Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 4200; Flight Crew Type 400

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 2100; Flight Crew Type 30

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Procedure; Weather; Environment - Non Weather Related

On a vectored departure from DFW we were level at our assigned altitude of 10;000 and on an assigned westwardly heading in IMC. While IMC we were issued traffic at our 1 o'clock southbound who would be descending on the arrival through our altitude. We were issued a climb to 11;000 and began our climb. While climbing through roughly 10;200 we exited IMC and immediately saw 2 recognition lights at our 1 o'clock in close proximity with no relative motion. Recognizing we were on a collision course; I immediately reduced the throttle; aggressively pitched over and started a left descending turn. We deviated from our assigned heading by approximately 45 degrees and descended roughly 400 feet during the escape maneuver. We advised ATC that we were avoiding traffic and that it seemed really close. Our aircraft was not equipped with TCAS; so we did not receive a traffic alert or resolution advisory.

On climb out from DFW while receiving vectors; we were told to remain at 10;000 ft and expect higher in a few minutes. We were in and out of the tops of the clouds when we saw what appeared to be the recognition lights of a large aircraft on a collision course with us. When we inquired about the location and direction of the aircraft to ATC; they were unable to provide a prompt response. We took evasive action to avoid what appeared to be a possible collision. Later it was reported that this aircraft was clear of us by 2000 ft vertically and 2 miles horizontally.

A flight crew departed DFW on a vector took evasive action at 10;200 feet from unreported traffic as they departed IMC into night VMC.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On final about two miles out at 600 feet; we observed what looked to be a drone passing the aircraft on the left. It was red and white about the size of a small goose. I recall it passing off our left wing by about 50 feet at our altitude. I made a slight bank to the right but we were past it so fast that it wouldn't have made a difference if it was on track to hit us. We reported it to the Tower and landed without further incident. The Tower Controller gave me a number to call. I called the Tower and gave them the details of the incident. We saw the drone fly by the left wing; we could only see it for about 2 seconds. The drone was flying too high near a busy airport. I banked slightly to the right as a reflex and continued the approach. Hopefully we can collect a data base of drone sighting descriptions. Police could use this data base so that when they see drones flying around airports even at legal altitudes; they can see if the drone matches any descriptions of near miss situations and act accordingly.

An air carrier pilot on short final reported a NMAC with a drone.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 400; Flight Crew Total 950; Flight Crew Type 350

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

On the way from ZZZ; the airplane lost electrical power. Enroute; I decided to activate the autopilot after which the alt circuit breaker popped out and the avionics started flickering. I notified it to ATC immediately and decided to request clearance to proceed back to ZZZ. I chose to go to ZZZ since I am familiar of the airport and had we lost [communications] proceeded to the original destination; I wouldn't have been able to pick up weather on the way. The radios became intermittent and then I squawked the 7500 by mistake. I intended to squawk 7600; but somehow entered the wrong squawk code. ZZZ TRACON somehow notified us on our intermittent radio and we corrected the squawk code. On our clearance back to ZZZ; I told ZZZ TRACON that we will shoot the RNAV XX approach and then we lost all radios completely. We landed uneventfully by using the ForeFlight app on my iPad. That was the best option in my opinion since I didn't have any navigation source remaining.

C182 pilot reported losing electrical power and squawking wrong code of 7500.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6; Flight Crew Total 456; Flight Crew Type 10

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Landing; [Runway] 34 to the north. Landed a little hard. When that happened my left control stick switch top popped off which let my hand come off the control stick; this took me by surprise and I started to run off the asphalt runway into the grass between the runway and the taxiway. I took control and reentered the runway and continued to my home/hangar without incident. No damage to the airport/airplane was done.

Private pilot reported a brief runway excursion following a hard landing.


Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

I was pilot flying on an all night to MIA. While we descended to 4;000 FT in Level Change mode; MIA Approach Control initially asked our runway preference; 8R or 9. I chose 8R because I had already briefed and setup for the ILS to 8R. Approach gave us an initial heading. When Approach directed a slow down because we were number five (5) for that runway; the pilot not flying conferred with me and asked if we could switch to Runway 9. Approach agreed and gave clearance direct GRITT; cross GRITT at 3;000; cleared ILS Runway 9. I set 3;000 in the MCP altitude window; typed GRITT in the scratchpad and selected it to LS1; confirmed with the pilot not flying; executed; and selected LNAV direct to GRITT; then on the LEGS page set 3;000 crossing altitude for GRITT and selected VNAV with Speed Intervene. My next step was to select the ILS 9 with no transition in the FMC and setup for the approach. Two discontinuities appeared and I closed them; then changed to the proper frequency/course/altitude for Runway 9 and amended the approach brief. Having been cleared for the approach; I selected VOR/LOC; however; once we intercepted the course; I failed to select APP; and passing GRITT got high on the glidepath. I realized my mistake and selected APP; but the whole way down I had trouble slowing once I got on path. I finally called for flaps 30 just prior to 1;000 FT and they reached that setting shortly after the '1;000 FT' call. On proper ILS glidepath and visual glidepath; but about 15-20 KTS fast and slowing; I thought I was in a stable and safe position to land; and did so uneventfully on speed. After block in the Captain checked the flaps and approach parameters in the computer: no overspeeds; but the flaps did not reach 30 until 838 FT at 173 KTS! I should have gone around. One mitigating factor: the Captain told me we had a 6 knot tailwind the whole way down. I had completely dropped the wind readout on the Nav Display from my crosscheck.1. Have a plan and stick to it; especially at the end of an all-nighter.2. I have a habit of selecting VOR/LOC first; then APP when intercepting the course. I must change to select APP when cleared for an ILS approach.3. Stay ahead of the approach; so I don't start neglecting things in my instrument crosscheck.4. If not ESTABLISHED in final configuration at 1;000 FT; go-around.

B737-800 First Officer reported being high and fast during an ILS approach; but continuing to a normal landing. Post flight reveals that the flaps did not reach 30 until below 1;000 FT at 173 KTS.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 4199; Flight Crew Type 5

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

My student and I landed at CNW for a training flight. We exited RWY 17L and was told by the tower to taxi back to and hold short of runway 17R at taxiway hotel. We taxied via the ramp to what I thought was a taxiway that parallels a grass triangle between the ramp and 17R. I expected to see taxiway markings as we entered what I thought was taxiway delta only to realize that they were in fact hold short markings. The ramp at CNW is rather large and we did not realize the hold short markings were there due to the curvature of the ramp and line of sight.  They are also not depicted on the airport diagram. We exited the area as quickly as we could and continued our taxi to RWY 17R at Hotel. Ground never said anything to us about it nor did we receive a brasher warning. We departed CNW and returned to our base airport.Contributing factors: the hold short area was not depicted on the airport diagram. There was so signage nearby to indicate the hold short line. The hold short markings did not parallel or follow the active runway and as a result we didn't expect to see them there. I brought up the subject at our last aviation safety meeting; but no one from CNW was in attendance. I intend to continue to follow up on the matter.

