Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation; General Declared Emergency

To begin with; the flight was in cruise on the arrival. Sky conditions at the time were SKC. We heard another aircraft asking ATC if they had to make all the crossing restrictions on the arrival. They said they wanted to stay above the weather. ATC told the other aircraft that they must cross [next waypoint] at 10000. After hearing this I turned on my weather radar. At the time; I didn't see anything on my radar since we were way above it. As we continued on the arrival; we were able to see visually what the other aircraft was talking about. Then; the Captain turned on the seat-belt sign and called the FAs to asked them if they were still doing service. They said yes and the Captain told them to hurry up and finish because in 5 minutes we would be hitting turbulence. We began our descent to cross [next waypoint] and 10000. At this time the Captain started to slow the aircraft to from 290 to 270 knots. He told me to inform ATC of our speed. I told ATC we were slowing for turbulence. ATC asked how bad the turbulence was. I informed ATC that as of right now we're in smooth air; but we're anticipating hitting turbulence ahead on the arrival. ATC accepts our new speed and about 15 seconds later tells us that an aircraft ahead of us on the arrival reported moderate turbulence. Immediately after receiving this report the captain calls the FAs. He said that there was a report of moderate turbulence right in front of us and that they need to be seated right away. Looking at the radar the buildup didn't look that bad. I was showing light precipitation. However; it was so big you couldn't go around it. The top of the buildup was about 14000 feet. We entered the buildup at 11000ft approximately one minute after the Captain warned the FAs. Upon entering the cloud it was light turbulence follow by a upward moderated jolt. This jolt lifted me about and inch of my seat. After the jolt; it was light turbulence in rest of the buildup. About 5 seconds after the moderated jolt of turbulence; we get a call from the cabin. FA B is telling us that FA A has a broken leg with bone protruding out of her skin. We know instantly this is true because we can hear FA A screaming in pain in the background. The captain then tells me to declared and medical emergency. We're just passing ZZZZZ waypoint and I declare the emergency. ATC gives us direct to the airport and speed at our discretion.  I contact dispatch and ops while the captain handles the radio and fly's the airplane. I make an announcement of our situation to the passengers and ask the them to please remain seated to allow the paramedics to assist the FA. We land about 10-15 minutes after declaring the emergency. Paramedics met us at the gate.  Suggestions:  This situation is really hard to determine a way that it could've been prevented.  I believe we followed the correct flight procedure; but yet it still happen. I don't know what the FAs get trained in about turbulence; but if they hear moderate it should be a word that causes instant action. Also; sometimes we call FAs about turbulence and it's a false alarm. Maybe; these false alarms(crying wolf) are causing complacency and a lack of motivation to follow through with the procedure.

Once the paramedics were on board and were with FA A in the aft galley I allowed passengers to deplane.

When their ERJ-170 struck turbulence on descent a flight attendant suffered a severe leg injury.  An emergency was declared and their arrival to their destination was expedited by ATC.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

This could be called a systemic problem; as it happens all the time. I filed it as an event since you can specifically look at this event. Aircraft X departed and did not tag up. The Tower controller called to coordinate the 'no tag'; but failed to recognize from Clearance Delivery; Ground Control and Local Control that the flight plan had timed out completely. They launched an aircraft with no flight plan in the system. I called the tower to ask them if they could re-enter the flight plan as they had all the information in front of them via the flight plan; they told me 'we don't do that'. So in one of the most critical phases of flight; we have to ask the IFR commercial jet; where he is going; off one of the busiest airports in the country. This is not only embarrassing; but unprofessional that a tower is unwilling or worse incapable of entering a basic flight plan into the FDIO. This happens daily and is unacceptable and unsafe.Force Tower controllers to DO THEIR JOB. Entering clearances is basic air traffic and should be mastered before they work any actual air traffic.

TRACON Supervisor reported that Tower allowed an aircraft to depart IFR without a flight plan on file.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer; Trainee

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 62; Flight Crew Total 4405; Flight Crew Type 1069

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 123; Flight Crew Total 10584; Flight Crew Type 463

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On a VFR flight plan; we were cleared the VOR-B approach at ADM. Tower directed the crew to report 2NM SW of the airfield. The PNF contacted tower at 2NM. Tower directed us to maneuver for runway 17. PF told the PNF to ask to continue the approach because we had not reached the missed approach point. The tower then said to remain west of runway 17. We continued because we were not going to cross runway 17. The PNF told ATC that we needed just a little bit more. We did not receive a clear response. ATC didn't direct us to avoid overflying runway 13/31; nor were we told to turn. After the MAP; we climbed to pattern altitude and we were told by ATC to set up for a left base to runway 17. [Another aircraft] was just crossing the threshold to runway 13 at the time of the event and we had the aircraft in sight. We made an uneventful full stop on runway 17. In the chocks we were told to contact the tower. Clear communication is essential. To improve ATC's ability to sequence traffic; we should have told the tower on our initial contact that we needed to fly to the missed approach point. Secondly; when ATC's response to our request to continue; wasn't clear and due to the time constraint; we should have discontinued the approach. Lastly; the controller had an opportunity to resolve his concern with us overflying runway 13/31 by being directive; i.e. 'turn right; do not overfly runway 13/31.'

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Light twin flight crew on a VFR flight plan reported flying the VOR-B to ADM and being instructed by the Tower to report 2 NM SW. At 2 NM the crew is instructed to maneuver for Runway 17 but do not cross it. The crew wants to fly to the missed approach point but a clear response from the Tower is not received. An aircraft was landing Runway 13 at the time of the missed approach.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Descending on approach PF (Pilot Flying) called for gear down before landing checklist; I complied with the command; placed the gear lever down; and accomplished the checklist to the item Gear down - 3 green/verified. At this time I noted that the gear down and locked annunciation for the left main landing gear was not illuminated but the gear unsafe light was extinguished. I notified the PF and we elected to recycle the landing gear handle. The gear annunciator remained in the same condition when recycled. We advised Tower of a need to conduct a missed approach to run a checklist and requested that they observe the landing gear position during a low approach which they granted. Approximately 300 feet before above TDZE (Touchdown Zone Elevation) the landing gear annunciator became illuminated. This change was noted and I requested landing clearance from the Tower; informing them of the updated circumstances. Landing was continued and uneventful.Noted during checklist itemFailed connection for landing gear bulb causing failure to illuminateAs we were descending below 1500 ft. I delayed checklist usage. I recycled the landing gear as a technique from training and requested the low flyby from Tower to assist in troubleshooting gear position. When the landing gear annunciator illuminated I requested landing to prevent further incidents from occurring during a prolonged flight.

Airliner 99 Flight crew reported that; upon extension; one of the main landing gear initially failed to indicate down and locked.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Aircraft

Aircraft X came to the gate with an open log write up that read: NOSE WHEEL VIBRATES AT TAKE OFF MX (maintenance) CHECKED THE NOSE TIRES FOR US. RUMBLE DURING TAXI. VIBRATION ABOVE 120 KT ON TAKEOFFAfter following FIM (Fault Isolation Manual) task 32-51-00-810-804 it was determined that with the lack of history and the condition of the tires that that both NLG (Nose Landing Gear) tires would require replacement on the gate. In order to ensure the safety of the aircraft; maintenance and ground personnel the first item in the flight deck is the maintenance safety [tag]. The page prominently displayed on the center pedestal read as follows: AC MX work in progress WARNING: DO NOT TOUCH OR OPERATE ANY SWITCH OR CONTROL WITHOUT FIRST CHECKING WITH THE AIRCRAFT LEAD OR SUPERVISOR!AT THIS TIME the Aircraft had a BROKEN MRD (Maintenance Release Document). The aircraft was not released from maintenance. Maintenance personnel were preparing the aircraft for a dual NLG tire change IAW (In Accordance With) AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual) 32-45-21-400-801. 3 each Downlock devices where installed IAW GMM (General Maintenance Manual). [Work orders] were generated to document the replacement of the NLG tires. While beginning the jack the nose of the aircraft the flight crew entered the flight compartment; and began to prepare the aircraft for a departure. The jacking of the NLG stopped and I returned the flight compartment to find the First Officer inputting his flight plan and beginning his pre-departure check. The maintenance safety [manual] was still displayed on the center pedestal. I then asked the crew what was going on and why they by-passed the maintenance [manual] and they stated that they are allowed to still use the aircraft MCDU (Mulitpurpose Control Display Unit). At that point I asked the Captain and First Officer to leave the flight deck because of the NLG tire changes and that for my safety they are not to press ANY switch or button. The Captain insisted that they are allowed. I returned downstairs and a coworker also working the NLG tire change then went upstairs and asked them to completely leave the aircraft for our safety and the Captain said he would make a PA announcement and everyone would leave.We continued working when the Captain came down to the ramp area where we were working and began asking what is the correlation between the MCDU and the AC nose tires. I then explained it does not matter and that no button or switch should be pushed and that it is endangering the aircraft and the ground personnel that if hydraulics were to come on or the tiller moved the AC could come off the nose jack. By BYPASSING the maintenance safety [manual] the Captain and the First Officer put not only the AC in immediate danger but all maintenance personnel and ground personnel in the area in danger. The Captain's complete arrogance and anger towards the fact that he was not allowed in the flight compartment angered him to the point of swearing at me and my co-workers. At this point I radioed to my direct supervisor. The Captain returned upstairs. And the Tech Operations maintenance supervisor conferenced with the Captain and returned to speak with us saying that he was not sure of the rules and that if the [manual] does indeed mean the NO SWITCH can be pushed and that the MCDU is okay to be used. He then asked me [to] send him the reference material so that he can read it for himself because he was unsure. I then explained that he is the supervisor and HE should know the GMM and that it is unacceptable for the crew to do what they did. He said he took note of the Captains name so he could send him the appropriate GMM for the Captain to read because the Captain and the supervisor were unaware of the company policy related to Lock out tag out [per] GMM. The Captain made it clear to us that it was HIS aircraft and they will do as they wish and that we 'think' that they are stupid; this is clearly not the case that these procedures are there for everyone's safety. This showed a large lack of respect for maintenance personnel's safety. After the supervisor conference with the crew they returned to the flight deck with the [maintenance manual] in place and continued their pre-departure process.The crew seemed to be unaware of the magnitude and danger that was created in this event and did not take my warnings or upset seriously. This is the THIRD [report] I have filed regarding BYPASSING OF LOTO (Lock-Out Tag-Out) DEVICES AND THE MAINTENANCE [Manual] in THREE MONTHS. It seems that only aircraft damage or loss of life will bring this to the company's attention. The aircraft was later released without further incidence.

