FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 08L

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

While on the ONYON One Arrival we were cleared the arrival routing for the ILS Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) Runway (RWY) 8L.  Prior to the downwind leg; the approach controller provided the current RVR of >6000.  When on the radar downwind the weather was updated to 2600 RVR.  I was flying and the Captain briefed the changes in procedure required for a Monitored Approach.  About the time the controller turned us to a 180 heading for the base leg the master caution flashed and the EICAS message 'AP TRIM IS LWD' flashed for about a second and both lights extinguished.  The autopilot continued to function fine.  We were given a 120 heading and cleared for the ILS PRM RWY 8L.  While on the ILS final; the aircraft 2 ahead on the approach landed and provided a PIREP that they had the runway lights in sight at 450 feet AGL.  Our approach was uneventful and stable until 500 feet AGL.  At approximately 500 feet AGL; the Pilot Not Flying (PNF) glanced outside searching for the approach/runway lighting.  I noted the command bars direct a right turn and an amber boxed 'A' flash on the PFD for about 1 second.  I cross checked that the aircraft was on course and on glide path as the aircraft entered a right bank turn.  I was initiating a go-around simultaneously as the PNF looked back inside and directed a go-around.  The aircraft had reached approximately 10 degrees right bank as I pushed the Take Off Go Around (TOGA) button; pushed the power up; leveled the wings and raised the nose to 7-10 degrees nose up.  I simultaneously directed 'set go-around power; spoilers in and flaps 8.' The PNF set the power; reset the flaps to 8 and notified the tower of our missed approach.  Tower then stated; 'you are headed toward runway 8R.' I then began the missed approach turn to the north noting the altimeter read 1700 feet.  Tower handed us off to Atlanta Approach.  We were given a heading of 270 and altitude of 5000 feet to put us back in sequence for the ILS PRM RWY 8L. The controller provided updated weather of touchdown RVR 1800; mid-point RVR 1600 and roll-out RVR 1800. We flew an uneventful monitored ILS with the Captain going 'visual' at 200 feet AGL.Changing weather due to the fog setting in right at sunset provided the greatest environmental threat.  We had briefed and were prepared for monitored approach procedures to aid in mitigating this threat.  The autopilot/flight director error during a high workload phase of flight compounded the low visibility threat.  The aircraft autopilot/flight director error caused the aircraft to turn off course and result in a course deviation and an undesired aircraft state on short final in the weather.  The undesired state was realized and an immediate missed approach/go-around was executed.Go-arounds are in frequent and missed approaches are even more infrequent.  This is the first actual missed approach in the aircraft I had flown.  Out of about 210 flights I had only gone around once.  The training department is very adamant about planning approaches to go missed.  That way you are best prepared for the missed approach procedure.  The challenge is maintaining that mindset.  Even tougher when aircraft in front of you are providing PIREP's and landing from the approach.  I was vigilant during the approach but I do admit the autopilot directing a turn away from course was surprising.  Although it probably took a second to recognize and react; the undesired aircraft state (course deviation) happened quickly. The tower advisory interrupted the flow of the go-around procedure and we did not retract the gear until initiating the turn to the north.  Also; in accordance with the published missed approach; I should have turned toward the north at 1500 feet.  A lot happens quickly during a missed approach and I now know it probably won't go as cleanly as in training. If external factors are causing the missed to not go cleanly; I will just stay on the profile.  Even more so now; I fully appreciate the mindset of planning every approach to a missed approach. One item the training shop may want to introduce is a missed approach due to a minor aircraft/navigation/flight director system malfunction.  As I recall most every missed approach in training was due to weather below minimums.

We had an issue with this airplane with the Jet pipe overheat fail message in flight even though we thought it had cleared. We notified maintenance on it and went on to Atlanta. When we arrived we were told to expect Runway 8L and fly the Runway 8L Transition. Somewhere between the descent below 7000 feet and turning to base on a vector we briefly saw a Autotrim message; I didn't quite see what message we got but it cleared since I didn't know what the message was. We continued along and started the approach we had briefed; a Category I since the RVR initially was reported at over 6000. After we were cleared for the approach and switched to tower the RVR had dropped to 4000. Still ok for the approach. Everything seemed to go smoothly. Once inside the final fix the RVR was reported to be 2600 RVR and the guy in front of us reported the runway at 450 feet AGL. When we got to around 500 AGL the airplane appeared to start drifting a little bit right of course; then in a matter of seconds the airplane turned to the right and the course turned amber and we were moving away from the course. The Autopilot trim warning came on and we were clearly not tracking the course any more. I immediately called for the go around. We initiated the go around/missed approach. Initially we had the wings level and didn't turn right away due to proximity to the ground. However the heading was about 15 degrees to the right of where we were when on the course. So our initial climb was towards Runway 8R. I realized this and immediately let Tower know we were going missed due to automation failure and she directed us to turn to a heading of north immediately because we were flying almost over Runway 8R. We got the airplane cleaned up (all be it a little bit late trying to make sure we had a course and altitude). The Autopilot came off when First Officer (FO) hit the Take Off Go Around (TOGA) Button. The airplane seemed out of trim for a bit in initial climb but since I was not on the controls I am not sure about that. Threats. Weather deteriorating and sense of security that the airplane in front of us saw the runway at 450 AGL. Trusting automated system so much when it started doing things it isn't supposed to do we got caught somewhat flatfooted and had to do a missed approach where and when we didn't expect it. The autopilot had turned the airplane to the right by about 15 degrees by the time we started climbing. The initial reaction was to climb straight when we really needed an immediate turn to the north or at least back to the course. The undesired state was that we were right of course and flying in the wrong direction due to this failure. Not doing missed approaches a lot makes us slow in execution of the procedure. Due to the unusual occurrence and new checklist we were out of normal rhythm. The First Officer and I discussed the checklist after we landed and we both believe we did ok but we did use some of the old terminology during the procedures. We briefly briefed another ILS (Category II this time) and we did the approach again; this time on our toes for the failure and ready to go missed immediately if the course even would have deflected a little bit. (The threat being that we see the course on the ILS deflect some time and the autopilot getting back to the course) I think this would be a good training event. Have the automation send you off course at 500 AGL on an ILS when you don't expect anything like that to happen. Another thing might be to verbalize the missed approach one more time just before you start the approach. We thoroughly briefed the approach; yet when we went around we were still trying to analyze what happened with the autopilot instead of being totally on the ball for this missed approach which is now the most important thing to do for the day.

A CRJ200 Flight Crew experiences an autopilot malfunction at 500 feet AGL during a low visibility approach to Runway 8L at ATL. A missed approach is initiated but not before the aircraft has turned 15 degrees toward 8R. When the Take Off Go Around (TOGA) button is pushed the autopilot disconnects causing a late turn away from Runway 8R and late gear retraction. The second approach is a Category (CAT) III and successful.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 6720; Flight Crew Type 280

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Evacuated

Upon landing everything had been normal on the flight but; after setting the nose gear on the runway; the aircraft veered left. The crew made all efforts to maintain the aircraft on the runway; but the aircraft departed the runway to the left. The aircraft stopped on the grass and the crew performed the shutdown and evacuation procedures. The nose gear had collapsed during the landing.No passengers were on board the aircraft. The crew did not suffer any injuries.

When the CL600's nose gear collapsed after landing the flight crew was unable to arrest an excursion off the left side of the runway.


Other RNAV (GPS) Y Runway 27; STAR LINDI4

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Airport; Weather; Human Factors; Procedure

I was the Captain and pilot flying while operating to San Diego (SAN). We were on the LINDI 4 Arrival for the RNAV (GPS) Y for Runway 27 at San Diego. While on the approach; and at approximately 5000 MSL; near LUCKI intersection; we noticed converging traffic to our right. SoCal Approach Control gave us vectors to the left to put the converging traffic ahead of us for the arrival into San Diego. After separation was satisfactory; we were vectored to rejoin the approach at LYNDI intersection. The weather was a solid overcast at approximately 4000 MSL; and we began our descent on the RNAV approach. As we passed REEBO Final Approach Fix; San Diego Tower told us to slow to our final approach speed; which we did. We heard the tower clear an aircraft for takeoff on the runway we were landing. As we continued the approach; we were very surprised to hear the Tower clear a second aircraft to takeoff on our landing runway. We broke out of the cloud layer at approximately 1500 MSL and we saw the aircraft taking the runway when we were inside 1000 AGL. We became concerned as to the lack of separation and we reviewed the go-around procedures. We were at approximately 100 AGL when San Diego Tower initiated a go-around for our aircraft; as the other aircraft was still on the runway. We accomplished the go-around and the Tower gave us vectors to the left and a climb to 2500 MSL. We were switched to SoCal and climbed to 5000 MSL and were vectored back for another approach.It was very busy getting the approach set up and complying with ATC instructions. SoCal turned us back to VYDDA intersection and descended us to 4000 MSL. There was confusion with the FO talking to SoCal about the clearance altitude; as we were prompting SoCal for a lower altitude and clearance for the approach. We finally received approach clearance; but we were approximately 1000 feet high on the approach and in IMC conditions. We struggled to get the aircraft to descend and capture the glideslope on the RNAV approach. Not satisfied with what the automation was doing; I disconnected the autopilot and hand flew the remainder of the approach and tried to get the aircraft down to the appropriate glideslope. We were fully configured by 1000 AGL but will still high on the approach. We had to increase the rate of descent below 1000 AGL to approximately 1400 FPM momentarily to get down. The 'sink rate' warning did go off in the cockpit. We were on a normal glideslope at 500 AGL. I felt it was much safer to continue what would possibly be considered an unstable approach that to execute a second go-around; given the reduced level of ATC service we had experienced; along with a high workload; frustration; and reduced fuel state. The landing was uneventful. I debriefed this event over the telephone with supervisors with both San Diego Tower and SoCal Approach. ATC vectored us for the approach higher than we should have been to execute a stabilized approach. ATC should not 'PUSH TIN' and try to get out aircraft without proper separation; resulting in a go-around and the subsequent vectors for the second approach putting us high and making it difficult to descend on a normal glideslope; especially in IMC conditions.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A321 flight crew reported having an aircraft cleared onto the runway at SAN as they were approaching to land. At 100 feet they were issued a go-around by ATC. On the next approach they were held high by ATC resulting in an unstabilized approach; but a successful landing.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 3400; Flight Crew Type 1075

