Flight Crew Last 90 Days 28; Flight Crew Total 11165; Flight Crew Type 3423

Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Our aircraft had been out of use for 5-1/2 months for modifications and upgrading. Avionics were upgraded to Collins Proline 21 and the engines changed to Williams FJ44-3AP. We (the Flight Crew) received Part 135 approved differences training before taking over the airplane four weeks ago; however; no simulator was yet available for hands on training on the new equipment.Due to extended use of battery power the day before this flight we decided to use avionics for ATIS and preflight checks only after engine start. Time between start-up; clearance and our assigned departure slot was very short so the First Officer conducted the checklists silently for most items while I taxied to the runway for takeoff.The manufacturer provided short form checklist requires generator checks after engine start. In the short form checklist there is no reference pointing out that generators have to be reset to be brought back online following this check. Neither of us saw a warning light but we believe that both generators had been offline since that generator check.We were focused at another avionics problem when FMS 2 quit about one minute after takeoff while in the clouds. When FMS 1 quit a minute later we prepared to return to Zurich airport immediately. The aircraft was slightly out of trim and aileron trim no longer worked. This required the PIC to be focused on hand flying the airplane. All screens went black shortly thereafter; but FMD1 could be used in an emergency mode. With radar vectors we intercepted the ILS. With no flaps and landing gear having to be extended by the alternate gear extension procedure our landing speed was a little higher than required for the weight but that runway is very long and landing was uneventful. We left the runway and taxied towards the nearby FBO. Due to two aircraft blocking our access we had to stop on the taxiway and wait for 5-10 minutes. During that time we had time to analyze our electrical problem and were able to restore power by resetting the generators. Because of that delay; however; all Main Landing Gear tire fuse plugs blew so the aircraft had to be put on dollies to be towed to the FBO.Our next recurrent training will include the new cockpit equipment but there will still be no simulator which matches all aspects of the modifications. This will be available early in 2013 so we plan to book another sim training to be on the safe side.

Insufficient training in the recently highly modified BE-40 and rushed cockpit preflight and checklist procedures during a short taxi for takeoff resulted in the flight crew failing to reset both generators after performing a 'silent' checklist conducted solo by the First Officer. As a result; shortly after takeoff they suffered the loss of both FMS's and their associated NAV displays in IMC as battery power was drained.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

At 45000 feet 50 miles southwest of LAR VOR we encountered severe turbulence. It started with moderate mountain waves that took us up to 45200 feet then down to 44700; with this happening twice in succession. The airspeed fluctuated from Mach .80 to .77 or so. This lasted for about a minute. About a minute in we were hit with a 2-3 second burst of severe turbulence. The airplane banked to the right 30 degrees rapidly; at which point I switched off the autopilot. Though I had control of the plane it rapidly went to Mach .74 even though I had the nose down and we lost about 500 feet. Initially as this happened we got the 'Stall' aural warning; though we got no stick shaker and it didn't come close to any kind of stall. After a few seconds the turbulence went to moderate then light; I had full control of the airplane and we got back up to 45000 feet. We requested lower and got down to 43000 feet where I put it back on autopilot. I went back to check on our passenger and reassure him. He seemed fine; a little nervous but overall ok. Conditions were clear; total VFR and no convective activity anywhere. The airplane weight was 31500 pounds and it was ISA -4c; well within performance parameters for 45000 feet in the CL-350. The only reports of turbulence in the area was for light turbulence. The release shear report for the LAR area was 1. Just a case of clear air turbulence with mountain waves. As the PIC I included is the shear report for the flight.

Bombardier Challenger Captain reported encountering severe turbulence that resulted in speed deviations and momentary altitude excursions.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 925; Flight Crew Type 350

Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I may not have closed my IFR flight plan until an hour after landing. I flew in yesterday and the Tower had closed during my flight (I think for COVID). It's a very busy airport with lots of private and commercial jets. After being cleared for the approach by SCT TRACON; airport was far busier than normal and non-controlled. I simply do not remember if I cancelled in the air or not. Regardless; I tried to cancel about 20 minutes after landing when I doubted if I canceled in the air. It took me over 45 minutes to get a human on the phone. I called Weather-brief repeatedly and 1) the new menu isn't friendly without an account. 2) I was on hold forever all times. I also periodically called SCT TRACON and the SNA extension was busy. I finally tried BUR; got a Controller and he walked down the hall and canceled for me.What should I do? Always think about canceling. I was complacent; I never cancel there. I also should set up a WX-brief account. I also realize you can call other ATC numbers than the airport you landed at.

GA pilot reported the SNA airport Tower was closed possibly due to COVID-19 resulting in difficulty closing the IFR flight plan.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 21000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6.7; Flight Crew Total 383; Flight Crew Type 20.8

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

Normal approach and landing Runway XXR at ZZZ airport. Nose landing gear collapse during rollout at about 50 MPH after landing. ALL landing gear down indication were normal through the approach and landing. No gear unsafe indications were present. No abnormal systems indications were present during the approach prior to landing. Notified Tower and theN stopped the aircraft straight ahead on the runway after the incident. No injuries sustained by either pilot. Emergency equipment approach the aircraft along with airport operations personnel. Pilot information and identifications were provided. The aircraft was towed to its parking location at FBO.

[Report narrative contains no additional information.]

PA34 pilot reported nose gear collapse at 50 MPH during landing roll.


Workload; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

We received the PDC to the MMUGS1 departure; which is a 'New procedure at this airport'. We planned on a [Runway] 26L takeoff. The departure was briefed; to include an incorrect initial altitude of 5;000 FT as posted in the 'INITIAL CLIMB' section at BOTLL. We missed the 'MAINTAIN 4;000 FT' as posted in the 'ROUTING' section of the SID. We were assigned [Runway] 26L for departure. During taxi to [Runway] 26L we were subsequently assigned [Runway] 26R for departure. We checked to see if there were any different departure instructions for a 26R vice 26L departure and there were none. We were cleared to line up and wait [Runway] 26R. [When cleared for takeoff] we were cleared for a left turn to TTAPS (which is not part of the MUGGS1 departure from [runways] 26L/R; but is on the departure routing from [runways] 15L/R) so it was not in our FMC routing. Once airborne I heading-selected toward TTAPS and entered TTAPS into the FMC and executed it. LNAV was selected and executed. I missed noticing the 'At or below 4;000 FT' notation on the SID at TTAPS (which would have protected us with regard to the 4;000 FT restriction). The entire time we were in the left turn to TTAPS we were entering the new routing; accelerating; cleaning up the airplane and switching to and checking in with Departure; so we were very busy. As we were climbing above 4;000 FT on our way to 5;000 FT; for the crossing restriction at BOTLL; the Departure Controller queried us our altitude; I replied with our current altitude and that were climbing to 5;000 FT and he responded that we shouldn't be that high; but that it was not a problem and to climb and maintain 16;000 FT. The problems were: We saw the 'cross BOTLL at or below 5;000 FT' in the 'INITIAL CLIMB' box and interpreted that as the initial altitude and we didn't notice the 'MAINTAIN 4;000 FT' that was buried in the 'ROUTING' box. We received 'with our takeoff clearance' instructions for a left turn to a fix that was not on the departure routing for the runway of departure via the SID. I think it would be helpful if the actual 'initial altitude' was in the 'INITIAL CLIMB' box rather than for it to be hidden in the 'ROUTING' box. [THERE ARE] DIFFERENT LOCATIONS FOR THE 'MAINTAIN XXXX' altitude restrictions for all the different SIDs out of Houston. There is no consistency at all. There really should be a standard; and prominent' location for all initial altitude restrictions for ALL SIDs. Emboldening the MAINTAIN XXXX FT' would also help.

Our initial clearance was to depart Runway 26L MMUGS 1 RNAV SID. We checked the SID in the FMC and noted the first fix was BOTLL 'At or below 5;000 FT.' Also; on the approach plate in the INITIAL CLIMB box it states for runways 26L/R; 27 'Climb heading 267 to 600 FT; expect radar vectors to cross BOTTL at or below 5;000 FT. On climbout the pilot not flying heading-selected towards TTAPS [as] TTAPS was not in our published routing for a departure off [Runway] 26R and the Captain had to type it into the FMC. Once TTAPS was identified the Captain selected it and executed LNAV. This was during a high workload period in the climb as we were cleaning up the aircraft. We were never assigned an altitude when cleared to TTAPS. Once we leveled off we examined the SID again. TTAPS is on the plate and is referenced in the INITIAL CLIMB chart for departures off of runway 15L/R. TTAPS has an AT or Below altitude of 4;000 FT. Also; what I hadn't originally noticed was the ROUTING box; which was located below the INITIAL CLIMB box; which stated MAINTAIN 4;000 FT. The problems that contributed to this situation were: 1) The INITIAL CLIMB box states to cross BOTLL at or below 5;000 FT 2) The first fix and climb restriction in the FMC was identical to the instructions in the INITIAL CLIMB box - BOTTL........./5;000B. 3) The ROUTING box is below the INITIAL CLIMB box; the MAINTAIN 4;000 FT was buried in the [ROUTING] text. It would be more beneficial to have the more restrictive altitude located either above or within the INITIAL CLIMB box.

