Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 10300; Flight Crew Type 2160

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Standard arrival procedures coming into ZZZZ; starting out on one of the STAR arrivals and then vectors to our final approach course. There was some deviation around CB's and rain showers coming towards the aerodrome with FEW at 600 feet; FEW at 1;700 feet CB; SCT 2;600 feet and BKN 13;000 feet. Winds were variable at 2 knots and the ATIS information was calling 7 KM vis with moderate rain. It was more like rain showers and we missed just about all the rain showers close to the airport. Upon being cleared for the approach and after joining final; Captain was hand flying the aircraft with the autopilot off and the auto throttles on and he noticed and verbalized some rudder oddity. There was a lot going on for me as I was talking to the Approach Controller; switching to Tower and configuring the airplane for the Captain as he verbalized the commands. He stated that the right engine was rolling back which it was and then he placed the Right Engine Start Selector to FLIGHT and moved the Right Thrust lever back slightly. I believe he clicked the Auto-throttle switch off at this point and I confirmed the Right Engine appeared to have flamed out and he commanded the flaps back to 20 degrees for landing and to reset the speed bug for a Flaps 20 SE approach; which I did. He was flying the airplane just fine; we had the runway in sight straight ahead and were established on the LOC and GS with the Gear Down and now Flaps 20. We did not feel rushed or that the outcome or our aircraft or approach to landing was in jeopardy so we continued. At this point; I believe I saw about 1;400 Feet AGL on the Radio Altimeter and we were configured for a simple and timely Flaps 20 SE landing. There was no traffic behind us or on the runway or anywhere near our landing runway so we did not verbalize any urgency or problem to the Tower. Captain just continued to fly the aircraft while I made the standard calls at 1;000 feet and again at 500 feet. The Landing Checklist may have been completed shortly after the 1;000 feet call and I don't remember which one of may have started the APU but I believe it was running prior to our touch down. I did query the Tower again on short final just to verify our landing clearance for [Runway] XXL and we did get the TOO LOW FLAPS EGPWS announcement due to our not overriding the system with the SE Flaps 20 Landing configuration. As soon as we heard the TOO LOW FLAPS we reverified the flap position and selected the Flaps EGPWS Override switch to Override and Captain landed the airplane uneventfully. All standard calls were made upon the landing roll out and we cleared the runway safely. After exiting; everything appeared to be normal other than the inoperative right engine; so we secured the right engine and followed our taxi clearance to parking at gate on the cargo apron via single engine taxi.

B767-300 First Officer reported a flameout of the Number 2 engine while on approach.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

An A320 departed on SID X. A GLF5 departed on the SID Y and was instructed to maintain visual separation with the A320 departing before him. The GLF5 failed to maintain visual separation with the departing aircraft because the GLF5 had a greater climb rate than the A320. The GLF5 was leaving 041 as he reported he lost sight of the departing traffic which was at 035. I called traffic and the GLF5 still did not have the A320 in sight. The next transmission was a vector for separation. When the GLF5 reported he lost sight of departing traffic; I should have vectored for separation first and then call traffic. Unfortunately I called traffic first; then vectored for separation.

TRACON Controller experienced a loss of separation when attempting to establish visual separation between two successive departures; the second aircraft climbed faster than the first.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 175; Flight Crew Total 700; Flight Crew Type 200

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

On the landing rollout; ATC (tower) gave me a clearance to Exit at a specific intersection; hold short of the parallel runway; and stay on that frequency. My student was asking a question during the busy radio exchanges. I acknowledged the instruction but thought I had heard the instruction to taxi across the parallel runway. So I went ahead and taxied across. However the tower had cleared an aircraft (a commercial airliner) to takeoff on that runway (on another frequency- that airport uses different frequencies for different runways). I saw the airplane holding and taxied across. However; he had been cleared and was beginning his takeoff roll. I was across the runway before the aircraft taking off reached my position but it was too close. The lesson here is not to let a student distract you with a question during high work-load phases of a training flight. He was a new student and did not know to not ask questions then.

A flight instructor reported that he became distracted by his student's question during taxi and crossed onto an active runway as an air carrier began a takeoff roll.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 3500; Flight Crew Type 300

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft

While enroute to OSH; were using VFR flight following until past Chicago Center where this was terminated; encountered limited GPS signal; and changed to VOR guidance for enroute navigation. While approaching RFD VOR from the south nearing Class C airspace at 5500 feet; DME came active indicating 15 miles south of the VOR and immediately turned west to leave airspace in the event this was entered. Continued west then north to make sure clear and continued to OSH.  Better preflight planning for back up VOR guidance in the event of loss of GPS signal would have helped route planning to correct situation and prevent future occurrence.

Piper 34 pilot reported loss of GPS signal when approaching RFD led to a Class C airspace penetration.


Distraction; Physiological - Other; Training / Qualification

Training / Qualification; Physiological - Other; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Declared Emergency

On climb out I (First Officer) happened to notice a wisp of smoke coming from under the ACARS area of the instrument panel. After a short time we began to smell a slight burning odor. We decided to return to the departure airport. The smoke and odor stopped. We continued to return; ran the QRH checklist and declared an emergency. We did an uneventful overweight landing. We entered both the overweight landing and smoke in the logbook.

[Narative #2 had no additional information.]

A MD82 crew returned to the departure airport after a wisp of smoke and an electrical odor appeared to come from the ACARS unit.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

Time Pressure; Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

On departure while climbing (hand flying) through 9;000 FT and about to level at 10;000 FT the Lead Flight Attendant called the flight deck. The First Officer asked if he should answer the phone and I said not at this time. At few seconds later ATC cleared us to 14;000 FT. We acknowledged and kept climbing. Before reaching 10;000 FT we then answered the call. The First Officer spoke to Lead Flight Attendant and she reported a strong acrid odor in the cabin. We then asked ATC for a level off to work a problem for a few minutes and then we selected Command A autopilot. Neither the First Officer nor I noticed any odor. I then handed the aircraft to First Officer and spoke with the Lead. I then arranged to have the Flight Attendant enter the flight deck while I investigated the cause. As soon as I opened the cockpit door I noticed how strong the odor was and immediately informed the Lead that we were returning to the departure airport and [to] prepare the cabin for an airport return and that we would be back on the ground in 10 minutes. Upon closing the cockpit door I resumed my duties at pilot flying and informed the First Officer that we will be returning. We contacted ATC and requested to return. After a very brief discussion we declared an emergency and requested Runway 9 for landing. Not sure why the event happened but in my post flight de-brief with the flight attendants I was informed that the aft Flight Attendant smelled a strong odor about 10-20 seconds after takeoff and the odor had worked its way up to the forward flight attendants about a minute after that. Also in my debrief the Lead Flight Attendant said that next time she would use 6 chimes to get my attention. Also in my debrief with the First Officer and flight attendants; and I am embarrassed to say I neglected to use TEST procedure. In the debrief the flight attendants hadn't noticed that I didn't use the TEST procedure until I brought it up. They assumed correctly the situation. I also made a PA to the passengers that we would be returning back to the airport as a precaution and we would be on the ground and at the gate in 10 minutes. However I strongly believe that active communication was the key and TEST should always be performed. My major concern was to get the aircraft back on the ground. Several times was distracted bet ATC and I had to remind ATC that we an emergency aircraft and required immediate landing. Originally they gave us Runway 10 and then requested and received Runway 9. The odor never entered the cockpit and after landing I learned that the odor had dissipated before landing.

[Narrative 2 contains no additional information.]

A B737-700 aft cabin initially filled with a strong acrid odor which eventually was detected through out the cabin so the Captain declared an emergency and returned to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 19; Flight Crew Total 484; Flight Crew Type 479

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

ATC requested that I descend from 8;000 ft. I entered the clouds and picked up ice very quickly. Pitot iced over and lost altitude & VSI (Vertical Speed Indicator) gauges. I began trouble-shooting; immediately turned on pitot heat. Immediately turned on defroster for windscreen de-icing (very busy in a bumpy situation) and most important to keep cool and wings level. Lost altitude and was reminded by ATC (Air Traffic Control) not to deviate from assigned altitude. I informed ATC that I was rapidly picking up ice and was busy resolving. I was aviating and navigating; but possibly not communicating as clearly I could have. I was busy being safe... Losing my altimeter was not helpful at that time. ATC requested that I call them after landing at ZZZ airport. Proceeded to perform the RNAV 1 (Area Navigation) and called ATC on the ground. It was summer and I was not expecting ice to build up so fast.

