Flight Crew Last 90 Days 187; Flight Crew Total 1862; Flight Crew Type 645

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

On takeoff roll as power increased to takeoff thrust; we received a L ENG HPSOV (High Pressure Shutoff Valve) EICAS annunciation. This was accompanied by the left BLEED light on the overhead bleed air panel. I was pilot monitoring and I announced the EICAS message. The Captain verbalized the EICAS; analyzed the situation and made the decision to reject takeoff. We had reached approximately 40 knots When the EICAS came on; and the reject was initiated at 60 knots; we reached a maximum speed of 70 knots before decelerating. We performed the rejected takeoff per the flight manual and taxied clear. We did not evacuate. The EICAS L ENG HPSOV light went out when power was reduced; so we elected to review that procedure in the QRH; but did not reconfigure the bleed panel. We contacted Dispatch and [Technical Support Maintenance Control] via SATCOM and we were told we would need to return to the gate to allow Maintenance to work on the left engine HPSOV. This engine had recently been changed and this was the first flight after installation. It was an ETOPS verification flight. We had also been dispatched with a R RECIRC FAN inoperative (MEL 21-XX).After Maintenance looked at the engine; Dispatch and [Technical Support Maintenance Control] concurrently recommended operating under MEL 36-XX in addition to the previous MELs. The L ENG HPSOV was locked closed per the MEL and we were re-dispatched. We asked several questions about operating with concurrent MELs. [Technical Support Maintenance Control] informed us that operation with the right recirculating fan inoperative and the right pack in high flow was acceptable. They also informed us that the ETOPS verification under the new MEL was also acceptable as the ETOPS verification was only verifying displayed engine parameters such as EPR; N1; N2; fuel flow; and EGT. With all of the MEL requirements complied with; we pushed back approximately 3 hours late and departed normally; per SOP.

I was the PF (Pilot Flying). On takeoff roll; L ENG HPSOV (High Pressure Shutoff Valve) EICAS and Left BLEED light came on. FO (First Officer) called it out at about 40 knots I repeated it back to him and said 'rejecting' and rejected the takeoff; according to the procedure. The max speed reached was approximately 70 knots We cleared the runway and asked ATC for a good spot to stop and analyze. We then ran the Rejected Takeoff QRC (Quick Reference Checklist)/QRH checklist. The FO determined the time needed before another takeoff as per the Brake Cooling Table. I then spoke with the Purser; made a PA to the passengers and then called Dispatch with a patch through to [Technical Support Maintenance Control] to determine our course of action. We were advised to return to a gate so that maintenance may check the L ENG HPSOV and possibly defer it. The FO and I worked together to accomplish all checklists and communications. We taxied to Gate XXXX. The Left Engine HPSOV was deferred as per MEL 36-XX. Our flight plan indicated that our flight was an ETPOS Verification Flight and that the left engine primary instruments had to be verified as operating normally before entering ETOPS. We checked with maintenance that the left engine bleed system was not part of this certification. In addition; the right recirculation fan was deferred as per MEL 21-XX. Maintenance confirmed that these two deferrals were acceptable together. We departed the gate 3 hours late and completed the ETOPS verification as requested.

B767 Flight Crew reported an engine high pressure shutoff valve alert on takeoff; resulting in a rejected takeoff and return to gate.


Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

I was training a new Ramp controller. I had an incident where a B737 turning out of a gate hit their brakes and requested to return to the gate due to an injured flight attendant. We gave clearance to a RJ to taxi to the gate. The RJ was moving at a good rate of speed. The B737 called for taxi from their gate. The taxi instruction were issued. The pilots read back was correct. As the RJ approached the B737 still hadn't moved. I then instructed the trainee to tell the RJ to give way as it got closer and then changed my mind because the B737 still did not move. The B737 then started to rollout quickly. I then instructed the B737 to give way. The B737 did not read back the instruction. At that moment the aircraft stopped quickly as the RJ approached.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

DEN Ramp controllers reported they allowed an aircraft to taxi behind an aircraft which they allowed to pushback.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

I was working sector 19 and had a CRJ descending into the El Paso terminal area. The CRJ was on the star at this time. A VFR BE20 called for VFR flight following the aircraft was leaving El Paso Approach's airspace climbing. So to understand the picture the CRJ was just about head on with the BE20. The BE20 was going to pass maybe a 1/4 mile north of the CRJ. El Paso Approach called me and said to stop the CRJ at 14;000 FT and told me nothing about the BE20; I then told him I had already shipped him and proceed to give El Paso control. At this point I was gathering all the BE20's info to put in the computer as well as verifying the mode C; radar identification; type and route. By this point the CRJ and the rebel were in very close proximity. At this point I was unaware of the altitude the BE20 was climbing to. Then when I saw the BE20 climbing thru 13;500; I asked him what he was climbing to he said 16;500. I issued vectors to the BE20 to clear the CRJ. Both aircraft got within .25 mile or less at the same altitude. After the situation I asked the BE20; was El Paso Approach proving you flight following? He replied yes; but they canceled my flight following and had me contact you. All this could have been avoided if he was not terminated. In my opinion El Paso Approach was not providing any service to this VFR aircraft. I noticed the situation late on my end; and I should have caught it quicker; but my question is who terminates flight following on an aircraft with IFR traffic descending thru his flight path. My opinion El Paso Approach was using careless Air Traffic Control and was not providing safety. If they would have flashed me the BE20 data block this would not of happened. I spent precious seconds gathering all the info on the BE20 when he came over putting me way behind that is why my response was late. We need to work better as a team.

ZAB Controller describes a conflict between a VFR BE20 departing El Paso eastbound and a CRJ arriving from the east. The BE20 was receiving flight following from El Paso Departure but was canceled before being switched to ZAB; wasting precious seconds.


Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Workload

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was the pilot flying the MASHH RNAV arrival into MEM. Approaching MASHH Intersection I realized the automation was not sufficiently slowing the aircraft for the published speed of 230 KTS at FASOP Intersection. I believe I may have overridden my speeds at the fixes with an earlier tactical speed adjustment. I deselected profile mode and extended the speed brake and slowed the descent to reduce the speed. In doing so I also reduced my rate of descent and was approximately 300 feet high crossing FASOP and about 18 knots fast. I kept the speed brake extended and met both speed and altitude constraints approximately 1.5 to two miles past FASOP.There was no loss of separation vertically or horizontally with any other traffic that we were aware of. These were the circumstances to the best of my knowledge and recall. My primary focus was getting the aircraft on altitude and speed not focusing on the distances once I saw the need to make a correction. Earlier intervention with the automation [might have helped]. Also; I could have adjusted the altitudes and speeds more conservatively in the FMS to ensure the parameters of these new arrivals are met.

An A300 flight crew was unable to comply with the crossing speed and altitude restrictions at MASHH Intersection on the MASHH RNAV STAR at MEM.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 400; Flight Crew Type 300

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was enroute; VFR 8500 feet [and] entered pattern for runway 28 at my planned destination. Below 1000 feet; the winds were substantial and variable; gusting to 30kts. Although I am proficient and comfortable with crosswind/gusts; the conditions were outside my personal safety limits. I immediately went missed when it was clear that I would not be able to land there. I went direct to KRVJ; an airport I am familiar with and comfortable landing from prior arrivals. Due to the turbulence at enroute altitude (approximately 1500 feet); I was unable to check NOTAMS at RVJ. Due to turbulence; I could not devote full attention to ForeFlight to verify NOTAMS; as I was trying to safely fly the plane in the aggressive winds.On short final; approximately 200 feet AGL; I noticed a VERY SMALL 'X' in the runoff area. I believe it meant that the run off was closed; not the airport or the runway. I have seen the 'X' actually on the runway; blocking the runway at other airports; indicating a closed runway. After landing safely; I noticed the NOTAM in ForeFlight. I believe that the severe low-level turbulence and strong winds prevented me from checking NOTAMS in an airport that I did not intend on landing. On short final; had the 'X' (runway closed) been more prominent; I would have recognized it as the runway closed; rather than the overrun closed. I had not intended to land at RVJ; it was an in-flight safety decision due to the extreme winds at intended destination.

Beechcraft Bonanza pilot reported landing on closed runway in turbulent; gusty conditions. Runway closure marking was incorrect and unclear. Pilot exercised Part 91.3 authority safety decision.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 270; Flight Crew Total 26000; Flight Crew Type 900

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

FO iPad mount was situated by fo nosewheel steering tiller... as captain I tried to exit rwy but tiller was jammed by FO iPad mount.

