Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

While conducting RNAV Runway 15 approach into ESN; received a low altitude alert from Easton Tower while at our MDA of 440 ft. MSL. We immediately climbed to 550 ft. MSL and conducted a missed approach once at the MAP. My assumption is that the aircraft descended too rapidly; causing us to be below glide slope as indicated by the PAPI's.

Flight instructor reported executing a missed approach from an instrument approach after descending below minimums.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

During preflight preparation in operations the three of us remarked on the very northern route we were filed. The CA called dispatch and queried the routing. She was told by dispatch that the routing was to avoid moderate to severe turbulence. CA questioned the legality of the routing because she had never been routed so far north. She was assured it was legal. Approximately one hour outside of our coast out fix of Lenim; while the CA was on break; the PF was reading about areas of magnetic unreliability in the FM. He was concerned when he read the line that states 'Operations within the Arctic Control Area (ACA) are not authorized for [our aircraft]'. Based on our flight plan; we were routed into the ACA. PF contacted dispatch through ACARS to question the routing. Dispatch responded in agreement that the routing was not authorized for our aircraft. At this point; the CA was called back into the cockpit. Dispatch contacted us via SATCOM. A new route was discussed; agreed upon and filed with the appropriate controllers as our coast-out fix keeping us clear of the ACA. The fuel was checked and papers sent to the printer. We contacted Edmonton to request direct to ADSAM. We were cleared direct ADSAM. The flight proceeded uneventfully.

B767 First Officer reported they were initially dispatched on an international routing that was not authorized for their aircraft type.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 18

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

OGG Tower switched Aircraft X to sector 10/09 combined and they were already talking to Aircraft Y. Aircraft X was head on with Aircraft Y. I asked Aircraft X if OGG Tower told him about the traffic. Aircraft X stated he did not get any traffic information on the opposite direction helicopter from OGG Tower. In the past; I had asked [my] supervisor about OGG Tower switching aircraft to R9/10; and he stated that we (the R9/R10 controller) should not touch the aircraft; since OGG Tower has worked out separation; if they have switched the aircraft. I always remember this statement; and I don't touch aircraft if they are head on. I called OGG Tower; and he told me I could climb the Aircraft X; but the conflict alert had already gone off. I don't believe OGG Tower is separating aircraft correctly. This seemed to be an event that could have been avoided; if OGG Tower just kept the aircraft longer; or gave a traffic call; or coordinated with the R9/R10 controller.First; R9/R10 needs to be split and not combined at all times. There is too much traffic at R9/R10 and the complexity of traffic becomes great with the amount of VFR traffic in the area. There was almost a midair years ago at OGG Tower; and from my understanding; the NTSB made the recommendation that R9 & R10 needed to be split at peak times. If that is true; why is this sector now combined? The complexity is still there; the traffic is greater now than at the time of that incident; and we have management now who is not even certified on the sector to help in times of crisis.OGG Tower needs to have a better procedure to handle separation of aircraft. OGG Tower just switching a head on aircraft with opposite direction traffic that he is talking to is totally unsafe and inappropriate. Safety really needs to be addressed. I feel the current procedures are unsafe; and I fear a catastrophic incident may occur.

HCF Controller reported an opposite direction airborne conflict that was set up by the tower.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 10500; Flight Crew Type 175

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Human-Machine Interface; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Aircraft; Staffing

While we we were descending at our destination we got an AMBER CAS LOW OIL PRESS ENG 2 warning.  When I reduced thrust; which was almost at idle; I quickly decided to shutdown the engine as we had three and were in a busy environment.  I directed the First Officer to execute the shutdown and securing checklists. I took the radios and requested a vector and a level off while we were accomplishing our tasks.  We declared an emergency to cover all the bases and landed from a visual approach uneventfully.My concern are possible mistakes I may or could have made; and would like to report the [reasons for my concerns]. I think I may have overreacted; but may never know for sure. It does concern me that I feel that way.Factors: For the past six months I have been away from home with an unexpectedly heavy schedule that has caused much stress due to not being able to manage my home life effectively. The owner of the airplane has refused to hire more than the minimum crew which is why I have been gone so much.Six days ago the lead pilot complained [of the workload] and was fired for [voicing] his opinion of the situation. Hence; the pilot with me today has never actually been on a 900EX EASY until this trip. Last year I was also reprimanded by an owner for reporting a pilot smelling of alcohol to the management company. That situation is currently being investigated by OSHA and I have an interview with them next week.  I am also suffering from the flu and feel awful. I know that I am at my personal limits [due to] fear for my job.There is no choice when it comes to being conservative when you fear your livelihood will be in jeopardy if you report anything to Management. There has to be more protection for pilots.

The Captain of a corporate DA900EX used the occasion of an engine malfunction requiring an in-flight shut down to expand on what he believes to be unsafe pilot pushing by his employer.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 186.7; Flight Crew Type 186.7

Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

I am a student pilot with in my sign off; practicing landings on Runway 29 right. Winds were at 140 [at] 7 knots. I believe the crosswind caused the problem. On landing roll a gust of wind caught tail of aircraft and I ran off runway. Aircraft ended up inverted. No injuries. As aircraft left runway I tried full right rudder to correct and that didn't help. There was no problem and the tail was just starting to touch when the aircraft shot left.

Stinson 108 pilot reports losing control while practicing crosswind landings and running of the runway then flipping.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 77.4; Flight Crew Total 9082; Flight Crew Type 1247

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted

While I was waiting for the passengers; I refueled the aircraft; obtained a computer generated weather briefing; and filed an IFR flight plan. I also completed a weight and balance check; a center of gravity check and reviewed performance numbers for departure. The manifest; weight and balance information and flight following information were phoned into our communication center via telephone. All in accordance with company procedures. We started the engines; taxied out to run-up area and performed a run-up in accordance with company checklist procedures. No abnormalities were noted. Weather condition [were] as follows: Moderate rain with a reported ceiling at 4;400 FT broken and 5;000 FT overcast [and] visibility of 7 SM. I wanted to receive my IFR clearance on the ground prior to departure. After several varied attempts; I was able to receive my clearance via Flight Service as follow. We departed via the obstacle departure procedure. I was unable to acquire initial contact with Center due to poor radio reception. I flew the departure procedure to within about a mile of the VOR and began to reverse course to pick up the Victor Airway to the north. After turning back to the north; I was able to confirm communication with Center. During this time I received a clarification of my IFR clearance. Center further amended my clearance to direct my destination which I was able to accept. He subsequently cleared us to climb to 16;000 MSL. We entered the clouds at about 4;500 FT MSL. I checked for ice accumulation once with the de-ice lights somewhere around 6;000-7;000 FT MSL. There was barely a trace present; not enough to exercise the boots and I had all other de-ice equipment on. Up to this point; in the departure; I was hand flying the aircraft. I intended to top the weather en route to my destination. Once through approximately 7;500 FT MSL I engaged the autopilot for the continued climb to 16;000 FT MSL. The autopilot was on for only about a minute when passing through about 8;000 FT MSL; the autopilot went into an uncommanded nose pitch over rapid descent. I immediately went to the autopilot disconnect switch on the yoke while trying to arrest the descent with elevator back pressure. The switch did not disengage the autopilot. I tried the switch again but it would not disconnect. I then tried the go-around switch and disabled the electric trim; again to no avail. I then went to the autopilot on/off switch on the autopilot controller head and selected the off position. It again failed to disconnect the autopilot. During this sequence and while in the descent; I reduced the engine power via the throttles. I told the crew I was having trouble disconnecting the autopilot and they asked if they could help. I asked our passenger to come up front and if he could bring a flashlight. He moved to the co-pilot seat and initially attempted to help me pull the yoke back to recover from the dive. We could not over come the autopilot servos with both of us pulling. I asked him to use the flashlight to look over my left shoulder for the autopilot circuit breaker. He scanned for a few seconds and then I told him to look on the right side circuit breaker panel as I believed it was on the right. It was at this point that we came out of the clouds and could see the extreme pitch down attitude we were in due to the visual reference with the ground. Right after this; [a frequent passenger] found and pulled the autopilot circuit breakers and the yoke pressure I was fighting against was released. I then began to pull the aircraft out of the steep dive. I was concerned that the aircraft might come apart in the recovery and I tried to balance the amount of back pressure I was applying with the approaching terrain. I was able to affect recovery back to level flight somewhere in the vicinity of 2;000 FT MSL and then began a slow climb at which time I made sure my passengers were uninjured. The airplane was responding normally after the recovery. I had dropped out of radio contact with Center and called the nearby airport Approach. I informed them who we were and what had just occurred. I asked them for vectors to land at the nearby airport. I did not declare an emergency at this point as I felt the aircraft was responding as it should. I did not communicate with ATC in the uncontrolled descent as I was too busy trying to resolve the emergent flight condition. While being vectored toward the airport; we contacted our Communications Center; and informed them of what happened and that we were diverting. Approach vectored us for localizer approach and we picked up the field just outside of the final approach fix. We landed on and taxied to the FBO and shutdown the aircraft normally using the checklist.

