Flight Crew Last 90 Days 41; Flight Crew Total 205; Flight Crew Type 205

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

While attempting landings at ZZZ; on a flight from ZZZ1; I made two approaches to Runway XX; with winds showing from the southwest and appearing (and feeling) gusty. Windsock suggested Runway XX was slightly more favorable than Runway XY. Executed go-around near the threshold on first attempt as plane felt unstabilized. Executed go-around on second attempt at about 300 feet as approach felt high. I flew to southeast to regroup and set up for grass Runway XZ; believing that to be more in-line with the winds (while I had landed on Runway XX several times; this was my first approach to XZ). On final approach; trimmed at about 80 mph (and thus; slightly fast given the gusty winds); the plane seemed to suddenly lose lift and begin a roll to the right (wind shear or sudden loss of headwind?). I pushed yoke forward until I felt enough authority to roll wings level; and then added power; climbing out well off-center (and to the right) of the runway. I probably did not regain control of the plane until about 100 feet AGL. I don't recall hearing the stall warning; but was primarily focused on not crashing during this sequence.Once under control again; I climbed out and to the southwest to re-group and choose an alternate airport. I initially selected ZZZ2; but while inbound; the wind report from the Tower suggested crosswinds that I didn't feel prepared to attempt; so I re-set course for ZZZ3. While then flying just south of ZZZ enroute to ZZZ3 at 2;000 feet MSL; one plane in the pattern did ask for my tail number (which I gave). The airport manager also asked that I check in the office upon landing (which I tried to do upon driving back; but he had left for the day).I was aware that I was having difficulty executing a landing at ZZZ; and aware that the stress of going around on the first two attempts was adversely impacting my mental capacity. I tried to take steps to give myself room to think and formulate a plan; but the near loss of control on approach to Runway XZ certainly shook my confidence and scared me. My focus thereafter was to ensure I remained aware of nearby traffic; and to develop a plan for a successful landing. I probably should have given a more proactive CTAF report when getting near the ZZZ pattern when enroute to ZZZ3; but was primarily focused on visually keeping clear of traffic and remaining well above the pattern altitude (of ~1;200 feet).

C182 pilot reported that gusty wind conditions on final resulted in a loss of aircraft control.


Flight Data / Clearance Delivery; Ground

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

I was working Ground Control and Clearance Delivery combined from the Ground Control Position.  We had an emergency inbound for runway X which was a Cessna 172.  The fire crew began rolling from the fire house as 4 different call signs: Airport Command; Police Command; F2; and F3.  I also had an OPS14 coming out to assist the emergency vehicles.  I told them to proceed to runway X at their staging areas and they went to the areas they were supposed to go to. The emergency aircraft was the third aircraft to land on X with 2 aircraft taxiing out to [RWY} X.  I initially told Airport Command that the Cessna was 3.5 miles southeast of the airport on initial call.  The first aircraft landed and exited the runway at H4 where there was no emergency vehicles located. The 2nd aircraft to land was a P28A and was planning on exiting H3; where there was a fire truck and an SUV.  The fire truck had to back up to allow the aircraft to exit the runway and this is when another fire truck entered the runway from an access road to follow this aircraft. I noticed the fire truck was following the wrong aircraft and promptly told them to exit the runway and that the next aircraft would be the emergency aircraft; a high wing Cessna. The Cessna landed on [RWY] X with no incident and the fire trucks went back to the fire house with no further assistance.  The Cab Coordinator alerted the supervisor that the vehicle had gone on the runway without authority and I was alerted by the supervisor the next morning when he wanted to listen to the tapes. I would highly recommend that all the emergency vehicles be under one call sign and not 5 calling the ground controller at once.  It adds to the confusing that is already going on with the emergency inbound and it is very unnecessary.  It would have also been nice to know which vehicles were under which call signs because I'm new to this airport and at my last facility; only one vehicle spoke for the entire convoy.

Ground controller reports of a runway incursion due to emergency equipment entering the runway for the wrong aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22; Flight Crew Total 7700; Flight Crew Type 14.4

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

This homebuilt aircraft was built in the early 90s and sat for 15 years after it was flown at Oshkosh.  I purchased it and annualed it with the builder.  I flew it after all those years and it flew well. However; it has a homebuilt powered nose wheel steering system for low speeds.I took off the other day and heard a loud band on after liftoff.  I thought a tire had blown and approached it as such.  I stayed calm to assess the situation and flew the airplane smoothly.  My thoughts were to burn as much fuel out of airplane as possible before landing especially out of wings totally.  This would allow a slower approach speed on landing to minimize potential damage to us and aircraft.  I accomplished this and called Unicom to alert fire department in case of problem on landing with an unknown outcome.  I touched down slow and as soft as possible and held nose up high as long as possible.  Air braking is normal on this aircraft and is effective.  Finally; the nose came down and as soon as it did the aircraft veered hard left and stayed that way in spite of full right rudder and braking.We came to a stop and exited aircraft quickly after shutting systems down.We have a takeoff video clearly showed the nose gear going full left after liftoff prevent it from fully retracting into nose gear well.  It has never malfunctioned before this event and has been reliable up until this day.  I am thankful no one was injured and there was no fire after the rollout with nose gear stuck full left.  I can't say I would do anything different as I handled it the best I could by burning the fuel in the wings (transferring the fuel to center tank) and reducing my kinetic energy for landing as much as possible.  Some precautions for any pilot operating experimental homebuilt aircraft are just that. Realize that systems are sometimes homemade and the components might be old even before they are installed on aircraft before first flight.  Thus; there could be corrosion or degraded rubber gaskets on pistons and actuators.  Finally; even though I have an ATP and thousands of hours flying large jets; I think that reading and absorbing what is in Bob Hoover's book 'Forever Flying' could be helpful to any pilot.  He was in many difficult situations - sometimes hopeless - and always managed to get the aircraft down and stay alive. Energy management and minimizing it before ground contact is something Mr. Hoover was an expert at.  Staying cool under pressure and assessing the systems available and inoperative after a noticeable malfunction is something Mr. Hoover was an expert at.  I am thankful to have read his book and got to know him over the years. I highly recommend his book to every pilot.  He is an American Hero that has truly ridden out many crippled aircraft - and lived to tell about it.I feel that every flight in an aircraft is a test flight because of the unknown variables involved and to occasionally expect the unexpected.  I also recommend that there should be foam blocks placed around AWOS systems placed next to runway at airports. These are electrified hazards to aircraft that can cause damage to an aircraft as well as an aircraft fire if not properly cushioned or placed farther from runway.  After looking at the aircraft in the hangar; the mechanics were confident I could get it flying and said that he would call it an incident as the flight controls and flaps still worked and surmised that the minimal damage was repairable.

An experimental jet's nose gear turned full left after lift off preventing the nose gear from retracting so an emergency was declared. On landing the aircraft veered hard left but caused minimal damage.


Due to workload and sabre issues I've been behind all day; barely enough time to devote to flight following. At XA00 local; I had a 777 desk turn over to me. I had no idea what the workload was. I had approximately 15 flights in the air; I inherited another 15 flights in the air for a total of 30 flights in the air. I am scheduled to receive another desk at XB00; an additional 20 flights. Myself and all of the dispatchers I work with are very concerned not only about workload; but the state of the tools that we are using. In my opinion we have been set up for a major failure. I am stressed and very concerned about safety. Can we do something before someone gets violated; or much worse PLEASE!

Air carrier dispatcher reported his concerns with understaffing and excessive workload.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 1330; Flight Crew Type 225

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was attempting to fly to a private airport for a fly-in. Usually when I go any distance to a specific destination I get flight following but on this occasion I did not as anticipated 'wandering around' at a relatively low altitude and wanted to monitor the designated CTAF for the expected high volume of traffic. I was unable to locate [the field]; as it was not in my G1000 database and the location was not on my sectional. I turned back to [departure airport] and was half way back when I found that [the private airport] was in the database of my ForeFlight app on my cell phone. Of some importance was the fact that I had passed by an airport that I thought might be [a local skydive airport] but was puzzled as there was no sign of activity. In retrospect; this was actually [another field] which has a similar configuration but is unpaved. I decided to go back for another look; making a 180 degree turn to the north; using the Fore Flight map on my phone for guidance. Suddenly in my field of view I saw two parachutists ahead of me and slightly to the left; as well as a Twin Otter at my altitude. I immediately realized I had entered the drop zone; but by the time I started to react; the Twin Otter had swung around to my right; wagging its wings. I made a turn to the right; but not as sharp as I would normally done in the situation as I feared a collision with the other plane. I continued north and found [the private airfield]; but was sufficiently rattled that I thought it unwise to land at a narrow unfamiliar airport and returned to [the departure airport]. On approach the tower informed me that ATC Center had called them with the report that I had almost hit the parachutists.CONTRIBUTING FACTORS:I was annoyed and in a hurry because I had initially planned to take my antique aircraft; but found on run up that it had a fouled plug; so I hurried to the 182 and took off without adequate planning. If I had looked up the exact location of [the private airfield] and entered the GPS coordinates I would have not had a problem. Also; I had promised my wife that I would be back in time for an event and was unlikely to make it; so I was stressed. If I had thought ahead; I would have been more actively on the lookout for [the skydive field] and would have monitored their advisory frequency. And of course if I had gotten flight following; ATC would have warned me of the hazard.Finally; I have Traffic Information Service (TIS) in the aircraft and it was active during the flight; showing multiple targets below me when I was in the region of [the private field]. I had gotten at least one audio warning. I cannot understand why I did not get both a visual and audio warning of the presence of the Twin Otter; since it was extremely close and at my altitude. Was its transponder in operation? To summarize:1. Disorientation due to confusion and 'wandering around.'2. Misidentification of [an airport] and not taking the time to accurately recognize and make the correct identification.3. Hurried planning and execution due to time pressure.4. NOT USING FLIGHT FOLLOWING!5. Spending too much time with my head down looking at my iPhone map.6. Overdependence on TIS.I have lost a lot of sleep over this. I have been flying for over 60 years without incident and to have collided with a parachutist would have been a shameful end!

