Air Traffic Control Radar 14; Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6.5

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Training in progress; we were working departure; west radar and satellite combined; moderate VFR conditions. Aircraft X eastbound restricted to 10;000 feet with Aircraft Y also eastbound climbing above Aircraft X. The trainee restricted Aircraft X at 10;000 feet; at some point the pilot asked for a block altitude 9000 feet block 10;000 feet; the trainee responded 'I have your request'; it was never approved. The trainee started to fall behind; there was a lot of frequency congestion on multiple frequencies. The amount of traffic and frequency congestion was beyond the trainee's capability so I took the frequencies. Aircraft X was blocked on the frequency at least once but I knew he was restricted below Aircraft Y and I had higher priority transmissions. I heard the controller-in-charge (CIC) ask what Aircraft X was doing; I saw him at 103 and immediately descended him back to 10;000 feet; I gave him the brasher warning. The Pilot stated that I didn't answer him so he decided to climb (paraphrasing). I never saw a loss of separation; the closest altitudes were 10;700 feet and 11;700 feet.Although this was not a result of a phraseology error; I did review 'On request' phraseology with the trainee. I don't believe the pilot was confused about the altitude restriction. The pilot did not receive a reply from ATC due to frequency congestion and decided to climb. Even if I would have taken control of the position and frequencies sooner; it would not have prevented this situation because I had other higher priorities. I would recommend monthly or quarterly meetings with the squadrons; an exchange of knowledge; rules and restrictions from both sides (pilots and controllers; not office staff or management) would be beneficial.

The two aircraft involved in the incident were Aircraft X and Aircraft Y which departed Tucson Int'l. Both aircraft departed simultaneously off their respective airports simultaneously which are separated by only 4.1 miles. Both aircraft are filed to go out the same exit fix 'MESCA'; but Aircraft X has an assigned altitude of 13;000 feet prior to getting shipped to center; and Aircraft Y has an assigned altitude of 17;000 feet; but is expected to get direct El Paso however that would require Aircraft Y going over the top of Aircraft X once separation is established. I noticed the aircraft were climbing at similar rates so Aircraft X was capped at 9;000 feet and Aircraft Y continued to climb. When Aircraft Y reached 10;000 MSL I would put him over the top of Aircraft Y and give him direct El Paso. I tried calling traffic for Aircraft Y on two occasions; but he could not get the aircraft in site. Also going on in the airspace was a guard recovery of multiple aircraft checking in with requests on different frequencies that I was monitoring. There were also different departures checking in at the same time. The frequencies were getting congested as people started stepping on each other. I am only [time removed] training hours into this position and I was starting to get a little overwhelmed. I then noticed that Aircraft Y had left 11;000 feet so I went back and assigned Aircraft X 10;000 feet which was read back correctly by the pilot. At that point Aircraft X requested a block altitude of 11;000 feet to 13;000 feet. My response was 'Aircraft X; I have your request'. I went back and talked to other aircraft. A moment later my trainer took over the frequency and told Aircraft X he can not climb on his own and warned of a possible pilot deviation. I looked at the data blocks and Aircraft X had climbed through 10;000 feet and was indicating 10;400 feet while Aircraft Y was still going over the top indicating 11;300 feet. My trainer took over the frequency to catch me up a little bit; and also to warn Aircraft X of a possible pilot deviation; and advise he call the radar facility. I was unsure if there was an actual loss of separation. The Falcon replay looked to show 1;000 feet at all times; but I was told that the there was a loss of separation. The final was 800 feet and 3.84 miles. I feel this was a pilot deviation as Aircraft X was assigned and read back 10;000 feet; a safe altitude that met all upcoming Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA); but he decided to climb on his own.As a trainee I learned a lot from this incident especially after a debrief with my trainer; and more discussion with a FLM as I discussed what were some different techniques to act sooner; and get better control of the frequency. The plan I had did ensure separation; but there were different techniques to not even make this a factor had I acted on the conflict sooner. I know there are techniques to such as expediting climbs if able; or stopping one of the aircraft sooner. I am new to radar and am learning a lot; but this was an unfortunate event that I was able to learn a lot from.My original plan to separate the aircraft could have worked; but as a result of this deviation I learned ways to better control the frequency and resolve conflicts closer to the airport as opposed to further out when aircraft are at higher speeds.

U90 Approach Controller describes a confusing reply from his trainee to a pilot. Pilot requested a block altitude; Controller answered 'On request.' Pilot later climbs on his own and separation was lost.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 36; Flight Crew Total 145; Flight Crew Type 142

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Reporter is a new pilot with no previous canyon flying experience and had not been warned during training about analyzing a canyon prior to entry. Reporter described the climbing maneuver used in an attempt to exit the rising terrain; and how he had no airspeed left for the last 20-30 feet prior to the rim. He instead stalled a few feet above a snow covered sloped field and was able to walk out of the situation. The only damage during landing was a bent propeller blade. However; the fuselage was damaged during the attempted recovery with a helicopter and sling.

Reporter is a new pilot with no previous canyon flying experience; and had not been warned during training about analyzing a canyon prior to entry. Reporter described the climbing maneuver sloped field and was able to walk out of the situation. The only damage during landinused in an attempt to exit the rising terrain; and how he had no airspeed left for the last 20-30 feet prior to the rim. He instead stalled a few feet above a snow covered g was a bent propeller blade; however the fuselage was damaged during the attempted recover with a helicopter and sling.

The pilot of a C150 reported entering a canyon that did not provide an escape route; and resulted in an off-field landing just short of the canyon rim.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 23; Flight Crew Total 252; Flight Crew Type 126

General Maintenance Action; General Police / Security Involved

After completing a local sightseeing flight in my Paradise P-1 (PAR1) on a beautiful clear day; I returned to my home airport for one touch n go and then a planned full stop. I made a very good stable approach with the aircraft properly configured; airspeed correct over the threshold; and aligned with the runway centerline. I made a normal flare and I sensed that the aircraft had touched down on the main gear first. When the nose came down the nose strut collapsed; the prop hit the pavement and I slid about 100 feet. I immediately shut everything off including fuel flow and called on the CTAF for assistance to remove the airplane from the runway. There were NO injuries; NO fuel leaks and NO damage to airport property. It was an unfortunate incident as describe in 49 CFR Part 830. However; several people near the runway had seen the incident and called 911. Soon police and firetrucks responded. I refused medical examination but the bureaucracy ball had been in motion. When the police were notified that there was a disabled aircraft on the runway; they immediately notified Center and the NTSB! The airport manager issued a runway closed NOTAM for several hours. The police would not let us move the airplane until they heard back from the NTSB that it was OK to move it. I told them over and over it was an incident and did not need to be reported; but they had already notified NTSB. I finally talked to an FAA Representative and got permission from him to move the airplane to my hangar for insurance assessment and hopefully repairs and return to service.This was an unfortunate incident of possible material failure of the nose gear strut causing the nose landing gear to collapse. NO injuries to personnel; NO damage to airport property and NO fuel leaks. Just embarrassment and frustration at the way it was handled by local authorities with a report to the NTSB.

A Paradise P-1 pilot reported that after a stabilized approach and normal main wheel landing; the nose strut collapsed when he lowered it onto the runway.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Shortly before our final descent into ZZZ several flight attendants began experiencing various symptoms ranging from dizziness to nausea. Approximately 3-5 minutes later the Captain called to ask if we had noticed a rapid descent. We confirmed that we had noticed a change in cabin pressure because our ears had popped. The Captain said we had just experienced a depressurization but the cabin altitude never got high enough for the masks to drop and they decided not to deploy them manually or make a public address to inform the passengers what was going on. In this the Captain assumed we were fine because we had not figured out we were experiencing hypoxia.Several minutes later all 7 crewmembers were experiencing various symptoms of hypoxia. Taking all of this into account I decided it would be advisable to administer oxygen. Flight Attendant 5 contacted the flight deck to advise them that we had used an O2 bottle and get clarification on what was going on. The Captain took the initiative to contact paramedics to meet us at the gate. It was also in that moment that the Captain told us we 'shouldn't be experiencing these symptoms;' giving us the impression that he was negating our symptoms.Upon our arrival into ZZZ we discovered further miscommunication occurred when the paramedics gave us the impression they were told to expect many passengers being ill and that we had experienced a rapid decompression. The Captain then pulled all of us aside for a discussion of what had happened. He then explained that an air conditioning pack had overheated and went inoperative. He said that the remaining air conditioning pack was failing to keep the cabin pressure pressurized and that they were alerted to don O2 masks when the cabin pressure reached 10;000 feet. He said the cabin pressure never got above 12;000 feet and that's why the masks never dropped. He then told us the event was called a 'controlled loss of cabin pressure'. An abrupt departure from his earlier term of 'depressurization.'4 of the 7 crew members chose to be evaluated by paramedics and declined transport to a hospital. The concern of the entire cabin crew was that the flight deck failed to inform us of what was going on when it was occurring and chose to wait until several minutes after the fact to let us know what happened. Our concern lies in the fact that in failing to inform us of what was happening we were not given the opportunity to take appropriate measures; such as being seated or donning oxygen as a precautionary measure. Additionally; the crew is concerned that in reporting our symptoms; the Captain's words and actions invalidated our concerns by telling us 'that shouldn't be happening'. Additionally; the crew is concerned that this is the 3rd reported cabin pressure issue with this particular tail number [in four months] and that this tail is still in service. We cannot perform our functions as safety professionals if we are not properly communicated with by the flight crew and are allowed to work on an aircraft that has known pressurization issues.

