Ground; Flight Data / Clearance Delivery; Local

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Staffing; Airport; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

I worked Aircraft X for a few hours on the night of the occurrence. When Aircraft X was still on the ramp de-icing I asked Operations to say conditions of the first 100 feet of the runway. Earlier OPS had advised me to caution aircraft when they back taxi to use caution during their turn around on the runway; that the first 100 feet of the runway was sloppy. OPS responded that it had been adjusted a little bit and to change the caution to the first 50 feet of the runway. I then asked what the condition of the taxiway run up pad is; would that be a better place for the aircraft to turn around? OPS responded if the aircraft could shorten their runway use by a hundred feet or so that would work or the run up pad would be a good option.Aircraft X requested taxi with current ATIS information. I instructed Aircraft X to taxi. I then advised Aircraft X of their two options for turnaround:  the runway was available using caution for the first 50 feet of or the option to taxi off the runway and turn around in the run up pad. Aircraft X responded that he would use the run up pad. An UNKN tag appears on a taxiway and the runway. OPS calls on frequency at the taxiway. I was recording the appended NOTAM portion for the overnight ASOS broadcast and did not respond to OPS right away. OPS calls again. I acknowledge the vehicle. I ask Aircraft X if he will be ready upon reaching the runway. He responds yes; he'll need about 10 seconds. I try to initiate a silent release and get an error message about the flight not stored. I full route the clearance to make sure the flight plan has not timed out and make sure it is still active in the system. OPS calls on taxiway requesting to cross the intersecting runway. I scan out the window to verify the OPS vehicle position and then instruct him to cross. A controller in the TRACON calls upstairs to ask about if Aircraft X is using a closed taxiway. I look out the window and check the ASD-X and Aircraft X is in the run up area. I said I did not instruct Aircraft X to taxi onto the closed taxiway and did not see him turn onto that taxiway. The controller inquired if OPS said anything? I said I have OPS headed towards the approach end of the runway and he did not question the aircraft's movements. The controller says Aircraft X is released. Aircraft X calls ready for departure and I instruct him to standby. I read the 5 minute prior to closing announcement on frequency.  Maintenance vehicle calls and I ask him to say again. Maintenance vehicle on taxiway requesting to cross the approach end of an intersecting runway. I issue Aircraft X his takeoff clearance. Aircraft X taxis onto the runway for departure. Aircraft X tags up off the departure end and I switch him to departure frequency.  Aircraft X thanks me for all the help and leaves my frequency. In reviewing the recordings and ASD-X I found that when OPS is requesting to cross a runway it is the same time that Aircraft X appears to turn onto the closed taxiway. This short taxiway leads directly to the run up pad.  It is also within a few hundred feet of the beginning of the runway; which operations had advised I instruct aircraft on their back taxi to use caution because of the still sloppy conditions.Aircraft X had the current ATIS information. I reviewed the ATIS broadcast. I made a correction to a different taxiway closure. Listening for this correction I did not catch that the taxiway closure for this aircraft was not on the ATIS at the time. I did catch the mistake when I was reviewing the tapes. I listened to most of the ATIS broadcasts from the day; including a special information broadcast when the closures first appear; and taxiway is not listed as being closed on any of the ATIS broadcasts from the day that I reviewed. The Field Condition Report shows the taxiway closed.   I recommend a reminder to review ATIS broadcasts; especially during an event that has multiple closures like winter weather. Having another person besides the controller working the position review it will double the chances of catching a mistake. This is a responsibility of the Controller in Charge position and is especially important during the initial closures to ensure that many ATIS broadcasts to follow have complete and correct information. Input into the digital ATIS has to be precise to assure the correct phrase is being transmitted by the computer.  For example if you want the digital ATIS to broadcast plural taxiways you must spell out 'taxiways' and not use an abbreviation (TWYS).  For runway condition code descriptors you have to spell out the word 'percent'.  It helps that there is a section for Taxiway Outages; where you can select individual taxiways.  Another recommendation to enhance safety and ensure limited distractions while working aircraft would be to extend the closing shift hours by 10 minutes. Currently the tower closes at midnight and this is when the closing shift ends too. You have to perform closing duty paperwork and review your checklists while the tower is open. Extending just 10 minutes would give ample time to shut down the tower and various equipment; review checklists and do the necessary paperwork without performing these duties while working live traffic. The opening shift begins 15 minutes prior to the tower/TRACON opening. The closing shift should do the same.

We departed three hours late due to inclement weather. The Operations crew was worked hard to clear the runways to reduce the contamination to allow us to takeoff; since the winds were out of limits for a contaminated runway. There was constant communication between us and Ground Control/Tower; as well as ground operations on the constantly changing runway conditions and wind. Once the runway was cleared to 20% snow; we pushed back and deiced; which took nearly an hour. Ground cleared us to taxi; and apparently cleared us to taxi on a closed runway. I don't specifically remember the taxi directions; but with the amount of snowfall that day; there weren't many options; and so I didn't question ground control's directions and thought they had the best situational awareness of the airport. We also took off about 5 minutes before the tower closed; so I'm not sure if this was a factor in the route they gave us or not; but given the field conditions; the route seemed logical. Most of the taxiways were closed due to deep snow. I was notified by the safety review committee that we taxied on a closed runway.With the constantly changing airport conditions; and the operations crew working to clear up the airport; the fact that runway had not been opened was missed. I assumed that ground control had the most up to date picture of the airfield; and didn't question their taxi instructions. We followed the directions we were given. In the future; I will double check with ground control that the current taxi directions are valid; since there had been a previous closure; regardless of the changing conditions. I also won't take for granted that ground control has given valid instructions; despite the fact that they rarely make mistakes.

PVD Tower Controller and the flight crew involved reported the crew was approved to use a closed taxiway that was not listed as closed on the ATIS.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 159; Flight Crew Total 3788; Flight Crew Type 1347

Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Software and Automation

While enroute ZZZ-ZZZ1 our center hydraulic quantity started decreasing. While reviewing the appropriate non-normal checklists in [App]; the application crashed twice. We had to close and restart it each time; which resulted in a loss of all open tabs. Essentially we had to start the checklists over from the beginning.This happens frequently (like once or twice per trip). [App] just freezes sometimes -- it doesn't matter whether you're connected to the internet or not.Flight Operations wants to remove paper QRH's from the airplanes. This absolutely cannot be allowed to happen until we have a replacement system that works 100% of the time.

B757 Captain reported the center hydraulic quantity began decreasing while enroute.  Captain stated the app used to troubleshoot the issue kept crashing.


Physiological - Other; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation; General Maintenance Action

During takeoff and climb cockpit crew smelled a musty and dirty odor; very distinctive. As flight progressed the odor was not smelled anymore; [and] we could not remember how long it lasted since we were busy during climbout. Actually; we were very busy for most of the flight due to ride conditions; ATC communications; arrival and approach briefings; etc. At the end we sort of forgot the odor for few minutes until during approach and landing phase when we perceived the odor again but this time less apparent; or not as noticeable. After landing; Captain asked the 'A' Flight Attendant if she perceived the odor described above and she said that she smelled it during final approach and landing but could not remember smelling it during takeoff. 'B' Flight Attendant; said that during takeoff the dirty and musty smell was very noticeable and that he thought of calling us but since the smell appeared not to be present; he forgot to call it to our attention. However; during descent he started to smell it again. I asked the crew if they felt OK? Up to that moment; everyone did not showed any indications of being sick. No passenger complained of any symptoms during deplaning; however; a deadhead Captain from another airline suggested that he also noticed a foul smell; but did not complain of any sickness. The Captain decided to report the event to Maintenance Control and went to the podium to make the telephone call to Dispatch and Maintenance Control. After that call; the First Officer advised the Captain that the 'A' Flight Attendant had a headache; felt light headed and [had] thrown up two different times. The 'B' Flight Attendant had a headache; felt a burning sensation inside his nostrils; and also felt lightheaded. When Captain asked the First Officer; he also felt lightheaded and a headache. Captain felt lightheaded and had a headache also. Emergency medical attention was given to all four crew members; test revealed higher than normal blood pressures at that time. Medics then suggested that we should be taken to a hospital for further tests. At the hospital blood pressure test were taken and showed normal blood pressure. However; doctors performed a CO exposure test that revealed we were exposed to carbon monoxide; results showed higher than normal amount of CO. Test for TCP were not given because according to the doctors at the hospital; those tests are highly specialized and are only conducted in few parts of the country. They advised us to continue to follow up with our own doctors.We think that the causes are engine oils and hydraulic fluids. Studies have shown that long term low exposure to engine oil and the organophosphates contained therein causes symptoms similar to the ones described above. Even normally operating engine seals can have leakage and over serviced fluid levels causes spills that can affect everyone on board. Maintenance should be checking faulty oil seals; prevent over servicing engine oils and hydraulic fluids. Company should investigate and invest on oils less toxic; oils that does not contain TCP's but instead tri-isopropyl phenyl phosphate.