The pilot of a C182 reported an airborne conflict with skydivers and the jump airplane while distracted due to pilotage problems.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 27; Flight Crew Total 750; Flight Crew Type 700

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

After multiple vectors by Norcal Approach in the vicinity of the SJC VOR; I was cleared for the VOR/DME approach to PAO. I elected to join the approach; with ATC approval; just west of the VOR. When I lined up on the segment of the approach between SJC and 5 DME west of SJC; I thought I was considerably further west than I was; and considerably higher than I needed to be. I then commenced a brisk descent. Rather than levelling off at the segment altitude of 1;700 feet; I continued my descent to 1;100 feet and broke out of the clouds in the vicinity of NUQ. At this point; I received an altitude alert from the tower advising me to check altitude immediately and climb. As I was in visual conditions and could clearly see PAO; I advised the tower that I wanted to continue on a visual approach (rather than climb back into the clouds). I then made the mistake of answering in the affirmative when the tower controller asked if I wished to cancel IFR. This was not my intention; as I did not have the necessary vertical separation from the cloud bases in class C or D airspace for flight under VFR. Had I not been in visual conditions; this could have been a very hazardous situation. However; as I had excellent visibility to the field; and was about 1;000 feet above any nearby obstructions; I felt that it was safer for me to remain visual rather than climb back into the clouds.I believe the problem started when I was denied entry to the VOR/DME approach via the published holding pattern. Instead; I was vectored away from the approach. Had I been cleared for one turn in the hold; I could have set up a stabilized approach and not been confused about position and altitude. Also; I should have initiated the approach at the VOR; rather than the intermediate approach segment. Finally; I should have requested a special VFR clearance in order to remain in visual conditions.Additional factors were my desire to land at PAO as soon as possible because of a breakfast meeting and the Norcal Approach controller's statement that she was holding traffic at SJC for me in order to complete the approach. One other factor was my previous experience using the GPS approach into PAO. While this approach was designed to avoid traffic conflicts with SJC; I have had approach clearances cancelled and been vectored far off course while attempting to use the GPS 31 approach. I thought that; like the last time I flew the VOR/DME approach; there would be light enough traffic at SJC in order to receive clearance for the full approach with hold into PAO.

A Pilot flying the PAO VOR/DME 31 got low on the approach and remained VMC; clear of obstacles even with an ATC low altitude alert and climb request.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

I was the OJTI (On-the-Job Training Instructor) in this scenario. My trainee has low hours on final radar. We were pairing up two arrivals on the right runway with Aircraft X on the left runway. We were in full discussion while this was occurring. Aircraft X was given a 250 heading to intercept the localizer for 28L. My trainee asked if he was established on the localizer; he replied he was received it; trainee asked if he had field in sight; he responded he did; trainee cleared him for visual 28L. He then cleared Aircraft Y for the visual to 28R. It wasn't the prettiest operation but it was a learning process for him for pairing. However; as soon as he cleared Aircraft Y; I noticed that Aircraft X had gone through the localizer and was now at 2200 ft. which is too low in that area. I gave him a Low Altitude Alert; despite the audible alert not going off; and then asked him if he had the correct airport in sight as LCK has parallel runways and is easily confused for CMH. He said he did; I gave him a 300 heading and recleared him for the visual to 28L. He did keep going towards LCK so I quickly asked him again and pointed out the difference in direction as well as the fact they both have parallels. He replied he had the wrong airport. I cancelled his approach clearance; climbed him back to 2500 ft.; and turned him to the east. His altitude went all the way up to 3000 ft. but I assumed he was probably jittery. There was no one in the area so I gave him 2500 ft. again. I turned him northbound; called the field; he had it in sight and then cleared him for the visual approach without further incident. I'm not sure there's much you can do when both airports have been there longer than I've been alive. It's a known issue so must of us look out for pilots mistaking LCK for CMH especially coming in from the north side.

Columbus TRACON Controller reported an aircraft lining up for the wrong runway; having the wrong airport insight; and descending to an unsafe altitude.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 3100; Flight Crew Type 100

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Myself and my Captain were flying our final leg from ZZZ to HWD. Conditions were night VMC and we had the Hayward city and airport location in sight. The Captain was pilot flying and I was pilot monitoring. The Captain was manually flying and our clearance was to maintain 4;000 until established on the localizer. I went into my iPad to look at my charts; a few moments later I heard the Controller tell us; 'low altitude alert; check altitude immediately; MVA is 3;900.' When I looked over at the Captain's PFD; I saw we had descended to between 3;300-3;400 feet. The Captain took over the radios and corrected the altitude and continued uneventfully.

Light Transport aircraft First Officer reported a CFTT event during approach to HWD airport.  The crew immediately corrected after ATC made them aware of the issue.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Center gave us a descent from FL380 down to FL340. First Officer (FO) was Pilot Flying. We selected 340 on MCP; we both verified; he selected ALT Intervention; the aircraft began to pitch over; and we both verified 'VNAV PATH'. I am 99.9% sure that we both saw and verbalized we were in VNAV Path and starting down. A few minutes later ATC ask us if we were descending? I looked up to see that we were still at; or close to FL380; MCP was in V/S mode. We had not descended. We corrected flight path and descended to FL340.We (I) surely missed the monitor portion of VVMI. Simply watching closely what the aircraft was doing AT ALL TIMES would have solved the problem. We continued that leg; and flew one more to ZZZ. We noticed that when given an altitude change; sometimes the MCP would stay in VNAV; sometimes it went to ALT Hold; and once to V/S. We learned that we had no idea what the aircraft was going to do; or why it was going to do it. I needed to be more involved in the monitoring of the aircraft itself. However; I found myself very; very task saturated with new hire FO; who spoke and understood English well; but somehow had a disconnect understanding or reading back ATC instructions. I think he was listening in English; thinking and translating in [a foreign language]; then translating back to English. Too much going on in his head; very poor results. I found myself very busy clearing up even simple instructions and communication problems; along with the normal; or sub-normal; new hire task loading. I was quite simply doing the best I could; but came up short.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A B737 flight crew reported that ATC gave them descent clearance and the aircraft failed to descend using automation.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

We departed ZZZ [Runway] XXR on the ZZZZZ2 departure following Company Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z ahead of them. While attempting to initiate the turn to ZZZZZ; I found that I was unable to roll into a bank to the left. I added more aileron pressure and started adding trim to the left. Though I was not encountering any unusual resistance in the yoke; the aircraft was not rolling left. I reached and maintained about half control travel to the left. After a few seconds of this; I began to suspect a flight control problem and told the FO (First Officer) to select the flight controls synoptic page on the EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System). Almost simultaneously with the selection of the page; the plane began to respond to my aileron inputs. I only had the chance to observe the left side control positions before everything felt normal again; but I saw that the left aileron and both left multi-function spoilers were deflected upward as they should have been. I believe the full event lasted 15-20 seconds; and I believe I was holding half control deflection for 5-10 seconds.I honestly don't understand what happened. My two best guesses are wake turbulence or a transient aileron PCU (Power Control Unit) runaway; but both ideas seem unlikely. I don't believe Aircraft Y would produce enough wake to require that much aileron; and Aircraft Z was two planes ahead of us. It also seems unlikely to me that we would hit wake turbulence perfectly enough to experience such a consistent roll tendency for so long. An aileron PCU runaway seems unlikely to me because I don't know if that malfunction can be transient. Also; while I only had the chance to look at the flight control synoptic page as the event was ending; what I observed there looked normal for the control position I was holding.This probably was not an aircraft malfunction; but if similar incidents are reported; particularly in the same aircraft; I recommend inspecting the aileron system; and possibly the rudder system; although I did not feel any unusual yaw tendencies; nor did I observe anything amiss on my slip/skid indicator.

