ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

This flight was flown into RNO during a period of variable weather and visibilities with intermittent snow and rain in the area. The arrival time was near dusk. I was the Pilot Flying and we briefed and flew the RNAV RNP Y 16R. The approach was flown in accordance with our Standard Procedures with .3 set on the RNP on the LEGS page and the ANP showing a .01 accuracy. I believe the temperature was above freezing. The approach was backed up with the RNO ILS to 16R with 110.9 set in both NAV radios. While on the approach approximately one mile prior to MASTR; and in contact with RNO Tower; the Tower issued a Low Altitude Alert to us. No EGPWS Cautions or Warnings occurred. We checked both EGPWS indications and raw radio altimeter indications and all were normal and green. We were monitoring aircraft status on the approach; the approach mode was in LNAV and VNAV PATH and our path indicators were centered for vertical and lateral deviations. The autopilot and autothrottles were engaged in CMD mode. Nothing on the approached looked abnormal and the ghost glide path indications from the 16R ILS were centered with the VNAV PATH indications.As the aircraft rolled out on final near OKITE all Localizer indications were centered as well. Basically everything worked fine with the aircraft and we landed uneventfully. Upon our taxi back we queried the Tower concerning the low altitude alert while on the approach. They said that if the aircraft is near one of the mountains while on the approach that their equipment will signal the warning. I think that if this is part of the normal procedure while flying the RNAV RNP approaches that there should be a note either on the approach plate or within the Company 10-7 pages to prevent confusion.This is a high threat airport when it comes to terrain. The RNAV RNP approaches reduce the risks extensively. If our procedures are going to cause an ATC low altitude warning; then we need to know that either on the approach plate or on the Company information page. I really should get no warning from ATC when the approach is flown properly.

B737 Captain reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC on approach to RNO even though the aircraft appeared to be on course and altitude.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 4600

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Weather; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft

The automated weather is available with 5 clicks on the Unicom Frequency at 3B1 Greenville; Maine. The automated weather reported wind calm. The RNAV 14 instrument approach was used and there was an 18 knot tailwind on short final. This was not acceptable for a straight in landing. The approach had to be a circling approach to runway 32 or a missed approach. The automated weather does not appears on ADS-B or on Sirius XM weather in the cockpit. It does appear on Foreflight which is not available in the air. This is a very serious safety issue. The weather should be available on airborne receivers such as XM or ADS-B and the information must be correct. I believe that this represents an accident looking for a place to happen. Can this be fixed?

A pilot reported there is no way to receive the current weather for 3B1 non-towered airport while airborne.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22.7; Flight Crew Total 1159.8; Flight Crew Type 553.7

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was doing take offs and landings at ZZZ using runway XX. I announced departing runway XX and remaining in the pattern. As I was turning downwind a Cessna 182; Aircraft Y announced he was taking off on runway YY. I looked at the runway and he was really departing on runway XX; not YY. I didn't correct him because I was the only one in the pattern and I thought he just miss-spoke. I had him in sight the whole time. After I did several landings I heard Aircraft Y report 9 miles southwest of the airport and he said he was going to land on runway YY. I told him that XX was the runway being used; and he replied that he would enter a downwind for XX.I did another landing and as I reported turning downwind Aircraft Y reported that he would enter the downwind for XX on the 45. I was wondering how he was going to do that if he was southwest of the airport. As I was on the downwind approaching abeam the numbers of XX; I saw Aircraft Y pass in front of me about 100 feet above and 200 feet horizontally. I watched him pass in front of me and then he reported turning downwind for runway XX. I told him he just flew a crosswind for Runway YY and cut across the downwind for XX. I turned base and final for XX and asked Aircraft Y for his location. He reported crosswind for XX; which I was able to confirm. He was no factor for my landing at that point.The guy in Aircraft Y; obviously doesn't know what runway he is using and needs additional training. How does a 182 driver not know which end of the runway is in use? Guys like that are dangerous.

Pilot reported a near mid air collision with an aircraft using the opposing runway without communicating their intentions correctly.


Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 4100; Flight Crew Type 250

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Landing gear recently serviced re: uplock switch.  Preflight indicated hydraulic fluid not full; noticed in sight glass. Notified mechanic who affirmed it was full and probably overfilled.  Possible bubble at sight glass.  Went on word of mechanic and after further preflight departed on an instrument training flight ZZZ-ZZZ1.  Upon gear retraction at takeoff; the uplocks released and [gear] failed to retract further; hanging in the 'wasp leg' position.  Having the instrument student continue flying the aircraft; recycled the gear...little movement observed in the mirrors owner had installed under each wing.  Contacted ATC that we needed to troubleshoot a landing gear issue while holding over ZZZ2.  For the next 45 minutes we (instrument student and myself) communicated with the aircraft's owner on the ground via text messaging initially; followed by radio on a discrete frequency while he was in contact with the mechanic. Recycled the gear several times with very little movement and initiated the emergency gear extension procedures using the hand pump. Upon pulling out the handle all the way to the extension; the handle would not move up or down as it seemed 'locked.'  At that point recycled the gear handle several times noticing a fair amount of movement in the landing gear (reference mirrors) indicating there was some hydraulic fluid in the system.  Student reached for the handle and was able to release it with a firm upwards movement and we were able to further pump the gear down to confirm locked. Declared an emergency and preceeded to land [returned to] ZZZ with a runway flyby for the Tower to visually confirm landing gear extension; most noticeably the nose gear.  Landed uneventfully on 18R and taxied to FBO. Aircraft was put up jacks for a landing gear checks about an hour later confirming fluid was low; most likely due to the aircraft was connected to the hydraulic 'mule' after it's servicing and the fluid drained out.  Several swings of the landing gear during the course of the next 30 minutes on jacks confirmed there was no mechanical concerns.  A test flight was completed later that evening indicating no extension or retraction issues.

Reporter stated the Cessna C-210 had a Continental IO-520 Six cylinder engine. There are only two lights in the cockpit for the landing gears: an Amber light for gear 'in-transit;' meaning anything not 'locked' and a Green light for 'Down' and 'Locked' for all three gears. He did a runway 'Flyby' just to confirm the nose gear was showing down since he did not have a mirror mounted on the aircraft to view the nose gear. Reporter stated the low Hydraulic fluid was most likely caused by the Hydraulic mule equipment being positioned lower than the aircraft's service connection. Although initially the hydraulic quantity was probably 'full' or over serviced; gravity allowed the hydraulic fluid to flow back into the mule unnoticed; prior to Mechanic disconnecting the hydraulic service line.

A Flight Instructor describes the efforts of a student pilot and himself to manually extend the landing gears on a Cessna C210 aircraft after takeoff when all three gears failed to fully retract. Landing gears were hanging in the 'Wasp Leg' position.  Low Hydraulic fluid quantity was a contributor.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

GPS; FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 22L

Relief Pilot; First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance

After ATC handoff to EWR tower during approach to runway 22L; the Captain PM (Pilot Monitoring); was unable to get any reply (after 2-3 check-in transmissions) from the tower controller; who seemed highly preoccupied with conversations/clearances to aircraft on the ground taxiways. At the 1000 AFE (Above Field Elevation); both PM and PF (Pilot Flying) verified 'no landing clearance' and; at approximately 500 AFE 'runway is clear. 'Thereafter; it was my expectation that we would either get a late landing clearance during a break in the Tower COMMs; or that we would execute a go-around from a safe in-close altitude. Nonetheless; I continually scanned the runway and adjacent taxiways (as well as monitoring the Tower frequency for possible runway conflicts; all of which presented no apparent hazards. No break in the Tower COMMs with other aircraft (all/most of which were on the ground) occurred. At approximately 150-200 AGL on a perfectly stabilized approach; I verbalized 'We don't have a landing clearance' to my fellow pilots. The Captain then directed the PF to land the aircraft. While this surprised me; it was clear that the runway and adjacent taxiways were clear; and that a forced 'Go around' from my seat could prove hazardous; considering our very low altitude ~100 AFE; and any delay/confusion from the contradictory messages. Of secondary concern was the additional COMM load and confusion we would create on the already jammed Tower frequency by executing what would likely be a very surprising go-around; back into his airspace. Landing; taxi to the gate; and all subsequent ATC communications were uneventful. After engine shutdown and completion of the Parking Checklist; we pilots discussed the events in detail. This conversation made clear that each of us was monitoring many considerations all the way down the approach; constantly evaluating the safest COMM and maneuvering options. Each of us did what we felt was safest; moment to evolving moment; and also would have changed certain choices considering how the event played out. In retrospect; I regret that we landed without a clearance. We had plenty of fuel and clear skies; a crew-coordinated go-around from a safe altitude (above ~ 150-200 AGL) perhaps would have been the better option. Every second of any pilot talking (especially me; the IRO) created another possible missed radio call; of course; but I likely could have better addressed the creeping threat by asking early - perhaps approaching 500 AGL - 'Are we prepared to go missed?' If a directed go-around later became necessary; at least it would come as less of a startling or confusion-inducing surprise.

