Flight Crew Last 90 Days 26; Flight Crew Total 712; Flight Crew Type 665

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

I filed an IFR flight plan with 1800wxbrief.com for the first leg of my IFR Training 'long cross country' flight; to be completed with my CFII as PIC. I had the aircraft refueled the evening before by the fuel truck on the field. I did a normal aircraft preflight inspection on the morning of the flight including checking the fuel sumps for water. None was observed.  After startup and upon contacting ground we were informed they had no flight plan on file after a long delay. We re-filed via telephone with FSS for immediate departure. I was advised that 'Lockheed Martin was having computer problems.' I contacted ground again. Again; after a long delay; they were unable to find the flight plan.Ground then contacted TRACON and manually created a flight plan for us; asking each of the required details in successive radio transmissions. At the point we were finally cleared; we had been in the run-up area with the engine idling for over 40 minutes. I did a second run-up check; out of prudence after such a long idle. I observed normal indications from the engine on each mag and with carb heat. Once we received the IFR release we departed without incident. At takeoff power the static RPM indication for my Continental O-300 engine was normal; and climb performance was normal.After several vectors and altitude changes; we were given 'direct ZZZ VOR' and 7;000 feet for the cruise portion of our flight. Shortly after reaching cruise and about 45 minutes after departure we experienced a sudden and dramatic RPM drop in the engine; followed by a series of dramatic 'surges' and RPM drops. The engine was smoothly but dramatically changing between 1;900 and 2;300 RPM sporadically. There was no vibration; backfiring; or indication of a cylinder problem - it was as if power was being reduced or fuel was being starved. I immediately applied full rich mixture and full carb heat. This had no noticeable immediate effect on the engine at all. The RPM drops and surges continued. My CFII and I agreed that this was a worrying symptom; more dramatic than is usually seen from in-flight carb ice.Upon abandoning the role of 'IFR Student' I looked outside and observed that we were in VMC conditions with excellent visibility and no ceiling. I immediately visually identified three airports near us. I radioed Approach and requested to cancel the IFR flight plan and continue VFR to make a precautionary landing due to a reduction in engine power. [ATC] confirmed that I wanted to cancel; and then asked the requisite emergency procedure questions. [ATC] advised that the two closest airports were ZZZ1 at 3nm and ZZZ2 at 10nm. I started a turn for ZZZ2; but the engine surging and power loss got worse so I decided to instead opt for ZZZ1 as it was within gliding distance should we lose all remaining engine power.ATC then gave us all the weather info for the area and advised us that they had emergency responders on the way to ZZZ1. We switched to CTAF and advised of our arrival and pattern. I entered the pattern and execute a normal (albeit slightly high and fast) power off approach and landing without incident. After landing we taxied over to the ramp. I did another run-up test to full power and the engine operated normally with no observable loss in power. I then shut the engine and aircraft down and exited to talk with the arriving emergency response team.The ATC operations manager had me telephone him and let him know that we landed safely and without incident. He asked as to the nature of the engine problem as well. I thanked them for their prompt and thorough assistance. My CFII and I then inspected the aircraft. Some of the local pilots on the ramp joined us. We drained fuel from the fuel strainer and observed no anomalies. It was blue and had the usual properties of 100LL Avgas. I drew multiple sumps from each of the wing sump points; all the fuel looked and smelled normal.We then removed the cowling and inspected the engine. Everything looked normal; there were no signs of problems. We inspected each of the carburetor linkages (mixture / throttle) and actuated them through their full range of travel. No problems observed. We repeated the same for the carb heat control; which also operated normally. I 'pulled the prop through' six times to observe the compression stroke on each of the O-300's cylinders. They all felt normal with the expected amount of resistance. I checked the oil; it was within parameters at about 6 qts. I added a quart of oil.We put the cowling back on and did a thorough full power run-up. No problems observed whatsoever. Despite the unusual presentation; I decided the most likely explanation is carb ice due to the fact that (a) the power loss was 'smooth'; (b) it got worse after carb heat was applied; (c) the problem was transient; and (d) it resolved itself with no evidence afterward. We decided to depart VFR and remain in the pattern. No problems arose; so as planned we climbed in the pattern to a safe altitude and proceeded north along a highway; where there are landing strips about every 10 miles. We also contacted Approach and obtained radar service out of prudence. The airplane ran smooth and at normal operating power the entire route. We turned West at ZZZ4 and proceeded direct to ZZZ3 and executed a normal landing on 26R. I parked the aircraft at my usual A&P for further inspection.They inspected the engine on the following [day]; found no anomalies; and returned it to service with the same conclusion - likely induction system icing that manifested itself after takeoff.

C172 pilot on an instrument training flight at 7;000 feet experiences surging power and RPM. Carb ice is suspected but carb heat has no positive effect. A diversion is planned and executed with the engine continuing to run throughout the descent and landing. A thorough visual inspection of the engine and another run up reveals no anomalies. The aircraft is flown back to base for an inspection by an A&P mechanic and no anomalies are noted. Carb ice is the primary suspect.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 200

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Airport; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Aircraft X entered the left traffic pattern. Two [Small Transports] were in the pattern. Aircraft X announced downwind airspeed of 80 Knots. Twice during multiple approaches Aircraft Y initiated right traffic patterns. Aircraft X did announce 'Standard Pattern to Left;' with no response. Once Aircraft Z was on a right base almost at the same time Aircraft X was about to make a left base. AC-90-66B clearly states left hand traffic pattern is standard. This is the second time this conflict has happened. I understand [these aircraft] have a training requirement for right patterns. Training requirements do not trump FARs at non-government airports. A NASA ASR was submitted about a year ago for the same conflict. A nearby airport has two runways that require right traffic patterns. The event noted resulted in head-on situations resulting from non-standard pattern and standard left pattern operations.

Small aircraft pilot at a non towered airport reported two other aircraft were making non standard right traffic patterns and not communicating on the appropriate frequency.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Evacuated

Once cleared for take off; I began to add thrust and line up with centerline on the runway. I applied take off power once aligned with the runway and dropped my heels to the floor while on the rudder pedals; as I do for every takeoff. We began to accelerate down the runway; after the '70 knots cross check' call; and before the V1 call made by the Pilot Not Flying ; the aircraft began to pull to the left of centerline. As I began to apply more and more right rudder; I realized that I was losing directional control of the aircraft. I then began to apply brakes and reduce the power to initiate an aborted take off.At the same time all of this was happening; the Pilot Not Flying was calling V1. I did not rotate because I had already stepped on the brakes and began to pull the power back. Once the Pilot Not Flying called V1 and looked up; she questioned what was happening. I told her that I couldn't maintain directional control. She then took the controls and brought the plane to a stop on the runway. When she took the controls; I heard a loud pop shortly after. As we rolled to a stop; Tower called us and advised us that our aircraft was on fire and to evacuate immediately if able. The Pilot Not Flying and I then began the evacuation checklist; and I jumped out of my seat to open the passenger door. I opened the door and the Pilot Not Flying and I exited the aircraft.I learned that I must be quicker and more deliberate when it comes to a rejected take-off. The fact that my abort was a little slow and unclear caused some confusion in between the Pilot Flying and Pilot Not Flying.

Cessna 525 Captain reported rejecting the takeoff after experiencing directional control difficulties on the takeoff roll. Crew evacuated the aircraft after the Tower advised aircraft was on fire.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 13.0

Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Weather; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Aircraft X checked onto my frequency requesting a right deviation for weather that was impacting my sector further north. I went ahead and approved the right deviation. Approximately 3 to 4 minutes prior to Aircraft X checking on frequency I had Aircraft Y check on as well flying a similar route that of Aircraft X; that had also requested right deviations for weather. Both aircraft at the time were at interim altitudes. My plan was to climb Aircraft Y to 35000 feet and to hand that aircraft off to the next sector. Instead; I inadvertently climbed Aircraft X to 35000 feet updating the data block for Aircraft Y to FL350. Within 15 to 20 seconds of issuing the climb Aircraft X reported an RA with Aircraft Z southbound descending to 34000 feet. It caught me completely off guard for I still showed the interim of FL330 in the data block of Aircraft X. Aircraft X proceeded to level off below the other Aircraft Z. When Aircraft X was clear of that aircraft I descended Aircraft X back down to 33000 feet.I have played this event over and over again in my head as to what and why this situation occurred. I knew all about the traffic; as well as the weather conditions during that session. It was just like any other day here at the Center during the summer period. You must be extremely vigilant when you have periods like this. As I look back; and as focused/aware of the situation I felt that I was in; I got into a hurry to climb Aircraft Y to his requested altitude of 35000 feet; as well as handing the aircraft off to the next sector. This lead to the transposing of the call signs of Aircraft Y and Aircraft X. This simply comes down to being a bit more patient therefore maintaining a better focus of the situation at hand.

