Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 26.5

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft X was being worked by me eastbound and checked on VFR. The controller told me (next to me) verbally he was climbing from 16;500 feet to 17;500 feet VFR. I amended the altitude and then when he checked on I told him about precipitation intensities to the SE and asked about the tops. I made a point out to Sector 31 a little bit later and she said 'What is that guy doing?' I commented about CMH approach running the departures too far West and she said; 'No the VFR Aircraft X'.  I hung up and went immediately to the aircraft to verify mode C as I saw 18;700 feet. He verified the altitude and I told him that you cannot be in the PCA above FL180. He stated that he needed an IFR clearance for this part of the flight and I gave him a clearance to maintain FL190. Later when I switched Aircraft X I advised him that he got the attention of two fellow controllers that were watching him on their boundary and my Supervisor and told him he can't do that anymore. I think he knew better and indicated such.Alert the pilot of non-compliance should be sufficient.

ZID controller was working a VFR aircraft at 17;500 feet. While coordinating with a neighboring sector; another Controller inquired about the VFR aircraft which was now observed to be at 18;700 feet in the PCA. Reporter then advised the VFR aircraft that they cannot be in the PCA and issued a subsequent clearance.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days (UAS) 0.33; Flight Crew Total (UAS) 25; Flight Crew Type (UAS) 25

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS); Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

I was performing an inspection of a property and flew my drone without checking the airspace. Management discovered the incursion during monthly flight reviews; we discussed that we must check airspace before every flight.

Reporter indicated they saw another UAS pilot flying which made them believe it was okay to fly at the location. After further review reporter learned the depicted airspace has Class E airspace which starts at the surface.

Part 107 pilot reported they were informed that they flew into controlled airspace and had not checked airspace before the flight.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 2500

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC

An IFR flight plan had been filed for the portion of the planned flight to TTN. However the PIC decided to proceed VFR on the flight because the destination was reporting 2100 broken with 4 miles visibility and other airports along the route were reporting similar weather. The aircraft was a helicopter.The flight left at approximately XX:35 and proceeded southwest bound at 1500 feet; well below cloud cover and with good visibility. At approximately 10 miles northeast of TTN the ceiling began to lower. The aircraft started a descent to 1200 feet and turned toward the northwest to maintain VFR. The aircraft continued to the northwest until it was approximately 10 miles due north of TTN; and had descended to 1000 to maintain VFR.The aircraft then turned south and called TTN tower for clearance in to the Class D. TTN tower radar identified the aircraft; and gave clearance into the Class D. As the aircraft proceeded southbound the ceiling continued to lower. The PIC was expecting improvement in ceiling as they continued to the airport because the METAR at XX:00 was reporting 2100 feet broken. (Though the METAR was changing at XY:00; that report was still 1600 feet broken)When the aircraft was at approximately 7-8 miles north of TTN; and now at 700 ft as the ceiling continued to lower; the PIC instructed the SIC to tell TTN tower that the aircraft was contacting PHL approach control to pick up the IFR clearance in order to continue IFR into TTN. The SIC complied; and then contacted PHL approach control for clearance. The PIC started a right turn back to the north to avoid the TTN Class D airspace; and began a climb. As the SIC was receiving a transponder code and clearance from PHL; the aircraft encountered inadvertent IMC.After being radar identified; the aircraft was given a radar vector to the west for the ILS to runway 6; and a climb to 3000 for the approach. The aircraft proceeded on the ILS without incident; however; the aircraft did not break out on the ILS until approximately 800 feet.I am not certain why it is that some airports do not seem to update their METARS in a more timely fashion. I also am not completely certain how an airport can report a 2100 foot ceiling and have it be so much lower in reality.Weather reports are more or less factual; and are depended on to a great extent to plan flights and options to flights. If reporters are not diligent in keeping up with changes in conditions and reporting them. Pilots cannot effectively; or safely; plan and execute their missions.This is not the first time I have encountered conditions at an airport in the northeast area that were very different from what was being reported.

Helicopter pilot reported an inaccurate METAR prevented continuing to the airport VFR when the weather was IFR and getting worse.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 1800; Flight Crew Type 30

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Cleared to land by Tower on Runway 20. Student handling aircraft controls; rounded out too high owing to visual illusion from 'wider than usual runway'. Instructor added forward pressure to elevator control on two occasions; once on short final and once again during flare to minimize sink rate. Instructor failed to add power - initial approach had been too high so power had been reduced to idle. [We had a] hard landing on main wheels followed by 'normal' roll out for around 1;000 FT to exit on Taxiway C. On clearing the active runway with minimal braking and just prior to performing 'after landing procedures'; nose wheel collapsed causing a prop strike; ground speed almost zero. Aircraft engine secured; especially fuel. No injuries to either occupant. Ground Control advised. Aircraft recovered by local FBO and towed to apron.

Technam Sierra Instructor pilot describes a hard night landing that results in nose gear collapse as the aircraft is taxied off the runway.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We have received a [Dangerous Good] (DG) which was under 80% full and had no straps. There was DG in the [cargo bay] which was not secured. The tag was a DG tag with no DG remarks.

Air carrier ground personnel reported Hazmat transport violations on arrival shipment.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11.25

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was working 90 combined with 47 (interestingly enough; not 46).  Aircraft X called me for an IFR clearance from SAD (Safford AZ) to PRC (Prescott; AZ).  The Jackal MOA/ATCAA was active FL290 and below (base of the MOA is 11;000 MSL or 3;000 AGL; whichever is higher) with Aircraft Y; flight of 3 military fighters.  I told Aircraft X I couldn't give them the clearance due to Jackal being active; radar identified them; and started telling them about the flight of three.  Aircraft Y's datablock showed two aircraft (I left the datablock up instead of freezing it like most people in my area do) at FL240/250 (or thereabouts).  There was a third north of the two ship at FL185 on a 4000 code.  They looked like they were running intercepts.  I told Aircraft X about all three fighters and kept calling traffic.  I called Aircraft Y on 243.0 to have them come up on 281.5 (sector 90 UHF) for traffic information.  Aircraft A called me.  Since I wasn't sure which one Aircraft A was; I asked the pilot if he was the single ship; but the pilot didn't respond; so I started telling the pilot about Aircraft X reference the location of Aircraft Y as the two fighters were closer to Aircraft X than the single 4000 code.  As I kept calling traffic between all three fighters and Aircraft X; I saw Aircraft Y descend out of FL240 for 15;800 and buzz Aircraft X.  They were head on at same altitude.   I gave Aircraft X a traffic alert and advise them to turn 40 degrees right immediately.  Aircraft X said they had the traffic in sight.  Aircraft A then told me they were going to stay above 170 and work to the east to stay away from Aircraft X.  I told the Front Line Manger (FLM) about the situation in no uncertain terms and expressed my dismay about the fighters doing something so blatantly unsafe.  The FLM called the squadron.  Before I gave up the sector; the FLM had me ask Aircraft X how close they got.  The pilot said about two miles.  Given that they were head on at the same altitude; that is a bit too close.  I also told the two Operation Managers (OM)s at the desk as I walking out of the control room and said they may want to touch base with the FLM.I give permission to share this report.Not sure what to say about this.  Blatant disregard for safety is a problem for me.

An Albuquerque Center (ZAB) Controller reports of working an aircraft IFR that makes a request he is unable to approve due to a restricted area being hot with aircraft operating in that area. He issues traffic to both the aircraft and the second aircraft group; and one of the aircraft attempts to buzz the single IFR aircraft. The Controller reports this to Front Line Manager (FLM) and Operations Manager (OM).


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Procedure; Weather; Company Policy

I started my shift and I was assigned to an A319 aircraft. I proceeded to continue the Trouble Shooting Manual (TSM) Task 77-00-00-810; and the non-routine write-up. The TSM and non-routine write-up discrepancy was completed. No faults found. I informed my Lead Mechanic that the task was completed. Maintenance Control requested that I check the chip detector; and the scavenge screen; no particle found. Later; I was informed that Maintenance Control was requesting to change out the Turbine Rear Frame Bearing Vibration Sensor. After lunch I started installation of the Turbine Rear Frame Vibration Sensor and completing the installation at XA:15 am. I used A320 Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) Task 77-31-30-000 and 77-31-30-400. Completed Task Card 77-31-30-400 up to Step: 9 (Close-UP). Before moving aircraft out the hangar; one of the Mechanic's needed [help] to complete his job; the job was to replace the Call Horn; which was on MEL. At XA:45 am; I started on the paperwork for aircraft. At that time the Manager was requesting for the logbook; the paper was not completed; the [Maintenance] Ready Room was busy; because of shift turnover; weather was at red status and heavy rain; and Manager was requesting that aircraft be taken to gate 'now'. By this time my Lead informs me that he was leaving in fifteen minutes with two minutes to go. All the paperwork was in disarray and missing. With all the confusion and break down in commutation; the final task was not performed as require on task card.Prior to my shift starting; my Lead informed me that the aircraft I worked on that morning; had a problem with Number One Engine Thrust Reverser; did not deploy. [Contributing Factors were] time; stress; confusion; weather; communication. Once I was informed; I contacted our Union Safety Committee. Management needs to communicate with the Lead not the Mechanic; to keep stress level down.