Switched to Newark Tower frequency 118.3 outside BUZZD ILS 22L fix. Tower communications were very busy with numerous air carrier and helicopter arrival; departure and taxiing traffic. Our initial calls to tower went unanswered. Since it is not unusual for ATC to respond to other traffic first before responding to unanswered callers; I fully anticipated Tower to get back to us with clearance to land. That never happened. Conditions were clear with calm winds allowing me to observe the entire runway area. I had preceding traffic in sight and observed them exit 22L via a high-speed turnoff. While I was waiting for a break on Tower frequency to call again for landing clearance; Tower issued a long stream of clearances to ground traffic: A lineup 22R clearance and then multiple cross 22R clearances to aircraft that had landed 22L prior to us that were holding short of 22R. Tower then gave repeated clearances to another air carrier to cross Runway 11 at S. All these required read backs and some repeats. This occurred as we were getting closer and closer without landing clearance. Once I realized we would not get a word in before touching down; I told the pilot flying to continue and land. I have spent a lot of time thinking about this event since it happened yesterday. Directing the pilot flying to land without clearance was a difficult decision I did not make lightly. Weighing multiple factors; I decided landing was the safest course of action. We had been sequenced to follow traffic with normal spacing. We switched to tower frequency and checked in but went unanswered. As we continued inbound; frequency congestion resulted in no landing clearance. In my opinion; all along the Tower intended for us to land but was saturated with other traffic and simply remained unaware that landing clearance had not been issued. I do not believe clearance was intentionally withheld or delayed due to separation or conflict. I honestly believe lack of clearance was an oversight due to task saturation. Unlike an unstable approach scenario that should result in a go around; our approach was stable. Further; I sometimes observe helicopter traffic overhead making their approach to EWR. Sometimes that traffic is pointed out and sometimes it is not. Had we discontinued our approach and gone around; the potential loss of separation with either 22R departure traffic or overhead helicopter traffic combined with Tower frequency congestion were rapid considerations that made me decide that continuing to land on the clear; available and intended 22L was the better; safer course. It was never my intention to land without clearance. Yesterday; I felt doing so was the safest course to follow. All of these considerations happened in a short; stressed time.

Flight crew reported the inability to obtain landing clearance at Newark due to frequency congestion; ultimately resulted in a landing without clearance after visually clearing the runway.


Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Attendant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Company Policy

Upon boarding my flight I was approached by a Flight Attendant refusing to wear a mask. I inquired why and was informed COVID is fake and masks violate constitutional rights. I was afraid of confrontation to push back further; so I just asked Flight Attendant to stay away from me. It created an uncomfortable work situation where I had to decide between feeling safe; and wanting to maintain peace. For the rest of the trip not only was my health put at risk; but others were as well. From other cabin to each and every passenger on board; our health was more at risk then it needs to be due to non-compliance of a requirement.To avoid a lack of CRM and a situation where FAs might become hostile towards each other; as well as for everyone's health and safety; masks must be mandated unless strictly for medical reasons.

Flight Attendant reported that another Flight Attendant refused to wear a mask during boarding and throughout the flight. Reporter expressed concern that the health of passengers and other cabin crew were put at risk.


Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Weather; Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure

On departure; #2 GEN faulted and would not reset. Complied with checklist and started APU. During cruise; APU auto-shutdown. Complied with checklist and restarted APU successfully on first attempt. Then received CABIN PRESS REG SYS 2 fault. Complied with checklist; REG SYS 1 operated normally. Although no ECAM indications were present; the Auto Fuel-Feed system had malfunctioned. With the center tank being empty; the system remained Center Tank [CTR TK] pumps instead of switching to Inner [INR] TK pumps. Fuel burned out of sequence from outer tanks until we shut down the CTR TK pumps. After this; we discussed if another event/failure occurred; we would divert to an airport with better weather than our filed destination. Contacted [dispatch] via ACARS and they concurred with either the closest or the furthest but the best weather. During descent; APU GEN went offline; but APU remained running. Shortly after; relay shuttling began and First Officer's (FO) Primary Flight Display; Navigation Display; and both ECAM displays began to flicker on and off for roughly 10 seconds. Then; received SPLR 6 FAULT SPLR 4+1 FAULT; PITCH TRIM 2 OFF; YAW DAMPER 2 OFF; TRIM TK SYS FAULT; FWS AMBER CAUTION NOT AVAILABLE; R LAT HEAT FAULT; AND R WDSL FAULT. Shortly thereafter; FO's ADC went offline; and all the above mentioned displays went blank for approximately 1 minute; then came back online. Autopilot and auto throttles disconnected. Captain assumed role of Pilot Flying and FO became pilot monitoring. We [advised] ATC and requested the ILS 16R as previously discussed. Complied with ECAM and QRH procedures as able until on final approach. Completed Normal Approach and Before Landing Checklists. Landed in visual conditions without further incident and cleared the runway. Emergency vehicles were standing by; although not specifically requested.At our departure airport moderate rain was falling during offload and unload; as well as during taxi and takeoff. After shutdown at the divert airport; maintenance and fire crews inspected the electronics and equipment bay and found water dripping from above onto Generator Control Units (GCU) and other equipment. Found evidence of water moving along the floor from the nose aft towards the belly compartments.

An A300 Captain reported numerous equipment malfunctions in flight. After landing; water was observed in the electronics compartment.


Workload; Confusion; Distraction; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

After takeoff the FMS dumped our flight plan for the second time with this aircraft. We reentered the flight plan as per the PDC. After the first VOR we were suppose to fly to an en route intersection and then the airport arrival. What we didn't realize is that intersection was not in the flight plan. ATC asked to verify our routing; we told them we were direct an intersection on the arrival. We also stated that our flight plan dumped out of the FMS after takeoff and had some issues with it. ATC stated no problem; simply fly to the en route intersection then the arrival. They stated no issues. [This] reiterated the [need] to double check the flight plan more accurately especially after having problems with the FMS.

[Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]

An EMB145 FMS dumped the flight plan so the crew reentered the data from the PDC but entered an intersection which was not in the flight plan for the destination arrival.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 2450; Flight Crew Type 500

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Took off from ZZZ in VFR and picked up IFR plan and was given clearance to 190. After passing through a thin layer I encountered a very large build up and the base was lower than the MEA. I was concerned for the safety of flight and descended below the MEA in order to clear the buildup. I did this without calling center. Center was very upset and canceled my flight plan. After clearing the buildup I began my climb again and was reissued my clearance.

TBM pilot reported deviating below MEA to avoid weather.


Flight Attendant Airline Total 5; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 5; Flight Attendant Total 17; Flight Attendant Type 85

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

During taxi; we had to sit on runway and wait for a thunderstorm to pass; the flight attendants in the back of aircraft had smelled a chemical/ hot electrical smell. Both were developing sinus headaches and raspy throats. I working 1st class therefore smelled nothing at that time. After my service and during descent; I went to the back of the aircraft as the girls had started to smell the chemical smell again. I walked to the back and could definitely smell it. Captain was advised. In ZZZ1; mechanics came onboard. One of the mechanics took the aircraft out of service.  We were taken to the medical clinic for evaluation. Myself and Flight Attendant #2 were eventually released to deadhead home.  Flight Attendant #4 was kept for a breathing treatment and kept overnight. The next day she was deadheaded home.

A319 Flight Attendant crew reported experiencing 'chemical/electrical' fumes in passenger cabin which resulted in health issues. Flight Attendant crew taken to medical clinic for evaluation and treatment.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Generator placarded. At cruise flight APU failure. Diversion to ZZZ. Landed overweight.

B767 First Officer reported APU failed inflight; with one engine generator already on MEL; which caused the flight to divert and land overweight.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

I was pilot Flying (PF). Late configuring flaps on [a] night visual approach to ZZZ RWY XXL. Hand flying with auto throttles off. Cause [was] misinterpretation of final approach fix location on Jeppesen chart and GS intercept altitude on chart. I did not see that the GS intercept altitude was only 3 miles from runway and about 1100 [feet] AGL. I assumed most GS intercept altitudes were 1500-2000 AGL and 5-6 miles from runway. I turned base and descended to 1600 [feet]. I was hand flying with auto throttles off for proficiency. I noted I did get about 75-100 low on this approach. My intent was to intercept final at 1600 [feet] and finish configuring full flaps when GS was about 1/2 dot. I did this but as it turns out I was 984 [feet] AGL when it happened so I got a printout showing late configuration. My [situational awareness] was not where it should have been. I did not really even notice I was so low until the 1000 [feet] call was made. At that point I should have gone around per SOP since I was not fully configured for landing. Contributing factors [included] unfamiliar airport. Night. Poor runway lighting coming in on left downwind. Runway lights are very dim and hard to see clearly until established on final. Too much task loading on me. I thought it would have been easier flying by hand but I felt I was definitely in the yellow on this approach because I just don't practice this enough. Lack of regular flying. Me; interpreting a cross as FAF/GS intercept altitudes as always around 1500-2000 AGL and 5-6 miles from runway. The 1600 [feet] published altitude was the trap that set me up on this. I had forgotten field elevation was about 500 [feet]. Suggestions [are] for me; in the future; I will practice no autopilot/no autothrottle approaches only in day VMC to airports I am very familiar with [and] with long stable final approaches anticipated. Night visuals especially from downwinds are a challenge. If unfamiliar with airport I will ask for vectors to intercept ILS in the future. I know it's not [going to] happen but make ZZZZZ at 2100 [feet] the GS intercept altitude point. I noticed also a lot of the ILS approaches into ZZZ have this really low GS intercept altitude. This is not good!