The flight crew of a B767-300 cleared for takeoff from Runway 26R and cleared to fly the MMUGS RNAV SID from IAH failed to note the fine print restriction to 'maintain 4;000 FT' in the ROUTING section of the SID text; which is illogically located below the INITIAL CLIMB box. As a result; they were climbing to cross BOTLL at or below 5;000 as directed by the chart graphic; and the directives in the INITIAL CLIMB text box when ATC advised they had flown through their cleared altitude.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 362; Flight Crew Type 4858

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

During boarding; the A Flight Attendant brought a concern about a passenger mobility device to our attention. She thought it 'looked like a hover board' and she wasn't sure it should be on the aircraft. The Ops Agent took the device and tagged it to go with checked baggage. The Captain and I saw them walk across the ramp to load it. After we landed in ZZZ the A Flight Attendant showed us pictures of what looked like the same device from the internet that showed it had lithium-ion batteries. If this was the case; the device (or at least the batteries) should have been stowed in the cabin or not allowed on the aircraft at all.As the Flight Deck Crew; we assumed the Ops Agent had properly checked the device before loading it. In future it would be wise to verify for ourselves what kind of device it was and what kind of batteries it contained.

B737 First Officer reported Lithium Ion powered mobility device was improperly transported on aircraft.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface

Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I was the Captain and flying pilot on takeoff roll on Runway 19R. At the 80 KTS call; I checked my airspeed indicator and it was normal and indicating approximately 80 KTS. Then a few seconds later at an airspeed somewhere between 80 KTS and V1; I glanced back down at my airspeed indicator and it was showing below 80 KTS. As Captain; I exercised my command decision to reject the takeoff. The rejected takeoff maneuver was completed; and we taxied clear of Runway 19R. My First Officer informed Tower; consulted the QRH and turned on the brake fans. I made a PA announcement to the passengers and stated the reason for the rejected takeoff. I also informed them that we would be returning to the gate after our brakes had a chance to cool. We then informed Operations and Maintenance and returned to the gate. After consulting with Maintenance; we deplaned the passengers without incidence. I then called Dispatch and informed the Dispatcher of the event. Systems Scheduling then decided to cancel the flight. The event occurred due to a faulty and inaccurate airspeed indication.

At approximately; V1 the Captain called 'reject' and said something about his speed and rejected the takeoff. I advised the Tower we were aborting the takeoff. The Captain let the autobrakes decelerate the aircraft until a safe speed and finished the braking manually. The Tower asked if we needed any assistance; we declined and they told us to contact Ground clearing the runway. We cleared on Taxiway W1. At this time I advised we needed to go back to the Gate but needed to stop and let the brakes cool. We pulled off on the taxiway to let the brakes cool and I advised Operations we needed to return and have Maintenance meet us. I got out the QRH and reviewed the hot brake section with Captain. After about 10 minutes with the brakes cooling down we proceeded to the Gate and met with maintenance. On the taxiway while we waited for the brakes to cool the Captain said his airspeed indicator was only showing 80 KTS when he glanced down at it. Up to the time of the reject my airspeed indicator was showing normal acceleration. I believe the Captain rejected the takeoff due to the fact he didn't think there was sufficient airspeed to continue.

An A320 Captain rejected the takeoff near V1 because his PFD airspeed indicated around 80 KTS while the First Officer's indicated near V1.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

While on the climb out I noticed that my ears began to pop and the feeling of pressure was different than normal. As a result I looked down at the pressurization panel and noticed that the cabin was climbing at about 1;800 FPM; almost the same rate as the aircraft. When we leveled at 8;000 FT; the cabin altitude was 5;600 FT. At that time the Captain and I discussed the situation. He then transferred the controls and the radios to me as he contacted Maintenance Control to discuss the situation. I informed ATC we had an issue and needed to stay at 8;000 FT. ATC then began to vector us to keep us out of the departure/arrival paths. The Captain then returned to the radios and informed me that Maintenance said we should try to continue the climb. I notified ATC and we were cleared to 14;000 FT. As we passed through 11;000 FT we got the amber CABIN ALT message. The Captain then said that we needed to descend back to 8;000 FT. We notified ATC of such and were immediately cleared to 8;000 FT.Passing through 10;300 FT; we got the red CABIN ALT warning. We ran the immediate action items and donned our oxygen masks. By the time the immediate action items were run we had returned to 8;000 FT; we were then cleared to 7;000 FT. As we began to run the rest of the QRH we reviewed and discussed both the RED warning message and the AMBER message QRH. We elected due to the low altitude to not drop the masks as required by the RED warning QRH; but not required per the AMBER message. I then removed my oxygen mask and took the controls while the Captain removed his; then returned the controls and radios to him while I notified the Flight Attendant. Once the emergency was resolved and the crew was all in the loop the aircraft was prepared for landing. Landing occurred under max landing weight. Fire equipment had been dispatched even though we stated it was not required. After landing the trucks followed us to the North Hold Line.The event occurred due to the cargo door not being properly shut after all bags were loaded. Maintenance personnel pressurized the aircraft and found no pressurization leaks. They then inspected the baggage door and found that the door had not properly sealed.This issue could have possibly been prevented in three ways. First; a full walk around by ground personnel to check that all aircraft doors had been shut might have prevented it. The second would have been if Maintenance Control had not asked us to try and climb higher. With passengers on board 'testing' to see if the cabin will climb more is not a best practice and should not be suggested by Maintenance Control. Third; as a crew we should have declined the suggestion/direction of Maintenance Control to climb and just returned to the airport.

An emergency descent was not required; as we had reached 8;000 FT by this point. In addition; the cabin ALT message had extinguished due to our lower altitude.I informed the passengers that were returning due to an issue with pressurization; and that the aircraft was sound and there was no reason for alarm. We landed without incident and returned to the gate unassisted.According to Maintainance; this issue has been occurring regularly. A thourough analysis of why the cargo door is not seating properly should be performed.

A CRJ flight crew declared an emergency and returned to their departure airport when they were unable to pressurize the cabin.  Maintenance discovered a cargo door was not sealing properly when closed.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft X was base leg for an ILS approach into SNA. He was given a turn onto the localizer and cleared for the ILS approach. Apparently he was confused by the turn on and came back to me asking for the turn again. He now was crossing the localizer and approaching a 3700 feet MVA. I gave him a turn to intercept from the other side but his turn was not steep enough. He ended up in a 3700 feet MVA at 3000 feet. At Tustin [radar sector name] we used to have an area where we could descend below the MVA to the east. Where Aircraft X was a 3000 feet 'dump' area. It would really help out the airspace congestion if we could attack the ILS from both sides with the same MVA; instead if there's a blow through they are immediately in a higher MVA.

SCT TRACON Controller reported that an aircraft went through the localizer and ended up in a higher Minimum Vectoring Altitude then was issued.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 3500; Flight Crew Type 3100

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

[I experienced a] gradual engine failure (Not catastrophic.) [It appeared similar to] fuel starvation. I landed on highway with minimal damage to the aircraft.

The pilot of a Mooney M20 experienced a gradual engine failure and successfully landed on a highway with minimal damage to the aircraft.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Tower told us to join right downwind. Entered pattern on a high wide downwind as I was initially intending to go straight into right base. Turned right base; Tower called out traffic 300 feet below and I saw helicopter pass by on my left. Then; Tower said 'I didn't tell you to turn base.' He had us continue; however. We were now head on with a Cessna that was on the left base. Tower told the Cessna to turn off to the north and advised us of traffic 12 o'clock and 300 feet below. I had just initiated my descent to land normally; then I received an RA to climb. I climbed about 200 feet until clear of conflict; and watched traffic go under me about 400 feet below from right to left. Continued approach and landed normally using normal stabilized approach. Customers commented jokingly after landing about the Cessna that caused us to climb. Tower did not comment further about incident. Tower said to join right downwind but did not say he would call the base. Main issue in my opinion was Tower's failure to tell us exactly what he needed from us. Tower will typically say 'Extend/join downwind; I'll call your base.' I took his initial instruction as join right traffic.

BE-400 Captain reported an NMAC while on visual approach due to miscommunication with ATC.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Two main gear tires were [planned for cargo loading]. One fleet service member on this crew has already been injured in the past and was out injured for roughly 5 months. The person asked us about the loading of these heavy tires. We called rep and was instructed to take pictures as they should not be loaded onto the plane and they should be trucked as they always are.

