Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14; Flight Crew Type 44

Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

I was performing local pattern work with one passenger on board. Controller advised on takeoff that I was authorized 'right closed traffic'. First takeoff was uneventful; first landing was made without flaps due to moderate to strong crosswind on the landing runway. Second takeoff and landing were made normally; again using no flaps due to moderate to strong gusty crosswinds (I noted the winds at the time; but do not recall what they were today and did not write them down during taxi or flight). Third takeoff was normal; retracted landing gear and climbed to pattern altitude I was working on crosswind work throughout the pattern; accommodating from winds out of North and trying to maintain ground track and landing checkpoints. During 3rd landing approach; winds got me off centerline and I began to talk to my passenger about crosswind correction and the need to have a stabilized approach all the way to touchdown. Since this third approach was not entirely stabilized; I elected to take a 'Go Around' and began to climb. I continued to concentrate on wind correction and ground track and continued around the pattern with intention of completing full stop landing. Focus was on ground track and not on procedures and checklists. On downwind I failed to complete my landing checklist and verify gear handle and lights in 'down and locked' position. I continued my forth approach; though it did not feel right (this was the approach that I should have waved off). Concentrating on my 'checkpoints' (drilled into me years ago) I was wrestling with the plane intent on making my ground checkpoints and altitude checkpoints in spite of the gusty conditions. I did the preflight planning and knew the runway and pattern details; but these were my first landings at this airport. I was intent on making a nice 'stabilized' approach; but on short final with the power back I thought I heard the stall warning; which I attributed to wind gust and slightly slow approach speed (Could it have been the Gear Warning?). I touched down on centerline about 1200 feet down the 10500 foot long runway. Nice approach; but NO LANDING GEAR! Rookie mistake by experienced (but apparently not a very proficient or focused) pilot. Chain of events: I had a long layoff from flying due to numerous job related [and personal events]. At end of last year I made the commitment to get my airplane back in annual and to get me flying again regularly. I worked with a very competent A&P mechanic and another IA to ensure that all the required maintenance was completed. After a very thorough and expensive annual the airplane with new Carb; Mags; Plugs; Wires; Control Cables; bearings; tires; brakes and just about every other potentially worn part replaced; we had an airworthy airplane. Was the pilot as airworthy? I thought I was. I completed hours of ground study and review of my POH; Weight and Balance; Flight Planning Info; purchased new charts also completed an online Flight Instructor Refresher Course arranged for a Flight Review before my first flight in the airplane in years.  I had planned a cross country flight to ZZZ; about 12 hours by our planned route. Destination was my home base and the airplane's new home. I was flying with my mechanic also a competent complex single qualified pilot; but no M20 time. He did know the landing gear well as he had completed all the gear checks with the IA. Our plan was to complete several landings during our cross country flight back to ZZZ even included planned delays at enroute airports for touch and go landings. Contributing Factors1. While well planned; the whole scenario was not well executed. What happened? Airplane was ready but I had difficulty coordinating my Flight Review with local CFI (we had never met or flown before he was recommended by a friend). But we did get together and instead of the well planned and scripted Review that I had intended to create with him. We fell back into the casual mode. More chatting thenagreeing on our flight scenario and determining what I needed after my long layoff from flying. 2. I had planned to show my CFI a Mooney M20 operation video (FBO had internet access); as a way to refresh both of us of the specific procedures for raising and lowering the gear. My CFI advised me that 'he'd just seen that video' so we could forgo it. Wish I hadn't; might have put me in a different mindset while operating the airplane over the next 4 flights. 3. Instructor Experience. A young enthusiastic and apparently competent instructor. He deferred to my judgment (and my age?) on what we should do. I should have stuck to my idea of what I really needed to do 2 hours or more of focusing on basics that would make me safe after a long layoff. I am a 5000 hour plus former Naval Aviator (fixed wing and helicopter). Maybe he thought I could fly anything well and this was just a formality? 4. I did not ask enough questions about the Instructors experience. I asked if he was qualified and insurable in my airplane (20 hours Mooney time required). I did not ask about his review/teaching experience with the 'Johnson Bar' procedures. Turns out most of his time was in Mooney J Model Electrical Gear not Johnson Bar. I neglected to ask about his specific Mooney experience (and how to get the most out of our flight review).5. We completed about an hour of Ground Review. It was technically not required since I had just completed my Flight Instructor Renewal Course but I thought it would be good for both of us. It would have been better if I had provided some written objectives for ground and flight instruction. 6. My CFI and I did get the flight completed and although I was a bit rusty on first two landings and my initial ground reference maneuvers. Stalls; high work; VOR tracking and other maneuvers were all strong. We landed with just 3 landings (full stops) and 1.2 hour total. I had planned some more flight time that day with a local Mooney qualified pilot (not an instructor but well versed in the Mooney). Due to changing commitments that pilot could not make our flight. After that planned flight (which we canceled) I had planned to depart on first leg (3 hours) of my trip to Airplane's new home. Flying with my Complex Single (but not Mooney) pilot friend he was also the mechanic that had performed most of the maintenance related to Annual 'Squawks' and he participated in Gear Checks during annual with the IA. 7. I had planned a simple VFR Cross Country 2 days three stops 12 hours; and had planned to get the first 3 hour leg in after completing my Flight Review and a local flight with my Mooney friend (take advantage of his Mooney knowledge again due to schedule conflicts that flight did not happen. 8. Changing weather picture and Sigmet for winds during our 4 leg cross country caused us to abandon our plans for multiple Touch and Go Landings during our cross country. When I arrived 2 days later at the incident airport I had about 14 new Mooney Hours (bring my total to only about 44) but only about 8 landings in past year!9. Overconfidence: I felt good flying with another pilot and when we got there my copilot/mechanic's son was there so I offered him a ride in the airplane (repayment for some work and washing of the Airplane he had accomplished while working with his dad on my plane).On the final landing (the one without the gear); I was focused on talking about ground track and wind correction to my passenger rather than focused on flying the airplane and completing/verifying the checklists and gear rechecks on final. My 4th approach that day was only too memorable landing with the gear retracted. But I hope others can learn from it. 10. None of the airfoils or aircraft structure seems to be significantly affected but that prop is done and the engine will require at least a tear down inspection. Regardless; I have learned a lot from this incident and hope other can as well.

M20 pilot reported a gear up landing due to distractions caused by gusty winds and lack of recent experience.


Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

I arrived at the gate for my flight. I noticed that there were numerous items in the logbook. These items required extensive review and actions that needed to be achieved. These items distracted me from my normal preflight sequence. As the Captain returned to the flight deck; we both went over the MEL items. He thoroughly reviewed the logbook and signed it. As I am very new on the plane with only 55 hours in the last 6 months; I concentrated on my expanded checklist as well as the aircraft internal checklist to accomplish the preflight. It was at this time I must have over looked the new entry 'FUEL DOOR CYCLE FORM REC.'Cause - There were multiple write ups [and a] new [fuel door] procedure.

Air carrier First Officer reported missing a logbook entry involving a new procedure. Lack of flying was cited as a contributing factor.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Other

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other; Party2 Ground Personnel

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

In cruise at FL 360; relatively smooth with occasional light turbulence.  About 50 mi south of ZZZ.  Forward and aft lower cargo compartments indicated fire with associated EICAS; Master Warning; and aural alert.  Called for QRH procedure and executed an immediate turn and descent toward ZZZ while simultaneously [advising ATC].  PM (Pilot Monitoring) found appropriate QRH checklist and began execution.  Just prior to fire bottle arming step; all alerts and warning cease on their own.  We discussed and considered the likelihood that both compartments had independently caught fire and extinguished on their own simultaneously and agreed that it was very likely a malfunction.  We elected not to arm or discharge the fire bottle(s) as the situation no longer conformed to the QRH condition statements and our reasoning that there was a malfunction.  We did; however; elect to continue to ZZZ.  Upon landing on Runway XX; we immediately shut down the right engine while establishing communication with crash/fire rescue and asked them to conduct thermal imaging assessment of the forward and aft lower cargo compartments.  Both were reported as cold.  We taxied to the ramp.Upon arrival a ZZZ; ramp personnel opened the lower cargo compartments.  Ramp and maintenance both reported that they had been loaded in excess of the compartment's marked limits.  From the MX write-up resolution 'Upon arrival at ZZZ; it was noted that the FWD and AFT cargo compartments were loaded with bulk freight all the way to the ceilings'.  All system tests were normal and our best guess is that improper compartment loading led to the erroneous fire indications.  No obvious equipment deficiencies were found.Suggestions: Retraining and refreshing of ramp personnel regarding the importance of proper loading procedures and compliance with limitations.  It may be instructive to inform them of the consequences of failure to comply with procedures.  Also of note/concern was the fact that ZZZ ATC did not have any contact information for [company] operations.  Because of the time critical nature of the incident; we were not able to communicate directly with the company [Ramp or Operations]; and ATC did not have the information to do so.  I suspect that is an item that needs refreshing at more than just this one station.