Flight Attendant reported lack of oxygen and a feeling of hypoxia and that the pilot advised that they; 'shouldn't be experiencing these symptoms.'


Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

This was my first flight to Bogota. In preparation for the flight; I watched the airport familiarization video; read the Jeppesen airport pages for Bogota; and highlighted the appropriate HI-LO charts for the route to be flown. My approximate time in this aircraft is 150 hours. The Captain was the pilot flying. During the cruise portion of our flight; the Captain and I discussed in detail the descent into Bogota; the terrain surrounding the airport; the approach itself and the current weather. The engine failure/missed approach procedure was also reviewed and loaded into the secondary flight plan as per the Jeppesen pages. As we began our descent the Captain was viewing the radar on his ND and terrain was being displayed on my ND. Bogota approach issued a late descent to 12000 feet; and asked us to slow to 210 kts until 5 miles from the BOG VOR. At this time we were cleared for the ILS 13R approach. I did not notice 10000 feet being set in the altitude window. The aircraft had not reached the BOG VOR; my scan was alternating from inside the flight deck to outside because the aircraft had entered VFR conditions and I had the airport in sight. At this time Bogota approach asked us our altitude. It was 11000 feet. Approach said we needed to remain at 12000 feet until the BOG VOR. At this time we had a 'Terrain and Pull Up' aural. In response to this; the Captain added thrust and climbed the aircraft. I noticed the radar altimeter read 1700 feet; at no time did I notice any red indications displayed on my ND. We then intercepted the glide slope and landed on 13R.

First Officers first time to Bogota. Enroute; we reviewed the arrival; approaches; engine out procedures; and the terrain; including the terrain in the vicinity of the Bogota VOR that requires the 12;000 feet crossing altitude.Coming into Bogota we were deviating right of course for weather. We requested descent prior to calculated top of descent point. Stepped down in increments; getting farther and farther above the path. Finally; at approximately Mariquita (MQU) we were 'cleared direct to the Bogota (BOG) VOR; descend to 12;000 feet; cleared the ILS runway 13R.' At this point we were over 6000 feet above the path. Descending at 210 kts; (assigned; until 5 miles from BOG VOR) with speed brakes and gear down; we were making progress toward the path.For some reason; I perceived that we were crossing the BOG VOR as we passed 14;400 feet (still high). I said 'inside the Bogota VOR; 10;000 feet;' set 10;000 in the FCU; and pointed. First Officer replied 'roger; 10;000;' meaning (to him) that once we were past BOG; that would be the correct altitude to set next. He was looking outside; and did not actually notice that I had changed the altitude from 12;000 feet to 10;000 feet. As we continued the descent; Approach asked if we have the field in sight. When we responded in the affirmative; he said; 'OK; no problem. Next time; you should maintain 12;000 feet until the Bogota VOR.' I said to the First Officer; 'we did' as I double checked position on the ND. I saw that we were still prior to the VOR; and the EGPWS said 'Terrain; Terrain.' I began a climb back to 12;000 feet; when the EGPWS said 'Pull Up.' I disconnected the autopilot and continued the escape. First Officer called out 'Radio Altitude 1700; climbing; Radio Altitude gone; we're above 2500 feet.' I re-engaged the autopilot and continued the approach; on profile.Lessons learned:1. There are many layers of the cheese. Approach control and the airplane both caught my error; and brought it to our attention.2. Altitude Setting Procedure calls for PF to set the altitude in the FCU; point to it; and state that altitude; silently check FMA. I did those things. PM verbally states the altitude; points; silently checks FMA. I heard the verbal altitude; but that was not his intent. He did not realize I was actually making a change on the FCU. Going forward; I might add the word 'SET' when changing an altitude in a high workload environment; so the PM knows that there is an actual change happening; not just a prospective change. I will also look for the confirming finger pointing at the altitude in the FCU.3. The late descent had us above the path; and Managed Descent was not going to catch it; so I switched to Open Descent. If I had gone back to Managed Descent; it would have honored the programmed constraint to cross BOG at 12;000 feet.

Air Carrier flight crew describes the circumstances causing a descent below assigned altitude prior to the BOG VOR during ILS to Runway 13R at SKBO. The flying Captain had set 10;000 feet in the MCP window thinking that BOG VOR had been passed; without obtaining the First Officer's confirmation. ATC alerts at the same time a terrain warning sounds.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure; MEL

I was told that the 'O' ring was non-deferrable and the purpose was to keep the Fire Handle secured in the stowed position in the event of turbulence.  So I'm filling out a report to find out if that is the case as I question the deferral.  To be corrected in 6;000 Flight Hours (FH) seems excessive if the purpose is to keep the handle stowed.   The engine will shut down if that handle falls.  This is the second aircraft I found with a damaged 'O' ring in the last three weeks.During the flight from ZZZ I scanned the Overhead panel.  I noticed the rubber 'O' ring on the Fire Extinguisher handle was broken- missing a chunk of it. I wrote it up.  Maintenance Control deferred it under an Administrative MEL.  The Corrective Action was that they removed the remaining damaged 'O' ring. That rubber 'O' ring supposedly helps keep the fire extinguisher handle stowed. The engine will shut down if it falls. That 'O' ring should not be deferrable if that's the case.

A Captain questions Maintenance Control's long term MEL administrative deferral of a damaged and removed O-Ring used on EMB-145 aircraft Engine Fire Extinguishing 'T' handles. The O-Rings secure the overhead fire handles in the stowed position during possible turbulence. The pilot notes the engine will shut down if the fire handle falls from the stowed position.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 350; Flight Crew Type 150

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Upon climb out; I contacted ATC and received Squawk code and clearance at approximately 2;000 feet MSL. Was given direct ZZZ intersection and approved for climb to 8;000 feet MSL. Upon reaching 5;000 feet MSL I attempted to lean the mixtures. Left engine responded appropriately; Right engine did not lean. At 6;000 feet MSL I asked ATC for 6;000 feet to investigate engine issue; which was granted. Immediately following approval for 6;000 feet Right engine lost power. I asked for vectors for nearest airport. I was given heading for ZZZ. I momentarily became disoriented; informed ATC that I needed to stabilize the aircraft. I was able to stabilize aircraft shortly thereafter. I then requested vector to ZZZ and was given appropriate heading; runway length; and airport conditions. While descending from 6;000 feet I attempted engine restart without success. I then feathered and secured the right engine. I broke out of the bases around 2;000 feet MSL approximately 5 miles from airport. I advised ATC that I had the airport and runway in sight. ATC asked me to call when I was on the ground; which I did through Flight Service. I stayed on the line while the briefer spoke with ATC. Briefer indicated that ATC had no additional questions for me at that time. The aircraft was secured in a hangar at the local FBO. Aircraft is currently being inspected by a mechanic.

BE55 pilot experiences an engine failure at 6;000 feet during climb. Vectors to a suitable airport are requested and a restart is attempted during descent unsuccessfully. A single engine landing ensues.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

The entire crew noticed a musty/moldy/melted crayon smell. It was present in the entire cabin; and flight deck. The smell was present on climb out; and descent. The odor seemed to become apparent in the flight deck before the cabin. On descent; I deselected the number 1 pack; and the odor seemed to weaken substantially. I feel confident in saying that the odor was emanating from the environmental system. I wrote it up as a persistent level 1 occurrence.

Air carrier flight crew reported a 'musty/moldy/melted crayon' fume event during flight. Flight crew deselected number 1 pack which weakened the odor.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 800; Flight Crew Type 500

Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Just before liftoff avionics started giving me false information. At approximately 500 feet had avionics failure in moderate to heavy turbulence. Avionics showed aircraft at a different heading than what I saw visually. While working a solution PFD went solid red. Tower informed me I was headed in the wrong direction and not on runway heading. Tower told me to correct and switched me to departure. Departure gave me a new heading and told me I was over my assigned 3000 feet altitude and to correct.I told ATC I was in heavy turbulence and was getting it corrected. ATC took me up to 5000 feet over the clouds. Turbulence stopped and avionics came back on. ATC asked me what my assigned altitude was. I told him it was 3000 feet but I had lost avionics on takeoff and was trying to get the plane altitude and heading corrected. He asked me if everything was working now and I told him yes it was. The flight continued with no more issues. The plane went to avionics repair as soon as we landed. Avionics shop confirmed that they could see the failure but could not duplicate it and did not know why it happened.