PA28 pilot reported an icing encounter that necessitated a deviation from an assigned altitude.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 103; Flight Crew Type 66

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

While sitting on taxiway A short of RK the First Officer and I observed a roughly 12' drone overfly the ramp. The drone approached from the ball park and flew between Gate 1 and Gate 2. It was at roughly 30 feet. We advised Ramp of the drone and another aircraft on frequency confirmed that they also had a visual on the drone. Upon contact with Ground Control we also advised them of the drone sighting.

B737 Captain reported sighting a small UAV flying at approximately 30 feet over adjacent taxiways at EWR.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

First Officer is Pilot Flying; I am Pilot Monitoring. As the aircraft is climbing through FL250; about 65 NM after takeoff; the Master Warning flickered twice and then came on steady. We both consulted the overhead panel and observed the TAIL COMP TEMP HIGH light illuminated in red. I extinguished the Master Warning light and the First Officer called for the QRH and performed the Memory Items; calling out each step as he accomplished them. I then started the clock and read aloud the procedure from the Bulletin. The light extinguished in less than 2 minutes and I called the checklist complete at the LAND ...NEAREST SUITABLE AIRPORT step. I told the First Officer to fly and talk; declare an emergency and advise ATC of our intention to return to the departure airport and land. I asked ATC to notify the Company and roll the ARFF. We received vectors to XXL and landed normally. I taxied off the runway and was met by the Command (ARFF); who examined the aft tail area with infrared. They said it was cool and followed us to the gate. Maintenance and ARFF inspected the aircraft and it was taken out of service. We completed the flight with a new aircraft.

[No additional information contained in Narrative #2.]

During climb after takeoff; a MD-83 Master Warning and TAIL COMP TEMP HIGH lights illuminated so an emergency was declared; the QRH completed and the flight returned to the departure airport.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 487; Flight Crew Type 168

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

This is a correction. Departed from ZZZ on the departure and was vectored for altitude climb for VXX [airway]. The departure was normal and the aircraft was stable in the climb. While passing 7;000ft MSL I notice a rise in the CHT in cylinder 1;4;& 6. Temperatures where stable prior of takeoff and in the beginning climb at 356F. At 7;000 ft. MSL temperature jumped to 386F than 2mins later to 400F with several quick spikes in the EGT sensors for cylinder 6 and followed later by 1 & 4. Prior to reaching 11;000 ft. MSL the temps with the CHT began to climb faster to 420F. Reaching 11;000 ft. MSL I began to; trying to make small adjustments to throttle and mixture to cool the 3 cylinders down. The adjustments were not making a difference and the engine began to sputter and quit. I panic for a millisecond realizing the problem was worsening and noted the mountains; west of the ZZZ1; I was about to travel over. With a quick decision I informed Approach as I felt still in control of aircraft and still had somewhat of power available. I began a quick left turn to an airport on my left about; maybe; 30 miles and tried a steep descent to see if I could cool the engine down and get power back. ZZZ2 was chosen with the help of Approach and prior to the threshold of the runway power came back and engine was cooled down to 345F. Quickly did a landing checklist and through flaps in and landed safely on a 13;000 ft. runway. Was met with ARFF and Military Police. Informed the operator/owner of the problem and concluded that the magnetos R side went bad possibly in the climb after taking a video after the landing to show him what I was seeing. Mechanics came out on date to find more problems on the engine that may of been a caused to the performance decrease with the help of the R side magnetos. Aircraft is currently grounded and is in the process of being repaired.

Pilot reported problems with the engine overheating and having to make an expedited landing.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Ground Personnel; Person Maintenance

After an auto brakes 3 landing; we taxied to the gate. Upon arrival to the gate; we accepted ground power and shut down the number one engine. I went to the back to crack the door. Returning to the flight deck; the external power was flickering and kicking on and off. The Captain started the APU as we noticed a smell. Thinking it was associated with the electrical fluctuations we looked around the flight deck for evidence of a tripped circuit breaker. After a few moments; a mechanic came up to the aircraft to inform us the aircraft is on fire. We expeditiously exited the aircraft. Maintenance explained it was a main landing gear fire due to a hydraulic leak.Hydraulic leak in the left main landing gear well and associated fire. 'Fire' was left out of the maintenance write-up. The fire department was called and responded. The mechanic that came on board to inform us after the fire had been fought described the aircraft as 'on fire;' but 'fire' was not communicated in the write-up.

During shutdown after block in; I noticed an acrid smell in the cockpit. My First Officer (FO) smelled the same thing; we had no cockpit indications that indicated any problems. I asked the FO to leave the jet via the stairs as I shut the aircraft down. Shortly after maintenance came into the cockpit and told me to evacuate the jet because there was a fire. Maintenance notified the ARFF (Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting) service and they were on the scene as I got to the foot of the steps.Per maintenance; a hydraulic leak associated with malfunctioning electrical hydraulic pump.

Flight crew reported that after parking the aircraft the main landing gear caught fire; which maintenance attributed to a malfunctioning hydraulic pump.


Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

The aircraft briefly encountered a period of loss of braking and/or directional control on an icy taxiway during the turn onto the departure runway after being cleared for takeoff. Speed going into the turn was below 10 knots. The first sign of loss of control was lack of steering response. Directional and steering control was regained after a brief application of idle reverse thrust. Fortunately; the aircraft remained on the taxiway during the brief encounter. The Tower was notified of the area of poor/nil braking. The flight proceeded normally thereafter. One contributing factor to the encounter was my self induced time pressure to ensure our takeoff would be accomplished before our deicing/anti-icing holdover time would expire; considering the number of aircraft observed lining up for final approach for landing on the runway we would be using for takeoff. Upon reflection; I believe a few knots slower in the turn might have avoided the encounter altogether. Lesson (re)learned? Haste makes waste!

A319 Captain experiences a momentary loss of control on an icy taxiway while turning on to the runway for takeoff.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 4200; Flight Crew Type 540

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 360; Flight Crew Type 105

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While on an instruction flight in a Helicopter; my student was on the controls turning left-base to final for taxiway bravo parallel runway 35 (Bravo is west and parallel to runway 35) at 4;800 ft MSL/300 ft AGL. A [single engine Piper] began conducting a power-off 180 to runway 35 at the same time (flying through the approach path of the helicopter). While on short final; a helicopter instructor also in the pattern made a radio call '[Aircraft] turning final; do you have the helicopter on final in sight?' The pilot replied; 'We've got the helicopter in sight.' At that moment I looked up through the overhead window above the cockpit; directly above; to see only the belly of [aircraft]; within 50 feet; descending rapidly directly above us. I immediately took the controls from my student and began a rapid collective descent and turn to the left. At that time I made a call on the radio; '[Aircraft] ON FINAL; STOP DESCENDING; YOU'RE RIGHT ABOVE US!' The [aircraft] continued to descend however we were no longer on a collision course.This was my SECOND incident of a near midair collision with a [local] aircraft; in the same scenario. Since the first incident; the [local] Flight School has not changed the way they conduct 'power-off 180's' to make the maneuver safer for all pilots.

[Several] fixed-wing aircraft in the pattern. 3 helicopter traffic in the pattern. My aircraft was Left-Downwind starting a descent; abeam the numbers 35 and landing on Runway 35. There were two helicopters on a Final Approach. The first helicopter was Short Final for Runway 35. The second helicopter; on a longer final for Runway 35 was unaccounted for. Somehow the radio calls from the second helicopter were missed; thus lapsing my aircraft avoidance procedures. Although the area was visually cleared by myself and my student; the near miss traffic was skipped. My aircraft began its Left Base leg turn; then shortly afterwards its final leg turn. Placing my aircraft within close proximity of the second helicopter. Once the danger was acknowledged an immediate Go-Around procedure was initiated. Helicopter pilot claims a proximity straight-line distance of 50 or more feet. Eye witness account on ground and air say 200 or more feet. A more accurate estimation is unattainable.

Instructor Pilots from 2 aircraft involved in a near-mid-air-collision at a busy non-towered airport provide their insight of the event.