A320 Captain reported a CFTT/unstable approach due to human factors.


Pilot Not Flying; Captain; Airport Personnel

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

In-flight; Pre-flight; Aircraft In Service At Gate

Aircraft Automation Overrode Flight Crew; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

I arrived for my 4th of 4 days; XA:20 show to operate me scheduled flight. The plane had 4 MELs to begin with. The two I'll focus on are 27-XX-XX-Y. After reviewing the MEL; there were several people questioning whether we could even apply this specific MEL. The Modification (MOD) list needed to be referenced and after that was complete it came down to the word 'OR' as the aircraft had one MOD installed but not the other. After 40 minutes of discussion; the TLR was modified. If you also include the passenger medical issue requiring a paramedic sign off; you can see it was a very busy morning already. After successful engine start; we performed the first control check (not required by the MEL) and observed only 'pair 3' locked out. Per the sign off; the aircraft needed both sets disabled. We needed to leave the ramp for company to push. With all the GA traffic the only place to go was the end of the runway. After a quick review of the MEL; for either a paperwork swap to one pair inoperative or for two pair inoperative; we needed a Mechanic (MX). We verified this with Maintenance Control; :25 later (can't remember exactly) we parked at the gate. Just to take a second here ... The system was 'MELed' on the 4th and flew. We're the spoilers correctly disconnected? If so; did they trouble shoot overnight and not re-comply? These two items I don't have the information for but I do know for a fact I was given the plane with a non-compliant MEL procedure. The flight Ops assistant met us and inquired about the situation. I gave him a quick airbus systems dissertation on why we were back at the gate. MX quickly met us and took the logbook to examine the work and why we weren't in compliance. Within: 10 or so they were back and another: 03 the new procedure was apparently completed. 'Wow I thought that was quick'. Looking at the Flight Control (F/CTL) page we now had 3/4 spoilers 'X-ed' out. Even though it did not call for the next step; I insisted we do a control check prior to push. They cleared the outside and the 'visible cockpit indications' showed correct deflections. We buttoned up and pushed back; check Automatic Information System (AIS) for times. Maybe an hour late? This is the SECOND TIME we were apparently MEL compliant. I can't speak for what the other crew saw but as for us; everything we saw on the instruments and paperwork said we were compliant. My First Officer (FO) was flying the first leg. It was windy for our departure; rotation was normal but the coordination and turning were sloppy. Probably due to both turbulence and 1/2 of the roll spoilers gone. As we accelerated thru 12;000' and the ride calmed down thru the upper teens; we started to notice the Left Hand (LH) wing started to indicate a slight wing down indication on the Primary Flight Display (PFD). As we climbed further and transitioned to Mach; the indication continued. We changed to the #1 DFGC; at first there appeared to be some improvement but that later mimicked #2. We disconnected the autopilot and manually trimmed the plane out with the rudder. We couldn't fully right the wings. Once we leveled at FL360; we reengaged #2 and watched the PFD/F/CTL indications. 2-3deg LH turn on the PFD; LH AIL outside the cruise ticks; RH AIL normal. Rudder showing a 1.7deg R deflection. We started communication via ACARS with dispatch and MX. Over the next hour the problem continued to progress to a greater offset and more rudder correction. We tried again to disconnect and manually fly but this time there was no correction to be had. We couldn't level the wings. VERY uneasy feeling in a FBW plane that has no aileron trim installedAt our Time of Departure (TOD); the first step down; it actually felt like the plane was in a mild 'slip'. Not indicated as much but we were definitely not tracking straight. We took a conservative descent approach. The headwinds helped get us down in time. We vectored into the pattern eventually on the downwind. Everytime we turned (especially to the left) we experienced a very noticeable uncoordinated slip all the way thru the turn. These factors continued to worsen until we passed flaps 2. Then all indications flopped. Rudder inputs remained but opposite aileron and spoiler indications. At 600' we has LH AIL deflected 50-60% down; RH AIL deflected 30-40% up. ALL REMAINING spoilers on RH wing extended normal rudder indications but we were in a slip down the GS. We increased speed and flew a shallow approach as we had 11;000'+ to land on. It was a positive touchdown in light winds and VFR conditions. We used more braking than reverse for this landing; the rollout was normal. I felt VERY uneasy and out of control while operating this airplane that I have trusted now for 2 1/2 years.When we arrived at the gate; a mechanic (as I requested) met the plane. As I began to enter as much data into the logbook; the FO sends me a picture of the LH wing ... THE LOCKED OUT #4 SPOILER IS DEFLECTED 10-15deg. This is impossible I said to myself! It's locked out electrically via SEC1 and the MX procedure should have had the existing hydraulic pressure holding it in place. We've all read the articles about spoiler float and it can present in different ways; poor rotation or extended TO run; poor handling; rumbling; etc. of which the handling was assumed; initially; to be the missing spoilers.After a very thorough search by our 'unexperienced airbus on call MX' (who worked at night on the line); we discovered the panel WAS NEVER LOCKED OUT. ONLY TWO OF THE THREE STEPS WERE FOLLOWED. This was the 3rd miss by our maintenance team. I talked in great length with 3 different dispatchers; one in training; the duty pilot and my crew about the situation and how we felt the plane may be unsafe to fly. I think what I was looking for was a 100% '... Yes this was a spoiler float event and not electrically influenced ...' We would never receive such a statement. For a large portion of the delay I was convinced I was not moving the plane anywhere. We eventually came to an agreement after several control checks; inspecting the spoilers myself and factoring in all the other 'pros' we had (long runway; VFR; light winds; only 142k) that we would take the plane. We planned on engaging the autopilot very early in the flight and if the wing dipped; even a bit; we were going to declare an emergency; apply the penalty and land overweight. We loaded after an extensive delay. During Engine #2 start; we experienced an IGN B failure that needed to be deferred. I'll just mention here this system has been deferred more than just once. I reluctantly say more than 10 because that may not be factual but if someone was looking at the history; I'd bet I'm not far off. I know they have replaced several parts and continue to troubleshoot but the #2 motors' initial power applications lag; and normal starts have taken 1:40. All significantly different than others but that's another story ... At times this aircraft has carried 8+ MELs at one time. This (and apparently sister ships which are both at out departure airport) are a great barrier to completing on time; reliable and predictable operations for our customers. During this delay; we needed to amend the release for fuel burn AND extend: 30 to complete our mission. At no time did the company or safety or the duty pilot or whoever just ask how we were. Look at this chain of events? It's NOT supposed to be like this. I hope I caught everything I needed to because we were definitely doing the job of SEVERAL departments this day. This was easily one of the top 5 most challenging days I've had here in all my years. The possibility of an aircraft accident was created by incomplete maintenance procedures; and the lack of possibly parts; tools; or personnel to complete either the deferral of a repair. This is supposed to be a fairly routine procedure. This incident indicates a need for properly trained maintenance technicians andsome sort of cross check being implemented for these aircraft. It highlights the need for readdressing how this company perceives its maintenance function. While maintenance may have failed to accomplish a maintenance procedure; other links in the chain held fast. A properly trained crew was able to safely fly a compromised airframe; without further damage. I hope that I have been able to convey the importance of this incident. This event points out how dangerously thin this company's resources are apparently being pulled. It's also apparent that the schedule pressured is obviously elevated at the expense of a thorough procedure. Our [company] does not enjoy the luxury of any mistake!Multiple mechanics doing every MEL procedure. Some system of cross checks MUST be implemented by maintenance.

A320 Captain reported MEL procedures were not complied with completely causing irregular flight characteristics.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3; Flight Crew Total 1475; Flight Crew Type 600

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Was using Foreflight. Was on airport page for 01G and selected A/FD tab. Forgot it only goes to the page and not directly to the right airport. Was looking at the traffic pattern altitude for Penn Yan [PEO] rather than Perry Warsaw and wound up quite low on downwind over houses. Adjusted best as I could and figured out my mistake once on the ground.

