Flight Crew Last 90 Days 127.17; Flight Crew Total 2746.37; Flight Crew Type 487.87

Fatigue; Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Distraction

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Pairing X was modified once a week or two ahead for report times.Trip began with along ZZZZ layover and second day with a XA:50 report to fly XR:03 block to ZZZ. In cruise to ZZZ we were informed by the FA crew that no meals were boarded for us. We asked for what snacks were available given neither of us had eaten since breakfast. We were given snack type food; sugar and nothing of substance.Upon landing in ZZZ we had to clear customs and had no option for food before leaving the airport as after customs we were right at the hotel pick up area. We called the hotel and asked them to send the van and they informed it would be 10-15 mins. 45 mins later (now 11 hrs remaining in our layover) we got the hotel. We asked what food options were available and they said nothing. We both changed and walked around the hotel and found a takeout restaurant still open but with 5 plus people in line to order. By the time we got our food we had less than 10 hrs remaining in our layover and a full meal to eat. I am not use to eating this way and tried my best to get what rest I could prior to our van at XS:05 AM for a XS:40 AM report.My Captain started the crew briefing that morning with 'I did not sleep as well and I'm feeling effects of fatigue so keep an eye on me.' I slept OK and we both felt OK to fly to ZZZ1 and would evaluate the day as each flight came. Upon reaching ZZZ1; we were both making our standard SOP callouts - but the wrong callouts at the wrong time. For example; 'Set missed approach altitude at GS intercept vs at 1;000 feet AFE'. We landed and both agreed we were feeling more effects but were still fit to fly our leg to ZZZ2.Roughly half way to ZZZ2 I felt like I 'hit a wall' and told the CA that I would be calling fatigue for the ZZZ3 leg. Immediately she said 'please do the same for me.'We completed our flight to ZZZ3 per SOP and no errors were made on arrival nor en-route aside from a few misplaced callouts.This pairing X had multiple fail points. First; no food was boarded in ZZZZ - not even the COVID adjusted non approved meal. Nothing.Second; upon arrival and clearing customs; the hotel van took over 45 mins to get to us and over an hour to get to the hotel further shortening our layover time.Third; upon arrival at the short layover; the hotel had zero food options available - not even a to go option. I can assure had we not found the restaurant across the street this would have resulted in a call to scheduling that evening. We cannot not be fed on a 6 hour flight we are planned to get both a meal and a snack and have nothing boarded. And then get to our short layover and have no food available and have to spend more time finding food and then eating a full meal to then have to sleep immediately afterwards. The sleep quality was poor at best.This completely set up day 3 - the longest day of our trip for failure. This pairing needs to be looked over and corrected; and/or the company has to provide some failsafe option if food is not boarded. In this instance we not only had food not boarded and available; but at the time we needed a quick option with no other option - the hotel had absolutely nothing.In this case we were set up on day 2 to have a minimal rest night and then move into a 3 leg day spanning 11+ hours with minimal poor sleep the night before.

Air carrier First Officer reported a flight pairing where they had no proper food available and minimal sleep leaving them fatigued and hungry during flights.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 10700; Flight Crew Type 900

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

During flight; a red 'L REV Unlock' CAS message was observed indicating the left reverser was unlocked. The reverser was stowed via the Emergency Stow and the check list was referenced. Shortly afterwards; an Amber 'COM HYD FAIL' and SNGL RUDDER LIMIT' CAS messages were observed. A check of the hydraulic system showed complete loss of both pressure and fluid of the Combine Hydraulic System. The appropriate check list was reviewed and complied with. Once the Aircraft was configured and check lists reviewed; approach control vectored us for a visual approach. Landing was successful using approximately 7;000 ft of the 10;000 ft available. Once stopped; the gear was pinned. While there was an attempt to taxi; it was decided to be towed to the FBO.

G-IV Captain experiences a 'L REV Unlock' CAS message during climb and the reverser was stowed via the emergency stow switch. Shortly afterwards; 'COM HYD FAIL' and 'SNGL RUDDER LIMIT' CAS messages are observed and the flight diverts to a suitable airport.


Epic Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

I vectored Aircraft X for an ILS approach. After the initial vector I gave the following information; distance from FAF; heading to 230; maintain 6000 ft until established; cleared for ILS approach. After giving the clearance my Radar Assist mentioned my turn on angle was too great; I then corrected it and issued a 240 heading to intercept the localizer. The aircraft was descending quickly and was in and out of radar contact. In my scan I noticed I had lost radar contact for one update; next update it was back but their altitude was 5600 ft. I issued a low altitude alert; the next update was 5100 ft. I again issued a low altitude alert and asked Aircraft X to climb immediately to 6000 ft. At that time my intention was to terminate their approach and try again. I waited for altitude to start a climb then did so. At that time the aircraft canceled IFR; in VFR conditions; and I switched them to tower.As this was a pilot deviation I feel my instructions were appropriate. My correction of the heading was the only thing that I felt was lacking and it was forced under pressure.

ZSE Center Controller reported that an aircraft descended too early for the approach; and went below the minimum safe altitude.


Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Chart Or Publication; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

I was instructed by Tower to taxi across concrete ramp to Taxiway J. The airport diagram depicts the taxiways with what appears to be separated taxiways; whereas in real life it's a solid ramp area. We overshot Taxiway J and got into a position of not being able to turn onto; thus we had to use Taxiway B.  This was the first time either of us had been at that end of the airport and it was very confusing for the first time. I suspect it happens regularly because another carrier's two arrivals behind us did exactly the same thing we did as we waited on ramp traffic in front of us.I would suggest painting in the areas separating the taxiways; like many airports have a green color. Something to better depict the taxiway. Although I don't suspect I will make the same mistake having experienced this. My concern was uncertainty clearing across over concrete ramp to Taxiway J.

The reporter stated that after landing on Runway 29; his first time ever; he was expecting either grass or clear demarcations between taxiways. That was not the case; and in fact the taxiways are connected by massive concrete open areas which make the taxiways indistinguishable from non-taxiways. He would suggest a chart redesign which more clearly depicts the connected ramp; taxiway network. The reporter believes the chart should clearly show the ramp areas; where they in fact exist; but dashed taxiway lines where taxiways exist (such as currently shown for Taxiway B at the Ball Park). When he received clearance across the ramp to Taxiway J; his mind boggled because the real world did not fit the expectation he had developed from studying the airport diagram.

After landing on and clearing EWR Runway 29; a flight crew was cleared across the open ramp to Taxiway J. The Captain was confused because the commercial EFB airport depiction did not look like the airport's massive open ramps and indistinguishable taxiways.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

ATL has a runway closure on one of its runways.  This forces a situation where arrivals and departures have to share a runway.  Controllers at ATL ATCT don't shoot gaps on a regular basis.  Some FPL's haven't done it since at a previous facility; and the many that came to ATL from off the street have never shot gaps in their life.  The spacing and speeds on final are completely unreasonable and create a situation that isn't needed.  There are a few things we need to understand.  1) There aren't true high speed taxiways on 8R/26L.  That does require a little more room than normal.  2) When you don't use a skill (or never had it); the ability or discretion to use the skill deteriorates.  3) The users aren't used to rolling immediately when they get their takeoff clearance at ATL because we have dedicated arrival and departure runways.  4) Tower supervisors in the tower are 'hovering' over the position increasing the anxiety of the position.  They're also hell-bent on insuring the speeds are exactly what they want; regardless of the space behind the aircraft.  This needs to stop immediately.  On this day; I was told by the controller I was relieving that the tower wanted 6 miles at 160 knots for a single departure gap.  When I sat down; demand wasn't that bad; so I proceeded to apply a little common sense to the position {gasp}.  160 knots requires most aircraft to drop their landing gear to hold that speed.  Today we were shooting ILS approaches; which mean a 22+ mile final.  That's roughly 25 miles an aircraft would have to fly with their gear down.  I'm throwing the 'BS' flag. From years of doing the job of a tower controller; there is rarely a situation where such a slow speed and HUGE amount of room is required.  I was running 5 miles at 170 knots; and noticed I had a skilled tower controller who was running (when there was departure demand) two departures out in those gaps.  I did have one or two roll to the end; and STILL had no go arounds.  There is no need for this and it really needs to stop.  The users are getting used to the operation.  They're rolling quicker than when we started.  The FLM's in the tower need to let the controllers control; and if they aren't getting room; coordinate with the TRACON; or (as its been my experience); the tried and true method of 'giving one back to radar' instantly fixes the 'too tight' scenarios they're afraid of.  I will not do things that are meant to be punitive; and I will not put flight crews in the bad; high workload situation the tower is requiring.  If I'm removed from position; so be it.  I know I'll be helping the users by standing up against this instead of contributing to the delusional tower supervisors need to 'not have to watch it' (meaning; making the controllers sweat a little bit and do the job controllers all over the country do on a daily basis).  There's a time we need to use speeds less than 170 knots on final.  'Controller comfort?' isn't one of them.   Thank you.  Share this report with anyone you see fit.

