Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

It was a configuration 2 takeoff out of ZZZ and I was the PF. After passing 1;000 feet AFE; I selected climb power and the FO verified climb power. After accelerating through 'Flap' speed I called for 'Flaps 1;' the FO selected flaps 1 and called 'Flaps 1.' After the flaps were at 1 and as the airspeed was accelerating to '[Clean]' speed; I engaged auto pilot 1 and stated 'Autopilot 1.' While confirming autopilot 1 engagement on the FMA; I heard the FO say 'flaps up' while disarming the spoilers. I immediately stated 'Negative; Negative!' and reset the flap lever back to Flaps 1. After accelerating through '[Clean]' speed the flaps were retracted.I feel that saying 'Autopilot 1 or 2' can be confused with a flap configuration change. I have also noticed basic mistakes occurring with pilots returning from leave. It seems to happen a short time after their return to the line when comfort levels are starting to return.I feel that the PF should select autopilot on and use the callout 'Autopilot IS on.'

Air carrier Captain reported a flap setting issue during climbout and stated that a callout sounding similar to the flap callout may have caused confusion.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 47; Flight Crew Total 947; Flight Crew Type 730

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

I flew my privately owned aircraft from my home base to PAO. I flew direct VPLEX (to remain clear of San Jose Class C). I contacted NORCAL Approach near Salinas (SNS) and began a descent prior to passing west of VPLEX to remain below the outer rings of SFO Class B.From VPLEX; my flight plan called for a right turn prior to VPSLA; which would position me for a right crosswind or left downwind entry to Runway 31. ATIS Information was current at the time; and I advised NORCAL that I had picked up ATIS. Approximately 8 miles out; NORCAL advised me to turn inbound direct PAO and change to tower frequency. While this would give me less time to descend to pattern altitude and slow to desired speed for the pattern; I assumed that the direction was intended to provide separation so I complied without hesitation.It is possible that during this time; I unintentionally descended below noise abatement guidelines and possibly below pattern altitude before I realized I was too low. Upon contacting tower; I was advised to enter L downwind for Runway 31. I turned left; then nearly 180 to the right (to a heading of 130) to join the left downwind. I was immediately directed to make a 360 to the right; then rejoin the left downwind. At about this time I realized I was slightly below pattern altitude; so I added power in the turn to climb back to proper altitude. The tower controller thanked me for the 360 and called my base turn. Immediately upon turning left base; the controller directed an immediate climb; then a turn to final. As I turned to final; I saw a Cessna (or other high wing) passing below and nearby my position; approximately 300 feet below me. I judge my altitude to have been approximately 800 feet at the time of the turn to final. The controller thanked me for the climb; and I landed uneventfully.It was very busy at PAO and I had a hard time seeing the field from more than two miles away; although I knew from studying the sectional and other maps where to look. I do not fault the controller for the close proximity to the Cessna; but believe I followed his directions promptly and accurately. I would sincerely like to learn from the incident; so would appreciate feedback/analysis when available.

A pilot approached the San Francisco Bay Area from the South intending to land at PAO. They were vectored to the airport by NCT; but once nearing the PAO pattern he had difficulty seeing the airport; entering the pattern; maintaining altitude. Turning final for Runway 31 they had a NMAC.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy

I was working the TRACON supervisor position when Aircraft X was sent around on runway 8L by local 1 due to an aircraft still on the runway. Local 2 was working an aircraft who was departing a parallel runway. There were numerous coordination's with the TRACON regarding headings and altitude of the two aircraft. In the end; Aircraft Y went to departure on a 120 heading; stopped at 2000 feet; which is below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA) and Aircraft X was on a 140 heading climbing to 040. Although I was not witness to the operation in the tower; and do not know what kinds of coordination happened; I feel having local 2 open in the tower is unsafe. The aircraft at Honolulu; both arrivals and departures; are so intertwined with each other that they should be on the same frequency; worked by the same person. Local 2 alleviates frequency congestion; but does not make the tower safer. It is unsafe to have aircraft in such close proximity to each other; crossing flight paths; and be on two different frequencies. I suggest terminating local 2 and going back to a single local control position.

HCF TRACON Supervisor reported a go around and a departure from parallel runways were cleared to conflicting headings with one of the aircraft assigned an altitude below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.


Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Distraction

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

During climb passing about 2;500 feet and at 220 KIAS and in a right turn to avoid weather I as Pilot Flying (PF) inadvertently allowed bank angle to reach 35-40 degrees followed by GPWS 'bank angle' aural warning. My focus was on the weather radar and thunderstorm avoidance instead of flying the plane.  Recovery was immediate and smooth with no stick shaker or physical vibration indicating a stall. Autopilot was engaged and aircraft cleaned up. No loss of PFD information and no exceedances of flight control limitations occurred.  No abnormal flight control conditions were noted and flight was continued to destination.  [Logbook] entry made.Human error - failed to aviate first. Distracted by multiple cells of weather displayed on screen. Fatigue - well rested day before event but trip revision; minimal crew rest and long duty day the day before; and this being the fourth night of hub turns had me short on sleep for the week Non- compliance - unintentional exceedance of bank angle normal limits of 30 degrees.Aviate first; use autopilot during high workload; don't fixate on one issue - keep scan going.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

A300 flight reported bank angle limit was exceeded after takeoff when pilot flying was distracted by weather in the area.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6.5

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway; Ground Incursion Runway

Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors; Staffing

I was working Controller in Charge (CIC)/ Ground Control Flight Data (GCFD)/ Clearance Delivery (CD) combined. Aircraft X and Aircraft Y requested VFR flight plan information; both aircraft had filed the same flight plan route. Aircraft Y taxied first followed by Aircraft X. Aircraft Y departed first; then Aircraft X; both aircraft were southeast bound. The local controller did not observe a transponder for Aircraft Y and reached out to the pilot to verify that the aircraft transponder was working and set correctly; but the pilot did not respond. After another unanswered transmission; the Local Controller (LC) asked Aircraft X if he had Aircraft Y is sight. The pilot confirmed the aircraft insight and LC issued a frequency change. During this time; I was attempting to reconnect to the Domestic Event Network (DEN) phone that was found to be disconnected. I was also receiving phone calls on the land line from National Capitol Regional Coordination Center (NCRCC) and airport vehicles and another aircraft were calling on ground. I told vehicle and aircraft to stand by while I was broadcasting in the blind for Aircraft Y on GC/FD/CD frequencies. The LC also used the PET 2000 radio to broadcast on 121.5 for the aircraft; with no response. LC was also working other aircraft. During this time; the LC and I were both scanning the airspace; frequencies; and the radar scope for the aircraft. The LC advised BARIN [sector] that Aircraft X had Aircraft Y in sight when he changed frequency. BARIN asked the pilot if they had Aircraft Y insight still; and the BARIN controller relayed to LC that Aircraft X saw Aircraft Y turn back to the field. LC and I began more closely to scan the final as another aircraft was landing and also to scan the area south of the runways for evidence of an aircraft. At this time; the pilot of Aircraft Y called the tower on land line; he reported that he had been unable to raise the tower on the radio and he returned to land; and then taxied to the ramp and called the tower. Neither LC nor I saw the aircraft land. I thanked the pilot for calling and hung up the phone. LC notified BARIN that the aircraft was on the ground and I notified NCRCC.ARPT3 was conducting an airfield inspection; I requested that they check the northeast ramp where the pilot said he was to verify that the aircraft was on the ramp and to ask the pilot again to call the tower.ARPT3 did locate the pilot and he called again. At this time I asked the pilot what happened and collected his personal information and the name and number of his supervisor. He said that he had a voltage indication and then he began to lose electrical systems; including his radio. The pilot then returned to the field and safely landed without interfering with other aircraft and without incident. Upon landing he was still NORDO; and taxied safely to the ramp and called the tower on the land line.1) There should have been a broader scan by both controllers in the tower to include the runway. While we both worked every avenue we know to locate the aircraft; we should have also been looking more closely at the runways incase the aircraft returned to land.2) There was an anticipated increase in aircraft activity for today and the next few days. The staffing for today was for 3 controllers and 1 supervisor. Given the anticipated increase in inbound activity; it may have been beneficial to have staffing the tower to have all 3 main positions decombined; thus providing an extra person to assist in the scan and to manage the phone. Instead only 2 controllers were in the tower working positions.3) I could have done a better job prioritizing and recalled the controller on break

Manassas Regional Airport Tower Controller reported an aircraft departed VFR; then returned due to radio problems; but the Tower Controllers did not see the aircraft land and taxi to parking.


Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Despite landing past the touchdown point of the last arriving aircraft; after landing and while slowing down; the aircraft encountered wake turbulence from another aircraft; most likely the Airbus that departed before my arrival. The aircraft tried to roll on the ground and veered to the left then right.

C210 pilot reported encountering turbulence from a departing Airbus that affected his landing roll out directional control.