An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) describes how time; stress; confusion; weather conditions and lack of adequate communications contributed to an A319 aircraft thrust reverser on the Number One Engine not deploying upon landing.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I was instructing on LC1. Traffic was picking up and my trainee was working. Cherokee was entering the pattern from the Northeast; within 4-5 miles of the airport; VFR. We cleared a Cessna to depart VFR on a right downwind departure. I was aware that the two could be a potential conflict as it is a hot spot for our Tower due to the neighboring Class C airspace. I made the decision to over key and change the Cessna to a left downwind to alleviate the conflict with plenty of time to discuss it with my trainee. Cessna did not respond. I issued the clearance two more times with no response. I then began to give him the traffic again with no response from Cessna. I then began to believe that it was an equipment failure on my part as the instructor jack on LC1 has been a noted problem (previously an aircraft did not receive a go-around clearance as the transmissions were not going out; and another instructor was also unable to key over his trainee); but we've been told it's alright to use. I did not trust that my transmissions were going out and unplugged my trainee and took his/her jack and continued and even tried another controllers push to talk when my transmissions did not receive an answer. Due to the positioning of the Cessna to the Cherokee; behind and below in a potential blind spot; I did not issue instructions to the Cherokee as I wanted him to continue his present course to avoid traffic; turning left could put him into the downwind departure exacerbating the conflict; a right towards the runways could put him into arrivals/go-arounds. The Cherokee then began saying 'I wish you could have pointed that traffic out to us' I told him I had been trying to change the Cessna but my transmissions were not going out. He replied that he had heard all my transmissions; which is possible but if at one point I wasn't transmitting he wouldn't know. After the Cherokee finished one transmission; he started into another question asking if the Cessna was remaining in the pattern. I replied that the Cessna was a downwind departure. While the Cherokee was talking the Cessna had moved to the left of the Cherokee and below him slightly behind. The Cessna then pulled up outside the Cherokee and now slightly ahead. The Cherokee started a left turn towards traffic and terrain; and said 'I'm making a left here.' I told him to continue in the left 360 sequenced the Cherokee in the pattern. The Cessna left our airspace to the South without incident as traffic had to be prioritized following the Cherokee's time consuming on frequency statements. The controllers do not have full faith in some of our equipment. We've reported the issue; and units have been swapped around the Tower or given a once over. Maintenance has stated they'd like to replace; or do detailed inspections; but are not getting allotted the time or money by their higher ups so we are putting band aids on the problems and playing shell games. At one time the instructor jack on LC2 was reported to have problems with recording or transmissions; the post it note that was affixed to it to tell us this important fact is missing; the unit could have been moved to LC1; but we don't know. It is amazing that we can spend tens thousands of dollars sending two certified letters to tens of thousands of employees to tell them what they already know but getting safety related equipment fixed/replaced falls by the way side.

Tower Controller providing OJT issued a turn change to a departure that went unheeded apparently due to a long standing problem with radio jacks in the cab; the turn failure resulted a significant conflict event.


B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Airport; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Pushback of a B787. The crew has little experience pushing from this gate. The area [we were] pushing back [from] has a confusing amount of lines with no written detail. Push out driver pushed according to the guide in line the approaches the outer taxi and continues on the zipper line causing him to encroach on a live taxiway. When he realized that on coming traffic was approaching he did not hesitate to stop. He immediately brought the aircraft back in to the safe area. A near collision almost occurred. Two  aircraft almost hit wings. The only reason the push out driver realized that he was doing something wrong was due to the B737 heading was at about 30 mph. And to avoid a accident he rushed the aircraft back to the safe area.The gate mentioned has dashed line from the taxiway leading into the gate. The push out driver assumed that was the correct line for push out. If one views the diagram from above; you can see the confusion of lines with little explanation or definition. The push out driver did not understand why or what happened until he was shown and explained. We showed him the pictures and what  the correct push should have been. His comments were it is so different and difficult to what is what. At some gates and areas of push out; we have no clue of what some lines mean. Yes training is provided by the county but it's mainly about encroachments on to taxiways. There is no good detailed class with instructions of how of each gate works. This does not have a push out card with details. In many cases the tower just says clear to push with no instructions. This dynamic manning is not helping the cause . It's really making the crews unaware of specific gate pushes. Also another recommendation is a blue line on where to turn during a push.

Push Back crew member reported the tug driver was pushing the aircraft when they observed a conflicting aircraft taxiing and immediately towed the aircraft back to parking to avoid collision. The reporter stated he crew had little experience at this gate; the ramp markings are confusing and they receive insufficient training..


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 145; Flight Crew Total 10000

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

On a heavy weight departure the crew experienced multiple loud bangs and the aircraft shuddered. It happened shortly after passing 500ft; and commencing our first turn. All instruments looked normal; so we assumed that we had some kind of structural damage. The configuration of slats extend; flaps 10; and gear up was maintained. The crew elected to air turn back. A fuel jettison was required; and Departure cleared us to hold at 11000 ft. Once there with the [fuel] jettison commenced; we cleaned up all required checklists; and coordinated with the Dispatcher and Maintenance for the return. Also spoke to the Engineer on duty; and he concurred with our plan. An ILS approach was set up for; and briefed. After jettisoning 120;000 lbs of fuel; we requested vectors to the ILS. A normal approach was flown to a normal max landing weight landing. No CFR was requested after landing. Normal taxi and normal shutdown. The mechanic did a full exterior inspection; and found no damage. The crew prepared for another departure while he was doing his inspection. Another 120;000 lbs was uploaded. The aircraft logbook was cleaned up; and we were cleared to proceed again. After being cleared to proceed from our last air turn back; we accomplished a normal pushback; startup; taxi; and heavy weight takeoff.  Again commencing the first turn on the [departure procedure] at approximately 500 ft; we experienced the same loud bangs and shudder; but more pronounced. This time the number three engine indicated multiple severe compressor stalls. The PF (FO) pulled back number three throttle; and pushed the power up on number one and two throttles. A brief fuel jettison was accomplished on the climb out. The engine recovered from the compressor stalls; and power on number three throttle was slowly increased. We decided to accomplish another air turn back.  For the remainder of the fuel jettison; we were again cleared to hold as published at 11000 ft. Once established in holding and the fuel jettison commenced; we again cleaned up checklists and coordinated with the dispatcher; Engineer; and maintenance. Set up for and briefed the ILS. After the jettisoning of 120;000 lbs; we accepted vectors to the ILS. Normal approach; max landing weight landing; and taxi. No CFR was requested. Turned plane over to maintenance; and went into crew rest.

MD-11 Captain reported returning to the departure airport twice after experiencing a compressor stall shortly after both takeoffs.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 30

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Two different things happened. The first was a low altitude alert below the Minimum IFR Altitude (MIA). The second thing was a pilot deviation in the formation flight.  The wingman climbed 700 feet higher than assigned altitude. Flight X was leaving TRACON airspace immediately following an intercept exercise to go to a restricted area. The controlling facility approach called and said that Flight X was not on the schedule and are not allowed to enter the restricted area.The aircraft was notified and they wanted to verify if they were on the schedule and that they should be able to enter. Flight X was told to expedite climb and told low altitude alert and the MIA is 10;900 feet. The aircraft entered the area lower than the MIA. The aircraft was then given another low altitude alert because he was about to penetrate another higher terrain area. Then the wingman climbed above the assigned altitude of 20;000 feet; he climbed to 20;700 feet. I asked the flight led to have the wingman maintain 20;000 feet.We had to vector the flight out of restricted facilities airspace because of a non-important reason and we put the flight crew at risk. They were concerned with getting access to the restricted area and busted the altitude for the MIA and the assigned altitude. These are single piloted fighter aircraft that are being denied entry into an area for fighter aircraft and in a high terrain area with additional civilian aircraft.

