Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

When we leveled off at FL370 and noticed an amber IAS indication. When we checked the airspeed indicators we noticed that the FO's airspeed was indicating lower than mine and the standby airspeed indicator. As we accelerated there was no change in his airspeed indicator. Based on this I thought there was a blockage of pitot tube 2. The PM pulled out the QRH and it instructed us to do an ADC (Air Data Computer) reversion. This also required us to descend out of RVSM airspace. ATC assigned us FL270 and we began to descend. We descended with the autopilot on. As we descended we noticed the standby IAS and Captain side no longer matched up. Captain side IAS was descending and acting like an altimeter. This caused some uncertainty initially as we were not sure which one to believe. We were asked to increase our descent by ATC so I increased the VS to 2000 fpm. Shortly after this the airplane did an uncommanded pitch down and we disconnected the autopilot. It was at this point smoke or water vapor came pouring in through the window seals. I wasn't sure which it was at first; but it made me worried about our pressurization and we were still at FL300 and hand flying. I checked the cabin pressure on the EICAS and it seemed normal. About at this point we also experienced a failure of both ADCs as we got red Xs across our instruments. I also saw an IC-600 failure message on the EICAS and the first officer reported seeing a PRESN auto fail message. We [advised ATC] and proceeded to ZZZ. We received radar vectors there. As we descended the systems came back online and by the time we were getting vectors to ILS all indications were normal again. At some point I turned the autopilot back on but it kicked off after we intercepted the localizer as the localizer was swaying back and forth. After that we landed uneventfully at ZZZ.Bad weather; instrument failure; task saturation. The autopilot pitch down was caused by me leaving the autopilot on after I should have disconnected it. At the time I was busy and it did not occur to me that I should turn the autopilot off. At that time I was busy trying to decide which airspeed indication I could rely on and trying to figure out what was going on.

The flight started about 1.5 hours delayed due to a line of severe weather. Our filed route took us north with expected vectors around the west side of the most severe elements of the line. Previous aircraft had flown through our route without any issues. We reached our cruising altitude of 37;000 ft. and were leveled off for approximately 9 minutes before we received an amber IAS indication on the PFDs. Taking note of the three airspeeds revealed the FO side was in disagreement with the standby and captain's side PFD. I pulled the QRH. The guidance provided stated to compare data with the standby indicator and if required use cross-side data by pressing the appropriate reversionary button. We did this resulting in the FO side airspeed reading in agreement with the captain's side and standby instruments. Further guidance also instructed us to descend below RVSM so I as the PM called ATC and requested a non RVSM altitude for a minor issue with our airspeed indications. At that point the problem seemed solved and we intended to continue as planned. It was during the descent; however; that the real alarming airspeed indications began to manifest. As we got lower; all three airspeed indications fell out of agreement and all trended lower with each bit of altitude lost. Obviously we were both extremely alarmed at this indication and I began thinking out loud about what would cause the result. My thought was that a partial pitot tube blockage which prevent air from entering the tube but not preventing it from escaping would possibly result in this reading. This thinking was based on static pressure continually increasing as we descended but ram air pressure remaining unchanged. This would result in an ever increasing static to ram air pressure ratio thus resulting in a lower airspeed indication. My mind immediately went to [a recent aircraft accident] which crashed due to pitot tube blockage and an improper pitch and power setting in response to inaccurate airspeed indications. The time spent during the descent while the airspeed was rolling back was incredibly stressful as it was IMC in the thin air of 35;000+ feet. I am certain both of our minds were trying to figure out as rapidly as possible what was happening in order to best figure out how to handle the problem. Any EICAS indications which may or may not have existed during that period went unnoticed as the evaluation of whether or not a stall at 30 something thousand feet was imminent took precedence over all other things. Once I was done verbalizing my theory on the pitot tube blockage and we both agreed it was a real possibility; our focus became pitch and power and working together to ensure the aircraft continued to fly safely in the descent. Up until this point the captain had elected to continue to let the autopilot fly; perhaps due to the thin air; but we were both very aware of the probable need to disconnect it when our airspeed indication read very low. I don't think either of us knew for sure what the Autopilot was going to do at such low airspeeds which in hindsight should have been a trigger for the captain to hand fly the aircraft but there was a lot to think about at that point. When the airspeed indication (not actual airspeed) read dangerously low the autopilot commanded a very rapid pitch down attitude. The captain immediately disconnected the autopilot and I jumped on the controls with him to pull the nose back up to a safe descent attitude while also trimming the nose up to relieve the pressure. I notified ATC of our situation. I asked if there was any known VMC in the area but none could be found. ATC offered ZZZ as the closest suitable airport and provided vectors to the field. At some point during our continued descent we lost all airspeed and altitude indications as both PFD's were covered in red Xs. A number of EICAS indications were presented which again took a back seat to flying the aircraft; getting setup to land at an airport now less than 30 miles away with a Metar of TSRA over ZZZ. Honestly there was so much going on as the PM that the only EICAS message that was clearly noted in my head was PRESN auto FAIL. Perhaps this was because it seemed like a completely new problem in the storm of events. It was somewhere around this time; likely before I noticed PRESN auto FAIL; that our windows were completely fogged over and both the Captain and FO side windows were venting in visible water vapor. The windows were so obstructed that I initially thought we had severe clear ice buildup on our windows further adding to my workload as it produced even more stress to an already very stressful event. Concerns of seeing a runway with an obstructed windscreens became the next thought in my head so I moved on to trying to solve that problem. There were no indications of failed windshield heat; however; I checked the windshield heat buttons at least three times to make sure they were on and even cycled the captain's side as I have never seen so much condensation on a heated windscreen before. I eventually had a moment to grab the box of tissues we thankfully had on the fight deck and was relieved to find our visibility issues were solved after wiping down the front windscreens. While we didn't get into VMC conditions until around 2;000 feet on the approach; we did at some point during our descent into ZZZ get all of our indications back and in agreement with no reversions. To the best of my knowledge we were within 10 miles of the field and getting vectors for the ILS when our instrumentation resumed what at least appeared to be a normal operating condition. I would be dishonest if I said I wasn't very skeptical of all instrument indications at that point after all we had been through thus far. Because the indications were in agreement the Captain elected to reengage the autopilot again for our arrival into ZZZ. Keep in mind from the point of failure when the Captain took the controls from the autopilot until right now in the scenario; all that I have been doing from the right seat has been in conjunction with being equally focused on watching the captain's flying to back him up on his pitch and power. Nothing was more important in my mind than 1. Preventing a stall and 2. Ensuring we didn't descend the aircraft into the ground due to task saturation. Our descent into ZZZ was constant moderate precipitation and despite an ATIS indicating TSRA; Approach had two aircraft which had recently landed; thus encouraging us to continue into ZZZ. In one last reminder from the aircraft to never stop flying until you are safely on the ground; the autopilot started badly s-turning on the localizer and the autopilot disengaged itself. The captain of course took the controls again and hand flew the ILS to the runway to land without any further issues. Some of the major threats included severe weather along the route of flight as well as a malfunctioning aircraft with incorrect indications provided by the instrumentation. The most significant factor was the uncommanded pitch down by the autopilot due to not hand flying sooner. That would stand out to me as our biggest error. We both were unsure of what was going to happen with the autopilot in charge so allowing the autopilot to take it for as long as we did was not necessarily wise. It did; however; free up both of our brains a bit more to decide what was happening and how to respond. The only positive I can take from this was we were at least watching the airplane like a hawk ready to take corrective action immediately if a proper pitch attitude wasn't maintained. As soon as it was apparent the autopilot wasn't up to the task; we took over. We experienced a very nasty mix of major task saturation which couldn't be aided by an autopilot as well as honest to goodness fear. Stalling the airplane in IMC was hard to not think about; nor did I wish to try. Aviate-Navigate-Communicate was definitely our approach. It doesn't do any good to flip through a QRH while death spiraling toward the ground after a stall. That being said; at no time did I ever make a decision to not follow the QRH. I simply did not have enough free resources to get there before the messages eventually cleared and the PFD's appeared normal again. With so much going on; including the water vapor and suspected icing; working with ATC to get us to ZZZ; having to consider the weather and the TSRA in the ATIS; getting numbers for the runway; setting up frequencies; briefing approaches and running the arrival check and sending a diversion report to dispatch; I simply never had the time. Had this been a sim where the consideration of myself and other peoples lives were not on the line; I probably would have been better able to address the EICAS messages which may or may not have corrected our instrument indications. Unfortunately; this was the real world and we both did the best we could with everything which was thrown at us. While I feel overall we did ok with the situation presented to us; there are always things you could do better. Certainly as previously mentioned; the autopilot should have been disconnected sooner in order to prevent the need to take sudden corrective action. I do wish I had been able to get to the QRH after the initial ADC (Air Data Computer) reversion. I really tried my best to clear my mind and focus on the tasks required. Unfortunately; I couldn't stop hyper focusing on the aircraft state and trusting the Captain to fly correctly. It wasn't because I didn't generally trust his skills; it was simply a scenario which is very rare (never happened in my experience) and had a severe enough outcome (high altitude stall) if improperly executed that I felt backing him up took priority. Especially since with all that had gone wrong; my trust of any indication outside of the standby indicator (even my trust here wasn't very strong) was gone; despite what they were or were not reading.

