Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

While on right base to Runway 36R; heading 270 assigned vector by Approach Control; we began flying through extended center line of RWYs 36R/36C. Attempted to contact Approach several times for clearance to final with no response. Contacted Tower on 119.7 and was given vector back to airport and clearance for visual approach to 36R. Tower then said to switch back to Approach as 'he wants to talk to you.' We switched back to 125.8 and Approach gave us a clearance for visual approach to 36R. When we asked if there had been a problem with the transmitter; explaining that that is why we contacted Tower; the response was 'you shouldn't have done that; we were in a briefing.' We were then instructed to contact Tower again. There was no conflict with any other air traffic during this incident.Unknown cause. We only know that we attempted to contact Approach on 125.8 with no response; then later Approach implied that there was never a problem with their communications.

We were flying downwind vector for Runway 36R. Approach Controller had us turn to heading 270 for a right base. We were about 9 miles from the field and 3000 ft. MSL. We continued on our heading and realized we were going to fly through approach course. We attempted to contact the controller numerous times with no answer. As we continued on the heading; we completely passed the airfield. We finally called tower on 118.7 and told the controller our situation. The tower controller gave us a turn and we proceeded back to the field. Tower then handed us to approach again. We told approach we switched due to no contact with them; despite numerous attempts. We then were passed back to tower and cleared to land on 36R. We could not get a reply from approach after numerous attempts.

Air carrier flight crew reported of flying through the approach course; attempting to contact Approach. No response; so they changed to Tower frequency and got vectored back on to final. Approach Controller told pilots they should not have switched to Tower frequency. Controllers stated they were in a briefing.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

During climb out of PHX while on assigned heading passing through 13;000 ft.; felt large jolt/bump as if we hit something followed by momentary compressor fault message on ECAM. Left engine just rolled back and basically shut down. I took control of aircraft and radios as PF (Pilot Flying) and FO (First Officer) performed quick reference card and then we moved to ECAM. Left engine was shut down per ECAM then completed ECAM follow up in QRH as I took vectors back to PHX [advising ATC] and requesting Runway 08. FOB and souls were stated. After ECAM follow up was completed FO did landing assessment. Flaps 3 was briefed for single engine return. Weather was VFR. Airport was in sight and home base for both pilots. I talked to FAs (Flight Attendants); precautionary return landing was briefed and return to airport in 10 minutes. I made PA to passengers. Aircraft was slowly configured and made visual approach to Runway 08. Landed overweight at 142;200. Normal stop and right turn off. We never had fire indications and no smoke all engine indications were normal. We released fire department and proceeded to gate. On after landing inspection no noticeable damage to left engine. Left reverser remained deployed as both were selected as per operations for using both thrust reverser's on landing. Aircraft was written up for engine failure at altitude it occurred at (13000 ft.) max EGT of 792 C was noted and overweight landing noted in [logbook]. My First Officer did an excellent job and was well trained prepared and communicative!! My cabin crew did an excellent job also! Crew contacted director of PHX who is an incredible Director!! Crew was released.

A319 Captain reported a loud bang and aircraft jolt during climb out; with the left engine failing; resulting in a return to departure airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 158; Flight Crew Total 1730; Flight Crew Type 213

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

After landing the tower controller told me 'You can reverse; taxi to (FBO); with me'. He never mentioned any taxiway or hi-speed exit; just 'reverse'. I assumed he meant I can course reverse (back taxi) on the runway. I made a 180 turn and proceeded to the next taxiway. Just before reaching the taxiway he called me on the radio again and told me 'When I say reverse I mean use the reverse high-speed exit; it's all good for now; taxi to (FBO) and contact clearance on your way out.' I apologized and went on my way. There was no loss of separation; or any kind of evasive action taken by anyone but I could clearly see two airplanes lined up on the approach for that runway (I'm estimating 10 miles out).I think part of the reason for this situation is the fact that ATC is so used to us. We fly here [very often]; usually night time and they are giving us instructions in an abbreviated form. Skipping taxiway names is common. Most of our pilots had been with the company for 10 plus years. I'm a new hire; barely 4 months of flying single pilot IFR into big Class B airports. Tower controllers developed an 'understanding' over the years with our pilots. They know when we park and how and when we operate and they are very; say; 'efficient' on the radio. Anyway I've learned my lesson. If that controller had included anything about a taxiway it would have prevented the whole situation. 'Reverse next high speed' or 'reverse the Yankee to parking' or even name the high speed taxiway.