PA28 pilot reported using Foreflight to find the TPA for 01G and inadvertently selected the altitude for PEO due to the lack of familiarity with the Foreflight A/FD tab. PEO has a 570 foot lower field elevation resulting in the traffic pattern being flown very low initially.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Type 100

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Had to return due to dual pressure controller failure; which resulted in an overweight landing. I coordinated with Dispatch; Station Ops and Maintenance for the overweight landing. After landing; I wrote up the pressurization issue; and then got caught up with multiple phone calls from Dispatch; Supervisor on Duty and [others]. At some point; while I was on the phone; Maintenance took the logbook to work the pressurization issue. I was informed that we were going to another aircraft; so we departed the aircraft. The previous aircraft was towed away; and we departed with the new aircraft. Once we got to cruise I reviewed [the paperwork] and realized that I hadn't made a logbook write up for the overweight landing. I sent an ACARS message to Dispatch to forward to Maintenance Control; about the missing write up. Upon landing; I called and talked to Maintenance Control so that the Maintenance Tech doing the inspection would document in logbook.

B737-700 Captain reported a dual pressure controller failure which resulted in a return to departure airport.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Physiological - Other

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Cleared to descend via the ZZZZZ2 arrival except maintain 10;000 feet. Initially high; changed descent mode from managed to open and selected 300 knots to get to path with speed protection. However; due to distractions; failed to manage descent appropriately. A few miles from ZZZZZ with a constraint of 12;000 feet from FL190 I noticed we were approaching 12;000 feet rapidly. I asked the FO to request descent to 10;000 feet. We leveled off; but not in time and crossed ZZZZZ several hundred feet below 12;000 feet. ATC did not say anything however this was not safe and not professional airmanship.Distracted with conversation related to COVID and job security instead of flying the aircraft more attentively. Switched descent modes without alerting the PM. Failed to recheck altitude constraint early enough to discover error. Discontinue involved conversations prior to phase of flight changes.

Air Carrier Captain reported an altitude deviation during descent and cited being distracted due having a conversation about COVID-19 and job security.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

We were descending into PHX on the EAGUL 5 RNAV STAR. The arrival had published restrictions of 210 KTS/9;000 FT at QUENY and 120 KTS/7;000 FT at HINEY. Approximately 5NM from QUENY intersection we were told to delete the 210K speed restriction at QUENY. As the aircraft was [already] in altitude capture at 9;000 FT; I deleted the both the speed and altitude restrictions from the Flight Plan page of the FMS. As a result the aircraft [instead of leveling at 9;000 FT] continued a managed descent to the next altitude restriction; 7;000 FT at HINEY. I noticed the error immediately and attempted to arrest the descent by setting 9;000 FT in the altitude window and manually selecting a positive vertical speed. We corrected the descent about 250-300 FT below 9;000 FT but were immediately reminded by PHX Approach to maintain 9;000 FT. By that time we were already back to 9;000 FT. We were given a last minute clearance to deviate from a published RNAV Arrival procedure. That led to us being rushed causing a breakdown in procedure and causing a slight altitude deviation.ATC should not change so many restrictions on published arrivals. I should have simply disconnected the auto-pilot and corrected the deviation by hand.

ATC's late airspeed change to a crossing restriction as the flight approached QUENY on the EAGUL RNAV STAR to PHX; compounded by an FMC programming error; resulted in the deletion of both the speed and altitude restrictions and allowed the A321 to descend 250-300 FT below the required 9;000 MSL.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 2500

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 4300

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Smoke; Fire or Fumes Checklist was followed. [We] declared Emergency with Center. [We] diverted normal approach and landing; not over weight. Emergency equipment met aircraft after landing; after exterior inspection by them; continued to an approved Wide body gate. Flight deck crew stayed with aircraft and assisted Local Maintenance; four hours later flew different aircraft back to departure airport with the passenger. Spoke with Dispatch; Maintenance Control; Duty Manager; at gate.

The pushback; taxi and take-off were all normal. As we reached cruise altitude (FL340) the ride began to deteriorate and we requested higher (FL380). Sometime during this last step climb; approximately 30 minutes into the flight; both the Captain and I noticed a strong burnt electrical smell. The fumes appeared to be strongest along the left side cockpit windows. After several minutes of attempting to determine the origin of the odor; we gave up and both agreed it was time to run the 'Smoke; Fire or Fumes' checklist. I pulled out the QRH and we both donned O2; 100% (step 1). In accordance with the rest of the checklist; we then declared an emergency and diverted to the nearest available airport. At some point during the descent/approach the Captain informed the Purser that the situation in the cockpit was relatively stable and that they could anticipate a normal landing. We accomplished all checklist items and had an uneventful landing and taxi-in. We were followed to the gate by Crash and Rescue.

B767 flight crew experiences electrical fumes climbing to FL380. After attempts to locate the source are unsuccessful the crew complies with QRH procedures and diverts to the nearest suitable airport. A report from one of the flight attendants concerning the diversion is also included.


Confusion; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

Flight pushes back. Fifteen minutes later the crew advises via ACARS need to add MEL 22-10-01; Number 2 A/P inop; aircraft now CAT II.  MEL not showing in system yet; advised crew waiting for Maintenance Control to enter MEL before I could give time/initials. Shortly thereafter; I contacted Maintenance Control due to no MEL showing in system yet; Maintenance Control advises they don't know anything about a problem with the flight. Minutes later an MEL added in system; at same time release amendment and time/initials being sent to crew.  Maintenance Control calls to advise that it was a pilot discovered mechanical and has crew conferenced in on phone.  Crew advises they received the ACARS amendment; added further amendment by voice to include the pilot discovered mechanical control number. Thirty five minutes after this evolution started flight takes off.  Maintenance Control then attempts to add a second MEL 20-03-02 CAT II Operation: Restricted due to Repetitive or Chronic Autoland Discrepancies.  This downgrades the aircraft; which is already airborne to CAT I.   I called Maintenance Control to question whether MEL should be added and CAT status changed on an aircraft already airborne.  Maintenance Control advises that it's just an administrative MEL; that they had done research after the initial pilot discovered mechanical problem and discovered that this was a repetitive issue on this aircraft.  I asked him if this should have been done while the aircraft was still on ground; he responded that they would just remove MEL 20-03-02; but it would be added again as soon as the plane lands.  I then asked Maintenance Control what the CAT status of the aircraft was. He replied that it was back to a CAT II; but would be downgraded upon arrival. This causes me concern because if there is a problem that could prevent the aircraft from being able to shoot a CAT II approach; then the crew needs to know about it; regardless of what the paperwork says.  Maintenance Control removes MEL 20-03-02.  I advised Duty Officer of situation; he concurs there is an issue with what has just transpired.  I relayed same information to Duty Manager. He calls Maintenance Control C3 to find out what the exact situation with the aircraft is. The Duty Manager advises that Maintenance Control is now saying that the autopilot issue may not be a repeat item; it's subject to interpretation once the crew writes it up in the logbook upon arrival.  In the meantime; aircraft is considered in CAT II status.  MEL 20-03-02 will not be added until arrival; if needed per write up and maintenance interpretation.If there are multiple MELs which may need to be applied or research that needs to be done as part of a MEL addition during the pilot discovered mechanical process; Maintenance Control needs to ensure that entire process is completed prior to letting the aircraft continue and get airborne.

A MD-11 Dispatcher describes the Maintenance Department actions before and after departure which would have downgraded the aircraft to a CAT I status inflight; but relented until the aircraft landed with an open maintenance item.


Flight Crew Total 3600; Flight Crew Type 1000

My FO called my attention during our final descent into LAX on the HLYWD 1 arrival; cleared for the approach to 25L; and passing FUELR at 9;000 ft. I looked straight out 12 o' clock a little high and I saw a black object flying by us a few hundred feet above us. I asked him; do you think it was a bird? He said that he thought it was a drone. It was too late to do anything and no strike was suspected. We reported this to the ATC; who reported to other planes. The landing was concluded uneventfully.

EMB-175 Captain reported a NMAC with a UAV on approach to LAX at 9000 ft in the vicinity of FUELR.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 5

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Aircraft X was cleared for takeoff on Runway 22L. City vehicle called for instructions to west ramp.  I instructed the vehicle to proceed via taxiway E; F; & turn left at taxiway A and hold short of Runway 13.  I did not issue a crossing or hold short instruction for Runway 22L.  The vehicle then crossed the runway.  As the city vehicle was clearing Runway 22L the local controller advised me that aircraft X was airborne.  Aircraft X was approximately 100 feet in the air and just north of taxiway G. There is 1600 feet between taxiway G and F. New tower that is taller or in a different location.  It is very hard to see aircraft at the approach end of Runway 22L.

BTR FLM reports of a vehicle wanting to go to the other side of the airport from their present position. Instruction is given with a hold short of a specific runway; which is the third runway that the path will cross. Vehicle doesn't hold short at first runway and crosses while an aircraft is departing that runway.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Declared Emergency

When descending out of FL240 on the SEAVU 2 arrival to LAX; a STAB OUT OF TRIM light illuminated with the Autopilot engaged. The QRH was followed and the autopilot was disengaged. There was no movement from the trim system with either one of the Yoke trim switches (No Electric trim). An emergency was declared; and approach continued with a flaps 15 landing per the QRH to a normal landing.