B777 Captain reports being unable to turn off the runway after landing due to the tiller being jammed on the First Officer's side by the unused iPad mount.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Workload; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 21.5

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Company Policy; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Staffing; Weather

I was working Sector 25R combined with Sector 65 during busy and complex traffic for nearly 2 hours with no D side. It is an arrival sector and we had multiple shutoffs to Denver airport during that time. I issued multiple reroutes and had the majority of aircraft deviating for weather in my sector and adjacent sectors. Aircraft Y flew through my sector at FL370 and was handed off to Sector 30 eastbound and deviating for weather. After the aircraft left my airspace I dropped the data block.Aircraft X came from Sector 5 headed eastbound to Sector 30 at FL370. The aircraft was in handoff status to Sector 30 for approximately 7 minutes. Aircraft Y deviated back toward my airspace; but I had not been shown a data block or received any coordination. The conflict alert went off when Aircraft X was about 2 minutes from the boundary. I called Sector 30 and told him that I would turn Aircraft X 15 degrees right. He said I didn't need to; that he would descend Aircraft Y. I turned Aircraft X when I didn't see Aircraft Y descend in a timely manner. Aircraft Y began a slow descent; but when the aircraft reached FL364 and was on the edge of the bubble it began to climb again to FL370 when we had less than 5 miles.We were very short staffed and didn't have enough staffing to open up my D side or split off Sector 65. The supervisor took 4 or 5 people back to have a 'break out session'. The supervisor made the comment during breakout that he knew there wasn't enough staffing to have them out; but he was proving a point to the evening supervisor because he approved shift changes that were outside of his shift. I feel that safety was compromised due to supervisors disagreeing with one another and trying to get even. Staffing has been falling below numbers a lot lately and we very rarely get overtime called in to help. Now that summer weather patterns have begun this is going to be a serious issue soon.We need more staffing and we need supervisors to make better choices.

The Radar Controller; who was training; was working aircraft Y heading northwest into some weather near Denver. Aircraft Y asked to deviate left or west and was permitted to do so. Aircraft Y was getting close to Sector 25 and I had not pointed him out to Sector 25 yet. Aircraft Y turned further to the left and the Radar Controller saw the traffic (aircraft X who was being worked by Sector 25) and turned aircraft Y 20 degrees right for traffic.After both his trainer and I said that that was not going to be enough; he initiated a descent to Aircraft Y to FL350. At that time; Aircraft Y and Aircraft X started flashing and Sector 25 called me telling me that they were turning Aircraft X to the right 15 degrees. I told them that we were taking Aircraft Y down to FL350; but we would turn Aircraft X back. When I hopped back off the line; I heard Aircraft Y stating that he did not want to descend because of weather and would rather take the turn. The Radar Controller climbed Aircraft Y back up to FL370 and turned him 20 degrees to the right (the original plan that I knew was not going to work). I told him that Sector 25 had turned Aircraft X 15 degrees right and that they were shipping him. There was nothing else I could do as 25 had shipped Aircraft X. I did not think that it was going to work at that time; but it was too late as they were already too close.The Radar Controller measured it and said that separation was not lost and so I stopped writing down the call signs and went on with the business of the sector. I did not find out that there was a loss of separation until [the next day;] when my supervisor told me.The trainer for the R side should have never allowed the trainee to climb the Aircraft Y back up! When the loss of separation occurred; the Aircraft Y was climbing back up into Aircraft X. If he had just kept him descending; there would not have been a loss in separation. When I went off line to talk with Sector 25; there was a plan in place that would have worked! When I came back to the sector after coordination; the R side ruined the plan!

Center Controllers reported a loss of separation between two aircraft deviating for weather.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Vectored onto the [Runway] 16R ILS at 2;100 [feet] due to a medical situation aircraft behind us; putting us lower and about 3 miles from a 737 ahead of us and a little above. We hit some wake turbulence putting us into a slight bank and then again pushing us to about 10 to 15 degrees of bank. The First Officer immediately took control and climbed and stayed high on the glide slope for the approach and landed with no further problems.

EMB-175 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on approach to SEA in trail of a B737.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

While in cruise; both the First Officer (FO) and I smelled what appeared to be an electrical odor. I called back to the Flight Attedent's (FA) to ask if they had any unusual odor in the cabin. They said that they did with a very light haze in the cabin. The FO and I accomplished the QRC for SMOKE; FIRE or FUMES which then lead us to QRH Chapter 8 SMOKE; FIRE or FUMES Checklist. We accomplished steps 1-12. I read step 12 as we had extinguished the source through previous steps. The smell had dissipated as did the haze in the cabin; which in my opinion confirmed that the situation was contained. We then moved to item 13. At that point I contacted Dispatch and informed them of the entire event and discussed with them our options and their preference. I conferred with the FO and all FAs and apprised them that it was my intent to continue on to our destination; but if anyone did not feel comfortable with this decision; that we would divert into ZZZ. At that time we were about 30 minutes east of ZZZ. Dispatch had also said that based on the information that we gave them; and having spoken with Maintenance; asked if we were comfortable to continue to destination. I informed them that we would continue on and would divert to ZZZ if the fumes returned. As I sit and spend more time reading this QRH out of the Cockpit; I could see how maybe we should have have diverted as the smoke; fire or fumes were not 'obvious' although it was obvious through the absence of smell and haze the source was 'isolated and extinguished.'

Air Carrier Captain reported a fume event during cruise. After completing the appropriate QRH procedure and  conferring with Maintenance the flight continued to a safe landing at destination.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 7500; Flight Crew Type 3500

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Procedure; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related

As we were taxiing the airplane into the FBO ramp in Teterboro; we noticed it [seemed] narrow with airplanes parked on both sides of us; but plenty wide enough for our G-V. We were met by 3 marshalers; one in front and one on each side. They guided us down the right side of the alley. We thought they were going to 'nose us in' and use a tug to turn us around to face the exit. As we got closer to the end of the alley; the marshalers had us make a small turn to the right to get us closer to the airplanes on the right side of us with still plenty of room between us. They then had us make a hard left 180 degree turn to face the exit. I remember seeing the pilot flying use very little power on the right engine (less then a knob up) while the left engine remained at idle to keep the airplane very slow due to the proximity of the parked aircraft. After engine shut down; the pilots from a nearby corporate jet came over to inform us that our turn had caused their gust lock to disengage and they could not re-engage it. They were concerned there could be some damage. They also said another corporate jet had been 'knocked around' as well. I told them I was shocked because we had used such little power due to our light weight. They told us they thought the marshalers had us too close to the parked aircraft and should have never had us do a 180 degree turn that close. When the turn was made; I did not think our exhaust would be an issue because we were light and used so little power. A gusty 28 KT wind directly on their tail did not help our cause either. They informed the FBO Ramp Agents and their Supervisors of the event. In retrospect; it would have been better for all involved if we would have stopped the airplane straight ahead and been tugged into place instead of following the marshaler's directions. I have made this same turn many times in my career with no problems. I will think twice before doing another turn in close proximity to other aircraft.

A TEB FBO marshaling crew guided a G-V into a tight ramp area and directed a 180 degree turn between aircraft which may have allowed their jet blast to damage nearby aircraft.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9.5

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Physiological - Other; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors

Had just relieved another controller. Aircraft X was descending via JFUND2 STAR and (I think) flashing to Approach Control. I signed in with my settings and went on to help an aircraft at a different airport up north with a practice approach and subsequent missed into another. This may have distracted me enough so that I didn't become aware that approach hadn't taken the hand off on Aircraft X. However; when I looked back down; Aircraft X was around 3NM into Approach airspace and I still had track control. I could've sworn Approach already had the hand off but when I looked back it wasn't even flashing to them anymore.I accept I may be in error. Fatigue was definitely a factor and it was the end of my week. That being said; when I called my Supervisor over; I noted to him that the auto-hand off function was still active on the data block. At a minimum; this means that even if I'd forgotten Aircraft X; the function should have activated and worked as designed to initiate a hand off to approach when I hadn't done it myself in a timely manner.I'm uncertain; but believe that when I signed in with my settings the hand off that the previous controller had already initiated for Aircraft X ceased. I am certain that the auto hand off function was not suppressed when I noticed Aircraft X was 3NM into approach airspace. Look into the auto-hand off function behavior.

ZBW Center Controller reported an airspace violation that may have been either human or equipment failure.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication

On the HAROB6 Departure we early turned the point RENBE to make our turn west to next point RICHR as prescribed by a fly-by waypoint. Our turn started approximately 2.5 miles prior to RENBE as our speed was 250 kts by then. The Departure Controller was surprised by our early turn and gave us a vector 220.  He said he thought we turned too early and thought RENBE was a fly-over point. We double checked our Jepps charts and it is clearly marked as a fly-by point.  Next Controller said same to us about it being a fly-over point.  This discrepancy needs to be sorted out. Please address discrepancy with SEA Departure Control and correct our Jepp charts as necessary.