SR22 pilot reported on an intermittent avionics problem and a PFD failure.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 8000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

In 25 years and 3 months of IFR airline flying; I have never before until this flight today; been issued a clearance to climb to and maintain a VFR altitude. We leveled at our initially cleared altitude of 4;000 FT on Departure frequency; and were then issued climb to 8;500 FT. I said; 'Please repeat altitude' and the Controller repeated; '8;500.' I said; 'That's a VFR altitude.' He stated; 'Yes it is.' My First Officer and a jumpseating fellow Captain agreed with me that it was unprecedented to be issued a clearance to level at a VFR altitude under IFR in a large 121 jet transport. I stated that it did not sound safe to us and the Controller flippantly said; 'Are you flying the airplane or controlling the traffic today?' It is obviously a Captain's responsibility to question any clearance which he or she believes to be unsafe or not in compliance with standard procedures and regulations. He then asked us to read back our altitude and I read back; 'XXX 123 cleared to 8;500.' We did not have to level off; because climbing through approximately 7;500 FT; the Controller said; 'Traffic no factor; climb to 16;000.' He then said; 'The reason I was leveling you at 8;500 is because you would have gotten a TCAS RA with that other traffic;' to which I replied; 'We could have leveled at any other altitude below that traffic.' The most obvious example would have been a clearance to 8;000 FT. He could have vectored us around him; as the traffic level was extremely light overall. He then stated; 'You are in Class B airspace.' A look at that chart shows that Class B terminates 30 DME west of IAH; which of course we are closing in on pretty rapidly in a jet; if the frequency gets tied up and the controller leaves us at 8;500 FT; we could easily overtake all kinds of light aircraft just outside the Class B. Just as importantly as the non-standard altitude; was the initial attitude of the controller that his clearance to level at a VFR altitude was beyond questioning. To use an extreme example; I will question and I will not accept a vector clearance into the side of a mountain either. I had an incredibly close near miss with a light aircraft in a heavy jet on a New York area arrival; and I do not wish to ever be level at light VFR aircraft cruise altitudes; even in Class B airspace; which such aircraft occasional blunder into.

An I90 Controller issued an air carrier a climb to 8;500 FT during its departure climb which the Captain took issue with because he did not want to level at a low VFR altitude.


Flight Crew Lighter-Than-Air; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 3400; Flight Crew Type 1800

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Made street landing in residential west side area. Complaint from home owner because he believes I didn't know what I was doing; even though I have over 40 years of experience. I said nothing to the home owner because that would have made his rage worse. We packed the balloon in 5 minutes and promised we would never return. Weather was too calm which prevented us from going farther to open dirt area. This resident must have had a bad night at the casino.

A balloon pilot reported having to land on a residential street due to inability to safely continue to an open area.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 31; Flight Crew Total 339

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

After our touch and go; we were told to extend upwind for spacing and our crosswind would be called. Tower called our crosswind over point defiance. The student and I were mid field downwind; right close traffic for Runway XX in ZZZ. The student and I were in the middle of our before landing checklist when we noticed another plane on what looked like a crosswind flying directly at us. We banked left away from traffic and descended; but still continued to fly the pattern. I was not sure if they were closed traffic of just east bound departure. The other traffic continued to fly pattern as well but they were a couple hundred feet above us. I believe Tower became over saturated with aircraft and forgot about us or vice versa. At this point Tower had me perform a left 360 which placed me closer to the other aircraft followed by a right 360 over the approach end of Runway XX. Once spacing was obtained we were both told to land but no number was given to us to contact. This occurrence was not due to pilot error. I spoke with the other pilot and she agrees. Both PIC (Pilot in Command) in each plane were CFI and I believe that helped the situation.

C172 flight instructor reported taking evasive action to avoid another aircraft while in the VFR pattern and talking to Tower. A subsequent ATC instruction placed the reporter closer to the other aircraft.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 1800; Flight Crew Type 1000

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Completed practice aerial maneuvers with student in Wichita west practice area. [I] announced intention to return to ICT for landings to Wichita Approach. [I] understood Approach's instruction to enter left base for Runway 01R. [I] flew ground track for left base to Runway 01R which resulted in slight crossing Runway 01L south end of runway. Approach advised us to contact Tower. We announced to Tower on initial contact 'Wichita approach; Cessna X; left base for one right.' Understood Tower instruction to be 'Cessna X; Runway 01R; cleared for the option.' [I] continued ground track for left base to Runway 01R; subsequently turning final. Onboard TIS provided traffic alert; 600 FT below and closing. [I] sighted traffic; T-6; passing directly underneath us; coming slightly in front. Closest miss distance estimated at 400 FT. Tower questioned 'Cessna X; are you lining up for one right or one left?' [I] responded 'Cessna X we're lining up for one right.' Tower advised 'Cessna X go-around begin left turn.' [I] responded 'Cessna X turning left; traffic in sight.' It appeared as though Tower's intention and understanding was a landing on Runway 01L; while my intention and understanding was a landing on Runway 01R.

C172 Instructor pilot reports being told by ICT Tower to enter a left base for Runway 1R. On final TIS indicates traffic overtaking from below and Tower issues a go-around to the C172. ATC believed they had issued a clearance to land on Runway 1L to the C172.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Unusual attitude recovery at low altitude. Being vectored onto final in ATL following a 747. Separation about 5 miles. I think we were cleared to 3;000 feet heading 300 to join Runway 28 final and cleared the visual approach.  We think around 4;000 feet and a couple miles south of final; flaps were at 20 degrees and about 170 knots and encountered wake turbulence. Initial roll was to the left just a few degrees then all of a sudden hard right roll of at least 130 degrees or possibly more. Saw nothing but ground out my forward windshield. I was pilot flying and turned off the autopilot and pushed full forward on yoke. First Officer (FO) pushed power forward but not sure if he went full power or not. Stick shaker was going off and I think I heard bank angle a couple of times. After shaker stopped I started rolling back out and started a gradual climb back up to glide slope and turned back toward the runway as we had turned a little bit toward the north probably about a 330 heading. Not sure of the recovery altitude but think it was around 3;000 feet (we did receive a low altitude alert from ATC.) My flight bag was upturned; the MEL and my Jepp book was on the floor and the knob on my audio control panel was missing. We reported incident to ATC; called Flight Attendant (FA) to check on PAX and she said all were ok. We decided to continue with approach and land. After landing we called dispatch and maintenance and requested assistance in case of any passenger wound up being injured.Not sure if anything could be done to avoid event as I believe current separation procedures were being followed. Maybe a policy change from ATC on separation standards are in order. Upset recovery training works.

We were on the intercept for final approach in ATL for runway 28; following a 747. We believe we were cleared down to 3;000 feet on a heading of 300. We started to get a little turbulence and the wing dipped slightly to the left. I believe I stated something about possible wake and then we went inverted with a bank to the right approx. 130 degrees or more with the stick shaker. The nose was pointed slightly down. The Captain immediately started the unusual att. recover procedure. I added power with the stick shaker. The Captain rolled the aircraft back to the left and recovered eventually with a gradual climb. The aircraft was heading a little more to the north now so the Captain started a turn back towards the final approach course. I told ATL we had recovered from an unusual attitude. ATC gave us an altitude alert. We continued the approach with no further wake turbulence.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported encountering wake turbulence in trail of a B747 on approach to ATL. Encounter resulted in a low altitude upset; with a bank angle in excess of 130 degrees.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy

As the pandemic is surging to record levels again; I feel compelled to highlight an ongoing and now seemingly institutionally entrenched intentional violation of basic company safety policy regarding mask wear in the ZZZ base pilot lounge.  According to the policy letter from management; employees are required to wear face coverings in crew bases whenever not actively eating; drinking; or taking medicine.  This does not occur with the vast majority of employees I observe regularly regardless of time of day; number of occupants; lack or not of social distancing; and is an ongoing situation.  I have even heard some say they spend more time in the lounge these days in order to avoid the gate/terminal areas where other work group members might express the need for compliance.  The ZZZ base pilot lounge is seen by nearly everyone as a 'safe space' to willfully flaunt company face covering policy and could easily end up being a major source of COVID-19 transmission; resulting in increased sick calls; company health expenses; or even employee deaths.This starts at the top.  I can't speak about other bases; but there is no messaging; signage; or even leadership by good example by base leadership for this simplest and most effective of pandemic mitigations.  If company policy is meant to actually have a positive effect and not be simply lip service; leadership needs to inform and demand compliance and show leadership by demonstrating compliance.  This needs to be standard across ALL employee work spaces and leadership must be held accountable.  I refuse to spend any more time than absolutely necessary in my company workspace of the pilot lounge because it jeopardizes my health and that of my co-workers and family.