A80 Controller describes a situation where he feels the separation required by Approach to give the Tower is too much.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 200

I had taken a load in the aircraft and taxied to Runway XX at ZZZ. There were 2 airplanes in the pattern for Runway XY; Cessna 172 and a Bonanza. The Cessna 172 was on base for [Runway] XY planning a touch and go and the Bonanza was across midfield for a downwind entry to [Runway] XY. My plan was to taxi into position; wait until the Cessna 172 had passed by and then takeoff. I announced those plans on frequency. I heard the Cessna 172 acknowledge my radio call. I then thought that the Cessna 172 told me that they were on short final and would hold short of [Runway] XX. I acknowledged that call and replied that I was rolling on [Runway] XX. I proceeded with my takeoff and as I crossed runway [Runway] XY I saw the Cessna 172 go over me after taking off on [Runway] XY. We crossed paths and I estimate we cleared by about 150 feet. I later called the pilot of the Cessna 172 by phone to find out what happened. He said that he never said that he would hold short; but intended to do a quick touch and go in order to get past runway [Runway] XX and let me depart. Apparently; I misunderstood his radio call. This was my fault in that I misunderstood his intentions and was only using his radio calls to determine his position. I did not have the Cessna 172 in sight when I started my takeoff. If I would have held position until I had visual contact then this could have been avoided.

Aerial pilot reported an NMAC event during takeoff with another aircraft in landing pattern due to a communications breakdown.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 2.1; Flight Crew Total 470.6; Flight Crew Type 228.6

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Following issuance of a first class medical under special issuance for sleep apnea; conducted a flight for a flight review with a qualified flight instructor. This flight was conducted a few weeks after the first possible dose of an investigational vaccine for COVID-19. The vaccine was unapproved for general use; and the trial the pilot is participating in phase 3 at the time of the flight and currently. The pilot has subsequently taken a second possible dose; but was unaware of any potential FAA interpretation that participation in a vaccine trial was potentially medically disqualifying; he treated the situation as with any vaccination and self certified himself as fit to fly having no adverse symptoms. This may have been incorrect for the moment; but was done in good faith at the time.

Pilot reported taking the COVID vaccine and was unaware that it was unapproved for general use and a possible FAR violation.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

I was the Captain and flying the aircraft and was going directly to ZZZZZ on the ILS Runway XXR approach.  We were hoping for the ILS YYL approach because we were parking on the west side.  They said we could have XXR and we accepted.  I was probably a little tired and I was fast on speed approaching the glideslope.  I tried to slow; got configured; but was too high on the glideslope and did a go-around.  During the go-around; because we were already high; a little fast; and flying a light aircraft; I failed to get the flaps up on time.  We oversped the flaps and exceeded 250 knots below 10;000 feet.  We momentarily reached 263 knots before cleaning up and slowing.  I wrote up the overspeed in the AML.  All else was uneventful.No excuses; but maybe a factor is that I have been flying 5 days in a row after being off for 2 months.  I felt things were coming back to me; and then this happened.  It was a somewhat long day; ZZZ - ZZZ1 - ZZZ2 - ZZZ1;  but not terrible.I will review the go-around procedures before every approach.  Also; in this case; I believe I lacked a little situation awareness because when we changed to the ILS for XXR; we were much closer on the approach and I should have started slowing the aircraft sooner.

CA was PF. FO was PM. While executing a go-around from XXR at ZZZ; we momentarily exceeded 250 kts IAS. The PM told the PF and he immediately adjusted thrust to reduce the airspeed. We received vectors from ATC; landed on YYL at ZZZ; and went to the assigned gate without further incident. There were no aircraft alarms or comment from ATC. We decided to go-around because we were high and fast on the approach. PM might have anticipated an airspeed issue because it was one of the reasons for the go-around.

Air carrier flight crew reported a speed deviation and flap overspeed while executing a go-around.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Pre-flight; Routine Inspection

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused

When we entered the aircraft the F/O and myself both commented it had a really bad odor in the cabin. There was a cleaner on board and he asked us for assistance. He said the last crew wrote up an odor and wondered if we still smelled it. He had been cleaning trying to get rid of the smell. The first 10 rows of the aircraft had a musty smell as well as the flight deck. I then checked the logbook to find the prior Captain had written up a bad odor reported by the flight attendants and that he was refusing the aircraft for safety reasons. We immediately got our belongings and got off the aircraft. We had been in for approximately 15-20 minutes.Aircraft should have been removed from service and we never should have been subjected to this event.[Reporter recommends] the aircraft should have been removed from service to find the source of the odor. I asked for maintenance to come out to the aircraft. He wanted to spray some disinfectant and send the aircraft out. He asked if I was refusing the aircraft and I explained I couldn't refuse an aircraft with the open write up still in logbook. He explained that in order to find the source he would have to remove it from service and it was time consuming.

Air Carrier Captain reported a fume event upon arrival at the aircraft. Aircraft logbook had an open discrepancy by previous flight crew who had rejected the aircraft due to a fume event.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We took off from runway 4L in Newark. Prior to starting our right turn via the SID we became aware of another aircraft off our right side so we continued straight ahead. I was about to command a left turn when ATC told the other aircraft to make an immediate right turn and told us to maintain runway heading. At that point we entered IMC and followed ATC instructions. None of us heard the other aircraft announce he was going around.

B777 pilot reported deviating from SID heading due to traffic; moments after ATC gave conflicting traffic evasive clearance.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

At cruise an hour and a half into a 3 hour planned flight; when the engine monitor (EDM700) showed a spike in EGT and a fall in CHT on number 6 cylinder. [I] attempted to remedy by changing mixture; power settings; etc. to no avail. Condition continued to deteriorate and engine began to vibrate. Reduced power to 20 inches MP (flight idle to maintain power and keep the engine warm). Used GPS to locate the closest airport and landed uneventfully. As it was a holiday; there was no mechanic available to investigate or repair. The next morning; the Mechanic removed and cleaned the injector and spark plug for number 6 cylinder. Ground run showed everything good so took off to complete trip. Climbed out northeast to 9;500 FT; as I passed 8;000 or so same condition as before with number 5 and then number 3 cylinder. Did a 180 and returned. Removed and cleaned all 6 injectors; together with rails and lines. [I] drained fuel from sumps. [I] noted dirt in main sump drain. Both wing tanks showed no matter. Removed gascolator; [I] noted sludge and dirt. Cleaned; replaced gaskets and ran more fuel through all lines. Ground ran for 10 minutes at high idle (15 inches). Took off to complete trip; I made it to about the same location and noted cylinders 2; 3; and 5 with problems. Returned and cleaned all six injectors; rails and lines again. Ground ran and took off and orbited. I was able to reach 9;500 but by the time I set it up for cruise; noted a problem with number 5 cylinder. Returned and cleaned all injectors; lines and rails. At each of these past trips; fuel samples were taken with no particulate matter noted. Took off and orbited again. Climbed to 9;500 FT set up for cruise flew for 10 minutes and noted a small issue with number 6 cylinder. Returned and cleaned all injectors on that side (left). Took off and orbited at 9;500 FT set up for cruise; flew for 10 minutes and noted no issues. [We] successfully completed trip. Contacted FBO where the last fuel purchase was made. They reported several purchases at the self-serve both before and after me with no other issues reported. They reported that they sample the tank daily. Aircraft had previously been flown for 3.7 hours; 2 days prior with no problems. Aircraft is flown regularly. It is hangared at home base but spent a large part of the winter outside in New England. A drain that operates from the cockpit with no easy method of collecting the fuel seems to be an issue. Operating manual says to utilize the cockpit activated drain on every 3rd or 4th flight. Subsequent experienced Mooney Maintenance had told me to do it every flight. The sample drained onto the ramp will tell you if there is water but nothing else.

