Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

When arriving in BOI we were cleared for a Cat 3 approach. The visibility was reported at 1200 RVR with freezing fog and temperature -2. As we were shooting the approach; I elected to fly solid bug even though we had no ice detected. Once we entered the clouds I didn't want to be distracted by a possible Ice Detect message near the ground. But after passing 500 ft. an Appch Warn message appeared so I missed the approach. After the missed approach; I was trying to figure out what was not right and it occurred to me that I didn't have the Ref Speed switch on. So I selected it on and came in for another approach. By this time the weather had gone down to 1000 RVR. We shot the approach and landed. During the rollout the visibility was pretty good and as I was braking and slowing down I plainly saw taxiway E and I made the turn at E. After I had made the turn; tower told us to continue to the end of the runway and turn off at the end. We told them we had already turned off at E. They proceeded to have us cross the left runway at E and continue to parking. It occurred to us that low vis ops were in effect and we should have gone to the end of the runway to follow the lead off lights but tower didn't tell us to go to the end until we had already gotten off at E. The main cause of this was being distracted by the missed approach and trying to figure out why we got the Appch Warn. After we figured it out; the weather had gone down to 1000 RVR and it didn't occur to us about rolling out to the lead off lights. I was more concerned about shooting a successful approach. Another thing that didn't help was that company had shot an approach in front of us and we heard them get off at E. But the weather was 1200 RVR when they landed. I think we were expecting to be able to do the same thing based on what they did. After researching a little we found in the Flight Manual a cautionary note saying that I didn't need to proactively fly at solid bug in anticipation of getting ice. I could've flown open bug if practical and if we did get an ice detect message to not destabilize the approach presumably by increasing speed to solid bug and selecting the Ref Speed switch on when below 500 ft. If I had done this originally I wouldn't have needed to miss the approach the first time. I learned to pay attention to RVR values as they pertain to roll out and taxing; not just landing. 1200 RVR and below is a clue to remember that low vis ops are in effect even if tower doesn't say anything about it and to anticipate looking for lead off lights.

Air carrier Captain reported turning off the runway at the incorrect exit point after landing during low visibility conditions.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.7

Conflict NMAC; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

I had Aircraft X on a 340 heading for the RNAV 18 approach to OXI. He was approximately 9-10 NM NE of the airport at 2900-3000 ft. He reported that a drone came very close to him; about a couple hundred feet to the west. I asked him for any of the details that he could give me about it. It was about the same altitude he reported. I let him continue to fly and start the approach. I took down his phone number to get more information once he was on the ground. I told the CIC what had happened and he called ROC. After I was off position; I talked to ROC and called the pilot back to try to gather a little more information. Pilot had his wife with him and she said it was Red and Black in color and the pilot said it was tough to tell but maybe 2 ft in diameter. He didn't take any significant action because it would've been too late. There was nothing that showed up on radar.

Approach Controller is advised by a pilot on approach to Runway 24 at OXI of a drone sighting at 3000 feet. No evasive action is taken.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

While at the gate all normal procedures and briefings occurred. It was my leg to fly. While I programming the FMS; the Captain assisted in programming the MFD Menu and the Radio portion of the 'J' pattern. While doing this; he was in the Radio portion of the programming and attempting to place Nav1 and Nav2 into 'Auto' mode; however; he was unable to place my Nav2 into Auto since my side was still in green needles from the previous crew. I took the Nav Source knob and turned it fully clockwise to the right to get back into FMS white needles. The Captain then proceeded to place Nav1 and Nav2 into Auto. The briefing occurred with details discussing the complex special engine out procedure; the heading bug was set to 332 degrees; a 2.5 fix ring around [a fix] was entered for a visual reminder of the engine out turn; the climbout discussed; a review of the two Prohibited airspaces and the need to remain clear was also reviewed. I went through a full briefing.The taxi to the runway was uneventful and had no delays. The takeoff was a flaps 20; full thrust takeoff with V2+10 to 1000 feet. After rotation and calling for speed mode/NAV mode and at 400 feet the FD did not indicate a turn to 332 degrees. Within seconds and climbing through 600 feet; I called 'Autopilot On' and the Captain did so. It was engaged and NAV mode was active in the FMA. I recognized that with the AP engaged and NAV active in the FMA that the aircraft was still not turning and the FD also did not indicate a turn. At the same time I was recognizing this and quickly reassessing to ensure the AP and FMA was configured properly; which it was. The Captain said that the turn was not occurring for some reason and to switch to HDG mode; and turn left to 320 degrees. He referenced that the AP was not responding and to disregard the NAV mode issue for now and that we can figure that out later after we climb out. The Captain spun the HDG bug to about 320 and I hit the HDG on the ACP and HDG became active in the FMA and was confirmed. The aircraft seemed like it did not initially respond to the turn and finally responded at a slow rate. This scenario with a westerly strong wind in the air resulted in encroaching upon [a restricted area]. After [resuming] on course; I continued to fly the SID with the AP engaged; in HDG mode and by referencing the FMS map on the MFD until we could figure out the navigation/autopilot issue. Shortly later; the Captain noticed the PFD showed no data in the FMS area and that the white needles had disappeared. I confirmed this fact and then I took the NAV Source knob; clicked it one click counterclockwise; then one click clockwise to reset my FMS back to white needles. The flight then continued on course with no further FMS anomalies. The cause of this FMS/AP anomaly is unknown. This is no precursor; there is no warning; it simply occurred without reason. This is the second anomaly that I have experienced. The first anomaly was reported [a few months ago]. This was another automation anomaly in which climbing through FL250 at 290 knots with the AP engaged. Again for no reason and without any input; the bugged airspeed automatically changed from 290 knots to 140 knots. This was recognized by the PF and caught as the aircraft pitch rapidly increased and airspeed rapidly decreased. [Company] reported that they would pull all the data from the flight; however; after a week; they called to inform me that the data was lost from the aircraft as it was a newly acquired plane and the data was not pulled. The also acknowledged that they have heard of this anomaly three other times. I discussed this FMS/AP/white needle/loss of data with Chief Pilot. During this conversation; [the Chief Pilot] explained that he too had experienced this anomaly during a cruise portion of a flight in the past similar to what we experienced. There simply is no explanation of what; why or how these happen. They just do and we have to be vigilant to catch them when one occurs. It is easy to sit back in a chair after the [fact] and think about what we could have done or should have done. It is also easy for other pilots to suggest other actions. However; things are a bit different when in the cockpit. As we have many other complex departures in our system; we are conditioned to rely heavily on the RNAV procedure and the use automation for accuracy. When an issue arises when using automation; we can usually and quickly fix it - whether it is the HDG button that wasn't pushed all the way; or AP wasn't actually engaged; or the FMS has to be executed; etc. If the autopilot is not reacting immediately; we typically will not quickly disengage the autopilot and hand fly on a complex departure. After all the hundreds of flights we do; and if the automation is not doing what we anticipate it should be doing; we will attempt to quickly assess the situation and attempt to correct the automation which is generally pilot error. In this case; it was not pilot error; but rather; another anomaly. In an attempt to correct what should have been a simple automation issue; it could not be quickly corrected as it was verified twice that the configuration of the AP and it active modes were what it should have been. During this attempt to solve this issue; the aircraft continued on its straight-ahead flight path and with a strong westerly wind aloft; pushed us east and closer to [the restricted area]. Once realized that an anomaly occurred; the NAV mode was deselected and HDG made active. Three things have been learned. Firstly; future briefings will include the discussion that if something with the automation is not doing what we expect; we will disengage the AP and hand fly with a left turn to stay west of the Prohibited areas and not to attempt to correct the AP/FMA/FMS. Secondly; a quick call to ATC to advise them that we are starting the turn could have prevented any security issue with encroaching [the restricted area] as they have acknowledgment from the crew. Lastly; the anomaly should have been written up. Both the Captain and I discussed writing up the anomaly; especially since we likely encroached the [restricted area] airspace. However; after discussion of the fact that the remainder of the flight occurred without incident; that there were no indications of any further anomalies; that the flight did not have to be delayed with a write-up which likely could not be duplicated; to not delay the subsequent flight; and that it could be conducted safely as all systems were functioning normal; the anomaly was not written up. Returning [to base]; the anomaly occurred during the approach and it was written up. We waited until Maintenance arrived to discuss and to look over the onboard data logs and as expected; because the system does not record these anomalies; it could not be duplicated and no fault found.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ-900 flight crew reported a track deviation and a restricted airspace incursion resulted when the FMC malfunctioned.


Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Attendant Airline Total 17.5; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 1; Flight Attendant Total 17.5; Flight Attendant Type 100

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

A mother coming on board with her child hit her head upon entering the aircraft.  No injury to either one.