Cruise; Parked; Takeoff / Launch; Landing

Boarding; Safety Related Duties; Deplaning; Service

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy

Passenger in seat (4X) giving passengers in seat 5Y and 5Z a hard time; because they were trying to tell him that he had to keep his mask on. So he started giving them a hard time as I was doing my safety demo. Once I finished my demo I went to passenger and told him line by line airlines mask policy. He nodded and put his mask on. Then once we pushed back from the gate passenger 4X proceeded to get on his phone and start having a conversation. I walked over to him and stated he must comply with Airline and FAA's policy or we will go back to the gate. He then got off the phone and proceeded to put his mask back on. Then while inflight after finishing the snack service; while not eating or drinking passenger 4X takes his mask off and starts sneezing. There's passengers seated across; behind; and in front of him just shaking their heads. I then inform the Captain and First Officer of the situation. So I then proceed to go over to passenger 4X and politely tell give him 'This is a warning that if he doesn't comply; I will have to inform my Captain and the Captain is going to inform the agents once we arrive into ZZZ1. So I ask him; 'What's it going to be?' Passenger 4X states he'll put his mask back on. I inform the Captain and he states okay; keep me posted. Then about 25 minutes later as I'm doing another trash run through the cabin; passenger 4X is asleep without his mask on. I gently nudge him and tell him to put his mask back on and he does so. I inform the Captain on what just took place and the Captain states he'll talk to him as we deplane in ZZZ1. Once we land; I inform the gate agent in ZZZ1 about passenger 4X. Gate agent states she'll let her Supervisor know; also gave her (witness) his number if she needs to speak to someone. Also as we deplaned; passenger in 4Y; who sat across from passenger (4X); stated passenger 4X should not be flying since he can't comply with the mask policy.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger had to be continuously reminded to wear a mask.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110; Flight Crew Total 6500; Flight Crew Type 400

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 2500

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

After landing Runway 17 at OUN; we experienced some confusion due to runway markings and barricades on the taxi into the terminal ramp.  We passed Taxiway B on our rollout due to another aircraft being on it; and we thought; blocking our exit. We later figured out Taxiway B is the ONLY useable taxiway onto the terminal ramp.  We continued down the runway to taxiway C where we saw a number of barricades and did not think we could taxi any further without getting stuck due to barricades. We then continued down Runway 17/35 to the intersection of it and Runway 3/21. At that point we did not see any barricades blocking our turn onto the closed runway and thought it was open for taxi only. There was a NOTAM for Runway 3/21 stating it was closed; but nothing telling us we could not use it for taxi. Being based elsewhere; we used a closed runway for taxi all the time; it is our norm. As we continued down 3/21 someone spoke to us on the CTAF frequency stating we had to do a 180 and taxi back on 17/35 to get to the ramp. We did; and exited B to taxi across Runway 3/21 to get to the ramp.  Again; there was poor signage and barricades not clearly marking where we could not taxi. That combine with the outbound aircraft on Taxiway B blocking our initial turn off; we did not know how to get to the terminal.

After landing at OUN during uncontrolled operations (tower closed) we became confused during taxi into the ramp. On roll out we bypassed getting off at taxi way B due to an aircraft on the taxi way. Taxi way C appeared to be unusable because of barricades visible from 17. Taxiing further down 17 it appeared the only route to the ramp was down the closed runway 3/21. Someone in the tower recognized our confusion and directed us to back taxi down runway 17 to taxi way B which crosses the closed runway and then taxi way A to the ramp. The crew was aware of all NOTAMs and even had to submit for a waiver due to the displaced threshold and reduces LDA. I spoke with the airport manager following shutdown.

A corporate flight crew reported that after landing on OUN Runway 17 access to Taxiway B was apparently blocked so they taxied to the runway end only to find all exits barricaded. The NOTAMs did not state no taxiing on Runway 3/21.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

I was working LC-3/4 (Local Control) during the first arrival push of the morning; working the arrivals on Runway XXR. The weather was marginal with a low level fog layer that was spotty around the field. I had several PIREPS stating that they were VFR until approximately 1400 ft.; then zero visibility and only at minimums did the approach lights become visible. The runway was then visible around 70 ft. below minimums. I had 1 go around due to the weather and divert to ZZZ1. Due to runway construction on Runway XXL the departures were pushed to the north complex as long as possible. As the departures started taxiing to Runway XXR coordination between myself and GC-C (Ground Control) we agreed to hold aircraft on Taxiway November short of the critical areas due to losing visibility of the arrivals on short final for Runway XXR. The supervisors during this time were coordinating and it was said that the arrivals would be coming off Runway XXR so that we could get the departures out and avoid aircraft being in the critical areas. More coordination from the supervisors with TRACON then said that they will continue to land Runway XXR with 6 mile gaps. The supervisor said that if we have anymore go a rounds that TRACON would then come off Runway XXR. At this point aircraft are still holding short of the critical areas.I then give a position relief briefing and take a break. After my break I returned and was assigned to LC-5 (same side of the Tower); I ask the controllers how and why we're in the critical area worth the departures. I was told that because the reported weather on the ATIS showed the field was VFR and that we didn't need to protect the critical areas. We are constantly told that we need to create a culture around safety and that safety should be first. It seems that way until we become overwhelmed with traffic and then safety takes the back burner. Fog was in the forecast; this was expected; and the arrival rates should have been adjusted to accommodate coming off landing on Runway XXR when we should have favored the departures. Just because the ATIS says the field is VFR doesn't mean we should be compromising the critical area to accommodate the traffic volume when that portion of the airport was heavy IFR.

Tower Controller reported departing aircraft were cleared passed ILS critical areas despite heavy fog and inbound IFR traffic.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Type 1988

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

We leveled off at our initial cruise altitude of FL280.  While considering a subsequent climb; we noticed an uncommanded yawing motion.  We scanned our instruments; and quickly observed we had indeed lost power to the #2 engine. Seconds later; the flight attendants called and relayed they heard two loud bangs out of the engine on the right side; and the aft part of the airplane had fishtailed simultaneously. The First Officer was flying; so I told him to keep flying the airplane.  It appeared the jet was flying fine with no degradation of airspeed initially.  Nevertheless; I quickly ascertained our engine out altitude and airspeed using the FMC and passed that info [to] the First Officer.  ATC gave us a descent clearance at our discretion.  Once the First Officer had us headed in the right direction; I went to the QRH for Engine Failure.  (Note:  In the heat of battle; I never referenced the QRC or QRH for the Driftdown Checklist.  It appeared our relatively low altitude when losing the engine helped us easily maintain altitude throughout the initial discussion of our issue. We got quick clearance to begin a descent; and the airplane handled well.  Looking back at the QRC after the fact; we did manage to accomplish all the steps with our actions.)In accordance with the guidance given after completing the Engine Failure QRH; we decided to attempt a restart. I started the APU and simultaneously started the Engine Start-Inflight Checklist. We successfully restarted the engine and decided to divert to [a nearby alternate].  ATC coordinated our diversion and passed us off to Approach.  (Just a note here about Dispatch communications; I sent several messages but none went answered. We later learned from [a manager] that Dispatch had momentarily lost their ability to communicate or received messages.  The First Officer made a great suggestion to simply have ATC relay our intentions to Dispatch; and they concurred.)  I made all appropriate briefs to the flight attendants (TEST) and passengers.  The descent and landing were uneventful. Because we were successful in restarting the engine; we chose to do a normal Flaps 30 landing with Max braking.  We were definitely cognizant of the fact we could lose the engine again and prepared accordingly.  After having the airplane checked; we taxied to the gate and were met by local station ops personnel.

[Report narrative contained no additional information]

B737NG flight crew reported diverting to an alternate airport after experiencing loss of thrust on the #2 engine.  The engine was successfully restarted during the QRH procedure.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

During our descent into TUL; Approach Control advised us that a previous aircraft conducting an approach to 36R had reported a green laser illumination from the east while passing 1600 feet.During our approach to 36R; we were attacked by a very bright green laser illumination not from the east but from a point directly in front of us as we passed 900 feet AGL. We continued to be illuminated from approximately 900 to 600 feet AGL and passed directly over the source of the illumination at 500 feet.The FO (First Officer) was flying and could do little to shield his eyes while conducting a visual approach (with ILS backup) to 36R. As the pilot monitoring I was able to shield my eyes partially with my hand. The FO was able to overcome the effects of the laser and continued the approach to an uneventful landing. While the attack was occurring; we advised the Tower that we were being illuminated and provided a description of the area of the source of the laser.Upon landing we both commented to each other that we were seeing spots and had blurred vision. The FO complained upon arrival at the gate that he was also experiencing a headache in the area of his right eye. Neither of us felt that we needed immediate medical attention however; we did feel it was prudent to call in sick until our eyes could be properly evaluated. Upon gate arrival; I immediately phoned Dispatch to report the incident.Additional Info:Because a previous aircraft had been attacked by a laser at such a low altitude; we attempted to mitigate the threat to our aircraft by turning off all exterior lights (except navigation lights) and held off turning on landing and taxi lights until reaching 1000 ft AGL. Unfortunately; this technique proved to be inadequate since we were illuminated by the laser 2-3 seconds after turning the landing lights on.This was obviously a premeditated attack by someone who had prepositioned themselves to purposely laser commercial aircraft at low altitude. Further investigation indicates that the attacker was located in the middle of a parking lot of a [shopping center] that is located south of the extended centerline of 36R in TUL.Both pilots experienced detrimental effects from the laser including mild disorientation; partial loss of night vision; after images and blurred vision. The FO also experienced headache and discomfort in his right eye. Now; more than one week after the incident; the FO continues to be evaluated with continued pain in his right eye.Final Thoughts & Recommendations:The prospect of low altitude laser attacks is a game changer and is not specifically addressed [in company documentation]. If alerted to the possibility of low altitude laser attack I would recommend considering:1. Setting up for and conduct an Autoland if possible.2. Utilizing an ILS approach with autopilot on to DH (Decision Height) to permit pilots to adequately shield their eyes while maintaining aircraft control.3. Extinguishing all exterior aircraft lighting during descent and approach until below 500 ft.