Workload; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airspace Structure; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Flight crew briefed and understood the RUUDY4 departure from TEB prior to takeoff; including engagement of the autopilot before the first level-off (WENTZ). Departure was properly loaded in FMS. After takeoff; at approximately 500 FT MSL; the FMS automatically switched from HDG mode to LNAV mode; as the crew had briefed and expected.In capturing the LNAV mode; somewhere between 1.3 and 2.3 miles on the departure; the flight director commanded an initial turn to [toward] the 260 heading [track] before correcting back to the 240 heading. During this time; the pilot flying followed the command bars; turning to the 260 heading before the charted intercept from the 240 heading. ATC queried if the aircraft was on the departure and said it looked like we had turned too early. At this point the pilot flying returned to a 240 heading to rejoin the departure.While I responded to the radio call I also noted that the pilot flying had climbed to an altitude of 1;600 FT MSL and made the statement 'altitude.' The pilot flying corrected to 1;500 MSL. The altitude situation could have been avoided by engagement of the autopilot at 1;000 FT; as briefed prior to takeoff. The aircraft avionics did try to make an abrupt capture and would have caused the airplane to turn off course even if the autopilot had been engaged. Better situational awareness on the part of flight crew would have lead the pilot flying to follow the departure procedure as depicted on the chart rather than relying solely on the command bars.

A momentary erroneous right turn command as the FMS transitioned from heading to LNAV mode while flying the RUUDY RNAV SID from TEB resulted in a premature turn to intercept the track to WENTZ. That distraction contributed to a small altitude deviation when the pilot flying failed to level at 1;500 FT MSL as charted.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

While waiting to cross [the runway] behind an Airbus; ground keyed the mic and began to give the instruction to cross when suddenly a loud automated 'TAXIWAY' alert was heard in the background and the Controller told [the Airbus] to hold. Due to the odd transmission I looked up to see the navigation and landing lights of [a corporate jet] right over the tail of [the Airbus] suddenly pull up and fly right overhead. [The corporate jet] had appeared to have lined up to land on [the] taxiway.

The alert given by the taxiway arrival prediction system clued us in on a problem which was then verified by what we saw outside the cockpit. He was indeed lined up with [the taxiway].

EMB-145 flight crew reported that while holding short of the runway a corporate jet executed a missed approach after lining up with the taxiway.


Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 2139

Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Approximately just before the halfway point across the Atlantic; the Captain voiced to me that he thought he was 'passing a stone.' He became very ill; very fast; in what I would describe as extreme pain; as well as nausea and vomiting. It came in waves; and got progressively worse. We brought the First Officer; who was on break; back to the flight deck early. The Captain retreated to the rest seat in discomfort. Due to the awkward switch out; the First Officer sat in the left seat. I remained in the flying right seat as the First Officer was disoriented and needed to be briefed. I remained in the right seat. I briefed the First Officer on the situation; as well as the lead Flight Attendant. Up until this point; the Captain did not want any medical treatment; because he was not wanting to interfere with the flight. When he retreated to the rest seat; his situation became much worse; and a doctor was paged for.I briefed the First Officer that I did not feel comfortable with the Captain returning; at any point; to his seat based on his condition. The First Officer agreed; and the lead Flight Attendant also in a separate conversation expressed the same feeling. The First Officer and I decided he would remain in the left seat; and I continue flying and execute the landing from the right seat. As the Captain's situation got worse; him returning became a non-issue; because he was unable to return to the flight deck and we deemed him incapacitated in the sense that we were now operating without referring to the Captain for decisions because he was being tended to by doctors; was in audible pain; violently vomiting; and all the symptoms of a bad kidney stone. The passengers didn't see anything.The First Officer and I worked with dispatch; medlink; and together formulated a game plan. After a warm compress made no difference; the decision was made by Medlink; the onboard doctor; and us; to divert. The Captain also expressed that he was a '12 out of 10' in pain. Having flown with the Captain before; for him to even admit pain means it's big. For him to now be ok diverting confirmed he clearly was not in good shape. His audible pain and vomiting continued. After considering multiple airports; an airport was decided on due to it being exactly 170 miles in front of the nose; a hub; access to medical care; connecting flights for passengers; and a known airport since we'd now be taxiing the aircraft. It was middle of the night; clear weather; and while we knew this airport is busy; this situation warranted it as a diversion.I [notified] ATC. I was also the pilot flying now and the First Officer took care of the rest of the satellite call with Medlink and Dispatch; worked the cabin aspect; and other Pilot Monitoring duties. ATC was great and we barely had to turn; we received a straight in to the runway. We made sure not to mention the word 'captain' on the radio due to the sensitive nature of the emergency; however after inquiring; ATC did know it was a member of the flight deck crew. We also left the PAs very vague and did not say it was the Captain to avoid panic. We followed the diversion [procedures]; and had a rather uneventful diversion and landing. The First Officer did a great job with a quick taxi - we rolled to the end of the runway; and simply made the left turn to the terminal. That's where the problems began. As soon as we turned onto the ramp; I did not see any blue flashing lights. That worried me; because they knew for the last 25 minutes that we were diverting in with a severe medical emergency; and needed an ambulance. None was inside. To summarize; we waited 40 minutes after touchdown for a simple paramedic in a sedan to come. He gave us attitude; said he just got out of work [very early in the morning]; do not rush him; and he would determine whether or not an ambulance was needed; not us. When he determined an ambulance was needed; we waited almost an additional hour for the ambulance. The final times I recorded looked like this: ON at XX:55Z; IN at XY:09Z; paramedic showed up at XY:35Z; and ambulance at XZ:23Z. Unacceptable.I tried multiple frequencies; begged multiple people; including operations; and Tower even though we were parked at the stand to get help. None was available; and the Captain now appeared to almost be going into shock. People became curious and we tried to keep everyone seated. Excuses from operations; paramedic; and staff was that we were the third flight needing an ambulance that morning. I will not go into more detail as my feelings are beyond strong that the airport failed us on the medical front. It not only was an embarrassment; but the Captain could have become more injured. Finally when the ambulance came; the Captain walked down on his own power. I made sure to cover his uniform and hide his hat/jacket so the passengers wouldn't take photos out the window 'of the sick captain.' He went to a hospital; and we waited a few more hours to wrap up hotel and the logistical aspects. I'd like to personally say our whole crew; dispatch; medlink; ATC; and airport operations staff were all fantastic. A great team effort turned this medical emergency into a smooth rolling practiced procedure.

B767 flight crew reported diverting due to Captain's illness.


Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

We were being radar vectored to a LOC only approach (using LAVS). We called the field in sight and were cleared for the visual; and were given a tight turn onto final. ATC instructed us to stay 170 KIAS until 5 NM final. [This] makes it difficult to slow and descend. Captain was flying; and I was the pilot monitoring; and we were flaps 5; gear down. Approaching the 5 NM point Captain called for flaps 15 then 20; then 25 to start slowing and help descend. At the 5 NM point Captain called for flaps 30. I always try to check airspeed before moving the flap lever; however; things were busy and I didn't check the airspeed...Captain called for flaps 30 and I moved the flap handle right away from 25 to 30. Then the Captain said 'not yet I am slightly fast' (we were probably about 169 KIAS and flap limit speed for 30 is 162 KIAS) So; I moved the flap lever immediately back to 25. I didn't think the flaps actually moved much out of the 25 position. At that time I noticed a Flap Load Relief EICAS message. Once our speed had slowed to below 162 KIAS; the Captain called for flaps 30. When I moved the flap lever back to the 30 position; we noticed a 'Trailing Edge Flap Disagree' EICAS message. The Captain called for a go- around. We did a normal go-around procedure. I announced the go-around to Tower. Looking at the flap gauge the flaps appeared to be at the 20 position. We requested vectors to sort the problem out. During the go-around as were attempting to level at 3;000 feet; as instructed by ATC; and as we accelerated towards 180 KIAS; the flaps would not retract up any more; (we normally would have gone to flaps 5); and I think that the extra lift; trim forces; etc....caused it to be harder than normal to level off the aircraft; and we went to 3;280 feet. During the vectoring we went through the QRH checklist; and had very good CRM and communication between crewmembers; and landed normally without further problems. Do not allow yourself to be left high and fast close in; and get busy and distracted. Pilot monitoring should always verify current airspeed is under flap limit before moving handle.