We were assigned and flew the HAROB6 Departure. Prior to reaching the second point on the departure; RENBE; we started a turn to the west as depicted on the chart. The Controller then asked us to fly a heading; stating that it looked like we turned early. Since RENBE is clearly shown as a fly by point and not a fly over point; we were confused as to why he stated we turned early. After asking the Controller if he showed RENBE as a fly by and not fly over; he stated that he was not able to check the chart himself at that point; said 'You're ok' and switched us to Seattle Center. A minute or so after switching; Seattle center told us they got a call from Departure to let us know that they showed RENBE as a flyover. This was in direct conflict with what was on our chart and in the FMS.The purpose of this report is to ensure that our Jepp charts and the charts that Seattle Departure are looking at show the same thing. There seems to be a conflict with RENBE on the HAROB6.

Air carrier flight crew reported a track deviation while on the SEA HAROB6 departure due to a charting discrepancy.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 19000; Flight Crew Type 7103

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Maintenance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We arrived at the airplane from layover; and preformed our preflight duties. When I checked the O2; the pressure dropped approx. 400 lbs. and stayed there - recovering after the test. I asked the F/O (First Officer) to test; and got the same result. We then tested at the same time; and the pressure dropped about 850 lbs. I called local ops for the mechanic; wrote it up in the maintenance (MX) log book; and sent an ACARS message to MX. When the contract mechanic showed up and I demonstrated the problem; he called MX control. They told him it was within limits. I requested to speak to the MX controller; who said to me that nothing was wrong since the pressure while testing; was still above allowable (approx. 950lbs). I explained that it was definitely NOT normal. That I've flown 737s for 10 years; and this has never happened before. I got the run around that it was a contract MX base and no parts; and who knows how long it would be before it could be corrected to my satisfaction. I indicated that the mechanic was here; and could inspect the system. I was particularly concerned that the valve was only partially open (Bernoulli's principle). MX control spoke again to the contract mechanic; who went below and inspected the system. He returned 5 minutes later - problem solved: The valve was less than one full turn open; and safety wired. He clipped the wire; turned the valve about 7 turns to full open; and reinstalled the safety wire. The system then tested normally.Whomever worked on the O2 system did not follow procedure - possible catastrophe. The pilots who brought the plane in (and all those who flew it after the O2 was improperly worked on); either did not preflight the O2 system; or did not investigate a non-normal indication - possible catastrophe. I felt pressured by the MX control that I was writing up a nonissue - With a new captain; or weak personality - possible catastrophe.

The shut-off valve on the Crew O2 Bottle was only open a small amount; therefore the O2 pressure would not recover in a timely manner.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

ATC directed go-around on short final. Inside the final approach fix; the Tower Controller instructed an aircraft to 'line up and wait;' adding that an aircraft will cross down field. After the aircraft accepted the clearance to line up and wait; Tower issued instructions for another aircraft to cross the runway at Taxiway N. The aircraft that was crossing the runway took his time; delaying the takeoff clearance to the point that spacing became an issue. It was my observation that the aircraft on the takeoff roll might lift off; allowing us to continue the approach to a landing. The go-around was initiated prior to 120 FT; however; that was the lowest RA observed after the application of TOGA thrust. Tower issued a climbing left turn to 4;000 FT; heading 270 degrees. My concern during the latter portion of the approach was that a go-around initiated on our part would create a conflict with the aircraft on takeoff roll; (overtaking) and/or a possible conflict with a go-around or takeoff on the parallel runways. In my opinion it was safer to continue the approach than to initiate a go-around on our own. As a result; the go-around was initiated after Tower issued the go-around instructions. As our aircraft passed over the numbers on the go-around; the aircraft on the runway rotated. Inexperienced Tower Controller who attempted to 'keep the operation moving' complicated by slower than normal taxi speed of aircraft crossing the runway.

A321 Captain reports being issued a go around on very short final due to the departing aircraft not being airborne. The reporter had determined that a go around would be necessary but elected to wait for the ATC instructions due to possible conflict with the departing traffic ahead and off parallel runways.


First Officer; Pilot Flying; Relief Pilot

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I am the Captain and was Pilot Monitoring (PM). The First Officer (FO) was the pilot flying. I called dispatch on Satcom enroute to get an update on weather on our route. The dispatcher mentioned a small speck of weather on the Sat IR approximately 150 miles ahead on our position. We already were looking at that on our radar and started a deviation to the west of course with ATC clearance about 80 miles away.Our current altitude was 39;000; the optimum altitude was 37;900. We were 1;000 above optimum but also 2;900 below Max (41;900). We had selected that altitude as the ride was not good at 35;000 and we were unable to get 37;000 approved earlier.The Weather was on the route at OPLIP intersection; and our Deviation was west of course 60 NM. Time was XA:40Z and we were talking with Amazonica Control. As we approached the cell (still approx. 40 miles off our left) the FO deviated even further to the west to give a wider berth. With the turbulence we had slowed to mach 82. We were about 20 knots above the yellow hook. VNAV was engaged and rather abruptly we both noticed a change in wind direction from a right cross wind of 30 to a headwind of 25. I noticed a sudden change in Total Air Temperature (TAT) temp warmer and then the Pitch Limit Indicators (PLI) displayed on the PFD about 1.5 degrees above our pitch attitude and the speed was decreasing; still above the yellow hook. Engine thrust was now at max Climb we both knew that we would not be able to maintain altitude. The FO asked me about a descent; I said yes descend immediately.I called once to ATC for a clearance and got no reply to our request. I declared a mayday and broadcast our intention to descend to 370. The FO selected 370 and pushed the altitude select button and turned the jet even further from the cell. I suggested a vertical speed descent rather than VNAV.I scanned the engine instruments and EICAS on the descent I notice the temp had gone from -18 to -3. Almost as quickly as we had lost speed in the descent we gained it; and quickly approached max airspeed or the red tape. The FO had his hands full selecting the heading sector and pulling the throttles back some. I used the speed brakes to aid the descent and control speed; after some variable movements in speed from the high to low (all still within the yellow and red bands) we leveled off and maintained 370.I explained our reason for the Mayday call to Amazonica control and got clearance to maintain 370. After passing the weather we were in the clear and returned to the track.We surmised that the temp change put the airplane in a coffin corner situation suddenly and once we got slightly behind the power curve; the aircraft was unable to maintain altitude.I've seen sudden changes in wind speed and direction around thunderstorms and also temps changes; but this was the most significant temp change I've witnessed. We gave this rapidly developing cell (with significant lightning during our passage) at least 20 miles clearance at all times and choose to fly upwind of the cell. But even that was not enough to avoid these atmospheric circumstances prompting our Mayday descent. The Mayday call was to warn ATC and other aircraft of the immediate situation; the outcome of which was never in doubt. [The other] FO was in the bunk and was briefed on the event after our crew change a short period later.Dispatch needs better weather tools for Thunderstorms in Latin South America. They often look at weather and think that not much weather exists and can offer no help to crews in real time. Often causing us to deviate far off course to avoid developing thunderstorms; such as this weather event. Also inflight weather charts and Radar for flight crews in a must in this modern era. Most GA aircraft have much better real time pics of the weather than a $300 M airline aircraft; using hours old paper charts and old electronic data from prior to block out! It's time for real time weather in our flight decks!

[Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information].

A B777 flight crew encounters turbulence at FL390 approaching a thunderstorm over South America. A sudden temperature increase and wind shift make FL390 untenable and a descent is requested. At FL370 the crew is able to maintain airspeed and altitude.


Confusion; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure

Before I took the D-Side on Sector 8; the R-Side being relieved had cleared two aircraft previously on an ALTRV direct to the destination; EIL. This caused one of the CPLs (Aircraft X) to reject with CZEG; requiring manual coordination. Shortly after taking the position I called CZEG to complete the coordination. The Receiving Controller in CZEG took several minutes to process the transfer I was giving; but eventually took the information and approved everything (time; alt; routing); including the fact that Aircraft X was coming NEG RVSM reference two aircraft that he showed being traffic. The Receiving Controller told me everything was approved if those two aircraft were both stopped at FL310. Both aircraft were departing ANC; one filed over JAGIT; one COHIL (NCA and CPA). I called Sector 7 and coordinated both of those aircraft should be stopped at FL310 for crossing traffic in CZEGs airspace. Another call was made from CZEG; when the Controller became concerned that we had not stopped the traffic. I told him everything was coordinated with Sector 7 and the traffic would be stopped; and also told him that Aircraft X was already entering their airspace at this time; and to confirm that they were still traffic. The CZEG Controller told me yes; he still wanted them stopped. I relayed this information to my R-Side; who became skeptical and called CZEG to ask how they were traffic. It is my understanding that my R-Side; after passing CZEG a Lat/Long; was informed that CZEG had a loss of separation in their airspace with Aircraft X and another aircraft at FL350 that we did not have information on. This information was all passed along to the FLM. Avoid rerouting aircraft when transfers have already been accepted; especially during special situations such as NEG RVSM aircraft.

