Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Pushed back in ZZZ. Began taxi and noticed NWS (Nose Wheel Steering) was erratic enough to notice the steering of the aircraft was not 'normal' (significant aft CG (31+) but within limits). I could control the aircraft but could feel the nose wheel did not have sufficient weight to maintain normal nose wheel steering. Our aircraft was a light MD-11 with aft CG within limits. Our payload was 6420 lbs of empty cans. We had 41.7 lbs of fuel. Very light aircraft at 305;000 lbs. Had to taxi all the way around the airport to the west side to Runway 34L. The thunderstorm northeast of the field began to cause strong gusty winds and we were directed to Runway 25 for takeoff due to wind shear on 34L. By the time we got to Runway 25; winds were out of limits due to tail wind. Taxied back to 34L for takeoff. By this time the wind shear was over and the winds were steady at 040/34 kts. Discussed the issue with the aft CG with the FO (First Officer) and directed him to be sure to hold the nose on the ground with the elevators to keep it on the ground until rotation. Started the takeoff roll; selected max power. As max power was set; FO had full nose down on the control wheel and full right aileron for the wind. Approximately 40-60 kts; the nose left the center line and the aircraft began to weather vane into the wind. We were approximately 5-10 degrees off of Runway HDG when I was challenging the FO to maintain center line. He immediately stated full left rudder. I called reject and took the aircraft to stop our progression toward the right side of the runway. Max speed was approximately 60 kts. Exited the runway and taxied back to the ramp. This event was caused by an aft CG; light aircraft (Little fuel); no freight except for empty cans; and a significant cross wind on takeoff.This event could have been prevented with a CG much further forward than it was. This aft CG caused the nose to bounce during taxi causing a 'mushy' feel for steering. I suggest that something be written for training for all MD-11 crew members to see that; if they have a light; aft CG aircraft and note during taxi that the NWS is not taxing the aircraft very well; and combine that with a significant crosswind; to return to the gate and request more freight forward; ballast pallet; more fuel. Whatever can bring the CG forward to help hold the nose on the ground during taxi and takeoff. We were lucky today. I had not flown for over a month. So my skills needed a couple of legs to get back in shape. My FO deserves a Bravo Zulu because his comment after I challenged him was short and concise enough for us to have the time to keep the aircraft from departing the runway surface. A few more seconds and I am not sure we would have stayed on the runway. His 'Full left Rudder' call made me realize immediately we had to reject. I am not sure any other comment at that moment would have made me reject so quickly. Another 5 degrees toward the side of the runway probably would have been my action point but luckily he said what he said at the best possible time and we saved some precious moments to stop on the runway. We should never had been put in the situation with the light aircraft and Aft CG. There was a tell (mushy NWS); but it wasn't enough to think we would have a problem for takeoff. Lesson learned for this crew.

MD-11 Captain reported aircraft control issues due to aft CG and winds; resulting in a rejected takeoff.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Weather; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Airport

I received a briefing for my duty times and flights for the next morning; which were a positioning flight MFI then a Part 91 flight with 2 passengers. While planning the flights that evening I noticed a FICON (Field Condition Report) NOTAM for MFI that listed both runways being contaminated with PTCHY THN SN BA FAIR; and the same report for all taxiways and the airport apron; a total of four NOTAM's in all. The longest runway at MFI is 5;002 FT; and that is not long enough for either wet or contaminated landing distance numbers. As per Company procedure I contacted Dispatch that night; notified them of the issue that could affect the flight; suggested CWA as an alternative; and was told it would be passed down and looked at in the morning. The next morning; I received my Crew Itinerary listing the flights for the day; which were the same as I was briefed the evening prior. I checked in for duty slightly early and spoke to Dispatch and once again informed him the latest NOTAM I had showed the same unsuitable field conditions at MFI and again suggested CWA as an alternative. I asked him to run landing numbers based on the conditions at MFI and get back to me; however this was only an exercise as I already had run the numbers and I did not have the runway length for the current conditions to legally land at MFI. A little over an hour later I called Dispatch and asked if they had informed the Customer of the NOTAM airport conditions and changed my destination airport to CWA. He told me they spoke to the Customer and the Customer said it had not snowed the day before and thought the airport would be OK to land there. The Dispatcher then asked me to dispatch to MFI and 'Do a flyover' and 'Take a look'. I asked him what 'Take a look' meant; and he responded if the runway looked OK then I could 'Give it a try'; disregard the NOTAM and land anyway. I told him I believed that would be illegal; and I base that on both CFAR 91.103 and 135.69; among others as well. Over the next hour and a half; I received five more calls from the Dispatcher. On every call he again asked me if I would be willing to go 'Do a flyover' and 'Take a look'. On one call he told me he spoke to the airport manager and tried to coerce him to remove the NOTAM but the manager refused; saying the NOTAM was accurate. The Dispatcher called me five times trying to get me to take off for MFI and 'Take a look.' There was literally nothing I could do make him understand that I could not legally land at MFI. I felt like the Dispatcher; in his role in Dispatch; which is to represent the wishes of our Carrier; was trying to make me do something both illegal and unsafe. On every contact I had with Dispatch; I professionally and steadfastly declined to depart to an airport I could not legally land at. Our Chief Pilots and Flight Duty Officer do not have authority over Scheduling. Our Pilots do not have authority over Dispatch.

A fractional airline Captain reported that his Dispatcher attempted to coerce him to depart for an airport where braking action was reported as fair and his performance calculation indicating insufficient runway available for the conditions.


G2 Heritage (Glasair II) / G3 Heritage (Glasair III)

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 107; Flight Crew Total 1365; Flight Crew Type 1014

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

I was cruising at 8;000 ft. I was on an IFR flight plan talking to ZZZ Approach. Conditions were VFR; good visibility; no clouds; a little low lying fog in the valleys. All of a sudden I got an immediate and strong vibration. Initially I checked the engine instruments and everything appeared normal. I turned on the fuel pump and pushed the mixture full rich. I also pulled the throttleback to 'ease' the vibration; no significant change. I changed the propeller speed and that changed the vibration; but did not make it go away. I was able to maintain airspeed and altitude and alerted ZZZ Approach that I had [requested priority handling] and was diverting ZZZ1. I was not within gliding distance; but would be in about 3 miles (1 minute). I told ZZZ of my fuel (35gal) and souls on board (1). Once I had the airport in sight I told ZZZ of my intentions to fly over the field at 8;000 ft. and then start circling down to land. I began descending and pulled the power back further which further increased the vibration. I noticed the nose gear transit light was lit; and that the gear system had low pressure. I moved the gear switch to the down position and nothing happened. I moved the gear selector back to the up position and nothing happened. I checked the circuit breakers and noticed the landing gear pump had tripped. I reset it and extended the gear normally; three green. At this point I was about 2;600 ft. MSL on downwind at about 100 kts. I started putting the flaps out to add some drag and get lower. Any power changes made the vibration worse. On short final I pulled the power back and the vibration got really bad. Over the numbers I could not move the control stick it was shaking so badly. I turned off the mags and landed while the engine stopped. After the engine stopped the vibration went away and I could see part of the propeller blade was missing.I taxied off the runway just using the momentum and I had and cleared the hold short line. The fire and police were waiting at the intersection; and were a big relief to see.  After I gave them my driver license and told them what happened; we pulled the plane using the tow bar onto the ramp. Upon inspection of the fracture surface; there was evidence of corrosion 1/8 in. back from the leading edge indicating the crack had existed for some time.  I had recently dressed the prop during a conditional inspection; but did not see the crack.  About 6 in. of one of the two blades had departed in flight.  The prop had been overhauled about 10 years prior by a reputable shop and had 960 hours time in service.

Pilot reported vibration during cruise of an undetermined origin. After successful diversion it was discovered several inches was missing from one of the propeller blades that had been repaired years earlier and recently inspected.


Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X was on an IFR flight plan; destination SVN.  The prior sector placed ILS in the scratchpad and handed the aircraft off to me.  SVN only has one ILS which is to runway 28; although Runway 10 was in use.  Since I received the aircraft with ILS in the scratchpad I assumed the verbal opposite direction coordination was already completed by the previous sector.  I initiated a hand off to SVN Tower using automation and the approach to the opposite direction runway was clearly visible in the scratchpad.  SVN accepted the automated hand off approximately 15 miles away from the airport.  I cleared the aircraft and switched [them] at approximately a 10 mile final.  It was only after clearing the aircraft for the ILS and transferring communications that I had realized the coordination was not completed. At this point Aircraft X was on a short final.  I then called SVN Tower to let them know I was aware of the missed coordination and it was entirely my fault and they implied that they were aware of the aircraft's intentions and the event was a nonissue.  It is important to note that SVN does not have automatic releases and no other aircraft were affected by the missed coordination. No recommendations.  This was a situation where I did not apply the correct procedures as outlined in our LOA due to an inaccurate assumption.

