Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11.0

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 17.1

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

SFO airport configuration was landing runway 28L/R and departing runway 01L/R. The primary SID in use for Richmond Sector was the Trukn SID. SFO tower scanned Aircraft X flight plan which showed Trukn SID. The departure controllers were expecting this pilot to depart runway 01 on the Trukn SID. Aircraft X departed runway 28 on we had no idea what route or altitude. When the pilot was queried on what departure he was issued and what altitude he had been assigned; it was discovered he was re-cleared on the Santana SID and stopped at 3;000 feet by the tower. But we had no idea; so we have to act based on the assumption the pilot was departing runway 28 on the Trukn SID; which is a right turn heading 040 and climbing to 19000 feet. Instead of the pilot departing directly into Richmond airspace as expected; the pilot departed into Sutro Sector airspace without prior coordination. Per LOA (Letter of Agreement); the tower is required to scan the strip noting Runway 28 departure for all flights that will depart Runway 28 on this configuration to departure control. This did not happen. Nor was there any verbal coordination. Departure control bases all control instructions/separation on what is scanned on the flight plan strips received from SFO tower. SFO tower does not seem to understand the importance of communicating amended flight plan information to the departure controllers because this happens with alarming frequency. This is the second incident of this type I have witnessed this week.SFO tower usually claims the strip was scanned correctly. I have no idea if this excuse is being used as a 'get out of jail free' card or if there is truly an equipment issue. The result is; we have aircraft entering another controller's airspace without prior coordination resulting in potential loss of separation with other aircraft. SFO tower also claims that amended flight plan information need not be forwarded to departure control because it is covered in the NCT/SFO LOA. I am not sure why the tower feels the LOA replaces required coordination of amended flight plan information; but this misunderstanding introduces unnecessary high risk of loss of separation into the NAS. The LOA states what CAN be assigned based on runway/flow configurations; not what HAS been assigned. We have no way of knowing if the flight plan has been amended from what was originally scanned unless the tower makes and FDIO amendment and re-scans; or verbally coordinates the change directly with the [other controllers]. It's that simple. Our responsibilities are clearly stated in the air traffic order. You cannot enter another controller's airspace without prior coordination. We are required to electronically or verbally forward amended flight plan information to the receiving controller. Whatever is on the IFR flight strip is exactly what the receiving controller is expecting the pilot to execute. I recommend that SFO tower comply with the requirements regarding entering another controller's airspace and forwarding of amended flight plan information.

I was working Local and Assist combined. There were two closed runways (1L & 28L) and two open runways (1R & 28R). SFO was landing Runway 28R and departing Runway 1R. I had auto releases for all departures. Ground and I coordinated they would scan departures strips when able; and if not I would do it.After [the runways opened] we were normal operations but I still had the assist combined. Ground taxied a SNTNA SID aircraft to Runway 28R at E. I had trouble reaching the aircraft at first. The strip had been passed to me and I scanned them straight-out Runway 28 with a 'dot' for the scan and crossing out the 'T' for TRACON release. The aircraft departed once in communication and when space opened up to get them out.About ten minutes later I heard the outside phone ring and the Controller in Charge approached my used strips to look up the departures. The ONLY aircraft that could have been in question was Aircraft X since they were the only one to depart the other than the advertised runway. The TRACON claims the 'Straight 28' did not print. I have no idea why this would have been; and they subsequently had us scan the next 'Straight 28' departure and verbally check to see that it was working correctly. It did.

NCT TRACON Departure Controller reported an aircraft departed on a different route than was coordinated via automated strip scanning from the Tower. The Tower Controller states they accomplished the automated strip scan correctly.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 245; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 3100

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Maneuvering for landing for visual approach at DEN just outside of the FAP got a pop up TCAS Climb command. Threat aircraft showed 100 feet below us basically superimposed on our position. There were no previous traffic alerts. We went from maneuvering for a normal approach and landing to a 'Climb Climb' command. The green fly to arc was very small and at the top of the VVI and was commanding 3;200 feet per min. We executed the escape maneuver and went around. We informed the Tower that we were executing a TCAS climb. ATC said they were unaware of any aircraft in our vicinity however the Purser informed us after landing that he saw an aircraft out the window. Subsequent vectors for the next approach were uneventful.

The reporter stated that although ATC did not report traffic; a Flight Attendant confirmed it. Because the commanded maneuver was so extreme the crew was distracted about the aircraft's control and neither pilot remembered hearing clear of conflict. The 3;200 feet climb command was the most the reporter has ever seen and questioned the accuracy.

An air carrier Captain reported a pop up TCAS RA on a 5 NM final to DEN Runway 16 at about 2;000 feet and executed the escape maneuver and go-around. ATC reported no traffic at that location.


Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency

While in cruise at FL360; clear air and SAT -44; I noticed that Number 2 N1 was at 93% while Number 1 and Number 3 were at 95%. When I attempted to advance Number 2 to match Number 1 and Number 3 I noticed that the throttle wouldn't move in either direction. We sent a maintenance report via ACARS advising of the problem. They replied that the cable was likely frozen and to turn on the engine anti-ice in an attempt to thaw it. We did this with no results. As we were approaching our filed destination I requested a descent to the lowest altitude commensurate with terrain. We were initially cleared down to 14;000 FT; eventually down to 9;000 FT. While TAT warmed to +2 and SAT to -15. The throttle was still stuck. We advised Center of the problem and that we would likely have to shut down the engine eventually. When asked if we wanted to declare an emergency I elected to defer this until we were in the destination area. When level at 10;000 FT and still no improvement in the throttle condition we shut down the engine IAW the QRH. Fuel was the other consideration as we were at low altitude and still had 93% on Number 2 with engine anti-ice on. I wanted to be as light as possible. With weather not an issue and being an emergency aircraft by that time I was comfortable landing with an estimated 18;000 LBS; which we did. We declared an emergency with the second Controller we spoke with shortly before being handed off to Approach - I think. I'm not sure of the exact sequence of these events. I believe Approach asked for fuel and SOB. We advised that it would not be necessary to roll the fire trucks. We reviewed 'landing with one engine inoperative' procedures and used flaps 35 with normal configuration points and speeds. We chose to land on the longest runway available. The HUD was a great asset while hand flying a visual approach with RNAV backup and with autothrottles off. Touchdown and rollout were normal. While waiting for clearance across [runway] I noticed that there was some forward movement in the Number 2 throttle; but no backward movement. After taxi in and shutting down the aircraft I noticed that the Number 2 throttle had pretty much full movement. I have been told that a frozen Number 2 throttle cable (if in fact that is what we had) was a known problem with the DC-10 years ago.

We had flown through some moisture early in the flight; but had been in clear air for at least 30 minutes before this happened. We had used the engine anti-ice while in the clouds; so I don't know any way to prevent this and still fly our missions.

A DC-10 Number Two Engine throttle became immobile in-flight because of apparent moisture frozen cable. The engine was shutdown and after a normal landing; throttle movement returned to normal.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 26000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airport fueler was putting jet fuel in the PA31-350. I stopped him after he put 6 gallons in the right main tank. I had him top off with 100LL; wrongfully thinking a small amount would not be a problem. I flew the trip to ZZZ and back with no incident. When being parked I saw a red ALT and ALT INOP light come on the right engine; the one with the jet fuel in it. I do not remember any other negative engine indications. Being at the gate; I shut the engine down. I reported to the Director of Operations and the Director of Maintenance that I had flown the plane with 6 gallons of Jet A in A 56 gallon tank. The next day I found oil on the ground below the right engine.

PA31 pilot reported the ALT INOP light and oil leak occurred after flying with six gallons of Jet A fuel mistakenly mixed with the 100LL fuel in the right main tank.


ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

There is a solar farm south of Las Vegas which is in Sector 6 and Sector 37's airspace.  Daily; during the late morning and early afternoon hours we get complaints from pilots of aircraft flying from the northeast to the southwest about the brightness of this solar farm. They usually ask us what it is because they don't know. On this particular morning; an air carrier complained about the brightness and reiterated that it was 'nearly blinding.'  I reported this to Management and was told that they were going to do nothing about it. They then suggested that I tell the pilot to report it through the safety reporting system that they have and to report it myself. I have no idea what can be done about this situation; but being a passenger on an aircraft that flew through this airspace and saw it for myself; I would say that something needs to be done. It is extremely bright and distracting.