Ground personnel reported refusing to load large main gear tires due to possible injury during aircraft loading.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

There were several wildfires in San Diego County including one very close to the airport which prevented some controllers from getting to work.  Traffic at CRQ is usually very light in the early evening hours and with the fires and resultant flight restrictions it was even less busy than usual. Aircraft X was the only airborne aircraft I was talking to when he called inbound on the ILS approach.  I started giving him traffic calls reference the fire fighting aircraft south of a six mile final.  I was not too worried because the fire fighters had been there for hours and had always been south of final and around 1;500 feet and lower. Two of the aircraft climbed to 1;800 and moved a little further north so I gave another traffic call.  One of those aircraft started turning south again so I figured the one behind would as well; but instead the aircraft started climbing opposite direction on final.  The two aircraft were about a mile apart with Aircraft X descending from 2;600 and the other aircraft climbing from 2;200 when I started the traffic alert; by the time I finished the traffic alert the targets were already merged. The pilot of Aircraft X was understandably not happy.  I took down his information over the frequency after he landed and began making notifications and writing the MOR after the other Controller came back upstairs.The TFRs took way too long to get into place. The TFR for the Carlsbad fire went into effect 8 hours after the fire started; coincidentally right after all the aircraft that were fighting it had departed.  I think the San Marcos fire did not have a TFR until the next day.  Even without a TFR; ATC could have been more proactive in denying approaches. The weather was fine for the most part and we could have done visual approaches. If aircraft are going to be firefighting and not talking to anyone then we probably should not be running approaches right next to them.  It also seems like ATC should have had communication with someone at the fire. During the day we were constantly communicating with fire fighting aircraft while just south of CRQ. I am sure there was an aircraft performing a similar function over the San Marcos fire.  I think that if we could have advised them that there was an aircraft on the ILS approach they would have stayed south of final.

CRQ Local Controller describes situation where fire fighting aircraft exit the TFR and become a conflict for an arrival.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 67; Flight Crew Total 2840; Flight Crew Type 410

Confusion; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was cleared (via radio phone patch) to LAR as filed (direct) climb; maintain 6;000; expect FL260 10 min after departure. On departure [frequency]. The cloud bases were around 7;000 feet MSL in our direction of flight. I did not file; nor was I assigned the graphical RNAV-ODP. I departed Runway 31 and climbed to 500 AGL; started a left turn to the south-west and completed the normal acceleration schedule while putting the wing into cruise-climb mode in steps. After announcing away and clear on UNICOM; I switched to 119.5 and contacted Ellsworth Departure at around 4;500 in the climb. I got a very clear and loud 'meow' in response and then silence. I tried them again a couple seconds later and got the same cat-like response. I asked the pilot sitting next to me if heard the same thing and he was looking quite confused and said he did (it sounded like a person imitating a cat). Later my 3 passengers (with headsets) said they heard the cat-like sound also. I leveled off at 6;000 and pulled the power back to keep under 250 KTS IAS (my Vmo); switched to COM Number 2 and tried again...no controller; just a 'meow.' We saw the 6;900 foot mountains approaching; there were certainly a few places I could sneak between the peaks while staying at 6;000; but I would have had to change heading substantially. I was unsure what to do as my clearance was 6;000 and 10 minutes (the lost com climb instruction) had not passed. At that time; my TAWS system alarmed. I added power; turned on the anti-icing equipment and climbed into the clouds. While climbing I switched to 121.5 and called in the blind on Guard asking for an alternate frequency. To my surprise; Ellsworth answered and advised me to switch to 119.5. I explained why I was above my 6;000 foot assigned altitude and that I had been unable to raise them on 119.5. He had me try again (now at about 10;000 feet) and it worked fine. The pilot sitting next to me and I both had cross-checked our frequencies and they were not in error. I also was just using the 'flip-flop' feature on the GNS430W so I can't explain why it didn't work earlier but then worked at 10;000 unless a repeater was broken resulting in poor reception; or something was wrong with both of my radios that then fixed itself. I have no explanation for the cat sounds on the radio...it was not radio interference/static; it sounded like a person having some fun with me. I do not know what I should have done. I could have turned back to the field; orbited and tried the phone patch again; I could have stayed VMC; turned around and returned to land. I could have stayed at 6;000 and started scud-running through the mountains while trying to raise Departure Control but I wasn't sure I'd ever get in touch with Ellsworth and it looked pretty dicey ahead of me at 6;000. I elected to climb before 10 minutes had passed in response to my TAWS alert. Should I have done the ODP? Since it only gets me to 4;500; would it have helped? Any idea on the cat sound? I wonder if I incorrectly wrote down my initial climb altitude limit (could it have been 16;000?) but I believe I read back 6;000 and the guy sitting next to me heard the same (I was on a phone patch and my radio recorder didn't go back that far to check). But in thinking about it; if I'm cleared direct to the south-east at 6;000 MSL traveling 250 KTS IAS; 10 minutes before allowable lost-com climb would put me into the terrain shortly after takeoff; so I really don't understand the whole situation. Obviously if I had made contact with Ellsworth right after taking off; they would have cleared me higher and it would have been a non-issue. I know these reports are not supposed to be for intentional deviations and I made the decision to climb early; but as I stated; I don't know what the right answer was in this situation.

Turboprop pilot reported a communication breakdown with ATC led to an altitude deviation due to approaching terrain.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Crew was alerted by a red Master Warning; CABIN ALT; and CABIN ALTITUDE lights illuminated; triple chime alarm and EICAS message CABIN ALTITUDE displayed.  Crew observed the cabin altitude increasing through 11000 ft climbing 500-1000 feet per minute. Immediate action checklist items were accomplished; ATC clearance for an immediate descent obtained. Cabin altitude continued to increase however; stabilized at approximately 13;000 ft as the aircraft descended in an idle power; full speed-brake; 250 to 300 kt IAS; wings level descent. During the wings level stabilized descent with flight spoilers; the cabin pressure descended below 10;000 ft and seem to stabilize at various lower altitudes upon aircraft level off at 13;000 ft for terrain. Captain transferred pilot flying responsibilities and ATC communications to the First Officer. Crew elected to divert. Remaining Cabin Altitude Warning checklist items were completed; ATC clearance to divert obtained; company and Station Operations notified. Inflight coordination; flight attendant cabin inspection; diversion checklist completed and passengers advised of the situation during the descent and Captains decision to divert. Terrain was insight throughout the descent; approach and landing accomplished. No assistance was required after landing or during taxi to the gate.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B757 flight crew reported a loss of pressurization while at cruise altitude. An immediate descent was initiated and a successful diversion to a suitable airport was accomplished.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 7285; Flight Crew Type 2812

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Fairly high gross weight out of ZZZZ. Computer suggested flaps 5 reduced thrust takeoff.  V2 was 188.  Since the latest training event; or possibly [previous] training showed an increase in delayed rotation rates and tire speed exceedances (202kts) I decided to brief crew on that particular issue as a possible threat. Pilot Flying rotated precisely at Vr at a near perfect rotation rate and then stopped rotating at around 8 degrees nose up.  I used body english and a 'lets go' as I feigned pulling back on the control wheel but we still did not leave the ground until an airspeed of 207 to 208 as seen by the IRO. The winds were down the runway at 15 to 19 kts so its possible our GS was considerably less but that wasn't the real problem. It wasn't what the Pilot Flying was expecting! Once we were thru FL180 we debriefed. In conclusion; it turned out that none of the First Officers knew what the target pitch attitude for a normal takeoff was. (15 degrees.) Hence; even a beautiful rotation at the prescribed Vr would not avoid a late unstick speed if the proper pitch angle wasn't used; not to mention adversely affecting our single engine climb segments.

Captain reported First Officers did not know procedures for rotation angle during a non standard takeoff.


ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Procedure; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

During a visual approach to Runway 26L at George Bush Intercontinental Airport; our aircraft encountered wake turbulence. I was acting as the pilot not flying during the encounter. As I read the Before Landing Checklist; the aircraft rolled quickly to the right. The pilot flying applied full rudder and aileron deflection to correct the roll. This caused the Yaw Damper Fail EICAS message to come on and remain on for the remainder of the approach and landing. Restarting the system after arrival at the gate fixed the problem. Maintenance was consulted and the aircraft was inspected and OK'd. Our aircraft was number five for the visual approach to 26L. The aircraft immediately ahead of us was an Airbus A310 flying a very slow approach speed. Despite the fact that the pilot flying was maintaining an altitude slightly above glide slope; we must have encountered the wake of the Airbus. A bit more separation between aircraft of significant size difference may help prevent this type of event in the future.

EMB-145LR First Officer reported wake vortex encounter in trail of an A310 on approach to IAH that resulted in a roll. When the Captain applied corrective controls they got a Yaw Damper Fail message.


New York Center told us to descend to 17;000 feet (from FL180) and turn 10 degrees left. He told us we had VFR (Visual Flight Rules) traffic at our 10 o'clock and 500 feet below us (16;500 feet). As we leveled at 17;000 feet and about 3 miles away from the VFR traffic we received a TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance System) RA (Resolution Advisory) to maintain our altitude. At this time; we noticed the light twin bank hard right away from us. Even though we were level and the light aircraft appeared level both visually and on TCAS; I suspect the VFR light aircraft did not like the sight of a 767 heading at him and banked hard to get a better angle away from us. I suspect that during this maneuver the light aircraft could have climbed slightly - causing our TCAS RA. Note: We never deviated from 17;000 feet during the RA. Also; we received a TCAS TA (Traffic Advisory) prior to the RA.Close proximity (500 feet) to VFR aircraft. Not sure why ATC (Air Traffic Control) turned us into the VFR aircraft - probably for spacing or other traffic.