A SAV Tracon Controller accepts a handoff on an aircraft that has an ILS in the scratch pad area. The ILS refers to the ILS for runway 28; but 10 is in use. The Controller assumes coordination has been done; hands off aircraft; and flashes the aircraft to Tower. The Controller then realizes; with aircraft on a 10 mile final; that coordination hasn't been done and then coordinates with the Tower. Tower advises there is no problem; they see the scratch pad. The Tower does not have automatic releases.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

I was called out to defer the L/H wing anti-ice valve per MEL on a CRJ-700. The work was completed but I apparently left the MEL manual paperwork in the area of the valve. Later the flight crew made a maintenance discrepancy that they felt binding in the rudder. The paperwork that was left in the valve area had worked its way to the flight control cables and was rubbing against the rudder cables.To prevent a recurrence I will double check that all paperwork has removed after the work has been complete.

A Maintenance Technician reported that maintenance paperwork had been left in the work area and caused a subsequent binding of the rudder cables.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Checking the Aircraft Maintenance Log (AML) I noticed the aircraft had been written up multiple times for crew oxygen leaking. Yesterday the Captain's oxygen mask and smoke goggle equipment box was removed and replaced from aircraft to repair a suspected oxygen leak. This morning when testing the crew oxygen mask communications microphone it failed to transmit anything spoken. Called maintenance and we troubleshot the issue. I had the First Officer double check his mask and I also checked the observer's mask and both of them worked fine. Contract maintenance came out and found that the repairs made the day prior were incomplete and the maintenance personnel failed to connect the cannon plug to backside of the emergency oxygen mask. Had we or previous crews had an emergency with smoke or fumes in the cockpit we would have been unable to establish communication with each other. Captain would not have been able to speak with ATC as microphone was not hooked up.Maintenance needs to follow maintenance manual procedures/diagrams when putting aircraft back together and a full functionality check of the entire affected system once repair is complete to ensure next crew has an airworthy and safe aircraft.

CRJ-900 Captain reported he noticed during preflight that his crew oxygen mask had been serviced improperly and he would not have been able to communicate using it.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

I was the Lead on flight XXX. I noticed I had a dangerous good on my loading from the store department. Originally; I had loaded on Pit 5. Upon pushing the flight I realized I did not have the required bags around the dangerous good. I went in the ally way. I moved it from Pit 5 to 4. After the aircraft taxied out I was not able to close out the flight due to the fact that particular Airbus 320 had a netting system no dangerous goods in the nesting system. At that point I had contacted Operations to bring the plane back to the gate; which they did. I moved the dangerous good from Pit 4 to Pit 6 and also moved 5 bags from Pit 4 to 6 to have enough bags surrounded the dangerous good.

Air carrier Ramp Lead reported aircraft ground return to correct Hazmat cargo load error.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Airport

FSD ramp area lighting insufficient intensity creating dangerous shadows and making it difficult to see ramp to taxiway transition.

Air carrier Captain reported insufficient airport lighting in the taxiway and ramp area at FSD.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 41; Flight Crew Total 7048; Flight Crew Type 4149

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors

Taxiing to Runway 8 at SJU; we were cleared to taxi and hold short at S1. I noticed the Captain wasn't going to make the turn at S1; so I prompted him; but it was too late and stopped just past the intersection. Tower called us and said that S intersection was closed; so there was no way for us to turn around and return to S1. Tower called a follow me ops vehicle and instructed us to follow him through S intersection; onto the runway and then taxi off at S2. We complied and returned for takeoff from S1. We missed complying with the taxi instructions; but there were no markings of the closed intersection; and the ATIS was unclear; stating only 'S intersection closed'; which seemed ambiguous since it didn't mention S at Runway 8 closed.

Air Carrier pilot reported unclear ATIS information and a lack of markings resulted in a taxiway incursion at SJU.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport

I was working Local Assist. Aircraft X was instructed to line up and wait on Runway 1R. When in position; the Local Controller attempted to reach Aircraft X on the frequency several times; but was unable. This has happened many times before with lower profile jets (smaller Citations; Lear Jets; Phenoms; etc). There is apparently a dead spot where the tower antennas do not reach low profile jets while they are in position on Runway 1R. The only way to reach them is to relay a message to them through another aircraft. I told the Local Controller about this and told them that they should tell an air carrier jet who was holding short of Runway 1R to instruct Aircraft X to move up a few feet to get out of the dead zone. We re-established communication with the jet and cleared it for takeoff. Tech Ops needs to find a solution so that the entirety of all runways are receiving radar coverage for all aircraft types. This problem should not persist as it could potentially lead to some very unsafe situations if; for instance; cancel takeoff clearance instructions are not heard.

SFO Tower Controller reported a radio 'dead spot' identified at the approach end of Runway 1R that continually affects lower profile jets when in position on the runway.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

On descent into PAFA talking to FAI approach noticed TCAS traffic in a climb at our 11 o'clock moving to 12 o'clock position approximately 3-5 miles away. We were IMC; in the descent to 7000 ft. No traffic call of any sorts from Approach Control about the traffic. As the traffic closed in on us; I disconnected the autopilot and initiated a climb to avoid the traffic. About the same time; we received a TA followed immediately by a RA. Still no call from Approach Control. My FO (First Officer) called Approach Control to advise of our traffic conflict and that we were climbing to avoid. Multiple alarms were heard in the background of the Approach Controller's transmission when [the Controller] called back to command a climb clearance to us. We passed above the traffic by approximately 400 ft. We then cleared the traffic and descended back to 7000 ft. and landed uneventfully.

Air Carrier Captain reported an NMAC in IMC inbound to FAI.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

I was in cruise at 9;500 ft. when both L and R HYD Flow lights started to flicker. I started descending and started heading toward ZZZ. I referenced the QRH running though the LEFT/RIGHT HYDRAULIC FLOW LIGHT ILLUMINATED checklist. Told ATC i was diverting to ZZZ. On the right midfield downwind I decided to put the gear down. With the gear handle down I only had the two main gear lights green with no nose indication. I referenced the LANDING GEAR WILL NOT EXTEND HYDRAULICALLY; trying the press to test and then trying to change the nose gear bulbs with no luck in showing a green indication. I blew the gear down per the QRH procedure; I heard a thump of the gear going down but only had an indication of the left main gear down (green) I continued the checklist by checking the gear warning horn and it did not sound. At this point I [requested priority handling] with ZZZ tower and requested the firetrucks. I referenced the QRH checklists landing with defective main and nose gears and told the tower I was ready for landing. I followed the checklists killed the engines and landed on the good wheel. All 3 gear were down and I stopped on the runway. HYD fluid was all over the right engine. I requested a bus for the 2 passengers and a tow back to the gate. I received clearance from on call duty manager before allowing them to tow the plane to the gate. Cause: HYD leak/Problem and Gear Indication problem.

Pilot reported a hydraulic system failure that resulted in a diversion.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 450; Flight Crew Type 10000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

Rejected takeoff at approximately 110 kts after aircraft started shaking badly; [making a] loud noise and pulling to one side. Captain was Pilot Flying. First Officer called out blown tire as I was in the process of rejecting the takeoff. We remained on the runway with about 4;500 feet left. Rejected takeoff procedure followed; brake cooling on [weight and balance] completed; after aircraft was inspected and unable to be towed off runway. Passengers were deplaned by stairs into buses with assistance of fire department. Aircraft logbook was filled out and handed over to Maintenance. Cabin Crew and Passengers were given updates throughout the process and time it took to evaluate the aircraft and deplane them.

During takeoff at ZZZ; at 110 kts; the right main inboard tire failed; causing a loud bang and strong vibration. I called 'tire failure' and the Captain simultaneously decided to reject the takeoff. He executed the rejected takeoff procedure and worked to maintain centerline. I verified the correct procedure (it was correct) and notified Tower. We stopped on centerline with 4;000 feet remaining. Maintenance and Airfield Operations advised us that hydraulics were leaking and we couldn't taxi and an attempt to tow the aircraft failed due to a locked brake; the passengers were unloaded onto busses.

B737 flight crew reported a tire failure that resulted in a high speed rejected takeoff.


Person Manipulating Controls (UAS); Remote PIC (UAS)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days (UAS) 7; Flight Crew Total (UAS) 7; Flight Crew Type (UAS) 7

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue

Aircraft Lost Link (UAS); Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Aircraft; Human Factors; Software and Automation

I was flying my drone over some woods when the controller screen went blank. The footage had been glitching all day. This is an ongoing issue with Smart Controllers and DJI Air 2S based on my research. I contacted the company and they have told me to try some things and blamed it on the software.

Reporter stated the smart controller has intermittent connectivity with the UAS. Partial lost links have occurred but reporter has always been able to regain control of the UAS.