Due to workload; and SABRE issues I've been behind all day; barely enough time to devote to flight following. At XA00 local; I had a 777 desk turn over to me. I had no idea what the workload was. I had approximately 15 flights in the air; I inherited another 15 flights in the air for a total of 30 flights in the air. I am scheduled to receive another desk at XC00; an additional 20 flights. Myself and all of the the dispatchers I work with are very concerned not only about workload; but the state of the tools that we are using. In my opinion we have been set up for a major failure. I am stressed and very concerned about safety. Can we do something before someone gets violated; or much worse PLEASE!

B777 Dispatcher laments the number of airborne flights the company expects him to monitor on a night shift.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 11.1; Flight Crew Total 460.0; Flight Crew Type 176.2

Other / Unknown; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

I flew a Robinson R44 on a Part 91 personal flight from the helicopter pad with two passengers. Weather on the date of the flight included a local altimeter setting of 29.96; density altitude of 1;800 FT and light winds out of the southeast. During run-up; the helicopter's OAT gauge read 95 degrees Fahrenheit on the concrete helipad; and approximately 89 degrees over the grass. Nearby flags indicated winds directly out of the east at approximately 8-12 MPH. The helicopter's total weight on the incident flight was approximately 2;175 LBS. The R44's gross weight is 2;400 LBS. At the given weight and temperature; the R44 has a demonstrated ability to maintain a zero wind OGE (Out of Ground Effect) hover at approximately 3;000 FT AGL. In other words; the helicopter was operated well inside its published operating envelope. I performed a normal run up and all checklist items appeared normal. Upon takeoff; the helicopter developed insufficient climb power. I dropped off a passenger; and thinking the helicopter would now climb easily; entered a second maximum performance takeoff. The helicopter again developed insufficient power; but the engine did not miss; surge; backfire; or give any other indication of partial lack of power. Seconds into the flight; rotor RPM decayed and I entered an autorotation and made an emergency landing in a private front yard; having narrowly missed several houses and other obstacles.After the remaining passenger departed; the engine suddenly surged; then appeared to behave normally. As bystanders approached the aircraft from all directions; including the direction of the tail rotor; and fearing for their safety; I made the immediate decision to takeoff again. The helicopter performed perfectly on each subsequent flight. The cause of the loss of power has not yet been determined.

While apparently within temperature and gross weight limits; an R44 pilot experienced diminished engine power on liftoff. After removing one passenger; helicopter again developed insufficient power and pilot made an emergency landing in a private yard. On a subsequent takeoff with no passengers; the engine developed full power.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

After landing at LGA; we received numerous taxi instructions and we thought we heard the Ground Controller tell us to to: 'Taxi B in.' At the time we were taxiing on B. As we approached A; I noticed there was an opposite direction Regional aircraft that was stopped on Taxiway A near the intersection of Taxiway M. As we began our turn into A; the Ground Controller told us to hold position and told us that he had not cleared us in; only to 'taxi via B.' We apologized and he told us to turn left back onto B. I had already shut down Number 2 engine and was not able to make the hard left turn that would have been required to get back onto B. I informed the Controller that we would have to restart the Number 2 engine to make the turn. (It should be noted that there was plenty of room for us to continue taxiing into the ramp as the opposite direction RJ was well clear of our inbound taxi route to the ramp).The Ground Controller then told us to turn right on A; right on K; right on B then right on A. Essentially; a 'penalty lap' for misunderstanding his original taxi instructions. Radio and traffic congestion along with slightly non-standard radio phraseology all contributed to this situation. (It would have been more clear for the Ground Controller to issue a clearance like 'Taxi via B...hold short of A or Taxi via B; right turn on A into the ramp.' I understand that due to the high volume of traffic; the Ground Controllers often truncate their phrases; but unfortunately that can sometimes lead to misunderstanding.

Air Carrier Captain reported communication problem with not understanding ATC non-standard phraseology.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft X; departed en-route to MTN. I climbed the aircraft to FL230 and shipped him to the next sector. The next sector climbed the aircraft; then the pilot stated that they lost the #2 engine and needed to land. The pilot did not specify which airport. The other controller descended the aircraft back to FL190 and the d-side moved over from that position to my sector to fill me in on the situation. The pilot did not know where he wanted to land; I gave the options of SBN which was about 10 miles away; or AZO which was about 50 miles away. The pilot opted for SBN when he was about 5 miles directly north of that airport. I descended the aircraft to 110 and had the d-side coordinate with SBN approach. Aircraft X was descending eastbound; and I also had an aircraft descending westbound for SBN. I vectored that aircraft to the north and stopped him at 120 in order to get Aircraft X underneath. SBN approach asked for Aircraft X on a 360 heading; which would have aimed him directly at the aircraft at 120 on the heading. I turned Aircraft X to a 70 heading and the d-side coordinated it and released control. SBN also had the hand off on the aircraft at 120. Aircraft X asked for the approach frequency; I gave him the frequency; and SBN called wondering what the aircraft was doing. The d-side re-stated the info; I called the aircraft again (he never went to approach the first time); and shipped him again to SBN approach. Eventually; Aircraft X ended up landing at AZO.The controller at the sector above me gave me no information when she descended the aircraft back into my airspace. She then went on break and maybe could have stayed an extra minute to make sure things were ok. The d-side was extremely helpful and moved right over to my sector; but didn't know exactly what needed to be done; having never worked an emergency before; and being newly checked out on only 1 radar position.  My own supervisor could have called SBN and started coordinating with their supervisor; who ended up calling us anyway. I should have re-routed the aircraft AZO instead once I realized the other traffic landing SBN was going to create so many problems; or I should have called SBN myself to complete all the coordination. I started to feel like I wasn't in control of the situation; and my plan was not matching up with the controller at SBN.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

ZAU controllers describe a situation where an aircraft loses an engine and the steps taken to get the aircraft safely on the ground. Confusion and airspace deviations were prevalent as no one could communicate what the other was doing from controller to controller.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 2300; Flight Crew Type 700

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

After takeoff; we encounter a HYD PRESS light (Hydraulic Pressure Light) and a STAB MISC light (Stabilizer Miscellaneous Light) with a GEAR UNLOCK light (landing Gear Unlock Light) when we tried to lift the gear up. We decided to level off at 10;000 ft and troubleshoot while getting vectors around ZZZ. We cycled the gear and got the stab misc light to extinguish. The gear would extend and lock but the hyd press light would stay on. We ran through the checklists for hyd press and gear unlock and determined we should divert to ZZZ1 and we could do so safely. We stayed at 10;000 ft and 200 kts. We said multiple times to Center and Approach controllers that this is NOT an emergency. ZZZ1 said it was protocol to have us use the longest runway and that they would roll the trucks.

CE560XL flight crew reported receiving multiple indication problems when trying to lift the gear. Flight crew decided to divert and land.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Situational Awareness; Workload; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Simultaneous ILS monitored approaches to 35R and 35L. My trainee was trying to fill a hole with downwind traffic. Aircraft X was cleared for the ILS approach and on tower frequency but still at 10;000 feet and complying with the charted altitudes on the ILS. The trainee turned Aircraft Y late and ended up being in the back of the hole; Aircraft X was already slowed but we ended up having 2.7 miles laterally between the two aircraft. At no time was vertical separation EVER lost. It was clear that it wasn't going to work so I instructed the monitor controller to cancel Aircraft X's approach and get him off the final. I believe we fixed the situation before it became a 'loss' as we cancelled Aircraft X clearance and turned him out before vertical separation was lost. Management at this facility disagreed. When I pushed further; management got a 'ruling' from the region. The region determined it was still a loss. I still disagree as we are the controllers and we have the ability to 'control' the situation. Furthermore; if this is a loss; then the Dual RNAV STARS feeding the downwind to DEN at D01 should all be considered losses as well; as every single aircraft is cleared to descend via to the same point in space; at the same altitude. And if this is so; we should decommission all the arrivals and cease and desist using them immediately.We should have people who actually work airplanes making policy and rulings at the regional level. These people are so disconnected from what is really happening in the field. Furthermore if this is an actual correct interpretation of the rule; then it should be considered for the chopping block. It is antiquated and unrealistic at high density airports; when trying to run minimum separation.  We are the controllers; and have been taught 1000 feet or 3 miles since day one of training. Why are we not allowed to exercise our skills as 'controllers' in every situation? Recommended change is to change this rule; or teach our region the correct way to apply this rule.