B737 Maintenance Technician reported that the flight crew ignored the safety requirement while maintenance was working on the aircraft.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Human Factors

The new pilot directives regarding air flow on the airbus fleets are making pax and FAs sick. The cabin is stuffy; we feel sweaty; clammy; and lethargic. Both pax and FAs are developing headaches and feeling noxious; sometimes even to the point of getting physically ill. Although I personally suffer from migraines; they rarely occur at work but they have been coming on more frequently since this new procedure is taking place. The ventilation is not adequate and it is very difficult to work in such an environment.We deal with enough safety hazards that we should not have to have to vehemently argue with pilots to get proper air flow and O2.

An Airbus Flight Attendant complained about passenger illness; migraine headaches; cabin stuffiness as well as feeling sweaty; clammy; and lethargic following a company mandated air conditioning system inflight airflow management policy change.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

We were cleared to taxi 23L holding point; which is S10; the end of the runway. We were then cleared to line up and wait on the runway. When we were cleared for takeoff; the Captain advanced the power and Runway awareness and Advisory System (RAAS) advised 'ON TAXIWAY ON TAXIWAY'. We were not on the taxiway so take off was continued normally. As we approached S9 (the displaced threshold) RAAS then said approaching RWY 23L! There is a displaced LANDING THRESHOLD; but not for takeoff. So RAAS/EGPWS database may be incorrect for this runway. I have never heard that before utilizing any other displaced threshold for takeoff!Possible bad programming in the RAAS. If it is programmed correctly; then crews need to be aware they will receive the warning because it is very disconcerting; even in VMC. Imagine doing a low visibility takeoff and having this occur! Fix RAAS so that it doesn't nuisance alert thinking the runway is the taxiway! Or alert the crews so they know what to expect. Or disable RAAS until it's fixed!

An Air Carrier Captain experiences a Runway Awareness and Advisory System (RAAS) warning 'ON TAXIWAY ON TAXIWAY' while attempting to takeoff on Runway 23L at RCTP from the S10 taxiway. The warning is ignored as the runway has a displaced threshold for landing that does not apply to aircraft taking off.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 3500

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action

Speed 160 KTS altitude 9;700 FT; Flaps 3; landing gear was lowered; ECAM resulted showing gear not down and locked. ECAM completed and gear was lowered manually. Normal landing and braking ensued. Taxied clear of runway and parked for eventual tow-in. Nose wheel steering inop resulting from manual gear extension.

An A319 Captain reported manually lowering the landing gear after the ECAM alerted the gear not down and locked when the gear handle was selected down. The nose wheel steering was inoperative so the aircraft was towed to the gate.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Pushed back from gate in ZZZ. Taxied to deice pad and received Type I deicing; then proceeded to taxi to Runway XX for takeoff. Most; if not all of the taxiways at ZZZ were still coated with significant melting snow/slush all the way to the runway. We took off; and as Tower handed us off to Departure; we had the triple chime with a 'gear disagree' aural. NOSE DOOR OPEN and GEAR DISAGREE warnings were present on EICAS. Departure told us to continue climb to 17;000 [feet]; at which point we [advised ATC about] the gear in order to take vectors and work on the problem. We ran the QRH for the GEAR DISAGREE Message. It called for putting the gear back down; which cleared the messages. We attempted to bring the gear back up; and we got the GEAR DISAGREE message again. We then ran the QRH for the GEAR DISAGREE Message. After turning on the pumps in step 2; the nose gear came up after approximately 10 seconds and all associated messages were cleared. We completed the checklist and cancelled the [advisory]. ATC kept us as an [priority] aircraft due to the nature of the problem and their own procedures/requirements.We diverted to ZZZ1; and held briefly to burn fuel and prevent an overweight landing. We landed and taxied to the gate without further incident; and called Maintenance and Dispatch.Snow and ice lodged in the nose gear assembly is the most probable cause. Ensure deice crew sprays gear as well as the rest of the aircraft if able. Push ZZZ to do a better job of clearing taxiways of snow. Consider using as an example/provide training on issues like this during winter ops training.

CRJ-200 First Officer reported diverting to an alternate airport due to nose landing gear retraction issues following takeoff in snowy and slushy conditions.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

The #1 Engine [Oil Filter] bypass light illuminated. As per crew and QRH (Quick Reference Handbook); engine required to be shut down as a precaution. [Aircraft] diverted to ZZZ for repair.

A Boeing 737 diverted as a precaution due to indicated engine oil issue.


Initial Climb; Final Approach; Climb; Takeoff / Launch

Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency

At V1 we had a master caution light illuminate; I turned it off and noted I had lost my attitude indicator. We continued the departure profile and at 10;000 feet I began the QRH procedures to correct an IRS fault. We complied with the checklist and ended it at the point where the fault light extinguishes. My attitude indicator was slowly returning. At this point we had elected to return to the departure airport due to the failure; loss of the autopilot; and the weather enroute. As I was checking the overweight landing procedures in Part 1 and the QRH; the fault came back on with the loss of more instruments on my PFD. We were already running the checklists for our return and did not return to the IRS Fault Checklist. At one point I noticed our airspeed had exceeded 250 [knots] below 10;000 feet which we promptly corrected. On final approach I declared an emergency due to the overweight landing. The landing was smooth and uneventful.I believe we handled this in a good manner as did the FAA inspector who was giving us a check ride. The only issue perhaps is that the checklist had two choices the light extinguishes or the light remains illuminated; our light did extinguish for awhile; long enough for me to move on to  and complete other checklists. When it came back on it seemed I lost more instruments on my PFD and my ND. It was day VFR and the airport was in front of us so we just continued and landed.

A B737-800 IRS failed during takeoff and because it would not properly reset the aircraft was returned to the departure airport for an overweight landing.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 3854; Flight Crew Type 68

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

I landed on Runway XX following a short cross country from ZZZ. After landing; I was given taxi instructions to the FBO via backtaxi on Runway XX/XY. Toward the end of the runway/taxi route the aircraft became sluggish. I tested the brakes and ensured the parking brake was all the way off. This was done  while exiting at taxiway into FBO. Having been cleared to the FBO and having a lineman in sight the brakes seemed to be working normally again however before I attempted to turn down the line of parked aircraft I gave them one more check while planning to stop well short of the lineman and remain clear of any people or personnel on the ramp in case the brakes failed to work or worked uncommanded in an asymmetric fashion. Upon that test the brakes failed. I cut the engine; shut off all electrical power; exited and chalked the aircraft. Smoke was observed emanating from the left main landing gear. FBO personnel were quick to respond and used a fire bottle and fire extinguisher on the left main gear. After that we observed the aircraft for 30 minutes before approaching to observe the damage. It is suspected a brake failure caused a leak of brake fluid on the brakes which were still warm from landing and a long taxi. As it was a holiday weekend; it is going to be Tuesday until the aircraft can be inspected and replacement parts ordered. As such; I returned home via commercial carrier. Upon reviewing my aircraft logs I noted that I made a clerical error in my own notes and believed that the aircraft annual inspection was due by the end of September when in fact it was due at the end of Aug. As such an annual inspection will also be required and ordered before it is flown off field.