A Center Controller reported a flight of two military aircraft entered their sector below the Minimum IFR Altitude while climbing to an altitude to enter an adjacent Restricted Area. The reporter stated the Restricted Area controlling facility would not permit the aircraft to enter the airspace due to a change of procedures. While vectoring the flight clear of the airspace the wingman in the flight climbed above their assigned altitude.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

GPS; FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 6

Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were planning on and had briefed the ILS Runway 6; Circle to Land Runway 1 approach as indicated by the last ATIS we had received. We briefed the requirement to cross DANDY at 1;500 feet per the approach procedure. When we contacted New York Approach; we were told there was a new ATIS and that the only change was the landing runway was now Runway 6; and that we could plan on a straight-in ILS approach to Runway 6. We re-briefed the new approach landing minimums and missed approach procedure; but failed to re-brief the altitude restriction at DANDY. Approach descended us to 2;000 feet and told us to 'maintain 2;000 feet until established;' and cleared us for the ILS Runway 6 approach and then switched us to Teterboro Tower. There was a slight bit of confusion in the cockpit about how to arm the approach mode on the flight director; but that was quickly remedied and the approach was armed from 2;000 feet MSL. We captured the glideslope as normal; and began our approach. We crossed DANDY somewhere around 1;850 feet MSL; rather than the required 1;500 feet and as we did so; Teterboro Tower asked us to 'begin (our) descent.' I explained that we were descending on glideslope; and as I said it; I immediately realized that we had failed to comply with the DANDY altitude restriction.After landing; Tower explained that approach had a Newark departure off to our right; and was concerned about a potential conflict; but then went on to say that all was well. At no time did I observe or did TCAS call out any traffic in our immediate vicinity. As a crew; we need to make sure that any time something in our briefed plan of action is changed; we stop and take the time to carefully and thoroughly re-brief the new plan in its entirety. That was a breakdown in CRM and communication on our part; and the lesson has definitely been learned and de-briefed thoroughly.  It would also be helpful if ATC was able to descend us to 1;500 feet prior to issuing the approach clearance; or at least change the verbiage to 'Maintain 2;000 feet until established; cleared for the ILS Runway 6; except cross DANDY at 1;500 feet.'

Pilot reported crossing DANDY 400 feet above the required altitude after briefing a last minute runway change during approach to TEB airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 123; Flight Crew Total 21500; Flight Crew Type 6950

En route at FL350 number one engine N1 vibration increased to as much as 8.1 units.  Reduced thrust turned on engine anti-ice (temperature -44) and complied with the checklists. Called Dispatch; patch to Maintenance Control. Says no relation to leak deferred before flight. After a discussion with all parties [we] agreed to continue to destination. As we descended to landing vibration was reduced; landed uneventfully.

Air Carrier Captain experiences excessive N1 vibration at FL350. After a discussion with Maintenance Control the Captain elects to continue to destination. The vibration diminishes as the aircraft descends for approach.


Training / Qualification; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

MIA turned us just outside of INESS about 1.5 mi and cleared us for the visual. Captain was flying as I was trying to complete the checklist. Captain set 1;000 feet in ALT window and descended to just above 1;000 feet. Trying to complete my tasks; I looked up and noticed what I thought was over INESS and level 1;000 feet; VASI on left side of Runway was RED. I advised Captain not to descend any lower [and] at that time we received a below glideslope warning. Captain flew the aircraft back into glideslope and landed normally. At the gate; I asked if the Captain was going to file form; he thought it may not be required since it was a visual approach.I suggest be completely configured before turning on base this close in? Use combo G/S/VTI to landing.

MIA TRACON turned an Air Carrier to a MIA Runway 9 visual final about 4NM from the runway. The Captain set 1;000 feet in the MCP and descended too low but returned to the glideslope following an EGPWS Glideslope warning.


Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action

During the flight control check; I noted that the left aileron lacked resistance and feel. All other axis had the correct feel. I asked the FO if he noticed anything and he stated that the right aileron lacked resistance Parked on taxiway; set the brakes; and called Maintenance Control. We assisted in resetting the ELAC 1 (Elevator Aileron Computer) and ELAC 2 per recommendation. We still had the lack of resistance during the flight control check. We returned to the gate; mechanics were prompt and immediately started to diagnose the issue.The plane was yanked out of service. Apparently; two rods had worn down below the joysticks that provided the artificial feel. The plane theoretically could have flown; but it was determined by the flight crew and maintenance that the plane was not airworthy.

A321 Captain reported the aileron control lacked feel and resistance.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I got a message on [the system] that showed a filed route and a cleared route for this flight. I looked in Dispatch Monitor and I had not even worked up a release or sent a flight plan for the flight. I figured it was just a glitch or that it was showing me what route ATC wanted me to file (like a Reroute alert) so I called [Center] Flight Data to see if they actually showed a flight plan on file. They said they did. I told them to remove the strips then later I worked up the release and filed the flight plan for the flight. I do not know who sent the first strip or when. There was no plane swap; it wasn't delayed from yesterday into today; it didn't show filed in Dispatch Monitor; it was a strange route that was filed; the proposed time on the strip was not the regularly scheduled departure time of the flight; but a much later time even though the strip was filed hours ahead of scheduled time. I immediately sent an email to duty managers; IT; and all dispatchers alerting them of the issue and suggested that they look in [the system] to see if anything was showing filed that shouldn't have been. The 2 dispatchers next to me both found they had flights that showed on file of which they had not yet filed. It's 19 hours after I sent the email and I have not received a response from IT or management to even say they are looking into it. I would not have even known there was already a strip filed if I hadn't gotten an alert that ATC changed the route that I supposedly filed so there could have been more. I think we need to investigate how these strips are being filed without our knowledge. I feel it's a safety issue that could lead to confusion with ATC and in the worst case; the flight could depart over a fix other than the one ATC is expecting them to.

Dispatcher reported an existing flight plan for a flight that dispatcher had not filed.


Lake Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 3085; Flight Crew Type 2729

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action

I filed a VFR flight plan as a private Part 91 pilot in my Lake Amphibian aircraft between ZZZ and ZZZ1. I was given a cross border squawk code and was using it flying north towards my destination. My aircraft has a current IFR pitot static system certification and my instrument ticket is current. On a VFR flight in suddenly deteriorating ceiling and visibility; I was flying low over the water in a place noted on the chart as Name enroute to ZZZ1 in what is clearly class G airspace. I was under some pressure to arrive at XA45 in ZZZ1 due to customs wanting a landing within 15 minutes before or after the filed time of arrival. I have quite a bit of experience flying low over the water in class G airspace; able to land in low visibility ceiling conditions. At approximately XC15; flying low over the water I suddenly and completely unexpectedly hit the water. I had already configurated the plane to a flaps down; mixture full rich; prop pitch flat attitude; for a water landing were it necessary to do so. But; I did not anticipate the plane hitting the water and when it did so the let down on the water was extremely violent. The plane pitched up in the air and back down slamming onto the water extremely hard. The plane came to a stop and myself and my single passenger were in dense fog. I [climbed] out of the cockpit with the plane on the water and stood on top of the cabin and looked at as much of the airframe as I could see to ascertain if there was any damage in the place as detectable in that portion of it visible floating above the surface of the water and saw none.There being no visibility and ceiling sufficient to fly in we displacement taxied for some 20 minutes. Being on the surface of the water and too low to contact anyone by radio my passenger called [number] and informed them that we would report back airborne if we were able to find a ceilings and visibility adequate to fly in. After 20 minutes of displacement taxiing on the water we got airborne and arrived a short time later in ZZZ1. I [received priority] going into the pattern because we did not get an up and locked light on the gear and wondered if we would get a down and locked light before landing the plane on the runway back to ZZZ and do a grass landing adjacent to the runway gear up rather than do that on the water or suffer a gear collapse landing on the runway. Tower was helpful. When I cycled the gear down I got a down and locked signal on the panel and proceeded to land the plane on the runway without incident.I flew home later that day and have not been able at this point to find damage to the airframe. It may be the case at the time of annual when I pull up the floorboards I will discover some bent frames but that is to be determined when I perform the inspection. The take away lesson in all of this is that despite not liking to set the plane down in saltwater because of a several hour clean up to prevent corrosion it is obvious to me that I need to be willing to do so if encountering lowering ceilings and visibility as I did when the event occurred.

Pilot reported striking the water during low altitude flight caused by weather. After returning to the home airport; air frame damage was discovered.


Cruise; Landing; Takeoff / Launch; Hovering (UAS)

Airport / Aerodrome / Heliport; People / Populated Areas; Private Property

Person Manipulating Controls (UAS); Remote PIC (UAS)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days (UAS) 2; Flight Crew Total 0; Flight Crew Total (UAS) 14.5; Flight Crew Type (UAS) 14.5

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)

I received an invite to fly my drone over the residential property to determine damage to the roof of the detached garage. I normally check Airmap in order to determine airspace before flying.  I did not check airspace before this flight. My Manager upon doing reviews; determined that I flew in a Class D of ZZZ Airport without prior authorization.  Future flights; I shall check airspace before flying my drone and obtain authorization prior to flying in controlled airspace.

