Flight Crew Last 90 Days 146; Flight Crew Total 1738; Flight Crew Type 1738

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

During preflight preparation; a log item was noticed regarding the blanking out of the right tank fuel indicator and totalizer from a previous flight on [date]. The item was noted to be tested and reset. On climbout from ZZZZ; the right tank quantity and totalizer once again blanked. The crossing of the Atlantic was normal; with the fuel burn and quantity tracked on the FMC. Approximately 1:30 from landing; the right tank quantity and totalizer came back but showed a fuel imbalance of more than 4;000 lbs. between the left and right tanks. The fuel configuration EICAS message was displayed and the two First Officers ran the appropriate checklist as I; (the Captain); was on my scheduled rest break. I returned to the cockpit and the First Officers informed me of the situation and what they had done with respect to the checklist. We discussed the fuel situation and we determined that we really didn't know our exact fuel quantity and location with the conflicting information from the totalizer and FMC generated fuel. A Satcom call to Dispatch and Maintenance was initiated and it was determined that the best course of action was to [advise ATC] for unknown fuel quantity and receive priority handling to expedite our landing in ZZZ1; as we were only about 90 miles from ZZZ1. An uneventful landing was made in ZZZ1 and the aircraft was taxied to the gate.

B767 Captain reported that a failure of the fuel quantity indication system resulted in an expedited landing.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 216.38; Flight Crew Type 10905.68

This is my third and hopefully my last ever 2-crew member only crossing of the Atlantic late at night. Before each one of them; I tried my best to prepare physically and mentally for them. I commute; so I try to start early to reduce the stress of trying to get to work (not counting the constant delays; like today); and try to get some sleep before my late night; 2 pilots ocean crossing. I have never been able to achieve restful sleep in the middle of the afternoon; especially downstairs at Ops. So going on an all-night flight with no possibility of a break is stressful enough. I've tried standing up often; I've tried drinking Coca Cola ( I don't drink coffee; and drinking sugary drinks just for the caffeine is not good for my blood sugar levels); I've tried engaging in conversation with my First Officer; none of that compensates for having at least a short break in the cabin to recharge your batteries. I've always felt very fatigued at the end of these flights; questioning the safety of doing so. What if we have to divert for a sick passenger or worse; an engine fire/failure? We don't have the additional resource of one more crew member to help get the airplane safely to some obscure location in the middle of the Atlantic; in the middle of the night!For a company that professes [the importance of safety]; it sure is a shame that they have twisted the meaning of FAR 117 and chosen monetary gain over conducting a safe operation. The company seems to prefer to save the money of an additional crew member on these flights because supposedly we are 'acclimated' for the flight back. I don't think ANY of us have a problem staying awake during daylight on the way back. But ALL of us feel fatigued doing this late night two crew member crap![All pilots] urge [Company] to stop this unsafe practice of sending late night flights overseas with only two pilots.  It's not safe or reasonable!

B767 Captain stated he feels his company's policy of flying some East Coast to Europe North Atlantic flights with just two pilots is unsafe.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

The takeoff and climb out were normal. During the later stages of climb I noticed that the cabin altitude was a little higher than normal (8;000 FT) but differential pressure was still increasing so I didn't think anything of it. As the flight progressed the First Officer pointed out the cabin altitude was about 9;000 FT. I then asked ATC for a lower altitude and called the Flight Attendant and asked her to take her seat and informed her that we were having a pressurization problem and that the passenger O2 masks might have to be deployed. Next I made a PA to the passengers informing them of the problem and that we might have to deploy the O2 masks and that we were in a descent to a safe altitude. Shortly after we started the descent we came to the conclusion that we were not going to keep the cabin below 10;000 FT so I declared an emergency with ATC. We then slowed the aircraft to 250 KIAS and extended the landing gear. Though we had already donned our O2 masks I completed the rapid decompression QRH and the Emergency Descent checklist. At FL200 with the Cabin Altitude at 12;100 FT and climbing I instructed the First Officer to deploy the Passenger O2 masks. About three minutes later we leveled at 10;000 FT; slowed to 200 KTS and retracted the landing gear. I requested and was granted priority handling direct to our planned diversion airport. At this point I sent an ACARS message to Dispatch letting them know what happened and advising of our plans to divert. I then made a PA to the passengers letting them know that we had leveled off at a safe altitude; that the O2 masks were no longer required; and that we had everything under control and would be diverting. Then subsequent landing was normal and we taxied to the gate.

[No substantive additional information was provided in the secondary narrative.]

An EMB 145 flight crew declared an emergency and descended below 10;000 MSL in response to a slow but steady increase in cabin altitude; ultimately reaching 12;100 FT at which point the O2 masks were manually deployed for the passengers. Upon leveling at 10;000 MSL the flight diverted to a nearby airport.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Training / Qualification

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Observer

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

This event happened While training was in progress on the local one position. Aircraft X was sequenced to follow Aircraft Y in the pattern. The trainee did not observe that Aircraft X was much faster and had turned in too close behind Aircraft Y. Aircraft Y was on short final approximately 100 feet AGL. Aircraft X was off the left wing of Aircraft Y at approximately the same altitude. It was apparent that Aircraft X had offset to the left side of Aircraft Y in an effort not to land on top of or create a collision with Aircraft Y ahead. This being said; Aircraft X never attempted to query ATC. It was not until the ground controller said 'what is happening' That the trainee; trainer and the Controller in Charge even looked out the window. The trainee was staring at the radar; the OJTI and the Controller in Charge were not paying any attention and we're engaged in a non ATC related conversation. Neither one of them were looking out the window. At the time of the incident; the Instructor had his back turned away from the runway threshold. Once the incident was brought to everybody's attention; the trainee who looked out the window but did not make any attempt to send the aircraft around until the Instructor instructed the trainee to send the aircraft around.  I saw the incident; however; I chose not to say anything.After this Incident; I brought it to the Supervisors attention. That said; at the time of the incident the Supervisor was not in the tower cab. I later heard that the Controller in Charge stated to a management official that the situation was 'not that bad.' In fact; the situation was incredibly dangerous. The aircraft probably were only separated by maybe 200 to 300 feet laterally and 0 feet in altitude. I do believe this statement was made by the Controller in Charge in an effort to cover up the situation considering that the Controller in Charge was distracted in a non ATC conversation and did not see the situation developing.  I believe the only thing that needs to change from this incident; is the Controller in Charge and Instructor paying attention. There is too much trust put in a trainee that has a history of dangerous happenings.

Tower Controller reported an NMAC on short final was not detected by the Local Control trainee; the Instructor; or the Controller in Charge until the Ground Controller brought it to their attention.


Piper Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 13600; Flight Crew Type 750