ZJX Center Controller inadvertently climbed the wrong aircraft into conflict with a descending traffic.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

Confusion; Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

The DOD was doing radar testing reference windmill interference. They scheduled this testing during the sectors busiest time of the year. During this time of year we have AFPs in place to control the level of traffic in and out of the sector; we also will decline equipment outages for the volume. As an FLM; I was told about the testing a week in advance and told the Airspace and Procedures office this was the worst possible time; my OM also told them this. The response we got was there was a lot of planning and coordination done prior to the event and we weren't allowed to say no. To summarize; the test involved several VFR aircraft around the BKX airport one above 10000 [feet] without transponders or Mode C. They were also planning an aircraft without transponder and Mode C to fly in the flight levels. The day that I worked R33; I was an FLM as well. The NOM (National Operations Manager) requested radar search for the test. I denied it based on traffic. I was told by my OMIC (Operations Manager In Charge) that I couldn't as it was owned by the DOD and it was their equipment and don't worry about it the search out is transparent. Later; I worked the sector and the DOD did something with the radar that created false targets; target jumps and a loss of radar. It happened probably 5 or 6 times within 20 minutes with a return to normal after approximately 30 seconds to 2 minutes. I was busy at the low altitude sector and so was our high altitude sector. I am not aware of any other days during this test that this happened.If we as a facility find a need to incorporate an AFP for a large traffic volume event; we should be able to decline equipment outages and experiments. I have attached a briefing sheet from a different day then the one I am referring just to assist with information.

ZMP FLM reports of a shift where the DOD was testing a radar system reference windmill interference. The radar system created false targets; target jumping; and a loss of radar.


Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The NOTAMs in some cities have become so erroneous that I am concerned they are being neglected as a whole by many crewmembers. It is rare that I will fly with a pilot who reads the NOTAMs for our flight. When I read them; I frequently hear the comment; 'You actually read that stuff.'  When reading the NOTAMs; I can understand why they are being neglected by so many of my fellow crewmembers as a large number of them are outdated or unnecessary at many of the airports we fly to. IAH is an excellent example.I had a [single leg] flight from IAH two weeks ago with over 80 pages of NOTAMs. The IAH NOTAMs still include NOTAMs for arrival procedures that no longer exist; such as the TXMEX arrival. That TXMEX NOTAM was in our paperwork for years; to cross TXMEX at 12;000 FT; instead of the altitude on the chart. This chart could have simply been revised to reflect the proper altitude and the NOTAM eliminated. There are numerous similar NOTAMs for current procedures that should result in chart changes; so as to eliminate the NOTAM and reflect the proper procedure on the chart. Instead; these NOTAMs have effective dates on them through 2015; such as the arrivals into IAH instructing you to descend at 280 KTS in the transition. Why would this remain a NOTAM through 2015; instead of being revised on the chart?There are also duplicate NOTAMs; such as FDC 04/6220 and FDC 04/5737; both instructing the same changes in altitudes to the same procedure.The examples above merely scratch the surface. In total; I found 64 NOTAMs in IAH alone that either contain duplicate information; information that has already been corrected on the chart; information that simply should be revised on the chart so the NOTAM can be eliminated; or information for procedures that no longer exist. Eliminating these would get rid of roughly half of the pages of NOTAMs for IAH.

A B737 First Officer addressed the excessive proliferation and validity of NOTAMs; citing; among others: redundancy; outdated; excessive numbers and long term dependence on NOTAM changes to procedures instead of revising charts in a timely fashion.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 5600

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 700

Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On the KARLB2 arrival into ONT; we received a clearance to cross COAZT at 16;000 feet. Read back clearance. Was queried by Controller if we would make the restriction. We had just started our descent to make the restriction in PROF. Shortly thereafter; we received a heading 90 degrees left of course; then another heading 90 left. We asked the Controller as to the nature of the headings; and Controller replied 'for traffic.' Then informed us that the restriction was for GOATZ; not COAZT. These points are very close together on the STAR; and sound very similar.

I was up securing the aircraft; using the restroom and making sure the jumpseater (mechanic) put away the bunk. As I returned to the cockpit I heard the FO answering a radio call. He answered cleared to cross COAZT (KARLB2 arrival) at 16;000. FO reiterated to me we're cleared to cross COAZT at 16;000. Just as we started our descent the Controller (next Controller; not the issuing Controller); asked if we were going to make our restriction. I assured him [we] would. As we approached GOATZ the Controller gave us a vector to help us lose altitude. I inquired about this as we were on a normal vertical profile to make our restriction. The Controller responded we were to cross GOATZ (not COAZT) at 16;000. At that point we realized the mistake made with the previous Controller.  In my opinion; the names of these 2 fixes are way too similar to be on the same arrival. The name of the 2 fixes sound identical. After a long flight; this mistake I feel is too easy to make especially when there is only one person monitoring the radio for physiological (restroom) or any other reason.

Air carrier flight crew reported confusion while on KARLB2 STAR due the similar sounding fixes; GOATZ and COAZT.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

We climbed to our final altitude of FL250 and leveled off. Sometime after level off we noted a faint smell of smoke in the cockpit. We were then called by the Flight Attendant who informed us there was smoke in the cabin. We executed our emergency procedures which included donning our oxygen masks and decided to divert to [a nearby alternate]. I [advised] ATC and informed them of our intentions. Further contact with the Flight Attendant informed us that he couldn't locate the source of the smoke and that it was subsiding. We kept our O2 masks on and executed a normal landing and taxied to the gate where ramp personnel promptly parked us and we deplaned without incident. After deplaning I entered the discrepancy in the AML (Aircraft Maintenance Log). We the secured the aircraft.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

EMB-145 flight crew reported diverting to a nearby alternate after smelling smoke in the cockpit and cabin.


Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather; Procedure

We were cleared for takeoff right after a 757 was rotating off of 26L. The winds were 310/17G30KT and there were windshear advisories in effect. We elected to perform a full rate takeoff. After being cleared for takeoff we intentionally delayed our takeoff roll for a few seconds because of our close proximity to the preceding 757. Right after takeoff as we were bringing the landing gear up; we received a windshear warning message. We promptly executed the windshear escape procedure by checking max power; checking the spoilers were in; and following the windshear (WS)/go-around (GA) flight director commands. We experienced a slight decrease in airspeed and there was minimal roll caused by the windshear (or most likely wake turbulence). The windshear warning extinguished after several seconds and we quickly executed a right turn to intercept the RNAV course on the SID. We managed to turn the aircraft on to the SID before any lateral deviations occurred; even though the flight director stayed in WS/GA mode. Once we re-selected the appropriate flight director commands the autopilot was engaged; and we commenced the flap retraction sequence. We reported the event to ATC.No aircraft or engine limitations were exceeded; so we continued the flight without any further incident.Threat of gusty winds; and the lack of separation between a 757 and our aircraft on takeoff.

CRJ-200 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence on takeoff from ATL in trail of a B757.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

We diverted to PUB due to weather in DEN. We prepared for an approach to the active Runway 26L. Approach changed the active runway to 8R approximately five miles from the field. We reviewed the numbers in the performance computer for the new runway and landed without event. After arrival while preparing for departure; we noticed Runway 8R was labeled as 8L in the performance computer. Departure was conducted on Runway 35; which is properly labeled. Correct the PUB performance data. Crews should double check for the correct runway in the performance computer.

The reporter stated that PUB was an off-line weather diversion with fuel considerations because of previous holding at the destination airport. The crew was concerned about the legality of the diversion because of the airport data error but made Dispatch aware of the errors.

An air carrier flight crew diverted to PUB and discovered after landing that the on board computer database incorrectly labeled Runway 8R data as 8L.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 228; Flight Crew Total 3680; Flight Crew Type 1613

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

During climb out in night IMC through 10;000 ft. at 250 kts; ATC gave direct to RAYNR and mentioned precipitation ahead. While scaling out to about 40 miles and working radar and evaluating course change; got 'Traffic' followed instantly by 'maintain vertical speed' PFD had red pitch avoid areas. Within about 3 seconds command switched to descend with TCAS RA red boxes on PFD commanding a descent.  This command led me to believe TCAS was communicating and coordinating with another airplane. Seeing red I looked outside while also ranging down the scale I was on as I  had red target on our airplane apex. During climb/descent I use relative altitude setting and I was seeing 00 to +01.  Pilot Flying descended per RA which was a rapid descent below 10;000 ft. The RA would clear momentarily without 'clear of conflict' and came back on again with descend type command after a few seconds advised ATC that we had descended per an RA and asked about traffic. Said none. Stabilized at 7;000 ft. and advised and requested climb again. This was followed by the 3rd RA . With ATC saying no traffic I switched to TA only as it was seeming this was a false traffic target. Training leads you to follow your training and work with the TCAS system. In the back of my mind I did consider a random VFR aircraft could have been trying to get around weather near us; so I was trusting the TCAS system. Later during climb out switched to RT transponder and after level off checked maintenance history with Maintenance Control phone patch. I noticed during preflight RT transponder was active. I switched it to left per SOP as both were available.