Air carrier pilot reported that many employees in the pilot lounge do not comply with company face mask policy.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 1750; Flight Crew Type 1700

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

This is the second time I have landed at ZZZZ1 (the first was a normal IFR landing at dusk 2 years earlier). ZZZZ1 is a high use uncontrolled training airport located under ZZZZ's Class B airspace. It proved to be a very busy afternoon with 4 to 6 aircraft simultaneously in the pattern. Some pilots had very limited English proficiency. The ATIS listed in ForeFlight for ZZZZ1 is actually for ZZZZ so the Runway information is misleading. The lack of clear communications and the traffic density resulted in my experiencing Task Saturation for the first time since I completed my training 20 years earlier.Issue 1 - Unexpected runway change. Based on my communications with ATC I was expecting to land on Runway XX from my IFR approach and did not have warning that Runway XY was the active runway until after being instructed by ZZZZ to change to the ZZZZ1 Unicom. After listening to the ZZZZ1 Unicom I broke off my approach to Runway XX because I found the conflicting runway was in use and sought to understand what the traffic was doingIssue 2 - Confusion TCAS/sight/radio reports. As I approached the airport; the aircraft I saw in the air; corresponded with the aircraft I saw on the TCAS screen. The self-announcement pattern positions from the aircraft appeared to correspond with what I saw in the air and on TCAS. What I did not realize was the aircraft I saw were not the ones reporting the positions I heard. There were likely others in the same relative position at the opposite end of the field at the same time. I consequently unintentionally set myself up for Runway XZ thinking it was Runway XY. I did a 45-degree entry into what I thought was the left downwind leg for Runway XY and a heard conflicting mid field downwind traffic report which I could not locate and decided to exit the pattern and reenter. Another pilot informed me I was actually on the upwind side for Runway XY and I subsequently set myself up in sequence for entry into the pattern for Runway XY.  As I was in the downwind someone used 20 seconds on the Unicom asking for a weather radar for an area 20 miles report north of the airport. On downwind I slowed down for the aircraft in front. The only part of their call sign I could understand was Aircraft Y. Aircraft Y called base. I called base. Aircraft Y called final. I extended my downwind a bit and later called final. I lost sight of Aircraft Y and as I was trying to reestablish their location; I lowered the nose to see. Aircraft Y eventually came into my view as I was abeam him; but I could not reduce speed further to get behind him. He was low and to the right of the final approach course. In hindsight my best guess is he was doing 65 kts. or less (my minimum normal approach speed is 80 kts.) When I had become aware we were converging I advised him and he said 'sir that's illegal ??? theres off the words two cows on the left on final' [Verbatim]. I was trying to make sense of what he had just said and was preparing to go around but then I heard him say 'Going around for Runway XY' at which point I thought the safest thing to do at that point was continue with my landing on Runway XY. There was no injuries or damage to either aircraft.As I was focusing on situational awareness another pilot consumed 20 seconds on the Unicom asking someone on the Base radio to check the weather radar well north of the Airport. Having the pattern frequency used for other purpose reduced everyone's opportunity for situational awareness. ZZZZ ATC was very insistent I understood they were holding the airspace open for me and twice read me an 800 number to call on the ground. I felt pressured to cancel IFR while in the air. After landing I later saw a sign in the Pilot Dispatch area saying 'keep the Unicom Free' and advising the use of XXX.XXX for Weather and Airport information. However; the frequency is not published in [our database] and when a local CFI and I tried it a few days later we found it was inoperative.The pilot in Aircraft Y I conflicted with was often impossible to understand; even though he had made several radio calls; I could never establish what his call sign was. Variations in US/Country X procedures. I entered the pattern per US VFR entry rules; I was not aware the [country] rules do not allow for two of the common US VFR entry methods. Given its location relative to the ZZZZ Class B airspace the remaining VFR entry options are very limitedI found having coverage terminated by ATC with limited prior airport information severely impacted my situational awareness; resulting in the beginnings of task saturation. Use of the Unicom for non-essential communications reduced opportunities for everyone to provide position reports. I lost a sense of where Aircraft Y was; and when Aircraft Y came into my view I was already abeam him. Normally I would have immediately gone around but I was trying to understand what he was saying.I have since reviewed the [country] VFR pattern entry rules with a local CFI and done several VFR pattern entries with him at ZZZZ1. I have booked time with my regular CFI to reevaluate and refresh my VFR skills and go over the incident with him. In future I will assume my runway can be reassigned to anything at anytime after arrival and will study every runway before arrival and map out the situational awareness should I be required to change. I will put the Common traffic frequency in Radio two and monitor ten miles out (well before instructed by ATC) to determine what runaway is being used rather than wait until the controller says to switch.A dedicated ZZZZ1 ATIS (rather than using ZZZZ's) that included announcing the active runway in use would have reduced confusion and would do a lot to help be prepared for the current traffic pattern. A dedicated ZZZZ1 ATIS with weather remarks appended (rather than using the common Unicom frequency) would have reduced the need for other pilots to ask someone to check the weather and increased the available time for all pilots to provide position reports. Audit students' ability to clearly communicate in English when in the pattern and especially under stress.

Single Engine Pilot reported a NMAC while in the traffic pattern at a non towered airport on foreign soil; and cited as contributing lack of clear communications; traffic density; an unexpected runway change; and gaps in the reporter's knowledge of the foreign country's flight rules.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 182; Flight Crew Total 9920; Flight Crew Type 7219

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Prior to departure; I noticed multiple indicator lights in cockpit panels that were inoperative; which I believe to have been simply defective bulbs. I entered these into the ACARS (Aircraft Communications and Reporting System) maintenance fault reporting; relief pilot called then in on VHF2 radio; and we also notified Mechanic in cockpit personally of the items. He was working on another dome light issue from previous flight. After all passengers boarded; fuel on board; we were waiting for Maintenance Tech to address indicator lights. Tech came to flight deck and told me they would be deferring the gen drive; cargo door; etc. lamps instead of re-lamping; and that they were working on the deferrals. I inquired delicately since replacement bulbs were in the box just behind his shoulder; re-lamping would be safer and quicker; and he looked back at the box and declined. He then left. Both first officers commented on the very strange attitude Maintenance Techs; there were 4 on aircraft; were exhibiting during our departure. I agreed. So we sat for another 5-10 minutes. Agent asked me multiple times if they could close the door; and I said no; as we were waiting for techs to finish deferring indicator lights and place deferral stickers.Agent must have called on radio; because she came back asking to close door again; having heard from Maintenance that they were finished with aircraft. At that time a new [Maintenance Report] started to print on cockpit printer.As there were still no deferral stickers on indicator lights; I told agent no; and proceeded to call ZZZ Maintenance on VHF to inquire about deferrals and stickers. I was told very abruptly that the indicator lights were not deferred; but carried forward. I asked about decals for these items and was told that no decals are needed for carried forward items; only deferrals. He was very sure of himself.About 30 seconds later; the Maintenance Tech who declined earlier to re-lamping the indicator lights appeared in the flight deck. He too said no decal stickers were needed for carried forward items. I told him previous statement was that they were deferring them; he said they changed their mind and we were legal to go without any decals and with our new [Maintenance Release]. He too was abrupt and irritated because of my questioning; in my opinion. So we left 3 hours late to ZZZZ1. It seemed strange to me that no decal would be applied; but I could not find any reference in short order to back up my feeling; so we left. Once airborne on our way to ZZZZ1; I had time to search my iPad and found the reference in the FOM. I have attached it here. It clearly says that all deferrals and carried forward items will have a decal placed adjacent to the inoperative item.I was very irritated upon finding this; as I feel that I was pushed out of ZZZ because [Maintenance] clearly did not want to perform any work on this aircraft. I entered a new log item en-route that the flight deck was missing required decals for the carried forward items. Upon arrival in ZZZZ1; a [Maintenance] tech appeared and asked about the decals. I explained the story as I have told it here.His response was that yes indeed; decals are required; and that ZZZ Maintenance should have read the entire General Maintenance Manual section on this and they should have known better. He said he would take care of it and I left.The continuously increasing hostile attitude that I have been subjected to from ZZZ Maintenance has been noticed by me; and almost every First Officer I have flown with recently. This attitude and lack of willingness to do their job in my opinion erodes safety; builds dis-trust; is dis ingenuous to our passengers and shareholders; and in this case; violates the federal air regulations; which I will not tolerate; and will continue to resist with whatever strength and capability I have.This particular flight was issued a valid [Maintenance Report] without the main techs in ZZZ properly performing their duty to completion. The fact that it was reinforced by more than one maintenance person; I believe it to be willful and without regard to the safety of our passengers. I have not the power or influence at United to effect change in our maintenance operations; I can only use my authority on my personal flights to assure and stand for what I believe to be right and within the regulations; which [Company] tells me on a continuous basis is my charge.