Air carrier Captain reported being targeted by a laser on approach to TUL.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 35L

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather; Procedure; Human Factors

Flight to HRL without incident. ATC gave the Crew several reroutes due to rainstorms on the field. WX reported as Rain; 500 BKN; 1200 OVC; expect LOC BC to 35L. Flight was initially given direct to HRL. After we were switched over to Valley Approach on 120.7; while at 4;000 ft; ATC asked if we had the field in sight to which we responded we were completely IMC. Then we requested vectors for the LOC BC 35L. Approach said to expect that. Next clearance was to descend to 2;000 ft. Flight read back the clearance and descended to 2;000 ft. After we were level for approximately two minutes; Approach said we were only cleared to 3;000 ft to which we replied we confirmed the readback clearance with him. ATC directed us to climb to 3;000 ft and said to be advised of towers at one o'clock. We said we were initiating an immediate climb to 3;000 ft. There were no EGPWS warnings. The rest of the approach was flown without further event.

Air carrier flight crew on approach to HRL was cleared to 2000 ft from 4000 ft while IMC on the LOC BC Runway 35L. When level; the crew was told to return to 3000 ft because of towers in the area.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Enroute ZZZ to ZZZ1 in IMC conditions; a right fuel annunciator illuminated. After turning on the boost pump; changing fuel tanks and checking gauges the fuel pressure and fuel flow continued to be erratic and unreliable. I then proceeded to secure the right engine; [advised] ZZZ Center and returned to ZZZ where VFR conditions existed and emergency personnel and equipment were available.

PA-31 Captain reported an issue with the right engine fuel pressure during cruise. Captain secured the engine and returned to the departure airport.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Captain inadvertently hit the crossflow switch with shoe and pant cuff while exiting the left seat of the aircraft. After exiting the seat; Captain continued into the FBO to wait [for] passengers. After passengers arrive; both crew and passengers walked out to the airplane where we found fuel exiting the vent in the right wing. Approximately 200 to 250 pounds of fuel spill over to the ground. FBO personnel cleaned up the fuel without incident and no fuel was leaked into the sewer system. Flight was delayed one hour and one minute until the fuel was cleaned up. The suggestion is to not leave the aircraft alone while power is applied.

Citation Captain reported inadvertently activating the crossflow switch with his shoe that allowed fuel to be released from the wing tank spilling on the ground.


Company Policy; Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling

Dispatched with APU INOP for a transoceanic flight. WHY? ..the Aircraft X is a very hungry electrical power aircraft and the APU is a very critical component to supply Emergency and Normal Electrical Power. Even though the MEL allows this placard the 'Safety Implications' alone should override flying this aircraft over water on several 9-11 hour flights. This APU had been on placard for four days and allowed to fly through major Maintenance Hubs without repair. Why?  While I believe the 'Spirit' of the MEL is to allow the aircraft to continue for a short duration or even Domestic Operations where 'Emergency' airports are plentiful; allowing continued Oceanic flights just to 'keep the operation going' strains the definition Flight Safety. An added threat and danger is the need to be assured that 'Acceptable External Ground' power is available at the gate for the Aircraft X. This is what did not happen as we arrived at our gate; the aircraft accepted the power then when engines were shut down; External Power was dropped by the Gate system and unable to restart the power leaving the aircraft on Battery power.  After five minutes; and calls to Operations; it was apparent that no External Power would be available. So to keep the aircraft battery from to discharging to a dangerous low level; even while passengers were still disembarking I shut all battery electrical power down per checklist. Aircraft X only has 10 minutes of certified electrical power available when all emergency buses are charged and very expensive to replace. A maintenance log book write up was made detailing the time the battery had been powering the aircraft without charge.

Air carrier Captain is dispatched on a transpacific flight with the APU deferred; which it had been for four days. Upon arrival at the gate; ground power is connected and the engines are shut down. Ground power quickly fails and cannot be reestablished leaving the aircraft on battery power alone. After five minutes the battery is turned off leaving the aircraft in darkness.


Climbing out of EWR on Runway 22R via the EWR2 departure we were cleared to 6;000 feet. Subsequently; we were advised of VFR traffic at 12 o'clock position [at] 6;500 feet. We had reported the aircraft in sight. As we were leveling off in the climb; we received a TCAS RA. I was still flying without the autopilot; however; neither of us remembered to de-select the Flight Directors. I noticed that the VFR traffic was only indicating 400 feet above us so I nudged the aircraft down another 80 feet to approximately 5;920 feet before the traffic passed directly overhead. A few moments later and after receiving the clear of conflict alert; we were cleared to climb to a higher altitude.

A320 First Officer reported a near mid-air collision on climb out from EWR when VFR traffic passed above them with less than 500 feet vertical clearance.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 21; Flight Crew Total 606; Flight Crew Type 182

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Evacuated

I departed XXX RWY XX direct to XXX VFR.  Climb and cruise were uneventful as well as descent just west of XXXX; and set up for a right crosswind landing on RWY XX; announcing intentions. Having reviewed the descent checklist I then reviewed the prelanding checklist and put auxiliary fuel pump on; lowered manifold pressure to 12'; mixture full rich; prop full forward; and placed the Johnson bar into the down lock block with the familiar click into place and the attempted to pull it out without my thumb on the release button.  It did not budge. The green down indicator light came on.  At no time did the gear warning horn sound.  All circuit breakers were in.  I entered the pattern within a few feet of the published altitude and noted the speed reduced to 80 KIAS.  I turned to base and noted the PAPI was white/white; announcing position in the pattern.  I turned to final and crabbed to align with the centerline and then used aileron/rudder to side slip and maintain runway centerline.  I put in full flaps and retrimmed nose up and rechecked all instruments.  Speed now down to 69 KIAS; descent 400 FPM; Johnson bar in down lock; green light on; manifold pressure just above idle.  I flared just past the numbers using rudder/aileron to compensate for right crosswind and touched down right main then left main then lowered nose.  I realized something was wrong as I was sitting lower on the runway and skidding right with no more rudder control and that the prop turning pattern was altered with some smoke in front of the cowling.  I skidded to a stop and shut the engine and turned off master and closed the fuel flow.  I noted that the Jbar was now sitting about 4 inches up from the horizontal.  When I exited the aircraft unhurt other pilots immediately drove up to the runway to assist. I noted all 3 gears had collapsed; the prop had struck and runway and both blades were bent about 6 inches.  The airplane was able to be raised by two tow trucks and the gear lowered and locked again.  The airplane was able to be gently tugged back to tie down in wide arcs.  Observation of the downlock block a few days later with the plane on jacks and the gear cycled shows some wear in the receptacle and locking mechanism on the thumb latch release.  The gear circuit breaker had popped out.  A review of the current annual inspection does not reference the downlock block or preload and overcenter gear settings.  The annual was done by a mechanic who stated he had worked on a Mooney aircraft before. In retrospect; I would have had the annual done by a Mooney Certified Service Center and I would spend at least a few hours reviewing all systems and Mooney idiosyncrasies with the A&P.

The landing gear of a Mooney M20F collapsed/retracted during a normal landing. The reporter states that all checklists were followed and there appeared to be nothing out of the ordinary before touchdown.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 225; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Shortly after rotation we heard a couple of loud popping noises from the aircraft that seemed to come from the right side and aft of the First Officer. After flap retraction there was an audible noise in the cabin accompanied by a vibration that could be felt in the floor by the flight attendants from the overwing area forward up into Business Class. At the same time the stall buffet feathers on the First Officer's ADI remained displayed despite both the flap handle and flap indicator showing the flaps were fully retracted. We extended the flaps again and the noise and vibration dissipated; but once we retracted the flaps the noise and vibration returned. We coordinated with ATC to stop our climbout; and called Dispatch and Maintenance Control to seek assistance. With no solution found; we determined that a return to the field would be required. We declared an emergency with Center; coordinated dumping fuel with them and then returned. The landing was at 324;000 LBS (overweight) but was very smooth with minimal sink rate at touchdown. We debriefed with Maintenance upon arrival and relayed to them all of our indications.

