Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Upon landing while parking the plane at the gate; we noticed an extreme odor of fuel (kerosene) type inside the cockpit. It was noticed by the Flight Attendant as well. During a walk-around examination; Captain and I established that the fuel leak was possibly coming from an area close to the APU titanium firewall. He proceeded to call Maintenance and Dispatch and was told by Maintenance to MEL the APU and that should take care of the problem. We tried several times to get contract maintenance on site to inspect our problem but our company told us they were working on some other plane and was gonna take an indefinite amount of time (several hours). While waiting for our wheels up time I was told by Captain to call our Chief Pilot. I immediately contacted him on my cell phone and the call took lasted for about 5 minutes. The details of the call was him trying to explain to me the systems of the E-145; which for me coming fresh from training was absurd and a waste of time. Finally; as the last resort; he tried to convince me several times to fly the airplane even though he would not send Maintenance to check it out quoting it was safe to fly. He repeatedly communicated to me and my Captain several times that contract Maintenance was only going to take a look through from the outside of the plane and not open any panels and to get Maintenance there it would take hours. After disagreeing; he agreed to send contract Maintenance and the mechanic showed up in less than 15 minutes. I only saw him 'after the inspection' took place; nobody saw him inspect anything. In fact when questioned by Captain and myself about the fuel leak spot on the ground; he was completely unaware of that and we had to walk him to the site because he had not noticed that before.After discussing the whole situation again with Captain. I decided it was a NO-GO and he called Dispatch to inform the flight was canceled. After waiting for about an hour at the airport; the company got us ground transportation to ZZZ so we could pick up our original leg the next morning. Fast forward one month later I received an email notifying me about upcoming training. When I asked why; she said she did not know and told me to inquire a Supervisor. After doing this. I get the following response email which I'm attaching to this report.Number 1: I'm not a mechanic; I'm a pilot and I'm being paid as a pilot. I cannot make uninformed decisions without proper backup (maintenance).Number 2: Without having a mechanic inspecting the APU inside and out and given the OK by him I would have not changed my decision of not completing the flight.Number 3: We were uncertain about the location of the fuel leak and there was no mechanic available to establish where the leak was coming from.My job is to safely transport passengers everyday and safety is the number one priority on my list. This airplane was UNSAFE to fly without having proper maintenance. Even though Section 121.533 of the FARs (section D) applies to PICs and I was the SIC of this flight. Nevertheless I helped my PIC to reach a safe decision which ended in the cancellation of the flight. Last thing to add: After the flight was canceled; dispatch called Captain to see if we were okay ferrying the airplane back. This brings us to an interesting question. They are willing to risk our lives as crew members but not our passengers?

An ERJ145 First Officer reported they declined to take an aircraft with a fuel leak in spite of pressure from management to fly it.


Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

During taxi for departure from Runway 28; I noticed the use of the tiller for steering required more force than usual. As a result; we paid close attention to our pre departure checks especially checking the rudders and flight controls. We did not detect any abnormalities. Therefore; we continued with our takeoff preparation and were cleared for takeoff. After lining up with the Runway; I started to advance the thrust levers but before I was able to ask for Takeoff Thrust; I noticed that the aircraft [was] drifting to the left. While I started to apply right rudder to correct the movement; there was no response at all. The aircraft continued to the left; at which point I aborted the Takeoff.We cleared the Runway; did our checks; advised the cabin and asked ground for a parking spot to trouble shoot the problem. At which point I [had] regained the rudder control. We consulted with our flight mechanic and investigated a sound coming from the left side of the aircraft. Assuming it might have been an issue with the left main gear (brakes; blown tire) we elected to check it out. We shut down the left engine and our mechanic climbed down the lower EE compartment to check on the gear. He returned with everything appearing okay.After completing all our checks; no abnormal indications and nothing appearing to be wrong we decided to attempt another Takeoff. Considering we still had plenty of gas available. During our taxi for another takeoff; we checked again; our steering with rudders only. Not using the tiller. That is when we noticed that the problem had reappeared. I even let the First Officer try from the right side and he could only agree with my observation. At that point; we elected to return to the ramp and let maintenance do [their] job.

B767-300 Captain reported that during takeoff roll the aircraft seemed to drift to one side; using the rudder pedals did not correct the steering problem.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Workload; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Warning! I believe I found a data error in the BOWIE 3 arrival to DFW in FMS database. Flying into DFW with the new BOWIE 2 arrival in the FMS we selected Runway 36L. It would not give us the arrival to SILER only to HIKAY with a 160 heading out of HIKAY. If you read the ball note #2; this is the procedure is for props landing north. I believe the FMS somehow is reading the prop data only. We tried putting in Runway 35C to see if it would make a difference and it did not. We requested vectors and Regional Approach gave us vectors for the ILS to 36L with no problems. We need to get this looked at ASAP. Maybe it is only this aircraft but I think it will affect all FMS's.

An air carrier jet FMS database listed only the DFW BOWIE 2 propeller arrival so the flight crew requested vectors for their arrival.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 2100; Flight Crew Type 550

Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 3500

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

FO and Captain were flying 2 passengers to Airport ZZZ.  As we were approaching the ZZZ we were asked by ATC to begin a descent from flight level 390 to flight level 370.  When the Captain began to pull the throttles back to begin the descent;  it became apparent that the throttle controlling the #2 engine was stuck in the open position and would not allow a reduction in power to that engine.  The crew discussed the situation and decided to ask ATC for a lower altitude (in the lower 20;000 foot range) in case that engine had to be shut down and we needed to make a single engine approach.  ATC granted our request and gave us vectors to a more direct approach to the airport.  While in the descent; the throttle lever became active again and a normal approach and landing was made at ZZZ. During our descent we were asked several times by the ATC controllers if we had an emergency situation.  Every time we answered that it was not an emergency and once the throttle became active again on the #2 engine; we relayed that information to ATC and repeated that we were not in an emergency situation and would need no assistance at the airport upon landing.Evidently ATC took it upon themselves to activate an ARFF warning because fire and emergency equipment were at the ready when we landed at ZZZ.   We discussed the situation with the person in charge of the fire department and filled out a report with him.

When cruising at FL390 we (the crew) were asked to begin a descent. It became apparent that the throttle control for the #2 engine would not move from its present position to allow a reduction of power. We asked ATC to allow us to descend to a lower altitude than they originally requested. We were granted a lower altitude and given vectors towards a more direct route to our destination ZZZ. When asked by ATC what the problem was; we told them about the throttle issue. When asked if it was an emergency situation we told them that it was not.During the descent the throttle lever became active and responsive and we then relayed that information to ATC. A normal approach and landing followed at ZZZ. I do not know what caused the situation but our maintenance facility was notified and will inspect the aircraft.

Upon commencing descent the number 2 throttle would not respond to pilot inputs. The crew advised ATC of the situation and requested a lower altitude. However; during the descent; the throttle became responsive again and a normal approach and landing was accomplished.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 28; Flight Crew Total 1993; Flight Crew Type 121

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Maintenance Action

I was practicing engine out landings; and I was making an approach that involved a curving final approach course. This technique is recommended per information provided on the American Bonanza Society web site. While everything seemed to be working fine; at the last moment; a gust of wind caused me to dip my left wing a bit; and this caused it to scrape the runway. This was very troubling to me; as i had never had this kind of issue before on any landing.  It was very sudden; and it was over as quickly as it happened. I decided to go around; and I did so with no further problem. When I landed back in ZZZ; I was able to inspect under the wing; at the point where it scraped.  It seemed like very minor damage; but it had definitely touched the runway surface.  As I inspected it more closely; I could also see that there was a small dent on the upper surface of the wing tip. I sent photos of this slight damage to my A&P mechanic; and he confirmed: 1. That this slight damage did not constitute any issue with regard to airworthiness; and 2. That this could be fixed; mostly from a cosmetic perspective. I asked him to schedule this work; and he agreed to get back to me during the work week.  I feel as though I learned an important lesson about not using a curved flight path down to so close to the runway; in case I needed to maneuver further for wind effects.

Bonanza 36 pilot reported momentary loss of aircraft control during landing resulting in wing tip ground contact.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

During climbout from ZZZ; above approximately 2;000 feet AFL; an amber GPS-L enunciated. I continued to hand fly the jet as we climbed into IMC conditions in the pre-dawn darkness. The GPS-L caution distracted me from calling 'flaps-up' at the appropriate speed. The Captain called my attention to this as we approached 240 knots IAS. I called for flaps up and the captain retracted them normally. I engaged the autopilot after flap retraction. At no time did we exceed the 250 knot flap placard limit. Maximum speed I remember seeing was 244 knots IAS with flaps not up. The rest of the flight to ZZZ1 was uneventful. I believe my recency of experience was a factor; this being my first unsupervised flight since re-qualification. Also; night; IMC in low marine layer clouds while hand flying the initial portion of the RNAV departure. The GPS-L caution was a nuisance warning that served as the distraction. I was focused on hand flying smoothly and lost situational awareness of aircraft configuration.Earlier use of automation may have helped with my situational awareness during the nuisance GPS distraction. My habit is to hand fly the aircraft until clean.