The reporter stated that the autopilot controller was removed and found to have corrosion which started the pitch over. Apparently the pitch trim servo clutch also failed which locked the trim full forward and prevented the elevator trim movement after it ran away full down. When the circuit breaker was finally pulled he was able to manually trim the aircraft. The reporter estimated that the pitch down was between 70 and 80 degrees. As ground contact was reestablished; he was intent on a smooth pull up so as not to cause structural failure or damage.

A Cessna 421 entered an uncommanded pitch over at 8;000 FT with the autopilot engaged. The pilot recovered at about 2;000 FT after the autopilot circuit breaker was pulled.


Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

On the takeoff roll; after calling out 'thrust set'; I scanned the EICAS engine indications; and then I fixated on the altimeter confusing it for the airspeed indicator. When the numbers on the altimeter dial did not increase during the takeoff roll I mistakenly believed it was a stuck airspeed indication and called for an aborted takeoff. The captain aborted the takeoff and we taxied in to a location where we could talk to maintenance. As I was explaining to the Captain what I had seen I realized my mistake; I had confused the Altimeter indication for the Airspeed. There were no problems with the aircraft and we completed the flight safely.

As we discussed the problem the first officer realized that he had become fixated on the altimeter not the airspeed indicator and there was not actually a problem with the airspeed indicator. Once we had established that there was nothing wrong with the aircraft we continued the flight normally.

During the takeoff roll an EMB-145 First Officer call for a reject after scanning his instruments and interpreting the 0 altimeter indication as an airspeed indicator failure.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While in cruise; I noticed that a very small piece of paper was sticking out of the Parking Brake Indication Switch. I pulled the switch out to find that it was being held by multiple ripped pieces of paper. I removed the papers and placed the switch back in the slot. Wrote up the now INOP switch in the maintenance log and advised maintenance in ZZZ of my findings. This; unfortunately; has been a common practice when these types of switches go INOP. This constitutes a risk to safety due to the fact that you are placing shreds of papers (combustible) close to an electrical connector.

B767-200 flight crew found parking brake indication switch held in place with shredded paper.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft X was descending for an arrival into a non towered airport. I had elected to vector Aircraft X north of the IAF for a straight in approach. Aircraft X descended with the terrain as instructed until entering a 13;000 ft. MIA (Minimum IFR Altitude) box. At that point Aircraft X was cleared direct the IAF. After Aircraft X was cleared direct the IAF; I cleared the aircraft to cross the initial approach fix at or above 13;000 ft. for the straight in RNAV Approach. The Pilot read back the clearance and left out the straight in command. I restated the straight in portion of the clearance to the Pilot and he read back the straight in portion of the clearance correctly.I attended to a few other duties before switching the aircraft to CTAF. As I returned to switch Aircraft X to the CTAF I noticed the aircraft had descended below 13;000 ft. to 11;800 ft. I restated the clearance to verify that the Pilot was to cross the IAF at 13;000 ft.; then issued a low altitude alert for the area MIA the Pilot was in. At that point the Pilot was in the lowest MIA in that area of 12;000 ft. The aircraft had descended to 11;200 ft. before I read the low altitude alert because it took me a few seconds to bring up my MIA chart and verify that he wasn't on the approach already as well as in the 12;000 ft. MIA box. When advising the aircraft of the low altitude alert the Pilot responded that they were currently on a visual approach. I verified with the Pilot of Aircraft X that the airport was in sight. The pilot confirmed airport in sight; and that is when I cleared the Pilot for the visual approach. I advised my Supervisor of the incident immediately after the visual approach clearance was given.

A Center Controller reported an aircraft descended below its assigned altitude and below the Minimim IFR Altitude.


Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

In ZZZ airport; we have employees testing positive for COVID-19; but yet the process of notification (notifying the crew) is very subjective. There are technicians; which have tested positive. The company has only notified a selective few to quarantine.There are technicians who have tested positive and have contaminated the rest of the crew. Some have been forced to take their own sick time because the company refuses to acknowledge they have been exposed at work. The exposure happened at work because they were all in the same room and worked together. The company says they have followed CDC guidelines; but how can that be when more technicians are testing positive at work. Let's have guys who were at work quarantine and have the company notify the work areas that maybe have been exposed.

Technician reported concerns with company procedures related to notification of possible exposure to other employees who have tested positive for COVID-19.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 900; Flight Crew Type 100

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

During descent for landing at I19; at approximately 2500 ft MSL over populated area; I observed a small black dot at my same altitude; and 1 o'clock from my position. I banked slight left to avoid the object. As I passed the object; I observed what appeared to be a stationary drone of the hobby store variety. I felt this to be a very dangerous activity on the part of the drone operator that could easily have ended in loss of life or severe damage to the aircraft if I had not seen it in time to maneuver away.

PA28 pilot reported a NMAC with a UAV on approach to I19.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other; Party2 Dispatch

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Work Refused

During preflight; I was given a printed copy of a Notification to Captain (NOTOC) by ground personal. During the conversation; the ramper asked if I was going to refuse the lithium battery shipment. Immediately; I was on guard and asked if the shipment was cargo or company material. The ramper indicated that the shipment was company material. After a conference call with Dispatch and Cargo; it was determined we could not tell if the total battery load was below the limits that cargo relayed during the call. The cargo was unloaded. After the offload; I saw the cargo was a shipment of custom electric bikes. The total stated battery load was beyond the 5 KG of load in FOM I. FOM I doesn't address a maximum limit on battery load in combination. The unknown combined limit of all the packages exceeded the total 5 KG limit talked about FOM I. FOM I doesn't state a total limit on batteries; yet the next pages in the FOM talk directly about battery limits on checked baggage.Even FOM I states the company ignores the responsibility of battery weight by assuming the package is less than 5 KG of battery weight. The shipper has no responsibility by law to declare any battery size or capacity. We assume the shipper is being truthful on the declaration of the battery mass with no respect to the battery power or potential hazard due to its energy content. Electric bikes can in fact contain a battery more than 150% of any limit imposed on checked baggage. The battery capacity of bikes was determined in hindsight. With the information that was present in the conference call the decision was made to remove the shipment. After my limited research; I feel it is important to address this concern for future events. Suggestion: Publish a total [Max Allowed] limit of battery load. If there is none say so. I will error on the side of saying no...now prove me wrong.

First Officer reported refusal of Dangerous Goods shipment due to undefined cargo load weight on board; additionally; FOM does not provide clearly stated weight limitations.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 300

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was instructed by Bethel Tower to enter a right downwind for [Runway] 19R and report midfield. I heard another aircraft call up after me and at the time I believed that I heard he was inbound from the southeast and I was inbound from the west-southwest. As I was coming up on midfield downwind Aircraft Y called in 'midfield downwind; traffic that I'm passing in sight.' Tower then responds that he is cleared to land [Runway] 19R and told him to keep his base tight because he was number 1 inside the aircraft he was passing. After Aircraft Y repeated his clearance back to Tower; Tower then asked me if I had a visual on the aircraft passing me and that I was number two and cleared to land. I then looked over to see Aircraft Y passing inside of me maybe 100 ft. off my right side and maybe 50 ft. lower than me. I responded that he was in sight and that I was number two. I then slowed down my aircraft because at this point we were abeam the threshold. I believe that Tower should have advised me of the other aircraft before he was that close to me. I also believe that Tower should have sequenced the two landing aircrafts long before it got to the point where the other aircraft was passing me at midfield on the downwind. They should not have allowed Aircraft Y to pass me without any direction to either aircraft about the situation.

C207 Captain reported ATC failed to alert them of traffic on downwind; resulting in a NMAC.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While removing leftover bags from Aircraft X; I observed a smart bag with its lithium battery yet intact. Bag had an attached priority flag.