M20 pilot reports diverting for a rough running engine. The number six cylinder spark plugs and fuel injector is cleaned by a mechanic but the problem returns. Contaminants are found in the fuel and three more injector cleanings and three more test flights are required before the problem is cleared up.


Testing; Installation; Work Cards; Inspection

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

While performing the Installation Inspection of a slide replacement for a Boeing B777 at ZZZ Maintenance Hanger; Spot X area; I armed [Cabin] Door-2R (2-Right) to make sure all arm/disarm indications showed proper positions. In the instant from arming the door; looking [down] at the lower door Indicators and performing the door Operational Check for smooth operation; clearance; and verify proper [door] bustle installation and workmanship; I moved the door handle slightly before remembering to disarm the door; which inadvertently blew the slide.

A Line Inspector describes how he inadvertently deployed a door slide at Cabin Door 2-Right on a B-777 aircraft during verification of the slide installation.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 3300; Flight Crew Type 200

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency; General Evacuated

We had an engine failure/fire during our climbout. The Captain used emergency authority and immediately turned back to the field while talking to ATC. I ran checklists while trying to get the fire out; and became hypoxic. We donned our oxygen masks and had difficulty communicating after this. I could not hear the Captain and he couldn't hear me. We landed single engine with the fire light still illuminated despite using both of our fire extinguishing bottles. We came to a stop on the runway and did an expeditious normal deplaning on the runway. No one was injured.Possible contributing factors included the following. Before takeoff and during taxi I remember talking about a non-pertinent gate location at another airport that probably broke the sterile cockpit rule. Also prior to takeoff our standby attitude indicator flashed with a maintenance page and it normally doesn't do that. With VFR conditions and the standby attitude indicator still showing a correct picture we decided to continue the flight.Communication became very difficult after we donned our oxygen masks and made everything more challenging.

An engine fire during initial climb caused the flight crew of a Q400 to discharge both fire retardant bottles; shut down the engine; declare an emergency and return for a landing and evacuation on the runway.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast)

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 101.17; Flight Crew Total 17454.30; Flight Crew Type 6215.78

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

Approx 400 feet AGL [we received] ECAM for dual ADS-B failure 'ADS-B RPTG 1/2 fault'. This followed [at] 800 feet [by] GPS lost/failure shortly after. ATC advised; per NOTAM we understood DEN has issues. Dispatch notification after level off.

Air carrier Captain reported loss of ADS-B and GPS departing DEN.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Weather

Aircraft X was in level flight. There was weather between them and their destination that other aircraft had to deviate around earlier in the night. I issued the weather; and even though the pilot didn't see the weather; he still requested to deviate. We typically lose radar on aircraft at or below 12000 feet in this area and he was level at 8000 feet; but later requested 10000 feet. We had just been briefed earlier that we cannot issue weather deviations to non-radar aircraft. I was very worried that we would lose the aircraft on radar and I would have to declare an emergency on his behalf. This situation occupied my attention and while nothing unsafe happened; I would have been extremely distracted as I had an 'emergency in the making.' I was relieved from the sector before the aircraft went non-radar; so I'm not sure how this situation ended.There was nothing unsafe in the way we used to assign direct routes in non-radar situations; we need a waiver or something like that to let us give pilots what they need (point to point direct clearances; ability to deviate around weather non-radar; ability to give direct clearances while non-radar e.g. initial approach fixes or fixes to avoid military airspace.) With our rapidly deteriorating staffing situation; I'm not sure that we'll have the staffing during the summer to properly handle these situations.

Today we were told in a briefing that if an aircraft is not in radar coverage and needs a deviation for weather we need to [give special attention to] that aircraft. I was working Aircraft X at 8000 feet on radar. They asked for a left deviation which I approved then they asked for 7000 feet so I descended them to 7000 feet. At about 7500 feet I lost Aircraft X on radar. I told the supervisor that I was [taking special attention] for Aircraft X because he was nonradar and deviating. Two or three minutes went by and he said he was done deviating.

ZLC ARTCC mandated that controllers cannot approve weather deviations for aircraft not in radar coverage unless the aircraft is given special attention.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Other / Unknown; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Takeoff conditions were IMC and windy. It was my leg to fly. Before takeoff we briefly briefed the possibility of wind shear after takeoff. Once we did the takeoff; we actually encountered a caution wind shear. The reason for this [report] is my insufficient wind shear SOP. I did not move the thrust lever to max nor said the callout. Because I did not move the levers to max thrust the wind shear guidance did not activate. However; because I seemed to have tunnel vision; thought it did activate and ensured positive aircraft control at all times. The Captain also missed the call outs; however I do not blame the Captain for it as she was probably focused on seeing if I would ever push the thrust lever to max and ensure I had positive aircraft control.The Captain and I had a thorough briefing once we landed about the issues and how we could have done better. We briefed that next time we should ensure we go over the procedure mentally and do some chair flying to better prepare as to avoid the heat of the moment mistakes in not the most comfortable turbulence and situation. Additionally; I learned how my body reacted and will ensure next time I do the SOP properly.At the moment of wind shear; I knew what I had to do; callout wind shear max thrust and push it to max thrust. However; in the heat of the moment I may have suffered confirmation bias when I heard the ATTCS (Automatic Takeoff Thrust Control System) move thrust automatically to max thrust and made me hesitate. So when I noticed my hesitation I just forgot about SOP and focused on maintaining aircraft control by ensuring airspeed wings level  with the rolling tendencies the turbulence was doing.

After departure from Runway XXR and into the beginning of our takeoff climb we received a 'caution windshear'. The aircraft was configured for a no flex takeoff prior to departure and the Captain briefed windshear guidance procedures in the event windshear was encountered. However; once the caution occurred the windshear escape procedure was not executed properly. The Pilot Flying (First Officer) pitched to 20 degrees and maintained heading; however did not call out or move the throttles to the max thrust position or press the toga button. PF did proceed to call out of windshear and recover. The Pilot Monitoring (Captain) recognized windshear and the aircraft maintaining an increasing Ra position. While verifying the thrust position; the PM became aware thrust lever position hadn't moved up and toga button not pressed. The PF started to turn towards the assigned heading around 1;000 feet and around when the caution cleared. The PM attempted to communicate max thrust but became distracted by the turn; ATC instructions and got tongue tied. The aircraft proceeded with the flight with no other occurrences. PM and PF discussed the occurrence; identifying what went wrong and how to prevent future errors. The PF explained how he heard the engines spool up thus creating misperception and how he focused on the departure. The PM believes the missed call out created missed triggers and lead to getting behind. We believe better communication and speaking louder is an effective solution to prevent tunnel vision and enhance situational awareness. The weather posed threats and a changing environment that requires risk management and quality CRM. We understand these events happen within seconds and that maintaining vigilance will eliminate errors and mitigate threats. Reviewing procedures and call outs as a crew and individually will help eliminate future errors and maintain safe operations.

Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a windshear warning on takeoff and failing to perform the Wind Shear Maneuver.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Never received hand-off from Houston ATC.Did not receive hand-off from Houston. If we did we both missed several attempts by Houston to give us frequency change. Checked with [First Officer] FO who was monitoring 121.5 only to be told FO turned the volume down because of people meowing; when we turned up volume and contacted Atlanta they gave us 120.4 . We were past out Top of Descent (TOD); he laughed and said thought you missed something being still at 35;000 [feet] 50 miles out; gave us a heading and descent landed ZZZ with no further issues. I did have a number to call [and] gave them all my info. He said he still had to fill out a report even though we were in no one's way and middle of nowhere.

Captain reported missing a frequency change and stated the First Officer had turned down the volume of guard frequency due to people 'meowing.'


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I handed off Aircraft X to HTO sector.  I still had communications with Aircraft X. I had radar and communications on Aircraft Y.  I climbed a departure off of JFK to FL190 ref these aircraft.  The HTO sector changed the data block on Aircraft X to show FL190 and was handing the aircraft to the SARDI sector.  I asked my handoff if he gave control and he said no.  I called the HTO sector and asked what he was doing.  He asked for control and I said no due to traffic.  I asked him to change the data block back to FL210.  I then realized I hadn't switched communications and switched Aircraft X to HTO.  As soon as HTO had communications with Aircraft X they put FL190 in the data block and handed the aircraft off to SARDI.  I called back to HTO sector and asked if he was descending Aircraft X.  He asked me if I gave him control.  I said no and he said then I'm not descending him.  I told the HTO controller to put back the assigned altitude because I'm getting conflict alerts on Aircraft X and Aircraft Y.  He never did and I advised my supervisor.Do not change data blocks in other controller's airspace.