CRJ-900 Captain reported a transient left aileron malfunction described as aileron non-responsive to pilot's inputs.  The event lasted 15-20 seconds before returning to normal. Reporter did not provide any logical cause and no additional information provided.


Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 16500; Flight Crew Type 6200

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Confusion

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

[We were] flying into Quito on the RNAV RNP Runway 35 approach. VMC conditions; I was pilot not flying. Airplane was in VNAV and LNAV and the autopilot was engaged. We were told to report DEVAS inbound. I had my head down at DEVAS while tuning the radio frequency to make the report to Tower. I heard the warning 'Terrain... pull up.' As I was looking up the Captain pulled back on the yoke and the warning went away. I looked outside and at the instruments and did not see any indication that we were too low. We were above glide path and the runway and ground lights were visible. The Captain resumed the approach and we landed without incident.

I was the pilot flying conducting the approach beginning with at PATCO into Quito. We were kept a little high over PATCO but were re-established on the VNAV path and on speed shortly after the fix. Inbound from ANBUR or speed ranged from 170-175 KTS with flaps 10. About 3 mile from DEVAS we selected Gear Down and selected flaps 30 about 1 mile from DEVAS. Just inside of DEVAS we received a Terrain Warning followed by a Pull Up command. We were on VNAV Path; on speed; and above the VASI with the runway in sight in clear conditions. As I pulled up the aircraft went into CWS pitch as the warnings ceased. Only green terrain indications were noted at the aircraft symbol. With the warnings gone and prior to me initiating the CFIT recovery maneuver we were still in a position to safely land so with the concurrence of the First Officer we did so without event.

An Air Carrier crew reported conducting the escape maneuver in response to an EGPWS TERRAIN PULL UP alert at 10;400 FT on the SEQU RNP RNAV Runway 35 just inside DEVAS even though the aircraft was in VNAV PATH above the VASI.


Flight Crew Total 7683; Flight Crew Type 1008

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

During departure; at approximately 8;000 feet while climbing to 10;000 feet on a 50 degree heading; ATC issued a traffic advisory for a Meridian aircraft at our eleven o'clock position at 10;500 FT. We identified the aircraft on our TCAS and simultaneously informed ATC that we were IMC. Upon further assessment we determined that we were potentially on a collision course with said aircraft and requested a turn to 70 degrees. ATC granted our request and subsequently received a request from the Meridian to 'orbit' at its current position. Upon leveling at 10;000 FT; we were intermittent VFR/IMC conditions. At this time we obtained visual with the Meridian and maintained reference to TCAS; which continued to indicate potential aircraft convergence. Additionally; at this time the aircraft indicated 10;400 FT. At this point we received an RA lasting several seconds and concluding with an aural 'clear of conflict.' Within seconds; as the Meridian continued its orbit and began chasing our aircraft while in its turn; we received a second RA. Seconds later; we received a second aural 'clear of conflict.'During the evolution of this event (approximately 30 seconds); the ATC Controller received several indications from our flight that should have heightened his/her safety concern for potential aircraft conflict. These indications included: -our announcing IMC conditions when given traffic advisory.-our request to a 70 degree heading to avoid aircraft conflict.Despite our articulated concerns; ATC issued a clearance to the Meridian to orbit as requested - this; as we continued to converge with the Meridian.Upon the completion of our second RA; we informed ATC of our serious concerns for what had just happened. The ATC Controller appeared to be very defensive of his/her actions in controlling [the] Meridian. In fact; several times; the Controller articulated that his clearances with the Meridian were perfectly legal. We questioned his authorization of the Meridian's orbit when in such close proximity to our aircraft. We were still met with the controller's defensiveness and rationalization that his/her clearance was 'perfectly legal.' In fact; the ATC Controller appeared to be cavalier with his/her actions. We concluded our articulated concerns with a statement that what had just occurred was 'ridiculous.'

B777 Captain reported he was uncomfortable with ATC handling of his flight in IMC conditions that was conflicting with a light aircraft.


Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Other Exterior & Interior of A/C Loading

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The lead passenger arrived 45 minutes earlier than scheduled and informed us the other passenger; as well as the bags; would arrive 5 minutes later. This resulted in myself completing the 'cockpit task' while the other crew member greeted and loaded the baggage. Upon arrival; I went to the baggage compartment to assist in offloading to the other crew member. This is when I discovered the two boxes labeled with Hazmat stickers. Moving forward I will assist in the loading of the baggage as a crew to ensure only allowed items are loaded.

Two lithium batteries used in electric bicycles were accidentally carried aboard Aircraft X from ZZZ to ZZZ1. One passenger arrived 45-50 minutes prior to scheduled departure and the second passenger arrived shortly thereafter in a vehicle with baggage; which was pulled plane-side. Due to the early arrival of the passengers; the PIC was busy in the cockpit setting up the flight plan and receiving clearance as I; the SIC; helped the passengers aboard and loaded the baggage. The baggage consisted of two rolling suitcases; a few hanging garment bags; several small soft tote bags; one large; flat; partially-opened cardboard box that contained pictures/art; and two sealed cardboard boxes. I placed one suitcase and a couple of hanging bags inside the baggage compartment from the ground; then walked through the cabin to the baggage compartment so that I could arrange baggage as the line crew transferred the remainder from the vehicle to the plane. The baggage compartment was not filled to capacity and the two sealed cardboard boxes and other soft bags were placed on the floor near the door in a suitable position by the line crew. Throughout this process; I did not notice the Hazmat labels on the boxes due to their relative position with soft bags around them and my attention to arranging the other baggage. The flight landed uneventfully and I reported the discovery to the director of operations as soon as possible. Moving forward; I will not allow my familiarity with any passenger nor my haste to accommodate an earlier than scheduled departure to supersede the crew's duty to inspect all items loaded upon the aircraft.

CL-600 flight crew reported two passenger Hazmat boxes were detected during cargo unloading at destination. No required Dangerous Goods documents were provided to flight crew prior to departure.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors

During triple ILS monitored approaches at DEN it is tricky to get BKF departures out safely without conflicting with DEN traffic. We have an SOP procedure that is not being followed. It first states that the Front Line Manager (FLM) shall call BKF Tower and advise them that DEN is in a Land North Monitored operation. BKF is then supposed to avoid departing Runway 14 (at DEN Traffic) as much as possible. None of this is happening. When traffic does depart 14 the coordination is very reckless. No approval is required. The DR4 Controller simply advises the monitors and they are required to get out of the way if needed. This was extremely difficult today since no call was made. The FLM walked over and said 'aircraft are rolling off 14 turning to a 200'. That's it.First; the FLM did not seem to know the procedure. Second; in these rare conditions; BKF Runway 14 departures should not be allowed unless the DEN FR Controllers can build a safe hole for these departures. Third; the 'I'm going to fly someone into your airspace and you need to get out of my way' coordination needs to be fixed.

Denver TRACON Controller reported that a SOP procedures are not being followed leading to unsafe situations.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Being vectored on a NON STAR arrival into IAH we were assigned runway 27. ATC was calling out speeds; headings and altitudes; our last speed assigned was 170 to REDOC; cleared for visual approach 27; contact Tower 135.15. When we contacted Tower he informed us to slow because we were overtaking preceding (2.5 miles ahead) aircraft by 20 kts. We configured and slowed to final approach speed flaps 5; approximately 140 kts. On glideslope at that point we were instructed to S-turn south; but before I could do that the aircraft rolled left violently startling myself and the FO. I immediately took action to recover wings level and the autopilot was sounding 'Auto Pilot; Auto Pilot'. I'm not sure if it kicked off or disengaged by my upset recovery inputs. I called out 'TOGA; flaps 2' and we got the aircraft climbing. Cleaned up to flaps 1; stabilized and re-automated. Our only explanation is we believe we encountered wake turbulence from the bigger Airbus ahead. We calmed ourselves and ATC brought us around for a normal approach and landing on runway 27. I would like to add that it was a very hectic day with ATC doing their best to bring all of thunderstorm delayed aircraft [in]; some with minimum fuel.[Suggest] slowing on our own if needed for safety.

EMB-175 flight crew reported executing a go-around after encountering wake turbulence in trail of an Airbus on final approach to IAH.


Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Attendant

Workload; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew

Just near time of departure one passenger indicated he had lithium camera batteries in his carry on roller bag that there was no room for on the plane. The A flight attendant correctly noted that restrictions apply to this. She knew there was a restriction; but not what it was. She asked the agents to resolve the situation. The agents; nor their supervisor did not have an understanding of the restrictions. My copilot found that our manuals did not contain this information. Since there seemed to be an impasse; I decided to go and see if I could help. The flight attendant found their manual. As I read the page it seemed to me that a passenger could have two batteries installed; and two that were spares but protected; on board. I also read they could have two protected spares in a checked bag. (His bag was going to be checked.) I had him carry on his two cameras; two spares with covers on board and pack two spares with covers in his gate checked bag. According to his count this left one battery left over that was left with the agents to be taken to the baggage area to be held. The next day the A flight attendant told me I had mis-read the restrictions and that would be reflected in her report. I should have left the issue to the ground staff to resolve.

Bottom line...passenger had boarded last...with a suitcase full of cameras...and lithium batteries...he was told to stow it onboard; I told him I would hold it and look into where we would put it...I contacted the [manual].  I looked up hazardous/approved lithium non ionizing batteries in my manual; the agents (3) were out on the jetway near the bag...I paged for the pax to come up...I asked him to open and identify to us what exactly he had in there....he had at least 7 LARGE lithium batteries and a few cameras.He was allowed to bring on 2 cameras with the lithium batteries installed; one in each pocket of his jacket; 2 in a plastic bag (not installed) to into the cargo; and a bag to leave behind the remaining batteries. I was not comfortable with the batteries in the cargo uninstalled....a ground crc/ops/cargo/lead agent was brought up to the jet way...the Captain; First Officer; ground personnel and 3 agents made these determinations based on their interpretation of my manual. With our Flight Attendant training and studies of inflight fires re: lithium batteries...this did not ring right....Please have all carrier personnel who are relating to passengers and their carry ons with approved hazardous materials....csa's; cargo; maintenance; ops; crc; pilots; everyone in a need to know position to have approved hazardous items re: Lithium non -ionizing batteries accepted FLOW CHART/re: onboard stowage and cargo specifics...we all need to be on the SAME PAGE with the SAME INFO!THANK YOU!

A flight crew tried to help a Flight Attendant solve a dilemma posed by a passenger wishing to bring aboard a number of lithium batteries. The flight attendant Manual had a chart which provided guidance but unfortunately; they misinterpreted the chart.


Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Maintenance

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

We were working [a flight] to ZZZ1 there was a spill of a red unknown liquid inside pit 4. Someone called Maintenance to see if they could identify what kind of liquid. Maintenance could not identify what kind a liquid and they refused to clean it. Then the Supervisor gave us the order to clean it and we (the crew working the flight) refused to do it because we did not know what type of liquid it was

Air carrier ground personnel reported an unidentified liquid spilled in cargo pit. Ramp personnel refused Supervisor's orders to clean up spill because liquid had not been identified.


Boarding; Deplaning; Safety Related Duties

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

We were originally scheduled to work a flight to CDG. There was a problem with the cockpit door and maintenance was trying to fix it for a long time. The flight attendants were going illegal at XB:15. At around XA:30; crew scheduling decided that we were going to work to LHR and the crew that was supposed to work that flight was going to work to CDG. In order to prevent us from going illegal; scheduling; inflight services and customer services were rushing the swap of crews. Once we got to the London gate; we were rushed to get on and the ZZZ crew to get out; ultimately resulting in the closure of the aircraft door; despite the objection of the flight attendants. Consequently this action by management didn't allow us to complete SOP and FAR requirements as per FAOM. Jumpseat assignments; preflight safety checks; door arming procedures; none of which were completed prior to closing the aircraft door.

An International Flight Attendant reports being rushed to complete an aircraft swap; then having the aircraft door closed prior to the completion of all preflight duties.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 14

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Workload

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 17

Confusion; Workload; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

GSP ATCT advised ZTL that they would be closing at XA:30 local for a COVID cleaning at that ZTL would be assuming the airspace. There was debate about which sector/sectors would assume the airspace based on the contingency plan but eventually it was decided that it would be divided up as is usually done on the midnight shift. When GSP ATCTC closed; The ARTS entry was not made to ensure that hand offs could be properly forwarded to the correct sectors and a through briefing of which VFR towers were still open was not given leaving areas of confusion about who were and were not open after the airspace was assumed. The automation issue of the ARTS entry caused each hand off to be verbally coordinated within the airspace as well as manually tracking up each hand off leading to increased and unneeded complexity and coordination. Staffing was also an issue as 2 CPC's and the only Supervisor on duty in the area were given annual leave during the shift leaving the area short when the GSP closure took place and a CIC was left to work the unusual situation. This resulted in the 3 sectors being combined with multiple frequencies as well as high complexity from working CLT inbounds and departures in addition to the GSP inbounds and departures at the same time. We are not an approach control and cannot provide the level of efficiency or safety of an approach control during the hours when the approach control is suppose to be open. We are limited by the rules we must adhere to and cannot provide the level of service that the users are accustomed to during this time of day. This was not a COVID emergency or an evacuation. The cleaning should have been conducted after the normal closing hours of GSP ATCT to minimize impact on the operation of ZTL as well as the users. There is no reason why this could not have been done after midnight when GSP ATCT is normally closed. If it was based on the cost of not holding someone at GSP over for an overtime shift; then safety was put behind cost by the agency; and the ATM of GSP ATCT should have volunteered to personally stay him or herself. There were a few unsafe situations and unneeded stress on ZTL brought on by this closure and cleaning that could have been delayed by a few hours. The supervisor on duty should also not have been allowed to leave early given the unusual and complex nature of the situation.

X night; GSP Approach closed at XA:30 Local time for COVID cleaning. I was told only that we would be taking our part of their airspace and there was only four aircraft expected in their airspace after that time. There was a lot more than four. No one appeared to know outside of area two since the OM didn't know they were closing and neither did any other areas affected. Then there was confusion on who took what part of the airspace since some of management thought we were operating on the emergency plan. Lack of staffing was also an issue since so many people were allowed to go home on leave including the supervisor. Also GYH tower was still open but we don't have any way of contacting the GYH tower cause more issues. A helicopter was operating over the OXABY intersection for the ILS to runway four at GSP which had the GSP facility had been open the helicopter might have been in contact with them but since the pilot probably didn't know they were closed; he was operating at the initial approach fix just 200 ft beneath all the aircraft approaching the airport for which Aircraft Y had an alert with.  Lack of coordination and notification brought about a seriously unsafe ATC environment.Clean the GSP facility after the busy period of traffic so that the flying public isn't put at risk for the sake of saving someone in the FAA management from having to stay late on a shift. This isn't the first time this has happened and should never happen again if safety is a concern.

Atlanta Center Controllers reported issues relating to COVID cleaning at the facility and resulting impact on airspace operations.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Incursion Runway

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

After we landed in INL we had a runway excursion with a GA aircraft. While on approach we heard the GA traffic make radio calls about being inbound about 3-5 miles north of the field. We notified them of our location of about a 10-mile final for Runway 32 and they said they would wait for us to land before landing themselves. They also called us; 'In sight'. After we landed we advised on the radio we were back-taxiing; and as we were turning around we saw the GA traffic landing while we were still on the runway. They stayed well clear of us and were able to exit the runway so we could back-taxi with no issues; and no evasive maneuvering was required at any point.GA traffic apparently not being aware of the risk of landing on a runway we were still on. While he had us in sight I did not have him in sight or on TCAS; and therefore did not know exactly how close behind us he was. Construction in INL requiring back-taxiing and therefore a longer landing time than usual that the GA traffic was probably used to. Try to advise GA traffic earlier if a need to back-taxi is required.

We were flying into an uncontrolled airport and made two-way radio contact with another aircraft north of the field coming into land on the same runway we were. He told us that he would let us go first since we were much faster than him and that he would follow us and be #2 to land. Normal radio calls occurred after that and we landed without incident. Because of construction there are no taxiway turn offs available on the runway and a180 degree turn and back taxi is required. After coming to almost a stop and just about to turn around I made a radio call stating that we would be back taxiing on the runway. Once we just about completed our 180 degree turn we saw the other aircraft about 50 feet off the ground at the other end of the runway in his landing flare. So we pulled as far to the side of the runway as we could just in case he made it down to us. We stayed still until he landed and pulled off on the taxiway about 2;000 feet down the runway where we needed to exit. Once the other aircraft was clear we continued our back taxi to the exit point without incident.The other aircraft stated he saw us on about a one mile final and would be number 2 to land. A contributing factor could be that he never actually saw us or he just disregarded us. Being that he was in aircraft type he might have just assumed he had plenty of runway to land and turn in before us without it being an issue on his end. Poor communication on his end as well; very few radio calls almost all of them were non standard; no tail number; no position reports at all outside of being north of the field; and simply stating 'I'll follow the jet'. A pilot with little regards to aviation safety more or less.The only thing I could think of is maybe more communication. We could have tried getting back on the radio real quick and attempting to have the other aircraft go around. By the time we saw it however; he was basically on the ground

Flight crew reported that after landing at an uncontrolled airport; another aircraft landed on the runway while they were back taxiing causing a runway incursion.