[Narrative 2 contained no additional information.]

During approach crew experienced a stabilizer out of trim condition.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

It was day two of a two day trip; [morning] sign in. The logbook had two MELs; one fuel related; the other; a pressurization/landing elevation auto function. We were initially delayed due to the local ground crew handling another flight; the mobile air-stair was not in position; as such we were late getting on the airplane; and also subsequently late in beginning the boarding process. Following his exterior pre-flight; the First Officer determined that the aircraft would require to be deiced. In addition to that; the number one FA (Flight Attendant) told me that a headrest on one of the FA jump-seats was broken; and that an ancillary med-kit was also missing. Additional interruptions and distractions included a passenger with a leg injury that required to be moved to an aisle seat; an overhead compartment that would not latch; and we were also dealing with a verbose irate ops-manager who was concerned about not getting his 'out' time.'Needless to say we were busy; and I personally felt that I was getting a bit behind in dealing with the admin stuff. After briefly reviewing the directives on the MELs for compliance; we pushed to the deicing pad. Following deicing; and after reconfiguring the aircraft for engine start and taxi; I spoke to FO (First Officer) about leaving the manual altitude setting at 6;000 feet; just in case we had an emergency that required us to return; or to divert to another high altitude airport with a systems problem. He agreed; and I asked him to remind me to reset it to [the destination] field elevation once we were at cruise altitude. At this point I looked to see if the LANDING ELEV MAN message; (which was required by the MEL) was displayed on the lower ECAM. Either it was not visible; or I just missed it; (I'm not sure which). FO and I then discussed if we needed to press the cabin pressure switch in order to display the MEL required message.Without knowing it; at this point; we had set the table for a self-induced problem. In retrospect; I had somehow confused the CABIN PRESS SD message with the ELEV MAN message; and that by pressing the cabin pressurization switch; I thought that I had satisfied the systems logic; and was in compliance with the MEL directive. [By the way;] it was my leg; an uneventful taxi; and we departed; on an RNAV RNP departure. Passing approximately 9;000 feet. MSL; the Master Warning/ECAM 'Cabin Pressure Excess Cabin Altitude illuminated.' I performed the standard litany; 'my aircraft;' we then identified the problem; and cancelled the master warning. FO picked up the QRH and determined that it was neither a quick action nor an ECAM exception. We both looked at the immediate action item on the ECAM; which stated that we manually deploy the passenger oxygen masks. At this point; both of us were aware that the cabin was climbing past 10;000 feet and with that in mind; we subsequently donned our Oxygen masks and established comms. In order to avoid a rapid climb; I shallowed out our rate and began to accelerate to 250 kts. We had a brief exchange; and then decided that it was more important to try and stop the cabin rate of cabin climb; rather than to immediately deploy the passenger oxygen masks. (My thinking was that option would always be available). I told [my FO] that I would handle ATC; and I asked him to reference the QRH for additional guidance; and to also continue to monitor and call out the cabin altitude on the SD. I informed Center that we had a pressurization issue; and that we needed to remain clear of terrain; preferably at or below 14k; and that we needed some time to run a checklist and to troubleshoot the problem. (We were VFR throughout the entire departure and climb; and we could clearly see all of the terrain along the RNAV SID). ATC subsequently assigned us 13;000 feet followed by a climb to 14k. FO told me that the QRH ECAM message section 'Cab in PR Excess CAB ALT' had taken him to the page for the volcanic ash procedure instead of what we expected to see: the Cabin Altitude follow up. ([By the way;] that's another issue best left to folks who wrote the most recent QRH change). With that in mind; we decided to enter holding; and just use some common pilot-sense to try trouble shoot our problem.The first step that we agreed to do was to put the system back in auto; and see if it would reduce the cabin elevation back to normal parameters. That did not work. I made a quick PA to the passengers; and told them that we were experiencing some minor pressurization problems; and that we would be entering holding while we solved the problem. We then decided to go back to manual pressurization mode; and use the toggle switch on the pressurization panel to control the outflow valve. [The FO] then attempted to bring the cabin altitude back down to normal tolerances. Long story short; he did a great job; and he quickly got the cabin altitude down to 6;000 feet and also back to a normal delta-p; (3.5 or so). At this point we decided to try and put the system back into auto mode; and see if it maintained the current cabin altitude and pressurization. It worked; and the cabin altitude remained stable. We then discussed and decided that it was safe to proceed to our destination. At this point we took off our oxygen masks; and I made a brief PA to the passengers regarding our progress. I then told ATC that we had resolved our issue; and that we'd like to exit the hold and resume our flight planned route. The rest of the flight was uneventful. While en-route; we 'walked back' how we had committed this mental chain of errors; and in doing so; we came to realize that other than verifying switch positions during pre-flights; neither of us had ever touched the pressurization panel; and as such; my systems knowledge had probably atrophied a bit. It was an 'own goal' on my part; and I'm embarrassed that I had confused the manual elevation system with the manual pressurization system; and I had undoubtedly simply misread and/or misunderstood the MEL procedures; along with the synoptic display messages that had confused us. Contributing factors were the high altitude layover; which precluded me getting my usual good rest. More importantly; I allowed myself to be rushed with a bunch of non-operational issues; and in doing so I didn't analyze and sufficiently understand the MEL procedures. Although the QRH was not a causal factor in the chain of events that occurred on the ground; neither of us could not find a single reference in any of the pages in the QRH that were related to the ECAM message 'Cabin Pressure Excess Cabin Altitude illuminated.' That plus the page number problem which we were directed to; was a dead end. Just my two cents here; but someone needs to look at and review the pages for this type of ECAM (and there are dozens of them; and have the references in those pages direct us to the supplemental non-normals.Just my opinion; but a lot of the Airbus verbiage; a language construction in many of the checklists; QRH; pubs; MEL; etc. is less than ideal; and can lead to some level of confusion. It seems to be written by engineers as opposed to operators. Of course; that's just my opinion.

I was the PM (Pilot Monitoring) on the departure. At approximately 9;500 MSL we experienced a warning that the cabin pressure altitude was high. The cabin PA was indicating over 13;000 feet. The Captain announced that he was in control of the aircraft and communications and assigned me to execute the non-normal procedure. We donned our oxygen masks and I elected not to deploy the passenger oxygen masks. I reset the cabin pressure switch to auto and after observing no discernible reduction in the cabin pa; I switched back to manual and toggled the descent switch to descend the cabin. This action had an immediate effect; and after about 3-5 minutes the cabin pa was in an acceptable range. At this time I switched the cabin pressurization back to auto and the system began to operate normally. While I was taking these actions the Captain had reduced our rate of climb; eventually leveling off at 14;000 MSL and entered holding at a nearby fix. When the Captain and I concurred that the system was operating normally; we elected to continue our scheduled flight. We had several distractions during our initial arrival to the airport and during our pre-flight preparation; including delay of the air stairs; late boarding; passenger accommodation; de-icing; and pressure from the station manager to push ASAP.The Captain and I misinterpreted required action on an MEL item and set the pressurization switches incorrectly. The MEL 'actions required' could be a little clearer about the proper indications and where they can be observed. The QRH should be annotated in a way that sends you to the supplemental non-normal instead of a generic page which gives the impression of an omission or a mistake in the yellow page index. More familiarity training with the non-normal operation of the pressurization panel in the Airbus.

A319 flight crew reported experiencing pressurization problems on departure due to improper pressurization panel setup.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

On taxi; final walk-through; as the #2 FA; I noted a passenger who would not wear his mask. The passenger stated that he had asthma. I asked if he had noted that to the gate agent and was he on the list for medical exemption. I walked to first class; reviewed paperwork and had borrowed the #3's tablet as it was closer to me. After speaking to the passenger; I went back up to first class to return #3's tablet. Clearly; I didn't process that the Captain had made the prepare for takeoff PA and found myself in the FWD galley for takeoff. In over 20 years; I have never had this happen to me; I was positively stunned that I wasn't in my jumpseat for takeoff. The #1 and #3 stated that I should stay where I was as an attempt to run to my jumpseat during takeoff could injure myself or our passengers. The personal sense [of] fear; shock and embarrassment I am experiencing over not being in my jumpseat for takeoff will more than likely make me hyper vigilant to this issue. In addition; I will place more emphasis on situational awareness and pay greater attention to PAs being made; stopping what I am doing to pay attention to what is being communicated. Recent global events (COVID-19 pandemic) policy and procedural changes in concert with related stressors involved have been dis-regulating; thus placing a greater emphasis on being present and aware in the moment; the gradual adjusting to new procedures (mask wearing) should also prevent re-occurrence of this FAR violation.