EMB145 flight crew reported an airspeed indication failure at FL370 in IMC with thunderstorms nearby. The flight diverted to the nearest suitable airport with airspeed returning to normal during the approach.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was the Pilot Monitoring during this flight. We briefed the visual to Runway 10R; backed up by the ILS 10R in the FMC. It was nighttime; clear VFR conditions with surface winds 080 and gusting 25-30 knots. We were on the HHOOD arrival; downwind on the north side of the airport. We were cleared for the visual approach to runway 10R while heading approximately 180 degrees pointed right at the FAF POWLZ (FMC was set up for the ILS 10R). The tower controller had turned us to the base leg while we were still high. When given the clearance by tower for the visual approach I believe the Pilot Flying (PF) selected LVL CHANGE to facilitate a rapid descent to the glide path. I was completing landing checklist items at the same time as the PF was calling for the deployment of the landing gear and flaps. We decelerated and descended fully configured to the glide path. During this very brief time I kept an eye toward the airport but I didn't realize our rate of descent took the aircraft well below glide path until the Portland Tower controller issued us a 'Low Altitude Alert'. The PF immediately leveled off. We were just above 1000 feet. I determined our position on the extended center line and felt it was safe to continue the approach. We intercepted the glide slope and landed.Lessons learned Using Level Change brings the throttles to idle and sets up too high a rate of descent near the ground; also providing a good chance to get slow (or fast) if hand flying since the throttles go to the ARM mode and will not wake up or provide any speed protection. Vertical Speed would have been a better mode and provided a more controlled rate of descent and also speed protection.I also failed to recognize the APPROACH mode had not been engaged. We therefore unwittingly flew through the glide slope and didn't realize it. Selecting the APPROACH mode is certainly a habit pattern I always plan to employ but in this case I missed it and therefore suffered a very poor result.

I was pilot flying right seat VFR arrival to 10R Portland first time. On left downwind was given left turn vector just inside Final approach fix POWLZ. At this point on left base I called for gear down and flaps 15. I had slowed down to 180 knots from 190 knots on downwind and flaps 5. Upon left hand turn went flaps 10 below 210 then called for landing gear down and flaps 15 noticing I was about 300 feet high at that point. We had in the altitude selector window 2000 feet. I went to flight level change on vertical descent mode and throttles went to arm as we configured to flaps 40 with gear down. Wind was gusting from 18-33 knots from the left. We turned inside the FAF below 2000 as we rolled the altitude window selector to 0 feet. We had the ILsS set up in the FMS and navaids for a brakes 3 flaps 40 VFR arrival severe clear.We had no autothrottle protection and got slow which the captain pointed out and then got an altitude alert from tower as we descended below glide slope with just the localizer arm button activated and not the approach mode to prevent any vertical oscillations until we were close to intercepting the glide path. The combination of low speed and low altitude put us outside parameters and it happened in seconds not minutes. I corrected back to airspeed by advancing the throttles and arming the approach mode and climbing back up to 2;000 ft to capture the glide path. Landing was smooth and uneventful. Landed within the first 1/3 of runway on path; VASI reading normally. Runway length is 11;000 ft. Slight left crosswind gusty winds. System knowledge regarding flight level change arms throttles and you don't have any protection. Slipped my mind and taking a vector delayed outside of final approach fix to set up properly for approach. Fly the airplane not the automation! I could clearly see the runway and allowed myself to get distracted inside. Select approach mode once on base turn instead of just LOC. Better cross check of altitude and airspeed. SOP! These events happen very quickly left base to final is where I got slow and too low. Be vigilant in all phases and use vertical speed down low when you don't have a altitude selected in the altitude selector window. ATC gave us an early turn inside the FAF and I won't allow that next time late at night into unfamiliar territory first time approach. Due to little traffic they vectored us in tight and I got behind the jet.

B737 flight crew reported getting low and slow during a night visual approach to Runway 10R at PDX. The Tower issued a low altitude alert and the descent was arrested; speed increased; and a normal landing completed.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 190; Flight Crew Total 1133; Flight Crew Type 81

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 68; Flight Crew Total 235; Flight Crew Type 10

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Diverted

During cruising flight over ZZZZZ Intersection on the way back to ZZZ (22 miles west ZZZ VOR on the radial 253) [We experienced] total electrical failure. (Emergency checklist [was] followed with no success).Comm 1; NAV 1 and GPS lost. Used comm 2 as alternative to transmit the last communication to approachApproach cleared me to the B airspace.Lost comm 2 (only receiving was reliable and could not transmit); NAV 2; PFD and MFD lost too. Only transponder was totally functional. Approach request to acknowledge instructions via ident.10 nm north west of ZZZ1; lost engine indications.Engines were still running.Used transponder code 7700.Approach cleared me to ZZZ1 and maneuver as practical to descent.Runway XX in use and cleared to land. (Aircraft refueled full tanks at ZZZ2) Endurance with full tanks: 5.5 hours approximately Flight time after refueling when emergency occurred: 2.1 hrs.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

BE-76 instructor and student pilots reported experiencing total electrical failure during cruise.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 92; Flight Crew Type 80

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

We were flying at 2500 ft. I started losing electrical power. At that point I was unable to light up the runway without a radio; and could not identify it to land safely in the dark. I decided to fly to a towered airport. I had no way to communicate with the tower other than a hand held light from the cockpit. I saw traffic was clear; and came in for a landing. Once on the ground I was able to contact the tower with a cell phone. We were directed to a secure parking area where we were greeted and shown to the FBO. No paperwork was requested to be filed.

A Pilot reported a loss of electrical power at night and diverting to a towered airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 2500; Flight Crew Type 180

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 1000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were given vectors prior to the arc for the ILS DME 2 RWY 10. We were at 180 knots; Flaps 15/15; and north of final approach course. After a vector to join the LOC; ATC cleared us for the approach and for a descent. Shortly after beginning the descent in V/S; we received the 'Terrain Ahead' alert followed by the 'PULL UP; TERRAIN!' At this point I firewalled the throttles; disconnected the autopilot; and began an aggressive climb toward the min safe altitude. We coordinated with ATC; leveled off; and received vectors back to final.

While on vectors to intercept the localizer for the MMGL ILS DME 2 RWY 10 MMGL approach control told us to descend to 6500 FT from 7500 FT (?). First Officer is the PF and Captain is PM. We were inside 13 miles of the MMGL airport and considered our position to be clear of the hill (7480 FT) vertically as well as the surrounding terrain at around 11 miles out while on the final vector to the ILS course. Shortly after the start of the descent we received an EGPWS call out of 'Terrain Ahead' while in IMC conditions. Within 3-5 seconds of the initial alert we received a command alert of 'Pull Up Terrain.' First Officer executed the CFIT maneuver immediately and we climbed up toward the highest MSA altitude of 11;700. We notified Approach about the CFIT go around and they repeatedly asked if it was due to traffic! We repeated several times the cause for the go around was a terrain alert in the cockpit due to the ATC assigned altitude. During the climb; passing 10;500 FT we were given vectors for another ILS approach to RWY 10 again and the ensuing approach and landing were uneventful.

Flight crew on a radar vector to the ILS DME 2 RWY 19 at MMGL experienced an EGPWS terrain warning during descent to 6500 feet at ATC direction. The flying First Officer immediately abandoned the approach using maximum power and climbed to the MSA. The second approach was uneventful.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 24.4; Flight Crew Total 104.5; Flight Crew Type 36.7

Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Upon landing I noticed the aircraft veering to the left.  I over corrected to the right with right rudder.  The aircraft started spinning and ended up veering into the grass off the runway.  I was able to taxi off the grass [back] onto the taxiway.  No damage occurred to aircraft or runway and there were no injuries.

A M-20 private pilot lost control during the landing roll; spun and departed the runway into the adjoining grass.  After coming to a stop with no injuries or damage the reporter taxied onto a convenient taxiway.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 169; Flight Crew Type 6143

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Time Pressure

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 144; Flight Crew Type 221

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

While cruising at FL400; with a weight of approximately 130;000 pounds and about a 30 knot buffer between Red Line and top of the yellow arc; the PLI (Pitch Limit Indicator) displayed 1 above our Pitch Attitude. I did not realize that it was only on my (Captain) side ADI (Attitude Director Indicator); I asked the FO (First Officer) to request FL380 and I initiated a shallow descent with the AP (Autopilot) off. I believe that the PLI disappeared but then reappeared approaching FL380 with the PLI still indicating only 1 above our Pitch Attitude. I continued descending to FL360 and asked [the FO] to request FL360. It took ATC a short time to respond and issue clearance to FL360 and I may have deviated from our cleared altitude trying to ensure that we did not enter a stalled condition. The PLI did appear a 3rd time; briefly at FL360 but then disappeared for good. I then switched the AP to the B AP. We had been in the tops of clouds and I initially thought the turbulence was causing the PLI display but after leveling off at FL360; [the FO] informed me that the PLI never displayed on his ADI. We worked with Maintenance Control who informed us of a previous write up 7 days earlier of the #1 Stall Management Yaw Damper (SMYD). After a short time we returned to FL400; and continued to destination uneventfully.