Turboprop pilot reported receiving abbreviated and unclear taxi instructions after landing at IAD.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

DFW and DAL were in a south flow configuration. Weather was a factor as thunderstorms moved through the area. DAL was still reporting VFR weather and I was running visual approaches. The AR Controller for DFW had deviations around weather and were descending their downwind over DAL northwest bound. I noticed AR began descending aircraft into my airspace (Dallas North satellites) with no coordination; but I understood that they may have been too busy with their final and the weather impacting them. I coordinated with ADS tower to descend Aircraft X to 2;000 early through their airspace in order to help the AR's get lower. With Aircraft X at 2;000; he was headed to the final approach fix for Runway 13L from the east/northeast of DAL. I asked him to report the field in sight when he was about 6 miles out. He could not see the airport. I slowed him to 170 KTS or less and told him to turn to a 310 heading and that these were vectors for an ILS Runway 13L. I typed ILS in Aircraft X scratch pad and displayed the aircraft to AR2 (who was descending aircraft into my airspace with out coordination); to bring their attention to the plane so they would not descend on top of him. I noticed Aircraft Y; assigned Runway 17C at DFW begin descending out of 3;000 about 2 1/2 miles in front of my traffic. I turned Aircraft X immediately to a 240 heading to diverge away and issued traffic. Aircraft X called traffic in sight and I applied visual separation. I then boxed Aircraft X back around to set him up for an ILS 13L approach without further incident.Arrivals were training to my understanding. We have pre-arranged coordination between DN and AR's at 4;000 with a display. This did not occur. Secondly; no coordination took place from the AR's to descend through my airspace. They were descending aircraft to 3;000 and lower. Arrivals came over to me later and stated that once they passed my traffic; they believed they had divergence and so decided to descend further. AR's did not expect my traffic to turn to a downwind for an instrument approach. I stated that I lost visual approaches and had no choice but to turn him for an instrument approach and that they should have called and coordinated the use of my airspace.

Controller states another Sector did not coordinate as necessary with him leading to a loss of separation.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

I was a passenger on...a 737.  It had been snowing; prior to our pushback and the aircraft was deiced at the gate before departure.  Type I and type IV fluids were applied.  This is the second time that I have personally witnessed an inadequate application of type IV fluid.  The wing was striped orange and green after the application.  The snow and all precipitation had ended so I did not feel that this was worthy of reporting to the crew.  I was going to try to speak to them after we landed to let them know to be on the lookout for this; but they had already left the aircraft when I deboarded.To be clear; there was no jeopardy for this particular flight as the precipitation had ended.  There was also no requirement for the crew to do a wing check as the precipitation had ended so the crew would have never known otherwise.The safety issue is that as a crew; you expect a complete application of the proper fluid.  If there had been more precipitation; there would have been a danger of the fluid not providing an adequate anti-ice protection as the type IV application was not done correctly.  It almost appears as if they are skimping on the amount of fluid to save money.

An air carrier Captain flying as a passenger on a B737 witnessed an incomplete Type IV de-icing application prior to gate departure; a failure he had previously experienced himself.  As there was no current precipitation he opted not to attempt to contact the flight crew until the end of the flight; but they had deplaned prior to his being able to do so.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 117; Flight Crew Total 13528; Flight Crew Type 5997

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 95; Flight Crew Total 1582; Flight Crew Type 95