Captain reported Maintenance Tech did not follow proper procedure in deferring inoperative aircraft components.


Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Air Traffic Control Radar 4; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 34200; Flight Crew Type 350

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 870; Flight Crew Type 830

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Approach Control had cleared me for a visual approach to follow a Cherokee on a practice ILS approach short final; and to contact Tower. I was cleared to land on [Runway] XXR and heard Local Control tell a Cherokee on right downwind for [Runway] XXR; to follow a Bonanza (me) on Final. The next thing I heard was Local Control ask the Cherokee if he was on base leg. Before there was a reply; my passenger yelled that an airplane almost hit us under our wing. I saw the Cherokee; number 3 for landing; disappear under our airplane. At the same moment this all happened; Local told me to maintain altitude. He told the Cherokee to continue north; if there was an instructor on board and to call the Tower; that he had a pilot deviation. It was one of the local training school airplanes doing pattern work. He; Local; then cleared me to land; again.I fly into this airport every month; and I am also a former controller and a recently retired airline Captain. I am very keen to listen to all traffic; and keep an awareness of the traffic. This day; I was busy looking for my short final Cherokee traffic to make sure I was not catching up to him. I have an iPad with WingX Pro; that displays traffic; but neither of these Cherokees have ADS-B; so they do not show up. My passenger was also trying to find the Cherokee short final with me; while also checking the iPad. The one drawback; Local was also working ground control and never issued a timely alert to me about the errant Cherokee and conflict alert that I am sure was going off in the cab. I was a flight instructor many years ago; so I know how it can be distracting to try and teach while also maintaining safety. This flight school needs to have a review of their procedures and standards.

CFI was giving instructions to student pilot and coming into [airport] for full-stop landing. Instructor's plane was on right downwind for right traffic pattern of Runway XXR. When Tower instructed/said; '[Call sign]; you will follow Bonanza off your right side; 2 miles.' Student pilot and instructor spotted aircraft 2 miles on final approach path and started the base turn to follow as per ATC's instruction. However; instructor missed Tower's radio call to the Bonanza afterward. (According to the record) Tower said; 'Bonanza; you will be following traffic 3 miles ahead; number 2; Runway XXR cleared to land...' It turns out that instructor was supposed to follow the traffic on final leg 5 miles off the airport; not the one on 2 miles straight in for Runway [XXR]. And; instructor's plane was number 3 for landing. Because instructor couldn't constantly monitor other conversations; instructor was staying on right base leg while Bonanza was approaching for final leg. Instructor and student couldn't spot Bonanza aircraft; and Bonanza aircraft also couldn't spot our airplane until instructor's airplane crossed/passed their final path 700 feet below (based off ATC's radar altitude encoder). After near miss; instructor followed Tower's instruction to continue inbound for landing on final leg. Pilot understood the mistake/deviation made from ATC's instruction that caused the near miss. Instructor should have paid more attention on radio for better situational awareness to avoid any kind of incident/accident [from] happening. Instructor went over the voice records after landing to review/check own performance and mistake to prevent the same situation in future.

A Bonanza pilot and a Piper PA28 flight instructor reported that misunderstanding of ATC instructions caused a NMAC.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 17500; Flight Crew Type 5000

Distraction; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

On approach conditions were favorable for windshear and were flying about REF plus 5 to 10 KTS; and had briefed for windshear. Turbulence was light and little crab was necessary to maintain alignment. At about 100 AGL hit a little bit of chop but speed did not go below REF. Entered ground effect and with engines spooling down and was expecting to hear the 50; 40; 30; 20; 10; call; but instead got a windshear warning. [We were] considering energy state of aircraft and proximity to runway; and in a good position to land normally. Judgment was made to continue to land. I felt that it was safer to land than to go around at this point of the landing. If same events were to happen maybe 10 to 15 seconds prior I would have executed the windshear escape maneuver.

The Captain briefed the approach per the Company Policy and I prepared for the approach as instructed. The Captain also briefed for possible windshear. We discussed recognition and recovery in the event of the windshear. During the approach we expected light turbulence but we encountered very little turbulence. At no time did the IAS drop below Vref. During the flare we received a wind shear warning. The Captain stated 'landing' and I confirmed. The landing was normal and without incident. We taxied to the gate as normal without incident. I don't have any recommendations relating to this event. The fact that I am a former Captain myself; I would not have done anything differently.

A CRJ90 Captain continued to a normal landing after the WINDSHEAR WARNING alerted while the aircraft was beginning the landing flare at 100 FT.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 221; Flight Crew Type 4743

Pushed off the gate; Captain decided to taxi on one engine from gate to 1R. We started #2. Captain forgot to call for flaps on after start check; and there is no line item in the after start check to verify flaps; so if I hadn't caught this misstep it wouldn't have been caught until even later. Why has setting the flaps been removed [from] the checklist?Before moving; with the #2 engine running; in order to help decrease workload; and allow for me to be heads up during taxiing; the Captain called for the before takeoff check to the line. I announced 'before takeoff check to the line' and ran the check to the line. We taxied out; he called for delayed engine start. I completed this and ran the delayed engine start checklist. We then waited our turn in line and departed without either of us catching that we failed to do the 'final items'. We realized this when the Captain ran the after takeoff check and the igniters were off.

B737 FO reported flight took off without completing the final items on the before takeoff checklist.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 103.0; Flight Crew Total 1091.9; Flight Crew Type 717.7

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

The student and I had taken off of Runway 17 and at 1;500 feet MSL turned on course to the practice area on a heading of about 230. At this point; I had the student put on their foggles to start their simulated instrument time. Tower informed us that there was an aircraft about 6 miles to the South of the airport which was going in our general direction; their path was South to North. I acknowledged the call and told Tower we would keep a lookout for the traffic. The student asked about something on the instrument panels so I looked inside to answer their question. I heard the other aircraft radio that they had us insight. Since I had not yet gotten them in sight; I hoped to now be able to since they had. I looked back outside in the general direction that the airplane was supposed to be at (right side) and saw the airplane in a steep bank at approximately 400 feet from us with no vertical difference. As soon as I saw them; I banked the airplane to the right and kept our climb pitch attitude. I reported to Tower that I had the aircraft in sight.The conditions that caused the problem were: my heads-down time answering the student's question; not having Tower get a distance from the traffic; and not being able to locate them sooner.Actions to prevent/correct the situation: do not have my head down to answer a student's question; have Tower get a distance from the traffic.

GA instructor pilot reported an NMAC during departure from SWO airport requiring an evasive maneuver.


Confusion; Fatigue; Human-Machine Interface; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

We were dispatched with the right thrust reverser deferred. On landing I was trying hard to remember not to accidentally deploy the right thrust reverser and cause an EICAS message; so I kept my hand on the left thrust lever. However on landing I mistakenly shut down the left engine at about 90 KTS instead of activating the left thrust reverser. I then used normal braking to slow down and; once at taxi speed; exited the runway and taxied to the gate on the right engine.Our actual block hours for this day three of a four day pairing were 9:17 over a duty day of 14:26. Our original schedule was for 7:49 block and 13:39 minute duty day followed by 9:26 layover with an early return to duty the next morning. We exceeded this due to operational delays. This left the crew feeling exhausted. By the time of the landing event we were tired and trying to do the best we could under the circumstances. In fact; by day 4 of this trip we would have exceeded 30 in 7 on the last day; so the company had to take away our last round trip.This pairing and [similar] ones the company has been using over the last few months are extremely dangerous and just waiting for a serious accident to happen. Scheduling this many legs over a duty day without sufficient rest to recover from the previous days flying was the number one factor in this incident. These pairings might look good on paper; but actually doing it is another story. Luckily; in our case nothing happened.If the company is serious about safe operations and avoiding fatigued pilots; it needs to adjust pairings accordingly. The stresses and work load involved in flying 6; 7 and even 8 leg days in a 14 hour time period; combined with scheduled reduced rest over nights; is like playing Russian Roulette with our passengers and crew members lives.I'm sick and tired of hearing it's legal; so you're good to go. I try not to bid these kinds of trips but sometimes I can't avoid getting them.

[No substantive additional information was provided in the secondary narrative.]