During cruise at FL400 at approximately 130 knots; CA (Captain) stated he had 'whiskers' (a.k.a. the PLI Pitch Limit Indicator); disconnected the autopilot (Command A); requested that I ask ATC for FL380; and initiated a descent. By the time ATC responded with authorization; we had passed FL397. CA then stated that PLI went away passing FL390; but as we approached FL380; the PLI returned and he had me coordinate for FL360 while he continued the descent. Again ATC was late in responding and we were past FL377 by the time we received approval. During this second descent; I noted to CA that I didn't have a PLI indication on my ADI (Attitude Director Indicator); we had sufficient airspeed stall buffers; and it appeared to be a system malfunction. CA leveled the aircraft at FL360; his PLI went away and we began to troubleshoot. No other malfunctions were noted and QRH was not applicable. A review of system in flight manual and discussion with [Maintenance Control] identified the potential cause of the erroneous PLI to a malfunction in the SMYD #1 system (previous write up noted by [Maintenance Control]). CA re-selected autopilot with Command B and flight resumed without incident.

B737 flight crew reported the Captain's Pitch Limit Indicator came into view during cruise and a descent was initiated before the full clearance was received from ATC.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 6800; Flight Crew Type 2800

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

In descent a pitch trim runaway resulted in a difficult to control pitch up. I [requested priority handling] and was able to fly the plane to a safe landing at ZZZ.

TBM 940 pilot reported runway pitch trim in descent.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 7800; Flight Crew Type 400

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

We were following a stolen car that was being chased by Sheriff and State Patrol.  We were using our standard ATC squawk and were cleared by Atlanta into the B airspace and to continue North as required up the west side of highway 285.  Things were happening very fast and fluid due to the stolen car pursuit and there was quite a bit of chatter on all radios.  We had FTY in standby in our radio in case ATL decided to hand us off to them.  We didn't receive a hand off and believed it to be due to the late hour and light traffic.  After the car was detained; we turned back to the south and called ATL to get cleared to cross back to the south of the airport when they informed us to give FTY tower a call.  FTY reminded us to call them when coming through that area east of them.  When I returned from the flight with no incident; I called FTY tower on a land line to make sure I was clear on proper procedure for this instance and thank them for their attention.  FTY tower informed me I should have been handed off or that ATL should have shared our situation with them in this instance.  Both towers were very professional and this was just a breakdown in communication.  ATL is always top notch and a pleasure to work with on a regular basis.

Pilot reports of being told to call the Tower after he has entered their airspace.  Pilot was utilizing flight following and the other control Tower did not hand off the aircraft to the adjacent Tower.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Release was requested by FFZ. I looked up at the IDS [Information Display System] and saw rwy 22. The aircraft was not assigned the ODP [Obstacle Departure Procedure]. So I pulled up the DVA [Diverse Vector Area] assigned a 190 heading and released the aircraft. I was being relieved as the aircraft departed. I observed the aircraft depart rwy 4. I took immediate action and assigned a 220 heading; same as the [ODP] and climbed to 5000 ft. I stopped my briefing and finished the event prior to releasing control of the sector to the relieving controller. The flight data controller knew that the aircraft was not on the [ODP]. When dropping the flight plan off; he said he doesn't give a [expletive] because he is [not] getting paid. My mind is distracted thinking about how I will pay my mortgage in [the coming] days. We have worked thru the shutdown and have not been paid. Morale is awful at this facility. The controller relieving me was very disgruntled. This situation is very dangerous. We should not be used as political pawns. We are aviation safety and should be treated as such. Tower should have questioned my heading when given their release. I should have observed Rwy 4 in use. We had just changed to west flow at Sky Harbor. All [satellite] airports should be required to change directions with PHX. Also; open the government and pay employees. The FAA should not be subject to government shutdowns!

Phoenix TRACON Controller reported an unsafe operation due to low morale and distractions.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12.0

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Weather; Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing

I was assigned Controller in Charge so that that the Supervisor could conduct a checkride on a controller who had just reached their minimum training hours a few minutes prior. During the briefing; the Supervisor advised me that there were multiple re-routes westbound into Sector [xx] and that the sector was going red 'but only up to 19.' The MAP (Monitor Alert Parameter) value for red for this sector is 16. I asked if anything was being done or traffic slowed to keep aircraft out of the sector and he replied 'no; but it's your desk...' implying that he wasn't doing anything; but I could try. He did keep reiterating that there was heavy volume and complexity at that sector [and] implying he had been aware of this for some time but chose not to take any action. As the briefing was wrapping up; the controller at Sector [xx] yelled over the arrival routing 'isn't working anymore...they won't fly through it because the weather.' The Supervisor shrugged his shoulders and said the Controller in Charge 'is in charge now.' I got on the phone with TMU (Traffic Management Unit) and asked for the rerouting. The Supervisor TMC (Traffic Management Coordinator) advised me that he had never heard of the reroute; even though this is an official playbook move that we were briefed on Traffic Management just a week ago. Frustrated; I explained that it keeps traffic out of Sector [xx] and I was really just looking for help from him to reduce the volume at the sector since it was going well above its MAP value. He said he'd look at it and 'oh; by the way; there won't be any more aircraft coming over the arrival routing; they've all been rerouted to keep them clear of that weather you won't see any more'. I said 'ok that's great.'I then was advised by the [xx] controller that another sector was still attempting to hand-off aircraft on the arrival route and deviating. I told the [xx] controller they are not to be routed over that fix and that TMU had advised me those routes would be fixed; not to take the handoff and I would call the other sector's Area Supervisor. I called the Area Supervisor and I asked him if they would fix the routes on Aircraft X and Aircraft Y because TMU had advised no more aircraft over [fix]. The Supervisor shouted at me and said that their sector was 'very busy; the sector is red and I have a tracker in there right now so I cannot get them to fix the route'. I advised him that [xx] was red too; and that we needed the route fixed. The Supervisor continued to berate me on the line saying his sector was 'so busy and red; with a Tracker and D-side' and that he couldn't do it. I then quick-looked their sector and counted 7 data blocks in the sector at the time. A view at the position log and a walk past their area showed that there was no Tracker at that sector either. There also wasn't a D-side. I became very disappointed that not only was a delivering Area unwilling to help out the request of the receiving controller; but that the Supervisor lied to me on a recorded line about how he was staffing his area.Traffic Management Unit should be more proactive to ensure sectors don't go red with excessive volume and aircraft impacted by weather; and supervisors should be more willing to accept/listen to the requests of the receiving controllers vs. berating them and coming up with excuses for why you can't do it. I believe it was unnecessary for the Supervisor to rush to conduct the check ride on the controller who had just gotten their minimum hours a few minutes prior; thus; placing me right into the fire by taking over the desk.

ZBW Center Controller in charge reported an adjacent sector was not complying with flow control instructions to regulate traffic flow due to weather deviations.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 2600

Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Day 3 of 3-day; leg 2 of 3; enroute to DEN we received the first of several ACARS messages from Dispatch. They were worried about our fuel since we had been dispatched w/ no alternate and the weather 'caught them by surprise; big-time' (Dispatchers words not mine). Weather had been rapidly changing from CAT II (we had an MEL for no autoland) to MVFR. ATIS also had reports of moderate icing below 10;000 FT and there was a previous PIREP of severe turbulence from 15K-18K in the descent. Armed with this info; we elected to seat everyone including the FA's prior to TOD and hurry down. We had all anti-ice systems on (extra power required) and were issued the 'descend via the KOHOE 1.' This arrival has all altitude ranges except for a final hard altitude of 11;000 FT I believe at [DOGGG]. At KOHOE we checked in with approach as being 'a little high; hurrying down' (about 11;500 FT on our altimeters) and were given 9;000 FT followed by a 7;500 FT; base turn; and 7;500 FT until FRONZ; cleared ILS 35R. Due to the airfoil ice protection being on and the power being up; we struggled to get down the entire arrival in VNAV (take away for me: next time I will come OUT of VNAV....it was not working well). The ILS was armed and the next thing we received was a low altitude alert from approach instructing us to climb immediately to 7;500 FT. This was confusing momentarily as our altimeters said 7;500 FT. As we received this call we also got a 'landing gear; landing gear'. I looked at the Radar altimeter and it said 1;600 FT. I climbed immediately by clicking off the autopilot and autothrottles and proceeded to hand fly the ILS. As I was doing this; I yelled out something to the effect of 'verify the altimeter' and believe I heard the Captain say 'Oh [expletive]' but am not sure as I was very busy. Rest of approach was uneventful and we heard nothing further from ATC. Preventive measure as I write this; I can not believe that it happened. In fact; it was a grim reminder to me walking through the airport afterwards of the seriousness of our business and the inability to EVER let your guard down. This incident has gotten my attention. The Captain and I even talked about altimetry before TOD because I asked the Captain if we need to apply cold weather corrections. I could not remember 'how cold was cold' for altimetry purposes (ATIS had -08/-04). I had also asked the Captain if he wanted me to activate the ATIS AUTO/UPDATE function on the ACARS and he said no. He had been texting w/ Dispatch and we had pulled up several ATIS messages due to rapidly changing conditions at DEN. Despite being well aware of the weather; apparently the Captain put the incorrect altimeter in the STBY altimeter rolling it the wrong way from 29.92 to 30.38. Later; when it came time to set altimeters and run checklists; he set his (incorrectly) to what he had previously set in the STBY and as the busy pilot flying; I did the same when queried. The correct altimeter was a very low one and should have been 29.38. In the future; I will swap aircraft control if needed to check the ATIS myself rather than looking across to see what the pilot not flying set in his windows. Perhaps on the descent and approach checklist we should pull up a hard copy of the ATIS to 'verify' as we do with the PDC now. This would help to actually 'verify' since a 'crosscheck' of an incorrect number results in nothing more than another incorrect number. This might sound like overkill but it would have prevented what happened to us from happening again. Lastly; from now on I will have more of a 'verify' mentality and much less of a 'trust' mentality regardless of who I am flying with (this particular Captain is an Line Check Airman).