B767-300 Captain reported a Resolution Advisory on approach to land.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft X experienced and rollback and unresponsive throttle immediately after takeoff. It was found that the rib of the thrust reverser cowl had rubbed through the CDP line going to the fuel control. This lead to an engineering order to set up all of the same series motors on the 767 fleet to be inspected for the same problem. I was sent with another technician to ZZZ to inspect Aircraft X. On inspection of both engines we determined that both lines had slight wear and out of caution both should be replaced. We addressed the clearance issue and replaced both lines. The Engineering Revision Authorization (ERA) stated that ETOPS would not be affected. So we signed off the work and released the aircraft. The aircraft made two flights before this was found and had a re-inspection in ZZZ1 to verify that the repair was good. Looking back being that both technicians were ETOPS qualified we should have made a call to [Maintenance] to verify what we were reading to be correct.

An ETOPS qualified Maintenance Technician signed off work and released a Boeing 767 for service not realizing that it required an inspection sign off also.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Troubleshooting; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Time Pressure

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Upon reaching the hold short line runway 9 Key West the captain noted that the selected airspeed readout showed amber dashes. I said that I thought it was because something was missing in the FMS. The captain said that we could just use manual speeds and flipped the speed selector switch to manual. I asked him if he wanted to take a minute and figure it out. He said it was fine (all paraphrased; I don't remember the exact words). At some point we received the takeoff clearance. We were assigned runway heading. I don't remember if I called or the tower gave it unsolicited. At this point I was still trying to process the amber dashes issue. The captain called for the Before Takeoff checklist; and we got 'takeoff okay.'On the roll I missed the 80 knot callout (that never happens). I was still distracted. Around 90-95 knots the captain asked; 80 knots? With the flaps 4 takeoff V1 was rapidly approaching and I made the V1 call. Rotate. I missed the 'positive rate' call. That also never happens. At 400 ft he called for heading and I selected HDG. We got handed off to Miami Center. I flipped the frequency; but did not call. I usually wait for flap retraction so I'm not on the radio while the captain is asking for flap retraction. At 1000 ft he asked for VNAV and I selected VNAV; but we didn't get it. The takeoff crossbar remained; and a message appeared on the FMS. Something like 'vertical mode not available' or 'vertical guidance unavailable.' We went through the flap retractions in the climb while the captain was manually selecting speeds. Also at some point the auto throttles were disconnected. I'm not sure if it was the captain or a result of the VNAV/amber dashes issue. My call to Miami was delayed because of the distraction of the VNAV issue and the extra steps in retracting flaps from 4 instead of 2. We ate up miles on runway heading. Miami gave us 'direct CURSO.' It took me three tries to set up the simple task of direct to CURSO. We had now continued further on runway heading. We selected the direct to and turned toward CURSO. Shortly after the turn; at between 4000 and 4500 we got GND PROX with an aural 'terrain terrain' and the Terrain Awareness Display showed a red circle just inside my 5 nm ring on the MFD. The magenta line went right through it. I immediately knew it was the tethered radar balloon. I told the captain it's the balloon. He said that it was okay; that we were climbing. I said NO; were not going to out climb that! I received no response; so I took the yoke; disconnected the autopilot and turned the airplane to the left. I think we stayed out of the restricted airspace; but I cannot confirm that.After clearing the balloon Miami gave us a 040 vector to CURSO. We resumed direct to CURSO. When I accessed the PERF DATA page to begin the process of getting the landing speeds there was no data. I believe it was at this time that the captain re-entered the zero fuel weight; and the PERF DATA page populated the data I was looking for. The captain stated that he believed the zero fuel weight was the source of the original problem with the airspeed readout and the vertical mode. I was able to get the landing speeds and we continued the flight without incident. It's imperative that we as FOs trust our instincts. While we have much less experience on the plane than the Captain; we are still fully qualified on the equipment. Slow down procedures. There was a very fast pace in the cockpit prior to closing the door. It was an atmosphere of everything needs to be happening fast. As we closed 11 minutes early; I even asked the question; 'Why is everyone in such a hurry? We're early.' I got no response. First red flag.

Air carrier First Officer reported they may have entered Restricted Airspace without clearance. A CRM breakdown contributed to the event.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 700; Flight Crew Type 200

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

While on final approach for ILS we had a complete electrical failure. We lost HSI; Loc; glideslope; Navs; coms; transponder; rpm gauge; everything. It was VMC when the failure happened and we were about to descend into an overcast layer around 800 FT MSL without any ground reference. Per ATC Approach instruction; upon going missed we climbed to 2000 FT MSL and flew runway heading with our magnetic compass. We maintained 2000 FT to maintain VFR due to layers above and beneath us. After running through all of the relative checklist with no changes; I decided to fly to an uncontrolled airport to land after exiting the airspace. While performing an emergency gear extension; we regained total electrical power. I determined that the failure was related to the gear switch. After putting the gear down on the approach is when our HSI and NAVs failed. When we went missed and picked the gear up; we lost all electrical power before I could advise Tower of the situation. I attempted to transmit our condition and situation just in case they could hear us. We could not squawk 7600 due to the failure. After lowering the gear for the emergency gear extension and immediately recovering electrical power is when I realized it must be related to an electrical issue with the gear switch. After regaining power I contacted ATC approach on 121.1 and let them know what happened. After we landed; I called Tower and informed them of the problem as well.

Reporter stated the PA-44 was equipped with a Standard six-pack; round gauges and two Garmins. The Landing Gear 'Extend/Retract' handle is electric and to the left of the Throttles. The Emergency Extend 'Pull' switch; a round Red knob; just to the left of the normal gear handle.Reporter stated he never actually got to the item on the Emergency CheckList that says to pull the Emergency Extend switch because the first item on the list says to 'Extend' the landing gear. When he did that; the gear extended and locked down (three Green lights) and the hydraulic pump stopped; that's when all electrical came back. Maintenance later told him the aircraft battery was weak and would not hold much of an electrical load. As a result; when he had selected 'Up' (retract); the electric hydraulic pump continued to run even with the gear up; until 1400 psi hydraulic pressure has been reached. The PA-44 Landing gears do not have uplocks; continuous hydraulic pressure is used to keep the gears up and locked. With the aircraft battery being weak; even with two Alternators functioning; not enough electrical power was available and the electrical system shut-down until the hydraulic pump no longer was required to keep running to maintain 1400 psi pressure. No Circuit Breakers (C/B) had popped. The hydraulic pump is aft of the baggage bulkhead. The Emergency Extend pull switch routes hydraulic fluid from the hydraulic pressure 'Up' side so the gears can free fall.

A Flight Instructor reports losing his HSI and navigation on approach when he extended the landing gear on their Piper PA-44 Seminole aircraft. Due to the missed approach; he retracted the gear and then lost all electrical power and indications; except for the magnetic compass and vacuum gauges.


Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft X had a lightning strike pilot write up going into ZZZ. The contract mechanic performed a 'walk around inspection including looking for lightning strikes per standard inspection procedure'. The aircraft was then released for a ferry flight to ZZZ1. Upon arrival our mechanic did a lightning strike inspection that is required per maintenance and aircraft manuals. Aircraft damage was found. The aircraft was not given a proper inspection and flew with undocumented damage. Maintenance Manual requires all lightning strike documentation to be sent to maintenance control for review before being released for flight. The logbook documentation was not correct. After the damage was found; an Engineering Authorization had to be written for an interim repair before the aircraft could fly.I think as just a simple safety factor the company would want (per the Maintenance Manual) only a [company] mechanic to perform a lightning strike inspection over the whole aircraft before it is released for a ferry flight. What if several rivets on the top of leading edge of horizontal stabilizer were blown out. Now the leading edge departs the aircraft? Now what? Using contract maintenance to just do a visual walk around when a known aircraft damage inspection is required doesn't save that much time and money for a downline. Now we are finding more aircraft are being flown from outstations to maintenance following this same procedure.Adhere to the Maintenance Manual and Aircraft Maintenance Manual policies and procedures when an aircraft has a damage event. Follow the Maintenance Manual lightning strike inspection policy and don't fly an aircraft with possible damage putting lives at risk. Stop trying to save money by not sending [company] mechanics downline to perform these safety inspections.

A Lead Technician reported that a B737 did not have the proper inspection performed after a lightning strike.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 228; Flight Crew Type 6200

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 218; Flight Crew Type 8400

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

While flying at FL410; we got a left Bleed Trip indication. Not long after; the Altitude Warning horn sounded due to a loss of pressurization from a right Bleed Trip. I was the Pilot Flying. We completed the necessary checklists and regained pressurization during the descent. After coordinating with Dispatch; we continued to destination and turned the aircraft over to Maintenance. As known from previous events I have read about; communication was a challenge at first due to wearing masks. The Flight Attendants were curious at first since we were descending steeper and unexpectedly; but we quickly explained to them about our situation. This report is written to present an abnormal situation we have seen more of lately that presents challenges in communication between pilots. The crew worked well together and the passengers were kept informed. I believe this scenario has been run in training and should be continued since it is odd to communicate with the masks on. 'Chair flying' the steps help to make it more familiar in the event of a loss of pressurization and use of masks.