B737-800 First Officer reported a GPS-L annunciation on departure which distracted flight crew from calling flaps up at the appropriate speed.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

These failures of Jepp FDPro need to be captured in the SMS process. There are four separate issues in this report.1. On a transatlantic flight; the route into tab opened up blank. Obviously not good.2. On a different transatlantic flight; I tried to enter the CP information in accordance with [pilot bulletin]. The CP initially appeared on map; but when I switched to a different application and then back to FDPro the CP was missing. I entered it three separate times with the same result each time. The three points I created are in the flight tab; but there is no coordinate data associated with them. Somehow this dropped out when I switched apps. So on at least this occasion; the plotting procedures as specified in the Pilot Bulletin do not work.3. On a domestic transcontinental flight; the currency badge turned red in the middle of the flight. I clicked on it and got the screen which shows nothing in the red zone and no update available. I exited this screen and clicked on the currency badge again. Still nothing in the red zone; but now it shows updates available. According to an answer to [a previous report]; FDPro cannot access the internet in flight unless the WiFi is purchased. Yet somehow it is. This flight was on a 757 with a relatively new broadband system installed; so maybe the filters on the new system are not set up correctly.4. Jepp FDPro appears to be updating the weather information during flight. It is not supposed to do this since it is not supposed to access the internet. And the fact that it is accessing the internet is a violation of the policy. Pilot Mobile accesses the internet too; which is also a violation of the FOM policy; so perhaps the policy about what apps can access the internet needs to be revised to reflect reality.I embrace the use of technology; but the technology needs to work correctly. Our version of FDPro is already several versions behind. If these are bugs that have been fixed in the current version; we need to be allowed to update.

B767 Captain reported several malfunctions of the Jepp FDPro application.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.5

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

I was monitoring the operation indirectly from a position not in use at the time. The developmental in training issued a turn to Aircraft X off of the NSIGN3 departure to the MURFI waypoint to rejoin the route. Aircraft X was not climbing at a rate that allowed for MVA clearance. The instructor issued instructions to Aircraft X to turn to a 160 heading in an attempt to gain more altitude and avoid the MVA. Approved separation was lost when Aircraft X entered an 11;000 foot MVA at 10;200 feet.

S56 ZFLM reported of an airspace violation due to a developmental vectoring an aircraft into a MVA which the aircraft was below.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

This was 2nd issue with similar scenario in the same day and bank. Fueling was still in the process of fueling the aircraft when the flight crew gave the approval for the main cabin door to be closed by the agent. The agent closed the door but the ramp lead caught this and did not allow bridge to be guided back and alerted me to situation with fueling. I immediately had the agent open the door. The bridge in this instance was never removed unlike the similar report I filed. Again I feel this is process driven by the new process with Electronic Fuel Slips and situational awareness of the flight crew and ground personnel. While again nothing came of this it has the potential to happen again and has system wide ramifications.

Ramp agent reported the cabin door was closed while fueling was in progress.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

Flight pushed from the gate; I received an alert that the ramp was unable to closeout the flight due to no 15 bags surrounding the Hazmat. The total bag count on the flight was only 12. The flight was brought back to the gate to offload the Hazmat.

Commercial airline personnel reported Hazmat cargo incorrectly configured for air transport resulting in ground return to unload Hazmat.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The Center still assigning speeds that violate the LOA. This situation was an overtake where the center assigned a speed to the first aircraft until the common point; then the arrival created a 60 knot overtake.When the situation is reported to management; there is no recourse for the Center.  This has happened on numerous occasions. Review the safety culture.

A90 controller reports of ZBW not following the LOA reference speeds on aircraft descending into A90 airspace.


Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling

We arrived at the airplane at and found that Maintenance was being performed on the hydraulic system 3B; and also found that the standby horizon would not erect. Both of these items were written up and eventually an MEL was effected for the hydraulic pump.  After all items were entered in logbook; I went out to inspect the area where repairs were made and found a fastener missing from the airframe. It was found lying on the ground underneath the airplane; and Maintenance was called to reinstall the fastener. I went back to the cockpit and was in the midst of preparing the airplane for departure when Maintenance came into the cockpit telling us that we needed to write up the missing fastener even though it was associated with the earlier hydraulic fix. We did so and this logbook entry. We were again getting things ready for the push with jet bridge disconnected now two hours late; when we were further interrupted by a ground crew asking us to take additional passengers from another delayed flight. They shortly changed their minds and we were again allowed to push. We had reached cruise altitude before either the First Officer or I realized that we had forgotten to download the newest release that included the newest MEL and sign it. Upon landing; we did download and sign. I attribute this failure to numerous interruptions before the push. We received no indication from Dispatch that the new release had been sent and did not remember to download ourselves.

CRJ-200 Captain reported not receiving the newest flight release from Dispatch until airborne.


Installation; Testing; Inspection; Work Cards

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

April 2013. My partner and I were assigned to take over a window shade replacement on the overwing emergency escape door. Removal of the door is necessary requiring disarming the Off-Wing Escape System. Job Card 25-92-03; as well as the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) references were on hand and utilized. With the start of the Arm/Disarm procedure; a 'Caution' about personal hazard and aircraft damage was called out on the Job Card; which referred you to Maintenance Manual 25-65-00-442. It was a procedure to check for the possibility of stray voltage before installation of the electrical connectors (4 total) to the squibs [for the overwing slide]. A multi-meter; as well as an [electrical] shunt; could not be located. Multi-meter COM1793 or shunt were not at ZZZ; or anywhere that could be located. Management instructed us to proceed without testing for stray voltage; and also that they would assume responsibility; should the slide deploy. We 'Armed' the Off-Wing Escape System without incident as instructed. We were also told that Technical Support and the Training module said that once we started using the Maintenance Job Card; to not use any of the Maintenance Manual instructions within the Maintenance Job Card. The whole time we were being pressured to get the job completed; and the Manager could not understand why we wanted to refer to the Maintenance Manual; and not just complete the job.

Two Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (AMTs) were directed by a Maintenance Manager to ignore the 'Caution' instructions and Maintenance Manual (M/M) references in a Arm/Disarm Job Card for the Overwing Escape Slide System; before attaching four electrical connectors to slide squibs; on a B757-200 aircraft.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 13.0

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

I was working the morning departure push of aircraft from. At the time of the event I was working between 4 to 6 aircraft. All were on RNAV SIDS.  Aircraft X; was climbed to 17;000 feet via the SID. Aircraft Y was climbed to 17;000 feet upon initial contact after departing. Aircraft Y was on a SID.The paths of the SIDs cross. When I climbed Aircraft Y to 17;000 feet Aircraft X was a few miles west of its departure airport out of an altitude of somewhere between 5000 feet and 10;000 feet. I was reasonably assured; based on the good climb rate of this morning's group of aircraft; that Aircraft Y would not be in conflict with the other aircraft climbing. I was led to this assumption because aircraft previous to Aircraft X were switched to my frequency well before my airspace boundary and in more than ample time for me to climb the aircraft to 23;000 feet and easily top the aircraft departing DCA which were climbing only to 17;000 feet.  All of my assumptions and decision making based on how the aircraft were performing was all for naught.  Aircraft X was never switched to my frequency by the adjacent sector controller and flew for approximately 6 miles into my airspace at 17;000 feet converging with Aircraft Y which was climbing out of 16;000 feet for 17;000 feet when I recognized the problem.  I immediately issued a vector to Aircraft X that would have caused it to pass behind Aircraft Y.  No answer.  I called Aircraft X again; no answer.  I instructed Aircraft Y to descend immediately to 14;000 feet and issued the traffic.  No answer.  Again I instructed Aircraft Y; now level at 17;000 feet; to descend immediately to 14;000.  (Why 14;000 feet?  It was something to aim for lower the Aircraft X at 17;000 feet.).  A pause; then Aircraft Y answered stating they were descending.  2 seconds too late.  I then instructed Aircraft Y to turn left to a heading; maybe 280 degrees; I don't remember exactly. Any heading to the left of the course Aircraft Y was on was one that I had hoped would avoid what was looking like an imminent collision; even though I was told the closest proximity was 1.9 miles and 2.1 miles.After Aircraft Y responded that they were descending to 14;000 feet I called the adjacent sector controller and told her 'Aircraft X was not on my frequency.'  A couple seconds later Aircraft X called me level at 17;000 feet and I immediately issued a climb to 23;000 feet.  Again; 2 seconds too late.I did not issue traffic alerts to either aircraft because in my opinion that was wasting precious time to correct the error and keep a bad situation from ending much worse. There has been a great initiative to introduce RNAV SIDs and STARs into the National Airspace System (NAS).  Virtually every air carrier that operates within the Potomac TRACON airspace is on a charted RNAV SID or STAR.  The result is a known path and altitude crossing restriction for each aircraft with minimal input from the air traffic controller.  Sounds like a good idea.  And it is except that the air traffic controller now spends more time monitoring an aircraft's compliance with the SID/STAR rather than directly controlling it with vectors and altitude assignments.  This; I believe; leads to a sense of complacency or expectation bias that was not as prevalent in air traffic control before the introduction of RNAV SIDS and STARS as they are used now.  This does not take away from the fact that I erred in not ensuring separation.  This event makes me more aware than ever that with less interaction between air traffic controller and pilot it now requires more vigilance on ensuring separation.