An EMB-190 crew became ill following prolonged exposure to a musty; dirty odor and paramedics detected high blood pressure. Later at the hospital high carbon monoxide levels were detected.


First Officer; Pilot Flying; Airport Personnel

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was the First Officer on this trip and for this leg.  After engine start I called for taxi.  We were pushed back to exit from taxiway S5.  Ground instructed us to 'Taxi via S5; J4; S6; J3.'  I mentioned that we weren't given any hold short instructions; but that I would clarify where ground wanted us to hold on J3 after we started taxiing.  The Captain started to taxi and verified that we were exiting at S5; I concurred as did both [First Officers].  The Captain said we would wait to configure until we were on J3 since there were three 90 degree turns in rapid succession.  As we started to complete the turn onto S5 I began scanning to the right to ensure that J4 had no traffic on it that would be a conflict.  The Captain said; 'What's that?' and I turned my attention to 12 o'clock and saw lighted cones that were on J4 and aligned with the centerline of S5.  The Captain stopped the aircraft.  We stopped well clear of the cones; however; we couldn't turn left or right without the danger of ingesting cones into an engine.  At the Captain's direction I contacted ground and described the situation.  After a ten minute delay ground had us contact maintenance.  Maintenance asked us to start the APU and shut down both engines so they could come out and tow us onto the taxiway.  After another 30 minutes an airport vehicle showed up and with the help of our maintenance; moved the cones to the far edge of the taxiway.  After that we started our engines; completed all checklists and departed RJBB without further incident.There were numerous taxiway closures that were active by NOTAM at the time of our departure.  We were aware of these closures and the Captain specifically briefed their existence.  I believe that the cones were placed in error.  The way they were placed made S5 unusable.  S4 was not available to us as it would join J4 in a section of the taxiway that was closed due to maintenance.Proper placement of the cones.  Also; we could possibly have seen the cones slightly earlier; however; we would have been in the same predicament since their placement rendered S5 unusable to join J4.  Either way; we couldn't have departed our ramp without the danger of FOD.

Air carrier First Officer reported cones were positioned too close to Taxiway S5 at RJBB airport which rendered it unusable. Once they were cleared the flight continued to taxi normally.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 3200; Flight Crew Type 50

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

While picking up clearance in BHM I failed to verify spelling of first fix and I failed to verify it on map; so on departure I was given direct GUMMP and I went direct GUMPE. Departure called and stated [we were] left of course; I asked for [a] vector and then asked for correct fix spelling. Afterward I requested and received direct to correct fix. In [the] future to avoid [this]; I will verify all spelling with clearance and verify on EFB that [the] route makes sense and clarify any discrepancies before taxi.

Light Transport aircraft pilot reported a track heading deviation during departure from BHM airport after confusing similar sounding fixes GUMMP and GUMPE.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 2200; Flight Crew Type 350

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

After arriving at ZZZ; I requested 50 gallon of a gas; 25 per side. On initial departure climb CHTs (Cylinder Head Temperature) on both engines spiked to red line. I verified mixtures rich; airspeed and deck angle. Immediately decided to make a left 180 and land. After landing queried lineman about fueling. He verified that aircraft had been misfueled with Jet A.

Pilot reported encountering engine issues during initial climb and immediately returned to the airport where it was discovered the aircraft had been mistakenly fueled with Jet-A.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Company Policy; MEL; Procedure

We currently operate the Legacy 450/500 electrical system differently than it was designed and intended to be operated. We do this during ground operations and in flight until we accomplish our after takeoff checklist at 3000 ft MSL. During our after start checklist; we place the Bus Tie #2 Knob in the 'Open' position and leave it there until the after takeoff checklist is completed. This is done to prevent a cascade electrical fault caused by the failure of a DC electrical Hydraulic Pump that has in the past; transferred over to and completely disabled both the #1 and #2 electrical systems. Not a good situation in any airplane; especially one with a fly-by-wire flight control system. Embraer recommended opening the Bus Tie Knob as a temporary fix until new and improved DC Hydraulic pumps could be installed. The problem in this instance is that when you have the #2 Engine Generator deferred; the APU generator will not power the #2 Electrical system when the Bus Tie #2 Knob is open. Operating the aircraft on the ground; during takeoff and climb with the Bus Tie #2 Knob in 'Auto' is the only solution but is not I/A/W (in Accordance With) our current operating procedures. Operating in this manner opens us up to the possible situation described above. Opened the Bus Tie #2 Knob as per the [company] Legacy 450 After Start Normal Checklist and the entire #2 electrical system became unpowered.Utilizing an MEL listed procedure (24-XX-XX-XX) that does not take into account the abnormal electrical switch position (Bus Tie #2 Knob) OPEN vs. AUTO.Placed the #2 Bus Tie Knob to the Auto position; the #2 electrical system regained power but numerous nuisance CAS (Crew Alerting System) messages remained posted which required a complete aircraft shutdown of at least 15 minutes. Maintenance was then contacted.Do not allow the deferring of the #2 DC Generator per MEL # 24-XX-XX-XX on ALL Legacy 450/500 aircraft until Embraer and [the company] have addressed the underlying non-normal operation of the aircraft electrical system. The normal operating checklists; procedures will have to be updated as well as all crew members must be informed and trained on the new procedures.

EMB-545 Captain reported experiencing an electrical system failure after engine start.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

In cruise flight well outside ROA we were inbound on the SBV4 arrival in RDU. ATC then issued us a vector off course about 10-15 degrees to the left. A few minutes later we were re-cleared direct to ROA via the ALDAN 1 Arrival. I loaded the arrival into the FMS and selected the ROA transition. Prior to executing the change; I verified with the First Officer and noted that ROA was in the TO line of the FMS. However for some reason the FMS did not give us a direct course but instead place the course to the right of the aircraft. In order to intercept the autopilot attempted to take a hard intercept to the right to get on course. I saw what was happening and reselected direct ROA in the FMS to correct the problem. However due to the heading change ATC did query us if we were proceeding direct ROA. ATC made no further issue or remarks and we proceeded to RDU uneventfully. Reliance to automation. Uncommanded response to input in the FMS. I would be more vigilant in ensuring the FMS is showing a direct to line to the selected fix.

A CRJ-200 FMS did not proceed direct ROA after ATC vectored the aircraft off the ALDAN 1 Arrival then recleared direct ROA for the transition.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 5500; Flight Crew Type 150

Distraction; Fatigue; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

This is a twin engine experimental airplane that was designed to fly low and slow to take videos and photos. I was flying with a friend who is also a pilot. I was the pilot in command and pilot flying during the event. We were flying a cross country with a fuel stop. The flight was a total of 6 hours and the event happen at the last 3 minutes of the flight. As we were approaching our destination we spotted a shark in the water and we started a descent from 300 feet to about 30 to 50 feet. The shark was just stationary and we started to circle it. I did 2 turns around the shark with no issues and as I came around on the last turn; I saw something going by that took my attention away from the shark and brought the airplane wings to level. I immediately noticed my sink rate was very high and added full power and started to pitch up. The sink rate continued until I had contact with the water. Right before touching the water the sink rate was very close to zero (0). The airplane skipped on the water and flew away with a lot of vibration. I looked at my instrumentation and noticed my right engine RPM was much higher (red arc) than the left which seemed normal to the power lever position. I started to bring the right engine to idle and the airplane vibration decreased significantly. I quickly assessed the situation and confirmed that all flight controls were working and the airplane was flying well on 1 engine. My friend who was in the back was looking around the airplane while all this happened and said that everything looked okay in the plane other than the right wheel which was missing. I continued climbing until 700 feet while flying toward the airport. I made a radio call stating my position and my situation 'lost my right engine and wheel'. Once on final the airplane flew normal with both power reduced. The winds were favoring Runway 12. They were coming from probably 180 at 10 knots (what I assumed from looking at the windsock). With the left engine running; right cross wind and right wheel missing it was very difficult to keep the airplane on the downwind wheel as the airspeed got slower. As soon as the right landing gear leg touched on the ground the airplane started to turn to the right toward the gravel/grass. The airplane did a 360 ground loop coming to a stop about 10 feet on the right side of the runway. Nobody was hurt and there were no damage other than aircraft damage. Police came within 5 minutes of landing and he wrote a report in which he said it was going to be submitted to the FAA for follow up. Looking at topics below and talking about them separately. How the problem arose: Low altitude flying on a windy day. Pilot perceived high sink rate. Downwind turn; flying low; distraction with shark; possible windshear; possibly flew through my own wingtip vortices; possible downdraft. Full power and pitched up. During the first 2 turns I noticed the airplane was loosing a lot of performance while turning downwind. I compensated by flying faster which was my decision and action. This was a 6 hour flight in the sun (open cockpit). Although there were 2 pilots and we took turns flying; I was tired at the end of 6 hours and should have not gone to lower altitude.