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I coordinated my annual recurrent training with the instructor to take place yesterday. The instructor was Director of Training for Company for many decades; and even still provides insurance-required recurrent examinations; etc.; and I have been flying with him since I purchased Aircraft X in 2006. The instructor is also a recipient of the Wright Brothers Award from the FAA for 50 years of safe flying. With the weather situation; we decided to fly out of ZZZ. I met the instructor about noon after flying in from ZZZ1; and by the time we got Aircraft X started and taxied to Runway X for departure; we heard Aircraft Y announce 'downwind'. It took a few minutes to get to the approach end of Runway X; and we came to a full stop so we could carefully check for traffic before taking the active. In fact; the instructor and I examined just about every place we could look; including downwind and approach trying to locate any traffic; especially given the previous call. No traffic was depicted on the ADS-B (Automated Dependent Surveillance Broadcast) either. I specifically asked the instructor; 'do you see any reason we cannot take the active'; to which he replied he saw no reason not to. At the time; I even commented seeing what appeared to be either a large bird or an aircraft; but whatever it was it seemed to be moving out of the area and was therefore not a factor. Accordingly; I announced taking the active and departing Runway X for local air work with a northwest departure. After establishing Aircraft X on the runway and starting to advance the power; we suddenly heard Aircraft Y report 'short final'; after which Aircraft Y passed over Aircraft X and landed on the same runway in front of us. I aborted the departure and we watched Aircraft Y land far down the runway (it appeared to be well over halfway down from where we were sitting) at what seemed to be a very high speed; and then; after touchdown; generating all sorts of smoke in the aircraft's wake; either from the engine or from the brakes/tires. It appeared as though there wasn't much runway left and it eventually cleared the runway at the end; apparently using almost all of the 6;704 ft. runway. The instructor observed the smoke to be more 'whitish' in color; meaning it may have been coming from the tires (notably; the instructor provides recurrent training events in the TBM and Jet-prop aircraft as well).Following our recurrent event; the instructor and I thoroughly debriefed what had transpired. We could not understand why we had not visually observed Aircraft Y; given the careful examination of the area surrounding the airport we did prior to taking the active. We were in no hurry whatsoever; and would not have taken the active runway unless we were completely certain there was no conflicting traffic approaching; and we observed none. We examined the FlightAware record as well; but it did not become more obvious as to what may have transpired until today when the instructor and I were discussing the event. For example; Aircraft Y climbed to a cruising altitude of 30;000 ft. enroute from Columbus; Ohio to ZZZ. We believe the pilot may only possess a private pilot certificate; which brings into question whether he could legally be operating at that altitude under IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) conditions or on an IFR flight plan. The mysterious track Aircraft Y flew descending into ZZZ commenced with Aircraft Y descending to 12;500 ft.; presumably VFR (Visual Flight Rules); while still a significant distance from the destination airport. For whatever reason; Aircraft Y pilot apparently elected not to execute one of the three IFR approaches available for that airport at the time; including an ILS (Instrument Landing System) and two GPS (Global Positioning System) approaches. According to the FlightAware data; Aircraft Y first circled the area at 12;500 ft.; completing a 'racetrack' pattern in the immediate vicinity of the airport; while at the same time descending.After flying the racetrack pattern; Aircraft Y continued to descend in an even tighter circular pattern around the airport. It then commenced a base leg turn as it descended out of 5;300 ft.; and then; as it was approaching the airport; it completed an even tighter 360 degree turn at approximately 3;700 ft. As it descended out of that exceedingly tight turn onto final; it was closing on the airport very quickly at an altitude of 2;100 ft. Given our familiarity with the weather at the time; some of the cloud bases of a scattered to broken layer were approximately at 2000 ft. MSL (Mean Sea Level) or even slightly lower; with multiple layers above. In other words; it appears as though the pilot was descending in the vicinity of the airport in what was essentially a 'cloud break' procedure; instead of flying one of the three available instrument approaches. He apparently only relocated the airport visually when he was on a very high approach path already; which would explain the extended touchdown point and the use of most of the runway. It would also explain why we did not see him; as at 2;100 ft. Aircraft Y was likely obscured by the clouds at that point; when Aircraft Y would be located approximately a mile south of the approach end of Runway X.First; the airman made no callouts on Unicom other than flying 'downwind'; not mentioning he was at or above 6;000 ft. while on the downwind leg. Nor did the pilot tell anyone on Unicom he was orbiting the airport and descending trying to locate the runway visually. He made no callouts whatsoever between the original 'downwind' call we heard while taxiing Aircraft X initially; and then just the 'short final' call before Aircraft Y overflew Aircraft X; landing far down the runway in front of us.As the conditions were very similar when I arrived approximately 30 minutes previously; there was no problem maintaining VFR conditions in order to make a visual approach to runway X; and those conditions continued 45 minutes later when we concluded our flight. Visibility was at all times in excess of 10 miles. There appears to be a significant amount of desperation exhibited by the pilot in landing over Aircraft X after we had initiated the departure; as it seems he might have been in somewhat of a panic to get Aircraft Y on the ground; when the only prudent course of action at that point; given that neither of us visually located Aircraft Y; despite an extremely diligent search; and after announcing that we were taking the active runway for departure purposes; was to immediately go around and reenter the pattern.Quite a few of the preceding flights for Aircraft Y available on FlightAware appear to be training type missions; and it is unclear what put so much pressure on the pilot to complete the approach and landing; imperiling all involved; instead of merely executing a prudent go around and reentering the pattern; which the weather would certainly permit at the time. Quite frankly don't know what else we could have done to prevent this situation from occurring; as we used all due diligence before we took the active runway. Aircraft Y was likely above the clouds when we searched for traffic before departing. The two pilots on our flight deck at the time had over 100 years of [combined] flight experience; without incident or accident.

Pilot reported a near miss; during takeoff roll; with an aircraft flying overhead on short final.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Original clearance was to fly the ORKA5 departure with LAS transition. FO was flying. At or near COOPP intersection Center gave us instructions that we understood to be 'fly heading 070 degrees and expect ORCKA and then the BEALE transition'. We set up our FMS for this new transition. Shortly afterward we both heard what we thought was 'cleared direct ORCKA and fly the BEALE transition' and the CA read exactly that back.  A few minutes after we had established course to ORCKA center called another flight and directed a stop climb at FL190. We were passing through FL200 for FL230 when we noticed another aircraft on TCAS at 10-15 miles range reach 300 feet below our altitude before descending back down to FL 190. Center then called out that we were off course. CA replied we were direct ORCKA then BEALE Transition as directed. Controller then stated 'No you were cleared ARCUS and the BEALE transition'. ARCUS is the next fix after ORCKA on the ORKA5/BEALE SID and sounds very similar to ORCKA on a VHF radio. No TCAS alerts were initiated and no conflict occurred.The primary factor is the fact that ORCKA and ARCUS; two consecutive points along the ORKA5 SID sound similar over the VHF radio.  So similar; in fact; that both pilots heard it wrong when the clearance was first issued and the ATC controller heard it wrong when we read it back.Two suggestions: 1. I recommend that Jeppesen change either ORCKA or ARCUS naming on the SID.  2. When waypoints on a SID sound so clearly similar ATC should phonetically spell out the fix cleared to.

Original clearance was to fly to ORKA5 departure with LAS transition. FO was flying. At or near COOPP intersection Center gave us instructions that we understood to be fly heading 070 degrees and expect ORCKA and then the BEALE transition. We set up our FMS for this new transition. Shortly afterward we both heard what we thought was cleared direct ORCKA an fly the BEALE transition and the CA read exactly that back. A few minutes after we had established course to ORCKA center called another flight and directed a stop climb at FL190. We were passing through FL200 for FL230 when noticed another aircraft on TCAS at 10-15 miles ranger each 300 feet below our altitude before descending back down to FL190 LA Center then called out that we were off course. CA replied we were direct ORCKA then BEALE Transition as directed.Controller then stated ' No you were cleared ARCUS and the BEALE transition. ARCUS is the next fix after ORCKA on the ORKA5/BEALE SID and sounds very similar to ORCKA on a VHF radio. No TCAS alerts were initiated and no conflict occurred.The primary factor is the fact that ORCKA and ARCUS; two consecutive points along the ORKA5 SID sound similar over the VHF radio. So similar; in fact that both pilots heard it wrong when the clearance was first issued and the ATC controller heard it wrong when we read it back.Maybe a change to the fixes on the SID.

Air Carrier pilots reported two similar sounding waypoints on this SID which caused a heading deviation and TCAS traffic warning.


Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Distraction; Workload

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Object

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; Procedure

This report is really two related events in one; an injury to me (the Captain) and a fumes related injury to my Flight Attendant.  The flight was unremarkable.  There was no communication with the cabin; other than to ask the Flight Attendant to remain seated due to our proximity to thunderstorm activity.  The approach was normal in every respect.  Upon arrival at the gate; and just after the GPU was plugged in; I noticed a distinctive odor in the air.  It wasn't the sort of odor that immediately caused grave concern; but it was enough that I noticed something may be amiss.  A quick look at the First Officer's face confirmed my suspicion as he was sniffing the air as well.  The cockpit door was opened at the completion of the parking checks; and the first thing the Flight Attendant said 'Is something burning? I started smelling it when we were descending'.  I immediately shut off the APU bleed at that point; not wanting to worsen whatever problem was occurring.  The cabin door was open; the air was clearing rapidly and all seemed well.  I recalled that the aircraft had a recent history of fumes; and at any rate; I wasn't going to allow a possibly bad airplane to be passed to another crew; fumes; I know; are a serious thing.  Upon speaking with Dispatch; the first questions from my Dispatcher revolved around ferrying the airplane.  I was not keen on the idea at all; but I simply stated that I thought that we were putting the cart before the horse and that perhaps we should discuss this with Maintenance Control first.  In speaking with Maintenance Control; they asked me to run the airplane.  I had no objections to this; but in hindsight; this may have been a less than optimal choice.  We ran the aircraft once we received proper ramp signals from the Company staff.  We tried the #2 and #1 bleeds independently; both with the recirc fan off and on.  We were able to reproduce the odor; especially when the pack was run at full cold.  The fumes seemed to be the worst from the APU bleed.  We worked this issue for maybe 10 minutes.  Then my First Officer said to me that his throat was beginning to hurt a bit and I realized that we had gone too far in helping Maintenance Control to diagnose the issue.  This is where my choice was less than optimal:  In helping Maintenance Control; I actually ran the risk of exposing my crew to additional harmful fumes.  If I had that choice over again; I would not have done this.  The final indignity of the evening was suffered by me as we brought the process to a close.  Maintenance Control asked me to walk to the back of the airplane to see if I could hear the ACM turning.  I did so.  A few minutes prior; the airport CFR folks had showed up to see what all of the fuss was about.  They have very bright lights on those trucks; and those lights were right in my eyes as I walked back to the forward park of the airplane.  I could not see much; and by not much I mean I could not see the tip of one of the blades of the #1 prop which was directly in my path.  I walked straight into it; which earned me 4 stitches in my head as a reminder of my less than stellar decision making in this event.  As the transportation company was taking me to the hospital with my crew in tow; ostensibly so that they could go to the hotel; my Flight Attendant became ill.  We feared that she may have incurred a fumes related injury; so we insisted that she obtain a medical check out as well.  As the Captain; I was very concerned that our attempts to help Maintenance Control may have resulted in an injury to my Flight Attendant.The fumes are of unknown origin.  As for my head; the props are actually very difficult to see under certain conditions. I was able to complete the logbook prior to leaving for the hospital.  I made sure my crew was cared for and safe prior to receiving care for my own wound.There are three takeaways here for me as a Captain:  First:  I have now had an object lesson in how insidious fumes can be.  I wasn't even sure we had an issue; and in the process of figuring that out I exposed myself and my crew to potential harm.  Had this been in flight; my reactions would have been radically different; I am trained for that.  Being at the gate; my 'safety SA' was reduced.  I just didn't do the head work to realize that diagnosing a problem for Maintenance would be hazardous.  In the future; I will not do this.  Maintenance Control needs to coordinate the investigation of fumes on their own.  Second:   The cabin needs to inform the flight deck at the first sign of smoke or fumes.  My reaction to this event probably would have been different had that occurred.  I definitely would have wanted to know about that!  Third:  Don't be in a rush walking around the airplane; especially talking on a cell phone with Maintenance Control and with your head down walking toward really bright lights.  It may cost you a fair amount of skin.