A controller took handoffs on two departures off different airports on converging routes. Although both aircraft were climbing to 17;000 feet; the controller was initially only in communication with one of the aircraft. He could not make contact with the aircraft he intended to keep climbing and waited too long to issue other aircraft instructions to ensure separation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 14390; Flight Crew Type 1252

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Ground Personnel; Person Flight Crew

Inadvertently pushed back without dangerous goods final report. Delayed taxi until report was received.

B777-200 Captain reported pushing back prior to receiving Dangerous Goods final report.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Type 85

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 94; Flight Crew Type 11800

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Captain was Pilot Flying on visual approach.  He called for Flaps 5 and I moved the handle to that position.  Flaps indicator showed slight trailing edge device split and total flap deployment of only two to three degrees rather than the selected five.  Overhead leading edge device panel indicated normal leading edge device extension.  There was no abnormal roll of the aircraft.  Captain then called for Flaps 10 and I selected the handle to that position.  There was no further movement of the pointers on the trailing edge indicator. However; the leading edge device indicator indicated that leading edge devices had moved to the full extend position.  Again; there was no abnormal roll of the aircraft.  Captain then called for landing gear down and Flaps 15; and I complied with that request.  Again; there was no further movement of the pointers on the trailing edge flap indicator.  At this point we were rapidly approaching the runway and the Captain and I agreed a go-around was necessary.  I informed ATC and the Captain began a go-around.  We concurred that the flaps and landing gear would be left in their current configuration.  The Captain directed me to run the checklist in the QRH while he flew the aircraft and communicated with ATC.  At some point during the go-around; the trailing edge flap indicator moved to the selected (Flaps 15) position with no asymmetry.  I was momentarily confused with which checklist to use; but chose the Flaps Trailing Edge: Symmetrical Non-Normal/No Flaps Checklist.  The Captain concurred.  This checklist directed us to land with Flaps 15; which we did.  While I was running the checklist; the Captain declared an emergency as a precaution. We made an uneventful landing; and then taxied to the gate.  At the first sign of any abnormal indication; we should have consulted the QRH.

During approach the flap gauge did not go to the commanded selection of Flaps 5 degrees.  The overhead lights indicated good extension of the LED's.  I then commanded the flaps to 10 degrees.  The flaps gauge stayed at just past two degrees but the LED [Leading Edge Device] lights indicated full LED extension.  The aircraft felt/responded like the flaps were at 10 degrees.  I then commanded landing gear down; Flaps 15 degrees.  The flap gauge stayed at just past two degrees but the aircraft responded normally like flaps were at 15 degrees.  I elected to initiate a visual go-around.  I left the flaps at the commanded position 15 and left the gear down (horn nuisance.)  ATC was informed as well. I asked my First Officer to run the QRH procedure for non-normal flaps while I flew the aircraft and handled ATC.  The QRH procedure was in question by my First Officer but we did get the proper QRH procedure done (flaps non-normal 15 or better.)  The flap gauge did indicate 15 degrees normal two to three minutes after the go-around was initiated.  An emergency was declared with ATC.  The cabin crew was informed as well as the passengers.  The landing was uneventful other than a Flaps 15 landing.  The airport emergency vehicles were canceled as they were not needed.  At the gate; I contacted Dispatch via phone and Maintenance Control and discussed the event in detail.  A logbook writeup was made at the gate and a person to person discussion with a Maintenancee employee took place to further describe the event.  At no time did I feel the aircraft or souls onboard were in jeopardy.The crew action is valid and warrants no further enhancement.  A possible revision to the QRH on keeping the two non-normal flap procedures separate could help.  Also; crew training on this type of procedure during the PT would help as well.

B737-300 flight crew experiences a trailing edge flap failure to move to the commanded position during approach.  The flaps stopped moving at 2 degrees but the flap handle was moved from 5 to 10 to 15 degrees with no apparent movement.  A go-around was initiated without changing gear or flap positions and at some point TE flap position was noted at 15 degrees.  A 15 degree TE flap landing ensues.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 20

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft; Airport; Procedure; Human Factors

The aircraft was newly purchased. I had approximately 20 hours of time in the aircraft. We picked up the aircraft in ZZZ1 and departed for ZZZ filing a VFR Flight Plan after receiving a standard weather briefing through 1800WXBRIEF online. I conducted weight and balance and performance calculations for both departure and landing. We received VFR Flight Following throughout our flight to ZZZ.We landed at ZZZ as a fuel stop before continuing the flight to ZZZ2; where the aircraft is based. We filled the mains; and obtained food. I re-checked the weather and that it was in accordance with the briefing I had received earlier; and that it allowed us to proceed VFR on a route further south before turning north to ZZZ2. A VFR flight plan would not be accepted within the 30 minute window when attempting to file a VFR flight plan online; so we would be picking up VFR Flight Following from ATC once in the air using the inbound frequency. I performed another weight and balance; and also a detailed performance calculation since the ASOS was reporting a density altitude of 6;100 feet. Our takeoff weight was 3;532 lbs; with CG 81.1 which were both within limits. It indicated a takeoff roll of 1;800 feet; and a return to land landing distance roll of 950 feet. Initial takeoff performance was computed at 872 FPM. On climbout the passenger cockpit door burst open. This was very startling and severely impeded communications in the cockpit; and rendered the radio virtually useless. I determined that it was not safe to proceed; so we turned back to land at ZZZ. When I called on CTAF; there was unintelligible traffic taking the active runway for takeoff; so I entered a left downwind to runway. Due to rising terrain surrounding the airport in that direction; as I maneuvered to avoid the terrain I ended up high and fast on final. At approximately 200 AGL I determined I would not be landing on the fixed distance markers and initiated a go-around.The aircraft is Turbo-Normalized. I was instructed to leave the mixture lean during descent and approach; and to then advance the mixture during a go-around using the technique of mixture full; prop full; throttle full. When I advanced the Mixture and reached for the prop the engine sputtered and began to falter. I reversed course and leaned the mixture to regain the engine and determined that even if I landed beyond the fixed distance markers; my landing roll of 950 feet provided enough margin to bring the aircraft to a stop. I crossed the fence at approximately 90 knots; which is 10 knots faster than normal approach speed; and touched down approximately 1;500 feet down the runway. The down sloping runway and the position of the field contributed to illusions throughout the pattern that I was low; when in reality I was much higher than I thought. At this point I initiated maximum braking; anticipating the need to modulate the brakes. There was no appreciable slowing of the aircraft. I started retracting the flaps to get better braking action and began standing on the brakes to apply all the force possible and the aircraft slowed; but not at anything near the rate of performance that I had expected. We departed the paved surface of the runway at under 5 knots. Unfortunately there is no overrun to the runway and the terrain is unforgiving and canted at a steep downhill; and I continued to engage maximum braking until we struck a fence on the airport property. When I inspected the tire there were no bald spots or cord showing. I would have thought this would have occurred consistent with maximum braking. Nor was there any reverted rubber on the paint of the threshold number that I had passed over. When we came to a stop I immediately turned the fuel selector to off; turned the mags to off; and turned off the battery and alternator. I then surveyed the occupants of the aircraft for injuries. There were no injuries of any kind. We opened the doors normally and exited the aircraft. The rocky terrain had torn the left landing gear from the aircraft. There was [hydraulic fluid] on the ground and on the aircraft landing gear; along with the smell of light brush smoke in the area; so I removed the fire extinguisher from the front seat and as a precaution sprayed down the landing gear. I then went under the wing and sprayed fire extinguisher on the right main landing gear as a further precaution. We were able to open the doors normally and remove all luggage from the aircraft.