Flight Attendant reported being distracted with having to verify that a passenger had a medical condition and therefore did not have to wear a mask. During the distraction the Flight Attendant missed the Captain's PA 'prepare for takeoff' and was not seated as the flight departed.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Police / Security Involved

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport; Human Factors; Procedure

Taxiing to 24L we were instructed to Taxi C; C9; B; C10; S-North Route. Approaching the C/C9 intersection I slowed the aircraft to 10kts and [the] First Officer (FO) and I checked for crossing road & taxiway traffic. The FO responded clear; and I; noting a pickup truck down near C8 called 'one truck approaching; otherwise clear' I slowed as I made the turn; keeping an eye on the truck as it was traveling much quicker (approximately 30-40 mph) than I usually see traffic move on the road. As I began the turn; my assumption was that the truck would yield as I was already in the turn. We were more than 30 degrees into the turn before the truck passed the taxiway C/C9 sign. When the truck did not even slow as it passed the C/C9 direction sign; I called out that he wasn't stopping; turned on ALL the exterior lights and slammed on the brakes. We stopped with our nose just short of the zipper road; approximately 80 degrees perpendicular to it. The truck sped through the intersection; crossing C9 about 10-15 feet in front of us (It was so close the bottom half of the truck was obscured by the nose/glare shield). At no point did it even attempt to slow down or yield; even after passing through the intersection. I called ground to report the event; a description of the truck and direction of its movement. A few seconds later another aircraft reported that the same truck was weaving in and out of other road traffic. I called the FA's to apologize and ask if everyone was ok; and they responded yes; so I continued my taxi. After turning back on to C from C10; I noticed the truck was still westbound on the road and as we approached S; it began to turn northbound. Although we were cleared to taxi north on S; I slowed down to almost a stop to allow the truck to cross so that we would not have another encounter. I reported that the truck was now n on S and we continued our taxi to 24L with no further problems. After taking off; LAX tower reported to us that the truck had been stopped by ops.

Captain of a Commercial Aircraft reported a ground conflict with a speeding vehicle while taxiing at LAX.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

During the first stage of climb just after gear retraction we received a windshear warning message. I was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) (Captain). However; due to my FO's lack of response I had to push the thrust levers to max thrust and stated max thrust. I then read off our airspeed and altitude trends until we were clear of conflict. I saw our ITT as high as 912-913 degrees C; due to the high altitude there was not much excess thrust. I chose not to divert back to the departure airport because of the current conditions.Upon approach at the destination we were cleared for the visual; however; the First Officer (FO) was waiting on the automation to turn from base to final. Which we had not sequenced when we turned from downwind to base using the autopilot HDG mode just a moment before. I asked him if he saw the far North runway and he said yes. I then said are you going to turn in? He said he was waiting on the autopilot to intercept the final. I said that we need to set it up in the FMS and be on NAV mode for that to happen. I told him to turn in and turn off the auto pilot so we do not over shoot; he was hesitant and we almost overshot. Once on final we were stabilized but just above the runway the FO made incorrect inputs which would have resulted in a wing strike if I did not take the controls at 5 feet off the ground. There was less than a 5 knot cross wind and this should not have been an issue. I believe the root cause is due to several issues. 1. Due to the current make-up within the industry we are now receiving more inexperienced first officers who meet standards yet are weak in flying ability. 2. Again due to staffing we shipping our FOs and CA across the system to unfamiliar places with extend duty times due to the 18 hour limit allowed by FAR 117 with respect to reserves. 3. There seems to be an over reliance on automation. Given that there is an undeniable pilot shortage within the regional airline industry; events like this are going to become commonplace. The first officer had a great attitude and a willingness to do the job correctly; however; being in an unfamiliar environment (TDY); with low time in the aircraft; combined with long duty days permitted by FAR 117 loopholes; I am fearful that we are faced with a decrease in safety due to inability to staff with more experienced pilots. I do not have a resolution for this event; which is why I am filling out this safety report in hopes to bring more attention to the issue.

CRJ-200 Captain laments the experience level of new First Officers that the company is hiring and believes that they are trained to be overly reliant on automation.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Departing Runway XX Captain was the flying pilot and I was Pilot Monitoring. It was a normal takeoff until the Captain asked for the autopilot. About 3-6 seconds later we got a 'AP Trim is NU' caution message. Since we were only 700 feet above the ground the Captain turned off the autopilot and tried to trim the plane himself. He was putting in nose down trim but nothing was happening. During this time we got direct to ZZZZZ and climb to 7;000 ft. We started the turn and kept the plane climbing. During the turn I tried to put nose down trim to see if it would work on my side. It did not. Since we were not getting any messages on EICAS and the trim was still not working; we disconnected the stab trim and Mach trim and then reconnected. The plane was already in a nose high pitch attitude and once we reconnected; the nose high trim increased by an additional .4 units while the captain was trying to trim down. Once we confirmed that we disconnected the the stab trim and Mach trim at that point the Captain transferred the controls to me and he took the radios and started running the QRH. I started to slow the rate of climb of the aircraft and we asked ATC if we could stop the climb and maintain the altitude we were at. ATC gave us clearance to do so; the altitude was 5;000 feet. We were still heading towards ZZZZZ. Then we advised ATC and ask for delay vectors to return back to ZZZ. The Captain did the checklist for the stab trim caution message and we also did our check lists for landing. We then asked ATC for vectors to land on [Runway] XX. We landed with the trim at 8.8 and took off with a trim setting of around 6.8. During the whole fight we never put trimmed up. It was a successful landing in ZZZ. At we taxied to the gate without incident. The stab trim was not responding to our inputs.

First Officer reported a Mach Trim malfunction caused an Air Turn Back and precautionary emergency landing.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 3617; Flight Crew Type 30

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

On roll out after landing I hit the brakes and the aircraft tipped over on its nose and came to rest upside down. Wind was calm and no contributing factors other than human error in judging the speed of the aircraft. I was only going 5 MPH and thought I could hit the brakes without incident. I am assessing the damage to the aircraft at this time. I was by myself at the time of the incident.

GA pilot reported tapping the aircraft brakes; causing the aircraft to nose over and flip on its back during taxi.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Enroute to PDX airport; we were at or near the PDT arrival fix and we were talking to Seattle Center. The Captain which was the nonflying pilot which made no less than 4 attempts to check in with the next assigned controller. After about 10 minutes of trying to check-in. Finally the controller came back with a response of 'I'm working multiple frequencies!' At this point we were several thousand feet high on the arrival. And; the new controller issued us a descent clearance. When we were handed off to Portland Approach we had to get vectors off course to get down for the approach and landing. The Seattle Center was overwhelmed or over tasked and was unable to issue us a descent clearance. Perhaps having one controller per radio frequency.

Air carrier First Officer reported being high on arrival due to ATC being overwhelmed working several frequencies.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Total 6060; Flight Crew Type 630

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

I noticed a significant dirty sock smell on departure as we lifted off. The Captain immediately concurred. We identified the smell as pyrolyzed engine oil; and I donned my oxygen mask at about 1;000 feet AGL. I coordinated with the Captain to call the flight attendants; who did not report any unusual odors. We discussed our options; including a possible return to the departure airport. By this time we were about four minutes into the flight. As we passed 10;000 feet; the odor dissipated; which I confirmed by taking the mask off momentarily and checking for the odor. We elected to continue the flight. I noticed the odor again on descent around 10;000 feet. It was not as strong this time. We turned off Pack 1 and the smell dissipated immediately. We continued the flight without further incident and wrote up the fume event upon shutdown.Provide training to Maintenance Personnel; pilots; and flight attendants on the hazards and causes of engine oil fume events. Develop a checklist for pilots and cabin crew to address engine oil fume events when they occur in flight. Investigate the physical causes of these events and attempt to correct the underlying mechanical issue. Correct the information that appeared in company publications blaming engine oil fume events - and the illness caused by these events - on coffee. Ensure the entire organization from top to bottom is educated on this hazard and not conflating engine oil fume events with pack contamination or other odors.

EMB-175 First Officer reported a dirty sock smell on departure that initially subsided; but returned on descent.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

When we got to ZZZ; we shot the RNAV Approach since there was not an ILS and went missed approach twice before diverting to ZZZ1 for fuel. When we arrived at ZZZ1; we waited approximately 2 hours for the weather to improve. We were dispatched under exemption 3585 to try to get to ZZZ. The Captain and I discussed how we would go to ZZZ2 if we couldn't get into ZZZ. When we departed ZZZ1 the weather in ZZZ was reporting 600 overcast and 3 miles visibility. When we arrived it was 2 1/2 miles visibility with 600 overcast. The weather in ZZZ2 was the same. I felt comfortable knowing that we could get into ZZZ2 on an ILS if a diversion was necessary. On the descent we talked about how on the radar we saw a cell right over the approach end of the runway. We discussed how we would do one attempt and then divert to do an ILS approach into ZZZ2. At ZZZ we shot the RNAV Approach. At minimums we could not see the approach lights or the runway and I stated; 'Missed approach' for the third time today at ZZZ. The Captain hit the TOGA button on the thrust levers but continued the approach using the TRS button to override the automation and then turned off the automation to land once he saw runway. While the Captain was overriding the thrust levers; the Yellow Master Caution went off for the thrust levers not being in TOGA. After shutdown in ZZZ; the Captain tried to tell me that our altimeters didn't match. I explained that our company 'has a proactive go around policy. When we don't see the runway at minimums; we must go missed. I called missed and you continued.' This report is accurate to the best of my recollection.