While cruising at FL360 enroute in light turbulence we had a FWD/AFT Cargo Fire indication. As the pilot monitoring I pulled out the emergency checklist and the pilot flying recommended diverting into ZZZ. We [advised] ATC and started an emergency descent. After 1 minute or more the indication extinguished. We continued our descent into ZZZ and full stopped on RWY XX and had fire rescue run the thermal gun over our lower cargo compartment where the indication originated. The cargo compartment was cold; so we taxied to the ramp and shutdown and gave the jet to maintenance.Cause: Upon arrival mx opened the cargo door where the lower compartment was loaded to the ceiling. Our best guess is the improper loading was causal to the erroneous cargo fire indication. Suggestions: Ensure the ramp cargo loading team follows all directions when loading cargo. If there is a limit to height of stacking parcels to allow airflow; it is essential to follow the limitations. Also; ATC did not have the telephone numbers [for our company] so it is our recommendation to update contact numbers to ATC agencies.

B757 flight crew reported diverting due to a Cargo Fire EICAS Master Warning.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 1286; Flight Crew Type 1286

On the Razzr4 arrival and cleared for the ILS 30L; as we were nearly turning onto final a Bonanza aircraft passed about 200-300 feet below and about 500 feet laterally under our left wing. There was no TCAS warning and I asked NorCal approach about the Bonanza; he replied that there was no transponder information but that there was only primary painted information.

A320 Captain reported a near midair collision encounter on final approach.


Air Conditioning Distribution Ducting; Clamps; Connectors

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

While cruising at FL400 I heard and felt a 'pop' in my ears which seemed to emanate from somewhere in the back of the passenger cabin. I looked back and saw the 2 passengers looking around the rear seats and lavatory area (on later discussion with the passengers; they thought a shampoo or lotion bottle had burst in the cabin). At first; I thought that one of the outflow valves had become momentarily stuck and then released. Because I felt a change in pressure in my ears; I proceeded to monitor the cabin pressure altitude indicator. At first no change was discernible. However; after a few minutes it became obvious that the cabin altitude was slowly climbing. Due to Part 135 regulations I had already donned my oxygen mask before climbing above FL350. I instructed the PM to advise ATC of our situation and ask for an immediate descent. We decided to divert to [a nearby airport] since we were almost directly overhead the airport at that time. ATC provided vectors and an immediate descent to lower altitudes as we were directed away from possible conflicts with other aircraft. We were able to descend to 10;000 FT just as the cabin altitude gauge indicated 10;000 FT. I flew the airplane and the PM handled all communications; passenger briefings; and checklists. The airport was VFR and we were vectored for a visual approach and uneventful landing. Although we were met by the airport's fire department on taxiing in to the ramp.  At no time during the event did we get any annunciators or other system warnings of a problem. The passenger oxygen masks never deployed nor were they needed. We did not declare an emergency and because of ATC's quick reaction we did not have to do a full emergency descent; although our descent rate at times was around 4;000 fpm. The company sent a recovery aircraft and the passengers were back on their way after about an hour and a half on the ground.After speaking with a Tech at a Cessna Service Center; it seems that the pink (or orange) couplings around the air ducts that feed air from the ACM to the cabin (CE560XLS) may get loose and back pressure from the system at altitude may cause that coupling to slide back from the duct thus allowing pressurized air to escape and not go into the cabin. One of the things we noticed was that air conditioned air out of the overhead wemacs stopped after we heard and felt the 'pop'. At lower altitudes and on the ground the condition may seem to correct itself but then reoccur at altitude. I have now included checking these couplings more closely as part of my preflight inspection.  I am thankful that we monitored the cabin altitude after the anomaly occurred and recognized a situation that could have been tragic for our passengers; ourselves; and the company had we not caught it in time. Instead it turned out to be a mild inconvenience for our passengers and just another day of flying for us. I would highly advise anyone who experiences unexplained changes in airflow through the wemacs or senses pressure changes (especially in your ears) in flight to vigilantly monitor the cabin altitude indicator and be prepared for an immediate descent to a lower altitude. Many thanks to my SIC and ATC for the smooth and professional support during this incident.

CE-560XLS Captain reported loss of cabin pressure while cruising at FL400. The pressure loss was slow enough to allow the aircraft to descend to 10;000 FT before they met the cabin altitude. Reporter mentioned air duct couplings as a probable cause.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X was a ferry flight. An ACARS message was received saying that 48lb of AOG (Aircraft on Ground parts) was loaded in the aircraft. The flight was finalized without showing the AOG loaded on the aircraft. The weight information was invalidated until ZZZ stores have reentered the information in DSTG (departure staging guide). While waiting for stores to reenter the information; ZZZ Ramp decided to finalize the ramp information without knowing whether or not the AOG part was loaded.

Airline Ground Personnel reported Ramp provided inaccurate Hazmat cargo data to facilitate aircraft departure.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We were on the downwind at 7000 ft descending to 4000 ft (I think) when we were vectored into severe thunderstorm cells. We were assigned a speed of 170 and had flaps 20 selected. Once inside the thunderstorm we encountered severe wind shear with lightning all around us (don't know if we were hit). The airspeed must have fluctuated almost a 100 kts and we went several times from stick shaker into overspeed by about 20 +/- with bank angle up to 40-45 degrees while in a turn on autopilot out of the thunderstorm cell. We could not maintain the assigned speed due to the severe wind shear airspeed fluctuations. Several times we had to advance full pwr (Power) to keep the speed out of the stick shaker. We did not want to do a wind shear escape maneuver to avoid flying deeper into the cell. We could see the clear area ahead of us on the nav (Navigation) display hence we decided to keep turning and after 10 to 20 seconds we were out of it. We wrote up the overspeed (10-20kts) for the selected flap setting of 20 degrees and possible lightning strikes.We asked the Controller to give us a right turn in less than 2 miles but she turned us just about a mile or 2 too late. Approach in the clear and landing were uneventful.  The flight in front of us must have encountered similar weather and told ATC not to let anybody go as far on the downwind. ATC should have had more spacing between flights to allow a turn short of the thunderstorm cell.

Aircraft on downwind; approaching weather front from the west and north. Several aircraft in front of us on downwind reported severe turbulence on base leg; we requested a turn in 2 miles or less; with weather on both sides of us; we had few options. Upon being given 170 knots; and a descent to 4000 from 5000; we initiated a base turn; upon entering a strong cell; the aircraft encountered a severe drop in altitude; followed immediately by an updraft; severe airspeed fluctuations going from stick shaker to overspeed were instantaneous. Aircraft went to approx 40 deg of bank. Throttles were overridden in order to not chase airspeed; executing a wind shear maneuver per se would have exacerbated the situation; as we need to continue our turn to escape the cell. Airspeed exceeded the flaps 20 limitation by approximately 10-20 knots. Aircraft flew out of the cell; continued the approach visually; with no further discrepancies. Encroaching weather system; and the lack of ATC foreseeing the need to close off the downwind. Better ATC flow control with given weather conditions. They were extending the downwind into the weather; by allowing several aircraft requesting close in base turn; and approving their request. Several crews advised ATC to not let any aircraft go where they had been. Too late for us unfortunately.