Hobby UAS pilot had a controller malfunction while flying. Pilot landed UAS safely.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Flight crew flew to Airport ZZZ without any issues. Landed and taxied back to take back off to return to Airport ZZZ1. ZZZ Ground issued clearance for return back to ZZZ1. Flight crew was on the ground for about 2 minutes. Flight crew took off Runway 9 at ZZZ. Pilot Under Instruction (PUI) flew runway heading up to 2;000. We were then cleared to ZZZ1 at 3;000. When the crew loaded the GPS and continued climbing we noticed the Cylinder Head Temperature (CHT) cylinder 5 had spiked. Instructor contacted [and advised] ATC which gave us a clearance turn to the airport and maintain 2;000. We then were swapped to Tower and cleared to land. CHT came back down when we started the descent to land. No further issues after landing. Returned aircraft to FBO ZZZ and shut down. Instructor checked the oil and found it to be normal after landing. Instructor took evasive action and [advised ATC] as pilot in command.

SR20 crew noticed high Cylinder Head Temperature (CHT) shortly after takeoff. Crew received clearance to return to airport. CHT indication returned to normal range prior to landing.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Briefing the departure procedure the crew missed the non-standard climb gradient to the 16;000 FT crossing restriction at the departure fix. However; the crossing restriction itself was entered in the FMS. As a result; the crew should have notified ATC that it was unable to comply with the climb gradient since the requirement was 500 FPM and Econ Climb only yielded 493 FPM; or use max climb speed; which would have yielded a rate of climb in excess of that which was required. The crew departed and made the restriction; but by maintaining a slower than normal climb speed.Transitioning to the Commercial Chart Company's format seemed to be an issue in this case since the pages in normal mode are illegible; causing the crew to have to zoom in. The Commercial Chart only permits one level of zoom; so the page goes from too small to too big; causing the crew to have to hunt around the page for information. The other issue that must be accommodated with the Commercial Chart Company is that the pertinent information is so cluttered that it gets lost; versus the other Commercial Charts which presented only that information for departure from the particular operational runway. These are factors that the crew will have to deal with and adjust to over time with the use of Commercial Chart Company's EFB.

First Officer chronicles the difficulty deciphering EFB chart information and text in both normal and zoom mode.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 7000

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Controller stated per our conversation that I showed .5 miles south of course while intercepting the outbound course to ZZZZZ intersection. The Controller issued a low altitude alert due to the MEA in that area. The Controller also stated he could see me in the turn outbound to ZZZZZ when the alert was issued and that other than the MEA there was no conflict with other aircraft or terrain. I was VMC until clear of all terrain and there were no TAWS alerts received.

TBM pilot reported ATC identified an off course and low altitude situation.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action

On the arrival into the destination area at 6;000 FT; ATC assigned us 190 KTS. Pilot Flying (PF) called for Flaps 8. Pilot Monitoring (PM) selected flaps to 8 and we received an Amber Caution 'Slats Fail' message. PF called for corresponding QRH procedure and took over radio duties in addition to PF duties while PM ran QRH. ATC was notified that we had a flight control issue and that we would need delay vectors to troubleshoot the problem with our checklists. QRH procedure did not resolve the problem and slats remained at 0 the entire time. We notified ATC of our flight control malfunction and requested longest runway along with emergency vehicles standing by as an added precaution. At no time did we as the crew declare an emergency; however; ATC began calling us the 'emergency aircraft' over the frequency. Captain then notified the flight attendants of the situation and that we had the situation under control while covering the prepare for emergency items. Captain also calmly notified the passengers of the malfunction and that we would have trucks standing by upon landing only for precautionary reasons and to follow the instructions of the flight attendants. PF made landing with Slats 0; Flaps at 45 per QRH. Lower than normal pitch angle was experienced as QRH advised. We touched down without event. After clearing runway we advised ATC that we would like Airfield Rescue and Fire Fighters (ARFF) inspect the aircraft for any overheating of the brakes. ATC asked if we were able to continue onto the ramp and we complied. We did not expect any overheat situation as all BTMS indicators were in the green and not rapidly increasing. A headwind on landing also factored into decreased landing distance and assisted with braking. None of the BTMS indicators came out of the green and ARFF confirmed everything looked OK after using thermal imaging on the landing gear. ATC asked if they could secure the emergency after ARFF had cleared us. We confirmed that everything could be secured and did not require further assistance. We remained parked on the mainline ramp as Captain contacted Maintenance Control. Maintenance advised us not to retract the flaps and to continue to the gate as configured. We followed Maintenance instruction. Ramp Control asked us per Dispatch request if we had signaled the passengers to brace. We told them that we did NOT require a brace on landing as there was no need and had landed without incident. The flight attendants did a great job with the passengers throughout the event. Upon arrival at the gate; the passengers were happy with how we had controlled the situation and many thanked us as they exited the aircraft. The flight attendants said the passengers remained calm throughout the event. We are unsure as to why the slats did not extend as commanded.

[Narrative 2 contains no additional information]

A CRJ-701 EICAS alerted 'SLATS FAIL' during the initial flap extensions for landing so the QRH procedure was complete and the landing accomplished slats zero; flaps 45.


Fatigue; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors

After a two day trip; I received a call from the crew desk advising me I had a one day trip the next morning with a 10 hour 45 minutes block to block separation. I asked if I was the only reserve available and they said yes. I received just enough rest to fly the trip. While walking to my car after the flight; I received a call from the crew desk giving me a 13 hour callout [for the next morning]; field standby. I informed them I was tired and got just enough rest to fly the Mexico turn after a 10:45 block to block callout. They said the assignment was legal and I informed them if I didn't get a good night sleep I would be calling in fatigued. After driving home my body was fatigued and out of sync. It took me a while to fall asleep and when I did; the sleep shallow and uneven. I have been a reserve captain for over eleven years and I've written several reports on the legality of changing a 2 am short call to an 'all-nighter;' and I'm equally concerned about flying 10:45 block to block trips and subsequently being assigned a minimum rest trip after your return to home base. I was assigned a 10:45 block to block trip last week and it was equally tough but it was also the last trip of the week. The Bottom Line--assigning a minimum rest trip; after a 10:45 block to block trip is exhausting. A 10:45 block to block assignment will work if it's the last trip of the week; but if an additional assignment is added on the body can't recuperate fast enough. I sincerely hope NASA and any appropriate agencies will test fly a trip with west coast pilots acclimated to central or eastern time zones; returning back to the west coast and receiving a 10:45 block to block assignment. Then subsequently assigning the pilot a minimum rest trip the next day. The minimum rest after a 10:45 block to block assignment should be extended.

A Reserve Captain discussed his company's pilot scheduling policy which includes minimum rest periods at home between duty periods after transcontinental time changes and alternating on duty times varying from night to day.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure

I was on a VFR flight. I was following the ZZZ 310 radial inbound and approximately 28 miles from the ZZZ VOR.  My plan was to turn southbound towards my home airport ZZZ1 before approaching the ZZZ area.  I was watching the floors of the Class B as I approached ZZZ; but I inadvertently crossed into the floor airspace. Upon realization of this fact I immediately turned around and descended to clear this airspace.  Not flying during the COVID-19 restrictions made me rusty and behind the airplane.

Pilot reported inadvertently flying into Class Bravo airspace and cited lack of flying during the COVID-19 pandemic as a contributing factor.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Aircraft X checked in and was immediately given a small S-turn for spacing between him and the preceding aircraft to be able to depart Aircraft Y. Everything appeared as though it would work. Aircraft Y was given an immediate takeoff clearance. As Aircraft X was in the flare; he initiated a go-around. Runway separation was close to 6000 feet and airborne but no action was taken by me because it seemed safer at that point to let the aircraft land rather than executing a go-around. It was simply a judgement call. Aircraft X was given a climb to 4000 feet and a 150 heading. I should have given Aircraft X a larger S turn or not tried to hit the gap with Aircraft X and Aircraft Y.

SAT Tower Controller reported an aircraft on short final initiated a go-around due to departing traffic from the same runway.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 23000; Flight Crew Type 17000

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather

Flew through what I thought was a heavy jet wake. Very heavy turbulence momentarily. Never saw another aircraft. We were in a 100 knot plus crosswind.