BE36 pilot reported a runway excursion after a return to departure airport due to distraction on departure.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 3100; Flight Crew Type 500

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

[We had an] initial climb off Runway 24 at TEB; 240 degree heading to intercept 260 degree course to WENTZ Intersection. After turning to 260 degree course to WENTZ; I verified the altitude preselect was set to 1;500 (mandatory crossing altitude) and traveling at 240 KTS. After WENTZ; as per the departure procedure; expected to cross TASCA at 2;000 FT as Departure Control had not given us another altitude. We were leveling at 1;500 FT 0.4 NM from WENTZ. I thought the aircraft had begun its turn from WENTZ to TASCA and I thought I had verified the green annunciation of ALT on the ADI. I must have been incorrect as I selected 2;000 FT on the altitude preselect the aircraft continued to climb at a reduced rate and as I made the turn from WENTZ to TASCA I realized the aircraft was climbing through 1;800 FT; intruding into the floor of the Class B airspace protecting Newark. Upon crossing WENTZ; was told by Departure Control that we should be maintaining 1;500 FT. As Departure Control was transmitting; I had already reduced power and adjusted pitch by pressing the touch control steering button and manually applying nose down pitch control contrary to what the command bars displayed. I was in the 'NAV' mode and the altitude preselect was set to 2;000 FT and we were past WENTZ at this point. As the climb was arrested; we were given further climb instructions and the rest of the departure procedure was conducted without issue. Contributing to this error I believe could be the congested airspace; the turbulence that seems to be ever persistent in this geographical area in the spring time but most of all I would have to say that my incorrect recognizing of the green annunciation of 'ALT' on the ADI when it must have had the annunciation of 'ASEL' in green. If 'ASEL' was annunciated green it would explain why; during the level off from 3;000 FPM if I had adjusted the altitude preselect from 1;500 FT to 2;000 FT; the autopilot would have continued to climb at whatever rate it was climbing during the level off when the preselect was changed. In the future; I will verify what mode is currently active and annunciated green (not white/armed) on the ADI and mode selector. If I had done that here; as I have in the past; there would not have been a disparity between our path and profile compared to the departure procedure we were cleared to fly.

CE650 Captain reports exceeding 1;500 FT prior to WENTZ on the RUUDY 4 departure from TEB and exceeding 200 KTS below the Class B.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 152; Flight Crew Total 5508; Flight Crew Type 4545

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 255; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 6700

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

During climbout we had an LGCIU #2 failure and completed the QRH procedure and reference actions for the failure. Enroute we requested and received landing data and determined no issues existed with our planned landing. On descent through approximately 8;500 feet MSL for landing at the Captains (PF's) direction I placed the landing gear handle in the down position with no resulting gear extension. We completed the ensuing ECAM and QRH procedures for the L/G Gear Not Down Locked event without success and accomplished a go around. The go-around was normal considering the aircraft configuration. Established on a downwind we successfully accomplished the L/G - Gravity Extension QRH procedure; declared an emergency due to the loss of nose wheel steering capability; and completed a normal approach and landing with approximately 4;000 FOB.

At cruise the LGCIU #2 ECAM appeared. On final approach when landing gear was selected down nothing happened. Following ECAM procedure the landing gear handle was recycled; with no effect. We went around. On downwind we manually extended the gear and got three green indications. Landed normally and cleared the runway at the high speed turnoff and stopped (No nose gear steering). Tug came and towed us to the gate.

A320 flight crew reports failure of LGCIU Number 2 in cruise. During approach the landing gear fails to extend when selected; and the gear handle is cycled to no avail. A go-around is initiated and the landing gear gravity extension procedure is followed successfully extending the gear.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We went into the shift slightly short staffed. Management knew that we were beneath the number and they were approved to call in overtime. Management agreed that it was beneficial to hold over 2 controllers (1 FPL; and 1 trainee) in order to provide appropriate staffing. I feel that this decision ultimately led to an unsafe situation in which I worked a combined sectors that were too busy/complex without a D side. We normally staff the area with 3 or 4 Radar positions and one D side that can float around and help somewhere else; with 3-4 people on break/able to be paged back within minutes. Tonight we were running with 3 Radars and 1 D side as usual. The problem was when two of the 3 radar positions got so busy that we were unable to get people back in time. All sectors had turbulence and minor deviations; I asked for a D side; which was pulled from another position that was also busy. Management paged someone back in order to help the other D side. There was an attempt to page back a controller; then the supervisor paged back the other supervisor; and went 'looking for the controller' who was actually clocked out and past his shift duty time. During this session specifically between the times of XA40-XB00 I had a good amount of traffic on frequency; with a complex workload. The radar person beside me had told management that she was ill and was going to be sick at the sector; the supervisor proceeded to page another FPL back. I had a sector west of me call and help me with a possible traffic situation that I had missed. At this time; we went into the hold for LGA with a short notice. We had both supervisors in the area and at one time 1 FPL on break.I feel that our staffing was inadequate for our workload; management's decision to use 'hold over' overtime was an unsafe call that created at least 3 unsafe situations/sectors. If safety really is the main goal of the FAA; we need to staff accordingly. Taking 2 sick leave calls for our late night staffing which is normally 4 people is not safe. We were short staffed the majority of the night and it wasn't an unsafe issue until we had the volume and complexity.As I finish this report; which I have spent doing on my break; I got paged from management to come back and I was unable to report now; I will have to resume tomorrow.When our staffing gets below the minimum number; we need to factor in the staffing throughout the shift; not just focus on getting 2 controllers to stay a bit late. This situation happened in the middle of the shift with the number of controllers that we had going into the shift. Management made a poor decision and it created an unsafe environment; enough so that I felt obligated to report the event and bring it to attention. Who knows? Do people even read these?

ZOB Controller reported of staffing issues on a shift. Controller did not like the fact that Management did not call in overtime for the shift and reported that Management went looking for someone to keep over; but that person had already left. Reporter felt that hold over and overtime was an unsafe call that created at least 3 unsafe situations/sectors.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

After takeoff from ZZZ; the red lights for all three landing gear remained illuminated. Accomplished 'landing gear fails to retract' checklist; gear retracted normally; and flight continued to ZZZ1. No airspeed or altitude limits were exceeded. During 'gear fails to retract' checklist; discovered the overhead gear door was slightly open; and after closing it and finishing the checklist; the gear retracted normally. The aircraft was towed to its spot in ZZZ; so the tow team; first officer; and myself all failed to notice the door wasn't completely closed.Will put more emphasis on double checking the configuration of the aircraft after its towed.

DH8-400 flight crew reported landing gear retraction issue after takeoff.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 1368; Flight Crew Type 688

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The entire flight was conducted inside the SFRA; VFR under the class Bravo shelf. Once I had the field in sight I notified Approach; kept my transponder code; and switched to the advisory frequency. I listened for a few seconds then reported my position; a few miles to the east. No other traffic was on frequency. I had listened to the weather and the winds were favoring ever so slightly Runway XX. I then reported my intention to enter on a crosswind pattern for Runway XX. As I neared the airport I scanned for both traffic in the air and on the ground. I then announced my crosswind entry onto XX. I then turned downwind and made the appropriate radio call. I then turned base and made the appropriate radio call. I then turned final and made the appropriate radio call. On short final; at maybe 100 feet off the ground and once I had the runway made; my eyes caught Aircraft Y that had just departed runway XY. The aircraft was my altitude if not 50 feet higher and would pass on my left side; to the west of the runway. I scanned for other aircraft potentially departing XY - there were none - There was no more danger so I continued with my landing a few seconds later. On rollout; Aircraft Y; called with a 'landing traffic' have you been making radio calls? I responded with 'Yes; multiple; initial call a few miles out; crosswind entry; downwind; base; and final. Have you been making calls?' and Aircraft Y responded with 'wind calm runway is XY.' I responded with 'Wind was favoring XX a few minutes ago.' No more communication followed.I did not see the aircraft taxiing or in position as I approached the airfield. I was obviously on the correct frequency as Aircraft Y contacted me after departing. Aircraft Y made NO calls on frequency other than to question me. I'm curious if Aircraft Y was originally on the temporary tower frequency which is different from the correct frequency.