Ramp Agent reported smart bag transported with lithium ion battery intact in violation of FAR and company policy that requires batteries be removed.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 4400; Flight Crew Type 1500

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

We were flying the ILS Runaway 06 into ZZZ. The approach was uneventful until landing gear extension. Upon selecting landing gear down; we received an amber HYD PTU failure CAS message. Then we received a RED GEAR CAS message along with a GEAR Voice message. We then noticed that only the nose gear was indicating down and locked with both main landing gear indicator cross-hatched (Indicating Gear unsafe). At this point; a go-around was started at approximately a 2-mile final. We were instructed to execute the published missed approach procedure. The landing gear and flaps retracted normally and the warning horn and previous CAS messages went away. After getting handed off to Approach Control; I requested delay vectors and an altitude assignment as opposed to doing the published hold. Once level; the only remaining CAS message was a cyan 'L ENG HYD PUMP FAIL'. We then elected to do the emergency gear extension checklist. What prompted us to that checklist was the previous RED GEAR CAS message. That checklist calls for the landing gear handle switch to be selected down. All three landing gear extended normally; with three green indicator lights. We elected to keep the gear down for the remainder of the flight. Since we were having a problem with the left side hydraulic system; which controls the gear extension and nose wheel steering; we were concerned about taxiing off the runway after landing rollout. I then contacted Tower and told them we were eventually going to be coming back in for another landing attempt; but there was a possibility we would not have full nose-wheel steering and may have to be towed off the runway. We set up the approach and ran the checklist for Approach and Before Landing. The fight concluded with a normal landing along with full nose wheel steering ability. Once we were parked; I pulled up the Hydraulic-system schematic on the MFD. The left side hydraulic system reservoir showed 0 percent quantity remaining.

CL30 First Officer reported that an emergency gear extension procedure was used due to a hydraulic pump failure. Landing and taxi were uneventful.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 162; Flight Crew Total 15720; Flight Crew Type 7719

Distraction; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 23000; Flight Crew Type 10000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

On descent at approximately FL200; I received an interphone call from Purser telling me that there was white smoke coming from a ceiling panel near the forward galley in the area of Circuit Breaker Panel 2000VU. She also told me there was a burning smell that accompanied the smoke. I requested an immediate vector to our destination airport. We had a company A320 First Officer deadheading in the cockpit who I sent to the cabin to assist the purser and give me an evaluation of the situation. He reported back that the smoke was dissipating; but the smell was still noticeable. ATC vectored us to a visual approach where we landed uneventfully. On the ground we stopped on the taxiway where we were met by air rescue and firefighting (ARFF) who checked the aircraft with their FLIR and reported there was nothing unusual seen. Since both the smoke and smell had dissipated we made the decision to taxi to our gate with ARFF following. We were not able complete the smoke/fumes checklist in the A320 QRH because of the time available to landing (12 minutes) and the coordination with our jumpseater and Purser. We did the immediate action from memory donning our O2 masks and establishing communication. They had thunderstorms in the area and were on a non-standard routing for the flight. Upon landing; an evacuation was considered; but since the smoke had dissipated and the smell was diminishing along with the fact that ARFF saw no indication of a fire; we decided to continue to the gate.

On the arrival at FL200 received a call from cabin that a passenger had witnessed smoke 'puff' from the ceiling near the forward galley and also smelled smoke. Flight attendant said she also could smell smoke but could not see any. Captain instructed her to put on her PBE; evaluate the situation and to keep him informed. The flight crew donned O2 masks at this time and the Captain informed ATC of our condition. The cockpit jumpseater was sent back to the cabin to verify condition and to also render aid and report to cockpit. No further smoke was seen but smell was reported as electrical/ozone and getting stronger. Odor of electrical smoke was now present in the cockpit at which point the Captain advised ATC. First Officer continued duties as pilot flying and initiated a rapid descent. Captain requested and received clearance for visual approach with progressive vectors and altitude recommendations by ATC. Landing was uneventful; on glide path and on speed. We exited at Taxiway and to turn left onto another taxiway where we immediately came to a stop to do a final evaluation of the inside of the aircraft by the jumpseater and flight attendants and the outside of the aircraft with infrared equipment by the fire department. Flight crew removed masks at this point. The Captain and First Officer came to the decision that an evacuation was not necessary and proceeded to the gate for a normal deplane. We requested that the fire department escort us all the way to the gate while maintaining fire watch and communications with the cockpit. The flight attendants were informed of the plan for a normal gate deplane but were told to be prepared in case the problem escalated. The aircraft arrived at the gate where a normal deplane commenced and a final fire inspection was initiated and completed and an all clear given.

An A320 Flight Attendant reported smoke from the ceiling near the forward galley during descent to their destination so ATC expedited the arrival. At the gate; the aircraft was deplaned normally because the smoke had dissipated.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We originally had a tail swap due to return to the gate from a maintenance issue on original aircraft. Upon return to gate we were around LAS for a long length of time before we were tail-swapped to this aircraft. I accepted a 2-hour extension as a result. As boarding I calculated my FDP (Flight Duty Period) and flight time limitation. I contacted Scheduling and we both had matching numbers of having to be airborne by XA:07 local LAS time. We finished boarding and pushed off the gate no issue taking off by XA:03 local time. Enroute no issues occurred until reaching the HVQ VOR on arrival. We were given a hold over the VOR with a clearance time of 30 minutes. Entering the hold we weren't even done a quarter of a turn before ATC cleared us to north heading and was going to be brought in on another arrival into IAD. Upon reaching the initial fix they turned us back to our original filed arrival. I asked ATC if people were getting in and they said no problem from this arrival (the one we were originally on). We landed and taxied to the gate causing me to exceed my FDP by 7 minutes with the 2 hour extension.

First Officer of a part 121 passenger aircraft reported exceeding FAR flight time limits.


I was pilot flying with autopilot OFF departing ZZZ for SJC. At 'about' 3;000 FT in the westbound turn on the RNAV departure both digital flight guidance computers (DFGC) kicked off leaving me with blank FMA; no autothrottle or autopilot if I wanted it; no CDI; no altitude pre-select/alerted and a few other items. I said I was unable RNAV departure and need a heading. After a bit of trouble shooting with no luck; we were unable to restore the DFGC's it was decided to return to departure airport. An emergency was declared and we received heading and altitudes back to ZZZ in VMC. After a smooth landing we taxied back to the gate and switched airplanes.

Rather than try to fly with the conditions for more than 2 hours to use up enough fuel to be under max landing weight; I decided to declare an emergency; and return immediately to ZZZ and land overweight. We were vectored by ATC back to ZZZ for a visual approach. We made a normal approach to a very soft touchdown; slowed using normal braking procedures; exited the runway and taxied to the gate without incident. Maintenance then came aboard and found what they said were multiple failures in the maintenance check functions and took the plane out of service.

Air Carrier on initial climb experienced a digital flight guidance failure on both systems resulting in a return to the departure airport.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Weather; Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Aircraft

Aircraft X was holding at 3;000 ft. several miles northeast of a 4;000 ft. MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude). Aircraft X requested to proceed to a fix to begin an RNAV approach. The vector 170 was issued to keep Aircraft X from entering the 4;000 ft. MVA.  Shortly afterwards; there was a minor unrelated occurrence that required some coordination with an adjacent facility. I allowed my attention to be diverted momentarily; and when I looked back at Aircraft X; I noticed he had just slightly clipped the 4;000 ft. MVA while still at 3;000 ft. I do NOT believe this was any kind of pilot error; I suspect it was due to wind or the pilot turning slower than expected; or perhaps I should have initially issued a wider turn to keep clear of the 4;000 ft. MVA. The pilot exited the corner of the MVA shortly afterwards and did not report any issue. I should have stayed more vigilant; and possibly issued a wider initial vector to ensure against wind or slower than expected turns.

A TRACON Controller reported they issued an insufficient vector to an aircraft to avoid a higher Minimum Vectoring Altitude area.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 16

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I cleared Aircraft Y for take-off on Runway 20L. This aircraft was on a VFR flight plan with departure instructions to turn left heading 080. The Local 1 controller cleared Aircraft X for take-off on Runway 20R. Aircraft X was on a departure SID that had a left turn of 175. Aircraft that depart Runway 20L are supposed to make a left turn of 15 degrees after take-off to avoid aircraft departing Runway 20R; this is published in the AFD. Aircraft Y departed and I then issued instructions to a helicopter that was waiting for a taxiway departure that would go westbound across Runway 20R. I was carefully watching the helicopter to make sure it cleared Runway 20LR and I did not see Aircraft Y on the upwind. The radar (STARS) did not show any target or primary on the upwind however other controllers ask me what Aircraft Y was doing. I could not see Aircraft Y out the window because I was looking at the wrong place (where he should have been) while the aircraft had actually flown straight out and was in the vicinity of Aircraft X. Aircraft X asked the Local 1 controller about the Aircraft Y and took evasive action by staying at an extremely low altitude to avoid him. Aircraft Y finally acquired on the radar and approximately 2 miles south of SNA. I told Aircraft Y to turn left to 080 degrees and he complied.During this session on Local 2 I experienced several incorrect data tags in my airspace. The tags were not correctly depicting the position of the aircraft. Several times the radar indicated that an aircraft in the pattern was 1 or 2 miles north of the runway on base or final when in fact the aircraft was on short final. This is very unsafe because if you do not immediately have your aircraft in sight you may think your runway is clear and issue crossings etc.I recommend that the STARS system be adjusted to work correctly or to put a different system in place as this provides a false sense of security that aircraft are in a particular when they are not.