Experimental light twin pilot reports water contact while circling at low altitude to view sea life. The right propeller is damaged and the right wheel is missing. Aircraft is flown to a nearby airport and landed safely with minimal additional damage.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

During our initial approach phase into JFK and after shooting the CAMRN4 arrival we were instructed to maintain present heading after CAMRN for vectors to runway 04R. Then; we were told by the controller to descend to 7000ft; after that we were vectored to the 04L and asked us to descend to 2000ft; and since we were doing 200kts the controller decided to vector us around to position us as the last aircraft for the approach. In the meantime; we were given heading 090 to the 04L and while doing so I noticed an amber traffic off my left side on the NAV Display (same altitude) followed by a traffic Advisory (TA). The controller steps into the frequency and very agitated instruct us to 'IMMEDIATELY TURN RIGHT HEADING 360'. At this point I had to disconnect the autopilot in order to react faster to such an event. The controller continued to vector us and hand us off to tower. We finished the approach and landed successfully on runway 04R. At NO point during this approach we received a Resolution Advisory (RA) just to clarify; but an evasive maneuver by the pilots took place in order to NOT get into a more serious manner.

Pilot reported receiving a Traffic Advisory during vectoring to final approach.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) .5

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 145; Flight Crew Total 4665; Flight Crew Type 1050

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I had just taken and split the position with another controller who had previously had both grounds combined. The push was just getting started and I had a few opposite direction conflicts to work out; involving traffic in and out of the GA ramp at the northeast part of the airport. Aircraft X was one of several aircraft I asked to standby at their outbound spots because I had numerous runway crossings to coordinate. I then went back and started taxiing aircraft; including Aircraft X. I recall hearing; and later confirmed from playback a good read-back of the instructions to taxi 'Runway 27 Left via Hotel and Echo; hold short Runway 27 Right.' I went back to planning and resolving my arrival/departure traffic from the GA ramp; and accomplishing runway crossings. I was alerted by the Ground West controller of something wrong when he asked; 'What's Aircraft X doing?' Looking at the ASDE-X I could see that Aircraft X had turned left out of Hotel and taken Echo 4 across Runway 35; joining Delta 4. I advised Aircraft X that they had taken a wrong turn and crossed a runway and began working out the now increasingly complex set of conflicts presented by their deviation. Aircraft X continued taxi to Runway 27 left without much further incident.What's odd about this incursion is that it happened at what has long been a hotspot for PHL; the Hotel/Echo intersection; but in a way that I've never heard of or seen before. Taxiway Hotel east of Echo and crossing Runway 35 is currently closed precisely because aircraft leaving spots XX and XY sometimes fail to make the right turn onto Echo and instead continue straight on Hotel and across Runway 35. But Aircraft X; in order to have this incursion; had to make a hard left off of Hotel; onto Echo 4; and took that across Runway 35; a scenario that I would not have considered very likely prior to this event. I can only speculate on why Aircraft X mistakenly turned left instead of what seems like the obvious correct choice to turn right onto Echo; joined the wrong taxiway (echo 4 instead of echo) and crossed a runway. But the intersection occasionally still gives pilots trouble; in spite of or perhaps because of the taxiway closure. In fact later in that same push; a 757 stopped on Hotel short of Echo and requested confirmation of his instructions to turn right on Echo. He seemed confused at first but quickly figured it out. I've never seen the Hotel/Echo/Echo 4 intersection from ground level at night but judging from the close proximity of all the taxiways and runways; I'd imagine it's a confusing sight to an unfamiliar pilot. Maybe the blinking barrier lights showing the closed portion of Hotel make this situation worse? Without getting more detail from the pilots; I can only speculate. In the future; I'd consider specifying 'Hotel; turn RIGHT on Echo; hold short;' to avoid what seems like a very unlikely error by the pilot.

Aircraft X cleared to spot XX. Ground then cleared us to taxi via H; E; hold short Rwy 27R.  Captain proceeded to taxi via H and turned left onto E4; I was looking down to figure out taxi directions. At the time I looked up; we were holding short of Rwy 35. I stated to Captain 'We are not to cross this runway' (my exact words) and looked down again onto my iPad to figure the next taxi instructions steps. Before I realized what had happened the Captain had already began to cross Rwy 35. We were passed the point of no return; ending up at D4. Our new set of instructions was to turn right on taxiway D and hold short of G; which we were right on so we could not hold short of G. We were immediately told to hold short of A.We then were told to turn left on Rwy 26; make a 180 degree turn and go north on D; backtracking our route and immediately controller changed his mind and told us to continue on D; cross Rwy 26 and hold short of Rwy 27R at D. Next instructions were: Cross Rwy 27R then right on S; short of 35 and finally cross Rwy 35 at S.  We were told to monitor tower and then given a phone number to copy (PHL tower).  Flight left PHL without any further issues and a safe landing was accomplished at destination.  After I landed; and when parked at the gate and done with our flight duties; the Captain called PHL tower and spoke to one of the controllers.

PHL Controller and pilots report of a runway incursion caused by possibly bad lighting on the taxiways and runway.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 3000

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted

Right main landing gear light failed to illuminate during approach. Crew performed checklist; diverted to alternate and had tower confirm gear extention. Crew landed aircraft at alternate.

C550B Captain reported right main landing green light failed to illuminate on approach. Flight crew diverted to alternate where a visual check confirmed gear was down.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I just took over R5. There were a lot of things to be done. Right away; ITO Approach called me and told me that aircraft X; an SR20; departure from ITO; was not going to be able to make the MOCA of 6;500 FT at OKALA; can he just RADAR vector him? I asked him what his MVA is because mine is 6;000 FT. He said 5;400 FT. I told him to RADAR vector him until our boundary on a 310 heading since it's a lower MVA. When ITO called me back at the boundary; aircraft was above 6;000 FT (my MIA) I told him to switch him to me. As soon as I got him; I told him to turn left to join V22 to V2. He read it back correctly. He was less than 1 mile right of V22 when I gave him that clearance. I was busy with vectoring for practice approaches at KOA with jets; when I noticed aircraft's MSAW went off. He was left of course and I advised him. He was now in my 8;000 FT MIA. He said that he did go to V22 and now is going to V2. I restated that he was cleared via V22 to join V2 and to climb quickly. When he leveled at 8;000 FT I cleared him direct UPP. It was busy on R5. I needed to tell the Supervisor to open up my D-Side. They needed to juggle a few bodies to get me the D-Side. Another problem is with the pilot. If he knew on the ground that he was not going to make the MOCA; he should have informed us or requested a route on the ground that he could comply with. I think if I wasn't as rushed; I may have given a more thorough clearance to ITO Approach to issue to aircraft rather than tell him to switch him to me at the boundary. This worked; but I may have spent more time to give him more attention to make sure he understood his clearance. I thought he did; but he really didn't. If I had a D-Side to have dealt with that coordination with ITO; it might have been more clear and less on the fly; while trying to deal with my practice approaches and multiple air carriers flying in to KOA.

HCF Controller described a below MVA event resulting from an apparent aircraft performance issue. The reporter noted that this performance limitation should have been reported by the flight crew before the flight.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 234; Flight Crew Total 10294; Flight Crew Type 683