Prior to taxi a CCAS ENG 1 OIL warning and local amber OIL PRESS light illuminated and the number 1 engine was shut down in approximately 3-5 seconds. Approximately 40-35 PSI was noted on the oil pressure gauge at shut down. The mechanics were signaled and connected the GPU and the number 2 engine was also shut down. Upon exiting the aircraft the mechanics had a ladder up to the cowling and had it open to the number one engine. It was obvious that an oil leak had occurred and oil was all over the engine and a puddle of oil was under the engine. Operations was notified as well as a log book entry and Maintenance Control was notified. The oil cap on Engine 1 came off due to not being sufficiently secured. There was a log book entry that the oil caps were checked and secured; and it may have appeared to have been secure. This seems to be a recurring problem. Is it only occurring at our company or other ATR operators also? Perhaps ATR or Pratt and Whitney should come out with an AD.

ATR42 Captain experiences low engine oil quantity shortly after engine start and shuts it down. Maintenance finds the oil filler cap off and oil everywhere.


Bell Helicopter Textron Undifferentiated or Other Model

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

1/4' Drive 7/16' Shallow Socket unaccounted for during FWD Fuel Cell replacement FAA Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) compliance. Socket used to Torque (TQ) Fuel transfer lines inside fuel bladders. Last believed used to TQ Boost Pump and Transfer Pump housing. Discovered missing after Aircraft was fueled for Return to Service. Barrels for waste fuel were full from initial defuel. Aircraft was scheduled for training flights early evening. Thorough search of the facility and aircraft was initiated. Decision was made to enter a discrepancy of missing socket. Entries included inspection of critical areas that would effect safety of flight; ie. Engine Air Intake; Intake Plenum; Engine Deck; Transmission Deck; Flight Control Vertical Tunnel; Flight Controls and Rotating Members. Trash cans that were used throughout duration of ASB compliance were emptied that afternoon. The existing trash cans were sorted through. Given more time; arrangements to empty the waste fuel barrels and defuel the aircraft to inspect Fuel Bladders would have been the next course of action. Training Flight crew was notified of situation and actions taken. Decision was made to accept the aircraft for service. Lack of assertiveness.[Recommendations:]Travel box with tool control. Tool verification at the end of each working day. Trash collection should be done after completion of work.

An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports about the efforts made to locate a 1/4' inch drive; 7/16' inch shallow socket that was unaccounted for after a Forward (FWD) Fuel Cell replacement on a Bell BHT-407 helicopter. Inspections of critical areas that would effect safety of flight were accomplished; socket not found. Fuel tanks were not drained. Training Flight crew accepted aircraft for service.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Maintenance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Company Policy; Human Factors; Logbook Entry; Aircraft; Procedure

We had a Functional Check Flight (FCF) in the last couple of weeks that once airborne there was the determination to change its plan and arrival airport to a different airport with a different flight plan entirely; with Director of Operations approval. This brings up several flags and possible safety concerns. 1. Why is the Dispatcher not getting copy of the Maintenance Check Flight (FCF) form prior to planning the flight plan?  Inserts from the FOM would indicate to me that the Dispatcher should be required to get a copy of the [FCF] form prior to Planning and Releasing the flight. 2. The guidance is that the Director of Operations must approve a destination other than the point of departure.  a) Why is this not predetermined before the aircraft pushes back for original departure?    i) Better flight planning  ii) Better ATC coordination iii) Better fuel planning   NOTE: I do not understand the perceived secrecy. Why can't the communication upfront be if it [FCF] passes; we would like the aircraft to go to this destination and if it fails we would like it to go to this destination. The other issue is why the Dispatcher/Pilot is not getting a confirmed copy of the Director of Operations approval.I would like a review of the Maintenance Flight Check (FCF) current Dispatchers procedures and if it warrants; I request the Company comply with the following recommendation:1. Dispatcher receives a copy of the FCF Maintenance form and a joint briefing with the Crew from Maintenance Control on what is being checked.2. Dispatcher and the Flight Crew receives a copy of the Director of Operations approval to continue to a different destination other than the departure airport. 3. Communication on where the Company would prefer the aircraft land in either case [of a] pass or fail of the Maintenance Flight Check (FCF)Functional Check Flight Procedures:The purpose of a Functional Check Flight is to verify the in-flight operation of an aircraft system or component that has undergone a repair or alteration that may have affected the aircraft's flight characteristics. The Director of Operations must approve a destination other than the point of departure.A thorough brief with the Maintenance representative regarding the type of check and each person's responsibilities is extremely important. Review the Maintenance Functional Check Flight Report for correct information.Ensure Maintenance has a current copy of the Functional Check Flight procedures. For any questions; contact the Chief Pilot on Call; Dispatch; Maintenance Control; or all three.Prior to Flight:Upon arrival contact Dispatch and coordinate the route; release; and aircraft location information.Additional calls to Maintenance Control; Maintenance Base; or Ground Operations may be necessary to facilitate a timely departure (e.g.; aircraft location; whether the aircraft is fueled; whether a Check Airman is required). The Flight Deck Crew must review the flight requirements with Maintenance as outlined in the MPM and the Maintenance FCF form.Dispatch notifies the Chief Pilot on Call; and a conference call allows Maintenance; Dispatch; and the Chief Pilot on Call to evaluate all pertinent details.Flight Planning:Company Air Carrier Dispatcher will issue a Standard Release for each Functional Check Flight. Typically; a round-robin flight plan is used for the flight. Pilot coordination with ATC for specific airspace requirements is required.Dispatch must brief the Captain on the route of flight given to ATC. The flight plan will be dependent on Functional Check Flight requirements. In no case will check flights requiring Manual Reversion be accomplished below 10;000 ft AGL.Weather Conditions:The weather conditions for the functional check flight must be evaluated by the Captain; Dispatcher; and Chief Pilot on Call.The actual check portion for the flight (including elevator and trim tab checks) must be conducted clear of clouds. Weather at the origin and the destination of the check flight must be at or above landing minimums.For all Functional Check Flights; the fuel load will be determined by Dispatch and agreed upon by the Captain by signing the Functional Check Flight Dispatch Release.Aircraft Logbook Procedures:If an aircraft is released from any Maintenance Check and a Functional Check Flight is required; Maintenance will make an Airworthiness Release for the Maintenance Check performed prior to the check flight.Prior to each Functional Check Flight; Maintenance enters a defect in the aircraft Logbook using the following or similarly worded statement: 'Aircraft requires Functional Check Flight for ______ (reason). Reference: Maintenance Check Flight.'Note: A Maintenance Functional Check Flight Report must be used for each functional check flight performed.The resolution remains open until completion of the Functional Check Flight. When the aircraft returns from the Functional Check Flight; the Mechanic or Inspector reviews the Captain's entry on the Maintenance Check Flight form and completes the resolution block with one of the following or similarly worded statements; as applicable (all defects must be entered in the aircraft Logbook):'Aircraft passed Functional Check Flight. Reference Maintenance Check Flight form.''Aircraft failed Functional Check Flight. Reference Maintenance Check Flight form.'An Airworthiness Release must be completed at the conclusion of the successful functional check flight or after a failed functional check flight upon correction of all defects.Maintenance Functional Check Flight Report:When a Functional Check Flight is required or requested by an authorized person; the Captain and Maintenance must complete the Maintenance Check Flight form. After completion of the flight; the Aviation Maintenance Technician (AMT) or Supervisor submits the form to Maintenance Aircraft Records with the appropriate aircraft work package.1. For an aircraft being released from a Maintenance Check; the AMT or Contract (on-call) Maintenance documents the completion of the check in the aircraft Logbook.2. In the Defect section of the next unused aircraft logbook page; the AMT or contract (on-call) Maintenance makes an entry that remains open until completion of the Functional Check Flight.Note: When a Functional Check Flight reflight is required; a new aircraft Logbook page and Maintenance Check form are completed for each individual Functional Check Flight.3. For an aircraft requiring a Maintenance Ferry Flight for other repairs after completion of the Functional Check Flight; the AMT or Contract (on-call) maintenance ensures the open defects requiring the Maintenance Ferry Flight are documented in the aircraft Logbook.4. Upon completion of the Functional Check Flight; the AMT or Contract (on-call) maintenance completes the Postflight Section of the Maintenance Check form; and ensures that defects noted during the functional check flight are entered into the aircraft logbook.5. Upon completion of the Functional Check Flight; the AMT or Contract (on-call) maintenance Closes the open aircraft Logbook defect using one of the following (or similarly worded) statements: 'Aircraft Passed FCF. Reference Maintenance Check form' or 'Aircraft Failed FCF. Reference Maintenance Check form.'Note: When a subsequent Functional Check Flight reflight is required; a new aircraft Logbook page and Maintenance Check Flight are completed for each individual Functional Check Flight.6. Upon completion of a successful Functional Check Flight; the AMT or Contract (on-call) maintenance signs the Airworthiness Release.7. The AMT; Contract (on-call) Maintenance; Maintenance Supervisor; or Line Maintenance Supervisor notifies the Maintenance Controller of the outcome of the Functional Check Flight and the requirements for any subsequent Functional Check Flight.Director of Maintenance (DOM) Flight Authorization and Flight Plan Preparation:[14 CFR Part 91][14 CFR Part 121][FOM 20.10]:All flights flown by company Flight Deck Crews; or all flights using company aircraft; are released and monitored by Dispatch. Maintenance Ferry Flights; and Special Permit Ferry flights are authorized by Company Maintenance Control Pilot trainers; initiated by Dispatchers within company Communications System. Release to be issued by a qualified Dispatcher.