Lear 55 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence at FL320 in ZLA airspace.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I filed an IFR flight plan for a flight to ZZZ. The aircraft I was flying was a Pilatus PC-12/45 equipped with Garmin G600's and GTN750's. The autopilot is a KFC 325 AP/FD. I departed and was radar vectored and climbed to 16;000 ft.; my requested altitude. During the climb I turned on the autopilot. The aircraft leveled off at 16;000 ft. and flew the route I had programmed into the GTN750 without issue. I picked up the ATIS for ZZZ. ZZZ was using the ILS so I set the ILS approach into the GTN750's and set the ILS front course into the G600. At that time; Center had me contact approach and the following events took place.I contacted and advised them I was at 16;000 ft. and I had the current ATIS. Approach told me to proceed direct to a fix and cross the fix at 8;000 ft. and 220 knots and to contact Approach. I checked on with the next sector and the controller assigned a heading of 270 and slow to 190 knots then descend to 5;000 ft. and to contact Approach. I checked on and I advised them I was descending to 5;000 ft. heading 270 and speed of 190 knots. The controller told me to turn right to a heading of 290 and that I was number 2 for the ILS. I set the heading to 290 and the aircraft turned to 290. The controller then told me to turn to a heading of 230 and descend to 3;000 ft. (I believe that is the heading and altitude assigned). I turned the heading knob to 230 and set 3;000 ft. I then noticed the aircraft was still on a 290 heading; but the heading bug was set to 230. The controller then told me they needed me to make the turn to 230. I replied to 'Stand by that I was having instrument trouble' the controller did not respond or acknowledge to me that I was having instrument trouble. At this point I checked the autopilot control head and verified the plane was in heading mode and that the autopilot was still engaged; it was. I next checked the G600 to make sure it was in heading mode; it was. I also checked to make sure it was not in GPS mode; it was not. While I was trouble shooting the issue; the controller told me to make the turn right now.At this point I determined one of the units was not working as it should and decided the best course of action was to use the emergency autopilot disconnect and hand fly the aircraft.After I disconnected the autopilot I told the controller I was turning to the assigned heading. The controller continued to give me vectors to the ILS. I intercepted the ILS and landed the aircraft. After landing; Ground control said I needed to call Approach for a possible pilot deviation. I called Approach and talked to the person who answered the phone; he asked me if I knew why they asked me to call. I stated Ground said I need to call about a possible loss of separation. He said they had a loss of separation between me and another aircraft. I stated that I reported to the controller I was having instrument trouble and that she never responded to me; his response was that she knew I was having instrument trouble.I feel that this loss of separation could have been avoided by simply working as a team. If the controller would have taken the time to ask what was going on or how she could help me; the loss of separation would have never happened. She could have given the other aircraft a short vector after I reported to her that I was having trouble. Instead she decided not to respond to me or take any action to assist me or ask me why I was not turning.

A Pilatus pilot reported being involved in a loss of separation when the auto pilot failed to fly the assigned heading.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 328; Flight Crew Total 1300; Flight Crew Type 830

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

[My student and I] experienced an 80% loss of engine power on the left downwind to base leg of [the runway]. The flight was a lesson in the local traffic pattern. Immediate return for the runway was executed by the CFI and the airplane was safely landed. After the initial loss of complete engine power occurred; the engine attempted to produce power but was very minimal. Instructor and student were able to exit the runway with no harm to persons or property. The airplane was shut down after taxiing off the non-movement area to be inspected. Emergency services responded on site and the airplane was eventually towed back to its local flight school.

C172 Instructor Pilot reported a safe landing after experiencing an 80% loss of power in the traffic pattern.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Sea

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 156; Flight Crew Total 8967; Flight Crew Type 466

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I was assigned to drop two passengers off at the beach. The bay is open to the ocean swell and ship wakes from the ship channel. I surveyed the landing area three times and landed without incident. While taxiing to the beach; the waves started to build. I turned back from the beach and started to taxi out toward open water. While taxiing in displacement mode; a wave broke over the floats. I immediately surveyed all engine indications and noted no discrepancies. I then tried to taxi to other beach locations to deplane the passengers. The water was too rough at this time and I was unable to get to the beach. I then flew to a marina and dropped the passengers off there. After the engine was shut down at the dock; I noted all three blades of the propeller were bent. The aircraft was grounded. I have been flying float planes for 27 years. I was unaware that a wave could reach up high enough to cause damage to the prop. I believe the main difference between regular rough water and this incident was the fact that the wave actually broke just ahead of the aircraft. This caused the floats to submarine through the wave; instead of merely riding up and over.

DHC2 pilot reports bent propeller blades due to contact with a breaking wave while attempting to drop passengers on a beach.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Descending for the visual to 24R in LAX we encountered some wake turbulence from a preceding 737. We experienced some rolling motions with a max bank angle around 20 degrees.  Around the final approach fix the last and largest turbulence encounter occurred and caused WINDSHEAR FAIL; STALL PROT FAIL; and AT FAIL EICAS messages. (There was also a fourth Warning Message that the FO and I could not remember once we arrived at the gate.) Once we recovered from the bank and were established on the G/S inside the FAF we decided to continue the approach given the calm weather and the aircraft handling normally. A normal approach and landing followed. On rollout; around 80 kts; the Warning Messages went away and ADS PROBE 1; 2; 3; and 4 FAIL status messages popped up instead. We verified we were OK to taxi given the messages and continued to the gate.

EMB-175 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on visual approach to LAX Runway 24R in trail of a B737 that resulted in several system failure messages.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Approximately 15 minutes prior to top of descent into ZZZ we were informed that a passenger heard a pop and smelled something electrical in the vicinity of row XX. Initially the flight attendants could not verify an odor. As we began our descent; a few more passengers smelled an odor and it was confirmed by one of the flight attendants. We ran the smoke; fire; and fumes checklist to a point the fumes had dissipated. At no point was any smoke ever noticed and the fumes were only confirmed by a few passengers. By the time we completed the checklist and the odor was gone and we were in the terminal area at ZZZ. We elected to land and taxi to the gate as the odor was gone and no evidence of smoke or fire existed.

B-737 Captain reported Flight Attendant notification of cabin fume event during cruise which dissipated after a short time. Captain continued to destination and executed a safe landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Type 469

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

While on the RNAV (GPS) Runway 25 into PGSN; the tower controller was queried as to whether the PLASI-L (Pulse Light Approach Slope Indicator) was operable and the tower controller responded there is no VASI for Runway 25. So there is no vertical visual guidance for Runway 25. Further inquiry was made on the ground about the status of the airport facilities concerning the VASI. Tower controller stated the NOTAM that stated VASI U/S (Unserviceable) has been there for four years and he does not know why our charts show a PLASI-L. He also stated that he thought one might be in the process of being installed; VASI not PLASI. So it appears our 10-9 showing PLASI-L for Runway 25 is totally incorrect. I suspect there is nothing installed for Runway 7.

Captain reported there is no visual vertical guidance; PLASI or VASI; available to the runway. The Jeppesen 10-9 chart shows there is a PLASI available for guidance.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

I was the Captain (pilot not flying) and it was the First Officer's takeoff. During the takeoff roll; at approximately 80 KTS; Captain observed left engine EGT fluctuating and then started to roll back. The conditions were daylight; dry; headwind and 10;500 FT of runway. Captain initiated an aborted takeoff; closed the throttles and deployed the spoilers. Autobrakes did not engage. Captain elected not to use reverse thrust and allowed the aircraft to slowly decelerate to below 80 KTS before gently applying manual brakes. Aircraft slowed to safe taxi speed and exited the runway. ATC was informed that no assistance was required. Captain made a PA to the passengers. First Officer completed all normal and abnormal checklists and brake cooling charts were referred to and acknowledged. Aircraft taxied to gate and was removed from service. The Aborted Takeoff procedure states to 'immediately initiate maximum reverse thrust consistent with conditions' I elected not to use reverse thrust due to the dry; clear and favorable environmental conditions; the speed at rejection and the runway length. Reflecting on my actions; I realized that I should have; as a minimum; engaged minimum reverse thrust. Even though conditions were ideal; use of reverse thrust is the stated procedure and I should have complied with its use. It would have only benefited my efforts by increasing the aircraft's deceleration rate and reducing the amount of runway used. This could have been accomplished while still maintaining a safe; smooth and deliberate rejected takeoff.

A B767-300 Captain rejected the takeoff at about 80 KTS after he detected an EGT fluctuate and roll back. Neither reverse nor heavy braking was used on the 10;000 FT runway.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

Runways 23 and 19 are closely aligned. We received vectors for a left downwind visual approach and the runway we were paralleling was actually runway 19; when we were cleared for a visual approach to runway 23. The approach was conducted at night in VMC conditions with strong crosswinds. When I turned base to final; I was momentarily lined up for runway 19 since the runway lights and VASI lights were clearly identifiable for that runway. The tower had the lights on for both intersecting runways; which made it confusing in this instance. Tower immediately noticed we were not aligned for landing runway 23; and queried on the radio. I simultaneously noticed my error since my LOC course needle to runway 23 was 'to the left' and not aligned. I was immediately able to correct to align to runway 23 while still at a maneuvering altitude of 1;000 AFE. I would recommend making a -7 page note about these two runways being closely aligned and if both runway lights are on at night and on a base to final turn; it is possible to turn and line up with runway 19 in error.

Air carrier vectored on a left downwind for a CAK Runway 23 night visual initially lined up on Runway 19. Both runway VASIs and runway lights were on and the runway lights appear closely aligned at night. ATC and crew became reoriented and continued the Runway 23 approach.