B777 Captain reported a TCAS problem that resulted in numerous erroneous alerts.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS LOD/DME 15

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Weather; Airport; Human Factors; Procedure

We were dispatched ASE.  This aircraft had MEL 35-13; which resulted in being dispatched to Aspen with a FL250 restriction.  In my opinion; a FL250 restriction is problematic as rain showers develop over this area of the Rocky Mountains every summer day at the time of our arrival and a FL250 restriction greatly limits our ability to circumvent storms due to the high terrain of the Rocky Mountains.  Nonetheless; the route west of the Rockies was clear and we were legal.  In addition; the PKN localizer was inoperable and was not projected to be fixed until 30 minutes after our original scheduled arrival time.  We complied with a request from Dispatch to delay our departure in order to match the time of our arrival to the time of the expected completion of the repair.  Upon arrival at the Rocky Mountain range; storms had expectedly sprung up and due to our altitude restriction; we had to navigate our way around the storms; rather than top them and garner a 'bird's eye' view. As we passed by Aspen (west to east) while being vectored to the approach; we saw on radar what appeared to be a strong storm cell sitting just west of the ASE localizer at CEYAG and another cell sitting atop the missed approach course; just west of the field.  We elected to begin the LOC DME 15 approach so that we could get on a southwesterly heading and get a better view of the course and the position of the storms before making a final decision regarding whether to continue or hold.  Unfortunately; Aspen Approach Control has no ability to depict weather radar; so they provide virtually no additional weather- related information.  ATC's vector and decent clearance to WOKUV was way to close and too high; as is often the case.   Nonetheless; because the goal was not to complete an approach at this point; but instead to get a good radar picture of the approach corridor; we initiated the DME ARC.  Once we got to a southwesterly heading on the DME ARC; we could see clearly the heavy rain in the valley in which the localizer course resides.  In addition; we were still painting a significant cell just west of CEYAG and another significant cell right atop the missed approach course at the exact and most critical point where we would be struggling to gain altitude should a missed approach be necessary.  Lastly; we asked Aspen Approach Control which direction the cell was heading and were told; 'West.'  This was confusing to us as the prevailing winds were from west to east.  A few seconds later; Aspen Approach Control advised us that the cells were moving east; meaning they were moving over the airport.  Lastly; the downdrafts now triggered a LLWS alert.  We had already made our decision to break off the approach but this information certainly confirmed to us that our decision was appropriate.  Since we were still outside of the FAF; we advised ATC that we wanted to break off the approach and find a suitable place to hold until the storms had moved east of the approach course and the field.  Given all the available information; neither the First Officer nor I were not comfortable continuing with the approach at that time.  ATC then gave us a heading to the Red Table VOR and a climb to 17;000 feet.  We complied with ATC's instructions but unfortunately; Red Table VOR was in the middle of another storm cell.  As we were advising ATC of the location of that cell and that we would instead need a westerly heading; we received a traffic alert from TCAS.  Soon after; we received a revised clearance to stop our climb at 15;000 feet (we were already at 15;300 and climbing at 2;000 FPM).  We were then given a heading toward the west and almost immediately after; another heading to the east.  These changing clearances came in rapid succession.  Due to the closing proximity of traffic to our right side; I cranked the aircraft to the left to create separation.  I was surprised that we did not receive an RA.  Nonetheless; as I turned the aircraft to the left; I received abank angle warning and responded by lessening the angle of bank.  After clear of traffic; ATC reissued the clearance to hold at Red Table; which I declined.  I informed ATC  that I wanted a heading of West (270 degrees) to get away from the storm cells and that I would get back  to them with an appropriate fix at which we could hold.  We were then assigned a heading of 270 degrees which gave us time to determine a save location to hold.  Keep in mind that Aspen Approach Control was completely unable to determine a safe location to hold as they had no depiction as to the location of the thunderstorm cells.  Ultimately; we informed ATC that we wanted to hold North of AJAXX; away from the weather.  This hold would also provide us with a good visual and radar picture of the arrival corridor every few minutes when we were on the inbound course which was a southerly heading.  We were issued that clearance and held for two to and one-half turns at 17;000 feet over the AJAXX fix.  After the storms cleared the area; we proceeded to fly the LOC DME 15 without further incident. My thoughts on this situation are as follows.  First; in my opinion; it is not in the best interest of safety to dispatch an aircraft with a maximum altitude of 25;000 to Aspen during this time of year.  Every single day of the summer has afternoon thunderstorms and with the 14;000 foot terrain; only altitude can effectively provide storm separation and provide the 'bird's eye' view necessary for the pilots to select a safe flight path and make informed decisions.  I am surprised at how many times I have been dispatched to Aspen with an aircraft what was inappropriate or not legal for the flight.  For one example of many; on one occasion; I was dispatched to Aspen with an aircraft with one MEL'd FMS/GPS.  I telephoned the Equipment Coordinator the night before to alert him to the fact that we could not legally depart to Aspen with that MEL.  He acknowledged that fact and changed the aircraft.  The next morning; I woke up to conduct that flight and found that we had been changed back to the broken aircraft.  It is hard for me to understand how a company of this age and size does not have better safety checks in place so that these types of mistakes do not happen as often as they do.  Second; also in my opinion; the lack of weather depiction in Aspen Approach Control leads to unsafe clearances.  I am surprised that with today's access to technology; Aspen Approach is not equipped with simple weather radar depiction.  There are pop-up thunderstorms over or near Aspen every day in August and due to this year's weather pattern; virtually every day of the summer.  When you combine the lack of available weather radar to ground-based air traffic controllers with an aircraft with a 25;000 foot altitude restriction; the safety margin is further compromised.  Third; this is not meant as a slight to anyone; but I am told that Aspen is a junior assignment for ATC controllers.  As a result; I have been the unlucky recipient of poor clearances at least one dozen times in  the seven months I have flown to Aspen (e.g.; Clearances to descend to cross WOKUV at 14;000 feet and 190 knots from an altitude where that is clearly impossible; headings that are way too close from which to make an intercept; etc.)  It sometimes feels like we are declining so many poor clearances that we might as well be controlling ourselves.  Today was one such instance where what sounded like a Senior Controller stepped in to fix the errant headings we were being issued that were steering us directly into the path of traffic.I have some suggestions. First; I suggest that we revisit whatever system we use to dispatch aircraft to particular cities and see if we can enhance this system to make it more reliable.  Secondly; I realize that ATC is not under the control of our airline but it seems to me that as a primary user of the Aspen Airport and associated Approach Control that we should be ableto forward these concerns and have them addressed; in the interest of safety.

An air carrier dispatched to ASE during an active thunderstorm period broke off the approach while still VMC and while climbing to 17;000 feet to hold took evasive action from a TCAS RA. Aspen is not equipped to assist pilots during summer weather.


Workload; Training / Qualification; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Company Policy; Aircraft

Upon arrival my First Officer found a hydraulic leak on the aircraft we were flying. After making a write up we were informed that no maintenance would be available for several hours and we would be waiting for a terminating aircraft to complete our day. The previous day was an early report with 6 legs and this day was another 6 leg day not scheduled to finish until near midnight so any normal sleep pattern may as well have been thrown into a spinning prop. The aircraft finally arrived and we took over from the inbound crew. When trying to enter the flight number in the TAMDAR then we were unable to because the unit was 'frozen' and would not receive any inputs. We powered down and powered up and it did not self correct so I notified Dispatch. First my Dispatcher did not want to take a write up on the TAMDAR because it was sending accurate OOII times. I tried explaining that the time reporting function was literally of no concern but that the SATCOM portion of the unit was unusable and my primary means of contacting the company airborne was no longer available. My First Officer listened in to my conversation in disbelief the reluctance to accept a write up for the TAMDAR. I was finally switched to Maintenance to finally make the write up. I described what was wrong and we agreed upon the wording to be put in the logbook. I entered the discrepancies and must have written the wrong word or made a grammatical error because I scratched it out and entered the correct word so that the same wording in the logbook would appear in Maintenance Controls computer. MEL's were issued and we left to complete our day after midnight; legal doesn't equal safe. A couple days later I was called by my Supervisor and told to I made a mistake when making the write up and that if I have to scratch something out of the write up I only make a single line so that they can see what I mistakenly wrote. I've looked in the manuals and so far have been unable to find where I'm only to make a single line through a word so that you could see my spelling error or where I mistakenly wrote the same word twice in a row. Guess grammatical perfection is to now accompany FAA mandated mathematical perfection.This company has an unhealthy love affair with the TAMDAR units. I just flew the aircraft in question again and apparently it was self cleared before it got into a Maintenance Base. It was very obvious that my Supervisor absolutely did not believe the unit was malfunctioning and felt he had to make a phone call to somehow intimidate me. Sadly this is the culture at this company; it's not the first time I feel like I've been pressured to not write something up or to just keep flying. Apparently over 10;000 hours in the this aircraft type means I don't know jack about the airplane I'm flying and I can't tell when something is broken. Why didn't my Dispatcher want to take the write up? Why did my Supervisor have to call me about this issue? Once again; my issue with the TAMDAR unit was I couldn't use the SATCOM portion; a legitimate safety concern. Somewhere that was lost and I don't envy anyone in the Safety Department at this airline working with the personality types we have running this company.