GA pilot reported an NMAC at a non-towered airport with an aircraft that was not making radio calls.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

The flight contained three people. An instructor in the back; a student in the front left seat and myself in the front right seat. We took off the first time to the west to do maneuvers. We did all of our maneuvers and headed back. We tried to land the first time and we did a go around because it was unstable. The second attempt was much better and we did a stop and go. When we were on the go I noticed that the engine didn't sound right and the RPM was only about 2;100 and the airspeed was not increasing fast enough so I aborted takeoff. Exited and taxied back to the ramp and shut down the plane.

PA28 Instructor pilot experiences low power during a stop and go takeoff and rejects.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 1500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While on route the weather was deteriorating to 600 feet overcast and 2 miles.  I was reviewing the approach options for the airport and when I went back to heads up the autopilot had disengaged and was 7 degrees nose down and 45 degrees bank to the right. After recovering from the unusual attitude I was 1 mile south of course and 500 feet below assigned altitude. By the time I had finished accessing the failure; getting back on course I was already on a different frequency and had failed to report the deviation to the controlling facility.

C182 pilot experiences an autopilot disconnect while he is reviewing the approach charts. When the anomaly is detected the aircraft is seven degrees nose down and in a 45 degree bank. ATC does not comment on the 500 foot altitude loss or the track deviation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 162; Flight Crew Type 2300

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Prior to Top of Descent we experienced a Low Pressure light on engine 1 hydraulics. We accomplished QRH and informed Maintenance [via] ACARS. Shortly after reporting we noticed intermittent lights on electric pump 1 and Flight Control A. System A read zero quantity and system pressure cycled between 0 and 2925 psi. This happened throughout descent; and upon leveling at 9000 MSL the light became steadier.We surmised a total loss of hydraulic system A and went back into the QRH. We coordinated with Approach Control for extended final visual to allow time for gear extension. Upon landing we extended the rollout to avoid excessive braking and side loading upon turnoff. We then parked awaiting inspection from Fire/Rescue. We were towed to gate. No reported passenger or crew injuries.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported loss of hydraulic system A fluid and pressure.


Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure

Departed Runway 1L cleared for SHEAD RNAV SID and cleared to 'climb via.'  We briefed use of the FMS and autopilot with first level off of 9;000 feet [crossing at MDDOG]. Aircraft leveled at 9;000 feet; but FLCH disarmed. We were instructed that the aircraft must be in V FLCH mode to make the prescribed level off altitudes at the proper fixes. So the Captain reengaged the FLCH button. The aircraft began a rapid and immediate climb. The Captain disengaged autopilot; after I stated that we needed to be at 9;000 feet for the next fix. After a few seconds of hesitation and orientation he began to level the aircraft. We were live with passengers so I feel he did so in a controlled manner. Meanwhile we had gained approximately 1;400 feet and ATC came on reclearing us down to 10;000 feet. They informed us of a phone number to call and the flight continued.I said 'we need to be at 9;000 at MDDOG' and made the Captain aware of his deviation after he re-engaged the FLCH button.Not sure of automation in a V FLCH climb. Upon reaching 9;000 FLCH disarmed; not expected.We need more training on use of automation in a V FLCH climb in the simulator on multiple step up altitudes; such as required on a 'climb via' clearance.

We briefed our plan to let the flight director with autopilot fly the departure. Briefed to engage NAV; VNAV and FLCH in order to climb via. After takeoff; we engaged NAV; VNAV & FLCH; aircraft leveled at first restricted altitude of 9;000 feet. While level I noticed that FLCH was no longer armed; I re-armed FLCH and the aircraft initiated an accelerated climb. The automation performed differently than we expected. I plan to go back to step climbing; by selecting each restricted altitude until further guidance is received about VNAV climbs.I believe more training and guidance on VNAV climbs will be beneficial and aid all crewmembers in all fleets. I think we should all fly the 'climb via' profiles in the simulator.

A Challenger 605 flight crew; cleared to 'climb via' the SHEAD RNAV SID off Runway 1L at LAS; failed to maintain 9;000 till passing MDDOG as required when they failed to utilize the autoflight vertical navigation modes properly.  Both airmen stressed the need for better instruction in the use of the vertical nav modes and more extensive simulator training in the proper management of those vertical navigation modes when cleared by complex RNAV terminal procedures.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 6310; Flight Crew Type 175

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Landed ok after an RNAV approach - rolled out - gust of wind pushed the tail slightly - I over-corrected with rudder and maybe some brake [resulting in a ground loop].

Maule MX7 pilot reported ground looping after touchdown; citing a wind gust and possible rudder overcorrection.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 63; Flight Crew Type 6025

Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

I was Captain on a flight. Once the flight reached cruise altitude I received a call from the [A Flight Attendant] that discussed with me he had a passenger with mask compliance issue and that he had spoken to the passenger several times. He also had the other crew members check on the passenger who was with a teenage child. I asked him to try again; and issue information for noncompliance if needed. Later he called me and said he had attempted to give the information to the passenger who refused it; and also refused to wear the mask. He had asked the teenager to also wear the mask; but the parent had snapped at him and said it was a child and leave them alone. The teenager was acting as if asleep; but not wearing a mask either. I took note of the names; and contacted dispatch. The dispatcher let the Customer Service (CS) know the details and we were told they would meet the flight. As the flight continued; this became more of a distraction as many other passengers were visibly upset about the passenger not wearing a mask; and several stated that it compromised their safety. Several people wanted to be moved as it wasn't a full flight; however the passenger causing the problem was in a premium seat. When we took a bathroom break; passengers approached my First Officer about the issue even though it isn't allowed for passengers to come up front when the cart is out protecting the cockpit. I noted the passenger's name; and personally made a few announcements regarding mask usage in airports and on aircraft along with my normal announcements. When we arrived at ZZZ a CS agent met the passengers. I debriefed this CS agent as I departed who said the passenger also wouldn't take any info from him; and was not cooperative. He stated he would send the names and info to security and that the couple would likely be banned from travel on our airline. I do hope this is followed through on because it was a distraction and I would say to the point of a safety problem as it distracted all of the crew in critical flight duties.

Captain reported passengers refused to obey the face mask policy in flight; which was a safety concern because of the distraction created during critical phases of flight.


Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

During flight 40 minutes before landing [we] smelled odor in cabin like stinky socks. Captain called back and asked if we smelled anything and we all concurred that we did. I personally got a slight headache and had a weird metal taste in my mouth and felt lightheaded. I did not go on oxygen as we were in our descent and I was the B position and didn't feel safe to have an oxygen bottle out upon landing while I was on the jumpseat. That evening still felt dizzy and nauseous. Come to find out this had happened on the same flight the day prior. Not sure why the aircraft was put [back] flying and not inspected.

On descent; at about 25;000 ft; crew (flight attendants and pilots) smelled a strong odor resembling dirty socks/rotten cheese/electrical burning. Flight deck called flight attendant to confirm odor. A and D flight attendants shared a therapeutic oxygen bottle during the final decent. I had a minor headache that evening following the flight.

Flight Attendant crew reported odor of 'dirty sock' in the cabin approximately forty minutes prior to landing. Entire cabin crew experienced health issues.


Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

During our climb out my First Officer was completing the after takeoff checklist. Upon selecting the Electronic Control Unit (ECU) mode switch to norm; the #2 engine lost all indications of torque (digital and analog); the prop dropped to about 1000 rpm; and the Inlet Turbine Temperature (ITT) was indicating in the 500 to 600 degree range. Realizing we had an engine failure; which we believed to be a turbine failure; I called for the shutdown of the #2 engine. We then declared an emergency with atc and ran the appropriate checklists. Once the aircraft was secured I notified dispatch of the event; and after consulting with them about the weather decided to divert to ZZZ to land. I then notified the Flight Attendant of the situation and that we were heading to ZZZ and also made a PA to inform the passengers. We landed without further incident. Engine gauges indicated a failure and the aircraft handling/performance supported that conclusion. The engine failed and the First Officer and I responded per our training in accordance with established emergency procedures. I called for the shutdown of the #2 engine. We then declared an emergency with atc and ran the appropriate checklists.