A ZNY Controller reports of another Controller changing the data block of his aircraft. The other Controller asks for control of aircraft and the reporter advises no due to traffic. The Controller then transfers communication to other Controller and other Controller changes data block again. The reporter asks other Controller if he gave them control and he said no. The reporter asked again for other Controller to put the correct altitude in the data block. The conflict was because of the other Controller changing the altitude in the scratch pad area.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Cleaners came onboard during deplaning; standing in the way of passengers deplaning. The cleaners were supposed to maintain separation from others due to social distancing. How can you clean a plane to COVID-19 cleaning standards if you have cleaners onboard and in the way of our customers? This increases exposure with numerous less than 6 foot encounters. The cleaners spend all day exposed to dirty environments.

Flight Attendant reported the aircraft cleaners are proceeding onto the aircraft before all passengers are deplaned which does not conform with social distancing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 119; Flight Crew Total 11588; Flight Crew Type 64

As I prepared for departure of Aircraft X; I inquired about the lack of a [Maintenance Release]. I was told the a Ramp Service Employee had reported a cotter pin missing on a NLG (Nose Landing Gear) door and maintenance was investigating. Curious as to what cotter pin a ramp service employee would be looking at and why; I went down to the nose wheel well to see. It seems that the aft Nose gear doors on Aircraft X each have an adjustable proximity stop on their forward ends. This stop consists of a length adjustable bolt that is held in it's adjusted position by a metal clip or pin. That pin was missing on the right door adjusting bolt which allowed it to spin freely; varying its length. Upon examining the left bolt; it struck me as something not very likely to become dislodged. I would like to believe that if the clip was an item that required frequent examination; it would have been pointed out during walk around training. It was not. We did have the part at ZZZ; but the maintenance manual called for a gear swing to confirm nose gear door alignment. As a result; Aircraft X was taken out of service. A replacement aircraft was brought down from the hangar. While the Tech Ops employees were preparing Aircraft Y for departure they expressed their extreme frustration that this particular ramp service employee was 'constantly' touching things that were not part of his job and finding aircraft faults that were not within his purview. They went on to say that this ramp employee had been caught in the cockpit manipulating switches. When confronted he stated that he had seen it on YouTube and wanted to see for his self. I took my First Officer's down to the nose wheel well of Aircraft X to show them where the fault had been found. All of them reported that they were unaware of the stop limit bolts and none had been trained to inspect them. As we stood there; three Ramp Servicemen happily approached; two of them pointing at the third who identified himself as the person who had found the faulty bolt on the other aircraft. The person that found the faulty bolt explained to me that he 'liked to touch those bolts after in plugged in his cord'. I did not ask why and I resisted the urge to ask him not to touch parts of the equipment that were not his responsibility. I know that we are on a very slippery slope when we ask someone not to report faults. However; I am concerned and uncomfortable to learn that an employee with no technical training is examining my aircraft in search of mechanical faults. I'd like to think that the retaining clip had departed the aircraft on it's own volition and the ramp serviceman was so proud of himself because he had found a problem; but; given the anecdotal information supplied by the Tech Ops and CS employees about our recent performance at ZZZ; I am left to wonder.As an aside; as part of the preparation for our flight; Tech Ops had to run both engines to get an accurate quantity check. Just before pushback I was asked to run the left engine again because this same ramp serviceman thought he saw an oil leak. Net result 3:19 late out 2:44 late in and [next flight was] 2:01 late out and 1:35 late in.

Air carrier flight crew reported a missing aircraft part was discovered by ramp agent and resulted in a flight delay.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 114; Flight Crew Total 1449; Flight Crew Type 154

Saw a lightsport looking plane out of periphery of my vision while punching in a button or two on GPS on my panel. Immediately pushed forward and rolled away in steep descending turn to the left; as I was already positioned level and about 100 feet left of a head-on alignment with the other aircraft. I was heads down for less than 6 seconds estimated by time of noticing other aircraft due to relative movement in my field of view that would not have been apparent further out in distance and time from the near-miss. Immediate recognition of need to deviate to left (rather than right) was made along with recognition that a collision would not result due to the immediate evasive action taken. The other aircraft did not take any evasive action and is therefore assumed to have been unaware of my presence. I looked towards aircraft as I rolled and kept eyes on aircraft as it passed by me towards my 5 o clock position while I was rolled in a 70 degree left bank. I then recovered to level flight and continued to climb to 6;300 pattern altitude at my destination airport. I had ADS-B out from a modern solid state transponder unit as well as ADS-B in capability; but I was not referencing ADS-B in on any device screen at the time of the near-miss. The situation may have been avoided in the difficult to see case of a head on convergence had I had my ipad or phone connected to my ADS-B over wifi and a method for monitoring the ADS-B situation with auditory alerts in my headset so that an alert of impending collision would have taken my attention away from a cockpit task and diverted my eyes outside to search for a collision waiting to happen. I was lucky that my field of vision included enough of the view in front of me in my periphery to permit my vision to inform me of the near-miss by the time the aircraft was less than 1;000 feet in front of me. Closure rate was estimated to be 170-190 knots taking both of our speeds into account; with 100 foot lateral separation and less than 30 feet vertical separation before evasive action was taken about 2 miles north of Boulder reservoir; coming southbound from Longmont; CO.

GA pilot reported an NMAC near LMO airport.


Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

While in the climb out at approximately FL284; the autopilot disengaged while simultaneously the Captain's PFD and MFD lost all indications. I transferred control of the aircraft to the First Officer (FO). We stopped the climb and descended out of RVSM. The amber IRS fault light along with the Master Caution IRS lights had illuminated. I ran the corresponding QRH checklist for the IRS fault. We operated with the IRS selector switch in BOTH ON RIGHT. I established a radio patch with Dispatch and a subsequent conference call with Maintenance. We discussed what had happened and the possibility of diverting into [a nearby alternate]. After seeing the TAF called for broken clouds I ruled that out. As we progressed to the east we could see [another possible alternate]. After discussing the situation with FO; we decided that our best course was to divert into [that airport]. With the loss of redundant attitude; airspeed; and altitude indications; the continuation did not seem like the best plan of action and diverted.

B737 Captain reported diverting to an alternate airport after noting the loss of the L IRS system.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

As we were boarding; Passenger X came onboard with her face mask not covering her nose. I politely asked her if she could please cover her nose and mouth with her face mask before entering the aircraft. Passenger X complied and went to her assigned seat. I had to inform Passenger X  two other times during a trash walk-through and after I closed the main cabin door to place her face mask over her nose and mouth because she completely took it off both times. Around the fourth time I caught Passenger X with her face mask completely off her face; I politely asked her to comply with Airline's face mask policy. Also; I asked my coworker to double check to see if Passenger X was complying with Airline's face mask policy during another trash walk-through; to which Passenger X wasn't complying with. Passenger X would place her face mask on when we asked her to comply with the face mask policy; but as soon as we walked away she would take it off again. I informed the Captain about Passenger X's non-compliance issues with wearing her face mask. The captain gave me permission to give her the final notice. When I [told] Passenger X the final notice: she pulled her face mask completely down and rolled her eyes at me. I informed the Captain and asked him to call for a CSR to meet us at the gate in ZZZ.When we made it to the gate in ZZZ; the CSR was there waiting. The CSR came on and I told her Passenger X was the one who was having face mask compliance issues. The CSR asked me what happened and I briefly explained. However; the CSR ended up letting Passenger X race right pass her and let her get away. The CSR ask me What am I supposed to do now?' I was at a loss for words. I explained to the CSR that you'll have to go after her because it's not like I could have walked off the aircraft because we were deplaning with an aircraft full of passengers onboard. I pointed Passenger X out to the CSR."

Flight Attendant reported a passenger did not comply with face mask policy throughout the flight.


