Flight Crew Last 90 Days 104; Flight Crew Total 23000; Flight Crew Type 5366

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Landing Runway 11 at Delhi. As aircraft was in the flare in the touchdown zone what I would describe a series of professional grade fireworks; multicolored/flowery; were lit off approximately near Taxiway S3 and between Taxiway Z and Runway 11; where I show a red/yellow symbol on the airport chart.This took the crew by surprise and was very distracting at a critical time. The crew had no previous knowledge that this activity would happen. I briefly considered a go-around but felt the safest course of action was to land as I could not see any objects or obstacles on the runway ahead. The Tower was queried with no explanation. Later the Ground Controller stated something about either 'bugs;' or 'birds.'I have never heard of professional grade pyrotechnics (display fireworks) being used to scare animals. Even if this is a common procedure the crew should be warned and the fireworks should not be set off so close to a runway that aircraft are landing on.

Air carrier flight crew reported that an airport was using fireworks to deter birds; causing a distraction on final approach.


During takeoff roll; approaching 120 KIAS (V1=134KIAS; VR=150KIAS) the red ENG FAIL glare shield light illuminated. Captain assumed control of the aircraft and executed a rejected takeoff. No engine parameters were exceeded and brake temperatures remained below a yellow box value. Aircraft briefly stopped on the runway while QRH procedures were complied with. Taxied to the gate and debriefed maintenance. During debrief; both the First Officer and off duty pilot jump seater stated; they hear some sort of engine rollback. Aircraft was trans-loaded and flight continued to destination.

MD-11 Captain reported experiencing an ENG FAIL light during takeoff roll resulting in a high-speed rejected takeoff.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related

During preflight; flight attendants brought to our attention that there were no sani-wipes on board.  We called Operations for some to be delivered and they said they had zero inventory to give us.While the planes are cleaned; wipes need to be available so crews can ensure their workstation is wiped down after crew/plane swaps.

Air carrier First Officer reported no sani-wipes were on the aircraft; nor available from operations.


Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion

Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Procedure

While descending via the LTOWN6 in profile with the autopilot and autothrottles engaged; at the lead point for the turn at CLARK I was changing ATC frequency as PM when I felt the aircraft pitch over.  I looked up and saw the airspeed increasing and called out the deviation to the Captain.  He immediately threw out spoilers then turned off the autopilot and leveled off to correct the speed deviation.  At first we thought it might also be an altitude deviation; but we were at the lead point for the turn at CLARK; so the descent was OK; just a little too dramatic.  We built the LTOWN6 with one change.  At LTOWN we put in an altitude constraint of at 15;000 because the FMS was not calculating.  After making this one change the FMS appeared to be working just fine.  I have had this happen at least three times in the past but not so violently pitching and definitely not the dramatic increase in airspeed.I would suggest fly level change for the final portion of the LTOWN6 every time.  If a deviation such as this occurs quickly disconnect the autopilot/autothrottles and fly the airplane.  Never trust the automation.

The reporter stated that this event occurred while the aircraft was at 8;000 FT; 210 KTS beginning the turn at CLARK toward DIGLE. This RNAV arrival's final 3;000 FT DINKE constraint drives the entire arrival and in this case caused the aircraft's FMS to calculated a rapid descent in order to make the DINKE constraint. If the aircraft does not cross DIGLE at 6;000 FT it will not make the DINKE constraint. He has seen this in his widebody aircraft on several arrivals and has talked with other heavy jet pilots who have experienced the same FMS behavior. The reporter believes this RNAV and many others have too many constraints; too close together and that simpler would be better. The reporter also believes that the FMS computation ability along with the coupled automation have difficulty smoothly complying with the steep constraints.

During the LTOWN arrival about 2 NM prior to CLARK; the aircraft began a rapid pitch over and acceleration; causing a potential airspeed and altitude violation. Both Autopilot 1 and autothrottles were engaged. Assigned altitude and airspeed for CLARK is 210 KIAS and 8;000 MSL minimum. The aircraft was in Profile and was stable at 210 KIAS and 8;000 MSL with slats extended when it began to pitch over and accelerate just as it began turning south to intercept the next point on the arrival; DIGLE. Airspeed accelerated to 240 KIAS and the aircraft descended to 7;500 MSL. I disconnected the autopilot and extended the speedbrakes while pulling throttles back to idle manually to override the autothrottles to get back to 210 KIAS and stop the descent. By this time; we were abeam CLARK; so continued the descent down the 6;000 MSL min for DIGLE. We then re-engaged the autopilot and continued the descent using Level Change. Approach Control made no mention of either the airspeed or altitude deviation.The First Officer had recommended using a hard altitude 15;000 MSL at LTOWN; which we programmed into the FMS. Everything appeared to be operating normally until this time although we extended the slats a little earlier than normal to help maintain the required airspeed of 210 KIAS on this portion of the arrival. The First Officer was slightly distracted by a frequency change during all the excitement; but was still quick to call out the altitude deviation while I was trying to correct the airspeed problem. Only recommendation I can come up with is to use Level Change and Altitude Hold on the FCP for arrivals like the LTOWN with numerous altitude and airspeed restrictions. Airspeed and altitude control when using the autopilot and Profile are too imprecise for the restrictions on arrivals like the LTOWN.

An aircraft descending on the MEM LTOWN6 had an uncommanded descent while the aircraft was beginning the turn at CLARK toward DIGLE because the DINKE constraint compliance required rapid FMS calculations and automation response.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 6500; Flight Crew Type 1500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

At about 14;000 [feet] and 12 east; Baggage Smoke Indicator and Master Warning illuminated. Checklist commanded land as soon as possible. We discussed briefly and agreed to continue to ZZZ. Pilot Flying flew at max aircraft speed until needing to configure. Pilot Monitoring [advised] with ATC and informed passengers. No smoke or abnormal smell observed exterior or interior. Pilot Flying exited the runway and aircraft was approached by airport fire truck. Pilot Monitoring exited to coordinate baggage compartment inspection with fire crew. No fire; smoke; or abnormal smells observed.

CE-525 Non-flying First Officer reported a baggage compartment fire warning.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working the Paine Sector but I was watching Departure as well during periods of non-activity. I noticed an air show aircraft coming very close to the edge of the air show TFR. Then a departure came off Seattle northbound. I observed a fighter jet aerial demo aircraft come within about 3/4 of a mile and 600 FT or less of the departing Air Carrier. He was also traveling at a speed (approximately 450 KTS) where the Air Carrier could not have made any maneuvers to avoid him. It appears to me that these pilots have not been properly briefed on the risks and traps of flying within the Seattle airspace. Avoiding SEATAC should have been the top priority during the planning and morning briefs with these air show pilots. This was a very dangerous situation. The pilots should have been better prepared and briefed by the lead ATC representative on how to depart and return to their airport safely. At a minimum they should at all times know where they are reference the Seattle flow of traffic. Controllers; Air-boss; pilots and ATC representatives need to be on the same page on how to work these guys. It's seriously poor planning that this situation occurred. Pilot should fly at a safe speed. Lastly; a FLM said that he told all aircraft to turn off their transponders while in the TFR; this seems wrong. There is no separation built in with a TFR. They can run right up to the border and non participating aircraft can run up to the outside border; so where is the separation? It seems to me like a transponder might be the only thing that separates two aircraft. The Air Carrier had no idea that the the fighter jet was there because his transponder was off. Had it been on; the Air Carrier at least may have been able to see him coming and take evasive action if he felt that was necessary. This wasn't a big deal this time because they missed but it could have been much worse. And worst of all; it could have been prevented.

S46 Controller described an unsafe event when a military fighter participating in an air show transitioned very close to the TFR boundary in close proximity to departure traffic. The reporter voiced concern regarding the FAA's 'no transponder policy' issued to air show participants.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 27600; Flight Crew Type 14500

Taxiing from Southport; passing B3; a large fuel truck cut us off (west to east); forcing a hard immediate stop.  Our taxi light was on.

B737NG Captain reported making a quick stop to avoid a collision with a fuel truck while taxiing at ORD.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 18; Flight Crew Total 515; Flight Crew Type 335

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Student and I were working left traffic for 22R at MWC. There was a large volume of traffic coming into the area due to the [event] taking place. After [touch and go] we entered left traffic; leveled off and were established on left downwind. Tower called an experimental that he was to follow a Cessna on left downwind; same altitude less than 3/4 mi and that he was gaining on us. The experimental pilot said he would try to slow down. I made visual contact with the aircraft and mentioned on frequency that we were at his 1 o'clock. He was unable to establish visual contact with us. He said he would extend downwind; at which time we began our descent; shortly beyond abeam 'the numbers'. I expected the traffic following us to continue his downwind at pattern altitude. We slowed to 80 kts; descended with flaps 10 deg and turned base. I do not remember any further traffic advisory calls. After turning left base; at approximately 1300 ft MSL; I look to our left and slightly behind and see the [aircraft] pass very closely overhead and just behind our flight path; on a downwind heading. My student and I made a normal full stop landing and taxied to the ramp to shut down. I asked on frequency if the Tower Manager was still in; the Controller reported that he was not. The Tower Controller called the FBO after I walked in to discuss the event with me. He wanted to better understand what happened. I don't mean to speak negatively of the Controller; but his performance in general is inadequate. This is not the first issue I've had; or have heard of; just that this near mid-air collision should have never come close to happening. I am planning to make a report to the tower manager of the event. I much appreciate the controllers; but I will be thinking twice about the amount of traffic at the airport if this Controller is working. I feel the Controller should have kept a closer eye on the situation as it progressed; and alerted the aircraft following us to maintain his altitude. I spoke with the other pilot after landing; he also felt the Tower Controller was overwhelmed at the time.