ZLA Controller relayed concerns expressed by flight crews overflying a solar farm south of LAS. Flight crews have noted the facility causes nearly blinding reflection.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Very short taxi to [Runway] 8L in Ontario so we had discussed and ran before takeoff checklist down to the line before leaving ramp. As we approached 8L I had called Tower and let them know we were ready for departure. If I remember they briefly told us to hold short awaiting IFR clearance and then it was just a couple seconds later she cleared us for takeoff on Runway 8L. The Captain was taxiing the aircraft into position as I was running the before takeoff checklist. As the airplane was just getting aligned with centerline the Captain mentioned he thought there was something on the runway. I was actually looking towards the far end of the runway to see if I could see any type of strobes or lighting as it was night time. It was once we had all the aircraft lights on that we could clearly see a van parked broadsided right on the middle of the runway about 1;000 feet in front of us or so. I had not yet called before takeoff checklist complete or verbally mentioned Runway 8L verified before the Captain had noticed something on the runway. No takeoff power was added or anything like that. I called the Tower to let them know there was a vehicle on the runway and the controller seemed very surprised. The controller cancelled our takeoff clearance and gave us a clearance to line up and wait. Controller then began communicating with FAA ground vehicles to try and get a hold of whomever was on the runway. Controller was unable to contact vehicle on the runway but was able to get a nearby airborne helicopter to hover over the vehicle and use a spotlight and or loud speaker to alert the personnel on the ground. We saw the ground personnel then run over to the vehicle; hop in; and drive off. The tower controller then had another FAA vehicle do a runway inspection the length of the runway and verify that everything was clear of the runway. Once the runway was verified to be clear we were once again cleared for takeoff. We ran the before takeoff checklist below the line again as it had been several minutes since our initial takeoff clearance. We departed ONT without further incident. The controller was very apologetic about the issue. Not sure exactly what happened or where the breakdown was that allowed the vehicle onto the runway without the controller's knowledge. It would have been very very difficult for controller to see the vehicle on the runway from the tower.Some type of breakdown in communication between FAA Ops vehicle/operator and Control Tower. The controller mentioned to us that the vehicle had not been authorized to be on the runway. I believe the operator had been out on the runway changing lights possibly? I do know the vehicle was running though and there was not anybody in the vehicle. Not exactly sure how/why vehicle had gotten out onto the active runway without authorization. Better communication/procedures between Ground Ops/Tower. I also think that if you're going to have vehicles like that on the runway; especially at night; they should be required to have some sort of strobe or beacon light. The vehicle was honestly very hard to see before all of our aircraft lights were on. If the vehicle had been further down the runway; I'm not sure we would have noticed it before we began the takeoff roll.

We had been cleared for takeoff on Rwy (Runway) 08L when we spotted a white panel van parked broadside on centerline approximately 800 to 1;000 feet in front of us. The First Officer suspended the takeoff checklist; I stopped the aircraft; and I asked him to notify Tower about the vehicle. Tower canceled our takeoff clearance and directed us to line up and wait.She then started coordinating with ground personnel to determine why the van was on the active runway. Once she had ground personnel investigating; she enlisted the help of a helicopter nearby to use a spotlight and loud speaker to alert the van driver he was inhibiting airport operations. Once the spotlight illuminated the van he quickly left the active runway.Another vehicle had entered the runway from the departure end; drove toward us; and verified the runway was clear. Once everyone was satisfied; Tower cleared us for takeoff. We re-ran the takeoff checklist below the line and commenced takeoff.Unauthorized men and equipment on runway.Retraining for the ground personnel involved that emphasize the importance of communicating intentions with Ground/Tower/ATC when operating in and around airport grounds.

Flight crew reported observing an unauthorized vehicle on the runway prior to night departure that had gone unnoticed by ATC.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 8

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We were training on Ground control. We had Aircraft X on taxiway G holding short of runway 6. Aircraft Z was on taxiway G holding short of taxiway L. Aircraft Y was flaring out to land Rwy 6. The trainee told Aircraft X to follow a Gulfstream and continue via L. However this instruction was meant for Aircraft Z. Aircraft X never moved then stated he was told to cross the runway with an aircraft flaring out. The 'cross' instruction was never issued. No runway incursion took place but an accidental; ambiguous instruction was given to the aircraft which could be misinterpreted as a runway crossing.We believe this mistake took place because the trainee was using a confusing strip posting technique. We reviewed better ways to make strip postings less confusing and more efficient.

TEB Instructor reports of a situation where an aircraft thought they had clearance to cross a runway but did not due to an aircraft flaring out on the runway. No incursion occurred and the pilot did not move the taxiing aircraft until later.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 1300; Flight Crew Type 1100

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Before departing; a local A&P cleaned off the alternator which resolved an electrical generating problem. The alternator was generating power; but instead of continuing on to our original destination; I decided to return to [home airport]; so the plane's normal A&P can take off the alternator and decide if further maintenance was required. During the flight; the generator failed again; or there was a different issue with the radios. I tried calling the Tower using both the hand-held radio and the plane's own radio; neither worked. I squawked 7600; entered the airspace; flew over the field and entered a left downwind for landing.

A C172 pilot reported losing contact with the Tower; either because of radio or electrical system malfunctions. He squawked 7600 and landed.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 24; Flight Crew Total 61

Distraction; Workload; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

After entering Runway XX for takeoff; stopped on runway to align aircraft to center line; released brakes; applied throttle gradually to ensure aircraft stays on center line. When applied full throttle; the aircraft turned left (due to left turning tendency); to correct that applied right rudder correction. However the aircraft turned more left towards the edge of runway and felt risk of takeoff. So pulled throttle off completely; applied brakes and steered safely into grass.Tower contacted me immediately to check; I was safe. Then asked me to check if any of the tires were flat/punctured. I confirmed looking at both the tires; they were not flat/punctured. Tower provided progressive taxi to parking. After parking; control tower provided a contact number for flight instructor to contact them. Also a person from rescue team came and checked with me about what happened and noted my information; checked tires and aircraft for any visible damage. Everything was found ok. Also there were no damages to airport property.

My student pilot lost directional control of the aircraft during the takeoff roll on Runway XX at ZZZ and ended up rejecting the takeoff; however; he ended up in the grass on the side of the runway before coming to a complete stop. He was on a solo cross country flight ZZZ1-ZZZ-ZZZ2-ZZZ1.I was immediately contacted by my student who notified me of the event and he told me to contact the ZZZ Tower; which I did as soon as I was done talking to him. The controller said that it appeared as if my student lost rudder control. He also said that neither the aircraft nor the airport property sustained any damage.My student informed me that the aircraft was veering to the left slightly and he tried to correct it with right rudder. After the application of right rudder; the aircraft veered even further left; which is when he decided to abort the takeoff by pulling the throttle to idle and applying brakes. The aircraft was turned too far left to safely turn it back to the runway center line while applying brakes and therefore; the aircraft ended up in the grass. My student then taxied back onto the runway and exited at the next taxiway. The controller gave him progressive taxi to parking where the aircraft was inspected.Based on the description of this event from both the controller and my student; I suspect that my student inadvertently tapped the left toe brake while applying more right rudder to keep the aircraft on the runway center line. As a result; the aircraft quickly veered to the left.

C172 instructor and student pilots reported that student pilot lost directional control during takeoff roll while on a solo flight; resulting in a Rejected Take Off and a runway excursion.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Before performing an airstart; everything was setup correctly. We had the larger airstart machine located on the co-pilot's side of the aircraft. We also had both hoses already staged in the airstart ports under the aircraft. The airstart machine was already idling and waiting for the go ahead for full power to start the aircraft. Once everyone was positioned in place and the beacon was flashing we were ready to start the aircraft. I was located under the plane near the engine on the co-pilot's side of the airplane. I was positioned well into the ingestion area; focusing on both the opposite engine (waiting for the visible waves) that indicated that the there was exhaust coming from the engine. From what I remember; this is the engine that is always started during the airstart process; with the co-pilot's side usually the one that is started for [the] aircraft.While focusing on the other engine and waiting for the exhaust to become apparent; keeping in mind we had the airstart machine going as well as my ear protection; I started to hear a rumble that was getting louder and louder.  I then turned to my side and the co-pilots side engine was going at almost full throttle. I had to step away quickly to prevent getting sucked into the engine. To make matters worse; the lead indicated that we were ready to disconnect the hoses being used for the airstart. We told him that there was no way that we could safely disconnect any of the hoses associated with the airstart. We couldn't even cut the power to the hoses because once these hoses became limp from lack of pressurized air they would have surely gotten sucked into the engine; let alone me as I was the person that needed to disconnect the hoses. This act could have had some fatal results for me; considering I was the one that was literally standing in front of the engine.Once I had stepped away from the engine it was indicated to the pilot that the other engine was; per SOP; was the engine that needed to be started. The wrong engine was shut down and the correct engine was restarted.We asked the lead why the pilot elected to start this engine as opposed to the engine that is usually started during an airstart. He indicated that this was the engine that was the easiest to start.I understand that these things happen sometimes. Communication with the ground crew could have easily prevented loss of life; or severe bodily harm.  Carelessness of this nature will almost always result in someone getting severely injured. An incident like this should have never happened.