At FL410; the number one engine bleed tripped off. Pressurization remained stable and checklist procedures were accomplished. About 10 to 15 minutes later; the number two engine bleed air tripped. The Cabin Altitude Warning horn sounded and cabin pressure started to climb. We put our oxygen masks on; declared an emergency with Center and started an emergency descent. During the descent; we were able to regain pressurization. The flight attendants said the passengers were fine and not aware there was a pressurization problem. We coordinated with Center and Dispatch and continued onto our destination.

B737-700 flight crew experiences a bleed trip at FL410 that cannot be reset. Ten minutes later the second bleed trips and the cabin altitude warning sounds. An emergency is declared and descent initiated; with a successful reset during the descent allowing the flight to continue to destination.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

This morning we had a dangerous amount of staffing for the area. I have filled out reports before about staffing issues but now we had an emergency aircraft and I was not able to get any help because of staffing in my area. I was working the neighboring Approach airspace. I saw numerous arrival traffic coming and since no Supervisor was in the area I called to the OMIC desk and requested something be opened because of the impending traffic flow. The Supervisor in charge came to our area and looked at the traffic. Since the only two controllers signed in; and working at the time was me and another Controller at Sector X; they couldn't open a sector to help manage the flow. The Supervisor returned to the OMIC desk when an early morning Controller arrived. I asked if he could help me out and take some airspace away and open a sector; which he did. We had three people on staff and three sectors open leaving no controllers for help if help was needed. Low and behold an air carrier started to descend and descend rapidly. [The neighboring Center] called to notify us that he had an emergency and was descending due to cabin pressure loss. I over heard this and immediately notified the OMIC desk via the landline of the situation and mentioned he was going to need someone over there to assist. I quickly called the Approach Control; knowing this aircraft was going to need to go to at least 10;000 FT to block airspace. In the meantime; the Controller over at Sector X yelled over and asked I could release lower which I approved. Since I was so busy and needed assistance to make phone calls; I overlooked an Air Carrier flight at FL210 crossing paths with this rapidly descending aircraft. Thankfully I caught it in time to turn the air carrier out and provided the best service I could to the emergency aircraft with no help being available to me. Once the aircraft had the situation under control they decided to proceed direct at 8;000 FT. I was trying to get all coordination accomplished and also work both combined sectors that I failed to utilize my emergency checklist and never did get persons on board and fuel remaining. I feel that it was a failure on my part but the lack of help available really put me into an unsafe situation. Staffing and overtime needs to be utilized! We had two people on staff from 0530-0600 three people on staff from 0600-0630 four people on staff 0630-0700. This is our busiest time of day on Saturday's; we are the only area in the building that is busy and everyone knows this. Having eight people originally on the shift was already below numbers then an additional two sick leave calls left us in a dangerous situation. I noticed and recognized that safety was being compromised so I took it upon myself to talk with the OMIC about how we need more help. Numbers on the ESIS were double digits and yellow for 2.5 HRS. The response to me from the OMIC was that he is unable to make a decision on overtime until 0600 when the other OMIC gets in. We finally did get one overtime approved bringing our numbers up to seven when the overtime came in later which was way too late; the traffic was before that. I feel they need to be proactive and call people at 0200-0300 and get the help here when the traffic demands it. The OMIC joked with me about how he wouldn't want a call at that time for overtime! I think that's horrible to compromise safety on what time a phone call is placed vs. getting the help in. This also was my first emergency handling situation like this. I don't recall ever getting trained on what type things need to be done when an aircraft is diving low to get to a safe altitude. I feel that some type of refresher training should come out on emergencies and assistance.

Enroute Controller experiencing an emergency descent acknowledged failure to secure all required information from the aircraft; the reporter claiming lack of staffing as a primary causal factor.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 16000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

I was PNF (Pilot Not Flying). We were slowed to 210 kts. My F/O (First Officer) called for flaps 1 and we got the siren; EICAS message TE (Trailing Edge) Flap Disagree; and annunciator light. I told ATC that our flaps were stuck and that we need time to work on the issue. ATC said they would vector us around.  I told the F/O to fly and talk while I ran the QRH.I ran the TE Flap Disagree checklist which directed us to the TE Flap Asymmetry checklist. There was some confusion when the 1st checklist transitioned to the 2nd because it seemed that we were going to land with 20 flaps ref +20 then the 2nd checklist directed us to land only with the LE (Leading Edge) Slats out and 30 ref +40. We held to run the checklists; determined bingo fuel of 7.0; had a major discussion about the checklist ambiguity; and after speaking with maintenance; determined that our TE flaps were not going to extend so we set 30 ref +40. We [advised ATC] and went direct and vectors to the runway.I set auto brakes at 4; slowed to 170 kts; and extended the gear. The approach was uneventful and we turned off at mid field. We terminated the [flight]; clearing the runway; but CFR (Crash Fire Rescue); wanted to image the brakes when we arrived at the gate. Our brake temperatures never exceeded 4 on #3 forward brake; the others were 2 or less. We secured the airplane.

A B757 Captain reported a flap anomaly during approach. Checklists to apply were reported to have been somewhat ambiguous but the flight landed uneventfully.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A BE36/G was flashing at me Sector 32/31 from Sector 22/21. Routing SHR.V86.RAP..FSD. The aircraft was level at 9;000 FT. I called the Sector 22 Controller before taking the handoff requesting the BE36 climb to 11;000 FT to comply with the MEA on V86. The MEA on V86 went to 11;100 FT/10;000 FT GPS/*9;300 MOCA. The BE36 was a /G aircraft. The Sector 22 Controller agreed to accomplish this so I took the handoff. The pilot never came over on the radio because he was too low to reach me. I then noticed that the aircraft was not climbing fast enough for me to ensure the MEA on the airway and he was more than 22 miles from the RAP NAVAID so the MOCA was not applicable. I then called the Controller back and requested that he send the BE36 direct to RAP because the MIA was only 9;300 FT along his route of flight. The Controller was agitated that I made the request and then decided to argue the need of the new routing. The BE36 was in my airspace; not on my frequency; and popping in and out of RADAR. I then proceeded to tell the Sector 22/21 Controller that he could deal with it and he needed to ship him to RCA Approach when they took the handoff and then I hung up the line. Recommendation; there needs to be several things done to resolve this situation and to help prevent another one. There needs to be better RADAR and radio communications west and northwest of RAP. It is a bad area for both and makes our job increasingly difficult. There needs to be some clarification as to what is the correct way to handle the situation via altitude and routing. There needs to be some clarity on the definitions of MIA and the use of the MOCA; no point did I feel that the BE36 and its passengers were in danger of running into the hills but this is an issue of protecting my ticket.

ZDV Controller described a below MIA/MVA event and the disagreement between controllers involved with regard to routing and procedure; the reporter suggesting that improved Radio/RADAR coverage would help prevent future events.


Takeoff / Launch; Landing; Initial Approach; Final Approach

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 203; Flight Crew Total 10584; Flight Crew Type 7800

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy

During the last 15 months of the pandemic; with greatly reduced traffic volumes; Newark Tower has used the primary tower frequency for the VFR traffic traversing the Class B airspace (helicopters and VFR sight-seers) which used to be on a discreet frequency with their own controller. Now that airliner traffic is returning to normal volumes at Newark; the Tower needs to go back to a dedicated control station and frequency for the helicopter an VFR traffic in their airspace. There is just too much workload and frequency congestion; especially in the early am and afternoon rush hours.

Air Carrier pilot reported excessive frequency congestion at EWR airport due to VFR transitioning aircraft using the same Tower frequency as arrival and departure traffic. The reporter stated these operations used to have separate frequencies to alleviate the congestion.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Passengers arrived with two electric powered skateboards. Although unable to identify one; the other was confirmed to be a 'One Wheel XR.' This One Wheel XR contains a large lithium based battery capable of carrying the rider about 18 miles on a single charge. I denied the passengers the ability to place these powered skateboards in the baggage compartment. The passengers in turn requested the skateboards be carried in the cabin. Based on the length of time to remove the batteries to isolate them; should there be a fire; I denied this request. I consulted the FOM to support my decision and discovered there was no guidance on these types of batteries. Nickel Manganese Cobalt Oxide batteries.With the amount of stored energy in these batteries; it is my opinion they should not be aboard an aircraft. I recommend more detailed information and or guidance be released to the pilot group to clarify what types of electric vehicles can or cannot be carried. The popularity of these types of vehicles is on the rise and the technology is continually advancing.

EMB-505 Captain reported denying Lithium Battery powered skateboards to be boarded due to insufficient FOM HAZMAT guidance.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 400; Flight Crew Total 3200; Flight Crew Type 300

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

Post Maintenance test flight on J3 Cub with newly overhauled engine.After takeoff; engine oil pressure dropped to 0. Knowing the oil pressure probe was working and calibrated; I knew the engine actually had dropped oil pressure. I shut down the engine for fear of engine seizure and performed an uneventful engine-out landing at ZZZ.It was found that two of the components in the engine were out of tolerance and not overhauled.