B767 First Officer reported hearing a couple of loud popping noises shortly after rotation. After flap retraction there was an audible noise in the cabin accompanied by vibration and the stall buffet feathers on the First Officer's ADI remained displayed despite the flaps showing fully retracted. When the flaps are extended the vibration dissipates and the crew elects to dump fuel and return to the departure airport.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Our aircraft was at 14;000 ft and 15-20 miles northeast of ORD. Chicago Center cleared [us] 'direct PETTY intersection; climb FL230; resume normal speed.' The Captain (pilot flying) began to accelerate the aircraft and continue the climb to FL230. At 18;000 ft MSL the aircraft rolled approximately 20 degrees right; 20 degrees left; and the autopilot disconnected. The Captain returned the plane to straight and level flight while the First Officer radioed to ATC that they had just experienced severe turbulence. Chicago Center; surprised; said that a B777 had been in that area but was approximately 50 miles east of that location already. The Captain made an announcement to the passengers and the First Officer talked to the flight attendant. The flight attendant said that she had hit the left side of her head on the overhead bin and then the right sight of her head on the overhead bin during the severe turbulence as she was doing her water service. No passengers were standing at the time of the wake turbulence and the seat belt sign was on. The Captain and First Officer advised the flight attendant to return to her seat and remain seated for the remainder of the flight (approximately 20-25 minutes). Upon landing; the flight attendant complained of a headache and the following day the flight attendant visited an urgent care clinic because of her injuries. The First Officer had slight discomfort in his right rib cage due to a previous broken rib many years prior; but both the First Officer and Captain remained uninjured. There was no damage to the aircraft. Poor spacing by ATC from a B777 aircraft resulting in severe turbulence. ATC cross check altitude and clearing distance from heavy aircraft.

CRJ-200 First Officer reported a Flight Attendant was injured after they encountered wake turbulence at 14;000 ft possibly from a B777 50 miles away.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Inbound to DEN Runway 35R; we were cleared direct to FRONZ (FAP on the ILS) for the visual approach about 30 miles or so SSW of the field. Captain set 7;000 feet for the altitude at FRONZ. We both pulled up our Class B reference charts for Denver to make sure we would remain in the Class B for the approach. We were descending through about 11;000 feet at the time and it looked like the only altitude that would be a concern on the way to 7;000 feet was the 9;000 feet floor at 20 DME. We made that crossing and headed down to 7;000 feet. Both of us thought that the next shelf had a base of 6;500 feet. We got down to 7;000 feet and we looked pretty low for how far out we were. I looked at the Class B reference chart again and saw we were in a sector with only an 8;000 feet base. The 6;500 feet base was for a tiny sector closer to the airport.The marking on the Jeppeson chart is very misleading. It's showing the altitudes for another sector that the actual text is not in. It has a tiny line drawn up to the small sector which is easy to miss with all of the other lines going every which way on the chart. The actual altitude for the sector we were in is not centered and not easily readable.Redesign the Class B reference page with an easier to read altitude for the small sector south of the airport. Perhaps even a numbered ball note would help.

Flew below the lower limit of the Class B Airspace while on a Visual Approach into DEN. While on arrival to DEN Runway 35R; ATC issued a clearance direct FRONZ (FAP on the ILS) and cleared the visual approach. Approximately 30 miles from the airport; (I) Captain set 7;000 feet for the altitude at FRONZ crossing. Both the FO (first Officer) and I selected the Class B reference charts for Denver; 10-1B; and observed our geolocation symbology. While descending through 11;000 feet; we correctly interpreted the limiting altitude of 9;000 feet between D30/DEN and D20/DEN but incorrectly interpreted the 8;000 feet limit between D20 and D10. Crossing the D20/DEN limit at 9;000 feet. I selected open descent to 7;000 feet. Traveling approximately 8 miles to achieve the descent to 7;000 feet; it appeared that we [were] relatively low based upon our distance remaining to the runway. Reselecting the 10-1B page; we recognized our error interpreting the limit (8;000 feet at DEN/D20) which was depicted east of our path and the V366 airway marked on the chart vice the limit of 6;500 feet which was along our path (marked inside the D20/DEN ring but applicable to the D10/DEN ring).I believe this error occurred due to the manner in which the chart is depicted. Upon closer scrutiny; the D10/DEN limit is depicted with a line that points to the interior area of a small portion of the Class B airspace but is placed in the D20/DEN ring. Our path to FRONZ was west of V389 and our geolocation symbol led us to a limit that appeared along our vector. However; it was not applicable to our actual distance from the airport.Redesign the Class B 10-1B page with an easier to read altitude for the small sector south of the airport. Additionally; I note that on other airport Class B charts; altitude limitations that are depicted outside of the boundary are shown with an arrow head pointing into the limited segment. On the DEN 10-1B page; the arrow head is not depicted.

A321 flight crew reported inadvertently flying below the floor of the DEN Class B airspace sector due to unclear charting.


Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge

Boarding; Safety Related Duties; Service

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Passenger X; entered aircraft with mask below his nose.  I requested that he pull it up before boarding.  He complied and sat.  Several times throughout the flight I walked cabin to collect trash and reminded many people to pull up mask over nose.  I asked Passenger X once and he complied.  The next time I asked; he informed me 'I can't breathe.'I told him I was sorry but he agreed to our terms of face masks when he checked in.  He pulled mask up.  I did another trash run and mask was lowered again.  I reminded him of policy.  Instead of pulling it up; he requested to see the policy in writing.  He then spoke with other FA and said he was being singled out because of his tattoos.   She told him she had seen me as I had reminded several others.  She said further non-compliance could result in a ban on flying.I called Captain and asked to make the nose and mouth announcement.  Captain did.  I went back to show him the verbiage which explicitly spells out the policy.  I asked him if he would please comply.  He said 'I am complying; #%$^!'  His nostrils were clearly visible.  I left and called Captain; informing them of the non-compliance.  Captain confirmed and would notify the ground agents to meet the plane.Passenger Y talked to other FA and said I was harassing Passenger X.  He said others around him felt uncomfortable.  I said we needed people to comply with safety rules.  He said I hadn't said anything to a nearby woman when her mask was off; and I tried to explain it was because she was still eating and drinking.  But he was convinced I was discriminating in my enforcement.Make an announcement at boarding gate that explicitly tells people they can be banned for failure to comply with nose and mouth covered rule.

Flight attendant reported a passenger was non-complaint with face mask policy during the flight.


Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

A visual approach backed up with the ILS. I was on final approach; configured for landing; on visual glidepath according to the PAPI; I was chasing my airspeed a little bit but seemed to be getting it corrected. Shortly after the RA called 500; the Captain made note of a windshear caution I didn't fully hear/understand what he said; when I looked in to scan the PFD the caution was already gone. Shortly thereafter as we approached the runway; I got fast and high on the visual glidepath. I seemed to be pushing quite a lot to get the nose down; the Captain mentioned I needed to push the nose over; I pushed the yolk and pulled back the power levers. The Captain then told me to add power; as I started to push the thrust levers forward; the RA called 100; at that point the Captain called; 'I have the controls.' I let go of the yolk and repeated; 'You have the controls.' We started to round out; the stick shaker went off and the aircraft rolled to the right as the Captain fought it back to the left. We landed pretty hard right wing low. We taxied off the runway; verified everyone was ok and followed normal after landing and taxi procedures back to the gate; I remember asking what I had done to get off the glidepath; I thought I had it stabilized; we discussed vigilance during taxi to prevent any further mistakes and that we would discuss what happened after the aircraft was parked; the Captain mentioned he thought he felt the right wing hit so we would go look at it as soon as we were parked and shutdown at the gate. Upon shutting down at the gate; someone from Maintenance knocked and entered the flight deck as passengers were deplaning and exclaimed; 'Y'all know about the severe damage to the right side; right?' We let him know we were on our way to inspect it. We filled out the maintenance can and went to inspect the damage. Post flight inspection revealed damage to the right wing tip; right flap and flap fairings. The Maintenance person told us not to worry about reporting it to Maintenance Control; that he had called it in on the radio. The Captain told me to take a break; and then head to the next gate while he called his Supervisor and the Chief Pilot's office and he would call me with an update. While enroute to the gate after a brief break in the crew lounge the Captain and I met and he told me we needed to proceed to the Chief Pilot's office; we had been pulled off the trip as a precaution to make sure we were not too shaken up. When we arrived at the Chief Pilot's office he had a couple forms for each of us to sign and then we headed over to complete a drug and alcohol screening. My low experience level with transport category/jet aircraft training taking place Winds Caution message not fully understood Critical Phase of flight. Once losing the glidepath I should have executed a go-around. The aircraft stalled during the landing flare causing wing contact with the runway. If the approach becomes unstable especially that close to the ground execute a go-around; don't try to stick with the landing.  If a non-standard call is made and I am not sure what is said; verify if there is time or discontinue the approach if I'm not completely comfortable.  Better manage the aircraft energy; and stay ahead of glidepath deviations to prevent having to correct the approach at the last minute.  More experience will help my skills and figuring out the 'feel' of the airplane especially as it differs from the simulator to more correctly make corrections during all phases of flight.