A DHC-8 Flight Attendant reported that a mother carrying her child hit her head while entering the aircraft but she was not injured.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

My FO (First Officer) was flying a visual into ZZZ RWY XX. We were cleared for the approach and the FO turned off her Auto Pilot and turned inbound. She was high and had her pink needles still up. I told her she is high and fast; still going 170-180 KTS. After looking outside; it appeared to me that she was not making corrections or not making them fast enough. I told her to pull her power back and pitch down to the glide slope without diving. At this time; I switched her from FMS to NAV so she would have a glide slope. I was looking outside and saw she was still high. I looked inside and saw her speed was now slow. I told her to continue to push the nose down to gain airspeed and lose altitude. I did not know her power was at idle. I was looking outside; and she now appeared low. I looked back inside and saw she was below the glide slope and the PLI (Pitch Limit Indicator) was coming down. I said; 'my aircraft' and put in power. The PLI touched the FD (Flight Director) just as I took over and I believe the stick shaker may have activated for a split second. I am not sure. I believe the airspeed was at approximately 123 or 124 knots when I took the controls. We did not lose any altitude and we were above 3;500 ft when the event occurred. I believe my FO was focused on looking outside and became tunnel visioned and not looking inside at her airspeed; altitude; etc. for situational awareness. I believe she may have been behind the aircraft and when she met up with the glide slope; did not put in power and was not aware of her speed.Spend more time watching the FO than looking outside at the airport and runway. I should have been more aware of what she was doing with the power and told her to put power back in once she was on the glide slope. When I told her to pull power to lose airspeed and push the nose down to lose altitude; I should have told her what to do once she got on her target airspeed and altitude.

EMB-140 Captain reported that the First Officer's pitch and power inputs while flying a visual approach caused the aircraft to become unstable; necessitating the Captain to take the flight controls.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 9; Flight Crew Total 140; Flight Crew Type 20

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Preflight went fine; I added a quart of oil to bring it up to 6 qts. and topped off the tanks. When starting the engine it was a bit slow to start; as in the starter almost seemed to be sluggish; but no different than it had been in the past. It started fine and had proper oil pressure; no problem there. The run up went smoothly; no adverse indications there. Power check on roll out seemed fine. The plane was a little sluggish getting off the runway; but I didn't think much of it because I had my wife; our 70 lb dog; and full tanks on board so I wasn't expecting it to jump off the runway like it does when it is just myself with fuel at the tabs. We climbed up to 7;500 ft. where we settled into cruise. I powered back and leaned for cruise flight. After about 30 or 40 minutes I started to notice the RPMs starting to drop. Being my first long distance flight in Aircraft X; my attention as glued to the engine instruments and I think I picked up the drop almost immediately. I then gave it full rich mixture then full throttle. Still losing RPM. As I dropped through 2;300 RPM will full throttle; I figured we were in trouble. I had gotten in the habit of keeping the [GPS] at the nearest airport screen so I could see immediately which one was the closest. ZZZ at about 10 miles off our left wingtip. At that point I made my left hand turn and figured we be doing a partial power landing. I looked up at my Foreflight and could tell we had plenty glide distance to get to ZZZ given the glide distance ring. At that point I was double checking fuel; magnetos; carb heat and nothing was restoring full power. After about 30 seconds since our deviation the engine quit. We were doing about 100 kts. and the prop came to a stop; I knew was a bad sign because it should be windmilling. I pitched and trimmed for best glide; pulled up the ZZZ CTAF and announced an engine off approach about 7 miles out. At this point I went through the restart procedures again. Switched fuel tanks this time. Problem was; the starter wouldn't turn the prop. Only a fraction of a full turn at a time. So fuel and mags can't help with a stuck prop. No luck and my full attention went back to judging my approach. I ended up entering midfield downwind right traffic for Runway XX at about 1;500 ft. I left zero flaps all the way through base and final. Only when I was on short final and I could tell I was making the runway did I deploy full flaps; while at the same time putting the aircraft in a slip to slow it down as fast as possible. I touched down and taxied off the runway until it rolled to a stop. Cause is still unclear and I'm still not sure what can be done to prevent a recurrence.

PA-28 pilot reported an engine failure in cruise that resulted in a successful forced landing at a nearby airport.


Normal taxi out; tower cleared us to take off and the Captain brought the power up to approximately 80-81% N1 and armed the auto throttles after the 3 engines stabilized. Initially the throttles came up evenly but at approximately 90% N1 the number 3 engine shot up past the (V) target. I was able to quickly pull it back so the exceedance was only momentary. When I pulled back number 3 engine; the number 1 & 2 engines jumped up to the (V) target while the number 3 was coming back (it came back to approximately 90% N1) at this point we got a red engine fail warning light on the glare shield and the Captain rejected the takeoff at 90-95 knots. We cleared the runway and did the appropriate checklists.Engine 3 exceedance and engine fail warning.

MD11 First Officer reported an engine failure and subsequent rejected takeoff.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

MEL; Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part

During the walk around at ZZZ the First Officer noticed a cable on the nose wheel assembly was zip tied to a hydraulic line and the connector was covered with plastic. (see attachment) During the flight deck preflight I noticed there wasn't a NW STR DISC memo on the ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor). I mentioned it to the FO (First Officer); he showed me the picture and mentioned that the disconnected cable may be the cause. I radioed ZZZ maintenance and told them we had no NW STR memo and that we couldn't move the aircraft without it. A mechanic arrived; confirmed the pin was installed and stated we could placard/MEL (Minimum Equipment list) the ECAM memo and be on our way. I said that I'd prefer it if he reconnected the cable first and see if that fixes the issue. He inspected the nose gear; reconnected the cable and the issue was resolved. If we would've put the issue on MEL and then subsequently retracted the gear there could've been serious damage to the electrical and hydraulic lines on the nose gear since they were zip tied together. The aircraft was a RON (Remain Overnight) in ZZZ and it arrived with MEL for NWS bypass pin lever clip broken. The spring clip was replaced and signed off as 'OPS check good' and the MEL cleared. During the re-activation process the electric harness was supposed to be reconnected and it wasn't. Follow the re-activation steps as published. A check of the recent maintenance history and they would've noticed the system in question was repaired just a few hours earlier. As a result; they could've made a more thorough inspection of the system rather than just looking at the pin and suggesting we put it on MEL.

A321 Captain reported discrepancy with Nose Gear Steering during preflight.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

This report regards a flight [that diverted] in September. I read the crew's report and I was also able to view the releases for the flight; but due to the elapsed time since the flight I have only a slight recollection of the event. I am not the Dispatcher who sent the original release so I cannot speak as to how it was planned or how the original alternate was selected. I did amend the release twice. The first amendment was to change the alternate at the crew's request and the second was to add another alternate due to the flight diverting. The crew stated that 'Dispatch continues to use inadequate alternates'. I cannot disagree with this. In my opinion the fuel savings policy has made it difficult for dispatchers to use their discretion to select more appropriate alternates. Even though we follow the policy outlined in [the Dispatcher Manual]; we are still being reprimanded by management. Remarks put on the releases per the policy are not being filtered out or even looked at; so we are being penalized even if the extra fuel or alternate is completely appropriate. During one occasion when I was being talked to by management about my fuel numbers; I was told that the company had recommended that specific dispatchers be fired for planning too much fuel. This was right after July; one of the peak months for convective activity when ATC reroutes and airborne holds are common. I was also told that the company preferred diversions over planning extra fuel. Other dispatchers have had similar meetings with management. Overall; the fuel saving policy is beneficial but the way it is being administered is fostering a negative culture amongst dispatchers and crews.

CRJ200 Dispatcher comments on a flight that diverted five weeks earlier and laments the company policy concerning alternate selection and adding extra fuel for anticipated delays enroute.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 198; Flight Crew Type 9000

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Object

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure; Equipment / Tooling

After landing; we taxied to our gate where we verified/verbalized the Safety Zone was clear; followed the Marshaller's guidance; and parked with the left engine running. While waiting for ground power to be plugged in the plane started to vibrate and I immediately shutdown the engine; after which the plane went dark. After explaining the situation to our passengers and getting electrical power restored; I went down to the ramp and observed that the left engine had ingested a large quantity of the yellow aircraft [air conditioning] hose.

Despite the flight crew having verified their parking safety area was clear of clutter; a B737-700 ingested a large quantity of the ground air conditioning hose into the left engine while they awaited the connection of ground power.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.0

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Training / Qualification; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was working the Ground Control position. Local Control was busy working aircraft within the Delta airspace. I had given taxi instructions to Aircraft X. The pilot had trouble acknowledging the clearance and sounded as if he was a student pilot. I relayed instructions to the pilot again to taxi to the runway to which he acknowledged the instructions. He advised me on frequency he was 'ready to go.' I instructed Aircraft X to contact Tower as I saw the aircraft holding short of the runway. Some coordination occurred between our Radar Controller and Local Control and a crop duster had called on Local Control frequency. As I took care of an IFR clearance and taxi instruction; I look up and see Aircraft Y on short final and an aircraft on the runway. The pilot of Aircraft Y is keying up on frequency saying 'What is that aircraft doing on the runway?' As the Controller in Charge in the Tower; I instructed the Local Controller to have Aircraft Y to go around. The pilot sidestepped to the side of the runway and went around. The Local Controller reached out to Aircraft X on frequency to turn left and exit the runway immediately. The pilot was later given the Brasher Statement and taxied back to the runway for departure. The pilot of Aircraft X never called for takeoff clearance and taxied onto the runway without any ATC instruction. The pilot attempted to takeoff without an ATC clearance. Had it not been for the swift collective action between ATC and pilots to initiate a go around; the aircraft may have collided.The aircraft came from a flight school that has had multiple issues with Air Traffic Control instructions at this facility in the past. The students of the flight school seem not proficient with Air Traffic Control procedures at controlled airports. Each time; the aircraft in question has either announced every single leg of the traffic pattern to the Control Tower acted like the airport was un-controlled. Additional training for the pilot of Aircraft X for operations at controlled airports and education about runway incursions.