Part 107 UAS pilot conducted an inspection over private property. After the flight; ground staff learned the flight took place within Class D airspace.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

In cruise; I began accumulating ice. I activated all anti and de-icing systems and monitored the situation by watching the wing leading edge via the wing ice light. Additionally; I was monitoring the OAT probe for accumulation. What I failed to notice initially was the ice building aft of the boot. Once I noticed; I requested an immediate climb; thinking that perhaps I was encountering freezing precipitation and/or SLD. In the climb; the airspeed decayed to the point where I determined that my only option was to level off and build up some speed for the wing deice boots (and for minimum icing speed considerations) and failing that; I would have to descend and potentially divert. I leveled at an intermediate altitude for several minutes while I activated the deice boots. The airframe cleared of much of the ice and I was able to climb to my assigned altitude. I informed ATC of the reason for stopping my climb and that I was continuing to climb to 8;000 FT. The Controller seemed disinterested; so I felt that there was no potential loss of separation. I continued and landed at the destination. On the approach; the stall warning device activated at approximately 125 KTS; though physical cues (I was hand-flying) of an impending stall were absent. I was able to land without incident. When I inspected the aircraft after landing there was as much as 1-1/2' of ice on certain unprotected parts and approximately 3/4' on the stall warning device. I should have monitored the area aft of the boots when I began accumulating ice. I believe that the ice accumulating on unprotected surfaces caused my climb airspeed to be too low and that caused the intermediate level-off. From now on; I will monitor unprotected surfaces.

A PA31 encountered icing conditions that the aircraft deice systems initially were unable to handle. After leveling off; much of the ice successfully shed and a climb to 8;000 FT and slower ice accumulation was made.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 189; Flight Crew Total 6399; Flight Crew Type 2900

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

We departed SAN runway 27. Normal take off to a heading of 290 for noise abatement. Upon reaching 7000 ft MSL; we received the instructions to fly direct to PGY VOR via the left turn (almost a 180 degree turn). We set PGY VOR on top in the FMC and upon reaching 90 degree intercept executed and confirmed that NAV function is 'tracking' inbound direct to PGY VOR; in both NAV and VOR function. At approximately 2.9 DME to PGY VOR; aircraft made a slight left turn at about 10 degrees off course indicated; which from what we were seeing on our MFD's didn't make any sense. At the same time the controller said 'I see you in a left turn direct to PGY VOR'. This caused confusion on the flight deck; as well as prompted the controller to ask us if our equipment is operational. There was no abnormal or caution messages displayed. As soon as we situated ourselves; we started troubleshooting and couldn't find the issue. We also checked with center controller and as it was a clear night confirmed we are on the cleared route. We continued flying now in VOR mode as when the problem occurred it happened in NAV.Upon descent to [our destination] our FMS displayed 'FMS NAV DR' 'NAV BUS FAIL' and 'XFEED INOP'.Upon landing we recycled power to the FMC and the fault messages cleared. I made an entry in the logbook describing the erroneous indication as well as the annunciators observed. I believe that we have experienced NAV failure without any indications which caused us to deviate slightly right of the PGY VOR. Either way DME indicated 2.9 NM TO PGY VOR when the turn started. Paying closer attention and flying in both NAV and VOR modes simultaneously monitoring both 'pictures' --not only selecting it--would of prevented the initial confusion and possible deviation.

An MD-83 flight crew got confusing NAV information between their FMS and VOR based systems. They opted to continue to destination utilizing the VOR. Approaching their destination they received CAS messages reflecting FMS and NAV buss problems. Upon recycling power to the FMC post landing the fault messages cleared. They wrote up the event in the logbook.


Light Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 850; Flight Crew Type 200

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

While conducting skydiving operations; I placed a two-minute call to ZAB center per the Letter of Agreement (LOA) between ZAB and the skydive operator. Center then called traffic seven miles out. He advised it was fast moving; but did not specify a speed or an ETA.Per the LOA; I was supposed to call the traffic as either 'in sight' or 'no factor' before releasing the jumpers. Not having the traffic in sight; but believing it was far enough away as to not be a factor; I released the jumpers and inadvertently omitted the 'no factor' call to Center. The traffic passed close enough to the jumpers to cause the ZAB controller some concern. Typically; traffic that is seven miles out will not be a factor at the two minute mark. However; this traffic was fast moving and I failed to take that into account in making my determination. Contributing to this was my inexperience as a skydive pilot. As of the date of this incident; I had been working in the position less than three months. This was my first day conducting skydive operations away from the airport where I usually work.

Sky dive pilot reported releasing jumpers without proper coordination with ATC; resulting in reduced separation between jumpers and other traffic.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

An initial takeoff roll; my copilot said airspeed alive and I said checked; then my copilot said 80 knots and I said checked and then immediately got a indicated airspeed disagreement on the Captains airspeed indicator the copilot had the same thing and I rejected the takeoff.  We notified Tower and returned back to the gate.IAS DISAGREE on both the Captain and Copilot IAS.I return to the gate and turn the aircraft over to Maintenance. I also took the passengers off the airplane and put them into the terminal building where it was much cooler.

On initial takeoff roll I called out airspeed alive then 80 knots.  The 'IAS DISAGREE' indicator cam on and I announced 'airspeed disagree'.  The Captain rejected the takeoff.  We notified the Control Tower and exited the runway; back to the terminal.Visual detection 'IAS DISAGREE' in yellow letters.IAS DISAGREE indications on both displays.Performed rejected takeoff; and returned to the gate where maintenance was performed.

B737 flight crew reported airspeed disagreement on takeoff roll; causing a rejected take off and a return to gate for maintenance.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

Run-up of aircraft was normal. All engine instruments were showing in the green throughout the entire start up; taxi and run-up. The student and I were issued a clearance to take off and fly heading 110. We needed to perform a soft field takeoff for the lesson we performed the maneuver and was pitching for 81 knots IAS and was climbing. At less than 500 feet the airplane made a loud pop noise in which I felt in rudder pedals. Followed by the noise was a power loss and a severe vibration. I took controls and [advised ATC] while trying to climb. ATC cleared us to land in which we did safely. While exiting the runway and taxiing to the ramp I saw that the oil pressure was getting lower and was able to taxi the aircraft to the ramp. I shut the engine down with 26 PSI oil pressure. After exiting the aircraft found oil covering the bottom of fuselage and on the ground. At no time was there any abnormal indications of there being a problem with the aircraft and was confident in my abilities to return the aircraft to the airport. Upon inspection of the engine we found that one of the cylinders had failed and separated.

A flight instructor described a training flight that experienced an engine failure after takeoff at 500 feet. A successful return to the field was accomplished.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

At 80 KTS on takeoff roll; IDG 2 OIL LOW EICAS Message Posted; immediately followed by GEN 2 OFF BUS EICAS Message Posting. Takeoff was rejected by Captain. Exited runway; Contacted Operations; and Maintenance and returned to gate. Aircraft was swapped to another tail number and flight departed 2+30 late. No information from Maintenance as to the problem; however; aircraft had been serviced overnight and flown in on an earlier flight.

ERJ170 Captain reports rejecting a takeoff at 80 KTS when IDG 2 OIL LOW EICAS immediately followed by GEN 2 OFF BUS EICAS Messages appear.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

After landing Runway 28L and exiting at taxiway Echo; we were cleared to taxi E3 to T to park at gate.  Aircraft Y was southbound on T to park at gate.  PDX Ground did not give a priority to either aircraft.   We stopped short of T and the Aircraft Y continued to its gate.  Had we not stopped; we would have collided at the E3/T intersection.    After stopping and asking Ground Control about the Aircraft Y we were told to give way to it.    No additional data. Use extreme caution for the very congested end of C gates.

Air carrier Captain reported a ground conflict during taxi-in at PDX airport.  Reportedly; ATC did not give priority to either aircraft as they taxied to same gate area.


PA-46 Malibu/Malibu Mirage/Malibu Matrix

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 3500; Flight Crew Type 600

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Autopilot - Maintenance Static System malfunction. In climb as cabin pressurized airspeed '0'. Altimeter 1;200 - Encoder 1;200 even though climbing. Vertical Speed Indicator '0'. IFR in clouds - declared emergency with Approach - vectors return to departure airport RNAV 15 Approach. On ground; discovered disconnect in static system plumbing inside pressurized cabin.

During an IMC climb on a test flight following autopilot maintenance; a PA-46 pilot discovered he had no airspeed; vertical speed and an incorrect altimeter. He returned to the departure airport where the static plumbing was found disconnected inside the cabin.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Low altitude alert from AFW Tower during night visual approach to [Runway] 16L from the south. We entered a left downwind to [Runway] 16L; turned base early due to traffic ahead; and descended initially to 1;000 feet AGL. At the alert from ATC; we cross-checked our altitude; intercepted the glide path from below but inside the instrument FAF; and landed uneventfully. Turning earlier than what would have set us up at the instrument FAF and attempting to interpolate a visual descent path; cross cockpit; at night.

Set up for a left base at AFW at 1;500 feet AGL rolled off for the turn to final and slowly descended to 1;000 feet AGL to join up on the ILS glide slope for [Runway] 16L. During the rollout received a call from ATC saying they were getting an altitude alert and heck our altitude. At no point during the rollout did we go lower than 1;000 feet AGL and rolled out on final on glide path. Landing was uneventful. We were on a visual and turned inside the FAF for traffic. As a result we were lower than normal during the final turn.

Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a low-altitude warning during base leg of a visual approach to AFW airport.


Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

I had my company issued iPad in the Ram mount and was using Jepp FD Pro for the STAR and subsequent approach. Since we were planning a VMC autoland; I wanted to quickly review the callouts in [the Electronic Flight Manual [EFM]. However; when I selected [that content]; I got the blue screen. I tried going back to the home page; then back to [EFM]; no joy. Also tried going back to Jepp FD Pro and back to [the EFM]; also no joy. I didn't have time to turn the iPad off and back on since we were given an unexpected runway and it got busy. When I got caught up I tried [the EFM] again and after at least five minutes of the blue screen; it worked normally (albeit slowly) again.  I should add that the bunky's iPad also hung up.Fortunately; we have paper approach plates; but we have no paper [operational manuals]. What if we had an emergency and needed to access the manuals immediately? It is true that much FM information is also available on the ECL [Electronic Check List]; but the forward and lower screens are in use for other displays in this phase of flight; and the FOM and [other manuals] are not displayable on the aircraft screens. The sole reliance upon electronic media for these documents is foolhardy.

A B777 flight crew preparing for a VMC autoland was unable to access and review the Operations Manual guidance on their iPads. The reporter feels sole reliance on electronic media for such data is 'foolhardy.'


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 7500; Flight Crew Type 3300

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Our trip was canceled before the first flight because of the evidence of a bird strike on the bottom of right-hand engine nacelle. There; approximately 18 inches aft of the intake; was a quarter sized perforation of the nacelle cowling; covered with feathers. The damage was discovered just after engine start by an FBO lineman. He called the damage to my attention; and I aborted the start and the subsequent Part 135 trip. The damage was in an out of sight location and was not discovered prior. We assume the strike occurred on the flight prior; when we did a night departure; our 5th and last leg of the day. I believe the strike occurred then; as it is near the Coast; with a higher probable concentration of birds. We are not positive of when the strike occurred; as we (the crew) never noticed a noise or had any other indication when the strike occurred. The bird strike caused no other damage to the aircraft and it was returned to service after the cowling was replaced.

BE400 Captain is informed during engine start by an FBO lineman that the right engine appears to have bird strike damage. The damage is confirmed and the flight is canceled pending maintenance action.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 38; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 3899

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

During preflight in ZZZZ a SEC2 Fault occurred. After calling Maintenance Control and attempting to reset; the fault remained. Local maintenance was called. Only one Technician was available. English is a second language and all procedures were written in English. The language barrier combined with lack of experience on Airbus caused some lack of confidence on the Technician's part. I was required to assist in understanding what the procedure said and had to point out the systems required to be deferred. I consulted Maintenance Control again to ensure all items were accomplished per the deferral. Upon completion of the deferral and receiving a new Maintenance Release; we were ready to depart. However; the Local authorities would not release us stating; the Technician did not document the event correctly. I called the Chief Pilot and they coordinated with the station and after a 90 minute delay; we were released. The remainder of the flight was uneventful.

A319 Captain reported a maintenance technician did not properly document an equipment deferral; resulting in a departure delay. Reporter cited language and communication difficulties as contributing to the event.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

After push back and start the flight attendants called up complaining of an oil and fuel smell. My First Officer and I ran the QRH for fumes. We were unable to clear the event as we waited 40 minutes for a gate. Once at the gate we deplaned and Maintenance came on to confer with us on the troubleshooting. We made the logbook entry referencing said event. The in-flight supervisors as well as CSR's dealt with passengers and the flight attendants to help accommodate their needs. Multiple CSR's mentioned short staffing in their department as well as the ground personnel. That day was particularly alarming with the long waits needed for a gate. It would've been helpful to be on a gate sooner to help facilitate the needs of our passengers and crew.

Air carrier Captain reported Flight Attendant notification of oil and fuel fumes in passenger cabin after pushback.


Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

We leveled off at our final cruising altitude of FL350. All systems were set up in their normal configurations. About ten minutes into cruise flight the cabin altitude warning horn went off. We immediately started memory items for the situation. By the time I had my O2 mask on and checked the cabin altimeter; we realized the cabin had already gone up to 14;000 - 15;000 FT. We contacted ATC; declared an emergency; and asked for an immediate descent and continued with the QRC/QRH procedures. During the descent with the outflow valve fully closed; the aircraft still lost pressure. We notified the flight attendants about the issue and made an announcement to the passengers. When we leveled off at a safe altitude; I decided to continue on to [destination] because we were fairly close and had enough fuel at that time to make it there. We landed without further incident.

[Narrative 2 had no additional information.]

B737-300 flight crew reported loss of cabin pressure in cruise flight at FL350. They declared an emergency; executed an emergency descent; and continued to their nearby destination.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 367; Flight Crew Type 10000

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

F/O (First Officer) and I noticed a series of 'thumps' while in cruise at FL410. We suspected pressurization and noticed cabin climbing slowly at 500 fpm. Cabin did not stabilize and was just over 9000 feet. We decided to start a normal but rapid descent to a lower cruise altitude. We got the Cabin Altitude aural alert and warning light during the descent. Accomplished QRC/QRH; which required an emergency descent and deployment of cabin O2 masks. Notified ATC and got clearance to 14;000 feet. Passing about FL230 we noticed cabin was below 9000 feet and stable. We stopped descent at FL210 and diverted to ZZZ. Checked with F/As (Flight Attendants) to make sure there were no injuries and to advise that they and passengers could remove O2 masks. The rest of flight was uneventful. Preventative Measures: F/O suggested that we start down as soon as we saw the cabin climbing after the thumps. I wanted to see if cabin would stabilize since the rate was slow. If we started down earlier; we may have avoided the emergency descent/masks since the cabin stabilized at FL230.

We noticed a thumping/ vibrating sound. It sounded like something that had to do with pressure; as in an air pressure change in the aircraft. Associated with that noise was a cabin climb of about 500 fpm on the cabin rate of climb indicator. We were at 41;000 feet and had been discussing starting a descent as soon as we could; since the cabin was definitely climbing. We called Center and started our descent when the cabin reached about 9000 feet we were already on our way down. As we were descending through about FL390 the cabin reached 10;000 feet we donned our oxygen masks; went through the QRH; complied with the required items and continued our descent to 14;000 feet. ATC was great; they asked questions; but not in a rushed 'need an answer right this second' kind of way and were very helpful in our divert plan. Our cabin stabilized passing through 23;000 feet and was trending down to a lower cabin altitude. When things settled down; we talked to the flight attendants to make sure they were ok and get a status check on the passengers. The flight attendants were fantastic; definitely handled this event professionally and took care of passengers above and beyond. The passengers that we interacted with hardly seemed rattled or concerned at all; I feel this was likely due to how the cabin crew handled the situation. We landed in [diversion airport]; taxied to the gate; shut the aircraft down and went on about our day.

B737-700 flight crew reported an uneventful emergency descent & diversion due to a loss of pressurization during cruise.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Shortly after departing; I realized that both attitude indicators were inoperative. With the low clouds and darkness I decided to return [to departure airport] and troubleshoot the problem on the ground. Shortly before landing I noticed that both inverter annunciators were illuminated.After landing and exiting the runway; I cycled the inverter switch and found both inverters to be operational. I contacted dispatch to file another flight plan and [continued] without further incident.

SA-227 Captain reported losing both attitude indicators shortly after takeoff. Flight returned to departure airport where the issue was resolved.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Exiting Runway 27C after landing; ATC issued issued instructions to taxi on Runway 4L; A1; and B. After turning onto 4L I began to look for the A1 signs; but didn't see any. I slowed the airplane; and confirmed with my First Officer that the unmarked taxiway was indeed A1. We came to an agreement; and verified as we proceeded down the taxiway by referencing a one-directional further down the taxiway. After looking at the sign to confirm; I noticed that I had inadvertently passed a hold short line for what appeared to be Runway 27L. The runway is closed and deactivated for construction; and no signage was present to denote the entrance to a runway. To further complicate the matter; the runway surface isn't depicted on the Jepp 10-9 taxiway diagram; making it seem like the runway is acting as a taxiway. It wasn't clear speaking with ATC after the fact if this is indeed the case. [Caused by] poor airport layout combined with poor charting were the primary causes that led us to inadvertently cross the hold-short line for the closed runway. The controller's instructions should have included a clearance to cross the closed runway; however confusion on the state of the runway led the controller to neglect the instruction. Suggest the NOTAMs included outages of both signs and lights concerning Runway 27L. With between 50-100 NOTAMS at ORD it is very difficult to discern where certain signs and lights are located. The airport needs to do a better job of signage if that taxi-route is used more frequently to avoid confusion.

Regional Jet Captain reported confusion with the amount of ORD NOTAMS; poor signage and charting; which resulted in taxiway and runway incursion.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Inspection Authority; Maintenance Airframe

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Pilot said aircraft was flying out of trim. Maintenance adjusted and flew aircraft after preflight. Trim was adjusted and second flight made. On second flight left hand aileron moved back from outboard hinge. Aircraft was flown back to airport. Found left outboard hinge pin missing and aileron bent.