Relatively tight turn onto final shortened with 170 knot speed to 5 mile final assigned. I was flying on autopilot planning on Localizer backing up visual approach. Configured flaps 20 gear down at final approach. Did LAVS and on path but as autopilot maintained path speed did not bleed off so I called for flaps 25 then 30 and as I called for 30 realized I was at still 170 knots. I announced I was fast for flaps 30 but the first had already moved the handle to 30. He realized the overspeed and retracted flaps until I slowed. I called for 30 again and saw we had a TE flap disagree so I executed a go-around. During the go-around we were given 3;000 feet by Tower but as I approached level off I called for flaps 5 forgetting the flap disagree locked the flap control out so I ballooned to 3;300 feet with the flaps stuck at 20. We worked well together to return with the abnormal making a flaps 20 approach per the QRH. During the debrief I learned the First saw a flap relief EICAS message so we felt that contributed to the flap disagree 170 knots to 5 mile final with runway shortening make for an overly challenging approach. I know this is to accommodate more arrivals but it isn't very safe. I should refuse these but typically accept them to help.

B757 flight crew experiences a flap disagree EICAS message during approach when flaps 30 are called for by the Captain above flaps 30 speed and quickly corrected. The flap handle is moved to the 30 position by the First Officer then back to 25; resulting in a flap disagree. A go-around is initiated; the QRH is consulted and a flaps 20 landing ensues.


Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Departing as a repo flight. The aircraft was written up the night before for a flight control malfunction. We actually had the airplane the day before and noticed that the autopilot acted a little funny at times. We both did not think it was a big deal. Apparently it had gotten worse that afternoon. I do believe that airplane actually diverted to [an alternate] for that specific reason. Before we departed Maintenance Control called us and informed us what the situation was and if we had any issues return back. Everything seems normal with all our originating checks. After departing we engaged the autopilot which at that point the airplane decided to roll right 20 degrees past what the heading bug was actually sent to. At this point both me and the Captain decided that it was not safe to continue so we returned to the field; landed safely; and parked the airplane at Maintenance. We informed Maintenance and Dispatch Of the situation.We detected it when the autopilot was engaged and we decided it was best to return to the fieldI believe it was an issue with a servo or the autopilot itself.Our Maintenance crews should have probably run more tests than just an aileron alignment.

EMB-145 First Officer reported returning to departure airport after experiencing an autopilot anomaly.


Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

We were at 10;000 feet and assigned 300 knots; between ESSPO fix and the ORD VOR about 10 to 14 DME and given a turn to 270 degrees. The Captain saw a few TCAS targets pop up and then we got a RA to descend below 10;000 feet. As we had to descend fast we were not able to slow to 250 knots as we went below 10;000 feet. The target aircraft was very close to us; maybe 200 to 400 feet. The Captain called Approach to tell them and they and they forgot to tell us there was a Citation at 10;500 feet. We had descended below 10;000 feet and were off our altitude and were not able to slow to 250 knots below; due to responding to the RA Advisory. That ATC needs to give more warning of aircraft to prevent RA's.

EMB-170 First Officer experiences a TCAS descend RA approaching ORD at 10;000 feet and 300 knots; caused by a Citation at 10;500 feet that ATC forgot to mention.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

On arrival into DEN; we were being vectored for the ILS 35R on a clear; VFR night. With the runway in sight; we were level at 9;000 FT. After clearance for the visual approach; we then set in the FAF altitude of 7;000 FT for FRONZ (the FAF). We descended out of 9;000 FT and got a radio call from Approach telling us to check our altitude as they got a low altitude alert. We then climbed back to about 8;000 FT to join the VASI. We never got any aircraft GPWS warnings or alerts. After joining the VASI; we continued on for an uneventful landing. We should have kept 9;000 FT in the Altitude window and stayed at 9;000 FT until we were past DRUMM Intersection.

[Narrative 2 contained no additional information.]

A B737 on a night visual approach to DEN 35R was issued an ATC Low Altitude Alert descending toward 7;000 FT at FRONZ but climbed to 8;000 FT then descended on the VASI. The EGPWS never alerted.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy

The PDC received directed our flight to use the BLUFS ONE departure from OMA. Initial altitude using this DP is 4;000 feet. We initiated a courtesy call prior to pushing. At this point the Ground Controller inquired our departure clearance. He then advised we should have received clearance using the CATTL ONE departure based on direction. He advised the PDC was wrong. Please note: This was not a revised clearance. WE received a PDC stating one DP AND ATC EXPECTED us to use another DP. While 1;000 feet amongst friends is gracious; we all know the consequences of being off 1;000 feet. We are not sure how ATC caught this trap; however; we are appreciative of the catch.This is a pure ATC quality assurance event with us as operators caught in the middle. I would suggest a call to OMA and ascertain how our crews can assist by providing a 'reasonability audit.' An FAA Inspector was a part of our crew. He had no additional comments at the time; however; his input would be welcomed.

We arrived in OMA over an hour late; and our paperwork indicated our filed flight number was amended to flight number with an 'A' suffix. Everything was initialized fine using the original flight number within ACARS; except that our PDC was unavailable. We called clearance delivery for our clearance via voice; and the controller told us that PDC was available; and we should request it under 'XXXA'. After resending the data page; we received our PDC. We then had to resend the flight data page in order to get our performance numbers under the original flight again. Since all this seemed odd to us; we contacted clearance delivery to verify our PDC and that everyone was on the same page. ATC advised that our squawk and route received via PDC was correct; but our SID was incorrect for some reason. We re-verified everything with the controller one more time; then continued with the rest of our pre-departure prep.I have no idea why this was such a mess; except that I suspect that ATC should have given us our voice clearance to begin with; rather than instructing us to attempt to retrieve it under the new flight number. I'm still not sure why the SID on the PDC was incorrect though (may have been an unrelated issue).

A CRJ900 flight crew is assigned an 'A' suffix to their flight number due to being late. This results in the wrong SID being received via PDC. The crew contacts Clearance Delivery to verify the route and the error is discovered.


Right forward support fitting for the inboard flap inboard track separated. Found other aircraft with the same condition with sheared bolts. Ref AD 2013-23-16.

Maintenance Technicians reported a B757 subject to an airworthiness directive was found to have a separated Trailing Edge Flap Support Track Fitting.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft had left ram air door placarded with MEL 21-4.  On recall after pushback; left air conditioning and pack light illuminated. Returned to gate and ZZZ Maintenance signed off logbook allowing warning lights on ground when MEL specifically only allows lights in flight. I refused aircraft.

B737 Captain reported they refused aircraft after Maintenance misapplied an MEL to the left ram air door.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 16.3; Flight Crew Total 124.9; Flight Crew Type 54.3

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Declared Emergency

I was on a VFR flight via VOR's along the route. I had obtained flight following shortly after departure. Ceilings were at 6;000 FT and I had a cruise altitude of 3;000 FT initially; [and] then climbed to 4;500 FT through the TRSA. I was unable to make radio contact with flight watch or a FSS while en route to obtain updated and current weather. Ceilings appeared to be rising; and visibility was 20+ NM. ATC informed me to climb to 7;500 FT to maintain radar service and radio contact; and I obliged. I continued my VFR route to the ZZZ VOR. While en route the ceilings began to drop and I noticed small clouds forming like fog on the ground. The small clouds on the ground became more expansive over the next 15 minutes; so I looked around to see if there were better VFR conditions in the immediate surrounding area. I decided to head southeast and descend to 5;500 FT to find more favorable conditions; but was met with a rapidly deteriorating weather condition. Visibility went from 20+ to 10 NM and I found myself being enclosed by clouds. I stayed at 5;500 FT on my current heading and asked ATC if they saw any better VFR conditions; because I was losing VFR and rapidly entering IMC.I then asked what the weather looked like eastward (to see if ATC could vector me through the clouds to help me land at another airport). ATC came back to me and stated that all airports/airfields are in IFR conditions and it would be better to turn around and climb to 7;500 FT for obstruction avoidance. I obeyed ATC's instructions and found that conditions behind me and in front had deteriorated into IFR conditions. I kept the aircraft straight and level on a 255 degree heading. IFR conditions persisted and ATC declared an EMERGENCY for me. IFR conditions persisted for approximately 30 minutes after that; and approximately 30 NM from [my destination] I was in VFR conditions and ATC stated they are stopping the emergency and I should maintain VFR to my destination. I maintained VFR until I landed.Contributing Factors: Rapidly changing weather; weather was different than forecast.My Perception: clouds 'looked' like they were maintaining current altitude; but were changing. I did not have a lot of experience dealing with rapidly changing weather; and I made the decision to not push through to an IFR airport and turn around (with ATC help) to VFR conditions.Lessons Learned: Do not fly if weather forecasts; reports/conditions do not match what is going on outside. This could indicate unstable weather that can change rapidly and put the pilot in a dangerous situation.