C172 flight instructor reported NMAC in pattern due to inadequate ATC service.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Climbing out of ZZZ strong dirty sock smell. Coordinated with company and returned to ZZZ.

On climbout; experienced a fumes event. Leveled off FL270. Contacted Maintenance Control; and Dispatch. Decided to return to ZZZ.

A319 flight crew reported a strong dirty socks odor during departure resulting in a return to departure airport.


Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Received communication from Operations that flight ZZZ to ZZZ1 was coming back to [the] gate because a customer had O2 oxygen tanks not approved for flying.  Went onboard to investigate customer who was traveling with her infant.  The oxygen bottles were for the infant.  I asked if the baby could fly without oxygen.  Customer assured me that yes; the baby could fly; the oxygen was for tonight at bed time when she arrived in ZZZ1.  I advised customer of our policy and that these canisters could not fly.  Customer advised me that both she and the baby and the oxygen all flew in from ZZZ2.  I relayed our policy and advised her that I would take the oxygen down to baggage claim area. Passenger had two full canisters in a black roller board bag; and the 3rd O2 container was in a small pouch with a shoulder strap that easily looked like a shoulder strap purse.  The CSR boarding the aircraft was senior and did not notice any discrepancies that may have alerted her to the fact that there was oxygen canisters being transported.  Once the plane pushed off the jet bridge the flight attendant onboard witnessed the customer with the O2 bottle and inquired about it. Baggage Service is advised and has customer's phone contact; but bottles cannot be flown; customer will need to make arrangements in ZZZ1 for the babies oxygen tonight.  Will also follow up with a report on how the oxygen canisters made it through TSA in ZZZ2 undetected.

Ground Agent reported notification of aircraft ground gate return to remove unauthorized oxygen canister.


Snow; Icing; Fog; Turbulence; Windshear; 8

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 1060; Flight Crew Type 217

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Declared Emergency

I was doing a student's Instrument Stage I Check in [a] practice area...in VMC. At the completion of his checkride; we began to return to [the airport]. I realized that we were not going to be able to return...due to a wall of snow and low visibility that obstructed [the airport]. I called Dispatch to ask what the visibility was on the ground and if they could see the...Library (3 miles away). They responded that they could not and the visibility was approximately 1 mile. I advised them that we would wait a few minutes to see if it cleared up; if not we were going to [an alternate]. Approximately 1 minute later; I realized that the wall of snow and low visibility was moving in our direction very quickly and the visibility surrounding us was beginning to drop. I immediately made the decision to go to [the alternate] and advised Dispatch of this decision. We flew to [the alternate] and landed with no further incident. Up until this point; the student was flying the airplane. After landing we tied the aircraft down and entered the FBO; where I called Dispatch to let them know we were safely on the ground. I advised them that we would wait about ten minutes to see if it cleared up; and I would call them back to see if the weather was clear the [departure airport] area.... I then received a call saying that the weather was clear...and that I should leave now. I verified that the weather was clear.... From this point forward I had the flight controls. After takeoff...there was another huge wall of snow and low visibility directly in front and to the north of us. I flew south to avoid it. Once in the air I could see that these walls of snow were randomly scattered all around us; but none that caused a threat to our flight. After flying south around the column of snow I could see [the departure airport] with no weather hazards in its vicinity.... There was no problem until turning 45 to downwind.... From here I could see another wall of snow and low visibility west and north of the runway. I continued because I believed that we would be landed before it would pose a problem. However; the wall was moving faster than I had previously thought and it would have been reaching the base area by the time I would have been reaching base. I decided to enter right base Runway 1 due to the winds being a direct crosswind out of the west. When we reached pattern altitude and below; we were experiencing continuous low-level windshear; moderate turbulence; and occasional severe chop. On final; I was continuously correcting for windshear; turbulence and airspeed variations of approximately 15 KTS. The winds were so great that I had run out of rudder while trying to keep my nose lined up with centerline. When entering ground effect; I lost airspeed due to losing the gust and the aircraft began to drop. I added power to compensate; but there was not enough energy and the aircraft dropped and bounced off the runway back into ground effect into a somewhat stable condition. Normally; I would have gone around; but the wall of snow was now at the threshold for Runway 19. I continued to attempt a landing. Once again; I lost the gust and the aircraft began to drop; so I added full power and went around avoiding bouncing the aircraft again. Approximately 5 seconds later I entered the snow wall and shortly after that [went] into IMC. I climbed straight out to gain altitude. I knew the last known area of VMC was to the southeast.... My plan was to fly to this area. At approximately 500 FT AGL; I began a right hand climbing turn. I set the GPS up to go Direct.... Once traveling toward the VOR I noticed the aircraft was beginning to accumulate rime type ice very rapidly on my wheel. At this point; I decided to declare an emergency and called Approach to do so. I gave them my tail number; my approximate position and told them I was declaring an emergency. They told me to squawk and asked what my emergency was. I told them that I had inadvertently enteredIMC and was now picking up ice. They told me the two nearest airports; and asked what assistance I needed. I asked for vectors.... At this time; I exited IMC into VMC. Approach then gave me a vector; but I told them that I was currently out of the clouds and could not fly that heading or I would enter the clouds again. They asked if I would prefer [another airport]. I told them yes; because I had just gotten it into view. Approach eventually told us to switch frequencies and to contact Clearance Delivery when safely on the ground. After switching frequencies; we experienced a communications failure. I could hear myself talk; but could not transmit. Furthermore; the student could not hear anything; and I could not hear him talk. I continued to blindly transmit radio calls.... While on final for Runway 25; I noticed I was too high; so I circled to lose altitude. I chose to do this because there was another wall of snow beginning to form west of the runway. Once again; we were experiencing continuous moderate turbulence with low level windshear and occasional severe chop. Once on final; I noticed the winds had shifted and were coming from more out of the north. Once again; I had a lot of cross control in and did not have enough rudder to keep the nose lined up with centerline. Furthermore; I had airspeed variations of approximately 15 KTS. When on short final; I noticed the snow wall had solidified into a wall of low visibility off the departure end of [the] runway. Due to the radio failure; I made the choice that if I had to go around I would squawk 7600 and try and avoid the snow wall. I continued to land (a rough landing due to losing gust again). I taxied to the FBO and shutdown.

C172 Instructor and student pilot attempting to land in turbulence; low level windshear and gusty wind; bounced off the runway twice; executed a go-around; entered IMC; encountered icing and declared an emergency. After receiving vectors to an alternate airport; the pilots lost radio communication; but were able to land visually.


Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

We were in clear; VFR conditions. Approach Control had previously cleared us down to 3000 ft and direct to the final approach fix on the Localizer 23 into CAK. About 12 miles out; heading direct to the final fix; ATC asked if we had the field in sight. We did and were cleared for the visual approach and sent to tower frequency. We had already begun to slow down and configure while still heading to the final fix even though we had been cleared for the visual approach. As we got a little closer the altitude selector was mistakenly swapped to 1800 ft by the pilot flying. He then selected the vertical speed down and began to descend below 3000 ft; which on the approach plate is the altitude to intercept the glide slope on the ILS 23. Upon questioning by the pilot monitoring; the pilot flying arrested the descent and leveled off. We were fully configured and on speed; so the pilot flying turned the auto pilot off; called to clear his FD; and hand flew the approach and landing. We were in VFR conditions and in sight of the runway and surrounding obstacles at all times. The Tower Controller did get a low altitude alert on us as we descended below the MSA before being established on the localizer. By that time we were correcting; as well as confirmed with the tower that we still had the airport and obstacle/tower in sight. Because of our altitude; when we captured the localizer we were below the glide slope and received a 'glide slope' audible warning. Rather than climb up; we remained level until intercepting the glideslope and landed without further incident. Descending below the MSA before intercepting the localizer inbound was poor technique and against company procedure. After discussing it on the ground with the pilot flying; I believe it was a mistake brought on by over thinking by a low time First Officer who is still gaining experience on visual approaches. In his mind he wanted to be at 1800 ft AGL (which would have been 3100 ft MSL) 6 miles out on the approach. That would have put us on the standard 3 degree glide path to the runway. That was proper logic but improper execution as he mistaking put 1800 in the altitude selector. As the pilot monitoring I should have recognized this well before VS was selected and we began descending. We had been cleared for the visual approach with the runway in sight at all time. I should have also recognized that my fellow crew member was a fairly low time First Officer and given more guidance/technique on how I might fly a visual. At no time were we not in control of the airplane; but the experience was a valuable reminder to me to stay vigilant on the flight deck. Errors can happen to all of us; regardless of background or experience. There are two of us up there to check each other.