Tower controllers reported an aircraft entered the runway without a clearance to takeoff with another aircraft on short final.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Just after takeoff we were being vectored south off Runway XXR to ZZZ VOR. At about 3000 ft. climbing to 4000 ft. We hit what was thought was clear air turbulence. Sharp firm jolt that rocked the airplane once and stopped. Then a few seconds after got a 'bag door open' message on EICAS. I was the PM (Pilot Monitoring) and told ATC immediately we have to level off to trouble shoot an issue. We stopped climb at 5000 ft. I immediately asked for vectors and realized it was not clear air turbulence. Ran the QRH it said to continue to 10;000 ft. and trouble shoot for pressurization issues; then consider landing at nearest suitable if there is an issue. I was conducting a requal IOE (Initial Operating Experience) and had a new pilot as Pilot Flying. The weather was building and it would have become a task saturated event if we tried to climb and troubleshoot for pressurization issues. This jolt was not normal. I decided to do an air return since we were so close to ZZZ and it is most suitable. I told my trainee to continue to fly and talk with ATC for vectors and give me some time to set up for an air return. Contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control and ZZZ Operations to let them know we were coming back. Got it all set up. Completed burn off the fuel and landed without further event. Coming to know after Maintenance came on board. The entire cargo load shifted and fell on the bag door somehow set off the sensor.Threats was conducting IOE; weather; vectors around weather. Trainee and myself learned that workload management is imperative and would make a difference...clear concise leadership and communication plan stated allowed me to decide to have him fly while I got in the books and did all the housekeeping to allow a successful and safe air return. It was his first time seeing and being part of one and was definitely getting overwhelmed.

EMB-145 First Officer reported executing a precautionary air return due to an EICAS message.


Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was summoned to meet an aircraft that had returned to block at gate. I was the originally assigned to the flight originally so I repositioned the jetbridge to offer egress and to deplane passengers. The captain came to podium to say that there would another 15 to 20 minutes so I didn't have too deplane my passengers. Afterwards I was given the okay to close the aircraft door. I then retracted my canopy and I called zone to say that I needed a guide off and she responded that she would relay the message to ramp and there would be a few minutes. I would say that well after 10 minutes I observed the aircraft moving without a ramp guide off at this time was scared and shocked that it happened. All kinds of questions went through my mind for example what if I had been too close to the aircraft there certainly would have been substantial damage ramp should have given me a signal. I then called zone and spoke to another guy; he said he would contact a ramp supervisor.

Gate Agent reported a flight pushed off the gate even though the jetway had not been moved away from the aircraft.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 22312; Flight Crew Type 8031

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft X apparently hit a set of stairs on pushback with their right wing tip unbeknownst to the crew or Marshaller. A ground crew member saw it and called it in to his supervisor; who called it in to the Ops (Airport Operations). The plane at this point was on takeoff roll and wasn't in contact with Ops via radio anymore. After getting airborne; Ops took it into their own hands and called Tower and told them to have the flight return to field. I received an message from the crew asking why the return to field; which is when I started to make calls. This happened while the crew was at 3;000 feet and turning around. Crew landed uneventfully and the plane was taken out of service with visible damage to the right wingtip. No request was issued for a return to field as I felt in the short time frame; and with how busy the crew would have been setting up an unexpected approach; that it would have been unsafe to add more to their workload. Operations staff need to be fully aware of their limitations in regards to operational control of flights. Perhaps there needs to be a rapid communication procedure for the ground personnel; as they had to make several calls to get the information to someone who could have made a difference quicker.

After we took off and checked on with ZZZ Departure Control we were advised by the controller that Company wanted us to return to the airport. Upon questioning; the controller did not know the reason. I sent an ACARS message to our Dispatcher advising of an air turn back and asked why. His response was that he didn't know but would find out. We set up for the return to ZZZ and landed uneventfully and taxied to parking. Upon aircraft shutdown and secure a ZZZ maintenance representative met us inside the cockpit to advise us that the right wingtip possibly came into contact with a set of crew stairs during block out. We took a look at the wing and there was some minor damage to the right outboard leading edge slat just inside the right navigation light. At all times during the block out we were under the guidance and direction of the marshaller. Appropriate logbook entry made and reports submitted by both myself and First Officer. Reflecting upon blocking out; after engine start we cleared the mechanic and ascertained immediate area left and right were clear; I signaled the marshaller across the ramp and on the nose that we were ready to taxi out. We were marshaled straight out into the alley and given the signal for a left turn into the alley followed by a wave-off and salute. During the initial block out taxi roll; the First Officer mentioned the crew stairs seemed close; but from my position the stairs did not appear to be encroaching on the taxi lane and I continued to follow the marshaller's instructions. All marshaling signals were consistent with the aircraft being clear of any obstacles; and at no time did the marshaller give us a stop signal during the taxi out; nor did we feel any bump from the right wingtip possibly making contact with the crew stairs. I do not know if there was a wing-walker on the right wing due proximity of ground equipment between our aircraft and the aircraft to our right. I do recall a white ramp vehicle was encroached in the clear area to our right as we were blocking out; but the vehicle backed up out of the way. Recommendations: wing-walkers; all ground equipment clear; equipment safe boxes painted on the ground around the aircraft like in ZZZ1.

Air carrier flight crew and Dispatcher reported that the aircraft wingtip hit a set of stairs during pushback but that it was not communicated to the flight crew until after departure. An uneventful air return was made.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While conducting a single engine approach on 27R another aircraft appeared to be flying parallel lined up for 27C. The aircraft was very close within 500 ft horizontal distance and kept moving toward my approach path. The aircraft eventually cut me off and crossed right in front of my approach path. I had eyes on the aircraft the entire time; my student was under the hood and I took controls to change heading and reduce power to have better separation. Tower keyed up the mic with a high priority traffic alert. The aircraft was supposed to be going to 27L. After the aircraft realized it massively overshot it's intended runway. ATC advised the aircraft to fly north bound and re-enter the pattern for landing 27R.The other pilot seemed to lack situational awareness and was unfamiliar with the Monroe/Jessup arrival and SFB. At no point after I took controls did I feel like that NMAC was possible since the aircraft was ahead and to the left.tttt

GA instructor reported an NMAC during approach to SFB airport.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

During preflight weather check for flight to APA; we talked to Dispatch about our filed route and the line of thunderstorms to the west of our route. Dispatch and I agreed to refile a new route to the north of BUM to circumnavigate the line of thunderstorms before turning westbound and added additional fuel. During the passenger safety brief; I advised passengers of our plan and that we might have turbulence so make sure seatbelts were secured and adjusted well. After takeoff during climbout; we advised Kansas City Center of our plan and he said about 10 aircraft had just done the same thing and it had worked out well. We flew northbound on the east side of the line of thunderstorms and leveled at 40;000 FT. We requested and were approved heading deviations for weather avoidance. We turned westbound and crossed the line of storms with the largest radar returns about 35 miles south of us. We were right in the tops of the clouds and could see blue sky above. We requested wrong direction 41;000 FT but were unable due to traffic. We then encountered a short burst of severe turbulence. The autopilot disengaged and we had a red flashing Master warning but no other annunciators. We re-established aircraft control; and reset seat belt sign to on. The largest altitude deviation I observed was about 200 FT high and aircraft heading changed about 20 degrees to the left. We checked on passengers and one who didn't have seat belt secured said he hit his head on the ceiling twice. We asked if he was okay and wanted to divert for medical attention. He said to continue on. The flight continued to destination uneventfully. After landing; the passenger advised us he was going to have his driver take him to be evaluated at a medical facility. We post flighted the aircraft with no noticeable discrepancies and entered a maintenance write-up in the log for a Severe Turbulence Inspection. It would be nice to be able to use aircraft wi-fi to update weather radar once enroute to see how storms are moving or changing and get an updated big picture on the situation as weather changes rapidly and new storms had probably formed since we had been airborne 30 minutes plus start and taxi time. It would be nice if company dispatchers also could track us better and keep us informed of changes during challenging weather. We made the mistake of thinking we had already passed the line of storms and that no other significant weather was along our route. Our airborne radar didn't indicate any severe looking storms once we passed the line north of BUM. We were actively using the airborne radar and didn't observe any severe storms when we encountered the severe turbulence.