I completed Initial Operating Experience (IOE) [recently] as a first-time Captain on the Airbus 320. From that moment; it has been a struggle to maintain proficiency and gain the hours needed to get off restricted status (75 hours) or reach the 100 hours needed for consolidation. I am a short call reserve pilot. Here's an example of what's been happening:[A few weeks later]; I had completed only 7 flights; had less than 14 hours; and only 4 landings for the month. I sent emails to the flight office requesting that they buy me a trip. I was not given a trip; so I spoke with [the] Chief Pilot and gave him several options to obtain a proficiency trip. Sadly; despite several attempts and options that I gave him; he was not able to get me a trip.So; [I did not fly over a two week period]. I have to say I felt very uncomfortable yesterday on final into Orlando; dodging thunderstorms while descending the last 100 miles; flying through moderate rain showers on final; and landing in a crosswind in the A321 (having only landed a 321 twice).When I got to operations; I found a phone message from [the Chief Pilot]; asking me if I still was interested in proficiency flying. Luckily; he was still in the office; and I told him I really wanted to fly a three-day trip: one day of flying after 16 days off was not enough. He told me if I could find a trip; he would call scheduling to buy one for me. Unluckily; 15 minutes later he told me that 'it did not look good with scheduling to get me proficiency flying.' So today I find myself back on [reserve]; no open trips; competing with the other 11 pilots on reserve to get any flying the last 4 days of the month.I doubt I am the only new Captain with this problem. It's the 'perfect storm': I'm on short call reserve; at the bottom of the seniority list; with all the other reserve pilots above me also on restricted status. I just can't believe that the 'needs of the company' always take priority over the 'need to stay proficient.' Even when I told the chief pilots that I really felt my situation had changed from being a question of proficiency to one of safety; they were still unable to convince scheduling to give me any flying to get me back up to speed.I firmly believe that one of the 'needs of the company;' which should be a priority; is to have safe; competent; and proficient pilots. Especially when I tell the flight office that I'm not flying enough to be that pilot.

Newly trained A321 Captain reported he was uncomfortable with the small amount of flying he has been doing since training.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 9600; Flight Crew Type 2000

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Extreme solar glare from a solar power plant creates a hazard for pilots flying the CRESO3 arrival into Las Vegas.  Route segments from DANBY - SARAS - WHIGG - CRESO cause aircraft to fly directly toward/overfly the new solar power plant.  Light reflected from the mirrors and the central towers is blinding; making it difficult to visually clear the airspace.  Additionally; the bright light creates 'sun spots' in the pilot's vision.  I fly this route several times a week and have experienced these hazards every time the sun is visible.

Beech 1900 Captain reports the new solar power plant southwest of Las Vegas is a visual hazard while flying the CRESO3 arrival to LAS.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Flight ABC was told by Ramp Control to hold short of N3.  We kept looking for N3 but never saw it.  Was told by the Ramp Control that we passed it.  We advised Ramp we never saw it.  It no longer exists.  We were told most pilots know about where it was.  How can you be told to hold short of something that doesn't exist?  Neither pilot had taxied north of the north satellite in many months.  SEA Ramp Control gave a clearance to hold short of N3 which no longer exist. ATC should not tell aircraft to hold short of something that does not exist.  With the construction on the airport; pilots have enough to focus on and ATC should not assume all pilots are aware of how things used to be!

Air carrier Captain reported being issued instructions to hold short of a taxiway that no longer exists at SEA airport and that they could not visually locate. ATC subsequently advised that the aircraft had passed the taxiway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 131; Flight Crew Type 1671

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On arrival to DEN we flew ANCHR 4 RNAV while planning for ILS 35L Approach. When switched to initial Approach Controller; were given ILS 35R. Changed approach; programmed box; rebriefed; continued on. Once in terminal area passing FULLA and approaching FFFAT we were given new approach to RNAV (RNP) Z 35R; assigned speed of 210 at DOGGG. Changed approach; programmed box; attempted briefing while programming; [and] continued on. Shortly thereafter; Approach Controller asked why we refused to accept RNAV 35R Approach. Wasn't clear on what prompted that inquiry; but immediately following it; we were given a heading to fly (right turn); then asked to report the airport for a Visual Approach 35R. Then another heading (further right) to intercept the localizer for ILS 35R. We flew a visual/backed ILS approach to 35R. Landed uneventfully. Taxied to gate. I requested a number to contact the Controller upon completion of flight. After deplaning; we discussed/debriefed the flight and in particularly the sequence of events during the terminal phase of flight. While approach didn't query our position (RNAV phase of approach) I suspect I may have flown over the waypoint from which I was to start the turn towards the runway (time/distance between where given new approach and beginning of RNAV approach wasn't sufficient to properly perform required duties. ie; program and properly sequence waypoints). While enroute to the hotel I contacted the Center and spoke with the Operational Supervisor. We had a good lengthy discussion and debrief about what transpired; from their perspective and from our perspective. Exchanged input as to what could have been done to make that sequence of events more smooth and less complicated for the both of us. He said he was going to submit an internal report on the event explaining how they can better assist us (arriving aircraft) without unknowingly increasing our workload. And we; pilots; [should] not be hesitant/intimidated to refuse a particular approach because of the workload factor and/or time constraint in preparing the approach/landing may present.

B757 Captain reported a track deviation occurred on the RNAV (RNP) Z Approach to 35R in DEN; when an FMC programming error occurred following a late clearance change.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft X was level at FL450 and requested FL350 upon checking in on my frequency. I advised that I was unable due to crossing traffic 7 miles away opposite direction level at FL430. Aircraft X responded with 'we're going down to FL350 unable to maintain altitude.' I vectored Aircraft X 30 degrees to the right to avoid traffic and then called Fort Worth Center to coordinate that Aircraft X [called in an urgent situation] and was unable to maintain altitude. Upon further questioning Aircraft X told us that he had an engine flame out and needed a lower altitude to restart. With the information we had at the time nothing could have prevented this from happening.

Memphis Center Controller reported an aircraft descended due to loss of an engine in order to attempt a restart of the engine.


While I attempted to disarm the boarding door (L1) to deplane I was unable to lift the arming lever to disarm without using excessive force. I asked Flight Attendant D to try as well; but she couldn't. The cabin pressure light was never illuminated in the door window. I then called the Captain and informed him of the situation. He attempted to disarm the door as well. We had the gate agent wait before opening the door and the captain contacted maintenance. We continued trying to disarm the door and I would say after 5 minutes and maybe ten times attempting to disarm; the arming lever finally budged and the gate agent opened the door and we disarmed all the other doors in normal fashion.

Flight Attendant reported considerable difficulty disarming door L1 after gate arrival. Several other crewmembers tried without success also; and after about five minutes they were able to disarm the door.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Air Traffic Control Military 14; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 613; Flight Crew Type 588

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Entered non tower airport area from the north upon arrival; made a 30 degree entry from northeast and reported position and altitude on CTAF. Entered right downwind and reported position and altitude (1200 ft). No other aircraft reported themselves in the vicinity. Turned right base and reported position; right base. Began turn to final and reported position; intentions; etc.; on CTAF. While rolling out on final at approximately 900 ft observed a small Cessna below and slightly ahead; heading 340 degrees; on runway centerline. I immediately applied full power and climbed to 1500 ft over the field just as the intruding aircraft reported on CTAF that it was over-flying the field from south to north. I reported my position and my go-around 'due to the aircraft that just flew beneath me' to which they responded 'sorry; we just got handed off by Approach Control'. The intruding aircraft continued north. I set up for another approach and landed without incident.

Cessna pilot reported an NMAC with another Cessna while rolling out on final to FHR.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 245; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 878

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Cleared for takeoff while in position on the runway - pushed power up to 40% and then began pushing up to takeoff power - aircraft started veering left - pulled power back to idle. At first thought maybe I had not waited until power stabilized at 40% and the reason for veering left at start of takeoff roll was because of uneven engine spool up - tried one more time to push up to 40% and something was obviously wrong. We notified tower of the problem and pulled off the runway to have the fire trucks look at us after other aircraft advised us of excessive smoke on #1 engine. We shut down the engine and waited for the fire trucks to look at and clear us and then we taxied back to the gate on one engine. Maintenance immediately advised us that it was probably going to be an engine change due to seeing metal fragments in the bottom of the engine and the engine was not spinning freely.

