Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

On climb passing FL180 we received an ECAM; HYD G RSVR OVHT.  ECAM directed us to turn OFF the PTU; and G ENG 1 PUMP.  After doing so we experienced a significant airframe vibration/flight control flutter.  After completing the ECAM actions; and consulting the FOM; we attempted to find the source of flutter.  We changed the pitch angle; and changed power settings to no avail.  In the interest of safety we declared an emergency and plotted our diversion.  Although the FOM directs you to turn the G ENG 1 pump on for the approach procedure; (G OVHT OUT); based on experience; systems knowledge; and an overall concern for the integrity of the flight controls; we decided to turn the G ENG 1 PUMP; and PTU PUMP on in an effort to stop the flight control flutter; (G OVHT light OUT).  Immediately after turning both pumps on; the flutter abated.  We continued our diversion; had CFR trucks standing by; and made a routine landing.

Climbing through approximately FL180 we received a 'HYD G RSVR OVHT' ECAM; and related Master Caution.  We followed the ECAM Procedure; which involved securing the PTU; and GREEN ENG 1PUMP.  Immediately after doing so; the airframe or flight controls; developed a very pronounced; and continuous vibration that would not go away.  We tried changing pitch; power; and airspeed settings; but the vibration continued; and in my opinion; I felt it even got worse.  We discussed the various possibilities and options available; and decided that diverting  and declaring an emergency would be our best option; as we were very concerned about the vibration; or control flutter; and could not detect the source.  Realizing this; and the fact that the overheat was over; we decided that re-activating the pump may cause the vibration to go away.  We gave it try; and the vibration went away instantaneously.  Enroute we completed the FOM portion of the checklist; and saw that the approach procedure was to turn the pump back on if the the system was no longer overheating.  At that point; we decided that the safest course of action would be to continue the flight with the pump on; rather than waiting for the actual approach phase of the flight to reactivate it.  As a precautionary measure; we had Emergency Vehicles waiting; and informed ATC to expect a normal outcome as we had regained full functionality of all aircraft systems.  We also informed our flight attendants to simply prepare for a normal landing.  As our final preparation; I handed control of the aircraft to the Captain; as I felt it was most prudent for him to accomplish the over weight landing himself.  We then accomplished the Overweight Landing checklist; and as expected; landed uneventfully; and taxied the aircraft to the gate.  The overheat never returned; nor did the vibration from the point we re-activated the green hydraulic pump all the way to landing.  From there Contract Maintenance started looking over the aircraft; as I performed my post flight walk around.  I was not able to see any external anomalies which may have led to this event.  the Captain made the appropriate logbook entries for the hydraulic problem; the aircraft vibration; and the overweight landing.  In closing; it should be noted that we re-activated the pump after securing it; only because we were extremely concerned about the level and intensity of the aircraft vibration; and it was the vibration; and the potential unknown problems with the aircraft; that forced our decision to divert.  I adamantly feel that we erred on the side of safety; both with our decision to re-activate the pump; and to divert.  Allowing the aircraft to vibrate the way it was; while there was a fix for it; was unacceptable; and a very poor option; as was the option of continuing on.

This reporter states that he has not been informed of either the cause of the overheat or the vibrations.  They were felt throughout the aircraft by passengers and flight attendants.  Attempts to alter the vibrations included changing pitch; power; speed; and turning off the autopilot all with not effect.  Because turning the pump back on caused the vibrations to disappear; it may be that the pump itself was somehow causing the vibrations.

A319 flight crew reports a HYD G RSVR OVHT ECAM during climbout and complies with ECAM actions; turning off the green engine driven pump and the PTU.  Upon doing so a strong vibration is felt in the airframe and through the flight controls.  Attempts to quell the vibration are initially unsuccessful and the decision is made to divert.  The vibration continues and the crew elects to turn the green hydraulic system pumps back on since the overheat had gone away.  This action has a positive effect and a normal landing ensues at the diversion airport.


Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Confusion; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Following an otherwise normal preflight and pushback; we got a plethora of ECAM messages and aural warnings  regarding hydraulic pressure during the second engine start. A quick glance at the ECAM hydraulic page revealed that all three hydraulic pumps were pressurized to 3000 psi; yet each hydraulic system was unpowered.  There is no QRH procedure for what we had. There were no hydraulic fault lights nor open circuit breakers in the overhead panel; but a thorough inspection did reveal that the three guarded black 'HYD Leak Measurement Valves' switches (one  for each hydraulic systems) had been left lifted and tripped.  Having done a parking brake check during the preflight; then reset them a second time following the pushback; I didn't  have much accumulator pressure left with two engines running. I directed FO to reset the three tripped switches.Prior to moving the aircraft; with normal brake pressure recovered; I asked the FO to call maintenance and explain what  had occurred. (There were no entries in the book regarding hydraulic problems on the overnight). We had them verify we  were safe to proceed with three; now normal; hydraulic systems; and that they did not need us to return to the gate. The  remainder of the flight was normal except for a passenger medical issue (with NO declared emergency) that is  the subject of a separate report. Having previously missed the incorrect switchology; I was a quite concerned about sitting in the dark alley; un-chocked; with  low parking brake pressure; no hydraulic pressure on any system; and two engines running. I was also uncertain how long it  would take to get the tug back out to tow us to the gate. In The Interest Of Safety; I elected to reset the three hydraulic  switches to recover normal hydraulics. It may have been better to shut down the engines and wait for a tug... but I didn't  trust parking brakes set with less than normal pressure with a full aircraft. Perhaps a mindset of looking for what might be wrong during the preflight might be better than looking to see that the  switches are set in their normal position.

Performing the first flight of the day I entered the aircraft and performed my preflight duties. During my  flow I inadvertently missed the Guarded hydraulic leak detection push buttons that had been closed on the  maintenance panel. After pushback and during 2nd engine start we received multiple ECAMs for hydraulic pressure.  The ECAMs were accompanied by no fault lights on the overhead HYD panel. A subsequent check of  the hydraulic page on the ECAM showed zero pressure in the system but engine pump pressure normal.  At that point I checked the hydraulic maintenance panel and noted the dim lights and push buttons in the  off position.We decided to reset the push buttons to regain hydraulic pressure to the systems; after  reset of all systems the hydraulic page and status page returned to normal. We then contacted  maintenance and alerted them of the position of the valves. Maintenance informed us they were turned  off to do a check the night before and left off. With the push buttons in the proper position and all  systems normal maintenance confirmed we were safe to continue the flight. I inadvertently missed the Guarded hydraulic leak detection push buttons had been closed on the  maintenance panel. I believe this was missed due to the black guard over the switch and dim selected on  the annunciator switch along with bright selected on the dome lights.

A321 flight crew reported unusual hydraulic pressure indications after second engine start. Careful inspection of the overhead panel revealed that the hydraulic leak detection push buttons had been closed on the maintenance panel.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Passenger in [seat] X1 on board appeared intoxicated and was non-complaint of wearing [a] face mask during the boarding process.Passenger in X1 on board appeared intoxicated and was non-compliant of wearing mask during the boarding process. I; the Captain; was approached in the jet bridge prior to the passenger boarding that the passenger [would be assessed] if he was fit to be on board. The passenger was allowed on board; but shortly after was removed for his non-compliance of face mask after being asked multiple times to wear it. He appeared intoxicated.

Air carrier Captain reported a possibly intoxicated passenger was removed from the flight for non-compliance with face mask policy.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 116; Flight Crew Total 6707; Flight Crew Type 5884

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Procedure; Software and Automation; Human Factors; Aircraft