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Taxiway

About 3 miles or more out I called the runway in sight and landing. As we proceeded inbound; I felt like there wasn't enough lights on. I clicked the mic switch 7 times to make sure the lights were on. I didn't see much if anything change. I was looking through the HUD at the time and I moved my head to the side to see if maybe the HUD was somehow obscuring my view of the lights. I didn't see anything different so I thought I must just not be seeing absolutely everything but believed it would be more clearly seen as we got closer. As we proceeded; in the back of my mind; I felt that I should be seeing more lighting and I tried once maybe two times more with the mic switch to see if either I had inadvertently turned the lights down low or what was going on. At the same time I am seeing the PAPI and also the blue lights of the taxiway (as I am writing this it seems clear what I was seeing but at the moment it did not). And I am thinking I should be seeing more lights. As we came  closer to what I thought was the runway; I started to pick up more of the pavement to our  left than in front of us where we were lined up to land. This is happening very fast obviously and we are getting closer to where the runway should be but I am not seeing it where I think I should be. I am seeing pavement to our left and in the last moments my mind says - there is pavement over there and lights on either side; go land there because you don't want to land in the dirt and you must have mistaken what you thought was where the runway was going to be for nothing and you had lined up to the right of the runway so slide a little left and land on the runway (again this is what my mind is thinking). And yes the 'runway' seemed a little smaller but this is ZZZ and it will seem smaller based on the width of the runway. Either just as the main landing gear was touching the pavement or just prior my FO said 'this is the taxiway' and by that time the plane was on the ground and it made more sense to slow the plane down and assess what just happened then try to go around. We then taxied to the end of taxiway and turned on the runway. There was no other way to turn around to go to the ramp area other than this. So we proceeded on the runway and exited; then proceeded to the ramp where we parked and nothing more took place as far as the flight. No pax were injured; the crew was fine and the plane was fine. We just landed on the taxiway instead of the runway. As we were taxiing on the runway; I was trying to figure out what happened with the lights for the runway. I clicked the mic button trying to get the lights to turn on but they would not. I finally saw some of the landing light posts where the lights should be lit up and they were dark. After parking the plane I went outside to see if others had seen the lights come on or if anyone notice the lights weren't on or just what was going on. Others (rampers) didn't see the lights on the runway but I have no idea when they made this observation. Nothing further happened with the flight.

I was a required crew member on a flight that inadvertently landed on taxiway instead of [the runway]. I was acting as pilot monitoring and first officer during the flight.During an otherwise normal approach both the captain and I called runway in sight right inside of the (FAP) when we both believed that we had the runway in sight. It was not until touch down was imminent; we observed that in fact we were on a taxiway. It was later determined that at some point during our approach the runway lights had shorted out; but the taxiway light remained illuminated.After landing we noted we were on a taxiway and continued until the end and back taxied down the runway to the gate.The mist and the failure of the runway lights definitely are contributing factors the this inadvertent landing. Up until the point of touchdown; my opinion is that both the captain and I felt that we had the runway environment in sight.

De Havilland DH8D flight crew reported an inadvertent landing on a taxiway instead of the runway.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Fuelers disregarded inoperative placards.I was picking up Aircraft X at [the] gate. Upon review of the AML I observed MEL 28-06 was applied to the aircraft (inoperative single point refuel). During pre-flight the first officer observed the required INOP stickers in the applicable areas of the re-fueling panel per the MEL instructions.Eventually the fueler pulled up to the aircraft. The first officer and I observed a FUELING DOOR OPEN EICAS message; indicating the fueler was preparing to fuel the aircraft. However at that time we noticed that the fueler instead hooked up the single point re-fuel hose and was obviously disregarding the INOP placards on the fuel panel.At that time I immediately went outside to advise the fueler that over wing fueling was required. Upon telling the fueler those requirements; he advised me that 'he saw the INOP placards and by not being able to single point refuel the aircraft he was not able to do his job properly by overwing fueling the aircraft; and that the single point re-fuel system worked fine in his opinion and therefore he made the decision that it was okay to single point refuel.' Disregarding the inoperative system.At that time what I believed to be a fueling supervisor was present also; who then advised me the same as the other fueler said...'that the fueling panel and single point was working fine in their opinion and that they would take a delay (of an already delayed aircraft)! If they weren't allowed to single point re-fuel'. The fuelers single point re-fueled the aircraft; against the fact that I was telling them the system was inoperative and that they were required to over-wing this aircraft.At that point I felt it was necessary to make an AML entry for a maintenance safety inspection due to the fact that the fuelers used a inoperative and obviously placarded system. Maintenance did the requested inspection and found the aircraft airworthy.I find it necessary to submit this ASAP because the fuelers assigned to re fueling had a complete disregard to the inoperative system; found it appropriate to make an operational decision based on little system knowledge; and a complete disregard to regulations and safety and blatantly did not want to properly complete their job . I also find it disturbing that even the captain of the aircraft telling them not to do something; they still found it justified to do the incorrect and unsafe action.My suggestion to further help the fuelers in the future; is to ensure they understand the importance of complying with each aircraft/fleet requirements and captains direction. Perhaps even a review for the fueling supervisors to understand of the importance of complying with aircraft requirements.  Not to mention they MUST understand that as fuelers they are in no position to make operational judgement calls as to which system they should/shouldn't comply with when it is placarded inoperative.