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

While crossing ISABL and maintaining 11;000 FT MSL on the Glenn Rose Nine Arrival for Runway 18R at DFW; our head Flight Attendant informs me that our Number 3 Flight Attendant; who was stationed at the back of the aircraft; had complaints of ear aches. My response to her was that I will keep a low rate of descent for the rest of the flight and was confirmed that no medical assistance will be required for her once we arrived at DFW. Regional Approach (Freq.: 118.42) gave us a descent down to 5;000 FT and a downwind vector of heading 355 degrees for Runway 18R. While reading the Approach Checklist; Regional Approach requests to increase our rate of descent. I replied that it would be unable due to the aches that one of our flight attendants had with her ear. As a result of that; Regional Approach informed us to expect an extension on the downwind leg in order to conduct a low rate of descent (1;000 FT per minute) and requested us to fly 10 degrees to the left from the previous assigned heading.Flying abeam the final approach course for Runway 18R between YOHAN and LEGRE; Regional Approach using our call sign; gives the instruction to fly a heading of 150 degrees and to 'turn back' to the localizer for 18R and descend to 3;000 FT. Passing 40 degrees of azimuth direction to the right; Regional Approach queries about our turning and after informing the Controller that I read back to fly heading 150 degrees; since he used our call sign; he instructed us to fly a heading of 320 degrees to the left and descend to 3;000 FT; informing me that the 150 degree heading instruction was for another aircraft. At that moment and to avoid radio interference as well as lack of situational awareness; I decided that it was best not to argue with the Controller. After that; we received vectors for a visual approach to Runway 18R since the ILS was out of service as reported on the NOTAMs on ATIS Information 'Whiskey.'I would like to mention that while I was acting as Pilot Monitoring; prior and during the commencement of turning right to a heading of 150 degrees while in VMC; I kept close monitoring of our TCAS display in expanded mode which showed that we where not going to be in any conflict with nearby aircraft and did not receive any TA or RA advisories for that matter. No evasive maneuvers were required to turn to a heading of 320 degrees. Also; after our arrival at DFW; I did not receive any verbal or written notification from the authority with regards to the matter.My perception of what might have caused this problem lies with the subject of ATC phraseology. I recall that Regional Approach did not use the instruction to turn 'right' to a heading of 150 degrees. Instead; the Controller used the term 'turn back' with the instruction to fly a heading of 150 degrees and 'turn back' to intercept the localizer for Runway 18R. This put no doubt to me and the First Officer the Controller wanted a continuous right turn (shortest direction) to intercept the localizer since the runway was behind us at our 4 to 5 o'clock position and also because he extended the downwind vector to compensate for the low rate of descent that we needed.In order to prevent a recurrence; I believe that the direction 'left' or 'right' needs to be given when a heading is assigned by ATC since a pilot will assume that he or she will turn in the shortest direction of the given vector.

An aircraft on vectors to DFW Runway 18R with a slow descent rate because of a Flight Attendant ear block was given an extended downwind. During a subsequent vector; ATC used their call sign with a clearance meant for another aircraft resulting in a track deviation.


Person Manipulating Controls (UAS); Remote PIC (UAS)

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Remote Pilot (UAS); Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days (UAS) 100; Flight Crew Total 3500; Flight Crew Total (UAS) 1500; Flight Crew Type (UAS) 200

Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)

Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Software and Automation

I had been operating the UAS from early morning through approximately XA:00 am; providing news coverage of the tornado disaster in City; State. I had been checking periodically for TFR's using Foreflight on my cell phone and none were being imposed. I resumed flying at approximately XC:00 and again checked for TFR's using the same method.Upon returning to the hotel that evening I checked again when online as I was preparing for flights the next day and also to see if a VIP TFR may be upcoming; and saw to my surprise that a TFR had been imposed for the area that I had been flying in that took effect at XB:30 that day. I do not know why it did not appear on Foreflight other than I was in an area of poor cell coverage and perhaps the map loaded but the application was not communicating for updates. In the future when doubt is cast on the reliability of internet based mapping applications; a phone call to FSS is in order. Then there is no doubt.

Reporter had no additional information to share.

Part 107 UAS pilot was flying in an area of a natural disaster. Prior to the flight the UAS pilot checked for NOTAMs/TFRs and saw none. Reporter learned during post flight that they flew in a TFR that had been created after takeoff.


Observed potential issue in aisle 'overhead bin wave.' Notified Captain upon identifying issue that overhead bin shifted at black bin dividing structure showed and showed Captain concern. Asked Flight Attendant C to guard bins; so no passenger would place items in either adjacent bins around affected area until Maintenance is able to inspect.Maintenance came onboard initially placarded bin and started process to sign off on logbook after placing a call with logbook in hand Maintenance came onboard aircraft and felt bin structure again. Stepped off aircraft and communicated with person on phone. Maintenance informed me this aircraft was dead there's a structural issue. Aircraft [was] deplaned.Proper assembly of overhead bin units. Additional training of identifying potential structural issues with [the new interior] additional inspection of overhead bin units.

B737 Flight Attendant reported discovering overhead bin damage prior to boarding.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

On the SEEVR4 arrival FEWWW Transition to DFW descending from FL360 to FL340; in VNAV; smooth air; seat belt sign off; FO pilot flying we experienced wake turbulence from a preceding aircraft. The first encounter started with a light buffet typical of wake turbulence; then developed into a more severe rolling [motion]; and eventually rolled 15-20 degrees left disconnecting the auto pilot. The First Officer stabilized the roll; selected a shallow descent in vertical speed; and reengaged the autopilot. Shortly after; a second buffeting began and the aircraft rolled left again. The First Officer implemented unusual attitude procedures disengaging the autopilot; calling 'my aircraft' prior to the aircraft rolling to the extent it did in the first encounter. After stabilizing we asked for a lateral offset and reported the wake turbulence upset to ATC saying we were unable to avoid the aircraft's wake. It was granted and no further wake turbulence was encountered. I asked if the fight attendants were ok; which they responded 'yes'; and made a PA to the passengers. On landing; the No. 1 Flt attendant said that he hurt his neck trying to stay upright while standing in the aisle during the event. He had not fallen or hit anything but twisted it trying to keep his balance.I reported the event to Dispatch on landing.

During descent on the SEEVR4 into DFW leaving FL360 to FL340 wake turbulence was encountered. Preceding the event the aircraft was in smooth air. Approximately passing through FL350 the aircraft encountered the wake. A slight buffet was felt followed by a bank of approximately 15 degrees to the left. An immediate recovery was made. ATC was notified and the descent was shallowed to separate from the leading aircraft. This followed with a second less aggressive encounter and a full recovery was initiated. ATC was notified and we requested an immediate lateral deviation. No further wake was encounter for the remaining flight. The Captain made an announcement and talked to the flight attendants to verify everyone was ok. At this time he was informed no one was injured. Upon landing a flight attendant informed the captain that his neck was bothering him. Stating did not hit his head but may have twisted his neck and now felt pain.

Air carrier flight crew reported encountering wake turbulence descending through FL350 on arrival into DFW.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

During takeoff started to smell a dirty sock smell; asked Flight Attendant 1 if she smelled anything odd. She confirmed she did. Dirty sock smell became stronger. Asked Flight Attendant 2 if they smelled anything in their area (aft galley). They did not. Flight Attendant 2 came up to see what the smell was; confirmed she smelled dirty socks. While discussing with Flight Attendant 1; I excused myself feeling lightheaded/dizzy and speedy heart palpitations and went to back of aircraft to get away from the smell. Flight Attendant 4 then went to FWD galley and confirmed he smelled odor. Flight Attendant 2 came back to galley not feeling well and Flight Attendant 4 as well. Flight Attendant 1 was experiencing lightheaded. I let the pilots know what the situation was (odor/location/symptoms) asked if they could check on it for us. They couldn't conclude anything at that time as smell dissipated. We grabbed an O2 from the back of aircraft and breathing that helped a bit; was used by Flight Attendant 2; Flight Attendant 4; and me. Did not experience odor on descent. Experienced cough after incident. Flight Attendant 2 still felt lightheaded; Flight Attendant 1; Flight Attendant 4 and I felt better by end of flight except for my cough.

B737-800 Flight Attendant reported strong 'dirty socks' odor in cabin during flight resulting in physiological issues.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Diverted

We had departed for Airport ZZZ in IMC conditions associated with a cold front passage. The frontal system was stirring up rain and thunderstorms associated with the convection. Both crew members checked weather together within 10-15 minutes prior to departure and had determined that there was sufficient room for maneuvering as we climbed to our enroute phase. We queried ATC prior to takeoff of our departure clearance to confirm the latest instructions. After departure we climbed to our cruise altitude without incident and began receiving vectors around weather by ATC. Prior to reaching our filed cruise altitude we requested right deviations based on our on-board radar indications. We were asked to expedite to 16;000 before we could receive any deviations. After leveling off at 16;000; we requested the deviations again with no response. Moments later we were asked when we could turn to the left. We replied; not for 10-15 miles. We were instructed; when able proceed to ZZZ VOR. Utilizing on-board as well as NEXRAD radar we began to inch our way around towards a course to ZZZ VOR when we encountered icing. We had already leveled off at our cruise altitude and we turned our deicing equipment on. Within moments we began to encounter heavy rain; moderate to severe turbulence and we immediately requested vectors to the closest departure from the weather. ATC responded that there were no exits (our radars; both on board as well as NEXRAD) did not show any signs of such intense weather. Within moments we encountered what felt like a downdraft and severe turbulence causing a stall warning alert; but no pusher activation. We immediately applied full power and reduced AOA; attempting to keep wings level and airspeed within maneuvering limitations. After recovering the aircraft; we [advised ATC] and requested lower altitudes for positive temperatures. We flew the RNAV 11 approach into Airport ZZZ1 and landed without issue. We performed a post-flight walk around to check for damage; but could not determine anything. We contacted Dispatch; Maintenance Control; and the Duty Manager. Be extremely cautious when flying around frontal activity (especially fast moving cold fronts.) Consider embedded thunderstorms and keep a close check on go/no-go decisions.