PA-28 pilot notices brake problem during after landing taxi. After subsequent failure; he successfully stops and deals with the smoking brake.


Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure; Procedure

[We were] cleared for the visual approach. Pilot in Command hand flew the visual approach. Switched to Tower and was cleared to land. During the descent to land Pilot in Command got too low. Second in Command informed Pilot in Command to climb as aircraft was too low and almost hit terrain Pilot in Command said he was good; Second in Command advised Pilot in Command to immediately climb. Pilot in Command was reluctant to climb. Tower informed us that we were too low for that sector of the approach and to Immediately climb. Pilot in Command climbed back up to 3;100 feet from 2;000 feet; then landed normally. Pilot in Command lost situational awareness during a visual approach. Pilot in Command initially did not react and did not listen to advice from Second in Command that the aircraft was too low on the Approach. It was not until the ATC Tower Controller told crew to immediately climb to 3;100 feet; did the Pilot in Command react and then climb back up to 3;100 feet. Suggest that the company discusses and better trains flight crews in performing visual approaches at day and night and to somehow incorporate improved Crew Resource Management Training so that if a Second in Command tells the Pilot in Command to climb or descend Immediately; he or she will listen and react immediately; and then ask questions later when the risk factor has been mitigated.

First Officer Pilot Monitoring reported the Pilot Flying flew too low on a Visual Approach and did not respond to his instructions to climb to avoid terrain until ATC also instructed them to climb.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Tower cleared us for takeoff. I spooled up engine 2 to 40% N1 to make the left turn from E1 onto the runway. I transferred the controls to the First Officer (FO) after we completed the before takeoff checklist. He advanced the Thrust Levers (TL) evenly toward the TOGA detent. I noticed a split in the engine N1 indications immediately. I saw engine 1 N1 at about 40%; and engine 2 N1 at the blue carrot (takeoff setting). The FO immediately reduced the TL's and called reject; which initially confused me because I thought engine 1 just needed a second or 2 to spool up to catch engine 2. This caused me to verbally override the FO's reject decision. He advanced the TL's once more; resulting in 'TLA NOT TOGA' EICAS message and master caution. I realized my mistake and called reject. I took the controls and turned off the runway at E3 taxiway. I made an announcement to the passengers and returned to the gate where we swapped airplanes.One obvious lesson: Once the TL's are reduced and the takeoff reject call is made; do not change your mind. Turn off the runway and sort out the issue.Lesson 2: Trust the pilot flying's judgement. The FO had good reason to reject. What I didn't know at the time was how much yaw he felt immediately after advancing the TL's; because he compensated for it with the rudder. That prompted him to look at the N1 gauges; which revealed a large split. He has a lot of time in this airplane and that takeoff thrust felt very abnormal to him. Lesson 3: I'm in the habit of often transferring controls to the FO with one engine already spooled at 40% N1 and the other at idle (20% N1). In this case that added to the confusion. From now on I'll transfer controls with the engines at symmetrical thrust. That takes away the initial confusion regarding takeoff thrust settings.

Tower cleared us for takeoff. As we were lining up with the runway for a rolling takeoff the captain transferred the controls to me. I quickly looked down at the thrust levers and noticed engine #2 thrust lever was slightly more forward then the #1 thrust lever. I figured this was due to aligning the aircraft on the center-line. So when the controls were transferred to me; I re-centered the thrust levers and advanced them both towards TOGA. Almost immediately; I felt a hard yawing motion towards the left. At first I thought the nose was not centered and applied right rudder. At this time the airplane was still veering to the left despite my rudder inputs. This caused me to briefly glance down at the EICAS and I observed while engine #2 was achieving N1 takeoff power; engine #1 N1 was fixed at approx 40%. I immediately called for the abort and placed both thrust levers to idle. Being on this airplane for almost 3 years; I have never felt yaw that extreme during initial takeoff.(From the time I advanced the thrust levers to the time I called the first abort was rapid; maybe 3-5 seconds). The captain then stated something to the effect of 'thrust is stabilized' and called to continue (after debriefing with the captain; I later became aware that he didn't feel the same yawing motion and did not find anything abnormal with the takeoff to call an abort.)With the captain calling to continue; I placed the thrust levers back towards TOGA and observed both engines where now producing takeoff thrust. So I continued the takeoff and advanced the thrust levers. Due to the confusion of the abort; I failed to completely place the thrust levers back into TOGA and received a 'ENG TLA NOT TOGA' displayed and we aborted the takeoff for second time. I recall at the time of the second rejected takeoff; N1% on both engines were producing thrust near TOGA; I just hadn't properly set them into the de-tent. As I recall; this all occurred while at a slow speed (below 80kts) and we exited at E3 taxiway off [the runway]. After speaking with passengers and maintenance we returned to the gate with no other issues.Even as a FO; I should have been more assertive in my decision to abort; to the point of guarding the thrust levers at idle. Even after the captain stated 'continue'; we were at a very low groundspeed on a dry runway. It would've been better to discuss it off the runway with the parking brake set even if my reject call was unfounded.

EMB-170 First Officer detected a strong yawing moment as thrust was advanced for takeoff and called for the reject. The Captain; seeing nothing wrong called for the takeoff to continue. The First Officer advanced the thrust levers; but not to the TOGA detent causing an 'ENG TLA NOT TOGA' message to be displayed and the takeoff rejected.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 18

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

I was pilot not flying with a lesser total time Captain; but who has more time in type; as I just recently was typed and this was only my sixth time in the aircraft. We were given a crossing restriction prior to SWFFT to meet at FL240; 25 NM south of SWFFT. Upon crossing SWFFT we [were] given [clearance to] descend via the SWFFT one RNAV arrival. Our FMS was already programmed for this arrival. The pilot flying requested that the bottom altitude on the arrival be set in the altitude preselect and I complied and set 5;000 FT MSL. The pilot flying then selected VNAV as LNAV was already our lateral mode. Then the Controller called us back and said 'Nxxxx plan on the south landing transition'. The pilot flying then decided to pull up on the chart page of the pilot's DU to confirm that the landing south arrival was indeed loaded in the FMS correctly; (first mistake as this is the pilot not flying's job to confirm and the pilot flying's job is to monitor the descent; as stated in our companies ops specs); This took some time as a second page must be navigated to and selected to read the arrival procedure text. By the time it was confirmed by the pilot flying to his satisfaction that the FMS was indeed loaded correctly; we were only 10 miles southeast of SWFFT; with the autopilot and FMS not having begun the descent to cross SWFFT below FL200 and above 13;000. The Controller at Memphis prompted us by asking 'if we were descending via the SWFFT arrival?' which we had not begun to do. The pilot flying immediately began the descent; and I informed the Controller that we would not make the restriction; he said not to worry about it; as he had already coordinated our late descent. We crossed SWFFT at approximately FL220 descending rapidly to get back on the path.The biggest contributor to this issue is that the pilot flying PIC was not following company procedures and monitoring the autopilot and vertical navigation; and took it upon himself to confirm what was in the FMS was indeed correct. I should have taken the aircraft and confirmed the descent path was captured. (But I was wrapped up in trying to assist him in confirming that the FMS had been set up correctly; my fault; no one 'flying the airplane') Secondary is that this Arrival is a very complicated one with multiple arrival paths after ADAAY and a second page that must be read to confirm the correct arrival gate is programmed. This arrival should be broken down into several independent arrivals; instead of multiple gates all jumbled together to suit either a north landing; south landing; or 13/31 runway landing. I have seen this on other arrivals and have voiced my opinion of this to friends that are controllers [at] ATL Center and they are in agreement with my opinion these should be separated into individual arrivals.Finally; the Controller should have given us the expect to descend via the SWFFT one sooner as well as given us the south transition final fix to confirm to all parties that we were using the correct transition. This would have eliminated this situation all together as we did in fact have the correct transition loaded to begin with.

A Gulfstream 280 flight crew failed to comply with the crossing altitude at SWFFT on the SWFFT RNAV STAR to BNA due to distractions associated with insuring the complex arrival was properly programmed.


Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Y was inbound that needed to descend; with Aircraft X departing out of DTW. Aircraft X needed to climb above Aircraft Y. We descended Aircraft Y and told him to descend quickly; it looked as though it was not going to work; and we ended up turning Aircraft Y a total of 35 degrees right; and Aircraft X got a 20 degree left turn; neither of which seemed to do much; and separation was lost; barely. At HUD and DET; we had a pretty complex situation with a military block on UHF; and other aircraft on other frequencies so the congestion was a major factor. Also; with the new Metroplex redesign; the traffic volume in certain parts of the sector is different than it was; as well as the times at which we get busy.  Aircraft Y did not seem to do anything to help the situation either. The lows were also very congested with frequencies and odd traffic. We just need to get more used to the new complexity and timing of busy traffic related to Metroplex.