DHC8 Captain experienced a loss of torque indication; along with low RPM and ITT; when the ECU switch was placed to NORM after takeoff. The engine was shut down and the flight diverted to a suitable airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

During the final climb phase of Aircraft X (ZZZ-ZZZ1); the aircraft experienced a high-altitude decompression event; the result of a L BLEED DUCT Master Warning and subsequent automatic left and right bleed valve closures. The crew requested priority with ZZZ2 [Center]; initiated a descent and diverted to ZZZ3 for a precautionary landing. The process and procedure of preparing and securing the aircraft for the abnormality; as directed by the appropriate priority and QRH Checklists; was complicated and slowed somewhat by a temporary vision impairment of the Pilot Monitoring (myself) due to an unknown dust or contaminate in the smoke goggle portion of the mask during donning. While climbing through FL316 to a filed cruise altitude of FL360; we were alerted to a potential bleed duct leak by a triple chime; aural 'Bleed Air Duct' and red EICAS message of 'L Bleed Duct'.I would STRONGLY suggest that maintenance inspect; clean and blow out the crew o2 masks / smoke goggles on a regular basis. These masks are checked for air pressure and operation by the flight crew every morning; but the condition and cleanliness of the actual mask is widely unknown until it is needed. The white powdery dust that blew all over my face and lap during the initial use of this very important safety gear could have been a lot worse than it was; possibly creating a crew incapacitation during critical emergency operations.

Captain reported a high altitude cabin depressurization event causing an immediate descent and subsequent request for expedited handling and diversion.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

At 5;000 feet MSL; 20 miles from the airport at 250 knots; a Flight Attendant notified me of an ill passenger who had been in the lavatory for 40 minutes. She believed the passenger needed emergency medical attention. I returned to the frequency and advised the First Officer of the situation and that I was going to ask ATC to arrange for EMS to meet the flight. ATC acknowledged our request and gave us a vector for RUNTS and cleared us direct to the fix. As the First Officer was programming the FMC for the new clearance; I said; 'We're going to be high; I'll slow you down;' as I selected the Speed bug to the MASI UP bug. The First Officer acknowledged what I had done and I verified RUNTS on the LEGS page. The First Officer executed the change and selected LNAV. As he was doing so; ATC cleared us to 3;000 feet. The First Officer immediately called for flaps 1 because we could see that we had some excess energy; but the situation remained manageable. Just below 4;000 feet ATC asked if we had the field in sight. I asked the First Officer if he had the airport and he said he did. I called the field in sight to ATC and he cleared us for a visual approach. I felt we still had extra energy but did not say anything because I felt the situation was easily recoverable with speed brakes or landing gear. The First Officer then selected direct HOBEL on the FMC; asked for verification and executed the change. We were then immediately high on the VNAV profile. The First Officer called for flaps 5. Speed was about 200 knots and I thought we needed flaps 10/speedbrakes/landing gear. Again; I didn't say anything because I didn't want to be thought of as a micromanaging Captain. A few miles before HOBEL I finally said; 'Gear?' and the First Officer called for the landing gear. By then we definitely had excess energy. The autopilot overshot the final in the turn over HOBEL and the First Officer disengaged it and flew manually. I focused my attention inside the cockpit on glideslope proximity and airspeed. We were configured at 1;000'= feet but a little fast. I didn't call for a go-around because I was concerned about the ill passenger and we were correcting nicely. At 500 feet we were stable and I looked up to see that we were aligned with Runway 31R (the wrong runway). I called for a go-around. The go-around was poorly flown and I (finally) became much more directive; giving the First Officer headings and altitudes. We were cleared for closed left traffic. The First Officer configured early and got the aircraft slowed to 170 KIAS; but he was aware that he was descending quickly through 1;200 feet AGL much too early. I then took control of the aircraft; leveled off at 1;200 feet AGL and got the aircraft completely configured and on Speed. We completed the Before Landing Checklist and I stabilized the aircraft on the glideslope and localizer. Just above 1;000 feet AGL; I gave the aircraft back to the First Officer. The subsequent final approach and landing was within Company limits. I should have been much clearer much sooner that we were carrying extra energy. Later; I should have been far more directive in getting the aircraft slowed and configured. When the situation first happened; before I said anything to ATC about the ill passenger; I should have said; 'Let's not rush this; take your time and do this right.'

B-737 Captain reported having to execute a go-around after expediting the approach due to an ill passenger.


Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Workload; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Air Traffic Control; Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Transitioning from the RNAV Arrival we were held high by Approach Control and transitioned to the approach higher and faster than normal. The PF had briefed the LOC with the LNAV/VNAV shadowing to a visual approach landing. At the FAF; the PF continued to configure the aircraft and started a descent that was steeper than normal. We were still in the clouds at the FAF; but broke out of the weather quickly and had the field in sight. After stopping the initial descent; and leveling off; the Tower passed a low altitude alert. PM acknowledged the alert and the PF continued inbound in level flight. In an attempt to make everything look right with the LNAV/VNAV approach; the PF focused on the VNAV and became distracted with the automation. Configuration calls slowed down and communication between PF and PM declined. When we got an automated too low flaps call; the PF called for and initiated an uneventful go-around and subsequent uneventful approach and landing.

In the process of attempting to engage the VNAV from a somewhat close in LOC to visual (1100 broken layer); flaps were set at 25 below 1000 AGL. Go-around was subsequently initiated.Less focus on VNAV engagement; reverting to MCP mode (vertical speed) to increase situational awareness in this situation.

B737 flight crew reported an ATC low altitude alert and unstabilized approach that resulted in a go-around.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 1200

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

At the beginning of my rotation I let the company know that my tire was looking bad and needed to be replaced.  As PIC I agreed to continue to fly with a worn tire for a few more legs; it was an educated risk as there was still some tread showing and no cord visible from what I'd seen.We departed ZZZ headed to ZZZ1 for maintenance on a variety of items; on departure the ZZZ Tower reported a loud noise and was concerned it was our tire. There was no indication on taxi or takeoff of a bad tire and Tower didn't observe a flat tire.Landing at ZZZ1; the tire popped on landing and the aircraft had a shake to it on roll out.  Upon parking; we looked at the tire and it had exploded and thrown pieces at the lower wing surface; flap; and engine cowl; causing some damage.In the future; when a tire is looking like it needs to be replaced soon; I'll have it replaced instead of giving it a few more landings.

Medium Transport aircraft Captain reported flying several legs with a known worn tire until it possibly failed during the last takeoff. The flight continued but the tire shredded to pieces during the landing roll causing the aircraft to shake.


ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

On a circling approach to the runway when the gear was selected down; the green nose gear safe indicator light failed to illuminate. We executed a go around and notified ATC who gave us runway heading and an altitude. We ran the gear unsafe checklist then contacted Dispatch and advised we were going to go below divert fuel but had determined our most suitable airport. We then declared an emergency and performed a low approach to verify gear down and locked by Tower; who did confirm the gear was down. ATC then re-circled us for an approach and normal landing.

Runway configuration: ILS Runway XXR circle to land Runway YY; Depart Runway XXR. Runway XXL closed. I was on Local Control working all arrival and departure traffic. Aircraft X had declared an emergency due to a bad gear indication. The Pilot requested a low approach so Tower and emergency personnel could conduct a visual inspection. Rather than clear the aircraft for the approach to Runway YY; the advertised arrival runway; the aircraft was cleared for an approach to Runway XXR; the advertised departure runway; in order to afford the Tower a better view of the landing gear. I cleared the emergency aircraft for a low approach on approximately a 6-8 mile final. A few moments later I cleared a B737 to LUAW on Runway XXR. Although I realized my error as the departure was taking the runway; I was unable to expedite the aircraft off the runway because all the taxiways to the east of Runway XXR were closed; and the taxiways to the right west were blocked by aircraft taxiing to the runway for departure. I was also unable to send Aircraft X around; deeming it more important to keep the aircraft at its present altitude of approximately 350 AGL for the purpose of conducting the landing gear inspection. As a result; the ASDE-X alarmed.I was too heavily focused on the arrivals; having aircraft landing on both Runway XXR and Runway YY at the same time and ensuring separation between the two. Better awareness and strip movement was in order.