B767-300 flight crew reports being vectored into a thunderstorm during approach after requesting that the storm be avoided. Previous aircraft had reported severe turbulence and this crew reported stick shaker and flap overspeed along with bank angles to 40 degrees before exiting.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We were scheduled to fly to ZZZ. Upon receiving the release before departure; the weather in ZZZ required an alternate which the dispatcher listed as ZZZ1. However; the forecasted weather at our ETA for ZZZ was 300 overcast which did not meet the requirements for the derived minimums to be a legal alternate. Since we were already fueled; I contacted the dispatcher and inquired why ZZZ1 was listed as an alternate. The dispatcher explained that if we didn't get into ZZZ; he would rather us return to ZZZ1. I explained that was understandable; but ZZZ1 was not a legal alternate. After reviewing the derived minimums with the dispatcher; we selected ZZZ2 as the alternate for dispatch purposes. However; we kept the Pfuel the same so we could divert to ZZZ1 if need be. So in the end; we had two releases; the original release with fuel numbers for the ZZZ1 alternate and the amended release with ZZZ2 listed as an alternate. However we did not change the Pfuel from the original release so we could return to ZZZ1.  Once airborne and approaching ZZZ; my First Officer (FO) picked up the weather via ASOS. I was the flying pilot. He advised me of the weather: 1000 overcast; winds were 12004. The field condition report on the release for ZZZ stated the runway was wet. Please note; prior to departure; the ZZZ winds were forecasted to be only light and variable. After requesting landing data via the ACARS; we saw we did not have the minimum required distance for landing on Runway 27 at our current landing weight. (3kt tailwind component on a wet runway)We were still about 50 miles out and decided to continue in route to see if the winds would shift westerly or abate. We were also very close to having the landing distance and entertained burning roughly 200 lbs to make landing numbers. However; five minutes later; my FO listened to the ASOS again; the winds were now 07004; now a 4kt tailwind. I asked my FO to contact ZZZ operations and verify the runway was indeed wet. ZZZ operations stated the runway was wet. At this point; Center had vectored us onto the localizer. They were aware of our situation; and our runway limitation we were dealing with. I asked the controller if he could verify with tower the runway conditions and winds. He did; ZZZ tower controller advised him the runway was wet and the winds were now 09005. This was now a 5 kt tailwind. At this point; my FO and I determined we could not legally or safely land in ZZZ. We also did not want to compromise our divert fuel by trying to burn the additional fuel to make landing numbers. At that point; we decided to divert due to the current trend of increasing winds shifting to a tailwind on a wet runway. We reviewed the original release and the amended released; verified the fuel on board and fuel burn numbers; and determined we had plenty of fuel to return to ZZZ1 (where our dispatcher wanted us to originally divert to.)During this time; my FO was messaging the dispatcher via the ACARS. His messages essentially explained that we could not land in ZZZ due to a wet runway with the current tailwind component...Runway 9 was not feasible due the ceiling. Additionally; he messaged the dispatcher inquiring if he wanted us to return to ZZZ1 or divert to ZZZ2 . There was a substantial delay in the dispatcher messaging us back which added to the workload and stress. He asked why we were not landing and if something was wrong. He stated the weather he saw showed light and variable winds.  However; he was not getting the true winds from the ASOS and the Tower Controller. He also did not provide us any guidance on where to divert or information outlined [in the] FOM.  He seemed more concerned with rationale as to why we were not landing rather than providing us operational information. After various exchanges with this dispatcher and wasting valuable time; I told my FO to message the dispatcher that we were diverting to ZZZ1 due to winds and a wet runway in ZZZ. Finally; the dispatchermessaged us; 'proceed to ZZZ1...no operational information was appended with the message. Again; we made this decision after reviewing the original release and the amended released; verifying the fuel on board and fuel burn numbers to ZZZ1; and determined we had plenty of fuel to divert to ZZZ1. We landed in safely in ZZZ1with 3200lbs of fuel on board. We made the decision as a crew to divert to ZZZ1: this was a very frustrating and stressful experience that could have been avoided if we had better and faster communication with dispatch. It would have been less stressful if the dispatcher would have assisted with information instead of questioning our rationale while airborne. That took a lot of valuable time. Suggestions: Better training of dispatchers concerning alternate airport requirements and landing performance; improving methods of communication with dispatchers when airborne; the ACARS systems in these aircraft are slow and antiquated; they often loose connectivity when in mountainous terrain...in todays world of smart phones and amazing technology; I am perplexed to why we are still dealing with basic communication issues; dispatchers should assist the crew when airborne; not waste time asking for rationale and explanations about a flight while it is  airborne; there is plenty of time for explanations after the flight safely lands....dispatchers are on the ground and removed from the dynamic and fast changing flight environment; they often do not have the full picture of what is occurring; it is inappropriate for a dispatcher to be questioning and challenging a crew's decision during that time; a crew needs direction; information and assistance.

Air carrier Captain reported that while diverting to an alternate airport; the flight crew encountered difficulty obtaining information and assistance from the dispatcher handling the flight.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Sport / Recreational

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 700; Flight Crew Type 400

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

I received a standard weather briefing. Good weather and favorable winds all the way. Plotted the course using Foreflight with its moving map display; on an iPad. Program calculated fuel usage from numbers put into the program. Considering weather and fuel burn rate and quantity; I should have had enough fuel for the first leg with at least 30 minutes of fuel remaining. There were a few spots where I flew into head winds; but other times I flew at indicated speed of 95 or more. I kept an eye on the fuel sight tubes and the right tank tends to draw faster. As I approached [destination] it became apparent that I wouldn't have that full 30 minutes worth left over. I closed my flight plan and flight following. When the right tank was empty it started drawing from the left tank fairly quickly. I contacted the Tower and got clearance to enter a left downwind for landing. About 1 mile from the airport; I was over housing; the engine started to cough and then quit. I knew immediately that I had run out of fuel. I stabilized the aircraft; found a field that I thought I could make it to; contacted the tower and told them I was out of fuel. They said I could land on any runway; but I was quickly losing altitude and airspeed. I was over houses at the time; there was a small green field off the right; and power lines right along the edge of the field. I just cleared the power lines; then had to bank sharply right and lose the last 50-75 feet of altitude immediately. Tower was still offering immediate landing; but I would have to cross a freeway. The field was my only hope. Had full flaps deployed. Got on the ground and found it to be very rough. Was able to stop safely about 10 ft from a ditch; with a fence and the freeway on the other side. Contacted the tower to let them know I was okay and plane was not damaged. They called 911 and a sheriff responded within 10 minutes. He asked how I was doing and if plane was damaged. Then he left to find a way into the field. While he was gone I contacted the plane manufacturer to find the best way to tow it. They strongly recommended not towing it because it would probably damage the landing gear. They recommended flying off the field. The tower recommended against this; but there was no way to get it out of the field. Tower made sure I realized I would be fully responsible for the flight. The sheriff and tow truck drivers arrived and told me how rough the field was and that there were a few deep ruts that ran across the field. I put a minimum amount of fuel in to reduce weight. The wind had shifted; and I had to taxi carefully to the other end of the field. I had walked it and knew the takeoff route that I should follow. With full flaps I gave it full throttle; released the brakes; and began my roll. The grass was fairly tall; and there were big hummocks that made for a very rough ride and slow acceleration. Finally the plane lifted off just before I reached the ditch and I got over the fence. Leveled out about 10 ft. above the freeway to pick up speed; and then climbed out normally. Had the tower put glasses on the landing gear to make sure nothing was damaged on the rough takeoff roll. Made a normal landing then with emergency vehicles following. Refueled at that point and after hearing from both the tower and the sheriff; who had talked with FAA; I continued my flight; with one more stop for fuel.Rechecked calculations for fuel burn that evening and found that the numbers I was using; which I had gotten from a website; were wrong. When I found more accurate numbers and recalculated. I found that I didn't really have enough gas to complete this first leg safely. I have since then changed those numbers and recalculated my fuel usage for the trip home. With one additional fuel stop; I can make it to each refueling stop with plenty of fuel left over at each stop.

LSA pilot reported an off-airport landing after a fuel miscalculation led to the tanks running dry.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Aircraft; Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication

While approaching the airport we were given a clearance direct to the BOG VOR for the ILS Z Runway 13L Approach with a speed assignment of 230 knots. While our altitude was on path for a standardized approach; our speed was higher than anticipated. The First Officer was flying. As we approached the BOG VOR he began to slow the aircraft to 210 knots. I suggested that the First Officer slow the aircraft. He elected to use speed brakes and I further suggested landing gear extension to slow at a faster rate; because there would also be an altitude change passing the VOR. The First Officer elected to utilize LNAV/VNAV and armed the ILS with the autopilot engaged as we were cleared for the approach. As we crossed the VOR the aircraft turned; captured the LOC and glideslope and the aircraft began to descend on the glideslope from the 12;000 foot altitude with the gear extending and the speed brakes deployed. I shifted my focus to the before landing checklist flow; ATC calls and finding the preceding aircraft and airport visually. Those tasks seemed to be done in the usual time frame. When I spotted the airport we seemed to be low. I looked back inside at the flight instruments to check our progress and found we were full scale deflection low on the glideslope; the command bars were centered; the autopilot was still engaged; and the LOC and GS were still captured. This made no sense so my call of 'glideslope deviation' was slowed by another 200 foot loss. I immediately called 'too low; climb now'; pushed the power up and pulled on the yoke. The First Officer also came on the controls; I'm not sure which of us disconnected the autopilot; but I retracted the speed brakes while we climbed back to the glideslope and what looked to be an appropriate visual glide path. There was no GPWS or glideslope (or any other warning) warning. The flight landed without further incident.After arriving at the gate; I called Maintenance Control to try to understand what failure could have transpired since we had no warning/failure indications. It was very possible that the preceding aircraft created interference with the ILS signal. But there is no way for us to gauge to what level that may have occurred. The airport briefing guide mentions possible LOC signal deviations but not glideslope deviations. The mechanic performed some maintenance fault scans. He was scrolling through the long list of faults too fast for me to take good notes; but there were faults which said; 'MCDP flight fault; Main Data Supply fault; several no land 3 faults; ILS Beam Error; and several VNAV failures.' In the final analysis; the mechanic thought that it was a ground based signal error.First; given the nature and history of this airport's flight operations; it should be a Captain only arrival and departure. Since it is not a captain only airport; first officers have every expectation they will either fly into or out of this airport; especially since this is only a two leg day. Several days prior the First Officer had already proclaimed that he had been here at least 8 times in very recent history and was thoroughly familiar and prepared to fly one of the legs in or out. Sometimes even those who think they are prepared have difficulty with this airport. Second; the briefing guide is very comprehensive but should also state that the ILS has possible glideslope signal issues as well. Third; I would recommend not using LNAV/VNAV to get to LOC/GS capture; but rather fly the step down segments as published.