PC12 Captain experiences severe turbulence and heavy rain while attempting to fly through a cold front with thunderstorms. Neither NexRad nor onboard radar displayed the severity of the weather encountered. Once clear the flight diverts to a suitable airport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors

I would like it on file that I have worn the [new] uniforms for the last time. They have caused me itchy skin; itchy eyes; nose bleeds; scratchy throat and sinus issues. My husband had small rash like bumps on his chest and arms. My uniforms are now packed in my garage. The local college in my area has a forensic department. They have agreed to run tests on my pieces. I have seen my coworkers break out in rashes; hives and what appears to be third degree burns. Recall the uniforms.

Air carrier Flight Attendant reported experiencing physical allergic symptoms when wearing the new company uniforms.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Aircraft X called asking to taxi to his gate on the south ramp.  Aircraft Y was told to push tail east do not block taxiway WB.  I instructed Aircraft X to taxi via taxiway NA and NR and hold short taxiway WB.  I went back to Aircraft X and told him behind Aircraft Y pushing [from] gate to continue his taxi to spot 3 and then contact ramp.  I noticed Aircraft X at spot 3 when Aircraft Y called and asked if the Aircraft X was supposed to have given way because they had to slam on their brakes and flight attendants were instructed to take their seats.  Aircraft Y asked me what his callsign was because he was going to call his company.  I told Aircraft Y his callsign at that time I informed the supervisor of the event taken place.  Gate A29 and A30 are not visible from the tower nor do the aircraft show up on the ASDE-X when pushing from the gate do they show up sometimes when the push is complete.If a camera was hung close to the gates and a monitor was at the GC1 position so they could see the aircraft push and possibly have the city paint another spot on the ramp just for those 2 gates to push back onto.

While taxiing down NR we were issued to hold short WB.  We were then cleared to taxi behind Aircraft Y who was pushing from the A terminal.  Our understanding was that Aircraft Y was to remain clear of taxiway WB and we were to remain clear of them.  We slowed as we approached their aircraft; Aircraft Y rampers were not pushing the aircraft so we contacted ramp and were cleared into the ramp via RC.Threats would include unfamiliarity with Aircraft Y's push procedure from the A gates into the taxi way as well as ATC clearing a push but with our understanding of them to remain clear of our taxiway.  Also with Aircraft Y not appearing to push we made the assumption they were not under tow at the immediate moment allowing us to move behind them.While this is the first time I have met Aircraft Y in push from those gates; I feel a hotspot or note regarding Aircraft Y's push procedures onto one of the most active taxiways at IAH; would be a good start to increase crew's awareness of the unusual and sometimes confusing procedure.

IAH Controller reports of taxi instructions given to two aircraft. One aircraft doesn't follow instructions and causes the other aircraft to slam on the brakes. Pilot of violating aircraft reports that they thought they were clear to taxi behind the other aircraft because it wasn't moving.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 400; Flight Crew Total 1420; Flight Crew Type 1000

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

I was on an IFR flight with a student heading into Atlantic city airport.  We requested the GPS 4 approach into the airport.  The controller told us to cross JEDOB at 2000 and we were cleared for the approach.  We crossed JEDOB intersection and started our descent down to 1700 feet as the approach calls for.  My student was under the foggles and I was looking outside for traffic.  We were currently out of the clouds in VMC conditions.  I noticed and aircraft moving left to right at a high rate of speed and had very little time to react.  It came within approximately 500 feet horizontally and 100 feet vertically of our aircraft. I immediately took evasive action and descended.  There was no report of the aircraft from air traffic control.  I asked the controller if she was showing an aircraft near us and she then responded affirmative and pointed it out and asked if we had the traffic in sight.  I told her affirmative and that it was a close call.  I believe the incident occurred in class C airspace but depending on where we were on the approach it could have been right outside in class E airspace.  Regardless we were on and IFR flight plan and were given an approach clearance.  In addition our aircraft was to the right of the other aircraft and legally we had the right away. I don't know if the controller was working the other aircraft or if it popped up on radar at the last minute.  If she was working that aircraft I think she needed to a better job monitoring the situation; given how close both our aircraft came.

C152 Flight Instructor reports an airborne conflict with another aircraft requiring evasive action. The reporter had just been cleared for the GPS 4 approach to Runway 4 at ACY and was out of 2;000 feet for 1;700 feet. ATC apparently saw the other aircraft but did not provide a warning.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

While we departed Ontario; CA on the RAJEE3 departure; ATC asked us to maintain 7;000 feet. Close to the RAJEE checkpoint ATC called two targets:1) [A] Small Aircraft; 12 o' clock; 7 miles; 6;500 feet. 2) A Medium Large Transport 8;000 [feet] at 10 o' clock.We responded searching for the Small Aircraft and called the Medium Large Transport in sight. ATC again called our attention to the Small Aircraft 12 o' clock five miles to which we responded searching. Many other calls not related to us continued over the frequency when we received an RA from the TCAS indicating adjust vertical speed. Looking at the VSI the vertical speed showed to remain level. We spot the Small Aircraft on TCAS converging but only visually picked out the aircraft less than 1/4 mile (hazy outside) at 10 o' clock (not 12 o' clock) passing directly underneath us 300 feet. TCAS indicated clear of conflict as the Small Aircraft passed to our five o'clock. The next call from ATC was traffic passing behind us and climb to 13;000 feet. Meanwhile; the Medium Large Transport passes over us.We indicated to ATC that we received a TCAS RA and that the Small Aircraft passed 300 feet below us. ATC departure acknowledged and passed us to center. ATC could have vectored us off the SID to avoid the conflicting traffic.

Air carrier flight crew reported NMAC with another aircraft during climbout from ONT airport.


Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On DATE while proceeding from ZZZ to ZZZ1 on a ferry flight with an employee's daughter onboard; we were diverted to ZZZ2 for a passenger recovery flight. We were proceeding direct to ZZZZZ on the RNAV GPS Approach. We were instructed to hold at ZZZZZ as published at an altitude of 6;800 ft. due to an aircraft that would be crossing our missed approach path until ATC made radio contact with the traffic. Approximately 5 NM prior to ZZZZZ; we were cleared for the approach. I proceeded to set 3;700 ft.; the FAF Altitude; in the ALT window; armed the VPATH and the APP mode. The aircraft proceeded to descend to cross ZZZZZ at or above 5;400 ft. A few minutes later; just prior to MREEE; at approximately 6;000 ft. we received a LOW ALTITUDE ALERT from ATC. He requested that we climb back up to 6;800 ft. We had the field in site and were established on the approach so; we cancelled our IFR flight plan and we were then cleared for the visual approach. We did not receive any TERRAIN WARNINGS; there was no yellow displayed on our PFD/MFD in regards to terrain. At the time; the SIC was on the CTAF frequency announcing our position and commencement of the RNAV GPS approach. Upon further query; ATC stated that they had asked us to maintain 6;800 ft. until ZZZZZ before commencing the approach. I did not hear that altitude restriction and only read back the cleared for the approach authorization. I'm not sure why we had that restriction; as we were in VFR conditions. All the high terrain was to our southeast; there was no other traffic in the area or displayed on our TCAS and 5;400 ft. was the crossing altitude for MREEE on the approach. The safety of the crew; passenger and aircraft was never in question and we had situational awareness throughout the approach.

Captain reported missing an ATC communication; resulting in Low Alt alert and a Missed approach and go around.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We were on an actual IFR training flight. During the ILS approach we lost communication; navigation and heading reference systems. We had no prior indications of power failure. We squawked 7600 and used my cell phone to communicate with tower. I informed them of our situation and intentions to use two battery backed up VFR GPS's to navigate a self vectoring final approach and descent. They coordinated with approach control. One was an iPad with approach plates with Geo referencing. I self vectored to ILS final and descent points to landing; very successful. Light gun control was used for landing clearance. I would advise all IFR pilots to have a backup GPS that powers independent from aircraft power. Also; I think approach control phone numbers should be on all IFR approach plates and; at least; RCOs (remote control outlets) for IFR clearances where available.

PA32 instructor pilot experiences a power loss in IMC; rendering communication; navigation and heading reference systems inoperative. A cell phone is used to communicate with ATC and an iPad with approach plates and geo referencing is used to successfully complete an approach to landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 152; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

In final turn for visual Runway 29 at night at 600 ft pointing at North Bridge fully configured exactly on vertical profile; ATC issues low altitude alert followed by EGPWS caution obstacle call out. Bridge tower was in sight so we continued.