A Maintenance Inspector reported the loss of an aileron hinge pin during a test flight following adjustments for an out of trim condition.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 23

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft X was a photo flight who had been delaying at FL200 for over an hour in Sector 29's and my airspace at Sector 44.  Sector 29 called me and told me that Paradise (NCT) was going to descend Aircraft X to FL190.  I approved this.  I had accepted a handoff on Aircraft Y from Paradise sector (NCT) direct FMG climbing to FL190 who would be in conflict with Aircraft X.  I called Paradise and verified they were descending Aircraft X to FL190.  They said yes.  I instructed Paradise to stop Aircraft Y at 170 for Aircraft X.  Paradise asked if they could turn him and get higher.  I said no; just stop Aircraft Y at 170.  Then Paradise made a request on another aircraft which we worked out a solution for.  Less than a minute later Aircraft X is turning toward Aircraft Y descending to FL190 and Aircraft Y checks on climbing out of 160 to FL190.  I asked Aircraft Y to say again and he again says climbing to FL190.  I stopped Aircraft X at 170. Paradise sector was obviously busy.  If they did not have two people working the sector maybe that would have helped.  Maybe if they had a way to enter altitudes on scope that would have helped.  Paradise probably forgot to stop the Aircraft Y because he was thinking of the other aircraft he coordinated on.  All of this happened right at the boundary where sector 29 owns a shelf of 200 to 230 up against 44's airspace.  If NCT owned up to FL230; like they did in the past; Paradise could have done his plan without having to coordinate with me and Sector 29.  I recommend that NCT's airspace be raised back up to FL230.  This would eliminate this shelf that causes many problems in at least 4 ZOA sectors.

NCT Controller reports of airborne conflict due to another Controller not complying with prior coordination.


Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

During a very long day; (12.5 hours of duty; almost 8 hours of scheduled block; and at least 6 separate calls to maintenance through the day); we had an extremely busy approach in less than ideal weather; visual; but moderate turbulence and winds gusting at 28+ knots; CA (Captain) took the controls to salvage and stabilize an approach to Runway 30 at about a 4 mile left base. While this exchange was going on and we were getting tossed around; we were given our handoff to Tower but failed to make the switch. In the flare at about 40 ft.; we hear over radio 'Aircraft X call Tower'. The First Officer immediately switched frequency and made a call; but it was incidentally the wrong frequency and we landed. We immediately called Tower as we pulled off the runway and were given a subsequent taxi clearance.Task Saturation; extreme winds/weather; original Pilot Flying misjudged distance to runway. We briefed the approach on the ground and rebriefed it again in flight and CA stressed multiple times the severity of the approach into MSO; FO (First officer) fell behind the aircraft leading to the control swap at critical stage of the approach. Rote response due to saturation for '500 to go' call out.Stricter attention to position of light switches and to SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) required callouts for landing. Maybe make MSO a captain only airport; even the visuals in there are difficult sometimes.

I was flying an RNAV (Area Navigation) approach into Missoula. The Captain was visual with the airport and programmed in a left 90 degree base turn onto final 4.6 nm from the runway. I did not see the runway; and was high. The Captain; who could see the runway; took the controls to avoid a go-around in the narrow valley; shortly after being directed to contact Tower. I now became the Pilot Monitoring and missed that he hadn't called Tower yet; and we therefore did not have a clearance to land.The RNAV D approach into Missoula requires a very steep descent within 10 miles of the airfield. We were experiencing moderate turbulence on the approach. We were very task saturated with trying to slow down in a steep descent and get configured when the handoff to Tower was given; and subsequently the needed communication between us about the need to contact Tower was missed.This is a very difficult approach for a new FO (First Officer) the first time here. I should have noted that a steep descent was necessary unusually close to the airport while needing to get aligned with the runway; and slowed down and configured further out. This would have prevented the need for the Captain to take controls right after being handed off to Tower; and he therefore would have made the call to the Tower to get clearance to land.

Flight crew reported landing without clearance.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure

We were training on the D-Side (Handoff/Coordinator) and coordinated the aircraft direct ZZZ so that the Radar Controller could clear the aircraft direct when he was above the MIA (Minimum IFR Altitude). The Radar Controller instead issued the airborne IFR clearance via direct. We must solicit pilot concurrence.

ZAB ARTCC Controller conducting on the job training on the sector's D-Side (Handoff/Coordinator) observed the Radar Controller issue an IFR clearance to an aircraft that was below the Minimum IFR Altitude.


Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

San Juan called on the land line to initiate coordination on Aircraft X; a flight inbound to the New York ARTCC Oceanic airspace. I was working the sector and completed the initial coordination with them. During coordination; I realized the routing was not acceptable due to the potential for processing errors in the Ocean 21 system. Normally I try to issue any reroutes that aircraft will need once they are in my airspace. However I decided that the reroute I wanted to issue the aircraft would need to be issued prior to crossing the boundary into my airspace. I called San Juan back to revise the routing coordinated and have them issue it. They indicated they would issue the routing to the aircraft.Both routings were coordinated at 36000 feet which probed with no procedural conflicts found. Around the same time (I believe after I called to revise routing with San Juan); I called to coordinate two aircraft inbound (Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z) to San Juan from my airspace. They were both over different fixes at 35000 feet but they would be too close together in San Juan's airspace for them to accept. I told San Juan I would change the altitude on Aircraft Z and call them back. I probed Aircraft Z to climb to 36000 feet. No procedural conflicts were found so I issued the clearance to climb; which they complied with. I called San Juan back and to coordinate Aircraft Y at 35000 feet and Aircraft Z at 36000 feet. At this point; with the revised routing issued and coordinated for Aircraft X; there was no conflict between the Aircraft X and Aircraft Z at 36000 feet.Upon crossing into my airspace; Aircraft X never checked in with Commercial Radio with their required position report. 10 minutes after they were estimated over the fix; I received a message in my sector queue and a visual indication on the aircraft's data block that the position report for the fix was overdue. Aircraft X gave their position report for over the fix at 36000 feet and indicated their next point with an estimate of XA18Z. Immediately; this resulted in a conflict with Aircraft Z who was estimating over the same fix at XA21Z; also at 36000 feet. At that point; separation was already lost and they had 3 minutes separation at the fix instead of the required 15 minutes for the cross. I issued a clearance to Aircraft X to immediately descend and maintain 35000 feet and report level. They read back the clearance and descended. I advised my supervisor and also asked Aircraft X to confirm their routing. Aircraft X indicated they were cleared [fix........fix]. When I had time; I also issued Aircraft X a request to call NY Center for a possible pilot deviation.Within a couple of hours; I was notified by my supervisor that the aircraft called and indicated they flew the route as they were cleared. I was also notified that; after listening to the playback; I coordinated with San Juan the routing and they issued that routing to the aircraft but the aircraft read back the routing incorrectly. The controller in San Juan did not catch the incorrect read back resulting in the aircraft flying a route that lost separation from another aircraft.Unsure of potential recommendations. This was a read back error and I believe that as long as you have two people communicating by voice; there will be potential hearing and read back errors.

A Controller working ZNY ARTCC Oceanic airspace needed to relay a reroute to another ZSU Oceanic control facility to relay to a pilot. The Controller issued the reroute and the facility issued the reroute to the pilot. Next the Controller noticed two aircraft they were working would have less than required separation entering the adjacent facility airspace. The Controller climbed one of these aircraft to resolve the conflict.  ZNY Controller later received a position report from the aircraft that was rerouted and the aircraft was on the wrong route and in conflict with the aircraft that was climbed.  The two aircraft were crossing the same fix 3 minutes apart instead of the required 15 minutes apart.


ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

FSS called for the departure of Aircraft X. I examined the flight plan to see if the 10;000 ft cruise altitude was safe. I thought that the aircraft would be departing northbound. The MEA (Minimum Enroute Altitude) northbound was 9;000 ft so I felt that the requested cruise of 10;000 ft was safe. I issued the clearance as filed. The aircraft called my frequency after departing and was not yet on radar. Under the assumption that the aircraft was proceeding northbound; I told the aircraft to report a point which was the boundary with the adjacent sector. Minutes later the pilot called and said if I still needed the position report since he was on the ODP (Obstruction Departure Procedure).At that point I had him on radar and told him the report was no longer necessary and I proceeded to radar identify him. I was busy with traffic in the southeast corner of my airspace which took my attention away. I went back a few minutes later to check on Aircraft X and noticed he was west of the airway nothland I asked if he was established on the airway. The pilot reported he was still on the ODP. I acknowledged and went back to my other traffic. I went back again minutes later and saw the aircraft was southbound. That is when I drew a route line and discovered that he filed the airway southwest bound.That is when I rechecked the MEA to discover it was 12;000 ft and he was in a 11;000 ft Minimum IFR Area. I immediately climbed him to 11;000 ft for the terrain. At no point did the MSAW (Minimum Safe Altitude warning) activate. I reevaluated the route for minimum altitudes. 11;000 ft was safe for the MIA; but the MEA on the airway would be 11;100 ft. I asked if the pilot if he would be able 12;000 ft. He said maybe. Since 11;000 ft was safe for the MIA I told him to expect to remain at 11;000 ft.For routes from small airports; I need to make a better evaluation and especially check the route once the flight plan has been activated while also drawing the route in the EDST.