PA-28 pilot entered IMC conditions during VMC flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Distraction

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 5200

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

While being vectored for approach; I was hand flying with the autothrottles off. As I was leveling at 9;000 and 240 KTS; we were given a runway change. I engaged the autopilot but not the autothrottles and went to the flight bag. The Copilot soon asked what was going on with the airspeed; as we were decelerating through 170 KTS; whereupon I pushed throttles to full; turned off the autopilot and lowered the nose. We lost about 80 FT and then gained the same before stabilizing again with autopilot and autothrottles back on. I'm sure fatigue from a long flight and coming off last break was a factor; but a poor excuse for not engaging the autothrottles and worse; not monitoring the aircraft. I ashamed of my performance; thankfully; the copilot saved the day.

On arrival into RJAA we were cleared to descend to 9;000 FT. At about 13;000 the Captain disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles and was hand-flying. The approach to 16L had been briefed previously. At about 10;000 FT; Approach Control advised of a runway change to 16R. At that time the Captain reengaged the autopilot but it was not noticed that the autothrottles were not reengaged. I was the Relief Pilot in the right jumpseat and was listening to the new approach brief over the First Officer's right shoulder. As the aircraft leveled off at 9;000 FT no one noticed that the throttles were at idle and the airspeed was bleeding off. At a point just above the yellow airspeed band the First Officer said 'what is going on with the speed?' The Captain grabbed the throttles and pushed them forward just as autothrottle wake-up was occurring. I immediately shouted 'turn off the autopilot and push the nose over;' as it appeared that the airspeed was not responding very quickly. I believe that the airspeed got about 10 KTS +/- into the yellow. The Captain turned off the autopilot and quickly recovered with only about plus or minus 100 FT of target altitude. We discussed how this happened and the Captain performed a normal approach and landing on 16R. All pilots were back on the flight deck by 45 minutes prior to landing but I do believe that fatigue was a contributing factor. Also the fact that it was smooth with relatively little pitch increase; subdued any of the normal physical cues associated with the gradual slowdown. All of these factors coupled with the runway change and subsequent re-brief led to the inadvertent lack of re-engagement of the autothrottles.

A fatigued crew descending into RJAA was issued a runway change and the Captain; while getting the approach chart; engaged the autopilot; but not autothrottles; so the aircraft decelerated to 10 KTS below clean maneuver speed before recovery was initiated.


Electronic Library (other than Nav database)

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Chart Or Publication; Manuals; Human Factors; Company Policy

iPad EFB (Electronic Flight Bag) is a great tool; however; the only way that it can be a safe substitute for paper documents is if the documents can be easily referenced and if changes can be easily reviewed. The new 'Content' application does neither. Its interface is confusing. Location of material (approaching 130 publications) is not obvious; even to someone who prides himself with being up to speed with most publications. Referencing material quickly has now become much more difficult. What is worse is that new material is not easily organized under a 'recent' tab as in the last app. The new 'recent' tab does not allow you to see what you have already reviewed anymore; it is simply a list; without highlight functionality. Half my job is to read and stay up to speed with the publications; mostly on my own time. That part of my job has just been rendered much more difficult by the implementation of an inferior publications tool.I feel that this is a safety issue; especially in light of the fact that since the inception of iPad EFB; average pilot knowledge of the publications has significantly declined; in my opinion and observation. This new App will further that dangerous trend. Thank you for taking this matter under consideration.

B737 Captain reported software issues with company issued EFB could potentially result in a safety risk.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Type 10000

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Intermittent stick shaker on turn to final. Conditions: ILS approach required for ceiling and visibility; blowing snow; wind shear reported on ATIS; braking action good reported by Tower; strong winds aloft; approximately 50 KTS at 2;000 FT AGL (approximately 200 degrees at 50 KTS). Icing conditions on descent and arrival. Engine anti-ice on and wing anti-ice used several times before starting approach (changes stick shaker logic). Autopilot and autothrottles engaged during event. Event Description: ATC usually gives a base turn and then a last vector to final to intercept the Localizer. This night we received a left turn to intercept the Localizer of approximately 120 degrees. The aircraft was clean; airspeed bug approximately four knots above [maneuver] speed. Bank angle set 30 degrees. In the turn; we encountered continuous moderate turbulence. I was the pilot flying with hands on the controls monitoring the automation. In the turn; we received several intermittent bank angle alerts and one intermittent stick shaker that lasted about one second just prior to localizer intercept. The autopilot was managing aircraft control; however; I did not set the automation in a state that allowed enough of a buffer to handle the turbulence with 30 degrees bank at current airspeed. Approach was armed after localizer capture. The automation was used to configure for approach and then disconnected in order the control airspeed on final approach. Wind shear plus/minus 15 KTS encountered during approach which was not relayed by proceeding aircraft. Other areas which increased risk this day were: Crew Scheduling of over eight hours flight time per new regulations; last flight of day running late; first flight with First Officer; fourth First Officer flown within two days. Select a higher speed to increase stall margin in turbulent conditions or select flaps 1 or flaps 5 and fly above bugged speed to increase stall margin. Reduce bank angle during turbulent conditions to increase stall margin; accepting flight path through localizer if needed. Approach could have given us several turns to final which would have made the final intercept less challenging for the current winds and conditions.

B737-700 Captain experiences stick shaker during the turn to intercept the localizer in the clean configuration; along with intermittent bank angle annunciations; in turbulent conditions. Speed had been set at clean maneuver plus five KTS.


Workload; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

While planning our arrival we had our routing and our STAR changed four times. On the second to last change we were cleared to a fix that did not have a crossing restriction for the initial fix; and none until several fixes later; then we were assigned to another arrival with the same initial fix; but with several restrictions. The FO (First Officer) stated that he was preparing for the most restrictive fix; set it and confirmed it and started down; we were soon notified that we descended below the initial restriction and did not need to climb again. There was no traffic conflict.High workload and changing routing and complacency regarding very similar routing with matching fixes but different altitudes. Also not setting the altitude for the nearest fix instead of the most restrictive.If ATC could remind new restrictions when a last minute routing change is made; that would help; but also; just setting the nearest restriction would do it.

I was the PF (Pilot Flying) as we flew to ORD. As we approached ORD; our assigned STAR changed either three or four times. We also had change of landing direction. We were overloaded while trying to set up the arrivals and brief them and a PRM approach to the east. The second to last arrival assigned was to descend via the Bradford7 arrival where there are no crossing restrictions at BDF. We were then told to descend via the Benky4 arrival and ORD was now landing west.The Benky4 arrival has a restriction to cross BDF at or above FL220. In the rush to set up the arrival and approach and get the landing data and brief; we did not notice as I descended below FL220 a few miles prior to BDF on my way to cross BYLAW between FL230 and FL190. As we arrived at BDF; ATC asked us which arrival we were assigned. We then realized that we were at approximately FL204 at BDF instead of at or above FL220. We continued to descend via and landed with no further incident. Not prioritizing the flying of the aircraft as the number one thing. I should have had the PM (Pilot Monitoring) set up the FMS and brief for me as I focused solely on flying.I will no longer set the next lower altitude on a descend via clearance until I reach the fix that I am currently approaching even when I think I have that restriction made.

CRJ-700 flight crew reported crossing below minimum crossing altitude on STAR due to numerous assigned STAR changes.