I departed Aircraft X off the right parallel runway. When I observed Aircraft X in the climb; I saw that Aircraft Y failed to do his required 15 degree and was drifting towards Aircraft X but at a higher altitude. I asked the Local 2 controller what their aircraft was doing. For a split second; I scanned the radar to see if I could get a better position on Aircraft Y to give a traffic call; but nothing was showing up. I turned back to the departure end and couldn't see where Aircraft Y was at any more. I didn't give a traffic call; because it would have been incomplete and not helpful at all to the pilot; plus I observed Aircraft X leveling his climb to avoid Aircraft Y. After Aircraft Y finally turned to the East; Aircraft X asked what happened; I told him and told him to not worry about the noise abatement; because of his evasive maneuver.1. Scrap the STARs radar system at John Wayne. ARTs (Automated Radar Terminal Systems) was monumentally better than this new system. This new system; at SNA doesn't ever give you a complete and accurate picture of what is actually happening out there in the sky; especially with the General Aviation aircraft. Most times; General Aviation aircraft on the left downwind are nowhere near their target on the radar. On a hazy day; it makes it dangerous to locate aircraft.2. Having double shades down only when the sun is in the windows. Any time the sun is above the windows; only have one shade down. In the window that I was trying to locate the aircraft; we had double shades down and with a malfunctioning radar system; it made the task impossible.

SNA Local Controllers and commercial flight crew reported a NMAC on departure from Runway 20R. GA aircraft departing the left runway was supposed to turn 15 degrees left on departure. The aircraft did not comply with the procedure and drifted into the path of the commercial aircraft which had departed the right runway. The Captain of the commercial aircraft from the right runway observed the GA departure and took evasive action by stopping their climb. ATC did not detect the left departure was not complying with the procedure. The left runway aircraft did not show up on the Tower radar display. The Tower Controller had limited visibility out of the window due to sunlight and both Tower shades drawn down.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 6250; Flight Crew Type 310

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

I was cleared to taxi from via Taxiway A to Runway XXR in my [Homebuilt Experimental] tailwheel aircraft. A Challenger 300 had been cleared from the West Ramp to hold at Taxiway A1; while waiting to cross XXR to get to XXL for departure. Just as I was taxiing directly behind [the Challenger 300]; Ground cleared him to cross XXR.  [The Challenger 300] applied immediate power to taxi. I was directly behind him; I tried to accelerate but was unable to get past his jet blast before we were blown in a violent 330 - 360 degree right ground loop. My aircraft suffered damage to the left wing tip; both wheel fairings; and the left gear fairing. There was no prop strike and no contact with any flight controls. Neither I nor my passenger was injured.  The cause of the problem was the Ground Controller not noting my position directly behind [the Challenger 300] when he cleared him to cross; I also believe [the Challenger 300] used excess power to begin his taxi roll.

Pilot of an amateur-built experimental aircraft taxiing behind a Challenger 300; experienced a ground loop due to jet blast when the jet powered up to resume taxi. Experimental aircraft suffered limited damage to wing tip and wheel fairings.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 48; Flight Crew Total 4561; Flight Crew Type 1761

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was the First Officer on this flight. Weather was forecast 4 SM BR SKC; with a TEMPO of 1 SM BR SCT 003. We were also advised not to arrive before Tower opening and adjusted our pushback and timing enroute to ensure this. We received updates enroute from Dispatch; initially indicating deteriorating conditions and suggesting a new alternate; but later forecasting improving conditions at our arrival. We checked current weather conditions a couple of times after this ourselves using ACARS and found that the visibility was fluctuating; but remained greater than or equal to the 1/2 SM needed for the ILS approach. Once we were within radio range; I listened to the ASOS (ATIS was not available yet; as the Tower was still closed). The observation indicated 1/2 SM FG BKN 003 and I wrote this on the landing data card. The Captain built and briefed the approach for the ILS. Shortly after this; Center gave us the latest weather and asked us which approach we wanted to set up for. I don't remember the exact visibility given at this point; but we briefly discussed whether it was good enough for the RNAV since the Controller had asked us which approach we wanted. We decided it was not and both agreed that we still had the visibility for the ILS and this is what we requested. At this point Center cleared us direct to the IF for the ILS; cross at 3;000 FT; cleared for the ILS approach.Shortly before turning to intercept the localizer; a different Center Controller informed us that ATIS information 'Yankee' was now available. I replied that we understood this to mean that the Tower was now open; which Center confirmed. I told the Controller that we would get information 'Yankee'; and then we were then cleared to contact the Tower. At this point we were established on the ILS approach and I checked in with the Tower Controller and informed him of our position on the ILS. Tower then cleared us to land; but did not report the visibility. I then flipped over to the ATIS frequency on the other radio to get information 'Y'. The weather I recorded was: 300/5; 1-1/4 SM; FG OVC 001 2999. I relayed this to the Captain and we continued the approach. During this time I was also complying with normal aircraft configuration changes requested by the Captain for the approach. We completed the appropriate checklists and were configured and stable per the FOM. The flight visibility was less than the 1-1/4 SM we were expecting at the DA; but was not less than the 1/2 SM required for the approach. The Captain was able to see the required visual references and safely landed the aircraft. As we completed the rollout the visibility seemed to worsen on the departure end of the runway. During taxi we heard an aircraft query Tower as to whether the visibility was still 'a quarter mile.' The Controller responded that the visibility was still 'one quarter mile.' This was the first point at which we realized what we thought was the reported visibility of 1-1/4 SM may have been reported at 1/4 SM. When I checked ATIS 'Y' on final approach; I heard the visibility as 'one and a quarter mile' and relayed this to the Captain. However; it may have actually been 'one quarter mile' - which is how the Tower Controller phrased it to the requesting aircraft after we were on the ground.We taxied to our ramp without incident. We received no communication from Tower at this point that he had any concerns with our flight. I did not listen to the ATIS again; as I was focused on monitoring the taxi and then became busy with post flight duties. I was confident at the time that I heard the visibility correctly and relayed what I thought I heard to the Captain. At no point during this approach did we willfully try and disregard any regulations. By the time I was able to retrieve and relay the ATIS we were established on the approach and may have intercepted the glide path as well. In hindsight; it would have been easier for me to simply ask Tower or Center to read information 'Y' tous. Given the high workload at this phase of the flight; this would have ensured that both pilots heard and agreed to the reported visibility. Digital ATIS would also have useful in this situation; but was not available at this airport. I could have requested the ASOS over ACARS to confirm; but would still have needed to listen to the ATIS to obtain 'Y'.

Air Carrier First Officer discovers after landing that the prevailing visibility is 1/4 mile instead of 1 and 1/4 miles as was thought to be what was broadcast on the ATIS.


Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The First Officer and I completed all the departure requirements for this flight (aircraft preflight; briefings...). We both looked at and discussed the actual SID given for our departure. I reviewed the SID a few times before takeoff myself. The final altitude on the SID is 13000 with a restriction to cross a particular fix at 5000. We missed the crossing restriction. ATC queried the restriction and immediately gave us a climb to 13000 ft. There is another SID for this Runway that I have done many times over the years with the same altitude restriction of 5000 ft. which has advisory notes to get your attention on this 5000 ft. crossing restriction. The SID given to us is a brand new SID; basically the same as the other common SID used but missing those what I consider very important NOTES of the crossing restriction. Had the notes been on this particular SID WE may have been alerted more obviously to this crossing restriction but due to our; I know my fatigued state of mind and lack of focus; we didn't notice. FATIGUE; we are both east coasters suddenly on the west coast and switched to a very late night departure next day with six and half hour standby before departure.Having those Restriction notes on this NEW SID like they do on the other similar SID would help in alleviating this kind of scenario as well as not switching east to west day to night abruptly. Proper rest time for adapting different time zones and suddenly switching days and nights.

The flight crew of a G-IV failed to note the initial level off at 5;000 feet on their assigned SID from SJC. Fatigue was cited as a contributing factor.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.5

Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 169; Flight Crew Total 12403; Flight Crew Type 11482

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Aircraft

I was vectoring to final for the approach. Aircraft X was on a vector to intercept the localizer. I issued a crossing instruction for the final approach fix. This protects for the adjacent airport arrivals below them on their approach. Aircraft X read it back and I verified the read back. I was dealing with another aircraft for the approach and when I looked back Aircraft X was at 2000 feet at the Final Approach Fix. About 800 feet low. I then saw conflicting traffic on final (for the adjacent airport) at 1600 feet about a mile west of Aircraft X and eastbound. I asked Aircraft X if he was crossing the fix at 2800 feet and he responded there was a glideslope issue. I instructed them to climb and asked if he had the airport in sight. He said yes so I cleared him for a Visual Approach. The LOSS already happened and there was divergence now.We had a similar situation last week with a descent prior to the final approach fix where they should have. So the new procedure came out yesterday to change how we clear aircraft. Before I always instructed aircraft to maintain an altitude until established on the localizer. Management instructed us to give a crossing restriction at the Final Approach Fix to fix this problem. I started doing that today which is not what I'm used to. I believe the pilots also were confused which led to this LOSS.