Conducting IOE for a new hire First Officer; second day of his first trip. This was his fifth approach. He had been demonstrating typical progress; very rough glidepath control in the beginning; but making steady and obvious progress with each experience. His airspeed control was good. He was well above average in all other areas. On this approach I had decided it was time to back off on the volume of verbal coaching; keeping my mouth shut as much as possible to allow him to concentrate. He did very well; until about 200 feet AGL where he began to deviate high. I made a comment; at which point he reacted by pitching down; but it wasn't enough; and I took the controls. At this point I was in a relatively familiar situation; one in which I have; in the past; continued to achieve a good landing without undue effort. I pitched down and added power; and began the flare for the landing. In the flare we experienced stick shaker; and the landing was hard. I heard and felt unusual contact; which turned out to be the right wing contacting the runway. Overall training environment threat; last-minute control swap; expectations due to previous similar experiences which had always resulted in good outcomes. The primary error was my decision not to opt for a go-around. I would have been plenty justified in doing so. Low energy during flare; resulting in possible accelerated stall just before touchdown.I think the company is already doing quite a bit to spread the word about our no-fault go-around policy and the need for most of us; including me obviously; to work harder to achieve a fundamental; philosophical change in our individual mindset. Maybe more communication on the subject would help; possibly including praise for specific good examples. If my bad example can be used to help in this effort; then at least some good will have come from my experience. Sometimes the time available for making the go-around decision is effectively zero; therefore at least some of one's thinking; in general terms at least; needs to be done ahead of time. I have been regularly preaching this myself; this personal experience will; among other things; result in my becoming much more of a 'born again' preacher on the subject. The lesson I learned here is priceless. Sometimes one truly doesn't know exactly where a certain line is until one blunders across it. In the future my personal trigger points 'my own comfort level' will be far more conservative. I must also remind myself that demonstrating a go-around to an IOE trainee in such a situation is a good thing in itself. It's a prime time for setting the right example; one that will then get relayed to many of his future crewmates over the years.

CRJ-200 flight crew describes the events leading up to a hard landing with the right wing contacting the runway.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 81; Flight Crew Total 3000.07; Flight Crew Type 4000.07

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

During the takeoff roll at approximately 90-100 kts; a bird struck the radome and right side of the aircraft before being ingested by the #2 engine. A rejected takeoff was initiated and we cleared the runway without incident. Aircraft was brought to a full stop after exiting the runway and communications with the flight attendants and passengers took place as well a thorough review of the aircraft systems and completion of appropriate check lists. Aircraft returned to gate without further incident.

B737 Captain reported a rejected takeoff due to bird strike and engine ingestion.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Fatigue; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Ground Personnel; Person Maintenance

I was asked to go on a road trip to ZZZ at XA:30; did not leave till XD:30. After we were being escorted to the aircraft arrival time approximately XH:30; first thing we did was look at the log book and talk to control to find out exactly where we were with the window change. Around XL:00 we started installing and torqueing bolts; around XL:30 station personnel came and said he had to leave and we could not stay unescorted. We arrived back at the plane around XM:30 finished up the torquing and double checked; I read the manual again to make sure of torques and to make sure we did not forget anything; once done with torques around XN:00 am; I prepared the window for sealing and sealed the window with sealant and forgot to install the weather seals.I believe someone was called out to the aircraft because the sealant I mixed did not cure and it blew out.The aircraft was located in the remote pad; lighting played a big factor also being tired.

We flew out on the XD:30 flight. I and another mechanic went on the road trip. We arrived at the aircraft around XH:00-XH:30 pm. We were told the windshield was in place and we were to finish the install of the LH windshield. At approximately XL:48 our escort from station said we needed to go with him to the office which is off site of the airport. I asked if we could leave in a few minutes because I was in the middle of torquing the bolts on the strap. He said we needed to go. The missing seals were confirmed at the destination airport; the seals were not installed. Once I heard that I knew when the step was missed was when we had to go off site to the office and while we were gone we were discussing with maintenance control about the other mechanics that were going to come back to the aircraft and finish all the checks that needed to be accomplished and finish installing the wiper. Also I notified maintenance control the bolt for the wiper arm was missing. There were a lot of different topics that were discussed in between the time frame.The missed step happened between the time we had to leave the aircraft and go to the offsite office.Between the time we were gone both of us discussed what else needed to be completed when we returned. Once at the office I was in contact with maintenance control. We were already past our duty time. We arrived back to the aircraft 45min. to 1hour and I torqued the bolts from the beginning so I did not miss a bolt. After I completed my co-worker was going to seal the windshield. We finished the windshield and we left the aircraft around XO:00. A mechanic noticed some sealant on the windshield and brought to my attention the sealant had blown out. The aircraft was at its destination and I notified my supervisor about the concern of the seal installation may have been missed. My supervisor notified maintenance and talked to my co-worker on the phone and was determined the seals were not installed. Maintenance installed the seals.

While replacing the Left Hand Windshield on a CRJ-900 the Maintenance crew neglected to install the weather seals.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Air Traffic Control Military 13; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3; Flight Crew Total 384.4; Flight Crew Type 37.8

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

The flight where this incident happened was a night VFR cross-country from ZZZ to ZZZ; as the final leg of a cross country flight along the route of ZZZ-ZZZ1-ZZZ2-ZZZ; which was being conducted for the purpose of instrument proficiency for me; using a view-limiting device while accompanied by a safety pilot.  Flight planning indicated that we had sufficient fuel for this mission; and indeed; I have flown this route several times with no issues in other similar aircraft.  I was using planned fuel burn of 10 gph; in accordance with performance charts for [this make/model]; such as the one we were flying.  We checked fuel state prior to the flight both on the gauges; as well as by visual verification on both tanks (both myself and my safety pilot) during the pre-flight inspection.  Both tanks were visually noted by both of us as being above the tabs.  The flight proceeded uneventfully until the final leg from ZZZ2 to ZZZ.  Approximately halfway between the two airports; at an altitude of 6;500 MSL (a little over 3 hours into the flight); the engine developed roughness; then sputtered and quit.  We had just changed tanks approximately 2 minutes prior; and I had adjusted the mixture slightly; so I immediately applied full rich mixture; turned the electric fuel pump on; and switched the tanks back.  The engine caught almost immediately; and I was able to initiate a full power climbing turn in order to remain near the town of ABC; which I knew had an airport; just in case the engine quit again; since we didn't know the reason for the engine stoppage.  After about 2 minutes or less; the engine quit again; and I pitched for best glide; and began searching for the airport; which we initially had difficulty doing; due to the obscuration of the airfield beacon by trees when approaching from the south.  We attempted to use the CTAF to turn the runway lights up; and eventually were able to do so; and spotted the runway.  Upon identifying my landing site; I then had my safety pilot read the emergency checklist for engine failure; while I performed the action items.  We were unable to affect a restart.  We then attempted to contact ZZZ Approach (just as this happened; ZZY Approach had handed us off to ZZZ; but before we could establish radio contact; the engine had quit the first time).  Unable to reach Approach on the radio; we squawked 7700 on the transponder; then prepared for an emergency landing.  We easily had the altitude to make the field; so I utilized S-turns and a forward slip to bleed off altitude for a straight-in approach to RWYXX.  We landed safely; (a textbook short field landing) and egressed the aircraft.  We could hear sirens as emergency responders from the city of ABC; both fire and police (having been notified by ATC) were en-route to our location.  I notified approach via cell phone that we were safe on deck (all personnel on board; as well as the aircraft); and the first responders assisted with towing the aircraft to a parking area.  Upon inspecting the aircraft afterwards; we discovered that both tanks were completely empty (both fuel tanks were still reading approximately 1/4 tank on the gauges when the engine first quit; and the left tank gauge continued to show this fuel state even after landing).  According to pre-flight planning; we should have had about 1.2 hours of fuel remaining at that point of the flight; which would have allowed us to make it back to ZZZ and have our legal VFR night fuel reserve plus some; so this gauge reading seemed reasonable at the time (although I have never entirely trusted fuel gauges in aircraft; and this incident has greatly deepened that distrust)!My understanding is that the owner will be doing an inspection in the next few days to confirm that there are no fuel leaks or other issues that might have contributed to running out of fuel early.  Assuming that no mechanical issues are found at that time; I believe that the following factors are involved:(1) For some reason I thought that fuel at the tabs on this plane was X gallons (Y per side); but I later found that in this aircraft it is Z gallons (A gallons per side out of a Y gallon tank).  A contributing factor for this may have been that most of my recent flight time has been in a [different model] for which tabs are indeed Y per side.  I may have confused this with the Y gallons per side TOTAL for this aircraft for full tanks; not tabs.  (2) It is possible that this aircraft was burning a lot more than 10 gph.  I was told afterwards that the aircraft burns more like 15 gph average if you are performing a lot of pattern work (and we had conducted 4 instrument approaches prior to heading home on the final leg).  None of the [aircraft] publications that I have substantiate this type of fuel burn for an IO360 engine; but if so; than that would partly explain why we ran out of fuel early.  I am not aware of whether this aircraft has any performance modifications that would increase fuel burn.  A 15 gph burn rate; even for a short time; would definitely run us out much sooner than expected.Thankfully we were able to safely land engine-out at this small rural airfield; especially given that this happened at night in an airplane that I was relatively unfamiliar with.  This incident reinforces the value of proper pre-flight planning and ensuring that accurate information is available in terms of fuel burn as well as fuel tank size; even when operating in the local area on a fairly short flight in terms of distance between points.  It also reinforces the value of cruising at higher altitudes when over rugged terrain; especially at night.  Lastly; it shows the importance of staying proficient at all aspects of an engine-out emergency.  My thanks to all that assisted; from the approach controllers; to the first responders; as well as my safety pilot.