A320 Captain reported receiving low altitude alerts on approach and continued with obstacle in sight.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy

-This is a general statement not isolated to a single flight-It has be nine months now since Boeing flight attendants started working Airbus flights. And yet; there is still a fundamental lack of understanding of how the Airbus intercom system works as well as flight deck entry and exit procedures. Flight attendants are using All Call on the intercom system to confirm doors are armed for departure. This is necessary on the A321 due to the multiple mid-cabin jumpseat stations; but it is not necessary on the A319/320 and as a result pilots are distracted by an intercom buzzer that interrupts our pre-flight duties.Flight attendants are blocking access to the forward galley successfully and as expected from a legacy (airline) perspective. However; the flight attendants that will be entering the flight deck do not always understand the urgency of the flight deck door being open for as short amount a time as possible. I have had 'A' flight attendants; usually the least experienced new-hire flight attendants are placed in this position of responsibility; wandering around the galley area waiting for me to open the door instead of standing ready to enter the flight deck as soon as the door is open. When I told them they need to be ready to enter the flight deck quickly their response was 'Why?' Seriously; this actually happened. I explained that the longer the flight deck door is accessible the bigger the security threat becomes. They then commented that 'It's different than how we do it on the Boeing.'You are a multi-equipment operation now. I hope someday the cabin crews I have to work with will learn to drop the negative attitude toward the Airbus; which is fostered from the top levels of management down; and learn how to execute procedure properly. Additionally; if flight attendants can't manage to learn two different flight deck entry procedures perhaps the company should re-evaluate the minimum hiring requirements for what is arguably one of the most important safety positions in the company. Or; perhaps whoever is designing the training curriculum should spend some time flying the Airbus because a poorly trained flight attendant is a liability to the rest of the crew in an emergency situation. And yet; I have been told by newly graduated flight attendants that they receive no training at all on the use of the intercom and that their first experience with the entry/egress procedure is at cruise altitude.

Airbus Captain reported cabin crew not sufficiently trained for Airbus safety procedures.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Troubleshooting

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Previous Enroute Controller cleared as to deviate right of course for weather.  We stated that the weather we were deviating for was 140 miles ahead in vicinity of DTW.  About 3 sectors later; the Controller seemed upset that we were flying a heading and that we should be flying with enroute fixes instead of just a heading deviation for weather.  He stated he had lots of eastbound traffic from O'Hare going around the weather and he needed us to fly heading 255 (I don't remember exact heading) direct IOW when able. We were deviating right of course for weather on about a 300 heading.  He also stated that other aircraft had flown through that area we were trying to avoid and that he was not depicting anything on his radar.  (We described to the Controller where the thunderstorms were located and that we could visually see the anvil.) We stated that we could accept this 255 heading for about 40 miles and then we would need to deviate right of course for weather.  (To help him out for about 40 miles with some of his O'Hare eastbound traffic.)  He did not give us right deviations for weather as we requested down the road.  Instead he asked us what fix we'd like to fly to enroute to IOW.  We stated MBS.  He coordinated with Toronto to coordinate MBS. He didn't want to let us deviate right of course for weather.  I didn't think it would have been the safest course of action to declare an emergency and turn right of course for weather on my own based on the Controller suggestions that his airspace is so saturated with traffic that he didn't want to let us deviate right of course for weather.  We even offered to change altitudes.  Ultimately we flew into the weather that we were trying to avoid.  Cleveland Center sent us into the anvil of a thunderstorm with tops above 36;000 feet.  We were IMC while at 36;000.  Fortunately it was mostly smooth.  Enroute air traffic control was aware of the weather we were deviating around 140 miles prior to the fact.  We were given a clearance to deviate right of course for weather.  (I believe it was direct IOW when able.)  Why couldn't ATC do a better job of coordinating our route around the thunderstorms with that much advance notice?    The Cleveland Center Controller seemed irritated and inconvenienced when we checked in with him on 120.07 with 'deviations right of course for weather.'  Are not O'Hare eastbound flights at odd altitudes for the most part and west bounds at even altitudes?  I don't understand why an even westbound altitude would have been available for a deviation right of course for weather.  I would like to know if this Controller could have cleared us to 'deviate right of course for weather' as we requested and just chose not to.  We could have accepted any number of headings ranging from 300 to 360.  We could have descended out of FL360 for FL350; FL340; FL330; FL320; FL310; or FL300.  I don't feel I should be left with the choice of either flying into the anvil of a thunderstorm (estimated tops into the low 40s.)  A thunderstorm that is very well depicted on national radar or to declare an emergency to avoid it and put my passengers; crew; and aircraft at risk by deviating from my ATC clearance in Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum airspace.      I'd like to hear from a Manager at Cleveland Center explaining to me why his airspace was so congested that the only option available to me was to send me into a thunderstorm anvil or to have me declare an emergency and have me fly my own headings in Reduced Separation Minimum airspace which would present an even greater danger for not only my passengers; crew; and aircraft; but also for but for the passengers and crew of other aircraft as well.  I want to know from Cleveland Center Manager detailing what could have been done differently that would have made both the Controller on 120.07 and myself happy.

Pilot describes flight that at first is on approved deviations by the Center; then a few sectors later the controllers are asking him to fly into the weather they are trying to avoid.


Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action

On approach in Denver there were thunderstorms in the area. About 45 minutes out from arrival; Denver was landing on Runways 25 and 26 due to strong winds out of the west. Upon getting close to the airport; within 30 minutes; the winds had shifted and were around 200 degrees. This caused the airport to change to using the south runways. For our flight they offered runways 16R or 16L. The crew elected for runway 16R. ATC notified the crew that it would be a short approach. The crew turned final for runway 16R in a wide turn. On about a 2 - 3 mile final; ATC stated the wind was now 310 at 22 and to state intentions. The captain (PF) told the first officer (PM) to let ATC know of our intent to land. We continued on the approach and ATC updated the winds to 310 at 23 and asked if we could accept that. The PM acknowledged we could and that we were going to land. We got our landing clearance with the winds of 310 at 26. We landed on runway 16R. On the taxi in the First Officer did his after landing flow and noticed the brakes on the left gear were in the amber cautionary range. He let the Captain know and we continued the taxi. The temps quickly climbed and we got an EICAS message regarding a break temp overheat. The captain stopped the plane and called for the QRH. After running the QRH they continued to monitor the break temps which continued to climb. With the temperatures continuing to climb well above normal; the captain elected to have fire trucks dispatched to the aircraft in case the high temps might lead to a fire. The fire trucks came to the aircraft and after monitoring the situation; the temps started to come down and the fire lead gave us the all clear. We taxied into the gate without further incident. As a jump seater I should have let the crew know of their situation of landing with a tail wind outside the limitations of the aircraft. The event could have been prevented by executing a go around and then electing to use a different runway that would have been within the limitations of the aircraft.

We had to make a few deviations for the weather and were a bit absorbed with planning a safe way around the cells starting about 140 miles out. After dodging the t-storms; we were cleared to descend via the PEEKK3 arrival and given a few heading/speed changes once we were within about 20 miles of the field. Following that; we were given a bit of a chop and drop approach to 16R. Things were happening quickly at this point. We landed; pulled off at D5 and started our taxi to the gate. About a minute into our taxi I noticed that the left brake temps were climbing rather quickly. We kept an eye on it and eventually got a high brake temp EICAS message. We stopped the plane and ran the appropriate QRH. After running the QRH we asked ATC to have the fire trucks come out to take a look at the left gear assembly to make sure we weren't on fire or glowing like a hot BBQ coal. I don't recall declaring an emergency; only asking them to send the trucks to have a look. The brake temps eventually cooled down and we commenced our taxi to the gate. The mechanics came out to have a look at the brake assembly and determined the plane was safe to fly.

During a high workload environment while landing at DEN; with changing weather and winds; the crew landed with a tailwind in excess of limitations which resulted in hot brakes.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

I was in the aft galley by myself during the cruise portion of the flight. The coffee pot was making a hissing noise; and the burner was filled up with coffee. I lifted the handle of the coffee maker and hot coffee grounds exploded out onto my chest and face. I received medical assistance on board the plane. The aircraft diverted. It was met by medical personnel. I was taken to the hospital. I received second degree burns to my face and chest.   Had there been a crew bulletin or warning from/by the company explaining that this can happen with the coffee makers; I would have taken precautions. I found out that in January 2013; the FAA let airlines know that this was something that could happen. Everything I read was exactly what happened to me.

The reporter stated that after this event she saw a news item about exploding aircraft coffee makers. Her Company had not put out any information about this potentially serious event.

I was flying 'B' position. 'C' came to the back while I was setting up galley for service and said she was going to go take her drink orders. Before I went into the cabin; I did start the coffee pot and everything seemed normal. I did not hear any strange sounds. When I went to take drink orders; 'C' was in the aft galley. Just a couple of minutes later into my orders; I heard a scream come from the back. I then stopped and went to see what was going on. I found the 'C' face and chest covered in coffee grounds. She was crying and said that the coffee pot was making a strange sound; so she lifted the handle and the coffee grounds exploded on her. I then called the 'A' and Captain to let them know what had just happened. 'A' came to the back and made a PA for a Doctor. A Doctor who happened to be a burn specialist came to the back and assisted the 'C' He then spoke to the Captain and said she will need medical attention and go to the hospital when we land. Then Captain then made the decision to divert.