Beech 19 flight instructor reported being cleared to taxi to Runway 17R and hold short of Taxiway Hotel after landing Runway 17L at CNW. Runway 17R was formerly a taxiway and a very long hold line runs along its west side which was inadvertently crossed approaching Hotel.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Departed after a 2 hour rolling maintenance delay for several issues including the MEL placarding of the Predictive Windshear System of the onboard weather radar. We were heading to ZZZ and there was a large area of thunderstorms throughout the [area]. Once leveled enroute I decided to test the radar to make sure it was still operating and a weather radar fail annunciated on both my side and the FO's side of the NAV Display. We happened to have an FAA Inspector onboard with us that day who was a Maintenance Inspector. We tried several different things to see if we could get the radar to function; but could not. I was concerned about continuing the flight without a working weather radar into a line of weather that ran South of the ZZZ1 area; and an area with thunderstorms around the destination airport; and thought that landing at ZZZ1 might be the safe thing to do in order to have the radar repaired; or exchange the aircraft for another one. We had a large amount of fuel remaining so time was not critical. I contacted Dispatch; who briefed me on the weather conditions. I told him of my concerns; and we agreed that we would divert to ZZZ1. I discussed with him about the plan to either burn down fuel and land below max landing weight; or to land overweight and get the required inspections after that landing. He contacted me a few minutes later via ACARS and said that Maintenance and Dispatch both agreed an overweight landing would be acceptable. We took the time enroute to review the QRH; as well as the Operating Manual regarding overweight landings. I briefed the flight attendants; and then spoke to the passengers about what was going to happen; including the fact that there would be Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) there when we landed and why. We coordinated the Emergency with ATC letting them know what was wrong. We informed ATC that we would need to land on Runway 10L as it gave us the longest runway length so we had more distance for our rollout; thus reducing the brake energy we would need to slow the aircraft in an effort to reduce the likelihood of blowing tires due to excessive heat buildup. Weather was beginning to move into the area as we descended for our approach. I flew the aircraft down final to a smooth touchdown at a sink rate of less than 200 FPM. I had the auto brakes selected to 2; which decelerated at a consistent rate until we were below 100 KTS; then disengaged the auto brakes letting the aircraft roll to the end of the Runway to the XXR pad where we started the APU; had ARFF chock our wheels so we could release the brakes; and then shut down the engines so ARFF could check out our brakes with a thermal sensor for heat buildup. After getting the all clear we started engines and taxied to the gate with ARFF in trail without incident. I entered the overweight landing into the maintenance log with the info Maintenance needed for their inspection.Interesting side note: The brake temp at the end of the runway after 5 minutes was about 110 degrees. By the time we got to the gate; I asked them if they would check the temps again; and in that time the temperature had risen to over 210 degrees.Max landing weight was 154;000 LBS. Sink rate at touchdown less than 200 FPM. Touchdown was smooth to an easy deceleration to taxi speed. Even though the 'emergency' was relatively benign; the task load was high as we moved into the terminal area with weather approaching and coordinating all the final details before landing. I would like to recognize and thank my First Officer; for an outstanding job of support and professionalism. His ability to assist and anticipate was exceptional; and without a doubt contributed to safe and uneventful result at the end of the flight.

B737 crew experienced a weather radar failure enroute. Due to predicted thunderstorms at the destination; crew elected to divert and have the problem corrected.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

After deplaning in ZZZ the gate agent informed my First Officer that a passenger had a lithium battery in his carry-on bag which had been placed in the baggage compartment. I'm guessing that it was a smart bag that was found by the baggage handlers when unloading. They took pictures and informed the gate agent. She told the First Officer who then informed me about the situation. I talked to the agent who told me that the passenger said he 'forgot' about the battery. She forwarded her report to customer service.

Air Carrier Captain reported passenger gate checked bag containing lithium ion battery was transported in the cargo compartment in violation of HAZMAT regulations.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; General Maintenance Action

Following a reduced power takeoff; correctly computed for Runway XX and the correct aircraft weight; the Captain (while hand flying) commanded 'flaps up' at 1;000 AGL with airspeed at 170K and accelerating (a long green acceleration indication on both speed tapes) and with a rate of climb of 500 FPM. When I raised the flap handle from the 6.6 degree position to the 0 detent the stick shaker immediately activated with at least the Captain's PLI [Pitch Limit Indicator] indicating red (no confirmation can be given about the status of the First Officer's PLI). The speed tape was well above a stall indication on both sides. The Captain decreased the pitch attitude further to level flight with a slight descending bias and after the airspeed increased another ~10K the stick shaker ceased. Pitch was adjusted to achieve a normal climb rate and no further stick shaker events occurred during the flight. We believed our weight and balance calculations to be mostly accurate since the approach and landing on our inbound flight; with flaps set to 50 and airspeed flown at exactly computed Vref plus 5; was completely normal in all respects; with a large AOA margin indicated on the PLI throughout the entire approach and landing. We confirmed that the First Officer's takeoff data was accurate. No CFDS [Computer Flight Data System] faults indicated any confirmable problem with either the AOA system or FCC [Flight Control Computer]system. Maintenance ran the best diagnostic tests they could on the AOA systems and the stick shaker systems and could find no observable/measurable problem.

An MD-10 flight crew received an inexplicable stick shaker when retracting the flaps up from 6.6 degrees after takeoff.  An immediate lowering of angle of attack extinguished the warning after a gain of ~10KIAS.  Examination of weight and balance and performance data provided no explanation and a maintenance inspection was equally negative.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 500

During flight instruction a noticeable engine roughness occurred. The flight was conducted under VFR and utilizing Flight Following. I immediately turned on carburetor heat to no avail and turned back toward ZZZ (airport of operations) that was about 17 nm distant.  By adjusting the throttle; rpm was kept at cruise setting and roughness stopped.  After approximate 8 miles of flight the roughness returned and would not subside.  I notified The Approach controller of the situation and asked for an expedited path to the closest airport. He cleared me direct ZZZ1 and asked [about] souls and fuel on board; with two souls and 3 hours fuel. He then switched me to ZZZ1 tower who cleared me to land.  The approach to runway was uneventful with the engine running rough but producing more than adequate power.  The landing was uneventful and taxied to the FBO without incident.

LSA pilot reported a loss of engine performance that led to a diversion and a successful landing.


Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related

Since last week there is not enough alcohol gel available at office for employees (everyone has to bring it from home) to keep us safe. Also; there is no water bottles available for employee's hydration in every operation. We are working X type flights and since COVID-19 situation is getting worst we need to have safety tools like alcohol gels or liquid alcohol to sanitize the work areas to give a good customer service and provided customers a safety area.

Ground employee reported there is not enough alcohol gel available in the office for employees to use during the COVID-19 pandemic.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Police / Security Involved; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

The Agent came and told me that a Ramp Agent found a small checked duffle bag smoking as it was coming up the belt loader; and that he threw it on the ramp before it got into the cargo compartment. A Ramp Supervisor found stick matches in a bundle next to the striker strip in a baggie. The matches had apparently struck the striker strip and had started to burn. I called Dispatch and the Safety Officer was listening in. The Chief Pilot on Call was notified by the Dispatcher. The CSS had the Passenger who owned the bag come off the aircraft to discuss the matter and then the CSS let him return to his seat. The Agent notified the TSA Official and the Local Police. I had Maintenance come out and check the cargo compartment door frame and he found no damage. The Ramp Supervisor took the bag to an office to document it for his report. The Police then took custody of the bag and pulled the Passenger from the flight so that they could continue their investigation (I believe he was accommodated on the next XXX flight). I had more fuel put on the aircraft and the Dispatcher affirmed our departure to XXX. We departed without further complication. I failed to brief the Passengers in a timely manner due to the complexity of the situation. I believe we made three PA's but after the first 20 to 25 minutes after the departure time. The Ramp Agent saved our Company a lot of money; let alone the lives of 144 people.As far as the smoking bag; I am glad our Ramp Personnel are watching out for us. As for keeping our Passengers informed every 15 minutes; I will try to be more diligent.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A Ramp Agent loading bags in a B737 noticed smoke from a bag on a belt loader before it entered the Cargo Compartment; threw the bag on the ramp; and notified the Captain. The smoke's source was stick matches next to a striker pad ignited within a baggie.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

We were ferrying [an] aircraft. We knew that this aircraft had previous issues with pressurization on other recent occasions. On climbout everything looked normal. Rate of climb was approximately 200 [and the] cabin differential looked normal. After crossing FL300; we received a CABIN ALT warning and EICAS message. We performed the memory items and asked for a descent to FL250 where the cabin was still at 15;000 so we continued the descent to FL230 where the cabin started to come back to 10;000 and stabilize.After the QRH was completed we wrote numerous messages to [the] Company asking for new fuel burn numbers at the lower altitude. We had a Mechanic on board [and] we asked him his opinion on everything or if he had a different way to look at things. He agreed with our assessments. While waiting; we checked the oxygen tables to make sure we had enough oxygen for our plan; in which we did. We had planned to wait to hear from [the] Company before making a decision. We then changed the step climb in the FMC in case the new numbers were okay to continue and we would not be able to step climb anymore; to which we received a message of insufficient fuel and showed us landing with 10.2 in ZZZ. At that time; we asked to return to ZZZZ and requested priority handling. We then made it back to ZZZZ with no further issues.

B757-200 pilot reported ferrying an aircraft where a previously known issue reappeared; resulting in a return to the departure airport.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working another sector when I saw this happen and I talked to the RADAR controller involved. I thought it was very very dangerous and I was shocked that it happened so that's why I'm filing a report. LAX Tower cleared an A320 routed south of the north complex runways for a departure into the Manhattan RADAR (MANR) Sector. MANR has control to turn this aircraft and climb them. About the same time maybe a 1/2 mile offset; a CRJ-900 routed north was coming off the south complex. These aircraft have to swap out. MANR was never advised about the CRJ-900 and even though the CRJ-900 was instructed to maintain visual separation; MANR had no idea who that aircraft was. Ninety Five percent of the time a departure off the north complex is immediately issued a south bound heading. In this case the controller waited wondering who this unknown target was (CRJ-900). Had MANR done the norm; and turned the A320 south; there not only would have been an ugly loss of separation but a potential MID-AIR collision. The CRJ-900 would have freaked out if the A320 had turned. Dangerous and Scary! Recommendation; training to LAX Tower on the proper use of Visual Separation; requirements to inform Departure Sector of aircraft using visual and stopped at lower altitude.