Ground employee reported standing well into ingestion area of an engine that was NOT started per SOP during ground air start.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure

The Citation jet was pointed out with Approach and cleared for the RNAV approach direct [fix] at 4000 feet. I told the Radar Controller at least 2 times that the MIA (Minimum IFR Altitude) was 4200 feet prior to the aircraft reaching the fix. The Radar Controller didn't amend the clearance and it appeared the aircraft was at 4000 feet prior to [fix] and below the MIA of 4200 feet. The scale of the map at quick glance could have appeared to the Radar Controller that [fix] was in a 4000 foot MIA and that's why they took no action.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A Controller working the Radar Assist position and their trainee reported the Radar Controller allowed an aircraft to descend below the Minimum IFR Altitude even though they advised him of the MIA.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft

After departing Runway 28R from PIT; at about 200 ft.; App 2 not avail msg and LDG ATT msg in FO (First Officer) HUD and RA (Radar Altimeter) on FO side displayed erroneous readout. FO RA displayed -5 ft. climbing thru 28;000 ft. No issues descending into ZZZ. Maintenance was advised and they deferred FO RA. I was told it would be replaced on the overnight.

Captain reported a series of erroneous equipment indications when departing out of PIT.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While descending via vectors for RMN; a descent clearance was issued to descend to 2000. The initial part of the transmission was blocked; but my First Officer believed that it was for us. He read back the clearance and inserted that our N# was now cleared to 2000. I questioned him about the clearance and he insisted that he read back our call sign when responding to our clearance. At about 2300' the controlled asked what altitude were we descending to and the first officer responded that we were descending to 2000' as cleared. The controller said that clearance was for another aircraft. We asked what altitude he wanted us at and he said to just maintain 2000'. No other comments were made and shortly after that we were handed off to Quantico Approach.Standard procedure in the cockpit for any clearance for a change in altitude is that the PIC confirms hearing the same clearance as the first officer before changing altitude. We deviated from that policy and should not have. Strict adherence to our altitude change procedure should be adhered to in the future.

Corporate Jet Captain reported a descent on vectors that was meant for another aircraft.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 1110; Flight Crew Type 970

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Loss of power on take off; prop control released to low RPM. Planning off field landing. Requested priority handling with ZZZ Approach was able to regain some power by holding prop control in for high RPM and return to field. On the ground; inspection of the Vernier control for the prop pitch would not lock in place and slid out on its own to low RPM. Plunger button would not stay out to lock setting.

Bonanza 33 pilot reported engine power loss after take off and performed an air turn back to a precautionary landing.


Medium Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

It started when we flew into the Redmond area and we were handed over to a new Controller. The Controller left us high and asked for a 'runway in sight' call 25 nm out. When we couldn't see the airport due to haze; we received a vector towards the DSD VOR and descent to 6;000 feet. At this time; a GA airplane was in the holding pattern over DSD at 6;500 feet. I was about to question ATC; when Controller changed the descend-to altitude to 7;000 feet.Once the field was in sight; Controller cleared us for the visual; leaving us high and too close in to make the approach. We were approved to maneuver for the descent for the visual.While on the visual approach into RDM; a small single engine GA airplane crossed KICBY at 5;500 feet; while we were approaching KICBY at about 6;200 feet and descending. This resulted in an RA. We complied with the RA; then followed the missed approach procedure after the RA was cleared.ATC failed to be proactive about this traffic; and had left us high and close-in on the visual; vectoring us towards traffic. The traffic alert at KICBY was caused by an aircraft that was in contact with ATC and had reported us in sight. This aircraft continued to fly into the final approach course (towards us) and ATC did not take any action to move us or them around.After the missed approach; we received a vector to the west. At this time; the [aircraft] behind us had to go-around as well (ATC cancelled their approach clearance for no apparent reason). Being busy with [aircraft]; it seemed that ATC had forgotten about us; as we were flying towards the mountains at a low altitude. I prompted ATC to turn us inbound again.After landing; taxiing in; we noticed a [turboprop] behind [aircraft] on final aborting the approach. After they landed; the crew expressed that they had received an RA as well. Between the 3 crews; we were very unsatisfied with ATC's performance and regard to safety.A few days ago; ATC was performing below standard in this area as well. Perhaps a lot of new controllers are being trained here? It has been challenging to operate in the Redmond area with these controllers.Please talk to Seattle Approach.

We were radar vectored into RDM behind two other aircraft for Runway 5. Because we had the preceding aircraft in sight; we were cleared by Seattle Center for the visual approach. However; our position for the approach was a bit too high and close to the preceding aircraft. We slowed and lowered our flaps and gear and started making S-turns to mitigate our high position. As we approached the airport; it became evident that spacing and altitude just weren't going to result in a stabilized approach with our initial efforts. Due to a TCAS target a few miles to the right of us; we requested a 180 degree turn to the left to help with spacing and altitude. Tower granted this request; but at the same time we were given a DESCEND TCAS RA due to that same target off to the right. The PF did an excellent job complying with the TCAS advisory; no limits were exceeded; and we completed the 180 degree turn; resulting in a stabilized approach. The position of the TCAS target was on the extended centerline for the approach corridor. According to the PF; it appeared to be a small aircraft doing air work. I personally did not catch whether they were in contact with Seattle Center; but another company aircraft ahead of us claims that the small aircraft was. On the ground; RDM Tower asked if the RA was due to a helicopter also doing training in the area. We never noticed a helicopter; nor did our TCAS pick up more than one target.This is a tough situation to make recommendations for. The visual approach for Runway 5 is situated between the airport and three tall mountains; making for a tight approach corridor. This is further complicated when multiple aircraft such as airliners; general aviation; and helicopters are all sharing this same airspace. From the controllers tone; it sounded like the situation was a bit overwhelming due to the congestion and coordination of so many aircraft in such a tight space. Personally; I wouldn't have done better if I were in their seat. My best recommendation would be at looking into the way the airspace and approaches are coordinated into Redmond; especially for that runway and especially for the vastly increased amount of traffic that has been flying into that airport in recent years.

Air carrier pilots of separate aircraft reported a loss of separation on approach to RDM airport that resulted in a TCAS RA followed by a go-around.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Vectored Aircraft X for a Visual Approach to Runway 24R initially without a heading then later assigned a 230 heading to join final and issued traffic for south complex Runway 25L traffic Aircraft X had traffic in sight. Aircraft X passed through the final approach course getting close to the south complex traffic Aircraft Y; Aircraft Y was issued traffic but did not have them in sight. Aircraft X was given instructions to correct back to Runway 24R.Right now we are getting a lot of unfamiliar and less experienced pilots coming out flying at LAX due to slow downs during COVID and it's my responsibility to be extra diligent in ensuring these types of aircraft are doing what they need to [in order to] operate safely.

SCT TRACON Controller reported experiencing an airborne conflict between an air carrier and a GA aircraft.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

Aircraft was flying on the arrival to Runway 36R. ATC instructed 'cross KRISS at 13000 ft.; then descend via KRISS arrival'. Crew set aircraft to comply with instruction. Approximately 2 miles prior to KRISS; Aircraft switched controllers and immediately instructed 'Aircraft; plan Runway 36L.' Pilot Flying changed landing runway in FMS. Upon changing landing runway; FMS deleted '13000 ft.' restriction and inserted published arrival restriction at KRISS of 'at or above 11000 ft.'; requiring altitude restriction to be reprogrammed. By the time Pilot Flying put the 13000 ft. restriction at KRISS; aircraft was nearing 13000 ft. and sequenced to the next fix on the arrival (early turn) and began descent. Prior to going below restriction; crew noticed impending deviation and selected 'Level Off'. Crew immediately and pro-actively corrected and crossed KRISS at 13000 ft. as assigned but dipped momentarily below. Aircraft deviated by altitude not more than a few hundred ft.; and subsequently met all assigned restrictions.When inserted new arrival (36L vs 36R); FMS re-strung the approach and automatically set back to the database crossing restriction; eliminating programmed and assigned ATC crossing restriction. Was a 'Swiss cheese' moment where change occurred all within a short period of time. Had the change been entered 20 seconds earlier or later; it wouldn't have been an issue. Wait until crossing restrictions aren't imminent; and be more proactive with confirming the FMS honors entered crossing restrictions.