Inadvertent switching off of IR1 mode selector which deactivated that associated ADIRU. ADR and IR data not available. This occurred during flight one of day two of an initial Captain upgrade. The trainee came off the B777. He has been with our company for many years. The three legs of day one was extraordinarily busy. It was immediately clear to me during those three legs he had studied hard during training and had mastered much of the material. On the first two legs of day one I had a LCA (Line Check Airman) in-training watching me conduct the line check as part of that LCA's upgrade training. I commented to the new LCA not all trainees will be so well prepared as this one.This flight was leg four of the IOE and the first flight of day two. Our transportation to the airport was 15 minutes late and there was a detour so we arrived at the aircraft about 30 minutes prior to departure. Normally; I introduce myself to all the FAs (Flight Attendant). However; because we were on IOE; [we] were somewhat late to the aircraft and on Release 6. I only introduced myself to the FM. I felt I did not have time go to the back to introduce myself to the FAs assigned to the rear of the aircraft.We had been in the seat for approximately 3 hours. The upgrade Captain requested I ask the FM to prepare the meals and that we would then take a restroom break when the meals were ready. I did so. The FM called us about 25 minutes later to state the meals were ready. The upgrade Captain offered me the opportunity to use the Lav first. I declined and said he should go first and I would then go. The door chime rang and then I heard a knock. That knock is not standard. However; it occurs occasionally with legacy Company 2 flight attendants. We put on our masks. I saw the upgrade Captain move to get out of his seat; stand up; and let the FA in while he then left the cockpit. I noticed nothing odd about his movement out of the seat and to the rear of the cockpit. I saw out of the corner of my eye the FA was standing near the rear of the cockpit just behind and to the right of the Captain's seat; a normal position for a relief FA.My concentration then focused on something else. I think it was because we were getting ready to enter a large area of convective activity. I might have been looking at WSI and comparing that to what I was seeing on the weather radar. Why my gaze was generally focused forward and right I am not sure; but it was. I planned to brief the relief FA about this weather and its possible effect on their service in a few minutes. It was at that point; maybe 30-45 seconds after the upgrade Captain had left the cockpit; that for lack of a better description; 'all hell broke loose.' The cockpit went from a completely benign environment to one of confusion. The startle effect was in full force. The first warning was a continuous repetitive chime and the warning lights flashing. I immediately looked at the E/WD (Engine/Warning Display) and noted about 4-5 ECAMs listed; primary secondary and independent failures in both red and amber. I silenced the CRC (Continuous Repetitive Chime) by pushing [the] master warning light. That silenced the CRC. However; there still was an aural alert going off that I could not silence; which created a fair bit of consternation on my part. I look at my PFD and saw the FMAs were wrong. I then saw the AP (Autopilot) was off and that there was nothing where I expected to see the AT (Autothrottle) condition. I noted the aircraft climbing slightly and corrected that. I knew the AP disengaged for some reason but didn't know why. I thought about engaging AP 2 but then thought that may create new problems; so I elected to hand-fly until the ECAMs were sorted out. I saw we were no longer in NAV but again; wasn't sure why. I did see that the aircraft didn't diverge much from the 'green line' so lateral stick inputs weren't necessary. At this point ATC called to ask us something about recycling the transponder. We wereon speaker at that time; I responded we had a problem and to standby.I then noted the airspeed increasing and pulled the TLs (Thrust Lever) back; I didn't want to add an over-speed to our problems. This silenced another aural sound. I do not recall seeing a Thrust Locked ECAM or FMA which I thought would have been the source of the alert I couldn't silence. I glanced at the Captain PFD (Primary Flight Display) and ND (Navigation Display) and saw they didn't look right.The aircraft was reasonably stabilized now but; in my mind; because the ECAMs were displayed; the situation wasn't. I then told the FA to recall the trainee Captain to the cockpit. He opened the door; looked and then closed it; and said he was in the bathroom. I told the FA I knew that and I wanted him back in the cockpit now. He then had the FM knock on the Lav door. The trainee Captain returned to the cockpit and the relief FA left. The trainee Captain was incredulous when he looked at the E/WD. I told him I was hand-flying; had the aircraft and radios; and that he was to handle the ECAMs. It was at this point I noted we were about 20 knot slow; well within flying speed but slow for planned speed. I had overcompensated for my worry of overspending the aircraft. I pushed the power back up. Airspeed had fallen out of my cross-check. The trainee Captain methodically and correctly went through the ECAMs. As I recall the first several ECAMs had no action items; one ECAM had us switch the air data switch to three. At some point during this; ATC stated they now had data on us and asked if we needed assistance. We told him we were completing a procedure and to standby. Once the status messages were read and the ECAM procedure completed; I reached up to engage AP two. It did so. I armed the AT and then moved the TLs to the climb detent to engage it. Our ATC clearance was to proceed direct to a fix so we reinserted that. I don't recall having to pull or push to capture our assigned altitude but I can't be sure.It was now maybe 4-5 minutes after the initial event where I could take a breath. I recalled the ECAM and saw the ADR 1 fault. I then looked over to the ADIRS panel and saw IR mode selector one was in the OFF position. It; of course; was on for the flight up until some point in [the] last few minutes. I asked the trainee Captain if he recalls hitting the switch with his head or back as he left his seat. He said no. I then thought perhaps the switch was defective. This aircraft came to us as a through flight. We did not have to turn them on so we had no knowledge of how that switch felt by turning it on. We again discussed it and he stated he didn't recall even touching the overhead panel while leaving the seat.Because I didn't introduce myself to the FAs at the rear of the aircraft prior to the flight; I wasn't sure which FA came to the cockpit during our break. I asked the FM to ask the FA who came to the cockpit to call us on the interphone. That FA did and I asked him if he recalled touching anything on the overhead panel; he stated he did not. What I found unusual was that during the event; the FA seemed very nonplussed by the cacophony of sounds in the cockpit. I would have expected a FA to at least ask what was going on; but maybe he was somewhat shocked by what he saw and heard during his short time in the cockpit.The trainee Captain and I discussed that I would write up the ECAM and then conference Dispatch and Technical Support Maintenance Control to provide further details of what we thought may have occurred. I wanted the switch looked at but also didn't want Maintenance to search for a problem which might not exist. I ACARS'd Dispatch with the request and he set up the conference call. The communications with Technical Support Maintenance Control were reasonably good and he captured exactly what I wanted him to know and he appended it to our write-up. Since the Captain's displays were significantly degraded; we switched PF/PM roles. Fromthat point we continually deviated for weather; were put in holding; and changed our alternate three times. We over-burned by almost 5500 lb on this flight; more than on any flight I have been on in [an] Airbus. It was an understatement to say this was a busy flight. I don't know how this happened. The final flight of the day was a termination. As the trainee ran that checklist and turned off the IRUs; he stated he couldn't believe how he accidentally managed to switch that style of switch - pull and turn - off by getting out of the cockpit.I am disappointed in myself for not more thoroughly reviewing the flight manual for ADR 1 fault after things had settled down. We did not have a GPWS TERR FAULT light and no ECAM direction to switch it off so it remained on. We discussed that threat in that we were now the aircraft's GPWS system and to be cognizant of the terrain. We also discussed changing the transponder to position 2 but did not do so because there was no ECAM direction to [do] so and ATC noted no anomalies in our reporting. Also; once I saw the IR mode selector switch in the off position; I should have considered reviewing the NAV IR fault non-normal even though we didn't have that ECAM. I did not do a word search in the flight manual for ADR. Had I done so; I would have seen that there may be RVSM limitations associated with its failure and should have gone to the FOM for further information. I recall many years ago; our Line Manager at the time; wrote up in his weekly update a similar event. As I recall he wrote the trainee somehow managed to hook the window shade into that same switch and turned it off. That of course didn't happen here.

A320 Captain reported that a component was inadvertently switched off after the other pilot left the cockpit for a lavatory break and a multitude of warnings and ECAM messages went off as a result.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Center coordinates of the WRA [Weather Reconnaissance Area] were coordinated with the West Side Coastal area prior to my shift beginning for Aircraft X/Aircraft Y. Aircraft Y was already airborne and Aircraft X would be departing a couple hours after the Aircraft Y working in a large amount of overlapping airspace- the WRA center coordinates were slightly different. The first issue the West Side Coastal area brought to my attention happened after one of the WSC controllers was debating with another controller about whether or not the Aircraft X and Aircraft Y can self-separate in the overlapping airspace because it is in the LOA that they are allowed to self-separate. I advised the WSC Supervisor and the two controllers that the aircraft Y had specifically said that he would work around the Aircraft X's altitude block and even if it says in the letter they can self-separate that Aircraft Y had coordinated earlier with the morning MOS [Military Operations Specialists] that he will work around the Aircraft X's altitude. I advised them to separate the two by altitude unless both pilots state on frequency they can self-separate from each other.The second issue is the WSC area lost radar on the Aircraft X; which was expected since they are flying at lower altitudes over the Gulf; and the WSC Supervisor asked that I call and make sure ZJX was blocking the airspace since they were using non-radar procedures. When I called ZJX; I believe I spoke with a CIC (Controller-in-Charge) and he sounded surprised that the flight was IFR and they were supposed to block the airspace. Later on; ZJX called and wanted to know specifically how far from Tampa approach did they need to protect for the Aircraft X/Aircraft Y aircraft. I wasn't sure of the answer to this and have only been briefed/trained that the Hurricane Hunter aircraft will coordinate and get permission from an approach control before entering their airspace; but we have not had any specifics on exactly how far away they stay from the approach control boundary. In the LOA; there are terminal maps and myself and another controller were sure the 57NM line from MCF around Tampa's airspace must show the area the Hurricane Hunters would need to request permission/coordinate before entering. We later learned that these maps are just a reference for the pilots and have no meaning for controllers. I do not know how many Tampa arrivals ZMA had and ZJX had; but the arrivals we had were descended into the protected non-radar airspace up until the time after we received that call from ZJX. After the phone call; our WSC Controller restricted the Hurricane Hunter aircraft to stay 80NM from MCF- so both the WSC controller and the ZJX controller could descend their Tampa arrivals without hitting any protected airspace.The first issue with the debate on whether or not these aircraft can self-separate is a training issue. The one controller that was pushing the self-separating between the aircraft claimed that he personally wrote the CEDAR that everyone was required to read and should be aware that this is an option. I don't know when this CEDAR came out; but no one I spoke with except for the controller that claimed he wrote it was aware of the self-separating option. This is something that should be a refresher training course on how to clear the aircraft into the airspace if they are accepting self-separation or if they would like to work at different altitudes. A CEDAR on this issue is not enough to prepare controllers for this.The second issue also needs training; but needs procedure changes as well. We are falling short in what information we need to know and coordinate. The prior briefing of the Hurricane Hunters we were all told was they will remain off the coast and outside all approach control airspace. Each area needs to know how many miles from approach they need to request the Hurricane Hunters to remain clear of to be able to descend their arrivals. We should also havea procedure in place in case the Hurricane Hunter aircraft are unable to accept the areas requested restriction/s to stay clear of descending arrivals/departures; then the area needs to coordinate this with TMU (Traffic Management Unit) and request for reroute for the arrivals or departures affected by the blocked non-radar airspace. This needs to be clear to each area of what is expected of them and what is expected of the MOS/TMCs. This all needs to be in writing; so even though the track of the storm is different each time; our procedures will remain the same and they need to eliminate the huge amount of confusion from Controllers/Supervisors/and other Centers I witnessed during this shift. It should be crystal clear what we are supposed to be protecting while these aircraft are non-radar; and it is far from that. I witnessed confusion across the board from every level during this shift and it rolled over and continued the next morning when I came in for my morning shift. This is the first time I worked the MOS position with the Hurricane Hunter aircraft; after speaking with some of my coworkers they advised that this is the same amount of confusion we have across the board every time we work these aircraft. This is not acceptable.