Eurocopter AS 350/355/EC130 - Astar/Twinstar/Ecureuil

Workload; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Procedure; Weather; Manuals; Human Factors; Company Policy; Aircraft

We met in the hangar and prepared to launch. Mission parameters; including possible destination hospitals; were discussed. [X] County protocol dictates that trauma patients with burns are flown to the nearest trauma center. Patients with burns only; are flown to Hospital [X]. At the time the initial call came in; the patient's actual condition was yet to be determined. The first responders had not yet arrived. When I checked the weather; the radar showed a huge thunderstorm [near] the potential LZ. This storm was part of a large system; moving from the southwest. At the time the call came in; [the area] was covered in a large level 3 to 4 thunderstorm. Hospital [Y] was open. It was also the alternate hospital if [Hospital X] was weathered out. Medics indicated that they wanted to adhere to the protocol and preferred [Hospital X]. At this point; and up until launch; the PIC had neither rejected nor accepted the flight. I had only outlined options and solicited medic preferences. None of the medical crew indicated that I should 'just launch and Go to [Hospital Y].' More information was required. It is important to note that the PIC is not directly involved in communications with the [X] County Dispatcher. This is handled exclusively by the medics. The PIC can simply advise the medics; on Go; No-GO; or GO with conditional options. The PIC does not accept a flight. He can only reject a flight if; in his judgement; [Operating Manual] & FAR parameters are not met. Based on the facts available; I decided that we would need 30 gallons of additional fuel to proceed. Contingency fuel would be prudent in case we encountered airspace clearance problems; had to circumnavigate weather; or hold near the hospital; waiting for the weather to clear. Additionally; I wanted extra fuel to go back to the alternate hospital or hold nearby if the storm near the scene LZ delayed initial landing. Fuel = options. Since the patient report lacked detail and; statistically; we only fly about 30% of the Alert-1 calls received; I decided to wait for more facts before pumping an additional 30 gallons. If the call canceled; or the patient had trauma; the additional fuel would not be necessary and would seriously reduce the useful load we could fly from the base on a subsequent call. De-fueling would require nearly an hour's flight to burn off at significant cost. Just in case; I readied the fuel truck and laid the hose next to the helicopter to expedite the fueling process. As I asked the medics to request a first responder ETA; someone on the net requested that we pre-launch. I repeated the request for their ETA and was told about four minutes. Since the fuel decision was important; if not critical; I elected to wait for first responder arrival before launching. My priorities are crew safety; patient welfare; customer support and cost in that order. Transporting the patient to the preferred hospital outweighed the negatives of a short delay. I felt that proceeding to the intended destination without contingency fuel was imprudent; unwise; compromised safety and was possibly in violation of 135.69; and the [Operating Manual]. Based on my considered experience; I thought my decision was the best balance of safety concerns; regulatory requirements; patient outcome; and costs. When the word came in that the passenger was a burn only; I quickly fueled the helicopter and launched within a few minutes. After the passenger was loaded; we proceeded south and watched the thunderstorms dissipate on the radar allowing us to get into Hospital [X]. The mission was completed without further incident. AFTERMATH: The Base Coordinator asked that [I] respond to an inquiry from the EMS Chief who was concerned about the fact that I had delayed a launch after being told to do so. I responded that the customer merely makes transportation requests; they do not have the ultimate authority to order a launch. That authority rests solely with the PIC under FAR 135.67 and the [Operating Manual]. I explained my decision; informed him that I stood by my decision and told him that the Chief was welcome to discuss it with me if he had any further concerns or questions. I was later told that the Chief disagreed with my assessment. I expressed my displeasure; informing the coordinator that neither the Chief; [X] County Dispatch or anyone other than the Certificate Holder; may exercise operational control over the [flight] program. (See FAR 119.9; 119.43; 135.79 and Operating Manual) To wit: 'Only a PIC who is a direct employee of [Corporation] may exercise this second tier Operational Control over any [Corporation] flight.' 'At no time shall any non-certified entity attempt to exercise Operational Control nor hinder in any way; [Corporation] oversight and/or exercising of Operational Control...' 'The...call center (County Dispatch or Command) has no authority to override the authority of [Corporation]; or the pilot's authority to refuse any mission; or other flight safety issues. At no time during a response to a medical flight will speed into action criteria be allowed to compromise safety. Failure to adhere to the certificate holder's directions and instructions may be subject to legal enforcement action by the FAA.' My actions also complied with FAR 135.23; 135.25; 135.65; 135.71; 135.209. [Corporation] Risk Assessment Program was also utilized. Operating Manual Condition for patient leg was indicated to be 'C.' [Operating Manual Requests for Service states: 'No attempts should be made by the Communications Specialist (in this case County Command) to question the pilot's judgment in denying a flight request.'Suggestions: Since I am now being 'questioned' about my decision(s) by the customer and my supervisors contrary to the [Operating Manual]; the issue of operational control needs to be addressed. If this isn't an operational control issue; then I don't know what is. Being questioned and second-guessed about conservative; pro-safety PIC decisions constitutes pressure to fly. Therefore it is a serious (indeed major) safety of flight issue which needs to be addressed at the highest level of management.

Contracted EMS helicopter pilot was questioned by the customer regarding a delayed takeoff for trauma patient pickup and delivery to a hospital. Pilot maintains that he acted in accordance with FAR's and the company Operating Manual in making his decision based upon safety of flight considerations affected by weather and fuel requirements.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Procedure

I was on an IFR departure from runway 21L at PRC when I experienced a heading deviation. We received following departure instructions. 'On departure turn left heading 200; cleared for takeoff ....' Field elevation at KPRC is approximately 5100 feet. On departure; we received the handoff to approach at approximately 6000 feet. Upon contacting Departure Control with the climb information; approach acknowledged with a request for me to IDENT. On a 200 heading; we were climbing into rising terrain. Thinking that seemed like a strange circumstance; we called approach with a request for a heading. We were informed that we would not be in radar contact until at least 9000 to 9500 feet. We were also informed that they could not provide the radar vectors until radar contact was established.Our initial thought was why are we with Departure Control if they are unable to see us; or vector us? In addition to a heading toward rising terrain; the initial heading also took us further from our first fix. Our present altitude was approximately 8000 feet remaining on a heading toward rising terrain. At this point I made the decision to initiate a left climbing turn back around to 200 degrees (making a mistaken assumption that this was the intended instruction to gain altitude to attain radar contact). I failed to inform Departure Control of the turn and the reason behind this decision. Upon reaching approximately 9000 feet passing through a heading of 010-360 in the left climbing turn; we were in radar contact and instructed to turn right to 045 and intercept the airway.A few moments later the controller came online and indicated that they spoke with tower regarding instruction and confirmed it was a 200 heading. They acknowledged that we were not informed that we would not be in radar contact until passing 9000-9500 feet then expect vectors. I responded with the concern about rising terrain and controller indicated that while PIC discretion; I am obliged to inform ATC. I acknowledged with 'Understood.' The controller was understanding; indicating that the goal is to make sure 'we are all on the same page for the next time.'While ATC instructions were standard at the outset; confusion came from the 10 degree heading on departure; combined with the rising terrain; and the early handoff from tower to Departure Control. An Approach Control that would not have radar contact for several minutes while we were climbing on an IFR flight plan on an assigned heading toward rising terrain.PRC tower could have provided additional information about what TRACON was capable of and expecting. We were not aware that PHX would not have radar contact and be able to provide additional vectors; nor were we informed. When we were concerned about instruction and queried were we informed that we were to follow tower instruction until radar contact was established.Of greater concern to me is that the tower handed us off early to an approach control unable to attain radar contact and providing no instructions. We are flying a high-performance piston twin; with TAWS (Terrain Awareness and Warning System) and in visual conditions. Should that instruction have been given in IMC; at Night; or should we not have had performance or onboard technology adherence to the heading increases the likelihood of a CFIT occurrence. If we had not continued a climb for any reason; PHX approach would never have radar contact to assist.It also makes little sense to receive a clearance for radar vectors; be handed off early and be informed that they are unable to provide those vectors. Much of my confusion would have been avoided with the issuance of a heading on departure that climbs the aircraft away from terrain and toward the intended course. There was no imminent threat of loss of terrain clearance; however I was not comfortable; even in VMC accepting a heading into climbing terrain on an IFR flight plan outside of radar contact. While I am comfortable with the decision to turn it was based on the 'assumption' of an instruction that perhaps the left turn to 200 was to be a 360 degree turn (an instruction I have received in the past at other high altitude airports). I failed to inform ATC of my intentions and the reason until after the fact; leading to the heading deviation.

BE58 pilot was concerned his assigned departure heading was toward high terrain while he was in an area where ATC did not have radar contact.


Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Cruise flight; FL320; left Generator failure. Performed and complied with QRH GEN OFF checklist procedures. [We were] unable to reset generator; unable to start APU at FL300; FL280 and FL260. [We] contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control via ARINC. Evaluated destination and en route weather conditions and returned to the departure airport. Prior to landing performed and complied with Landing Single Generator checklist.