ZOB Enroute Controller reported a loss of separation occurred between a departing CRJ and an inbound AC90; due in part to the complexity of the Metroplex.


Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion

Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

When pulling into the gate; a large flat spot was found on the Number 3 tire and the tire was deflated. A normal landing and normal braking was made. Taxied off and back to the gate normally. On short final; the ANTISKID light illuminated intermittently; but the approach was continued due to intermittent illumination. The light was not illuminated during the actual landing. The Number 3 tire was written up along with the ANTISKID light and the aircraft was given to Maintenance. If put in the same situation; I would recommend a go-around to investigate the intermittent light and possibly divert to a longer runway.

The landing was firm but appeared normal. On the rollout; braking felt normal and stopping margin was not a factor. Also; on short final; the AUTOBRAKE light and ANTISKID lights were intermittent. On short final; I assumed it was just an autobrake problem. I wrote up the Number 3 tire and the intermittent anti-skid light. Maintenance changed the Number 3 and Number 4 tires and grounded the aircraft. I should have gone around and better analyzed the problem.

A B737-700's AUTOBRAKE and ANTISKID lights illuminated intermittently on final. After landing and parking at the gate; Number 3 tire was flat and Number 4 tire was also changed.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Landing Runway XXL in ZZZ. FO flying. It was a stable approach. He flared slightly high and we floated and may have landed passed the touchdown zone. I was about to say Go-Around just as we touched down. I contribute my late call out due to flying the red-eye from ZZZZ.I haven't flown in a couple of months. The First Officer hasn't flown much as well. Even during a stable approach in good weather; be prepared for a go around; and always be ready to call it out; if warranted.

I was landing Runway XXL in ZZZ. I had a stable approach.  I started the flare at 20 feet and I floated.  I may have landed just past the touchdown zone.It was late after an all night rocket trip from ZZZZ-ZZZ.I will be going to ZZZ1 for landing currency sim; since I haven't had enough currency in the right seat in 3 months.  Some of this can be attributed to lack of flying during the COVID-19 crisis.

Air carrier flight crew reported they may have landed passed the touchdown zone. First Officer stated lack of flying contributed to the event.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 174.22; Flight Crew Total 11640.23; Flight Crew Type 11640.23

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

I operated Aircraft X ZZZ - ZZZ1. I was the Pilot Flying. Flight was routine until we were about 170 miles out of ZZZ1. My First Officer was having problems with his radios when answering. We finally figured out that the problem was his ACP (Audio Control Panel) panel. It was causing problems with his speaker and Mic. He could only hear out of my side. I told him to make the landing and I will do the radios. It was just after that time we got a F/CTL ELAC 2 PITCH FAULT ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor). We got the book out and went through the reset procedure. When we reset the ELAC (Elevator Aileron Control) we received a FLT CONTROL ELAC 2 FAULT and F/ CTL L ELEV FAULT. I should also mention that on takeoff on [Runway] 28L in ZZZ when I rotated the aircraft it felt unresponsive with pitch initially. I even mentioned to [First Officer] that the CG must have been wrong; so this now got my attention. Descent was now upon us and we started down. When reading the notes in the book about no use of the speed brakes and Flaps 3 landing with a note that said we would lose normal law and revert to direct law when we dropped the gear. I decided to try to communicate with Dispatch and Maintenance. I had them call me and with the radio issues and was able to confirm what we had read in the handbook. The work load was really starting to increase at this point. I told [First Officer] I would take control of the aircraft. With the degradation of the elevator system along with being unable to use the speed brakes to meet ATC constraints on the STAR; I decided to [advise ATC]. I briefed our Purser about the situation but did not prep the cabin. ATC got us right in and we landed on Runway 9 with no issues. It should be noted that when we dropped the gear we never did go to direct law. We did have elevator flutter on the descent however.

Flight crew flying A320 encountered multiple system failures in flight.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 4700

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Approach from the west on the arrival; on IFR flight plan; in VFR conditions; planning a visual landing on Runway 29.Aircraft is equipped with [a] FMS system. Regular copilot was not available for trip; so I was flying with a contract pilot in right seat who; it turns out; did not have complete mastery over the [FMS] system. Therefore; I had to do most of the programming of the FMS; and I did program the reference STAR.Near ZZZZZ intersection; we were given a heading change for traffic; and a descent clearance to 3;000 ft. I switched from NAV to HDG mode; complied with turn; and started the descent. Believing that we were no longer required to track on the arrival route; I selected 'direct ZZZZZ' (fix on the Runway 19 ILS approach course); inserted the inbound course; and executed the command. The result; which was expected; was that the course and fixes that were previously displayed on the MFD disappeared; and were replaced with a depiction of the final approach course fixes and runway.Shortly thereafter; the approach controller asked if we were proceeding to ZZZZZ. I replied that we were not and asked for a vector. His reply was 'no problem'; and he gave us the vector.The reason I asked for the vector was that it was a very busy time in the cockpit; the copilot was having trouble re-programming the FMS for the ZZZZZ One Arrival; I didn't have time to do it while managing the flying duties; and it seemed to be the best course of action.My recommendations are: 1. To not change FMS programming from 'arrival' to 'approach' mode until you ascertain that you have been cleared off the STAR; and 2. To make sure that your fellow pilot is fully qualified in the operation of your NAV equipment.

General Aviation Jet Captain on Standard Terminal Arrival Route proceeded to the Initial Approach Fix before being cleared off the arrival. The Aircraft had been given a heading for traffic.


Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload

Descending thru FL180; checking Status Page on Descent flow we observed:'ENG2 at Idle on GRD''ENG2 Max Pwr Idle'INOP SYS:'REVERSER 2''ENG2 THR'[There was; however; no ECAM message; No Immediate Action; No ECAM Exception; No QRH Procedure or guidance in the QRHI asked a jumpseating Captain to see if there was something in the ECAM Supplemental Guide for supportive information. [Although I understand the] ECAM Supplemental is for actual ECAM and Crew Awareness [and that] we never received an ECAM [however it appeared] we had a possible situation with the Number 2 Reverser. The guide did provide some insight into what COULD be wrong. We discerned that a probable reason is there could be a disagreement relating to the FADEC and Thrust Lever Position. Nevertheless; we figured this had to with Reverser Door position with the STS/Inop SYS messages.The ECAM Supplemental Guide under 'ENG REVERSER PRESSURIZED' explains...'Reverse Thrust System Pressurized Without Reverse Deployment order'ACTION: 'THR LVR 2..... Idle' 'If flight conditions permit; reduce thrust lever of affected engine to IDLE as a precautionary measure'.What we didn't know was if the reverser was pressurized or not. What we DID know [is] if the reverser sleeve/door opened it would not be good.Landing distance [decrement was] quickly checked and verified with 25% increase.  We were in a position to land [while] on base leg when I made the decision to bring the Thrust Lever to IDLE as a PRECAUTIONARY measure. We briefed and used BOTH reversers on touchdown. Landing and rollout were normal with BOTH thrust reversers operating. STS messages and INOP SYS cleared.After shutdown; a Maintenance Message: ENG2 FADEC [was displayed][An MEL:] 'Reverser Inop' was added for next flight.

Odd Status page messages--observed during completion of the Descent Checklist--regarding the right engine reverser but which had not triggered an ECAM message/resolution presented a quandary to the flight crew of an A320.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

At rotation on takeoff we had a surge on left engine with a loud bang. The EPR (Engine Pressure Ratio) dropped to approx. 1.60 then returned to normal with a brief MC (Master Caution) light. All 3 FAs called and said 'we have a real bad odor with smoke' We then [advised ATC] and returned to [the departure airport]. Also a deadheading pilot told a FA that we might have a blown tire. We really didn't know what we had. The tower had had the runway checked for debris. It was clean. After landing the aircraft was checked out then we taxied to gate. It was an overweight landing 140;000 lbs. The post flight walk around showed signs of bird remains in left engine. FAs did a great job and the passengers seemed to be in good spirits.