A B767 Captain reported the First Officer descended below the glideslope even though they were using autopilot and were receiving the localizer and glideslope signal.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Aircraft

I and another mechanic were performing routine maintenance on base. After performing various inspection items; I was replacing #2 engine input seal when he asked if I would check over an inspection area he was completing; so he could reinstall the access panel. I stopped the work on the input seal and crawled under the aircraft to verify his work; I visually verified [his] work and began to reinstall the panel; when he said he would get the panel; I said okay because I wanted to get back to the engine work. There was a lack of communication and complacency to verbally verify that one of us was going to finish the panel installation. Then it was the distractions of finishing the other items and to get the aircraft back in service it was overlooked. This was an incident that should have never happened. I was distracted about finishing what I was working on; if I would have just taken a couple minutes to finish the panel install none of this would have happened.One way to avoid this kind of mistake is to communicate more; ask if the panel was secured. And we should always have someone else like the Pilot look over every area; where we had access panels opened to verify that they are installed and secured.

The reporter stated that he neglected to complete the installation of the panel. Because the installation was not complete; the panel got bent in flight. The reporter stated that there was no damage to the aircraft; only to the panel. The reporter stated the panel was located on the underside of the aircraft.

While performing maintenance on an EC135 T2 Helicopter the Mechanic neglected to secure a panel in the lower half of the fuselage.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 850

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Evacuated; General Maintenance Action

Cleared to land 22R with a left base entry.  The aircraft was configured for landing by base entry.  Gear lever down; gear safe light illuminated and manual gear down indication; were observed.  One more gear down and locked check on short final indicated gear down and locked.  On round out the mains touched first followed by the nose gear.  Approximately 1 second after the roll out had begun the left wing began to drop.  The belly drug for about 200 feet before the propeller stuck the ground.  The aircraft slid to a stop in anther 200-300 feet and did not leave the runway. The tower confirmed seeing the gear down on base and final.

The reporter indicated that the event was not a hard landing. He added that the single gear position indicator; the gear safe light; was verified several times prior to landing. The left main gear collapsed initially; but only partially. The nose and right main gear in a 'less extended' position. The landing gear system is linked together by pushrods and the failure of one rod may have affected other portions.

The pilot of a Mooney M20 experienced a landing gear collapse during landing for unknown reasons.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Just as I was about to step off the plane and conduct a post flight walk around for my First Officer; the A Flight Attendant stopped a deplaning passenger from exiting as the jet bridge moved erratically downward. The gate agent then proceeded to reposition the jet bridge. The A Flight Attendant partially closed the forward door until we were given the all safe indication from the gate agent. As we waited the A Flight Attendant informed me they had a similar issue the prior day that took 35 minutes to finish deplaning because of a malfunctioning auto leveler. I decided to start the APU as we waited. I disconnected power and turned on the air conditioning. I also called on the radio to ops to inform them of the malfunction. I asked they send a mechanic out to help fix the jet bridge. As we were waiting I saw the Captain who was waiting at the end of the jet bridge go down below and conduct a pre-flight inspection. Once the jet bridge was in place we continued deplaning without any issues. I told the out going Captain the only issue we had was the jet bridge malfunction. I did not complete a second walk around.The jet bridge issue was not fixed from a earlier issue from the second hand knowledge I obtained. I should have requested an inspection regardless of hearing or seeing any damage done by the jet bridge. I assumed the departing Captain at the end of the jet bridge would have seen any contact with the jet bridge and told me as I was leaving.

I have never been so furious in my career. When I went to the aircraft first; jetway at [gate] was malfunctioning due to an autoleveler fault. I did not witness any aircraft damage and we departed normally. On climbout at 11;000 ft.; the A Flight Attendant called me complaining of a loud squealing on the 1L door. I told him this happens sometimes and as the aircraft pressurizes; the rubber seal will push against the door frame and it will stop. I told him I would call him back in 5 minutes. I called at 17;000 ft. and asked how it was. It was worse and I could hear it on the interphone. I asked him to place a cart out so I could personally come hear. I went out and it was a loud and unusual squeal and whistle. Sitting in the jumpseat; it was almost deafening. I said to him we would climb and let the cabin pressure get to a higher PSI and if it did not resolve; we would look at returning to ZZZ. At 24;000 ft; I called and the noise was worse. We opted to return to ZZZ. Upon landing; I called Maintenance Control. I talked to [Mechanic] [who] told me Aircraft X had the jetway make contact with the main cabin door earlier in the day; and they were planning on replacing the seal on the 1L door. He also told me; 'I am not happy with the way that was handled.' I asked him if he knew there was no record in the logbook. His reply was; 'You're kidding me!' I said; nope. In addition to this; I found out the autoleveler on [gate] had been malfunctioning all day! Station ops had known about this ALL DAY LONG! Aircraft X had been on [gate] all day doing ZZZ turns. Later in the night; local airport maintenance was inspecting the jetway and did actually find a problem with the autoleveler. Clearly someone in Maintenance at ZZZ was involved; because how else would Maintenance Control know about the seal needing replacement? This is borderline criminal negligence. For no record to be made in the logbook when they knew something was wrong with the door; and for me to have to deal with an air return is beyond comprehension. I have never been so livid in my career. To put the crew and the passengers lives at risk because of not properly evaluating and documenting aircraft damage from a faulty jetway; cannot be classified any other way. This is negligence to the highest degree! I cannot believe I took an aircraft with known damage to the door; and I was not informed and it was not documented. No excuse!

Flight Crew reported jet bridge malfunction caused damage to aircraft that was not reported or logged; resulting in a return to departure airport.


Cessna Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 41; Flight Crew Total 6100; Flight Crew Type 165

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

The purpose of the flight was to photograph a coal ash pond that had recently been the site of an accident in northeast West Virginia. Prior to departing; I obtained a preflight briefing using the computer service at my home FBO. This service (WSI) displays a list of NOTAM's for a route of flight. I reviewed the list and did not see any mention of a TFR. I also use the 'Aviator' service from XM which transmits real time TFR information via satellite for display on my GPS moving map. I thought I had the TFR base covered. Upon return to my home base; ATC told me to call. I did and they said I had violated a TFR described in NOTAM that was centered on the exact spot we were photographing. It was a 1-mile radius around the pond up to 3;000 FT. We violated the TFR. There are two possible explanations and one solution. One is the FAA; WSI and/or XM did not properly disseminate the TFR information and it simply was not on the computer or my GPS map to be seen. The second is that I somehow simply missed the NOTAM in the long list that the WSI service displays. The solution; I now know; is to not rely on technology but to call Flight Service and talk to a human. That is my lesson learned.

Cessna pilot is advised after landing that he has violated a TFR located over a coal ash pond. The TFR NOTAM was not noticed on a list provided by WSI nor seen on the GPS moving map display with XM.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were set up and prepared for a visual approach backed up by the ILS. Everything was briefed prior to descent. The weather was clear and night VMC. The tower asked if we had the airport in sight around 15 miles out. After confirming with the captain that he had the airport in sight we were then cleared for the visual approach. We slowed and configured as normal outside the final approach fix. While working the radio and preparing the checklist I noticed the pilot flying descending below the final approach fix altitude a few miles prior. After a second or two I queried him about his altitude and mention he was low and mentioned the altitude at the final approach fix. We continued the descent at 1;000 feet per minute or so to an altitude of I believe around 1;000 feet AGL; while I was reviewing the approach plate; all the while being queried by the tower about our altitude. I made the call altitude again and said we were too low and we needed to level off and go around. At this point we received the GPWS 'terrain' I called for a go around and we climbed to 3;000 feet; still outside the final approach fix. After it was confirmed the pilot flying had indeed Misinterpreted something other than the airport as the airport; and confirming with the tower and pilot flying everything was okay and we were still in a position to make a normal landing at this point; we decided to continue the landing. At this point again [we] became too low and slow on the approach and another go around was then called around 800 feet. We performed a complete go around. After reentering the pattern and autopilot re-engaged; we discussed again that the pilot flying was Indeed aware of airport and runway position; we flew the localizer and glideslope back in and a normal landing was made.The fact the pilot flying Did NOT have the right airport in sight; coupled with his disorientation of position; led to a descent below a safe altitude quickly and suddenly. I was not aware of his disorientation until it was too late. I was taken by surprise as the non flying pilot as I believed the pilot flying was in full contact with the airport and lining up for the runway. I was taken back by how abruptly the airplane was put in an inadvertent; low altitude position. The speed of things happening; led to things becoming unstable quickly. While I called go around the first time a full 'TOGA' go around was not completed as should have been.