PA28 pilot on a night training flight reported the engine stopped working and they made a successful engine-out landing at an airport. Post flight inspection revealed the engine failure resulted from fuel exhaustion.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 1500

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

On preflight we noted a shortened runway due to a displaced threshold. My copilot called airport and received additional information on construction and NOTAM's we already had received during preflight. Upon arrival we were asked if we were aware of the shortened runway and copilot replied with an affirmative. We touched down and made a normal landing and were told we had landed inside the displaced threshold. The copilot and myself never saw any indicators that a pilot normally looks for on a displaced threshold. There were no obvious markers leading to where the threshold starts. As a crew we feel we did everything to prepare for the flight and never saw exactly where the threshold began or anything to lead to it. The only obvious thing on the runway was a tarp over the numbers. We feel thresholds need to be marked clearly so high performance jets can have a clear aiming point.

The reporter state that the only indication of the location of the displaced threshold were two traffic cones placed on either side of the runway.

CE650 Captain reports being aware of a NOTAM for AHN creating a 1;500 foot displaced threshold for Runway 27. The reporter is informed after landing that he touched down in the displaced threshold. Nonstandard displaced threshold markings were cited as the cause.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

We had an aircraft with MEL's 79-XX-XX (Eng. oil lvl Indic) and MEL 79-YY-Y (oil replenishment system.) We kept the same plane for our next Flt. We had a MX man come and request the logbook but never mentioned why he needed it as I was getting out of the aircraft for a post flight walk around. When I got back; he was gone and they were boarding the aircraft. After all the passengers were on board; I mentioned to the FO that MX still had not returned the logbook. MX arrived shortly to say we need to deplane because they over serviced the oil and were cleaning it up and they had to run the engines without passengers on board. He also did not understand why they boarded the aircraft after their Manager called Ops to hold off boarding. I called our Dispatcher and they knew nothing about this. I explained to the passengers the issue before we deplaned them and said it should not take too long and we will be on our way again. MX ran the aircraft and we boarded the people and MX came out with the logbook and said it was good to go. I then got out of the aircraft and did another walk around to verify all service doors were closed etc. We taxied out to the runway and I briefly checked all our engine indications were in the green and equal before taking the runway. While on climb out about 30 miles east I noticed the left oil temp in the red. We caught it before the master warning. I called for the abnormal checklist and immediately reduced the left engine to idle and turned the aircraft back and declared an emergency. As per the checklist we monitored the oil pressure and it continued trending down and we agreed as long as it continues cooling; we would not shut it down. We were able to ACARS 'emergency and returning' to our Dispatcher. During our descent it ended up back in the green on about a 10-15 mile final. We landed overweight and met all of the requirements for not being considered a hard landing or a hard de-rotation. We briefed the passengers about the situation and let them know we have another aircraft. Once boarded the other aircraft I let them know we appreciated their patience and we were going to give them free refreshments enroute.

The event occurred after the aircraft reached 10;000 feet. The pilots called the flight attendants and explained that there was going to be a precautionary landing due to high engine oil temperature; and told us to prep the cabin for landing. We landed safely and taxied to the gate. Everyone was safe and deplaned via the air bridge.

CRJ-900 Captain and Flight Attendant describe a precautionary return to the departure airport for high engine oil temperature. The engine oil had been replenished prior to departure and some spilled due to MEL's for Engine Oil Level Indicator and for Oil Replenishment System.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Passenger; Person Flight Attendant

While strapped into my 3L jumpseat and sitting on tarmac waiting for our turn to take off a sudden very strong smell of fuel/oil came into the main cabin very strong in aft part of main cabin. Many passengers started waving their arms at me and were concerned about the strong odor it was bothering them I called the Captain to inform him of the strong fuel/oil smell coming into the cabin. These incidences are happening more often and are not acceptable. Threatens the health of crew and passengers. Passengers were waving at me concerned about the fumes I had already called the Captain to inform him of the strong smell of fuel in the aft part of main cabin.

A321 Flight Attendant reported a fume event while awaiting takeoff clearance. Multiple passengers also reported strong fumes.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

On taxi out received a 'Tire Press' EICAS alert. This occurred approximately 5 minutes after pushback. We were on [a] taxiway. The Captain stopped the aircraft and we ran the checklist and observed approximately 78psi on tire 7. Pressure continued to decrease to approximately 2psi. We notified Ground Control and returned to parking on ramp. All preflight indications were normal including visual inspection. Aircraft was taxied on centerline entire time. No FOD was noticed on taxiway. Crew did not feel anything unusual while taxiing. Probable FOD. Tire appeared to be cut. [I suggest] proper FOD sweep on taxiways/ramp.

B777 First Officer reported an EICAS message for low tire pressure led to a return to the gate for maintenance.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway XXL

Confusion; Distraction; Fatigue; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Workload; Fatigue; Time Pressure

Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

We were established on the localizer to the ILS approach. As we were approaching the FAF with the glide slope indication of a half dot above the aircraft; I as the Pilot Flying; called for gear down and flaps to 15. At the point that I thought the Pilot Monitoring lowered the gear; the autopilot and auto throttles suddenly disconnected. At that point; I tried to figure out why and didn't noticed that I went through the glide slope to being above the glide slope. I then applied correction to recapture the glide slope. When I adjusted pitch and power to capture glide slope; I then noticed that the flight director was not showing in the PFD. Having directional information still showing in the HUD and having clear sight of the runway; runway lights and approach light; I elected to continue with hand flying using the HUD and PAPI lights. I then began to notice that I was getting below the glide slope and began to correct too much and went above it again. By 1000 feet; I elected to continue because I still had the runway environment in sight and was correcting back to the glide slope. By 500 feet; I was still correcting to the glide slope that was below the aircraft; and because airspeed was under control and still in visual conditions; continued to correct pitch to catch glide slope and then got an aural 'SINK RATE' announcement. Made necessary pitch adjustment; landed under better control in touchdown zone. I know; in hindsight; that I should have gone around on a couple of locations on the approach because I was not stable. I fully admit that my false sense of desire to salvage the unstable approach caused me to make the poor decision to not go around throughout the approach.

I was the Pilot-Monitoring in a B737. We were given a RNAV Arrival; and then we were vectored to intercept the LOC for the approach. Our set up for the approach was good and we were 'in the green'.The Captain was the Pilot Flying at the time. Approaching the FAF we had the autopilot and the auto throttles on. Airspeed was approximately 180 KIAS with the flaps at 5. The LOC was captured and the Glideslope was alive. At 1/2 dot below the glideslope the CA called for 'Gear Down' and just as I reached up to extend the gear; the autopilot and auto throttles disconnected; and the PFD flight director command bars went out of view. I extended the gear and we set the flaps to 15. I experienced the 'swimming in glue' feeling of trying to understand what had happened to our well set up approach.The CA continued flying raw data; hand flying the aircraft and throttles with no flight directors. I began calling out deviations; LOC tracking and airspeed were good; but glideslope tracking was problematic. I called 'Glideslope' when initially we were slightly low (approx. 1/2 dot) and then called 'Glideslope' again as we became one and then 2 dots high.Our before landing checklist was complete and we were fully configured before 1000 feet AGL. We still did not have flight director guidance on the PFD's and the captain was hand flying the airplane and the throttles. The CA called for me to reset the flight director switches; but we still couldn't make the flight directors work for us. At this point we had the runway in sight and we were still too high. The captain called correcting but in hindsight I should have called for a go around. We were too high and we were descending too rapidly; it was not a stabilized approach.

The B737 crew experienced an autopilot and autothrottle disconnect at glideslope intercept; which led to an unstable approach. The Captain elected to land.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion; Distraction