SCT Controller observed a conflict event involving two air carrier aircraft departing LAX; the north complex aircraft routed south and a south complex aircraft routed north.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Fatigue; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Departure on this flight occurs well before the Control Tower opens. While preflighting; the aircraft received and printed a PDC with a clearance that deviated slightly from our filed plan. We inputted and cross-verified the clearance and the squawk code. This was the first time for both of us operating out of SJC as an uncontrolled field and we carefully reviewed and briefed the 10-9 and 10-7 for any pertinent information. I remember commenting that it was odd getting a PDC with the Tower closed and the Captain agreed that it was unusual. We made all necessary calls on CTAF as we pushed; taxied; and took off. When I called NorCal for the first time airborne; the Controller sounded confused; asked for an ident and told us to remain VFR; then told us to standby for our route clearance. I responded that we would stay VFR and that we had received clearance via PDC. He said they didn't have that capability; then read us pretty much the same clearance and same code. He instructed us in the future that we needed NorCal permission to depart IFR. At no time were we in IMC condition or near any other traffic. Challenging morning! This is a XA:XX scheduled departure that followed a minimum rest overnight. Preflight prep was a bit of a struggle. Neither of us could get flight view to work for some time until we utilized the hotspot; then could not get weather as the ASOS frequency only broadcast NOTAMs; until we figured out to call the number for the ASOS on the 10-7. We were both very familiar with SJC but neither had operated with ATC closed. We focused pretty hard on all the unusual stuff making sure we didn't miss obstacle procedure; noise abatement or a required runway but utterly missed the fact that the PDC did not apparently constitute an IFR clearance to depart. The PDC was 'normal' and did not contain a wheels up or any unusual instructions. Had we not received the PDC; we would naturally have contacted NorCal just like at the dozens of uncontrolled fields we go to; but for some reason having the PDC; along with everything else did not trigger that instinct that early in the morning. This should be a schedule red alert reminding pilots about operating outside ATC hours at this airport. I'm not sure where the PDC came from; but I can see this confusing a lot of people. Why one was generated at all is my biggest question.

On power up of aircraft at SJC; a PDC printed out and we entered this flight plan into the FMS. The Tower was closed and we commented to each other that it seemed odd that we got a PDC to begin with. We both looked very thoroughly through all of our documentation (10-7; 10-9; release notes and NOTAMs) for any information on this and only saw that the Aircraft X was exempt from the SJC curfew. We figured that this was our ATC clearance so we taxied out and took off from SJC and contacted NorCal Departure. NorCal told us to remain VFR and then gave us our clearance and squawk code which matched the PDC. It was VMC conditions and we told NorCal that since we received a PDC we thought we were cleared to depart SJC. He said that the departure facility did not have PDC capability and that next time we should contact them on the ground for our clearance and release. We then continued the flight with no more difficulties. This flight departed well before the Tower opened and we had a reduced rest over night the night before. Upon trying to initialize our iPads we were having trouble with the flight view program. It was not allowing either of us to enter the schedule to scan the Q codes. We turned on the portable WiFi device and this allowed us to initialize. This took extra time and we were already slightly fatigued from the prior nights short rest. The WX (weather) was also not being transmitted over the ATIS frequency. We called the AWOS phone number and got the one-minute WX. This seemed odd to us that the WX station was not broadcasting good information. All of these things seemed odd to us and were a cause for fatigue. There was also no guidance in any of our SJC information on contacting ATC for clearance even though we received a PDC. I've never been to an airport that I received a PDC before while the Tower was closed. Put in our company manuals and Jepp documents some information to contact ATC before departure even if you get a PDC. Had I not received a PDC I would have had to contact ATC to get my clearance and release. It was very confusing to have a PDC at a closed Tower facility. There should be a red exclamation mark on our schedules about departing SJC before the Tower is open while being issued a PDC.

Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a PDC from SJC Control Tower that was not open and departing; without calling the overlying TRACON.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Descending via the LYNDI FOUR into SAN our aircraft encountered two wake upsets from [an] A320.  Aircraft bank angle was approximately 35 degrees.  After second event we queried ATC on our in trail distance and were told '5 miles behind A320.'  We adjusted VNAV descent to fly above published path to avoid further encounters in A320 wake.

Falcon 2000 pilot reported encountering wake turbulence 5 miles in trail of an A320 on approach into SAN.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

[Aircraft X] was on an IFR flight to ZZZ1 on [Airway1] at 9;000 ft. There was another aircraft on [Airway2] also landing ZZZ1 just handed off to me also at 9;000 ft. The adjacent sector asked me if I would like [Aircraft X] at a different altitude and I gave them 8;000 ft.; which they complied with. Upon further review that was below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude of 8;600 ft. and [Airway2]'s Minimum IFR Altitude of 8;400 ft. I should have been more aware of the Minimum IFR Altitudes along [Airway2].

A Center Developmental reported they issued a control instruction to an aircraft through another controller that placed it below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude and Minimum IFR Altitude.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 255; Flight Crew Total 950; Flight Crew Type 893

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 27; Flight Crew Total 27; Flight Crew Type 27

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object

Student on solo flight had slight loss of control after a bounced landing and went off the runway and struck a runway light.

Came in on final too high and too fast. Bounced on touchdown and veered off left of center and struck a runway light.

A Flight Instructor and student reported that the stundent lost control of the aircraft during landing.


Human-Machine Interface; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other; Party2 Dispatch