I was pilot flying on an ILS Approach. Received very late turn onto final and clearance for approach from Approach Control while descending through approximately 4000 feet. Clearance was Maintain 2800 until SHAKE; Cleared ILS approach. ILS Identifier WAS verified. Approximately 2-3 miles outside of SHAKE; Glideslope captured and descended on glideslope. We then got a gradual but FULL SCALE deflection showing us ABOVE glideslope. While cross checking the approach plate and the altitude of the preceding aircraft 5 miles ahead of us; it became apparent that something didn't make sense. The preceding aircraft altitude was almost the same as ours. Simultaneously; we got a call from Approach Control to State Altitude. We were at 2000 feet over SHAKE. At this time; we also got a FULL SCALE deflection below glideslope.We were in VMC conditions with the preceding aircraft in sight. The glideslope finally stabilized throughout the remainder of the approach. We reported the issue to ATC. Throughout the Approach the ILS Frequency showed Identified. When we arrived at the gate; we talked to both the Tower and Approach control Supervisors. He explained the sequence of events. They mentioned that a similar event occurred with another aircraft not long after our event.

An aircraft on approach to SFO received incorrect glideslope information and descended below the glideslope and a crossing restriction into conflict with crossing traffic below it.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 127; Flight Crew Total 8933; Flight Crew Type 4329

Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Confusion; Distraction

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 11853; Flight Crew Type 9552

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

In the early part of takeoff roll all appeared normal. Shortly after the 100 knot call I perceived a thumping sound and vibration. This happened 2 or 3 times in rapid succession. I suspected compressor stall and aborted the takeoff about 130 knots.Aircraft was quickly slowed to the point I determined we would have no problem stopping on the runway. The FO made a 'remain seated' PA announcement. I communicated to the FO to use the switch to deactivate the auto brakes as we were rapidly decelerating to approximate taxi speed and I was concerned with brake temperatures. Tower was notified that we had aborted and their instructions were to exit the runway and turn right on Taxiway R. We asked that fire equipment be dispatched to inspect wheels and tires due to high brake temperatures. After we came to a stop I directed the FO to perform the rejected takeoff QRH. The fire department equipment arrived within about 3 to 4 minutes.I made an announcement on the PA to inform the passengers and flight attendants that I had stopped the takeoff due to unusual sounds and vibrations and that the Fire Department was coming to inspect the brakes and tires. We were able to establish communications with the Fire Department personnel on a discrete frequency and they said the wheel temperatures were high and the left wheels were smoking.There was no fire; but the high temperatures had caused the tires to go flat on the left side; and eventually the right side of the airplane. The brake temperatures decreased; and the fire department personnel brought air stairs to the aircraft. During this period I made several PA announcements in an effort to keep the passengers informed of what we were hearing from the Fire Department and that transportation was being arranged for them back to the terminal.The Fire Department operations told us they were ready to enter the aircraft so after confirming with the purser that the door was disarmed; I opened door 1 left. I spoke with the Fire Department personnel to begin the coordination of the unloading of the passengers.Shortly after this the Customer service agents and the assistant chief pilot and a flight attendant supervisor arrived and aided in the orderly deplaning of the passengers and their transportation to the terminal. When the passengers were off the aircraft the FO and I ran the parking checklist and the crew was taken to the terminal.

It was a normal flaps 1 flex takeoff. Gross weight was approximately 135;000 pounds. I was the pilot flying. After takeoff clearance; I set the power to the Flex detent and called for 'Check Thrust' and removed my hand from the thrust levers. The Captain called out 'Thrust Set' and I called out the FMAs'. Somewhere after the 100 knot callout by the Captain; the Captain initiated a rejected takeoff. As the pilot flying; my focus was outside the cockpit. The Captain indicated that he heard/felt unusual vibrations and noises. I made a PA announcement to 'remain seated; remain seated' and I made a radio call to the Tower that we were aborting our takeoff. I made the 80 knots callout. Once we slowed down; I asked the Captain if he wanted me to turn off the Auto Brakes. He said yes. I made another radio call to the Tower and told him that we were exiting the runway to the right and we would turn right on Taxiway R and to please send the fire trucks to inspect the tires and brakes as we suspect hot brakes.

An A320 Captain rejected the takeoff at about 130 KTS after he heard/felt unusual vibrations and noises. The tires deflated after leaving the runway so crew and passengers were bussed to the terminal.


Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

I was training on the Toga sector. I was working a RHV departure; SJC departures and a few VFR aircraft going to different locations. I was working a northbound Aircraft X that didn't have a transponder and I was trying to adjust his data block to put an altitude. It is different in STARS than in ARTS. The STARS was put in use last week and everyone's learning the different functions of the system. I switched the Aircraft X to the next controller and then Aircraft Y checked on. She checked on and talked very fast and I thought I heard the pilot say they were climbing via the TECKY 1 departure but after listening to the tapes the pilot said they were climbing to 10;000 feet. On the new TECKY 1 departure they're supposed to climb to FL050 until a point about 6 miles southeast of SJC then climb to FL190. Aircraft X came back to my frequency because they didn't get a hold of the next controller and then I worked with Aircraft X again. When I scanned back at Aircraft Y they were at FL067. I pointed the aircraft out to the sectors that they were going to enter and got approval to enter the airspace. I later gave the pilot the Brasher statement and when the tape was reviewed I was told I had a read back error because I didn't hear them saying they were climbing to 10;000. I didn't hear the pilot say that they were climbing to 10;000 feet and that was my fault. It wasn't super busy but there was things going on that that caused distractions like Aircraft X and learning how to use STARS. Another issue is that many pilots don't say they're climbing via the SID and I have to tell them that many times throughout the day. They're phraseology doesn't match the phraseology we're required to use. 1. I'm going to tell all the pilots regardless if they said they're climbing via the SID to maintain 5;000 Feet. 2. The TECKY 1 is a RNP departure that is fairly new. There have been many pilots that don't do what they're supposed to do in this procedure. In this week alone while I've been training there have been about 6-8 pilots that have gone through the 5;000 feet altitude restriction but luckily I've either caught it or have been able to get point outs done prior to the aircraft entering the adjacent controllers airspace. This RNP SID needs to be cancelled and reviewed again because there have been too many mistakes by pilots. These deviations can make a catastrophic event. The altitude restriction is to keep the aircraft away from the SFO arrivals. If they go through it there's a chance they'll get too close to one of the many arrivals for SFO. This SID needs to be rewritten so that it does not create confusion to the pilots so that they know exactly what they're required to do.

NCT Controller while training has an aircraft climb through an altitude. The controller did not hear on check in that the pilot was climbing to an altitude and not climbing via the SID; which the controller though the aircraft was doing. Controller reports that the RNP departure needs to be re-written and corrected.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 13400; Flight Crew Type 1500

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

Honeywell TFE-731-5R-1H shuddered and quit running. We secured the engine; ran the appropriate Emergency checklists; and landed uneventfully.

An HS-125-800 engine shuddered and shutdown while at cruise altitude FL330. Then emergency checklists were completed and the flight landed a short time later.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

At the gate; door open fumes report. The crew boarded flight; the two aft flight attendants said the aft galley had a smell/odor. The Captain went to the back to see what the smell was and didn't smell anything. He asked me to go back and see if I could detect any odors; and I did not. We called for a cleaning crew to spray deodorizer in the lav. We agreed to board and continue as we had two other MX issues going on. About 35 min after boarding the aft flight attendants complained of headaches; and soon after the lead reported a headache and lightheaded symptoms. The Captain made the decision to deplane the aircraft and started the fumes checklist. Also; we were in contact with the [Duty Officer] and Flight Attendant Supervisor. The three flight attendants were taken off the aircraft and waited on the jet bridge for EMTs. They had their o2 levels checked and were normal. They declined the ambulance ride to the ER; but elected to go to the hospital for testing. The Captain and I finished paperwork with MX personal and a follow up call with the [Duty Officer] and Scheduling.

A319 First Officer reported flight attendants notified them of an odor in the passenger cabin resulting in health issues. Aircraft was referred to Maintenance.