A B747 sent a downlink via CPDLC; 'Request Climb to FL350; due to aircraft performance.' Upon probing the requested altitude via the clearance window; ATOP indicated a conflict with the B737 who was northbound on L453 crossing the B747's route of flight. As per procedure; I sent an uplink to close the downlink to the aircraft stating; 'Unable; Due to traffic.' After performing some other tasks I went back to evaluate the B747's request for higher. After evaluating that the cross would more than likely not be a direct merge; I constructed the clearance; 'Maintain FL330; at XA:52[Z] climb to and maintain FL350; climb to reach FL350 by XA:57;[Z] Report level FL350' which is a standard 'at time climb by time' clearance. The aircraft sent a downlink of; 'WILCO' to the clearance. While coordinating the revised altitude with the appropriate sector I noticed an ARP message in the sector queue and since the aircraft was near a position that commonly gets ARP reports from ADS equipped aircraft I deleted it and sent a 'Demand' request for another position report. Once I received the next ARP I noticed that the data block indicated that the B747 was above his assigned altitude and that the ARP was due to the altitude situation. The aircraft reported level at XA:48Z; four minutes before it was supposed to start its climb. The B747 climbed through the B737's altitude without the appropriate separation for aircraft on crossing tracks. Something needs to be done with CPDLC equipped aircraft to ensure that they are actually reading the clearances sent to them; not just seeing what they want to see. It was my understanding that the 'Maintain FLXXX' SHOULD fix this but clearly it is not a foolproof solution. Something should be done in collaboration with the pilots to reinforce the importance of fully reading CPDLC clearances before initiating a maneuver. As we move towards a non-RADAR environment where more aircraft will be CPDLC and ADS-B equipped this has the potential to become a much bigger problem.

B747; requested climb to FL350 for aircraft performance from New York Oceanic via CPDLC at XA:41Z. [We] received CPDLC message back at XA:41Z from New York; unable due to traffic. At XA:45Z; received message from New York via CPDLC to climb to FL350 and report level by XA:57Z. At XA:46Z responded to New York WILCO via CPDLC. At XA:48Z sent CPDLC message Level FL350. At XA:50Z received CPDLC from New York confirm you climb already. Responded; level at FL350 at XA:50Z. On handoff to New York Oceanic over Bermuda; on VHF spoke to Controller and told him that an error had happen on our climb clearance. He instructed us to contact New York via SATCOM. I used SATCOM to call and then was instructed to call another number and could not get through. I then contacted our Dispatch and informed them of the error and asked them to call. They responded that a possible pilot deviation occurred. I told Dispatch that I would call a soon as possible on my return. I contacted New York Oceanic and explained how the error occurred when we received the CPDLC message on ACARS. Page 1 of the message had; CLIMB TO AND MAINTAIN FL350 and on the second page CLIMB TO REACH FL350 by XA:57Z and REPORT LEVEL FL350. I missed the AT XA:52Z on the first page; thus; climbed early. Check and recheck all CPDLC clearance for AT times and BY times to avoid misinterpretation!

ZNY Controller described a loss of separation event reportedly caused by the flight crew not reading the entire CPDLC instruction.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 0; Flight Crew Total 440.8; Flight Crew Type 278.6

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 13500; Flight Crew Type 2000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

We were about 1.4 hours into an instrument Proficiency check ride with my Instructor. We had performed three approaches at two different airports and we're returning to our home airport to perform the RNAV XY approach. We had been cleared VFR direct to ZZZZZ Intersection; at or below 2700 by Approach. We were in level flight at about 2;600 MSL; 7-8 NM Southwest of Airport; when suddenly; without warning; the plane started vibrating violently. [The instructor] immediately grabbed the controls and I released them stating 'you have the plane'. [He] being the much more experienced pilot we both believed; without discussion; this was appropriate. [He] executed a 180 degree turn to the left intending to return to ZZZ. He immediately notified ATC and Squawked 7700 on the transponder. By this time copious amounts of smoke and oil were spewing from engine cowling and we became concerned about a fire. [He] quickly decided that we were unlikely to be able to make it back to ZZZ with a 10-20 KT head wind; and with a potential fire; getting on the ground quickly seemed our best choice. He stated his intentions and I fully agreed. We both started looking for a suitable landing site; which we quickly identified; and [he] executed a rapid descent. As we approached the selected field we noticed high power lines on the final approach path and [he] maneuvered to descend below them; which we did. As we passed below the wires there was an audible 'Bang' but the flight path of the plane was unaltered. We continued on final approach and [he] executed a perfect soft field landing in a tilled; frozen; cornfield. There were no injuries. We both unbuckled our seatbelts and exited the plane quickly and walked away. There was no fire and the plane remained upright on its landing gear. Upon Landing we contacted 911; and the FAA. We visually inspected the plane after landing and noticed damage to the plastic wing tip fairing of the right wing. There was no observable damage to any other surface of the plane including the Tail. Later that day we participated in an inspection of the plane and the landing site with an FAA Aviation Safety Inspector; and his team. They determined that it was best to wait until the plane was recovered to a hangar to remove the cowling and inspect the engine compartment. So we have no in sight as to the cause of the engine failure at this time. We returned to Airport ZZZ FBO and were interviewed by the inspection team. We were not informed that there were any violations or discrepancies at the time of this interview.

Serving as a flight instructor performing an instrument training flight combined with an IPC (Instrument Proficiency Check). I immediately turned to ZZZ the nearest airport but realized instantly that I did not have enough altitude to make the airport. I then flew to the southeast to the only area that had suitable landing sites. By now smoke was pouring out from under the engine cowling and a film of oil had coated my side of the windscreen. On final we both noticed high tension power lines at our altitude in front of us. I did not believe I could clear the wires over the top as the engine was not making power. This left only one option which was to go under the high tension wires. I wanted to get on the ground as soon as possible as I was concerned of an engine fire. Landing was uneventful save for some minor damage to the right wingtip for reason I cannot explain. I had informed TRACON. I think there was some confusion so I read back my tail number and told ATC that I would squawk 7700 which I did. The ELT went off during rollout. There were no injuries to client and myself.

A pilot and instructor in a C172 experienced an engine failure that resulted in an off field landing.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

On arrival we were cleared for the approach. As PM I read back 'turn right 200 degrees maintain 2;000 till established cleared for the ILS approach'. Just outside the initial approach fix; ATC informed us of a low altitude alert and were told to climb back up to 3;000 feet. Once there we were re-cleared for the ILS approach. No further incidents.I would say that fatigue was the primary culprit. When we read back the clearance it should have seemed an unusual altitude to intercept at; as the minimum altitude at the IAF is 2;600 feet. Also when I received the clearance there was chatter on guard 121.5 which could have interfered with hearing our clearance correctly.

Aircraft descended below cleared altitude. Low altitude alert provided by ATC resulting in flight correcting to cleared altitude.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I briefed the student on the challenges of LAX; Ramp Tower frequencies and where to locate them; and taxi routes during our break in ZZZ. Upon arrival into LAX; we were assigned [Runway] 24R for landing; cleared the runway on Zulu and began our taxi towards our gate; assigned by operations when we called in. We were given the South route; published taxi route. Upon contacting South Ground; they cleared us onto taxiway Bravo [intersection] to the gate. I asked the First Officer to verify our gate with operations; no response was received from operations so we checked in with Ramp Tower who informed us '[gate] is your new gate and it is occupied; please check in with you operations.' We informed Ground our gate is occupied; they assigned us a turn around to circle back to the west and hold on taxiway Bravo; short of taxiway Uniform.We were monitoring ground and operations on Comm 1 and 2 respectively. Our gate switched again; third time. We were then quickly assigned taxi instructions to taxi via Bravo; [intersection] to the gate; give way to Air Carrier Y at Juliet. I instructed the First Officer to find the other Ramp Tower frequency as we slowly proceeded down Taxiway Bravo. This proved to be a huge distraction and we ultimately missed the 'hold short of Juliet to give way to Air Carrier Y' ground quickly called us 'Air Carrier X; you were supposed to hold short of Juliet for Air Carrier Y. Hold short of [intersection]' which I apologized for our mistake and complied with the hold short [intersection]. We received new clearance '…to the gate give way to another Air Carrier Y aircraft at [intersection]. We taxied into the alley and [gate] without further incident.I'm a Check Pilot; LAX is an extremely dynamic and challenging environment; it was my first time conducting an OE 1 & 2 into LAX which I knew would greatly increase my threats and workload. Looking back I wish I had just stopped and asked to hold on the taxiway until we had figured out the confusion of multiple gate changes and subsequent frequency changes for Ramp Tower. This would have potentially prevented the missed ATC instruction. The other challenge was ATC assigning multiple clearances all into one call. I wish ATC would have at least clarified it more with 'give way to Air Carrier Y from your right/left; exiting the runway/alley way' these types of descriptions greatly improved situational awareness. The challenges of an unfamiliar new flight route compiled with extensive taxi instructions proved to be too high of a workload for my student and myself. In addition; the airport information chart only shows 6 potential parking gates instead of the 10+ gates we can be assigned. The information as to which Ramp Tower and associated gates is hidden in many paragraphs in subsequent pages; instead of being on the first page with the map of gates. In review we certainly learned no matter how much you try to brief everything you may encounter; gate changes and frequency changes prove to be a huge threat and distraction for crews in this busy environment; leaving very small margins for error and safety.Redo the airport information chart with better visual representation of all potential gates; within the picture of the gates and alleyways add the respective Ramp frequency to make it easier for crews to find the info they need for quick gate changes; especially 3 gate changes like we experienced. Not seeing our gate on the chart added to our confusion. A great example of how a chart should look in my opinion is ZZZ taxi chart. This chart is easy to follow and has the ramp frequency in bold with a box around it to stand out. I also recommend a taxi clearance sim session that could expose crews to the challenges of LAX (spot style training like we do for SNA). This experience has proven why we need 2 pilots; it is a challenging and very dynamic airport with threats all around you; next time I will definitely ask to hold on the taxiway until we are 100% clear onour route and associated frequencies. I did attempt to clarify with ATC our clearances; however I still missed the hold short of Juliet to give way to Air Carrier Y.