Against his Dispatcher's wishes; a fatigued Captain entered a TAMDAR malfunction in the maintenance log because SATCOM and ACARS were disabled and the Captain's Supervisor criticized his maintenance entry error correction method. The Captain felt pilot pushing pressure.


Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 77.4; Flight Crew Total 29000; Flight Crew Type 600

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 1200

This flight was to HYI (San Marcos; TX); IFR and occurred at approximately 30 minutes into this 45 minute flight to HYI. The time of this is approximate. We were level at FL180 deviating around storm cells in IMC. We encountered moderate to severe turbulence for about 15 seconds and lost all navigation and radios. Our only communication with Center was the transponder that was still working. Unable to get the navigation or radios back in operation we squawked 7600. We broke out into clear weather and decided to descend in VMC down to 3000 feet and look for a suitable airport. We landed at [an airport] and called Center by phone.After shutting down the engines and then turning the Battery Switch back on to trouble shoot this problem all navigation and radios came back on and operated normal.We did a preflight and departed VFR; called Center for VFR flight following to San Marcos (HYI).

On IFR flight plan to HYI (San Marcos; TX) first officer flying; we passed between two buildups. There was a smaller one between the buildups. I thought we would pass over it but we just clipped the top and hit two severe bumps about four seconds apart. Only two and then smooth ride. We then noticed both Garmins (530 & 430) were totally blank. Now we had no navigation and no communication. We recycled avionics and inverters to no avail. We discussed problem and squawked 7600 (lost communications). We were on border between FTW and HOU Center. Don't recall which we were talking to at the time of lost navigation/communication event. I realized we could not navigate accurately and decided we should get on ground before became a hazard to other traffic. I commanded the copilot who was flying to descend to 3;500 MSL so we could find a landing place as soon as possible. We were VMC after the turbulence. After about 10 or 15 minutes we spotted a paved; single runway airport and landed there.After parking and shutdown a man from the small FBO approached us with a phone [number] and name to call. I called; and I explained the situation and he seemed satisfied. Short conversation. We got back in; started up; powered up avionics and all started and worked well. We flew VFR with flight following to HYI. No problems.Next day I mentioned the situation to an avionics shop and learned there is a 5G switch in the Garmins. That was what shut us down. He said we could have totally powered down (batt and gens) and recycled to get Garmins working again. We could have done that in air. Learned something. Also; I will not ever try to hop over a buildup even if a small one. They are rough. They come up faster than you think. Even in smooth air.

Citation flight crew experiences moderate to severe turbulence at FL180 for 15 seconds that apparently causes both Garmins to shut down. This eliminates both Navigation and Communication and will not reset. The crew elects to remain VFR; squawk 7600; and divert to a suitable airport. When the aircraft is powered back up for trouble-shooting the Garmins work normally.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 55; Flight Crew Total 7212; Flight Crew Type 2133

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Upon landing and applying brakes it seemed like nothing was happening; which is; initially; NOT unusual in a Phenom 100. The runway was wet at the time of the landing and from experience I knew that it would take longer than on a dry surface or to feel the brakes actually working. After an appreciable amount of time waiting for the electric braking cycle to work; I concluded they were not working and began slowly operating the emergency brake system. It became clear to me shortly after initiating; that I did not have enough runway left so at this point I focused on choosing the best departure path from the runway to avoid the runway end lights and the lights beyond. I did not lose directional control of the aircraft at any time and it came to a stop in the grass beyond the paved surface--estimated by an emergency responder to be 500 feet. I checked with the 2 passengers and made sure there were no injuries. There were none and they were buckled in. The field was uncontrolled at the time and I had been vectored to the approach by Approach Control. I then cancelled my flight plan on the radio with them and apprised them of the situation. The overrun was certainly unintentional and I hate the circumstance of it as one could only imagine. Clearly in my mind I had no brakes and in the immediate aftermath was certain that there was a problem with the brakes that was outside of the usual quirkiness that has been part of the history of this braking system. It was a scary few seconds; that I can tell you. However; investigators reviewing my statement after the event seem certain that I actually lost anti-skid during the landing which left me with 'manual braking' and that this was to be expected and pre-planned; and thus not result in an over-run based on the correct performance numbers and perfect pilot performance. It is obvious that I failed in that and I apologize for all of the inconvenience this event has caused. In conclusion; I am not in any way trying to throw the blame somewhere else; if in the fact the data indicates all of these circumstances were pilot error. The one thing that seems glaring to me in this situation if it is: If I am to get on the brakes and wait for something to happen on a wet runway--1) how long do I wait before going to plan b? 2) assuming anti-skid CAS happens at the instant it becomes unavailable: Was it working at all during the time it was trying and is that penalty built in to the runway distance required? 3) are we certain that if an element of the normal brake system fails; the CAS message is instantaneous? I say that because some switches I flip do not instantaneously display. And I conclude with--that is a lot of things happening cruising down a runway with no brakes--trying; trying; trying. From a human performance consideration as requested by this form: There were no factors affecting my performance that I am aware of. I did voluntarily find a drug testing facility within a couple of hours of the event just to document that claim if it ever came up.

The reporter stated that the incident is still under investigation. The reporter stated that after the incident the surface of the runway failed an inspection; presently the runway is being resurfaced. The reporter stated that the data from the FDR indicated that it was as if the aircraft was sliding on black ice. The reporter stated that the data also indicated that a RH transducer failed one second prior of pulling the emergency brake handle; which may have caused the anti-skid to fail; which caused the tires to blow out. The reporter also stated the brake control units on these aircraft have a history of malfunctioning. The BCU was removed and is being looked at.

An EMB500 Pilot reported that upon landing and applying the brakes it seemed like nothing happened.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Relieved previous controller; and sat down to immediately begin making multiple transmissions.  Aircraft X had been turned on a downwind heading for the sequence behind another commercial air carrier prior to the previous controller being relieved. Upon sitting down; frequency congestion became an issue. The lead aircraft in the sequence had been cleared for the visual approach; and as I looked to point out the traffic for Aircraft X to follow; I noticed they were already in an obstruction MVA (2;800 ft) at 2;500 ft. Aircraft X's course was about 3 miles Northwest of the antenna. At no time was the jet pointed at the antenna; but did lose lateral separation from the antenna. Upon realizing that the Aircraft X was within the required lateral spacing for an obstruction; the aircraft saw the interval traffic; was told to follow the traffic; turned away from the obstruction; and was cleared for the visual approach.Controller preference in that area of the base turn is usually taught to descend aircraft to 3;000 ft; or 2;800 ft at the lowest due to that obstruction. Better controller judgment of using 2;800 ft; or 3;000 ft; especially during a controller relief while combined with more than one position.

GSP TRACON Controller reported an aircraft flew below an MVA.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

First flight for a Student Pilot. There was 1.5 hours of ground instruction prior to the flight which included ATC instructions and compliance as well as positive exchange of flight controls. The training flight was fully briefed from takeoff to landing. All radio communications were handled by the instructor; and compliance was maintained at all times.Upon return to [the airport]; we were given instructions by the tower controller for a final approach to [the runway]. We were cleared to land and the runway was clear of all traffic. At touchdown; the student attempted to manipulate the controls of the aircraft and I brought the landing back under positive control. Despite our pre-landing/approach brief prior to flight on positive exchange of flight controls; the student would not relinquish control of the aircraft to the instructor after touchdown. As a result; the aircraft began to skid left of centerline and came to a complete stop left-of-center of the [Runway and on a] Taxiway intersection. Once the aircraft was safely under the control and completely stopped; I (the instructor) made an immediate 90-degree right turn to exit the adjacent taxiway to the right of the aircraft. Unbeknownst to us; the tower controller cleared another aircraft to land behind us (Aircraft Y) and because of our aircraft coming to a complete stop; they decided to execute a go around. The controller; during this event; continued to shout on the radio that we were not permitted to stop on the runway and then erroneously insisted that we had turned the aircraft 180 degrees and began to back taxi to exit at [the taxiway]. This was erroneous because we were abeam the exit and did not require a back-taxi. Due to the nature of the training environment; we were attempting to maintain safe operation for our aircraft. The tower controller never informed us of minimum spacing on traffic to follow our aircraft; nor were we given a long-landing clearance as he intended; nor did the controller request we make any particular exit from the runway. There was added confusion because the controller insisted on reciting over the radio that a pilot deviation had been made while reading off the tower phone number over the tower frequency. This added further confusion to the situation; and communication broke down. Once the aircraft was clear of the active runway; we contacted ground to receive clearance to the non-movement area for parking.To prevent this event from happening again; a clear correlation of what the positive exchange of flight controls during a critical phase of flight entails. Meaning; that the student will physically remove their hands and feet from all primary and secondary flight controls when instructed to do so by the instructor pilot. Additionally; the tower could have advised us of a need to expedite clearing the runway when the landing clearance was issued.