ZAN Controller reports of a conflict that they tried to resolve but the confliction was in another Center's airspace.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

I printed out a full paperwork package from the podium computer; knowing that we could not get performance data from ACARS because the ACARS was on MEL (and would need to leave a signed release/fit for duty). During the FMC set-up; we noticed the Performance Data Report (PDR) had become invalid for the proposed temperature. I returned to the podium computer and attempted to access the performance data tool program. I could not get the performance lookup program to run. The computer appeared to be blocking 'pop-ups' when I clicked the 'performance' word on the introduction page. Typically; a 'run' icon appears; but did not in this case. I contacted dispatch by telephone explaining I could not get the performance lookup tool program to run and asked if they could run performance for me. My dispatcher ran performance for 30 degrees C and said he could email the TPR to my first class email. I accessed the email and printed the new TPR. I returned to the airplane and we used the new data and completed our set-up; checklists; and pushed for departure. During rotation on the takeoff roll; I noticed a heavier nose down feel and after rotating; the aircraft did not immediately become airborne. After a few seconds; the aircraft became airborne and the climb out was more typical. We reviewed the paperwork enroute and discovered the second TPR sent by dispatch (via email) had an error. The data was appropriate for the runway; temperature; and weight. The TPR also had the correct tail number. However; the last line after tail number in the TPR read CFM56-XI believe we received data for the correct tail number; but for an incorrect model/engine. We may have had takeoff data/speeds for [the XXX-X1 model] instead of a [XXX-X2 model]. This resulted in V-speeds that were too slow. This explains the slow; heavy rotation. We did not have a tail-strike or any other incident during the takeoff. After discussing this with the dispatcher; we agreed that a data error was to blame; but when we tried to re-create the error using the same inputs; we could not reproduce the erroneous data. An erroneous data report was generated and sent to me for my departure.

An aircraft ACARS printer was inoperative so Dispatch emailed the performance data to the crew. During takeoff the nose heavy aircraft extended the takeoff roll. In flight the crew determined the V speeds were too low for the installed engine type.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Type 1212

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 142; Flight Crew Type 1595

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

I was the PNF (Pilot Not Flying) onboard Aircraft X from ZZZ. Weather was 040/09kts; 1 SM visibility; BR (mist); OVC002. We departed off RWY XX using Flaps 5 with Engine Anti-ice ON. Assigned to fly runway heading to 10;000 feet. Once level cleared direct to ZZZZZ intersection and climb and maintain 23;000. PF (Pilot Flying) commenced the turn and climb using VNAV and LNAV. Passing through approximately 18;000 the PNF noticed the left engine oil quantity at 6 quarts and decreasing. PNF remarked that he checked it prior to departure and knew that it was good. PNF mentioned to PF that we should level off and slow down to monitor the engine parameters. ATC was informed; 'we may have a potential problem and need to level off.' ATC granted an early level off and asked the nature of our problem. The PNF stated that the left engine oil quantity was decreasing but all other indications were normal. PNF and PF discussed the possibility that it could possibly be only the one gauge indicating a malfunction but decided that it would be prudent to turn back towards ZZZ in case other indications began to manifest. The PNF asked ATC for a return to ZZZ stating that the left engine was still operating but there was a possibility of an engine shutdown should the left engine indications continue to deteriorate. PF followed ATC instructions. PNF looked through 737 QRH for an ENG OIL QTY LOW checklist but there was not one. PNF did find an Engine LOW OIL PRESSURE and Engine High Oil Temperature checklist but neither of these applied. PNF began to review the Engine Failure or Shutdown checklist in case it became necessary to shut down the engine. Soon afterwards; the left engine oil quantity decreased to zero; the left engine oil pressure dropped to zero (?); and the left engine oil temperature turned red. The PNF then performed the Engine Failure or Shutdown checklist and secured the left engine. ATC was informed that the left engine was now secured; the need for delay vectors to complete all required checklists and program the FMC for the approach and landing; and the fuel remaining and number of souls onboard. The PNF sent a quick message to Dispatch stating;' Left ENG oil quantity zero. Return to ZZZ.' The PF flew all assigned headings and altitudes. The PNF completed the Engine Failure or Shutdown checklist and informed the lead Flight Attendant of the nature of the emergency and that we would be landing in approximately 15 minutes. The PNF then informed the passengers of the situation and that we would be landing shortly. The PF used the autopilot at all times and was able to program the FMC and set up the approach while the PNF was finishing up checklists; briefings; PA announcements. The PNF then ran the ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE LANDING checklist using VREF ICE speeds. Landing weight was approximately 1;000 lbs below max landing weight; NON-NORMAL CONFIGURATION LANDING DISTANCE for One Engine Inoperative Landing Flaps 15 was adequate. PNF told the PF to continue to fly the ILS XYR approach to landing since he had a good feel for the aircraft and its trim condition. PNF quickly set up his own approach plates; and confirmed crossing altitudes; minimums; frequencies; etc. Both the PNF and the PF felt confident that the aircraft was well stabilized and ready for the approach and landing. PF flew the ILS XYR approach and landed very nicely. The ZZZ fire trucks had already been alerted and were standing by. Normal landing and taxi to the gate. Briefed maintenance crew of complete symptoms and the need to shut the engine down while airborne.

B737 flight crew reported that left engine oil quantity decreased to zero; resulting in engine shutdown.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was a part of an A Check and [ETOPS check]. I was under the assumption that I was ETOPS Qualified while working on this aircraft. I stamped multiple task cards including the ETOPS [check] card. I became aware I wasn't ETOPS qualified on the morning of [date] while discussing ETOPS with fellow mechanics in my [Airworthiness Release] class.When initially hired I had ETOPS awareness class and CBT's (Computer Based Training). I was under the assumption that I was ETPOS qualified. At my previous job at [company]; everyone is ETOPS qualified from the start after finishing training. So I thought that after having this ETOPS awareness class I was considered ETOPS qualified. I even went into learning hub and saw that the class was complete thinking that made me ok for ETOPS maintenance. It wasn't until I was in [Airworthiness Release] class that I overheard other mechanics talking about not being ETOPS qualified. I thought to myself that everyone was ETOPS qualified after core training. I found that to be false and immediately notified Supervisors and my union representatives.Maybe explaining that the ETOPS awareness class does not make you ETOPS qualified and that you need more training before you are considered ETOPS qualified.

Technician reported that confusion regarding qualifications resulted in his stamping ETOPS blocks on work cards without having an ETOPS qualification.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 0

Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I plugged in on ANTELOPE handoff while Aircraft X was being assisted in finding VFR weather. Heavy smoke and clouds was the predominant weather today and the pilot was above 14;000 and advised they were not IFR equipped or capable. I worked with adjacent facilities to find suitable weather conditions and got PIREPs from aircraft ZLA 17 was working. We determined DAG was their best chance to descend visually. The radar controller I worked with definitely seemed very stressed and at times the situations on sector seemed to go beyond their capability. Visibility and ceilings were poor throughout the airspace; yet visual approaches continued to be advertised. At one point an IFR aircraft who hadn't reported the airport insight was cleared for a visual approach and the pilot responded with 'uhh; we're in IMC'. That radar controller was eventually relieved and everything went smoother after that point. The aircraft was switched to ZLA 17 and safely landed.  I think it's hard to prevent a situation like that from our side since a pilot called up in an emergency status. But when it became clear the situation was too much for this particular controller; I think they should have been relieved earlier. It was good to get a handoff controller to assist. I don't believe an emergency was formally declared for this pilot and I think that should have been done.

JCF Controller reported assisting radar controller during an emergency situation who was unable to handle the traffic complexity.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was working a B737 (FL340). The SOP gives me control to descend to FL330 from the adjacent sector (X). I cleared the B737 to FL330 and initiated a hand off to Sector Y (beneath me). After the hand off was accepted I switched communications to Sector Y. In my next scan around I saw that the B737's Data Block showing FL324. I asked the Sector Y Controller to check that altitude for me. The pilot told her that he was descending to FL230! The pilot was then assigned FL300. I can't verify the original read back; nor do I know what the pilot said when he checked on with Sector Y. No other traffic was affected by this action; however the airplane did descend below FL330 in Sector X and into Sector Y. It is interesting because I have had this problem in the past; with pilots reading back 230 instead of 320; and I'm a little bit paranoid about it. I started saying flight level three two zero; thirty two just for emphasis. I don't recall doing that this time; of course. Many times when I say it that way; the pilot reads it back so perfectly clear; like I didn't need to say the extra part and I feel like I'm just adding extra words. Perhaps that's really why it's clear. Since that method seems to work I will try to use it all the time.