Air Carrier Captain reported confusion over LAX ATC instructions and taxi charts that resulted in a taxiway incursion.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted

Procedure; Company Policy; Human Factors; Staffing

Captain calls me to inform me that we have a maintenance issue. The landing gear 'sensor' was malfunctioning. We were making an emergency landing in ZZZ. He is requesting emergency vehicles to follow us. CA (Captain) informed me to prepare for worst case scenario-loss of brakes and rolling off the runway. CA makes a PA. I pull out FA (Flight Attendant) Manual and start preparing galley; cabin and passengers for possible emergency landing. Due to large Spanish speaking population onboard I asked a bilingual passenger to make PA in Spanish from the FA Manual. CA lowered the landing gear and informed me and then later; the passengers; that we were burning fuel for another 30 or so minutes before we could land safely. The CA also told me that the sensor started working correctly once the gear came down but we were still going forward with the diversion to ZZZ. CA informs me that brace will be issued on landing because the landing gear didn't look secure on flyby. Brace commands given by CA.Safe landing and CA gives ok over PA that we are clear and to stop brace commands. We to the gate and deplane passengers. The safety issue in this event was a language barrier. I had approximately 16 Spanish speakers who had no idea what was going on. I am thankful there was a bilingual passenger that graciously offered her assistance.We need other languages on the announcement CD. When going to [other countries] where passengers don't speak English; it can be impossible to convey very vital; sometimes lifesaving information to passengers! Even a short announcement stating that we are in a possible emergency situation; please read your Passenger Information Card and follow the instructions from the flight crew. Spanish and English. Having all of the announcements in all 3 languages would be a great help but at least emergency announcements. This was a domestic flight and almost half the passengers were non-English speakers.

Flight Attendant reported difficulty communicating safety-related information to several non-English speaking passengers.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

While in cruise from ZZZ; after exiting ZZZ airspace; the right rudder pedal went to the floor/full forward. I did not have any right rudder authority; but the aircraft remained in straight and level flight with this configuration. I then told Approach of my mechanical issue and request to divert to ZZZ1 as it was the closest suitable airport. I then informed Operations of my intentions to divert to ZZZ1 and that I had a mechanical issue with the rudder. The tower in ZZZ1 was informed of the issue and had emergency vehicles waiting for when I landed. I landed with no incident but was unable to taxi off the runway. The passengers were taken off the aircraft and brought to the terminal by a van and I was towed back to the [ramp] by Maintenance.

Cessna 402 pilot reported diverting due to the loss of rudder control during cruise.


Upon beginning the shift I read the Comprehensive Electronic Data Analysis and Reporting (CEDAR) information as required. I noticed there was a Read and Initial (R&I) memo about not using the (TYP) amendment for aircraft using ERAM as a RADAR display system. The memo said do not use the TYP amendment or it would delete all data in the equipment part of the ICAO flight plan template. I notified the Operations Manager; who was in the area at the time; I felt the memo should have been a Hot Sheet instead of and R&I. I understood what was being said in the memo and how to use the ICAO template; because I have taken time to teach myself how to use it; but most of the work force in my area and the facility do not. She said that the facility had been 'trained' on this issue and the way it was in CEDAR was just fine. I went on to tell her that I estimated less than 30% of the controller force know how to use the template portion of the ICAO Flight Plan. She said we had been trained in the past and it was the problem of the controller to know how to use the template. There have been a few times when the wrong data in the RNP section have resulted in a deviation in another control facility; and charged to my ARTCC. I arrived to work today and as was given a copy of the briefing that was given several years ago about the ICAO flight plan. Obviously she did not listen to what I said; because there was a note attached to the FLM to ensure I understood the information in the packet. I asked 12 of the 15 other controllers in the control room at the time; either they did not understand the information; or had never been given the briefing; let alone taught how to make changes in the ICAO flight plan template. I recommend that there be computer based instructions or hands on training be given to the controller work force on how to use the ICAO template. This could be in the TTL or a free sector in the area by the FLM. There is a big difference between a briefing and instruction.

Enroute Controller described an unsafe situation in the facility with regard to ERAM equipment and ICAO Flight Plan modifications; the reporter suggested additional instruction on the subject process in lieu of briefings.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 16.5

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I have two issues with the same aircraft. Working the Quartz position; ZAB46 handed off Aircraft X a Non RNAV aircraft to me. ZAB46 coordinated the aircraft at 16;000 because of a parachute jump aircraft at 15;000 at Coolidge Airport (P08). Coolidge airport is approx. 42.6 miles from the PXR ASR-9 and 1.6 miles from the edge of the airspace. If the aircraft was to be jumping there then it would have been reasonable that there was a point out made to Phoenix TRACON Quartz; Willy or Santan positions since the aircraft is in close proximity to the area of jurisdiction (AOJ). But there was no point out made on the IFR parachute jump aircraft. The second issue I have is that when Aircraft X reported on frequency he advised me that he was tracking the PXR130R. The ZAB/P50 Letter of Agreement (LOA) states that the Non RNAV aircraft are to be on a 'RV thru BRDEY Gate expect direct to airport and cross the boundary/BRDEY.' Aircraft X was not on a vector; he was established on the PXR130R that places the aircraft in my airspace for approx. 1.5 miles before it enters departures (Santan) airspace without coordination. The aircraft cannot be contained within my airspace if ZAB46 continues to route traffic direct PXR or on a radial as they did. Reporting this to management falls on deaf ears and the FLM (Front Line Manager) usually states there is nothing I can do. This does not even comply with JO N7110.65 since the receiving controller does not know how he will be receiving the aircraft. What heading is he placed on? Paragraph 5-4-5 states: Advise the receiving controller of pertinent information not contained in the data block or flight progress strip unless covered in a LOA or facility directive. Pertinent information includes: 1. Assigned heading. Well what is in the current LOA does not comply with this since the receiving controller does not know what the 'Assigned heading' is! Why do we continually have to file reports on these types of events?  Even when this LOA was in the draft stage; the Article 48 workgroup and procedures Manager were advised that this did not meet the requirements set forth by headquarters recently when we had to rebrief these items via eLMS (Electronic Learning Management System)/verbally.This is unacceptable and both facilities know of this issue since the procedure went into effect and they have not resolved the issue. God forbid and aircraft is climbing out on the KATMAN departure; we will have a loss or worst a near midair. This needs to be resolved immediately but nobody appears to be doing anything to fix this issue. In the meantime ZAB46 controllers are not feeding the aircraft in accordance with the current LOA and there is no consistency either. Have the aircraft placed on a vector so it will be contained within the receiving controller's airspace. Require ZAB46 advice the receiving controller of the assigned heading as required by JO N7110.65 5-4-5g. Or place the heading that will be assigned in the LOA as is allowed.

P50 Controller describes two incidents involving the same aircraft. First issue was the relationship to a jump area that ZAB did not point out to the appropriate sectors. Second issue was the aircraft was not on an assigned heading that the TRACON Controller knew about. Coordination was not complete.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Landed runway 27L in ATL and was instructed to hold short of runway 27R at N5. Then instructed to cross 27R and join M taxiway and contact ground on 121.75. Ground control was busy; so after I cleared hold short line and join M; I brought the aircraft to a stop. After a minute we were able to get a word in on ground control and informed him we were on M and needed to go to ramp X. We were instructed to taxi to ramp X. First officer switched over to ramp and received clearance to enter. Shortly after he tuned ground control on number two so that we could monitor. As I made the left turn off M into ramp X; I noticed an Aircraft Y; from my left; taxiing at a high rate of speed with his nose light on. I felt like the Aircraft Y was not going to slow or stop and a collision was imminent. I slammed on brakes and the Aircraft Y passed off our nose. Ground control contacted us as I was slamming on brakes; and asked why we stopped; and if ramp would not let us in? We informed him of the Aircraft Y; and he instructed us to; again; taxi to the ramp. At gate; I called clearance delivery to get tower supervisors phone number. Called supervisor; have not heard back from him. Would like to know what happened first.

The flight crew of an Aircraft X inbound to the gate at ATL had to stop abruptly for a crossing Aircraft Y that failed to acknowledge or slow before passing the reporter's aircraft.