A C172 Flight Instructor reported a loss of control of the aircraft when transferring the controls from the student to the instructor during landing.


Embraer Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Captain (CA) entered flight plan in FMS after receiving clearance. First Officer (FO) verified flight plan in FMS while CA was dealing with a passenger that was unhappy about having to check their luggage. The waypoint 'heaven' was in the flight plan and there are two waypoints with that name and different spelling HEVAN and HEVEN. Our flight plan included HEVAN; but it was entered as HEVEN and neither CA nor FO noticed the error. Because we were leaving GSO; the 'Heaven' waypoints were relatively the same distance; and we had excess fuel because of weather in ZZZ. Therefore the strange fuel balance and other things that would normally make the error obvious were not present in this flight plan. We were by PSK at approximately FL180 when we were given the shortcut 'Direct Heaven' by Atlanta Center. We used the FMS to turn direct HEVEN; which was approximately a 030 degree heading; and a right turn from where we were located at the time. After about three minutes; the CA noticed that the flight plan seemed weird; because it was not really a shortcut (because the waypoint was wrong). Not ten seconds later Atlanta Center contacted us and said 'Are you going direct Heaven? If so your heading should be approximately 310.' At that time we switched into heading mode and turned to a heading of 310. The CA realized immediately that the error was the spelling of 'Heaven' in the FMS and corrected it. The CA entered HEVAN and we then went direct to HEVAN and engaged LNAV again. As FO; I need to pay closer attention to the spelling of the waypoints. Truthfully; until this happened it had not occurred to me that there would be two so close in spelling and distance that it would create this confusion. Had we been at a different airport; it may have been obvious through distance or fuel information; but today it didn't stand out. In fact; in our debrief we discussed that even if the CA had called the waypoints while the FO verified them (as is normally done) the spelling error would most likely still have been missed. In fact; it seems to me that when I verified the plan myself I should have been more likely to notice such an error because I was looking at the spelling on the paperwork. We both agree that if we each had paid closer attention this could have been prevented. I will definitely learn from this and watch waypoint spelling more closely in the future.

Embraer Regional Jet First Officer reported confusion with similar spelled fixes HEVEN and HAVEN resulted in a heading deviation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 149; Flight Crew Type 47

After a local flight southwest of Oshkosh; I called Oshkosh Tower and reported 'Fisk;' (VFR reporting point about 6.5 NM southwest of the field) inbound for pattern work. The pattern for [Runway] 9/27 was very busy so I requested [Runway] 18/36 for touch & goes - common practice in Oshkosh as the runways don't intersect and are in the shape of a capitol 'T.' Tower acknowledged and asked me to make right traffic for 18; remaining south of 9/27; and report 2 NM southwest. I acknowledged and proceeded to set up for a right base for 18. During this time I had a high workload watching for traffic on the busy 9/27 to my left (north) and keeping lateral separation from aircraft on final for 9 as I aligned on base for 18; while at the same time managing my own approach. About 3 NM away from the field on right base for 18; a King Air crossed in front of me at approximately my altitude; apparently on a right base for 9. I cannot accurately recall the lateral distance; but it was close enough for me to feel very uncomfortable. I would estimate 100-300 yards. There was no mention of the encounter or our positions by either of us (the planes involved) or the Controller.I can see two ways in which I may have erred: a) I was a little farther north than Tower might have expected to find me; as I was set up on more of a long base rather than a southwest approach to the airport. b) I did not look right anywhere near enough while on base. I was fixated on traffic in the pattern for 9/27 and my own approach; unaware that traffic was approaching from the south. The King Air was communicating with the Tower and I probably missed getting a good picture of where he was. Nevertheless; I feel the Controller should have called out the traffic to me and the King Air as we made our respective approaches. I will note that it was a single Controller working two runways during a particularly busy period; but the encounter was simply too close for there not to be a mention of it by ATC.

Pilot of a light single engine aircraft reported NMAC with a King Air in the Oshkosh pattern area. Reporter mentioned he would have appreciated a heads-up from ATC.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency

We departed and received a cabin pressure light illumination [climbing] through 12;000 FT. We put on our oxygen [masks] and requested lower immediately. We declared an emergency and squawked 7700 in order to get descent priority. Pilot flying took controls and radios I prepared the appropriate cabin pressure light checklist. As we descended to 10;000 the light extinguished and [we] continued to finish the cabin pressure checklist. The checklist led us to check the bleeds I realized they were not on and had not been on since we took off. I turned them on and the cabin pressurized normally in both auto and manual mode. Realizing my error (i.e. accidentally not turning the bleeds on allowing the cabin to pressurize) we received legal approval to continue after canceling our emergency and continued to our destination.

P180 Captain reported losing cabin pressure and then finding he had never turned the bleeds on.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Cleared RNP 22 at MHLM. After landing Runway 22 and exiting at Taxiway B; Tower instructed us to taxi left (west) on Taxiway A; enter Runway 04 and backtrack down runway to Taxiway D. I advised Tower that we were entering runway at Taxiway A; whereupon tower instructed us to hold short of runway. I advised Tower that we had crossed the hold short line. Tower reiterated hold short instruction; 'For traffic.' CA (Captain) told the tower that an aircraft should not land on runway with us in our position. Tower said that aircraft was only doing a touch and go. After CA protested again; saying that it was unsafe for an aircraft to land on the runway; Tower said that aircraft would turn at the SAP VOR; which is on the approach (east) end of Runway 22. The aircraft; a yellow light twin engine; callsign Aircraft Y; completed its approach and made a low pass; flying the full length of the runway at 50 ft.; and passed in front of our nose. Tower then cleared us to backtrack on runway to Taxiway D. Remainder of flight without incident.Language; use of non-standard phraseology by ATC; lack of safety awareness (Tower).The tower seemed to think it was ok for an aircraft to land with another aircraft over the hold-short line.

Air carrier flight crew reported ATC violation of allowing aircraft to overfly them by 50 ft.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Work Refused; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Approximately 5 minutes at gate; after gate return; while discussing Weight and Balance issue with ramp supervisor; #1 FA (Flight Attendant) said #2 FA reported electrical burning smell that had since dissipated. We called for Maintenance. Maintenance techs arrived quickly within 5 minutes and said no odor/smell noticed by them.Asked for FA 2 to come to flight deck and explain the odor. She again said it was a burning smell and it was still there though not as strong. She said she could 'taste' it. At that point I told gate agents we would deplane the aircraft. I advised FA's and made an announcement for Passengers to deplane. I asked 2 to fill out a form and called the Dispatcher who said he would look for another plane.Passengers off aircraft; went to back and discussed issue with FAs. #4 now said he also could 'taste something metallic'. I advised FAs to leave the aircraft also while we talked to Maintenance. I inquired if anyone wanted or needed medical attention to which the answer was 'no' by all. I then completed and submitted the smoke/odor form with information gained while discussing the situation with FAs in the jet bridge. They now said there had also been a musty smell. Logbook entry made and discussed with techs. All fume/odor event SOPs completed.A new aircraft was assigned for the flight. While waiting for the cleaners in the jet bridge with the FAs both 2&4 said they had tightness in their foreheads and 4 said his taste was still a little metallic. I asked them to call for FA supervisor while I also asked the gate agents to do the same so we could evaluate everyone's fitness for duty.I called the Duty Chief; and explained the situation. I then discussed the situation with [name]; FA supervisor via gate telephone who said another supervisor was on her way to the aircraft. FA supervisor; came to the aircraft immediately and talked to the FAs who said they were physically ok. We then all discussed the issue together and all FAs said they were fit for duty and felt better.We arrived in ZZZ1 after an uneventful flight and the First Officer and myself waited for the FAs to make sure they were still feeling OK. Everyone said they were fine.Possible cause perhaps a tailwind on engine shutdown

A321 Captain reported a fumes event during pre-flight which eventually resulted in an aircraft swap and an uneventful flight.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Confusion; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Aircraft; Logbook Entry; Procedure