EMB-145 Captain reported that fuelers elected to disregard 'single point refuel INOP' placard rather than follow procedures due to not wanting to take a delay.


Instructor; Check Pilot; Captain; Pilot Not Flying

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

[We] departed on the 3rd leg of transition Captain Initial Operating Experience (IOE). Flight progressed normally until 90 minutes from LAX. At this time we received an abnormal amount of vectors and speed reductions. We questioned ATC and were told due to LAX runway closure LAX wants 30 NM in trail. Sent free text message to Dispatcher and informed him of this. No response from Dispatch. Rechecked our fuel several times and determined we would land LAX with over 6.0 of fuel. As I recall; reserve fuel was about 6.7 with an alternate of ONT. We re-discussed the LAX weather and alternate plans with 45 minutes remaining. Weather was 800 broken and 8 miles visibility at the time. Descent and approach was normal. [We] extended gear early to comply with ATC speed and altitude restrictions. This probably burned a little more fuel; but is not an unusual practice on the 737 fleet. Prior to 1;000 FT; with landing checklist completed; we received landing clearance from LAX Tower for Runway 25R. They were also using 25R for takeoff during this time. We had; at some point; heard an aircraft receiving line up and wait on 25R. At 800 FT we were in the clear and I could see the aircraft clearly on the runway threshold. At 600 FT I queried the Tower if our landing clearance was still valid. There was a slight pause and under 400 FT it was clear the other aircraft would not be off the runway prior to our landing. At this point the Controller told us to 'go around and offset left; maintain 2;000 FT.' We initiated a go-around and were told to fly heading 235; maintain 2;000 and contact SCT Departure. Upon contact with Departure I re-verified our heading and altitude and told Departure we had the other aircraft in sight visually. We were then vectored for the approach at 5;000 FT on downwind. The IOE Captain made a PA and checked with the flight attendants. We briefly discussed our fuel and options and concurred landing LAX was best. During the initial go-around our user defined FMS 'using reserve fuel' warning indicated we would land with less than 4;000 LBS at our alternate. I was aware this could happen in the event of a go around. The IOE Captain suggested we declare minimum fuel during the downwind. We did so; and we're advised we would be landing 25R at LAX; 12 mile final. During final approach inside of 5 miles; fuel low warning came on in number 2 tank.....1.95 on gauge. Landed uneventfully; and taxied to gate. [We] shutdown with 4.0 thousand LBS of fuel; slight imbalance of less than 300 LBS.

B737-800 Check Captain describes a low fuel situation arriving LAX due to delays for a runway closure and a go-around caused by an aircraft departure on the landing runway. Gate arrival fuel is 4;000 LBS.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

I was performing an inspection of the nose gear down light switch installed on this aircraft.  This inspection was a result of a 'flickering' nose gear down locked light during the prior flight.  With my knowledge of this aircraft; and of its recent work to the nose gear down light switch; I determined that the gear was safe for landing and the down light was indicating erroneously.  A safe landing was made without incident.  For safe measure the aircraft was shut down after clear of the runway and the nose gear lock was inspected.  The nose gear was down and locked.  To prevent any other further damage; the aircraft was towed back to its maintenance facility.  A small adjustment was made to the micro switch and the light performed as required during its first gear swing check.  The right hand nose gear door linkage was removed to facilitate easier adjustment of the switch.  The gear was swung numerous times to replicate the problem but was unable to.  The decision was made that the switch adjustment was adequate and aircraft was prepared for return to service.  It is believed that the gear door linkage rod was not re-installed and caused a bind in the landing gear when the landing gear was lowered in flight.  After the landing the aircraft nose was lifted and the bound door linkage rod was moved; the landing gear came down and locked manually easily.  It is believed that additional final inspection would have caught the missing hardware and prevented the incident.

PA-44 Maintenance Technician reports adjusting a nose gear down micro switch to correct an intermittent down indication on the previous flight.  The right hand nose gear door linkage was disconnected to facilitate easier adjustment of the switch and not reattached; which resulted in a jammed nose gear on the next flight.


Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

I emailed the Vice President of Safety and Security inquiring about our FAA Approved De-icing/Anti-Icing Procedure. At the time I was going through ground school and while reviewing such procedure in class; I found a conceptual conflict with previous training received about the same subject. I received a [reply] dismissing my Safety Concern. The letter explained two reasons for dismissal: First; current procedure is in compliance with FARs. And secondly; current procedure is in compliance with any FAA recommendations. I have to say I was disappointed with the response because I never said the current de-icing/anti-icing procedure wasn't FAA/FARs compliant. Otherwise; I would have contacted my Chief Pilot. Also I never said the current de-icing procedure was going against any FAA recommendations even if still in compliance and legal. The response was missing the point completely. Constructivism wasn't there either since there wasn't an explanation of why a change for the better was being ignored other than because 'we are in compliance already'.The change I proposed not only would increase Safety (Number One Company Value); but it would do it at no cost for the company. Here we start the procedure on the left wing going counter clockwise. [I believe that] they should start at the left wing but going clockwise. Difference; the importance of giving Hold Over Time (HOT) priority to the aircraft's tail. The tail should be granted maximum priority since two of the primary flight controls are on it and because testing at NASA Lewis found that the sharper edges of the horizontal stabilizer collects more ice than the rounded edges of the wings (transitioning to takeoff roll situation). Since by definition: 'Hold Over Time (HOT) starts when the final application of fluid commences and expires when the fluid loses its effectiveness;' it should be clear that the maximum protection for the tail (time wise) would be provided by the second method. Spraying the tail last (while other surfaces HOT is already counting) considering the time it takes to anti-ice an MD80 size aircraft; and considering HOT under several conditions may be only a few minutes; it will provide an extra assurance that tail HOT is being maximized. That was the philosophy and reasons why we were trained that way. This company doesn't share the same reasoning and I; at this point; am not sure why. Unless I'm wrong; we have a chance to make something good a little better a no cost.

MD83 First Officer takes exception to his company's de-icing plan; believing that de-icing should start at the left wing and go clockwise to the tail; so as to minimize time from completion to takeoff for these important flight controls.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Type 328

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On a missed approach from 27L in ORD we were given a heading and a altitude of 5;000 feet. After the aircraft was cleaned up and passing through 3;500 feet closer to 4;000 feet we were given and altitude of maintain 4;000 feet the altitude was put in the window and verified by both pilots and with our high climb rate and close to the altitude we went through the 4;000 feet altitude by 300 feet. At the time we reached 4;000 feet myself the captain and the controller realize that we were going to go through the altitude and we were told to descend and maintain 4;000 feet. The flight was vectored around for 28C Approach and landed.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A319 First Officer reported during go-around initial missed approach altitude was changed from 5;000 to 4;000 and the autopilot was unable to keep up.


Saab-Scania Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 116; Flight Crew Total 4950; Flight Crew Type 3050

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Myself and my Copilot were operating a flight departing from ZZZ1 enroute to ZZZ2. Approximately 40 minutes after takeoff; while at a cruise altitude of FL310 we felt the airplane begin to mildly shake as though we were encountering light turbulence. We began to scan the gauges and performance pages to see what was happening. After 4-5 seconds of shaking; we heard the engine start shutting down. As we were pulling up our engines data page; we began to receive multiple EICAS messages informing us that our left engine had failed. We performed our memory items to secure the motor then performed the appropriate checklists for the remaining warnings/cautions. At this point the only thing we have noticed wrong with the motor is that the oil quantity on the #1 engine (left) is reading yellow. All other temps; fluids; and pressures where still within normal operating ranges. Copilot and I then discussed the next course of action. We began a slow descent to keep a safe airspeed and prepare for a possible emergency landing. After a few seconds of the engine being completely shut down the oil quantity quickly climbed back up to a normal operating range. We decided after considering all factors to attempt an engine restart in flight. We performed the appropriate checklist and started the engine back up. The engine started successfully but when we attempted to take the prop out of feather and into normal RPM; it would not come out of feather. At this point we decided to land and have the engine looked at by Maintenance. We [advised ATC] and began a descent into ZZZ. I made an announcement to the passengers and flight attendant informing them of our situation and change of destination then coordinated with ATC. We descended and made a visual approach to Runway XXC at ZZZ where fire trucks and other emergency personnel were waiting for us. After a successful landing we exited the runway and came to a stop. Tower asked us of our intentions; and we said that we would like to secure the emergency and taxi into the FBO. We were escorted into the FBO by fire trucks. After shutting down the engines I called my company and began informing the appropriate employees/managers of the current situation.