CE560 Captain reports a severe turbulence encounter at FL400 while navigating around a long line of thunderstorms. One passenger who was not wearing his seatbelt was injured. Flight continues to destination.


Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface

Distraction; Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Before departing...the copilot and I discussed the flaps 20 required for Runway 19R. He even highlighted it on the TOLD card. We were given a flow time of 'on the hour' which would give us about 10 minutes from pushback. We went through the After Start checklist while I was listening to ground move an aircraft behind us. I was thinking with our flow time we would need to be moved. During this time I believe we both agreed to the normal flaps 8. We were then given the short taxi instruction. We began a taxi check when the Tower called us to continue around corner to hold short of 19L. Still thinking we had a few minutes before our flow time; we continued the taxi checks. A moment later we are being told to taxi into position. Still thinking we had at least a couple minutes for flow we accepted and tried to get the confirmation the flight attendants were ready. While still entering the runway we were cleared for takeoff. I told Tower we were waiting for the flight attendants and would need another minute. He cancelled takeoff clearance and had us position and hold. We had finished the taxi check and were now trying to get the takeoff check done. We were quickly given a new takeoff clearance and that traffic was on final. We let ourselves be rushed and missed the flap setting again.  During the takeoff roll; in the high speed segment; the First Officer announced that the flaps were not set to 20. My first reaction when I looked up from the airspeed was to abort; however when I saw what little runway was left at the high speed we were traveling I felt a rejected takeoff would be more dangerous and decided to continue while adding the flaps. We rotated normally and climb out was normal. The easy answer would be to not to let ourselves be rushed. I feel this was a perfect storm of events that led us to err. In the future; if I even sense we are being rushed; I will advise ATC how much time we will need to be ready well in advance of being on the runway. Also to prevent this in the future I will touch the flap lever while looking at the TOLD card.

At the '80 KTS' call; I saw that flaps were not at 20 degrees. I told the Captain 'We need flaps 20'. The Captain changed the flaps to 20 degrees; and said continue. I would estimate that flaps were extended to 20 degrees at an airspeed exceeding 100 KTS. We got a 'T/O config' caution message and continued the takeoff. Flaps were at 20 degrees; and the warning gone; prior to V1. As a precaution; I let airspeed build past V1 prior to rotation. There were no abnormal aircraft reactions upon liftoff or climb.

CRJ-900 flight crew missed flaps set at 8 rather than the required flaps 20 until noted by the First Officer in the high speed segment of the takeoff. Judging that a rejected takeoff would be more dangerous than continuing the takeoff; the Captain set flaps to 20 and told the First Officer; pilot flying; to continue. Takeoff and climbout were normal.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 2950; Flight Crew Type 820

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency

I picked up an IFR clearance airborne and the Controller located the aircraft; which was maintaining VFR; and assigned a southerly heading. I replied that I was unable to comply due to the Part 135.183 glide requirement of passenger operations. The Controller told me to hold until they could 'work me in' at which time I indicated I had a filed flight plan. I was given clearance to the intersection at 8;000 FT. The Controller lost my transponder and then identified me again near the intersection. She vectored me from the intersection on a 240 heading; which took me over the airport and just southeast of the field on what I anticipated were vectors for 04R. I was descended to 6;000. Solid IMC continued. I never obtained a visual on anything within 5 to 10 miles of the airport through breaks in the clouds below. I was switched to the next Controller who gave me a 190 heading and assigned me an altitude of 3;000 or below (I can't recall). I determined that this would likely put me in violation of FAR 135.183; and I advised the Controller. He queried why I couldn't comply and I explained the regulation briefly. He told me I should 'get another plane.' He vectored me just offshore at 3;000; which kept me in glide range. The aircraft is supposed to glide 2 NM for every 1;000 FT; in calm wind. At 3;000 FT; I was thus limited to 6 miles from shore. I was vectored in IMC south and at a point approximately five miles off shore; the Controller advised that he was going to keep me on that heading for another 2 NM. I contacted the Approach Controller and advised him that I could not do that and needed to turn in. He said he couldn't turn me in sooner and I stated that I would have to declare an emergency if he didn't. He told me 'go ahead then.' I declared an emergency and gave myself an immediate turn into shore. I was still totally IMC. At this point; the Controller identified one or two A-10 Warthog military aircraft within three miles of my position. I advised him that I could not see anything and that I was completely IMC. My TAS alerted me to traffic and I saw '-100' immediately near my aircraft on all screens. I think I may have come close to one of these aircraft in the process. I was vectored onto the ILS and eventually broke out of the IMC at around the FAF and landed.

C208 pilot on an IFR flight plan in IMC informs ATC that he cannot be more than two miles off shore for every 1000 feet of altitude; in order to comply with FAR 135.183. With the aircraft being vectored directly off shore and approaching the limit; an emergency is declared and a turn in initiated. This results in a NMAC with a military aircraft.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6; Flight Crew Total 261; Flight Crew Type 100

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Evacuated

My friend was being the PIC and I was being the passenger along with my uncle in the back seat. We picked up the CHO ATIS on 118.425 and then couple of minutes later; he called CHO Ground on 121.9 and informed that controller that we was ready to taxi and that we had the current ATIS. Ground control told us to taxi to Runway 03; via H and A.He taxied the airplane down to the active runway and prior to getting to the hold short line of Runway 03; he performed the before takeoff checklist. Everything seemed to be going ok at the moment. He then advise me that everything was ok and that he was ready to call CHO Tower on 124.5. Called Tower and cleared us for takeoff and follow runway heading. He replied the same phraseology to Tower.Upon getting to the runway I noticed that he was using right rudder to get the on the runway center line. As he was adding power; I saw the airplane yaw to the left and I asked him if he was using right rudder. He confirmed that he was and then all the sudden the stall horn came on and airplane airspeed was increasing. The airplane was able to get to roughly 45-50 kts and never rotated and then it suddenly made a sharp turn to the left and got off the runway and ended on the grass.As the airplane got on the grass the emergency procedures were followed to shut the engine off. The airplane left main landing gear had broken one of the runway lights and came to a complete stop about 2;000 feet from the beginning of runway 03.

Part 91 aircraft swerved off the runway during takeoff roll for undetermined reasons.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft TA; Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While in cruise flight; approximately 40NM south of ATL; we were given clearance by Atlanta Center to climb from our present assigned altitude; FL370 to FL380. Within a few seconds of initiating a climb; we received a TCAS alert for 'Traffic'. I immediately noticed an aircraft (a large amber TCAS image on the ND (Navigational Display)) at our same altitude '00'; opposite direction. I increased the rate of climb by electing CON (Max Continuous Thrust) on the N1 page of the FMC.Literally seconds later; we received an RA to 'CLIMB'. I immediately disconnected the auto-pilot and manually advanced the power to rapidly climb out of the red displayed warning area on my PFD (Primary Flight Display). At approximately FL380; the TCAS system said to 'Level Off'. At this point I was at 38100 ft. Moments later we received the aural 'Clear of conflict'. Still hand flying; I lowered the nose and descended 100 ft. back to our assigned altitude of FL380. We had just come from an area of weather over Florida and more weather was ahead beyond Atlanta.The radar was on; and I was on a 160 NM scale. In a busy area like ATL; I recalled seeing numerous aircraft on TCAS which was normal and gave no reason for concern. After the event; both of us (Us & Company) advised ATC we received an RA. The Company pilot asked ATC 'what happened back there?'. The controller replied in a broken sounding voice something like: 'I climbed them too late…'. Looking forward; I never saw the oncoming aircraft.My FO (First Officer) said the Company jet passed beneath us from the right side at a slight angle. The last TCAS altitude I recall seeing as we passed was '-02'. Perhaps; I expected that ATC would keep us safely separated at cruise altitude. At the end of the day; TCAS prevented a catastrophic event! No suggestion. I would not have responded any differently than I did.

We were flying at FL370 talking to ATL Center approximately 40NM south of ATL VOR at the time of the event. ATL center gave us clearance to climb to FL380. As we got the clearance; we got a TCAS Traffic Advisory. I reached up to zoom in my ND (Navigational Display). I saw the Yellow Square and 00" next to it. During this time; the Captain had set the new altitude; and pushed the ALT intervene button. I said to the captain; 'We are going to get an RA; get ready'. As soon as I said that; we got the RA and instructions to climb. The Captain promptly disconnected the Auto Pilot and pushed the throttles up to comply with the TCAS Climb command. I saw traffic under us under the left wing. AT FL381 we got the TCAS level off command; then a few seconds later Clear of Conflict. We returned to our assigned altitude of FL380. Company later asked ATC what the reason was for getting that TCAS. The ATL controller admitted fault and said they climbed us late. The causal factor was lapse of attention regarding two aircraft nose to nose at same altitude. ATC issued a turn to avoid traffic rather than slow to happen climb instructions. ATC having more awareness in regards to aircraft in their sector that are at the same altitude."

Air Carrier flight crew reported TCAS RA in cruise flight and flight crew took evasive action.


Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

Landing on Runway 12R at STL yesterday in a B737-300; we got a windshear warning and initiated a go-around. We went around the pattern and on our second approach we got the same warning. I directed my First Officer to land; and here's why: 1) Weather was VFR day with light winds; 2) Tower reported light winds on all of their instruments and no other reports of windshear; and 3) I also evaluated the highway configuration just short of the runway and felt that it was the main factor.After landing; we asked Maintenance to come to the jet and our Mechanic had the following to say: 1) We get bogus windshear warnings fairly often at STL; 2) Company at some time in the past had evaluated the situation to include some test flights. No idea what their conclusions were; and 3) He was confident it was not a malfunctioning system on our aircraft.Evaluate the windshear system for its tendencies to give false windshear warnings when highway traffic is present near the approach to a runway. Share any pertinent findings with the Pilot Group. Add a note to our STL briefing page.

B737-300 Captain experiences a windshear warning during approach to Runway 12R at STL on a calm VMC day; and goes around. The next approach produces the same warning; but the approach is continued to landing. Highway traffic on final is thought to be the cause.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Arriving into DEN 16R; we overshot 16R final approach course due to late approach clearance. The weather was clear so I corrected visually to make a smooth and gradual joining of the extended centerline. Soon after; I noticed via ATC; TCAS; and visually; 737 traffic rapidly approaching our flight path. The plane had overshot 16L and was turning base to final. ATC notified that traffic was correcting course to land on 16L. However; based on our location at the time; (we were still to the right of course of 16R due to overshoot) and the location of the 737; it appeared that the traffic had overshot both 16L and 16R and was lining up to our runway; with less than a mile separation just behind us. My last visual with the 737 was about 7'clock and less than a mile. From there; we received 3 separate RA alerts to descend. I complied with the RA and the 737 resulted in going around. The conflict was resolved at that time. We met the stable flight criteria well before 1000 feet and landed safely.Threat and error was late approach clearance by the ATC for the other traffic resulting in overshooting both his runway; parallel runway and resulting in a near miss with our aircraft. Undesired aircraft state was multiple RA warnings in approach phase close to the ground with a traffic right behind us. Ideally; we wanted to prompt the ATC for our approach clearance in time to join the final. However due to radio congestion; we were unable. Even if we had joined our runway earlier; that would've caused us to be even closer to the 737 that overshot 16L. We can always try to improve our vigilance in scanning of traffic especially in the terminal area. I highly encourage the company to address the issue in DEN about traffic separation landing on parallel runways. I've personally heard of multiple incidents of TA and RA warnings on approach from other crews resulting in an undesirable aircraft state.

At no point did we feel a go around would have helped us; as every RA was to descend. I should have called out the loss of traffic when they were behind us and the right of our position as indicated by TCAS. That would have alerted ATC as to the seriousness of the situation; helping them to focus on traffic separation with the 737 instead of landing traffic ahead. I don't believe we can change anything in policy; but I do believe Denver ATC should treat 16L/R parallel traffic more seriously; not vectoring us with hard intercepts when parallel traffic was present. We observed the 737 at full 30+ bank to intercept their final. Whether due to Pilot or ATC error; the situation was not recognized for what it was until 500ft separation. I believe that is due to Denver culture that TAs are normal in that this 'happens all the time.'

EMB-145XR flight crew reported they received multiple RAs on approach to DEN when a 737 overshot final approach course.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

The crew from [aircraft X] called over the aircraft radio enroute to ZZZ1. They said that his Blue Overhead Fuel Valve light was illuminated. I asked if the engine was still running; they said yes. I asked if the engine was operating within normal parameters; they said yes. I asked if there was any engine fluctuation; they said no. I told him that it appeared to be an indication issue. The crew agreed and continued the flight to ZZZ1.  I completed a Turnover Report in the Maintenance Control turnover log that the Overhead Blue Engine valve light was illuminated. Upon landing in ZZZ1; the [flight] crew created a discrepancy that it was the Spar Valve light that had illuminated in flight. I had believed that the crew was discussing that it was the Engine Valve light that was illuminating. Because of this belief; I had even discussed with the crew there would be a possibility MEL'ing valve in ZZZ1. I turned this information over to the on-coming Maintenance Control shift. The aircraft Engine Valve was MEL'd in ZZZ1 by the on-coming shift. The aircraft flew to ZZZ2 where company Maintenance determined that the MEL may have been incorrectly applied. ZZZ2 Maintenance corrected the Spar valve problem and cleared the Engine Valve MEL. ZZZ2 Maintenance noted that the discrepancy and the resolution did not balance.My belief had been that the crew had been seeing an Engine Valve fault. I turned this information over to the on-coming shift. The crew wrote that they had a Spar Valve fault. The on-coming shift used my turnover report to apply an MEL that may have not been correct. ZZZ2 Maintenance replaced the Spar valve and cleared the Engine valve MEL. Ensure that discrepancies and resolutions balance.

Aircraft had pilot report (P/R) inbound to ZZZ1 for # 2 Eng Spar valve Blue light illum in flight. I contacted ZZZ1 Maintenance & told Tech we would MEL the light. Tech read me the log page but I did not hear him say it was the Spar valve the crew had written up. I instructed the tech to accomplish the procedures for the MEL I wanted to apply 73-10. Tech accomplished them. There was a communication problem with which c/b needed to be pulled & collared and the location of it. The MEL for the 'Eng. valve light' # 73-10' was completed. Initially I had the tech collar the incorrect breaker which was rectified later. After the acft arrived in ZZZ2 the techs called ZZZ Maintenance Control and informed them of the error.At start of shift; received [Turnover] tie-in that 'Eng. valve light illum bright.' My first thought was a Cowl Anti-Ice light was on. My co-worker told me to look again at the tie-in and I read that it was a Eng. valve lt. I pulled up the MEL for that light (not uncommon for it to occur) and contacted the tech in ZZZ1. After the acft landed the tech read the P/R to me. I missed the tech telling me it was the Spar valve & not the Eng valve. I proceeded to have the tech MEL the Eng valve as stated above. We had a discussion while filling out the book about circuit breaker (C/B) location. At that time I had the tech collar the wrong breaker at my direction. This error was discovered later & amended to the correct c/b for that MEL.While Tech in ZZZ1 was accomplishing the MEL I was answering calls from other techs & helping with a window heat in ZZZ3 & in ZZZ4 with a piece of debris in a panel in front of the elevator. Techs in ZZZ2  trouble shot/s & repaired the system originally written up. Reversed the MEL procedures & removed the MEL.  I didn't look at the log page picture the Tech sent from ZZZ1 till the next day on my way to work. I make it a priority to look at them as soon as possible. Maintenance Controller. Evening [shift]. Workplace interruptions during task.

Two Maintenance Controllers; an Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) and a Captain describe their involvement with a reported # 2 Engine Fuel Spar Valve Overhead Blue light fault that was miscommunicated and deferred as an Engine Valve Blue fault light on a B737-800 aircraft. A downline Maintenance Station noted that the original discrepancy and the resolution did not match. Spar valve was replaced and Engine Valve MEL cleared.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather

Captain was in crew rest. Received SIGMET from [Dispatch] about VA (Volcanic Ash) cloud; reported to be over 100 NM north of current track. Reported previous flights had operated within SIGMET area with no issues. Crossing 180W at level 340; we were initially in and out of the tops of weather and encountered light turbulence. Continuing east; the weather began to break up; and we noticed 'distinctly grey' wisps of clouds and virga like projections.At level; it appeared as grey smog. We confirmed a slow and steady (but slight about 30-40 degrees Celsius) EGT rise on both engines. Re-examining our situation; we concluded a climb and an offset south would clear us from the grey haze and wispy clouds. The wind was about 140 kts. There was nothing of note depicted on the weather radar. We climbed to 350 and offset 4 NM right of course and could visually see that we were clear of the greyish layers below us. We both confirmed that the EGTs (Exhaust Gas Temperature) were normal. All engine indications were normal. We continued for another 10 minutes; monitoring indications. We pressed the EICAS event marker. The weather below us continued to clear; with now only small cumulus clouds low to the surface below us. We did continue to see the grey haze layer below us also. That is when the weather radar picked up strong returns below us; and we documented the event with the pictures provided. We contacted [Dispatch] with our status and location and asked Dispatch to report to ATC. As we passed over the radar returns; they cleared with no further indications. The grey haze also dissipated as we continued east. The Captain was informed and coordinated with [Dispatch] and ATC for a precautionary divert into ZZZ. Possible flight into area of [unforeseen] volcanic ash cloud.