DATE.  First day back from days Off; started at TIME and was turned over 2 out of service aircraft; and a ferry flight.  Turnover for ferry flight was everything in order will require the inspection sign off and MFD; it was to be a 3 leg ferry due to biobore in the tanks.   Each leg requiring a new MFD (Maintenance Ferry Document).  First leg was scheduled for a XA:30 departure.  During this time I was updating logs; fielding phone calls; and reviewing ferry checklist.  Started to review ferry documents and noted that there were a few overtime items that were not documented in the logbook on logs N and 5N1. I then documented the missing items under log page N2.  Overdue items were transcribed.  Under this transaction you will find open log pages; open work control packages; and overtime items.  Aircraft was then issued MFD.  Checklist completed.2nd leg of ferry was ZZZ-ZZZ1.  Ferry arrange was prepared and sent when aircraft arrived ZZZ.  I discussed the inbound discrepancies with ZZZ;  a dual tire replacement due to one tire being underinflated.  We noted; log page N as stating one or more items have been identified as overtime or becoming overtime.  I again reviewed maintenance release and noted no change in items.  Paperwork was completed; inbound discrepancies addressed and MFD issued.3rd leg of ferry was ZZZ1-ZZZ2.  During review of paperwork in preparation for ferry; it was noted 2 additional items under maintenance release as being expired.  It was during this time I discovered that these 2 items must have expired in flight and were not in a log item or on the MFD.  Part of the Ferry checklist is to ensure time-controlled workload items that will expire by the end of the flight are documented.Task Card X and -0024 GVI (General Visual Inspection) Strut 1 and 2 Insp appear to have expired in flight.  At this point I spoke with my co-worker and we generated another log with the 2 out of time items.  I was asked if it showed due in maintenance release.  My reply was that I have been viewing out of time items under maintenance release which will show task that are currently out of time vs forecasted task.  My oversight led to expiring of time-controlled workload items in flight.  Policies; procedures and processes are area that I feel I am thorough in.  For me this is a lesson learned and something that I will not forget in future ferry flights.

Maintenance Control Technician reported numerous errors when completing the required paperwork for an ETOPS ferry flight with numerous flight legs; resulting in time limited items expiring in flight.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Since we have taken delivery of more 737 Max aircraft; I have noticed that aircraft are coming with the aircraft headset attached to the sidewall of the aircraft.  The method this is accomplished; wires the headset wires into position near the headset jacks in such a manner that they cannot be removed.  The problem starts when pilots open the window; to talk with ground crew; ventilation; wing inspection; etc.  At this point; the wire becomes tangled; and stuck in the window mechanism.  The result is that the window is not completely closed; or that the headset cord is damaged; requiring replacement.  In addition to the costly factors above; if a crew were required to egress through the window; its possible the additional tanglements from the wire might prevent the window from opening completely.In the past month; I have personally observed two maintenance write-ups where damage occurred to the headset wire. One was on the FO (First Officer) side; one on the Captains side.  An additional write up involved a return to field; because the window wasn't properly closed despite the window handle being over center.There is no requirement to wire into position the headset (most of which are unused by pilots anyway).  Many other airlines fleet do not have the headset wired into position in this manner.

B737 MAX First Officer reported design of the crew headset wiring results in the wire getting tangled and stuck in window mechanism.


Sikorsky Helicopter Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown

While holding in the prescribed pattern over the East River exclusion in NYC; we joined two other helicopters who were also in the hold. The pattern is 1;000 feet AGL left hand turns from the 59th St Bridge to the Williamsburg Bridge along the banks of Manhattan; Brooklyn and Queens. A seaplane was departing the river to the north; and another seaplane was in a downwind on the Brooklyn side; southbound; opposite the helicopter holding pattern. On our second circuit; turning south from the 59th St Bridge a seaplane reported north of the bridge. We had visual contact before completing our turn; and then we lost visual contact. About midway on the south leg of our hold we were cleared to land. As I started my left descending turn the seaplane that was behind and above me was now fully in the left cockpit window and slightly lower. I jerked up on the collective to stop our descent because I thought we would collide. We had no TCAD warnings; and heard no reports from the seaplane of their intentions other than the initial report. We have made inquiries with the heliport manager; LGA Tower; and the Eastern Region Helicopter Council (ERHC) as to the procedures that the seaplanes use. Why the seaplane chose to fly below holding traffic and attempt to pass us from a blind spot without any communication is an unknown.

Helicopter pilot experiences a NMAC with a seaplane over the East River exclusion in NYC while turning to land at the East 34th Street Heliport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

There was Hazmat planned for this flight; I received it plane side. I received a total of 3 foreman carts from cargo two of the carts had items that were labeled with Hazmat stickers. The other cart items were 4 boxes that were not labeled as Hazmat and were on a pallet with plastic securely wrapped around the boxes. It gave no indication that it was Hazmat.The other items that were labeled were loaded and surrounded with 19 bags. The non-labeled freight was loaded in pit 6 by itself. When I went to close the flight out; it wouldn't let me. This was because the system was indicating that that piece was also Hazmat; I called [Load Planning] and they told me that I also had Hazmat in pit 6 and it needed to be surrounded by 15 bags minimum. Unfortunately the aircraft had been dispatched and we had to bring it back to the gate to rectify the situation.

Ramp Agent reported Hazmat cargo errors with configuration and labeling after the  aircraft was dispatched.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 7695; Flight Crew Type 410

Training / Qualification; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Staffing; Aircraft; Human Factors

As part of the 48 month check; aircraft was required to do an ADG (Air Driven Generator) drop test; to simulate total loss of aircraft power in flight; and ascertain the serviceability of the back up ADG. The Maintenance Organization told us an Engineer would go with us for the test. We were supposed to just takeoff; do one visual circuit at the airport; drop the ADG and return for landing. We departed from Runway 03 and climbed to 2;400 FT. On the downwind leg; we asked the Engineer how he wanted the test conducted and it was agreed that generators 1 and 2 should be taken off. The ADG deployed successfully. On base leg; however; we could not get more than flaps 20 (which was the flaps we took off with and had chosen not to retract). We did the approach at flaps 20 speed of 160 KTS and only slowed down just prior to touchdown. After landing; only the left reverser deployed; we did not have ground spoilers; nose wheel steering and the anti-skid. This necessitated the application of maximum braking on the landing rollout; which resulted in the blow out of the four main tires. Aircraft was stopped on the runway and did not sustain any damage apart from the blown tires. There was no injury to the three crew on board. Roles were not clearly spelt out between the pilots and the Engineer on board before the commencement of the flight. The pilots assumed the Engineer was on board to talk us through the flight test; since we did not know other things he needed to see that necessitated his coming on the flight test. The Engineer later said he did not know the pilots were expecting any inputs from him; so there was a communication gap. Flight crew should have relied on the QRH; rather assume the Engineer was on board to talk us through the flight test.

When a regular line flight crew was utilized to perform a required simulated failure of the AC electric system for a regular periodic maintenance check; a Maintenance Engineer was assigned to accompany them. When there was no comprehensive briefing as to how to perform the check it was conducted using TLAR (That Looks About Right) methodology which resulted in the loss of multiple systems for landing. Four main gear tires blew out when max braking was applied after the spoilers failed to deploy; one reverser failed to operate and the landing had had to have been made with only 20 degrees of flaps extended.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 18.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

[Ops Vehicle] called with electricians to enter runway XX about 15 minutes prior to the event. When Aircraft X called for taxi I was in the tower alone. I had the strip up that [Ops Vehicle] was on the runway but did not see it. I taxied Aircraft X for an intersection departure on runway XY (reciprocal runway) and cleared them for takeoff. Ground control NIDS monitor and STARS keyboard were blocking my view of [Ops Vehicle]. I saw [Ops Vehicle] just as Aircraft X was rotating and ASDE (Airport Surface Detection Equipment) said something but did not hear what it said. [Aircraft X] did climb well and was offset to the right of [Ops Vehicle] it appeared. I really don't believe any changes need to be made. I did use the visual aid. It was slow and it is an experience that I will never forget. I spoke to Ops on the phone and he said he heard me assign runway XY but it didn't register until he saw the plane.

Tower Controller reported inadvertently clearing an aircraft for takeoff while an airport operations vehicle was on the runway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 650

This report is meant to advise the Charlotte Airport that Taxiway 'M' at the approach end of Runway 23 is badly in need of repair. General aviation aircraft departing on Runway 18L are routed to the approach end of Runway 23 and after crossing Runway 23 must use that portion of Taxiway 'M' to reach Taxiway 'D' and the departure end of Runway 18L. Taxiway 'M' from the approach end of Runway 23 up to the intersection of Taxiway 'D' is cracked and separated resulting in increased tire wear on all aircraft using that portion of the taxiway. Since aircraft are no longer allowed to use 'D' taxiway all the way to the departure end of Runway 18L; the increased traffic and use of Taxiway 'M' has resulted in significant deterioration of that portion of the taxiway.