CRJ-900 flight crew reported descending below minimum sector altitude (MSA) while executing a visual approach.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew; Person Maintenance

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

At the top of the descent the ECAM Fuel Display for the right inner tank went to 'XX.X'. Fuel in this tank was approximately zero at this point. This lack of signal caused the fuel totalizer; CG; Gross Weight of the airplane to also go to XX.X. Per the QRH; there are two CB's (P60/P61) that we are advised to reset to restore the fuel quantity indication. That action only corrected the problem intermittently. We landed in ZZZ and Maintenance troubleshot and signed off on the fuel system as airworthy. The same problem recurred on the flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1. Again; we followed the QRH CB procedure; but still; it did not fix the problem. We landed and wrote up the AML. I received a maintenance report on [date] in ZZZ1 stating that they found burn residue at the terminal end of the probes inside that fuel tank. I would like to ensure that the right folks are aware of this incident to determine if we have a systemic issue here with the hardware (arcing in an empty fuel tank) or the QRH procedure when we are resetting power to the cadensicon probes. The gravity of the threat of a fuel tank explosion should be apparent to us all. Recommend that this issue be investigated to ensure that we do not have a systemic risk of fuel tank explosions with our hardware or the QRH procedure that requires you to reset the CB to this system.

A300 Captain reported receiving a maintenance report stating burn residue found at the terminal end of the probes inside the fuel tank. This was after the Captain had performed the QRH procedure for a fuel gauge inoperative/reset.


Indicating and Warning - Lighting Systems

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 192; Flight Crew Type 1249

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Passing roughly 2;000 feet; autopilot off; FO (First Officer) hand flying; get direct CSHEL. I'm heads down in the box; when my peripheral sees an ECAM and System page on lower ECAM pop up. By the time I execute the direct and look over; [the] screens go back to normal [and there is] nothing on [the] Status page. FO has no clue; but I know some thing's up.Passing roughly 4;000 feet; No Smoking and LDG light green indications on upper ECAM screen cycle on and off a few times; then return to normal. Passing roughly 12;000 feet; 'Ding;' ECAM: C/B tripped rear panel W-Z. No breakers are tripped; but ECAM stays displayed for about 3 minutes. Then goes out. Passing roughly 18;000 feet; 'Ding;' ECAM: HYD B RSVR LO AIR PR. On status page; HYD B quantity good; system output press good - 3;000 - but air pressure indicating low.[I] messaged Technical Support Maintenance Control; [and] they ask about quantity and fluid pressure. I reply; 'Both normal.' ECAM lasts roughly 3 minutes and then clears itself. Passing roughly 22;000; LDG LT indication on upper ECAM screen cycles on and off. Finally extinguishes after two minutes.I messaged Technical Support Maintenance Control again [and] ask what's going on. They ignore me [and] never reply. In order to document [them]; I wrote up all 4; tripped C/B; HYD low air pressure; smoking light; landing light. While this is all going on; I'm thinking the jet might be on fire. Always my first thought when random; inexplicable things start happening. Two thorough cycles through the system pages reveal all normal; which puts me at ease. Once established at cruise; all indications [were] normal and we continued [the] flight with no further incident.

A320 Captain reported multiple ECAM messages; advisory lights; and ECAM displays switching; then dissipating during flight with no observable systems failing.


Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Flight to LAX was normal with smooth flight conditions. Nearing LAX on descent (13;000 FT) we were advised by SOCAL Approach we were 10 miles in trail of a B747. Shortly after that we started encountering light 'rolling' turbulence consistent with wake turbulence. I turned on the seat belt signs and approximately 5 seconds later we encountered severe 'rolling' wake turbulence. The aircraft rolled to about 90 degrees left wing down and 30 degrees nose down. The Flight Attendant was in the aft lavatory when I turned on the seat belt sign and she immediately came into the cabin. However; she was first thrown onto the side couch then across the aisle where she hit her arm on the opposite seat. All passengers were belted and had no issues except spilled drinks. Galley contents were already secured so they stayed in place (but in big disarray) in the appropriate storage closets. Had they not been secured there would have been glass flying around the area. When we initially checked in with SOCAL we were assigned Runway 24R. I made a request for Runway 25L. The Controller acknowledged the request and advised of B747 traffic. I interpreted this to mean if we used 25L there would be heavy aircraft in the area. When we first encountered the very light wake turbulence; I remembered the B747 comment and asked ATC where the traffic was. That was when I realized the B747 was in front of us at that time and not on final (as I incorrectly assumed).The actions of the Flight Attendant of keeping the galley organized and doors closed when unused prevented a probably more serious condition. Most of the glassware was dislodged from the stored location but since she had closed the access door it was contained. Had she not done that there would have been a lot of glass flying around the cabin. During the incident I remember the excessive noise of the glasses and dishes moving around. When we opened the main galley storage door after landing just about all of the contents spilled out onto the floor. The Flight Attendant was taken to a medical facility after landing because of an injury to her arm. She is fine; although a little bit sore.

An EMB-135-BJ encountered significant wake turbulence behind a B747 on arrival into LAX that resulted in a 90 degree roll and 30 degree nose down pitch. Flight Attendant reported slight injuries.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Engine S/N XXXX-48 on a DHC-8-100 aircraft had an overtorque.  Engine was changed; as instructed by my Lead Mechanic; who was instructed by Engine Program Manager.  We removed Reduction Gearbox RGB 120306 from Engine XXXX-48 and sent it out for inspection.  We then installed Reduction Gearbox RGB (YYYY-24) on Engine XXXX-48. Engine was signed-in February; 2014. Don't know when engine was installed; but when [mistake was] discovered ten days later; the aircraft came to ZZZ to change engine. Overtorque was 168.3%.  My Lead and myself checked manual and found that the overtorque was [actually] 'Out of Limits'; but that was after Program Manager came to Shop on that day. Neither one of us ever checked the manual; just took Manager's word that turbo machine [Engine] S/N XXXX-48 was serviceable.  Engine Program Manager came to Shop and asked about the engine; he wanted to send engine out. Lead Mechanic told Program Manager [that] engine is [already] on aircraft. Lack of communication between Engine Program Manager and Lead Mechanic.  I knew it was [originally] an overtorque; but never asked how much. My Lead showed me the paper ten days [after the RGB change] that showed [an overtorque] at 168.3%.  If I would have [previously] asked how much [overtorque]; a light would go off; that's a lot; lets check manual.  The engine was changed at ZZZ.  Myself and my Lead should not take anyone's word that an overtorqued engine is serviceable; we both need to check the manual before; not after the fact.

An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) describes how a lack of communication between his Lead Mechanic and their Engine Program Manager contributed to their replacing a Reduction Gearbox (RGB) on a PW 120 engine that had overtorqued; instead of removing the engine from a DHC-8-100 aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 3200; Flight Crew Type 1000

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Just west of the MXQ VOR; in IMC conditions; we encountered a pocket of heavy precipitation (not painting on either radar screen) accompanied with severe turbulence and loss of aircraft control. The updraft disengaged the auto-pilot and yaw damper which resulted in a vertical climb of 4;800 FT per minute. Control was regained at 33;800 FT. The Captain (pilot monitoring) was able to then notify ATC of the altitude deviation and within a few minutes we provided a more complete PIREP to the controllers.

HS-125 First Officer reported severe turbulence encounter that resulted in 4;800 FPM uncommanded rate of climb from 32;000 FT to 33;800 FT before control was regained.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was the Pilot Monitoring. Approximately 2 NM NE of FATOR on the ILS14 at 2;000 MSL; I observed a mid-sized red drone pass off the left side of the aircraft; at an estimated altitude of 2;200 MSL. No evasive action was needed; and I reported the sighting to Mc Allen (MFE) Tower.Cause: Drone operation in the approach corridor of Runway 14.Suggestions: Difficulties in regulation and oversight of drones and their operators make this a difficult issue; but further emphasis on aircraft flight pattern awareness and the hazards of drone operation in the vicinity of airports (and extended runway centerlines) may contribute to safety.

Air carrier First Officer reported a UAV passed off the left side of the aircraft while the flight was beginning an instrument approach.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Environment - Non Weather Related

Not sure who to report to; but I live beside a decommissioned power plant (American Electric Power) in Conesville; Ohio. There are lights on the stacks which are in excess of 800 feet tall that have been on and flashing for over 30 years; these have been on during the decommission process; but tonight are now off. There is nothing alerting anyone of these 3 stacks over 800 feet tall.