Distraction; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

First Officer was pilot flying; I was pilot not flying. On takeoff roll; a large Hawk type bird flew from left to right in front of aircraft. We were at 145 KIAS. I heard a thump on the right side of the aircraft. I called V-1; rotate at 152 KIAS. Rotation was at 157 KIAS. Once airborne; a loud buzzing noise was heard and substantial vibration on airframe. The First Officer stated that the aircraft felt sluggish. We climbed to FL055; notified Tower of possible air return. We proceeded to the NDB via RNAV and held until all issues were taken care of and checklists were accomplished. Emergency was declared. Visual approach with ILS backup was flown by First Officer to an uneventful landing with flaps 30 degrees and autobrakes 3. Landing weight was 167;000 LBS. Taxied in to gate followed by the fire crews in case of brake fire. Normal deplaning of aircraft occurred at gate; on inspection #2 engine had substantial fan blade damage and damage to cowling floor behind the fan.

A B737-800's right engine ingested a bird on takeoff which caused substantial fan blade and cowling floor damage so an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the airport. Recent farming activity near the airport attracted birds.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

There was a listed MEL associated with the flight that required Maintenance (MX) action as well as a MX and Flight Crew 'Follow Up Required' before each leg of flight. The system that was deferred and required action was the 'Skin Air Outlet Valve (Extract Valve)'; listed on the MEL. The required MX procedures had been performed at a previous time and at a previous location for the initial deferral. The ZZZ Contract mechanic was summoned to the aircraft to perform the 'MX Follow Up Required' which consisted of a 'AEVC test' which was required to be performed before each flight. The Captain relinquished his seat in the flight deck in order that the Contract Mechanic could attempt to perform the required MX action so that the flight may continue. It very soon became quite obvious to both the Captain and myself that this Contract Mechanic had no knowledge whatsoever of the systems he was trying to test; nor any knowledge of how to access them. Nor was he able to follow the instructions that [company maintenance control had] emailed him in order to conduct the test. 3 specific incidents that stand out in my mind are the following:1. I had to verbally read the instructions to the Contract MX and show him myself where the associated systems were displayed and how to read them. 2. We had to point out to the Contract MX that the proper instructions to perform the follow up action were NOT in his possession and that he needed to contact [company maintenance control] for further guidance.3. I had to locate and point out to the Contract MX MYSELF where pertinent circuit breakers were in order to perform the follow up action because in each instance he had identified the WRONG CIRCUIT BREAKERS to perform the tests! Only after repeated attempts to communicate either with his superiors on the phone or with [company maintenance control] did another mechanic show up and together the 2 of them attempted to complete the follow up required MX action. And then; again; only with the help of the Captain and myself did the test get completed accurately. We felt compelled to file this [report] because it occurred to us that the MX action would not have been conducted correctly had it not been for the input of the flight crew. And again; these are NOT overly complex operations being undertaken: reading printed instructions; following directions; identifying circuit breakers based on a letter and number printed on a breaker panel. NONE of that was being performed properly had the flight crew not intervened.  In my humble opinion; this event could have been prevented had a CAPABLE AND PROPERLY TRAINED MX TECHNICIAN been at the aircraft to perform the required MX follow up action. These events took place over the course of approximately 45 minutes while we watched a grossly incompetent Contract MX technician attempt to conduct a rather routine MX follow up. In contrast; the next tech in ZZZ1 conducted the follow up test in 5 MINUTES!!! I would suggest that [the company] more cautiously vet their contract MX staff and in the future instruct the flight crews to always be paying close attention what is being tested / deactivated / placarded in the cockpit as it pertains to Contract MX in outstations.

An Airbus pilot described the frustration of the crew as they observed; and attempted to assist; an inexperienced contract maintenance technician perform a relatively simple system recheck required per an MEL.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors; Weather; Staffing; Procedure

I was working all sectors in my area with midnight operations. I received a few reports of moderate chop from some heavy aircraft near the SYR VOR; so I decided to call Cleveland ARTCC as well as ZNY to let them know that I was receiving very poor riders in that area; and that I'd prefer if they started sending me aircraft below FL310 to avoid the bad rides. I called ZNY and in the process of trying to inform the controller of the rides; he abruptly interrupted me and informed me that he was 'getting moderate everywhere'; and had a holding stack of 7 or 8 aircraft. It sounded like the controller was quite busy; so I tried to quickly convey that I wanted the aircraft from him delivered to me below FL310. Around this time; I took a handoff on a EWR arrival on the western half of my sector. I issued the aircraft to cross HNK VOR at FL180; per the normal crossing restriction. A few minutes later; an aircraft checked onto my frequency at FL210. I had no idea who the aircraft was; and at the same time; I received a phone call from ZNY trying to reach me on the shout line.During all of this; I was quite busy; due to trying to convey the ride conditions to several aircraft; and if I recall correctly I was also sequencing several aircraft for CYUL. I picked up the land line as soon as I was able; and ZNY informed me that he shipped me the aircraft accidentally; to which I responded I'll take radar and sort it out. The problem that I identified was that the aircraft was in direct confliction with my EWR arrival; especially since the ZNY controller had erroneously left the aircraft on a heading. I immediately amended the altitude of my EWR arrival; and resolved the situation. I feel if I had been busier; or not as vigilant in my identification of the confliction that it could have led to an operational error.The ZNY controller seemed quite busy so I might suggest if he was working several combined sectors that he either be provided a d-side; or another controller to help him out by taking some of his sectors. I was also quite busy at the time and I feel perhaps it would be better to have 3 controllers on the midnight shift instead of just 2. With only 2 controllers on ZBW's mid shifts; we are essentially forced to divide the shift into two 3+ hour shifts; which is extremely fatiguing especially when issues are compounded by bad rides; deviations; or simply unusual situations (that happen with regularity as any CPC knows).

ZBW Center Controller reported another Controller mistakenly transferred him an aircraft that was in conflict with his traffic.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 20

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Aircraft X was inbound to SVH trying to beat the weather to the field requesting a visual approach. Aircraft X reported the field in sight and was issued a visual approach. Aircraft X then informed me that he was circling the field to land on RWY 28. I then issued a clearance to Aircraft Y to fly heading 090 vector to the other side of airport for visual to avoid weather and help with traffic flow.Aircraft X then gave a pilot report and I ask him if he wanted to cancel. Aircraft X at 018 MSL responded not yet. I then descended Aircraft Y to 036 MSL. Aircraft X then reported he had to go around due to wind shear. I then attempted to climb Aircraft Y to 070 to allow for the unexpected situation of Aircraft X. Aircraft X was headed towards heavy precipitation requested vectors. I assigned him a heading of 300 and a climb to 036. The turns were issued below the MIA [Minimum IFR Altitude]. I issued the turn due the unsafe situation caused by the proximity of the weather. [The] weather posed a greater danger to the aircraft than the terrain did to the jet aircraft that was climbing.Encourage aircraft that are inbound [to] airports with weather to consider alternate or take a delay.

Atlanta Center Controller reported an unsafe situation relating to traffic; weather; and Minimum IFR Altitude.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 1200

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 5000

I entered the cockpit after my rest break.  The Captain stepped back for a bathroom break.  The copilot was alert; however; he shut his eyes and then his head tilted down.  When the Captain returned after a few minutes; it was copilot's turn to take a rest break.  He took several minutes to arise.  I called his name; pushed on his shoulder; then pulled back his chair.  He arose and went back for his rest break seeming groggy.  Because he took longer than normal to arise; and would now be in the back; out of sight and alone for two hours on his break; we wanted to confirm that nothing medically wrong had occurred.  The Captain talked to Dispatch then Medlink; then solicited the help of a doctor in first class.  He was examined and passed all tests for alertness; understanding; reactions; blood pressure; etc.  This was done within about 15 minutes of the initial occurrence.  He occupied the jumpseat after his rest break and for the landing; only as a precaution.  For the duration of the flight he appeared normal in every way and performed pilot duties normally.

Just before leaving the cockpit for my previously-scheduled rest break; I dozed off unintentionally; and was apparently very difficult to awaken.  Once awake; I went to the forward galley and chatted with the Flight Attendant; asked for a snack if one was available; then went to the sleeper seat.  I ate my food at a leisurely pace; popped in some earplugs and turned out the lights to take some sleep.  Shortly thereafter I was awakened by the purser; who was in the company of a medical doctor.  The doctor had been asked by the Captain to perform an evaluation of my condition; and it appears from her report that I was just fine.  Which is exactly how I felt.  I returned to the cockpit later to take over the duties of relief pilot.