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

On arrival; approximately 30 miles north of ZZZ; we were descending to 6;000 ft; when Approach informed us that the Tower would be closing in 5 minutes without explanation. We had prepared and briefed a visual approach to Runway XX per the ATIS; with no NOTAMs pertaining to a Tower closure. I was the Flying Pilot; and we decided to slow down and configure the aircraft early so that we could keep our heads up and watch out for traffic. At approximately 10 miles north of the airport; Approach asked us if we had the airport in sight; we acknowledged; and they cleared us for a visual approach to Runway XX. We switched to the CTAF frequency; announced our position; altitude; and intentions; began a gradual descent to 4;000 ft. and entered directly into the traffic pattern on a left downwind. The CTAF frequency was very active with aircraft announcements for simultaneous departures and landing to BOTH intersecting runways. We were inundated with TCAS targets coming from all directions; altitudes; and proximity; from as little as 500 ft. below us and 700 ft. above. We observed targets that seemed to be popping out of nowhere; over or alongside mountains; out of valleys; and several that were just flying low in the valley itself. All unannounced. It was almost like flying in a beehive. Our radio calls were continuous; as we announced our position; altitude and intention. We entered a left base to intercept a 10 mile final; and I began to have reservations about conducting an approach with so much traffic. I began to contemplate abandoning the approach altogether and started to consider where a plausible alternate might be; but decided to continue to 5 miles out as my decision point. At about 7 miles; a Cessna in a close in pattern announced that he was going to be making a left base turn to Runway XX; essentially right in front of us. We made several more calls advising our position and distance from the airport; and I became virtually certain that we would need to abandon the approach; but was waiting to acquire the aircraft visually before going around. Moments later someone using a ground-based radio (Airport Operations) advised the aircraft who was about to turn in front of us to extend downwind since we were on short final. The aircraft stated that he had us in sight and would continue downwind and land behind us. We could also hear other aircraft throughout the approach making sporadically coherent/incoherent announcements for departures and landings to Runway YY; with various traffic pattern variations; but none seemingly aware of our approach to the intersecting runway; or the spacing that might be necessary to accommodate safe separation.We landed; turned off at XX2 to Taxiway XX to the ramp. We announced that we were clear of the runway and would be taxiing across the approach end of Runway YY on A. We heard a helicopter announce that he was on a tight right base turn to Runway YY; but couldn't see him because he would have been above and behind us. We scanned the area and proceeded; just as the helicopter was cut off by a Cessna landing straight in to Runway YY. That aircraft went over the top of us; and we saw him outside the FO's (First Officer) side window as he passed over the top of us at about 50 ft. We couldn't believe it. We taxied into the ramp; and parked. We were both shaken by the stressful environment. As we began deplaning; I noticed an airport vehicle parking just in front of our left wing and the driver got out and made visual contact with me in the cockpit; so I went out to speak to him. He advised me that the Tower was closed due to COVID; and that it would be closed until XA:00 am the next day. I asked him if he had been observing the traffic around the airport; and told him that someone flew over the top of us on the approach end of Runway YY. He said that he had been listening to the radio and watching the traffic; relating that he had overheard an argument between two aircraft attempting to land Runway ZZ & YY at the same time in opposite directions. He described the conditions as total chaos with a 'bunch of idiots' who didn't know what they were doing. He went further to say that the airport was never designed for this type of traffic; as it was simply a modified military airport. I told him about the traffic conflicts we had experienced on landing; and we both agreed that operating a 121 category aircraft in the current conditions without a Tower in operation was not safe. I returned to the cockpit; the First Officer and I debriefed; and together we concluded that based on the current volume of traffic; operation into ZZZ without a Control Tower was simply unsafe for our category of aircraft. Both of us agreed that our scheduled return leg from ZZZ1 would require us to fly almost directly into the setting sun; at a time when people would be focused on watching the sunset over the [surrounding areas]; and at a time of the day when aircraft traffic volume was sure to be exceptionally high with a variety of different aircraft types. Without an operating Control Tower managing traffic flow to the two intersecting runways; providing aircraft separation and advisories; we concluded from our first-hand experience; that the risks associated with continuing our flight within our scheduled time frame was simply unsafe.I called our Dispatcher to advise her of the Tower closure; what we had experienced on our arrival; and our concerns for safety on the return flight into ZZZ from ZZZ1 within our scheduled time frame. I explained to her that we would be willing to fly the plane out of ZZZ given our capability to climb quickly away from the potentially conflicting traffic and congestion; but that we would not be willing to return given the current conditions. She said that she was going to reach out to her Supervisor; who I believe ultimately cancelled our flight; but we never received official confirmation from anyone.Shortly thereafter; I received a call from my Chief Pilot with an inquiry about our situation. I briefly described what we had experienced; and that we didn't believe it was safe to operate our return flight into ZZZ in the current conditions. He explained that we operate in uncontrolled airport conditions all the time; and I agreed. He asked me if I had the capability to predict air traffic volume; and I told him I did not. He then asked me if I was 'shutting down the operation'; and I said that I was not; but that I personally would not be willing to return to ZZZ based on the current conditions. Clearly frustrated and unsupportive of my decision; He requested an [report] and informed me that; 'this would not be the last I heard of this'. In summary; I refused a return flight segment to ZZZ in compliance with regularly scheduled operations for an uncontrolled airport due to safety concerns rising from traffic saturation in the terminal environment based on current conditions; the unscheduled closing of the airport Control Tower; and loss of ATC services that are normally available at this time of day. While we did not have a crystal ball that would have enabled us to see or anticipate what the traffic volume would be on our return; given the short round trip; we did not anticipate that it would change significantly over time; and rather than returning to what we believed would be similar conditions to those we had just experienced; we notified the company of our unwillingness accept what we believed were unacceptable risks to safety of flight.Unscheduled Tower closure due to COVID; loss of ATC services; high volume of aircraft operating in the vicinity; utilization of two intersecting runways operating simultaneously; poor situational awareness and communication by GA aircraft operating in the terminal environment; lack of adherence to standard traffic patterns and altitudes among by GA aircraft in the terminal environment. I also believe this was sort of a perfect storm situation; in that with the conditions being perfect for flying; the time of day; the greater ZZZ environment was unusually congested with GA aircraft enjoying aviation. While we typically would have no difficulty or safety concerns operating in this environment; this particular day and the lack of ATC services in this environment presented conditions that in my opinion were unsafe due to the differences in size and speed of our aircraft with respect to others operating in the same proximity.I believe the airport could have listed a NOTAM prior to the unscheduled Tower closure that may have informed pilots that the environment was going to become uncontrolled; allowing them to possibly make alternative choices for their operations; and/or plan ahead for standard traffic pattern entry procedures.

Air carrier Captain reported flying into a normal controlled airport; but Tower was closed due to COVID and having numerous issues in the air and on the ground with other aircraft.


Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were given a descent to FL180 by ATC.  The First Officer was flying the leg.  Upon nearing FL180; our altimeters' settings flashed; indicating a need to adjust to local altimeter settings while passing through FL180.  Acknowledging that we were leveling at FL180; I left my Altimeter setting at 29.92.  The First Officer saw his altimeter setting flash; and adjusted it to the local altimeter setting of 30.14.  From the Captain's seat; I noticed we were descending through FL180.  I asked the First Officer to level off; then told him to climb back up to FL180.  He was not responsive to my comments nor took any action to remedy the situation so I stated 'my controls'; disconnected the autopilot; and climbed back to FL180.  I then asked him to reset his  altimeter to 29.92.  He did so.  I called for autopilot on and then transferred controls back to him.  We lost  somewhere around 150 FT during the incident. Contributing factors include a procedural error; lack of understanding; and perhaps a confusing altitude to level at. More experience; more understanding of procedures; and ATC avoiding the assigning of FL180.

CRJ200 Captain reports being cleared to descend to FL180 with the First Officer flying. As the aircraft nears FL180 the altimeter settings begin to flash and the First Officer sets QNH of 30.14 resulting in a level off below FL180. The Captain tells the First Officer to climb back to FL180 then takes the controls when the First Officer does not respond.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

At the gate before pushback; as the A Flight Attendant was giving us the paperwork with the passenger count; we heard chimes in the flight deck. This created incredible confusion among us. As the A Flight Attendant jumped back into the cabin to get the handset to contact the C Flight Attendant my First Officer called the cabin to find out if everything was ok. At that point; no one knew who was talking to whom. The entire Crew conducted themselves in a very professional and calm way as to identify them and verify that none of us had chimed the flight deck and they did not see any emergency transpiring. At the same time; it occurred to me that it could be the ground crew. I called them on the headset and the Tug Driver answered jumping into his programmed briefing about being ready for pushback. I could not get a word thru to ask if everything was normal outside the aircraft until he was done with his routine. I asked him if he had called the flight deck [several] times in a row and he confirmed that it was him; trying to get our attention. I explained what [multiple] chimes meant and I got a very uninterested 'ohhh...K'. After pushback; I stopped the aircraft on the ramp and contacted Operations on their frequency and ask them to please instruct the Ground Crews on this very important Safety matter. To my further surprise the lady in charge explained to me very nicely; that she had no idea that [several] chimes meant anything. She said 'Oh that is very informative; thank you.' There was a moment during this event that we as a Crew had no idea if the back Flight Attendant was under distress; or if we had an outside threat such as an undetected fire but we all knew that [several] chimes meant emergency. With all due respect; I suggest we train our Ground Crews so that they know of the potential of creating an emergency that doesn't exist.