Center Controller reported they did not recognize the route an aircraft filed placed it below the Minimum IFR Altitudes.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

On climbout through 16000 feet; approximately 7 minutes after takeoff; APU Fire Alert and APU Fire Handle Light illuminated; along with Aural Alert. Captain was Pilot Monitoring and FO was PF at time. PM assessed for a moment and conferred with PF before executing Phase One procedure. Level 3 Alert and Aural Alert went away after a few seconds but light in APU Fire Handle remained lit. Phase one procedure was complied with and Bottle 2 was discharged. In the meantime PM advised Center and coordinated immediate return. PM then ran QRH checklist for APU Fire while PF flew and talked to Center. After approximately one to two minutes after initially pulling fire handle and discharging the first bottle the Aural Alert and Level 3 Alert returned and the second bottle (Agent One) was discharged. Those two alerts returned intermittently throughout remainder of flight. Captain then took controls as PF and made the decision to stay fast (350 kts) below 10;000 to expedite return. PF slowed the airplane approaching and configured for landing on schedule. We intercepted the ILS on a visual approach becoming stable with checklists complete by 1000 AGL. Landing was normal and on rollout we coordinated with tower to exit onto the taxiway where emergency vehicles met the airplane to inspect the tail area for indications of fire/smoke. The emergency vehicles reported no abnormal visual or infrared indications. The fire handle remained illuminated but all other alerts stayed extinguished. We elected to taxi back to the gate with the emergency vehicles following us; continuing to monitor the airplane. During the taxi back the FO suggested we secure Engine 2. This seemed prudent given the likelihood of a bleed leak in the tail giving the Fire alerts so we secured Engine 2 and advised Ramp Tower. About two minutes after shutting down Engine 2 the light in the APU Fire Handle extinguished as well. We parked the aircraft and shut down normally. Log entries were made for the APU Fire alert and for a Reverser 2 Press Fault and Reverser 2 Unlock indication. Maintenance was debriefed on everything before leaving the airplane. FO did an outstanding job as both PF and PM throughout the emergency and made excellent and timely suggestions (securing number 2 engine on deck especially). In our debrief we discussed Captain's decision to momentarily delay executing Phase One procedure and agreed that it would have been better to immediately pull the APU Fire Handle and discharge the first bottle.APU Fire Indication; likely caused by Bleed Air leak in tail section. This was agreed with by maintenance who will make the actual determination of the cause. Nothing we could have done to prevent the emergency and I believe our CRM and decision making were sound with the exception of momentarily delaying the execution of Phase One procedures. Given the indications of a possible fire in the tail section of the fuselage I believe it was more than prudent to get the airplane on the ground ASAP and to exceed 250 kts below 10000.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

MD-11 flight crew reported experiencing an APU fire warning on climbout.


ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Go around from flare on Runway 27. Wake turbulence from preceding aircraft associated with low level wind shifting and too tight ATC spacing. Go around per SOP was performed as trained.

Air carrier First Officer reported executing a go-around at SAN after encountering wake turbulence just before touchdown. Reporter stated the ATC spacing was 'too tight'.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

I had a B737 headed in for Runway 32L and to the northeast of him was a SR22 with altitude separation headed into Runway 32R. Both were inbound for Visual Approaches. Traffic was issued and the SR22 advised he had visual on the B737 stating his own callsign. I told the SR22 to maintain visual separation from the B737 and asked told him the B737 was descending to 40 and asked if he could maintain visual separation all the way to the airport. He replied affirmative; but gave no callsign; same pilot voice. I missed the lack of callsign and restated to the SR22 to maintain visual separation from the B737 and do not overtake that traffic and cleared him for the visual approach and gave a caution wake turbulence. He replied back 'cleared visual 32R behind the B737; WILCO'. I missed the lack of callsign. I am usually the one in the facility that's like a tiger on meat to get pilots to use their callsigns; but in this traffic scenario I missed it; even though the pilot's voice was a very distinct sounding one and was obviously the SR22 pilot and any voice mapping would prove it easily with today's technology. Nonetheless; I take full responsibility for my failure. That being said; I do have some suggestions. Some you may appreciate more than others; but after working traffic in the FAA for almost 30 years now; I have seen a lot of things; had a lot of gained experience and knowledge and went through a lot of changes over the years. While I don't always agree with every change; I do embrace them from the standpoint of always doing my best to follow every rule to the best of my ability. I have always been held to the highest standards and have always strived to deliver. Pilots [who do] not using their callsign is an issue constantly. It happens numerous times every hour at our facility alone; so imagine how many times it happens everyday at facilities across the nation. It is clear that pilots really do not understand the importance of using their callsigns or the ramifications of what happens when they fail to use their callsigns when issued control instructions; especially during busy times. It is much harder for a controller to get the job done; when they continually have to go back and beg for a callsign. I have requested callsigns more times than I care to count from pilots who refuse to restate them with the control instructions. I have had major air carriers and a few regional jet pilots get downright indignant with me when I have requested a callsign be used in the readback so that they could continue an operation. My Supervisor says that every time they go to a pilot meeting; the one thing they repeat every time is to tell pilots to use their callsigns. Of course the only ones hearing it are the ones actually at a pilot meeting. What percentage of the pilots out flying do you think that makes up? Several things can be done to correct the problem and lighten the load for controllers: 1. With all the money the government wastes on sending out posters and news letters and other paperwork that is of little value to the controllers; why not divert some of that money to sending out a letter to every person who holds a pilot license notifying them that a callsign is required with the readback and/or acknowledgement of any ATC control instruction. How about putting a little onus on the pilots?  2. If not already an FAR; make it an FAR.  3. Put a statement on the ATIS at all controlled airports that aircraft are required to use their callsign in response to all control instructions. This will serve as an ongoing; constant reminder and will cut down on the number of occurrences per day dramatically. 4. Make it clear that if a pilot accepts a clearance and acts on that clearance (i.e. climbing; descending; turning; etc.) without stating his/her callsign and an incident occurs; he/she may be sighted for a pilot deviation. So in the above event; here is the question; the pilot failed to use his callsign in conjunction with a clearance and yet he followed all of the instructions that were issued to the SR22; if it was in fact; not the SR22 who replied 'WILCO' to the lengthy clearance; then isn't the SR22 guilty of a pilot deviation for descending out of the last assigned altitude? The realization on my part is; of course; that it doesn't really matter what a pilot does right or wrong; if it can be held against a controller for missing a pilot's failure to follow proper procedures or readback correctly; it is always the controllers fault. Hence; I take full responsibility. This has always been true since I joined the FAA and watched the 7110.65 grow to more than double its original size. We are the watchdogs and we police ourselves to death. We have incorporated new rules and modified so many procedures that we have diminished the capacity of airports/airspace because of all of the excess requirements and the tying of controller's hands with so many overbearing rules and regulations. Basically we have dumbed things down to the lowest common denominator. So with this in mind and to follow in those footsteps; although it won't lighten the load; maybe the best suggestion in the interest of maximizing safety would be to: Get rid of visual separation between aircraft altogether. Then you don't have to rely on the pilot to state a phrase back in accordance with our controller requirements where he/she does not have full understanding of it's importance leaving controllers to have to go back and get the full readback with callsign; while the pilot meanwhile starts climbing/descending out of his/her altitude and into another aircraft in close proximity losing the 1;000 FT separation that the controller had originally built in. Instead; controllers can just build in and maintain standard separation on all aircraft nationwide from the moment of takeoff until the moment of touchdown/termination. That will spread them out a bit!

TRACON Controller was cited for a 'technical' separation loss during visual approach procedures when a pilot failed to acknowledge a clearance by using his/her callsign.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working a flight when an agent ([Company] airline vendor for wheelchair service) was taking a wheelchair down the jet bridge to store for the next inbound flight. The wheelchair would be in the way while we boarded the flight and would be in danger of jet bridge and wheelchair damage when the jet bridge was retracted for departure. Aircraft damage could also happen if there is an unaccompanied wheelchair rolling into the aircraft with no agents around.  I have contacted [Company] supervisors and the [Company] Safety supervisor and [Vendor] supervisor as well as individual [Vendor] agents for the last two months but this is still happening. I am worried that a passenger will be injured in the limited space left in the small jet bridge. I am also concerned that there may be jet bridge damage from a wheelchair becoming jammed while the jet bridge is being retracted. I think the best thing is to not store wheelchairs anywhere inside the jet bridge. Wheelchairs should only be on a jet bridge when it is accompanied by a wheelchair agent.