B737 First Officer reported apparent engine power loss when thrust was increased for takeoff. Rejected takeoff was executed and the aircraft returned to the gate for maintenance attention.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Other remote pilot

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 21; Flight Crew Total 12828; Flight Crew Type 178

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Ground Excursion Runway

I was pilot in command of a tail wheel airplane. The purpose of the flight was to maintain tail wheel proficiency. I was seated in the forward pilot station with a passenger seated in the aft pilot station. We departed to proceed to ZZZ with the intention of performing upper airwork maneuvers enroute to a landing at ZZZ to exchange pilot stations. Winds at takeoff were reported SW at 6 knots.On our arrival at ZZZ the automated weather was reporting winds as SW 8G16. The main Runway XX/XY [at] ZZZ is closed for resurfacing and the taxiway 'A' is marked as the temporary runway. The midfield windsock indicated the winds were generally SW 8G16 with some intermittent change to W and continuing intermittent gusts. On final approach to Runway XX the apparent winds were significantly more westerly. The aircraft touched down on the right main gear first. I used forward elevator to keep the horizontal stabilizer and rudder in an airflow that kept them aerodynamically effective. As the left main gear touched down I applied additional right aileron to arrest sideway drift and left pedal to maintain runway longitudinal alignment.  As the tail wheel was about to touchdown the rudder became ineffective for maintaining runway alignment I applied left braking action but was unable to maintain runway heading and the nose of the aircraft yawed right and the aircraft exited the runway. As the aircraft weathervaned further nose right it slid sideways a short distance and the left wing tip contacted the ground. The aircraft was partially on the runway. Both tires were inflated and there was no apparent damage to the left wing. I elected to apply power and maneuver the aircraft clear of the runway and taxi into the ramp area of ZZZ to secure and inspect the aircraft.

Flight Instructor reported a ground loop on landing in gusty wind conditions.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 3300; Flight Crew Type 850

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Prior to takeoff; the First Officer (flying pilot) and I reviewed the Offshore Five Departure procedure out of SFO as part of our before takeoff check.  This was the first time I had flown this particular departure.  28R would be the runway used.  The instructions stated 'intercept and proceed via SFO R-281/D6 at or above 2;500 FT.  SFO VOR was not inoperative.  The routing read 'turn left to a heading of 200 to intercept and proceed via PYE R-151 to SEGUL; then...'  We also discussed crossing restrictions that would occur during the initial climb.  Those included 16;000 or above at SEGUL and FL220 or above at CYPRS.  I programmed the FMS (Global GNS-XLS) and noticed the first fix in the box was WAMMY.  We backed up the departure with appropriate VOR frequencies and radials.  Upon take off; we proceeded via the departure.  At 2;500 FT; the First Officer turned to a heading of 200 to intercept the depicted route.  The NORCAL Controller then stated that we should have maintained runway heading.  I inquired; 'Are you sure?  We were following the OffShore 5 Departure.'  She then replied that we should have waited until 6 DME off the SFO VOR prior to making the turn.  She then gave us a heading to fly (240 degrees).  Prior to handing us over to the next Controller; she suggested that we review the departure procedures a little closer next time.  I apologized for the inconvenience.  No further action was taken.  Upon review of the procedure; I discovered that the appropriate turn (at 6 DME) was depicted in the graphical section of the SID.  We had focused more on the 'narrative' section and consequently inferred that the turn to 200 was to occur after reaching 2;500 FT.  We reached 2;500 FT at about 3.5 - 4 DME of the SFO VOR and as a result; turned too early.First off; I am thankful that we did not create any traffic conflicts.  I am also thankful the controller chose not to pursue action against us.  This situation has emphasized to me that it is important to review the graphical and narrative portions of a SID and/or STAR to ensure that (either as pilot flying or in this case Pilot Monitoring) the procedure is flown correctly.  If I could make some suggestions about this procedure; I would say the following: 1) Make note of the turn (6 DME) in the narrative; 2) Enlarge the chart to focus on that point 6 DME from the VOR.  Looking at the plate now; that point is in the upper left corner of the diagram.  I feel it can easily be overlooked. 3) Find a way to incorporate SENZY (the waypoint located at 6 DME) into future FMS loads.  I realize this is not an RNAV departure; however; if I would have noticed the fix SENZY prior to departing; I would have built it into the FMS as added situational awareness.  These suggestions listed above are not meant to be excuses for the error this afternoon.  I will certainly pay more attention to the various parts (narrative/text and graphical depictions) of the SIDs/STARs that I fly.  I write this report as if I was the pilot flying; I was the pilot monitoring in this situation.  As PIC; however; I am responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft.  Even as the pilot monitoring; it is important that I assist the First Officer during time of need and monitor his/her actions to ensure the safety of operations.  In regards to human factors; this was Leg 4 of 4 of a 12 hour duty day; however; at the time; I felt awake and alert.  The first officer and I missed the depiction of the point at which we were to make the turn.

CE560 Captain departing SFO Runway 28R reports turning left to 200 degrees at 2;500 FT on the Offshore 5 departure instead of the 6 DME point as depicted.  ATC points out the error.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 102; Flight Crew Total 780; Flight Crew Type 295

The near miss happened about 2.8 miles from NAWXY on the RNAV 35 approach into GPM. The student and the instructor (myself) were instructed to report the airport in sight about 7 miles southwest from ERGEY on vectors to intercept the RNAV 35. About 4.5 miles from ERGEY the student tried to call Fort Worth Center three times all the way to ERGEY without any response from Approach. (Approach was busy on arrival). As the instructor I changed radios to make sure the Controller could hear us and tried to call Approach (at this time we are already intercepting the RNAV 35 approach). [On] the first attempt still no response (10 miles from GPM); [on] the second attempt I received a response (7.2 mlesi from GPM/ 3.0 NAWXY) we were cleared for the RNAV 35 approach and told to switch to Tower on 128.55. During the switch over I got an alert on my iPad from my Scout ADS-B portable letting me know traffic at 12 o'clock 2 miles same altitude. The student was in the middle of calling Tower. During the Tower's response to let me know I have traffic ahead I had taken controls from the student and turned left to avoid the aircraft I had spotted after the alert. I was roughly 400 ft. or less from the aircraft; enough to see the tail number and pilot clearly as I rolled out on a northerly heading off of the RNAV approach path. After landing I went to [the] Tower and talked to the Controllers to make sense of why the aircraft was heading the opposite direction and same altitude when I was cleared for an IFR approach on an IFR flight plan. The response from the Tower personnel was that the other aircraft was already on with approach with flight following. Tower Manager had called approach to ask to look into the matter.Some contributing factors: 1. Controller was obviously overwhelmed with calls entire time on frequency.2. Controller was not paying attention to my aircraft- I was flying on radar vectors direct to ERGEY at 3000 [and] the Controller did not call out traffic in the pattern right below us; but called the traffic out to an aircraft nowhere near the airport to the north.3. Controller not following my aircraft dumps us off to GPM 2.8 miles from the FAF with no traffic advisories about the multiple aircraft coming out of GKY and GPM from ERGEY to the hand over.

C172 Instructor reported an NMAC with another light aircraft on approach to GPM.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Flight in August 2015; was scheduled for ZZZ-ZZZ1 with MD-83 aircraft. Departure weather was rain low ceilings and thunderstorms until the middle of destination State; then clear sky's to ZZZ1 with no alternate. Pre-departure checks; Start/Taxi and Takeoff where all uneventful with no abnormal engine or system indications.In cruise; approximately 50 minutes into flight at FL 330 with no prior abnormalities noted; the Throttle Quadrant began a very loud grinding with a considerable vibration with no throttle movement. After a few seconds a faint smell of hot rubber began emitting from the quadrant so First Officer (FO) and myself performed our memory items for smoke/fumes in cockpit. I then took control of the aircraft and radios and asked FO for the QRH; we agreed upon the 'air conditioning smoke fumes' QRH 26.2; since it wasn't electrical and smelled like it could have been in the Aircraft system and he began to run it. I contacted ATC; requested a lower altitude and began a descent. As FO started the QRH I disconnected the Auto Throttles; the smell immediately dissipated with no further signs but the grinding and vibration continued; but at a lesser intensity. Immediately we noticed the Number-1 Engine rolled back slightly; I applied power and it responded and all engine indications where normal except the left EPR was slightly lower. At this point the vibration in the Quadrant increased. As I began reviewing the situation and current flight conditions (clear; no icing or precipitation) the Number-1 Engine began to roll back even further. FO and I agreed to discontinue the Smoke/Fumes QRH since there was no evidence of such and we started to focus our attention on the Number-1 Engine. I asked FO to run the 'engine flameout failure shutdown' QRH 72.3 (severe damage). I would like to note that the sequence from throttle issue to engine shutdown all happened very quickly; only a couple minutes. As FO worked the checklist; I verified our distance to ZZZ1 to be about 250 miles so I chose ZZZ2 off our wing at approximately 60 miles as our diversion airport. I then contacted ATC requested lower; [advised them of the situation] and asked for the divert to ZZZ2. I also requested ATC to pass along to our Air Carrier of our situation and that we were headed to ZZZ2.First Officer finished up with the initial checklist and prior to continuing into the S.E. Approach Landing checklist I asked him to brief the Flight attendants with the emergency info then give the passengers a quick brief. I would like to also add that the feedback that we received from the Flight attendants and the passengers were all very positive and appreciative of the level of calmness and information provided by First Officer. He did a great job keeping everyone relaxed and in the loop. Once the briefings were complete; FO continued into the S.E. Approach Landing checklists as I continued to fly and communicate with ATC. I then contacted ZZZ2 approached and confirmed our situation and we requested Fire Rescue. I also decided to stop on the runway and not taxi clear due to the continued vibration emitting from the Number-1 Engine. We were then cleared for landing on 23L a visual backed up by the ILS. FO took over the radios and we finished the checklist and the landing was made uneventfully. At brake set on 23L; I made the ' remain seated remain seated' announcement and had Fire Rescue sweep the aircraft while monitoring them on the radios. Fire Rescue gave us the all clear and I made a quick announcement to the passengers then we proceeded into the gate under our own power. The rest of the operation was uneventful through the de-planing. We debriefed with the Flight attendants and I then began communicating with company operations.