General Evacuated; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

I was jump seating. At cruise I was awakened by a loud noise which sounded like a door fell off one of the cans in the cargo area. [Another deadheading pilot] heard the same noise. We both got out of our seats to take a look through the cargo viewing window when we noticed that the FSS [Fire Suppression System] indicator by L1 showed two red positions (1C/1R). We returned to our seats and notified the crew. They acknowledged our communication and shortly announced that we were diverting [nearest suitable airport]. Prior to landing; we were told that once the aircraft was clear of the runway; we would evacuate. Upon taxiing clear; the aircraft came to a stop and I could hear the crew go through the emergency evacuation checklist. The FO was the first one out of the flight deck and proceeded to open L1 using the emergency handle. The door opened and the slide started to inflate. The slide; however; did not extend and was being held back by its Velcro straps. The slide was finally freed and the FO exited the aircraft by jumping onto the slide as we have been taught. The slide did not provide the proper support and he unfortunately hit the ground extremely hard. He rolled clear of the slide and laid there in pain. After some discussion with the rescue crew; they physically held the slide out and taut which allowed the rest of us to deplane. The FO was cared for by the rescue crew and was transported to the hospital. We had a chance look at the slide and noticed that the support tubing underneath the slide was not inflated. This was no doubt the reason for the injuries sustained by the FO. The crew did a magnificent job keeping us informed and getting the jet on the ground in an expeditious and safe manner. Unknown why FSS activated. Unknown why slide did not properly inflate.

MD-11 flight crew deviated to nearest suitable airport due to a Fire Suppression System fault. The First Officer was injured when the escape slide did not properly inflate; allowing him to hit the ground hard.


Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was pilot flying and FO was pilot monitoring. Initially vectored and descended for ILS to runway 22L. Controller then changed the runway to 22R. We had already briefed 22R as the backup approach. FMC and radios were tuned for 22R and FO double checked that all frequencies and altitudes were set properly. Descended to 3000 feet and slowed to 170 knots perpendicular to ILS course for 22R. Controller was giving instructions to many aircraft in a rapid and uninterrupted stream. We were paying particular attention for our turn to intercept the localizer because of the extreme volume and rapidity of the transmissions by the controller. As we approached the extended course line for the localizer and it was becoming more apparent that we would overshoot the localizer the FO was trying to call the controller to ask for turn to intercept. There was never a break in the transmissions to allow him time to transmit. The next call we received from the controller was that we were cleared to intercept the localizer for 22R. I immediately began a  turn back towards the localizer as the FO acknowledged the call. The controller asked us why we had not turned to the intercept course we had previously been given and joined the localizer. FO replied that we had not been given a turn previously to join. At this point we joined the localizer intercepted the glide path and landed. Roll out and taxi to the gate were normal. On taxi-in ground gave me a number to call. After exiting aircraft I called the number given and controller supervisor called me back to discuss what had happened. His debrief to me was that another aircraft had answered the turn to final intended for us and the controller had acknowledged that response. I was told that since we had not acknowledged a turn to final and intercept we were not in the wrong. In speaking with the supervisor I stressed to him that we were keying for a turn to final and had not heard anything for us due to the tremendous amount of radio transmissions. He was satisfied with our explanation of the chain of events and ask that next time we ask for a turn to final from controller if necessary which of course we would have attempted if possible in this situation. He told me that no deviation was being considered.In the future if placed in this situation again and I am unable to ask controller for a turn to intercept due to extreme transmission volume I will execute the intercept myself since I am NORDO for all practical purposes. When able I will tell controller I have intercepted the localizer for the intended landing runway. I think this would be better than overshooting the localizer and intruding either to parallel runway airspace or other airport airspace.

I tried to ask for the turn to final but the frequency was extremely congested with no breaks in transmissions. I could not get a word in. Just after we passed through final; the controller told us to intercept final.

Arriving at destination at a traffic peak the flight crew of a B737NG failed to receive a timely turn to intercept the localizer for their approach. Immediately after passing through the final approach course; ATC called advising them to intercept; and asked them why they had failed to do as cleared. During a post flight interview it was determined that another flight had responded to their clearance and the error went undetected by both ATC and the reporters.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 1594; Flight Crew Type 1594

Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Distraction; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

I picked up the aircraft from [a service center] located at ZZZ. I performed a thorough preflight and departed ZZZ to the SW headed for ZZZ1. The flight was approximately 1 hour with maneuvering and operated flawlessly with no issues. Approximately 1 hour later I departed ZZZ headed for ZZZ2. This flight was approximately 2 hours and as well was flawless with absolutely no issues. I fueled at ZZZ2 self-serve Avgas pump with about 21 gallons. After performing a pre-flight inspection I departed back to ZZZ. Upon departure I began a gradual climb at about 250 FPM on a runway heading. At about 3100 feet MSL the engine went to what I perceived as idle or about 1000 RPMs. I ran through the emergency checklist and hit nearest suitable airport on the GPS which said ZZZ2 behind me. I began a gradual left turn to head back to the airport while trouble shooting the engine issue and establishing the best glide speed of 76 knots airspeed. When I looked at the distance to ZZZ2 it was 5.9 NM and I knew I could not make it with the altitude I had. I looked for a suitable landing location and choose a field to my right that I felt was my only option. Once I felt I had made the field I put in all the flaps and performed a successful no power landing. I then inspected the plane for any damage and began to look for the source of the problem; I manually checked the fuel in both tanks and at the engine drain and it appeared to be clean 100 Octane Low Level with no deficiencies. I then removed the cover and started the engine while holding the brakes and slowly pushed up the throttle at about 2000 RPM the engine acted as if it was not getting fuel and began to lose RPM almost immediately. After calling [the service center] I found a ride home and drove back. I flew back to ZZZ2 with [someone from the service center] and we got a ride to the field where the plane was located. We pulled the upper and lower engine covers and inspected the engine top to bottom. After determining everything was as it should be we started the engine and as I increased the throttle the engine began to die as if starving for fuel within a minute or so. We then shut it down and inspected the engine again and noticed that it had a fuel leak on the primer line that runs to 3 of the 4 cylinders. After closer inspection; we determined the line was broken near a clamp so we repaired it with a ferrules fitting. We then started the engine and ran it up to full rpm it maintained 2350 rpm for about 12 minutes with no issues. We then replaced all the engine covers and began to discuss options. We did some calculations and determined the field was more than 3000 feet long smooth low-cut grass. We discussed that we could taxi the aircraft to the high end of the field and set it up in a takeoff configuration and increase the throttle to full as if to take off but remain on the ground; to further test the engine.I taxied to the starting point and put in 1 notch of flaps then increased the throttle to full. When the aircraft wheels departed the ground; the speed increased very quickly and before I could set it back down I realized I may not have enough room to stop. The aircraft lifted off the ground and at approximately 150-175 feet AGL the engine appeared to stop or at least went to idle. I had no options for a straight ahead landing so I made a somewhat hard left turn and attempted to keep the aircraft from stalling. I cleared several obstacles and an electric pole/line. In an effort to avert the stall I pushed the nose down and impacted the ground with the front nose wheel and the aircraft slid to a stop. When I began to review my documents for the insurance claim I realized that I had inadvertently allowed my Biennial Flight Review to expire. To avoid a situation like this in the future I would never operate an aircraft that had a problem that could not be definitively identified and corrected by a person with the appropriate credentials and I will also employ the use of additional devices (such as electronic reminder) and monitor my credentials more closely.

PA28 pilot reported engine malfunction that resulted in an emergency landing. Following corrective maintenance and subsequent testing; a second takeoff was attempted with an additional emergency landing.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were assigned an intersection takeoff from runway 33 at intersection T10. Ahead of us was an Airbus (319 or 320) that received the same clearance. As the Airbus began its takeoff roll we were cleared to line up and wait. The Captain stopped the airplane on the runway and transferred the controls to me after we verified the correct runway heading. After the Airbus had departed and climbed to a distance of what seemed to be routine separation for departing aircraft; we were given a takeoff clearance. We proceeded with a normal takeoff (reduced thrust). Shortly after rotation (approximately 50 AGL); I felt the aircraft roll strongly to the right and immediately recognized the force as wake turbulence. Immediately as I began to correct with aileron; the stick shaker engaged for less than 1 second and I responded with brisk but slight forward pressure on the yoke. By no means were we at an unusually high angle of attack; and our airspeed was increasing normally before we encountered the wake turbulence.The sole cause of the stick shaker activation was wake turbulence from the departing Airbus ahead of us. As mentioned above; I believe that the separation provided for us behind that traffic was not less than ordinarily provided at ORD. The light winds at the time of our departure most likely allowed the wingtip vortices the remainder over the runway for an extended period of time.Increase awareness among pilots about the separation required behind departing aircraft; especially Airbus 319/320s. This is not the first time I have experienced strong wake turbulence behind this type of aircraft; and it is deceiving because it is not considered a 'heavy' aircraft. It may be wise to use normal thrust takeoffs behind Airbus 319/320 aircraft for this reason; and to allow extra separation to allow vortices to dissipate.