DC-9 series First Officer reports an altimeter setting error descending into DEN that results in the aircraft being 1;000 FT low prior to the FAF. ATC issues a low altitude alert and EGPWS annunciates 'landing gear; landing gear.'


Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

We were initially given through ATC and ATIS ILS24R into LAX. We had it set up in the box early and briefed a ways out. When we got within about 15 miles of the airport we were asked to do the ILS25L. We were busy up front with descending; making calls and we put the ILS25L approach and did an abbreviated brief the best we could. We were given a heading to intercept the ILS25L localizer. We blew through the localizer and were given another heading to re-intercept but were unable to...we were indicating different than the Controller was trying to get us to do. At this point we both knew something was wrong and asked to get off the approach and go around. The Controller gave us vectors out and around to the back of the line and put back onto ILS 24R with no problem. The localizer wasn't matching with where the controller was trying to take us. Either the localizer frequency did not populate the box or the approach didn't load when loaded. Needed more time to brief the approach and verify what we put in was correct. Asked ATC to break off approach and go-around. Be extra careful with verifying frequencies and appropriate approach is in the box

EMB-505 First Officer reported a late runway change on arrival into LAX led to a track deviation and go-around when the FMC was likely improperly programmed.


Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

During our takeoff roll at approximately 80-90 KTS we received the Aural CAWS Alert along with the Red Level 3 (FLAPS) indication on the EAD. I aborted the takeoff and then returned to the gate. The tug driver witnessed our slats-extended and flaps 5 setting just prior to taxiing out to the runway. Contract Maintenance also verified with much troubleshooting upon our gate return that upon extending our slats and flaps 5--this is exactly what correctly occurred outside and it's exactly what we saw on both of our PFD's (flaps 5)--which is exactly what we had programmed into both of our FMS/MCDU's (flaps 5 for takeoff). For the takeoff roll our EAD showed a hollow green box--however; Maintenance Control verified that either the flap transmitter indication was improperly indicating a different flap setting than everything else; [which] equals a flap split indication.

B717 Captain experiences a takeoff warning for flaps at 80-90 KTS and rejects. The flap setting appears to be correct and the flight returns to the gate for maintenance.


Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

During pushback a speeding van; which ignored the wing walkers; cut behind the aircraft causing me to stop the aircraft to avoid damage. This resulted in the shear pin on the towbar breaking.

Ramp Agent reported breaking the pushback towbar pin after having to stop suddenly to avoid colliding with a van on the ramp.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

[We were] given takeoff clearance approximately 30/35 seconds after a heavy B747.  [We] delayed takeoff for approximately 30 more seconds. Wind report was 280/7. Rough ride after takeoff 300 FT to 1;300 FT. [We] reported event to EGLL Tower. I thought EGLL provided a 1 minute minimum delay interval between heavy aircraft. They didn't. [They] should consider longer delays when winds are calm or straight down the runway.

B777-200 pilot reported encountering wake turbulence after takeoff from EGLL in trail of a B747. Pilot commented he felt separation standards were not followed by ATC.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 86; Flight Crew Total 1079; Flight Crew Type 235

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

I began my preflight in the dark; with very little sleep. I was preparing to takeoff to pick up passengers for [an early morning] flight. I completed a thorough preflight; however; I elected to leave the airplane plugged in to the Tanis preheater for as long as possible before starting due to the cold temperature. I taxied out normally; ran up the airplane; and then departed normally. During cruise I occasionally noticed a slight unfamiliar vibration with the airplane but otherwise all was normal and smooth. I made my approach and was crossing the numbers when I heard a bang; saw debris fly away from the airplane; and the oil compartment door flip open. I made a normal landing and taxi in to the FBO. I advised the line service that there may be FOD on the runway and they began an inspection. I began my own inspection of the airplane and saw marks down the side of the nose where the oil door is locate; but internally the engine seemed fine. I restarted the engine and did a run-up to ensure that there was no damage to the engine and everything checked out normally. I shut down again and prepared to load up my passengers as the airport employee who inspected the runway returned. He returned with the chewed up extension cable used to connect the aircraft to the Tanis preheater. It was then I realized I had flown the entire flight with the extension cord hanging from the nose of the airplane and was extremely fortunate it ended as well as it did.What I learned: Fatigue played a large part in my oversight and may have clouded my judgment to not pull the plug as I initially addressed the plane during the preflight. The dark predawn conditions did not help as well; I likely would have noticed the cord still plugged in out of the corner of my eye before I got into the airplane had it been light outside. Another factor is that I was in a hurry to make my arrival time so I would be able to meet my passengers and depart on the second leg on time. The other issue was doing my preflight out of order; I did my standard walk around before I loaded my bags. By the time I was on the other side of the plane loading bags I had forgotten about the plug. Finally; the checklist I use does not include the use of the Tanis preheater and checking of its condition. Going forward I am going to remove the plug first thing when I arrive at the plane during preflight and I am going to revise my checklist to include this item.

The pilot of a Diamond DA40 reported neglecting to remove the external heating unit extension cord prior to departure.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A company Brasilia was [cleared to] taxi into position and hold. SFO Tower Controller asked if we were ok with lining up on the runway behind company; I said 'NO!' Unequivocally 'NO!' I believe after the Tenerife disaster; placing two planes on an active runway simultaneously at the same time was made illegal and is prohibited by 7110.65. Next; this Controller said; 'After departure; fly heading 010; hold short zero one right;' which was somewhat counterintuitive and seemed prone to encourage a runway incursion. He repeated this instruction after we queried him. We had a check airman in the jumpseat who was giving us a line check; and he also got upset at what the Controller was doing; and stated; 'What he's doing is trying to give someone a runway incursion.' In any event; both events are bad practices; and should definitely be addressed! Cause; poor and possible Controller deviation. Improper phraseology and application of procedures specified in the 7110.65 for Tower operations.

SFO Air Carrier departure voiced concerning regarding ATC's procedure and phraseology reference a takeoff clearance.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 54; Flight Crew Type 31

Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Upon landing at ZZZ; I overcorrected due to being far right of the center line. My overcorrection was applying too much rudder (with possible accidental brake application) to the left to get back to center. There may have been a chance that the right wheel touched down first; then the left which amplified my overcorrection.The aircraft then made a hard left across the runway; exiting into the grass just before Taxiway X. Upon exiting the grass and entering Taxiway X; the aircraft clipped a taxiway edge light with the left wheel strut. The light was destroyed.The aircraft then continued across Taxiway X and came to rest in the grass just off Taxiway X but still in the runway safety zone.I contacted tower and they dispatched ops/emergency to me. With their help we moved the aircraft back on to Taxiway X; and out of the runway safety zone. There I was able to examine the plane and find the damage to the fairing on the left wheel strut; and uneven wear on the tires from the application of the brakes. No other damage was found.I was able to taxi the aircraft back to the hangar on its own power without incident.Better human judgment could have occurred to apply smaller corrections when the aircraft is on the ground moving at a high rate of speed. Future training with my CFI will focus on understanding this incident better and learning from it. In addition to review of landings; so that in the future large corrections will not need to be made once on the ground.