A concerned citizen from Conesville; Ohio; reported decommissioned power plant stacks over 800 feet tall are no longer lighted with flashing lights.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

The scheduled flight to ZZZ1 encountered some weather and was assigned a hold at ZZZZZ which is around 80nm off the coast of ZZZ1.  It took a while to find his actual location since Software X was showing it down the coast off shore and hollowed out.  I was able to find his actual location on Flight Aware and ran his numbers.  I advised him he was well out of the 50nm range allowed; he said it was due to ATC moving him there and the crew did notify ATC. It was past the 50nm range.I had two obstacles and it was Software X and ATC.  Software X was incorrectly tracking the flight as being on-shore so there wasn't anything to worry about since ZZZ Approach  was holding most of the day for volume and ATC for putting them in a hold that was past the safe range which was 50nm.We were looking at Software Y to possibly replace Software X but since Software X is incorrectly tracking (Or not tracking) flights; something needs to be done since Software X is not up to the task.

Air Carrier Captain reported ATC assigned holding fix in excess of 50nm offshore due to weather limitations. Reported added Navigation system malfunctioning.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.5

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I was working a radar position without a D-side as one was not needed. Aircraft Y was heading southeast; direct CUTTA Intersection at FL350. Aircraft X was heading northwest toward MLP at FL340. The paths of flight of the two aircraft were less than 5 miles apart. Aircraft Y's data block showed FL345 in one hit and the conflict alert initiated. I asked Aircraft Y to verify level at FL350. The pilot responded; indicating that they were responding to an RA and descending. After verifying that the RA was to descend and not climb; I noticed another sector had an aircraft; Aircraft Z; at FL360 that had shown 100 feet low for a couple hits; causing the RA. The RA resulted in a loss of separation between Aircraft Y and Aircraft X. Once Aircraft Y and Aircraft X were laterally separated; I cleared Aircraft Y to descend to FL310 once the RA was resolved as the aircraft needed to start it's descent into it's destination airport. Aircraft Z should have been level at FL360. I'm not sure if it was a pilot or equipment error; but the only separation that was lost was with another aircraft not involved in the RA at all.

Reporter stated he observed Aircraft Y deviate from assigned altitude because of RA from Aircraft Z; causing separation loss with Aircraft X.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

I was working the Mulford/Grove (3g/3m) sectors combined. I received Aircraft X descending via the EMZOH1 arrival except maintaining 060 after MYSHN from the SUNOL (3s) sector.  When Aircraft X came onto my frequency he checked in just descending via on the runway 30 transition. I responded with descend via the EMZOH1 arrival to reduce verbiage from having these new procedures and many pilots misunderstanding restrictions with the Optimization of Airspace and Procedures in the Metroplex (OAPM) descend via procedures having them just been implemented. I received Aircraft Y from TOGA (1t) sector climbing to 050.  Aircraft Y's exit route to me was radar vectors east of MYSHN at 050.  Aircraft X crossed MYSHN at 060 as Aircraft Y turned to a 340 heading to join V334 at 050 instead of being vectored east of MYSHN per the SOP TOGA (1t) to MULFORD (3m) exit routes.  I issued traffic to Aircraft X for Aircraft Y who was crossing left to right in front of him at 050.  As Aircraft X passed MYSHN at 060 I believed I had stopped Aircraft X's EMZOH1 descend via clearance at 060; I was wrong.  As Aircraft X descended thru 058 and Aircraft Y passed beneath him I realized my mistake and notified my Front Line Manager (FLM) of my error.I recommend that the aircraft on the EMZOH1 arrival be given the MYSHN @ 060 descend via clearance restriction when necessary and stay on that clearance at 060 until clear of traffic turning northbound at 050 or vectored east of MYSHN at 050 to ensure separation.

I was working Toga sector and had I was working toga sector and Aircraft Y departed SJC northbound on the SUNOL departure to 5000 feet going to grove sector.  Grove sector had Aircraft X descending northwest bound to on the EMZOH arrival to OAK to 4100 feet.  Aircraft Y crossed too close to Aircraft X and separation was lost.  Closest proximity was 1.2 miles and 800 feet.  I failed to use the new procedure of taking the aircraft off the departure and giving them a vector east of a fix called MYSHIN. I was notified by management of the loss; and told it would have made no difference because Aircraft X was not restricted from descending and there would not have been divergence.I'm not sure; possibly modify the EMZOH arrival to protect for SUNOL departure/v334 airway IFR traffic; or modify the SUNOL departure.

Northern California TRACON (NCT) Controllers report of a loss of separation due to him not having an aircraft maintain an altitude until crossing/lower traffic had passed. The controller thought he told aircraft to maintain specific altitude but did not. The other controller failed to use the new procedure and vector the aircraft past a fix to avoid the inbound aircraft.


Flight Attendant Airline Total 31; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 3; Flight Attendant Total 31; Flight Attendant Type 100

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Arrived on aircraft at XA:15 and smelled odor equivalent to oil. As soon as we took off it worsened and Captain called us to tell us we were diverting because of the odor and they had donned their oxygen. We were on the aircraft for over an hour before we were able to get off and smell fresh air. I have since been experiencing painful headaches and dizziness. This happened one other time to me on an A319 but I recovered in 3 days. This time I am  not rebounding as quickly. Since we smelled such a strong oil smell before we took off I was real surprised we left our departure airport.

An A320 Flight Attendant detected an oil odor during an early morning preflight. The flight departed but then diverted with the pilots on oxygen after the odor intensified once airborne. The reporter experienced painful headaches and dizziness days after the exposure.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

At level cruise at FL360 MFD 2 (non flying pilot) flashed red then went blank. Immediately after this happened an intense odor resembling that of electrical fire or smoke filled the cockpit. We went through the memory items for Cabin Fire or Smoke; and consulted the QRH. We ran the QRH Cabin Fire or Smoke checklist. The odor continued to increase and it was agreed that we should divert to the nearest airport; as we could not definitively pinpoint the location of the odor with reference to a fire; or that any point of heat was able to be extinguished.We spoke with ATC and they assigned us direct to [a nearby airport]. Although we were asked if we wanted emergency [status]; we were still running our QRH checklist and trying to determine what our options were; so we declined. I believe ATC [treated] us as an emergency aircraft.We had a normal landing; although overweight; and had fire department personnel search the outside of the aircraft for signs of fire or smoke damage before taxiing to the gate and deplaning the passengers.The fire department entered the cockpit once we were parked and noted the smell and said 'something was definitely fire related up here.' Contract maintenance confirmed that the MFD 2 CRT was the source of the heat related odor; but the wires associated were not. We MEL'd MFD 2; and continued on with the flight. When we first smelled the heat/fire related odor; we knew that we were likely to divert very soon. We worked with ATC to descend to the nearest airport with fire and rescue capabilities; in the event the odor we smelled led to a bigger fire/flame event. Although we were treated as an emergency aircraft; we complied with ATC instructions.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

EMB-145XR flight crew reported diverting to an alternate airport after the First Officer's MFD failed and they noticed an electrical smoke odor.


Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

On left base visual to 25L with the autopilot on; looking over left shoulder to spot traffic and the runway; the Captain selected the approach mode instead of the LOC button. This caused the airplane to climb 500 feet above altitude. As soon as the engines started to spool; I informed the Captain that we were about to start climbing out of our assigned altitude. He was not sure what to do; as he started pushing buttons to get the airplane to level off. After a few moments of letting him try to solve the solution; I asked him to turn off the autopilot; which he eventually did; and returned the aircraft to its intended flight path. He completed the visual approach with a slight overshoot. I should have intervened right away; instead of waiting for him to figure out the automation. I'll be less respectful of positional authority; and more respectful of the possible consequences.

We were at 5;500 feet on a base leg flying a visual approach. I intended to arm the VOR/LOC mode on the MCP. However; I accidentally armed the APP mode. The autopilot then captured a glideslope signal. The aircraft quickly began to climb. This resulted in a 500 foot deviation error. I immediately disconnected the autopilot and corrected the flight path.Correctly verbalizing and verifying automation changes would prevent this error.

Inadvertently selecting APP mode vice VOR/LOC to intercept the localizer while on autopilot resulted in a glide slope capture and a climb out of their cleared altitude for a B737NG flight crew.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

Dangerous goods (DG) agent presented HAZ paperwork for First Officer (FO) to go back and inspect HAZ can. FO went back to inspect DG and soon came back to the cockpit noting that there was noxious chemical odor emanating from the haz container. I went back with the FO and noted that I could smell the odor before even going through the small door leading to the upper deck of the airplane. I entered the haz can and noted that the odor was very strong. I bent over to smell the DG on the right side of the can to 'look' for the odor and quickly eliminated the right side of the can as the source. Loaded on the left side of the can; among other things were 5 or six buckets of paint Class 3. I leaned over to smell and determined that the smell was coming from the gray buckets of paint (Class 3) Since it wasn't obvious which bucket it was and because a few of the buckets had other hazardous cargo and first overnight packages; I made the decision to have the DG agent remove all of the Class 3 Gray paint buckets. The DG agents accommodated my decision quickly and professionally. As it turned out; one of the pour tops was where the liquid was coming out. As soon as buckets were removed; the noxious odor cleared quickly from the haz can. Human error caused this event; I believe. I'm not sure what the protocol is for the inital loading of dg into the haz cans is but after the haz can is loaded and it's freight is tied down with netting and the haz can doors installed until its loaded on an aircraft; the doors should be opened; at least for a final inspection. This may have avoided pushing back 23 minutes late and having to deal with this near push time. Open and recheck haz container before loading it on an aircraft.