ZMA Controller reported confusion relating whether two aircraft could self-separate from each other.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Cruising at FL410; the pilot flying in the right seat noticed a small darkened section along the outside rear edge of the right windshield. Approaching top of descent into ZZZ; upon closer examination both pilots determined the darkened section of glass was actually a crack in the windshield. Instructions were received to divert to ZZZ1.

CE-560XL flight crew reported a cracked windshield in cruise; resulting in a diversion.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy

We had to return to the gate and remove a passenger exhibiting the signs and symptoms of COVID-19.  We had just finished de-icing the aircraft and when I called the FA to notify her; she informed me that we had a passenger in the back of the airplane that was visibly ill. She said he was coughing; sneezing; not wearing a mask; and he refused to wear a mask despite repeated attempts by her to give him one. A doctor who was sitting in front of him said he had also gotten up to use the lavatory about five times since they had boarded. She also said the other passengers were starting to panic and become upset with him. I told her to keep them calm and we were going to return to the gate as soon as I spoke to Dispatch so they could put the wheels in motion per airline protocol. During a global pandemic; a visibly sick passenger was able to get through check-in; security; walk through the terminal; past a gate agent; and onto an airplane with [XX] other passengers and [X] crew members.I got Person Y on the phone; told him I wanted to return to the gate; and asked him what I needed to do to adhere to Airline's current COVID-19 protocol. He said he needed to make some phone calls and would get right back to me. While I was waiting I called operations on the radio to tell them what was going on and find out which gate they wanted us to return to once got back to the ramp. Person Y called me back and said once we returned to the gate EMS was going to evaluate the passenger and we would go from there. I notified the FA and then notified the passengers as delicately as I could of the situation. Once we got back to the gate EMS came on board and went back to the passenger who was in seat X. They escorted him off of the airplane and into the ambulance at the bottom of the jet bridge where they evaluated him. While this was going on I called Person Z to inform him of the situation as well. A few minutes later the EMS came up and said he wanted to speak to me out on the jet bridge. He informed me that the passenger was 'positive for every screening marker of COVID-19.' While I was speaking to him the station manager was on the phone with another woman and said she wanted to speak to me. I told her what had just transpired and she said we could deplane to have the entire aircraft fully sanitized or we could continue to ZZZ1 as is and the decision was up to me. I told her we would deplane to have the aircraft cleaned. I got back on the aircraft and made another PA to the passengers explaining what we were going to do. Once they finished cleaning the aircraft I spoke to Person Y again; verified the fuel; weather; etc.; from my release was still valid; boarded the [XX] passengers who still wanted to travel to ZZZ1; and we left. Even though it's already 2+ months into this pandemic I think mandatory masks for all passengers and screening at security checkpoints by TSA or at the very least at the gate should be mandatory. Social distancing isn't an option in a closed environment with recirculating air - like that on an airplane.

Air carrier Captain reported a passenger was removed from flight due to exhibiting COVID-19 symptoms.  Reporter suggested masks should be mandatory for all passengers and there should be screening for COVID-19 symptoms at security checkpoints.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.0

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Observer

Manuals; Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Airspace Structure

I had been monitoring Local Control for about 15 minutes at the time of the event. The Supervisor took the Local Control position then had a trainee sign on position with him. Aircraft X was a helicopter that was inbound from the north to land on a helipad. As the helicopter was approaching the airport from the North Local Control issued a clearance to remain east of the runway and cleared him to land on a helipad and then departed Aircraft Y. Looking out of the window I would estimate the two aircraft separated by less than 200 feet diagonally opposite direction. I don't believe I heard traffic calls to either aircraft. I looked at a FALCON radar replay afterward but it was not useful; our Radar is being worked on and is not useful below 400 feet.The Supervisor began asking about this when Aircraft X was well north of the airport; but he did not stop the loss of separation. He just told the Trainer that he should keep a close eye on the aircraft. It was very hard to hear their conversation from where I was located. This is a loss of separation in accordance with facility Directives. This is worthy to mention because many of the other reports I have filed on the violation of these standards are from this Supervisor's crew. He either does not understand or maybe does not enforce the requirements set forth by NTSB; WSA QCG; and our District after several high profile incidents in this notice.I decided to speak to the Supervisor when he came down from the cab. It did not go well. He stated that the directive was stupid; then he told me that I was doing a Internal Review in the cab. I told him I was just monitoring for my required familiarization time. He said he had to leave and shouted as he walked down the hallway; 'then you better report this to ...'; the Air Traffic Manager. I told him 'I am speaking to you; I don't need to report it to anyone else'. He shouted it again as he walked into the elevator.Clearly there is an issue. I am not sure how to approach this. I am a Support Specialist. He is management. If the workforce thinks that I am upstairs spying on them; they can easily not allow us to get my required monitor time. Help. I think I just identified the reason our facilities performance has not been improving as much as it should have by now. The Supervisor needs to be made to comply with requirements or requirements need to be changed. In my opinion the requirements are reasonable and safe they should not be changed.

A Tower System Support Specialist observed the Local Controller allow a simultaneous helicopter arrival and aircraft departure in violation of facility directives.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

A Cessna landed and did not exit the runway promptly. A second Cessna was on very short final when I noticed; and I attempted to send him around; but the pilot's lack of English comprehension caused him to land anyway; and get within 3;000 feet of the aircraft ahead. Make sure that pilots are fluent in English.

LGB Controller described a loss of required runway separation when a go-around clearance was ignored by a landing aircraft. The reporter claimed that a lack of English proficiency was the causal factor.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

At cruise B System Engine Hydraulic Pump Low Pressure light illuminated. We ran QRH. Approximately 30 minutes later; the B hydraulic fluid started to decrease; and then the B System Electric Hydraulic Pump Low Pressure light illuminated. We ran the QRH then ran Loss of System B. Shortly after B hydraulic quantity went to zero. After loss of B System we [advised ATC]; planning on landing at ZZZ. Approximately 30 minutes later the A System Engine Hydraulic Pump Low Pressure light illuminated. We ran the QRH  again. So now all that is operating is the A System electric hydraulic pump. A hydraulic quantity decreased to 74 percent from approximately 90 percent; so as a precaution we reviewed the 'Manual Reversion or Loss of System A and System B.' We flew a long final to altitude; extended the flaps and put the gear out early in case of Loss of System A. The A hydraulic quantity remained stable and we landed Runway XX; flaps 15 and taxied clear of the runway. We left the flaps at 15 and taxied to the charter pad.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported the loss of multiple hydraulic systems.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was operating an R44 and was picking up two friends for a trip.  There was a rain storm just south of the airport at this time and I was in a hurry to depart with my two friends to avoid the rain storm.  My friends went to get in and could not get their luggage under the seat.  I locked the controls and helped get the baggage in and left.  I understand that it was wrong to leave the controls while the helicopter was running and it was pilot error to do so.  It won't happen again.

On the ramp with the engine running; an R44 pilot left the controls unattended to assist a passenger in stowing luggage.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

GRR has been in ATC ALERT for about a week now. Our Management and our Technology Operations know about it and nothing is getting done. All that is told to the controllers is that due to budget issues they are not able to order parts for Channel A until Channel B goes out which means we then go ATC Zero until we can get CENRAP up and running.  With more and more nicer days it means more and more VFRs are out flying and doing practice approaches and we still have all of our scheduled flights in and out. I just can't believe that we are sitting down in the RADAR room just waiting for a scope full of planes to fail and go blank putting not only the pilots and the passengers at risk; but the controllers who once CENRAP is enabled and notice they have planes to close and no time to separate them. I don't know what or how much is being done about this issue; or if it is happening at other facilities; but the answer of it being a budget thing is just not sitting well with me or any of my other fellow controllers. Not sure what I can recommend because again not sure what is being done; but when we (the controllers) just don't get answers to questions and are told that it's a budget issue and CENRAP is being sent; that is just not an acceptable answer. It does not give you a good feeling sitting in the RADAR room working planes to the best of your ability and knowing that it could go out at any time. My biggest concern is that this is happening at very few facilities and the controllers there are being told the same thing we are and are doing nothing about it. I understand there are budget issues; but when it comes to the RADAR this is not a place to implement cuts.