ATC had aircraft on parallel Runway ILS approaches with monitor controllers. The Controller turned the second aircraft on to final late causing it to overshoot across the final approach course. Although greater than minimum vertical separation existed at all times; if both aircraft are cleared for approach the FAA interprets this as a loss of separation.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 186; Flight Crew Total 19600; Flight Crew Type 814

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On pushback from gate.  After tow-bar removal and headset disconnect; we were starting engines.  I observed the marshaller standing in front of our aircraft giving the all clear signal with arms at 45 degrees; waiting for me to flash the taxi light.  However; the tug was still directly in front of our aircraft!  We could barely see the tug if we leaned forward in our seats; it was that close to our aircraft. I tried to point and gesture at the tug in my window; trying to let the ramper know that the tug was not clear of our aircraft.  The ramper did not figure it out; and gave me a salute; and walked to the tug.  I never flashed my taxi light at him.  If we had taxied forward with the position of the tug; our aircraft would have struck the tug for sure. Before we taxied; I called Ramp Control on the radio; and informed them of this unsafe practice by our push crew. Non-SOP procedures.  Unsafe practice.  Poor training.  Frequent occurrence.

Air Carrier Flight Crew reported push back crew not following SOP.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

We departed with two passengers. Upon engine start engine oil quantities were noted at 1 QT low on each engine. Takeoff and climb were uneventful. After leveling off at cruise we ran the cruise checklist and noted that the right engine oil quantity was now showing 4 QTS low after the 35 min time to climb to altitude. We continued to monitor the engine oil level and noted that it was dropping 1/2 QT about every 2-3 min. As a crew we made the decision that we would have to land and probably secure the right engine if the quantity didn't stop dropping. After hitting 7 QTS low we made the decision to divert to [a nearby airport] and started our descent. As we were descending the right engine oil quantity hit 8 QTS low triggering the amber Crew Alerting System oil level low right message. Because of the high rate of oil loss we made the decision to shut down and secure the right engine before it lost all of its oil. As we approached [the airport] we noted that the crosswind was approaching 15-20 knots so we elected to land at [a different nearby airport] with a 10;000 feet runway and only a 4 knot crosswind. [ATC was advised] enroute and equipment was standing by upon landing. Landing was uneventful and the aircraft landed safely with no known damage. Upon post flight inspection of the right engine excessive oil was found inside and all over the underside of the cowling. The oil cap was checked during preflight before departure and was found to be secure and in place upon inspection. Our passengers seemed very understanding and a recovery plane was in place within an hour.Unfortunately a mechanical issue that could not be forecast and was handled appropriately. [We] feel that we handled this properly and would not have done anything differently.

CE-750 Pilot reported an inflight engine shutdown and diversion to an alternate resulted from low oil quantity on right engine.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Glider

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 48; Flight Crew Total 1811; Flight Crew Type 250

Conflict NMAC; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

The mission of this glider flight was to perform a simulated premature release (aka: rope break) at an intermediate altitude. I was instructing from the back seat; and my student was flying from the front seat. Surface wind was light out of the west; with stronger winds aloft expected. Ceiling and visibility were unrestricted. Appropriate flight path arrangements were made with the tow pilot and we departed from the grass parallel to Runway XX. We made a right turnout and continued to climb to the north/northwest. At about 600' AGL (1000' MSL) I pulled the tow release to begin the simulation; and made a radio call on CTAF warning that we were returning to the airport; opposite departure traffic; performing a simulated emergency. My expectation at this point that the student would make a left turn; into the wind; establish an approach speed; and evaluate the best route back to the Runway XX. I expected he would essentially fly a base leg at an odd angle to adjust his altitude so that the turn to final and glide to landing would be normal. However; the student; instead turned right and aimed directly toward the runway threshold. Since the student was advanced; preparing for his private pilot checkride; and had performed well on simulated emergencies in the past; I allowed him to continue to see what he had in mind - there's always more than one solution. In general I prefer to let students discover their own mistakes and devise solutions - as long as the situation does not become dangerous. For whatever reason; the student did not realize that he would arrive extremely high and he proceeded directly to the runway threshold with no spoilers or attempt to loose altitude. We arrived at an estimated 400+feet AGL. I made an additional radio call at this point; announcing 'Short final; Runway XX'. At this point I started suggesting corrections; such as to get the spoilers fully deployed. Still not descending enough; I suggested a slip. The student went into a mild slip; and then a more aggressive slip. I was sure we'd arrive safely near mid-field at this point; but that's when the next factor entered the equation and I spotted a white gyrocopter departing from the paved portion of runway XX. I never heard any radio calls from the departing traffic. I noted that in the aggressive slip we were drifting left; towards the paved runway; and suggested the student correct this. A moment later with no movement to the right; I nudged the stick right to give the student a clue. I had my eyes on the departing traffic as we approached the ground; and my last good memory is the student coming out of the slip and abruptly into his landing flare a bit too high. What happened after that is conjecture on my part; partly from what I think happened and partly from speaking to the student and observers afterwards. The student reported that the 'stick suddenly moved forward'. I suspect that was me jumping in and trying to arrest the flare and maintain speed. However; with the plane in a high drag configuration; I believe his rapid flare caused an accelerated stall approximately 5' above the runway. Several people reported the plane 'dropped down' in a level attitude. My next actual memory was coming to a stop with my back in extreme pain from the hard touch down. The hard landing was due to last minute maneuvering near the ground to avoid oncoming departing traffic. I use a hand held radio in our NORDO gliders. I was making radio calls and the radio was in my hand near my ear; so I was easily hearing other incoming traffic; etc. I heard no call from the departing gyrocopter. I generally do not initiate simulated emergencies when other aircraft are waiting to depart. The student later told me he did not see the departing gyrocopter and did not understand the urgency to my insistence on moving right. Perhaps my mistake was not declaring 'my airplane' at that point and taking over the flight controls. My eye was on our proximity to the traffic until it passed; and by then it was too late. Of course; I had every reason to expect my student to fly to a correct landing at that point. In retrospect he may have been over loaded. I deliberately passed up several opportunities early in the glide to correct the entire approach. My feeling at the time was to allow the student to make his mistakes and see the results. We would then have a lot to talk about during our post flight debrief. This allowed little margin for the unexpected; such as departing traffic in the opposing direction.

Glider instructor reported experiencing a hard landing by his student after taking evasive action to avoid a departing aircraft.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

On climbout at around 13;000 feet smoke was detected in the cockpit. The Flight Attendant called and said it was in the cabin as well. Memory items were completed for [a] smoke event. We asked for lower from ATC and executed [a] smoke removal checklist as we had no EICAS messages to lead to a Quick Reference Handbook (QRH). After [the] smoke removal checklist; smoke was removed and did not return. During this process we had contacted dispatch and ATC and arranged for a return to departure airport. We ran the overweight landing QRH and prepared for landing. The Captain landed the aircraft at probably 100 feet per minute. After landing we stopped on Taxiway X and had Fire Rescue inspect the exterior of the aircraft for signs of damage; smoke or fire. They reported the aircraft appeared to be in good condition so we taxied to the gate and deplaned. There were no passengers injured or issues reported to us.Apparently the ACM on PAC 1 seized causing the smoke event.We got this airplane back with it 'fixed.' The oxygen system had not been recharged. During the flight that night we had no temperature control on PAC1 leading to an MEL on arrival. The next day prior to push back a loud pop occurred. A hose had been blown off of PAC2. Five to six hose clamps on PAC2 were loose or installed wrong. Also a hose clamp was found in the belly of the plane not connected to anything. PAC1 was inspected and found to have a blown hose as well which was the home of the found hose clamp. Once everything was reinstalled and inspected an ops check was performed on the ground; everything appeared OK so the MEL was removed from PAC1. During climbout a PAC1 overload EICAS was received. The QRH was run for this and cleared the issue. However there was a strong metallic burnt toast smell present with PAC1 running. This issue was written up on arrival. The suggestion would be can we please ensure that our maintenance is actually fixing issues and fully investigating issues instead of rushing to return aircraft to service that could be potentially unsafe with 47-50 souls aboard.

EMB-140 First Officer reported returning to departure airport after experiencing smoke in the cockpit and the cabin related to an air conditioning pack issue.


Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

On initial climb-out we received a 'LE SLAT DISAGREE' EICAS message when flaps were selected to the 'up' position. We obtained delaying vectors from Departure Control while we executed the appropriate QRH checklist procedures; and then declared an emergency with the intent to return to our departure airport. We notified the company and local operations of the situation and our intentions then briefed the cabin crew and passengers.We entered holding in the local area at 10;000 FT in order to burn enough fuel so that the landing would be below maximum landing weight. Once the aircraft weight was below maximum landing weight; we executed an ILS approach in the configuration prescribed by the QRH. The landing was uneventful for the given conditions. Emergency vehicles were standing by. On arrival at the gate; I made a logbook entry and briefed Maintenance Control.

Following receipt of a LE SLAT DISAGREE EICAS message; a B757-200 flight crew declared an emergency; entered a holding pattern to burn fuel; accomplished the appropriate QRH procedures and landed without incident.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft X came in to ZZZ for overnight maintenance. A work package was created and Maintenance performed the work on the Company Form. I received a turnover to comply with leak checks for both engines to complete the A-Check which was on the work package from the previous night. After completing the leak checks I was asked by my Supervisor on duty to sign off the Airworthiness Release. I reviewed the Company Form and the AML for completion and double check both before actually signing the AR (Airworthiness Release) for Aircraft X on DATE. I signed the AR based off my knowledge for completion of the Company Form and AML. I was spoken to 2 days after the event took place. PS: the plane flew 6 legs before the Air Return occurred.Rushing to get the AC out on time.I spoke with both my Operational and Base Manager on the events that took place that day. They agreed with me that I'm not at fault for this situation base on my information.We need a better turnover process and communication. Also; we need to slow down while complying with the paperwork with Maintenance Procedures.

On DATE Aircraft X was down for an item that needed to be complied with and ops check/leak checks for the A-check. I thought that the Technicians had already accomplished the tow collar replacement in completion because when I came in that morning I saw the Technicians from overnight shift working on the tow collar. After closing up the aircraft and looking over the documents I saw a NRWC (Non Routine Work Card) that was not signed off; job card missing and job card was not added to the Company Form when the job card was printed. I left a note for the next shift to ensure that the Technicians that worked on it will sign it off the NRWC when they got back in that night. I did not see any continuation cards/job card for the work that the Technicians had done from over night therefore I had thought that they had forgotten to sign off the work. If I had seen the job card for tow collar replacement not completed I would've had Technicians complete the job.I was made aware of the situation by my Base Manager.The cause for this event is paperwork accountability from my part. I had seen the Technicians perform the task but was unaware that it was not completed due to the job card being missing. In the future I will not assume any task is completed until the proper documents are signed off.When I was notified of the issue DATE 1 I was told that the job card was found around the hangar. A spot where paperwork should not be kept after completion or still needing completion. In hindsight if I knew a job card was still open I would not have released the aircraft.

Technicians reported non compliance was caused by communications issues; resulted in a CRJ-200 air turn back days later.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 12200; Flight Crew Type 1000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Flight originated in ZZZ with ZZZ1 as destination; original planned cruise was FL230.Upon reaching cruise level we were in IMC and light to moderate turbulence; a request was made for higher cruise level.After leveling off at FL270 we were on top of the layer and smoother air; a few minutes later we had an indication that #3 fuel computer had failed and proceeded to follow POH procedures to attempt a reset; that required bringing the affected engine to idle before cycling the fuel computer control switch. While we were in the process to reset the computer there was an advisory message on the FMS regarding an out of trim condition; before attempting to re-trim the aircraft I disengaged the auto pilot to ascertain the condition; while re-trimming we started to encounter that the tops of the clouds below were in fact rising to our current cruising fl and encountered a sudden but brief increase in turbulence from nil to moderate so the aircraft was pushed upwards about 500 feet before I could correct it without a violent maneuver as we had passengers; ATC requested a confirmation of our current flight level and we advised that we were returning to FL270.The flight proceeded to ZZZ1 without further complication or comment from Controller.As the turbulence encounter occurred while the autopilot was disengaged and the sudden change in flying conditions (from smooth to moderate turbulence) Except for the use of more aggressive maneuvering the altitude excursion was in my opinion almost unavoidable.

Falcon 900 pilot reported that a fuel computer failed followed by an out of trim advisory message. They disengaged the autopilot to respond to the problems and encountered turbulence that caused an altitude excursion.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was the pilot flying. Received a clearance shortly after level off to precede direct PGS. I entered it in the FMC; verified with non pilot flying (NFP) and executed. As workload permitted I added the fixes from the flight plan for abeam point monitoring; again verifying with NFP. (I used the plan mode on Nav screen and saw no anomalies. (Abeam fixes were KD51U and KD42Q).Over an hour later; ZDV complained that it appeared we were about 5 degrees off course to the north and asked us to verify. I re-entered PGS direct and found that the Controller was correct. The abeam points were not in a straight line with the direct course. To my knowledge we followed correct procedures; however the abeam points were a few degrees off. The Controller did not seem upset; nor were we aware of a conflict.Since a long distance was involved; a few degrees of course change between points on the FMC did not alarm me. I thought the abeam points were using great circle course.

A flight crew on a NRS (Navigational Reference System) flight plan was issued a clearance direct to a distant NAVAID then entered NRS abeam points which caused a five degree track deviation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 29; Flight Crew Total 2480; Flight Crew Type 2480

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 596; Flight Crew Type 596

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

During acft receipt at a fixed jetway the aircraft was determined to be approximately 8 to 12 inches too far forward of the parking mark. Ground crew established verbal contact and coordinated with the cockpit crew to push the aircraft back to the correct spot. After the initial attempt to set the aircraft on the mark; the ground crew communicated that they would have to attempt the movement again and proceeded to tell the Captain to release the brakes. When I released the brakes; the aircraft began moving backwards and after about 1.5 feet; the ground crew said; 'Ground to Cockpit; set brakes'.Then the ground crew advised us that we would have to release the brakes so that he could pull us forward. At this point; I asked the ground crew if we had been attached to the tug when he had previously instructed us to release the brakes. He informed us that we were NOT in fact attached; so we therefore had experienced an uncommanded movement of the aircraft. At this point; the final attempt to bring the aircraft to the parking mark was only undertaken after I specifically inquired as whether the aircraft was secured to the tractor.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Flight Crew reported ground personnel advised them to release brakes when they were not connected to a tug and the aircraft rolled backwards.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 38; Flight Crew Total 4062; Flight Crew Type 38

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

We were on a normal approach to Runway XXR in ZZZ. When we attempted to select flaps 25; the FLAPS TE DISAGREE EICAS illuminated and the flaps stayed at 20. We went around from approximately 1;000 ft. AGL and I ran the non-normal procedure while the FO (First Officer) flew the aircraft as were vectored back for a visual approach to Runway XXR at ZZZ. We completed the non-normal checklist; sent a quick ACARS message to Dispatch; talked briefly to the flight attendants to tell them we were landing very soon; and made a flaps 20 landing. Per ZZZ Maintenance; we left the flaps at 20 and wrote up the malfunction at the gate.

B757 Captain reported a go-around was caused by the trailing edge flaps showing an asymmetry condition and stopped at 20 degrees. The Captain accepted vectors to rejoin the approach and made a successful landing.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Confusion; Workload; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