A B737 coffee maker produced a hissing sound while dripping coffee; so the Flight Attendant opened the coffee tray and received second degree burns from exploding coffee grounds. An emergency was declared and the flight diverted for medical attention.


Upon arriving into MMUN ATC cleared us to fly the BUBUN 1B RNAV Arrival expecting 30L; with a subsequent descend via clearance. The EFB Jeppesen App contains these STAR Arrivals; but not all points; and there are no Jeppesen approaches that tie into these arrivals. As our routing was toward LOPKA; I selected the LOPKA transition. Upon reviewing the points on the LEGS page I noticed many other points after LOPKA. These points establish a base turn and final approach segment; but nothing within our JEPP-FD products contain these points. We were subsequently cleared direct to a point (don't remember which) that was on the final segment for 30R; cleared the visual 30R. In order to get clarity on where this point was I assumed (correctly) that we needed to load in the EPNEL1B STAR/OTSOL transition for 30R. Only then were we able to verify this point was actually on final for 30R. The MMUN STARS need to indicate all points that comprise the RNAV Arrivals. With the higher potential for communication issues (ATC Controller accents/dialects) we need better clarity on the waypoints that we may be sent to.

Air carrier Captain reported that Jeppesen RNAV Arrival charts for MMUN do not include the additional waypoints after the transition points.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.0

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

I was conducting OJTI (On Job Training) on combined sectors with a Radar Assist. The Radar Assist took a call from Approach regarding Aircraft X; who was at 5000 feet. Approach was asking if we were OK with Aircraft X at 5000 feet on his present route because the pilot wanted to stay as low as possible to avoid any potential icing. From my viewpoint it looked good. I heard the Radar Assist and Radar trainee discuss the 5000 foot Minimum IFR Altitude (MIA) in that vicinity and they seemed to concur on Aircraft X being good.A few minutes later after Aircraft X the MSAW (Minimum Safe Altitude Warning) begin to flash '058'. I quickly leaned in and noticed that Aircraft X had actually been inside the 5800 foot MIA for a few miles already but for some reason the MSAW (Minimum Safe Altitude Warning) didn't alert until now. He was about to re-enter the 5000 foot MIA anyway but we were already planning to climb Aircraft X for higher MIAs further ahead; so I told the Radar trainee to climb him to 071 feet as planned. This was sort of a glancing penetration of the 5800 foot MIA in this area; where the 5000 foot MIA was just west and south of the aircraft while the higher 5800 foot MIA sort of juts out from the east for a few miles. I would estimate he was about 2 miles inside the higher MIA for approximately 6-7 miles before climbing above it. In addition; the MIA values and boundaries were recently updated the area.Our MIAs and the associated boundaries are quite complex. It certainly reminded me of the importance of being extra vigilant in monitoring the proximity to these boundaries; especially while training and due to the recent changes that went into effect.

ZSE Center Controller reported they allowed an aircraft on a direct route to fly below the Minimum IFR Altitude.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This was the second leg of a two leg evening. On final; ATC had asked us to maintain 250 KTS till glide slope intercept then slow to 180 KTS. The airplane was fairly light; 385;000 LBS. During the speed reduction; the airplane got a little above the profile/glide slope and Pilot Flying used vertical speed to re-intercept the glide slope. During this attempt to re-intercept the glide slope; we got busy performing other flight/checklist duties and failed to notice that the airplane had failed to capture the glide slope from above and descended 300 feet below the glide slope. (This was the second time this evening with this particular airplane that it failed to capture the glide slope on the first attempt). We immediately corrected back to intercept the glide slope and was fully captured on the glide slope by 2;400 MSL (2;200 AGL). We continued the landing to a very nice landing. ATC didn't mention the deviation to us at any time.  Failure to notice that the airplane hadn't captured the glide slope Do not get pre occupied with the checklists.

MD11 Captain reported the aircraft failed to capture the glideslope during approach to landing. Flight crew recovered and landed uneventfully.


Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were assigned the ILS XXR with the circle to XY. Tower instructed us to start the circle at the marker. We configured for a flaps 40 landing with auto brakes 3. At the marker; I turned southeast to approximate the track of the ZZZ Visual XY; which was briefed on the descent and was selected in the Control Display Panel. At approximately 620 ft. MSL; the Tower issued a low altitude alert. I did not have the PAPI in sight because we were heading south; and the vertical guidance was inaccurate since we were not on the lateral course. I immediately climbed approximately 100 ft.; and we then reestablished a proper descent. The landing was normal. The aircraft did not give any altitude warnings. I am a new [make/model] Captain. I just completed my 100 hours. The First Officer is on high minimums.

Air carrier Captain reported ATC issued a low altitude alert warning while the Captain was executing an ILS circle-to-land approach.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Upon arrival at the gate; my First Officer left the airplane to do a preflight walk around for our return flight. After a few minutes; he returned and asked me to accompany him outside. Under the left wing; forward of the main landing gear; we found a puddle (around 20 inches in diameter) of fuel and an active leak. The leak was not fast but at the time was dripping out approximately one drop per second. You could also see a trail of fuel from where we taxied into our parking position. I approached the Ground Crew and informed them that we had an active fuel leak and that we would be calling ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) and Maintenance to get it to check out. I asked my FO (First Officer) to inform ATC that we had a fuel leak on the ramp while I went up to inform the gate agents and asked them to hold boarding due to the safety concern of fuel on the ramp. I called Dispatch and [Maintenance Control] to inform them of the fuel leak and asked for contract Maintenance to come out and look at the aircraft. I also reported our situation to the [Chief Pilot]. ARFF arrived at the airplane and sprayed foam under the aircraft and left wing. Contract Maintenance arrived and removed the landing gear fairings to look for the leak. After over an hour of looking for the leak and working with our [Maintenance Control] to try different aircraft configurations; the contract Maintenance signed off our logbook; and we departed. After takeoff; we were informed by Tower that ARFF had found another puddle of fuel at our push back position. There was also a trail of fuel leading to the runway. I elected to continue and monitor the fuel status to make sure we had the endurance to make it. I advised Dispatch via ACARS of the report from the Tower; and they advised us to do the same. Center controllers had information that we had an active fuel leak and asked if we needed any assistance. I advised them that we did not. After landing; I inspected the aircraft to find a leak in the same location. I took some pictures which I attempted to email to Maintenance that showed the fuel streak from the wing root to the tail of the aircraft. Local Maintenance was informed; and I also spoke to the [Chief Pilot] again.

CRJ-200 Captain reported his First Officer found a relatively minor fuel leak before departure; which was deferred; but the leak appeared to have worsened during their flight.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

During climbout; the right seat pilot flying (PF) experienced difficulty trimming nose down while hand flying the aircraft.  We were cleared to FL210.  The PF is new to this model aircraft and thought he was doing something wrong when the trim would not initially move. He commented once the forces continued to increase so we leveled off at FL210 and proceeded to run checklists for the situation we encountered.  We referenced and completed the Electric Trim Inoperative Checklist as well as the Jammed Elevator Trim Checklist.  During our return to the field I spoke to the passengers and then declared an emergency to have equipment standing by. We assessed the control forces required at altitude and decided to configure early and higher than normal SOP to adjust for any issues we may encounter while configuring.  Once slowed and configured the control forces became more manageable. After landing and on the taxi in; I tried the trim again manually and it was still frozen in its current position.  During flight we were able to move the trim slightly rearward but never forward past the initial frozen point when assessing the situation. This has been an ongoing issue with this model aircraft.

During the climbout; after the flaps were selected up and I started to accelerate towards a normal climb speed of 250 knots; the electric elevator trim stopped would not allow me to trim the nose down. We tried the other electric elevator trim and the manual trim wheel; all would not trim nose down. We proceeded to level off at 21;000 FT; ran appropriate checklists; declared an emergency and returned to the departure airport for a visual approach and landing. The excessive back force on the yoke was neutralized as we configured for landing and the speed decreased. An uneventful emergency landing was successfully completed. ATC and airport crash/fire/rescue personnel were all extremely helpful during this event.

CE560 flight crew detects jammed elevator trim during climbout. After checklist procedures are unsuccessful an emergency is declared and the flight returns to the departure airport. The Captain states that 'This has been an ongoing issue with this model aircraft'.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

I'd like clarification and to highlight potential violation of FOM XX.X.X Unacceptable passengers. It's seems without doing any type of screening of passengers prior to boarding we are certainly transporting passengers who are positive for the Coronavirus. Our manual states that we will not transport passengers who have a contagious disease. Our continued operation without a procedure to screen potentially positive passengers seems to disregard our own policy.