A turboprop commuter aircraft was unable to get safe gear indications and requested a flyby of the Tower for a visual confirmation of the landing gear status. In attempting to manage the emergency request while maintaining traffic flow and separation the Local Controller cleared a B737 to LUAW on the runway about to be utilized for the flyby inspection. Due to taxiway closures and outbound traffic the Controller was unable to get the jet off the runway prior to the flyby and a facility ASDE-X alarm was triggered as the commuter aircraft passed overhead.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 0.9; Flight Crew Total 210; Flight Crew Type 210

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

With just 0.9 hrs of PIC time YTD; I arrived at my flying club's towered home field; ZZZ; rested and eager to shake off some rust. My first sign of how much rust I had came when I accepted a Ground instruction to RWY XX but taxied to the nearer RWY XY. After completing my runup; Ground advised me to taxi to RWY XX. I thanked Ground for 'that catch' and received a double-click 'you're welcome.' I paused; ensured I was focused and not letting myself feel rushed; and proceeded to RWY XX. I completed four takeoffs and landings; and after reviewing LiveATC recordings I believe that my radio communications were professional and crisp. Ground did request that I confirm one hold-short instruction; and Tower asked that I confirm a 'give way to helicopter' instruction as part of a 'hold short' read back. However; I acknowledged and complied with all instructions promptly; including hold-shorts; midfield reports; extended down winds; go-arounds; no delay etc.; using proper phraseology. A midair near-miss occurred when two Cessna's with 'XXXX' in their call signs began to turn base at the same time -- Aircraft Y from Right Downwind; and I; Aircraft Z; from Left Downwind. I mistook a 'cleared for the option' instruction for Aircraft Y as being intended for me; and radioed my acceptance for a full stop. I believed Tower had cleared me to land. The conflicting traffic had been advised of 'that Cessna on Left Downwind;' from which I further inferred my own landing priority over this newcomer to the pattern. Upon review of the recordings; it is clear to me that Tower attempted to clarify that the landing clearance was for Aircraft Y; and that the call out to my position was purely advisory for Aircraft Y -- and not a reaffirmation of a clearance for Aircraft Z to land. However; someone stepped on the frequency; and I missed the clarification. It was only after Tower instructed me; 'You need to turn right now' that I saw the conflicting traffic approximately 1/2 mile turning right base. Tower then instructed me for the first time that I was #2 for the field. I attribute this near-miss primarily to my own lack of recency; but secondarily to additional factors. I lost situational awareness of other similarly-[call] signed Cessna's entering the pattern from the opposite direction. ATC could have clarified our landing sequence earlier; or verbally emphasized the differences in our call signs. (A minute later; Tower itself briefly confused two call signs; instructing me to turn Right Base when I was already on Short Final from Left Base; Tower quickly corrected itself when I advised of my position.) It was also a very busy pattern in which to shake off rust -- for pilots and ATC alike. Simultaneous radio transmissions obscured instructions that might otherwise have been sufficiently clear. Stress was apparent: After landing; I complied immediately with Tower's instruction to exit without delay -- only to be told urgently to 'stop right now' to avoid a jet on its takeoff roll. (I appreciate Tower's urgency: I had acknowledged the hold-short instruction and was already preparing to stop; but to their eyes I was still in 'no delay' mode as I transitioned from RWY to Taxiway.) Tower similarly expressed frustration with another pilot for requesting 'a turn around a point;' a term that Tower did not recognize; they doubtless would have preferred 'a 360' or 'a circle.' When I was finished with my pattern work; I briefly expressed my appreciation to Tower and received a friendly 'no problem' in response. I think we all did what we could to be as clear as possible (urgently if the situation demanded it); and to correct our mistakes. Although it will be frustrating at times; on balance I think this is a good set of attitudes to have; especially as the entire National Airspace System shakes off varying degrees of rust coming out of the pandemic. The dangers here were addressed; but a slightly more intransigent attitude; or a slightly more congested frequency; might have tipped the balance to a midair collision.

A Single Light Aircraft Pilot; with low flight time because of the pandemic; reported a NMAC turning final after getting confused because of similar call signs. The Tower controller separated the aircraft and a normal landing was accomplished.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Upon taking off out of ZZZ at a couple hundred feet I got a CAS (Crew Alerting System) message alerting me that the RH Crew Door was open and unlocked. When I got a second to check it; it appeared closed securely to me with the handle all the way down and the door tight. Given the fact that until that moment the door was indicating closed and locked and my own observation seemed to confirm that; I believed it to be a sensor issue and elected to continue the flight. I had no further issue until I was less than a minute from landing. At this point the door came open. The door was still tight against the air frame due to the wind forcing it closed but it was clearly unsecured. I landed with no further incident and taxied to the gate.

Tecnam P2012 Traveller pilot reported receiving an alert for flight crew door opened inflight.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 37; Flight Crew Total 1075; Flight Crew Type 1067

Initially I was told to expect the TEB ILS 19 approach and cleared to UNVIL Intersection. I was approaching UNVIL at 2;000 MSL; still a few miles out; when NY Approach asked me if I could see the airport; and when I said I could; I was cleared for the Visual Runway 19 approach. I turned right and headed straight for the numbers. The GPS indicated the magnetic bearing to TEB was 170. Since it appeared I was already on glide slope; I started the descent; keeping the forward speed up at 120 KIAS during the initial approach in order not to be a burden to local traffic; which typically includes many corporate jets. I had descended to about 1;900 MSL when I noticed a plane to my left; at my 10 o'clock; that appeared to be at my height or maybe only a few feet higher; and I estimated that we were about 10 seconds away from impact. It looked like another Cessna 172. I chose to push the nose over to get under the other plane fairly quickly; and I passed about 200 FT underneath it as it went over me left to right. At that moment Teterboro Tower called me to say I had traffic at 9 o'clock; I believe they said a mile; proceeding westbound; to which I responded that I had already seen it and dove and that the traffic was now 200 FT directly over me. Teterboro Tower said the other aircraft was not talking to them. That was that. I did not observe the other aircraft making any maneuver; so I assume it never saw me. I proceeded to land normally.

C172 pilot approaching Runway 19 at TEB reports a NMAC with another C172 west bound at 2;000 FT. The Tower point out came after the west bound C172 had already passed over the reporter.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Approach control cleared us for visual approach to [Runway] 14R.  I turned right; towards ZATAR; the final approach fix; and started descending from 4;000 to the final approach fix altitude; 2;400.  We observed the 2;500-foot tower and passed several miles to the north of it.  The tower is approximately 5 nm east of OMA.The transition from the Pawnee City arrival to a visual approach to 14R places the aircraft in a position where the tower is difficult to locate and is in a location where the pilot will naturally be descending towards.  Our Jepp pages do not highlight this as a potential problem.Our Jepp page that shows how the tower interferes with a right traffic pattern to 14R.  The tower is at a normal traffic pattern altitude where a downwind to base turn would be made.  When arriving on the Pawnee City arrival; and landing 14R; a preferred route around the tower for a visual landing should be shown.   Also; approach control could vector the airplane safely North of the tower before giving the clearance for the approach.

Air carrier Captain reported a potential tower obstacle hazard to visual approach indicating the need to highlight on OMA approach page.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Work Refused

Weather; Procedure; Company Policy; Staffing

On our third leg of the day with no APU; we had ground air attached to the airplane. We started boarding the aircraft even though it was warm hopeful the ground crew would be ready to start the engine as soon as everyone was onboard. After about halfway through boarding we started getting complaints from the passengers and Flight Attendants. We tried calling Operations to stop boarding but they didn't call the gate. I ran up to the gate told them to stop boarding; they continued anyway. I; once again; asked Operations why they never called the gate and we need a Supervisor immediately. No Supervisor was available or not quickly enough. Boarding finished; it was over 90 degrees in the cabin and nothing was being accomplished on the ground. I was worried about the crew and passengers health. I tried calling Dispatch but received very little help other than we will back you up if needed. I finally made the announcement for the passenger to expeditiously leave the airplane in the interest of safety and leave their belongings to make this process faster. Passengers were thanking us that we made the call and we said their safety is paramount. I let Dispatch and Operations know what happened and I called the FODO (Flight Operations Duty Officer). (FODO) was supportive and understanding. I asked if we started an engine at the gate in order to help cool down the cabin; if that would be acceptable. He said it would be ok but gave advice to help mitigate other problems. I called Dispatch to give them my plan; talked with the flight attendants; talked with the ground crew and the gate team. Everyone was in agreement and we waited for fuel to facilitate running the engine for upwards of 40 plus minutes. The fueler only added 400 lbs. when asked for 2000 lbs. The FO (First Officer) walked around again and coordinated on the ground with the ground crew. We finally started the left engine; ran it for 20 minutes and got the cabin to between 74; 78; 76 degrees. The flight attendants were satisfied and we commenced boarding. After everyone was on board with an engine running we received a call from scheduling asking us to extend; we both refused because we weren't feeling well from the heat exhaustion and the long day with a broken airplane that required extra handling. A new crew was found and it only took another 10 minutes. I explained the scenario to the next set of pilots and handed over the aircraft; with the engine running; to the FO (First Officer) at the controls than the CA (Captain). I left aircraft to the new set of pilots with a comfortable cabin.This was an excessively unsafe situation. Despite saying ready safe go; we were being pushed to leave. We had no APU; no ground air even with a new jet bridge. It clearly wasn't work properly and we had very little ground staff available. The passengers were beginning to complain and one person felt faint. When we asked for we were being pushed even more. It started with a broken airplane; long scheduled day and finally broken ground equipment. This was not a good situation and it wouldn't surprise me if complaint with the DOT aren't filed. When the flight attendants says it's too hot to board that must be taken to heart and they shouldn't be pushed.