Air carrier flight crew and Dispatcher reported an inflight volcanic ash encounter which resulted in a diversion to the nearest suitable airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 260; Flight Crew Total 6600; Flight Crew Type 132

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

I was on a VFR flight to False Pass (KFP) along the Alaskan Peninsula. I was on a company flight plan. I was flying southwest at 10;500 msl and passing Cold Bay (CDB) airport. While I was still 25 miles north east of Cold Bay; I contacted the Cold Bay FSS and gave my altitude; heading; and my route of flight. I was planning on going to False Pass airport to drop off a passenger; and then back to Cold Bay. The FSS gave me traffic and weather updates. I descended into KFP; which is about 15 miles southwest of CDB. As I entered the pattern at KFP; I was alerted by another pilot that I should be on a DVFR flight plan. When I landed I immediately called Kenai FSS because I was unaware that I was near an ADIZ. Upon further inspection; I found that KFP; which is a VFR-only airport on US soil in Alaska; is about 5 miles outside the ADIZ. My plan was to file a DVFR plan to the north while I was on the phone with Kenai FSS. Midway through my conversation with the FSS; the cell connection was lost. I tried multiple times to reach Kenai and each time was given a recording about a phone system error. Cell phone coverage in the remote villages is often very bad. I proceeded to depart KFP and immediately exit the ADIZ; and land the very first airport (CDB) about 15 miles away. Enroute I contacted the CDB FSS; and they informed me that I was being contacted on 121.5. I tried to reach someone multiple times on that frequency but received no answer. I landed at CDB 5 minutes after departing KFP.I believe that a lot can be done to change this situation. First; I should have done better homework. This was my first time at this airport; and I did a thorough check of weather; Notams; Alaska Supplement; etc. before the flight but I relied on my GPS and navaids rather than consulting the Sectional for navigation to the airport. Nothing about the ADIZ was noted in any of my prefight material.  Also; the airplane is equipped with dual Garmin GPSs; a moving map display; ADSB; and synthetic vision. NONE of these alerted me to the close proximity of the ADIZ. Also; when I spoke to the FSS well northeast of the ADIZ; and expressed my route of flight; absolutely nothing was mentioned to me about the ADIZ on my route of flight even though I did not have a flight plan in his system. It would have been extremely simple to land and file a DVFR flight plan at that moment. Also; why is a State-run; VFR only village airport in Alaska this close to an ADIZ? The ADIZ needs to be moved in my opinion. There is a lot of air traffic in that area; and not all of it is IFR. The cell phones are regularly a problem in the Alaskan villages; and any airplane that lands at KFP and cannot contact the FSS is stuck outside the ADIZ. This is a problem. Finally; I spoke with my Chief Pilot and Director of Operations. They are immediately issuing a company bulletin for all pilots about the location of the ADIZ in order to prevent future incursions.

An air taxi pilot was informed by another pilot in the traffic pattern at KFP that he should be on a DVFR flight plan since the airport is 10 NM into the Alaskan ADIZ.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.5

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

While on GCN (Ground Control North) I had 2 aircraft under tow; holding waiting to cross at different locations. One holding short of rwy 8L at L7 and one short of runway 8R at M11. I instructed Tug X to cross runway 8R to which he replied 'Crossing runway 8R'. Tug X was actually holding short of runway 8L and begin to cross runway 8L instead. At the same time Aircraft X was beginning his takeoff roll on runway 8L. ASDE-X alerted and Aircraft X aborted and returned for takeoff.Crossing was issued during a relief briefing. Next time let the relieving controller issue the crossing.

I had just started my shift and we were in the process of a relief briefing for me to take over the combined GC (Ground Control) positions. I was told about 2 tugs currently holding short of runways. Before giving me the position the relieving controller said something along the lines of 'I'll just go ahead and cross him;' meaning the one that was only supposed to cross the closed runway. He apparently chose the wrong one and actually instructed the tug that was holding midfield to the active runway to cross. I mentioned to the GC that the other tug was moving and didn't look to be stopping. The ASDE-X alarm went off and the LC (Local Controller) aborted the takeoff of the Aircraft X departure The tugs on the ASDE-X were primary targets only. They could have been 'tagged up' with their callsigns to alleviate confusion.

MIA Ground Controllers reported a runway incursion due to the wrong tug being crossed at the wrong intersection as a departure starting to roll.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.0

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I'm not sure if I had standard separation from other aircraft and restricted areas. Aircraft Y checked on assigned 270 knots and I climbed him to 27;000 feet. I told him the rides were better higher and further east; and even though I didn't have radar on aircraft Z; I saw his flight plan at 32;000 feet so I told aircraft Y I could give him 31;000 feet if he wanted it. He said he did; so I climbed him to 31;000 feet with normal speed out of 27;000 feet.Aircraft X checked on climbing very poorly. Aircraft Y had resumed normal speed with a 75 knot overtake. I turned aircraft X 15 degrees left and aircraft Y 5 degrees right and I was going to parallel their routes until aircraft X was above aircraft Y then issue a turn to MOHAK. Aircraft Y got to 31;000 feet and didn't like the ride. I told aircraft X to climb and maintain 35;000 feet hoping to keep the same plan; but with different altitudes. Aircraft X read it back; and didn't object so I climbed aircraft Y to 33;000 feet and issued direct to HOGGZ. I turned aircraft X on a 080 heading. At this time aircraft Z and aircraft A were being handed off to me. I accepted a radar hand off on both; changed aircraft A's code and issued a speed. Additionally restricted areas were active to 39;000 feet; as well as an ATCAA 40;000 feet and below and another restricted area 50;000 feet and below.I kept watching it realizing I had worked myself into a pickle and I was banking on aircraft X making it to 35;000 feet over aircraft Z; aircraft Y; and aircraft A. Aircraft X left 33;000 feet so I turned him to a 095 heading to avoid restricted airspace and it gave me a little more room to get above aircraft A. When it was all said and done I saw it was going to be close between aircraft X and aircraft A. I tried to descend aircraft Y; only to realize that aircraft Z was in the way. I tried to turn aircraft A; only to realize the restricted airspace was hot. So I had to wait until the last possible second; and turned aircraft X a 100 heading; aircraft A to a 280 heading. I issued traffic; told aircraft A that aircraft X was level at 35;000 feet even though he was out of 34;600 feet. I called traffic for aircraft X on aircraft A. I'm not certain that I had 5 miles and a thousand feet between both aircraft; nor am I certain that I kept aircraft A 3 miles from the restricted airspace. It was very scary for me; my hands were tied by my own doing and all I was trying to avoid at that point was a NMAC; or an actual collision. It feels very bad.One thing that could be improved upon is the San Diego arrivals coming from ZAB should be left at altitude. If aircraft A was at 36;000 or 38;000 feet and not forced down unnecessarily; it could have made all the difference in that particular situation; as well as many others like that when we have to parallel aircraft and miss the restricted airspace active both left and right of course.

ZLA Center Controller reported an airborne conflict between enroute aircraft and aircraft in restricted airspace.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft X requested to depart Runway 04. Aircraft Y was cleared to land on Runway 14. Shortly before I had already departed Aircraft Z in the left closed traffic pattern for Runway 14. My attention then returned to watching Aircraft Z pass through the departure corridor of Runway 04 and I cleared Aircraft X for takeoff to turn right heading 220. When I scanned the runways Aircraft Y was at taxi speed and he stopped short of the intersecting runway Aircraft X was departing from. I did not instruct him to but he did. I also tried to cancel Aircraft X's takeoff clearance since I did not issue a hold short instruction to Aircraft Y; but received no response and he departed without further incident. I taxied Aircraft Y off of the runway without further incident.I should have utilized land and hold short instructions and focused on working the runway out and not become distracted.

SRQ Tower Controller reported they cleared an aircraft for takeoff while an aircraft was landing on an intersecting runway.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 135; Flight Crew Total 254; Flight Crew Type 254

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

This incident occurred while taxiway construction was underway. At this phase of the construction project; all aircraft have to back taxi on the runway either for takeoff or [for] landing. The day of this incident; the winds were favoring 14. I was holding short at taxiway C (a mid-field taxiway) for departure in a Cessna 172. I was waiting for an aircraft to land on 14 before I back taxied for departure. After the aircraft landed; a Cirrus announced he is on a 5-mile base for runway 14. Then I announced that I was back taxiing on runway 14 for a departure on 14. As I was getting ready to Depart; the Cirrus pilot announced that he was on a long final for 14. I announced I am departing 14 and shortly after that; the Cirrus pilot asked if an aircraft was on the runway. Another aircraft replied that there was an aircraft on the runway starting his takeoff roll. The Cirrus pilot replied; 'What should I do?'. As this was happening; I announced that I am taking off 14. As I was taking off the Cirrus was apparently close to me (couldn't tell where exactly; as I was in a high wing Cessna). Then the Cirrus pilot announced that he was going around to my right. In response; I announced I will keep left of the runway; and then I side stepped a bit to the left of the runway. Then Cirrus crossed over me right to left to proceed to join downwind. At this point; I continued at runway heading until turning left crosswind and subsequently leaving the pattern to the east.