Dangerous Goods emitting odor. During my inspection of the DG; I noticed a strong odor as I entered the main cargo area. As I entered the Haz can; the odor was strong; best described as a noxious chemical smell. There was no evidence of any leaking fluid from the suspect Class 3 Hazmat containers. I informed the DG agent that the odor was not acceptable and returned to the flight deck to inform the Captain of the situation. The Captain came back to the Haz can to verify; and agreed that the fumes were emitting from the Class 3 Flammable liquid containers/buckets. As the specific suspect container/s could not be identified; all of the Flammable liquid containers/buckets were removed from the aircraft. Once removed from the aircraft; the gaseous chemical odor was verified by the DG agent to be coming from the sealed pour spout at the top of the container. Once suspect DG was removed there was no longer any noticeable odor in Haz can. I reinspected Haz can and was satisfied it was safe and secure. Per the FOM; we requested new DG paper work reflecting the change and also received a new weight and balance reflecting the removal of the DG.It was moderately windy and this may have contributed to the odor not being discovered by the preparing DG agent during the loading process. Once the DG was in an enclosed environment; the odor became apparent.

Air Cargo flight crew describes the events surrounding the discovery of a leaking bucket of flammable paint in the Hazmat container. The paint is removed and the flight departs late.


Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While troubleshooting [an Airbus 320] Yellow [Hydraulic] System accumulator [deferral]; it was found to be not accomplished properly. I then began to test the system per AMM 29-13-42 and at approximately 1;820 PSI; as I was looking at the pressure gauge; something in the system let loose and sprayed me in the face and side. I was able to get out of the area without any damage but could have been much worse. What we ended up finding out; not only was the accumulator damaged due to not doing the MEL procedure properly; it caused damage to the yellow system reservoir; yellow system pump; and check valve.

I was assigned to troubleshoot an aircraft's Yellow Hydraulic System deferral to determine if we needed an accumulator. Since this was MEL item we checked to see if it was complied with. It was not complied with. We proceeded to troubleshoot yellow system and charged yellow accumulator to see if it would hold pressure; while charging to target 1;850 PSI at 1;820 PSI the safety valve let loose approximately 2 gallons skydrol while fellow Mechanic was in the charging bay; he was doused with skydrol as a result. It was clear that the accumulator internal bladder had been previously ruptured resulting in 0 pressure; further troubleshooting resulted in finding the yellow system reservoir had been over serviced; we attempted to relieve head pressure air and approximately 0.5 gallons of skydrol was blowing out of reservoir air pressure vent valve. At this point it was clear that the bladder on the yellow reservoir was also ruptured due to skydrol in the reservoir air system. We informed Management of our findings and removed the yellow system reservoir and that concluded our shift.

The reference A320 Minimum Equipment List procedure called for the high pressure pneumatic line to be disconnected from the reservoir to prevent pressure from acting upon the system.  The technicians reported that this line was found to be connected; which may have caused additional damage.


Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

While finishing our preflight; we were waiting for the last bags to be off loaded in the forward cargo. After the ground crew finished; we entered the final takeoff data. The Forward Green Trim band was showing. The Takeoff CG was 22.1% on the load sheet with a Stab Trim setting of 3.3 on the FMC. That trim setting was just above the Mid Band Indication and into the Forward Green Band. We continued with our checklist and began to Taxi to Runway 03. After being cleared for Takeoff; I pushed the thrust levers forward to around 65% N1 and allowed all 4 engines to stabilize. I released the brake pedals and pushed Take off go around. As soon as I did the; 'CONFIG WARNING' sounded and I immediately disconnected the Auto-throttle and pulled the thrust levers to idle. The indicated speed was around 40KTS. The FO (First Officer) was pilot monitoring and advised me that it was a Stab Trim CONFIG Warning. I advised the Tower that we aborted the Takeoff and advised them we would need to return to the ramp. The FO advised the deadheading crew members to remain seated. After we exited the runway; I noticed the Forward Green Band was no longer there. The FO informed the crew members that we had to go back to the ramp. I entered the Low Speed Rejected Takeoff due to Stab Trim CONFIG into the logbook. The Maintenance onboard the aircraft advised me that we should try to move all crew bags from the bulk cargo to the forward. After moving the bags we could still not get a Forward Green Band. Maintenance performed checks on the system and all passed. I decided that it would be prudent to have more fuel added to attempt to get the Stab Trim in the Middle Green Band. After discussing this with Dispatch and Maintenance Control we agreed this would be the best solution. After adding fuel and getting a new load sheet; we entered the new performance data. Once again; the Forward Green Band showed. However; this time our Stab Trim setting was inside the Middle Green Band. I looked back down to check the trim band again and noticed the Forward Green Band was gone again. We double checked the data again and made sure everything was entered correctly. Since the performance data was correct and the Stab Trim was now just inside the Middle Green Band; we decided to continue. A normal Takeoff was accomplished.There has been some instances of crews reporting changes in the Stab Trim settings after the performance data was put in the FMC. However; this time was not one of those instances. I believe the nose strut moved after we released the brake and the system removed the Forward Green Band. After returning to the blocks; I had the [numbers rerun] to make sure we were given the proper Take off CG numbers. He did notice a slight change from 22.1% to 22.3%. Negligible difference to say the least. The trim given by the FMC originally was 3.3 units. That was the same as when we entered the blocks. Since this is a Passenger aircraft and it has been in service for quite some time; I believe it would be prudent to have it weighed and a new [RON work] calculated. This is the only thing I can think of why the aircraft system is removing the Forward Green Band because we are starting from a point in the weight and balance that may be incorrect now.

Flight Crew aborted a takeoff after receiving a Stab Trim CONFIG Warning during the takeoff roll.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Passengers in X3; X4 and Y3; Y4 were non-compliant with wearing masks. They kept taking the masks off and we had to give them a warning. The passengers continued to take the face masks off. We told the Captain and he informed Dispatch. We tried to give them a few chances; but they just continued being non-compliant.

Flight Attendant reported several passengers were non-compliant with face mask policy.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Person Dispatch; Person Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

On taxi out for departure; we received an ACARS message to return to the blocks because of an improper loading problem.   Upon further questioning; we were told Radioactive material of .7 TI was loaded in 2L.  Company Dangerous Goods guidance states all radioactive material must be loaded in position 3 or aft.The Ramp Personnel loaded radioactive material forward of position 3; and the improper loading was not caught by the ramp personnel or flight crew before block out.I suggest better adherence to Company Dangerous Goods guidance and attention to detail when reviewing the paper work.

While taxiing out a cargo aircraft was recalled to the ramp after it was discovered that Radioactive material was improperly placed in a cargo position forward of where Company Dangerous Goods guidance allowed.


Bell Helicopter Textron Undifferentiated or Other Model

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Troubleshooting; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