An A320 First Officer reports being cleared for a night visual approach to Runway 12L at STL with the Captain flying. The Captain begins descending below the FAF altitude well outside of it and is queried by the First Officer. The descent is continued until the Tower asks the flight to check their altitude and a GPWS warning is annunciated. The crew climbs to 3;000 feet and is still outside the FAF so a second visual approach is attempted with the same results. This time the missed approach is completed and vectors are received to the ILS.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

8 miles from ZIMBI final fix (flying direct); at 4000 feet; we were cleared for the visual approach 28. Once cleared for the visual; I requested 2000 feet to be set and then I selected a descent rate of 1200 fpm. The final fix at ZIMBI had a published altitude of 1600. With the glare from the sun and wearing sunglasses; I did not notice the descent rate was 1900 fpm. We noticed the descent rate and I canceled auto pilot and smoothly transitioned to 1200 fpm. ATC contacted us with a low altitude alert saying there is a MVA of 3000. We leveled off at 2300. Note; MVA is a vectoring altitude and we were direct and cleared for the visual. At all times the aircraft remained in clear VFR conditions and proper altitude clearances were maintained. The altitude rate display was dim even at 100%. In direct sunlight while wearing sunglasses; it is difficult to read.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air Carrier turboprop flight crew reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC during a visual approach to SYR Runway 28 in day VMC. The crew climbed back to 2300 feet before continuing their descent to landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Total 6871; Flight Crew Type 6871

On takeoff in LAX on runway 25R we got a door caution light around 100 kts. I was the pilot monitoring and cancelled the light and said door light (looking back I don't know if I said it loud enough for the Captain to hear) The Captain performed a Rejected Takeoff. We both performed our immediate action items and cleared the runway. We told the tower that we did not need assistance; ran the QRH; talked to the flight attendants (the door light had gone out and we had the FAs re-check the main cabin door handle); and checked the brake cooling charts. We waited about 13 minutes and took off uneventfully.

B737 First Officer reported the Captain rejected the takeoff at around 100 knots when a door warning light came on.


Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was RADAR Controller. Class C Tower called to hand off the C172 who was unable to navigate to the Class D airport in VFR; and was requesting assistance. The weather at both the Class D and Class C had deteriorated rapidly in the prior 10 minutes. I inquired as to if the pilot was IFR rated; to which he replied 'negative.' he had requested a special VFR into Class D. SVFR is not permitted after sunset unless the pilot is IFR rated. I suggested the Class C airport as an alternative; as they were reporting VFR conditions. The pilot proceeded towards the Class C but the encountered clouds blocking his path; and turned away stating he wanted to go to a nearby Class E. He then said he could not see the Class E airport but could see the Class D. I contacted the Class D to see if they had perhaps improved to basic VFR minimums; but the Class D Controller stated they were still IFR. I advised the pilot to maintain VFR; and confirmed he had the terrain in site. He said he had the Class D in site; and after discussion with my FLM; we determined that this was an emergency; and the safest course of action would be to have the pilot land as soon as practical at the Class D. The aircraft landed safely. Specific training on when it is OK to deviate from FAR's for an aircraft in distress.

A C172 contacted TRACON requesting to land at a Class D airport; requesting SVFR. The Class D was IFR and it was after sunset and the pilot stated they were not IFR rated. I told the Controller; the pilot was not qualified for SVFR flight in these conditions. The Controller suggested a Class C airport as VFR alternative and the pilot proceeded towards the Class C. The pilot encountered clouds blocking his path to the Class C and turned away. The Class E airport was also suggested; but the pilot said they could see the Class D airport so I instructed the CPC to allow the aircraft to land at the Class D airport to get them on the ground safely. Pilot pre planning was poor. He should have thought out 'what if'; prior to 5 minutes from destination and review the pilot requirements for SVFR flight.

TRACON Controller with the approval of a supervisor; declared an emergency for a VFR aircraft requesting a SVFR clearance into an airport that was IFR; after official sunset.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was told by the PIC that the download crew found two flammable DG (Dangerous Goods) packages in zone 7 during the offload. That zone of freight comes from ZZZ on the previous leg which is flown by another crew. That zone does not get offloaded in ZZZ1. It stays on the plane all the way to ZZZ2. So; we did not observe the upload of that freight and could not have known that any DG was in there. It is hard to suggest any action since I do not know if the DG was missed by the ZZZ ramp during onload or if it was properly loaded but not downloaded by the ZZZ1 ramp.

Air Carrier First Officer reported undocumented Dangerous Goods were discovered at an intermediate stopover.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Pushback crew left headset attached to nose gear. Upon arrival to ZZZ; the station representative noted sparks emanating from behind the nose gear. Upon arrival; the headset was located and removed from the nose wheel. No damage to the aircraft was noted during the post flight walk around. Looking at the situation as a whole; we were lucky. If the headset became dislodged; it could have created the potential for an engine failure during takeoff and/or landing.Both flight crew and ground crew missed the disconnection of the ground crew headset. Both parties need to ensure disconnection of the bypass pin; the departure of the tug and tow bar; all ground crew is clear of the aircraft; and ensure their personal belongings are removed with them as well.

B767-300 Captain reported Ground Personnel forgot headset attached to nose gear.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 113; Flight Crew Total 3291; Flight Crew Type 267

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Shortly after reaching cruise altitude I noticed an unusually low fuel level on the fuel gauge for the right outboard tank. Later; 22 NM northwest of my destination; the right outboard gauge read 'E.' Five minutes later the right engine quit momentarily as I was in my descent towards the airport at 5;000 FT MSL. I was expecting it; so I turned on the auxiliary fuel pumps and switched to the inboard tanks and the right engine restarted within a few seconds. I continued the approach and landed.After landing the fuel gauges read: Main tanks Left 3/4 - Right 1/2; Outboard Left 1/2 - Right 'E.' According to the run sheet; based on block time I should have 548 LBS of gas. According to the calculations dividing the tank capacity by the indications on the gauges I had a total of 540 LBS indicated. I had the right amount of fuel on board; so no fuel leak; but both engines were obviously feeding from the right side.It all made sense thinking back to the morning preflight when I tested the fuel pumps and any pump on either side showed fuel pressure on both sides of the fuel gauge. At the time of preflight I consulted the lead mechanic who said; 'I've seen that before.' I insisted 3 times and got the same answer.It was suggested at the time that this was a gauge problem and not a system malfunction and that it was 'OK.' I know I have seen this same situation before during preflight; but I'm not sure if it was on this same aircraft. Based on the input from the lead mechanic I understood there was no malfunction at the time of preflight and I only became aware of the problem; on the subsequent flight.

A PA31-350 pilot suffered the temporary loss of the right engine when both engines fed from the same right outboard tank. He switched to the inboard main tanks and completed the flight. He had noted that any boost pump would indicate pressure on both engine fuel pressure gauges prior to flight; but had been told by Maintenance only that 'he had seen it before.' No write up or maintenance action was done prior to the flight that occasioned the report.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Total 5919; Flight Crew Type 881

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

At approximately N3704 W14929 the Captain and I saw what we believed to be a rocket/missile launch likely from a ship. There was a bright plume followed by residual smoke reaching high into the sky. Then we saw several more flashes that we believed were far in the distance. As we continued on course it became apparent that we were going to fly through the smoke trail of the rocket. This caused us concern due to potential air disturbance from the rocket and concern for another rocket going through the same piece of sky. We decided to turn left approximately 20-30 degrees to avoid it and request a deviation from ATC. After we avoided the smoke; we turned to rejoin the route. Then we received notification from ATC that deviation was denied. At this point I erroneously selected direct to the next fix. I should have selected HDG-LNAV to rejoin the course. Could have been a VVM error as well. Several minutes later we received a message from ATC stating that we were 7 miles off course and requested a position report. We sent the position report then requested direct to our next filed waypoint. This was approved. The rest of the flight was uneventful and no further launches or flashes.

The reporter stated that at first both pilots thought the missile was a great distance off. As their aircraft approached a thin cloud layer which they thought could be the missile's exhaust plume they deviated from their track. They did consider the possibility of a Vandenberg AFB missile launch but considered that a missile launched over 1;500 miles away would probably not be that visible. The event was not reported to ATC because they were uncertain about their perception of the missile's distance. Other aircraft were discussing the event on the common frequency but no one identified the object.

An air carrier First Officer reported what he believed to be a live missile firing near N37.04 W149.29. The flight deviated but ATC requested they return to track.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We were in the terminal area deviating around some small isolated thunderstorms.  We were descending down to 11;000 FT. When passing through 13;000 FT; we were struck by lightning.  We saw a flash of light.  I saw sparks fly out of the overhead circuit breaker panel.  I saw a bolt come down from the right side of the panel and connect with my co-pilot's headset.  We immediately noticed 2 CBs pop; and smelled a burnt odor.  We also noticed burn marks on various parts of the overhead CB panel. After we were struck; there was no sign of smoke or fire.  Everything seemed to operate normally except for the burnt smell and an indication showing that the wing anti-ice was ON.  One of the two breakers popped was the wing anti-ice breaker.  My co-pilot [notified ATC] and we got immediate vectors for the ILS. I briefed the flight attendant on our [urgent] situation and she briefed the passengers. The remainder of the flight was uneventful.  With what I saw on my radar screen; I didn't think there was a concern with where we were choosing to deviate around the weather and I didn't think we could have done anything more to avoid the lightning strike or the weather.