EMB175 First Officer reported the Captain continued an approach and landed even though the weather was below approach minimums.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 21001; Flight Crew Type 2001

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

During cruise Captain's forward windshield cracked. Complied with all checklists and the QRH. Phone patch to company discussing options we determined that we could continue to our destination. Advised flight attendants; but did not need to advise passengers. We continued to our destination. Upon arrival; Lead A Flight Attendant deployed emergency slide due to not following procedures. No further events.

A B767 Captain reported a cracked cockpit windshield; but was able to continue. Separate to this event; a flight attendant deployed an emergency slide.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

During vectors into OKC from the east; the Approach Controller assigned us Runway 17R differently from the one we had setup (17L). After re-configuring for the ILS 17R; I asked the Pilot Monitoring to brief the approach so I can concentrate on flying (Approximately 14;000 feet MSL and descending to 4;000 feet). During the brief a bright shining white light; like a spotlight shined at us; caught our attention and cause a distraction. We still conducted the briefing; including the highest elevation figure. As I kept flying I was paying attention if the light shined us again; in the event it was a laser that needed to be reported. I had the terrain page setup from the previous briefing and both pilots were aware of the obstacle northeast of the airport (Antenna 2758 feet MSL). After the briefing was complete; we were given a vector (a 90 degree angle) for the approach within a close proximity of the Final Approach Fix (minimum altitude at FAF 3;000 feet MSL). This vector would have flown us south of the obstacle depicted in the plan view section of the approach chart. Approximately 18NM from the airport the Approach Controller queried the visual contact of the airport. Pilot Monitoring told me he had contact with it and after I picked it up in sight I asked to call for it if he still had it. At that point the Approach Controller cleared us for the visual approach for [Runway] 17R. Slightly after; the Approach Controller notified us of traffic on the approach to the parallel runway. Both pilots were trying to ID the traffic since it was below our altitude and we had to cross his approach path. We seemed clear of the traffic; but a strong wind from the south was drifting us north which cause a concern for us due to the known obstacle. The aircraft was just approaching 4;000 feet of altitude and started to level off; when I set 3;000n in the Altitude Select box. The aircraft transitioned into a shallow descent instead of holding 4;000 since it wasn't fully captured. While having a discussion about the wind I adjusted my heading and kept the descent to 3;000 feet so we could be close to level and slow when we intercepted the course outside of the FAF. Around 3500 feet we both remembered the obstacles when we saw its lights ahead and below us. I already started a transition into a climb when the Pilot Monitoring verbally reminded me of the obstacles. During the climb we got a 'Caution Obstacle'; due to the projected descent; which was removed shortly since we were already compensating. We were 500 to 700 feet above the highest obstacle. The obstacle represented on the MFD was not the highest elevation figure on the IAP chart. This depicted obstacle was part of another group of towers not depicted on the chart but they can be seen on the VFR chart in the Jeppesen app. Since it was a visual approach; I had focused on maintaining the airport inside; and started to descend and slow down so we could be on a good position for the stable approach. Following the event; we landed with no issues and had a discussion at the gate on how we could have mitigated our error. We were below the MSA and had loss awareness of the obstacles due to other distractions and the tight vector to the approach with the visual approach. Several factors played key roles for the loss of situational awareness that led us to be at a lower altitude for our location. Flags:-A night Visual approach into an airport were an obstacle is a threat.-A night Visual approach to an airport were the elevation of the airport is higher than we are normally used to.-An arrival consisting of an extended base into a visual approach rather than a downwind arrival.-The change of runway that led to a new setup and briefing.-The distractions caused by the wind-drift; traffic; and the bright light.-The tight vector given and accepted for the original approach. Our error was the premature descent to 3000 feet with the goal of not being high once we intercept the final course with short distance to the final fix. Although the setup for the approach included the awareness of terrain and using the terrain displayed as an aid; we should have use TEM to establish a plan to avoid the premature descent. A briefed plan of using the last assigned altitude of 4;000 feet until intercepting would have avoided this. During the approach brief; I should have asked my Pilot Monitoring to intervene in the event I set a lower altitude while maneuvering for the visual (mitigation plan in the vent of losing SA). I realized that our briefings cover informational items that could be threats but we should discuss mitigating plans for them. Other actions that could have been taken are: 1) denying the visual at night due to the obstacle; 2) requesting a vector for the visual; and 3) querying if a lower altitude was needed which would have led the Controller to keep us at 4;000 feet.

I was Pilot Monitoring. Approximately 20min out we were giving the option to change our landings intentions from [Runway] 17L to 17R which we took. Captain asked me if I could brief the approach which I did and then we performed the runway change items from the checklist. During this briefing moment we both noticed a bright light from about a 12 o'clock position which caught our attention. Captain was aware of the obstacles to the northeast of the airport (antennas) and turned on the terrain. At approximately 18 miles out we were asked if we had the airport in sight. We both saw it and were cleared for the visual approach Runway 17R. Winds were out of the south at approximately 26kt pushing us to the north since we were coming from the east. We were at 4;000 ft. and began a gradual descent. ATC advised us of traffic at 11 o'clock landing on the parallel runway. Looking for the traffic we began to noticed the red lights of the obstacles (towers) on the northeast of the airport. I pointed them out as [did] the Captain. The altitude window was set for 3;000 ft. we were currently at 3;400 ft. Captain turned off the autopilot and began a climb. As we were climbing we received a Caution for the obstacle but it cleared quickly since the Captain had already began the climb. Once cleared we continue to intercept the final approach course and perform a normal landing. We both had a long discussion after the flight and both agreed that we should had mitigated this by simply staying at 4;000ft when cleared for the visual approach since we knew about the MSA which is 3;800 ft. Also the parallel traffic played a role on this since we started looking for it due to it being in our path for intercepting the final approach course of [Runway] 17R. As a Pilot Monitoring I should had advised the Captain that selecting 3;000 ft. and continuing the descent once cleared for the visual would had put us close to the highest obstacle stated in the approach plate. I will keep this in consideration for future flights to come ensuring we are not at a lower altitude than the MSA not established on a final approach course as well as keeping in mind obstacles around us at all times.

Flight crew reported receiving an obstacle alert on a night visual approach to OKC.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

As we were climbing out; we noticed the right engine oil pressure steadily decreasing; we cancelled the IFR with ATC; advised the passengers of what was happening and our intentions; came back and landed at [the departure airport]; wrote in the can and called [Maintenance].

A Cessna 402 pilot reported an oil system pressure anomaly during climb out; which resulted in an air return to the departure airport.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Our aircraft had numerous MELs. An inoperative APU required an external air start. We conducted all of our normal pre-start procedures and checklists as well as completing and reviewing the External Air Start Checklist in the QRH prior to the ground crew hooking up to the jet. When maintenance hooked up and began their Intercom Communication System (ICS) check-in with the Captain I turned down the ICS so I could coordinate starting 3 engines in the blocks with ramp tower. After getting approval from ramp to start I turned my ICS back up in order to hear the communications between the cockpit and ground crew. The captain asked if we had permission to start since he had the #2 radio turned down while I talked to ramp. I said yes. He said cleared to start 3. I started #3. The air cart was very weak and we had very little pressure but the slow starting [engine] finally started. We discussed possibly cross bleeding the others but we ended up continuing the air starts on #2 and #1. Both of us were watching the starts closely to avoid a hot start. As the 3rd motor was spooling up I noticed some movement in my peripheral vision as the mechanic said something on the ICS. The Captain; mechanic operating the air cart and I all realized we started moving so the captain and I stomped on the brakes. The aircraft rolled a couple feet prior to stopping. The Captain asked to make sure everybody on the ground was safe. After a few seconds that felt like an eternity the mechanic said everybody was okay thankfully. The Captain made sure no damage was done to the aircraft or ground equipment and there was none. We discussed the incident among ourselves and with our mechanic and agreed we could continue since nobody was hurt and there was no damage. We informed the mechanic we would file a report and he said he would too. Thankfully nobody was hurt. The parking brake was not set during start and chocks were removed without the aircrew being notified or a tug being hooked up to the aircraft. There were several errors by all involved that contributed to this close call. 1. The QRH has a Note in the External Air Start checklist that states; 'If no pushback is to be made verify the parking brake is set. If pushback is planned verify parking brake is released in coordination with pushback crew prior to pushback.' The brakes were not set during loading of the aircraft which is normal. When the mechanic checked in prior to start neither the Captain nor mechanic coordinated setting the brakes. I did not monitor their coordination since I was coordinating start with ramp and I did not confirm the brakes were set in accordance with the QRH NOTE. 2. The chocks were removed without a brake being set or tug hooked up to the aircraft. I don't know when this happened. [Pilot suggested:] A stricter adherence to existing procedures and a few modifications can prevent this from happening. 1. Rather than coordinating start with ramp on the radio while the Captain does his ICS check-in with the ground crew I will now monitor the communications between them and then coordinate start or pushback after they are done talking. This allows me to listen to their coordination and verify that brakes are set or when chocks are removed. When they are done talking I can then coordinate the start or pushback and the Captain can hear that as well. It keeps both crew members more aware of what each is doing. I suggest this be standardized as normal procedure. I was trained to coordinate start or push with ramp right as ground checks in on the ICS and I believe most crews do it this way based on observation while jump seating. This minor modification will provide better monitoring. 2. Obviously we didn't set the brake. We need to do that. I propose changing the QRH for External Air Starts. 'Step 1--Before Start Checklist Accomplish. Step 2--Set the Parking Brake. Note: Coordinate releasing the brake if pushback is required.' Then continue the Checklist as is. I know we read all notes as part of the Checklist. However; something as procedurally important as setting the brake should not be buried in a Note. It is a task that must be accomplished and can have tragic consequences if it isn't so it needs to be a step in the Checklist and not a note. Furthermore; I can't think of a scenario where you will pushback prior to starting at least one engine on an External Air Start so the note seems kind of odd as it is.3. The ground crew needs to notify the crew when they pull chocks. I did not hear what was coordinated between the Captain and the mechanic regarding brakes; tug hook up or chocks. When we discussed this in our extensive debrief the Captain indicated he never heard chocks were being pulled or that a tug was not hooked up during the check-in. I wish I had monitored this conversation on ICS rather than talking to ramp so I could say with certainty what was said and more importantly have been a better monitor of what was going on. Suffice to say there was a breakdown in existing procedures and communication.