Pilot questions why their dispatcher(s) are not getting a copy of their Maintenance Check Flight form prior to planning a Functional Check Flight (FCF) flight plan. He also questions the practice by the Director of Operations of determining; once airborne; where the airplane will go after a pass or fail Functional Check Flight becomes known. The perceived secrecy does not allow the check flight crew to effectively plan the flight and leads to degraded ATC coordination.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

While the catering people were changing the aft galley on a 737; I noticed the caterers open the small compartments at 2L. I asked what he was looking for. He said he needed to clean it out and put water bottles here. I reminded him the compartments are not storage areas for the water; these compartments are placard for 10LBS only. They were shoving up to 8 bottles; at 1.5 liters each. I said these items need to go in a carrier or cart; he said no that [company] has instructed them to board the water in this location. On multiple flights on the 737 aircraft; I'm finding 8 to 10 bottles of water each flight; and have to remove them as these compartments are right across from our jumpseat and pose a huge safety hazard. Why is [company] instructing the caterers to blatantly violate the placard weight limit on the compartments; and store galley items in non-approved galley locations?

B737 Flight Attendant reported catering was loading items into locations with weight limitations that were being exceeded.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 23100; Flight Crew Type 10000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Just after takeoff get a call from cabin there is a strange smell of smoke or odor throughout the cabin. The ovens were not on. In conversation with purser; we were trying to decide about whether we should continue or return. Got another call from cabin and was told that there was another pilot onboard that said that he 'was concerned;' and that passengers were asking. After hearing that key word; made the decision to return to ZZZ. Advised flight attendants and made a PA to passengers. Notified ATC. Accomplished the cabin smoke/fire/fumes checklist. Exceeded 250 kts; to expedite return. Landed XXR and cleared at golf. Inspected exterior by Crash Fire Rescue; and cleared to gate.  When door opened ground personnel could smell strange odor.  Advised that they were considering odor came from electro-static sprayer. One of the flight attendants later said she smelled the same thing yesterday.

After takeoff at about 8000 feet; Flight Attendant (FA) called saying a strange odor in galley. I also smelt what I thought was the galley oven maybe burning. FA informed me that the ovens were all off. We said let us know if the smell dissipates.  Smell was not bad in the flight deck. FA shortly called us back saying the smell is not dissipating and that a deadheading pilot in the cabin is concerned. We then decided to notify ATC followed by the odor/smoke/fumes checklist. Vectored into XXR in ZZZ. Speed was 280 below 10;000 feet. We landed and had CFR and the FAs check for smoke or fire. All clear and taxied to the gate. Maintenance thought perhaps the disinfectant spray was sprayed into vents for too long.

B737 flight crew reported a cabin fumes event during takeoff resulting in a return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I've had limited recency flying - 3 legs in the last month; and not much more the month before. That also translates to a small number of legs since the change of checklists; and I don't have a bunch of time in the seat or in the 737 yet; so my habit patterns aren't as well established as I would want - one of the reasons I'm flying a line this month rather than sitting reserve as I have been. Upon pushback today; FO (First Officer) started engine number 2 normally. As the engine was stabilizing at idle; the crew chief came on interphone to ask me to set brakes; and I missed putting the number 2 generator on line. Then when #1 was stabilizing; the flight attendants called with a question and I got distracted from putting generator #1 on line. I checked the rudder as part of the flight controls; called for flaps; and felt I had forgotten something. I glanced at the before taxi checklist and missed the generator step (the APU step's been removed). We taxied out; but didn't have a closeout; so I had the FO tell tower. As I started the turn; ops called to tell us the closeout was coming; and the FO responded. I took radio 1 and told tower we had numbers. There was only 1 aircraft ahead of us; but I taxied slow enough so that the FO could comfortably run through the checklist. When he called 'generators;' I did what I usually do; moved my head a little to the right to try to see if either of the blue gen-off lights were illuminated. It was a bright day; and the lights on this aircraft may be lighter than typical. I didn't see lights; so I responded; 'On.' Upon later inspection; it was clear that these lights were difficult to see unless you moved your head closely in-line with them. The FO couldn't make out the lights; even by moving his head substantially.So we took off with the aircraft on APU generator. Around 15;000 ft; the #1 FA called to tell us he had no galley power. We told him to check breakers; we did the same; and the FO and I looked over the overhead panel and saw nothing wrong. We checked the QRH but found no procedure. I decided to cycle through all of the electrical volt/freq etc. to see if anything appeared wrong. When I got to the APU; I saw that the APU generator was putting out voltage. I looked over and saw that the switch was on; so I turned it off. There went our AC busses. At that point; I realized exactly what I had done. I went to put a generator on line; but that don't work without AC power. I punched off the autopilot horn; and thought for a few seconds. Then I realized why the generators wouldn't come on line; so I put the APU switch back on (it hadn't rolled back yet) and then I restore APU power. Then I was able to put both generators on line.I turned the autopilot back on. Then I checked for instrument flags; FMS load; IRS (Inertial Reference System) status; and we both looked over the cockpit and noted no discrepancies. The aircraft was off AC power for about 5-10 seconds. I called the #1 FA to see if the galleys were working. They were; and the #1 didn't note anything about losing AC power; so I didn't bother with a PA. Nothing was wrong with the aircraft; so I didn't write anything up in the book. I did consider writing up the gen-off lights as being dim; but I couldn't remember if these were worse than typical.The FO and I discussed if there were any other considerations; and there were none. I looked up in the [company SOPs] regarding when to file a [report] and decided that this situation met the criteria; so I told the FO that I would file a [report] and explained to him why he should as well.I think this is one of those events where a lot of elements conspired against us. Distractions; checklist changes; my lack of recency; inexperience; poor human factors for those gen-off lights being so dim (other cockpit lights were bright; so we were fairly sure the lights were not set to dim); and checklist discipline all played a roll.As mentioned above; a lot of things workedagainst us; any of which; if they had not happened; would have likely had us catch the switch configuration error on the ground. Personally; I plan to stay more current; and I have already adjusted my schedule as such. It would be nice if those gen-off lights had brighter bulbs; but I doubt that will happen. I think the before taxi checklist should absolutely restore the APU step. If the FO had asked me if I wanted the APU on; the problem would not have occurred. This checklist change would be an easy fix. In our case; we didn't face a dangerous scenario. Put the jet in the weather though; with a fatigued inexperienced crew; and maybe some other distractions or aircraft malfunction; and I could see things snowballing.

B737-800 Captain reported taking off with the engine generators off-line; citing checklist changes and dim 'Generator Off' lights as contributing.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Multiple Center Hydraulic EICAS messages resulting in a total loss of quantity and pressure in the in the Center Hydraulic System. [Reported situation] with ZZZ Center; complied with QRH procedures; alternately lowered the flaps and landing gear; landed Flaps 20 on ZZZ [Runway] XXC. Towed to gate.Center Hydraulic System failure. Upon landing; Maintenance found a hydraulic leak on right spoiler.

Pilot reported loss of hydraulic fluid resulted in a precautionary emergency landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 5000

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

The MSCOT arrival is not built so the Airbus--as programmed--can fly the arrival without intervention. The FMGC was loaded by us correctly. There was only a slight headwind. The FMGC plans descent to cross JJACK at 19;600 feet which is 600 feet high. The FMGC plans to cross MSCOT at 250 knots; 30 knots slow. These are I assume programmatic errors with the airbus FMGC; but I thought the intent of these arrivals was to simplify [our task] and make our arrivals more efficient. This and several other arrivals into IAH (I have previously referenced the others in an FSAP); do not achieve this. The workload is increased exponentially as designed. These are violations waiting to happen for crews if they are not well ahead of the FMGC's plan. This needs to be corrected; and in my opinion the company needs to issue a communication to aircrews warning of the possible traps on these arrivals. This is not a professional analysis; but the way these new procedures have been instituted is very frustrating. The method puts crews at jeopardy every day. I asked ATC in the past if they were aware of the limitations and they said they had heard nothing. Incredible.