Captain reported a very loud grinding sound with considerable vibration and no throttle movement in the Throttle Quadrant of an MD-83 aircraft at cruise altitude. After Auto-Throttles were disconnected; a hot rubber smell dissipated with # 1 Engine rollback. Vibrations continued emanating from Number-1 Engine even after QRH shutdown had been accomplished. Flight diverted.


De Havilland Canada Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 21; Flight Crew Total 595; Flight Crew Type 83

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft was flown by owner who had checked oil prior to start. I did not think to verify or conduct another key check on that side of the engine - to rotate the pressure filter screen; which I later learned was jammed. En route; oil pressure was 40 PSI/80 degrees F - normal. Time on the ground at en route stop was hurried - attend briefing (also late!); eat; fuel; crank and hold for military launch. Oil press OK; after completing display; departed. En route [I] noticed oil at 30 PSI/80 degrees F; but stable. Landed and re-fueled. Oil pressure OK on start. CTAF blocked by inbound aircraft with stuck mic. After mag check; frequency cleared. Traffic called base-final; so I departed ahead of them (no impediment to their progress). Some fifteen minutes later; approximately 6 miles east and through 5;000 climbing to 5;500 FT; observed oil pressure at 20 PSI and going South at about 10 PSI/minutes temperature still 80 degrees F. With oil pressure passing 15 PSI - 10 PSI; turned back; loaded Tower frequency and declared Mayday. Pressure dropped to zero; I retarded the throttle to full idle and made for the field at 65 KTS. Engine continued to windmill with no perceived irregularity. It became apparent that the headwind (I recall it as 270/10 or 270/12) was not going to allow me to make the field. I had a couple of fields selected; mown and running East-West; when I recalled being told that the engine (a de Havilland Gipsy Major 10) could run on just a quart of oil. I re-applied power to 1800 RPM which allowed me to arrest the descent rate. Oil pressure remained at a solid zero PSI. Once the field was made I cut power and switched-off mags and fuel; and dead-sticked the plane onto runway; just past the numbers; rolling to a stop just short of Taxiway Echo.[People] helped me push the plane across the hold bars and the FBO sent out a truck to tow the plane into the hangar. The prop had continued to turn until the plane had decelerated to about 40 KTS. It could still be easily turned by hand once on the ground. I returned to the aircraft the next day and removed the pressure filter; this being the point at which I discovered it was completely seized (18' of leverage could not turn it). On removal the filter had a significant coating of crud which after being washed-off proved to be ferrous. The filter was cleaned; re-installed and the oil tank topped-up (7 quarts had been thrown out in the 2.7 hours in which the plane had been operated - it has a 12 quart tank). A ground run gave 45 PSI at full static power; 2000 RPM; which reduced to 40 after a few minutes with the temperature approaching 70 degrees F. Consequently it was decided to fly the airplane and bring it up to full operating temperature above the field and; if all was well; to continue to OSH with the SR22 in which I'd arrived as chase plane. After 15 minutes overhead at 5;500 FT oil pressure was 38 PSI/80 degrees F and; joined by the SR22; we headed for OSH; taking careful note of all airfields; public and private. Oil pressure remained constant and arrival at OSH was uneventful.Subsequent discussion with the owner revealed that the plane had flown only 300 hours since overhaul 18 (eighteen) years ago. Prior to a hop from the owner's strip; the aircraft had not been flown since February. Four A&P engineers I consulted afterwards independently questioned the wisdom of making a flight after finding metal in the oil. To my mind; with pressure holding; it was a calculated risk. Return to base had been considered but continuing to OSH was considered favorable because of its shorter duration and the availability of experts on the field who had knowledge of the vintage engine. Following the advice of the A&P's the airplane was left on the field and arrangements are in hand to have the engine removed and the source of the problem investigated. A full overhaul is anticipated. When taking over an airplane; especially one with which one is unfamiliar; perform a thorough pre-flight check yourself and ignore any pressure to get anywhere by a specific time. Trust but verify. If key items such as a screen cleaner on a filter will not move; investigate and solve before flying. If there's metal in the engine; quit flying it! There was no flight plan; no GPS; no flight following was requested but Center was monitored as the flight progressed and a [flight tracker] was active. Pilotage is alive and well.

DHC Chipmunk pilot describes loss of oil pressure on the third leg of a flight to OSH. The engine continues to produce power and the reporter is able to return to the departure airport. It is discovered that the oil filter screen is completely coated with metal particles. The filter is cleaned and reinstalled; the oil topped off; and the engine run up. When all appears satisfactory the reporter takes off and climbs over the field before continuing on to OSH.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On downwind to LAX for 24R at approximately 5;500 - 5;700 feet MSL; we spotted a drone at our altitude in very close proximity to our aircraft. I would estimate the drone was about 100 feet from our aircraft; and to my left. The drone was small and black with either white/silver/grey markings on it to be more visible. The drone appeared to be opposite direction to us; so it was going west; while we were going east. We were on an assigned heading of 065 degrees out of SMO VOR. We were also descending at the time. The FO was the PF and the autopilot was on. The event occurred around the JAVSI waypoint; but before the downtown area. Due to radio congestion; I was not able to report the event to ATC until we were over the downtown area and about 4;500 MSL. The drone was below our field of vision until it was basically passing us; so collision avoidance had it been on track to hit us; would have been difficult at best. The object also passed us at a high rate of speed. We were speed assigned 230 knots IAS at the time of the event. ATC did an excellent job notifying other aircraft in the area. Visibility was somewhat reduced due to haze and some scattered clouds at our altitude; but as mentioned; spotting this small of an object until it is in close proximity is difficult. There was no disruption of the flight and we landed safely.I realize this is an ongoing issue and I hope it gets resolved soon. When I saw the object; I thought I was crazy for thinking I saw one of these above 5;000 feet. I actually did some research online after this; and I've read about people seeing these as high as 7;000 feet. A system that works with our TCAS would be amazing to have in the future. I'm not sure if the technology is quite there yet. Maybe with the upcoming ADS-B rules; this could be on the table?

Air carrier Captain on downwind vectors for LAX Runway 24R near JAVSI reported a UAV near miss at approximately 5;500 - 5;700 feet.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather; Airport

There are currently no NOTAMs published for N40.Upon landing I see that the runway is not plowed full width; and there are large snow piles on either side of the runway that could result in an impact with low wing aircraft. The taxi way snow piles are high enough that low wing aircraft will strike their wing on them.Also the AWOS-3 has been INOP for at least a year and I've never seen a NOTAM.Someone could easily strike a wing or flap on the snow piles during takeoff or landing and end up in an accident. The problem is caused by the airport management's ongoing failure to publish NOTAMs. N40 has forty (40) separate owners. which may lead to a 'if everyone is in charge; no one is in charge' situation. To prevent this in the future someone needs to tell N40 airport management to keep their NOTAMs up to date. If there are no plans to fix the AWOS then it needs to be removed from the chart.