A DHC-8-100 developed a burning odor at the gate with ground power plugged in but the Captain; working with Maintenance Control; could not find the source while troubleshooting and causing the Flight Attendant to become ill. When emergency vehicles arrived investigate the engine run; the Captain walked into a stationary propeller causing an injury.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 75

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

During the initial climb after a VFR departure from BVU (Boulder City airport) via GPS to the DAG VOR on an approximately heading of 225 the Co-pilot and I were distracted and momentarily blinded by the sun reflecting off of mirrors at the solar power plant facility located near the CA-NV border near the town of Primm. This solar power plant which I believe is still under construction consists of three massive circular arrays of thousands of mirrors oriented inward toward a central tower. As soon as we cleared the mountains southwest of BVU from 6;000 to 12;000 FT MSL still climbing there were three very bright reflections (one from each solar array) of the sun into the pilots and copilots eyes. The reflection from the northernmost array was the brightest and the largest and grew in size as we flew closer to the facility. The flight path of our aircraft passed overhead of this facility. At its brightest neither the pilot nor co-pilot could look in that direction due to the intense brightness. From the pilot's seat of my aircraft the brightness was like looking into the sun and it filled about 1/3 of the co-pilots front windshield. In my opinion the reflection from these mirrors was a hazard to flight because for a brief time I could not scan the sky in that direction to look for other aircraft.

A flight crew experienced a very bright; intense light from three solar complexes which interfered with their ability to scan for traffic while climbing westbound between 6;000 and 12;000 feet along J60/V12 southwest of NATEE Intersection.


Immediately after we broke out of the clouds on approach; we observed what looked like a drone to right of the Runway 24 at BDL. It had purple and red led lights. Pointed it out to Tower and to aircraft that followed us on approach.

A320 Captain reported sighting a drone while on approach to BDL.


Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Company Policy; Human Factors; Weather; Aircraft

On the takeoff roll; we had the Auto Thrust System (ATS) lever trip right around 80 knots. Both the captain and I heard it and saw what had happened and the captain elected to reject the take off. We returned to the gate and had maintenance look in the courier compartment for any water. There was some water that had come from the main cargo area and ran into the galley area from the reject. They also found some water in the courier compartment and thought that it was possible that some of the cans may have been loaded with snow still on them earlier that morning. It's possible that some of the water they found in the courier compartment may have caused the auto throttle lever to trip. Don't load cans with snow on them into the airplane.

A300 First Officer reported a rejected takeoff when the auto thrust tripped off at 80 knots.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Cleared for the visual approach to Runway 17R into OKC and was handed over to OKC tower. We checked in and were cleared to land 17R. I heard tower communicating with another aircraft that I could not hear. After recognizing a military call sign and became aware that they were on a HF frequency. Tower was advising him to remain in traffic for 17L as there was 'traffic for 17R'. A few seconds later he was advising them of traffic again for 17R and that it was a 'Aircraft X'. At this point I was trying to identify this aircraft as it was appearing to get a little out of hand between the tower controller and the military aircraft in the pattern. I identified the aircraft on TCAS as being at our 1130 to 12 o'clock and 300 feet below us climbing. At this point we are on final by the marker and we are trying to visually see the target. I look back at TCAS and the aircraft is 100 feet below us climbing and at 12 o'clock in close proximity. We receive a TCAS advisory to 'descend. descend; descend now!' We visually see this [military aircraft] coming at us and climbing but then leveling off at our altitude. I followed the RA as best I could as it appeared to be all red descending. It immediately then transitioned to a climbing command as we were closer to the ground than what was comfortable for a high rate of descent. We were in a Flaps 23 gear down configuration at this point. We were able to level off. [Military aircraft] remained at our 1 to 2 o'clock position and was communicating with tower but we could only hear towers instruction to him. Tower appeared to try and get him into the pattern again for 17L.We configured for landing and were in the configuration by 1000 feet and I think we were stable. We were stable for sure at 500 feet. [Military aircraft] remained at the 1 to 2 o'clock position and I was too focused on him and what he may do as he was still too close to us after this incident to be comfortable. I wanted to go-around to collect our thoughts as this incident was way too close 'for comfort' but I did not trust the actions of the [military aircraft] pilot after this incident as he was paralleling our course towards the runway and was trying to get back into the pattern so I felt it was safer to continue and land and we were descending on glide path to the runway and he was maintaining altitude upwind for the 17 runways.In summary we had a near miss on final approach to runway 17R in OKC which caused a TCAS RA. It commanded a uncomfortable descending RA within about 1500' of the ground followed by a climbing correction. We followed the RA as we were trained. I was the flying pilot and the autopilot was off. The [military aircraft] was close that the RA required me to bring power to idle and push hard over to initiate the RA. At no time did the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) activate. We were stable on approach. We spoke with TRACON manager after landing and he advised that there were two military trainers in the pattern. There may have been some miscommunication between the aircraft and the tower controller. I made a PA at the gate advising the passengers of why the maneuvers on final and also the Flight Attendant heard very clearly the oral warnings as did some first class passengers.Appeared the military trainer entered final for our runway of 17R instead of 17L and when instructed to go around or re-enter the pattern he turned directly into our flight path and came directly at us.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air Carrier Captain on approach to OKC reported a NMAC with a military aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport; Human Factors

The flight was uneventful until the visual approach for Runway 16L in DEN. The visual backed up by the ILS to 16L approach was briefed. The Approach Checklist was completed on the downwind leg. We were radar vectored on the base leg for Runway 16L. The Controller asked if we had the runway/airport. The Captain replied yes so I called the field in sight. He then gave us another vector for the visual that took us inside the final approach fix on a left dogleg base visual approach to final and asked us to maintain 170 KTS until final. The Captain asked me to extend the final approach course from the runway in the FMC and set 5;400 FT in the altitude window. If I recall correctly we were out of approximately 7;000 FT and configured at 170 KTS at flaps 10. I've seen different captains use different techniques for altitudes they call for while on the visual approach so I didn't think anything of his technique in this case. I did however call his configuration on the MCP. I said verbatim. 'You're in level change; and 5;400' is set in the altitude window; you're slightly below the glideslope.' The Captain stated; 'I know; I've got it.' The Captain continued his descent on the left dogleg to final. As we got lower I stated; 'You are getting a little too low out here; are you sure you have it?' The Captain replied again 'yea; yea; I've got it.' If I recall correctly we were not yet below 1;000 FT AGL because I was still waiting to make the 1;000 FT call; but we were still below the glide slope to the runway. I was anticipating the Captain clicking the off autopilot for the visual and leveling us out until we joined the glide path on final. As we continued from this point all of my attention went to visually looking outside the aircraft to see where we were in relation to the runway; because for a few seconds I thought that the Captain might have made an error in identifying the runway surface while on the visual approach. As we began to turn final I could see that he was turning for the correct runway but too low for our distance out; so I stated 'we're still way too low out here are you sure you want to be at this altitude.' The Captain promptly stated 'no.' I was about to call for a go-around because I though the Captain was going to continue the descent but then he immediately disengaged the autopilot and began corrective actions. At the same time he leveled off and added power we got the gear horn. The Tower Controller issued us a low altitude alert. I responded to the Controller with our call sign to let him know that we were aware and correcting. At this point we were in a slow climb to capture the glideslope; the Captain then called for gear down; flaps 15; Landing Checklist; and then flaps 30. We quickly captured the glideslope and continued to a normal landing. I waited until we were parked at the gate to ask the Captain what happened on the approach. He stated that he got confused and mistook the 5;400 FT altitude that he saw in the FMC after extending the final approach course from the runway; for a fix and altitude that was further out on the approach.