C-172S Student Pilot reported loss of directional control on landing resulting in a runway excursion.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 8; Flight Crew Total 1800; Flight Crew Type 1600

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Landing after the second flight of the day; during shutdown noticed that transponder had been left on the previous flight's code assigned for flight following instead of having been set to XXXX which would have been appropriate for this flight conducted without flight following. The transponder is ADS-B; so there was still a unique identifier. The flight originated at ZZZ shortly after XApm when the Tower had shut early due to COVID. I am used to getting a flight following code from ZZZ ground; but did not this time because of the closure. Had I been at a normally uncontrolled airport; I would have followed my checklist for electronics; but I am so used to getting codes at ZZZ that I did not pay proper attention to that portion of the preflight/runup. Compounding this is that the transponder is new and less familiar than the one I have flown with for years; which actually would indicate more attention is needed. Always run through full electronics checks on startup and shutdown!

GA pilot reported inadvertently leaving the transponder code set from the previous flight. The pilot was accustomed to getting a code from the Tower; however the Tower had closed early due to COVID-19 hours and the pilot did not check the transponder.


On the descent the pilot flying prepared the aircraft for approach and landing.  Approach advised the crew to expect the visual for runway 03; after which the crew briefed the approach and landing. The winds were 340 @ 11 kts. A normal approach to landing was made in which the pilot flying landed the aircraft on runway 03 slightly right of centerline. The mains touched softly and the nose was slowly lowered down to the runway. The pilot flying then pushed the prop levers full forward for aerodynamic braking. While maintaining centerline for a brief period the pilot flying stated to the pilot monitoring 'it's gusty'. Meanwhile the pilot flying ensured the aircraft's ailerons were in the correct wind position. As the aircraft slowed; the pilot flying began softly applying both brakes. Initially the aircraft started slowly turning to the left. The pilot flying then applied slight right rudder. After applying slight right rudder with no change in direction the pilot flying pressed harder on the brakes and pushed harder with his right leg to counter the left turn with right rudder. It seemed as if the right rudder/brake input was not correcting the left turn. The pilot flying then applied brakes with more force as the aircraft continued its turn with greater rate. At this point the pilot flying called out 'Rudder; Rudder; Rudder' in hopes that the pilot monitoring would be able to counter the left turn or brake; stopping the aircraft. It happened extremely fast and before the pilot flying knew it the aircraft was sliding sideways to a stop on the left side of runway 03. The pilot flying's best guess as to the speed at which the sliding turn occurred was 30-50kts while rapidly decelerating.The pilot flying took a second to evaluate the current state of the aircraft and crew at which point both crewmembers immediately began securing the aircraft and shutting down the engines. The pilot monitoring handled all radio communications. Tower asked if the crew needed emergency vehicles and the crew declined; as there was no immediate threat or injuries. Tower informed the crew that they were shutting down runway 03. The pilot monitoring informed tower that they would call their maintenance team to have them towed to their ramp. An airport operations vehicle greeted the crew at their aircraft. The airport operations representative took the crews names; addresses; and phone numbers. An inspection was made of the aircraft; the runway; and the runway environment. The pilot in command; the second in command; and the airport operations representative performed the inspections. No damage was present to the runway; aircraft; or surrounding structures. Maintenance arrived and inspected the aircraft. Maintenance found no damage of immediate concern and cleared the plane to be towed.

The approach was normal in all respects -- aircraft configured properly (gear and flaps); approach speeds correct; the runway alignment was good; and checklists were accomplished appropriately. The wind was within the Chieftain's performance limits (demonstrated 20 knot direct crosswind component). Just before touchdown there were some wind gusts that required the pilot flying to address which he did appropriately. The touchdown was very smooth and very close to the centerline. After touchdown; including the nose tire; the pilot flying advanced the prop controls to the full forward/fine pitch setting and applied aerodynamic braking with up elevator as prescribed by standard operating procedures. The airplane began to slow down from its touchdown speed. The pilot monitoring did not have his hands on the control yoke or his feet on the rudder pedals during the approach; landing and runway departure sequence.Shortly after the touchdown and landing rollout began; the airplane started turning left and this left turn continued until the airplane was skidding sideways off the left side of the runway. After the departure sequence started; the pilot flying said 'Rudder; Rudder; Rudder' but the pilot monitoring did not have time to react before the skid had advanced to the point that directional control was still possible. The right main and nose tires slid off the shoulder of the runway into the dirt while the left main tire remained on the runway shoulder. The pilot monitoring estimates the airplane's heading slewed to the left by more than 90 degrees but less than 180 degrees from the Runway 3 heading -- say about 135 degrees. The pilot monitoring estimates that the airplane was moving at about 40 knots at the time the departure started and that the entire departure sequence lasted about 3 - 5 seconds.There were skid marks from each of the three tires. The skid mark for the left main tire started earlier and was narrower and darker than the skid marks from the right main and nose tires. The right main and nose tire skid marks correspond to the time when the aircraft was moving laterally/skidding. There were no personal injuries. The landing gear did not collapse. None of the tires were flat. There was no prop strike. The aircraft did not strike any runway lights or cause any other damage to the runway. There was no debris left on the runway as a result of the excursion. There was no damage to any of the cargo on board.The PIC; who was handling all radio communications; told the tower that the plane would have to be shut down where it was and then towed off the runway. The PIC told the tower that he would call the company and ask for maintenance to come out to tow the airplane. The tower closed Runway 3/21 temporarily. Tower asked if it should dispatch any equipment. The PIC declined that offer as it wasn't necessary. An airport representative drove to the plane within a few minutes and a few minutes later escorted maintenance personnel to the plane. The maintenance personnel briefly inspected the airplane to determine that it could be safely towed off the runway and then towed it to the maintenance hangar without any further issues. There is insufficient information at this point as to why this event occurred so I have no suggestions at this time as to how to avoid any recurrence.

A PA31 flight crew reported a loss of control during landing with the First Officer flying. The landing had been normal up until the brakes were applied; then the aircraft began a slow turn to the left rapidly increasing to a full skidding rotation to the left with a runway excursion.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

This event occurred on leg 2 of a continuous duty overnight pairing. The departure the previous evening was delayed by 1:18 and the break time between flights was reduced from scheduled 7:43 down to 6:40. On approach; we were sequenced to about a 20 mile final. The approach from that point on in was stable and all appropriate callouts were made. However at approximately 1200 feet AFL; I realized that I was not fully configured; and called 'Gear Down; Flaps 3; Landing Checklist.' Except for that detail; everything else was stable. While the gear and flaps were in transit however; an ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft monitoring) warning was triggered. Just as I was about to command 'Go Around;' the warnings ceased; everything was stable; and I judged that the safest course of action was to land.There is more than one contributing factor here. First the reduced rest contributed to a lack of concentration. While I felt fit for duty; in retrospect; the simple physiological fact that I was operating at a reduced level of alertness seems now self-evident. Also; I have been flying this trip sequence all month; and therefore the routine nature of these flights probably contributed to some degree of complacency. Next; the fact that we flew such a long stabilized final could have given me a sense of boredom to some extent.Having performed this flying duty on reduced period of sleep; I should have been reminding myself to be extra vigilant. I thought that I was; because I can remember giving myself a little pep talk silently as we took the runway for takeoff; reminding myself of the contingencies for rejected takeoff and engine failure after takeoff. But toward the end of the flight; I can't say that I remember doing the same thing for approach and landing. Though I had only about 4 hours sleep; instead of the 5 and-a-half that I was used to on this trip sequence; I felt 'fit for duty' when I electronically signed the release. One of the things that the 'fit for duty' certification does not take into account; however; is how you might feel 2 hours later. And while you might be able to guess at that; there is no way to know.

Captain (Flying Pilot) and I operated this flight. We were vectored off the [approach] for a 20 plus mile final to the ILS. Distracted by an abnormal amount of acute fatigue and also focusing on ground contact; Captain called for 'Gear Down; Flaps 3; Landing Checklist.'During configuration change and after initiation of Landing Checklist; I heard a Warning Bell (Configuration) momentarily and it went away after gear (and/or flaps) were down and locked. I completed last 3 items on checklist and the aircraft was configured for a normal landing. I have a memory of starting to call for a Go Around at this point and thought twice as I realized the Go Around should have been initiated earlier and new the current configuration of the aircraft was correct. I also do not recall hearing the '1;000' automated callout; but could have been blocked by Captain or bell.The pairing was an all-nighter and was delayed the night before. I had done the same paring the previous night and; although rested; was unable to take a nap the day before pairing in question. I didn't get adequate rest and seemed to wake every half hour for about 4 hours. Surprisingly; I felt fine getting ready; eating; transit to airport; preflight; push; taxi; climb and most of cruise. We were slowed from normal to 270; then 250; then 210; then 190; then 170 while still on the [arrival procedure] and the approach really seemed to linger. We were handed off to tower after being cleared for the approach and there was an unusual amount of time flying from 'clearance to land' to GS (Glideslope) interception.Although I did not fall asleep; I do not recall a time ever being so tired while operating an airplane. I became fixated trying to identify ground contact. Captain and I have been flying together all month and he is a strong crew member and safe pilot and I perhaps inadvertently put too much responsibility on him and didn't adequately perform my monitoring duties.I personally would have a hard time understanding how this could happen if I would have read the description written by another pilot. In my nearly 20 years of flying; I don't think I have ever gotten so behind and missed so many barriers; especially during a critical phase of flight.I am well versed and competent on all phases of flight; including Go Arounds; as I write this; I am still bothered as to why I didn't call for a Go Around. Looking back; I believe I got caught up trying to complete the task. This is a good reminder for myself to perform our company SOP regardless of what I may deem as having enough time.