A B777 Relief Pilot reported that as she is about to relieve the flying First Officer; he nods off and was very difficult to awaken.  As a precaution the Captain had the First Officer examined by an on board physician and the relief pilot assume the First Officer's position.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure

Time Pressure; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

MEL; Procedure; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Aircraft; Human Factors

I; Maintenance Controller; placed an MEL on an A321 aircraft that was in ZZZ1; but our computer systems were down and could not access the full MEL menu due to an outage from our communications provider and was not aware the Flight Warning Computer (FWC-1) could not be MELed.  I did not have our Air Carrier's full MEL procedure to use. [Recommend] having a better back up [procedure] for computer failures.

At the Gate; first flight of the day; received Flight Warning Computer-1 (FWC-1) ECAM FAULT. Attempted unsuccessful QRH reset procedure. Called Maintenance Control and attempted several other unsuccessful reset attempts with Maintenance Control. Crew was then instructed by Maintenance Control to apply MEL 31-XX-XX. Followed verbatim the Maintenance controller's instructions in applying the MEL. The MEL stated that FWC-2 could be MEL'd with the application of MEL XX-XX-XX; downgrading the aircraft's CAT-IIB capability. The MEL did not specifically say that FWC-1 could not be MEL'd (although it is implied with the statement that FWC-2 could be MEL'd) and Maintenance Control said nothing about switching FWC-1 with FWC-2. After applying the MEL; the flight proceeded ZZZ1 to ZZZ2 without incident. Upon arriving in ZZZ2; during the walk around; I noticed a Contract Mechanic in the E/E Bay; when I asked him what he was doing (I was never contacted or notified by Maintenance Control that this was going to happen) he told me he was switching FWC-1 with FWC-2. I then called Maintenance Control and asked them if we misapplied the MEL; he told me they should have switched the FWC boxes in ZZZ1 prior to our departure and that FWC-1 can't be MEL'd.In this case I questioned whether we could MEL FWC-1; but did not question the Maintenance Controller's instructions during the application of the MEL. In my opinion the MEL is not completely clear regarding whether or not FWC-1 can be MEL'd. I think there should be a sentence that specifically says FWC-1 cannot be deferred and there should be a Maintenance procedure that specifies the FWC boxes need to be switched before flight. Maintenance personnel need to be better trained and I needed to be more diligent in reading/applying the MEL. In addition the crew was dealing with a lengthy delay due to the computer system being down; we were dealing with multiple issues in addition to the maintenance problem.

A Maintenance Controller and Captain report on events that contributed to an improper deferral of #1 Flight Warning Computer (FWC-1) ECAM FAULT and dispatch of an A321 aircraft. Pilot notes there should be a sentence in the MEL that specifically says FWC-1 cannot be deferred; and a Maintenance Procedure that specifies the FWC boxes need to be switched before flight; which had not been accomplished.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter FOD

Airport; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related

I would consider this a hazard that needs to be addressed immediately. Pulling into the gate in ISP I noticed what appeared to be sand all over the Safety Zone which was also a bit snowy and icy. I went down to the ramp to verify what I did not want to believe but yes; somebody thinks it's Ok for engines to ingest sand in the Safety Zone area. I spoke to a Ramp Employee and he said the city is doing it and they cannot get them to stop. This will cause damage to our engines and is therefore a major hazard that needs to be addressed immediately.

Air carrier Captain reported the city is dumping sand in the gate Safety Zone area at ISP.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3.5; Flight Crew Total 349.7; Flight Crew Type 349.7

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 950; Flight Crew Type 65

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

While at cruise engine dropped about 1;000 RPM then prop stopped. Selected field could not make turn into wind for landing so landed downwind and rolled through field and through an old barb wire fence. Some Fiberglass damage; left landing gear bent. Over 10 gallons in tanks; fuel in carb bowls; all controls working normally; engine would not turn over. No injuries.

While cruising at 1;800 FT on a heading of approximately 030 degrees the engine lost approximately 1;000 RPM and quit running and the propeller stopped turning a few seconds later for an unknown reason. A suitable field was selected by the pilot and an emergency approach and landing were performed. In the pilot's estimation and mine; it was determined that maneuvering to land upwind would not be possible and we therefore landed downwind. The winds at the time were generally north northwest at about 7 KTS. The landing was made on an approximate heading of 180 degrees. Because of the tailwind it was not possible to stop before the fence at the end of the field and a fence post and barbed wire were struck during the roll out. There were no injuries and property damage was estimated at less than a couple of hundred dollars. The aircraft sustained damage when the left main landing gear was bent backward and the fiberglass fuselage cracked upon impact with the fence. After the landing it was determined that there was still ample (3 hours) of fuel on board (there was no leakage or spillage) and the flight controls were working properly.

Thorp pilot experiences engine failure at 1;800 FT and is unable to turn into the wind to land in the selected field and lands downwind. Some damage is reported to the left gear and the fiberglass fuselage.


Deplaning; Safety Related Duties; Service; Boarding

Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Gate Agent / CSR; Person Passenger; Person Ground Personnel; Person Maintenance

General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused

Company Policy; Procedure; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Upon arrival at the gate agents mentioned that the aircraft had a terrible smell. I proceeded to do my briefing with the agents and went to the aircraft. As I approached the aircraft you could tell there was something really wrong the smell was so strong you could smell it in the Jet Bridge. I met the other 2 flight attendants we did our pre flight checks and discussed the situation on board. I spoke to First Officer who was already on board and asked him if something had been written up in the logbook regarding the smell. We all agree at this point that Cabin Service needed to be called. I called the agents back. A called was place to Cabin Service. I also called Flight Service and Flight Service Managers showed up at the aircraft and witness what we were talking about. Few minutes later a CSM showed up to the aircraft as well. At this point the Captain showed up and he walked the cabin and he insisted he could not smell anything. I spoke to him regarding the smell and he agreed to get Cabin Service onboard. They proceeded to empty 2 bottles of lavatory spray into a mop and ran it through the carpet to dissipate the smell. I proceeded to check the lavatory and noticed that the bathroom was flooded. Cabin Service cleaned it and continued to spray the aircraft. We boarded the flight and received 6 complaints before closing the door. Passenger in XAEF asked me; what was the strong odor in the cabin. I responded that we were trying to work with it since the aircraft had been sitting in the hangar for 2 days. We pushed back and as we are showing the safety announcement passenger sitting in XBC rang her call bell twice and asked us for a plastic bag because the smell was getting her sick and she was about to vomit. Flight Attendant Number 4 took her to the back and sat her on the last row of Main Cabin to be close to the lavatories. The Captain informed me before we left that Cabin Service as well as Flight Service was going to meet the aircraft upon arrival. On our way since this is a converging service and due to the shortage of the flight you have to be quick doing the service. As I am coming back to the galley I notice that the carpet was wet. Passenger sitting in XCE informed me that the lavatory was flooded. I checked the lavatory and confirmed that indeed it was. At this point I locked the lavatory. I call the flight deck and gave them the write up. As the flight progressed the smell was getting worst and not dissipating as expected. Once in [our destination] we were met by the Senior Flight Service Manager; as well as the CSM and another Flight Service Manager. Cabin Service came onboard and the plane was cleaned. They vacuumed the entire aircraft and used Lysol in the aircraft as well as the Jet Bridge. I spoke extensively with the Management and explained the situation. Once Cabin Service left I went to check the lavatory again and notice that the lavatory was flooded again. The Captain called Maintenance and they showed up to check on the lavatory. They discovered that the toilet was leaking from the bottom and the lavatory was placarded. At this point I asked the Captain if there was anything he could do to get another aircraft once we get to [our destination] since the smell was not going to clear and it was obvious were the source of the smell was coming from. This lavatory had been leaking every time a passenger used it. On top of that this aircraft sat on the hangar for 2 days. We gathered in the First Class Cabin and Captain said he was going to call to get a different aircraft once we land. He asked the Senior Flight Service Manager to make the call and the Senior Flight Service Manager informed him that he did not had the authority to do it. The Captain called ahead and he informed me once again that we were going to get another plane. We boarded the flight and immediately we got a complaint from passenger sitting in 6F. The odor continued until we were met by the agent who happened to be at our gatethis morning and noticed the strong odor; she was working flight back. As soon as she opened the door she noticed that the smell had not cleared. The aircraft door opened and the Captain left the aircraft and informed me 'We are keeping the aircraft.' I immediately called Flight Service and asked to speak to a Flight Service Manager who showed up and I explained to him that I was not feeling safe flying this plane around the system. At this point I deemed that it was a risk for my health and I proceeded to get off the flight. I called my Flight Service Manager and informed her of the situation. I also informed her that I was going to get off the flight at this point since my health was being put at risk. By the time we got back to our original departure airport the lavatory was flooded again even though the mechanics in the last station had closed the water shut off valve. I took pictures of the forward. Entry area as well as the flooded lavatory and they can be submitted upon request. Broken toilet that was only discovered [when] we arrived in [our destination] and I insisted in getting the lavatory check. At this point after the aircraft was flown to [our destination] [when] they discover that the aircraft had the forward lavatory leaking from the bottom. Every time a passenger used it was leaking into the cabin. The lavatory was flooded as well inflight. Aircraft sat at the hangar for days and no one noticed the strong odor until the aircraft was put in service that the agents and cabin crew started complaining about the terrible odor in the cabin that reached the Jet Bridge Door all the way to the gate entrance. Accountability is a must.