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

In cruise mid-way through the flight; we received a SMOKE FWD CRG DET FAULT message. We completed the ECAM; completed the Cockpit Operating Manual (COM); and then looked for a COM reset. The reset in COM 3.224.15 says 'On Ground' only; so we did not perform it. As soon as I finished looking up the reset (within a minute or two of the first ECAM); we then received a SMOKE AFT CRG DET FAULT message in addition to the SMOKE FWD CRG DET FAULT message continuing to be displayed. The COM procedure was the same for both messages; and the reset was not applicable to either message.We both considered it unusual to receive one of these messages; and then the other a couple of minutes later. It seemed more likely that a Cabin Intercommunication Data System (CIDS) fault would cause both of these messages to be displayed simultaneously. We considered the situation to be additionally unusual because the Airbus Flight Warning Computer (FWC) software did not have a combined message for this situation (i.e. FWD + AFT); and therefore it seemed to be a situation that is considered not likely to occur.The COM 'condition' for each of these messages is 'Smoke detection fault.' The ECAM Status page displayed; under INOP SYS; 'FWD CRG DET' and 'AFT CRG DET.' Based on both the COM 'condition' and the ECAM Status; we both believed that all cargo smoke detection capability was lost (i.e. both CIDS cargo smoke detection channels for FWD cavity 1 and both channels for AFT cavities 1+2). Now; I wonder if this is ambiguous; and if we would have received the SMOKE DET FAULT message if that were the case.After receiving the second ECAM; we contacted the flight attendants; explained the situation; and asked them to walk up and down the cabin and report back if there was any smoke; hot spots; odors; etc. They called back within a couple of minutes and reported none. We asked them to walk the cabin approximately every 10 minutes until we gave them the 'flight attendants prepare for landing' PA.We advised Maintenance Control that we had received the two ECAMs and that there was no evidence of smoke. Maintenance Control replied; asking us to try the reset on COM 3.224.15. We advised Maintenance Control that the reset said it was applicable 'On Ground' only.  Control replied; again asking us to do the reset. We replied; explaining that we were not comfortable with that without them explaining their reasons for requesting this. Maintenance Control replied without mentioning the reset any further; and advised that local Maintenance had been notified of the faults.We discussed the situation; again reviewing that it was unusual to us that we would receive the FWD message; and then a couple of minutes later; the AFT message. We discussed our belief at the time that all cargo smoke detection capability was lost. We considered asking the ground crew; on arrival; to not open the cargo doors until cleared to do so by local Maintenance. However; we discussed that Maintenance would not be able to help us in the extremely unlikely event there actually was fire/smoke. We agreed that; out of an abundance of caution; and to ensure the highest level of safety for our passengers and ground crew we would:1) Request ARFF escort us to the gate.2) Taxi to the gate and deplane normally after landing; without stopping for inspection.3) Instruct the ground crew to not open the cargo doors until cleared to do so by ARFF.We informed the flight attendants of our plan; but stated we would not make a PA to the passengers until after landing; in order to prevent panic/hysteria/uncommanded evacuation. The Captain reviewed with the flight attendants procedures in the highly unlikely event of actual fire/smoke/need for evacuation at the gate. All communication with the flight attendants ensured clear understanding that we only had a detection fault--not an actual smoke indication--and this was merely contingency planning in the extremely unlikely event evacuation became necessary.We messaged Maintenance Control our plan; who forwarded it to Dispatch. We requested they coordinate with both ZZZ ATC to arrange ARFF and with ZZZ Ops to inform the ground crew. Dispatch replied that this would be done.I explained our plan to ZZZ Operations (Ops) when calling in-range. When we checked in with ZZZ Approach; they had not been informed of our situation; so I fully explained our plan to them. We were extremely clear that we were not declaring an emergency. I reiterated our plan to ZZZ Tower; who relayed it to ARFF. After landing; I re-confirmed the plan with ZZZ Ops while the Captain communicated directly with ARFF. I made a PA explaining that airport safety vehicles would follow us to the gate due to a maintenance issue; that there was no cause for concern; and that we would be deplaning normally once we reached the gate.After parking; ARFF contacted us; stating that there was no evidence of fire or smoke; and no hot spots on thermal imaging. They cleared the ground crew to open the cargo doors. I confirmed with ATC that they did not need a written report from the company. The Captain spoke with the ARFF Incident Commander in person; and then called the Chief pilot.Maintenance came on board and began troubleshooting. After engine shutdown; the ECAM Status displayed several items that were not displayed in flight. If I recall correctly; I believe they were INOP SYS 'CIDS' and Class II Maintenance Status messages 'CIDS 2' and 'SMOKE.' After maintenance troubleshooting; the faults were fixed; and we continued on our next leg with no further issue.The COM 'condition' for SMOKE FWD (AFT) CRG DET FAULT should more clearly indicate whether this is a single-channel or dual-channel 'Smoke detection fault.' I would appreciate it if the company could contact Airbus and request clarification of what is the difference between 'SMOKE DET FAULT' and the combination of the two messages 'SMOKE FWD CRG DET FAULT' and 'SMOKE AFT CRG DET FAULT'.The COM procedure for SMOKE FWD (AFT) CRG DET FAULT applicable to our aircraft does match Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM) PRO-ABN-26 P 8/70 dated JAN 2015; but neither paper procedure reflects that the ECAM Status page will display FWD (AFT) CRG DET under INOP SYS. This should be investigated.AOM 1.26.50.8 dated Oct 2012 should be updated IAW FCOM DSC-26-50-40 P 1/2. The vast majority of AOM-1 has not been updated IAW [Airbus] FCOM DSC in years. Our outdated AOM-1 refers to a SMOKE LAV + CRG DET FAULT message that can no longer be generated (it is replaced by SMOKE DET FAULT).Maintenance Control should not request that we perform 'On Ground' only COM Supplementary resets in flight without an extremely clear explanation of why they are recommending such action. IAW COM 3.224.3; 'In flight; as a general rule; the crew must restrict computer resets to those listed in the following tables; or to those in applicable OEBs. Before taking any action on other computers the flight crew must consider and fully understand the consequences.'The company should have contacted ZZZ ATC to arrange ARFF; as we requested and Dispatch replied would be done. We should not have relied on the company to arrange this; and should have asked Center to relay this to ZZZ Approach ahead of time.

A First Officer (FO) describes the procedural steps that he and the Captain followed that led them to believe their A320 aircraft had lost all cargo smoke detection capability after receiving two ECAM messages for SMOKE FWD CRG DET FAULT and SMOKE AFT CRG DET FAULT in-flight. The ECAM Status page also displayed; under INOP SYS: 'FWD CRG DET' and 'AFT CRG DET.' After engine shut-down; ECAM Status displayed INOP SYS 'CIDS' and Class II maintenance status messages 'CIDS 2' and 'SMOKE.'


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

During cruise flight; at FL330; the flight attendants called the flight deck and informed myself and the First Officer that there was a noticeable odor in the cabin; and the odor appeared to be getting stronger. The First Officer and I began reviewing the cabin fire/smoke checklist. The Lead Flight Attendant called the flight deck again and stated that the cabin lights had been turned off; and the odor had dissipated rapidly. The cabin crew suspected that there might be a problem with one of the ballasts. The odor never returned during the rest of the flight.After some time had passed; we were informed by the cabin crew that the aft left lavatory was very hot; and the walls and floor of the airplane in that area were too hot to even touch. They advised that they could feel the heat of the floor through their shoes. After receiving this information; I told the flight attendants to keep me advised of any changes; I transferred controls to the First Officer; and then I [advised] ATC and asked for their help in finding a nearby suitable diversion airfield. I then made a PA to the passengers that we would be executing a landing at [a nearby alternate]; and to follow the instructions of the crewmembers.We descended and landed normally; and we had Crash Fire Rescue (CFR) inspect the exterior of the aircraft. The CFR Captain advised me that through infrared; he could see large heat signatures in the back of the aircraft; in particular; he advised that the bags in the aft cargo compartment appeared to be glowing. Once CFR advised that the aircraft was cleared; and the flight attendants reported that there were no adverse changes in the cabin; we proceeded to the north transient ramp and deplaned via the forward stairs; with CFR continuously standing by and monitoring.More effective aircraft maintenance and inspection procedures.

MD-80 Captain reported diverting to a nearby alternate airport when the cabin crew reported noticing heat on the walls and floor of the aircraft. After landing; Crash Fire and Rescue (CFR) reported heat signatures in the aft cargo compartment.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 6300; Flight Crew Type 1000

Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

Declared emergency and landed after receiving 'L OIL PRESS LOW' red CAS message. Landed safely [at nearby airport] without incident.

A LR45 Captain reported receiving 'L OIL PRESS LOW' CAS message.  He declared an emergency and landed safely at a nearby airport.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 51.2; Flight Crew Total 355; Flight Crew Type 30

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Our aircraft had just landed at ZZZ when a single-seat aerobatic biplane began to do low-level aerobatics (hammerheads and rolls) opposite normal traffic in the pattern. A Cessna 150 entered left downwind Runway XX; well spaced from the biplane; which was in a modified right downwind/base; when the biplane crossed the field and entered a midfield left crosswind-to-downwind behind the 150. The 150 continued downwind; turned base then final; when the biplane banked hard from downwind directly to final abeam the 150 and approximately 25 feet above. The 150 initiated a go-around and the biplane did the same; nearly colliding which each other. The 150 eventually landed on a second go-around while the biplane continued to execute high speed low passes over the runway at about 50 feet AGL. The problem likely arose because the biplane; which was NORDO; was engaged in a low level acrobatics display for a group of onlookers in the tiedown area and was not scanning for conflicting traffic. The 150 likely saw the biplane traffic near the airport; but the biplane's erratic behavior and rapid altitude and direction changes would have complicated efforts to maintain separation. The conflict could have been resolved if the biplane pilot refrained from low-level aerobatics in the vicinity of the traffic pattern; was visually scanning for traffic; and vacated the traffic pattern area when other traffic was inbound to land.

Pilot observer reported a near mid air collision between two airplanes in airport traffic pattern.


While cruising at FL400 the Pilot Flying (PF) attempted to input left rudder trim with the rudder trim knob since the inclinometer indication was slightly left. He noted that the rudder trim knob would not move. We both tried moving the rudder trim knob left and right independently and it would not move either direction. I pressed on each rudder pedal and I could yaw the aircraft very slightly with the autopilot on.  We discussed our options and the PF communicated with our company in order to utilize all of our resources and comply with the FOM. We made a plan in the event that we did not regain rudder control and a plan in the event rudder control was restored.Once the descent was started the PF tested rudder authority several times during the decent and at FL230 (temp -11 C) rudder control and trim were restored. The rest of the flight proceeded uneventfully. The Pilot in Command (PIC) did note that rudder forces were higher than normal during the taxi after landing. The PIC made a maintenance entry noting the issue.We were both aware of frozen rudder events from reading the ASAP newsletter and considered that as a possible explanation of the issue. I had noted water draining from a drain hole in the bottom of the rear access compartment (hellhole) in Boca Raton that morning while the APU was running. I did not find that to be unusual since it was humid and assumed the condensation was draining out like it should. It had made a puddle on the ground about a 1.5 feet in diameter. There was no water draining from the departure airport for the whole time we were there (6 hours) and it was approximately 65 degrees F.After landing in DAL I immediately checked the rear access compartment for evidence of moisture but none could be seen in accessible compartments. There was a drop of water on the drain hole I had previously seen draining. The temperature [at our destination] was 36 degrees F.

