then proceeded to take care of a red conflict between two aircraft at FL430 which I was investigating; looking at their routes of flights and flight plans trying to figure out why Advanced Technologies and Oceanic Procedures (ATOP) was predicting a conflict. Aircraft Y made a Controller Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC) request for a further deviation 40 left of course which I probed and sent. Again back to the red conflict to fix the flight plans and received another ARP message on Aircraft X. I sent a message for Aircraft X to confirm altitude and moved on the take care of weather deviations and perform more inbound and outbound coordination. I then received notification that aircraft X was indeed at FL390 so I processed the altitude and noticed he was in conflict with Aircraft Y. I then climbed Aircraft X to FL400 to solve the conflict. I called sector 81 asking what altitude Aircraft X was coordinated at and the controller answered FL350. The sector 81 controller failed to notice the coordinated altitude on the strip prior to terminating radar service. Had this been noticed along with a more detailed relief briefing; this situation would not have been dumped on me. First I feel that if an aircraft is ADB-B equipped and we are tracking them on ATOP than any time that aircraft progresses a waypoint other than the correct altitude the ATOP system should notify the controller by lighting up red both that aircraft that are in conflict instead of a trial probe. We get trial probes constantly on aircraft and 9 times out of 10 they are not useful. This would divert the controller's attention to the conflict and situations would be avoided. Second; sector 81 controllers should immediately put the aircraft to the coordinated altitude instead of waiting until the last possible second or have the controllers descend/climb further from the boundary fix to stop the ARP messages. Lastly sector 81 should be removed from Area F and moved to Area E.

ZNY Controller reported of a conflict with two aircraft at the same altitude. Confusion ensued because aircraft progression reports showed one of the aircraft at a different altitude. Reporter climbed one aircraft to avoid conflict.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 112; Flight Crew Total 3838; Flight Crew Type 2493

Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Relief Pilot; First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 142; Flight Crew Total 9089; Flight Crew Type 2252

Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy

On the morning of an international departure that was scheduled to depart later that evening; the Captain emailed and informed both FOs of how the flight would be conducted in regard to face masks.  During the pre-flight phase; the #2 FO challenged the decision and said he was walking off the trip unless the Captain agreed to wear a mask whenever he was on the Flight Deck.  In an effort to maximize safety and also to address the #2 FO's concerns; the Captain offered the solution that he would wear a mask during cruise; whenever the #2 was performing his relief duties; but; with safety concerns about glasses fogging and hindered communications during critical phases of flight; said that #2 could sit in the cabin rest seat during those phases if it would make him more comfortable (since masks would not be worn).  The Captain believed this was 'legal;' since an #2 actually wasn't required by the FARs on the planned 6 hour and XX minutes flight and was also the safest option since; if the #2 dropped the trip; the flight would likely be sent un-augmented with zero inflight rest periods then available to the 'flying' pilots. The #2 agreed with this solution and the flight departed.Prior to the later descent; the #2 stated that he believed that an FAR's had been violated by him not being in the cockpit for takeoff.  He said that he would be in the cockpit for descent and Captain said he was welcome to be there but reiterated that masks would not be worn during critical phases of flight.  The #2 did then come up for the descent and landing.After the aircraft was parked and debrief conducted; #2 said he would be submitting a report over his belief that an FAR was violated by him not being in the cockpit for takeoff and departure.The Captain and #1 FO are not aware of any 'violations' of FAR's in this instance but decided to report the incident in case there's something they are not aware of.

During takeoff; the #2 FO stayed in overhead flight crew rest area instead of on the Flight Deck.  Erroneously thinking his presence was not required on Flight Deck on takeoff. Captain and #2 chose that course of action; as #2 wasn't comfortable with staying on Flight Deck with the Captain who had a cough. Captain was unable to wear a mask due to fogging of glasses.

Air Carrier flight crew reported they had an agreement between themselves regarding face mask policy on the flight deck and may have violated FAR/SOP policy.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

I was cleared for takeoff; assigned 140 heading. Advanced the throttles and checked the engine gauges (normal; power set; no lights; airspeed alive). Departed Runway XX; Rotated at 89 kts. upon positive rate gear up. Runway heading at full power but started drifting right but I thought it was just the crosswind pushing me. Airplane began to yaw right between 500-800 ft. AGL. The engine did not sound right and began to run rough. Right rpm began to drop and right fuel flow was high (over 300) and the airplane began to yaw significantly to the right. I [requested priority handling] and ATC said 'yep we saw it did you lose the right engine?' I said affirm and he asked if I wanted to do a 180 back for Runway XY. I said yes and he instructed the aircraft behind me to exit runway to which they said they saw it happen too.Took a few seconds to assess the situation and then proceed with the engine failure after takeoff red box memory items:Mix full; Prop full (engine power spiked and yawed plane to the left); Throttles full (Engine lost power and yawed back right); Flaps up; gear up.There was no change in condition and the airplane began to yaw back and forth with surges in power. I pulled out the QRH and climbed to 1;500 ft. I secured the right engine and made a left turn back to Runway XY.Began descent to 1;000 ft. and Tower asked if I could make the turn to Runway XY and I said yes just taking it slow. Followed the rest of the procedure and landed on Runway XY and taxied to the gate.

Pilot reported an engine failure on initial climb that resulted in a return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 53; Flight Crew Total 2911; Flight Crew Type 810

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

On landing I was holding right aileron trim in for a gusting right crosswind. The wind switched and raised the left wing; pushing me to the right. I exited the runway on to the grass along the runway.

C510 pilot reported encountering a wind gust resulting in a runway excursion.