GRR Controller voiced concern regarding the single RADAR channel limitation currently be experienced; noting budgetary limitations should not govern ATC equipment availability.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 74.57; Flight Crew Total 10000.60; Flight Crew Type 6000

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

A passenger refused to wear her mask. The aft Flight Attendant asked the customer to wear her mask; customer refused. The aft Flight Attendant was communicating via her electronic device to operations in ZZZ. A Supervisor came to the plane. Customer initially claimed to have a medical condition; customer then said; she purchased the ticket prior to our mandatory mask policy was put in place therefore she was exempt. The customer service Supervisor never communicated with the cockpit. We had to ask the gate agent what happened after the Supervisor left. The Supervisor decided to let the customer fly without wearing a mask.Other customers were not pleased. I feel this set a terrible example to the other customers onboard and did not support us.

First Officer reported a passenger was not complying with wearing a face mask pre-departure and was ultimately allowed to fly without having to wear it.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Parked on the southeast end of the ramp at [FBO] in San Jose (SJC). We were assigned taxi instructions to taxi Runway 30L via Golf; Whiskey; Bravo. We noted the route; and noted that we would exit the ramp via G; across V; W1; right on W. The taxi was at night; at first we did not notice that Taxiway G is actually (2) taxiways; with a turn to the right on Taxiway V when taxiing eastbound. So in my mind and my briefing; we would join Taxiway G exiting the ramp; and taxi straight across to Taxiway W. We taxied to the intersection of G and V. I (taxiing pilot) am looking outside the aircraft; but focused in the distance at the signs that denote the intersections of W1 and G; as well as W and G; which we could see clearly; but they were at about 1 o'clock; which didn't seem right. At that moment I notice in the (rather poor) lighting of the aircraft taxi lights that I don't see a taxiway in front of me as I expect to. At that same instant my First Officer commanded 'STOP; STOP; STOP' which I immediately did. We were stopped in the middle of Taxiway V; and I am momentarily confused. It is then that I realize we are not seeing tarmac or taxiway in front of us; but mowed grass of the same color as the ramp in the aircraft lighting. We then expand the 10-9 chart as large as we can and realize that there is a small 'white' island to our right; that Taxiway G is actually (2) taxiways; and that we must; in fact; turn right on V; then left on G. This was not part of our clearance. The taxiway designation at this point are very misleading and - at night or in poor visibility - confusing. The taxiway G leaving the [FBO] ramp should not have the same designation as the Taxiway G that is to the southeast of it; for the very reason described above. This is confusing during the day - especially when the taxi clearance does not mention Taxiway V - can be quite disorienting and confusing at night or in low light/visibility conditions. The ramp exit should be designated Taxiway H (or something similar.) The taxi clearance should have thus been 'taxi via H; V; G W; B Runway 30L. This would have been much clearer and would alert crews to this taxiway layout in night/poor visibility operations.

Air Taxi Captain reported a taxiway incursion at SJC citing signage and lighting issues as contributing factors.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted

The event occurred at ZZZ on initial climb out on runway 32. After rotation and positive rate; I retracted the gear and noticed that the gear in transit light was still illuminated after a short period. After noticing this I slowed the airplane down to about 100 knots in hopes that a slower airspeed would allow the gear to retract. Once the slower airspeed did not work I leveled off and continued to troubleshoot the problem by rocking the wings and pitching up and down. I checked to see if hydraulic pressure was the problem and I could not get a hydraulic pressure warning while pressing the test switch; I then tested the annunciator to assess whether the hydraulic warning light was working; which it was. After several troubleshooting methods; I decided I would try and recycle then gear; upon doing so; the gear circuit breaker popped and the gear down green lights only indicated the nose and left main were fully down and locked. I pressed the gear down indicator to assure that the light had not simply burned out. I then reset the circuit breaker and attempted to put the gear up again. Again I received the gear in transition light for an extended period with a slight yawing moment. I then tried to put the gear down and received the same indications as previously stated and at that point proceeded with the emergency gear extension checklist. After possibly 30 to 45 min of cumulative pumping of the alternate gear extension lever; I could not get a gear down and locked green light indication for the right main. During that time I had reached ZZZ1 airport and had executed a low pass to confirm if the gear was down; and received a positive confirmation from the airport manager on the ground. I decided that I should query operations on what they wanted me to do before I made any decisions on my own since I had sufficient fuel for options. To do so I climbed to 4;000 and requested a phone patch through ARINC; where I was advised to divert to ZZZ2. Once reaching ZZZ2 I was in contact with the ACP via company frequency. I first attempted a low approach to confirm the gear was down and received a verbal confirmation from two people that it was. I then gave the emergency gear extension lever 3 more pumps and attempted the landing. While landing I touched the left main first and tried to keep pressure off of the right. Once the right main touched; the right wing slowly started sagging down. Once I recognized that the gear was not going to hold; I cut power and feathered the props and brought the plane to a full stop on the runway.

C99 pilot reported a landing gear issue that resulted in a right gear collapse after touchdown.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

[We] received final weights showing passenger load 21/73 did not agree with planned load of 24/129. Checked with Lead Flight Attendant and sent message to Load Planning. [We were] delayed 10 minutes to get new weights with proper load. Unsafe due to large change in weight had we used the first weight manifest and adjusted takeoff speeds.

When we got our final weights they were 18;000 LBS less than planned. Investigation showed passenger count was way below planned (21/73). We had the flight attendants do a head count and the count was close to what we had planned and what the gate agent gave us (23/127). Load planning was contacted and we provided the count from the flight attendants. New final weights were issued. My concern is that our new procedures may have errors that if not caught; may result in incorrect takeoff data planning and or incorrect loading resulting unsafe takeoff or flight conditions.

A B757 crew reported that new Company procedures allowed the weight and balance to in error by 18;000 LBS which the crew caught because of a large passenger count discrepancy.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

There is an overabundance of phone usage and ear buds in co-workers ears while working in the warehouse. The majority of the equipment that is used within our warehouse area is electric with minimal sound emitting from it except for when the horn is used to make people aware it is in use. I am seeing people walking around using video chat which means your vision is not in front of you while you are walking. You are also distracted from everything going on around you. The ear bud usage is steadily increasing ranging from the wireless which are difficult to see to the old fashioned wire hanging from your ear plain as day. There is also equipment being used while the ear buds are in the operator's ear. I have told people that this is a safety hazard and can result in a serious injury or death when you get hit by a piece of the equipment in use. Our Management has briefed this item in the past and the usage of phones and ear buds is not as frequent; but it never completely stops. We also drive on the AOA (Airport Operations Area) and people come in from driving with the ear buds in which is even more unsafe considering you are in control vehicle.

Ground employee reported over-usage of ear buds during warehouse and ground operations; posing a safety hazard.


Light Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

I cleared a Aircraft Y for take off on Runway 8L. I then instructed a C208 to cross Runway 4R/L at Taxiway E and hold short of Runway 8L at Taxiway G. For added emphasis; I then told the C208 to turn left on Taxiway B after crossing Runway 4L. The ASDE-X sounded and said that Runway 8L was occupied. The C208 had crossed the hold short line at the intersection of Runway 8L and Taxiway E as the Aircraft Y was rotating off of Runway 8L. This event happened at night and the pilot may have missed the markings and signage that indicated that was approaching Runway 8L. Maybe better signage to help pilots find Taxiway B or better signage that would alert them that they are approaching a runway.