A319 flight crew describes fatigue due to a short overnight in the hotel resulting in a late call for landing gear and flaps and an unstabilized approach.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

We had just taken off from runway 01R at SFO and were assigned the NITE1 RNAV departure.  We entered the departure; route and arrival after receiving the clearance.   I was the pilot flying and shortly after takeoff the Flight Director commanded a left turn; which I followed.  The NITE1 turns slightly to the right on a 014 heading and then proceeds to MOSAY out of 520 feet.  I remember thinking that it was strange that the Flight Director was commanding a left turn when the Controller called and asked us to confirm that we were on the NITE1.  My First Officer responded with 'Yes.'  The Controller then came back with turn right to 020 degrees. We complied and continued on our trip. There was no traffic on Runway 01L which was fortunate.  We kept going over what went wrong as we were at cruise altitude. We had followed SOP when finishing the taxi checklist and confirming that the FMS and the runway we were taking were the same.  As to what I would do differently; I would be more vigilant in making sure the flight director is taking me where I want to go and not blindly following it.  I trust that this is a wakeup call for me to never become complacent.  I realize that is always a danger.  As to why it happened; as we continued our flight; the First Officer lost his FMC.  I don't know if that had anything to do with what happened or not.  It doesn't make sense that it would have.  Bottom line; fly the airplane to where it is supposed to go is first priority and never think that because you have the FMC telling you where you are going that it is correct.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

After entering the correct runway and departure an Airbus flight crew followed the incorrect left turn indicated by the flight director on the NITE1 RNAV departure out of SFO. ATC issued a vector for a right turn back on course.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 650; Flight Crew Type 375

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Just before sunset; my wife and I encountered either a small manned-aircraft or a large unmanned aircraft performing aerobatic maneuvers near BGF. We were flying [a] direct GPS route. We were no more than 7 NM from the airport and about 2;200 FT MSL; when I spotted an aircraft at my altitude; moving very fast; and almost parallel to my line-of-flight. Suddenly; the aircraft pulled up and performed what appeared to be a loop and returned to an altitude slightly above mine. I diverted northeast; making a radio call on 122.8 to alert the pilot of our proximity. No reply. Even though I was now flying a northeasterly diversionary course; the aircraft again appeared in my field of view; slightly (no more than 200 FT I would estimate) above me and appeared to cross my line of flight (I have a high winged aircraft; so I lost the view). My PCAS (Personal Collision Avoidance System) did not show any traffic; so this aircraft either had no transponder or it was not turned on. The severity of the maneuvers we observed made me and my wife think this must be an unmanned aircraft. I proceeded to BGF; crossed mid-field at pattern altitude; and did a 180- degree turn east of the field. I was planning to enter a left downwind for Runway 36 and then I saw the aircraft again in downwind airspace (I did not see any aerobatic maneuvers here). At this point in time; I felt very apprehensive about this situation; and decided to go back to my home airport without landing at BGF. The time of this incident was dusk; I saw no identifying marks on the aircraft. Nor; can I say for sure what color it was. However; I am certain it was a low-wing design; had a single white strobe; and I am 90 percent sure there were red and green wing marker lights. There was no radio traffic in the [pattern at] Winchester except for my routine VFR traffic announcements and my extra calls to the maneuvering aircraft.

The reporter stated that after doing some discovery; he is fairly certain that the other aircraft was in fact an RV-3. An aircraft of that type had been seen in that area previously and the extreme maneuvers performed would fit an RV-3 profile. The purpose of the reporter's flight was an evening outing and short trip to this airport for less expensive self-serve fuel but the possibility of encountering this aircraft in the pattern made him think that the danger was not worth the effort. The reporter does not believe the other pilot was acting purposefully against his aircraft; more likely that pilot was not paying attention.

A C182 pilot reported taking evasive action to an apparent RV-3 conducting aerobatic maneuvers near BGF and so left the area abandoning a planned landing at that airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Type 6884

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

ZZZ Tower was closed for early morning departure. Visibility was fluctuating between 1/4 and 1/16. A takeoff alternate was needed and obtained from Dispatch. We determined that 1/4 visibility was needed to takeoff because the Tower was closed and automated weather did not report RVR. We pushed and taxied with the understanding that we would not takeoff until the visibility was 1/4 or better. While waiting at the end of the runway; Dispatch sent an ACARS message with RVR values.  As we discussed the legality of that information; the reported visibility improved to better than 1/4. We departed without incident.   I don't know of any errors that were made. If we can legally take off with Dispatch reported RVR; then we were only delayed an additional three to five minutes unnecessarily. There are obvious references to Dispatch weather in the manual especially for arrival weather.  However; it was not so obvious for this exact scenario.

The Crew arrived at the aircraft and prepared for departure. During that time we noticed the visibility dropping rapidly due to fog. The ASOS was varying between 1/16 and 1/4 miles of visibility. ZZZ Tower was closed during that time of day; and the ASOS weather is the only visibility report available. During the Release review I noted no takeoff alternate was given. I called the Operations Center; and a new Dispatcher had just taken over. Once brought up to speed he gave ZZZ1 as the alternate. We discussed the weather; fuel onboard; and departure on Runway 6. We decided due to the varying visibility we would taxi out and depart provided we had the visibility. Which at the time I believed 1/4 was my limitation. (At the time of the call the visibility was 1/4).The Release was amended and the new weather provided and we pushed normally. During the taxi out the field dropped to 1/16 SM with no RVR reported on the field. We taxied out single engine with 4;000 pounds of extra fuel and our intention was to wait until 1/4 was again reported. The clearance was already given by NY Center. We only needed the Center release. While waiting; we received an ACARS message from Dispatch with an RVR report for Runway 6. The RVR given would have allowed us to depart; but I believed we were required to have 1/4. Shortly after that another RVR report was sent with even greater RVR values. The field was improving rapidly. Confused by the intent of the message I called Dispatch and asked if we were able to accept dispatch given RVR over ACARS and be legal to depart (ASOS still reporting 1/16)?The Dispatcher responded with 'I don't see why not; but let me ask someone.' This was not the informed answer I was hoping for. While I was on hold; the ASOS then reported 1/4 SM. After the Dispatcher returned; I told him we had the required visibility; we were departing; and I would call for an explanation in ZZZ2. We departed normally and arrived 30 minutes late. However; due to another flight out of ZZZ2 I wasn't able to receive clarification on the matter until a few days later. The explanation from Dispatch was 'yes' they can provide the RVR through SWIFT and/or WSI if RVR is being reported on the intended runway; even though we as Flight Crew can only hear ASOS weather not reporting RVR. This seems to be a reasonable and legal answer. However; after reviewing the FOM specifically Chapter 17 and the exemptions. I was not able to find any guidance relieving me of the 1/4 SM restriction while operating at an uncontrolled field with no RVR reported on the field. I specifically looked in NGRVR and the EWINS section. I may very well have missed or misunderstood the information available or how that information was presented in this situation; and I would be grateful to know where to find this information. However; if it is not defined; but legal that information should be disseminated to the Pilot Group as well.

Flight Crew reported departing airport late due to lack of RVR values and below minimum weather.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

This is a runway incursion event. The FO (First Officer) performed the landing on Runway XXR at ZZZ. As we exited the runway during a busy time for the FO; instructions were given for us to turn right on D; right on 'A'; hold short of Runway XY. Upon exiting the runway; the FO contacted Ground Control without being instructed to do so from the Tower. Ground Control instructed us to 'Cross Runway XY; 'A' 'H' to the cargo ramp. Apparently this was not coordinated with the Tower. The airplane was fully lit up for the crossing and we cleared left and right; but we did not see the business jet passing about 50-100 feet right in front of us. I think the Tower Controller came on the frequency just when we were about to cross and instructed us to HOLD SHORT! We abruptly stopped with the nose just past the hold short line and a few feet from the runway edge markings. We were then instructed to cross the runway; Alpha; Hotel; to the cargo ramp. We were informed of a possible pilot deviation and given a phone number to call. During the phone call; (which I think was the Tower Controller) he informed me that he had instructed us to hold short three times. We informed him that we were on Ground Control and that we had been cleared to cross. He reviewed the tapes and apologized.A very tired crew from our third hub turn; receiving instructions from the Controller at a busy time. The changed frequency without being instructed. Poor coordination with the Tower and Ground Controller (my opinion). Also we were not told the reason for the hold short; i.e.; 'hold short of XY for departing traffic; or; stay with me' which seems to be a standard. We are also absolutely sure that the Ground Controller cleared us to cross. Probably having our lights on and quick action stopping the plane made for a much better outcome.I informed the FO not to ever change to Ground Control after exiting the runway until instructed by the Tower. Apparently there is a misunderstanding of this procedure among many pilots. The controllers should always give a reason for a hold short clearance to give us situational awareness.