Aircraft was flying to CLT on the arrival up to land 36R. ATC instructed 'cross KRISS at one-three thousand; then descend via arrival'. Crew set aircraft to comply with instruction. Approximately 2 miles prior to KRISS; Aircraft switched controllers and immediately instructed 'Aircraft; plan Runway 36L.' Upon changing landing runway; FMS deleted '13000 ft.' restriction and went with normal arrival window; thus requiring altitude restriction to be reprogrammed. By the time restriction was put in; aircraft was at 13200 ft. and sequenced to the next fix on the arrival; and began descent. Crew immediately noticed deviation and selected 'Level Off' when apparent the FMS would not honor crossing restriction. Crew immediately corrected and crossed KRISS at 13000 ft. as assigned. Aircraft deviated by altitude not more than a few hundred ft.; and subsequently met all assigned restrictions. Be alert for frequency changes and landing runway assignments while under heavy workloads.

A Flight Crew reported after reprogramming the FMS to a different runway than planned they descended below a crossing restriction on the RNAV Arrival.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 152; Flight Crew Total 8025; Flight Crew Type 433

First Officer was PF; Captain was PM. After normal takeoff the PM moved the gear handle to the up position. The center gear primary and secondary lights remained red; the gear Non-Alert checklist was completed; and the PM contacted Flight Control and decided to continue at 260 knots or less.Aircraft was configured for landing early; and all gear indications were normal. A normal landing and roll-out was made. After shutdown; it was determined that the center gear pin had not been removed. An emergency was not declared.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 1410; Flight Crew Type 282

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On approach to landing; the approach checklist was completed. The approach became high and a little fast. With the airspeed distraction; the landing checklist was not completed. In the flare to landing; a grinding noise was heard. A go around was accomplished. No gear warning horn was heard. A left traffic pattern was entered; the gear was positioned down; and the landing checklist was completed. A normal landing was accomplished and taxi to parking completed without incident. Upon shutdown; bent prop tips were noted. Looking back; an upwind approach would have provided more time to complete all of the checklists; and ensure the aircraft was configured to land.

A Pilot reported they became distracted recovering an unstable approach and did not complete the landing checklist resulting in a gear up landing attempt and prop strike.


Confusion; Workload; Physiological - Other; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew

Troubleshooting; Confusion; Physiological - Other; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Before we pushed back from the gate; a passenger exited from the lavatory and asked what the burning smell was. I did not smell anything at that time; then I began to smell the burning smell. Burning Electrical smell. B-Flight Attendant called flight deck (FD); the First Officer came to the back; he said like stale cigar smoke. I opened up both lavatories; neither were the source. I said I smelled the odor between Rows 23-25. The First Officer returned to FD; door was shut. I armed my doors; and walked to the front. Demo was completed; but we had to perform the demo again due to new passengers boarded. C-Flight Attendant commented she had a headache; I said I did; too. I returned to the back and checked my galley. We pushed back. I looked up and saw haze; and it smelled like burning electrical smell; also like 'stale; Parmesan cheese'. I got out of my jumpseat; tried to call the forward galley. Grabbed my Halon; but since I didn't feel heat; I didn't grab a PBE. I tried to call the front and the FD; no one would answer. I could barely breathe. I finally got hold of the A Flight Attendant and let him know I was going to pass out if I could not get O2. He told me to go ahead; disarm your door and open the door to get ventilation. Passengers started to stand up; asking if there was a fire. C Flight Attendant started to come toward me; telling me we're returning to the gate. I felt like I was choking; I could not breathe. Passengers were not panicking; they responded to our directions to remain seated. I knew I could not leave my doors due to them being open.We were checked at the gate by EMT's. Blood pressure was 190/92 at gate. My CO2 level was 5.8; C Flight Attendant was 1.7. My doctor told me that if I had not opened the doors to get O2 it could've been extremely serious.

While taxiing off toward takeoff roll. Safety demo had been completed. Cabin had been secured. We were seated in our respective jumpseats; in our harnesses. C Flight Attendant noticed an odor and alerted me to it. At first I did not smell anything. It was very faint. She again smelled it seconds later. Making reference to having observed a passenger seated in first class having made facial expressions to what seemed to be an odd odor. Again; I took a deep breadth to see if I smelled anything. I smelled nothing. Then; all of a sudden I caught a trace of it. I looked at the C Flight Attendant and agreed with her about the odd odor. It smelled to me as if something electrical; a trace of something burned metallic in nature. It was not the smell of an oven; coffee maker; paper; or smoking materials. I called the flight deck immediately to inform them of the situation. We were assessing conditions within our area trying to locate the source of the odor. I stood on the interphone describing the conditions as accurately as possible. C Flight Attendant then noted that in the aft portion of the cabin; there was a build up of smoke and it appeared to be a white haze forming impeding the clear vision. We proceeded to shut off all power in our galley area. We were unable to localize a source in our section of the cabin. Obtained a PBE and Halon Extinguisher. The pilots indicated we were returning to the gate. C Flight Attendant proceeded to aft section to inform the B Flight Attendant who was in her jumpseat and had already started to react by obtaining an extinguisher. No source was established in the aft section either. As we returned to the gate; the odor and haze became increasingly stronger. PA's were delivered informing passengers to remain calm and stay low. C Flight Attendant returned to forward section of cabin. Aircraft came to a complete stop. Passengers immediately got up. We began shouting commands to stay seated. B Flight Attendant was by this time on interphone requesting to open doors to obtain airflow. She indicated that she had difficulty breathing and seeing clearly. I instructed her to stand by; I was going to contact the pilots. I attempted to call the flight deck; there was no immediate answer. I looked down the aisle. Cabin conditions did appear to be getting worse with the concentration of odor and haze. B Flight Attendant again called. Flight deck door opened. C Flight Attendant communicated directly with pilots and obtained permission to open doors after describing the existing conditions in the cabin. I then informed B Flight Attendant we would be opening the doors following normal door operations for arrival. In other words; I made the PA; 'Flight attendants Verify & Disarm Doors - Stand by for All Call.' The B Flight Attendant and I performed Team Monitor and Challenge in the forward section at doors 1L & 1R. We did attempt to look out the 1L porthole but could not clearly see a jet bridge. C Flight Attendant performed her monitor and challenge procedures and then answered that doors were indeed disarmed. I instructed here that it was OK to open in order to gain better airflow and aid her vision and breathing; safety barrier straps were put in place. As soon as we completed opening the doors; the pilots made a PA indicating that we had stopped short of the bridge and would be towed in. All power had been shut off. By this time all doors were opened with safety straps in place. This immediately cleared the odor and haze conditions in the cabin. During all this; we also kept monitoring cabin conditions as well as insuring passengers remained seated and calm; insuring to avoid in creating a panic situation and unwarranted evacuations. A PA was delivered to have passengers instructing them that we would be using the jet bridge to deplane through the forward 1L door. Once all passengers had exited the aircraft; the B Flight Attendant requested medical attention since she had been exposed the most toinhaling the fumes/smoke. She complained of having a headache; feeling light headed and having difficulties breathing. C FA had also indicated that she experienced having a slight headache. Firefighters were present on the scene. Paramedics also arrived and attended to us in the gate/concourse area.It is hard to say what would helped prevent what appeared to be something burning causing the odor and haze. We do; however; feel that the interphone system on the aircraft did hamper effective communication between all parties involved. As I attempted to deliver as much information as possible to the flight deck; the C Flight Attendant also attempted to do the same. I then attempted to call C Flight Attendant but she was in communication with the flight deck; making it impossible to quickly communicate and gather data that would help us in coordinating more effectively. I do; however; applaud the professional calm response from all those involved. Given the facts on hand; we acted in order to address the priorities of easing the breathing and vision in order to establish better conditions in the cabin.