Fatigued from a long duty day; lengthened by operational delays and being dispatched with a right thrust reverser deferred inoperative; a CRJ-200 Captain inadvertently shut down the left engine instead of reversing 'only' the left engine he intended. Both pilots reported significant fatigue which affected their performance.


The cabin altitude red crew alerting system message activated after cabin altimeter exceeded 10;000 FT. I noted that the temperature controller had also failed. I noted a strange bump when takeoff power was applied on departure. Crew executed proper checklist procedure; and diverted to the nearest suitable airport.

The crew became aware of a pressurization problem when the warning message appeared; indicating that the cabin altitude was above 10;000 FT. They performed the checklist procedure and diverted to a suitable airport.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency

After a normal pre-flight and taxi out the aircraft was ready for takeoff. I was the Captain and pilot not flying for the flight. We had over 100 passengers on board. The weather at takeoff was VMC; with no precipitation and a temperature of 4C; and a dew point of -1C. Shortly after takeoff; at approximately 1;500 FT; a level 1 alert of L Eng VIB HI appeared on the EAD. The secondary engine page showed a boxed amber 4.7 units. As the pilot not flying; I referenced the QRH for level 1 alerts; which stated that there was no vibration in flight limitation; and to monitor other engine parameters. I noted at this time that the TGT was running about 720C; while the right engine was about 640C. The TGT and VIB's were monitored further as the aircraft continued its climb; and I also tried reducing power on the left engine; but this did not have any effect on VIB's. At approximately 9;000 FT; the TGT for the left engine rose rapidly to 1149C; with associated Engine L BRG OVHT level 2 alert and auto shutdown. The aircraft was leveled at 11;000 FT; the immediate action items were completed for severe engine damage; and an emergency was declared with ATC. I asked for vectors back to the longest available runway; and started to run the QRH procedure; while the First Officer flew the aircraft. I coordinated with ATC; company; and gave the TEST briefing to the flight attendants. The aircraft was on a downwind leg to land; with the approach briefed and the QRH checklist completed. At this time I elected to take control of the aircraft for landing. This had no bearing on the First Officer; as he was doing an outstanding job of flying; but I simply wanted to exercise my PIC prerogative; and make the single engine emergency landing. All checklists were completed from the QRH; and the aircraft lined up and made an overweight landing of approximately 107;000 LBS. I exited the runway; and parked on the taxiway next to where the Fire Department was waiting. I made an announcement for the passengers to remain seated; and directed the Fire Chief to inspect the left engine for any signs of fire; smoke or other damage. The Fire Chief reported no signs of visible damage; fire or smoke. I taxied the aircraft back to the gate being followed by one of the fire trucks. Once parked at the gate; the passengers deplaned normally. The flight attendants did an outstanding job of keeping the passengers calm and informed. The First Officer also did an outstanding job of flying the aircraft through the engine failure; and getting the aircraft turned back towards the airport quickly and smoothly. I remained with the aircraft post flight; to be debriefed by the Fire Chief; and to brief the Mechanic upon his arrival. The event occurred due to a failure of the left engine; seemingly associated with the N2 compressor bearings. There had been no previous indications of problems; and we had just flown the aircraft with no issues. The left engine had been used for taxi out; and so had been running for at least 10 minutes prior to takeoff.

B717 Captain describes an engine failure during initial climb after the engine had displayed high vibration earlier. At approximately 9;000 FT; the TGT for the left engine rose rapidly to 1149C; with associated Engine L BRG OVHT level 2 alert and auto shutdown. Flight returns to departure airport for a single engine landing.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Type 7000

The 10-9; 10-9B; and the sign entering the ramp in BNA all say to monitor frequency 122.95 for ramp advisories. Our station procedures instructions state that the Nashville Ops frequency must be monitored for all ramp movement. Which is the correct frequency to monitor? We can't monitor both since we must also be on the Ground frequency; especially for taxiing out when we are in the alleyway.

Pilot reported a conflict between ramp signage and the airport diagram concerning the correct frequency for ramp movement at BNA.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 560; Flight Crew Type 536

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was conducting a flight training event with my student pilot. We just returned to the airport to practice performance takeoff and landings. We had just made a full stop - taxi back. We called holding short that we were ready for touch and goes. We were told to hold short for landing traffic. Several planes land and depart. Both my student and I hear what we believe to be our abbreviated tail number being cleared for takeoff. We read back cleared for takeoff instructions; finish final items on the checklist; and take the runway. On our takeoff roll we hear Tower ask who is on the runway and I respond with our tail number. Tower then advises to either exit the runway or begin our roll. We were already on the roll; so we continued the takeoff. After our lap in the pattern we terminate the training flight and contact the ATC number. I believe I heard our tail number and believed it was a takeoff clearance. However; due to a high volume of traffic the morning of the event due to a lengthy TFR that lasted most of the day; there was a lot of training and jet traffic. I could have heard a similar call sign and my student could have stepped on the intended recipient of the ATC instruction. I know when there is a high volume of traffic waiting to arrive and depart it could be best to use my full tail number to lessen confusion; and take extra measures to ensure all radio communications are properly received and copied.

Aircraft X called up requesting pattern work during a high traffic volume session and was given hold short instructions; due to the fact that there was an IFR arrival jet on about a 3 or 4 mile final. Aircraft X subsequently read back his hold short instructions. I talk to 3 different aircraft before I cleared Aircraft Y for a touch and go. Apparently Aircraft X read back 'Aircraft X cleared touch and go' and then subsequently got onto the runway without me catching it. Aircraft Y clarifies their touch and go clearance and I canceled the touch and go clearance and gave them a left 360. During this time inside the cab my CIC/GC/FD was trying to clarify information about a TFR that was supposed to be going into effect shortly and we had received no prior information on. This resulted in several phones ringing during this already busy time. After scanning the runway I saw an aircraft who appeared to be holding on the runway with my jet traffic now within 2 miles of the runway; since I had multiple aircraft holding short of the runway I tried to quickly identify the aircraft; so I could taxi them off the runway in a timely manner. However Aircraft X didn't identify himself by name until about the 3rd time I reached out to them. With minimum time to react I told the aircraft to taxi clear of the runway or depart immediately. Aircraft X started their departure roll and as soon as airborne I told them to offset the runway so I had sufficient spacing with my IFR aircraft on final. Immediately following my Jet traffic landing the OM entered the cab and started trying to have the CIC help him find our local weather form; so our new trainee could fill it out. We started the day short staffed with no prior knowledge that someone would be coming in to cover for a couple hours; so the rotation wasn't going to happen as expected. When there are less people in the cab we have enough space to work without our masks and due to the fact that there were extra nonessential people in the cab I had to replace my mask; while I firmly believe mask should be required; they do interfere with the side tone which affected my ability to catch Aircraft X's incorrect readback. No one in the facility had received any information on the TFR that was supposed to be going into effect. This resulted in several miscommunications and confusion.

Flight Instructor and Local Controller reported the instructor's flight departed without clearance with traffic on very short final after mistakenly taking another aircraft's clearance for takeoff.


Mooney Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 400

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

I called ground control from the hangars and requested taxi. The controller gave me taxi to runway 3L via Alpha; cross 34 and hold short of 3L and advise run-up complete. I acknowledged the clearance and began my taxi. While approaching 34; I turned all of my lights on for safety; looked both ways down runway 34 to make sure it was clear; and began to cross the runway. Upon exiting; I observed a Cessna turn right in front of me; causing me to slam on the brakes very hard to avoid a collision of my nose into his tail. I then immediately notified Ground that I didn't expect to see a Cessna in front of me. The controller said; 'I'm sorry.' The rest of the flight went fine.I was 5 feet or less from the Cessna; and barely avoided a collision. The Cessna was on taxiway B headed to the same runway. The Cessna pilots never saw me. This was a hotspot on the taxi diagram. I believe the controller lost situation awareness. I've also observed that sometimes the controllers at this airport don't give you instructions to cross runway 34 or hold short; but they've gotten a lot better. If they don't tell me what to do; I hold short until I get a verbal; 'cleared to cross'. Next time I fly out of this airport; and given the same clearance; I'll make sure taxiway Bravo is cleared as well as runway 34 before I begin my crossing.