A Cessna 172 Pilot reported a NMAC after takeoff while another aircraft was on final causing the other aircraft to go-around.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 700

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

We were at 11;000 FT MSL on the arrival when the Number 1 (Left) engine flamed out. The aircraft was night VMC between layers at the time of failure. The Captain (PF) called for maximum continuous thrust and started the APU. He then asked me to set 9;000 FT in the MCP. As I began to look up the ENG FAILURE QRH the flight attendants called. Upon answering they said the cabin lights had failed. I told them we had an engine failure and to prepare for a normal landing and I would get back to them. Things were happening fast. Now back in the QRH the engine self started. I placed the checklist aside for the moment but selected FLT on both igniters. We declared an emergency with Approach. Once all engine parameters stabilized normal at idle the PF attempted to advance the Number 1 throttle. We both recognized a muffled compressor stall and the PF immediately retarded the throttle to idle. Seconds later the engine failed again. I told ATC we needed to get on the ground and he asked if we were ready for the approach. The Captain indicated he was ready and I told the controller we were ready for the approach while I double checked the NAV frequency and ident. We were now IMC. He vectored us to an intercept heading just outside the IAF. The engine again self started. I called the flight attendants and told them we had an engine fail but that it was now operating and that everything from their standpoint would be normal. We broke out VMC and I quickly reviewed the QRH completing it somewhere inside the IAF inbound to the FAF. The Captain selected Autobrakes 4. After clearing the runway we asked the emergency vehicles to escort us to the gate. Concerned the passengers and flight attendants may be startled by the numerous emergency vehicles around the aircraft I made a PA explaining what had happened explaining this was precautionary only. I assured them they were safe and that deplaning would proceed normally. ATC provided exceptional service.

Reporter states that Maintenance replaced the EEC and the high pressure fuel pump for that engine to return the aircraft to service.

Air carrier First Officer describes a number 1 engine flame out at 11;000 FT during descent. An emergency is declared while the failed engine self starts and shuts down two times during the descent and landing.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Evacuated; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

We were cleared for takeoff in ZZZ. I began to notice smoke that appeared to be coming from the gasper and AC vents as we were passing through approximately 65-70 kts. The amount of smoke seemed to be increasing significantly and I detected a distinct burning oil/electrical smell. I made the decision to abort the takeoff as we were approaching 80 kts; took control of the aircraft; and stopped on the runway. The First Officer advised ATC and requested ARFF. I set the parking brake and made the following announcement over the PA: 'This is the Captain; Remain Seated; Remain Seated; Remain Seated'. The flight attendant immediately called the flight deck via the 'Cabin EMER' function of the interphone system and advised us that there was a lot of smoke in the cabin. I determined the most conservative and safest course of action was to evacuate the aircraft since we had no idea what was causing the smoke or if it would proceed to get worse; further exposing my crew and passengers to potentially toxic fumes and harmful smoke particles. The First Officer and I ran the evacuation checklist and I advised her that I would assist the passengers outside the aircraft and instructed her to remain inside and assist as necessary. Upon opening the cockpit door a haze of smoke was visible throughout the cabin. The ARFF equipment was already waiting outside so I proceeded to exit the aircraft and assist the passengers exiting via the main cabin door. All passengers (23 humans and 1 dog) were safely evacuated and bussed to the terminal. The ARFF team conducted a walk around inspection and a walk through inspection of the aircraft utilizing a thermal imaging camera. They did not detect any noticeable heat signatures; but did notice the presence of the smoke/fumes smell in the aircraft; particularly in the vicinity of the lavatory. They proceeded to inspect the cargo compartment as a precaution; but no visible sign of a fire was immediately discovered. The aircraft was towed to the maintenance hangar. I detected visible smoke followed by a distinct smell I would describe as a combination of burning oil and electrical. The Flight Attendant advised me of the presence of smoke throughout the cabin.Smoke/fumes from an unknown source on the takeoff roll.Aborted takeoff; requested ARFF assistance; stopped on the runway; and evacuated the aircraft. Evacuating an aircraft introduces a level of risk that we do not typically deal with during the course of a normal day flying the line; however; sudden smoke and fumes inside the aircraft also carry a significant amount of risk that we are not used to dealing with. I determined that the risk associated with further exposure to potentially toxic smoke and fumes from an unknown source; as well as a possible undetected fire; outweighed the risk associated with a controlled evacuation. The safety record of this business depends on our ability to effectively mitigate risks as they're presented to us. Everyday we analyze available information and are sometimes forced to make split-second decisions as a result. Scenarios like this are always going to be unique and we must rely on our training to lead us towards the safest course of action. There is no 'cookie cutter' approach that can be applied evenly across the board. I have no further suggestions.

It was my leg; ZZZ-ZZZ1. On the take-off roll in ZZZ; RWY XX; about 80kts; the Captain called for an abort and we aborted the take-off. As we were aborting I noticed a smell of smoke; and then I saw smoke in the cockpit. I called tower and advised them we were stopping on the runway; we were requesting priority handling; and needed fire trucks. The Captain brought the plane to a stop and then made the announcement to remain seated. The FA called immediately after and said there was smoke in the cabin and the Captain ordered an evacuation. We ran the evacuation checklist; then we opened the door to the cabin and saw it was smoky. The FA opened the main cabin door and people started to line up to evacuate. The Captain decided to help the passengers and asked me to remain in the aircraft. He went out of the aircraft as the fire trucks were arriving. The firemen brought over a ladder and helped the passengers off. We had 23 passengers and one dog and they all exited the aircraft and stood to the south of the plane waiting. There were no injuries. After all the passengers were off; I turned off the batteries and the courtesy lights and left the aircraft. The fire crew went on and detected smoke in the cabin and the lavatory; but no fire. They used a heat seeking device to look for fire but didn't find any. The passengers were bussed back to the terminal; and the crew went to the hangar.

ERJ-145 flight crew reported a rejected take off due to smoke and fumes detected; causing the evacuation of the aircraft.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 42; Flight Crew Total 5800; Flight Crew Type 322

Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Climbing out of FL270; Master Warning lights illuminated; subsequent engine instruments verified actual loss of left engine oil pressure with normal oil temperature indications. Per the Flight Manual; a precautionary engine shutdown was performed and secured per the emergency procedure. ATC was notified of our intention to declare an emergency and return to the departure airport. We; as a crew; decided in order to expedite our return as soon as possible; we would elect to perform an overweight landing instead of dumping fuel over a populated area. An abnormal landing was briefed and conducted without incident. Upon inspection; the engine oil dipstick was found to have a faulty 'O' ring. The aircraft was written up for both the precautionary engine shutdown and the overweight landing.

A LR35 crew declared an emergency and the flight returned to the departure airport after the Master Warning and Oil Pressure Lights alerted the loss of oil quantity because a faulty oil dip stick seal.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 3604; Flight Crew Type 1373

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I was bringing a Baron BE-58 from ZZZ to Roanoke after maintenance. The conditions were IMC with light turbulence. I was in cruise at 6;000 feet and was requested by ATC to descend to 5;400 feet. During the descent; and shortly before reaching the assigned altitude of 5;400 feet; I reached over to add the Tower frequency into the standby radio position; during this process; the aircraft descended through the assigned altitude of 5;400 feet; banked right; and turned 30 degrees to the right and began a descent which reached approximately 1;300 feet per minute. Control was regained at 4;300 feet; well below the assigned altitude of 5;400 feet. During the descent; I was alerted by ATC that a low altitude alert had gone off and I was instructed to climb back up to 5;400 feet. I was already aware of that and had begun to regain control and slow the aircraft by pulling power back and beginning a climb after the aircraft slowed. The speed had gone from 205 knots to 252 knots during the descent. I climbed back up to 5;400 feet and continued in cruise and completed an instrument approach to LDA 6 at Roanoke without incident. While descending; I had inadvertently disconnected the autopilot while entering the radio frequency; which caused the loss of control and altitude. I believe the following may have been contributing factors to this occurrence: Switching aircraft in ZZZ; I'd flown another aircraft there prior to picking up the Baron. Leaving ZZZ; I discovered an oil door open on the right engine cover after I began taxiing out and had to shut down the aircraft during taxi to close the oil door; and then taxi back to the runway again. During call up for taxi and taxiing out; I repeatedly misstated the number on the aircraft (I used the number of the aircraft I'd flown into ZZZ). The Controller even confusingly used the number of the aircraft after I had used it several times. Of course; adjusting a radio frequency while in a descent in IMC conditions caused distraction. During the descent and radio frequency adjustment; I had inadvertently turned off the autopilot. The combination of distraction from changing the radio frequency and inadvertently switching off the autopilot created a situation in which a significant loss of altitude occurred. Contributing factors were surely the open oil door on the right engine and the confusion over using the call sign of the prior aircraft flown.

BE58 pilot reported becoming disoriented during descent in IMC when experiencing light turbulence.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Fuel system synoptic showed fuel flowing from main tank 2 override pumps despite pumps being turned off (feeding tank to engine). Also showed no fuel flowing from any other center source (main 2 or 3) despite both eng pumps in mains 2 and 3 being selected on. Obviously no fuel was being supplied by ovrd pumps due to symmetrical fuel usage from main tanks 2 and 3. Issue corresponded to a CMC [Central Maintenance Computer] message indicating 'fuel supplied from fwd main 2 ovrd pump despite switch off.' That message was dated the day before we departed. Since the CMC is not a pilot preflight item; but is required of Maintenance; it seems someone should have caught that prior to our flight. Had the fuel actually been fed by an override pump that could not be turned off; we could have had a severe fuel balance issue. Also could have resulted in yet another large aircraft stuck in an out station requiring involved Maintenance. Seems like a trend lately.