Pilot reported concerns with the lack of NOTAM publications at N40 airport for known issues. Pilot stated the AWOS-3 has been inoperable for at least a year and has never been NOTAMed.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Human Factors; Aircraft; Manuals; Procedure

Fuel Imbalance Advisory; Initial Climb. Fuel Page pop-up on lower display; without ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor).Initial Climb departing ZZZ to ZZZ1. Imbalance indicated between tanks L6+; R8+.Normal all pumps on; cross-feed closed. Tank feeding each engine. Release fuel was 16.1. Question is do you believe the quantities display? Tanks added to a reasonable total; reference Release fuel. Could not justify imbalance due to a trend; leak etc. CA (Captain) as PM (Pilot Monitoring); decision to cross-feed re-balance during climb. Correct system response would determine if continued flight was indicated or divert ASAP before imbalance/Non ECAM problem worsened. Cross-feed re-balance corrected imbalance and arrival at ZZZ1 with correct flight planned fuel and balanced. Crew recollection is of checking fuel on preflight; but maybe due to refueling still in progress; if Imbalance was indicated; did not notice final imbalance; as we assume created the event. Post flight info; fuel slip indicated L8.0 + R8.0 = Release fuel (CA called ZZZ Ops Supr (Operations Supervisor); to inquire of what fueling slip indicated)). Gate shutdown post flight called Maintenance Operations to relay events and inquire about AML inspection/entry. Advised systems functioned correctly. Later; after calling ZZZ Ops and learning of fuel slip entries; called 320 Fleet Manager with the event details and conflicting Information. He informed of some rare probe indication problems and would follow-up this event. Question; if imbalance after start indicated above lower takeoff limitation....why would AB wait to advise until climb? In flight much higher limitations! One tank feeding each engine; subsequent instant big imbalance improbable? Crew missed imbalance after late refueling or fuel slip recorded L8+R8; if correct; sensors reported incorrectly until airborne? Personally check bleed page post-start; due to AB anomaly's that amber indications can be present without crew notification. Experienced a pack flow control valve amber after start and continued single pack operation; without ECAM or INOP (Inoperative) status messages. This previous event discovered during FL390 (39;000 ft) cruise system checks; told was a logic protection normal function; AB was within limitations? Precautionary; descended to FL310 IAW (In Accordance With) single pack Dispatch guidance. Training CKA (Check Airmen) know of these anomaly's; recommended SOP (Standard Operating Procedure); after start system page check! Double that recommendation.

Flight Crew flying A321 observed fuel imbalance inflight.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I was assigned to taxi Aircraft X to Gate XX. After engine starts and briefing we proceeded to get clearance from the tower to taxi to the gate. We were told to proceed via 'Charlie 1; hold short 28R' which is really '10L' from our end. We held short for a while and while there we noticed Zulu was closed and there were vehicles and personnel moving cones and picking up cones nearby to our right. We were then told to 'cross 28R (again recognized; perceived; being it is 10L from our end); Sierra 3; Sierra 2; Zulu; hold short Bravo 1.' As we were about to proceed from Charlie 1 towards Sierra 3 it became apparently confusing. The only sign in view from our position on Charlie 1 was a physical standing sign for Sierra 4. Sierra 4 was most evident and the closure; personnel and vehicles on Zulu off to our right made it seem as if we shouldn't; wouldn't be given instructions towards that direction. We did not and could not find signage for Sierra 3. I proceeded to what I believed to be the correct and safest direction towards what would be Sierra 3. There is NO taxi line that takes you from Charlie 1 to Sierra 3. With the Sierra 4 sign off to the right from our position on Charlie 1 it is far to easy to assume Sierra 3 to the left. I realize the mistake in assuming; but the signage in that area along with the closure was not of help. The Sierra 3 and Sierra 2 signs are painted markings on the ground that are visible only when upon them. We got to Zulu short of Bravo 1 and were told by the ATC to call the tower when we got to the gate for a 'possible deviation.' I was going over what I may have done wrong but could not figure it out. I called the tower but they were busy; and the controller asked I call later. When we got back to the maintenance area and looked at the SFO Airport map I realized that I had not followed the correct path of travel. It appears that I went Charlie 1 to Sierra 4 which again was the taxi line in route with Charlie 1 to Sierra; Zulu; hold short Bravo 1. Even upon the map review I believe I was thrown off due to the closure; safety of the personnel; no evident signage for Sierra 3; Sierra 2 and no taxi line from Charlie 1 to Sierra 3.My training and situational awareness not only was in controlling a multi-million dollar aircraft; watching our parameters and indications but also in considering the safety of the personnel that were on Zulu extremely close to Sierra 2. We were taxiing under aircraft power and the turn from Sierra 2 to Zulu would have put them in the jet blast zone. My partner in the right hand seat is very thorough; conscientious and experienced; he repeated instructions perfectly and although clear from the air traffic controller; there was confusion with the aircraft under tow behind us and the aircraft behind them with the same instructions given to them. At that point the Controller got frustrated; made a statement to us all in that area to 'listen to the instructions!' and then asked Airfield Ops 'when Zulu would be open?' to which they replied 'about 5 minutes.'This area has been an issue in the past. We have had other movement individuals get in trouble here; day shift move teams; two of our present safety reps as well as night shift individuals of which Airfield Ops is aware as they have offered help in the past. We should have asked for 'progressive' or more explicit help in this hazardous area and maybe it should have been offered to us as this is a known area to be a problem. We should not have to be afraid of asking ATC for fear of being scolded or treated rudely. Although I feel that was not so much the case on this particular day; it certainly is much too often. It is difficult to understand; see or know all our perspective jobs and insights thereof.I am truly very sorry and apologize to all over this incident. It is a terrible feeling as I have been doing this job and moving aircraft for many years without incident. I respectfully ask for the air traffic controller and someone from Airfield Operations to please accompany us on a 'ride along' via the same route to see what we see from our end. I do believe it would help us all going forward taking the events of this incident in review and with ATC help we can come up with better training for our movement personnel. I have an idea for a training module or maybe just some literature for emphasis on movement in that area and hope to be; would like to be part of a positive solution to this area of the airfield.

Technician reported that while taxiing an aircraft from a maintenance area; the instructions issued by ATC were confusing and some of the taxiway markings and signage were non-existent or difficult to locate at SFO airport.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X departed ZZZ on a 330 heading; direct to his destination. On initial contact I called him Radar Contact and instructed him to proceed direct his destination and climb and maintain FL100. He then informed me that he was [TACAN only mode C] and couldn't go direct; that he would need to be on his current heading for the next 75 miles. I had to coordinate this [with Center] directly since there wasn't time to find him an appropriate route before switching him to [Center]. They seemed a little incredulous; and frankly; so was I. We've been briefed by local management a number of times that these [Cargo Company] departures are in a mad hurry to get airborne every morning because once they seal the cargo; they have 5 minutes to depart or they have to submit delay paperwork to their employer. The problem is that their dispatch files all kinds of different flight plans for these aircraft and every morning we have to try to sift through what is correct and what needs to be changed. The pilots don't confirm their routing and flight plan information because they're in too much of a hurry to get under way. A lot of our tower controllers either don't notice these discrepancies because they're too busy; or they don't care to question it. It puts a lot of added stress and coordination in the hands of departure and ultimately [Center] to try to figure out routing for an aircraft that should have been figured out on the ground before he even got in the air. We've asked our QA (Quality Assurance) staff; to talk to the pilots and dispatch and share our concerns. I've noticed no difference. Either [the QA staff are] ineffectual in getting the point across; or the pilots and dispatch don't care enough to solve the problem.Possibly; reports could intervene by coordinating with the Pilot's 'Reports' or take the time to look into this matter and bring it up with local management. Either way; the situation as it currently sits; I feel is unnecessarily risky. We're launching IFR planes that have no idea where they're going or how they're filed; or what they're type of aircraft they have filed.

TRACON Controller reported routing issues relating to a specific airline company and their procedures.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

At cruise FL230 I heard a loud crack and cabin depressurized. I donned oxygen mask and initiated an emergency descent. Passengers [notified] me that the left forward window was cracked. While descending; ATC called and I responded standby. I tuned 7700 on transponder and called ATC and notified him of [the situation] once I had aircraft stabilized in descent. I then diverted to ZZZ.

The cabin depressurized in a Mitsubishi MU-2B-60 in cruise due to a cracked window.