During the initial leg of the RNAV Y 28L into OAK; we were descending between JUPAP and HEDER - MDA is 2;800 MSL- and heard one 'terrain' audio warning from the GPWS; with no other visual or aural warnings. I was the pilot flying; and I immediately disconnected the autopilot in anticipation of a GPWS-generated climb. As I did so; there were no other warnings so I leveled off about 200 feet high on that segment; and stayed on course until HEDER; at which point I started a descent to the next altitude of 1;900 feet as published. I remained in control of the airplane with the autopilot off; as I was somewhat spooked about the GPWS and we were still in IMC. As a result; we ended up somewhat high on the descent; and I descended somewhat faster than normal - probably 1500 FPM.Because of the closely spaced step-downs; we were still somewhat high inside the FAF and descending in a rush to get to MDA. In all this; and due to letting myself get distracted on the approach it now looks like I descended below the LNAV step-down altitude of 1;080 feet at TENIE; which I had actually briefed before but apparently ignored at that moment. My intent was to be at the 1;000 feet altitude by about 3 miles from the MAP; but I allowed the descent to stay steep and ended up going below the MDA. Tower called and advised of low altitude and confirmed altimeter setting. The Controller advised us to be ready for a possible go-around; but didn't call for one. We leveled off at about 500 feet. I think; but by the time we had passed the 1;080 feet step-down we had the airport in sight and then continued to landing with no further issues. My first mistake was not adequately briefing the step-downs to include the 1;080 feet segment at TENIE; especially in light of the fact that the approach is pretty tight and there's not room to wait on descents. The First Officer and I should have really reviewed not only the step-downs; but also the expected rates of descent to meet them. My next mistake was to accept an unstable approach while still out on the intermediate step-down. Even a couple of hundred feet of altitude makes the next segments difficult to meet; as I look at the chart now not under the pressure of the moment. A go-around; although not critical at that moment; should have been nearing the top of my list of alternatives after having difficulty getting down to the next MDA. I think that the self-induced distraction of stress about the GPWS aural warning also contributed to this event; in that my mind was already occupied with duties of training the new First Officer with me; and this was the last leg of a fairly long day. I am not normally prone to fatigue; but the extra elements of acting as a training captain and also monitoring the First Officer's performance probably contributed to task-saturation. Lastly; although I really appreciate that ATC was monitoring the approach; when he announced the low altitude alert; there was a few seconds of disconnect between me and the First Officer as he answered the call and responded with the altimeter setting number. In that critical time; it would have helped for ATC (OAK Tower) to also announce the MDA. I was in a fairly high rate of descent at that point (about 1000 feet/min?); so I wasn't sure if the cause of the altitude alert was simply a rate of descent warning or if we were really low. This is not a criticism of ATC; since it was ultimately my responsibility to ensure the safety of the flight; but it did add to the confusion of the moment. Going forward; I will pay greater attention to the briefing of the approach and especially the segment lengths to consider. Ultimately; I could also have elected to conduct an ILS to Runway 30; which would have been easier. This was an eye-opener for me.

Air carrier Captain reported an altitude deviation during approach that resulted in a low altitude alert followed by a go-around.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This report is simply to advice of incorrect Jeppesen 10-9 plate for BRO. There was no deviations or errors associated with our flight/s and current NOTAMs address the issue. However Jeppesen is severely lagging with publishing a new 10-9 plate for BRO. It has been at least 3 weeks if not longer since runway 13R/31L has changed to runway 13/31; and runway 17/35 has become runway 18/36. The 10-9 page is still incorrect even with the 1/2/15 rev. #1 update. This can and has led to unnecessary confusion in the cockpit when cleared to cross runway 18 and there is no runway 18 on the chart.Runway numbering changes are not something airports do just on a whim and take months of planning. Jeppesen should have been more proactive and sent charts with an effective date regarding this runway numbering change. Hopefully revision #2 will have this change but if not we will have gone over a month with incorrect charts; however even the current amount of time is unacceptable.

A commercial pilot reports the current Jeppesen airport page for BRO does not reflect the current identification of the airport runways.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 122; Flight Crew Total 1679; Flight Crew Type 964

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft; Human Factors; Software and Automation

On initial climb out at approximately 1;000 ft. my Garmin GTN635 GPS notified me that terrain awareness was unavailable and was in dead reckoning mode. Shortly after this I checked in with Albuquerque Center when they notified me of the GPS jamming in White Sands research area restricted area 5107B. I informed Albuquerque Center that I was unable to maintain my own terrain obstruction clearance and they put me on an IFR flight plan at that time. My portable Garmin 695 had about half the signal it normally does and I was able to use it to marginally navigate. Being unfamiliar with this area and possibly a different avionics configuration I feel my flight could have possibly ended as controlled flight into terrain.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

We were in IMC conditions with the wing anti-ice on. We received a master warning 'tail compartment temp high' light. After following the memory items and QRH procedures the light extinguished. We elected to return (nearest suitable airport) after declaring an emergency. Upon return we made a visual approach and after coming to a complete stop the ARFF inspected the aircraft and communicated that there were no abnormal indications. We then proceeded to taxi to the gate.

Climbing through about 28;000 FT; the Tail Compartment Temp High warning light came on while using wing anti ice. We performed the memory items and the light extinguished. Following up with the QRH procedures; we declared an emergency and returned (nearest suitable airfield); as directed by the QRH. FAs reported the aft cabin was warm on the ground; but that it quickly cooled off once airborne and was normal for the remainder of the flight. Using Captains emergency authority; we executed an uneventful overweight landing into the wind. Upon clearing the runway we were visually and IR scanned with negative results. We then proceeded to the gate and after a short discussion with the base manager deplaned the passengers.

MD83 flight crew experiences a tail compartment temperature high light passing FL280 during climb with the wing anti-ice system activated. QRH procedures are applied successfully and the crew elects to return to the departure airport for an overweight landing.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Rotorcraft

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 3200; Flight Crew Type 200

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

I experienced an engine malfunction and eventual complete engine failure while flying a Cessna 150J. The flight was a personal flight. I had filed and opened a VFR flight plan using commercially available flight planning software.  The engine start; run-up; taxi; and takeoff all were normal.  I climbed to 3500 FT MSL and leveled off where I leaned the engine mixture and set engine RPM to 2400.  Engine oil pressure and temperature were noted as well within the 'green arc'. While still in the cruise configuration the engine without warning had a significant loss of engine RPM accompanied by a severe engine vibration.  I immediately place the mixture to 'full rich'; applied full power and carburetor heat.  With the engine controls set in this configuration the engine was producing about 1500 RPM. I slowed the aircraft to approximately 60 KIAS; but the engine vibration remained severe; making it difficult to read the flight instruments.  At this point we were in about a 500 FPM rate of descent.  I quickly ascertained the nearest suitable airport.  I set up a course direct and made a distress call 'in the blind' on 121.5 while descending through 3000 FT MSL.  I then set the carburetor heat to off; which had no impact on engine operation so I elected to leave it in the off position.  I then attempted to lean the engine fuel mixture; which only further reduced engine RPM.  I quickly placed the mixture to 'full rich'.  I did not adjust carb heat or engine fuel mixture for the remainder of the flight.  The engine was producing approximately 1500 RPM with the severe vibration still present.  The airspeed was still about 60 KIAS and the rate of descent remained relatively steady at approximately 500 FPM.   My distress call on 121.5 was heard by what was an unknown aircraft or agency in the area.  They advised me they were relaying my report of engine trouble; approximate location; aircraft type and people on board.  Descending through 2000 FT MSL; it was apparent that making it to the airport was not going to be possible.  I made another distress call advising of my attempt to land in an open field and gave my grid coordinates.  I am not sure that this call was received by or relayed to any agency.  As I was making the distress call I made a right hand turn toward the East to find a suitable landing area while still maintaining about 60 KIAS.  Again; exact speed was difficult to ascertain due to engine vibration.  I continued my right hand turn to the South as this put us in a direction for the most suitable landing areas and it also placed the aircraft into the predominately southerly wind.  At the completion of the turn the aircraft was at about 1700 FT MSL.  I located one paved road and two gravel roads; but I quickly assessed them as unsuitable due to wires running parallel along them.  My first choice was a roadway or other hard packed area. Upon realizing that the roads were not a possibility I selected a large grassy field that was free of obstacles; relatively flat and was obtainable by our glide path.  The field also provided a paved highway and a house near by that I was hoping would offer easier access by Emergency Services should they be needed.  Descending through 1400 FT MSL and on a Southerly heading; I determined our glide path made making the field a certainty.  At about this same point the engine quit producing any power which had little effect on our flight at this point as the intended landing spot was assured.  Nearing the field I began to slow the aircraft in order to clear a terrace in the field and to allow the aircraft to touchdown as slow as possible.  Once clear of the terrace the aircraft touched down in the field.  Immediately the landing gear began to 'dig in'.  As the nose wheel dug into the soil; our momentum caused the aircraft to flip about its nose onto its back. The aircraft immediately came to a stop.  Once stopped; I assessed myself as ok and turned off the master power switch and magneto key switch.I opened the door on my side; released my seatbelt and exited the aircraft.  I then ran to the passenger side; opened the passenger door and helped the passenger exit as well.  We then moved to the west side of the aircraft about 30 yards away.  I didn't detect any fuel spillage so I returned to the aircraft to recover my cellular phone in order to contact emergency personnel.  At about the same time the residents of the nearby house arrived on their ATVs; offered assistance and advised that they had contacted emergency services.  Within just a few minutes I received a phone call from the local FSDO advising me they had received my distress call and offered assistance. I advised them that we did not require any more assistance and that our flight plan could be closed out. Emergency personnel arrived and we declined any medical assistance.  The FAA contacted me and directed me on how to secure the aircraft and that we were released from the scene.  My passenger and I were transported by EMS personnel to their station where family members met us to transport us home.