A MD83's left generator failed in flight so the crew returned to the departure airport after evaluating enroute and destination weather because they were unable to start the APU.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was PF (Pilot Flying); descending via the [charted arrival]. Due to a tailwind; I extended full speed brakes in order to make the altitude and speed restriction. Slightly before ZZZZZ; with the restrictions met; I selected speed 225 (to allow for flap extension); requested Flaps 1; and stowed the speed brakes. The AP (autopilot) rolled the aircraft into a right bank to make the slight turn onto the next leg of the STAR. The aircraft immediately entered Alpha-Floor protection; disconnecting the AP and setting thrust to TOGA; which resulted in a climbing right turn with increasing pitch. After realizing; with helpful input from the PM (Pilot Monitoring); what was causing the deviation from planned flight path; attitude; and altitude; I recovered the aircraft to wings-level flight; ensured safe airspeed for our configuration; disconnected the auto-thrust; corrected to course; began a descent; re-engaged the AP; and continued on the STAR ground track. Total altitude gain was slightly over 1000 feet and lateral deviation from STAR was approximately 1/4 mile. ATC queried us and the PM replied that one of our protections had engaged; causing the deviation. ATC put us on a heading and gave us a descent to 8000 feet. The remainder of the approach and landing was uneventful. I assume that this event occurred because the speed brakes were still retracting when the aircraft banked into the turn. [The flight manual] discusses ensuring an adequate speed margin if speed brakes are extended before beginning a turn; in order to prevent the activation of Alpha-Floor protection.Even before this event; I was concerned that our training inadequately addresses the A321's behavior with speed brakes extended with respect to the VLS hook [minimum selectable airspeed] and Alpha-Floor protection. You hear things like 'the 321 is hard to slow down'; but the details of why and recommended techniques of managing descents in the 321 are not well covered. This aircraft was relatively light; and I thought we were carrying plenty of speed. I retracted the speed brakes in what I thought was plenty of time to avoid Vls issues and got a notch of flaps down. I was completely taken by surprise at the activation of Alpha-Floor protection. I recommend training focus more attention on this situation and techniques for anticipation and avoidance.In the future I will stay even farther ahead on descents to avoid instances where speed brake extension can put the aircraft close to Alpha-Floor protection engagement. In addition; I realize I could have stayed at 230 with flaps up as long as I had the speed brakes up earlier. I was thinking of the upcoming 210 restriction at ZZZZZ1; but remaining at 230 through ZZZZZ would have been more procedurally correct.

A-321 First Officer reported track and altitude deviations occurred on the arrival when Alpha-Floor protections were triggered in a turn while retracting speed brakes.


FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS ZZZ

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 26

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

I issued an approach clearance to cross a fix at or above 11;000 ft. until established on the localizer; cleared ILS approach. The aircraft went through the localizer and was correcting back to the localizer and began a descent into a 10;900 ft. MVA. I was giving a relief briefing and looking at the checklist. When I looked back at the screen the aircraft was at approximately 10;700 ft. and already correcting back to the localizer and exiting the 10;900 ft. MVA into a 9;000 ft. MVA. No low altitude alert went off and I didn't issue a low altitude alert as it seemed unnecessary leaving the higher MVA and by the time I would have issued it the aircraft would have been in the lower MVA. My recommendation would be for the pilot to have complied with instruction to maintain 11;000 ft. until established on the localizer prior to beginning descent.

TRACON Controller reported an aircraft flew below MVA while correcting back to localizer course.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 8; Flight Crew Total 3500; Flight Crew Type 2300

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Airspace Structure

Flight planned and obtained a briefing via ForeFlight. I specifically checked airspace NOTAMs and noted that restricted area R-4301 was going to be active the next day from 0500 through 1200. It was not NOTAMed as active for the day of my flight. Departed in the afternoon VFR and was cruising at 6;500 MSL when I found myself on top of an overcast layer. I contacted Minneapolis Center and received a popup IFR clearance for my descent. After receiving my clearance from Center I was informed of a possible airspace violation and given phone [number] to call once on the ground. I talked to Mr. X at Minneapolis Center and explained to him about my checking NOTAMs. He said he had checked NOTAMs and found the same thing I did but that their facility had been informed and was treating it as active. He took my number and told me he would call back if he had any questions or found anything out. He called back about 45 minutes later and told me that in the margin of the VFR sectional it is noted as active daily for a certain time period. (I don't remember the times he said.) I explained to him that I use current charts obtained through ForeFlight and displayed on an iPad; (backed up by an iPhone.) These electronic charts do not allow me to see the margins of the charts. In the future I will avoid R-4301 unless in contact with Center and given a clearance. I would suggest that since the margins are not viewable on electronic charts that active times for special use airspace be placed on the chart in vicinity of the airspace and that airspace NOTAMs note the active times daily; as having occasional times noted as active could lead one to believe it is inactive when not NOTAMed.

General Aviation pilot reports entering R-4301 after finding no NOTAMs indicating an active status during preflight. ATC is contacted for an IFR clearance for descent through clouds and the reporter is informed that the area is hot. It is discovered that in the margin of the VFR sectional it is noted as active daily for a certain time period but the margin is not displayed on most electronic display devices.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 131; Flight Crew Total 6347; Flight Crew Type 894

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Environment - Non Weather Related

There was no adverse event or situation on this flight. I am making this report out of concern for safety and to hopefully prevent a future accident.Flying into PDK; Peachtree Airport in Atlanta; last night was typical - IFR approach in IMC using the best low approach procedure at the airport; the ILS to 21L. On final; breaking out of the overcast; my copilot and I did not see the runway because it was not lit despite our having triggered pilot controlled lighting on 120.0. We repeated the procedure and the runway lit up. Landing was uneventful.Lighting at this airport is poor. PDK is located in an urban area and is surrounded by ground lights not associated with the airport. One pilot; reportedly told ATC that all he could see was a 'sea of lights' when asked to call the airport in sight at night. I have had the same experience on multiple occasions. The pilot controlled lighting is erratic; and it is on a different frequency than CTAF after the Tower closes. The typical visual approach we get is from the side where it is hard to see the runway lights even when they are all on; and the beacon is weak and usually obscured by surrounding obstacles at the approach altitudes we are typically given. Moreover; the PAPIs have been NOTAMed out of service for quite some time now; so there is no visual vertical guidance at night.In my opinion; this setup is an accident waiting to happen; hence this report.

Pilot reported airfield lighting at PDK is poor and erratic. Surrounding ground lights not associated with the airport compound the issue further.


Bombardier Learjet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6; Flight Crew Total 1950; Flight Crew Type 1200

I was climbing during a straight-out departure from runway 29 at Bridgeport Airport. I was at 2900 feet MSL; heading 290 degrees. I looked out my left window during a scan for traffic; and saw a Learjet at about 150 feet away; at my altitude; also heading in a westerly direction; in a slight left bank.I am quite certain this Learjet had also just departed Bridgeport soon after I had; because I remember seeing the aircraft on the ground at Bridgeport waiting for takeoff clearance as I was taking off. I assume; but do not know for certain; that the Lear had also requested a straight-out departure from runway 29; and had overtaken me because of his higher speed. I assume the Lear pilot may have seen me and therefore was banking left to avoid my aircraft; but I also don't know if that is true. It may have been luck that he had banked when he did; or I believe his aircraft may have collided with mine.I believe the only way to have avoided this near-miss was for the tower not to have allowed the Lear to perform a straight-out departure so soon after a slower aircraft (my aircraft) had departed on a straight-out departure. Again; I do not know for sure if the Learjet had made a straight-out departure; or if he had come so close behind me during maneuvers after some other type of departure. All I know for sure is he came from behind and was very close when I finally saw him on my left.

PA28 pilot reported an NMAC with a Learjet on departure from BDR.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The new quick reference emergency/abnormal checklist in the [Citation] Excels have numerous errors in them. There are procedures with steps out of order; incorrect references; and even procedures that are completely missing steps. These new checklists don't help us. In fact; they actually introduce another threat into the cockpit. The responses from those I've discussed this with in management and training is 'we know about the problems. The AFM is correct. Use the AFM instead of the checklist if there is a problem. Cessna doesn't have to fix the errors right away because of their legal disclaimer on the front page.'We train like we fly and we fly like we train. Think back to all of your simulator training. When have you ever referenced the AFM instead of the quick reference checklist when practicing an emergency procedure in the simulator? In my 17 years and three different types here at [Company]; I have never done anything but use the quick reference book. So now what do you think an Excel crew is going to do when there is a major issue in the aircraft that requires use of an emergency checklist? Are they going to think in the heat of the moment to pull out the AFM; or are they going to do what they've been trained to do over their past 10-plus years of training?The checklist in the Excel sim at Flight Safety has been manually corrected to fix the errors. But the ones in our actual aircraft have not. This makes things even worse. Now we are training with a corrected version of the checklist; yet if we have to reference it while actually flying; we could be faced with a checklist that is different than what we encountered in training. This could cause further crew confusion in an emergency.The Excel pilots have not received a single communication about the erroneous checklist from anyone within [Company]. Not from our chief pilot and not from training. My first suggestion is that a safety alert be sent to immediately to all Excel pilots that mandates use of the AFM going forward until the errors are corrected. Second; cease all use of the quick reference checklists [in training] until the errors are corrected. We should be using the AFM while in training; just as we must do in the real world. Third; pressure Cessna to send out corrected checklists immediately; or at least yellow pages with the corrections.