A G-550 Captain reported excessively deteriorated pavement on Taxiway M at the approach end of Runway 23 in CLT.


Light Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 8800; Flight Crew Type 40

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

During parachute operations for military parachute training flight; we landed for fuel and a military jumper delay. CTAF was in radio #1; with the military ground station on the #2 radio. Due to some difficulty in hearing [military ground station]; radio #1 volume was turned down.We picked up jumpers and taxied to Runway 02. We monitored CTAF and made a call taxiing to 02; then departing 02. On the taxiway 90 degrees to the runway at the arrival end; I called 'clear left' for traffic; and the pilot in the right seat called 'clear right. I checked left and right; advanced the propellers to high RPM; and placed the left engine in flight idle as I completed the turn onto the runway.At [this airport]; jump traffic departs 02 and lands 20; opposite direction. Traffic on final is generally expected high; as the base leg to final is often 5;000 feet or higher; as arriving traffic arrives on a steep descent from the jump run. I checked opposite-direction final and placed the right power lever in flight idle; then advanced both engines to 50 PSI and began the takeoff roll.At approximately 60 knots; I noticed something on the runway; though it was hard to see. The right seat pilot noted it too; and shortly thereafter we were able to see a small airplane moving opposite direction; on the surface. We were unable to determine if it was landing; taking off; or taxiing. It was grey; without lights; and a checkerboard paint scheme that made it hard to see and broke up the outline. It was low to the ground with short conventional landing gear. When we both recognized the traffic; the right seat pilot called out 'abort; abort; abort.' I was unable to determine distance to the other aircraft or to know whether we could stop in time; given decreasing distance; and an accelerate-stop distance that would have taken us well down the runway. I declined to reject the takeoff; and instead angled the aircraft left. At that point we were at rotation speed. The right seat pilot pulled back on the control wheel as we approached the runway edge; and we became airborne. The other airplane turned off the runway at the runway midfield access intersection. We climbed out normally.The right seat pilot commented that it was the closest call he had experienced in [many] years; and was clearly shaken. He called on the radio; but received no response. He checked the volume; and found that he had lowered it when we taxied to the ramp on the previous flight. When the right seat pilot called out 'why didn't you make any position reports?' the pilot of the aircraft radioed back that he had made numerous calls. This was confirmed by company aircraft on the company frequency. None of that information had been relayed to us; and we did not hear the pilot's call; due to the decreased radio volume. We did not see the RV pilot; either due to looking for traffic at the usual higher approach angle for [this airport]; or because he was already on the ground. Unlighted and with a paint scheme that made identification difficult (and no lighting); we did not see that aircraft.The RV pilot apparently made no effort to take evasive action or to go around. I elected to deviate to the left during the takeoff roll; rather than right for two reasons: the runway access taxiway exited to our right and it appeared that the aircraft was attempting to vacate there. The other reason I elected to deviate to the left on Runway 02 was that it presented no immediate obstacles; a flat dirt area outside the runway in the event we left the pavement on the ground; and no obstacles beyond; for the climb. A deviation to our right would have turned us toward waiting jumpers; the exiting aircraft; aircraft on the ramp; and the maintenance hangar and trees.I intend to modify my departure procedures during jump operations at [this airport] to include a radio squelch check to determine volume during taxi; use of landing lights during the takeoff roll; and a more thorough scan of opposing final approach traffic (high; low and on the ground); to ensure this does not happen again. It has been brought to the attention of management personnel at [the airport]; including the Chief Pilot.

The pilot of a sky diving aircraft reported a ground conflict during takeoff due to improper CTAF operations. The flight crew did not realize that the communication radio in use had the volume set very low.


Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

We were cleared to line up and wait; [then] cleared for takeoff. I transferred controls to the FO (First Officer); and we began our takeoff roll. At approx. 70 kts the yellow caution light [illuminated] and we had an EICAS message 'HS VALVE 2 FAIL'. We both called REJECT. I took control of the aircraft and brought it to a stop. We exited the runway and assessed the situation. We proceeded to the west hard stand; contacted Maintenance; and were instructed to return to the gate and deplane; that the aircraft was unairworthy. We returned to the gate without further incident.

I was the pilot flying and the CA (Captain) was the pilot monitoring [and on takeoff roll] a High Stage Valve Failure was indicated by the EICAS at approximately 65KIAS. The appropriate actions were taken from the CA immediately after discovery of the message. The takeoff was rejected; the CA brought the thrust levers to idle and began taking the actions to bring the aircraft to a safe speed to exit the runway to the first available taxiway. I called Tower to notify them that we were a rejected  [takeoff] aircraft.

EMB-145 flight crew reported rejecting the takeoff after receiving the EICAS alert High Stage Valve Failure.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 1400; Flight Crew Type 100

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Distraction; Confusion

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 41; Flight Crew Total 133; Flight Crew Type 133

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

According to my student: While he was doing solo touch/goes at ZZZ; on his second landing; he touched down left of centerline. While rolling with the throttle in the idle position; he turned off the carb heat and began to retract the flaps. The nose of the plane began to veer right. When he applied left rudder he said the plane felt as if it would skid; spin or drop the nose onto the ground. Therefore; he applied just enough left rudder to straighten the nose wheel and rolled onto the grass adjacent to the runway. No contact was made with any runway signage or lights. There was no damage to plane; runway; or grass area; and there were no injuries. Tower cleared for continued movement to the Alpha taxiway. He continued to the transient parking area and called ZZZ Tower per their instructions.As the instructor; my student called me to inform me he had run off the runway; no damage had occurred; and he had spoken with the tower and FAA. I did not know he was flying by himself that day and had received no notification from him. I asked him to recount what happened to me several times trying to understand what happened. I called the Tower and confirmed that the winds were variable at 3 knots and visibility was very good. Based on his recount; I do not fully understand how he thought going off the runway was his safest option. I have not offered him any training or instruction that would indicate that was good judgment. He has never landed far off centerline with me in the plane and has never demonstrated that he would ever act in such a way. He and I have logged extensive dual hours at ZZZ doing pattern work; and he has never flown in a way that indicated he would act or make a decision in this manner. He had demonstrated consistently with me that he was able to maintain directional control of the airplane both in the air and on the ground. I have informed him that all of his solo endorsements are no longer valid. I was planning to spend an extensive amount of time with him on the ground and in the air addressing what happened yesterday through re-training; but he has decided to discontinue his flight training at this time. As a result of this incident; I have re-clarified to all students that they must inform me of any time they plan to solo and must receive my permission before doing so. I have also implemented a strict rule of no solo touch and goes. Solo pattern work will from now on only be full stop landings.

While doing solo touch/goes at ZZZ; on my second landing; I touched down just left of center. While rolling with the throttle in the idle position; I turned off the carb heat and began to retract the flaps. The nose of the plane began to veer right. Applying left rudder the plane felt as if it would skid; spin or drop the nose onto the ground and I was too far toward the edge of the runway. I felt it best; to reduce the chances of injury or damage. I applied just enough left rudder to straighten the nose movement and rolled onto the grass adjacent to the runway. No contact was made with any runway signage or lights. No damage to plane; runway or grass area and there were no injuries. Tower cleared for continued movement to the taxiway. I continued to the transient parking area and called ZZZ Tower per their instructions. As a result of this occurrence; training has been suspended for evaluation and scheduling with CFI.

Instructor and student pilots reported the student experienced a runway excursion on landing rollout during a solo flight.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 90

Training / Qualification; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

I'm a fresh private pilot and needed to log some cross country hours before starting my instrument rating. The airspace was a little complicated; did my homework and decided go follow a VFR Flight Rules Route. Also I made a post on our facebook page and asked if there's an experienced pilot that would like to be my passenger and may be helpful in case of need. Someone was interested and said he has a license and XXX hours; flying for X years; so I was happy to take him with me since he has such kind experience.I took off from my home airport with flight following and made it to special flight rules area; everything was smooth; and landed at the airport. There was a little errand I need to take care of; my pilot friend joined me and I wanted open route conversation for the way back; mentioned we need to stay under 3;000 ft. before we get under Class B airspace. His response was no you will talk to clearance delivery so we don't need to; they're going to give us squawk code etc. I was confused with his answer and before we got into the airplane I brought this topic up again. His response was the same. I thought he knew something that I don't know since he has so many hours but his attitude was super confident and seemed like he didn't want to talk about it further. We called clearance delivery got the squawk code and took off. I stopped climbing and maintained 3;500 ft. when we got under Class B airspace so probably our altitude was around 3;300 ft. while we were still in Class C airspace even though it was just several seconds. My experienced pilot license owner 'friend' who has X times more total hours than me was so confident that we didn't do anything wrong. The rest of the flight was smooth. Initiated the flight following after Special Flight rules area and landed at my home airport with no issues and went home started to dig around to find something about this and couldn't feel comfortable by what I found. I called my previous Instructor and asked him. I was right; what we did there was totally wrong. We should have been under 3;000 ft. if we're not talking with approach at that moment.I called the experienced pilot who traveled with me; he denied again until I saw him in person and showed him what we did on the app. He accepted eventually that he was wrong. He didn't understand I was talking about this when I tried to discuss etc. What I learned from this is whoever it is; it doesn't matter. I am the pilot in command and unless I am 100% convinced not going to proceed further; do my homework better; be 100% sure about everything on the route before flying even if there's someone next to me with professionally logged XX;000 hours.