A B737 Captain flying a night visual approach to DEN Runway 17L; requested MCP ALT 5;400 FT with LVL CHG engaged and descended below glideslope to about 1;000 FT AGL as the First Officer questioned his situational awareness until ATC called a low level alert.


Distraction; Fatigue; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

We had four jumpseaters in addition to the three operating crew members. I left the cockpit to secure the cabin prior to push back. I started with shutting and arming door L1 and checked the RCB (Rigid Cargo Barrier). I continued by inspecting the 4 cabin seats and proceeded to the right RCB. I then found bedding up against the supernumerary floor vents when I inspected them. I removed the bedding and the Jumpseater placed the bedding alongside himself so it was properly secured. This is when I missed arming the R1 door. I went on to checking the galley compartments. When I arrived in the cockpit it occurred to me that I may have missed the R1 door so I checked the EICAS and saw 'doors auto' so I figured I had armed the door properly. When I returned to the supernumerary compartment later in the flight jumpseater next to the door called the error to my attention. I informed the Captain and then armed the door.I believe that I made the error because of the numerous distractions that four jumpseaters on a long flight present. Stowing bags and bedding as well as maneuvering around extra bodies added a layer of complication. I lost track of where I was in my flow and missed arming the door. I needed to slow down and take as much time as was needed to complete the task at hand. I also misread the EICAS. I didn't finish reading it. It must have said doors auto/manual. I now have more familiarity with what the EICAS will say. I need to make sure that I take as much time as I need to be methodical in my tasks and take time to recheck things I am not certain about regardless if I feel like the crew is waiting on me to push.

During climb; approximately 15 minutes after; takeoff; the CA (Captain) authorized RFO (Relief Pilot) to leave the flight deck and go to the cabin to change out of uniform for the enroute portion of the flight. When Relief Pilot returned; she stated that she had not armed the 1R entry door prior to departure. CA selected the DOORS synoptic page and all three of us on the flight deck saw that the door indicated Manual. Relief Pilot apologized and asked if it was OK for her to arm the door at that time. The CA told her that she could proceed to arm the door; which she did; resulting in the door indicating Auto on the synoptic display. As a crew we discussed how this error had occurred. The Relief Pilot stated that while she was in the cabin to arm the doors prior to departure; she had paused to move some items which had been placed; apparently by one of our jumpseaters; on; or adjacent to; the cabin vent cage behind the cabin seats; which is not a permissible location. She stated that she subsequently forgot to complete the process of arming the doors and that one of the jumpseaters had pointed it out to her while she was in the cabin. In discussing the scenario we concluded that a variety of activities and communications which occurred as we were preparing for pushback and while we taxied for departure caused all of us to miss seeing an indication that the door was in Manual mode.As a crew we concluded that a series of internal and external distractions caused us to make this error. Recognizing that the (closed loop) DOORS item on the [Emergency Checklist] only verifies locked; not armed; status and diligence in confirming the DOORS AUTO; EICAS memo message; during the BEFORE START checklist; will prevent this from occurring.

B777 flight crew reported Relief Pilot did not arm the escape slide door prior to block-out.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

With the Captain as Pilot Flying (PF) and on heading 090 at 4000 ft we were cleared to turn heading 030 and join the 36L LOC. In the turn to intercept the LOC the PF airspeed and altitude tapes began to increase rapidly. This caused the autopilot to disengage; the Auto Throttle to disengage; the L and R ENG EEC to indicate off; the TERRAIN SYS OVRD to FAIL and the L transponder to fail. In addition; there were comparator indications on the PFD and the overspeed warning sounded. The altitude and airspeed tapes did not freeze or slowly indicate a difference. It was rapid and continuous. The comparator indications were present but due to the complexity of the situation I do not recall each comparator that was displayed. Once all the above occurred while in the turn the PF did his best to quickly cross check and determine which flight instruments were providing good information and which were providing bad information. We were able to determine the right avionics and standby avionics information was good and the left air data information was bad. This was all occurring while hand flying and trying to maintain the LOC course and assigned altitude. Due to the loss of the left transponder ATC approach was not receiving an altitude input from us and asked to verify altitude. The Captain as PF when the failure occurred transferred controls to the First Officer once the airplane was stable and the determination was made that the First Officer (FO) avionics information was accurate. The First Officer became the PF and the Captain became the Pilot Monitoring (PM). The Captain assumed radio communication and advised ATC that we have an avionics malfunction. The PM then reported to ATC our current altitude and deviation from the LOC as we worked to center the LOC guidance. With the airplane stable at 4000 ft and on the 36L LOC the PM told ATC that we would like a vector away from the immediate airport area to reference our checklist and would like to stay within 20 miles of the airport. Due to the busyness of [the situation] the PM requested that ATC provide holding type vectors and that we could not accept a holding pattern. This was to prevent either pilot from being heads down setting up the FMS. Once on a heading out of the immediate approach traffic area and stable at 4000 ft the PM referenced the QRH. There were approximately 5 Amber CAS messages displayed associated with the failures. The L ENG EEC and R ENG EEC messages were referenced in the QRH. This guidance did not apply to the root of the problem based on the air data system failures and we discussed that we should focus on the Airspeed Unreliable checklist. We followed the Airspeed Unreliable non-normal QRH procedure. The PM completed the checklist and the PF monitored the airplane. Following the checklist guidance; we reengaged the autopilot to help with workload management. Once the checklist was complete and we were holding on the deferred items the PM (Captain) brought to the PF's attention that as an additional tool we could radio Dispatch and have them communicate with Maintenance to determine if there were any further actions we could take with their guidance. At the time we had approximately 13;000 lbs of gas and both agreed we had time to get additional guidance. The PF took over ATC communications and the PM communicated with Dispatch. We contacted Dispatch and relayed all our indications to them and they communicated with Maintenance. Maintenance's response was they felt the L ADC was bad and to use the R ADC information; just as the checklist guidance provided. After finishing communication with Dispatch the PM summarized our situation and asked if the PF had any input or questions prior to continuing. We both agreed we were on the 'same page' and setup and briefed the approach. We advised ATC we were ready for the approach and told them we would like to join the ILS 36L outside of ZZZZZ1 at 4;000 ft. ATC provided vectors and then switched us to final Approach Controller. On the approach frequency the controller changed our landing runway to 36C. The PM setup the XXC ILS and briefed the PF on the changes. We joined the LOC XXC approximately 10-15 miles outside of ZZZZZ at 4;000 ft. I told the Approach Controller we would be in a non-normal approach configuration and our airspeed would be higher than normal. I also told the controller not to put anyone in front of us to reduce the likeliness of a go-around. On the final approach course the Approach Controller asked us to slow twice and to descend. The first airspeed reduction was not an issue and we slowed. He asked us to descend to 3;000 ft and I told him we would like to stay at 4;000 ft and follow the GS guidance down on the approach. He approved this and then asked us to slow again. I told him 'you are not making this easy; we are [a priority] aircraft'. I told him this because we were [a priority] aircraft and our plans were to be stable and configured on the ILS no later than 10 miles out to reduce our possibilities of becoming unstable on the approach. We continued the ILS XXC Approach with the FO as PF and the Captain as PM. The approach and landing were normal. Per our plan and brief; the PF (FO) brought the airplane to a stop on the runway and then transferred the controls to the Captain to taxi. Once clear of Runway XXC we cancelled the emergency and taxied to the gate. Unreliable Airspeed due to ADC failure

An air carrier flight crew reported experiencing an ADC #1 failure; failure of the Captain's Airspeed and altitude. The crew performed the QRH checklist and landed without incident.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Takeoff and climb to cruise was uneventful. At cruise FL260; received ATC reroute to avoid weather. Reroute was ZZZ1 then back onto the ZZZZZ arrival. About 50 miles north of ZZZ1; we were cruising at 280 kts in IMC conditions at +2 degrees TAT with engine anti-ice on. The Captain was flying. We then noticed the airspeed start to go way down then go way back up. It indicated maybe 40 kts to 300 kts (unsure exactly). 'Airspeed low' kept announcing as well. The Captain turned off the autopilot and autothrottle and set 4 degrees nose high and told me to set power. I pulled the power to 70% N1 and we compared PFDs. My airspeed indications would indicate properly for a few seconds then jump up or down. The Captain's was constantly moving up and down so we transferred control to the First Officer. I called for the QRC and the Captain read and accomplished the steps (we had missed flight directors off). We had climbed a couple hundred feet during this and I asked the Captain to notify ATC and I turned the airplane eastbound in an attempt to exit IMC. It worked and a couple minutes later we exited IMC and started a descent to warmer air. While the Captain ran the QRH for unreliable airspeed and informed ATC/dispatch; I continued to fly. As the air warmed and as we exited IMC; airspeed indications returned to normal. We reviewed pitch and power setting in the QRH to make sure the airspeeds were accurate. The rest of the descent and arrival to ZZZ was uneventful. My guess is we accumulated ice on the probes enough to make the airspeed indications go unreliable. I didn't see abnormal icing on the windshield wipers nor was icing reported. Being in IMC at +2 degrees was about perfect conditions for it. After landing; the Captain and I talked about how we were thankful for 737 MAX simulator training we had both recently completed. The training prepared us so well for this and I am thankful to our check airmen in the sims. I felt well prepared for this as described above thanks to 737 MAX training.