A B737-800 Flight Attendant reported that an aircraft had a flooded forward lavatory which had a strong; unsafe odor but after maintenance did not fix the problem the aircraft continued in revenue service with the odor.


Workload; Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Weather; Procedure; Human Factors

Approaching DEN 150 NM out working around weather on the JAGGR 3 Arrival. Got vectors; then the WAHUU 2 Arrival; told to descend via ending at 9;000 feet; and then vectors. No altitude given and had to question altitude. Told 13;000 feet after going through it. Then told to hold 12;000 feet. Earlier using Runway 34/35 and now 16s and 17s. I was flying and complying with ATC speed and headings. First Officer (FO) tried to keep up with FMC changes. Getting closer given and given direct PIEKE and then direct PUFFR. Then given heading 120; intercept LOC 17R. All okay. Then given to slow to 210 direct HISSY and maintain 12;000 feet. HISSY is not in the FMC and this led to the distraction of telling and checking FOs entry of HISSY. Speedbrake was out to slow. Now 12;000 feet. Level and got airspeed low warning. Corrected immediately. Believe we crossed HISSY at 12;000 feet. Then; we completed stable ILS approach.

An air carrier crew was issued multiple arrival STARs and runway assignments during descent into DEN resulting in a very high work load and a momentary low speed alert with the speedbrake extended.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Distraction

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

I was the Captain on [flight to] ZZZ. This aircraft had a requirement for Maintenance to confirm there was not a 'L/G System Disagree' caution message present; prior to each departure. Just before takeoff from [departure airport]; a BSCU System 2 Fault ECAM annunciated. We delayed take off to resolve this issue. First Officer was the Pilot Flying. On final approach to Runway XXC; Pilot Flying called for 'gear down'. I moved the landing gear handle to the down position…three red gear unlocked lights indicated on the forward panel...gear indicated UP on the wheels ECAM page with an Amber L/G CTL message. There were no other ECAM's or warnings. Cycled the gear handle up; then back down; same indications. All hydraulic systems indicated normal. [We advised ATC and that] we wanted to be vectored out to downwind again to work a 'landing gear issue'. Designated the First Officer as Pilot Flying and ATC communicator while I advised the flight attendants and passengers. Fuel on board was approximately 6;000 lbs at this point. I referenced the L/G Gear Not Down QRH. Completion of this checklist sent us to the L/G Gravity Extension QRH. At some point here; gave the flight attendants the briefing. Discussion with First Officer resulted in consulting [Maintenance Control] (through Dispatch) to see if there were any other options prior to manual gear extension. [Maintenance Control] did not have any other actions to recommendWe reviewed the Gravity Extension checklist which stated nose wheel steering would not be available on landing. ATC; ARFF; and the [Company] station were all advised of this.  Approximately 25 miles from the airfield; we were cleared for the visual approach to Runway XXR. The landing gear was manually extended per the QRH. Flap extension and remainder of the approach and landing were normal; with the exception of nose wheel steering. The aircraft was brought to a stop on the runway centerline...brakes set...APU started; and then engines shut down. ZZZ ARFF examined the aircraft and advised there were no obvious issues. We were eventually towed to the gate with an ARFF escort. Fuel on board at the gate was 3;500 lbs.

An Airbus 320 Captain reported a failure of the landing gear to extend normally which necessitated the use of the alternate manual system to extend the gear.


Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors

Zone in the station called to have flight unlocked to add more cargo... they claimed it was only 1;800 lbs.; an estimate of 24;000 was added!

Ground operations reported a significant increase in cargo for a flight just before departure.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Upon landing our gate was occupied. Told to hold in PAD A. Captain and I reviewed the pages for the hold pads; but it only displayed the Scenic Hold Pad. It did discuss other hold pads in general by saying 'entire aircraft will be contained inside the boundary line'. In pad A we were confused what line this was. There was a dashed line closer to the taxi way and one much further away that looked impossible to stop Aircraft X behind as there didn't appear to be enough room. We chose the former and it didn't provide enough room when Aircraft Y taxied by. His wingtip came uncomfortably close to our aircraft.The pages are not clear as to what the boundary line actually is.  Easy fixes are to put a note with an arrow on the Taxi chart saying to make sure to hold behind the boundary line. If that's too hard to do; make it a hotspot. At a minimum; pages need to show all hold pads and clearly show what the boundary line is.

Air carrier First Officer reported there are two possible boundary lines for the pad area at ORD airport and the chart does not specify which one to use.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Assigned the MIA Hedly 1 Departure from 8L.  Clearance was misunderstood to mean we were to fly the departure as depicted.  We reviewed the departure and the flight plan IAW the FOM and AOM procedures.  Upon reaching 8L we were cleared for takeoff.  I do not recall hearing an assigned heading nor were we told to 'RNAV to Senoy'; the first fix on the DP (Departure Plate).  We departed in Nav mode.After takeoff the FMS captured and steered us essentially straight ahead to Senoy.  At Senoy; we began a left turn toward the next fix Cimba.  At that point ATC queried and suggested that we may have taken someone else's heading.  The Second in Command (pilot not flying) replied that we were following the SID as cleared.  ATC said that was incorrect and gave us an amended heading; while I kept the aircraft slow until we sorted it out.Miami said they would talk to the tower to figure out what we were assigned; but we never learned the result of that call; if it was ever made.  The most telling comment from ATC was 'You wouldn't be the first one to do that; it's something we're working with the FAA on right now.'  That was the last thing we heard about it.It seems that there was some confusion on the part of the Second in Command when the clearance was received.  I was not present at that time; but I found it interesting that even following the FOM procedures for route verification; that initial copying of the clearance is a potential single point of failure.It seems that there is some known issue either with this departure or in how it is verbalized by Miami ATC. The controller's statement suggests that this is not an isolated incident; but it is currently being addressed.  I am not suggesting that we require both pilots to be present for the copying of the clearance. There are far too many duties placed on us already; and more show up by the day; including now passenger iPad maintenance; etc.There is simply too much required by our Company in getting a plane ready for flight to have yet another requirement for both pilots to be in the cockpit to receive a clearance.  Errors will happen; and I will be more cognizant to ask a question if I think something is out of the ordinary.  Adding another layer of redundancy in this case will likely lead to something else; perhaps outside of the aircraft; to be missed; unintended consequences.

I called Miami clearance delivery to get our clearance from MIA.  According to our company filed flight plan; we were filed for 'MIA..HEDLY J53…' I copied and read back 'Aircraft X cleared via radar vectors HEDLY as filed; maintain 5000 expect 400 10 min. after departure. Departure on 119.45; squawk XXXX'. The controller on clearance delivery corrected me by saying 'Vectors to HEDLY1 RNAV departure.'  With his emphasis on the HEDLY1 RNAV departure; which actually ends at HEDLY; I misunderstood the clearance to think that we were to takeoff and fly to SENOY and then follow the HEDLY1 RNAV departure. Upon reviewing our clearance with the captain prior to start; I was so certain that we were to fly the RNAV; that the captain didn't have any reason to question the clearance. We took off on runway 08L and flew out to SENOY where we commenced a left turn towards CIMBA on the RNAV departure.  Shortly after that turn; our departure controller said we must have taken someone else's turn by mistake.  I said we were just flying the RNAV departure.  We were given a tight turn to west.  I apologized for my mistake and we received a comment from the controller that we were not the first ones to have made that mistake and that we're working with the FAA right now to fix that.  Very shortly after that we were cleared direct to HEDLY and as filed.I was very mistaken to think that a vector meant to fly the published departure; but I was confused by the correction to my read back that it was the HEDLY1 RNAV departure not just vectors to HEDLY.  While it is not required; the tower controller who cleared us for takeoff might have said 'Fly runway heading' or assigned us a heading for vectors; though I am not certain that it would have alerted me to the error in my thinking of the RNAV departure.On our next leg flying out of Airport Y; we were waiting for 6 to 8 other departures prior to ours.  Airport Y was using the RNAV departure; and every single aircraft departing on RWY XY was 'Cleared for takeoff runway XY; RNAV to [fix on SID]'. That left no doubt as to what that crew was expected to do.

Pilot and co-pilot report of confusion on departure of flying the RNAV departure or flying to a fix.  ATC corrects them and advises that they aren't the first ones to do that.