Cessna 150 pilot experienced a complete engine failure and landed the aircraft in a field.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Operated Aircraft X. We were a two man crew; neither of us has been to ZSWX. As a special airport I have read all the available material related to the airport in the Jeppesen; station guide; NOTAMS; and the notes in the flight plan. The second page of the flight plan had special procedures for ZSWX identical to the special procedures pointed out in the NOTAMS. The last item reads: 'EVEN IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED ATIS; CONTACT TOWER 30 MINUTES PRIOR TO LANDING FOR WEATHER AND ARRIVAL INFORMATION; IF NO RESPONSE CALL BACK EVERY FIVE (5) MINUTES'. Related to the above statement; in the Jeppesen CO pages under arrival; the first item states: 'ATC REQUEST CREWS TO CONTACT TOWER 30 MINUTES PRIOR TO ARRIVAL TO RECEIVE WEATHER AND ARRIVAL INFORMATION. IF NO RESPONSE ON INITIAL REQUEST; CALL BACK EVERY FIVE MINUTES'. Apparently a very unique procedure for ZSWX is to establish communications with Tower to advise them of intent to land at ZSWX 30 minutes prior. But judging by the above statements that requirement is not very obvious; both statements are muddied up by including obtaining Weather and arrival information in the mix; neither indicate that such a call is mandatory to inform tower of the intention of landing at ZSWX. Furthermore the second statement puts it as a 'request' and not a mandatory requirement. As part of our descent planning; a time mark was inserted in the fix page to contact tower 30 minutes out. We were instructed to descend to 6000 meters / 19700 feet at about 230 miles from ZSWX airport. This put us at a disadvantage trying to establish communications with tower to obtain weather and arrival information. An attempt was made but to no avail; however; and to our surprise; we were able to obtain ATIS. We were handed over to approach control with further descent to 5400 meters / 17700 feet. When we asked which arrival to expect; the controller had no arrival information to provide us; and he handed us over to a second approach controller with further descent to 3600 meters / 11800 feet. The second controller informed us to plan on ILS Z runway 21. As the wind was favoring Runway 03 and according to the station guide; NOTAMS; and the filed flight plan; we planned; briefed; and had JTN 01A arrival/ILS Z Runway 03. That meant that we had to change and brief the new arrival and approach procedure; as soon as that was accomplished we were handed over to a third approach controller with further descent instructions to 1800 meters / 5900 feet and told to expect JTN 01A arrival / ILS Z Runway 03; which meant reprogramming the arrival and approach in the FMS for the second time in the span of a few minutes. Flying the airplane safely with all that was going on took priority over contacting tower; especially that we already had ATIS and arrival information! At about 3500 meters; roughly 10000 feet; and in accordance with the Jeppesen CO pages; we were handed from approach to ZSWX tower. That was about 55-60 track miles from touchdown (flying the full approach as we were cleared). That is over 15 minutes from landing. We communicated with tower throughout the arrival and approach phase; and we were cleared to land by ZSWX tower after we reported that we were established on the ILS. After landing we were instructed to taxi to parking. Up to this point there was no indication from ATC of any miscommunications or that the crew was not in compliance with any procedures. To our surprise when the station rep came up on the airplane; he informed me that tower is saying that we landed without a clearance! I informed him that there must be some misunderstanding as I am certain that we had clearance to land. Upon querying the First Officer he concurred that of course we had clearance to land from tower prior to landing. At that point the rep explained that the clearance to land in question is in reference to the 30 minute call that is apparently a mandatory call when flying into ZSWX.Furthermore he informed me that this hashappened before with the previous crew and that the tower needs a written explanation / apology from the Captain. I was handed a blank sheet of paper and asked to make a statement explaining why we could not establish communications with tower 30 minutes prior to our arrival. Even though I found their request unwarranted; as we were in full communications with tower 15 minutes prior to landing; I did comply with the request to prevent escalating the situation any further. In my written statement I briefly explained that more than once; attempts were made to establish contact; but when we became busy with the conflicting and changing ATC instructions; in the interest of safety flying the airplane and complying with all ATC instructions took priority over calling tower. That in the future we will try our earnest to make such a call. The rep informed me that he will e-mail the chief pilot so proper procedures are established to prevent this situation from re-occurring; and I informed him that I will also do the same.I question if a 30 minute call is a mandatory requirement and unique to ZSWX operations; why isn't it part of the official Jeppesen REF pages and not just an add on in the Jeppesen CO pages? If the local ATC requires such a call they should inform Jeppesen of such requirement to insure compliance by all operators who fly in and out of ZSWX; but that is beside the point!As I mentioned earlier; both statements from the NOTAMS and the Jeppesen CO pages lack the clarity that the 30 minute call to ZSWX tower is a mandatory requirement and not just a courtesy call; tying the call to Weather and arrival information adds confusion and ambiguity to both statements. There is no mention of any 30 minutes call in the station guide; the station guide need to include that information preferably using the same verbiage as the in the NOTAMS and Jeppesen CO pages for added emphasis.

Air Carrier Captain landing at a Foreign Airport; reported being required to make a written statement of apology when they did not contact the Tower 30 minutes prior to landing to get approval to land. This requirement is in addition to normal communications including actual landing clearance.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 800

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

We were on an IFR flight plan and were given 330 vector and 3;000 feet assigned. Center advised traffic at our 12 o'clock and 1 mile maneuvering same altitude. We spotted the traffic and called it in sight. The traffic then made a steep left turn and rolled out directly at us. I immediately took the controls from the student and turned us 90 degrees to the left. I told the student to keep his eye on traffic and then asked 'are we clear?' The student shouted 'no; climb climb climb!' During our climb Center issued two more traffic advisories which I did not hear or acknowledge. Once the conflict was resolved I began turning back to our assigned heading and altitude. Center asked us to say heading. I replied '060 we turned for traffic.' She replied; 'No sir! You need to be 060.' I told her we turned to avoid hitting another airplane and she responded saying there was more traffic behind us. She then asked our altitude and I told her 3;400 descending to 3;000. Contributing to the event was the Controller's delay in advising of traffic at our 12 and same altitude. The low wing Piper caused us to momentarily lose sight of the traffic in the turn to avoid it.

A PA-28 instructor pilot took the aircraft from his student and executed a climbing; turning avoidance maneuver from traffic which ATC pointed out late as it turned toward them.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 155; Flight Crew Total 30000; Flight Crew Type 32

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Departed on runway 36; and retracted the landing gear.  Had previously advised the tower I intended water operations on [nearby] lake (approx 6 nm NW of ZZZ).  Flew directly to the South end of the lake to inspect landing area; and made a LH traffic pattern over the intended landing site.  While on downwind I (inappropriately) extended the gear as I would have for a land landing; and confirmed gear position via mechanical indicators and electric gear position indicators.  Normal approach and at touch down an immediate pitch forward due to extended landing gear.  Aircraft came to rest slightly past vertical in the water.  I exited the aircraft without difficulty; and as it continued to rotate to inverted; climbed aboard a float and waited for assistance.

The pilot of an amphibious aircraft reported landing on water with the landing gear extended; resulting in damage to the aircraft.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Other AGI

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 9.1; Flight Crew Total 283.1; Flight Crew Type 13.1

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

The aircraft was on a normal approach to land at ZZZ RWY XX. During the final approach; the aircraft was within standards: the airspeed and glide path were stable; and the aircraft was aligned with the runway's extended centerline. Idle power was set about 20ft AGL causing the plane to touch down firmly on the main landing gears. This was followed by a slight bounce which caused the aircraft to lift approx 3ft off the ground. Following the bounce; I maintained aft elevator/yoke pressure to prevent the nose gear from impacting the ground first. The main landing gears then contacted the ground smoothly after this correction. As the airspeed decreased and the nose contacted the runway; I immediately felt a strong vibration from the nose followed by the nose continuing to fall to an abnormally nose-low attitude where I could see the runway directly. Seeing this happen; I immediately shut down the engine. Once the aircraft came to rest; I secured the rest of the cockpit. After exiting the plane; I was informed by the airport operations staff that they had retrieved the nose gear from somewhere on the runway (they did not specify where they found it). ZZZ Tower then closed the runway and airport for operations until both the runway and aircraft were secured. I do not believe any human performance considerations negatively affected this incident. As the events unfolded; I performed to the best of my ability to ensure that I was safe while also ensuring that the aircraft was not damaged further. while this incident ended safely; it has definitely inspired me to further my proficiency. I will focus on modules that will improve my knowledge on maintaining stabilized approaches; ADM; and preventing and recovering from bounced landings. As a flight instructor; I hope to use this experience as a lesson to any future students.