DA-2000 flight crew reported being struck by lightning in their destination terminal area. They noted some popped circuit breakers; burn marks; and a burnt smell.


Air Taxi X was in my airspace after departing BKL climbing to 6;000 FT. Mansfield Approach called with a manual hand off on [Air Taxi Y] an inbound to BKL also with the callsign. This caused difficulty starting a track on the inbound; and communicating with both aircraft even after explaining to both pilots of the duplicate call signs. This has the potential to be a very dangerous situation. There is absolutely no reason a company should have the same call sign on 2 active flights at the same time; given the infinite number of possible flight numbers.

CLE Controller voiced concern regarding the continued use of identical call signs by one company with both aircraft operating at the same time and in the same locality.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

While on approach at approximately 700ft as Pilot Monitoring (PM) I noticed the speed brakes were not armed. I then looked at the ignition switches and noticed they were off and I quickly realized the landing checklist had not been accomplished. The situation was corrected and checklist completed prior to the 500 ft stable call. I am writing this [report] as a concern with our new landing procedures on the B737. As far as I am concerned the landing checklist should be completed prior to the FAF at the very least. With these new procedures the landing checklist; talking to ATC for landing clearance and the 1000ft call can come right on top of each other. All of these things are taking away from the pilot monitoring to do exactly what they should be tasked with which is MONITORING the airplane and backing up the flying pilot. This is not the first time I have experienced this problem but fear what might result from this current procedure. This event was the closest I have come to landing without having armed the speed brakes. Had there been more distractions and the weather worse we may have not caught this and landed in a situation that would be good to have had them.

A B737 First Officer reported that the new procedure as to when to use the Landing Checklist has increased the workload during approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 5200; Flight Crew Type 200

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 60

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

We were enroute to the Restricted Area 12;000 ft. We received a clearance of 'cleared all altitudes ...'. We were almost to Restricted Area and the pilot flying thought it was an immediately effective clearance and commanded a climb toward our desired altitude. I was running the after-takeoff checklist and was in another shelter (not co-located). The pilot flying did not inform me that he had commanded a change to our altitude as is the procedure so that the other shelter knows what commands are being sent. Approach called and announced our off-altitude condition and I immediately realized what had happened. The pilot flying immediately commanded a descent back to the correct altitude.Approach passed a number to call and as the 'Mission Commander' I called. I apologized to the person who identified himself as the 'lead controller' and explained that the pilot flying had not understood the clearance as his experience led him to believe that a future clearance would have had 'upon entering' 'when established in' 'after passing' or something identifying exactly when it became effective. We are both very sorry for the event and have reviewed our procedures both privately and with ALL of our fellow pilots at our weekly pilot meeting. We have also reviewed the requirement for the pilot flying to announce changes to aircraft configuration so that the shelter not flying has the situational awareness needed to know that the aircraft profile has been changed.

Flying RQ-4 aircraft under COA requiring 12;000 ft. in the NAS. Received clearance from Approach that we were cleared all altitudes in the Restricted Area at this time. I was still 2 to 3 miles from the Restricted Area airspace and I incorrectly initiated a climb early. The Controller told me that I initiated too early. I immediately knew he was correct; so I initiated a quick descent until I was in the Restricted Area. The mission continued normally. The Mission Commander spoke on telephone and apologized for us. Approach stated there was no other traffic in area and no conflicts occurred.The Pilot must stay on top of the restrictions. That is not the job of ATC. After 18;000 hours of flying; my brain was triggered by the word 'cleared'. I had been accustomed to hearing the words 'expect' or ''after reaching' 'after passing'. Improved listening and confirmations could have prevented that.

UAV flight crew reported that their misunderstanding of a clearance resulted in an altitude deviation.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

After lengthy and unexpected taxi instructions from ground; I wrote down the instructions and expanded my airport diagram so as not to leave my Captain in the lurch. 14L data was not on the TPS so; after I made sure my partner knew his way to the runway; I requested TPS 14L. Since we were expecting 22L; I entered the new runway in the FMC. Even selected 14LX in the FMC; as X was listed for intersection U2. What neither of us caught was the TPS data was for full length 14L. The ensuing takeoff was long! We both realized our mistake; and after the climb went over the TPS very carefully. We were probably 4;000 pounds too heavy for the runway. Stop the aircraft before the runway; and make darn certain the CORRECT RUNWAY AND INTERSECTION is what's displayed on the TPS and the correct flaps/thrust setting correlates with it. I was distracted by a circuitous and unfamiliar taxi route and I should have asked my Captain to take some time; short of the runway to review the unfamiliar data. He was taxiing slowly; but I was still playing catch up.

Prior to taxiing planned Runway 22L for departure; max power; 26K; due to winds (ATIS: 090/07 knots); weight and runway length; First Officer's Leg to Fly. On taxi out assigned Runway 14L at U2 intersection. With a long taxi to 14L ( via A; A6; J; hold short 9R then further clearance G; E; U); First Officer went heads down to pull new TPS. With New TPS we updated runway; headings; flaps; power setting; etc. With a call for takeoff data and bugs I took the TPS and began reviewing the data in the FMC. My first item was to verify the runway intersection was correct and as I accessed the FMC takeoff pages the First Officer pointed out the runway information; on the FMC; to confirm he had put in X/14L; in my estimation; for the new TPS 14L at U2 intersection; which I confirmed from the TPS that U2 intersection was indeed called 14LX. Confident the TPS that was pulled was for 14L at U2; I went straight to the flap settings v-speeds etc.; and bypassed the first item listed in that row (the actual runway associated with that TPS which was 14L and not 14LX). Before Takeoff checks were completed and the flight cleared for takeoff. During takeoff roll aircraft performance indications were normal (N1; ground speed; etc.); however; remaining runway length became questionable if we had to abort. Continuing takeoff roll to V1/VR resulted in a much less than comfortable fly off point; on what I estimated; as less than one thousand feet of runway remaining. An inquiry to the Tower; for current winds; yielded winds at 100/09 knots; which was an approximate 4 knot headwind. Subsequent reviews; of possible causes lead us; almost immediately; to the TPS where we discovered it was pulled for 14L (full length 10k+ ft) and not 14LX (7310 ft). During the flight; we conducted a lengthy and complete review of the entire how; where; when and whys; on the proper procedures in retrieving; updating; managing; and verifying; TPS; runway and FMC information. I recognized the seriousness of this incident and have taken all possible steps to ensure this and any similar event is avoided in the future; to the best of my ability. I fully understand that the safety; conduct and successful completion of every flight under my command is my responsibility and I will continue to take all necessary steps to ensure the completion of my duties.

B737-800 flight crew reports departing Runway 14L from Taxiway U2 at ORD without verifying that U2 is an authorized intersection in the TPS [Takeoff Performance System] preplan. The result is a lift off point very close to the end of the runway.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 280; Flight Crew Type 280

Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Instructor Pilot was shadowing a student pilot during landing on Runway 31 at ZZZ. Student landed and bounced; slightly to the left of center line.He then input 300 rpms of power and full right brake and rudder. Aircraft was going about 65 kts. Because of this; the strong input of the brake caused the aircraft to skid and lift one wheel off the ground.This caused the aircraft to go off the runway and eventually stop on the grass to the right off of Runway 31.

C172 flight instructor reported a loss of control during landing that resulted in a runway excursion.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 1070; Flight Crew Type 1010

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft

While on final approach to ZZZ; 4 mins / 15 nm. out; 3;000 ft.; felt a soft 'thump' then a vibration. Troubleshot; verified and executed precautionary shutdown left engine; landed single engine.

BE55 Pilot reported engine issue and precautionary shutdown on final approach.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 2180; Flight Crew Type 1396

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

On approach into Boston; at night with visibility unlimited. We were initially cleared direct to RIPIT; the outer marker; and to descend to 2000 ft; on approach over the water to Runway 27. The altitude at RIPIT is charted at 1700 ft.With no traffic between us and the airport; we were then cleared direct RIPIT and cleared for the visual approach. My plan was to keep the speed up as long as I was comfortable and then slow a few miles outside of the outer marker but I did not want to be high and fast; thus causing an unstabilized approach. I turned off the auto pilot and auto throttles and was hand flying the airplane in a gradual descent of maybe 200-300 ft./min with approach mode armed and still in open descent however; almost all of my visual reference was outside and not referencing instruments or flight director. I had the runway in sight during the entirety of the approach however at some point; I completely lost situation awareness and ended up down between 900 to 1000 ft. AGL with the gear still up and 210 kts. My relationship to the outer marker when I 'captured this error' is unclear; as I stated my having lost situational awareness. I immediately leveled the aircraft at 1000 ft.; lowered the gear and slowed to flap speed and had an otherwise stabilized approach and landing on Runway 27 at Boston.Contributing factors to this incident would be flying into a 'black hole' and the visual references associated with that as well as fatigue. I did not feel fatigued at the time however; in recounting this incident and thinking about other small errors; such as missed radio calls; I do not think I was 'on the top of my game'. I did not realize this at the time otherwise I would have flown more conservatively. I had normal rest having been awake 12 hours and a duty start time of XA:00 with an event at XG:20.