An experienced Air Carrier Captain advised the crossing restrictions of the MSCOT RNAV STAR to IAH appear to be incompatible with the programming/autoflight capability of the A320; planning to cross JJACK 600 feet high and MSCOT 30K slow. Flight crew intervention required to correct those errors significantly increases flight crew workload; draws their attention away from other critical duties and exposes them to certificate action due to non-compliance.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

On a visual approach into ROA runway 24 outside of HIBAN the FAF at 3700 ft the crew received a brief terrain caution that extinguished. The crew had briefed that this may happen and the crew had the hill in sight. [We] continued the approach since we were in daytime VMC conditions.

[Narrative contained no additional information.]

Flight Crew reported a momentary terrain alert while on a visual approach with the terrain and airport in sight and continued their approach.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 500

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Airport; Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related

We departed the [FBO's] ramp at SMO. I was PIC and pilot not flying. The SIC was the pilot flying. During our taxi on the confined [FBO] ramp; we both monitored the taxi situation to ensure clearance from buildings and other aircraft. Once clear of obstacles; I looked down to retrieve paperwork and the taxi checklist. The pilot flying missed the taxiway centerline and continued beyond the designated taxiway. I glanced up and noticed the pilot flying had continued straight ahead past the taxiway centerline and had only just started a left turn to join the taxiway. At this moment; the Tower called and instructed us to continue our left turn and join Taxiway Alpha. We joined the taxiway centerline and continued with a normal departure. The pilot flying stated he was confused by the taxi markings and missed the turn. The taxiway has a standard solid yellow centerline. Double yellow lines form the boundaries of the taxiway. These double lines however are long dashed lines; not solid. These were the markings that the SIC said were confusing. At the intersection of the [FBO] ramp and Taxiway Alpha; I do not believe there are any taxiway direction signs or runway direction signs. Runway entry and/or runway directions signs would be very helpful at this location on the field to assist pilots with situational awareness and help ensure aircraft remain on the designated taxiway. I also do not believe that standard runway hold short lines are used along this section of pavement which serves as both ramp and runway. I believe we taxied outside the designated taxiway; but I do not believe we entered the runway environment without clearance. No aircraft were taking off or landing at the time and no aircraft operations were affected.

The reporter suggested using similar NON MOVEMENT AREA BOUNDARY markings as BUR does just beyond the outboard side of the taxiway boundary. He suggests pilots would see the solid yellow and dashed yellow painted markings in the tarmac and realize they are approaching a boundary. As conditions exist now he felt that there was a no man's land and the taxiway boundary and centerline were not clearly defining the boundaries.

A flight crew taxied out from the FBO Ramp and missed Taxiway A centerline at SMO; the taxiway signage and markings did not clearly indicate the taxiway boundary.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

On flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ we were given a steep; high-speed descent from 12;000 feet down to 3;000 feet. I asked my First Officer if he was ok with that and he said he was; he was flying; I was monitoring. Passing through approximately 7;000 feet we broke out into VMC (Visual Meteorological Conditions) with unrestricted visibility. It appeared as though we needed more drag (speed brake was already extended) so he asked for the landing gear down. We joined the localizer and were at flaps 5 and he asked for flaps 15. We were slightly high on the glidepath; but were catching it. Somewhere just below 3;000 feet we were given a frequency change to Tower. The speed brake was still out with the flaps at 15 and I noticed that the command speed bug was at Vapp (Approach Speed) (151 kts). I was in the process of saying something about it to my FO (First Officer) when I noticed the PLI's (Pitch Limit Indicator) dropping down towards the flight director. I simultaneously and immediately retracted the speedbrake and we both pushed forward (disconnecting the autopilot) on the yoke to get the speed back to where it needed to be. Just as I was doing that the stick shaker came on for a split second and then went away. I verified that my FO (First Officer) was flying the airplane; gave him flaps 20; then flaps 30 and bugged Vapp. The glideslope was joined around 2;000 feet and the approach and landing were stabilized and uneventful.  We could have and should have not accepted such a high workload arrival and approach. It was very busy and not necessary to put ourselves in such a rush. My FO is intelligent and has good flying capabilities which may have attributed me to not monitoring him as closely as I should have; regardless of the flight or situation I believe I was a little complacent and task saturated. I'm not sure when the command speed bug was moved to Vapp without flaps 30 being called for; but there always needs to be good communication between crew members. My attention was also diverted when the frequency change was given; I could have taken a quick look at the FMA's (Flight Mode Annunciator) before being distracted by the change to Tower. I also think it is a good idea to keep a hand on the speed break anytime it is deployed in flight so it is not forgotten about. An extra vector to build time or an early go-around would help avoid many errors during critical phases of flight; especially when hurrying to get a task accomplished. My continued goal as [company] crew member is to continually learn from both my own mistakes and others in order to stay as safe as possible. Human Errors were made and fortunately trapped and immediately rectified. I commend our training at [company] and the recent EET/UPRT (External Envelope Training/Upset and Recovery Training) I received. It helps [me] recognize and fosters immediate recovery from an undesirable situation. I am both ashamed and embarrassed that as a crew and as professionals that we did not recognize this unfolding situation sooner.

B767 Captain reported recovering from potential stall conditions after slowing a high speed descent.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Approximately 30 minutes from top of descent at FL380 flying into LAX near ZZZ the EICAS MSG: 'ADC RIGHT' came on. The FO (First Officer) was flying the aircraft. I pulled up the electronic checklist and read aloud the condition and objective and the first three items of the checklist which are to turn off the autopilot; ATS; and Flight Directors. At this point the FO and I discussed duties briefly (i.e.; FO Fly while Captain runs the checklist). When the FO felt comfortable; we turned everything off and the FO was hand flying just off of raw data. The checklist then ask if the EICAS MSG: is ADC Center MSG shown; I answered no; then the next step in the checklist is 'CENTER AIR DATA SELECTOR... ON R'. I looked all over the Instrument panel for Center Air data selector; could not find it. This is where I regressed to older aircraft I have flown and thought 'Center Air Data was the same as 'Central Air Data Computer' (CADC) and flying mostly the -400 I was also thinking we had only 2 ADC's when in fact we had 3 (747-8). So I took control of the aircraft and told the FO to position his ADC Source selector to Right. This is where things really got bad. By putting the FO's source selector to right I in fact took away his PFD. I handed control back to the FO as I continued to run the checklist. It was at this time the FO sounded off loudly and clearly the 'He had nothing 'on his side. I was trying to get through the checklist and did not look at his PFD. I basically shut him down (thinking he still had raw data on his side) and told him to let me finish the checklist. The FO at this time is flying cross cockpit off of raw data on the Captains instruments that were working satisfactorily. Finally after several overrides on the checklist we came to FO ADC Source selector... L; the FO accomplished this and the FO's PFD was restored. At no time did we deviate from assigned altitude or routing. We re-automated and advised ATC we were unable RVSM; ATC issued 15 degree left turn and a minute later instructed a descent to 28000 ft.; after the descent we finished the remainder of the flight uneventfully.The crew makeup was two Captains and one FO. Since data was good on my side I should have been the one flying the aircraft. The other Captain was present trying to help out with the hard copy checklist. He gave valuable inputs but I was running the show. The smart thing to have done would have been to let the other Captain and the FO run the checklist while I fly since there were no faults on my side. Putting that aside; when the FO was trying to tell me he had nothing on his side and had I stopped and analyzed our situation; maybe I would have taken over flying duties and allowed this very capable FO to run the checklist. I regretfully did not. The other thing is the Center Air Data switch is on the overhead panel. It wasn't until after landing the other Captain realized this and told me. It would have been helpful if the checklist read CENTER AIR DATA selector (on overhead panel) R. Since this switch is never or rarely talked about or trained on.

B747 Captain reported that an EICAS message of ADC RIGHT occurred and that the crew had difficulty locating the ADC switch and performing the checklist sequence.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

After clearing the Runway 36L at AUS on Taxiway G; Ground Control issued us taxi instructions:  'G; C; West Ramp on C.  The First Officer then went off frequency to call Operations. Just before reaching taxiway C; I looked to my left in the direction of the upcoming turn and saw a Aircraft Y; moving southbound on C at about 30-40 knots. I had to slam on my brakes in order to avoid a collision. I then made a snarky remark to the Ground Controller that a head's up about Aircraft Y jet would have been appreciated. He apologized and said something to us to indicate that he had been distracted by ramp traffic and airplanes waiting to get to gates. This could have been a catastrophic collision had I not been glancing to my left.  Recommend a dedicated ramp controller that deals with ramp traffic thereby allowing the Ground Controller to monitor and control the movement area.Ground Control distracted with ramp congestion and never told us about other aircraft.Suggest a dedicated Ramp Control frequency and Controller.