Enroute Controller described an airspace violation when the aircraft involved apparently confused FL330 with FL230; the reporter listed a phraseology modification that might prevent future altitude assignment confusion.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 20.8

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Safety Incident-I relieved In-flight Position and continued working In-flight 1 position for approx 4.5 hours till the end of my shift. Working the radio position on In-flight 1; I received a call from Aircraft X requesting a Special VFR Clearance into the Yakutat (YAK) service area he was 12 West inbound. I obtained the surface area from Anchorage Center and issued the clearance. A call was made at YAK on 123.6 'Any one on approach?' by an aircraft. I recognized the voice of the pilot and transmitted the following to the pilot. Aircraft Y- SVFR inbound on approach to YAK; Monitor the YAK ASOS and advise intensions. Aircraft Y reply 'RQ SVFR Clearance out of YAK to the EAST'.  Aircraft X heard Aircraft Y's request for SVFR. Aircraft X transmitted to FSS that he agreed to visual separation from Aircraft Y.  I issued the SVFR Clearance to Aircraft Y out of YAK CESA (East) as requested.Reviewing the tape recording with a supervisor; I was informed that Aircraft Y indicated he agreed to Special VFR Clearance. I took this to mean he agreed to Visual Separation with Aircraft X. I informed both aircraft of each type of aircraft required in visual separation during SVFR Clearances. Aircraft Y reported clear of YAK service area to the East. Aircraft X reported on the ground YAK 5-7 minutes later from the West.  My Supervisor tells me this could be a deviation.  This does not change the fact that I should have confirmed with Aircraft Y that his reply was to maintain visual separation from Aircraft X as well.I should have used standard phraseology and re-confirmed with Aircraft Y that he had agreed to Visual Separation from Aircraft X.

FSS controller approved SVFR operations for an inbound and departure simultaneously. The Controller thought he heard one of the aircraft agree to 'Maintain Visual Separation'. During a review of a tape recording of this period it was determined that the aircraft did not volunteer to maintain visual separation. Simultaneous SVFR operations as this require one of the aircraft to maintain visual separation. The Controller misunderstood one of the aircrafts' transmissions.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 13

Time Pressure; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 17

Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

The landlines in San Juan CERAP have been OTS for way too long.  I can't even remember how long.  Every time we get in contact with MSDS; SVMI or TNCC it is actually a success.  Aircraft X declared a medical emergency as it was approaching Santo Domingo airspace (MDSD).  A patient with a heart attack.  Luckily we got the coordination done in time.  However; later on the pilot advised that the patient had died and the pilot needed to deviate for weather.  This was the time when we could not communicate with MDSD to forward this information.  Consider the situation.  I needed to expedite the flight; but I could not accomplish the coordination.  Usually you would hold this aircraft in your airspace until coordination is done; but I will not hold the aircraft.  This almost gave me a deviation; but after many attempts; we got MSDS on the line when the aircraft was about 10 mile from their airspace.FAA needs to seriously work on these landlines.

Aircraft X had a medical emergency; an 85 year old man with a possible heart attack.  Due to the MEVA landline outage it took overly long time to coordinate with MDSD ARTCC the information and updated info and weather deviations for this flight.  It made for a VERY dangerous situation and we were handcuffed from providing the best possible service to this situation.  The passenger died before reaching the airport at MDSD.Get the landlines fixed before more people die!

Two ZSU controllers report of on going problem where they could not reach another facility via land line to advise the Controller of a medical emergency.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 225; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 50

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 23; Flight Crew Total 442; Flight Crew Type 15

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

On Date; I conducted a multi-engine commercial examination in a [small two-engine aircraft]. While conducting a simulated engine failure single-engine ILS approach to Runway XX at ZZZ; ATC; (i.e.; ZZZ Approach Control); vectored the applicant onto final. Once laterally established on the approach; ATC switched the applicant over to the common traffic advisory frequency. ATC provided no further traffic advisories or alertsThe applicant then switched to the advisory frequency and announced his position as a five (5) mile final to Runway XX. Aircraft Y then announced downwind for Runway XY. I then told the applicant that in the event of go-around; both engines were available. The applicant continued while I searched for traffic in haze and seven mile visibility. The applicant reported a three (3) mile final. I continued to scan for Aircraft Y. I told the applicant that I had not spotted the traffic and then radioed that we were on a one and one-half (1 and ½) mile final. In response; Aircraft Y stated they had us in sight. I asked them to go-around. Instead; they called they were turning final for Runway XY. When the applicant called one hundred feet (100') above minimums; I spotted Aircraft Y. At that time; I told the applicant the runway was in sight and the applicant removed his foggles. I pointed the traffic to the applicant at one to two o'clock and less than a quarter (1/4) mile and again asked Aircraft Y to execute a go-around; which he then did as he flew over the top of us at the intersection of Runway XX and Runway XY. As the applicant flared to land; the tail struck the pavement. Only then did I realize that the applicant failed to complete the before landing checklist; by extending the gear; which I; in turn; failed to observe.

On Date I was taking a multi-engine commercial check ride with Designated Pilot Examiner [DPE] Name. I was the pilot in command for the flight. After flying the maneuvers we set up for the ILS XX into ZZZ. We had a simulated engine failure during the approach. ZZZ approach approved frequency change and gave no traffic advisories. I made a 5 mile final call on the CTAF followed by a 3 mile final call. During a 2 mile final Aircraft Y made a final call for Runway XY. I still had the foggles on and the [DPE] was searching for the traffic. I announced we reached the DA; and at that time name told me to remove the foggles. He was still searching for the traffic and talking to the other aircraft. Aircraft Y announced they would go around and I continued my approach inbound for Runway XX. With all the confusion and concerns of a mid-air collision i failed to complete the before landing check. It wasn't realized that the gear was retracted until the tail struck.Distraction and pressure were two major human factors that contributed to this incident. The other aircraft distracted me from completing the before landing check. In addition; the pressure of flying the approach and completing the maneuver within standards played a role.

Flight crew reported distractions from a near mid air collision resulted in the landing check list not being performed and a gear up landing.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 152.3; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 13000

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Not sure if this is indicative of other issues at ZZZ as there were two others that I am reporting.  This report is safety related as the actions of the ZZZ ground crew could have caused damage to equipment and/or injury to Ground Personnel.After being pushed back from XX and setting the brake; the ramp person in front of the airplane proceeded to give me the all clear (arms extended down at 45 degrees) while the tug was underneath the nose and still connected to the aircraft.  I asked the ramp person on the intercom why this was and asked him to tell the ramper out front what the proper procedure was.  After the tug pulled away (the person out front maintained his arms at a 45 the entire time); the tug driver tried to explain what the procedure was and it appeared the two were arguing with the person giving us incorrect instructions defending his actions.Before we taxied away; I called ZZZ Operations on the radio to inform them of the issue as well.  This was probably the most unsafe pushback/release I've seen in a very long time and could have easily gotten out of hand due to the non-SOP actions of ZZZ.  Thankfully; due to me being away for two weeks and the FO being away from flying for over five weeks; we were hyper-vigilant of what was going on around us.

Air Carrier Captain reported experiencing an unsafe push-back from the gate.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 193; Flight Crew Total 4143; Flight Crew Type 860

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

On arrival to ORD from ZZZZ  at approximately XA:50Z near RHIVR; 121.5 (guard) frequency became saturated with multiple [name related statement] calls.  These calls stepped on several ATC transmissions and interrupted communications with arrival control; creating a safety of flight issue.  After approximately 1-2 minutes; the calls ceased; allowing clear communication to continue. The high potential for a serious incident to occur as a result of the lack of communications discipline or crews choosing not to monitor 121.5 is alarming and requires immediate attention.

Air Carrier pilot reported non-emergency flight related transmissions on Guard frequency. Reporter stated this resulted in interrupted communications; creating a safety of flight issue.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

This morning; I relieved the late night operations Controller working the entire JFK area combined. He had a difficult night due to weather and high volume of traffic and was fatigued. The Integrated Display System (IDS) information is was not up to date showing inaccurate and expired information. I worked for about 45 minutes without a problem until a G5 checked on over CAMRN. He said he had the current weather and asked what approach he should expect. I told him the Tower was closed and the approach was up to him. He asked for the ILS approach to Runway 14. I glanced up at the IDS and relayed to the G5 that the Approach Lighting System (ALS) to Runway 14 was out of service and he could expect the ILS to Runway 14. I did not notice the more pertinent information after the ALS outage which was that Runway 14/32 was closed. I continued working all of the other arrivals and departures in and out of Kennedy and eventually cleared the G5 for ILS14. I advised him to cancel in the air on my frequency or on the ground on 128.25. I switched him to advisory frequency and continued working. Two minutes later the G5 calls up saying he was on the missed approach runway heading and advised me that the airport authority had sent him around due to vehicles on the runway; Runway 14 was NOTAMed closed. He asked for a GPS to Runway 19 approach which occurred without incident. The Supervisor was informed immediately and I continued working for about another 10 minutes. This was a perfect example of the Swiss Cheese breakdown of communication which leads to incidents. First; the briefing was incomplete and I was never told about the runway closure. Next; the pilot did not have the current NOTAMs for his arrival airport and requested an approach which takes him to a closed runway. The IDS information area was not up to date; showing old and inaccurate information. The most pertinent information about the runway closure was listed behind another NOTAM for the same runway with less importance. Finally; I was very busy working a combined position in IFR conditions which included all of the arrivals and departures at JFK and FRG airports. This situation slipped through multiple safety nets and was caught at the last level (airport operations). I would recommend that runway closures be listed as a high priority item on the IDS. It should not be listed after less important equipment outages. I would also recommend that pilots obtain all pertinent NOTAMs for arrival; departure and alternate airports. Information areas such as the IDS should be updated and kept current. Adding the color red to significant closures would be helpful.