Air Carrier Captain reported hearing an emergency chime and was unaware of the source until questioning the ground crew.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Manuals

This report is less about this flight in particular than TLV and other flights in general. This was my first flight to TLV. The station guide mentions reviewing Jepp Briefing Bulletin about transiting Nicosia airspace to get to Tel Aviv. Unfortunately; it doesn't say where to find it. I guessed the Middle East Airway Manual but it was in the General Airway Manual. In any case; the relevant information is also found on the ipad JeppView app by holding down the Nicosia FIR boundary entry point and reading the notes. The Bulletin references three entry points to the north; where calls need to be made 10 minutes prior to entry. What isn't referenced; or easily found; is the requirement for flights approaching from the west/northwest to call Tel Aviv identification on 124.30 or 118.80 no later than 180 NM from Ben Gurion VOR. On the ipad; one must select the notes tab on the bottom left; which often results in a message that notes aren't available because the chart is zoomed out too far. Zooming in still results in a laundry list of 10+ FIRs. The station guide mentions Nicosia; but the restriction is found in the Tel Aviv FIR notes; which a crew might not think to reference until much closer. The check airman on my flight was giving OE to a new hire (but one who had previous international ACMI experience). He had me get out the en route high chart; and made a note of showing all of us how the 180 NM call requirement was rather obvious when looking at the paper chart; but you essentially had to know it was there to find it on the ipad. An easy trap to fall into.  As we transition toward a 'paperless' cockpit; do we intend to stop carrying all paper charts or just approach plates? The trend in training; OE; and on line; in my experience; has been to use the ipad and often not even get out the paper charts. This is but one example of how favoring electronic over paper could easily get a crew in trouble. For this particular flight; a note in the Station Guide would be most helpful. So would a change to the JeppView program that would generate pop-up alerts with such restrictions; based on the route of flight that has been entered.

An air carrier relief pilot reported confusion accessing the data necessary to operate within a foreign country when using the ipad as compared to paper charts.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

In the morning while performing the preflight inspection; I noticed three dark areas on the ground forward of the left main landing gear. Upon further inspection with the flashlight it was found to be several puddles of some liquid. Based on the location I surmised it may be hydraulic fluid. I passed this information to the Captain who notified me that the inbound crew the night prior had experienced a HYD LOW 1 QTY Master Caution message during flight. I was going to perform the hydraulic system check for the first flight of the day when the Captain said he would perform the test while I remained outside to see if there was a leak. After a minute or so of operation a leak was noticed inside the left wheel well. There was also another leak just in front of the left wheel well which appeared to originate somewhere inside the wing. Since there was nothing that could be done at this time to remedy the situation we repositioned the aircraft to the general aviation ramp after which we proceeded to the hotel since the next flight would not come in until that evening with maintenance personnel.The following morning we returned to the aircraft to find that the maintenance personnel had indeed changed out the spoiler actuator and were told the aircraft was good for flight. While performing the preflight inspection I once again found a leak forward of the left wheel well. The Captain turned on the hydraulic pumps at this time and the rate seemed to increase. There were no other leaks in the area with the pumps on. The current leak appeared to come from inside the wing just as the previously reported leak. At this point the mechanics arrived having gone through security separately from us. We showed them the leak and they seemed surprised to see that there was a leak still. One mechanic stayed outside with the Captain and myself while the other mechanic went to the cockpit to work the flaps and speed brakes. The flaps appeared to lower without any issue; but when the spoilers were actuated there was a faint 'pop' sound followed by an enormous plume of smoke rising out of the area just below the spoilers and forward of the flaps. This was accompanied by a smell of something burning; at which point the mechanic that was outside told the other one to shut everything down. It is not known what the pop sound was nor what caused the smoke; but everyone was told to step away from the aircraft by the mechanic that was outside. The one that was inside had been by this point walking off the aircraft to assist the other mechanic; so he returned to the cockpit and shut the aircraft down. As he was coming outside again he appeared to be annoyed with the fact everyone had stepped away from the aircraft. After a few minutes the auxiliary power unit (hereafter referred to as the APU) was started. Without any power to the electrical hydraulic pumps there was a constant drip of hydraulic fluid from the aircraft at a point just forward of the left wheel well. This was the same location as the previous day's leak and the leak we had found that morning. At this point the pumps were electrified and the rate of drip increased to what appeared to be one drop per three to four seconds. Finally the mechanics deployed the spoilers and the result can only be compared to a thoroughbred horse relieving itself of bodily fluids. The stream of fluid can be safely estimated at approximately one eighth of an inch in diameter and squirting from somewhere in the wing forward of the flaps but below the area where the spoilers retract. At this point we spoke to the mechanic who was outside with us during the entire time. As it turns out this was the shift lead for this trip and the one who would be signing off the paperwork. Based on his professional opinion there was no possible way this aircraft could safely or legally head fly until they were able to find what the issue was at this point. With this information the entire crew returned to the hotel.Upon arriving atthe hotel we got in contact with the crew that had arrived the night before to see if they were interested in eating lunch. We all agreed to meet downstairs. After stopping along the way we finally arrived and ate lunch. At this time; under the belief that we were done for the day and that the aircraft was not going to leave; both crews had Sangria with our lunch. After lunch the Captain's telephone rang. After hanging up he notified us that the mechanics had apparently done something that would allow the aircraft to fly immediately. At this point we had already consumed alcohol and were therefore unfit for flight. We asked for the bill and proceeded to return to the hotel. Upon arriving at the hotel we were met by hotel staff who informed us we were to contact company. We sat in the lobby and the Captain called the company who informed us it was more than likely the airport who called. After being connected to the airport the Captain spoke with maintenance who explained they had collared the spoiler breakers in order to prevent their use during flight and that they were ready to go when we were. The Captain asked if this was a normal procedure since earlier they had said there was no possible way to fly out the way the aircraft was. The Captain also advised the mechanic that departure would be a moot point since we had to wait at least eight hours prior to departure since we were under the impression we were not going anywhere and had consumed alcohol with lunch. At some point during the conversation the Captain also asked if this was safe since there was nothing done about the leaking system and whether there was anything they could give us regarding acceptable drip rates for the hydraulic system. Apparently there was nothing done with this respect either. At this time the Captain finished the call and we went our separate ways.The next morning we arrived in the lobby at which time the hotel personnel notified us that the Captain was already at the airport and that he was to be contacted as soon as we arrived in the lobby. After calling the airport and being connected to the Captain he stated that the mechanics had been on the van with him and that upon arriving at the airport they were given boarding passes and sent on their way. We were told that the aircraft was airworthy and that the required paperwork was complete. Upon hanging up with the Captain we left for the airport and arrived to find that nothing further had been done to the aircraft. We proceeded to conduct a preflight inspection and to check for any leaks in the hydraulic system. After approximately five or ten minutes there was still a leak in the aforementioned location. At this point the Captain began to contact several persons at the company with the hopes of getting the situation resolved. After speaking with the on call Chief Pilot we were finally released and scheduled to return exactly three days after our original departure date. The aircraft has not left as this has been a terrestrial event.

EMB-145 flight crew noticed a hydraulic leak during preflight. Several attempts to repair the aircraft were unsuccessful and the flights were canceled.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 26.28; Flight Crew Type 3784.27

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

When the tug driver plugged his headset in to communicate for pushback from [the] gate; I could hear interference on it from what sounded like a radio broadcast of a church ceremony with singing of hymns. I asked the tug driver if he was listening to a church service and he said no; but he said there was a church down the street that broadcasts their mass and sometimes it interferes with the interphone and you can hear it (!). The interference became even worse once we were pushed back as I could hear a woman reading scripture; but the tug driver was so faint I could barely hear him and had to ask him to repeat himself. My First Officer was listening too and he confirmed what I was hearing. It went away the instant the tug driver unplugged. I've seen some strange things before; but this is definitely odd and someone should look into this.

Air carrier Captain reported interference from a local church broadcast interfered with his communication with the tug driver at BOI airport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Ramp told us to push back tail north at a 45-degree; but First Officer (FO) mentioned tail South at 45 so Ramp pushed us in the wrong direction. Ramp said to plan on a 180-degree turn to exit on the left side. The weather was horrible. I cleared off the Ground Crew and after they left we completed the Control Check. I called for the Before Takeoff Checklist but do not remember the flap setting because Ramp called and wanted us to move.  I should have slowed down. We taxied. Ground then gave us a runway change from 9L to 9R and a complicated taxi instruction. We complied with and completed the box; performance; and the departure plan briefings. As soon as I wanted to do the Before Taxi Checklist; we were cleared across 9L to Taxiway Romeo. My plan was to cross the runway and complete the Before Taxi Checklist on the other side. As I crossed the runway; I did a quick throttle burst on the number one engine and to MY surprise I got a warning horn. We set the brakes on Romeo; completed the Before Taxi Checklist; and set the flaps from 0 to position 5. This has never happened to me in [many] years.Do not let anyone distract you after the control check and complete the Before Taxi Checklist in a very deliberate manner.

B737-700 Captain discovers late in the taxi for takeoff that the flaps have not been set and a checklist has not been run; due to distractions at a very busy airport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

We taxied out from the FBO via our issued ATC clearance.  The clearance was taxi to  Runway 33 via A Taxiway and cross Runway 25.  As we taxied across Runway 25 I saw a sign that said  approach for Runway 33 and I believed that I saw hold short lines.  At this point I told my PIC that he was approaching the hold short lines for Runway 33; the PIC replied that those where not hold short lines.  A few seconds later the PIC stopped the airplane because he started having doubts as to if we had crossed the hold short lines.  As we discussed the issue the Tower cleared us for take off.  We never saw any other hold short lines as we taxied onto the runway.  If you review the airport diagram  its difficult to see if there are any hold short lines from the point that we taxied onto the runway.   At this point we are not sure if we crossed the hold short line.  Next time I will be more aggressive in regards to stopping the airplane.

G200 First Officer questions whether the hold short line for Runway 33 has been crossed as the crew taxi's to that runway via Taxiway A at DET.