HCF Local Controller described a ASDE-X alarm event when traffic taxiing for departure crossed the Runway 8L hold lines; the reporter suggesting improved signage.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 13

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This is an event between three aircraft; two that are normally in this area and one that is not. All three aircraft were required to be at 11;000 ft. at fixes that are approximately 10 miles apart. DIODE is one of these fixes and is used for BHM arrivals as a route and crossing restriction. WAMPM is a fix on the ZME/ZTL boundary used for crossing restrictions for HSV arrivals. This is a corner of airspace that is shared by ZTL sectors 4/5/12; and ZME Hamilton sector 12. Aircraft X was routed from direct BHM to NULLS BHM which is the preferred routing from the north into BHM. The aircraft was later rerouted DIODE BHM for reasons unknown. This aircraft would not have entered ZTL 04 if was kept on the preferred routing. Aircraft Y departing from PHL to BHM via DIODE BHM. There is an automated information transfer procedure between ZTL06/05 where the 06 controller descends the aircraft to FL240; and Sector 05 puts in an altitude of 11;000 feet or higher traffic permitting and hands the aircraft off to sector 04.  The Sector 05 Controller followed the procedure and entered 11;000 ft. in the data block. At some point; ZME [Sector] 12 pointed Aircraft X to ZTL 05 descending to 11;000 ft. and sector 05 approved the point out. Aircraft Y was still in the upper altitudes and had a faster ground speed but as the aircraft got lower the ground speed bled off and essentially was now tied at DIODE with Aircraft X.I was working Sector 04 and had the hand off on Aircraft Y; and Aircraft X was in hand off status when I recognized the potential conflict. Sector 06 switched the Aircraft Y to my frequency in which I had to stop the aircraft at 15;000 to ensure separation. Further I had to turn the Aircraft X to a 130 heading to sequence the aircraft into BHM in a safe and efficient manner.  Aircraft Z had to be stepped down to 11;000 ft. referenced both BHM inbounds as well. This safety event happened because Aircraft X should have never been put over the DIODE routing as it is not routine and requires coordination with an additional sector with not enough time to make a well thought out plan for separation. After speaking to my colleague at 05 it was stated that once it was realized there was a potential conflict; both aircraft were not on frequency to be able to do anything.  I had gone from never seeing this route and conflict before to twice in one session. The other resulting in a less complex and safe outcome.In the future I would like to have the aircraft on the preferred routing unless otherwise coordinated.  When other sectors are aware of potential conflict in a subsequent sector more proactive means of coordination for separation prior to accepting an AIT and/or point outs.

ZTL Center Controller reported a route conflict problem that he had never seen before to twice in one session.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Type 12500

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Workload

The EFP (Engine Fail Procedure) for Runway 31 out of COS is very confusing and or incomplete. It states 'Reaching BRK R-218 (All Eng-delay turn until 7200 ft. Eng Fail After 7200 ft. Right Turn H125) or D5.6 ILPI LEFT turn H125. Min Cleanup 7187 ft.' We were cleared the SPRINGS 6 Departure; which calls for a RIGHT turn to H050. It does not say to wait until 7;200 ft. until turning to heading 050. If we lost an engine below 7;200 ft. in the turn to heading 050 what is the appropriate EFP path to follow? My F/O and I discussed at length but came to no clear answer. It needs to be more clearly written with appropriate 'EFP decision points' if needed.

Air Carrier Captain reported the Engine Fail Procedure for Runway 31 out of COS may be incomplete.


The other pilot and I performed a Flight Control Functional (FCF) check after an aileron change. During his walkaroud; the other pilot confirmed that the ailerons were bussed together. During a subsequent inspection of the new (right) aileron; although not specifically checking for proper bussing of the ailerons; I am convinced that the ailerons were in fact bussed together. All required flight checks were performed enroute. No deviations were noted. The aircraft was signed off and returned to service. At some point in time after return to service; the ailerons became 'unbussed.'

The Captain of a Boeing 717-200 reports that after an aileron change the aircraft was given a pre-flight inspection; a flight control functional check; and a flight check. No deviations were noted; and the aircraft was signed off and returned to service. Reporter stated the ailerons became 'unbussed' at some point during the flight.


Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

This is an ongoing problem in IAH arrival airspace. On all occasions when departing for IAH; a clearance that assigns a STAR or arrival to IAH that does not service the current or forecast airport runway configuration. This happens at the time the clearance is received at the departure airport regardless of the stage length is for the departure. The involved parties are as follows; IAH Air Traffic Management office for a start; then down line to all parties right down to the cockpit for each departure experiencing the clearance assignment.This is happening at other airports as well; this one is simply an example and one that is constant.This problem occurs due to a lack of understanding at the level of the Traffic Management Unit in IAH of the workload that is created for all controller and pilots attempting to comply with the directives from the TMU. They fail to recognize; by placing dispatchers; pilots and controllers on the ground and in the en-route/departure environment in a position of working to comply with clearances and briefings; that they are creating an increase in VHF traffic; phone line traffic and confusion in the cockpit with regard to arrivals. They are increasing the exposure to error due to a requirement to manage actual; practical procedures for arrival rather than the fantasy clearances they are creating. Further; they expose both the flight and the ATC to ambiguity with regard to the path predictability built into the NORDO rules and procedures. There is a simple way to prevent such exposure; eliminate the workload being created in the departure; en-route and arrival phases of flight and remove the ambiguity created by this process regarding the NORDO issue. Stop the practice of demanding the Air Traffic system issue invalid clearances from the start. Have the clearances issued at the time of departure reflect the actual runway configuration at the time departure or the forecast runway at the time of arrival.While we all understand that conditions change dynamically; when those changes occur they are handled by the system and new clearances for arrival changes are issued in real time however; even with those conditions; the automation system can be programmed properly for an anticipated landing runway. In this case; the actual and forecast runway and airport configuration is and was un-programmable. This is the issue. It is acceptable to modify en-route but in my view it is unacceptable to program invalid information from the start of the flight. Opens the door and potentially adds an additional hole the cheese; so to speak.

Air carrier Captain reported that many departure clearances do not take into account the forecast weather and runway usage when being issued.


Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency

Close to top of climb a BLEED 2 LEAK EICAS annunciation occurred. An emergency was declared with Center and an emergency descent to 10;000 feet was accomplished. The cabin altitude climbed about 700 - 900 FPM to just over 9;000 feet during the event. A leak was detected in the No. 2 bleed air system while the No. 1 system was on MEL. Maintenance reports that a crack was subsequently found in the No. 2 bleed precooler.I personally have declared an emergency twice in my career; and both events were due to bleed leaks on this aircraft. (About two years ago; I experienced a BLEED 1 LEAK followed by a BLEED 2 LEAK a few minutes later. Cracks were found in both precoolers after that event.) The bleed air system on the E190 has design and engineering issues. Our company's Maintenance department has attempted to address these issues with Embraer without success. Absent Airworthiness Directives from the FAA; I would expect these issues to continue unresolved. I also would like to suggest that our QRH BLEED LEAK procedure be amended to give specific procedures for a bleed leak with only one operative bleed system. This scenario may have seemed remote at the time the QRH was written; but it has happened to me twice.

An ERJ-190 Captain's second depressurization experience due to bleed leaks triggered the report which concludes with the suggestion that the aircraft's bleed system has endemic problems that need to be addressed by regulatory agencies and the manufacturer.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

I was working East radar and took a handoff on Aircraft X. This was immediately followed up by a call from the sector advising me of traffic 20 miles ahead at 10300 ft. about 3 miles East of LBV. This traffic was NW-bound and would not be a factor. The sector advised me that Aircraft X was released for lower. After I got off the line; LBV sector called me to coordinate with an arrival that was going south of a prohibited area and coming towards my airspace. We had a back and forth on the line when I suddenly realized that Aircraft X and the VFR traffic were a factor. I immediately hung up and issued a traffic alert with a left turn. Aircraft X advised that they responded with a turn and descent. I was able to review the tapes and the VFR aircraft flew passed LBV at 10300 ft. made a left 360 degree turn back into Aircraft X; causing a NMAC.1) I should have told the Center to descend Aircraft X to 8000 instead of taking the information that he was my control. I also; should not have gotten distracted with a pointless coordination of an aircraft that never got in my airspace.

RSW TRACON Controller reported NMAC with an airliner and a VFR aircraft due in part to being distracted.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 16; Flight Crew Total 245; Flight Crew Type 10

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Other / Unknown

I was conducting a personal flight introducing a couple of friends to GA (general aviation).  We did a few turns around a point near their houses and our town so they could see everything from above.  We then decided to head back to 39N at 2000 ft MSL for a full stop landing.  About 6nm S of 39N at 2000 ft MSL; at the last second; I saw a black object with flashing blue lights at our altitude and we were on a direct path with it.  My first sighting of the object (UAS) I would estimate it to be less than 300 ft in front of the nose.  I looked to be about the size of a large bird.  When I first saw the object; I performed an evasive climbing left turn to avoid it.  I believe if it wasn't for the sharp maneuver; this UAS would have hit the aircraft.  The aircraft I was flying is equipped with TCAS and this did not show up on it. Before flying; I checked the NOTAMS and nothing regarding UAS activity showed up.  After this incident I immediately checked 1800wxbreif's UAS operating areas for the time period this occurred and no NOTAMS where published for this area.  After the incident I warned other traffic on 39N's CTAF about the location of the incident.

Small aircraft pilot reported a NMAC with a UAV.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Workload; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

MEL; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Aircraft; Manuals; Staffing; Procedure

Worked on Aircraft X. Aircraft X had previous Class 2 faults on ELAC (Elevator Aileron Computer) 2 that was placed on MEL at a previous station. Per the MIC 77XXXXX; ZZZ requested that ELAC 2 be replaced. I proceeded to replace ELAC 2; printed out aircraft maintenance manual reference and made sure that the part is effective for the aircraft. However; I was unaware that there was supplemental information in the aircraft maintenance manual; stating that software configuration checks need to match for ELAC 1 and 2. I replaced ELAC 2 with the knowledge that it is effective for the aircraft. I am not qualified; so I asked somebody else to perform the Cat 3 configuration test.I think the event occurred because the IPC (Illustrated Parts Catalog) is unclear on the software modification information. Also; the Supplemental information does not pop up when opening the manual for the R/R (Repair and Replace).Provide training for personnel about ELAC software compatibility. Make the information a Warning in RED letters so the individual can read and understand that the software configuration cannot be different between ELAC systems.