N90 Controller described a go-around event at a non-towered airport when current information regarding a runway closure NOTAM was not recognized by the reporter and flight crew.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 24; Flight Crew Total 144

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

While flying in a Piper Cherokee on an instrument flight plan with two passengers; I was cleared by Approach Control to approach Runway 14 at the unattended airport MCN. ATC issued climb out instructions and approved a frequency change to advisory frequency. Upon landing; my passengers decided they wanted to switch seats. Instead of doing a touch and go; I turned off the runway and taxied back to the end of Runway 14 stopping briefly near the terminal to let my passengers readjust. While taxiing; I observed a [large transport aircraft] on final approach to WRB; but did not consider the close proximity of WRB to MCN or the overlap of my departure course with the approach course to Rwy 15 at WRB. I departed Rwy 14 as quickly as possible to best adhere to ATC instructions. During the initial climb at about 500 ft AGL; I felt the most powerful gusts of turbulence I ever had; and the plane was sent into a very steep right bank and downward pitch. I was able to identify the gusts as wake turbulence; and recover control of the plane. I turned away from the approach course of the cargo plane (which did not correspond to my assigned climb out instructions); then queried ATC for an alternative climb out heading; due to the wake turbulence encounter. My request was approved; but had it not been; I was ready to declare an emergency.The pilot factors that led to the incident include: flying to an unattended airport; performing a full stop and taxi instead of a touch and go; and not being aware of the overlap of my departure course with the approach course to the nearby airport. ATC was also a factor; as even if I had done a touch and go and turned to my assigned heading; I would have crossed the final approach course of the military cargo plane.

PA28 pilot reported a wake turbulence encounter with a military transport aircraft in the vicinity of MCN airport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

I believe SPJC/LIM has a mismarked taxiway signage. It was still dark as we landed. We exited Rwy 15 at Delta taxiway and were given 'right turn onto foxtrot then foxtrot 1…'  I executed a hard right onto what I thought was taxiway F yet signage downrange said I was on F1. It wasn't until I was committed to F that we saw the F painted on the ground. [This was due to] confusion as to where taxiway F actually begins coupled with signage on taxiway F that states it F1. Yet [airport information] page distinctively shows correct taxiway. Signage displaying correct taxiway needs to display correct taxiway. Yellow pant with arrows would benefit others not familiar with LIM taxiways when exiting runway at D.

B757 Captain reported the taxiway signage at Lima Peru does not agree with published airport information page.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; MEL; Aircraft; Manuals; Procedure

We received a gate call for a 'Flap Low Speed' Message. We verified the fault when we arrived at the aircraft and proceeded to place a Flap Channel on MEL. We checked the maintenance section of the MEL to see if there was guidance to verify which channel was inoperative; there was no guidance found. We went through a procedure of pulling Circuit Breakers (C/Bs) to verify which channel we should defer; this is how we determined to defer Channel Two. The maintenance function was completed for the MEL of Flap Channel Two and the flaps operations checked 'good' with Channel One in command (no 'Flap Fail' message). Maintenance Control was contacted by me to place Flap Channel Two on MEL. At this time I went over the procedure with Maintenance Control to verify the steps used to determine which channel was to be deferred and I was comfortable that we checked it properly and proceeded to defer Flap Channel Two. The aircraft left ZZZ for ZZZ1 and on approach to ZZZ1; the aircraft flaps failed and the aircraft diverted to ZZZ2. MEL book was used. Checked the maintenance procedure section of the MEL book on how to properly determine which channel was faulty. No information was provided by the MEL book; at that time I contacted Maintenance Control for guidance on determining faulty channel. I misunderstood information given by Maintenance Control which led to improper channel being placed on deferral. [Recommend] more detail in the maintenance section of the MEL for figuring out which channel was inoperative. Reference material not clear. [Scheduled departure] pressure.

Reporter stated the aircraft was an ERJ-145 aircraft and believes a Flap Channel had failed inside the Flaps Electronics Control Unit. The 'Flap Low  Speed' indication was an EICAS message.

A Line Mechanic describes his efforts to troubleshoot and determine whether Flap Channel One; or Channel Two had failed after a 'Flap Low Speed' message appeared on an ERJ-145 aircraft. Aircraft later diverted due to flaps failed again on approach. Incorrect Flap Channel had been deferred.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

We had been cleared for the RNAV RNP Z Runway XX into ZZZ. We were on speed and profile and I began configuring for landing at ZZZZZ which is also where I called 'Runway Landing' as conditions near the field were VFR and we both had the runway in sight. 1 mile prior to ZZZZZ1 at approximately 4500 MSL with the gear down and flaps at 15 degrees; I called for FLAPS 35. The PM selected FLAPS 35 which resulted in no response from the flaps and a FLAP POWER CAUTION. I disconnected the autopilot and executed a missed approach at this point.As ZZZ Tower was closed; we switched back to Center. We advised them we were on the missed approach out of ZZZ and we were [requesting priority handling] and requested vectors and a climb to start heading back towards ZZZ1. We were given a northwest heading and cleared to 14000 MSL. Once we reached 14000 MSL I called for the FLAP POWER CAUTION checklist. The checklist drove us to reset the FLAPS CONT CB L7 Essential as it was NOT tripped. After the prescribed 20 seconds following the CB reset; the FLAP POWER CAUTION was no longer present and per the checklist we could select flaps as desired and that was the END of the FLAP POWER CAUTION checklist.I called for FLAPS 0 to configure for normal cruise. I then called the flight attendants and told them the situation that we were returning to ZZZ1 due to a flap malfunction; that we would be landing in 10 to 15 minutes; and to anticipate a normal landing. There were no special instructions for them and since they were seated there was no need to report back to me. Next; I made a PA to the passengers in which I told them we had an indication that there was an issue with our flaps and we were returning to ZZZ1 as a safety precaution due to it having more resources. I told them to anticipate a normal landing and apologized for the inconvenience and told them to follow the direction of the flight attendants. Next; I called Dispatch and informed them of the problem; our actions so far; and that we were currently headed back to ZZZ1. They conferred with Maintenance who wanted us to go back to ZZZ1 as they said Maintenance could handle it there. I conferred with my FO (First Officer) and we quickly decided that due to this being the last leg of a long day; it being night; [there being] terrain; smoke and GA activity in [the] vicinity of ZZZ; [a] closed Tower and that we were already over halfway back to ZZZ1; neither of us were comfortable with going back to ZZZ1. I advised Dispatch as such and our destination was changed to ZZZ1.We advised ATC that we would like vectors for the RNAV X Runway XYR; [the] longest runway available as XYL was closed. We were given direct ZZZZZ2 and a descent to 4000. I briefed a visual; backed up by the RNAV X XYR. I also briefed the missed approach procedure with FLAP POWER CAUTION in the event we encountered the same problem we did on approach in ZZZ. We ran the descent and approach checklists. We were told [to] cross ZZZZZ2 at or above 2000 and cleared for the RNAV X XYR. Our plan was to configure early in case of another issue with the flaps. Gear down and flaps extension in sequence to 15 degrees went normally and approximately 1 mile outside of ZZZZZ2; I called for flaps 35. Again there was no response from the flaps and we received a FLAP POWER CAUTION. As we had briefed; I called missed approach and upon positive rate we retracted the gear but did not attempt to move the flaps. ZZZ1 Tower gave us vectors to the northwest and a climb to 3000. We again [requested priority handing] and asked for emergency equipment to be deployed as a precaution in case there was any unknown damage to the aircraft that was causing this problem that could result in a fire or aircraft controllability upon landing. We then ran the FLAP POWER CAUTION checklist again.Due to the checklist stating that we were limited to ONE FLAPS CONT CB reset; we followed the flow chart to YES after 'Is the FLAP POWER CAUTON still illuminated' which drove us to leave the flaps in the last position and land with available flaps. Since we had flaps 15 degrees per the checklist; we pushed the GPWS Flap Override button and planned a flaps 15 landing. At this time we were on a wide right down wind for XYR heading east at 3000 ft. We asked ATC to inform company of the new situation that we went missed again and were currently planning a normal landing. Our EFB's had not given us performance for the entire flight so we amended IBugs to retrieve numbers for a flaps 15 landing in ZZZ1. We were given vectors for a visual backed up by the RNAV X XYR. We ran the descent and approach checklists. When all this was accomplished we were approaching a right base for XYR.I felt that fatigue was becoming an issue and moreover we didn't know if there were any deeper issues with the airplane that was causing the repeated flap power cautions. Taking this into consideration I felt that getting the airplane safely on the ground as soon as possible was of paramount importance. Because of this; we decided not to make any additional calls to the flight attendants or the passengers as their instructions and information we would pass had not changed from the first call. We made a normal approach and flaps 15 landing. We exited at Taxiway XX and requested the fire department to inspect the flap area of the aircraft visually and with thermal sensors for any abnormalities. They said there were none and we were give taxi clearance back to the gate.Normal taxi-in and shutdown with the exception of leaving the flaps in the 15 degree position. We were both present in the cabin for passenger deplaning and all passengers were very positive and grateful for a safe return to terra firma. I received a text from the Duty Officer whom I called back after making the Maintenance logbook entry and briefing Maintenance. Crew Scheduling immediately called to inform us we would be taking another aircraft to ZZZ to which the entire crew was not comfortable with so we were given a hotel in ZZZ1.