A320 Captain reported descending out of assigned altitude during final approach; requiring evasive action.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 191; Flight Crew Type 9

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Upon the commencement of takeoff roll on Runway XX at ZZZ the left rear door jettisoned from the aircraft. The door departing the aircraft was audible. Pilot noticed [the] rear door was missing. Pilot immediately aborted the takeoff and exited the runway returning to the run-up area and shut down / secured the aircraft. Pilot contacted the FBO operator to report the incident. Pilot and aircraft were approached by owner. Door was retrieved from adjacent taxiway. No damage to the aircraft was evident other than the door being jettisoned. The door itself had scuffs on the plexiglass window and sheared off at the hinges but did not appear otherwise damaged. The exterior of the aircraft appeared undamaged. Further; no damage was evident to the airport environment. No injuries to persons occurred. Pilot recalls completing all preflight checklist items prior to start; taxi; run-up and takeoff. PFD (Primary Flight Display) Annunciator indicated all doors and latches were secure. Pilot also performed a visual check indicating doors were secure. Taxi and run-up were performed without incident.  Pilot believes that the latch / sensor may have been faulty causing door to jettison during the beginning of takeoff roll.

Pilot flying DA 40 aircraft reported door departing aircraft on takeoff roll.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 126; Flight Crew Total 2399; Flight Crew Type 2399

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 109; Flight Crew Total 7841; Flight Crew Type 7841

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Airport

Scheduled flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. Tower was closed for operations due to COVID-19. We both followed procedures for closed Tower; by making calls in the blind and contacting ZZZ TRACON for clearance and for departure time/permission There were multiple scheduled pushbacks at XA:45. The Captain briefed pushing back a few minutes early if possible to help alleviate congestion in a non-tower environment. We pushed and taxied to the hold short and called TRACON we were ready for departure. TRACON released us. I asked TRACON to clarify we were cleared to takeoff and they replied yes we were. We took off and departed uneventful following noise abatement procedure. After airborne; we discussed that we had departed several minutes before XB:00. ZZZ 10-7 page states no departures XP:00-XB:00L. After obtaining release from TRACON and verifying we were cleared to takeoff from ZZZ we realized that we had taken off several minutes prior to XB:00 once we were airborne. Other aircraft from another airline also took off before XB:00.

Air carrier flight crew reported the ATC Tower changed hours of operation and was closed due to COVID-19; resulting in a takeoff before curfew ended.


Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

During boarding a Flight Attendant (FA); arrived at the boarding door in uniform with a dog on a leash. I was FA 1 and was standing at the boarding door. I stated 'Oh. I was told that there weren't any service animals on this flight.' She stated that the dog was not a service animal but she would put him in the carrier once she got to the seat. She went to her seat and the boarding process continued. After we had played the safety video I did my walk through for my safety check. I noticed that the flight attendant had her dog swaddled in a blanket in her arms. I told her that the dog needed to be in the carrier under the seat. She said that she would before we took off. I told her that now would be the time and waited for her to do it. She told me that I did not need to wait and I said 'as a flight attendant; you know that I do. I am performing my safety checks and need to make sure that everyone is in compliance.' She then got upset and said 'just wait until I come up there later and have a word with you.' I felt as though she was trying to intimidate me and so I asked her if she was threatening me. She laughed and asked me 'do you really want to do this?' I again took this as intimidation and asked her if she wanted to go back to the gate. She laughed and then put the dog in the carrier. I finished my checks and then went to the front and looked up her name on the tablet. I noticed that the passenger sitting in her seat had a paid ticket so to confirm who she was I went back to her and asked for her ID. She did not show me her ID but instead wrote her name and employee number on a sick bag and gave it to me while stating 'go ahead and call the office. They all know who I am.' I felt this was another way to intimidate me. The dog was in the carrier so I went to my seat in the hopes that she would calm down.During the flight I spoke with my captain about the situation and we both agreed that we would wait to see if she gave us any more problems before we took further action. At the end of the flight while I was doing my safety checks before landing I noticed that the dog was again out of the carrier but she was putting him back in it. Once we got to the gate the captain came out of the flight deck as soon as possible to witness if there were any further problems with the flight attendant. The flight attendant then deplaned with the dog out of the carrier on a leash. The captain said that he was going to go talk to her about her actions and followed her off the plane. I did not hear anything else so I figured that the situation was being taken care of. Last week I was asked to come into the office to speak with my Manager. She stated that she received a complaint letter from [the Flight Attendant in question] stating that I was rude and did not handle the situation properly. I was told by my Manager that I should have never waited to make sure that she put the dog in the carrier and that my job is not to 'enforce' FAA regulations but only to 'inform'. She stated that I should have told her to put the dog away only a couple of times and then let her be. She stated that the flight attendant was trying to calm her dog down because he had anxiety about flying. When I told her that [the Flight Attendant in question] tried to intimidate me she responded by defending [the Flight Attendant in question] by saying that the dog was a rescue dog and had special needs and that I should have spoken to [the Flight Attendant in question] about the dog when she got on the plane.I need some guidance because now I'm confused about my place in my job. I cannot find anywhere in the manual that states that a dog who is not a service animal can remain out of the carrier for any reason. It is also my understanding that passengers must be in compliance at all times and should not argue or intimate a flight attendant under any circumstance. What should I have done in this situation? As a flight attendant are we just supposed to inform the passengers about the rules and then let them be? Please help me understand this situation better.

B737 Flight Attendant reported having to instruct an off duty Flight Attendant in uniform; to keep her small dog in its carrier prior to and after the flight.


Vans Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 290

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On five mile called on local frequency a five mile straight in approach; also a closer final approach to landing Runway XX. Landed Runway XX and about 1/3 down [the] runway another plane; about 1;500 feet ahead coming toward me from the opposite direction; Runway XY. Both planes headed toward opposite sides of the runway. I stayed just on the blacktop and the other plane touched a little gravel before reentering the blacktop runway surface; in order to pass me. My plane is a low wing and the other was a high wing. Both planes and occupants suffered zero damage. We proceeded back to the ramp for conversation to try to learn what element had been missing; leading up to the event. We both had radio contact as we returned to the ramp. The other pilot stated they were on a standard pattern touch and go. Wind was light and variable; however it favored Runway XX only slightly; as it was a quartering headwind from the West. Either runway would have been acceptable and the other pilot elected to use the standard box pattern; Right Down wind for Runway XY given the low wind speed from his quartering West entry to final. While I elected a long straight in approach. While both approaches to landing are appropriate; my choice requires additional visual observation; which didn't mitigate the event in this instance. While the event ended without injury or damage; I continue to look for mitigation for future operations. This kind of event has never happened to me in the past and likely will not in the future but; interested in any thoughts for future education or procedures for the future safety!

GA Pilot reported a critical ground conflict on landing rollout with opposite direction landing. Both aircraft deviated in opposite directions to avoid a collision. Neither pilot reported hearing radio position reports.


Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Workload

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Shortly after lift-off; the FO informed me something was wrong as the aircraft wanted to slowly pitch up. We accelerated and cleaned up on schedule. I then took the controls. To maintain the aircraft's vertical trajectory; a very slight forward pressure was needed on the stick. When the stick was released; we noticed that the trim wheel was very slowly rotating with a nose up trim movement and the aircraft slowly pitched up. As soon as forward pressure was placed on the side stick; the trim wheel would reverse itself and slowly trim nose down. I decided that this was not something we wanted to experiment with on our way to ZZZ1 and decided to return to ZZZ. We used an ACARS message to inform Dispatch; called Ops on the radio; I briefed the four Flight Attendants on the interphone and made a brief PA to the passengers. We decided to not engage the autopilot as the aircraft was stable even with the need for slight forward pressure on the stick. We also weren't sure what the trim situation might be when the autopilot was disengaged for landing.We asked for and flew a ten mile final as we were slightly above landing weight. On short final; our weight was still showing 171;800 pounds. I decided a slight overweight landing was a better choice than the unknowns of a night missed visual approach. I also then realized I should have declared an emergency. We had a flight control issue! However; touchdown was at less than 100 feet per minute sink rate. We taxied normally to the gate.

A321 Captain reported the aircraft's autotrim malfunctioned during departure. The crew elected to return to the departure airport.


Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

We had departed from EYE flying the Mario5 Departure and had been assigned 4000 ft. I was the pilot monitoring and was working the climb checklist. While silently running the checklist; I heard my FO (First Officer) say 'Whoa!' I immediately looked up and noted that we were about 300-350 ft. above our assigned level off altitude of 4000 ft. Immediately took the controls from my FO and corrected back to our assigned altitude of 4000 ft. Leading up to the event; I had been completing the climb checklist. I noted that for some reason I had not turned off the taxi/landing lights. Therefore; I went through the checklist deliberately; to ensure I had missed nothing else. It was while doing this I was heads down; and missed the 'approaching 4;000' call out. There was not any communication from the controlling facility. There was no issuance of a number of any kind. The reminder of the flight was carried out uneventfully.I would say that it was partially my being tired from min rest. However; the reality is that I was distracted by a checklist item; which I am certain contributed to this event. Further contributing was that my FO was newer and was hand flying the aircraft.

Flight crew reported overshooting altitude during climb.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 105; Flight Crew Total 12700; Flight Crew Type 4778

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 23500; Flight Crew Type 7000

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

At 100 KIAS the First Officer airspeed tape went red; lost airspeed indication. First Officer; who was pilot flying; announced 'airspeed failure; take controls'. Captain immediately took controls and executed a normal takeoff profile. First Officer reverted to pilot not flying. Captain asked me to complete after takeoff checklist; coordinate for a return with Departure Control and Dispatch. With autopilot 1 engaged; FMGC programmed; all checklists complete and on vectors; First Officer's air data switch was selected to AD3 with no restoration of speed tape. Switch was returned to normal and back to AD3 with a successful restoration of airspeed indication. [We] executed an uneventful landing.

Just prior to 100 KTS; First Officer (pilot flying) announced 'Airspeed failure; Take Priority'; I took control and decided the safest course of action was to continue the take off vs. a high speed rejected take off. All normal procedures and checklists were followed. After the Takeoff checklist was completed the First Officer selected air data first officer on 3. The airspeed still showed failed. We decided the prudent and safest course of action was to land at the nearest airport--returning [to departure airport]. A non-emergency request to return was made; we notified Dispatch; completed all associated checklists and a normal uneventful landing was accomplished. It should be noted that a second attempt selecting First Officer on 3 did restore his airspeed indications.

A320 flight crew reports First Officer's airspeed failure at 100 KTS during takeoff. The Captain assumes control and continues the takeoff. First attempt at switching the First Officer to AD3 is unsuccessful and the crew elects to return to the departure airport; although the second attempt is successful.


Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

The SDF Tower Controller cleared me for takeoff on Runway 17R and said to RNAV TAYVL. We were departing on the FEDRA ONE RNAV Departure and I read back; 'Cleared for takeoff direct TAYVL.' I selected and executed TAYVL while the First Officer selected LNAV on the MCP. Departure Control told us to turn to a heading of 180; traffic off the left; and we were to be on the FEDRA ONE Departure. We turned to the heading and I told ATC that I thought we were instructed to proceed direct to TAYVL. I am still confused as to why the instruction is not FEDRA ONE RNAV Departure TAYVL if they want you to stay on the departure. I really thought the instruction was to RNAV to TAYVL; miscommunication with ATC.

We were cleared to line up and wait on Runway 17R. Captain transferred aircraft control to me (the pilot flying). We were cleared for takeoff and I understood the clearance to fly the RNAV departure we had briefed; loaded; and verified. I selected LNAV prior to takeoff and announced my selection. The takeoff sequence was normal and we were on profile. I noticed that the command bars were directing me to turn to the left although I thought we were to continue on the 168 degree heading per the FEDRA1 Departure. I was confused because in my mind I believed we were to fly further away from the runway before turning towards TAYVL. I looked at the departure page quickly and tried to find my misunderstanding and verify what the correct lateral path was. There is no DME information prior to turning east toward TAYVL. I recall thinking that it must be an altitude that we obtain and perhaps that dictated a turn to the east. We were above 3;000 FT AGL and I was near VFS still. My attention was diverted further because I was still handing flying the aircraft at this point. I asked the Captain why the command bars were commanding a left turn so quickly once I could not figure it out for myself. I said that it did not make sense to me as I thought we were to fly further south than we had. The Captain responded that we were cleared direct TAYVL and that was what the Captain had selected. I did not see the Captain line select direct but once I was informed we were cleared direct via ATC by the Captain; I initiated the turn toward TAYVL. I thought that while I was hand flying and trying to figure out the correct lateral path that I missed a radio transmission from ATC clearing us direct to TAYVL. Again; my focus was on flying the aircraft and attempting to solve the discrepancy presently. The coordination between us was a factor as well as the clearance as it was understood from SDF Tower Controller. Rather quickly; we were told to fly a heading of 170 and then 180. I complied and turned immediately. When we were told to do so I realized that something was wrong. I should have placed the aircraft on autopilot sooner. It would have 'freed' me from having to hand fly and correct a navigation and communication issue. I should have asked the Captain to verify with ATC immediately when the initial doubt about our lateral path came into question. I didn't hear 'cleared direct' but simply accepted that was the clearance given after I queried the Captain. The Captain was sure of the direct clearance so I complied. But; I should have asked the Captain to verify that because my attention was on hand flying and in being confused as to why the flight director was commanding an easterly turn. I should have backed up the Captain in that respect and should have been more assertive and helpful. The clearance from SDF Tower may have been non-standard in delivery. We were informed that SDF is encountering many of these types of deviations. Perhaps clearer verbiage would be advantageous.

Air Carrier departure from SDF failed to comply with ATC instructions partly due to miscommunication in the cockpit and the ATC instructions.


Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Time Pressure

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 182; Flight Crew Type 12500

Workload; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

On takeoff from Runway 01 at DCA we were assigned the REBLL2 RNAV Departure. Prior to takeoff roll; both flight directors had been turned on with the Captain's (PF) set as master and LNAV was armed. On takeoff roll; the TOGA button was depressed and the autothrottles set the commanded takeoff thrust. Sometime between then and 400 feet AGL the flight directors disappeared from view and LNAV failed to engage. This was noticed at 400 feet AGL with the normal procedure to 'Verify LNAV.' I (PM) reselected TOGA to regain the flight directors then selected LNAV. Meanwhile; observing outside the cockpit that we were in danger of proceeding north of the Potomac River; I directed a left turn which the Captain (PF) was already beginning to initiate. We intercepted the normal departure course and flew the departure as published. By our estimation we had not entered the restricted airspace. I was also monitoring Guard frequency and we received no radio communication on that frequency.

Contract Maintenance in ZZZ could not duplicate the problem. Company MX Control said they have a history of this problem occurring on this aircraft but it always passes the BITE check. The same problem occurred with our takeoff from ZZZ. The aircraft was MEL'ed in ZZZ for LNAV and flight directors. Fixing the problem will avoid this from occurring again. Losing this system in IMC on an LNAV departure leaves the crew with limited choices.

A B737NG departed DCA on the REBLL2 RNAV. Shortly after takeoff both flight directors failed and LNAV ceased guidance so the crew manually initiated a turn to the departure course and avoided P56.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Flying at cruise and reduced the power to descent and set up for landing and the throttle at idle power was still producing 2;200 RPMs. I tried everything to get a reduction of power but I could not get the power to reduce. I notified ATC at ZZZ; set up on a 3 mile final; and shut the engine off at 100 feet landing engine out. This was the only option due to not being able to create a reduction in power. I rolled out on Runway 36L and was able to make a right turn onto taxiway Juliet past the hold short line to be able to keep the runway open. I believe there was just an issue with the throttle control to the engine. There was no injuries or aircraft damage.

PA28 instructor reported a throttle control anomaly which prevented a reduction of power; and necessitated the engine to be shut down just prior to landing.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.3

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft X had requested an opposite direction departure during pushback. When they called for taxi the opposite direction was denied and full route taxi instructions were issued to the active; Runway 10R. The taxi route crossed a closed runway and the active runway prior to getting to the active runway at departure end. Correct taxi instructions were given. The pilot read back; 'Taxi via ... cross Runway 10L to Runway 10R'. I believed I heard 'cross Runway 10L; hold short 10R'.As Aircraft X was crossing Runway 10L the Local Controller was clearing Aircraft Y for takeoff on Runway 10R. As Aircraft Y was starting takeoff roll I observed Aircraft X cross the hold short line for Runway 10R and instructed them to hold short of Runway 10R. I alerted local to Aircraft X incursion and returned my attention to Aircraft X. The pilots of Aircraft X began breaking and turned to the west about 60 degrees to avoid crossing the runway edge line of Runway 10R.Aircraft Y was airborne and passed approximately 50 FT horizontally and vertically from Aircraft X.I then coordinated and crossed Aircraft X and issued the Brasher statement.Although it is proper (and 7110.65 recommended) phraseology; and the FAR's specifically prohibit a pilot from crossing any portion of the assigned runway without a crossing clearance; in the future I will not issue full taxi instructions to aircraft required to hold short of the active runway somewhere along their route. I will only issue instructions up the hold short point.

BOI Ground Controller reports of a near collision that happened with a passenger aircraft that had a runway incursion and an aircraft that was departing the airport.