After clearing the Runway 36L at AUS on Taxiway G; Ground Control issued us taxi instructions: 'G; C; West Ramp on C. I then went off frequency to call Operations. Just before reaching Taxiway C; the Captain had to slam on the brakes in order to avoid a collision with a fast approaching traffic taxiing on Taxiway C; Aircraft Y. We pointed it out to Ground Control and he apologized. Recommend a dedicated ramp controller that deals with ramp traffic thereby allowing the Ground Controller to monitor and control the movement area.ATC ground controller overloaded with tasks.Get a ramp controller in AUS.

Air carrier flight crew reported abruptly braking to avoid a collision with another aircraft during taxi.


Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Human Factors

I am a Ramp Agent in ZZZ.  There is no one to take employees temps as they report to work at the airport. There is currently a sign that reads; take your own temperature and sign your name off. That thermometer has given me reading of 90; 91; 96; etc... Recently; I cannot absolutely confirm; but one of my fellow employees is quarantining with no taste etc...no one that I know of that was working with that employee last week has been notified that they may have been exposed. Why isn't airline following the rules that are so important. We have had fellow employees close family members die of COVID and I along with many others are high risk. It feels like they are not taking this seriously and many of us are concerned and don't want to die.

Ramp Agent reported issues with temperature check procedures at work and the company's lack of communication regarding employees that may have contracted COVID-19.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

During pushback; flight attendants advised that a passenger was having a panic attack. Returned to gate and requested law enforcement/medical to arrive at the gate as the passenger quickly disembarked and hurriedly rushed into the terminal before we could complete the parking check.

As we were cleared to push of the gate; we were advised by FA-B there was a passenger that was grabbing his luggage from the overhead bin and wanted to de-plane due to a panic-attack. I immediately told the Captain to stop the push and return to the gate. I advised operations we needed a gate agent ASAP; law enforcement and paramedics to the gate to confirm the passenger's condition. The operations staff responded promptly and the cabin crew opened the door allowing the passenger to deplane. We contacted Dispatch and we closed the cabin door; pushed and the flight continued without further issue.

Air carrier flight crew is advised by a Flight Attendant during push back that a passenger is having a panic attack and wants off the aircraft immediately. The aircraft was tugged back to the gate and the passenger's wishes were granted.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 500

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was with a new instrument student on his first ever IFR cross country; and he was really struggling with a lot of stuff; and as I was helping him set up the approach at night ATC told us to maintain 3;000 until established on the ILS. I was walking my student through setting up for the approach and I looked down at my plates and the Garmin 430 GPS and then I glanced at the altimeter and noticed we were [at] 2;700 FT. As I told him to get his altitude back; ATC kind of yelled at us for being below 3;000 FT and not established on the approach. Then after doing a stop and go the Tower told us we were cleared back to our home airport up to 4;000 and as filed (which was GPS direct). We started flying direct and Tower told us to contact Center. When we went back to that Controller he was upset with us that we weren't flying the published missed; but the Tower Controller never mentioned anything about flying the missed; and had cleared us as filed (which was via direct).

DA20 instrument flight instructor reports an altitude deviation by his student on vectors for an ILS; which is detected by ATC. After a stop and go; the Tower clears the training flight back to home base as filed (direct). This upsets the original Approach Controller who had been expecting the published missed approach initially.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 4690; Flight Crew Type 286

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict NMAC

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

I was conducting a visual approach to Runway XXL at ZZZ at night with landing light INOP (discovered while in flight). Landing light tested good on the ground before takeoff. I was approaching from the west and was instructed to enter right base for XXL. I was subsequently told to extend my base to a 2 mile final for sequencing. After which I was given clearance to turn base; I commenced a turn to final but could not acquire the runway. I let ATC know at which time they informed me I was just west of the field just about abeam the airport. I picked up the field and was told to make a right 180 degree turn to enter the right base for Runway XXR (this time). As I made the turn; I noticed my EFB display with Red Traffic and I looked up and saw a small GA aircraft pass directly underneath me at a very close range (no more than 150 ft). I believe I asked Tower if they were aware of the traffic in the pattern that passed underneath me. Evidently that was an aircraft on base to XXR. I requested XXL since my landing light was INOP and wanted a nice long runway with plenty of lighting. Tower cleared me to land on XXL after my request. The reason why I'm submitting this is because I don't recall Tower calling out the traffic to me at all. I was under Tower's Control at the time and should have been given an advisory on the traffic. I reached out to ZZZ Tower to verify and see if they can roll the tapes to examine this situation to enhance safety.

GA pilot reported a NMAC while in the traffic pattern and preparing to land.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110; Flight Crew Total 3800; Flight Crew Type 520

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors

I am confident based on my instrumentation that I did not violate Class A airspace. However; I was in contact with Center by phone who identified my aircraft via my ADS-B out and Mode S transponder. They informed me that they had observed on radar several gliders at or above 18;000 ft. They confirmed that it was not my aircraft that violated the airspace. I was asked to communicate with other glider pilots flying that day about the violations. I notified all of the pilots I knew of who were flying that day about my conversation with Center and stressed the need to be very careful not to exceed 17;999 feet given the danger associated with gliders conflicting with arriving or departing traffic in the area. In terms of corrective action the glider community is making sure they understand the possible differences in altitude displayed in our cockpits vs. the actual altitude read by ATC. Our flight level data is sent via our transponders and it is then corrected for local altimeter settings which will be displayed on traffic control radars. Due to pressure changes occurring over our flight paths we may inadvertently be above 17;999 ft. For instance on the day of the event the local altimeter setting at one location compared to another location about 30 miles away could have resulted in an aircraft being as much as 400 ft higher than was intended by the pilot.

Sailplane pilot reported he was contacted by Center and advised some of the sailplanes flying with him violated Class A airspace.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 7200; Flight Crew Type 600

Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 156; Flight Crew Total 9800; Flight Crew Type 3950

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Cleared for VOR Runway 14 at RAP; turned inbound and while rolling out broke out of the clouds and saw what we believed to be the airport 12 o'clock and about 5 miles. Requested and received visual approach clearance; switched to tower; received landing clearance. Landed; taxied off the runway; and realized that we had landed on Runway 13 at RCA (Ellsworth) Air Force base; rather than on Runway 14 at RAP.The problem arose when we determined that the airport in the window was our destination simply because it was approximately where we expected it to be; and the runway was aligned approximately as we expected it to be. Contributing factors include a late descent which left less time than should have been allowed to verify position and confirmation bias; wherein both crewmembers believed without verification in what they expected to see.Clearly; one action which could have prevented the occurrence would have been to check the inbound course with either FMS; as well as the distance to the runway. Another possible action which might have prevented or mitigated the occurrence would have been to request decent vectors rather than rushing to get the aircraft configured and down; allowing for more time to verify aircraft position; etc.

Upon arrival at RAP; we were given vectors to the VOR Runway 14 approach. While in a right hand turn; for the final approach course; weather conditions improved to VMC. We saw; and mistook Runway 13 at RCA for Runway 14 at RAP. We were switched to tower at RAP and was given a clearance to land. We landed at RCA in error.Factors which contributed to the error are the two runways are so closely aligned; weather conditions changed to VMC in close proximity to the airport; and the final approach course for Runway 14 at RAP is very close to final approach course into Runway 13 at RCA. In the future; I will use the FMS for all landings at airports at which I am unfamiliar all the way to the field. I routinely tune ILS approaches in VMC where available. Unfortunately; there is no ILS for Runway 14 at RAP.

During a VOR Approach to Runway 14 at RAP; a small jet flight crew mistakes RCA for RAP and lands there on Runway 13.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

On the controls; First Officer; and Captain monitoring. The approach was normal and stable. When approaching 300 feet the pilot monitoring called continue. The Captain had visual of the airport; autopilot came off while the pilot flying then visually acquired the runway. When the autopilot came off there was a slight drift to the left; preventing me from seeing the runway straight ahead; as it was just off my right shoulder. Scanned the instruments and looked back outside and the runway was visually acquired. I made the appropriate correction to align with runway. We were slightly high therefore I nosed the aircraft down to correct the situation and the sink rate aural caution came on. We were just about to touchdown when we heard the stick shaker at roughly 5 feet and we were on the ground a moment after. The landing was firm; however no bounce and the aircraft continued normally with the remaining landing phase of flight and taxi. The Captain decided to report it to maintenance as a precaution and I performed a thorough post flight inspection of the aircraft with no visual signs of damage. Request more training to work with approach to minimums in the airline environment where the Pilot flying continues to the ground or makes Go Around decision if runway not in sight to PF (Pilot Flying) at minimums.

ERJ-140 First Officer reported an unstabilized approach; leading to a stick shaker just prior to touchdown and a hard landing.