A General Aviation pilot reported an airspace violation.


Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

After flying together for three days; we were unable to develop much of a shared mental model. I struggled to understand my Captain's thought process and often found it to be unusual. From the beginning of our trip; I got the impression that he was someone that was consciously trying to suppress his abrasive personality; which would later periodically show itself throughout our trip. I found these issues to be both frustrating and distracting. I was often lagging in our risk mitigation simply because of the atmosphere in the flight deck. In an attempt to be professional and get along; I tried to be compliant and follow his lead. At the end of our last flight; we were dealing with thunderstorms. As we approached our destination; the storms were over and around the airport. Approach Control told us to expect Runway XX because of the wind direction and position of the storm cells. Approach reported that the storm was moving off the airport to the east. The ATIS was reporting 10 miles visibility. Because we were expecting improving conditions; we briefed the visual approach backed up by the RNAV (GPS) XX. We had to fly an extended downwind; to get around the storm cells; which led to a long final approach. As we joined the final approach the weather began to deteriorate again. We continued to approach the airport. Approach Control began giving weather updates. I suggested that we adjust our minimums from field elevation to LNAV/VNAV minimums as a precaution. My Captain agreed. As we continued to approach the airport; the weather continued to get worse. The last report; that I recall; was 1 1/4 miles visibility with wind gusting to 29 knots. Foolishly; we continued the approach. As we approached minimums; it became clear that we would have difficulty seeing the airport. Even though I was flying an autopilot coupled approach; my Captain began instructing me multiple times to make sure I stayed on the glide-path. I found his unnecessary coaching non-standard; distracting; unprofessional and degrading. We reached minimums. We were in heavy rain and I had nothing in sight. Therefore; I executed a go-around. I was shocked at my Captain's outward display of displeasure and irritation that I initiated a go-around. He sighed; then disgustingly stated; 'You had the runway right in front of you!' Never in my 21 year career have I had a Captain respond so inappropriately to a go-around. I was distracted and frustrated. As Approach Control vectored us out and back around; the wind and weather continued to shift and change. We set up and briefed the ILS CAT II to Runway XYL. My Captain flew the approach in significantly better weather and we landed uneventfully. The more I reflect back on our first approach; the more things I realize we did wrong. Also; despite the Company's efforts; there is still a reluctance to execute a go-around. More and continued emphasis is needed. With thunderstorms in the area; we should have completed a full instrument approach briefing; even though the initial expectation was for the weather to be VFR and improving. If we had done that; we would have been more aware that the weather had moved below our minimums of 1 3/8 miles for the approach. There were many warning signs that should have indicated that we needed to discontinue the approach. However; we continued for all the wrong reasons. It was the end of a long day on the third day of a long trip. There was a desire to finish flying with someone you do not enjoy working with. Never developing a shared mental model was both distracting and frustrating. Trying to be compliant and follow my Captain's lead; to prevent conflict; kept me from speaking up. I should have stated that; I don't think we should continue; we need to break this approach off; let the weather improve; and come back around more prepared; which; by default; was what ultimately occurred. However; the approach never should have begun. Unfortunately; there are still captains out there that do not create a positive atmosphere in the flight deck. Because of that our risk management was at a low level throughout our trip. Continued emphasis is needed with more scenario based training.

B737 First Officer reported experiencing difficult CRM during a trip.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 420; Flight Crew Type 400

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

I was holding short of Runway XX at Taxiway XX at ZZZ preparing to take off; a PA18 made one radio call that they were entering a right base for Runway XX when left traffic is standard. I continued to hold short of the runway. Aircraft landed prior to the displaced threshold and runway; taxied to the runway entryway [Taxiway] XX and stopped nose to nose with my aircraft. Pilot made a motion with his hands that he wanted me to move out of his way so he could taxi past.

PA28 Pilot reported holding short of runway when another aircraft landed before the displaced threshold and taxied directly nose to nose and motioned for reporter to get out of the way.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Fuel dump due [to a] pressurization issue [since the] aircraft would not pressurize. Flight leveled off at FL100 to work [on] the issue. 94;000 lbs [of] fuel dumped for a return to ZZZ. An access door under nose [was] not secure [and] aircraft would not pressurize [as a result].

Dispatcher reported a B777 failed to pressurize resulting in a return to departure airport.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 55; Flight Crew Total 386; Flight Crew Type 68

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace

Weather; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

I was flying VFR at night under radar services with the NY TRACON; ISP sector. I flew eastbound along the south shore of Long Island at 3;000 feet after performing several instrument maneuvers with my student. We listened to the ATIS and told approach that we would like to return back to ISP for stop and go's. The Controller then advised us to make a left turn heading ~290 for vectors to the airport; Runway 24. I told my student to descend to 2;000 ft.; not knowing that we extended far enough east to laterally be in the FOK Class D. We leveled out at 2;000 feet where approach advised us that to be careful that we were in technically in the FOK airspace and that it would not be an overall issue. I apologized; went to ISP; and had no issues or significant events occur. We did not cause any conflicts in traffic; we were the only aircraft in the general vicinity. We stayed with approach control until we went to ISP Tower on 119.300. I do believe that FAA Order 7110.65 makes the controller responsible for coordination with the tower as we had two-way communications; however; I take full responsibility for what had occurred. I thought I was south of HWV; and due to the restricted visibility on a moonless night and no GPS; I lost situational awareness of our overall position. I was also distracted getting the ATIS with my student that we strayed too far east for our comfort. To correct this in the future; I will make sure to be more aware of my current position through use of pilotage/dead reckoning; especially at night when it can be challenging to identify visual landmarks.

C172 instructor reported that distraction and loss of situational awareness resulted in unauthorized entry into Class D airspace.


This has been a subject that's received more and more comment on the flight deck as this year has gone by. The Challenger 350's voice annunciations on the ground are so loud that crewmembers can't hear each other or ATC while they're in progress. This frequently forces crewmembers to delay the callouts required by the AOM [Aircraft Operating Manual] until the voice annunciation has run its course. Particularly the 'cleared left; cleared to cross...cleared right' call taxiing across runways; and runway alignment calls when preparing for takeoff. These two types of situation can lead to delays in crossing an active runway; and delays in setting takeoff power after being cleared for takeoff. However; things came to a head yesterday when we were rolling out on Runway XX at ZZZ. It's a shorter runway; and the PF [Pilot Flying] elected to roll to the end before turning off. We were doing less than 20 knots; but the airplane was screaming so loudly that we had 200 feet remaining and 100 feet remaining that we could not hear Tower's taxi instructions twice. Twice we had to ask Tower to repeat himself; finally hearing him on the third attempt. This is not just annoying. Nor is it just a nuisance. This is an outright safety problem. I fully understand why the system is set up to prevent pilots from setting the volume on the annunciations. And the first thing the reader is going to suggest is that pilots turn up the volume on their ATC radios and interphone. Turning those up loud enough to override the aircraft annunciations would be downright painful. The annunciations are loud enough to wake the dead. And certainly far louder than necessary to be heard by a living human who has passed an FAA First Class physical examination. Surely; the annunciation volume can be adjusted through maintenance action. I suggest the company take advantage of this ability to set the volume at a more sensible level - loud enough to capture the crew's attention; but not loud enough to drown out all other communication.

CL350 First Officer reported the aircraft's voice annunciations on the ground are so loud that crewmembers have difficulty communicating.


Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

An IFR C130 had a fire warning light in No. 2 Engine. Engine was shut down. I received a hand off and information from Center. Center advised the C130 was assigned a block altitude of 2;500-5;000 MSL. The C130 was cleared direct to the airport and I instructed them to advise if they wanted to land at a closer airport. The route of flight would take the C130 through a 3;500 MVA. I asked the C130 if they could turn to avoid the area or climb. They advised 'they were an emergency and were going direct to the airport'. I issued visual reports of the known obstacles in the area and the C130 advised they had the antenna in sight. To further complicate the issue; I transferred communication to another Sector; whose airspace the airport is located. The C130 could not talk to that Sector because the radios do no function correctly in that area. I believe this has been documented. Fix the radio.

TRACON Controller described a military aircraft emergency event when MVA requirements were compromised and radio communications with the emergency aircraft proved problematic.