MD80 pilot reported a bird strike on rotation that led to engine surges; odor; and smoke in the cabin.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

We took off and the first indications of a problem were rather benign. We were advised to recycle our transponder and I lost my Air Data Computer; with corresponding loss of FD. No other ECAM warnings displayed at this time. Good weather was in front of us and bad weather back at departure airport; just on the very back edge of a large system. ATC advised us that FL230 would be the highest altitude available due to transponder being inop. We then noticed that we had a TAT (Total Air Temperature) issue along with all 3 pitots faulted. We were +7C at FL200 so elected to level there and sort things out. We coordinated with [Operations] to continue to [destination] at FL200 with fuel on board. I then started to look at enroute airports. About this time we started getting multiple ECAM warnings including 3 directing us to turn off all pitot heats due to overheat. This so much went against our instincts that we ended up have a long discussion which included current temps; VMC; enroute weather; divert possibilities etc. We ended up complying with the ECAM. Shortly thereafter we started losing various systems and having gyrations with the remaining yaw damper. Both N1 modes faulted; complete loss of airspeed etc. I [advised ATC] and read pitch and power settings to my F/O while we started a slow controlled descent and requesting immediate divert to [a nearby alternate]. We also immediately turned the pitot heats back on. Through FL180 things started to return and we were able to call ramp that were inbound. We decided to maintain a high speed through 10;000 ft to keep the TAT up since we still were not sure what we had as far as pitot heat. In the end we made flying the aircraft a priority; though it certainly was more difficult to ignore the wildly spinning speed tapes than I might have imagined. We slowed and configured well outside of the marker; probably ran the before landing checklist 3 times. Normal landing with very tentative braking because we were showing no anti-skid. Stopped midfield. Taxied in.After much discussion with Tech Pilot; duty officer; mechanics etc; the glaring question in our minds is: Why is the failure of the switch that dictates to the aircraft that it is on the ground or in flight not tied in to the ECAM? It (ECAM) warns us of all kinds of mundane; nice to know stuff; but this [is] a big ticket item that it completely ignores. We are left to play 'connect the dots' with ECAM guidance that could have possibly catastrophic results. The one glaring thing that kept repeating to us during our hours long debrief and Monday morning quarterbacking of ourselves is that we did exactly as we were trained. 'Do not try to out-think the ECAM. Comply with the ECAM.' Do not be a Sinatra and do it 'My Way' etc. etc. Complying with the ECAM got us into trouble in this case. What amazed us was how quickly things unraveled at that point. We thought we would have a bit more lead time; especially at such a high TAT with no visible moisture.

After landing and a long discussion with maintenance and a tech pilot; we figured out the failed systems were still in the ground mode. Some component had failed causing them to think they were still on the ground. No transponder (thought it was on the ground). Pitot heat didn't switch to 'air' mode; etc. When we did what the plane thought we should do (turning off pitot heat); it caused our loss of airspeed. Add a note (other than in the supplementary section of the QRH) to prevent someone from doing what we did. Just as our gut told us even in clear air turning off all pitot heat is a bad idea. But; that's the path the ECAM led us down. Even a warning or note in the expanded verbiage of the QRH procedure saying 'failure of all 3 pitot systems is extremely rare and caution should be exercised in turning them all off.'

A300-600 flight crew reported multiple anomalies during climb related to failure of the air-ground sensing switch. Flight crew was critical of the ECAM procedure that called for turning off power to all pitot heats; since that action resulted in more failures.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

In cruise flight; First Officer (FO) pointed out oil quantity in right engine had decreased to 3 quarts.   Pressure and temperature normal but temperature rising.  No other abnormal indications; noise or vibration. Declared Emergency with Center. Referred to QRH: Oil Quantity Decreasing.  Due to rising temperature; followed on to Inflight Shutdown Checklist.  Completed checklist and discussed landing options.   [Our departure airport was] selected due to known good weather; adequate runway for overweight landing and [our] familiarity with arrival and surrounding terrain. Requested a turn direct to the airport from Center.  Advised Flight Attendants (FA) including TEST brief. Made PA to passengers about situation and return to the airport.Advised dispatch via free text message and coordinated with ATC for a gradual descent back [to the airport].Attempted contact with company and station operations but were unable via VHF.  Contacted tower and requested they call company ops.  Advised ZZZ tower of intentions and requested Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) equipment as a precaution. Planned and briefed single-engine; overweight; landing at appx. 140;500 pounds. Flew a VOR approach to visual approach with uneventful landing.  Parked on Pad and deplaned passengers to busses.

An MD-80 series aircraft flight crew shut down the right engine; and returned to their departure airport after recognizing there was low oil quantity and an associated high oil temperature.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 400; Flight Crew Type 300

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Takeoff close call with icy runway conditions.Runway was icy; but landing immediately before takeoff was uneventful. During taxi; braking effectiveness was observed to be significantly reduced; but adequate steering was possible (too much breaking resulted in wheels sliding). During takeoff; heightened concerns about icy conditions with a crosswind; led the pilot to start on the upwind side of the runway and apply crosswind correction with the ailerons. Soft field takeoff technique was utilized. Part way down the runway; while the wheels were still on the ground; the plane began to drift towards the upwind side of the runway. The plane continued to drift upwind after correcting and reversing the aileron direction. Airspeed was enough to leave the ground; but not enough to maintain flight; so pulling on the yoke lifted the plane above the snowbank lining the runway (~3 ft high). Lowering the nose to avoid a stall resulted in the left main contacting the snowbank. At this time the plane had enough airspeed to safely climb away from the runway. The pilot requested a visual review of the left main from a local tower that noted no abnormalities. The pilot continued to their destination and landed safely. Upon landing; visual inspection of the landing gear indicated no damage. Things that should have been done differently: Takeoff should have started in the center of the runway; despite concerns of a crosswind on the ice. Training on soft field takeoff utilization for an icy runway would have been beneficial. Waiting until runway conditions improved would have eliminated any risks.

C172 pilot reported contacting a snowbank with the left main landing gear on climbout from an icy runway.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During my pre-flight checks; I discovered that one of the O2 walk-around bottles in the forward entry storage space was out of the bracket and did not have the mask and tubing connected. I reported the issue to the Captain prior to boarding. Captain requested Maintenance to come and correct the issue which was completed prior to passenger boarding. Flight departed without further incident. As in several previous ASRS reports; I am finding O2 walk-around bottles without the mask/tubing connected at an alarming frequency. I am not sure where they failure in procedures is occurring that these bottles are being replaced without the tubing attached so that they are cabin ready. As suggested in previous reports; this issue is chronic if; out of all of the flights operated and the few I am working; I find O2 bottles without the tubing connected as frequently as I am finding them. A thorough check of the fleet to make sure all bottles are connected would at least allow us to start fresh with emphasis on both Maintenance and flight attendant training to identify and correct this issue. In talking with many of my flight attendant colleagues; many said they were unaware that they were actually supposed to check that the tubing is connected during pre-flight checks.

B737-800 Flight Attendant reported multiple instances during preflight of finding walkaround O2 bottles with mask and tubing not connected.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Attendant

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

Aircraft X had previously departed and we were advised (by TRACON) thereafter that they planned on returning to land here due to an indication that a panel was open and they requested no assistance. A low-level potential emergency alert was passed on to the Port Authority; and they responded with several fire trucks as a preemptive measure. After Aircraft X landed and was turning off Runway X (the only active runway at the time); I noticed an unidentified target on the ASDE-X. This target was just behind them as they exited. I immediately advised the Local Controller of this and seconds later determined with binoculars this was not a false target but a large piece of metal. Local Controller quickly advised the following aircraft (on short final) that debris was on the runway. This flight did land without incident but was visibly steering well left of centerline to avoid the hazard. Fortunately; there was not enough space between these two arrivals to squeeze an awaiting departure in between. As stated in my previously filed report under 'Safety Problem'; the ASDE-X never issued an alarm. As the second aircraft was landing the Port Authority's Duty Officer that responded along with the emergency trucks advised that there were several areas of debris left by the Aircraft X and the runway was immediately closed. Two aircraft were given go-around instructions; departures were stopped and the TRACON began holding arrivals for at least 4 minutes as the hazard was removed. The severity of the damage incurred by the Aircraft X (right engine cowling torn) became apparent only after the debris had been spotted and they had turned the aircraft eastbound onto the taxiway. From the Tower vantage point; this side of the aircraft was not visible on the Visual Approach. As a witness to this; I can only say that the event qualified as a significant safety hazard. And that it was very lucky to have occurred during daylight hours. I am relieved we avoided a potential 'Concord-like; catastrophic event.Other than recommendations given in my previous report relating to this: The TRACON provided no extra space on these succeeding; arriving aircraft - which would have been nice. It is not unusual for a departing aircraft to return to the field for precautionary reasons; but - when they do - this instance shows the benefit that extra time could provide. In this case; there was very sufficient room behind the arriving aircraft in order for them to have done so. However; like I said above; being that we were a single runway operation at this time it is a good thing that there was not a lot of space as we likely would have had a departure directly behind Aircraft X. Aircraft X flight crew gave us no indication that part of their plane was left on the runway. Primary debris (which was picked up on the ASDE-X) was mid-field between taxiways Tango and Juliet; about where most departing aircraft are reaching V1 speed; or the point of no stopping before the water off the end of [our departure airport's] runway. Though I personally work the CIC position rarely; from my training I seem to recall that selecting the 'Significant Event' check box in a required report [this] is done when an incident that is potentially newsworthy occurs. The wreckage that was left on the runway potentially witnessed by passengers of the arriving airline as well as any passenger on board Aircraft X able to see the tremendous damage on that side's engine may have led them to be truly; rightfully scared for their safety. So when I hear the powers that be directing my supervisor to not qualify this as significant; it boggles my mind that this real and present danger that existed can be seemingly written off as 'not a big deal'. Clarification on logging events in that system and qualification procedures might need to be reviewed.