Citation Excel Captain reported he has found several errors in the quick reference emergency/abnormal checklists and the company has been slow to correct the situation.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

A lot happened in a short period of time. There was some convective activity in the area with lightning to the north and south but a clear shot for approach and landing. We were vectored onto 10C Approach and cleared to intercept the Localizer. As we were intercepting we got blasted with a bright laser beam from the left hand side. It was really bright and I could see it on the ground and they were aiming it towards the cockpit. I immediately pulled up my window shade and had the FO (First Officer) report it to ATC. We still had not been cleared for the approach and started getting high. We finally got a word in with ATC and they cleared us. The laser [strike] caused us to get high and we were near the tolerances for a stable approach. In normal circumstances I would have executed a go around but with the weather on both sides of us and another possible laser [strike] I felt the best decision was to continue. We landed a little high and a little fast but still made the touchdown zone and second high speed taxiway. Recommend more enforcement action and tracking to locate the people. I reported the issue but do not know that any action was taken. I did call and talk to the Tower but I got a person that had just started their shift. They asked others on shift but said nobody else was [struck]. I asked if there was anything I could/needed to do and he said no further action was necessary. Also; do not look at the laser!

EMB-175 Captain reported a laser beam encountered on approach to ORD airport.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 2900; Flight Crew Type 500

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Pilot was enroute. I had received ATIS; contacted ATC; and received a runway assignment. The aircraft was operating under a reserve fuel situation. One tank was very low and the other approximately 1/4 full. When the engine began to run rough I switched to the fuller tank. This seemed to resolve the engine roughness; but I decided to proceed to a GA airport I had just passed over; rather than fly over a heavily populated area with a rough running engine. I informed ATC of this and was told to proceed direct to my divert airport; squawk 1200; radar service was terminated; and frequency change to advisory approved. ATC also mentioned some traffic; but it was not a factor and was not relevant to what transpired. After reversing course; changing frequencies to CTAF; and flying southbound for a couple of miles; the engine began running rough again. I again switched fuel tanks. In hindsight; this was a mistake as I had gone back to the low tank. At this point the engine began to lose power and the aircraft lost altitude. I activated the electric boost pump; but this did not restore power. Since the aircraft had descended to approximately 1;000 FT AGL; I began looking for a landing site. I considered landing on the interstate; which was directly below me; but the traffic was too heavy and there was an overpass near the anticipated landing site; so I abandoned that idea and looked for a flat field. Luckily; I spotted a soybean field about 1/2 mile east of an interstate highway. Since the wind was reported out of the northeast; I elected to land in the direction of the crop rows to the north. I extended the landing flaps to full (40 degrees) and executed a force landing in this field. The aircraft came to a stop in about 600 FT from the point of touchdown. Thankfully; there was no damage to the aircraft and no injury to the pilot. The pilot contacted the company flight department; who informed the ATC; state police; and FAA FSDO of the incident. Mechanics were dispatched to the landing site to evaluate the aircraft. They disconnected the fuel line and activated the electric boost pump; which produced a steady; extended stream on both settings. The fuel sumps were drained and no evidence of water observed. The engine was started and run up for about 5 minutes. Upon visual inspection of the tanks it was observed that the right tank was down to the minimum (unusable) level. The mechanics believe that air was introduced into the fuel line when the low tank got to the unusable level. Unfortunately; this aircraft has only a left; right; and off fuel selector setting. If there was a 'both' setting; such as exists on most of the other aircraft in the company fleet; this could have been avoided. Additionally; the mechanics stated that if the pilot had pushed and held the electric fuel boost pump; rather than just pushing the switch and releasing; the air could have been purged from the fuel line and the flight continued without further incident. Pushing and releasing the fuel boost pump switch only activates the high pump briefly and the low pump continuously. Pushing and holding this switch maintains the high pump which is required to purge air from the fuel line. Regardless; the aircraft was towed a short distance by a local farmer using a tow bar borrowed from the airport to the closest road; fuel was added to the low tank; and the aircraft flown back to the departure uneventfully. Again; this was an avoidable situation. If the aircraft had a 'both' fuel selector setting; or the pilot not allowed the right fuel tank to get so low before switching tanks; or the pilot had continually held down the electric fuel boost pump switch to purge the air in the fuel line; this forced landing may have been avoided. Fortunately; this story had a happy ending and provided a valuable learning experience.

A C206 fuel line filled with air after the selected tank quantity became low; but because the electric fuel pump on LOW was unable to purge the line after the other tank was selected; the pilot landed safely off airport with engine producing minimum power.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12.0

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Procedure; Weather; Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Human Factors

A line of weather was moving from west to east. All military Restricted and Warning Areas airspace was active and a ship was offshore; which means that the restricted airspace control facility is often unable to take point outs or (perhaps even worse) will take a point out and then revoke it at a later time due to 'ship's traffic' - perhaps a separate issue; but I will include details on that problem below the description of this specific event.As is often the case; weather was spread throughout the Center's airspace; and in the interest of not 'sinking' the other areas and not slowing down traffic through the facility; we were vectoring aircraft in the narrow corridor between the weather and the airspace. The weather moved steadily east and it was apparent to the experienced controllers in the room that it would not be dying out on the coast like it sometimes does. Approximately 30 minutes prior to the event; our supervisor went to TMU (Traffic Management Unit) to advise them that the Warning Areas had already denied two aircraft deviations due to warning airspace and we needed to shift aircraft west. The Supervisor informed us that it was TMU's position to continue running down the coast until aircraft actually encroached on the Warning Areas.I was handed an Aircraft X's landing and advised pilot of the weather and Warning Area situation. Upon learning that east deviations were not available; the pilot advised he'd like to take up a 270 heading and stay north of the line. After the west turn; they needed another 30 degrees right to remain clear of the heavy to extreme precipitation. I informed the Supervisor that we now had an aircraft inbound flying northwest; bound for weather; and it was time to stop traffic on the coast. The Supervisor informed the Warning Areas then went to TMU to tell them.Around this time; three departures came off and due to the line of weather; immediately started an east deviation towards my sector. I took radar on the three departures and issued deviations as far east as possible without entering the Warning Areas. The Supervisor returned to inform me that the plan from TMU was now that we're not working arrivals; we can work departures since they would not be head on with landers anymore. I explained that 'heads up' traffic wasn't the issue; but rather the fact that the departures were now pointed at the same closed hole that the arrivals used to be.I took a handoff on Aircraft Y's southbound landing. Being sure to take extra time with the general aviation pilot and aircraft; I laid out a very clear picture of what was ahead with regards to the weather and warning areas. I allowed the pilot to get as close to the Warning Area as possible then advised I had to turn them away. Concerned the general aviation pilot may be more concerned about my authority than their own safety; I did explain something along the lines of 'I have to turn you 30 degrees for the warning area now. I am aware there is a thunderstorm to your west; if you are unable to take that turn; let me know and we'll do what we need to do to keep you safe'. The pilot advised he'd take the turn and have a look. Shortly after that; he said he could not take the heading and continued into the Warning Area.Similarly; my northbound aircraft were now telling me that they needed further east than the 010 heading I had assigned. I explained I had to turn them clear of the airspace. The first departure did take a turn and remained barely clear; but Aircraft Z and Aircraft A both continued into the Warning Area airspace. I advised these aircraft and Aircraft Y that I understood they were exercising their urgent authority while my D-side coordinated with their facility. They did take point outs on all three aircraft ultimately; however; they may have entered the airspace on their urgent authority before this point.First; I'd like to address the point out issue. Often; we continue moving aircraft very near or inside the Warning Area's airspace because they are taking point outs. Unfortunately; I believe their controllers are unfamiliar with what exactly a point out is and what they have authorized when they take one. It is a somewhat common occurrence that after accepting a point out; they will call back at a later time and tell us we need to turn an aircraft to miss something they have going on in their airspace. I have personally witnessed at least 2 of these occurrences in the past month. The first time; they took a point out on an aircraft northwest bound at 37;000 feet. The aircraft was well into the Warning airspace when conflict alert went off with that aircraft and multiple targets southbound at 37;000 feet in the airspace. The sector [was called] on the landline and told them to get the aircraft out of the airspace immediately. The second incident happened this week. The ALTRV (Altitude Reservation) was hot 19;000 to 22;000 feet; but nobody was in it. They told the Sector Controller they could use the airspace for the next hour because nothing was scheduled (but they did not officially call it down - something of a 'blanket point out' thing they do sometimes). Approximately 30 minutes later; the controller had to stop a departure at 18;000 feet because he observed limited data tags transitioning the ALTRV. About a minute later; they called to tell him his traffic had to stay clear of the ALTRV. Discussion with other controllers in the area leads me to believe that almost all of us have had a similar experience at some point in our careers.I bring up this issue to explain my feeling regarding running aircraft too near the Warning Areas because 'they're taking point outs.' I hate to say it; but I do not treat a point out to them the same way I treat a point out to another FAA controller. I know what I'm getting when I make a point out to any other surrounding facility; but with the Warning Area facility; I always need to have a 'Plan B' for when they change their mind or I observe traffic in the vicinity of my aircraft. With this in mind; it is my personal policy that I will ALWAYS vector to remain clear of the airspace until such time as it is absolutely necessary to make a point out. At that point I will do whatever I need to do to ensure that additional aircraft are not placed in a similar situation. I feel that if TMU were more responsive early to the requests of competent; experienced controllers and supervisors; aircraft can be moved in a timely and strategic manner instead of last minute 'panic' vectors. I understand they want to even out the traffic load; but ultimately the aircraft they try to keep out of the other sectors wind up there anyway; just they arrive in a random and chaotic manner instead of organized and spaced had they been moved prior to the weather.