During approach to Runway 22 in LGA; a [company] aircraft (I believe an A320 but can't be positive) crossed Runway 22 on Taxiway G or P. The aircraft began crossing [Runway] 22 when we were below 500 ft. The First Officer and I both thought the crossing looked tight. I anticipated a go around. Somewhere between 500-300 ft.; I believe; we were issued a go around from Tower. The Tower Controller instructed us to climb to 2;000 ft. on runway heading.We initiated the go around with TOGA (Takeoff Go Around) power; following SOP. As we began climbing and brought the flaps to 2; we got an AUTOBRAKE FAIL EICAS due to an existing MEL - which has been on the aircraft for quite some time. The First Officer canceled the master caution and continued his duties as pilot monitoring. At around 800 ft.; I believe; we received a TCAS TA for an aircraft above us at 1;500 ft. and slightly off our right wing. I attempted to shallow our climb to prevent excessive closure and an RA. At that time I reduced the power by overriding the auto throttles; which resulted in a TLA NOT IN TOGA EICAS message. To reduce distractions I turned off the auto-throttles and manually reduced the thrust to prevent a flap over speed as well as assist in shallowing our climb.At that point we received an RA to descend. As I shallowed to level the aircraft off; in the maneuver to lower the nose to the green box; I noted we were only at 1;100 ft. and knew I couldn't descend much without encountering terrain warnings. It was at this moment I also noticed we were only approximately 300 ft. from the aircraft above us. While the nose was about level pitch attitude; and before I was able to pitch to match the green box commanded by the RA; the TCAS announced clear of conflict and the traffic passed behind us. At that point we continued to clean up the aircraft; turn back on automation; begin a gradual climb to our newly assigned altitude of 3;000 ft.; and notified ATC of the TCAS RA; which ATC told us was a helicopter.The entire go around and RA happened incredibly fast. Neither I nor the First Officer ever saw the traffic; and I do not recall the Tower Controller calling the traffic to us. Using TOGA; while wise in nearly all low level go a rounds; in this case contributed to the high closure rate with the traffic immediately above the airport. I'm not sure how this could be addressed; but climbing to only 2;000 ft. AGL causes very rapid sequences of events. I did not notice the helicopter on the TCAS during our approach. I hand flew the approach from at least 1;000 ft.; which may have contributed to my focus out the window and allowed me to miss seeing the traffic above the airport while we were farther out on the approach. I'm not entirely sure knowing it was there could have changed much for us since we had little time to react; considering our low altitude when we began the go around combined with the low altitude of the RA.The Tower Controller never noted the potentially conflicting traffic to us while we were on the approach or during the go around. The aircraft that crossed the runway should never have crossed the runway with an aircraft on such short final. That aircraft should not have accepted the clearance to cross; nor should a clearance have been given. Additionally; the fact that we could not hear the crossing clearance - because Ground control issues runway crossing clearances in LGA - contributed to a reduction in our situational awareness. Had we been able to hear the conversation between the controller and the crossing aircraft; we could have potentially seen an issue earlier and prepared differently - however I'm not confident that would have improved the situation since it would have probably caused us to go around earlier and put us in an even more direct path with the helicopter overhead the field at 1;500 ft.It would be good to know at what point LGA controllers should no longer issue a crossing clearance with an aircraft on final to Runway 22. The in-pavement runway status lights are inoperative in LGA because of runway construction. I don't recall if there are runway status lights where Taxiways G and P intersect with 22; but all status lights are NOTAMed out of service right now. If they don't exist; adding them should be a priority item to prevent runway incursions; considering the hot spot. The NOTAM does not indicate where the status lights are out of service. The standard go around call outs on the 190; 'Go around; TOGA; FMS NAV' can be very distracting during a go around when a heading is assigned. We weren't able to select heading until we had passed the RA. In this instance runway heading was not appreciably different from the published missed approach; but it was a step we had to delay accomplishing.I'm not sure if terrain; buildings; airspace; or traffic permits it; but the Tower Controller should have assigned us a turn right or left to help avoid the loss of separation. Runway heading was a path that put our aircraft in a very small window that was very close to the traffic above the airport. Traffic overflying LGA should be at a higher altitude. Any traffic crossing at 1;500 ft. creates impossible separation in the event of a go around. Afterward; the First Officer noted that sun glare on the guidance panel - especially while trying to find the FMS button on my side - contributed to his distraction. The Tower Controller also issued us a clearance to 3;000 ft. just after the TCAS RA ended. The high workload in addition to multiple Tower altitude heading assignments can be distracting during the go around.If I had to do it again I would have told her to stand by instead of responding while we were trying to put the automation and aircraft configuration back together. The AUTOBRAKE FAIL EICAS master caution below 1;000 ft. during the go around was also a distraction. It's a distraction on a normal takeoff and a normal landing; since you also get it at about the time you clear the runway. This aircraft has had this MEL since [date]. There's no excuse to be running a distracting MEL for such a long time.I ran into [another] Captain a day or two later. He mentioned being on the ground watching a plane which was likely us go around. He said the Ground Control frequency was very congested and there were multiple calls for an aircraft crossing the runway to stop. It sounded like there was potential for confusion. I'm not positive it was our flight; but it sounded about right since he mentioned it was a [company] aircraft. The ATC tapes might help in this piece of the puzzle. Even if this wasn't the case; Ground Control in LGA can often be very congested and difficult to get a word in edgewise. I've often thought it would be beneficial there to have a metering frequency (even if it was just to call clearance delivery; considering there's less clearance delivery usage with PDC and controller pilot datalink communications) to call ready for taxi at a spot after pushback. The metering frequency could then advise you to monitor ground (this would be similar to MSP or BOS). Ground could then call aircraft on spots in an order that would be better for the controller when the frequency isn't congested with calls. I've heard many pilots get frustrated while waiting for a response from Ground Control while waiting on a spot; which can easily create frequency congestion.

On short approach to Runway 22 at LGA we executed an ATC instructed go around at 300-400 ft. maintain runway heading and 2;000 ft. (3;000 ft. published). This was due to an Airbus crossing the runway late around Taxiway G and Runway 22. During the go around and approximately 1;200 ft. we experienced a traffic RA for a helicopter that showed only 300 to 400 ft. above us. We never had traffic in sight due to workload and speed at which the event occurred. The event made the Captain (Pilot Flying) respond to a descending TCAS RA at low altitude on a go around. At approximately 1;000 ft. AGL we were clear of conflict and reconfigured the aircraft for completion of the go around maintaining 3;000 ft. and runway heading. We returned for landing Runway 22 at LGA with no other issues. Other contributors to high workload of go around was the illumination of two separate master cautions during go around event. One was at approximately 400 ft. for Autobrake fail (related to active MEL). And the other was ENG TLA NOT TOGA since flying pilot was reducing thrust on TCAS RA event all while turning off autothrottle. Possible traffic separation incursions both on the ground in LGA and in flight over airport. Workload management review of procedures for both LGA ATC and E190 go around procedure coupled with TCAS RA.

ERJ-190 flight crew reported receiving a late go-around instruction from ATC; resulting in a TCAS RA and requiring a level-off at an unsafe altitude.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12.7; Flight Crew Total 225.7

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Had flown from OLM earlier in the day. Light rain but no problems enroute. Later in the day; OLM was reporting 5 SM -RA with cloud bases around 2;500 FT. This seemed acceptable. Enroute conditions gradually deteriorated but I did remain clear of clouds. Approximately 15 miles southwest of OLM; visibility decreased somewhat and after a short time; I lost track of my ground position. I could still see the ground and had the required flight visibility; but due to scattered low clouds (500 FT and below) in the vicinity and reported 4 SM visibility at that time; I was unable to determine where in relation to the airport I was. The aircraft was equipped with only VOR and ADF; no DME receivers. I had configured the VOR for an approach from the south; but it became clear to me that I was not on that course. I had to spend too much time flying the airplane to appropriately update the navigation equipment. In addition; I had a portable GPS that was not active. At this time; aware of higher terrain in the vicinity and worsening conditions; I contacted OLM Tower to request assistance. Using landmarks; we determined I was actually very close to the airport; already within the Class D surface area. Shortly thereafter I was able to make a normal approach and landing. The cause of the situation was not immediately taking corrective action when the disorientation occurred. I should have contacted the Tower immediately at that point. In addition; I should have made better use of the equipment on board. The portable GPS should have been running the whole time. Both VOR receivers should have been set to different radials to provide a 'funnel' to the airport; instead a single radial. In addition; I should have been skeptical of the reported conditions. Rain often brings low clouds and decreased visibility; and with an initial reported visibility of five miles; I should have suspected that low clouds were in the area. I should have stayed until conditions improved. Finally; the Controller was very helpful. He had no concern about my airspace incursion and every concern about helping me find the airport and make a safe landing. If I could advise other pilots; it would be to always be ready to contact ATC for assistance. They are there to help.

A C172 pilot became disoriented approaching OLM due to low clouds and visibilities. The Tower was eventually contacted and provided the information necessary for the reporter to become reoriented.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 6715; Flight Crew Type 350

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

While at cruise at 2;200 MSL with Toledo Approach providing VFR traffic advisories; we had a [low wing] private plane pass under us at less than 200 feet separation. No indication that the Piper saw us as they did not deviate from flight path. Upon query to approach control; they said they had a 'ghost' showing in that area; but the signal was faint and they were not sure if it was an echo of our signal. Completed mission without further incident.

A VFR Helicopter pilot at 2;200 feet with TOL ATC traffic advisories reported a near miss after a single engine aircraft passed 200 feet beneath him without an ATC advisory. ATC reported a faint 'ghost' target.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

I was working Local Control. Aircraft X checked in northeast of the CRP VOR on the VOR Approach. I read Aircraft X the winds and cleared Aircraft X for the option to Runway 18. Aircraft X read back the option clearance. The only other traffic I saw in the area was Aircraft Y north of NGP heading northwest on a downwind at 1;600 feet for NGP Runway 13R on North radars tag. Aircraft Y had NGP in the scratch pad; as well as the symbol for the RNAV Approach.After clearing Aircraft X for the option and seeing the only traffic in the area was going to NGP I started looking out the window; to acquire Aircraft X visually and check for gear. After approximately thirty seconds to one minute Aircraft X asked if I had traffic out here for him. As I looked up at the scope the collision alarm went off. Aircraft X was over the CRP VOR at 1;600 feet still on the VOR 18 approach. Aircraft Y was approximately one mile south of the CRP VOR still northwest bound at 1;600 feet. I immediately issued a traffic alert to Aircraft X; 'traffic alert Aircraft X traffic 12 o'clock less than a mile Aircraft Y northwest bound same altitude suggest you climb immediately.' Aircraft X's response was 'roger; he's no factor now'. I asked Aircraft X if he wanted vectors to be re-sequenced; and he said no he would rejoin the approach on his own. I told Aircraft X traffic no factor and cleared him for the option again. Aircraft Y was vectored behind Aircraft X into NGP without further incident.I would recommend to myself never assume that because someone else is talking to the other aircraft and it's going to another airport it's not going to be a factor.