Technician reported installing incorrect ELAC due to manuals being unclear about software compatibility.


Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

After getting clearance to push from both Towers to the 'Y' I initiated the pushback. As soon as I started my turn into the taxiway the pilot notified me of a jet speeding in our direction. I immediately braked and pulled back toward the gate. The pilot stated again that we had the clearance and the jet should have stopped. It did not stop and sped right by.

Air carrier tug driver reported a near collision with another air carrier aircraft during pushback procedure.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 199; Flight Crew Type 9000

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On descent on the SWFFT TWO Arrival into BNA; we were given a descent to FL350 from FL390. We did a cruise descent; selecting FL350 on the Cruise page. As the aircraft was leveling at FL350; Center gave us a further descent to FL300. MCP to FL300; but Altitude Intervention was not pushed. The aircraft leveled at FL350. About three minutes later; Center asked if we were descending; at which point the First Officer selected V/S and expedited to FL300.  There were no traffic conflicts. I need to verify not only the altitude but that the autopilot does what we are commanding and expecting. I was confident in my First Officer because he was doing such a good job.

B737-800 Captain reports being cleared to FL350 from FL390 then cleared to FL300 as the autopilot is leveling at FL350. The MCP altitude is reset to FL300 but the descent is not reinitiated and the aircraft remains at FL350 until queried by ATC.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Troubleshooting; Workload; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

We were enroute today. Flight was pretty normal until about 100 miles outside our destination. Suddenly; we had a 300-400 ft-lbs loss in torque. We couldn't get it back; even with full power.  After taking with ATC this we noticed we were losing power at a rate of about 100 ft pounds a minute. Torque and Inlet Turbine Temperature (ITT) were gradually rolling back. We diverted immediately. At landing; we had only about 1000 pounds of torque at full power. One pilot flew it; the other worked the problem and coordinate the emergency. Time from start of power loss to landing was less than 3 minutes.  We believe we did all possible to act in the interest of our passenger safety. We successfully landed safely.

A C-208 engine torque suddenly decreased 300 - 400 pounds; then gradually decreased further as Inlet Turbine Temperature (ITT) increased. The flight diverted to a nearby airport and landed with 1;000 pound of torque at full power.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 1300; Flight Crew Type 550

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

I discovered yet another STAR (along with many SID's and approaches) that are incorrect in the commercially provided NAVDATA uploaded to the plane delivered via IS&S for all Eclipse 500/550 planes. Was told to descend via the DUNNN1 arrival. The DUNNN.DUNNN1 arrival loaded for Runway 17L simply terminates at XPATH [the waypoint at which the 'transitions' to land north or south split] and omits the following fixes to the west and north: XWILL; XMAAK; XYOUU; XRITE; XOUTT; XWNDO; and CRKDM. The FMS would go to XPATH and then head toward the airport into downwind traffic departing from APA.This is just one example. IS&S on their website lists all of the STARS/SIDS that are missing from the database with no timetable for resolution. They've been listed for a long time. It's time for someone from the FAA to investigate. These problems could be systemic. There is no indication that any strenuous error checking is in place before being shipped off to unsuspecting pilots.Note that the following 2 notices do not mention that APA is affected.Missing Runway Transitions on Arrivals from Databasehttp://www.innovative-ss.com/admin/Uploads/Database_Notice_DN1402.pdfMissing departures from Data Basehttp://www.innovative-ss.com/admin/Uploads/Database_Notice_DN1137_111109.pdfResponse from IS&S to another concerned pilot:'As you are aware we know of this issue and have submitted a fix to Jeppesen for the missing components.The issue was with our data cruncher tool used to create the Jeppesen databases for use on our system. The tool has been fixed and updated. The tool was submitted to Jeppesen for evaluation. The evaluation by Jeppesen must complete two successful releases in a row before they will [accept] the new tool. The trial began last month and we expect that the August release of chart databases will have the new fix and ALL the charts.'

An Eclipse EA50 pilot reported the FMS database doesn't display 'runway transition' waypoints beyond XPATH on the DUNNN RNAV STAR to APA.  He further states the lack of such nav data is a known and ongoing issue with the FMS supplied by IS&S which impacts a large number of airports and approaches. Document URLs provided by the reporter list the airports known to be affected but the lists did not include APA.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 13.1; Flight Crew Total 22.8; Flight Crew Type 22.8

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

On Date; I was doing solo touch-and-go landings at ZZZ. On my fourth lap in the pattern; I lost control of the aircraft after touching down; departed the runway; and struck a taxi sign. I had been out of the cockpit for about two weeks.My final approach was slightly steeper than usual; but I was maintaining my airspeed between 70-75 knots while flying to the numbers; so I decided to continue the approach. As expected; the round-out and flare portion of the landing were longer than usual. In ground effect; the aircraft drifted to the right of the centerline. I corrected this by pointing the nose of the aircraft slightly to the left in order to intercept the runway centerline.As my airspeed slowed past 40; I made contact with the runway and bounced back up into the air. Since a single bounce was not uncommon; my intent at this point was still to continue with the touch-and-go landing.I did one additional bounce as the airplane started coming back towards the runway centerline. I finally lost confidence in the landing and decided to go around. I do not recall precisely the airspeed; but it must have been around 35-40. I began the procedure to wave-off; and I applied full power. By now; the aircraft had settled to the surface and was rolling down the runway.After I increased the throttle to max; I became confused about the next steps to take because I was mentally prepared to execute the touch-and-go; and the actions I was prepared to take were to raise the flaps; turn the carb heat off; and take-off normally.Since the airplane was simply rolling down the runway at this point; I began to do the tasks associated with cleaning up the airplane for a takeoff. I knew that the aircraft would not be able to accelerate well with the flaps in the landing configuration; so I reached over and began to raise the flaps. I also needed to turn the carb heat off. But I was unfamiliar with the flap selector switch on this aircraft; since it was a spring-loaded switch. When I took my hand off of it to turn the carb heat off; the flaps stopped moving. I returned my hand to the flap selector again to raise the flaps and looked around to verify the physical position of the flaps.Throughout this entire time; I had been rolling from the right side of the runway back towards the centerline. Also; due to being at full power; the left-turning tendency of the airplane caused it to veer to the left. Since I was fixated on the flaps and preoccupied with the switches in the cockpit and checking the flap position; I did not immediately notice the change in airplane's direction. When I looked ahead again; I had only had a few hundred feet remaining before departing off the left side of the runway.At this point; I remember feeling confused because I was halfway through the procedures for a touch-and-go and halfway through the procedures for a go around. I was not completely confident in the ability to rotate and take off because the flaps were still partially retracted and I was unsure of the airspeed that I had. I knew for certain that I wanted to avoid any possibility of a low-level stall; so I wanted to abort the takeoff.I took out the power and applied right rudder and braking in attempt to stay on the hard surface; but did not do so aggressively enough to make a meaningful change in direction. I briefly considered applying even more right rudder and right brake pressures; but I am unfamiliar with the ground handling characteristics at high speed and did not want to risk tipping over the airplane and causing a wingtip strike.I believed that the best course of action was to slow down straight ahead. My first reaction was to apply full braking; but I ended up skidding and suddenly veering further left; directly towards the taxi sign. After knocking down the sign; I braked and came to a stop in the grass between the taxiway and runway. Then; I immediately proceeded with the emergency engine shutdown checklist.