ZJX Center Controller reported the facility controlling Restricted/Warning Areas approved point outs for weather deviations than called back to tell them to exit the areas for traffic.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Aircraft; Staffing; Environment - Non Weather Related

[I] worked 3 short legs on this [aircraft]. [Another Flight Attendant] and I were both extremely hot throughout the day. The APU was run on the ground on each leg; shades closed and air vents open as well. Our pilots made it as cold as possible. The [other Flight Attendant] was very ill; vomiting in the bathroom many times throughout the day from the high heat. Passengers were complaining throughout the day. I had a moderate headache and in the middle of the night began to run a high fever. I have chills; sweats; severe headache; tiredness; nausea; a rash; and fever. I spent majority of the night awake and sick. I was unable to complete my duty day the following day because of these symptoms and needed to be replaced. I worked an additional leg while feeling very ill in effort to not delay the flight or crew. I was treated in the hospital. I was diagnosed with heat exhaustion and dehydration and was given multiple bags of fluid to rehydrate. Today; I was seen for my follow up appointment with [company medical]. The Doctor was positive that I had not only been exposed to high heat conditions but to a toxic chemical/substance as well. He believes the high heat exacerbated this toxic exposure and is treating me accordingly for toxic exposure.

A Flight Attendant described feeling ill after several legs with the cabin temperature very hot and that other Flight Attendant was vomiting during the encounter.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 13900; Flight Crew Type 175

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Ramp

Aircraft is non-electrical with no starter; and based at a private airpark home.  Aircraft was tied down at tail and triple chocked. Preflighted and prepared for a normal start and flight. Normal start; but as I was walking around wing to the cockpit engine power increased more quickly than expected after start. I was unable to reach the cockpit to shut the engine down before the chocks gave way followed by the tiedown stake pulling out of the ground. Aircraft traveled unoccupied down sloping yard and hit a ditch coming to rest on the taxiway; resulting in landing gear damage and propeller striking ground and pavement and engine shutdown. No injuries or property damage occurred. In retrospect I have always been careful to secure the aircraft for start correctly with triple chocks and tie down. It's possible; on this start; I may not have tightened the throttle friction lock fully which may have allowed the throttle position to travel partially forward after start. The chocks in front of all three tires started to strain; then failed and the aircraft rolled forward as I was moving around the wing. The last available restraint was a tiedown at the tailwheel position. Momentum and some slack in the tie down rope caused the tiedown stake to pull loose from the ground as the slack was taken up. The downhill slope of the yard added to the acceleration before impact with the ditch. I should have double checked the throttle setting and friction lock to make sure that throttle position would not change. The increase in power would not have happened.

Pilot reported that after a prop start the aircraft jumped the chocks and separated from the single tiedown.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Training / Qualification; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Confusion; Workload; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

During our turn I got the ATIS and Aerodata info using FMS #2.  Everything worked fine.  The Captain set up the flight plan using FMS #1.  I verified the flight plan on FMS #1.  We were cleared for the DEBIE 6 departure off of Runway 18C.  I was the Flying Pilot and briefed the departure off of 18C.  I talked about verifying the runway in the FMS and about 'gear up; LNAV.'  I also briefed that we would takeoff pink needles and turn on the autopilot early so we could cross check the departure.  We took off 18C.  My FMS screen was on the Aerodata page as has been my habit since the introduction of Aerodata.  On takeoff everything was normal until we armed the LNAV.  At that point the flight director showed a hard right turn.  I started turning right and a few seconds later the Captain said; 'My flight director doesn't show that turn.'  We took a few seconds to figure things out because both flight directors were showing a different course.  While doing this we noticed the flight plan in FMS 2 was showing CLT direct IAH.  We decided FMS 1 was right and started to turn back on course.  ATC asked us what our heading was.  We informed them we had a FMS issue and were turning back on course.  They assigned us a new heading.  I selected the FMS data from FMS number 1; and the pink needle turned yellow because we were now using shared data.  A short time later they asked us if we could continue the departure. We said we could and continued the flight without further incident. RNAV departures are a big threat by themselves.  I thought we did all the right things to mitigate the threat.  Good brief; verified the runway; 'gear up LNAV'.  The one thing I didn't do that would have solved the issue was to check that the flight plan was loaded on the right side FMS.  I have never specifically done that before but after this experience it will now be a part of my routine.  The undesired aircraft state was a lateral deviation that occurred as a result of following incorrect guidance from the flight director.  This was initially corrected by us as we realized our error then assisted by ATC with the assignment of a new heading.One thing I mentioned earlier was to check the flight plan in both FMS units.  The other thing I will do is take off with the flight plan in the FMS screen.  It seems a lot more useful than the Aerodata page I have been using.

After a quick turn on the same aircraft we were departing CLT via the DEBIE 6 Departure out 18C. Flight plan was entered on the number 1 FMS by the Captain (NFP) and subsequently verified by both pilots. During the takeoff clearance Tower gave us the 1st fix GIRGY which I confirmed with Tower after looking at the 1 FMS which was on flight plan mode. At 400 Ft per the brief I (NFP) armed the NAV mode.

An air carrier crew departed on the CLT DEBIE 6 departure and the First Officer followed the #2 FMS Flight Director command off track because the flight plan was entered in the #1 FMS but not verified in the #2 FMS.


Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Cat II autoland winds 140/05. 3 autopilots on landing nose wheel touch down speed brake moved forward to disconnect autobrakes and engage manual braking and rudder went hard over to the right. Aircraft still on centerline. Brakes and nose wheel steering worked. Clear runway and came to a stop.  5 minutes after stopping rudder unfroze and everything worked.  Auto pilot also disconnected at that time.[Maintenance inspection notes]: inspected no status messages or [maintenance messages]. Performed a visual inspection of rudder no discrepancies noted. Also performed test of rudder control system. Rudder grd test good with full deflection left and right returning to neutral.  Indication agreed with all rudder movement. Engaged l; r and c  [autopilots] one at a time to look for rudder movement. No rudder deflection occurred. All 3 [autopilot] engagements and disengagements grd check good. No history and no faults Found rudder system grd checks good ok to continue.After clearing the runway and brakes set; I had the First Officer (FO) put his feet on the rudder pedals to see if he could move the rudder; he could not. I then called maintenance; while on the taxiway to see what they wanted to do. While waiting for the Ramp office to get maintenance on the radio the rudder and trim went back to normal operation and we taxied to the gate. I called the Duty Officer and explained the situation and ask to be connected to Tech Support; I explained the situation. Maintenance found no Fault codes and ran ground check on the Hydraulic and Autopilot System. Systems checked fine. (Maintenance was not able to check all three Autopilots engaged in the chocks)After talking with the FO we decided that we were comfortable flying the plane back. FO hand flew the aircraft to FL340; trimmed the aircraft for level flight and then engaged the right autopilot. The autopilot function correctly throughout the remainder of the flight. Landing was hand flown to a normal landing.Not sure as to what caused the situation.

A B757 Crew on a Category II landing rollout experiences a rudder handover to the right as the nose wheel is lowered to the runway. No fault codes were shown and the rudder checked out OK on the ground.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

Upon landing gear extension; a loud bang was heard in the nose wheel compartment. We suspected some major malfunction or damage so we configured the aircraft normally for landing but requested a low altitude (500 FT) flyby to have the Tower inspect the nose gear for damage. We had three green down and locked and no indication of hydraulic fluid loss. We flew the aircraft by the Tower and performed a normal go-around but left the landing gear down. We flew a right downwind visual approach and reconfigured for a normal landing with flaps 30. We discussed the situation between ourselves and had no reason to suspect anything but a normal landing; so communication with the flight attendants was curtailed due to time constraints. Particular attention was made to the nose wheel touchdown rate and touchdown ultimately was slow and soft. Taxi to the gate was normal. Upon reaching the gate; the next crew was in place to perform the preflight inspection; which resulted in observing large quantity of fluid coming from nose wheel area.

Upon gear extension; there was a loud bang in the nose wheel compartment. After a slight delay; we got three green indications. There were no abnormal lights or any other indications of a malfunction. The Captain and I discussed probable causes and decided to do a low level Tower fly by to make sure there wasn't any visible evidence of a malfunction of the gear. The Tower reported that everything appeared to be normal. We made a close in right pattern and the landing was normal and uneventful. After parking at the gate; the post flight inspection revealed a significant amount of hydraulic fluid under the nose wheel.

B737-300 flight crew reports a loud bang from the nose gear area when the landing gear is extended but no other anomalies are exhibited. After a Tower fly by a normal landing ensues with taxi to the gate. Post flight reveals a hydraulic leak in the nose gear area.