J3 Cub pilot reported a loss of oil pressure that resulted in an engine-out landing.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

I would like to bring to your attention an unsafe condition that I think requires an airworthiness directive and updates to the AMM; FIM; AFM; MEL; FCOM and OM. I bring this up because of what I observed with the brake system on a CRJ-700 aircraft. The sequence of events was as follows: Upon landing at ZZZ the Pilot Flying (PF) the First Officer (FO) determined that the aircraft veered to the right due to inadequate braking on the left side. Brake Temperature Monitoring System (BTMS) and a post flight tactile touch check of the brakes indicated that there was no energy absorption to the left inboard brake and the others had above normal energy absorption; particularly the left outboard brake. A Logbook entry was made and the Corrective Action was to safety wire the hydraulic coupling and perform an ops check of the brakes. During the Ops check the mechanic demonstrated to me that the left inboard brake was actuating. Upon landing in ZZZ; the aircraft veered to the right as before except this time the Asymmetry/Loss of Braking immediate action and QRH items were performed. Braking returned to normal and an appropriate Logbook entry was made. I had landed this aircraft on March 2015 but braking effort was light so I did not notice the asymmetry. I did at that time however; observe zero energy absorption on the left inboard brake and made an appropriate Logbook entry which I feel was misdiagnosed as a BTMS malfunction and deferral.The problem; once identified by Maintenance was that the left inboard anti-skid transducer was binding. This resulted in a false locked wheel signal to the Anti-Skid Control Unit (ASCU) which in turn; and by design; completely disabled the left inboard brake upon wheel spin up. This CRJ-700 was operating under this unsafe condition for at least the weeks of the Logbook history that I reviewed. The Logbook records a history of discrepancies with the left inboard brake; the anti-skid system and the left inboard BTMS. Discrepancies include: anti-skid faults; aircraft veering to the right during braking on landing roll; left inboard BTMS of 00 degrees with accompanied brakes 'cold to the touch' on post flight inspection and left outboard brake significantly hotter than normal. Upon review of the respective Logbook Corrective Actions; I can see that there is a lack of awareness of this unsafe condition for all corrective actions except the last one that addressed the Asymmetry/Loss of Braking Immediate Action/QRH items. That entry directed them right to the problem and required a Functional Check Flight (FCF).To avoid recurrences of prolonged unsafe conditions like this one; it is essential that brake temperature related indications always be viewed from an energy absorption perspective. If a brake is not getting up to operating temperature during use; then it is not operating properly. Just as turbine or exhaust temperature is a conclusive indicator of proper engine function so is brake temperature an indication of proper brake function. To avoid this unsafe condition in the future there are two things that the above mentioned publications must illustrate clearly to all concerned: First; after landing; a BTMS reading of 00 or significantly uneven BTMS readings on the same landing gear require further inspection. If this is observed then the post flight inspection must include a tactile/proximate check of the respective brakes (use caution).Second; if the brake with a BTMS reading of 00 is cold to the touch that's a huge red flag! The MEL should not allow deferral of a BTMS that reads 00 when post flight inspection reveals the respective brake is cold to the touch after landing. NO NO NO! The proper way to address this unsafe condition is to perform an Ops check of the brakes. If a mechanical problem can be conclusively identified and corrected then the discrepancy can be cleared. If not; then the discrepancy should be deemed anti-skid related; be troubleshot and an FCF must be accomplished with max effort braking on landing to verify that braking is symmetric and that all brakes reach an appropriate operating temperature. As a troubleshooting tool; a long distance taxi test with the anti-skid 'Off' and reference to the BTMS might further demonstrate energy absorption and BTMS functionality. If a reasonable brake functionality is demonstrated by this test; then the discrepancy is most likely anti-skid related. Unsafe condition.

A Captain reports about a CRJ-700 aircraft with a history of discrepancies involving Anti-Skid System faults and the aircraft veering to the right during braking on landing roll that were misdiagnosed until the Asymmetry/Loss of Braking Immediate Action/QRH items were addressed in a Logbook write-up. Maintenance then found the left MLG inboard Anti-Skid Transducer had been binding resulting in a false-locked wheel signal to the Anti-Skid Control Unit (ASCU).


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

About an hour into our flight near ZZZZZ Intersection we received a Degraded message on our Honeywell FMS.  This was followed by a DR or dead reckoning annunciation.  The Honeywell FMS manual defines DR mode as follows: 'DR mode is defined as the loss of radio updating and all other position sensors (IRS and GPS).'  When we looked at our GPS sensor page which normally shows the coordinates; the GPS sensor coordinates were blank.  We then asked ATC if they showed us on course and they informed us that we were off by 5 NM.  We then got vectors until we could pick up the ZZZ VOR with short range needles.  The rest of the flight was flown using short range NAV.  After approximately 30 minutes after the FMS issue we powered the FMS down and powered it back up but still had the same problem for 20 minutes or; so then the previous annunciations went away.  We monitored the FMS and at times it appeared to be off course when comparing it to our VOR course.  We landed uneventfully and wrote up the FMS.Suggestions: A dual FMS configuration would have given us a backup other than short range nav.

CE-560XL Captain reported a loss of all GPS/IRS input to the aircraft's FMS during cruise.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was cleared for takeoff on Runway XX in ZZZ.  Around 600 ft I noticed another aircraft 300 ft above and coming straight towards me on the GPS.  I looked outside for the aircraft and once I spotted it I looked back inside where I received a traffic alert from the GPS.  I immediately turned to the right and temporarily leveled off before continuing my climb and beginning my turn towards ZZZ1.  The helicopter was going for a straight-in Runway XY.  I called [fellow pilots] after I landed in ZZZ1 who informed me I needed to file a near-miss report with Tower.  When I called up Tower later that evening to file the report; he informed me that the helicopter was over a mile from where he was supposed to be.  I listened to liveatc.net to make sure I hadn't missed any traffic notification calls but there was none that I heard.

Pilots reported reported an NMAC with a helicopter.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was the pilot flying with autopilot/auto throttles engaged slowing to flaps 5 speeds 15 miles out on approach to ATL ILS PRM 28 Approach at 3;000 feet. Upon switching to Atlanta Tower; landing winds were called at 130/6G17. We suspected these winds were out of limits and re-entered them into the performance computer. The data showed our landing tailwind out of limits. We briefly discussed we would not be able to land. The Captain (PM) began to converse with Tower about the winds and that we would be unable to land with these winds. The conversation went back and forth; while I delayed calling for further configurations since I was preparing in my head for a go-around instead. Passing through a 1;000 feet; the winds reported for the runway were determined to be within limits and the Captain reaches up and drops the gear; however; we were still at flaps 5 approximately 160 knots. At this point; my overall situational awareness was low and I failed to call for the go-around. With the complexity of Atlanta operations and airspace; thunderstorms off the departure end; and the split-second decision; we elected to immediately configure and continue. We quickly configured and met stabilized approach criteria by approximately 500 feet. We landed safely on speed; in the first 1;000 feet with an uneventful touchdown.Upon reflection; even with the safe culmination of the flight; in accordance with our procedures for stabilized approach; the split-second decision after the winds were determined in limits should have been to go-around regardless of the complex airport operations and weather. We were just too low and far into the approach. With a completely clear head; it is clear a go-around was our only option in compliance with our procedures. Manage distractions better; stay focused on the primary task of flying and recognize when I'm no longer in the green so that I consciously regain my situational awareness to the point where I have the assertiveness to break the cycle; strictly follow the procedures; and go around. Also; I think Atlanta Tower giving landing winds that are out of limits or for a runway we aren't landing on needs to be addressed. This led to being forced to resolve a problem during a time where task loading was already high.