Student pilot reported a runway excursion caused by improper procedures that resulted in aircraft damage.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Change in maintenance procedures after servicing or replacement of parts in the hydraulic systems.I was flying with LCA (name deleted) for my Latin America route qualification; to finish the Captain Upgrade syllabus.   We got a late start because of our gate being occupied by another aircraft experiencing maintenance issues.   Once we received our airplane X and performed all associated preflight flows; briefings; and checklists we pushed about an hour behind schedule.  I noticed that a leaky valve on the Yellow hydraulic system was replaced and a RON check had been performed that morning.  Taxi; take off from runway XX and the initial climb up through FL180 was normal.   Somewhere around FL200 the ECAM flashed a message; too quick for us to see what it was; about 30 seconds later it flashed again; and then another 2-3 times before the ECAM Message stayed displayed; hydraulic Y RSVR LOW LVL.  I was Pilot Flying; and called for ECAM actions.  LCA (name deleted) performed the ECAM actions and then consulted the COM for further instruction.  At this time we were nearing our cruise altitude of FL330.  I remained in control of the aircraft and ATC communications while LCA (name deleted) contacted maintenance through ACARS about our issue.  Dispatch and Maintenance both confirmed that a return back to ZZZ was the best course of action.   I requested a return to ZZZ with ZZZ1 center and stated we had hydraulic issues.   Center Cleared us back to ZZZ via direct ZZZ and the ZZZ Arrival.  The next communication with ZZZ1 I declared an emergency to get services in place for our arrival.   I proceeded to load the MCDU for our return to ZZZ.  LCA (name deleted) kept in communication with Maintenance and Dispatch during this time.  LCA (name deleted) also gave the TEST briefing to the lead Flight Attendant (FA); and made all PA's in both English and Spanish to the passengers.  Once we were established back towards ZZZ and we were caught up on our duties; I briefed the arrival and approach; we both discussed outcomes of the landing to be prepared for anything that may arise with our associated failure.  The loss of the Yellow hydraulic system would require us to bring the airplane to a complete stop on the runway because of the loss of Nose Wheel Steering.  LCA (name deleted) calculated a landing distance assessment; and went through the procedure for an overweight landing.   LCA (name deleted) took over control of the aircraft on the arrival because he has been flying recently and I haven't had a landing in the plane in 3.5 months; My most recent experience was a warm up and PC the week prior.  The arrival; approach; and landing were normal.  We landed and stopped on the runway XX; called for 'flight attendant stations'; Crash fire rescue inspected the exterior of the aircraft; and confirmed no hot spots.  Once given the all clear; the 'remain seated' announcement was made; we completed the landing checklist; shut down both engines with the APU running so the ground crew could hook up and tow the aircraft to the gate.   Once hooked up we were towed to Gate XX where we then deplaned and talked with maintenance about our issue.I believe the RA's functioned abnormally due to their antenna's prolonged exposure to snowy and icy conditions on the runway; taxiway; and ramp at ZZZ airport. I suggest an advisory could be sent out to keep the crews from being startled when this occurs in the conditions explained above. However; remind the aircrews to still comply with the terrain warning; whether it's an erroneous warning or not.

Captain reported that after a routine hydraulic valve replacement; the aircraft lost hydraulic fluid on climb out and was forced to turn back and perform a precautionary emergency landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Type 1027

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

This is the most intense laser illumination event I have ever witnessed. It was; and is; a certain hazard to aviation/aviators.

A319 Captain reported being targeted by a laser on the Expressway Visual approach into LGA.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 2200; Flight Crew Type 600

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Upon departing ZZZ to the south southeast for skydiving operations; I leveled the aircraft to maintain vertical separation from a cloud layer. After leveling the aircraft; I proceeded in the same direction towards an area of no cloud cover. I believe leveling/increasing speed of the aircraft while having the passenger window open in the cockpit; created unequal pressure and caused the sliding door to implode. I immediately reduced speed and began to change direction back towards ZZZ. The imploded door then exited the aircraft; striking the horizontal stabilizer and fell to the surface in pieces into what appeared to be a wooded area. After landing safely I proceeded to scout the area where the debris landed in another airplane. No debris; damage; gatherings or any activity regarding the incident were observed.

Pilot flying DHC-6 aircraft reported cabin door departed inflight.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Fatigue

No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Since COVID; these particular international schedules have been in a lot of flux. Most sequences; up until now; have been 'rockets' where we only get to rest a relatively short amount of time during the day after an all-night flight; and then fly back all night. I have written about this before; and this is to reiterate: these sequences are sub-optimal in terms of safety due to the limited rest. The threat on these sequences is NOT a virus; it's the cumulative fatigue after being up for two straight nights. There is no reason not to make ALL these flights have a longer sleep opportunity with a 30 plus hour layover.  Three times in the last 2 months we lined up for the wrong runway in ZZZ after the double all-nighter. Fortunately; someone caught the error before it was critical; but it is reflective of the fact that the three of us are sleep-deprived. In this aircraft category; you have an older pilot group to begin with. Give us the opportunity to get enough rest.Upon arrival in ZZZ; I was extremely tired; and felt my ability to monitor was degraded.Schedule all these international trips as longer layovers. It's a safety issue; pure and simple.

Air Carrier First Officer reported fatigue related concerns with the scheduling of particular international flights since the COVID-19 pandemic began.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

This event happened because I made a mistake and chose the incorrect altitude and descent method. I should have denied the visual approach clearance and remained on vectors for the LDA approach. I was familiar with this approach; even at night and had briefed it; but on this occasion I made a mistake and was not where I thought I was. I was pilot flying to ZZZ at night in VMC conditions. I was flying with a First Officer (FO) I had never flown with and we were being vectored to the LDA DME 29 at ZZZ. I'm not sure the last altitude we were given; maybe 13;000ft. Approach advised of the field location; and my FO called it in sight before I had actually seen it. Then they cleared us for the visual approach. I told him I did not see it and I was frustrated inside myself that he had called it without asking me but I continued towards ZZZZZ fix 12.1 DME from the airport. He then extended the final approach course line off of ZZZZZ which prompted me to verify my chart for the next altitude and asked him to set 7;700 for the altitude I needed to be at crossing the fix. I lost my awareness of my current distance to the fix and in reality 7;700 is the altitude after crossing ZZZZZ. I saw that I was high needed to get down quickly; so I looked at my terrain map and did not see any issues below me and looked outside below the nose of the aircraft and double checked. I began a quick descent probably 2;000 feet per minute or more and a little while later we heard the 'caution terrain' and I added power and climbed back up to about 13;000. Once over the valley and near the LDA we were given over to tower and I began a descent with s-turn and then visually aligned with the runway and VASIs to a landing on runway 29. Never allow other distractions; whether it be external (like ATC; terrain; weather); or internal (like crew; automation; or expectation bias) to keep you from doing things the way you are trained to do them. Look more carefully at altitudes on charts and verify them with each other before setting and executing them. Follow through with items as briefed even when other unexpected changes/circumstances arise.

EMB 145 Captain reported descending to an altitude restriction too early on a LDA DME approach.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 19800; Flight Crew Type 2000

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Weather; Environment - Non Weather Related

Upon stable approach and landing on centerline aircraft experienced a strong left crosswind which pushed the aircraft off to the right and off the runway momentarily.  Patchy ice is suspected to be a contributing factor. Aircraft control was reestablished and taxied to the FBO.

Upon stable approach and touchdown on centerline for Runway XX; aircraft experienced a stronger than reported left crosswind which temporarily pushed the aircraft off of the right side of the runway. Patchy ice is suspected to be a contributing factor. At that point in time control of the aircraft was re-established and taxied to the FBO.

Do 328 flight crew reported a runway excursion during landing rollout and cited a strong crosswind and patchy ice on the runway as contributing factors.


Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Just after the gear was retracted we received CAS (Crew Alerting System) message Battery over Temp R and aural warning as well. The battery temperature was in red. We performed the former memory item and turned the R battery off. We then [elected to] return to the field. The landing was quick but uneventful. We parked on the taxiway and awaited the fire trucks. The battery temp decreased out of the red so we did not evacuate. The fire department used the infrared gun and found no obvious hot spot. Therefore; we continued to taxi back to the FBO and shut down with the fire trucks in tow. We deplaned the pax and the fire department did another inspection and found nothing urgent. Please put the Battery Overtemp CAS memory item in the AOM (Aircraft Operating Manual). I consider this a serious oversight. This is why they still give this scenario in the simulator. Watch videos as to what happens to batteries when they have a thermal runaway and you will understand the importance of this procedure! I worry about new pilots trained in the Sovereign not knowing this 'old' memory item procedure. I realize I'm 'only' an SIC (Second In Command) so my suggestion to training will probably fall on deaf ears! I just looked at the maintenance line and it shows the tech noted the battery is indeed hot and has ordered a new battery; so it DOES really happen!

CE-680 FO reported returning to departure airport after receiving a battery overtemp message shortly after takeoff.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110; Flight Crew Total 6500; Flight Crew Type 3000

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Upon flying the JANNY3 STAR arrival into BUR airport; we were given a clearance to cross KREME waypoint at FL240. Upon arriving at that intersection; we were then given a clearance to descend via the JANNY3 arrival and an altitude of FL210. After looking at the arrival again; there were other waypoints above FL210 ahead on the arrival so I asked the controller to verify that we are cleared to descend to FL210 at this time in which the answer was yes.After we discussed in the cockpit what to do next; we agreed that we were cleared to descend via the JANNY3 arrival; so we began a slow descent from FL210 to meet the next crossing restriction at CHKNZ at or below FL190.Upon passing through at 20;700 feet; we were told to maintain FL210 by ATC. We then returned to FL210 without any issue or conflict indications from the cockpit.ATC then instructed us to write down a contact phone number for us to call when able on the ground. I complied with the request and called the number to clarify the misunderstanding.He explained that there was a loss of separation by us initiating the descent and I explained that we were given the descend via the JANNY3 arrival with initial altitude of FL210. He further explained that he had listened to the tapes and that when I asked for clarification of the FL210 altitude and the controller agreed; then that became a hard altitude and that the descend via the JANNY3 was no longer valid. He also explained that there are new ATC procedures for arrivals and departures in the LA area.After the phone call was made to ATC; the First Officer; who was the flying pilot; and I spoke at length to try and figure out where the communication breakdown occurred and how could we both have maybe missed an altitude assignment and we both agreed that we were given the cleared to descend via the JANNY3 arrival along with initial altitude of FL210. We then agreed that what we were supposed to abide by the descend via Janny3 arrival initially given.We were operating in a high workload environment and are wondering if the descend via the JANNY3 arrival verbiage should be used if we are expected to just go to a hard altitude?A clearance for a descent to FL210 would've worked initially; and then a clearance for the JANNY3 arrival after that would lead to less confusion I believe.LA Center then apologized for any misunderstanding or miscommunication before handing us off to Joshua approach.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