Aircraft rolled forward 5-10 feet during engine start. I stopped the aircraft; no injuries; no damage to aircraft; no damage to ground equipment. I was unaware that the chocks had been removed and the tug was not connected to the aircraft during an external air engine start that was required because of our inoperative APU. Once again this was a long series of compounding events that almost led to an aircraft incident. Starting with accepting an aircraft with 5 MELs (Hydraulic; Pneumatic; APU; FADEC; EPR) all required special attention and addition procedures during critical phase of operation. Ground had not informed us that the chocks had been removed and the tug was not connected. Fatigue was a factor; the First Officer (FO) had [come thru a hub airport]; I got several hours of sleep prior to show. FO missed a note in the external air start checklist about brake configuration; and I missed backing him up. We were talking to Maintenance during this procedure and cleared to start all engines. The external air cart was providing only marginal air pressure for engine start requiring more of our attention to prevent hot starts. Ramp was crowded; I elected to continue with cart start vs; pushing power up for x-bleed start. Weather conditions...dark and drizzling rain. Complying with multiple MEL procedures and the nonstandard conditions they created... interrupting normal checklist flows; and habit patterns were huge distractors during this critical time. The brakes were released for aircraft loading as per SOP; not knowing the chocks had been removed and the tug wasn't connected was also a huge nugget of need to know information missing information.MD-11 External Air Start Checklist - Make 'Parking Brake Set / Checked' the first step of the procedure... not as an informational note. Limit the amount of MEL's that an aircraft can be dispatched with. While it may be legal; multiple degradations of aircraft systems have a synergistic effect with unintended consequences; the least of which is an interruption of standard checklists; normal flows and habit patterns. The bottom line is that a minor inadvertent error on both ground and flight crew were leading to a major incident. Thanks to good training and good professional crews we all worked together quickly to recognize and identify the threat; take immediate action to intervene and correct thus breaking the last link in the chain that was leading to an accident; making this a $0 cost learning event.

MD11 flight crew reported while starting engines the aircraft started to roll and was quickly stopped; with no injuries or damage. The brakes were not set during loading and the chocks were removed by the ground crew at some point without informing the crew.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Aircraft X came into GJT from the east; I asked him what approach he wanted to RY 29 and he requested the RNAV with direct HANSU. I explained to him that to turn him southwest bound to get him lower and then to expect direct HANSU from south of the fix. When he got lower; I gave him a 330 heading when able direct HANSU. Then I went back and cleared him for the approach. I immediately noticed he was going past HANSU and into an area of higher terrain. I gave him the low altitude alert and asked him if he could visually see the ground. He replied that he could and that he was correcting. He said he had a problem with the 'box' and asked to be vectored for the same approach; but with vectors to intercept the final. He landed without incident.

Denver TRACON Controller reported an aircraft did not turn as cleared and entered an area of higher terrain.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Turned aircraft onto wrong taxiway at night due to ambiguous signage. (Refer to PHL taxi diagram to visualize the following description). Instead of turning left on P3; I turned left onto L while taxiing east on S.While taxiing east on taxiway S after landing on Runway 9R; ATC initially instructed us to turn left on to Taxiway F and hold short of Runway 9L.  While taxiing on S; the FO (First Officer) contacted operations and learned that our gate was not available. Upon informing ATC that our gate was not open; we received a new clearance to turn left on P3 and hold short of P. Note on the diagram that between P and S near the east end of 9R; there are seven short connector taxiways that are immediately adjacent and parallel to each other. When I received the amended taxi instructions; I had already begun passing the westernmost group of taxiways. While looking at the taxiway signs for P3; I noted that the signs are located equidistant between the taxiways. As a result; it became unclear as to whether the taxiway sign was associated with the taxiway on the left side of the sign; or the right side of the sign. It appeared initially that the taxiway sign for P3 would be on the right side of the aircraft; but after making the turn I noticed that the in-pavement taxiway lights that were now visible further ahead (beyond P) continued across Runway 9L. Since P3 does not cross 9L; I now realized that I had turned one taxiway too soon. We contacted ATC to inform them of my mistake and they told us to remain where we were and to continue to hold short of P; which we did. There was no other traffic in our vicinity. Additional contributing factors include night operations and decreased level of familiarity with PHL due to limited experience there.Upon further review of the taxi diagram I noted that taxiway L was a left-turn only taxiway; while the P3 intersection also would allow a right turn onto S2. Had I noticed this feature during the taxi; I would have been able to confirm that the taxiway that I turned left on could not be P3. The next time that I experience taxiway identification problems; I will stop where I'm at and set the parking brake; and query ATC for clarification.

Air carrier Captain reported turning onto the wrong taxiway due to the ambiguous placement of taxiway signs at PHL airport. Signs are placed equidistant between taxiways; so it is unclear which taxiway is associated with each sign.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were scheduled to operate to ZZZ as scheduled. While reviewing the departure papers we noticed a company NOTAM that restricted using ZZZ as an alternate for B767s. The Captain called the Dispatcher questioning our ability to operate a B767 into ZZZ. After a brief time on hold; the Captain was assured this only applied to using ZZZ as an alternate we were okay to go to ZZZ. We operated as schedule and continued to operate this pairing the next two nights. We were later informed [Company] discovered that [Ops Specs] only granted authorization for the B767 to use this airport as an alternate.

I was notified via email from Captain [Name] that I was in violation of 14 CFR 121.555 for operating a B767 into ZZZ airport. Apparently at the time [Company] only has the authority to use ZZZ as an alternate airport and not as a destination airport with the B767. I would like this report to include [multiple flights]. On our first flight to ZZZ I called my Dispatcher to ask him about a company NOTAM at the airport. I am going by memory but; the NOTAM said something to the effect of do not use ZZZ as an alternate for the 767 aircraft. Further the NOTAM eluded that the reason not to use ZZZ as an alternate was due to ramp space. After the FO (First Officer) and I diligently reviewed the flight paper work I called the Dispatcher to specifically question the company NOTAM. When questioned about the NOTAM the Dispatcher was not sure what the NOTAM was referencing. He put me on hold and came back later and told me the NOTAM didn't apply to our flight. I then asked off the cuff 'Then we are legal to operate the 767 into ZZZ' the answer was 'yes'. Flight crews have a certain expectation that all of the airports we are dispatched to as a destination or alternate are legal. This should be an automated process handled through the computer system that the dispatchers use. To expect flight crews to check there Ops Spec for each and every flight destination or alternate is asking for human error to creep into play. I would not expect to be dispatched to an airport that is not approved. I would however check if operating a charter flight for example. I believe a complete review of all airports [Company] uses to insure which aircraft are approved is in order. [Company] also needs to develop an automated system in which the dispatcher can readily determine if the specific flight type is approved for that airport. Finally; peak offers many challenges to our operation. Part of peak planning (done well in advance) should include a complete review of airports and operations that are that are being serviced by different equipment than normal.

B767 flight crew reported having flown to destination that is not authorized per company Ops Specs.