On our flight to ZZZ crew noticed after 1 hour in flight that the airplane needed to have the rudder trimmed to the left. Crew attempted to use the rudder trim. The rudder trim would not move left or right. Crew turned autopilot off to see if the trim would move and the airplane was flying correctly and safe to continue. Crew contacted the company; dispatch; and Chief Pilot. We all agreed it was safe to continue the flight to ZZZ where it was warmer and we could burn off more fuel. On descent thru FL230 the crew turned off the autopilot and was able to move the rudders and rudder trim. On landing the pilot flying noticed the rudders were stiffer than normal but; easily controllable for landing. On the taxi in to the FBO the rudder pedals used for taxing the airplane were also stiffer than normal.  Crew again contacted the Chief Pilot and Maintenance upon arrival to the FBO.

A Citation air crew noticed after about an hour's flight at FL400 that the rudder trim knob would not move and that inputs to the rudder pedals resulted in only very slight yaw. They continued to their destination and found that rudder trim and rudder inputs were restored to normal operation after they descended through lower; warmer altitudes.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 23500; Flight Crew Type 5000

Physiological - Other; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Arriving at security at XA:00pm; we found all security check points and KCM [Known Crew Member] closed.  We were directed to security for airport employees in another terminal.  After setting off the alarm; I was instructed to start removing various articles of clothing.  With a line of airport employees behind me; I asked for a private search.  I was taken to yet another terminal and told to enter a room the size of an average walk in closest.  Two security personnel crammed in behind me.  There was poor ventilation and no possibility of distancing ourselves.  We all stood within a foot of each other.  I would suggest in this time of COVID; TSA like every other organization must adapt procedures and protocols to prevent the spread of COVID-19.  Utilizing KCM decreases the time and contact between security personnel and flight crews; two groups exposed to more human interaction than most.  Increasing the hours of KCM operation and relaxing constraints within the program to facilitate secure social distancing is a reasonable adaptation to help mitigate the spread of COVID among both essential workers and the public at large.

Air carrier Captain reported concerns with security checks in the terminal area that do not allow for proper social distancing.


A B737 followed an A319 on departure and visual separation was applied by the Tower. Once on my frequency; the B737 pilot asked to deviate off course for wake turbulence. This happens often; and while pilot concurrence is needed; sometimes during major departure pushes this creates increased workload; but more importantly is a safety situation for the aircraft.

TRACON Controller voiced concern that; at times; aircraft departing with required wake separation request to deviate for wake avoidance; indicating that during heavy departure pushes this can be a separation problem.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Procedure; Weather; Human Factors; Company Policy

While hooking up a tow bar during high winds; I noticed the plane moving 2 inches forward and 2 inches backward; moving the chocks each time a little more. I than noticed the brakes were not set. After chocking the plane again and hooking up the tow bar I notified a supervisor. The supervisor informed me that the plane arrived with hot brakes and that the pilot had informed the Operations [OPS] agent and tech [OPS]. The [OPS] agent did not inform the ramp lead working the flight. Had we not noticed the plane working itself loose from the chocks; aircraft damage and serious injuries were imminent.

A ramp employee reported observing a B737 movement in high winds which caused the wheels chocks to be displaced. The ground personnel were reportedly not advised that the aircraft arrived with hot brakes and the parking brake had not been set.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Physiological - Other; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

On this flight I was operating as the First Officer. During pre-flight we received the bag sheet. The ramp crew notified the Captain that there was a cat in the baggage compartment. He seemed to be concerned with the cat back there. I could not care less if the cat was riding on the wing of the aircraft or in the baggage compartment. The Captain then proceeded to make a PA and ask if the owner of the cat was on the aircraft. We are now very close to our scheduled push time. As a Captain I am becoming very annoyed with what he is doing as we have more important items to attend to; for example we have to fly the plane!!! Unbeknown to me the Captain has now removed the cat from the baggage compartment and the cat is now in the flight deck; the main cabin door just shut and the flight door is locked. All of this seemed to happen within a split second; and without my input. After all the doors had been shut; I asked the Captain what exactly is going on. He had some sort of plight for the cat to be in the baggage compartment. I further explained that I am allergic to cats. In fact it is the only thing I am allergic to. I am trying to apply every CRM trick in the book and others I have picked up over the last 15 years of being in this business. Not only has the Captain put us at risk with a live animal we know nothing about; its crate is now blocking an exit; I am allergic to Cats; and he has completely put his own feelings about how much he loves cats above the safety and security of everyone else on the aircraft. I was basically told that I would have to remove myself from the trip after he had now dropped the brake and blocked us out; and would have to explain this to the chief pilots.Normally I am a line Captain; and I would never put my First officers and passengers in this type of situation. The threats include among many: Blocking of an emergency exit. Possibly sick; or dangerous animal exposure. Exposure to illness. Ignoring the repeated concerns of the First officer and subsequently inappropriately forcing the decision. Unsecured object in the flight deck. Violation of company policy. First Officer is allergic to Cats.Although I have a significantly more senior line Captain position within the company than the Captain on this flight; I chose to sit in the left seat as I am very confident in my ability to operate the aircraft from the left and right seat proficiently. The Captain when asked did not share that confidence; so I made the decision to leave myself as the First Officer on the dispatch release and not call and have it swapped.I will not allow this to happen again; either as acting as the First Officer or Captain. It is now a day away from this incident and I am starting to feel the effects of being exposed directly to cat in a closed area. As a Captain I would never force something like this on any crewmember as it was done to me. I have had time to reflect what happened and I hope this report contributes in some way to prevent this in the future.

An EMB-145 Captain placed a passenger's cat and crate in the cockpit before takeoff; ignoring the First Officer's objections to blocking the exit. This violated company policy and ignored the First Officer's objections because of his cat allergy.


Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

I was working the departure sector that controls the north and eastbound departures off of SLC.  The general idea is to get them on course as quickly as possible while still topping the 118 MVA that is a few miles east of the SID.  I had been working the sector for a while so I was familiar with the conditions; favorable winds; cold temperatures; the aircraft were climbing well and I had adjusted my turn altitude for around 085-087 for the bulk of the jet departures. Through the entire departure bank I didn't have any issues with the MVA's or concerns that perhaps I was turning too early.  I turned Aircraft Y eastbound and as he was leaving 095 he asked me for higher (the NSIGN departures have been receiving 'climb via' clearances which tops out at FL230.  Even before 'climb via' was used the NSIGN departures were never restricted to 100).  I quickly gave him higher and told him to expedite because I knew he would be leveling his climb and was already headed towards higher MVA's.  This was right about when Aircraft X checked in; I told him 'Radar contact' but can't say I remember what he checked in climbing to.  My focus was on Aircraft Y which ultimately cleared the MVA's but it was certainly closer than I like it to be and it retained my attention.  I asked Aircraft Y if he was issued 100 as an initial altitude.  He said he was and either he was mistaken or clearance delivery issued the wrong altitude but I figured; perhaps wrongly; no harm no foul and realized it was on me anyways if he had checked in climbing to 100 and I missed it.  I went back to Aircraft X who was climbing out of 086 and I turned him eastbound.  I kept an eye on his altitude and noticed two sweeps where he was level at 090.  I told him to continue his good rate through 120 for the terrain and he replied that he would.  Three more sweeps still level at 090.  I realized even with a good climb rate there was no chance he could top the MVA's after having leveled at 090 for more than 20 seconds.  I turned him back northwest-bound but he was almost perpendicular to the MVA; I knew the turn wouldn't keep him out of it; I just wanted to keep him away from the actual rocks until he could figure out how to get the pointy end faced upward.  He entered an 110 MVA at around 106 (if I remember right) and I eventually got him back on course.  The only question I asked him was if the clearance delivery gave him any restrictions other than 'Climb via' and his response was; 'Just to maintain 230 knots.'  I can't say for sure that he checked in 'Climbing via' (to FL230 on a departure that never stops the climb at 090) but from that response I'm under the impression that both that pilot and I at least believe he did.I realize 'Climb via' is a nationwide thing that undoubtedly has some benefits in some areas.  I'm not convinced 'Climb via' on the NSIGN is the best idea.  I think we're making it more difficult than it needs to be.  Had the pilot been told to 'Climb and maintain FL230' he would have had it set before he rotated and he never would have leveled at 090.  This particular pilot probably had some other issues and was a bit slow to respond to my instructions anyway but I'm not convinced complicating the matter makes it any better.