During taxi for takeoff; the forward and aft flight attendants detected a strong burning electrical odor with a light white cabin haze so as the aircraft returned to the gate. The Aft Flight Attendant opened the door to prevent herself from passing out. Headaches; light headedness and breathing difficulties were reported with elevated blood pressure and two flight attendants CO level readings of 5.8 and 1.7.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 56; Flight Crew Total 8400; Flight Crew Type 7500

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

While in cruise on an international flight on an IFR Flight my aircraft experienced a total power loss. Review of gauges indicated fuel above 1/2 capacity in both tanks. Immediate attempt to restart was unsuccessful. I notified ATC of my power loss. ATC asked my intentions and I told them I wanted to land at an airport. ATC asked 'which airport'. I checked the location of airports on my GPS and requested [the nearest with services]. I made a turn towards airport and established best glide. I was also experiencing a 35 knot head wind as I made the turn towards the airport.I was instructed by ATC to maintain 4000 ft. I told ATC; I was unable to comply as I had a total power loss. During communications with ATC; I was continuing to attempt restart. Again I was told to maintain 4000 ft and contact another ATC sector. I again told ATC that I was unable to maintain 4000 ft due to total power loss and switched to a different ATC frequency.Upon contact; I requested RWY 25 and stated airport in sight. I was given another frequency change to the Tower and again attempted restart.This time I was able to gain partial power to the engine and landed safely on RWY 25. No injuries and no damage to the aircraft.Upon inspection of the aircraft on the ground the left fuel bladder had sucked up to the top of the filler tank giving an erroneous reading on the fuel gauge. Ultimately the cause of the power loss to the engine was fuel exhaustion in the left inboard tank. Approximately 55 gallons of fuel were still in other tanks on the aircraft. I was able to restart the engine due to switching tanks and giving sufficient time for the system to be primed.Contributing Factors were; Faulty Fuel gauge due to fuel bladder being sucked up against sending unit. Corrective Action O Rings in the cap are being replaced and all fuel tank vents have been inspected. The Fuel gauge is being checked for accuracy.Initial restart procedure was interrupted by ATC assigning the pilot a task of determining which airport I wanted to land. This task took my attention away from the restart procedure and I missed switching the fuel tanks during the first restart procedure.A second restart process was interrupted by ATC requiring me to maintain 4000 ft several times after I explained that I had a total power loss and was unable to maintain altitude. Only after switching frequencies; making contact with another ATC controller did I refocus my attention on the restart procedure and follow all steps for a successful restart.I as pilot failed to confirm fuel usage by estimated consumption and time and allowed distractions from ATC to cause me to interrupt my thought process during restart attempts. Corrective Action; I have installed an emergency checklist within easy reach of the pilot position to minimize future distractions.

The pilot of a BE36 reported a loss of engine power due to a fuel bladder collapse and fuel mismanagement. ATC did not comprehend the conditions and attempted to request an altitude that the pilot was unable to maintain. Power was eventually regained and a successful precautionary landing was made.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 28; Flight Crew Total 2750; Flight Crew Type 950

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

At 5;000 feet in cruise above a fog layer with tops at 4;000 and bases at 1;800 on an IFR Flight Plan (TER) from ZZZ to ZZZ1; a loud; continual thumping noise began to come from the front of the aircraft. I declared an emergency with ATC and descended without clearance. ATC restricted my descent to 2;800 feet for the airport Class [D] airspace at my 12 O'clock. I needed to get visual to allow for more options in the event I was forced to make an off airport landing; but ATC refused lower. I descended through the ATC restricted level to 1;800 feet where I became visual with the airport and landed safely.I am under the impression that once I declared an emergency and it was recognized by ATC; that I could proceed in whatever manner necessary to survive the emergency with no restrictions. The Controller and the Supervisor both asserted that their rules superseded my emergency and that I was in violation of the altitude restriction.  The Controller also gave me a deviation vector for traffic which I refused to accept and he then vectored the opposing IFR traffic away from my flight path.  I am unable to find any regulation supporting the Controller or his Supervisor's actions.

Pilot declared emergency and ATC had issues with what pilot needed to do to get aircraft on the ground as soon as possible.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8.0

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Aircraft; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport

Frequency bleed-over occurred again. Aircraft X called to push from on Ground 1 frequency. I was working Ground 2 on frequency and I heard Aircraft X on my frequency which has been a problem for some years now. I sent a previous report a couple of weeks ago. I just recommend investigating the equipment and determine why it happens with certain aircraft.

LAX Tower Controller reported one of the Ground Control frequencies receives bleed-over from another frequency from certain aircraft.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 4480; Flight Crew Type 650

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I just took over the sector. Aircraft X had a crossing of a fix at 4;000 feet. Aircraft Y was at 7;000 feet; with a vector behind Aircraft X. Aircraft X was through I believe 6;800 feet; so I knew I could get Aircraft Y on course soon. I gave a couple of clearances to other aircraft; and was evaluating a situation to the north when I saw Aircraft X climbing and flying roughly a 070 heading (mind you his flight plan and previous path was approximately a 280 heading.) I immediately asked what his altitude was; and expedited him down; calling the traffic. I then called traffic for Aircraft Y. I informed Aircraft X that he was flying away from his assigned flight plan. He said that he 'lost power to the panel; and was correcting.' I asked if everything was ok; and he said he had everything back. I gave a few other clearances; made sure Aircraft X was ok; then advised he calls Center because of a possible pilot deviation.

During my descent out of 12;000 feet for 4;000 feet. I accidentally shut off the master avionics switch instead of the static deice which is right next to it. This shut down all navigation; communication as well as disconnected the auto pilot. I immediately turned avionics back on however it takes time before the Garmin 530 and 430 recycle as well as I have to acknowledge each test screen with 'OK'. The Garmin 600 PFD also changed its screen display and audio warned me through the headset the navigation is not available. During my attempt to recover the avionics I realized the auto pilot was also disengaged and the plane was now on a steep right turn approximately 60 degrees and steep descent. I could not make sense of the PFD so I used the backup attitude indicator to rectify the situation. I finally got the plane level and straight flight at that point Center was querying me to my change; which I still did not have navigation back.I explained my situation and was trying to reload my flight plan when ATC advised me to continue my descent and head back to my fix. At this point I was using my iPad with Foreflight to navigate back on course. Once I got everything restored ATC did ask me to call a phone number because there was another airplane close by. This did not cause the other plane to deviate and they did have me in sight per the transmissions over the radio. I did call the number and reported what happened. I am going to install a switch cover to avoid turning off the wrong switch.

ZAU Center Controller and pilot reported a GPS failure during IFR flight that resulted in a clearance deviation and airborne conflict.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 5361; Flight Crew Type 1482

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Procedure; Human Factors; Staffing; Environment - Non Weather Related

While in contact with ATC and cleared to descend at pilot's discretion I was told to contact ZZZ Tower. I was also told to avoid ZZZ1 airspace which I did. I was not told to avoid the ZZZ airspace. After numerous attempts to get through to ZZZ Tower contact was made. The Tower operator was extremely busy because the Tower was short on staff. This airport was doing a lot of training flights and was very busy. The Tower operator was handling both Ground Control and Tower operations. After finally making contact with the Tower; the Tower operator got upset because I entered his Class D airspace. I thought I was handed off by Approach Control to ZZZ Tower. I don't know if I was handed off by  Approach to ZZZ Tower; or if the Tower operator was to busy to realize what was happening.In the future I will make sure that before I enter controlled airspace I will be in contact with the person controlling that airspace and not depend on being handed off by another Controller. Even though I realize that I need to be more diligent about controlled airspace; I believe that because the Tower operator was so overworked is what really caused the problem. If the Tower operator was not doing Ground Control and Tower Control at the same time in an extremely busy facility radio contact could have been made much sooner and this would have never happened. I would suggest that in the future if the Tower is short on staff; the number of training operations be reduced so as to not overload the Tower operator.

Pilot reported an alleged airspace violation while being under flight following and handed off to a Tower by Approach Control.  Reportedly; Tower Controller was working numerous frequencies/positions and advised pilot that he had violated the Class Delta airspace.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 2300; Flight Crew Type 300

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was piloting as I entered the airport traffic pattern in a mid-field entry to right downwind Runway 25R at KLVK per ATC direction; I was also cleared to land #2 for Runway 25R behind a Cirrus on a 3 mile final. I acknowledged the clearance. As I approached abeam the numbers of the approach end of Runway 25R; I established my descent power settings; and flaps. I also glanced out my right passenger window and observed a white low wing aircraft on the ground (which I believed was a Cirrus; I was supposed to follow based on its higher approach speeds and being on final as I entered downwind). I continued into my descent; turned right base and looked towards the runway. There was severe glare from the setting sun on the horizon line; which made the airport difficult to see. I looked left; did not see any traffic and believed the Cirrus had landed and was the aircraft I observed prior. I turned final; confirmed I was on glide path with the PAPI and at approximately 700 ft AGL at 70 kts indicated; I was told by KLVK Tower to go-around. I complied immediately and notified Tower that I had a prior departed aircraft in sight. The Tower did not specify if I should off-set for the go-around; so I asked and was told to off-set to the north of the runway. I complied and followed directions to return through a normal pattern and approach; which concluded in a full-stop landing. I asked as to distances and spacing; which Tower was unable to provide. The Cirrus had not made any turns to avoid or radio calls to me or the Tower at the time this incident took place.