CRP Local Controller reported observing an aircraft going to an adjacent airport fly into his airspace on a conflicting heading with an aircraft conducting an approach.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

Cleared for takeoff with First Officer was pilot flying. When before takeoff checklist was completed; and aircraft aligned with runway; Captain transferred control to First Officer. First Officer now pilot flying called for standard power. Throttles were advanced; and autoflight tile was selected. Autothrottles advanced normally. Between 60-70 KIAS amber caution on glare shield illuminated. Captain observed a Level 2 alert 'Gen Drive 2 Fault' displayed. Captain assumed control of the aircraft; called for and executed rejected takeoff. First Officer made appropriate calls to ATC. Flight cleared runway and north on taxiway per ATC direction. After landing checklist and Rejected Takeoff Checklists were completed. [We] observed on taxiway that LVL 2 alert had self canceled. Requested and was granted permission from Ground to hold position while we worked problem. Contacted Flight Dispatcher and advised of problem; and rejected takeoff. Then contacted Maintenance advised of rejected takeoff and problem. Reviewed QRH related to alert; however decided not to continue since alert self canceled. During discussions with Maintenance it was decided that a high power run was in order. [We] performed Number 2 Engine run up to 80% N1. Fault did not reoccur. Advised Maintenance; [we were] advised that it was most likely a transient fault; and that he saw nothing to preclude another takeoff attempt. Crew discussed what was observed; and decided that we would attempt another takeoff. All parties were advised of our intentions. Aircraft was reconfigured and checklist accomplished. Flight was again cleared by ATC to takeoff. [We] accomplished all procedures as we did in first attempt. At 60 KIAS amber caution once again illuminated; as did the Level 2 alert 'Gen Drive 2 Fault' alert. Captain assumed control; and rejected takeoff. All appropriate checklist were accomplished. Once again alert self canceled. Again contacted Flight Dispatcher and Maintenance to advise. This time Maintenance directed to comply with MEL 24-21-01; which requires disconnect of the IDG. We also had to perform a procedure as directed by Maintenance to clear an EGPS fault caused by the IDG disconnect. MEL process was completed as per the Flight Operations Manual and AML card. After all deferral and dispatch items were complied with; aircraft was again configured for takeoff. This time successfully. Good support from all parties involved. Flight Dispatcher was especially outstanding in support and coordination with operating groups.

[We] rejected takeoff twice due to Gen Drive 2 Fault Level 2 warning and Master Caution on takeoff roll at 60 KTS. Captain [was] pilot not flying; First Officer [was] pilot flying. Captain performed rejected takeoff at 60 KTS. Exited runway and ran appropriate checklists. Fault cleared itself following power reduction on rejected takeoff. After both attempts to take off we coordinated with both Dispatch and Maintenance. After second rejected takeoff the decision was made to use MEL 24-21- 01 to disconnect IDG and continue. Maintenance talked us through EGPWS reset. MEL procedures complied with. [We] checked with Crew Scheduling to verify duty time limits. Third take off successful.

MD11 flight crew experiences a 'Gen Drive 2 Fault' on the takeoff roll and rejects. The fault self clears and a high power run up is accomplished with no faults noted. The next takeoff attempt produces the same results and the generator is disconnected using MEL procedures and the third takeoff attempt is successful.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 202; Flight Crew Total 8984; Flight Crew Type 5350

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Airspace Structure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

On YV8c departure from PEK; we experienced an apparent GPS jamming event. Similar to what occurs going into TLV except in a much more critical flight phase. At approximately 3;000 ft.; we got an ADS R out msg.  As we were familiar with the TLV events we immediately noticed the GPS was inoperative and we were in inertial navigation.  This lasted till about 12;000 feet and totaled 6 to 8 minutes.  What makes this different is that eventually our ANP exceeded our RNP for about 15 seconds.  As this was in the departure phase the RNP was 1.0 and our ANP got to 1.16.  Since we routinely do RNAV departures from PEK this could be a serious issue if it continues.

First Officer reported experiencing GPS jamming during departure from Beijing Capital Airport.


Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

VFR day going into GUA.  We thoroughly briefed all threats flying into GUA but forgot about not arming the approach until established on final. Autopilot was on; aircraft was gear down crossing AUR VOR at 9;000 ft. with LNAV and VNAV PATH armed with 6;300 ft. set in the MCP window. Once on teardrop continued to extend the flaps to 40. In the turn to final the glide slope came alive and we armed APP mode. The aircraft captured the false glide slope and made an abrupt descent to capture the glide slope. Captain turned auto pilot off and climbed back up to altitude; but we were one dot low crossing the FAF. We never received a terrain warning. We captured the glide slope and continued the approach into GUA. CA (Captain) touched down approximately 600 ft. down the runway. Lessons learned: stay in LNAV and VNAV PATH and set 5;100 ft. on the MCP; arm the approach on final. We considered a go around but the aircraft met the stabilized approach requirements. We armed the approach too soon with the auto pilot engaged. Stay in LNAV and VNAV PATH until established on final and then arm the LOC and then APP.

Air carrier Check Pilot reported failure to follow SOP resulted in crossing the final approach fix at MGGT one dot low.  No terrain alert was received; and the aircraft landed safely.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action

The First Officer discovered evidence of a bird strike near the fan blades on the number 2 engine during his preflight originating walk around the morning of [date]. We discovered that we flew the aircraft into ZZZ the previous night and it terminated. Thus; we assume that we must have had a bird strike on the previous flight that went undiscovered when the FO (First Officer) did his post flight walk around the previous evening. Evidence of the bird strike was some dried blood; but no feathers or other remains were visible. I called Maintenance Control; and they had Contract Maintenance come to the aircraft. Upon further inspection; I noticed a bend on the tip of the #9 fan blade that was not easily noticeable. Unfortunately; the bend was greater than allowed tolerances; so the flight was cancelled.The Crew Member that does a post flight walk around needs to take additional time to ensure no evidence of a bird strike on a terminating flight. Catching bird strike evidence early provides unnecessary delays the following day.

Flight crew reported finding evidence of a bird strike on aircraft during morning walk around inspection.


Troubleshooting; Distraction; Confusion; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

With more than 11 hours of rest; this was the last leg of the day. [I] performed pre departure inspection and departed. During climb out everything was normal. Departure Controller assigned me 8;000 ft. as final cruise altitude. Upon reaching 8;000 ft. I checked my engine instruments and performed cruise flow and checklist. After completion of checklist; I took ATIS information. While I [was] listening [to] the ATIS the aircraft suddenly became uncoordinated; requiring left rudder (ball almost out of the center parameter). I confirmed this by checking my turn coordinator [on the] Captain side. I corrected almost immediately with my feet. I reached over [to] the rudder trim knob and corrected. In less than 1 minute I sensed the aircraft [behaving oddly]. I looked over and the aircraft was uncoordinated again. I reached over to look at the First Officer's side turn coordinator to double check if my turn coordinator was inoperative or something was going on with my left side turn coordinator. After seeing both instruments were indicating correctly; to the same side. (Ball completely left outside the center); I re-checked all the engine instruments for a difference in power/torque; they both matched at 1100 torque; RPM 1900.I corrected the situation with my feet immediately and once again reached out to the rudder trim knob and attempted to correct the issue; but the rudder trim wheel turned out to be loose and separated from the center console position. At this time; I realized that controlling the airplane was going to be difficult. I kept my feet on the left rudder crosschecking my position. I asked ATC to give me a vector around some weather ahead and at the same time told ATC 'I am having flight control problems; give 1 minute to assess the situation' and he vectored me around the weather. While doing this; I was controlling rudder inputs to maintain coordinated flight; rudder control just felt weird in their feedback. I requested lower altitude and I was assigned 2;500 ft. I performed my descent and approach checklist. Upon reaching 6;000 ft. I placed almost full left rudder to maintain coordination. At this moment I realized that the situation has [worsened] too much and safety can be compromised. I [advised] ATC and also called Dispatch letting them know the aircraft [problem]. Level at 2;500 ft.; I saw the airport and I determined that I was going to perform the visual approach and briefed myself once again for the visual approach. I asked Approach for delay vectors for the visual; they vectored me southwest from the airport while I was thinking if there's something to correct the situation or [to] help me make a coordinated landing. I took feedback from Maintenance and our Chief Pilot and my last plan was prepping the cabin for the worst. After taking a few moments to go over all my possible scenarios; I told Approach I was ready for the visual approach. He cleared me for the visual approach and switched me to Tower. I called Tower for the check in and immediately received landing clearance. Performed [the] before landing checklist; I was constantly on a skidding motion to the runway; I was trying not to place full rudder input because I was unaware what was going on with the rudder and trying to avoid [worsening] the situation. I noticed while maintaining 120 kts. my rudder input while I was descending to the runway [was] more effective. Around 500 ft.; I placed flaps down and around 200/100 ft. the aircraft became very difficult to control. It was on a strange yawing movement; slipping dive to the runway. I immediately executed [the] missed approach. During initial climb out [the] ball centered and felt like everything was normal.After the hand off with Approach and with completion of all checklists; I requested another visual approach. This time I tried flaps 30 with a little more airspeed since on my first approach I noted slowing down caused me more issues in controlling the aircraft near touchdown. I stayedon 120 and flaps 30 and applied left rudder pressure to maintain coordinated flight all the way to the runway threshold and landed successfully and safely. On the ground I used differential braking and thrust to maintain runway centerline. I exited the runway. Fire Rescue was waiting for me at the taxiway. No action from them [was] required. After landing aircraft steering was operating normal and forward movement of the aircraft was found normal; [I] decided to taxi the airplane by own power to our ramp. After exiting the airplane paramedics offered medical attention; which I denied since I was fine and I didn't suffer from any injuries. After post flight inspection aircraft exterior was found normal. Post flight action included Chief Pilot conversation; aircraft maintenance logbook write up; company safety report and [this] report.