S56 TMU controller reports of two aircraft departing SLC on the NSIGN departure that may have been issued lower than normal altitudes on the climb out; causing them to possibly enter a MVA that they weren't at yet.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure; Aircraft

Suspect possible damage to the Nose Wheel Tiller Shaft during test per Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) 32-51-00-735 Test Tiller Handle Steering. We set up to perform the test while the rest of the [Maintenance] crew was at break so that we could have hydraulics off. While trying to do the test during the crews break time; I forgot to raise the [Nose Gear] Upper Torsion Link to be parallel with the ground position per Step-G during the test; but didn't realize it at the time. When the Mechanic in the cockpit used the Torque Wrench to move the Tiller; I was watching the Load Limiter. I heard a noise as he applied the torque but assumed it was normal since it was the first time I had performed the test. The cam rollers didn't move and he said the torque wrench jumped so he was unable to get a good reading. The second time we tried to perform the test it was at the end of our shift. I had the Upper Torsion Link up at that time and was able to see the cam rollers move from the detent as they should. I was on my way home about midnight and thinking about the job when I realized that the cam rollers didn't move the first time we performed the test; probably because the torsion link was not up. I called and notified the Lead on the next shift. He said they would check and make sure everything was OK. But after looking at the [Shaft] tube and [Shaft] couplings the next day in the Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) and realizing they couldn't see the rivets that hold the coupling at the upper end of the Tiller Shaft; I talked to the Supervisor and requested that they do a Maintenance set-up to inspect the Tiller Shaft between the Load Limiter and the Tiller Handle; reference IPC 32-51-01-05. The Shaft is set up to be inspected tonight in ZZZ1.

Reporter stated he works as an Aircraft Mechanic for a major Air Carrier in their company hangars. The Torque Limiter; which is below the Lower Torque Shaft for the Nose Wheel Steering Tiller; had been robbed (cannibalized) for another B757 aircraft. A new Torque Limiter had been installed and he was trying to accomplish the Tiller Handle Steering Shaft Torque Test with the help of an Avionics' Mechanic in the cockpit. The rollers he was referring to; ride up on a cam inside the Torque Limiter. The Shaft Torque Test verifies the Torque Limiter spring and two rollers will 'break-over'; ride-up on a cam; to prevent excessive Tiller input to the Forward Cable Drum. He was under the cockpit floor to observe the 'break-over' motion.Reporter stated the Tiller Shaft Upper Torque Shaft coupling attach rivets are the 4-D type rivets. They were inspected the following night and found to be secure; not loose or partially sheared. That was his concern; especially since he had failed to disconnect the Upper Torsion Link on the nose gear when they had initially attempted to apply the Torque Limiter Test procedures.

A Mechanic requests his Supervisor initiate a maintenance follow-up to inspect the Nose Wheel Handle Steering; Upper Torque Shaft coupling attach rivets for damage on a company B757-200 aircraft. He had initially applied a Torque Test on the Torque Limiter without disconnecting the nose gear Upper Torsion Link first.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 11.7; Flight Crew Total 158.4; Flight Crew Type 23.7

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

At near touchdown a gusty crosswind lifted the aircraft 10 feet and pushed it off the runway. We were already below the power curve and unable to go-around for fear the aircraft could stall or lose directional control. We rolled down a steep embankment at the edge of the runway into a dry water retention area. There were no injuries or damage to property. The aircraft suffered minor nose wheel damage and the prop stuck the soil.

PA28 pilot reports being blown off the runway during flare by a gusty crosswind and electing to not attempt a go-around. Slight damage to the nosewheel is reported and the propeller contacts the ground.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

While working Local 1; Aircraft X was issued instructions to hold short of the runway. The pilot read back hold short instructions correctly but still attempted to cross. I observed the error and reiterated the hold short instructions. At this time Aircraft Y was rolling for departure. Aircraft X did stop however the aircraft crossed the hold short line the proximity was 297 feet to Aircraft Y departing at top speed.  I believe the hold short lines are confusing at this location. This particular occasion could be a clear case of expectation bias.

An aircraft acknowledged instructions to hold short of a runway but attempted to cross the runway anyway. The aircraft crossed the hold short line.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

While in cruise flight at FL290 in smooth air; we encountered wake turbulence. The First Officer was the Pilot Flying with the autopilot on. I noticed the aircraft roll abruptly left followed by a roll to the right. The First Officer took immediate action by simultaneously disconnecting the autopilot and providing positive control inputs. An Autopilot Fail EICAS message appeared as well. While he did that; I put the fasten seatbelt sign on; then noticed the aircraft climbing above assigned altitude and brought this to the Pilot Flying's attention. He was clearly attempting to arrest the climb. We continued a slow climb and I mentioned it again to him. He verbally responded that he was pushing forward. At this point I also pushed forward on the yoke until a descent began. The climbed stopped at FL295. I advised ATC that we had encountered wake turbulence and were descending back to FL290 which ATC acknowledged. Next; I called the Flight Attendant to find out the status of the cabin and passengers. She stated everyone was fine but that some were looking at her (presumably for information). I told her I would make a PA which I did. The First Officer and I discussed re-engaging the autopilot. The Autopilot Fail EICAS message had extinguished almost immediately after it appeared. We agreed to engage the autopilot again and did so with no issues. The rest of the flight continued without any other issues. I sent the appropriate ACARS message to Maintenance as per our SOP; made the AML entry; and called [Maintenance Director] after landing. [Maintenance Director] stated that the EICAS message was expected during a wake turbulence event.Wake turbulence during cruise causing autopilot disconnect. In my opinion; the Pilot Flying acted appropriately and we worked together as a team to make sure the aircraft; passengers; and crew were all OK. I cannot think of anything to be done differently. We were not given any traffic advisories from ATC that may have alerted us to the potential for wake turbulence. I've experienced several wake encounters prior to this one and it was the least severe of all of my experiences.

EMB-140 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence at FL290 that led to an altitude excursion.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

We were taking off at ATL behind a B-757 on RWY 26L. Tower cleared me to takeoff about 50 seconds after the 757. I informed him that I needed 2 minutes or 4-5 miles separation behind a 757. He stated that they do not have to use those separations anymore and that if I wasn't willing to take off that I would need to clear the runway. I was able to delay tower until I at least had 1.5 minutes of separation at which time I took off. Upon checking part 1 under takeoff; I am supposed to have separation behind a 757. The weather was partly cloudy skies and calm winds. I did get 2 quick turbulence pops from the 757 after takeoff.

B737-800 Captain reported refusing takeoff clearance in ATL because the preceding aircraft was a B757 and he felt more separation was appropriate.


Socata (Aerospatiale); Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 3300; Flight Crew Type 900

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

I was being vectored from ZZZ to ZZZ1 to the south and under the ZZZ2 Class B 4;000 ring at 3;000 feet. There was converging VFR traffic apparently not talking to Approach at 2;500 feet. The Controller turned me from a 250 to 270 heading which; according to my TCAS; indicated a convergence with the VFR traffic. As we converged; the VFR traffic began to climb as indicated by TCAS. I did not see the traffic. With the traffic at my location and 200 feet below; I began an immediate ascent to 3;400 feet. I received an urgent traffic alert on my TCAS. The location of the incident was just to the south of the 3;000 feet Class B ring. Pilot provided the following reasons why the routing was not the best route. On short flights from the east to ZZZ1; as a turbine aircraft; I am usually vectored over ZZZ2 in Class B. This avoids a large amount of VFR traffic ordinarily present between ZZZ3 and ZZZ1. I question the Controllers decision to vector me at a low altitude through a swarm of VFR traffic on a clear day. The Controller was not talking to the VFR traffic 500 feet below me and should not have vectored me toward the traffic knowing that the traffic could ascend to my altitude of 3;000 feet without even a radio call. Even if vectoring me south; the Controller could have given me a veil of protection from VFR traffic if he had routed me through the 3;000 feet Class B veil instead of putting me under the 4;000 feet veil in Class E.