A B747-400 flight crew noticed that; although the fuel synoptic was indicating fuel to all four engines was being delivered from main tank number 2--despite both override pumps being off--that fuel was being burned per the normal fuel management schedule.  They then discovered that the Central Maintenance Computer had noted the display fault the previous day; but the anomaly had not been addressed by Maintenance.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.3

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

The SOP allows Tower to launch successive departures utilizing pilot provided visual separation. The ATCT must modify the secondary scratchpad in the STARS data-tag to advise the TRACON that pilot provided visual separation is being used. However; in this case the first aircraft is an [Airbus] and that type of aircraft is notorious for climbing out much slower than most other aircraft. According to the FALCON replay the trailing B738 is 1.55 miles behind the [Airbus] with a 60 knot overtake. I restricted the B738 to 230 knots and requested the [Airbus] increase to 250 knots as soon as possible. Despite those efforts the situation continued to compress. While I was aware pilot provided visual separation was being utilized; in my judgment the situation had become unsafe and I decided to break our noise abatement procedures and initiate an early eastbound turn for the B738. After initiating the turn I made the supervisor aware of the situation. Both aircraft subsequently continued their departures without further incident.This is a common problem that we experience with [this type of Airbus departure]. I do not know why this specific aircraft type climbs out so differently; but it is common knowledge at the TRACON. I would propose that this situation could be corrected by changing the Letter of Agreement to exclude [this Airbus aircraft type departure] from the provision allowing the use of pilot provided visual separation between successive departures. If Tower had utilized the standard 3-5 mile in-trail spacing that would have been required during IMC; this event would have been completely avoided.

S46 TRACON Controller stated Airbus type departing aircraft routinely climb at much slower airspeeds than similar size type aircraft.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 2500

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On above time and date at SJC I taxied from FBO to 30L at intersection C for departure.  Upon completing the run up at about a 45 degree angle to runway facing departure end; I switched frequency to Tower frequency and immediately heard tower call me asking if I was ready.  I responded in the affirmative.  Tower's response was partially stepped on but I thought I was given take off clearance with an advisory of traffic on 2 1/2 mile final.  Since with Tower's initial call to me asking if I was ready I sensed possible urgency and in my attempt to assist in that perceived urgency I quickly ran through pre take off flow and turned aircraft perpendicular to runway which placed the aircraft partially over the hold short line.  Upon becoming perpendicular to runway I looked for the said traffic on final and saw the traffic not on 2 1/2 mile final but on short final.  I immediately stopped the aircraft at which time Tower urgently advised me to hold short.  I believe the tail of the aircraft was approximately at the hold short line with of course the rest of the aircraft beyond the hold short line.  The Tower did advise the landing traffic to go around.  After take off I was given a phone number to call.  Immediately upon landing I called said phone number as requested and discussed occurrence with Tower.

Pilot reported communications issues with ATC led to a runway incursion and the tower directing the other aircraft to go around.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 439; Flight Crew Type 12000

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

We were cleared to descend via the RNAV Arrival into ZZZ. While at FL270; ATC stated 'Do me a favor and cross ZZZZZ intersection at FL190.' The FMC wouldn't initially take FL190 at ZZZZZ intersection because the following waypoint (ZZZZZ1) had a restriction of FL200A. While working with the FMC to correct this problem; we failed to clarify if ATC wanted us to 'descend via; except cross ZZZZZ at FL190'; so with the ZZZZZ2 crossing restriction of FL240A (which is only 7.5 miles west of ZZZZZ) it left an extremely steep descent after the ZZZZZ2 intersection. Passing ZZZZZ2 Pilot Flying (PF) intervened with Vertical Speed and increased the rate of descent to make the crossing restriction. PF failed to immediately reset the MCP altitude to FL190 for the degrade in automation. Passing FL197; at a high rate of descent; the altitude window was reset to FL190; but further intervention and automation degradation was required to keep from busting through FL190. During this intervention; neither the PF nor the Pilot Monitoring (PM) noticed that the autopilot had disengaged. As a result the aircraft leveled initially at FL190 and then continued to descend to FL183. The next waypoint [after ZZZZZ1] on the arrival is ZZZZZ3; which has an altitude restriction of FL190. We descended to FL183 ft before correcting back up to FL190. The rest of the arrival and landing were uneventful. There were a number of things we could have done to prevent this event from occurring: Clarify the clearance with ATC. The removal of the FL240A restriction just prior to the ZZZZZ intersection would have allowed us to remain in the highest level of automation and allowed the FMC to correctly program a descent formula. If we had immediately reset the MCP altitude to FL190; the autopilot could have assisted in leveling off at the proper altitude. Proper phraseology by ATC could have mitigated the problem. Both Pilots should have been more vigilant in monitoring the aircraft to detect that the autopilot had disengaged.

B737 Flight Crew reported the aircraft overshot the altitude restriction because the autopilot disconnected.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 128.95; Flight Crew Total 4418.93; Flight Crew Type 3074.03

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Crew both inbound to EWR and outbound had to switch off guard frequency (121.5) with distraction of frequent inappropriate transmissions taking place (meowing sounds; political utterances; etc). Transmissions occurred throughout New York airspace. Safety was obviously diminished with the inability of crew to monitor frequency for potential safety related information. Absent switching off frequency; crew was unable to appropriately hear and monitor primary ATC frequencies.

Air Carrier Captain reported inappropriate radio transmissions on guard frequency interfered with their ability to hear ZNY ATC instructions.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

When departing Runway XXR in ZZZ; the left throttle was difficult to set for takeoff power; but by the time the problem was identified the aircraft was already at V1. Departure commenced and climb continued. The left engine APR (Automatic Performance Reserve) fired and the left engine was non-responsive to the movement of the throttle. When reaching 10;000 ft the aircraft was under control; the Captain transferred the controls to me and told me to get delayed vectors. The Captain started the QRH checklist for Uncommanded acceleration/ENG OVERSPEED after completion of the emergency checklist. The single engine in-flight engine shutdown checklist was commenced on Abnormal. After completing Abnormal the problem still continued. The Captain [advised] ATC and commenced the Severe Engine Damage In-flight QRH procedure. After selecting LH ENG FIRE PUSH switch light; the problem resolved and all associated emergency; abnormal; and normal checklists were completed. The captain and I briefed the approach and landing to Runway XXR at ZZZ. The Flight Attendant was notified that the aircraft would be returning to ZZZ for a precautionary landing. The passenger announcement was made in flight advising passengers of a maintenance issue that required the aircraft to return to landing at ZZZ. The Captain had me transfer the controls back to him and landed the aircraft. Upon landing we taxied off Runway XXR and [airport] crews did a post flight walk around of the aircraft. During crew walk around another passenger announcement was made advising passengers to remain seated with seat belts fastened and that the aircraft would be parking at [the] gate. After the aircraft was given all clear; the aircraft taxied to the gate and parked without further issue. After gate arrival passenger announcement was made advising passengers of the reason we returned to field. After parking at the gate; Maintenance write up was made by the Captain and associated phone calls were made to document the incident. [A] defective thrust lever on the left engine [could be solved by] possible checks more often on engine thrust levers.

When departing Runway XXR in ZZZ; the left throttle was difficult to set for takeoff power as reported by the First Officer; but by the time the problem was identified the aircraft was already at V1. Departure commenced and climb ensued. Left Engine APR (Automatic Performance Reserve) fired and Left Engine was non-responsive to throttle lever movement. Upon reaching 10;000 ft and aircraft under control. Captain transferred controls to the First Officer and told FO to get delay vectors. Captain started QRH checklist for Uncommanded Acceleration/ENG OVERSPEED after completion of emergency checklist. Commenced Single Engine Inflight Engine Shutdown checklist on Abnormal. After completing Abnormal problem was still ongoing. Captain then [advised] ATC and commenced Severe Engine Damage in Flight QRH procedure. Upon selecting LH ENG FIRE PUSH switch light problem resolved and all associated emergency; abnormal; and normal checklists were completed. Flight crew briefed approach and landing to Runway XXR at ZZZ. Flight attendant was notified that we would be returning to ZZZ for a precautionary landing. Passenger announcement was made in flight advising passengers of a maintenance issue that required return to landing at ZZZ. Captain then commenced transfer of controls back to Captain and landed aircraft. Upon landing aircraft taxied off Runway XXR and [airport] crews did a post flight walk around of the aircraft. During crew walk around another passenger announcement was made advising passengers to remain seated with seat belt fastened and that aircraft would be parking at [the] gate. After aircraft was given all clear we taxied to the gate and parked without further issue. After gate arrival passenger announcement was made advising passengers of reason we needed to return to field. After parking at gate maintenance write-up was made and associated phone calls were made to document incident.

Flight crew reported experiencing a malfunction with one of the aircraft's power levers resulting in a return to the departure airport.