We initially briefed the arrival and the visual 27L backed up with the ILS 27L. ATIS had visual conditions with 27L and 28. Landing distance was not [a factor] with a small tailwind. On contact with Approach; they told us to plan 28 approach. We briefed the visual 28 backed up with ILS. We reprogrammed the Runway 28 ILS in the FMC. I got ATL information G and the only thing changed was ILS PRM's. Had multiple descent altitudes; speed; and heading vectors. I had difficulties locating the ILS PRM monitoring frequency. We got that in COM2 and were nicely established on final in VMC conditions when switched to Tower frequency for Runway 28. We had the runway in sight and the FMC and ILS paths for 28 were tracking normally. Tower cleared us to land with Runway 28 winds 130 6G17. That seemed too much tailwind and I ran the numbers real quick. It said a 14 tailwind. I queried the controller and she repeated the same winds. I said they were out of limits. She replied the Runway 28 winds were an average of the winds at the airport. I asked what the real winds were. The controller answered the Runway 27L winds were 120 at 8. Those winds were in limits for landing. I asked why 27L instead of 28. She responded Runway 28 had no wind read out and that the Runway 27L wind read out was the most accurate winds for Runway 28. I accepted that we were within landing limits. I looked out and saw were close to the field and motioned to lower the gear to the F/O then commanded gear down and landing flaps. By the time we got configured; I realized that we had probably configured below 1;000 feet. At about 500 feet we were in the slot and could achieve a normal approach and landing from that position and I decided landing from that position was a much safer course of action that doing a go-around in Atlanta at a busy time with weather off the departure end on the airport.In dealing with the controller and solving the problem of the out of limits tailwind reporting; I had allowed myself to lose situational awareness. I should have been cross checking the pilot flying's approach more. A humbling experience on how one can get too task focused and lose situational awareness. I didn't catch that the plane was descending and the 1;000 foot call. On the ATC side; Tower needs to report the best winds available for the particular runway in this case Runway 27L and if those winds are significantly out of limits change runways. The Tower needs to be giving pilots information they can use. In this case; the initial Tower wind report was unusable and counterproductive. Being on final approach is no place to be trying to straighten this mess out. On the crew side; I should have better articulated the plan of keep flying and configuring for the approach until I call for the go-around. As pilot monitoring; I should have been much more diligent about monitoring the approach and backing up the pilot flying. Ultimately; I allowed the out of limits tailwind problem affect my situational awareness which I did not fully get until about 500 feet AGL. I should not have allowed that to happen. The optimum solution during the quick two minutes of problem solving would have been to either been configured by 1;000 feet AGL or go-around.

B737-700 flight crew describes the circumstances leading up to an unstabilized approach and landing at ATL.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 61; Flight Crew Total 614; Flight Crew Type 614

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

I landed on Runway XXR at ZZZ. The ZZZ Tower was extremely busy with the [military tanker] that landed just before me and at least two; perhaps more planes in the pattern. ZZZ is my home airport and by my estimates 75% of the time when I land there Tower tells me to 'taxi to parking; remain this frequency'. I had just landed; the Tower was super busy / occupied; I slowed to a near stop on runway XXR; I wanted to take taxiway D and A to nearby parking where I rent the plane. It was only a short distance. I opted (mistakenly in hindsight) to take taxiway D and a short hop on A taxiway to get off the non-movement area and nearby parking. I honestly thought I was doing the Tower a favor by getting off the runway quickly to make room for pattern traffic. I did not switch to ground because I mistakenly assumed Tower had to order me to switch to ground (I mistakenly thought I had to be instructed by the Tower to switch to Ground; I've now learned that is not true). Upon exiting 34R on D and turning left (north) on taxiway A I came face/face with the [military tanker] that had landed before me. The [military tanker] was about 100 yards (300 feet) in front of me. I instinctively turned right to parking and got out of the non-movement area and got out of the way of the [military tanker]. I never did switch to ground (my mistake). Afterwards the [military] Pilot came over and chatted with me about the incident (in a very courteous and professional manner; for which I am grateful) and that's how I learned I was in the wrong. I learned my lesson; ground has primacy and control over all aircraft once past the runway hold markings.

C182 pilot reported a communication breakdown with ATC led to a taxiway incursion and ground conflict.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 400; Flight Crew Type 400

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I frequently use the Coastal Route to transition LAX Bravo headed North from Avalon (AVX) to Whiteman (WHP).  Typically; ATC handles the VNY transition just before WHP. On one recent occasion; I asked if I needed clearance through the VNY Class Delta; and the controller said no; that he could get me into Whiteman.Today; however; the controller vectored me out away from VNY due to traffic.  I continued to descend; as I always do.  Several minutes later; the controller (still on 134.2) said that I had entered or was about to VNY Class D airspace. I told him I thought he had cleared me and was vectoring me. He released me and told me to contact Van Nuys tower to transition. I did so and was granted a transition.It is possible I entered the Class D airspace while still with So. Cal; prior to talking with Van Nuys. Though I was always talking to someone; it is possible I was in Van Nuys airspace prior to two way contact.This was a lesson learned for me; that just because I'm with flight following being vectored; I still must get clearance on the way down or stay above airport airspace. This was not my understanding previously.

Pilot reports of flying VFR to WHP under flight following with SCT. SCT Controller advises pilot that Controller will help him all the way to WHP; then vectors the aircraft around VNY due to traffic. Pilot continues descent and then Controller advises pilot that aircraft entered the VNY class D airspace. Pilot was under the assumption that he had approval to descend into Class D as long as he told ATC about it and AATC would take care of the point out to VNY Tower.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 2; Flight Crew Total 672; Flight Crew Type 439

Departed on Runway 27; climbed to approximately 1;400 FT and then engine developed popping noise. Upon hearing this noise; made a 180 degree turn and lined myself up with Runway 09. Airspeed was in excess for landing at that time. Reduced RPM's and lowered flaps and corrected for crosswind from the north. [We] neglected to lower landing gear. Aircraft skidded to a stop on Runway 09. [We] notified the FBO that my airplane was extending well into the runway so that they could warn any additional landing aircraft. Then proceeded to help FBO to lift plane up on gear and tow back to hangar.

M20 pilot experiences a popping noise shortly after takeoff and turns back to land opposite direction on the departure runway. The landing gear is not extended and a gear up landing ensues.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 8200; Flight Crew Type 3000

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

During a routine training flight in the traffic pattern at ZZZ; I was flying with a student in the traffic pattern. I had just turned downwind when Tower called out to make a sudden left turn. When I did so I saw a Learjet that had just turned crosswind from Runway X in my line of sight. I pulled power back and pushed the nose down. The Learjet was in a hard climb and we missed each other with no problem. It was unnerving and if either myself or the Learjet pilot had erred in evasive action; there was a very real possibility of a midair collision.

We were cleared for takeoff Runway X by ZZZ Tower and assigned a heading of 340. After takeoff and passing 700 feet AGL; we were established on the 340 heading. TCAS alerted us to a possible conflict at 12 o'clock. We increased climb rate and passed above the conflicting traffic that appeared to be on downwind for Runway X. No TCAS RA was received.

PA28 and LR75 flight crews reported ATC error resulted in an NMAC.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Landing gear lever moved up before flaps on go-around.My FO was flying the ILS PRM (Precision Runway Monitor) [for Runway] XXL into ZZZ. We had completed all briefings including the PRM brief and had monitor frequency setup in the #2 com. During the approach the winds were a direct 20 knot tailwind to about 2800 ft; so that was inside the G/S intercept alt. IMC conditions started about 4000 ft. with airport reporting east winds and about 300 ft. broken layer. Good visibility. I vaguely remember my FO reaching up to the MCP panel; on G/S fully configured with flaps 40; we were about 1200 ft. to 1400 ft. descending. I'm not sure if he pushed something or not but suddenly we lost FDs on both sides. We both hesitated with comments like 'what just happened?'. At the same time the wind was shifting to a 20 knot right crosswind. We then heard monitor Controller say something about our LOC track and I glanced down and saw we were drifting just slightly to the left off of the LOC. I said let's go around and then transmitted on Tower 'We are going around'. I couldn't get our call sign in there because I was distracted with the unfolding situation. My FO started slowly putting in power and I don't think he pushed TO/GA. Two seconds later he called landing-gear up and tower ATC gave us missed approach instructions; all at the same time. I looked to see positive rate and I selected gear up and right that second I realized flaps were still extended and I did the procedure out of order. We had good airspeed and did not exceed flap speeds. We then selected flaps 15 and then worked at cleaning up flaps and flying the missed approach instructions. We got vectors back around for another uneventful approach to landing.Debrief notes: I should have helped my FO with proper missed approach call outs but was so distracted at the moment getting my thoughts straight. Because of letting myself be distracted I missed the flaps to 15 first. 'Aviate; navigate; communicate'. I know better than to skip this. To help myself and my crew member; I will remember to make sure we brief the note section on the JEPP approach plate if the PF doesn't cover all the notes. In the notes on this approach it says FD or AP required during PRM. These are good 'flag post' items to help remind me to discuss missed approach procedures if we lose those and then execute a go-around without hesitation; and then do it methodically and correctly. The winds made this a difficult approach. Remember to be ready for anything.

B737-700 flight crew reported retracting gear before flaps during a go-around procedure.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Type 6000

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

The First Officer was the pilot flying on takeoff. After 80 KTS and prior to rotation speed; the First Officer's window slid completely open. The Captain took control of the aircraft; and completed the rotation. Once safely airborne; the First Officer attempted to close the window; but it was mechanically impossible. The First Officer held the window mostly closed with arm strength so that interphone and radio communication were possible. When the Captain realized the window was not going to close; he requested to divert and was given heading and altitude assignments to facilitate a timely landing. The First Officer tuned all of the radios; reset the FMC for the landing airport; and ensured all checklist items were complete and resumed ATC communication while the Captain flew the aircraft. While on final approach the window fell completely out of the track and onto the First Officer. The First Officer simply placed the window on his armrest and continued the call outs throughout the landing sequence. Once safely on the ground and clear of both active runways; the Captain made a PA explaining what had happened and the reason for diverting. There was not enough time to communicate with flight attendants and passengers. Frankly; it was so loud in the cockpit that it may not have been practical and would likely have caused more alarm than was necessary. Maintenance met the aircraft at the gate; inspected the track; replaced the window; and cleared the logbook. One of the Maintenance Technicians pointed out that the locking pin on the faulty window was not working correctly.