B737 flight crew reported that poor coordination between Ground and Tower controllers resulted in a runway incursion.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 94; Flight Crew Total 2500; Flight Crew Type 423

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

During a routine flight we were given vectors by ATC to avoid a MOA.  Once cleared of the MOA; ATC gave us direct to a waypoint and then destination.  Upon punching in direct to the waypoint in the FMS; the airplane started to turn left to a heading of 211 degrees. Once it started the turn; I noticed something was wrong; and the FMS was showing that we where 3 miles south of the waypoint; and it seemed to be making a left turn to try and hit the point before going direct to destination. ATC immediately inquired why we were turning left in the direction of the area he just gave us vectors to get around.  I told him that we must have passed the intersection; and the plane wanted to double back to the point.  He then informed me; 'Negative; the intersection is twenty miles to your south; turn to a heading of 190.' So I did as he said; and that's when I had time to access the situation; and notice that the FMS GPS position was not correct. I think I know the reason why this happened.  When putting the information into the FMS I had put in our destination as our current location while on the ground.  After doing so I realized my mistake; put in the wrong intersections and waypoints on the flight plan in the wrong sequence.  Even though I had corrected the initial fix; I think that the FMS stored our current location as destination; making the airplane think it was still at the wrong airport.I have made a note of this; and have informed all our other pilots that if they plug in the wrong airport on initial FMS start up; then you must simply turn the box off; then back on to reset it; and start all over.

The pilot of a Learjet 35A mismanaged his onboard navigational equipment and lost situational awareness; culminating in heading and course deviations. ATC noticed his difficulty and provided radar vectors until he regained orientation and was able to proceed to his destination all by himself.


General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

We took off with one generator on MEL. (I believe it was 24-20-01) Number 1 generator inoperative.  About 60 miles east of destination we got a low oil pressure Indicated Drive Director (IDG) 2 Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) which calls for IDG disconnect and subsequent 1 generator operation. I handed aircraft and radios to first officer after he checked to see if it was an immediate action item or ECAM exception. I did ECAM and disconnected IDG.  We were now down to single generator Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) and I had the First Officer (FO) declare an emergency. The QRH had a follow-up but didn't add anything new.We thought that although the weather wasn't great at destination; there was really no better alternative and we were already set up to go in there. I contacted the Dispatcher and he agreed that was best.We requested runway 28R which was longer and quicker and it was approved. I also requested the equipment just in case.  We were given priority handling and landed uneventfully. The flight attendants were told to prepare for a normal landing. The equipment followed us to the gate uneventfully.We picked this aircraft up just as maintenance was MELing it for the inoperative IDG. The write-up in the logbook was IDG low oil pressure and I thought it very strange that here was the identical failure on the next flight for the other IDG. I just wonder if maybe the IDG's had not be serviced properly. Other than that I am not sure how to prevent this except maybe make generators unable to be on MEL.

A320 Captain reports being dispatched with an inoperative generator (IDG low oil) with the APU generator operating. During descent the remaining engine driven generator Indicated Drive Director (IDG) indicates low oil and is disconnected. A normal landing ensues at destination.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Type 3000

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Type 11000

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Software and Automation

We were sent a CPDLC (Controller Pilot Datalink Communications) that cleared us to CHS. Instead of using the load function we selected direct to CHS. ATC queried if we were going direct to CHS. We responded affirmative. He then informed us the clearance in the CPDLC was to CHS via FKN. We both missed the FKN part of the route clearance. Asked if he would like us to go direct to FKN then CHS he responded no. We looked at the CPDLC and both had misread the clearance. The verbiage on the CPDLC was in my opinion a little confusing and the FKN showed up on the bottom left of the page after 'CLEARED TO CHS.' FKN was not on our file route. We didn't hear any vectoring of other aircraft do to out flight path.

Upon reaching cruise altitude; we received a CPDL (Controller Pilot Datalink Communications) clearance that read in top line; 'cleared to CHS via route clearance'. Next line free text; 'Rest of route unchanged'. Next line free text 'Cleared to CHS via FKN CHS.'  As Pilot Monitoring; I read first and second lines and due to expectation bias; immediately told my F/O; 'Cleared to CHS'  I then went to next page and hit Send.  My First Officer went to LEGS page and pulled CHS to top and executed.  Both of us missed FKN inserted into new route clearance.  We were later questioned by ATC.  After rereading CPDL clearance; our error was clear.

A Flight Crew reported a route deviation due to confusion between the clearance issued by ATC versus what had been issued via CPDLC.


Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Evacuated; General Maintenance Action

On descent I smelled an odor that appeared to be coming from the lavatory. It became stronger and stronger; and smelled like an electrical smoke. Very shortly after; I noticed it becoming hazy in the cockpit quite quickly. There were no caution lights; master warning; nor was the lavatory smoke detector going off. We donned the oxygen mask and smoke goggles; and at that time the flight attendant called us. I was informed there was smoke in the cabin as well. I asked the flight attendant to try to locate a fire if able. The flight attendant was unable; I told him/her we had about 10 minutes until landing; bracing signals; and also that we were to evacuate the aircraft upon landing. We transferred controls to my side knowing that load shedding would shut down the FO's instruments. We ran the smoke in aircraft checklist; while doing that I [advised ATC] and asked [for] priority to land. The pilot not flying ran the checklist leaning towards electrical smoke because it had a electrical smell. The smoke didn't appear to be disappearing yet getting any worse. Due to the lack of time and low altitude; I was unable to inform dispatch or operations. Landing was imminent so we proceeded to land and evacuate on the runway. The evacuation went quickly and smoothly; and there were no injuries.The checklist for smoke is quite the long checklist with many trees. Being so close to [destination airport] and at a low altitude; problem solving isn't timely. Having a quick checklist such as load shedding; dumping pressurization and land immediately would be fantastic to be used only when over an airport in which you can land at and at a low altitude.

Reporter indicated the source of smoke and odor was a failed air cycle machine. He added that in hindsight it may have been more appropriate to have run the pneumatic smoke checklist. Reporter described the conditions after the load shed as no navigation in IMC with trouble communicating with the First Officer with oxygen masks on. Additionally; ATC communication was hampered by attempts from the Flight Attendant to call the cockpit. Also; ATC did not understand the situation and that changing runways increased the flight crew workload.

During descent to land an odor was detected in the cockpit which seemed to be electrical in nature. No warning or caution lights were observed. Very shortly faint smoke was detected in the cockpit at which point the captain and I switched flying duties so that I could run the emergency checklist. While the captain flew I ran the smoke in aircraft checklist while he took over communications with ATC. Based on the smell I followed the electrical side of the checklist. With the close proximity of the airport we prepared to land in accordance with ATC requests. After landing we evacuated the aircraft on the runway. The flight attendant and emergency responders were prompt and efficient in their actions. No passengers were injured in the evacuation. Smoke in aircraft checklist needs to provide for unknown source of smoke. Choices are only given for electrical or pressurization.

Dash 8 flight crew and Flight Attendant reported smoke and odor during descent that was hampered by communication issues; checklist confusion; and high workload.


Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

During takeoff on Runway 4; (First Officer flying); at very beginning of takeoff roll; engines spooling up; it was apparent the First Officer was having difficulty tracking runway centerline and the aircraft began to deviate to the right. I then made the decision to reject the takeoff. The reject was performed at very low speed (less than 40 KTS) and at about 10 FT to the right of the runway centerline. I maintained aircraft control and we exited the runway. I made the PA for passengers and crew to remain seated as per SOP's. After clearing runway the First Officer and I evaluated the situation and both agreed that the runway tracking issue was most likely a direct result of a white 'STEER OFF' EICAS message. For whatever reason the message appeared just before applying takeoff thrust and I had no concern because the message means the nose wheel steering is disengaged and we would not need it for takeoff. The message consequently disappeared just before exiting the runway after engaging the nose wheel steering tiller. We both agreed the airplane was in good condition to fly (no indications of malfunction and brake temperatures well in limits) and to attempt another takeoff. I made a brief PA to the passengers explaining the situation and that we would be continuing to our filed destination. After performing another TAXI checklist we received takeoff clearance from Tower and proceeded to our destination without further incident. Upon reaching our destination I informed Operations Control of the incident. Lateral aircraft control during takeoff is by use of rudder but not at the low speed we were at. At that speed the pilot flying has limited control of nose wheel steering which I believe diminishes as speed increases. Therefore at the low speed and the aircraft not being perfectly aligned with the runway centerline probably gave us the resultant control issue. In hindsight I was mistaken to believe having no nose wheel steering would be of little consequence. I would suggest proper monitoring of EICAS messages and to not attempt a takeoff with STEER OFF unless it is part of an approved MEL procedure.]