A Jet Bridge Operator reported that a wheelchair stored in the jet bridge is a hazard to passengers during boarding.


Local; Pilot Flying; Captain; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 29; Flight Crew Total 7700; Flight Crew Type 47

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Failure on the part of the pilot to maintain situational awareness resulted in departing from a closed runway contrary to issued ATC instructions. The pilot was on the third night shift and the duty day started at dusk. [Aircraft departed PHX] for a flight conducted under VFR and utilized flight following [with center and] arrived approximately 44 minutes [later]. [Shortly after; aircraft] departed for PHX. The flight was conducted under IFR. [The flight] arrived at PHX; and 150 gallons of fuel was purchased. The pilot retired to the pilot ready room and awaited the return of the medical crew from the hospitalI obtained the ATIS and class B departure instructions from clearance delivery. The instructions were 'cleared out of the Class B airspace; fly runway heading and maintain at or below 4500; departure frequency… squawk '. I misread the squawk read-back; and [I] was corrected by the controller. I received taxi instructions; (sounded like one controller was working several positions: clearance; ground and possibly tower) to taxi to runway 07L via taxiway Hotel; Hotel 4; cross 7R and continue via taxiway Foxtrot. I failed to read back the instruction verbatim; and [I] was corrected by the ground controller. I read back in entirety and I had the NOS chart open to the airport diagram and the Garmin 695 airport diagram open on the co-pilot yoke. After crossing runway 7R; I proceeded west on Foxtrot and as I approached the departure end; the tower controller asked if I was ready to depart at which time I responded affirmative. I believe I responded to the tower controller on the ground frequency but I'm uncertain. I was issued takeoff clearance for runway 7L. I responded cleared for takeoff and advised him I was abeam Golf 2 (For an unknown reason; I was fixated on 7R instead of 7L and lost situational awareness. At that same moment; the crew in the back made a comment to me to disregard their comments (unknown as to the context). I made a left turn on to runway 7R (believing I was on the correct runway); completed the takeoff checks and initiated the takeoff roll. As I broke ground I noticed the illuminated X (runway closed lighting) at the departure end. Tower advised me to turn right to 130; that I had just departed on a closed runway and to advise ready to copy a phone number for possible violations. After leveling off at assigned 4500 feet; I copied the number and [I] was asked to call the tower as soon as I landed.Upon completion of the post flight functions; I contacted as requested. I provided my name and phone number and was told that someone would call me in the morning. I advised Communications Center that I was out of service for the rest of the night due to an earlier issue in PHX. I received a call from Director of Operations at which time I explained the situation to him. He suggested that write a narrative while it was fresh in my mind. I texted Chief Pilot with a brief narrative of what had transpired.

Pilot reported departing from a closed runway contrary to issued ATC instructions.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 6000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

We were level at 33;000 FT when the Flight Attendants notified us that a cabin window had cracked at seat 41A.  They said that it was the outer pane.  Reportedly; made a loud bang sound when it cracked.  Captain went to cabin to look and confirmed the outer window had a crack running in a jagged pattern from the top to bottom.  Via ACARS; we talked to Maintenance Control and Dispatch.  We agreed the safest action was to return to our departure airport.  ATC cleared us to descend; turn around and proceed direct.  We had dispatch send us landing performance data; read through the diversion page in the FOM and made a normal approach and landing.

A B767-300 returned to its departure airport when the outer pane of a passenger window cracked.


Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Airspace Structure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

Cleared for a visual approach from the northeast. Descended to 2100 feet within one mile of Final Approach Fix to turn final. Tower said check altitude for low altitude warning. We responded we were at 2100 feet.Extend final to BMORE at 2500 feet.

An aircraft conducting a Visual Approach was issued a low altitude warning by the Tower. The aircraft was at an appropriate altitude for fixes on the approach.


Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

We were on the EWR ILS 4R approach; in visual conditions. Tower notified all traffic; that there were several reports of a drone at 1000 ft near the Linden area. We had an FO; who was in the jumpseat; was dedicated to watching out for the drone. At 850 ft; over the refinery; on the left side of the aircraft; the FO spotted a white drone. He said; 'Oh my gosh that was close. That's a near miss'. It was within 100 ft from our aircraft. We notified ATC immediately of the near miss. FO in the right seat and I were focused forward and never saw the drone. He asked if tower notified anyone about the drone. ATC remarked that they had called 4 times. We did not notify dispatch in a timely manner. It was a few hours after we landed that they were notified.

B767 Captain reported that during final approach to EWR Runway 4R they encountered a drone within 100 feet of the aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 265; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

On climb out with First Officer flying at approximately 17;000 FT; we received ECAM; Air Engine 1 Bleed Fault. ECAM procedures followed immediately. After completion of ECAM procedures and as follow up with FM was started; both pilots noticed an increase in heat in the cockpit and hypoxia type symptoms. Both pilots' donned oxygen masks; emergency declared; descent initiated; and return to [departure airport]. I looked at pressurization initially when ECAM occurred and I did not notice any abnormalities with pressure. The only abnormal indication was an elevated (300 C) temperature and amber warning on Engine 1 Bleed Air. All valves in system reacted as expected and no further incidents reported. Neither flight attendants nor passengers reported any symptoms. Overweight landing procedure followed. After completion of flight; both pilots still felt physiological symptoms and both visited a medical facility; I was cleared to return to flight status with no restrictions.

During climb at approximately 17;000 FT got 'AIR-Eng 1 Bleed Fault' ECAM. Captain (as pilot not flying) performed ECAM procedure and then followed up with Flight Manual procedure. I turned on autopilot. Captain and I (within a couple of minutes) both started feeling hypoxic and both donned O2 masks. Captain got descent clearance to 10;000 FT and subsequently got clearance to return and declared and emergency; Captain also notified Dispatch; flight attendant crew and passengers of our return. Captain completed 'Overweight Landing' checklist. Landed and taxied to gate without further incident; completed Maintenance reports for AIR Eng 1 Bleed Fault and overweight landing. During taxi to gate; flight attendants said that no passengers complained of feeling ill. After gate arrival both Captain and I still felt crummy from hypoxic event.

A319 flight crew reports Air Engine 1 Bleed Fault during climb and compliance with ECAM actions. Both pilots notice increased heat in the cockpit and begin to feel hypoxia-like symptoms although cabin pressure is apparently normal. Oxygen masks are donned; an emergency is declared; and flight returns to departure airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 1500; Flight Crew Type 360

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was on a standardization flight in the Seminole. We had done multiple practice approaches and were on the last one; the ILS 31. At FAF I brought the gear down and verified 3 green lights; no red; [and] 1 in the mirror with the other instructor pilot. At 1;000 feet MSL we did another GUMPS check. The touchdown was normal and on centerline about 1;500 feet from the approach end. The nose gear collapsed after touchdown and the reduced clearance caused the propellers to strike the surface of the runway. We cutoff the mixtures; made a report to Tower and then turned everything off.

A PA-44 pilot verified three green gear down lock lights and completed the landing checklist but the nose gear collapsed on landing causing some damage but no injuries.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

[We] were flying the FORCK2 departure and were level at 10;000 feet; experiencing small altitude changes due to turbulence of a cloud layer at 10;000 feet; when the flight experienced an RA. Between the intersections of PAXTN and HANUH; ATC had called traffic in vicinity of aircraft with one A321 flying at 11;000 feet directly above our aircraft. The crossing traffic at 11;000 feet caused an additional small altitude gain due to wake turbulence; which did not exceed 200 feet. I responded to the altitude deviation by starting a slow descent of 200 feet per minute. Upon regaining 10;000 feet the aircraft received an RA from an aircraft below us that was climbing. Initial estimate would put that aircraft between 1;000-1;500 feet below our aircraft and climbing when the initial RA went off. I responded to that RA by initiating a climb and keeping the Flight Director in the RA Green Zone. First Officer called ATC and stated that we were responding to an RA and had initiated a climb. At 10;500 feet; the RA stated clear of conflict and we leveled off. After the below aircraft showed clear behind us; I started the descent back to 10;000 feet which was our assigned ATC altitude. Upon being clear of conflict; Captain and First Officer both mentioned the conflicting aircraft was then 1;700 feet below the aircraft. No further issues occurred throughout the duration of the flight.Turbulence from cloud layer at our assigned altitude caused minor altitude deviations. Wake turbulence from A321 crossing overhead of our aircraft 1;000 feet above caused major wake turbulence immediately following its passing from right to left.De-congestion of airspace when an aircraft is getting light to moderate turbulence at the base of a cloud layer. Within two minutes we were given multiple traffic alerts from ATC in regards to aircraft crossing. Other aircraft also could have been held lower or given a shallower climb to limit the crossing points of our system.

EMB-175 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence departing DFW from an A321 above them.