C172 pilot reported an NMAC in the traffic pattern; citing severe glare as a contributing factor.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Cabin crew collectively decided to allow a 'smart bag'; with a non-removable battery into the cabin. After reviewing company procedures; the cabin crew determined that the bag was not allowed. They notified the flight deck and we returned to the gate. The battery was removed and the flight continued without further incident. [Caused by] misinterpretation of FAA/company regulations/procedures. [Suggestions are] closer review of published material.

CRJ-700 Captain reported being notified during taxi of a smart bag mistakenly loaded in passenger cabin.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 143; Flight Crew Total 2125; Flight Crew Type 1354

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

After receiving a cancellation of an altitude restriction from ZZZ Approach we initiated a climb to 6;500 ft. to practice maneuvers. Another training aircraft had us in sight but also reported another aircraft in the same area that ZZZ Approach did not have on radar. We began searching for the unverified aircraft and then the aircraft passed roughly 100 ft. directly over us in a descent into ZZZ. We descended to avoid a collision. The unverified aircraft was a bright yellow crop duster based out of ZZZ.

C-172 Flight Instructor an NMAC event with a nonreporting crop duster during training flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 7600; Flight Crew Type 500

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Training / Qualification

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

In level flight at FL410 after being in cruise at altitude for approximately 1/2 hour; we experienced some moderate turbulence. Then we felt a buffet and the airspeed started decreasing. The autopilot started pitching the aircraft nose high to maintain altitude. I increased to max take-off power and disconnected the autopilot. We could not maintain altitude and the airspeed was decreasing so we requested descent to FL390. Upon reaching FL390 we continued to feel buffet and requested FL370. We continued the descent to FL370 and the turbulence cleared up. We continued the flight at FL370 for approximately 30 minutes in light turbulence. We requested FL390 for the rest of the flight and did not have any turbulence at FL390.

A G200 experienced an altitude loss in moderate turbulence at FL410 so after the autopilot pitched up and aircraft speed decreased to maintain FL410; the crew descended to FL370 to maintain stable flight.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Taking off out of MIA on WINCO2. Passing 4;000 feet (climbing to 16000 feet); vectored to 340 heading. Saw two large cells (tops to FL550) between my position and BORLE intersection. Cleared on heading 310; direct BORLE when able. I told the controller I wanted a heading of 350 to pass to the north of both cells. I was told 'No;' aircraft are getting through the gap between the two cells. Skirted the first cell to the south; but the gap had closed. Immediately got severe turbulence from the cell on the right. Turbulence was severe (off and on) for 2-3 minutes. Aircraft also had two distinct short periods of uncontrolled flight. First Officer was commanding a right hand turn in both instances and the aircraft turned left 45 degrees. No over speed; no G exceedance; no altitude deviations; no aircraft limitations exceeded. No injuries. Flight attendants were told to remain seated. After 3 minutes; the aircraft exited the cell and was VFR.This event occurred because MIA Departure was unwilling to let me head 350 as requested to miss all storms. I understand that FLL airspace is just to the north of MIA and leaving me on a 350 heading would conflict with arrivals into FLL is a concern. Telling me that aircraft are getting through the gap only works until it doesn't. For our flight; it did not work. Once we turned to a heading of 310; we were committed. There just is not a lot of room between where we were and BORLE.If the crew does not want to try to shoot a gap; another solution should have been offered. Once on the heading toward the storms; the aircraft was committed! Turning right 270 degrees and skirting the storms to the south should have been offered. Luckily; no one was hurt and no aircraft damage was noted.

A319 Captain reported asking for a turn out of weather; ATC said no; flight went through area of severe turbulence.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

I was working two sectors combined during a west flow. We were ILS XXR and visuals to Runway XY. I was trying to lay off of Runway XY because I just didn't have time to vector and hit the ghosts. I am already busy vectoring for space to [Runway] XXR and I had a couple that I was taking to Runway XY. Aircraft X popped up from ZZZ and I just didn't have a good way to take them to Runway XXR. I decided to assign them Runway XY. All my arrivals to XXR are already descended to 6;000 feet. Aircraft X came to me at 6;000 feet and I needed to get them under my ZZZ1 arrivals. I then descended Aircraft X to 5;000 feet and didn't see the traffic in front of them who ZZZ1 was working. By the the time I noticed it Aircraft X was already responding to an RA. After coming off of a COVID-19 reduced staffing schedule a lot of A siders are a little rusty in the radar room. I think that sectors should have been split.

TRACON Controller working busy combined arrival sectors descended an aircraft from 6;000 feet to 5;000 feet which caused a conflict with another aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 44; Flight Crew Total 9179; Flight Crew Type 9179

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

We were descending via the ZZZZZX arrival with the Autopilot off - on profile and speed. FO decided to hand fly the remainder of the approach and landing and disconnected both the Autopilot and Autothrust near ZZZZZ1 intersection. A minute later I looked away and when I looked again; I noticed the FO was high on profile and I mentioned that we needed to cross ZZZZZ1 level at 6;000 feet. The FO increased the rate of descent and crossed ZZZZZ1 level at 6;000 but then continued to descend to approximately 5;900 feet and around 250 knots - with accelerating trend. I verbalized both altitude and speed; and the FO quickly recovered both. We were soon level at 6;000 feet - 240 knots...and soon to slow to 210 knots by ZZZZZ2. There was very light traffic in the terminal area and ATC made no mention of conflicts of any kind. We then proceeded to land uneventfully on Runway XX. The main contributing factor was the FO being new as well as not having flown much for the last several months. We fully debriefed everything; including what to improve on; once at the gate when duties permitted.

Air carrier Captain reported an altitude and airspeed deviation during arrival.  Captain cited the First Officer's lack of flying time in the last several months as a contributing factor.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

We were very heavy at 200;000 LBS takeoff. It took us a long time to get to cruise. At first HEFOE check after reaching cruise altitude; realized the possibility there was a fuel transfer issue with Auxiliary Center Tanks (ACT). Observed fuel system display for 10-15 minutes until verifying that fuel was not transferring to center tank.Contacted dispatch and maintenance. Activated manual ACT pump override. Fuel from FWD ACT (left ACT on system display) began to transfer. Dispatch; with maintenance concurrence; said to continue. 30-40 minutes later the FWD ACT was empty. Unfortunately; the AFT ACT tank did not transfer its fuel with the secondary pump. Once again; we contacted dispatch advising them we would have to land with almost 4000 LBS in the aft ACT.Dispatch requested we divert. We took delaying vectors in order to land under max landing weight. We landed 25 minutes later at 171;000 lbs. We switched aircraft and continued uneventfully to our scheduled destination.

A321 Captain reported the Additional Center Tank aft did not transfer properly. Flight diverted to interim airport.


Time Pressure; Physiological - Other; Workload

Physiological - Other; Workload; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Captain [name] called back to the Flight Attendants approximately 6 minutes in to climb and asked the A & B FA (Flight Attendants) if we smelled fumes of burning oil or 'Dirty Socks' we both replied we did not smell anything out of ordinary. We came out of sterile flight; and the emergency light and call was initiated; we were told by the Captain we had requested priority handling; and returning immediately to gate at ZZZ. The Captain further said he would advise the passengers to the situation and we had 8 to 10 minutes to prepare for landing. We instructed the passengers to buckle up; put trays and seats upright; put away carry on bags. Lifts window shades for landing; We landed without [issues].. Hard; fast; and seemed heavy due to full fuel. The pax were alert and seemed highly aware; and when they saw the [Airport Rescue and Firefighting] vehicles they were a bit more animated. Captain came on the PA soon and said all is clear no problems ; [support] equipment was part of routine. The passengers were aware of new gate and plane to continue flight to ZZZ1 even before we were completely deplaned. We debriefed from the [safe] landing. Company and Supervisors called and asked if we were OK to continue with our legs to complete the scheduled flights. We both agreed we were OK to go forward and continue. Honestly; at the moment; with the pax already at the next gate; I felt ready...... I regret that mental decision. I was running on unrecognizable adrenalin. I did not know or understand the mental dump that was about to happen. On the flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 I felt like I had been hit by a bus; I had a sever headache and I knew it was the adrenalin from the event. Its not reasonable to have the flight crew continue on; after such an event. I agreed because I was two flights from home base; I thought and believed I was fine and fit for flight. Good Lord forbid an event were to happen again; I believe I will make different choices; in a landing event aftermath.