On descent to ZZZ; Captain Pilot Flying; in IMC conditions; FL260; TAT +2. No visible icing. Engine anti ice on. Airspeed unreliable on Captain's side. Repeated 60-100 kt changes with aural 'airspeed' warning. Executed QRC/QRH. First Officer flew rest of flight. Notified ATC and notified Dispatch on ACARS. Notified Maintenance on the ground; wrote discrepancy into log book and discussed the occurrence in detail with the mechanic at the gate. [I] suspect icing; but had no indications of a fault in the pitot or air data systems.

B737 MAX 8 flight crew reported unreliable airspeed fluctuations during icing conditions.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working on lubing the MLG and nose landing gears. Started on the nose then I couldn't reach the 2 top grease fittings so I looked for a nearby small ladder. The other mechanics were using them so I waited until a ladder was available. After that I grabbed a small ladder and started lubing the two top fittings in the nose wheel. I finished my job and got a lead to double check my work. I then replaced 3 grounding wires. I changed a MLG one and two NLG wires. As I was changing the grounding wires I noticed a fitting that I thought could have used more grease so I greased it up further. As I was doing that the lead tapped me on my leg and I came down and he gave me some corrosion inhibiting sealant that I needed for the MLG grounding wire. Then another mechanic needed my help and I helped him out. After that I finished the two front bonding wires in the nose. I went and double checked everything after I was done with a flashlight to see if I left any rags or anything up in the wells and didn't see anything. And I thought I put the grease gun back in the kit there was 3 total. Between that and getting distracted the grease gun could have got left up in the nose landing gear door. I don't know if the tool room has responsibility to check the kit to make sure that all 3 guns have been returned but if this was the procedure it could possibly avoid any future mistakes or human error. I always try to double check my work and I know the seriousness of this mistake.

Air carrier Maintenance Technician reported that he may have left a grease gun in the nose landing gear door.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

While in the descent for landing a 'LE ASSYM' message appeared on the EICAS prior to flap extension. We started the QRH procedure; notified Approach Control of the problem and declared an emergency due to a flight control malfunction. We requested a turn off the final approach course to complete the the checklist and configure for landing. When we were configured; we intercepted the approach course and made a normal landing with 20 flaps. Due to the higher speed we rolled out to the end of the landing runway. ARFF followed us to the gate where the passengers deplaned normally.

The flight crew of a B767-300ER abandoned their approach due to a LE ASSYM EICAS alert.  They declared an emergency; completed appropriate checklists and landed uneventfully with 20 degrees of flap.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 164; Flight Crew Total 3778; Flight Crew Type 3778

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Total 2729; Flight Crew Type 2729

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

During landing roll out; using max autobrake; transfer of control; stowing the thrust reversers; at a relatively high speed; Tower issued taxi instruction of turn left on Taxiway 1 hold short of Taxiway 2. As I was concentrating on flying the airplane (decelerating on landing rolling out) I only heard Left on 1 and 2. As I vacated the runway on Taxiway 1 Ground called us but was stepped on and was unreadable. When vacating taxiway 1 and clearing the hold short line for the runway there is barely room to even hold short of taxiway 2 thus; I never expected for that to even be a possibility. I taxied out onto taxiway 2 and then saw Aircraft Y under tow on taxiway 2. He was far away and there was no threat of a collision but there was a conflict now on 2. Ground advised us we were supposed to hold short of 2; sounded annoyed; and then told the Aircraft Y tow crew to pull into the run-up area which they did and told us to continue which we did with no further complications. Receiving taxi instructions during a landing roll out while a pilot is still 'flying' the jet and concentrating is definitely a threat I will address moving forward in my briefings.

Daytime/VMC arrival into ZZZ.  Normal landing/rollout; aircraft decelerating brakes MAX; Tower issued clearance to exit via Taxiway 1; hold short Taxiway 2; contact Ground.  Clearance heard/understood/read back accurately by First Officer; misheard/misunderstood by Captain as 'exit Taxiway 1; Taxiway 2; contact Ground.'  First Officer unaware of misunderstanding.  Clearing runway; VHF 1 switched to Ground.  Ground transmission blocked by simultaneous transmission of third aircraft; essentially unreadable to First Officer.  Captain still exiting left on 1; continued left turn onto 2.  First Officer assumed transmission heard/understood sufficiently by Captain to continue taxi.  Turning onto 2; CA noted Aircraft Y under tow opposite direction on Taxiway 2; stopped aircraft well short of conflict.  Reprimanded by ground for failing to hold short Taxiway 2.  Tow crew directed to turn into holding pad; allow Aircraft Y to pass.  Conflict resolved; ground directed taxi to parking via 2.Breakdown in CRM/communication/First Officer verification.  Contributing factors included:  ATC taxi instructions issued during high workload period (short field landing; brakes MAX; transfer of controls).  Minimal length of Taxiway 2 resulted in a) limited area to clear runway and still hold short taxiway A; and b) insufficient time to query ground regarding blocked transmission and/or verify with Captain understood taxi instructions.

Air carrier flight crew reported a taxiway incursion and ground conflict resulted from receiving ATC taxi instructions during a high workload landing roll and not being able to clarify with Ground Control.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Evacuated; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

On a reposition flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 at level off the Lav Smoke warning went off while we leveled at 6;000 feet for the really short flight to ZZZ1. Captain walked back to the lav to observe a light blue haze in the lav and the last three seat rows. There was also an electrical burning smell. The First Officer was the Pilot Flying; we switched; he was fairly new and did a great job. I then instructed him to do the Lav smoke QRH; while I advised ATC and took the radios. He pulled the respective circuit breakers and completed the checklist and then got ATIS; Landing Data; and set us up for a runway change while I flew the plane direct to ZZZ1 after advising ATC. We landed and ARFF (Airport Rescue and Firefighting) got on but no smoke was observed. I attempted to call Maintenance Control and got a message that all controllers were busy and to 'Call Back Later'. We walked into the Maintenance hanger and the awesome ZZZ1 maintenance team told me they would take care of it. Unseen threat of Lav Smoke. A few navigational errors were made and trapped. It gets really busy and when you smell electrical smoke your adrenaline starts to kick in and muscle memory takes over. I'm actually surprised that we got all the checklists ran. We did a great job dividing and concurring.Not much I can do; but my question to management is what is the company doing to be proactive and predictive with some of our own airplanes? Do we have the staffing to do the best job and is our SMS system doing its thing? I'm starting to get really scared out here flying the line. There's only so much we can control; but it feels as if we are all about spin and less about running an effective risk based airline. I might be back; I take the same aircraft to ZZZ2 and back today! I just hope Maintenance Control picks up when I call.

EMB-145 Captain reported smoke in the lavatory during flight that resulted in a diversion.


Distraction; Workload; Time Pressure; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

VMC day departure from BFL; assigned a turn to a heading of 180 and climb to 6000 feet with the takeoff clearance off 30 R. Quickly after takeoff we were handed off the BFL departure who verified the heading and altitude assigned by BFL tower. 5 miles south of the airport; climbing out of roughly 2200 feet and 200 knots; I; pilot flying; spotted a small single engine aircraft crossing from left to right (east to west); roughly 1 mile in front of us; and about 700 feet above our current altitude. I quickly made an aggressive and evasive action to stop the roughly 3500 feet per minute climb and descend to an altitude (around 2000 feet) to miss the small aircraft by around 400 feet vertically and 100 feet horizontally. The first officer; non flying pilot; reported the near miss to ATC who responded with; 'traffic 1-3 o'clock; 2400 feet'. The first officer reported him in sight as the near miss and the controller handed us off to Los Angeles center. We continued with the flight to Houston with no further events. My first officer and I agreed that had the evasive action not been taken a mid-air collision would have occurred.We never received an alert of any kind on the TCAS until after we passed the aircraft when we received only a visual advisory on our map on the MFD.I am unsure of anything the flight crew could have done anything differently or any training that could be done to prevent this type of event. Depending on the facilities available to the departure controller and the equipment of the other aircraft; it is possible that the air traffic controller may require additional training to avoid such events. However; without knowing what information is available to him I cannot suggest that he was at fault. Finally; I do not believe the other aircraft was ever in communication with BFL. Had he/she been in communication I believe this event would have been avoided.