Captain reported that on third leg of the day with an inoperative APU; it became too hot for safe operations and crew refused extension.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was providing instruction on the north final to Runway 26R. We were doing visual approaches; but had to get the aircraft down and close due to clouds and visibility. The Developmental was working a situation closer to the airport with a few airplanes trying to keep them separated. The CRJ2 came over slightly high and fast; so with the cloud base at about 6;300 MSL; we had to get the aircraft down to get the airport or proceeding aircraft insight. The B717 was inbound to Runway 27L; and had not seen the airport yet and was turning into final at 7;000 FT. Timely action was not taken to put the CRJ2 into a place to do anything with him; so my Developmental was going to try and turn the aircraft toward the airport; but I instructed him to turn him to the left to pass behind the B717. Since I was providing this information; it was not done in a timely manner; and the two aircraft loss separation. Make sure that my Developmental had a plan to work the aircraft into a position and altitude that would work him into the sequence in a safe manner. I should have controlled first; and instructed after as to the reason for my actions.

TRACON Controller providing OJT described a loss of separation event during attempts to vector aircraft below an overcast layer for visual approaches; the reporter acknowledging a failure to intervene in a timely manner.


Robinson Helicopter; Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Total 6497; Flight Crew Type 29

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

While making an initial descent toward T57 as part of solo training operations in pursuit of a Private Helicopter Rating; I received a Traffic alert for a traffic conflict at 10 [o'clock] less than 1 mile same altitude. It was the first warning or indication of traffic in my proximity that I received. By the time I located the conflicting traffic; the traffic was less than 1/2 mile and on a converging course. I did not want to turn away from the conflicting traffic and risk losing sight of the traffic; so I began a climb while watching to ensure that the conflicting traffic did not climb also. It appeared that I would pass over the traffic and was unclear if the conflicting traffic began a descent. Based upon when I lost sight of the conflicting traffic; I estimate that I passed directly overhead of that traffic with a vertical separation of approximately 300'.Once clear of the conflict; I continued my descent for the helipad at T57. I'm not sure if the conflicting traffic had just popped up on the Traffic Alert display immediately prior to giving the aural warning. Usually the Traffic Alert will turn a target yellow and provide additional time to locate the traffic. In this case the warning proved sufficient to avoid a collision; but insufficient to maintain the desired vertical separation.Additional factors were the relatively low-time in category and proximity to the helipad which caused my attention to be focused on finding the helipad and reduced my traffic scan area.

Helicopter pilot reported a NMAC with another helicopter at T57.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I and another Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) were performing a Right-1 (R-1) Windshield Removal and Replacement (R/R).  I was performing the outside work and the other AMT was removing Flight Deck components to facilitate the Maintenance. During the removal; he mentioned that a fastener was not installed in one position supporting the glareshield. We continued the window removal and proceeded to finish the job.  During the reinstallation; another fastener was obtained and installed for the missing part. The aircraft departed and returned to ZZZ when the crew could not retract the landing gears. Maintenance was called and a bolt was caught in the gear handle. If a job is started; and hardware pertinent to the job is missing prior to your work; a thorough search should be conducted nonetheless. Graveshift. Line Routine Overnight.

I was taking apart the glareshield for the Right-1 (R-1) window replacement. As I was pulling out the Mode Control Panel (MCP); I heard something fall behind the instruments. I proceeded with the removal. Later; I found that one of the glareshield mount bolts was not installed. I looked behind the glareshield to see if I could find it; thinking that is what I heard fall. After searching awhile; I found a screw from the ceiling trim behind one of the Display Unit's (DUs).  I figured that is what I heard so I continued with the window change. I told my partner that one of the mount bolts was not installed and I had to go get one from Stores. I came back. We finished the window. The aircraft left the next day when I was off-shift.  It made an air return for the Landing Gear Handle not going up; so the gear would not retract. The mount bolt that was missing was found down in the handle mechanism for the landing gear [lever] and that is what must have fallen from somewhere when I was taking the glareshield apart. I had not dropped the hardware myself and was not missing anything other than that bolt that was not installed when I opened it up for removal. Graveyard Shift. Not on overtime.

Two Line Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (AMTs) report about an air turn back of a company B737-700 aircraft due to the Landing Gear Handle would not move to the 'Up' position after takeoff. A previously missing mount bolt for the forward glareshield was found in the handle mechanism preventing movement of the lever.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

While on cruise at FL450; overhead the severe front that was crossing the Southeast on [date]; passing in between two thunderstorms with tops at FL460; we briefly went through turbulences (moderate to borderline severe) which resulted in a climb to 45;150 ft.; immediately followed by a descent to about 44;550 ft.; at a rate of about 750 fpm. The Captain who was the flying pilot immediately took corrective actions. With sky clearing below us as we were just passing the tops of that front; we immediately asked JAX Center for lower and were assigned FL400. during the communication JAX Center asked if we had experienced turbulences due to the proximity of the thunderstorm because they were showing an altitude variation on their radar. We confirmed that we had experienced turbulences and did a PIREP. Avoid getting close to a thunderstorm overhang especially at such an altitude but there was not much signs that we would be experiencing such turbulences because the 2 storms were further than 20 NM from our path.

EMB-505 First Officer reported an encounter with moderate to severe turbulence that resulted in an altitude deviation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 500

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

As we got close to the gate area we saw a wing walker off the left wing and two ramp personnel standing together just in front of the tug talking. The Captain stopped the aircraft as we awaited guidance to taxi to the gate. The self-guidance system was then turned on by one of the ramp personnel. We then started to taxi to the gate. As we did both ramp personnel were in clear sight watching us taxi and made no effort to get us to stop with hand signals. The lights on the self-park were difficult to make out the colors very well with the sun shining on them. We got to the point where we didn't feel comfortable continuing the taxi and decided to stop the aircraft; call Operations and ask them to have the ramp personnel guide us in by hand. Shortly thereafter one of the ramp personnel turned the automated parking system lights to green; and we taxied in the rest of the way. It was then that we realized that the lights had been red the entire time we were taxiing in; and the ramp personnel watched us taxi in and did nothing to stop us. After we parked I contacted maintenance to ask them if the self-park system was working correctly. The Captain went down to talk to the ramp workers and ask what happened with the self-park. He told the Captain that he was waiting for another wing walker and had it on red. When he asked him why he didn't simply cross his arms to stop the aircraft as he watched us taxi the whole way in; and he replied 'we were shorthanded today' and then walked off.

B777 First Officer reports stopping short of the gate to await Marshall instructions. After a few moments the self-guidance system is activated and the Captain begins moving into the gate as the ground crew observes. The Captain stops when the self-guidance system becomes difficult to see; possibly due to the sun angle. Shortly thereafter one of the ramp personnel turned the automated parking system lights to green and it was determined that the system had been off to that point.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Type 75

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

On a descent into DEN; we were cleared to descend via the CLASH 3 Arrival. I confirmed that the final altitude was 9;000 ft. and selected it in the altitude window. About 10 miles from EVRLY; we experienced wake turbulence for about five seconds; and then experienced it again. I selected Vertical Speed and leveled off the descent to get above the wake turbulence. After we were clear of the wake turbulence; I selected a 2;000 FPM descent to get back on my vertical path. At that time; we were told to switch to Denver Approach. Upon checking in with Denver Approach they changed our runway to 35L. At this point I was concerned about changing the approach in the FMC. I forgot to re-engage the VNAV. Because I forgot to re-engage the VNAV; the aircraft did not slow down to 250 kts for EVRLY. The aircraft also continued a descent below 12;000 feet.; which was the lowest altitude at TWNSN. The aircraft continue to descend until I notice the deviation. By this time I was leveling at 10;000 feet. and was below the 11;000 feet. altitude required for PNBAL. ATC advised me to slow the 210 knots; and gave me a vector for the final approach to Runway 35L. They also gave me a descent to 9;000 feet. The rest of the arrival went as planned.

B737 Captain reported distractions from a wake turbulence encounter on arrival into DEN contributed to altitude and speed deviations.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

During climb out at approximately 1;500 ft. AGL the door warning annunciator actuated. No obvious door abnormalities were observed by the flight crew and the flight continued to ZZZ. During descent into ZZZ the top clam shell hatch on the main cabin door opened. PIC was entering a left downwind to Runway XX when the door opened. Passengers were instructed to remain calm and do not touch the door. PIC [advised ATC] to ensure priority to the runway. Landed without incident.

Pilot reported that a malfunction caused a door to open in flight.