Met copilot at aircraft; preflight was accomplished with no issues noted; normal departure; very nice smooth; clear morning. Shortly after cleanup Number 1 Flight Attendant rang to relay a passenger had reported a loose panel on the right wing. My first thoughts were of a 'shark bite' flap or perhaps a floating spoiler. All cockpit indications were normal; no unusual vibrations; roll; yaw; or noise. Based on the lack of any abnormal indications my first inclination was to continue our climb out. I asked for more information and the Flight Attendant offered to take a cell phone picture; which was brought it to the cockpit. The picture appeared to be an unknown; rectangular panel on the wing; obviously open. At this point we advised Approach that we would like to return. Based on our landing weight; approximately 133 KTS; well below maximum; the flight conditions; and the lack of any indications of a serious problem indicted by the performance and feel of the aircraft we elected to return to [our departure airport]. I decided not to declare an emergency; we were very close to [our departure airport]; and my perception that this was a nuisance; not an emergency situation. At this point we assumed it would be a relatively minor fix to close whatever was open. The touchdown was smooth and roll out was non eventful from our perspective in the cockpit. On taxi in another aircraft reported that we had lost a part on the runway. We both assumed the open panel had torn loose. Only after parking did we realize that the right engine cowl had actually blown open and the mysterious panel was actually a piece of engine cowl that had been bent over the wing. The picture was a great idea; but from the angle I could not exactly identify the object. I should have requested another from a different angle. I have to assume the inboard nacelle was being held shut or close by air forces. There was never any mention of an engine panel; we all were thinking small wing panel. If we had known of the cowl; nacelle problem I would have declared an emergency; opted for the longer runways of [a nearby airport] and hopefully would have used little or no reverse. This may have mitigated the damage upon landing. I also knew [our departure airport] had maintenance; and several more flights to [our destination]; this also influenced my decision to return to [our departure airport] if indeed the aircraft was to go out of service. My First Officer is very conscientious and thorough. I have no doubts that he performed a professional preflight inspection. Perhaps we should review the guidance on the cowl latch preflight section.

Air carrier aircraft had engine cowling depart the aircraft on departure. Controller advises Local Control and city closes runway due to large amounts of debris on runway.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Cruising at FL250 we heard a pop and my ears plugged. Captain immediately went for the oxygen masks and then I followed. Established communication and executed an emergency decent to our assigned altitude of 9;000 feet. Captain was the PM (Pilot Monitoring); [and requested priority handling] and got out the QRH. Structural damage was not suspected so we descended at 300+kts with full speed brakes. I was monitoring the cabin altitude pressure and it did not go above 14;000 feet until well established in our descent. When it finally did; we got a level 3 warning message and shortly after flight attendants called up. I made an announcement to the passengers to put on their oxygen masks. Captain also tried to call Dispatch with no answer. [The Captain] followed all procedures and communicated with all involved. Minutes went by [before] I could take time to think and observe. It was loud in the cockpit. It sounded like the leak was somewhere in the cockpit but I couldn't find an air source. It was very loud; hard to hear [the Captain] talking. We made the decision to continue to [destination] because at the time we were 44 miles away and 43 miles from [a possible alternate]. [The Captain] made announcements to the passengers probably 2 times and talked to the flight attendants whenever they called (3 times at least). On one call; flight attendants said they smelled a burning smell; and then we could smell it too (likely the chemically [generated] oxygen which I realized after the flight). We elected to keep our speed at 300+ knots to get to [destination] as soon as we could just in case there was a fire somewhere on board. We ran all appropriate check lists and Captain had me continue to fly the plane to landing. We stopped on the runway and met by fire trucks. They did a walk around deemed it safe and we taxied to the gate on our own power.

B717 First Officer reported loss of cabin pressure at FL250.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 7600; Flight Crew Type 10

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Upon landing the aircraft yawed to the right and I corrected to the left. Upon the loss of control I aborted the landing. Upon climb out the left wheel hit a runway sign. While I was climbing out the airplane rolled to the left and I decided to land in a field off the end of the runway. The left wing impacted the ground first and rolled the plane around the nose coming to a stop upright. My friend and I exited the aircraft.

Carbon Cub Pilot reported wheel hit sign on aborted landing with loss of control resulted in off airport landing with damage.


Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Enroute at 4;500 FT we were 15 NM south of 2B1 when we heard jump plane announce to Cape Approach that he was climbing out of 1;700 to 9;000 for a jump run. The First Officer and I discussed the threat. We determined that our closest point of approach to 2B1 would be 5-6 NM west of the field. With northeast winds that would be more than sufficient clearance. Nevertheless; we planned to alter course even more to the west to avoid the area by a wider margin.Eight miles south of the field approximately over PEAKE Intersection; we saw the plane; in a climb; at our altitude. He passed off our left by about 250 FT laterally at the same altitude. After we were passed the C182 popped up on our traffic display behind us. That was his first electronic appearance to either us or Cape Approach. Although we had a traffic display; we were not relying on it. As a Garmin TIS; it piggybacks off Cape Approach's radar; and their radar had been unreliable over Nantucket Sound. That may not have been the problem; though. Other targets appeared. After landing I spoke with the Assistant Airport Manager. I told him how surprised I was to see the plane so far south and downwind of the airport. He explained that first; the plane's transponder had been intermittent last week. It had been fixed. Secondly; the reason why the jump plane was flying such a wide pattern was due to vociferous noise complaints from airport neighbors. The jump plane has been flying a couple of different wide teardrop patterns over the mid-Cape area to spread the noise. Without prior knowledge of his noise abatement strategy; our ability to avoid the jump plane was hampered.Our pilots should be advised of the jump plane's non-standard climbout patterns. Avoiding 2B1 by even 8 miles may not be enough. A direct line overhead Coast Guard Air Station (FMH) or Hyannis (HYA) may be required. Also; I would hope that the mechanical contributing factors could be addressed. We don't know if it was Cape Approach's radar outage or the jump plane's intermittent transponder that hampered Cape's ability to issue traffic advisories. Ultimately; we must of course understand that ATC's prime directive is the separation of IFR traffic. The responsibility to see and avoid VFR traffic rests with all of us.

A C182 jump aircraft near 2B1 was not detected on a small transport aircraft TIS and they had a near miss as the C-182 climbed over PEAKE Intersection.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

We accepted Aircraft X in ZZZ to perform flight from ZZZ-ZZZ1. The aircraft was catered for both legs in ZZZ. However; we did not eat during the short flight from ZZZ-ZZZ1. During cruise from ZZZ1-ZZZ2; the FO (First Officer) went to the galley to retrieve a sandwich. Upon removing the large black catering bag from the top cabinet; he noticed a white bottle in the very back corner. Once he picked up the bottle he realized it was a CVS rubbing alcohol 91%. The bottle was unsealed and almost full. He brought what he had discovered to my attention. We talked about the pre-flight safety inspection. I asked if he remembered looking behind the catering bag. He could not recall. After we talked about it; we both realized that this was easy to miss due to the following factors:1. When we check the catering inside these bags; we usually pull the bag to the edge of the cabinet; open it and check the contents. Most times the bag is not placed on the floor. After checking the catering contents the bag is pushed back into the cabinet and the door is closed and latched.2. We have many different caterers. The food is packaged differently into a large variation of containers.3. Our aircraft has many different galley configurations. Some only have cabinets; while others have a combination of cabinets and chiller. Some have ovens; others do not. At the end of our conversation we came to the following conclusion. We need to be more cautious and take our time performing our safety checks.Once we blocked in I immediately requested a GSC. A few minutes later GSC [name] showed up. I explained everything in details and he took possession of the bottle. He informed us that he would inform his supervisor and investigate the matter. I left the airplane and headed to the sort building. I wanted to share this with our local supervisor. He was not present; but my FO contacted him over the telephone and also informed him of what had transpired. My FO and I left the sort and went to the hotel. Suggestions: After the fact; my FO and I agreed that we must mitigate the risks mentioned above by being more cautious during the pre-flight safety inspection. Also; it becomes very difficult to control all safety barriers once we have performed pre-flight safety duties and there a numerous personnel coming in and out of the flight deck and galley area.