On climbout from BFL; an air carrier took evasive action from a near miss at 2;200 feet which ATC did not report until after the event.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS RWY 09L

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Total 9086; Flight Crew Type 5412

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

On approach to ORD 9L outside DOOGY at 4000 feet. Missed approach altitude for the 9L ILS is also 4000 feet. Intercepted the glide slope and started down; at 3700 feet; got the altitude alert but continued. The rest of the approach was uneventful. Purposely flying through an altitude alert away from a set altitude is bad SOP. I have filed multiple [reports] concerning this particular anomaly using the new SOP. As I said in my previous [reports] concerning this SOP; I believe this is a flawed SOP. We should not be flying through or away from altitude alerts.

B757 Captain reported continuing to fly through an altitude alert per new SOP.


Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

During the boarding process we discovered that the Customer Service Bag containing gloves; masks and sanitary wipes was not boarded. Other gloves were not boarded elsewhere. We reported the item missing to the Captain who requested it; but approximately 6 minutes before door closing we were told that; per the inflight Supervisor on duty at the time we would have to go without these vitally important PPEs. We indicated that per the Captain; the door would not be closing until the items were received. After several more minutes; the bag arrived and after all was said and done; departed on time.I am writing this report to bring this to the attention to all involved in the decision making process. This policy must be reviewed. Crews simply cannot be asked to depart without the essential PPE for a flight. Granted gloves can be found elsewhere in first aid kits; etc.; but not enough for an entire crew for an entire flight. Given the extreme danger of COVID contamination; gloves must be changed frequently between delivery and pick up services.

Flight crew member reported the bag containing protective gear for COVID-19 was not boarded on the aircraft; and that the on duty in-flight Supervisor directed the crew to depart without the bag.


Workload; Training / Qualification; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Procedure; Manuals; Human Factors; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication

Aircraft arrived late. We met incoming crew as they departed the aircraft and received a brief on its problems. Cockpit preflight was delayed while mechanics struggled with the required fuel transfer/refueling procedures due to inoperative Tank 3 quantity indication. Subsequently did cockpit preflight and setup; including a thorough review of lengthy MEL pages; the need to verify a voided cargo space; for an external air start (no APU); and to re-initialize the FMS data after engine start. Also reviewed autothrottles-off takeoff procedures; the SID; and the Engine Out procedure. Originally planned to start all 3 engines in chocks to simplify things; but Ground Maintenance started the huffer earlier than we anticipated and then advised us of a time limit on the huffer. Changed plans to start Number 3; disconnect the huffer; then push back and subsequently crossbleed start the others. In an intentional attempt to keep things slow; methodical; and controlled; I cut the ground crew free and then proceeded to complete the After Start Checklist; re-initialize the FMS data; configure the aircraft and complete the Before Takeoff Checklist to the line. It was during this phase that I failed to ensure the engine fuel pumps were turned on as part of the After Start Checklist with the fuel panel in manual control. Ground tried to give us 25R for departure (the short runway); which I declined in favor of the longer 25L. Subsequently departed from 25L; executed a normal departure and was climbing out on the departure. Passing through FL180; I noticed some wake-turbulence type bumps which lasted longer than normal. Began to look at engine vibration values and noticed Number 2 spooling down. Then the Low RPM alert came on. We were in the clear and the aircraft was flying fine; still climbing. Scanned further and quickly discovered the fuel pumps were OFF. We had precipitated this event by failing to turn them on while still on the ground. Confident that nothing else was amiss; we used the QRH to restart the engine; and restored it to normal operation. We reviewed our status and the Flight Operations Manual: Everything was working fine (except for the MEL'ed items); and nothing appeared to require a turn back or divert elsewhere. We elected to continue the climb toward [destination]; and sent Dispatch an ACARS message informing them of the inadvertent flameout; and intent to continue to the filed destination. Dispatch acknowledged receipt of the message with no further instructions. Continued the rest of the flight uneventfully. I wrote a Maintenance Log entry as required by the FOM; and spoke with Chief Pilot upon arrival. Obviously; even greater attention to detail is required on my part. Even though we caught and trapped several potential errors on this particular flight; none of that matters because this still happened -- and I should have caught it. I was the Captain; and the responsibility for this mistake is all mine. I can pretty confidently state that it won't happen to me a second time; but that won't change the classic setup for this kind of error. The MD-11 fuel system is fully automatic almost all of the time. When this type of MEL is employed to dispatch the aircraft; the flight crews absolutely will be entering a procedural regime into which they rarely venture; and it's full of possible human-error traps. I would strongly recommend significantly limiting other MELs when the fuel indicating MEL is employed. All four of the MELs on this flight required flight crew attention and action; compounding the probability of missing something. That could easily save crews from other errors; but probably the most effective prevention for this specific recurrence would be to add two crewmember verification to the position of the fuel pump switches when operating in Manual Mode.

Once operations were back to normal; I reviewed the Before Start Checklist and found my mistake. I had skipped over that portion of the checklist; just as I have for the past two years. At the time of the event; we were talking to Center. We had been cleared to climb to FL290. We never leveled off; and did not have a frequency change. I do not believe I have operated the Fuel System in Manual since my Initial training in the MD-11. Complacency in reading the checklist was a large factor. Other factors were the other abnormal procedures that caused distractions; the late departure as well as the late arrival of paperwork.A note or possibly even a Warning in the MEL might have prevented me missing the Fuel System Manual Operation items in the checklist. Having a Fuel System Manual during yearly training would have been beneficial.

A MD-11 Number 2 Engine flamed out in flight because an MEL required the fuel system be operated in the Manual Mode and the fuel pumps were never turned on. The flight continued after an inflight restarted.


Light Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

While using the iPad to look up answers during our Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) oral it became obvious that it has a serious shortcoming. The iPad has no compete table of contents that can be looked at once like a paper manual. If you were to look at a paper manual table of contents you would at a glance see the subject you are looking for. With an iPad you tap on the subject and then get a tab behind a tab etc. i.e. FOM - Policy>Flight>Standard Callouts. If you click on the wrong tab to find something you have to back out of 'the rabbit hole' and look elsewhere. It's very hard to find things. The Performance Manual has no index or tab to find specific airport performance and turn procedures. The only way to get to an airport is to scroll along to find it. Very hard to do in flight. The search function is almost useless. For example: type EAT in the Performance Manual to find Wenatchee and it will find many answers like great Falls etc.A simple complete table of contents and tabs for each airport in the Performance Manual will solve this problem.

A Captain; preparing for an Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) oral; reports on the many shortcomings of the IPad as a replacement for traditional aircraft flight manuals.


Troubleshooting; Workload; Confusion; Distraction

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter FOD

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

After an uneventful approach and touchdown with Captain as Pilot Flying; the aircraft was decelerating normally with speed brakes and reversers deployed. The crew accomplished a normal exit of the runway when smoke could be seen in the flight deck and sirens sounded in the cabin. Purser was immediately contacted and told flight crew that there was smoke in the cabin and detectors going off. The Purser was asked to assess the situation in the cabin as simultaneous contact was made with the Tower. Cabin was asked for any signs of a fire or source of smoke and none were present. The Tower advised crew that a runway treatment had been used two days prior and that upon crew request no signs of smoke or fire were visible coming from aircraft. Crew determined it was safe to exit the runway taxiway due to smoke being from possible ingestion into the packs or reversers from chemicals in the runway area and proceed to the ramp with constant contact with the cabin to ensure no escalation or fire warnings.A short time later an evacuation message and siren was triggered in the flight deck. Once again we verified with cabin crew that no fire or source of smoke could be assessed. We requested that the emergency equipment be available and accompany the aircraft to the gate out of an abundance of caution and increasing warnings in the flight deck. A normal shut down was accomplished and the flight mechanic entered the flight deck and informed crew that he had inadvertently set off the evacuate warning while trying to cancel the smoke detectors in the cabin.Crew was met by local airport authorities and emergency personnel. During the interaction with crew we were informed that two compounds 'Sodium Formate' a liquid treatment and 'Potassium Acetate' mixed in with 'aviation grade sand' had been used two days prior and could possibly have been ingested by reverser system and packs leading to smoke. A giant smoke cloud could also be seen at the midpoint of the runway at least 200 feet tall but centered in one location; the possible site where chemicals interacted with the aircraft. Crew taking over the flight was briefed on the situation and Maintenance was in the process of examining the aircraft. By all logic with no indications of a fire and smoke being generated inside the aircraft an external source was deemed the most likely cause. The pebble sized compound that may have been present along runway edge and some portions of runway; even though runway appeared perfectly clean and clear were brought by airports OPS Crew after an inspection of touchdown and mid runway areas.With the compounds mentioned not being familiar to crews not much comment can be given; I would suggest familiarizing crews with this event to help discern an actual fire with a foreign contaminant causing indications of smoke and fire. I would also point out that procedures need to be followed in regards to on board mechanics response to dealing with abnormalities; rather than helping in trying to cancel an alarm after it was deemed non-threatening the issue was compounded which could have forced an evacuation had flight deck and cabin crew had poorer communication.