As we approached ZZZ on the RNAV Z XX; we began configuring for landing around ZZZZZ. As we selected flaps 35; the flap indicator froze at 15 degrees. A master caution FLAP POWER immediately appeared on the annunciator panel. Seeing this; we executed a missed approach and [requested priority handling]. We mistakenly brought the flap lever to zero; one notch at a time; as we were executing the missed approach procedure - but it did not move the flaps. We agreed to climb to a safe altitude before proceeding further. Once we were at 14000; we began to run the flap power caution checklist. We reset the L7 circuit breaker per the checklist; and the caution disappeared. We then put the flaps up one notch at a time to get back to a cruise setting per the checklist. Once we determined we may have a zero flap situation; we decided to return to ZZZ1 where we would have a longer runway; ARFF (Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting); Maintenance; and more options for passengers. We then contacted Dispatch; told ATC our intentions; informed the flight attendants; and updated the passengers on the situation. The airplane was 'normal' at that point; but we suspected the flaps may not work again. As such; we decided to configure early; and execute a missed approach on the first indication of any abnormality. With that in mind; we used normal flaps 35 bugs from iBugs; EFB's were not receiving data for some reason. When we were cleared for the RNAV X XY R; we discovered the flaps once again would not extend past 15 degrees. This time we executed a missed approach and left the flaps at 15 degrees where they stayed for the remainder of the flight. We then ran the E&A checklist again. It concluded with us pushing the GPWS FLAP OVERRIDE and landing with available flaps. We then asked ATC for fire rescue trucks just in case; and set up to land on XYR. We landed without incident; and the trucks didn't see anything abnormal such as oil or other substances when they inspected the airplane prior to taxiing into the gate.

Q400 flight crew reported an uneventful air return due to a flap malfunction during final approach at destination.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 182; Flight Crew Type 939

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Taxiway

I was PF (Pilot Flying) on flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. During the landing phase of flight approximately 1000 ft AGL; the evacuation alarm began chiming; well in excess of 100 dB. The Captain; PNF (Pilot Not Flying); attempted to isolate the alarm by silencing the evacuation command before landing; but the alarm would not silence. I landed the aircraft on Runway XL at ZZZ1 and transferred control of the aircraft to the Captain at approximately 60 kts. At a safe taxi speed and with my after landing flow completed; I noticed that the evacuation annunciator light was illuminated. I attempted to silence the alarm as well; but the alarm continued to sound. Our taxi instruction were to follow a region jet ahead of us to taxiway SS. I subsequently coordinated with Ground to taxi to the C holding pad and attempted to silence the piercing alarm; but I had no success. I coordinated with the Flight Attendant to ensure nothing was wrong in the back and confirmed that they had not activated the alarm. We determined that the PA (Public Address) system or the crew intercom system was not operational at this point. After some troubleshooting in coordination with Maintenance; the Captain and I decided to taxi the aircraft to the gate and to turn the aircraft over to Maintenance to troubleshoot the system there. We received standard taxi instructions to SS then hold short of T6. I attempted to reduce the noise by covering the evacuation speaker. I was distracted by the noise of the alarm; attempted to cover the speaker with my hand; as well as attempting to coordinate with Maintenance when I realized we had missed the turn onto taxiway SS. The Captain immediately stopped the aircraft and we coordinated with Ground for a new taxi assignment. We then proceeded to the gate with the new taxi route assignment. The alarm only silenced when Maintenance removed all power from the aircraft.

A319 First Officer reported a malfunctioning evacuation alarm sounding in excess of 100dB; causing them to miss a turn during taxi to gate.


Bombardier/Canadair Undifferentiated or Other Model

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Airport; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Environment - Non Weather Related

During our approach to runway CLT 36R; [a flight] (#unknown) informed the tower that they would need to return to the gate. For whatever reason (taxiway construction? and aircraft awaiting takeoff on the east side of the runway); the tower chose to taxi the aircraft from the approach end of 36R to an exit taxiway farther down the runway to rejoin C taxiway.By doing this; our glideslope signal was disturbed causing the Avionic Flight Control System (AFCS) to pitch up to follow the distorted glideslope signal causing a sudden upset during final flap extension. The aircraft was stable; configured properly and the AFCS was engaged and properly tracking the localizer and glideslope prior to this disturbance. Noticing the rapid decrease in airspeed; the AFCS was disengaged; pitch reduced and thrust increased to stabilize the aircraft. Because of the rapid change in pitch attitude; the aircraft descended below the glideslope while regaining airspeed.  This resulted in a low altitude warning from the tower. By this time; the aircraft was in visual conditions; the runway and the Vertical Glideslope Indicator (VGSI) were in sight and we were in a position to continue a stable visual approach to landing.The aircraft behind us on the approach also complained of ILS disturbance during this same event.

The flight crew reported that; during a critical phase of their approach; the ILS glideslope signal was disturbed by an aircraft taxiing down the runway. The autopilot was quickly disengaged; however the aircraft momentarily descended below the glidescope; generating a terrain proximity warning from the control Tower. A timely correction was made and the approach and landing were completed successfully.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

We departed SMF on the SCTWN2 departure and after DOSCO were cleared to OAL LIDAT BTY. We were deviating around some build ups after DOSCO and were cleared to LIDAT when through deviating. No further weather was depicted; and so we proceeded to LIDAT. The tops of the cloud layer were at FL290; our altitude; so we asked for FL310. Due to traffic; ATC wasn't able to give that to us. We started to encounter moderate chop; so the captain made an announcement for the flight attendants to take their seats. Shortly thereafter; we encountered moderate turbulence. The number two flight attendant was in the aft galley and hit her head. The numbers three and four flight attendants had the cart in the aisle. They hit their hip and back; respectively. There was an EMT on board who checked out their conditions.While we were waiting for the EMT's report; we started to initially think about diverting to FAT; as it was the closest airport behind us. We then changed to LAS; as we were proceeding in that direction and there was no weather to deviate around. When we got the report that there was no immediate need to land; we proceeded to continue to destination. Flight attendants were taken to the hospital and released that night.

B737-800 flight crew reported encountering moderate turbulence at FL290 that caused injury to two flight attendants. Flight continued to destination.


Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action

We were to depart on Runway XXR; from [a] taxiway. Tower cleared us for takeoff. Power application; and procedures; up through the '80 knot' call were all standard and routine with no abnormalities noted. At approximately 100-110 knots while scanning the engine instruments; I heard a faint muffled 'pop' sound; and simultaneously noted the right engine rollback; and the 'Eng R Compressor Stall' alert illuminate. At this time there was the onset of a very noticeable; and continuous; 'shudder' (or; shaking) throughout out the aircraft airframe. I called 'abort' and initiated the abort. When the throttles were retarded; the spoilers automatically deployed as designed. During the short time to analyze; I thought maybe we had blown a right main tire; and that debris from that tire had entered the right engine. And since I had considerable dry runway remaining; I was very judicious in using minimum right braking; so as not to possibly exacerbate a blown tire and possibly compromised hydraulic line. I primarily used reverse thrust; and left main brake; to stop. Once we slowed close to a stop; the First Officer told the Tower we had aborted on RWY XXR. Tower acknowledged; and asked if we needed assistance. At this point we were abeam a taxiway that permitted us to exit the runway. We had no other indications of further problems. We did not set the brakes. The Tower authorized us to exit the runway there. We complied and stopped to diagnose the problem and comply with the QRH procedures. Brakes were not set; and the right engine was shut down. I made a cabin announcement for everyone to remain seated; and that we would be moving to the gate shortly. Before moving we asked the Tower to send an airport vehicle to inspect our right main mount; and the right engine for any visible damage; or other issues. They did so and reported that everything appeared to be normal. We acknowledged that the integrity of the right brakes and tires were not compromised; then notified Company of our compressor stall problem; were assigned a gate and taxied to it uneventfully. As we pulled into the gate the Brake Overheat warning illuminated for the left brake. We notified Company to tell the ramp personnel to stay clear of the left brake area.  When the chocks were put in place we switched to APU; secured the left engine and I released the brakes (the parking brakes were never set). Maintenance and Customer Service personnel met us at the gate. After all passengers had deplaned; I asked the flight attendants for their observations. Both had noted the 'pop' or 'boom' sound; then the airframe vibration.  No unusual odors were noted. The compressor stall and the brake overheat issues were entered in the aircraft logbook and we departed the aircraft. Maintenance towed the aircraft to the hangar for a boroscope.