Pilot reported an NMAC event while on ATC vector under Class B 4;000 ring at assigned altitude of 3;000 feet. Pilot took evasive action to avoid a collision. Pilot indicated ATC assigned route and altitude was conducive to VFR traffic conflict.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 5200; Flight Crew Type 2000

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was flying on a scheduled freight route. A snow storm had entered the area and was across the entire route. Upon leaving; I entered IMC almost immediately and was IMC during the entire flight. The temperatures were -1 C entering IMC and -10 C at 8;000 FT. I immediately started to pick up ice after leaving. About 30 miles into the flight I entered an area of moderate ice and went up to 8;000 to try and slow the progression. It helped but I still continued to get light ice with small pockets of moderate. All the deice equipment on the airplane was operational but the ice continued to form on the parts of the airplane not equipped with deice equipment. As a rule of thumb; if the airplane airspeed falls below 150; the pilot needs to take evasive action to get out of it. I was actually down to 140 KTS in level flight but I was close enough to destination that I needed to start a descent to get set up for the approach. I was 40 miles out when I got the weather and it was 1 1/4 miles and 600 FT overcast; shortly after that Center advised me that the weather was going down. At this point; I had already started my descent and was maintaining 140 KTS. I had started to run out of options at this point because the airplane had picked up enough ice I did not think I would be able to climb back up. I was maintaining airspeed only because I was descending. The visibility had dropped to 1/4. I elected to do the ILS approach rather than hold due to the ice the airplane had already encountered. I landed without incident with the actual visibility almost one mile. The trucks were plowing the runway and the wind was blowing in the right direction so that the snow off the runway was moving over the sensor. The snowstorm was the actual cause of the problem and the inaccurate TAF. While the weather was supposed to come down it was not supposed to drop below 1 1/2 according to the TAF. I was fully aware of the snowstorm and possible icing condition but also had many options for most of the flight.

A PA31 pilot departed on a one hour flight into icing conditions with forecast snow and low visibilities at destination. Ice formed on areas of the aircraft that are not deiced and airspeed dropped. Descent was required to maintain airspeed and an ILS approach and landing was made with visibility reported as one quarter mile.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

While taxiing out of the maintenance ramp we noticed that we were having difficulties connecting [to] ground control. Aircraft had the com 1 MEL'd for being intermittent prior to our departure from ZZZ. Com 1 had a 'Failed 2' on the com 1 screen. Com 2 was giving us difficulties transmitting and receiving while starting our taxi in the Non movement area from maintenance. While trying to contact ground control during our taxi we were concerned enough not to continue movement. After a few minutes stopped by the entrance to [an FBO] we deviate into [the FBO] ramp to assess the communication problems due to no response from ground control. While troubleshooting the problem we followed the checklists to determine if all switches were in the proper orientation (they were). We then unplugged the oxygen masks mics on both the pilot and pilot monitoring sides of the cockpit. Problems with communication ceased. During our troubleshooting the mic on one of the oxygen masks was transmitting through com 1 while the com selection switch was on com 2 and the mic switch was in the normal position on both sides of the cockpit. Tower frequency was on com 1 during our taxi and troubleshooting unknown to us it was transmitting through the oxygen mask mic. Remainder of the flight had no other communication problems. [Cause was a] hot oxygen mask mic.

First Officer reported a hot microphone on an oxygen mask; causing communications to be rendered inoperative.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

[Requested priority handling] when we got a EICAS message of flap fail. Ran the checklist and deemed that to return back to ZZZ was a safer choice due to how close we were instead of flying to ZZZ1. Got vectors for a no flap landing on the longest Runway XX at ZZZ.

E170 First Officer reported that a FLAP FAIL EICAS warning resulted in a return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 12200; Flight Crew Type 1300

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 7500

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

We taxied out to Runway XXL in ZZZ without any incident.  Takeoff was normal with normal indications.  We weighed 170;000 LBS and had almost full tanks of gas with a full load of passengers heading to ZZZ1.  Shortly after takeoff the Captain asked if I smelled anything.  I replied; 'Yes.'  It was not the normal galley/food smell; high heat smell or electrical burning smell; but more of a burning oil smell.  I associated it with the possible factories that we fly over in the ZZZ area.  The Captain called the flight attendants to see if they smelled it and they also smelled it in the back of the cabin.  Once the Captain heard this; he said that we were going to return to ZZZ.  I put my mask on and established communication (comm) and the Captain did as well.  ATC asked if we were declaring an emergency and the Captain responded; 'Yes.'  The Captain ran the checklist and I put the autopilot on and began the decent back to ZZZ for a landing on XXL.  We were only about 20 miles from the airport when we began the return.  My thought process was to get the aircraft on the ground as soon as possible and the Captain seemed to be the same. He ran as quickly as possible through the Smoke/Odor/Fumes Checklist while I set up for a 40-Flap max brakes; overweight landing.  We came back together on Final and ran through the Approach/Descent; Approach Checklist and set up to land.  After landing we called the flight attendants to see if they saw or smelled any more odors.  They did not and we proceeded to the gate.  Maintenance met us at the gate and said that they had borescoped the engine the night prior.  They said that nine out of ten times that is the cause of the smell.

Reporter stated he only smelled an odor; did not see any smoke; same for the flight attendants in the forward and aft cabin. He was not familiar with the engine borescope procedures that Maintenance performed other than Maintenance opened the borescope plugs and inspected the CFM-56 Engine.

Shortly after takeoff; I noticed a smell of electrical smoke in the cockpit.  As we climbed through 3;000; I felt the Circuit Breaker (CB) panels for heat.  I then called the flight attendants (F/A) to ask if they were using the ovens.  They replied; 'No.'  They also smelled smoke in both forward and aft sections of cabin.  First Officer (F/O) and I had a short discussion on what could be the cause. I chose to declare an emergency; and return to ZZZ; as I could not readily locate the source of the smoke. ATC cleared us to level off at 10;000. I instructed the F/O to continue flying.  He called for the Smoke Checklist. We were given vectors to ZZZ; I was also trying to communicate with the F/As about returning to ZZZ. I told them 5 minutes; but I did not tell them about the possibility that we may need to evacuate the airplane after landing. I had trouble locating the correct checklist the Pilot Flying called for. I was looking in wrong sections.  Pilot Flying donned mask. I had trouble communicating with him. I donned my mask and goggles about a minute or two after he did; we established communications. I found the Checklist; and ran it through the first two pages.  I stopped there to make sure we were ready for landing as we were now on final for XXL.  Approach Descent; Approach and Landing Checklist accomplished. Flap 40; Auto Brake max landing; approximately 170;000 lbs. F/O made a smooth touch down. We exited at Taxiway Mike.  The smell had dissipated significantly by then; I elected not to evacuate and taxied to [the gate].  Pilot Flying made some ATC calls and adjusted altitude selector as I was busy with other tasks.  F/O handled the workload I gave him with ease. Crew Coordination. Checklist confusion.

A Captain and First Officer report about a burning oil smell in the flight deck and cabin of a NexGen B737 aircraft shortly after takeoff. An emergency was declared and an air turnback accomplished. Maintenance noted that a Borescope Inspection had been accomplished on the CFM-56 engines the night before.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 22500; Flight Crew Type 6000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Airport

This narrative is concerning an inaccuracy on the LNK 10-9 taxi chart and the confusion that occurred when attempting to follow the taxi chart. Our flight was a night flight into LNK. Weather was VMC with winds out of the south at less than 10 knots.A visual approach to RWY 14 was briefed. The exit and taxi plan was thoroughly briefed. The plan was to exit at the end of RWY 14 on taxiway P for proximity to our parking area. The approach and landing was normal. The tower said we could exit onto taxiway K. We could have turned onto K but I had the First Officer tell the tower we would like to go to the end. The tower approved our request. The turnoff at the end looked to be wide open on the chart.The JeppFD-Pro App on the IPad is very useful to zoom in on the 10-9 taxi charts to view and brief in more detail the planned taxi routes. This is useful at infrequently visited airports such as LNK. The area of concern is at the south end of RWY 14. The end of RWY 14 is shown on the 10-9 chart by the arrow emanating from Elev 1178 FT.When landing on RWY 14 and planning to exit at the end the 10-9 chart would have you taxiing beyond the end of the runway and then exiting to the right. The large taxi area depicted beyond the end of RWY 14 also shows that it connects up to RWY 17-35.In reality the entire area shown on the 10-9 chart beyond the end of RWY 14 appears to be inaccurate. The end of the runway on the chart appears to not be in correct position in relation to the exit and taxi area shown. The actual taxiway appears to be only a portion of the area shown. Also; the area does not appear to connect to RWY 17-35. The landing lights showed the area beyond the end of the runway to be the same type of surface as the runway to add more confusion.The LNK 10-9 chart needs to be updated to be more accurate for unfamiliar crews. With the EFB and the Jeppesen App it is even more important to have accurate and precise taxi information depicted on the 10-9 pages because we can zoom in to see the details now. If I could offer a suggestion. There looks to be plenty of room on the LNK 10-9 chart to place a blow-up pictoral of that particular area of concern such as they have on the BOS 10-9 chart. Since a satellite picture such as Google Earth can be viewed to see what the airport actually looks like you would think that Jeppeson would use something like that to get more precise data. The digitized data could make for much more clear and accurate 10-9 pages.Our goal is to have the LNK 10-9 page updated so no other crew gets confused like we were.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

Air carrier flight crew after landing on Rwy 14 at LNK and exiting at the end of the runway was confused by the conflicts between the Jeppesen 10-9 display of the exit area and the actual layout of the hard surface in that area.  Cited as contributing factors were a night arrival and the ability of his iPad tablet to expand the chart for greater detail...in this case inaccurate detail.  Of significant importance is the fact that the hard surface area in that location does not connect to Runway 17/35 as shown on the chart.


Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 111; Flight Crew Total 345; Flight Crew Type 333

The Centurion was not on the practice frequency and was not changing course or altitude and came from our 8 O'clock position passing directly below us at a faster speed than us; we initiated a climb and a bank left to put as much space as possible between our two aircraft.

PA-28 pilot reported an NMAC event during training flight with a Cessna P210 Centurion who was not on correct radio frequency.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

[Company] maintenance doesn't seem to repair defective items by normal troubleshooting; but rather by random parts movements or replacement. There are numerous instances where an aircraft has a maintenance issue that is documented and the maintenance action is either 'could not duplicate' and return to service or move some parts and return to service. This puts the next flight crew in the position of being part of the troubleshooting process rather than having a repaired aircraft. Recent examples are Bleed leak issues experienced on Aircraft X and Aircraft Y. Both aircraft were documented with Bleed leak (R) CAS messages when the anti-ice was used. Maintenance did not trouble shoot and repair the problem; but moved parts and released the aircraft for flight. After several repeat write ups; the problem was finally repaired properly. This exposed the flight crews and passengers to increased risks due to hot bleed air being allowed to leak into sensitive areas of the aircraft. This also exposes the company to significant liability for using airplanes that are knowingly flown without being repaired. When first picking up a 'new' aircraft; a review of the logbook will sometimes show a history of repeat write ups. It is only a matter of time until the problem reoccurs. It may be the next flight or a few flights later. This failure to properly troubleshoot and repair aircraft causes increased risk to the flight crews and passengers; costs the company for several maintenance actions; rather than the one it should have taken to effect the repair and can have the unintended cost of crew fatiguing (to cover for the broken aircraft) or the cost of a sell-off to a vendor aircraft. This also reduces the number of available aircraft and destabilizes the operational schedule.Maintenance providers should be given the necessary training to properly troubleshoot and repair [company] aircraft. [The company] should expect that in most cases; problems are repaired correctly the first time. Since the company has moved away from in-house maintenance and started using contract maintenance; these problems have seemed to become more common. [The company] should require the highest level of professionalism and quality of work from all our maintenance providers. Maintenance seems to accept the practice of paying several vendors to solve a problem rather than fixing it correctly the first time. This practice must add greatly to costs for unnecessary repeat maintenance. Accept only highly trained maintainers and only pay them when the problem is fixed correctly.

Air taxi Captain reported that company aircraft have not been properly maintained.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors

During boarding; I approached passenger to confirm that she was aware that her dog had to be enclosed in the carrier and stowed under the seat on the aircraft. She stated that they flew often with their dog and knew what to do. Cabin pet continued to be in unzipped carrier. Customer Service was called and the couple heard him out; but was still out of compliance. A Manager was called to speak to the passenger in the row ahead because he was believed to be under the influence of alcohol. After this brief; it was determined that he was safe for transport; but the couple behind still did not stow their dog under the seat. At this point I asked that the Captain have them removed. Consequently; they were very angry. I believe that the gentleman was under the influence of alcohol; as well as the passenger in front and nearby. The passenger nearby made lunging gestures while he screamed at me on takeoff roll. He was lunging at me with his pillow while his wife tried to calm him. I would say that he was impaired by alcohol and he was part of the party who was removed for failure to stow their cabin pet. I felt very threatened by the passenger. The C Flight Attendant took over my first class duties. I traded jump seats with the B Flight Attendant for landing. We did not issue passenger misconduct because the passenger was so volatile and we feared pushing him further. I performed the C Flight Attendant duties for the flight. The Flight Attendant who took over for me advised me to stay clear of the forward cabin. I felt that the tone of the First Class Cabin was extremely hostile because many were friends with the couple who were removed. I felt sick and fearful for the flight after the passenger threatened me. I considered hiding in the lavatory should he come after me. He spent part of the flight at in the aisle at over wing conversing with his sister. When she heard that there had been a problem she asked if he had been drinking. The Flight Attendant who took over in First Class said that he later apologized to her and that he changed considerably. I tried to maintain calm and professionalism; but I could not stop shaking or calm my stomach the duration of the flight. I am afraid to leave my hotel room for fear that someone should be waiting for me downstairs. I know that this is somewhat irrational; but I am fearful and panicked after this incident. I was nervous exiting the airport and passing our passengers at baggage claim. A man waiting at the bottom of the escalator told me that he was in [the group] and 'not to worry;' as I was just doing my job. We also encountered clear air turbulence on final (I secured myself on the floor at Row 6 and a bird strike on final approach.)One problem is that we offer a pre-departure beverage (alcohol) when we have not had the chance to evaluate passengers seated in first class. It is often not until you have served a pre-departure cocktail that you have had enough interaction to question signs of intoxication. On this flight I served a glass of wine to [the threatening passenger]; a beer to [the passenger first suspected to be under the influence] and a gin and tonic to [another in the party]; whom was in the lavatory for part of boarding I believe. The situation and passengers seemed controlled when these beverages were offered. Not knowing what they had had to drink prior to boarding; there was no frame of reference for alcohol serving guidelines. After the events with [two of the party members]; I suspect that the pre-departure beverage contributed to the problems we had with these passengers.

After having a threatening; non-conforming passenger removed; the A Flight Attendant assumed the aft C Flight Attendant duties because she felt threatened by other members of removed passenger's party.


Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

On approach into SBN around 10 NM from the airport we were given a heading to join the 9R LOC for the ILS while level at 2;600 feet in IMC. As the LOC was coming alive we received a GPWS warning. The Captain executed the GPWS escape maneuver and the warning went away. We notified ATC and leveled off around 3;000 feet. ATC vectored us back around and we shot the 9R ILS without any further warnings (this time ATC kept us at 3;000 feet until intercepting the GS).We complied with the GPWS warning and notified ATC of our change in altitude. Suspected false GPWS warning as there aren't in high obstacles in the area.

On approach into South Bend we received a GPWS Terrain warning we were being vectored for the localizer at 2;600 feet we complied with the warning and climbed to about 3;000 feet the warning disappeared and we were re-factored back for the approach with no other incident. ATC verified that he did not see us go below 2;600 feet.We were IMC at the time and could not verify the warning was false.

The reporter stated that had they not been IMC at the time; he would have continued the approach. The crew believed that there were no obstacles west of the airport which posed a threat to an aircraft at 2;600 feet. The reporter believed his aircraft was equipped with an EGPWS.

An air carrier crew being vectored for the SBN Runway 9R ILS received an EGPWS terrain warning at 2;600 feet and because they were IMC executed the escape maneuver even though they believed there was no threat west of the airport.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 26

Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This is the first of three events that occurred tonight in a 1 1/2 hour period. ZDV handed us two aircraft at FL370 on collision courses. We had to reach out and call Denver to take one of them down to FL350. I have spoken to two different areas in our facility that deal with this same sector/area in Denver. Area 5; Area 6 and Area 4 all have sectors that border the area in Denver that houses this particular Denver sector. They all have confessed that they too have daily occurrences of separation errors. Unfortunately; I believe that most of these don't get reported. Quite honestly; I can understand why. The managers in our facility don't seem to care! I've had numerous experiences with my area manager in which he has told me that he wouldn't pursue the example that I've brought to him. Like I mentioned above; this is one of three situations Denver handed us in less than an hour and a half; and I'm not filling out the second one because it's exhausting doing these when I know nothing will come of it.

Minneapolis Center Controller reported that Denver Center handed off two aircraft on a collision course.