B767-300ER flight crew reported finding a bottle of alcohol 91% (Hazmat class 3; flammable liquid) in the crew catering container. Event was reported to GSC at destination.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 15

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

I was acting PIC of a multi-engine instructional flight when; the nose gear of the aircraft failed to extend; caused by a mechanical fracture of the nose gear actuator piston rod. Weather conditions reported by METAR at the time were variable winds at 4 KTS; 10 statute miles of visibility; scattered clouds at 4;900 feet AGL; temperature 24 C; dew point 11; and altimeter setting of 30.19' Hg. Runway conditions were dry.On every approach; upon passage of the final approach fix; the landing gear was successfully extended. Part of standardization that day was to reinforce the importance of keeping one hand on the gear selector knob until verification of gear down by three green lights. On the first four approaches; it was verified that all three landing gear were down and locked. Upon passage of the final approach fix; I noted that the nose gear indicator light did not illuminate. At that time we had begun our descent to minimums. I did not want to continue the descent; so we leveled off at approximately 1;500 feet. I took the controls of the aircraft and advised Tower that we did not have a safe gear down situation. I cycled the gear; and the nose wheel indicator still did not illuminate. This was followed by three more cycles; none of which produced any change. My next step was to see if the nose gear light was burnt out by exchanging it with an operable light of a different gear. However; the lights on this aircraft were not the type to be easily replaced in flight. I then requested a low approach for the tower to take a look at our nose gear. Permission was granted. After passage directly in front of the Tower at 500 feet MSL (350 feet AGL) they informed me that the nose gear 'appeared to be down.' My thought then was that it probably was down; but that we should use the manual gear extension knob to supply pressure to the gear in the case it was not completely locked. I instructed my student to pump the gear 35-40 times with the gear selector knob down; as called for in the aircraft's information manual. I also extended my upwind an additional mile or two. During that time; my student finished the manual gear pumping; and reported that there was hardly any resistance to his force on the selector; nor had the pressure changed as a result of his pumping. I cycled the gear one more time and checked the resistance to pressure myself. Indeed; there was hardly any resistance at all.By this point; I made the turn back for the left downwind; and concluded that: 1) The gear was down and locked; and the problem was electrical; or 2) the gear was down; but not locked; due to mechanical failure; and any cycling or manual extending would not solve anything. Thus; I made the decision that I would attempt to land the airplane. By this point; we were midfield on the downwind; and I knew a co-worker of mine with experience in this aircraft was in the traffic pattern. I advised him directly over Tower frequency of the steps I had performed; to which he responded that I had done all correctly. Tower had already cleared me for the option; but I advised them it would be a full stop; and that we may be having a gear up landing. I planned for a soft field landing. As I brought the airplane in over the runway at 100 feet AGL; I slowed the descent rate; and prolonged the airplane flare as long as I could some five feet above the ground with the nose up; thereby reducing speed and minimizing the force that would ensue upon nose wheel contact with the ground. Per my request; my students hand was on the mixture levers; and the instant I noticed that the nose wheel would collapse; I told him; 'CUTOFF;' which he did. We then skidded down the runway some 500 feet before coming to a stop. We secured all switches inside the aircraft and then exited immediately. I called the Tower on my cell phone to advise them we were okay.

Light twin instructor pilot experiences an unsafe nose gear indication during approach and goes around to investigate. All attempts at achieving a safe indication are unsuccessful and upon landing the nose gear collapses.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Type 135

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Arrived at airport; loading ramp slick. During preflight prep process; I was interrupted and had to call ops for more rock salt and ice for catering. Airplane had line maintenance night before; upon arrival; found water leaking from number 2 chiller drain line onto floor in aft galley. Captain dealt with that issue for a significant amount of time and subsequent new MEL application. Clearance obtained and monitored by both pilots and hold for release at the end of the clearance not read back for some reason. I wrote it down on the clearance paper; but cannot remember reading hold for release back; nor did the controller question it; and we pushed back after the reviewing briefing cards and completing appropriate checklists. We pushed and started engine one with a subsequent GEN 1 FAIL ECAM. We started both engines; ran the ECAM and then taxied. We arrived at the end of the runway; and took off after a landing Beech jet. We followed the ODP for runway 10 and were on a 140 heading when we received a TA ONLY for an inbound aircraft. We communicated with the [inbound] airplane and then realized upon checking with Denver center we had not obtained a call for release. Traffic was in sight and we were in communication with that aircraft. Denver center gave us a number to call when we landed in Houston. The captain had called Denver Center and the controller was pleasant and stated that their controller upon a tape review did not correct the hold for release readback terminology during the clearance and they would be filing a report as well for a potential OE.

Pilot is issued clearance and advised to hold for release. Crew gets aircraft airborne and realize they didn't call for release. Center advises they listened to tapes and the controller didn't catch that they didn't say hold for release.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Inbound to AVL; we received a GPWS warning of TERRAIN; PULL-UP about 10 miles northwest of the airport. We were heading directly to the 5 mile fix for the visual approach for runway 17. The winds were calm and the skies perfectly clear with good visibility. We were aware of the terrain in the area and noted the possible GPWS warning for runway 35.Coming in from the northwest and landing on runway 17 created a higher rate of descent in order to get down and prepare for the visual approach. We were cleared down to 5;000 feet and when we called the airport in sight; we were then cleared for the visual approach. The GPS to runway 17 depicts 4;000 feet to the final approach so the pilot flying selected 4;000 in the altitude pre-select and initiated a descent in vertical speed mode. At that time; we were approximately 10 miles northwest of the airport about to level out at 4;000 feet when the GPWS system alerted us of TERRAIN; PULL-UP. The pilot flying disconnected the autopilot and initiated a climb till the warning stopped. We still had the airport in sight at approximately 2-3 miles away from the 5 mile fix; so we extended the flaps and gear normally and executed a stabilized visual approach to runway 17.I don't know the exact parameters necessary for the GPWS system to activate; but we think it was caused by the higher rate of descent within close proximity to the surrounding terrain. Knowing the terrain could come into play on a visual approach at night; it would have been a better idea to load the GPS to runway 17 in the FMS as a backup.When cleared for a visual approach at night; it is best to back up the approach with a published ILS; GPS; or VOR approach. This will ensure necessary terrain clearances and enhance situational awareness especially around higher terrain.

Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a GPWS warning while on approach over terrain at night.


Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

During recurrent ground school; multiple pilots in the class had disregarded the updated company policy to wear protective face masks while on duty. Our instructor had stated that they were required; but about 40% of pilots had left their company-supplied masks on the desk rather than wear them. Even during the Chief Pilot's presentation; he had removed his at times in order to facilitate wearing his eyeglasses.Since the goal is to stop the spread of COVID-19 while possibly being asymptomatic; it is vital to keep the mask on at all times unless you need to ingest water or food. On the second day of class; we were told one pilot; who did a fairly good job of keeping his mask on during the day; had symptoms similar to COVID-19 overnight. This is exactly why everyone should have their masks on while on duty.Make sure everyone is following company policy. The three pilots sitting behind me did not put their masks on at all during our first day of ground school; which I found to be irritating and a safety risk to everyone else in class and in the building.

Air carrier Captain reported that during recurring ground training individuals did not always wear a mask to protect from COVID-19 exposure.


ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was working both north arrival gates; with light traffic. LANDR/SAYGE had just handed me a string of arrivals over the SAYGE metering fix; all approximately 5 miles in trail. The last in the line of airplanes was Air Carrier X. I observed he was between the metering fixes of LANDR and SAYGE and attempted to contact ZDV sector to find out what he was doing. I called 3 times with no response and on the fourth attempt; they finally answered. When I asked them what Air Carrier X was doing (already in my airspace and NOT on my frequency at this point); they advised he was 'direct EEZEE' (which is over 5 miles inside my airspace and 15 miles from where transfer of communications is supposed to be affected). I told him that wouldn't work for me; as Air Carrier X was 150 KTS faster than the aircraft he was following; 5 miles ahead and asked him to turn Air Carrier X westbound. The ZDV Controller advised me he had already sent him to my frequency. I immediately reached out to Air Carrier X to turn him westbound and keep him separated from the traffic he was rapidly overtaking; and slowed him to 250 KTS. I then called ZDV back to ask him if he realized he gave me Air Carrier X 5 MIT of the preceding aircraft with a 140 KTS overtake; the controllers response was 'he was descending via and should have had the restriction.' I don't understand how he could have had this 'descend via restriction' when Air Carrier X was instructed by ZDV to join the arrival inside my airspace? Also; even if he was given the restriction; he was way too close and RAPIDLY overtaking the preceding aircraft. Response to this report was that the issue has been resolved by the implementation of RNAV. This could not be further from the truth. ZDV is not even remotely using RNAV as it was designed; and the same problems continue to arise on an hourly (more like minutely) basis. The FAA and airlines have spent millions of dollars on RNAV (NexGen); only to have ZDV race the airplanes to the metering fixes and then give them the 'descend via' often inside D01 airspace; for a very brief few miles; wherein we at D01 usually have to take them off the RNAV route; just to get separation to the runway. The purpose of RNAV was to allow the airlines to float down; saving in fuel costs. How is this being accomplished by forcing aircraft max speed to my airspace boundary; then descend via at the last possible second? My solution is to force ZDV to use the RNAV routes; as designed; and if they need more in-trail spacing to accomplish this; place restrictions on the second tier Centers. We are the NAS; National Airspace System; and we should be working together to accomplish more effective; safer traffic flows. If this is an unacceptable solution; my second recommendation would be to cease the use of 8 STARS into DEN. It is almost completely ineffective during times of moderate or greater traffic; especially the way ZDV feeds us; as is evident by the lack of use of 8 STARS in the rest of the NAS. At best we could feed 4 STARS 5-7 MIT and use the other 4 as offload STARS 25 MIT. Although DEN has 6 runways DEN Tower rarely lets D01 use more than 2 at a time. The 8 STAR arrival system DOES NOT WORK to 2 runways; but we continue to work harder and not smarter.