Pilot reported concerns with carrying passengers who were COVID-19 positive.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 26; Flight Crew Total 6666; Flight Crew Type 5693

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We took off on RNWY 16R out of ZSPD. Our clearance was to fly the LAM 21X SID out to LAMEN. I'm not sure why; but when we took off the SID wasn't in the FMC so our first point was LAMEN and the flight director (with LNAV selected and engaged) was commanding a direct turn to LAMEN; so at about 400 feet the Pilot Flying (PF) started turning direct to LAMEN which was about a 90 degree turn to the left. As we were passing about a 130 heading; I and the PF; realized at about the same time that this wasn't correct. I stated to stop the turn and the Pilot Not Flying (PNF) quickly told ATC that we were having a navigation problem. ATC then issued us a 120 degree heading which we held for several minutes. During this time the PNF put in the SID and then informed ATC that we had no more navigation difficulties. ATC then cleared us direct to a point further down the SID and we departed normally.It was by far the quickest departure that I've had out of PVG. It was a very short taxi from [the] gate to RNWY 16R and I believe only 1 plane was in front of us as we taxied out. When taxiing out we received an 'insufficient fuel' EICAS because the winds hadn't been entered in during the preflight. During taxi out the copilot was busy getting that put in and I must admit that put us behind with the checklist. I was listening to the PA; to make sure the flight attendant departure announcements were finished before I made my 'Flight Attendants please be seated for departure' announcement. I then called back to them two times to make sure that they were seated and buckled in before we started our takeoff roll. I have to admit that I missed part of the pre takeoff checklist so I didn't confirm if the FMC was properly set up.

B777 First Officer reported the crew departed ZSPD without the SID entered into the FMC which caused an incorrect turn after takeoff.


Communication Breakdown; Workload; Confusion

Workload; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

We were being vectored onto the 6L localizer. ATC stated that there was traffic at 11:00. I was watching the TCAS and noticed the traffic before we ever made visual contact. The Captain and I were both looking for the traffic. The TCAS went from a non-shaded box; to a shaded box; to a yellow; to a red. I kept asking ATC if the traffic was going to be a factor and the Controller seemed to not really care. I asked again when the 'Traffic; Traffic' alert went off. The Controller stated; 'Yeah; I thought that was going to happen.' I made visual contact with the traffic before the RA sounded. The Captain stopped our descent rate just prior to the RA. The traffic was never; in my opinion; going to hit us due to his direction and our direction of flight. We stopped our descent at 8;000 FT. I clicked the mic and stated that we had just had a TA and RA; again the Controller stated; 'Yeah; again I thought that was going to happen.' I stated; 'Well I wish you would have done something to stop it; again we had a TA and RA.' The Controller again stated; 'Yup I guess it did happen.' At no time did the Controller take control of the situation; try to stop it; or try to correct it. I am worried about his attitude. Again the aircraft; passengers; and crew were never in a position to have a midair; but the RA did sound. The event occurred because the Air Traffic Controller did not due his part to correct the situation and vector us away from known traffic. Take the Controller offline; and find out why he just allowed it to happen; and have no remorse for the situation.

The clearance we received was 'Fly heading 320 descend and maintain 8;000; VFR traffic will be at your 10 o'clock and 5 miles; lower when clear'. We noticed the traffic on the TCAS at 5 miles as we were leveling off at 8;000 but could not attain visual contact. Once we leveled off at our assigned altitude we noticed the traffic was only 300 FT below us. At two miles we received a RA; complied with a vertical climb and notified ATC. ATC's response was 'Yeah; I figured that might happen.'

An air carrier on approach to CLE 6L was issued 8;000 FT traffic then in a descent to 8;000 FT took evasive to the traffic's TCAS RA but given no warning from ATC except after the fact with; 'Yeah; I figured that would happen.'


I was working an outer feeder sector for [the airport] arrivals; when we began metering to [the airport]. Delays were in excess of six minutes; so I elected to hold aircraft instead of vector them in order to make their meter delays. The Supervisor; at the height of the traffic situation; elected to come to my sector and demand to know why I was holding instead of vectoring for meter delays. I explained to the Supervisor that it was more efficient to meet meter delays of over six minutes by holding than by vectoring aircraft all over the skies. The Supervisor continued to yap in my ear; causing me to lose focus and forget to turn a CRJ back on course in a timely manner. I was a little stunned by the Supervisor's actions in the control room; and phraseology between myself and the aircraft on frequency were not crisp and concise. A few minutes later; the Supervisor made my D-Side relieve me; and proceeded to have a conversation with me at the supervisor desk about my choice of holding aircraft vs. vectoring aircraft to meet meter delays. He blamed me for making the CRJ late. The Supervisor's actions on the control room floor turned a safe and efficient operation into a potentially dangerous situation; not to mention causing a scene in the control room by having all other controllers turn around to see what was going on. A FALCON with voice is available if you would like to view it. Educate management on metering techniques; especially when to hold vs. when to vector for metering delays.

Enroute Controller elected to place aircraft in holding rather than delay vectoring to metering criteria; the reporter receiving criticism from his/her Supervisor for holding aircraft.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 68; Flight Crew Total 24863; Flight Crew Type 5932

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

An airplane departed before us and was cleared to fly 210 heading after departure.  We were cleared for takeoff; runway heading.  Passing 1;000 feet Tower turned us to 230 heading and we called Departure.  Departure cleared us to 9;000 feet and in a few minutes turned us to a 210 heading.  He mentioned that when we passed 8;000 we could expect a turn to DITCH.  At some point he turned us to heading 190. I was hand flying and increased rate through 8;000 and Departure said something to the effect that traffic was no factor; cleared to DITCH.  Sometime between 8;000 and 9;000 I engaged autopilot. Approaching 9;000 TCAS called 'traffic' and within a few seconds called 'descend; descend'. I disengaged autopilot; called for Flight directors off and flew to the green Vertical Speed commanded which was about 2;000fpm down; maybe more.  Around 8;400 feet TCAS commanded monitor vertical speed then clear of conflict.  The First Officer looked outside for traffic but due clouds saw nothing.  He reported that on the Navigation Display the traffic was very close; less than .25 miles and showed 100 feet above. We resumed the climb and ATC cleared us to 12;000.I have no idea why this occurred.  The crew; all three of us; felt we flew that we were cleared lateral and vertical path described above.

TCAS gave us descend command of at least 2;000FPM. The RA icon was right on us and read 0 feet. The Captain responded to the alert and when the RA icon passed our nose it was red and read 1. We recovered about 8;400 feet and were given a clearance back to 9;000 and direct Ditch. Continued flight without any more problems.

An air carrier crew departed PHL in IMC and near 9;000 feet followed a TCAS RA generated by a very close airborne conflict with another air carrier aircraft which had departed before them.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS 13L

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related

While on visual approach to RWY 13L in DAL spotted a UAV inside Class B airspace off our left wing. We contacted ATC and gave a visual description as well as location of the UAV. Was detected visually from left cockpit. UAV operating near approach path in DAL airspace. Notified ATC facility and gave description and location. As UAV operations become more common it is important to be vigilant of all types of aircraft; even in areas where they should not be.

Small transport Captain reported; while on approach; a UAV operating inside class B airspace.


ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

A military tanker was cleared to work the Buckeye MOA from 5;000 FT to FL500; in addition they were cleared to work the Charlie shelf FL190-FL220. I observed the tanker exit the Buckeye MOA at FL250 without clearance; I issued a whiskey alert and advised him that he needed to either return to the MOA or descend to the altitudes of the Charlie shelf. The tanker replied with a roger; after watching the aircraft for a minute and not observing a turn or descent I then asked the tanker his intentions. He informed me he was returning to the MOA and executed a turn to return. He informed me that he thought the Charlie shelf was active to the same altitudes as the MOA. The tanker had been cleared in by the previous controller so I don't know what the clearance was but I was briefed the Charlie was only active FL190-FL220. The Charlie shelf used to be used solely as a refueling shelf by tankers to refuel the fighters in the MOA. After one of our changes to the Letter of Agreement the requirement to refuel was removed; now the military schedules that area in addition to the MOA to get a bigger area to work in. Our routes and procedures are built around the MOA but not around the Charlie shelf; if the military become more active in Buckeye there are no restrictions to them scheduling the Charlie shelf as a MOA extension. I would recommend since the Charlie shelf is not depicted on charts as part of the MOA that it's use be restricted to refueling as was it's original intention; since refueling isn't nearly as common and the tankers always do a great job of staying in the shelf when refueling. Our airspace and procedures were not designed for the military to use the Charlie shelf whenever they want but as a way to accommodate the refueling of the fighters.

ZID Controller described a military airspace 'spill out' event; the reporter noting that current airspace and procedures do not accommodate the military's combined operations in the Buckeye MOA.