Air Carrier Captain reported smoke in the flight deck and cabin due to the reversers or packs ingesting chemicals that had been used to treat the runway surface.


Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird; Ground Event / Encounter Object

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

I was working Gate X flight XXXX to ZZZ. I was guiding the jetbridge away from the aircraft directing the tires to the yellow marker the tires begins to spin too fast. The customer service agent drove the bridge back towards the aircraft the plane turned and hits another ramp servicemen in the shoulder and head.

Ramp Agent reported that a CSR collided with an aircraft while operating the jet bridge; resulting in an injury to another ramp agent.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Doors were armed; the flight crew just completed safety demo; waiting to push back. Ground/CSA supervisor tried to open the forward entry door with NO warning. The 'A' FA was telling her to STOP and the sup continued to try to open the door from the outside. The 'A' disarmed the door and the 'C' contacted the flight deck to let the pilots know what was going on. The supervisor said she wanted to let more passengers come on board and that was her reason for trying to opening the door. The 'A' asked her if she was a new employee and she said no; and that she was NOT trained on operating the aircraft doors and did not understand that she was putting herself; crew members; or passengers at risk. This is a huge safety concern. The slide could have inflated.All ground personnel need to be trained on communicating effectively with the flight deck and training should be required for operating the aircraft door.

B737-700 Flight Attendant reported a Customer Service Agent attempted to open the main cabin door after the slide had been armed for departure. The Flight Attendant was able to disarm the slide before the door was opened.


General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

During the previous flight the radar was not working correctly. The Engineer entered it into the log. We arrived at the airplane the next morning to find all of our discrepancies were signed off as fixed; but 2 of them were not (INS DME #1 on Captain's instruments and a mystery warning light signed off as W/S Caution and moved to CI.) I was mainly concerned with the radar; as the other 2 were lights. I said to the Maintenance person that since the lights were not fixed; how can I believe that the radar was fixed. The radar was signed off as 'per 34-43-00' and 'normal.' He pulled the Maintenance Manual and we did the tests together. During the cockpit test; we followed; step by step; to test the radar tilt; gain; and test functions. The test function showed the correct pattern; but the radar would not provide accurate ground returns or changes in gain. This showed that the cockpit tests failed. The next step was to open the radome and visually check correct operation. The radome was opened. Then; with coordination through the intercom; the 2 Maintenance personnel visually watched as the radar would sweep. The radar would not tilt to the down position. The Maintenance personnel informed me that the radar antenna motors were inoperative and that the antenna would need to be replaced. Our route of flight consisted of embedded TS to FL550.If my crew had not flown the airplane in and entered this into the log; another crew would have accepted the aircraft. This could be a deadly mistake. Again; our route consisted of embedded TS to FL550. This event occurred because of Maintenance personnel being unfamiliar with certain systems and not completing the required troubleshooting tasks. Also Maintenance did not have the proper test harnesses to troubleshoot INS stabilization. These are all required to sign off 'per 34-43-00.' Our Maintenance is pushing aircraft out of 'their' stations to move problems to another person; or 'we can't fix that here.' Also; on time departures and avoiding maintenance delays are a primary goal. I believe that the aircraft are becoming extremely unsafe because of this culture. Once identified; the crew refused the aircraft. In order to correct these problems; the Maintenance personnel and crews need to trust each other. Maintenance needs to fix or troubleshoot airplanes correctly. This mistake could have been deadly. If not for due diligence among our flight crews; their superior flight skills; and unprecedented experience; a crash will happen. The flight crews will miss something; eventually. This is not a matter of 'if we miss something;' but more of a 'when we miss something;' that the ultimate costs of the culture here will be realized. The accident chain needs to be broken; and the final link is the crews. With increasing responsibility like ordering catering; missing charts; organizing the airport transportation; … incomplete or inaccurate paperwork; unapproved chart manuals; nonstandard aircraft; and duty days more than 18 hours with 'legal rest;' the crews are exhausted before reaching top of climb.

B747-200 Captain notes a radar discrepancy during descent and enters the fault in the logbook. The next day the radar is signed off but functional testing with the help of Maintenance indicates that the radar tilt is inoperative and the aircraft is refused.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.5

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was giving training at R-41. Sector 40 was open. We were working approximately 4 OAK arrivals that were descending via the WINDSR (OPD) arrival. I was looking up the arrival chart to discuss published speeds; phraseology options and techniques for assigning speeds. As I was discussing this with the developmental; Aircraft X reported that they were responding to an RA. We then saw the VFR traffic and acknowledged the RA and issued the traffic advisory. The developmental advised the conflict alert had previously gone off but he evaluated and suppressed it. At the time the 1200 code was at approximately 7;000 feet and the Aircraft X was descending from 21000 feet on the WNDSR arrival. When Aircraft X responded to the RA their altitude was approximately 16;000 feet and the VFR target was approximately 15;000 feet descending.TCAS RA's happen daily at sectors 40/41. There is a high volume of VFR sightseeing traffic; VFR flight training; skydiving aircraft; and many uncontrolled airports. I had an RA last year because I was busy issuing traffic advisories to a VFR aircraft in conflict with an OAK arrival. During this time a 1200 code departed DVO and climbed into a jet at 5000 feet between SGD and STS. My recommendation at that time was to create an Alert Area for the Sonoma valley. Alert Areas are clearly depicted on sectional charts and as a pilot and flight instructor I would definitely avoid flying through one; especially if I was not talking to ATC. The 1200 code in this event was a [business jet]. I would assume a business jet pilot would also avoid flying through an Alert Area VFR without at least getting flight following. If we could remove a fraction of VFR traffic from that area it would increase safety. At the very least it would encourage VFR traffic to call for flight following.My recommendation remains the same. To help prevent safety issues like this from reoccurring create an Alert Area over Sonoma Valley. An area that encompasses the airspace south from STS to CA35; west to PYE; and east to APC.

ZOA Controller reported an air carrier on arrival responded to an RA of a VFR target not in communication with ATC. The Center Controller did not notice that the VFR target was a factor for the arrival.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 4; Flight Crew Total 140; Flight Crew Type 140

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC

Our plane [is a] C172 with G1000 and TIS. [An] experimental called position [inbound to the same airport]. We responded with our position. He said we will probably beat him in as he had 80 for ground speed; 29 KT wind. We began our descent to 1;100. TIS reported a target moving from east to west in front of the [experimental]. We let [him] know of the target. He said he was looking 'no joy.' TIS showed a conflict with our path. C172 pilot and passenger [were] visually looking for target; but it was pretty hazy. TIS shows no plane is moving behind or ahead on intersecting path. We decide to Vy climb at full power. [We were] still looking and still no visual contact. I was taught that the best thing to do is climb in potential conflict as the plane becomes much more visible by showing more surface area.TIS showed a -40 and target passing directly underneath. TIS changed Target to yellow and audible 'traffic' alarms trigger. At this point I noticed [I was] in Vy climb at 2;500 FT [and in Class B]. [I] began immediate descent back under the 2;000 FT [Class B] shelf and set up for entering the traffic pattern. The [applicable] FAR here is 'A pilot may deviate from the FARs as much as necessary to maintain the safety of his plane and crew.' [I] made call [at] 2 miles for mid 45 upwind for 15. Turn on the ADSB to report all the time not just when a sender lights it up.

C172 pilot reported an NMAC with an experimental aircraft at a non-towered airport and during evasive action he entered Class B airspace.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 1380; Flight Crew Type 460

This occurred after shutdown upon landing at ZZZ. The owner of the aircraft had flown some of his employees out to him in ZZZ1. This was a return trip bringing them back to ZZZ. I recognized the FAA Inspectors because the same guys had ramp checked me less than a week before in ZZZ2. Once the door opened to the cabin they introduced themselves and presented ID to show they were FAA ASI's conducting a random ramp check. They asked me for my certificate and medical and while I was providing that another Inspector boarded the plane and retrieved the airworthiness certificate and registration (I had not authorized them for that but didn't mind). After he had taken down my information he began to ask me who my passengers were; I told him the aircraft owner's name and that they were employees of the owner's company. I confirmed that this flight; and every flight I've ever had with this company has been strictly part 91 owner flight.The passengers had left the aircraft and I went to work getting the luggage off the plane. They separated some of the passengers and asked 'who is in charge of this flight'. Confused; the senior most employee sheepishly raised his hand and wasn't sure what they meant. Upon further clarification the passenger explained that he along with the others worked for the aircraft owner. The safety inspectors asked all the passengers loudly if anyone had paid for the flight. They all confirmed that they had not and were increasingly confused as to what was going on. They continued to ask the passengers various questions.At this point I asked the inspectors if they needed any documents for the plane (the POH; MEL; VOR check; weight and balance etc) which they said they did not. This was clearly just to talk to the passengers and probe if we were doing something unsavory. The Safety Inspectors talked amongst themselves on the other side of the airplane; came back and took down the names of all the passengers. It held the passengers up and they later contacted the owner who was not happy his employees had been held up. This whole ramp check left me uncomfortable and I wasn't entirely sure they could actually do these things as part of a legal ramp check. After they left I talked with folks in the FBO who had said they were clearly waiting for us. They had arrived to the FBO over an hour before our arrival and told the staff that they would be conducting random checks. When the line guy said ok well I have a plane coming in soon; the Inspectors responded 'that they would be waiting on a Pilatus that was coming in'. Clearly these checks are not random. I asked if the company I contract for has a letter of investigation and they said no; but these ramp checks are clearly targeted.