An ERJ190 Captain rejected the takeoff at about 40 KTS after the EICAS alerted STEER OFF and the First Officer had difficulty controlling the aircraft's track which veered right of the runway centerline.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Avionics

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft; Human Factors; Logbook Entry; Manuals; Procedure

Sent out to B737-800 aircraft with Standby Altimeter reading approximately 600' feet higher than the Captain and First Officer (F/o) altimeters; at departure gate; myself; my Lead and the Captain and First Officer. Upon pre-flight the Flight crew noticed the Standby Altimeter was considerably out of tolerance. It was a driving rain that night and [rain] had filled the outer Alternate Static ports with water. As the Barometric Pressure changed; the pressure in the Alternate Static System did not; creating a pressure differential seen only on the Alternate Static System instruments. Inspected Alternate Static ports for the well known; above condition. Found water as expected. Called Lead Mechanic on radio to start looking for Maintenance Manual (M/M) reference.  Broke surface tension of water mass on Alternate Static ports by applying thumb to static ports and removing quickly. Observed water being pulled from ports due to low pressure induced by removal of thumb. Returned to flight deck and checked altimeters; all within less than 20' feet of each other. Had brief conversation with [Flight] crew to the effect of the Airworthiness of the aircraft and the Maintenance Actions that also had to still be performed. The Captain wondered if this condition would re-occur as they taxied out; I assured him just the airspeed alone would shear the water out of the ports and I had never had one return once cleared as above. Went to office to retrieve Maintenance Manual (M/M) references; but [instead]; ended up looking them up and printing them myself as they were not available as I had hoped they would be; given the amount of time between the request and my arrival at the office.  With the proper manuals; returned to aircraft; examined Alternate Static port drain for moisture as referenced in MM 34-11-00-680; Paragraph D.(1).  Finding no moisture; did not proceed to Paragraph D.(2); therefore did not 'break into' Alternate Static System. Returned to flight deck with MM 34-13-00-730 and determined by Table in Paragraph 'G' that the Standby Altimeter would indeed be within tolerance for dispatch. However;[I] poorly worded [information] on Log page; did not perform test per MM 34-11-00-680; only referenced test in resolution of discrepancy. Did not 'break into' any Pitot Static System. Did not require RII Inspection. Recommend more properly describe steps taken in examination of Static System drains; more properly word resolution as to reference of Table in the test for Air Data Instruments Test.

A Line Avionic's Technician describes a simple check for determining how water mass accumulation on outer Alternate Static ports had contributed to a B737-800 aircraft Stanby Altimeter reading 600' feet higher than the Captain and First Officer Altimeters while on the ground.  Technician noted the water accumulation at Static ports is well known.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 1850; Flight Crew Type 450

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

After takeoff I performed a climbing right turn (right traffic for 31) to turn on course (south) to my destination. My plane climbs in excess of 2;500 fpm. I was in the 'downwind' approximately abeam the numbers for 31 during the right turn to on course and climbing through 3;000 ft MSL. As I rolled out on my southern course I saw a B737 coming right at me about 3;000 ft away and maybe 500ft above. I checked my altimeter thinking I must have busted into the Class B airspace floor of 4;000 MSL. I had not. I was at 3;100 MSL. I disengaged the autopilot and took evasive action. I dived for 3;000 MSL. The jet didn't appear to take any action. About 1 sec after my action the 737 was flying directly over top me in the opposite direction. Moments later I got in his jet wash and nearly lost control. I ended up at 3;800 MSL because I had to go full power and pitch the nose up since the jet wash dropped my wing and nose to an unusual attitude. I typically stay 500 ft below the Class B floor as a buffer; therefore I didn't like being at 3;800 MSL. My NavWorx ADS-B TIS-B never showed the traffic or alerted to it. Since I was in a climbing turn and performing a checklist I didn't see the 737 approaching until I was rolling out on course. Two problems I see: 1) Why was the 737 at what appeared to be 3;500 MSL under the Class B? If the jet was in fact in the Class B; but on the floor of it at 4;000 MSL; I contest that it is not a safe buffer from the GA traffic that fly underneath the Class B. If they fly at 4;500 MSL and GA traffic at 3;500 MSL then you have your 1;000 ft buffer. TRACON altitude assignments need to be reviewed. 2) Why did my TIS-B fail to alert me? It has a built in test that I check on the ground prior to takeoff and all was passed. It has alerted me in the past on traffic that wasn't nearly as close.

Glasair III pilot reported a wake turbulence encounter departing LNC with a B737 inbound to another airport. Reporter expressed concern that his NavWorx TIS-B unit did not alert him to the traffic.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140.92; Flight Crew Total 5730.50; Flight Crew Type 5730.50

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Aircraft was dispatched to operate out of ZZZZ; a high altitude airport (+7900') in mountainous terrain with a faulty pressurization system. A subsequent failure of the Alternate channel during Takeoff or initial climb would NOT provide enough time to address the problem causing O2 mask deployment and a divert to an airport not currently served by the airline (assuming airport is not affected by volcanic activity). A return to departing airport would exceed oxygen/altitude time requirements for passengers making it impractical.

B737 Captain reported misgivings when the aircraft assigned for the flight had a faulty pressurization system and he would be operating in to and out of a high altitude airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 4000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

I took off from Goose Bay with a marginal VFR METAR expected at my destination. As I approached the southern tip of Greenland the weather was VMC. The Tower was reporting IFR conditions but they were constantly changing. I canceled IFR because they would not let me shoot the approach. As I continued closer the conditions remained VMC until less than three miles away. The rain from a passing system reduced the ceiling and visibility. I was advised by the Tower that landing was not authorized. Due to the remote location I had no option for an alternate. I proceeded to tell the Tower that I had no other option and I was going to land. Even before I went into the reduced visibility I had the runway lights in sight and because of that and my familiarity with the airport I continued with the approach and landed.

An SR22 pilot on a flight from Goose Bay Newfoundland across 600+NM of the North Atlantic Ocean to ZZZZ in the middle of the North Atlantic with no available alternates arrived at the airport to find it below minimums and ATC unwilling to approve an approach. He figuratively declared an emergency and; based on familiarity; located the airport via the runway lights and landed safely.


Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

I received a hand off from [Center] on a Cessna 421 out of 10;000 feet. Center advised me he was an emergency with a 'shaky left engine' and requested the nearest airport; which was ZZZ. I approved 3;000 feet. Center gave him a right turn to; I believe; 110 but the pilot turned left which put him tight to field with a lot of altitude and speed left to burn off. When he checked on; I turned to a 080 head which would set him up for base to a 3 mile final. Out of 5;000 feet; the pilot asked where the field was and I pointed it out to him. I also told him about ZZZ1 airport which is close by so he wouldn't get confused. I advised the pilot of the ceiling and turned him on a 3 mile final and descended him to my MVA. The pilot overshot the final and I had to give another turn back which was good because he was still very fast. He told me had the field in sight and I cleared him for the visual approach and asked the Tower if I could clear him to land; which was approved. The aircraft landed very long; on the last third of the runway. I should have asked the pilot if he would rather set for a long final or if he wanted a vector for the field.

TRACON Controller described an emergency event involving an aircraft with a rough engine needing to land immediately; the reporter's self critique indicated that he should asked more questions regarding final spacing.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 700

Almost hit a drone while executing an RNAV approach into DWH.

PA28 instructor pilot reported a near miss with a drone while on approach to DWH.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Local control cleared Aircraft X for takeoff. Aircraft X began his departure roll on the runway with no observed anomalies. Aircraft Y was sequenced and cleared to land while in the right downwind. As Aircraft Y was on landing rollout; the pilot announced that there was another aircraft on the runway. Aircraft X was at a complete stop at the very end of the runway. Aircraft Y exited the runway. Aircraft X was able to taxi off the runway and taxi back for another takeoff. When Local control asked Aircraft X what happened; the instructor said the student pilot 'inadvertently reduced power' during takeoff. As Controller in Charge (CIC) I was busy with talking to Tech Ops on the phone regarding an issue on our ACE-IDS computer. I was not actively scanning outside the window at the time this occurred; but I was listening to the frequency in the background and became aware as soon as Aircraft Y said there was an aicraft on the runway.As CIC; it's impossible to directly monitor everything going on in the tower cab. I do my best to listen to the frequency and watch the radar when traffic level becomes moderate. In addition; I was on the phone and giving Tech Ops information from the issue on the ACE-IDS. I would recommend that Local control scan the runway every time they clear someone for takeoff and when traffic is on final; to ensure the runway is clear. I regret not being able to stop this incident from happening.

Tower Controller in Charge reported the Local controller did not notice a departing aircraft had aborted their takeoff and allowed an arriving aircraft to land.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

During Takeoff Cylinder Head Temperature (CHT) #3 went to yellow to red; tried to lower the nose but it kept rising I decided to turn back around and land.

Reporter is aware of the cause of the cylinder temperature issue.

A flight instructor in a SR20 experienced high cylinder temperature indication for an unknown reason; and elected to return to the field.