D01 Controller described an over take and potential loss of separation event between DEN arrival aircraft; claiming that ZDV Controllers fail to utilize the RNAV STAR procedure effectively.


Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

High speed rejected takeoff. First flight of the day departing Runway 35R. Same aircraft we had flown in the night before. Weather was clear; 10 miles visibility; wind 320/5; 17 degrees C. Both engines were started for taxi out to insure proper engine warm up times. Takeoff was initiated by First Officer. Takeoff power was set and all indications were normal with an EPR setting of 1.93; a TAT of 41 degrees for 6 flaps. Shortly after the 80 knot call; at approximately 90 knots; we felt and heard two loud pops and initiated an abort. The right engine had rolled back slightly. The abort was uneventful with half of the runway remaining. The brake temp never exceeded 150 degrees. We stopped on the runway to analyze our situation and complete any required actions. The passengers were told to remain seated. The flight attendants confirmed the right engine was the culprit. With both engines at idle; the right engine showed an EGT of 500 degrees with the left showing 400. We suspected the right engine had compressor stalled. We could not find any specific checklist guidance for our condition. We informed Tower of our intention to clear the runway at Taxiway E4 and taxi back to the gate. While clearing the runway we shutdown the right engine as a precaution. Once at the gate; an exterior inspection of the engine did not reveal any visible damage. Later conversations with Dispatch informed us that the right engine had to be replaced.

A MD-82 First Officer rejected the takeoff at about 90 knots following two right engine compressor stalls and later the crew was told the engine would be replaced.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6; Flight Crew Total 1500; Flight Crew Type 500

Other / Unknown; Human-Machine Interface

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

After a normal approach and landing; the aircraft suddenly veered left across the runway. I momentarily recovered control of the aircraft again and again it suddenly veered to the left off the runway. I was unable to recover control of the aircraft back onto the runway. The aircraft struck a taxi identifier sign and a taxi light. The aircraft received some minor damage to the left wing and the propeller.Since a glider service was towing gliders aloft from that runway and other aircraft were landing/departing that same runway; I assumed this runway would be the active runway for the airport. A windsock is located on the terminal building and showed a minimal crosswind at the airport. After the incident the pilot and passenger could feel no crosswind after disembarking from the aircraft. At the time; we were told that an aircraft had landed minutes before and had a similar runway incident.I would appear that a gust of wind off nearby hills caused my aircraft and others to be pushed left across Runway 32. It would probably help others; in the future; to have a windsock located near the touchdown point of Runway 32.

General aviation pilot reports losing control during landing roll and departing the runway; possibly due to an undetected crosswind.


PMC; Performance/Thrust Management Computer

Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

At the gate the ACARS was going in and out of connection. In an effort to get the flight off the gate close to scheduled departure time; I decided to start filling out the ACARS back-up form. Once the bridge was moved off of the aircraft; the ACARS reconnected and the First Officer quickly grabbed the paperwork (CLR and passenger load information) and entered it in an effort to receive takeoff data before the ACARS could possibly lose connection again.We received our data; programmed it and closed the door for departure. We verified the takeoff data was set; accomplished all normal checklists and were cleared for takeoff. I called; 'V1; Rotate' as indicated by the speed bugs and the FO pulled back on the yoke. When the wheels left the ground; I felt what seemed like the tail sinking down. The FO slowed his rotation and the aircraft began to climb. During climb; I observed the low-speed warning tape on the bottom of the airspeed indicator. Normally; it is not visible. I believe the FO noticed this also and adjusted pitch to allow the aircraft to fly at a higher speed. After 10000 FT; we talked about it and he described how he had noticed the green line on the airspeed tape. I talked about the low-speed tape. The FO described how he allowed the aircraft to climb at a higher speed because of his realization of the speed issue. As we investigated the speeds and realized they were set at the correct speeds from the ACARS; we noticed that the passenger loadout was incorrect. The correct loading was: 12 in zone 1; 31 in zone 2 and 31 in zone 3. What was entered into the ACARS was 12 in zone 1; 11 in zone 2 and 11 in zone 3 - FORTY passengers less than were actually aboard. We calculated that the aircraft was almost 8000 lbs heavier than the v-speeds that were set.We manually calculated a correct weight for landing and entered this into the landing-data request to provide accurate landing speeds.The desire to get the flight going. The in-and-out nature of the ACARS communication. The rushed data-entering error that the FO made in the ACARS. The unknowingly set incorrect v-speeds.Cross-check of the entered data. The correct action was taken (in-flight) once a problem was realized; but the error occurred at the gate and more attention to the details of data-entry would have eliminated this situation.

Delayed in receipt of their performance numbers due to recalcitrant ACARS operation the flight crew of a CRJ-900 were able to quickly programmed load data immediately after pushback. During the subsequent takeoff climb response and acceleration were noticeably degraded and the aircraft was retrimmed to climb at a higher speed. Subsequent review of the transmitted passenger load compared to those actually on board showed 40 more passengers than utilized in the V speed computations. The flight crew utilized the 'actual' data for the subsequent approach and landing.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 10

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

I was providing transition training in an RV-6A to a 95 hour private pilot who had just purchased the aircraft. Today's flight was to be about 2.2 hours long. The prior evening I was with the owner and witnessed him refuel the aircraft with 20 gallons of 100LL. I told the owner that there were already six gallons of fuel aboard - based on our previous flying; our observed fuel burn of 8.2 GPH; and the fact that we started with full tanks and kept very careful track of fuel burned; added; or removed.The next morning I arrived at the airport; watched the owner perform the pre-flight and asked him about our fuel state. He told me the 'gas is fine.'We made an uneventful takeoff; climbed to altitude for a short cross country trip so he could practice descents and perform traffic pattern work. We departed that airport for a second airport using the same training profile and they headed back home. Approximately 16 miles from the airport at 2.1 hours into the planned mission; the engine coughed so the owner correctly reacted and switched fuel tanks using the proper procedures. I remarked to him that the event was strange because according to my watch we should have a little over 8 gallons of fuel remaining. At this point the owner goes 'Oh.' I asked Oh what? He tells me 'I probably should have told you before; but early this morning before you got to the airport I drained 8 gallons of gas out of the airplane into my gas cans.' The owner told me he was concerned we may be too heavy as he was worried we had too much gas on the airplane. He had no rational basis for this belief and no explanation as to why he did not tell me his concern or the fact that he removed fuel from the airplane and did not tell me. Concerned that we could experience fuel exhaustion; I opted to make a precautionary landing in a field about 12 miles northwest of the airport. The landing was uneventful. The owner refueled the airplane with the 8 gallons he had removed and with the permission of the land owner; I flew the aircraft out of the clover field back to the airport.

After it was necessary to switch tanks earlier than anticipated; an instructor pilot providing transition training to the new owner of an RV-6A initiated an emergency off airport landing when he was advised by the owner that he had drained eight of the twenty gallons of fuel added the previous evening due to concerns over weight.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Around 1;500 feet AGL on arrival into ZZZ; a very strong odor filled the flight deck (and later found out it filled the forward galley and cabin). It was close to unbearable--a strong burning plastic smell. After touchdown and roll out; we received an ECAM for the ventilation system blower fault. We accomplished the ECAM actions; called the FAs to ask about the status of the cabin; and other SOPs--and taxied to the gate. Upon arrival; we opened the flight deck window. As the CA; I grabbed the logbook and called the duty chief. I was unable to get through. I then called Dispatch and got patched with [Maintenance Control]. [Maintenance Control] was helpful in confirming the two together. He stated that it is a terribly strong plastic odor. He was extremely helpful through the night. He stated this could take quite some time to clear the cabin and flight deck. We wrote up the fault and fumes. We filed the fume form. After several hours the fumes were still present. We eventually agreed to depart close to XA:00 pm local time. Unknown as to why the blower faulted. Unknown whether there were any indications that this blower was on its last leg.

A319 Captain reported a strong 'plastic burning' odor during arrival. In-flight Maintenance Control guidance significantly improved the air quality.