Pilot reported an FAA ramp check looking for third party flight sharing platform activity.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

During passenger boarding a catering representative placed two carrier boxes filled with dry ice right in front of the boarding door; stating that the crew should take this on the aircraft because of an inoperative chiller. The crew was; at that moment not aware of any inoperative chiller on the aircraft. During the briefing with the Captain; and after checking the list of maintenance issues in my link; there was no mention about an inoperative chiller. The two carrier boxes posed a significant tripping hazard to our customers boarding; but the catering representative refused to remove the carrier boxes; stating that the flight attendants should take them on board. The carrier boxed where too heavy to lift; and it is my understanding that we should not carry heave carrier boxes full of dangerous goods through an aircraft with customers on board. An In-flight Supervisor was in the area and was unhelpful in resolving this dangerous situation. While I was trying to have these carrier boxes with dry ice removed; this Supervisor displayed aggressive behavior and stating if I was refusing the dry ice and taking a delay. He was unwilling to listen or understand the problem with having two carrier boxes full of dry ice being placed in front of the boarding door while customers were boarding. At this point I was informed by the Captain that chiller number 7 in the aft galley had an issue and the fuse was pulled. No one informed the crew about this. In the interest of departing on time; and to satisfy the Supervisor who was getting more hostile by the minute; I decided to accept two bins of dry ice; that I hand carried on the aircraft myself. We then were able to close to boarding door and leave on time.

Flight Attendant reported that a communication breakdown resulted in dry ice being brought onboard the aircraft without proper documentation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 129; Flight Crew Total 7491; Flight Crew Type 7491

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 156; Flight Crew Type 1015

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Descending into [destination] and leveling at 11;000 feet; moderate turbulence was encountered and 3 flight attendants were injured.  Airplanes in front of us did not mention any turbulence and we were not deviating for the weather.

On arrival we had been told to expect only light chop in the descent and had the seatbelt sign on. As we entered a small cloud layer between two cells barely displaying on our radar display we encountered about 3 seconds of moderate turbulence. We called back to check on the Flight Attendants to find that two had fallen and had hit their head. Not knowing the severity of their injuries we [contacted ATC] when ATC gave us a delay vector to ensure expeditious handling to the airport. We also requested an inflight supervisor and paramedics meet us at the gate to err on the side of safety.

A B737 flight crew reported they encountered unforecasted turbulence and several flight attendants were injured.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security

After my Dispatcher disconnected the tow bar; the pilot informed him that a passenger believed that their last minute checked carry on was loaded with a lithium ion battery that they failed to remove prior to boarding. We returned the aircraft to the gate to retrieve the bag. Once parked; my crew pulled the bag off the aircraft; scanned to offload it; and were holding it planeside. While I was helping my pit guy close up the FWD pit; Supervisor took the questionable bag from the planeside; and breached security by not only taking the bag upstairs and crossing the threshold of the secured area; but also leaving it unattended in the jetbridge. When I realized what had happened; and confronted [supervisor] about the breach in FAA protocol; he said he knew that he was not supposed to bring the bag up; but did so anyway.

Ground employee reported removing passenger luggage from cargo due to Hazmat restriction. Reporter also noted FAA security breach by leaving baggage in unattended on the jetbridge.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors

During descent into Baltimore on the RAVNN RNAV STAR we were vectored off the arrival numerous times and given assigned airspeed changes. After being vectored off the arrival we were cleared direct to OTT; cross OTT at 9;000. Neither the Captain nor I ever heard 'Descend via the RAVNN arrival.' We complied with the clearance to cross OTT at 9;000 and subsequently switched controllers. The next Controller asked if we were going to make RAVNN at 6;000. We told him that; although we had not heard a clearance to 'Descend via' the arrival; we would descend to 6;000. The Controller then cleared us to 'descend to 6;000' and never mentioned anything further about missing an altitude. No further incident occurred. In the future; when being vectored off the arrival and checking in with a new controller; it is would be wise to check with the new controller to make we are all on the same page as the previous controller. This way you know what is expected of you.

After they had been vectored off of and then returned to the RAVNN RNAV STAR to BWI; the flight crew of a B717-200; as well as the Controller to which they were switched; were uncertain as to whether or not they had been 'cleared via' the STAR and were intending to comply with the STAR restrictions.


Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

[We were on the] RUUDY 4 RNAV departure out of TEB Runway 24 to cross WENTZ at 1;500; then cross TASCA at 2;000. We cross WENTZ at 1;500 and than started our climb to 2;000 just passing WENTZ. TEB Departure called and gave us a new heading and a higher altitude and said we started our climb to 2;000 just before crossing WENTZ and then gave us a frequency change. Not sure what caused the problem. We know the problem with the Newark arrivals descending over Teterboro Airport. As this is a RNAV departure; we have no other way on this SID to identify WENTZ; TASCA and RUUDY waypoints. We briefed for the departure; setting up the FMS for this SID and using VNAV. I was hand flying the airplane and at 1;500 noticed that the flight director was still calling for a climb. At WENTZ we then started our climb to 2;000. What could have caused the problem? VNAV not selected on the flight director or VNAV drop off after takeoff? We seldom do VNAV departures and in the future need to verify VNAV is selected.

A HS125 pilot was admonished by ATC for starting to climb to 2;000 FT just prior to WENTZ on the RUUDY 4 departure from TEB.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

During cruise; three hours into the five-hour flight; I heard one of the engines start to roll back. It was as if we were losing power and the plane had some yawing. The cockpit was dark and I could not clearly see the throttles. I reached out and I touched the throttles; I felt the left throttle on its own had moved back about two inches from where it had been initially set. I pushed the left throttle back up to where it should have been. Then the left engine started continuously surging. The plane also started shuddering and shaking very violently. The Captain took over the throttles and shortly after turned off the auto throttles. We started losing the automation for directional control; the Captain turned off the autopilot; and hand flew the aircraft. As I tried to figure out why we were losing automation the flight attendants started calling the flight deck and told me passengers were screaming about the left engine and said the left engine was on fire. The Flight attendants and passengers could see flames coming out of the engine. We did not get any type of Engine Fire indications in the cockpit. I told the Captain about the fire and saw [a possible alternate] was approximately one hundred miles away. I suggested it to the Captain and he agreed. I [advised] ATC of our situation and we turned toward the [alternate]. I believe the Captain had pulled the power off the engines since we were close to the airport and at twenty eight thousand feet. Some of the shuddering and shaking dissipated for the moment. I ran the QRC Quick Reference Checklist for: 'Engine Limit or Surge or Stall' and that directed me to the QRH where I did the appropriate check list. I was also coordinating with ATC. I had ATC notify the company about our situation. I was later also able to notify the company via ACARS. While I was setting up the plane for landing; I asked [our jumpseat pilot] if he could pull up the appropriate approach plates and he gladly helped. I set up for the ILS. As we started to configure for landing the engine power was increased and the shuddering and violent shaking came back along with an unfamiliar and very uncomfortable sound from the left engine. The Captain pulled the left engine to idle and it seemed to help. We completed the before landing checklist and landed single engine.We stopped on the runway; the Captain spoke with the passengers and I coordinated with [ground personnel]. [Ground personnel] said the engine was not on fire at that time. It was a fiasco/ complete failure; trying to get hold of Operations and get a gate. During this the Captain was talking with [ground personnel]; I was talking with the Tower and [our jumpseat pilot] once again helped out and tried getting contact with Operations.Once we got a gate; we taxied to park with [ground personnel] following us where the passengers deplaned without any further issues.Cause: Unforeseen engine issues.Suggestions: Have our stations better trained for emergencies and make it mandatory for someone to always be able to respond to the operations radio. Having to call multiple; multiple times when you are under pressure to make sure passengers are safe is inexcusable.

B737-800 First Officer reported diverting to an alternate airport after experiencing an inflight engine stall and surging.