Gulfstream V flight crew reported an altitude deviation occurred on the JANNY3 STAR into BUR. Crew cited an ATC communication breakdown as contributing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 77; Flight Crew Total 1654; Flight Crew Type 215

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Night time Visual Approach into Class D Airspace at HEF with multiple light aircraft in the pattern. Sky clear with good visibility. Main Problem: Noncompliance of the pilot flying with ATC instructions in a crewed environment. First Issue: Communicating with Potomac Approach 128.52. I ([FO/PM] First Officer/Pilot Monitoring) read back a 'direct to' clearance to the airport at approximately 12nm distance from the field. Relayed the instruction to the Captain (Pilot Flying). Capt. did not comply and began heading for a fix on the final approach course for the ILS 16L. Suggested to the Captain that he head direct to the airport and the Capt. complied. Called the airport in sight within 10nm and we were cleared for the visual approach by Potomac. Second Issue: Handed off to Manassas (HEF) tower 133.1. Tower cleared us for a right base to RWY 16L. Captain did not comply and entered an extended right downwind. Tower cleared us to land RWY 16L. Tower contacted us a few moments later; sounding confused and advised that we were heading North and away from the field. Tower asked if we had the airport in sight. I replied and stated we were setting up for the approach. Tower re-cleared us to enter a 5-mile final for RWY 16L and stated we were now number two for landing. Third Issue: Capt. did not comply for a third time with ATC instruction and headed direct for the airport. I firmly prompted the Capt. to square up his approach and set up for the 5 mile final. Tower contacted us once more; still sounding confused; telling us to square up our base to final; stating that we were proceeding inbound; and to report the 4 mile final. Captain finally somewhat squared off his base; although it was more of an angled entry to the final approach course. Tower reminded us that we were still cleared to land on RWY 16L. I called tower at a 4 mile final. Aircraft landed without incident. Note: Captain's neglect to follow standard procedures and ATC instruction was cause for concern. I did not take control of the aircraft as my monitoring of TCAS; radio; and visual scan for traffic lead me to believe we were not in imminent danger. I am filing this report to state that I do not support the Capt's lackadaisical attitude and lack of professional courtesy to the tower and other aircraft in the pattern. I complied with ATC procedures as best I could in my role as FO/PM. Confirmed all of the above radio communications with ATC via recordings on LiveATC.net. Corrective Actions: 1. Ensure I am conveying ATC's instructions effectively through standard call outs; terminology; and clear vocal communication. 2. To speak up sooner rather than later to aid in the crew's overall situational awareness.

Corporate First Officer reported Captain's neglect to follow standard procedures; ATC instructions; and CRM principles.


Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Aircraft; Human Factors; Logbook Entry; Procedure

After engine start; as the First Officer ran the Before Taxi Checklist; only eleven of the twelve system lights illuminated during the 'RECALL …CHECK' item. The engine light did not illuminate. We advised Ramp Control that we needed to hold our position while we consulted the MEL. The pertinent MEL states that 11 of 12 System Annunciators are required for dispatch and directs the flight crew to: A. check that associated system indicator lights on associated panel are operative. B. If the MASTER CAUTION light illuminates with none of the system lights illuminated; it can be assured that the system with the placarded light is affected. C. Just prior to descent; check the associated panel for any light indications associated with the inoperative system indicator light. As I observed the Engine Panel in the over-head; I pondered how I could check the associated Engine System indicator lights were actually operational (not just tested). If; for instance; it had been a Hydraulic System six-pack indicator light issue; I could have turned off a hydraulic pump and caused the MASTER CAUTION light; the hydraulic six-pack indicator light and low pressure light on the overhead panel to illuminate; etc. However; to check an Engine System indicator light (i.e. reversers) was operational I would have had to shutdown the engine and deployed the thrust reversers.Since; this was not a part of the operations/procedures; I called Maintenance. Once I described the issue; Maintenance said I needed to return to the gate so they could reset some circuit breakers. Maintenance reset of the circuit breakers (3 times) was unsuccessful. The mechanic did a Lights Test; the six-pack engine light still did not illuminate; however the Engine System panel lights in the overhead (Reversers; Engine Controls) did illuminate. He said that met the requirements for an operational check. Though I voiced concern that steps A and B. above were not met in that an Engine System panel discrete light did not cause the MASTER CAUTION to illuminate; he said it met the requirements; and placarded the engine six-pack inoperative. In addition there had been two previous write-ups and placarding of the six-pack engine system indicator. Also during the Before Landing Checklist; recall; all 12 six-pack system lights illuminated normally. I placed an 'Info to Maintenance' item in the logbook describing the same. The long explanation is to get to this question; did I interpret the MEL language correctly? Or; is a Lights Test sufficient to meet the wording of MEL 33-15 to check the associated system indicator light(s) on associated panel is operative? I believe MEL 33-15 should also have a (M) Procedures since the flight crew cannot check all the associated panels (for the 12 Six Pack System Annunciator Lights) indicator lights are operational.

A B737NG Captain expressed concern about the proper interpretation of an MEL regarding malfunctioning flight crew alerting systems.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Airport / Aerodrome / Heliport; Aircraft / UAS

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 525; Flight Crew Type 100

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS); Inflight Event / Encounter Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft was in the traffic pattern at ZZZ; downwind leg turning to base; approximate altitude 3;000ft MSL; 90 MPH. Approximately .25 mile from the approach end of RUNWAY. A small impact was heard and felt by the pilot. There was nothing observed by the pilot; no evasive action taken. There were no control issues with the aircraft; initial thoughts were that a bird strike had occurred. After parking in the hangar; the aircraft was inspected. Damage from impact with a solid object was found on the underside of the right wing; outboard wing panel and wing tip. There were scratches on the paint and a slight crease in a wing skin. There was no structural damage and the aircraft is airworthy. The damage was consistent with a hard object with a width of at least 18 inches; and suggested that the impact was with a drone. Within the traffic pattern and at pattern elevation of an airport is not an appropriate area for drone operation.

Callback completed and pilot was able to confirm impact was most likely from a quad style type drone due to damage and scratches to aircraft.

General aviation pilot struck a UAS while on approach. After landing and during inspection of the aircraft the pilot found damage to the wing of the aircraft.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Aircraft; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

[We] were assigned to Aircraft X to troubleshoot a fuel leak out of #1 Engine. We noticed a fuel leak coming out of Fuel Pressure Relief Valve on the Main Fuel/ Oil Heat Exchanger. We created a non-routine on ELB [electronic log book] to troubleshoot and [someone else] transferred [the] ELB write-up to a paper write-up with work sheet.We removed the Servo Fuel Heater per AMM and removed the Main Fuel/Oil heat exchanger per AMM. We received a new Main Fuel/Oil Heat Exchanger but it was damaged when received; so we turned over to midnight shift.

B737 Maintenance Technician reported the replacement part was damaged.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 3200; Flight Crew Type 220

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace

I was repositioning the aircraft to AVQ. Approximately 30 miles from Marana I started monitoring CTAF in my #2 radio. There was a Cirrus on a similar route as me that I was overtaking. I told Center that unless Tucson Approach had taken my handoff I would cancel IFR so that I could coordinate spacing to Marana with the VFR Cirrus. Center advised me that there was no other traffic observed between me and the Marana airport and frequency change was approved. I slowed down and configured early to keep spacing on final. The aircraft ahead reported over Pinal airpark shortly before I did; I then also reported over Pinal. A voice then came onto CTAF and advised me I had flown through an active military drop zone at Pinal. I apologized and landed normally. I have several concerns about the jump operation at Pinal. 1. I had briefed through DUATS before departure and saw no NOTAM for parachute activity at Pinal. 2. Center did not advise me of any jump activity over Pinal. Center and Approach typically will advise when the jump area over Pinal and other surrounding airports is hot. Absent this; I joined an extended final approach to 12 to allow time to slow and configure for spacing. 3. The aircraft ahead also reported over Pinal. If the jump zone went hot in the less than 3 minutes between CTAF reports with no advisory over Marana CTAF as well as Center and Approach not being aware; a serious conflict could develop. 4. Having a drop zone located on a 10 mile final to the calm wind runway at a busy non-towered airport with large amounts of jet traffic does not seem like a good idea to me.

Corporate jet pilot reported unknowingly flying through a military drop zone at MZJ during final approach to AVQ.