Flight Instructor had a bounced landing and while attempting to land the aircraft again; the nose impacted the runway. Postflight; the pilot learned the nose gear had separated during landing and airport operations had retrieved it from the runway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Type 8000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Type 2286

Dispatched to fly to PBI. Once we get closer to destination we realize the airspace just east of the airport is closed because it's over the President's house and he is home. No information in our briefing packet mentioned anything about this VIP activity. Landing either runway 28R or runway 32 is not a good option. Unable to land Runway 10 due to the tailwind. Runway 28R requires a close in base leg to final turn which results in the aircraft being wings level from this turn over the end of the runway. Runway 32 has 6500 feet available and requires max braking to land. Neither way is the best way to do things. While neither is inherently unsafe; these do not leave much room for error should anything go wrong (gusty winds; aircraft floats; speed brakes fail to deploy; etc.)

B737NG flight crew reported they were concerned with the operational difficulties presented on arrival into PBI while the Presidential TFR is in effect.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport

I work in a contract tower at EDC; Austin Executive. The tower cab does not have a field lighting panel nor the ability to turn on/off runway lights other than activating with a microphone. This allows the lights to stay on for 15 minutes. We may call the FBO to ask an operations person to turn the lights on but it may take several calls before we are successful.This evening it took three phone calls before I was successful in getting the lights manually turned on by the airport operations. In the meantime I had activated the lights using my microphone hoping that Ops would turn them on before the lights turned off. Aircraft X had just landed Runway 13 and exited the runway when the lights turned off. Had they timed out a minute before when they were in the landing phase it could have been an accident. I have also had the lights time out when a Cessna was taking the runway for departure roll on Runway 31. Again; had the lights timed out 10 seconds later it could have been horrible if they had been committed to departure roll and the lights turned off.I have many decades in both control towers and approach controls. I have never been in a control tower that does not have control of the lights. Airport management apparently does not want to pay for the install. I don't think they have factored in the amount of a lawsuit if; God forbid; there is a fatal accident because the lights turned off when an aircraft was in a critical phase of flight. Please help bring this to the attention of an authority that is able to address this situation before we have an accident.

EDC Tower Controller reported Tower does not have full control over runway lighting which can time out during critical phases of flight.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was the Captain on Flight X. The aircraft was configured at flaps 180 /190 KIAS. We were issued a descending turn while being vectored between a base leg and the final turn to intercept the final approach course. While in the turn; the airspeed increased to 195 KIAS. Just as I was retarding the throttles; we encountered enough turbulence to cause the airspeed to vary; ultimately reaching a maximum of 205 KIAS; exceeding VFE for flaps 180 for only a few seconds. I immediately brought the airspeed below 200 KIAS and the remainder of the flight continued without incident. Upon shutdown; I annotated the exceedance in the aircraft logbook and promptly notified [Maintenance Control]. Upon reviewing the Aircraft Maintenance Manual; [Maintenance Control] concluded that the 5-knot exceedance for flaps 180 was within operational limits; that no further action was required; and that the aircraft could immediately be returned to service. This exceedance of an aircraft limitation was completely inadvertent.There were several factors that caused the workload on this arrival/approach to be greater than would have normally been the case. First; the weather was challenging. The winds on the ground required a maximum 15-knot additive for VAP. We were flying the RNAV-X to runway XX; which required the added workload of setting up and executing a CDFA (Continuous Descent Final Approach) approach. In addition; icing conditions were present; and there was intermittent light to occasionally moderate turbulence. These factors; in combination; created a higher than normal workload in the approach phase. However; there was an added issue that was more directly related to the limitation exceedance. ZZZ1 was used as the required an alternate for ZZZZ; due to weather in ZZZZ. Accordingly; the flight plan was designed with a planned fuel at the destination of 4;567 lbs. The calculated DIVERT FUEL was 4;384 lbs.; a difference of 183 lbs. Planning a maneuvering/approach fuel burn of 50 lbs./min; this provided only 3-4 minutes of maneuver/loiter time at the destination before a divert was required. The actual numbers permitted a landing with 4;581 lbs. of fuel onboard to be at MSLW (Max Structural Landing Weight). However; this only provided 197 lbs. of maneuver/loiter fuel before a divert would likely be required. However; the actual fuel burn at approximately 30-40 nm from ZZZZ showed us landing approximately 200 lbs. over MSLW. I took steps to get the fuel close to the target landing weight but could risk getting too close too early because it would have necessarily required a divert - potentially without ever being able to execute an approach at ZZZZ. Accordingly; I still needed to have the aircraft in a higher than normal drag configuration when the flap over speed occurred to ensure that we would be at or slightly below MSLW but at or above DIVERT FUEL. Because we were being vectored; I had to continually estimate our fuel state; fuel burn; and final fuel remaining - all within a window of fewer than four minutes while performing all the other required functions of the previously described high-workload approach. The actual flap over speed occurred after we were established 190 KIAS as ATC directed. Because I still needed to burn additional fuel to be at or below MSLW; I selected flaps 180. I would not have selected flaps 180 at that airspeed in turbulent conditions under normal circumstances because of its proximity to a limitation. However; because I needed to try to 'thread the needle' on fuel; I thought it the most prudent course of action at the time. Nonetheless; as a result of the turbulent conditions and high-workload circumstances; I inadvertently allowed the aircraft to exceed the 200 KIAS limitation for flaps 180 for a matter of a few seconds. Upon reflection; I have several 'take away' thoughts from this incident. First; as it has always been - FIRST - fly the airplane. Although inadvertent; I was the PIC and as a result responsibility for properly flying the aircraft ALWAYS rests with me. I was trying to the utmost of my ability to accomplish the mission under challenging circumstances. However; but for the fuel considerations; this arrival and approach would have been a standard operation without incident. Accordingly; I have also learned from this that I must perform my own calculations to 'backstop' Dispatch on the plans I receive. We routinely must be very careful regarding fuel burn and MSLW; which is generally quite easy to solve and does not require much diversion of attention. However; this flight plan reveals a circumstance in which even had things gone exactly as planned; I would have had less than four minutes between either landing over MSLW or potentially having to divert. Here; because the weather at the destination was actual IMC; the likelihood of having to divert was made greater. Thus; in this situation; the only solution to building in a reasonable difference between MSLW and DIVERT FUEL would have been to further limit the number of passengers. Accordingly; in the future; and absent an addition to our fuel policy to address a required planned minimum maneuver/loiter time I will closely scrutinize all planned fuel numbers to ascertain the maneuver/loiter time that is built in.

Flight Crew flying EMB-XRJ aircraft exceeded maximum flap extension speed during approach.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 32; Flight Crew Total 142; Flight Crew Type 142

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

I was on an active IFR flight plan in VMC conditions flying level at 5;000 feet. All check lists were completed in order with the FBO checklists. My electric attitude indicator failed and displayed a red x in its place. I began to find the checklist to troubleshoot the failure and when I looked up I found all the electronic instruments on the display were replaced by red x's. I went to report the electric failures to ZZZ Center but when I pressed the microphone button the power to my radios began to fail along with my transponder. I relayed a message over the radios just in case center could still hear me. Over the next few moment's communications to and from the aircraft I was soloing for my commercial training were broken. My display completely went dark and that is when I told ATC that I [had] complete electrical failure and was going to turn back to ZZZ. I used my iPad to help in navigating back to the airport. Once I was turned back towards ZZZ; I used my cellphone to call the airport and inform them of the situation and my decision to return. Center had already contacted the airport and the Dispatchers of FBO [and] cleared the area for my return to the airport. I was able to reach the airport and flew a visual approach with a straight in landing. Upon shut down I was met at the aircraft by primary flight instructor who had similar problems with the same aircraft just a week prior. The aircraft has been grounded by the Dispatchers and will be heading to maintenance before it can be flown again.

PA-28 pilot reported complete electrical failure during cruise resulting in a return to departure airport.