CRJ-200 First Officer reported the stick shaker was activated on initial climb out of ORD when they encountered wake turbulence in trail of an A319/320.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 17900; Flight Crew Type 500

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Incursion Runway

On the 3rd touch and go landing after touch down on Runway 28 I could see a Aircraft Y approach our runway from left to right at Taxiway C. I commented to the student to keep an eye on him to make sure he stops. Aircraft Y proceeded to cross the runway in front of us without stopping. I immediately took control of the airplane and began a full brake application. We were getting close enough to Aircraft Y that I was considering turning the aircraft off the runway to avoid contact. We were able to avoid hitting the airplane and remain on the runway. We were slightly past Taxiway D when we came to a full stop; I do not recall hearing any radio transmission from the Aircraft Y announcing his intentions. I commented to Aircraft Y 'Thanks for crossing in front of a landing aircraft and you can buy us a new set of tires.' He commented that 'he did not see us.' This is just the latest of several incursions I have witnessed on this runway. Most are caused by pilots unfamiliar with our airport; this is the first from an what I would assume to be a highly experienced pilot and was told by the lineman that aircraft is here fairly often. I feel there is a need for more emphasis and training in making pilots aware of ground procedures and traffic pattern etiquette especially at uncontrolled airports with multiple runways. Having to cross a runway to get to the designated calm wind runway which also is the longest runway (10;000 ft.) presents a huge potential for an accident.

GA instructor pilot reported taking evasive action after landing to avoid another aircraft crossing the runway at GXY airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 406; Flight Crew Type 12500

Weather in DCA was two miles visibility with rain and 300 overcast. It was night.  This is a general Safety concern about the taxiway markings and signage on the ground in DCA and around the gate area.  The taxiway markings are horrible at night; and when you throw in rain to wash out any discernible taxi markings; there might as well be no markings at all. In rain conditions at night you can barely make out the center taxi line using your taxi lights. A few times I had to use my landing lights to see any of the markings at all.  As we traveled on Taxiway K to the terminal; any lines on the taxiway seemed to disappear in the rain.  You could make out blue reflectors on the centerline; but they did not reflect any of my taxi light. Upon entering the ramp area; with multiple vehicles moving around; and parked aircraft; all pretense of safety marking seemed to follow the rain; right down the drain.  You could see none of the markings that defined a Safety Zone; parking spots; or the centerline of the parking spot. It was only because of good communication with my FO that we were able to figure it all out; and arrive safely at the gate with no damage to the aircraft; or a taxiway incursion.Both Company and FAA need to fix this; not only at DCA but at many of the airports in our system. This was a night event with rain and no snow. I should be able to see the Safety markings while taxiing.

Air carrier Captain reported that taxiway markings; signage; and markings associated with parking spots at DCA are difficult to see at night during rainy conditions.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

On approach into landing for runway 25L at LAX; both flight crew members experienced a laser event. A green laser was exposed into the cockpit from a position south and roughly abeam the final approach fix; LIMMA; for 25L. The first officer was flying and I had my head down running a checklist when he said; 'whoa.'  I looked up to see a green laser and turned away after I saw it. I notified ATC. We continued the approach in VMC and landed uneventfully. Approximately 15 minutes after landing; we both began to experience sensitivity to light. My left eye felt worse compared to my right eye. It felt like it was heavy and I had a slight headache. We contacted the union and the company. We then both proceeded to an urgent care clinic to have our eyes examined.

On final to 25L; LAX; just outside LIMMA; a green laser fired from the ground; at our 10 o'clock and 1-2 miles; and hit the cockpit. I was Pilot Flying (PF) in the right seat and the laser hit me in both eyes. I ducked under the glare shield and on my movement the Pilot in Command (PIC) looked up and was hit in the left eye. It was over in a second; before any other action could be taken. We advised LAX tower and landed normally. Again; it was so quick there was nothing we could have done differently to avoid it.

A CE560 flight crew experiences a green laser event approaching Runway 25L at LAX and lands normally. Eye discomfort is felt after the landing and medical attention is sought.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

An aircraft was taxied to Runway 25L at C8 for an intersection departure. The Ground Controller stated that there was an intersection departure at C8 to the Local Controller. An Archer (P28A) then landed on Runway 25L; on landing roll the Archer was instructed to turn left at C8 a contact Ground by the Local Controller. The Archer made the turn at C8 but was unable to cross the hold bars because the intersection was blocked. The Local Controller then cleared an Archer (P28A) for take off anticipating separation. The Ground Controller told the Local Controller that C8 Intersection was blocked. The Local Controller then cancelled the take off clearance. The cancellation of take off clearance was not accepted by the Archer and the aircraft departed. As CIC at the time of the event; I told the Local Controller that C8 was blocked when I heard him tell the Archer to turn left at C8. The event was caused by poor scanning by the Local Controller and not hearing the coordination by the Ground Controller.

Tower CIC described a confused intersection departure event caused by a breakdown of communications between the Ground Controller and Local Controller.


Coming in to CLT on the IVANE THREE RNAV ARRIVAL 10-2C landing north transition we were cleared to Descend VIA. If you look at the chart; IVANE is between 16;000 [and] 10;000 FT. The next fix is GIZMO at 250 between 13;000 [and] 11;000 FT. This doesn't make any sense. There are no notes anywhere stating the bottom altitude of IVANE is only for 23 or a different runway. I think this is an error on this chart and I don't know which one is correct? When you look at this chart it can lead you to bust an altitude since technically you need to climb again to make a restriction. I believe there is a miss print on the chart and that it needs to be corrected.

A pilot on the CLT IVANE THREE RNAV noted that a clearance to descend VIA could lead one to cross IVANE at 10;000 FT only to climb for the GIZMO 11;000 FT constraint. A chart note should be added indicating the IVANE 10;000 FT is only for Runway 23.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 153; Flight Crew Type 20500

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Flight pushed 19 minutes late due to being weight restricted (take-off weight) and having to leave six passengers.  The Agent was doing a great job; but was very task saturated. The original load sheet came down with 167 passengers and 600 pounds under ATOG.  FAs counted passenger count five times; and each time came up with 169.  The Agent finally determined that we actually had 169; so new load sheet was created to reflect 169 Passengers. We were now at 200 pounds under ATOG. [We] calculated that our only take-off option was Runway XX; bleeds off; and flaps 25. This gave us a 268 FT stopping margin. We had NO MEL ITEMS.  Just prior to departure; it started to lightly sprinkle. Although the runway was still DRY; we quickly ran the calculations for WET-GOOD.  Takeoff was still allowable; but the stopping margin would have been 94 FT.  Takeoff was normal. In our climb; and still below 10;000 FT; a message popped up on ACARS.  We waited until climbing out of 10;000 FT to check it. That message was soon followed by a second identical message from Dispatch.  The message stated; 'OPS CALLED AND SAID TO ADD AN ADDITIONAL 10 BAGS IN BIN C'.  We did not respond to the message.  On a 737-800; any change requires a new load sheet. We had just taken off slightly over ATOG; and potentially out of balance.  We were well below Max Gross Weight and were not landing limited. The problem was with takeoff; and we had been airborne five minutes before the first Dispatch message. We continued the flight normally.It was late at night; unhappy passengers were being told they couldn't go.  The Agent was giving 110 percent and was under pressure to minimize the delay.  I'd be surprised to find this not to be somewhat common for this flight. Too many people; too much weight; too short runways; too long a [flight] distance. Nine out of ten times; it probably all works out.  This time it didn't.

B737-800 Captain reported taking off slightly over ATOG when the departure was rushed.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was informed by operations that the aircraft that I flew had the wrong database installed in the FMS. It had a B777 database instead of an MD11 database. I did check the date of the database but did not check the numbers at the top to verify correct installation. After seeing the same thing at the top of the screen I rarely verify the correct database installed! We proceeded to destination without any issues or ATC questions so I am assuming the data base was close enough to operate a MD11. Have Maintenance verify the aircraft type and database type before installation then reverify after load.

An MD11 Captain was informed after the fact that he flew an aircraft with a B777 data base mistakenly loaded into the FMC.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

During a GPS approach to Runway 2 at JQF; we were outside ECEGA at 2;500 FT and 180 KTS. Flaps were extended to 15 degrees. We just extended the landing gear. We were experiencing moderate turbulence. Just as we were flying over an obstacle at 2;000 FT on the approach we experience moderate turbulence that caused the airplane to pitch down momentarily. This caused us to receive GPWS obstacle warning with a climb indication. We complied with the warning and climbed until the warning stopped. We climbed to an altitude of 3;600 FT; completed the Go-around Checklist and returned for another approach. The following approach was completed without incident.

A small jet on the JQF Runway 2 GPS encountered turbulence near ECEGA at 2;500 FT which pitched the aircraft over triggering the GPWS terrain warning so a go-around climb was executed until the warning ceased.