A pilot reported loss of rudder control and landed safely on their second attempt.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 8; Flight Crew Total 780; Flight Crew Type 130

Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

My passenger was flying left seat as PIC; and I was sitting in the right seat. Phoenix Approach released us from Flight Following a couple of miles south of Sky Harbor (PHX). I recall on the GPS we were just over 10 miles out from CHD at that point. My wife contacted Chandler Tower; and they told us to enter right traffic for [Runway] 22R; so she lined up towards the southwest end of the airport to facilitate a 45 deg downwind entry. We were still high (4;500 FT); so she put the flaps out early to let us descend rapidly without building up too much speed. At about 5 miles out and descending through perhaps 3;000 FT (1.5 miles east of Stellar Airport P19); a Beech Baron passed immediately in front of us; right to left on a climbing perpendicular flight path. I estimate it was less than 300 FT in front and 100 FT to the right of us when I first spotted it. By the time I reacted (<< 0.5s) it was disappearing below the cowl; Although I grabbed the yoke and banked right; in fact my reaction was far too late to have altered the outcome had the timing been less favorable. I looked out the left window and the Baron was rapidly receding; climbing and abeam and then behind the left wing. I estimate we missed impact by approximately 100 FT. At 120 KTS we were traveling roughly 200 FT/second. I suspect it was traveling at similar velocity; climbing out from Stellar. Assuming the Baron was departing Stellar; from the no-wind Runway 35; my wife never had an opportunity to see the plane. Once it turned crosswind; it would have been essentially fixed at a right 45 degree bearing; below the horizon; slowly growing and rising. At the instant I spotted it; I estimate it was about 10 FT lower than us but climbing (and we were descending). At all times prior to crossing our flight path; the panel/glare shield would have hidden it from my wife in the left seat. It seems unlikely the other pilot saw us since the Baron was level in roll and maintained constant heading while visible to me. I should have spotted it; but instead was preoccupied with monitoring my wife's approach. There was also no warning from the Tower. Chandler Tower historically has been excellent at providing traffic advisories; but they missed this one (as did I). Perhaps their radar feed from Phoenix Approach was inoperative. In general; air traffic at the time seemed to be very light. I attempted to acquire additional (factual) information via the internet; but our flight is not recorded; and I was unable to determine how I might find a record of a Baron flight at that time/location. As the pilot not flying; I should have spent less time monitoring my wife and more time monitoring the outside. About 30 seconds before the incident; I had spent several seconds scanning Stellar for traffic but noted none; and did not look back in that direction until the incident. For single pilot operation; it seems like we might need to institute S-turns for descents. I do plan to equip the plane with ADS-B for traffic awareness; but the FAA equipage requirements/constraints have created a practicality conflict (both with what we need/can afford; and what the market currently offers). As noted above; my personal experience has been that Chandler Tower has been superb at providing traffic advisories. I do note that our regular destinations consistently maintain flight following until we land; handing us off to the Tower while keeping the discrete transponder code. PHX has not historically done this; although recently they've done this on some flights; but it has not been consistent.

C177 passenger and rated pilot; reports a NMAC with a BE58 at 3;000 FT just south of PHX. Evasive action is taken; but too late to alter the geometry of the very near miss. VFR flight following had been terminated PHX Approach a few minutes prior.


Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I was the PM; CA was flying. At about 7;100 MSL while being vectored on the NE side of CLT airport for Runway 36R (cross side runway) we noticed a drone off our right side about 1-2 O'clock position; passing by off our right side.  It was close enough to distinguish it was a 4 propeller drone. It was hard to determine exactly how far away the drone was but my guess would be within a few hundred feet. As we passed by in our descent we appeared to be slightly below it as we passed. We notified ATC and continued the approach to landing uneventfully.At first I thought it was a bird until I quickly realized it was a drone. I kept my eyes on it as long as I could as we passed by. There is no doubt that it was a drone. Cause was drone flying in Class Bravo airspace near CLT at an altitude high enough to be in the way of commercial airline traffic. We were being vectored from the NW to the NE side of Charlotte airport for Runway 36R. I notified the CA when I first saw something; and he too saw the drone. We did not make any altitude or course changes as it happened too quickly and the drone was not in our immediate flight path.

Air carrier Captain reported an airborne conflict with a drone during approach to CLT airport.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.5

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The airport had issued a NOTAM and closed the main runway (28R/10L) to GA aircraft [for 2 hours] for asphalt repair and mowing.  During the closure the secondary runways were available and being used.  The asphalt repair had been completed and the airport vehicles escorting the repair crew exited the runway and reported clear of the runway.  Following their exit; the only remaining vehicles operating were the two mowers working in the runway safety area.  The Controller (CPC) working the Local Control (LC) position offered the main runway to the next arrival; Aircraft X; knowing that the repair crew was off the main runway and the second arrival; Aircraft Y would require the use of the main runway.  As Aircraft X was turning base to final; the mower asked if they should clear the runway safety area.  The CPC on LC questioned the need for the mower to move because Aircraft X is not an air carrier operator.  The mower operators stated they were not allowed to work in the safety area without ATC permission.  They also stated they were not comfortable being in the safety area with the arrival on short final and moved to the south outside of the safety area.  The mowers remained clear of the safety area while Aircraft X and Aircraft Y landed and Aircraft Z departed.  Following the last operation I took over at the LC position and asked the mower operators if they wanted the runway to remain closed for the remaining 25 minutes or if they would prefer a clearance in and out of the runway safety area.  They requested that the runway continue to be closed to finish mowing.  The main runway was not used for the remaining time of the NOTAM and all other traffic used the secondary runways.  The runway was re-opened when the mowing was complete. The first recommendation would be to correct the wording for the issued NOTAM.  The intention for the NOTAM was to make the runway available only to Aircraft Y; a scheduled air carrier arrival.  However; the NOTAM stated the runway was closed to GA aircraft.  This gave the appearance to both air taxi and air carrier operators that the runway would still be available for their use.  This created confusion between the airport; controllers; and pilots. The second recommendation would be for the airport to change its policy and operate in a manner consistent with CERT ALERT NO. 03-07 issued 11/12/03 and with FAAO 7110.65 3-1-5 and 3-1-6.  The current policy is for the airport to receive ATC approval to enter and operate within the runway safety area only when no operations are present on the runway.  This creates several issues with the CPC working the LC position.  It requires the controller to provide a movement area type clearance in a non-movement area where it is not needed.  The controller then has to continuously monitor this operation in the non-movement area to provide timely exiting instructions for a runway operation.  This creates additional and unnecessary work load and multiple transmissions for the controller.  The responsibility to monitor the Tower position and operate in the non-movement portion of the runway safety area belongs to the operator not the controller working the LC position.  ATC is only required to provide access to the non-movement runway safety areas and provide advisories and traffic information.  Done correctly this will reduce the transmissions and workload for these operations and allow the controller to focus on higher priority items while working LC.

BIL FLM describes situation where controllers were unsure if they should move mowers that were operating close to the runway.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Upon approach into ZZZ the gear would not go down. Tried numerous times to cycle gear and hand pumped it numerous times with no luck. Gear would not go down.

Reporter reported following all POH procedures; along with maneuvers and efforts learned in training. Reporter stated efforts to pump the gear resulted in handle moving but then it became very hard to move.

PA31 pilot reported landing gear extension failure.