GA pilot reported a near collision at a known Hotspot at Dekalb-Peachtree Airport.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Told to descend by ATC; checked TCAS and noticed an aircraft climbing into that altitude. Fl320 to Fl300. Pilot Flying CAPTAIN; asked to query ATC on traffic/altitude by Pilot Not Flying First Officer. During query a TCAS RA was issued and complied with both our aircraft and an Airbus flight opposite direction; they descended and we climbed. Multiple aircraft and ATC communications followed but still conflicted with TCAS RA. Aircraft were in close proximity but remained in visual separation while complying with TCAS instructions. ATC finally issued a higher altitude for us after event at FL 340. Late instructions; conflicting resolutions (ATC; pilot; TCAS) and communication failure/ similar call signs all were threats in a time compressed manner. Could be possible that ATC confused which aircraft was which and issued opposite instructions than intended.... No further conflicts arose and we continued to destination.Communication was the largest threat. Although not ideal; Captain Pilot Flying; could have communicated directly to ATC about possible conflict decreasing time to action; both with ATC instructions and resolutions.

When ATC cleared an EMB-145 flight crew to an altitude already inhabited by another aircraft; a TCAS RA was received and complied with in a timely fashion.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 15

Workload; Distraction; Confusion; Time Pressure

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 10

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Weather; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Airspace Structure

I was working many positions this session: RXX/TXX/DXX/DXY/RXY The volume of traffic became so intense we had to stop taking hand offs from ZTL. In turn they stopped taking hand offs from us. I'm sure there were many aircraft north and southbound that hit other airspace without a proper point out or a hand off. It was so complex that even with as many people as we had over there to handle the situation it could not be accomplished. Command Center denied all of our requests for help to slow down the traffic so we could do our job properly.Give us help from the Command Center when everyone in the country has to go around the weather into one hole between the military exercises and airspace. There is simply too much volume for one or even two controllers to handle. Maybe an ultra-high could have helped with the frequency congestion.

At XA:10am local I came into work and saw a large weather system extending from just east of SZW toward CHS; causing aircraft to go into the Warning Areas over the Atlantic. We were advised the military was recalling airspace (which we have no power to deny) and because of (Military Training Exercise) no aircraft would be permitted to deviate into the airspace once activated. We told our supervisors and Traffic Management Unit if this were the case; all southbound aircraft that were not able to fly the Atlantic routes would have to be routed something similar to CAE..DBN..VNA..SZW. This would cause all southbound traffic to be routed through two sectors XX/XY which do not have an ultra high and are FL240-600. When what we predicted started to unfold; we were told Command Center thought what we needed was too restrictive. XX/XY were already red sectors; it what they didn't know is roughly 85% of our traffic were on bad routes and were going to be added to the already unsafe numbers at XX/XY. This resulted in chain reaction no notice holds. After complaining for hours; we were told ZTL would not issue reroutes. This was by and far one of the most unsafe situations I had witnessed. Additionally; I overheard that Command Center was pressuring us to come out of ground stops while sectors were holding aircraft.Command Center constantly limits our ability to manage traffic and results in extremely unsafe situations. I have been told several Traffic Management Coordinators that have went to Command Center from ZJX go to terminal areas; thus wasting the knowledge they possess about our complex military/funnel/weather structure. It was clear that yesterday safety was not a priority in the National Airspace System and the Command Center introduced risk into the system by trying to overload the system and pressuring it to break.

Two Jacksonville Center Controllers reported FAA Command Center would not comply with their request for traffic flow restrictions for known weather; causing operational challenges.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Witnessed male operating UAV up to estimated 500 feet AGL in area of traffic pattern of SGS. Operator was frequently out of line of sight of UAV and was operating while talking on cell phone. Aircraft were using pattern at time.

A private pilot observed a UAV pilot operating his drone in the vicinity of SGS airport.


Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

After departing we noticed unusual sounds coming from the engine.   After examining the engine gauges we noticed the torque on the number 1 engine was over 125% and the RPM was approximately 400.  After we concluded that the aircraft had a number 1 engine unscheduled feather we preformed the appropriate checklist and shut down the number engine.  After handling the checklist I talked to the Flight Attendant and ATC.  The Captain continued to fly the plane while I ran the remainder of the Single Engine checklist.  After landing we had the fire department inspect the number one engine before taxing back to the gate.  After deplaning the passenger the Captain then called Dispatch.

After takeoff a DHC-8-100 number one engine autofeathered so with the appropriate checklist the crew shut the engine down and returned to the departure airport.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Upon arrival to aircraft in ZZZ; the flight mechanic briefed us on the status of the aircraft. He discussed an issue related to the Center Hydraulic Center #2 Pump. He was explaining that this particular aircraft didn't behave like any other 767 in that it would not load shed for any reason. He stated that it ran continuously. He assured me that this was in accordance with the way Boeing designed this particular jet. I told him I was going to need some further guidance on this matter as this aircraft already had a history of issues with the center hydraulic pump. He asked what our procedures were and if we had to see that the pump was load shedding during engine start. To which I told him we did and it was specified in our Normal Procedures Section. I again asked him to provide further guidance on this 'special' airplane if we were to operate it outside of the normal procedures. He proceeded to procure some documentation regarding the operation of the center hydraulic system provided by Boeing. On the first page of at least 20 the provided documentation described how the Center Pump #2 is load shed during engine start. Yet the flight mechanic still was adamant that this aircraft was supposed to work differently and that it was ok. After lots of discussion with him that this was not normal and outside of our normal procedures; he agreed to defer the Center Primary #2 Pump. I continue to see Maintenance knowingly push a known problem down the road. Furthermore; the lack of understanding on how the systems work complicates matters simply by not being able to communicate on a mutual level of basic knowledge. In this case; I felt this particular flight mechanic was pushing us to ignore this particular known problem. While the simple fix was to defer the item; which if fine considering it was not working as published; it seemed that Maintenance just wanted us to take the aircraft as it. After we resolved the matter (cordially; I might add) the main cargo door failed to close. The flight mechanic was involved into this matter and we resumed our normal preflight duties. As a result of trying to maintain an on time departure; we did not coordinate the hydraulic pump deferral with our dispatcher and did not get the appropriate time and initials added to the flight release. While this seems rather mundane; there's a lot that we can learn from this event. First; we continue to see Maintenance struggles with the appropriate actions to quickly return an aircraft to an airworthy status. That can be done by allowing the mechanics on sight to diagnose and fix the problem quickly or by deferring the appropriate item to accommodate a fix at Maintenance base. Second; as a flight crew; we allowed ourselves to get intimately involved with the problems facing Maintenance and this particular problem thus distracting us from our normal duties. Going forward; it's our responsibility as crew members to operate the aircraft in accordance with normal procedures and if any deviations arise; then deal with them appropriately. I feel this would have been a better course of action in the case.

B767-300 Captain reported a Maintenance Technician attempted to describe that one aircraft was unique in design and operation; but could not supply the requested supporting documents.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 7500

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Equipment / Tooling; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

First day of flight planning with our new commercially provided flight planning software. From the start I observed several major problems with the software; and some disturbing safety problems that were never resolved. 1. At least half the computers in flight operations are Windows XP with the Google Chrome internet browser. This combination is not supported by our system and fails in some print functions. 2. Half of these computers at any one time have either the printer jammed; or computer locked up. Many of these XP computers fail to display our weather web site. Doing so requires [specific] updates which are locked out by Company IT. Consequently; at any one time; there are only about 1/3 of the computers fully functional.3. After printing the flight papers the first thing I noticed was that the zero fuel weight [ZFW] was off by about 10;000 LBS. Our plane was a [special service] plane and; when full; the ZFW is about 160-162;000 LBS. The flight plan weight was 170;000 LBS. That means that all of the performance numbers; TO data; performance; fuel burn; cruise speed; fuel burn; and en route times were wrong. I queried Dispatch to correct the problem; and he checked with Load Planning. They said there was that much freight. I disagreed based on experience. The Dispatcher was unable to change the zero fuel weight. After receiving final weights; they were exactly what I had predicted. I asked for a revised flight plan from Dispatch and new fuel burn. The Dispatcher sent the same old flight plane with the incorrect zero fuel weight. 4. What's more; the format of the flight plan on the ACARS printer was in error; and in place of the release number; it had dashes. It should have read 'RL03' 5. More ACARS problems. Even based on the erroneous zero fuel weight; calm winds and a temp of 9C the takeoff data sheet was also incorrect. It came with flaps 15; engine anti-ice on. We tried to select flaps 5; and eng anti-ice off. ACARS continually insisted saying that flaps 5 exceeded the MATOGW; which is wrong. I've been taking off 1R in SFO flaps 5 on this flight for 10 years. The ACARS program is wrong. Also; we could not select engine anti-ice off. The temperature was 9C; with dry surfaces; and no moisture. These are two glaring errors by the take off performance ACARS part of the new flight planning system. Takeoff performance data should be simple and it is inexcusable to have these problems. 6. Flight plan times and fuel estimates were invalid. The flight plan was wrong by 21 minutes late. All the en route times were off relative to the en route flight plan time. I tried to manually input an updated ON time in ACARS; and the computer would not take the update. 7. Next computer problem. We increased the fuel slightly. That now requires a phone consultation with Dispatch. Now a second call to Dispatch after the zero fuel weight conversation. We had to wait another 5 minutes for Dispatch to input the change in the flight plan. Since I had to work on an XP computer with Google Chrome; the flight planning program failed to print the final release and the zero fuel weight was still wrong. 8. Another ACARS problem. Release verification on ACARS did not print the current maintenance release. We had no way of verifying the current maintenance status without a call to Maintenance Control. 9. Flight plan cruise speeds were significantly off based on the flight plan cost index. The actual aircraft cruise speeds were faster by 0.02M at a cost index of 14 for a [special service] 757-200 with winglets. Even after slowing the cost index to 0; we were still flying 0.015M faster than flight plan. This would have been even worse if the flight plan weights would have been correct. We have had several company notices recently on the importance of flight plan speeds. Well; the flight plan speeds are significantly in error. This gets really frustrating when the tools we are given to do the job are so inadequate combined with the insistence of managers that we 'stick to the rules.' 10. On arrival we checked the landing performance data. The numbers were all wrong again; because even after receiving the final correct weights from load planning; the new flight planning software still had the incorrect zero fuel weight; and all the performance numbers were off because of the 10;000 LBS ZFW error. We left 22 minutes late because of all the flight plan and performance problems. I was not able to get to the plane in a timely fashion again because you can't find a working computer that will print; and which will provide our commercially provided weather information--oh; and is not excruciatingly slow if you can find one that actually prints. These are embarrassing failures in many parts of the new system and should have been ironed out months ago. Even after identifying all the problems; Dispatch was unable to correct the problems. The flight planning system is not ready for operational use. The company should immediately go back to our previous 'in house produced' flight plans until the commercially provided system is fixed.