The First Officer was the pilot flying as we started the takeoff. Between 80 KTS and Vr; the First Officer direct vision window came open and slid back. I took control of the aircraft and made the rotation and remained pilot flying for the remainder of the flight. The First Officer attempted to close the window as I made the turn to 210 degrees and continued the climb to 4;000 FT. ATC cleared us to a higher altitude and a turn northwest; but the First Officer was unable to close the window even after multiple attempts. I requested and was given clearance to remain at 4;000 FT. I retracted flaps and accelerated to 210 KTS; but the wind noise was getting too loud so I put the flaps back down and slowed the aircraft. I did not declare an emergency but told ATC that we had a window open and wanted to divert as quickly as possible. ATC gave us a climb to 5;000 FT and vectored us to the east; then south; until we called the airport in sight and they issued a visual approach. The First Officer held the window as much closed as he could for the entire flight to keep the noise level down as much as possible. At some point before landing; I noticed that part of the window was out of its sliding track. The landing was uneventful.This was our second flight in this aircraft and the First Officer stated that he had not opened the window on the ground and had in fact checked the window to verify that it was closed before takeoff. The biggest issue of this event was communication. The First Officer and I could not communicate without the use of the intercom system. Until the First Officer realized to keep his hot MIC out of the wind as much as possible; I had a few brief moments that made communication with ATC difficult. If that situation had gotten worse; I would have declared an emergency.

B737 flight crew reports the First Officer's sliding window coming open during takeoff with the First Officer as the flying pilot. The Captain assumes control and continues the takeoff while the First Officer attempts without success to close the window. The crew diverts to a suitable airport with ATC assistance and lands safely.


On a recent trip the first officer and I attempted to use the new LIDO chart system.  The first officer was pilot flying and attempted to setup and brief the departures and approaches using the new LIDO chats.  I also had the LIDO charts out and I was backing it up with my Jeppesen charts.  Several times during the first officer's briefings I noticed that he had omitted critical pieces of information.  We both had to refer to the Jeppesen charts to ensure the proper information was inputted and correctly briefed.  We also had instances where information was not included at all.  The idea that we will solely be relying on the LIDO charts in the future is a great concern of mine.  [Our company] has been presented with many challenging variables in a short amount of time; new first officers; new captains; new cities; new main line procedures.  I feel that making this change now presents a level of risk to the operation that is unacceptable.  I encourage the FAA and management to take action and abandon the move to the LIDO chart system before we are listing it as a major contributing factor to an incident or accident.  Thank you for taking the time to review my concern.  My hope is that we can work together to fix this problem before we put passengers; crews; and equipment at risk.

Air Carrier Captain expressed concern with his company's decision to transition to LIDO charts.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 7; Flight Crew Total 490; Flight Crew Type 145

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

Airport; Human Factors; Weather; Aircraft

I pre-flighted my aircraft for pattern work at RHV. Everything was normal with engine start; taxing; magneto check; carburetor heat check and taxiing into takeoff position. But when I was cleared to takeoff and advanced the throttle; the engine stalled. The problem may have been carburetor ice. The temperature was 53 degrees and the dew point 31 degrees; for a relative humidity of 43 percent. This indicates a marginal risk for carburetor ice; but it's certainly possible. I left carburetor heat off. It also may have been that I advanced the throttle too quickly; on a cool day; with an engine that has no acceleration pump; causing a too lean mixture and a subsequent stall. I called the Tower and got permission to push the plane off the runway into the runup area; pointing toward Taxiway Zulu. The FBO's Mechanic came out in a golf cart to hand prop; accompanied by an airport employee in another cart. The Mechanic was angry and spoke intemperately; ordering me to return and tie the plane down at the FBO. I should have answered; 'We'll talk later.' But instead; I respond vehemently to his unprovoked attack. He was too angry to hand prop safely; but fortunately I had the presence of mind to do my part safely. The plane started easily and the Mechanic headed back to the FBO on Taxiway Zulu. Unfortunately; I did not have the presence of mind to call Ground Control for permission to taxi. Instead; still upset; I unthinkingly followed the Mechanic onto Taxiway Zulu; followed by the airport employee. My radio was still on Tower frequency so I couldn't hear any call from Ground Control and I didn't hear any call from Ground Control and I didn't hear any call from the Tower. A moment later I noticed a high wing single engine airplane about a quarter of a mile ahead taxing toward me; and immediately recognized my error. I stopped and contacted Ground Control. The plane ahead turned off to a parallel taxiway. Ground Control cleared me to the FBO and a few minutes later asked me to call the Tower Supervisor. I had had previous difficult interactions with this Mechanic; and thus had good reason to ignore his anger. Instead; rather than acting; I reacted. If I could do this over; I would relax; ignore his provocation and focus entirely on the safety of the hand propped restart and on correct taxi procedures. It also occurs to me that aircraft routinely taxi within runup areas without requiring permission of either Ground Control or the Tower. It would have helped me in this situation if there had been a yellow marker on the tarmac delineating the runup area/taxiway boundary - perhaps the yellow dashed Taxiway Edge marking. I doubt I would have taxied onto Taxiway Zulu if I had seen a yellow tarmac marker ahead.In future; I will also pay more attention to atmospheric conditions regarding carburetor heat and will advance the throttle more carefully in all circumstances. Note: While I am a commercial pilot; I earned that rating over forty years ago; never flew for hire and did not fly as pilot in command between April 1972 and November 2007. I'm currently flying under Sport Pilot rules and believe I have achieved 'experienced private pilot' capability. I worked hard to be a safe; competent pilot and get great satisfaction when I fly safely.

After an aircraft engine stalled during the preflight engine run up; the pilot failed to contact RHV Ground for taxi clearance back to the FBO.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

During approach to RIC; we requested the ILS Runway 02. The winds were reported as calm. Runways 16/34 were under construction so there was no ILS to those runways. Potomac Approach would not approve the ILS Runway 02. We were vectored to the visual approach to Runway 20. We were able to back up the visual approach with the GPS Runway 20.  If winds are not a factor; there should be no reason not to utilize runways with precision approach guidance. Especially when flights are operating at night. A freight carrier just had an incident in BHM where ATC closed the main precision approach runway and vectored the flight to an unfamiliar short runway with no precision approach guidance. ATC seems to believe there is no difference between flying at night versus during the day. Crews flying at night need all the technology available to operate safely.

PCT vectored an air carrier for a night visual to RIC Runway 20 with no precision approach back up. Runway 2 with a precision approach was available but a request for that approach was denied.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 190; Flight Crew Total 4930; Flight Crew Type 285

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were being vectored onto a visual approach for Runway 35 at 3000 ft in VMC conditions. We were never assigned a speed; so I was flying at 240 knots until we were about 3 miles from crossing over the final approach course for Runway 35. The FO (First Officer) and I had noted that the Controller working Approach was 'behind the curve;' sounding frazzled and rushed over the radio. He had not given us any new instructions for several minutes; and we were about to cross the final approach course; so we asked to make sure he wanted us to go through the course. He responded with a heading that'd put us on a nice course towards the runway's final approach. However; we soon noticed that our TCAS was showing us less than 6 miles from a plane at about the 1 o'clock position; so we asked about it. We were told to turn right to a heading of 090 'now'; which would point us towards the airplane for a time during our turn. I went ahead and complied; but asked about turning left; away from the aircraft. They stuck with their initial instruction; so I kept turning in HDG mode with the autopilot. Soon; the FO visually spotted the plane and it was on a collision course with us. When I saw it a couple of seconds later; I turned off the autopilot; banked to 45 degrees in the right turn; started a slow climb; and chopped the power to make the turn tighter. We never got an RA; but we did receive the 'TRAFFIC; TRAFFIC' caution from the TCAS. The cause was probably a lack of experience from the ATC controller; putting him behind the aircraft he was controlling. I questioned ATC; turned off automation; and took corrective action to avoid getting closer to the conflicting aircraft.

Air Carrier First Officer attributed a traffic conflict on approach to PHL to apparent controller inexperience.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Clearance: TECKY two departure EBAYE transition (tecky2.ebaye) maintain 5;000 feet. MLPTS is the first waypoint with two restrictions at or above 900 feet and speed at or below 230kts.  Departed runway 30R maintained 200 KIAS until clear of the KSJC class C airspace.  After MLPTS turned right on the departure toward SPTNS accelerating to 230 KIAS.  ATC advised us that we are still below the SFO class B airspace.  Immediately reduced power to maintain 200 KIAS.  ATC cleared us to fl190 (top altitude on the departure).  Maintained 200 KIAS until clear of the SFO class B Airspace.  ATC cleared us to maintain at or above 270 KIAS.Change chart speed restriction to at or below 200 KIAS until SPTNS.

The SJC TECKY TWO Departure has a speed restriction of at or below 230 KIAS; which is misleading as it is below the SFO Class B Airspace with a limit of 200 KIAS.