A B717 flight crew rejected their takeoff following a loud and compressor stalls warnings followed by airframe vibration.  They returned to the gate where the aircraft was taken out of service.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

We received a line up clearance onto Runway 04R. The line up check was completed. Pilot monitoring inadvertently followed with the callout 'Lights on; brakes off; heading verified'. I did not pick up the error and I started to advance the thrust levers and shortly after we heard the call from Tower to hold position. The Captain took control and the aircraft came to a stop. The power had not been set for take off. We had the takeoff data to allow a takeoff from that position. We proceeded with a normal takeoff from that point once the takeoff clearance was received.I need to be absolutely vigilant on the status of our clearance.

EMB-145XR First Officer reported loss of situational awareness after receiving takeoff line up clearance.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

We were executing the Roaring Fork visual into Aspen when Tower cleared another aircraft for departure. The departing aircraft was climbing up the valley from Aspen on our right as we were descending. Tower advised us of the aircraft and asked us to shoot a straight in approach because of the departing traffic. We moved to our left for a straight in approach and were on the PAPI lights well clear of the climbing traffic and any terrain. When we were over the last bit of terrain just prior to the valley Tower called us and said she was getting a low altitude alert and for us to climb. We continued the approach and landing without incident. At no time did we perceive that we were to close to any terrain.Aspen should not clear an aircraft for departure on the west side of the valley from Aspen when there is another aircraft on the Roaring Fork visual.

[Narrative 2 contained no additional information.]

While descending straight in to Runway 15 in VMC at ASE to accommodate a southbound departure on the west side of the valley; a G-200 triggered a low altitude alert from the Tower. They acknowledged the alert but continued to an uneventful landing with the airport and terrain in sight.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

MAFFS [Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System] aircraft had been entering IFR for their special mission regularly; canceling IFR and going VFR to their respective work areas. Aircraft X had called us up for an IFR pick-up clearance. Training was in progress at this time and we were in the process of getting a handoff (assist) at the same time. We entered in a flight plan manually and saw a tag that popped up. My trainee didn't issue the code; and I didn't catch that he didn't issue a code because of multiple things going on at the same time. We never noticed that the tag had popped on an aircraft performing VFR maneuvers neither talking to BUR area of SCT or ANT sectors.Watching the replay; that aircraft had come from BUR area and continued to use the old code. [The developmental] had thought he issued the code; called radar contact from the position the tag was at along with the clearance. The pilot read back the clearance and never question the contact position correlating with what [the developmental] had said. After a few minutes had passed; Aircraft X asked us if he should be squawking something different around the time we noticed the tag wasn't doing anything it was supposed to. Aircraft X was squawking 1200 still this whole time. By the time we had caught the issue and were trying to correct it; Aircraft X was already on the boundary to Valley sector of SCT. Coordination was accomplished and Aircraft X never had a separation issue with any other aircraft.For any special mission where the aircraft are going to work without talking to ATC in designated areas; it would be helpful if they all squawked VFR to reduce confusion and new codes being tagged up on the aircraft squawking codes that are no longer valid. I should have been a little more vigilant about what was going on with the clearance; even if there was a lot going on. Not sure what else aside from more vigilance all around because it was a build-up of a lot of little problems from both pilot and ATC side that lead to the airspace violation.

I was working the Antelope/Palmdale radar position. Multiple MAFFS [Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System] aircraft had been coming in and out of the airspace. Two MAFFS aircraft had recently entered IFR and cancelled to VFR. They were told 'IFR cancellation received; maintain VFR.' Then; almost immediately; both of those aircraft switched frequencies on their own. A MAFFS aircraft called later and asked for and IFR pickup. I gave him a new beacon code and issued the clearance. Shortly after Aircraft X called and said he would also like to pick up IFR and follow his company traffic.I input all the information and a new beacon code was established in the system. While dealing with other aircraft; including a traffic alert and vectoring to and clearing an approach; Aircraft X tagged up on his beacon code. I told Aircraft X he was radar contact and gave his position and a clearance to [destination airport]. The aircraft did not dispute the positioning and read back the clearance. Because the aircraft tagged up I thought that I must have already issued Aircraft X his beacon code; but had not. Shortly after I realized that Aircraft X was not turning as expected to a 250 heading to which he was assigned. I then told him to turn right to 270. The aircraft continued a gradual left turn and so I confirmed to the pilot that he was turning right to 270. The aircraft responded that he was turning to 270; but did not say it was a right turn. Then Aircraft X asked if he needed a different code and I said that the code he was on; [Beacon Code]; was correct. At this time myself; my trainer and handoff were trying to figure out if this was actually the correct aircraft when a limited tag squawked up on the code that I had just read back.We then realized that the aircraft that had previously tagged up was on an old code that had not been removed from the system. I believe this is because the MAFFS aircraft from before switched frequencies without being told to and remained on his old code. We quickly recognized where Aircraft X actually was and track repositioned the tag and started manual handoff coordination with SoCal. I then asked the other aircraft that was squawking [beacon code] what his call sign was and to squawk VFR. He said his call sign was Aircraft Y. Very bizarre situation including the fact that the actual Aircraft X never descended to 80.I would recommend that all aircraft that are routed in to our airspace be removed from the system unless they are landing immediately. All aircraft that cancel IFR and are told IFR cancellation received; maintain VFR should also remain on frequency until told to switch. If the aircraft had requested a cancellation of radar service he would have been told to squawk VFR.

JCF TRACON (Edwards Approach Control) Instructor and Developmental reported of issues with aircraft that are not squawking VFR (1200) when instructed to. Later in the shift when trying to identify other aircraft there is confusion because the aircraft tag up incorrectly.


Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

After hand-off from Center to Approach; I heard the tail-end of an event warning from Approach control regarding our preferred runway - 34R. At check in with Approach I asked what the event at approach end 300 MSL was; and the controller did not answer me; instead giving instructions - assignment to a different runway than expected (34L); and a heading of 010 to intercept the localizer. I read the clearance back; then I queried controller two more times about the issue with 34R before controller responded to me - the event was unauthorized drone activity on the approach path. Shortly thereafter I was looking at the CDI and thinking the vector to join was not very good. Then Approach called and asked if we were off of the arrival. I responded that we were flying the assigned heading to join the localizer; and controller said that our clearance was present heading to join. At that point controller gave us heading 020 to join; which was a more effective vector. The approach to landing proceeded normally from that point; although the position of the drone reports changed somewhat. There were no terrain or traffic separation issues.The sudden report of the drone seems to have thrown everyone's game off just a bit. I only heard a fragment of the report; and in good weather conditions I was wondering what the warning could be about. The sudden change also changed the workload for the controller. I am pretty sure I heard 010 heading; I don't know if it was a controller error or hear back/read back error. I did make a mistake by combining my query with the check in call - I should have made that two separate communications. Or I also could have waited to hear the report again; as we were more than 20 miles from the airport and there was really no time pressure (other than getting our preferred runway to end the day).If my read back was in error; the controller did not correct me from 'heading 010' to 'present heading'.

Approach cleared us for the RNAV Arrival and we were told to expect Runway 34L. After passing QWENN intersection and within 20 miles of the airport; Approach instructed us to 'fly present heading (about heading 010) and intercept the localizer for Runway 34L.' We read back the instructions correctly and complied as instructed. Right after they gave the instructions; they also made a general announcement to all aircrafts within the airspace regarding an unauthorized drone activity at about 300 - 400 AGL between Runways 34L and 34R. The captain queried Approach at least twice for more information regarding the drone; but Approach failed to respond due to multiple aircrafts receiving instructions for arrival. While this was all happening; the same Approach Controller then queried us within a few minutes; after receiving our said instruction; on why we departed from the assigned arrival course. We reiterated to the same controller that they instructed us to 'fly present heading to intercept the 34L localizer.' We then asked a confirmation question to which controller responded 'nope.' We were then instructed to fly a heading of 020 to properly join the 34L localizer. The rest of the approach to landing was uneventful. The root cause was lack of communication. It was a busy time since Approach Control was handling multiple aircraft at once and at the same time they were dealing with an unauthorized drone activity in the vicinity of the final approach course. ATC should have said something to the contrary when we read back the instructions given to us to fly a heading to join a localizer.

A UAV presence at 300 feet on the final approach to SLC parallel runway overloaded the TRACON and disrupted communications with arriving flight crews. All associated personnel experienced workload increases.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 25L

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

During descent on the STAR and cleared for the ILS Approach; at approximately 9300 feet; the First Officer saw a white drone pass under our right wing at approximately 9100 feet.

A B737 Captain reported a near miss with a drone.