A B757-200 Captain critically addressed numerous problems encountered associated with the company's newly introduced; commercially developed and provided; flight planning software. The issues included inaccuracies in takeoff data; en route planning/forecasting; landing data and weight and balance computations. Also described were weaknesses in the hardware provided to access and print required documents and data.


Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

We had two rejected takeoffs on the same airplane; same flight number. Both on Runway XL in ZZZ after setting takeoff thrust (So both times happened under 40 kts). The first time we had an EICAS caution 'ENG 2 REV DISAGREE' so we aborted; told ATC and taxied off of the runway and stopped on a taxiway. The message disappeared right after we went back to idle before exiting the runway. We contacted Dispatch and Maintenance and we came to the agreement to return back to the gate to MEL the Number 2 Thrust Reverser and followed company procedures. We tried a second time; again Runway XL and after setting takeoff thrust we now had a 'ENG 1 REV DISAGREE' caution. We Followed Company procedures again and returned to the gate for the second time. The flight was cancelled.Both messages were detected right after setting takeoff thrust on takeoff roll. Both times under 40 kts.ENG 2 REV DISAGREE caution on the first takeoff attempt and an ENG 1 REV DISAGREE on the second attempt.Rejected both takeoffs and returned to the gate twice after following company procedures.Keep Maintenance working on fixing the issue since this same problem happened to someone else on the same aircraft a few days before it happened to us.

EMB-145 flight crew reported that a recurring engine problem resulted in two aborted takeoffs and a flight cancellation.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While on the taxi up to runway XXR at ZZZ; I as the FO (First Officer) conducted the before takeoff briefing. We were waiting behind a number of jets and a single engine turbo prop and the briefing lead to a discussion about the approaching storm front in from the south and moving towards the end of the runway. Observing what the previous departing aircraft were doing and also observing a gust front our extended brief lead to a discussion of wind shear escape and what we as a crew would do to mitigate that threat. No other departing aircraft reported wind shear on their departure and we were then called to line up and wait. Subsequently we were given a heading and cleared for takeoff. As Pilot Flying (PF) I then went to set takeoff thrust and noticed that the gust lock was still engaged and both the captain and I immediately realized we hadn't completed the before takeoff checklist. We hadn't increased thrust or commenced the takeoff roll at all so the Captain requested a short delay on the threshold and we completed the flow and checklist. On completion of the before takeoff checklist we were given another vector and cleared for takeoff. We departed and the remainder of the flight was uneventful. Later; we decided it was worthwhile to complete the [safety report]; in order for the event to be properly analyzed by a third party. In our subsequent discussion we felt in mitigating the perceived threat of wind shear we became fixated which became the new threat and error of not ending the brief and moving onto the flow and before takeoff checklist. The result was the undesired aircraft state; lining up on the runway for takeoff with the gust lock still in and not properly configured for takeoff.Threat: fixation on other threats affecting the flightError: failed to complete before takeoff checklist[Result]: lining up on the runway incorrectly configuredIn this specific case; [I would suggest making] a clear ending of the before takeoff brief which would lead into the before takeoff checklist.Fixation; avoid fixation on tasks or conversations as it can lead to non-identification of other threats or tasks.

ERJ-145 First Officer reported the before takeoff checklist was not completed prior to taxi into position for takeoff.


Service; Safety Related Duties; Deplaning; Boarding

Fatigue; Physiological - Other; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Attendant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Pre-flight; Taxi; Aircraft In Service At Gate; In-flight

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ever since we began wearing masks I am fearful of my job. I am getting headaches and at times migraines. When I get a headache; I am cranky so not always nice to passengers. I cannot communicate properly with my [coworkers]; my customers; the agents; etc. In an evacuation; how are we to hear one another? We are in a metal tube with little oxygen already. What our company is spraying on the aircraft can be damaging to the human body.Neurologically speaking and hard to pinpoint.

Flight Attendant reported experiencing health issues since the wearing of a face mask began and the use of sanitizing spray in the aircraft.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Pushback [tractor] operator failed to properly secure towbar to aircraft and did not install by-pass pin before pushing. As push commenced; operator saw towbar not seated properly and stopped push; causing bar and nose gear to separate. Pilot advised to set brakes and stopped aircraft from short roll. Push speed was very slow at the time of incident.

Pushback tractor operator reported failing to follow proper procedure during pushback of aircraft.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was LC1/LC2/GC. The events happened on C-Radar/C-Sector. Aircraft X requested vectors for a GPS RWY 14L approach. This approach would possibly put him in conflict with aircraft (gliders) that appeared to be returning to the Ephrata airport; VFR and not requesting advisories. C-Radar issued a descent to 40 and heading 320. Near the base turn; an aircraft on a glider code; was 4 miles and 1500 FT away about 90 KTS. I do not believe the controller issued a traffic advisory. The controller cleared Aircraft X for the approach (approximately nine mile final) out of 7;000; he came back five hundred feet later and requested vectors to rejoin final for his descent. The controller instructed Aircraft X to make a left 360 degree turn back to final. Aircraft X was still at 200 KTS. A 360 would put him in conflict with the previous traffic again; and the controller still had not issued an advisory. I would have mentioned this; except that Aircraft X questioned the turn and reported the traffic on TCAS. The controller instructed Aircraft X to make a left or right turn to final. Aircraft X would have had more traffic in a right turn; two to three more aircraft appeared to be descending into the Ephrata airport out of 45 or lower. Aircraft X accepted the left turn and controlled it himself remain clear of the traffic.While Aircraft X was in the tower pattern; we received a message through the FDIO that there was a Call for Release (CFR) to [departure airport]. Moments after; Aircraft X requested to return to departure and remain VFR to the west. I confirmed that Aircraft X did not want to execute another instrument approach; at least not at that moment. I assumed that he would at some point though; after his VFR work. I should have assumed that he might request to return to [departure airport]; and advised him of the CFR. I coordinated Aircraft X; VFR to the west; and shipped him to departure. Aircraft X requested his clearance with departure almost immediately. The controller instructed Aircraft X to change codes; and issued the clearance to [departure airport]. I asked the controller; 'Didn't you just tell me that there was a CFR to [departure airport]?' He immediately began trying to coordinate a release time. It was not until Aircraft X was leaving 60 in the climb that a release was issued. Aircraft X was never advised that there might be a delay.There was only one aircraft on C-Radar frequency during both situations.I do not believe that there is a procedural change that can fix these issues. Similar situations have been reported many times; and not just by myself. In each situation; there is some rule/procedure not being followed. I believe that this controller has become complacent because he is not held accountable. I have brought these kind of situations up to the controller himself; and to management. At this point; I do not believe that he will change.

MWH Tower Controller reports of another Controller who the reporter thinks is complacent in their duties. Reporting Controller reports of a Call for Release(CFR) for traffic that is in the pattern and eventually going back to the airport that has the CFR. Aircraft leaves the traffic pattern and goes to departure who then issues a beacon code and clearance. Controller did not call for release on the aircraft. Reporter states the other controller is not held accountable for his actions.