At approximately 5-10 minutes into takeoff Captain [name] called to ask if FA [name] or myself smelled fumes of a burnt oil or 'dirty socks'. We both responded that no odor was detected at that time.Immediately after sterile light went off; the Captain called on pilot emergency line. He informed us that because of fumes in cockpit we were heading back to ZZZ. We had 10-15 minutes to prepare cabin for landing. There was no special instructions and no brace commands would be needed. Captain then informed passengers of situation and the cabin remained calm and understanding.We landed without incident. FA (Flight Attendant) explained to passengers via intercom why we were met by rescue vehicles and fire trucks. The cabin remained calm.Once rescue [trucks] cleared us we taxied to gate to deplane. Before pax exited they already were notified to proceed to Gate X for flight to ZZZ1.Captain [name] called for a debriefing and we talked for at least 30 minutes about incident. During this time I received a called from an unknown number. I assumed it was crew scheduling advising of 'changes'. Captain said to call them back once we were done with debriefing.As the four of us exited Aircraft X Gate Agent said to proceed to [gate] X because another plane was ready and so were our passengers.After I preflighted new aircraft I called back number. A man named [name] answered and said he heard about landing and wanted to know if I was OK to fly. I said yes. He asked to speak to FA. I realize now that I didn't have time to process events. I didn't realize what 'OK to fly' meant. I didn't understand that my mental and physical abilities might crash. All I knew was a new plane was ready; my passengers were waiting; I had two legs left then I would DH home to my base. I had a job to do. I didn't have a second to breath.....process......During my next two legs I experienced a raging headache and felt shaky. With the experience and support of FA we worked together to make sure these last two legs were perfect but we both realized we were not mentally or physically at the top of our game. When we finally landed in ZZZ1 I was informed from CS (Crew Scheduling) that my DH was canceled and I would remain overnight until a XA;30 flight home on [day]. There was a XE:55 flight to [home] with seats available. I was told I wasn't legal which made no sense to me because I said I would waive extension because I just wanted to go home after the days events. I had one more day of reserve which I could have done at [home].After 15 minutes on hold I yet again told I couldn't go home and I had no more strength to fight this fight. FA was kind enough to drive me to hotel so I didn't have to wait for van. I arrived back home on [day] at approx XC:00.

Air Carrier Captain and flight attendants reported a fume event during initial climb. The flight returned to the departure airport.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

The following is a description of the air turnback event on date:We departed ZZZZ operating ZZZZ-ZZZ. During climb out we started to notice a burning smell in the cockpit. We continued towards ZZZ; while trying to determine the cause of the smell. We climbed to 40;000 ft.; and continued towards ZZZ. The burning smell would continue to come and go. The smell started to get stronger and more frequent. I had the loadmaster and flight mechanic; as well as the FAA Inspector; looking for possible sources of the smell. We determined the smell was coming from the forward area of the cockpit. At that point I closed my air vent; and at that point notice that smoke was coming from the First Officer's side of the glare shield. We made the decision at that point to return to the airport in ZZZZ. As we started to descend back into ZZZZ we continued to try and find the source of the smoke and smell. As I was feeling the top of the glareshield; my finger touched the lower right portion of the windshield; and burnt it on contact. At that point I turned off the right forward window heat. After approximately 10 minutes the area was cool enough to touch. As we continued to ZZZZ the smell started to dissipate. Upon landing; the flight mechanic checked the connection; and the right forward window heat was deferred per the Company MEL (Minimum Equipment List). We departed ZZZZ for ZZZ and noted no further smells or issues. This was a mechanical malfunction. Nothing could be changed to prevent this in the future.

B767-300 flight crew reported smoke in the cockpit during climb that resulted in a return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 15400; Flight Crew Type 135

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Left engine failed due to fuel starvation. Was able to divert and land at ZZZ before the right engine failed. Upon further research; discovered that the FBO at BFI was not fueling the aircraft to the amount of requested and since the fuel gauges were not accurate; my fuel calculations were worthless.

Pilot reported aircraft received less fuel than requested resulting in a diversion as fuel gauges were also unreliable.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110; Flight Crew Total 900; Flight Crew Type 700

My student and I were landing on runway XX at ZZZ when an airplane passed behind and underneath us - from right to left - to execute a go-around when we were approximately 15 feet from the ground. We first arrived at ZZZ and were the only aircraft in the pattern. [About half an hour later] an airplane entered the right downwind for XX. The airplane made a downwind radio call; and we made our radio call for final approach. While approaching to runway XX the airplane asked us for our location. I responded on short final for XX. Shortly thereafter I made another call to say we were over the numbers for XX. At this time I heard an engine close to the helicopter; simultaneously looked right; saw the airplane; and flared the helicopter aft to avoid a collision. After stabilizing the helicopter I moved from the runway and landed the helicopter on the taxiway parallel the runway. All parties made radio calls and from my perspective it seems that the airplane did not have our helicopter in sight; but opted to land anyway.

R-22 Instructor reported NMAC during final approach with an aircraft doing a go-around.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 4900; Flight Crew Type 2500

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were on the ground at DNL waiting for our IFR release from Augusta ATC. We taxied out to runway 23 and held short while we waited. One aircraft arrived on runway 11 and we watched him land. After he cancelled his IFR we were given our clearance. We announced we were taking off [on] runway 23. I taxied the airplane into position for takeoff. As I pushed the power up I noticed something at the other end of the runway. There is a hump and a downhill slope to the runway so it was hard to see what exactly it was. There was someone in a small airplane (152/172) that had taxied onto runway 5 (coming towards us) and was starting to takeoff. This person made no radio calls at all. I immediately pulled the power to idle and did not have time to vacate the runway before the other airplane flew over our airplane. The smaller airplane continued to climb and went over us at approximately 300 feet.

Light jet Captain reported rejecting his takeoff roll when he spotted a light aircraft taking off from the opposite runway.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Staffing

During Main-Landing-Gear (MLG) Wheel Assembly replacement (for tire tread wear); during installation it was noted that some threads were stripped in an aluminum adapter inside the axle. Two bolts secure a spring clip that retains the wheel to axle nut. The spring clip prevents the nut from loosening. In turn; the two bolts are secured to the clip by safety wire. It would not be possible to torque one of the two bolts. The time was approaching to move the aircraft from the Hangar parking area to the Terminal; and there was insufficient time to procure and install a new adapter. The Mechanic installed the clip with two bolts; but could not tighten the second to the specified torque. The only thing holding the second bolt was the safety wire. The mechanic signed the block on the work card that he torqued both; but had not. If the bolt migrates; it may contact the (rotating) hubcap of the wheel. Damage to the hubcap may affect the anti-skid braking system.It is the (de facto) policy of local Management to reprimand any Mechanic involved in a late departure (originator delay due to maintenance). Usually this includes written 'performance counseling' forms on the Mechanic's record that can lead to termination. On time performance pressure to get the aircraft to the gate; to avoid an originator delay and to avoid being 'written up' influenced the mechanic to choose improper maintenance and falsification of records.Allow the mechanic sufficient time to perform and record proper maintenance -- i.e. follow written company policy.

An Aircraft Maintenance Technician reported about the effects of a 'De Facto' policy of reprimand by his air carrier's local Management whenever a Technician is involved in a late departure due to maintenance on originator flights. Technician did not torque one of two bolts securing a spring clip that retains a main landing gear wheel to axle nut on an ERJ-170 aircraft.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Aircraft X had a flight plan on file from ZZZ. The strip for it was in our suspense bay. When Aircraft X called up requesting IFR to [destination airport]; he said he was off ZZZ1. ZZZ is about 20 miles north of ZZZ1. As the D-side; I checked in the system for any flight plan from ZZZ1 but found none. The R-side must have seen me check or didn't care because he issued the aircraft a beacon code. By doing so; it was clear to me that the R-side wanted to build an IFR flight plan out of a VP [VFR Plan] command message; so I got right on it. He put up the tag near ZZZ1 and I built a VP because all of the info was on the IFR flight plan from ZZZ in our suspense bay. In the middle of this; there are other traffic situations for the R-side to monitor; in addition to a relief briefing that he had begun as well. He got pulled out of the relief briefing a couple of times to issue control instructions. I was inputting commands into the D-side keyboard when I heard him issue a clearance to Aircraft X. He cleared Aircraft X to '[destination airport] via direct; climb and maintain [IFR altitude].' Then he continued on with the briefing. Since I heard the aircraft get cleared and climbed; I inputted an IFR altitude into the VP to make it an FP. Truth be told; my assumption was that the R-side already had a safe vertical altitude to have given that clearance. When I looked up; I saw the M-SAW was flashing. For a moment; I didn't understand but then I realized that the aircraft was out of 4;400 feet in a 5;900 MIA. The R-side was speaking in the briefing and I was unsure as to what rule he thought he was using. Also; there might have been confusion as to the routing on the ZZZ Departure strip and what he could subsequently issue. The routing on the ZZZ Departure strip was ZZZ...[destination airport]. Also; the controller relieving him didn't say anything which compounded my confusion. Was there a rule this R-side was using? Did he think he could say 'direct' because it was on the ZZZ departure strip? In my confusion as to what legal clearance he might have given this aircraft; Aircraft X was quickly out of the 5;900 MIA. Regardless of how fast it all happened; I felt compelled to report the MIA violation as a safety concern.This R-side controller is volatile and difficult to work with. He's always right and everyone else is always wrong. I wouldn't consider him to be very professional. However; despite any differences I may have with this person; I can't fail to say something. If there was any question as to what he just did; I should have asked him despite him being in the middle of giving a relief briefing and breaking off the briefing to give control instructions.My biggest recommendation to prevent this in the future is to follow the following credo: 'See it; say it.'

Center Controller reported another controller identified an aircraft and made IFR below a MIA.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency

[We had a] Number Two Engine failure on climb out at 12;000 FT. Declared emergency and diverted to an en route airport for the ILS 24L.

[Narrative 2 had no additional information.]

A B737-700 engine failed during climb so the QRH was complied with; an emergency declared and the flight diverted to an enroute airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 105; Flight Crew Type 218

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Cleared the LDORA2 RNAV to DEN. Arrival and Runway 35L programmed and briefed. Initial Approach Controller gave us RWY 34R. First Officer asked if 35L was available and the reply was no due to traffic. We reprogrammed [Runway] 34R and briefed. Then; we switched to the Final Controller and were given an altitude and heading change. Controller asked if we would like RWY 35L. We replied yes and reprogrammed the FMC for landing [Runway] 35L. The previous altitude left us high and the Controller asked if we would like vectors to the east. We accepted vectors so we could get back on profile. We were then cleared to intercept the LOC. We intercepted the LOC for [Runway] 35L. We were then in VMC conditions and Controller asked if we had runway in sight. We were established on the LOC 35L and replied yes. The Controller then replied cleared for the visual 34R. The First Officer asked the Controller if they meant [Runway] 35L. Controller replied that they didn't hear our acceptance of Runway 35L and that our radio transmissions were being clipped at the beginning. We were then cleared the visual approach to [Runway] 35L and landed uneventfully.

A319 Captain reported an ATC communications breakdown on arrival into DEN resulting in a heading deviation.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9.1

I noticed a 1200 code transitioning from north to south east of the Class D. Aircraft X was inbound for 30R and I was trying to determine where Aircraft X would fit inbound with my other traffic. As Aircraft X approached the airport; it appeared they needed to descend out of 080; but there was traffic near them on the approach at 075. Eventually; after it appeared Aircraft X had to level off before turning inbound; the approach controller was able to switch the inbound to me; and he checked on reporting that he had the traffic in his proximity in sight. Out of curiosity; I asked if the pilot could tell what type of aircraft it was and he said it looked like a Cherokee.When traffic permitted; I was able to check and determine from ADS-B that the callsign of the 1200 target was Aircraft Y. A few minutes later; the approach controller called with a request to turn Aircraft Z into the Class D to avoid that northbound aircraft as well. I approved the request and Aircraft Y appeared to continue out of the area.This is another instance of an aircraft flying perfectly legally just outside of controlled airspace; yet causing traffic conflicts with aircraft utilizing the air traffic system. The air traffic system worked as intended (collisions avoided); but it would have been safer and more efficient if the transitioning aircraft was in contact with air traffic control. They could have received flight following from approach or contacted our tower to either transition or advise their intentions.My recommendation is to continue to encourage pilots to take advantage of air traffic control services; even if it is to simply advise as a courtesy that they are transitioning nearby controlled airspace. It may be helpful to remind pilots at local events; through online materials; and even provide suggestions on aviation charts (eg. frequencies for traffic advisories from approach or towers). In hindsight; I wish I had called in the blind to see if the aircraft was on frequency. However; I recall having other duties to perform at the time (traffic in the pattern or arriving); and did not want to get distracted with the transitioning aircraft.

BJC Tower Controller reported an unsafe but legal operation involving VFR and IFR aircraft.


ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; Procedure

We were taking off behind an EMB-170 on 26L. ATL will routinely clear you for takeoff before the aircraft in front of you has rotated and that was the case for this takeoff as well. After we rotated and selected the landing gear to the up position; I noticed some left and right wing rocking which usually indicates wake turbulence. We were climbing out at V2+10 and suddenly we had airspeed fluctuations and received a WINDSHEAR Warning message. Following the windshear escape procedure; I followed the command bars and selected full thrust due to the low airspeed and close proximity to the ground. I believe we received the warning below 600 ft AGL. As I was following the command bars; I noticed the right engine Aircraft X was flashing red. Shortly thereafter; the warning ceased and I pulled the engines back to the flex carats and requested the autopilot be activated to alleviate workload. I monitored the engine for the rest of the flight and it all seemed normal. Once out of sterile; I informed the Dispatcher and Maintenance Control via ACARS of the event and called them arriving at the destination. While on the phone with Maintenance Control after the flight; I checked the engine exceedance log in the maintenance computer menu and it showed that the engine encountered a level 3 event for 6.9 seconds and that the peak temperature was 927degC. The Maintenance Control technician checked the GE engine manual and informed me that while it wasn't outside of limitations; to write it up and they would have local maintenance come and sign it off. The weather in ATL was not gusty and no wind shear was reported in the area.I believe ATL is clearing aircraft too close to other aircraft. Wake turbulence encounters are a threat. Despite being of a similar size; the Aircraft in front of us put off enough wake to rock the aircraft and cause airspeed deviations strong enough to activate the windshear warning system. Encountering wake turbulence in ATL is a common occurrence though it doesn't typically cause windshear warnings to go off.I think there should be either more separation or perhaps a study into whether ATL Tower is following proper spacing procedure. I feel that if we encountered the wake of a larger aircraft; the airspeed deviations could have been more severe and there is not much margin for error when you're climbing at V2+10.

Reporter emphasized his concern regarding ATL wake avoidance procedures.

CRJ-200 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence departing ATL in trail of an EMB-170.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was complying with a functional check of the aileron cable tension in the forward cargo area. With this task you must remove the forward bulk head right hand panel and cargo area floor boards. After the aileron cable tension checks; I completed the job card signing off all the tasks including the completion of the bulk head blow out panel and floor boards. I failed to secure the floor boards and the bulk head panel resulting in the aircraft flying in an unsafe condition in which could of resulted in a catastrophic result. As a maintainer it is my responsibility to make the sure any and all aircraft is it a 100% airworthy. In the future; any task that is not completed will not be signed to make sure it is completed to ensure the aircraft is airworthy.

Maintenance Technician reported failing to secure the floor boards and bulkhead panel after completing a functional check.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Rejected takeoff prior to setting standard power; at about 25 knots. Held at arrival end of runway to complete paperwork for maintenance after block out. When we called ready; Ground Control did not direct a frequency change; and cleared us to line up and wait; then cleared us for take off before we had occupied the runway. When queried; Ground switched us to Tower frequency.We switched freqs and checked in; and were advancing power prior to transfering aircraft control for take off when Tower controller cancelled our takeoff clearance due to spacing with an arriving aircraft. Reject performed between 25 and 30 knots; little braking and no reversers required; exited at first taxiway. Consulted QRH; calculated brake energy; documented the rejected takeoff; and returned for an uneventful takeoff.

A B757 Captain reported that Ground Control cleared them for takeoff prior to sending them to the Tower. When checking in; the Tower cancelled the takeoff clearance as the aircraft started the takeoff roll.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Our flight became unstabilized below 50 feet during the landing phase and we executed a textbook balked landing on runway 33. The main tires did touch the runway; as expected.Unfortunately during the go-around phase; comm 1 radio flip-flop button got pushed. Once we returned to the right frequency; we received vectors back around for another VMC approach to runway 1. On the downwind I did quickly call the Flight Attendant (FA) and make a quick PA announcement about the go-around and gusting winds. We landed on runway 1 without further gusting wind issues. During the taxi in; tower asked us to give them a call; which I did after we parked at the gate and deplaned. Tower asked me why we went around. I explained that the winds had gusted and we became unstabilized during the flare. Next they asked why I did not stay on the tower frequency. I said; I was sorry; but during the balked landing things got very busy; and somehow the radio flip-flop button got pushed back to approach control. Who ever I was talking to the tower seemed very busy; and basically said don't do it again and make sure you stay on the tower frequency. During deplaning no passengers expressed any concerns to me or my crew. In fact; a few did say good job as they meet back up with us on our next flight.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported a sidestep maneuver to another runway and with gusty conditions the approach became unstable. The flight crew executed a go-around and circle back for a normal landing.