Saab Captain reported the number 1 engine shut down in flight and could not be restarted. The flight crew performed a successful diversion to a landing.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

I departed ZZZ about XA:38 via a right downwind departure to the southwest and direct to ZZZ1. I climbed to 4500 ft. and began experiencing intermittent moderate turbulence; so I began a gradual descent. I was still on the ZZZ Tower frequency (although out of the class D) and Tower advised of traffic about 11 o'clock and same altitude. I advised I was descending. I had traffic on TCAS and saw traffic at about my 10 o'clock; 700 ft. above and probably 3000 ft. horizontally; and told ZZZ Tower that I had traffic in-sight. It appeared to be an experimental aircraft. I then switched ZZZ2 Approach for flight following and picked up flight following about 15 [miles] north of ZZZ1. I was told to enter a right downwind for Runway XX and then told to maintain 2000 ft.; which I did (actually closer to 2100 ft.); and was told to overfly a Cessna who was slower and would follow me in and that I was number 2 following a Learjet on final. I saw the Cessna. ZZZ1 Tower spun the Cessna to the left as I overflew him by 500 ft. as instructed. I reported the Lear in-sight and was then cleared to land behind the Learjet and started my approach. I landed on Runway XX behind the Learjet at about XA:54 and taxied to my tie-down.

A SR-22 Pilot reported overflying another aircraft while on approach to land.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 25.0

Troubleshooting; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure; Procedure

The first problem was that the radar and frequencies were going out of service due to satellite alignment issues for about 10 minutes. The next problem was we have all of this [high volume of traffic] going on and sector 62 gets overwhelmed almost no matter how much flow they put out. I was at the Sector 63 Handoff position. Realizing that the radar was going out I coordinated all of the flights I had going into sector 62. They had strips on the aircraft coming from me because we have strips on aircraft going into/out of the Domincan Republic. But we no longer post strips on aircraft going into/out of San Juan center's airspace because of the volume of strips. I did not think about this at the time. The strips would normally be printed out for a full blown radar outage but because this is only 10 minutes we try to pretend it isn't as big a deal.Additionally; we also violated our Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) by leaving sector 63 split off from sector 62 instead of combining it; which we would also normally do. I guess the controller at Sector 58 did not think to pass estimates to Sector 62 about their aircraft. So; the Sector 62 controller (who was totally overwhelmed with the volume and complexity of what was going on) could not check for non-radar traffic at the crossing fix. We at Sector 63 gave sector 62 two different flights. It occurred to the Sector 63 controller to look and see if there was any crossing traffic. He looked and saw there was a flight at 37000 feet getting together with one of our flights. He warned the Sector 62 controller. By the time we had lost the radar and frequencies. The great thing about this satellite issue is that the sight of our frequency backups also goes down. After a lot of scrambling and thinking; somebody got a relay to the flight to descend and the flight to turn. We never lost separation but it was scary. These satellite issues also occurred on other days.The FAA has to stop pretending that working airplanes in the Ocean area is just like working airplanes in domestic airspace. If there is going to be some sort of massive outage in domestic airspace planes get flowed; planes get rerouted; things happen. Well; there is no place else to really route airplanes in the ocean. We have very little in the way of back up equipment. Massive flow needs to be put in ahead of time; not when it is already too late. Tech Ops needs to be held responsible when they forget to tell us such critical information. Management needs to be held responsible when they do too little (or absolutely nothing) about it. Bad things can happen. And we keep muddling our way through every time and get lucky enough not to make the news. A written plan needs to be developed and followed to the letter every time when these things are going to occur.

A Center Oceanic Controller reported proper procedures and equipment requirements were not implemented during a planned radar and radio outage period.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

General Work Refused; General Maintenance Action

Cargo Air Carrier Ground Personnel shipment was found with un-declared Dangerous Goods while being inspected by a [company] Manager. The shipment was not accepted; but was refused prior to tender. We found 12 small boxes of UN3481; Lithium Ion Batteries. As per the item; it appears to be AirPods (2nd Generation) for Iphones. Models A2032; A2031; and A1938.

[Cargo Air Carrier] Ground Personnel reported shipment of undeclared Dangerous Goods during preflight. DG shipment refused.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction

Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Manuals

Flight to west coast. Our route was taking us over FTI then J58 to ILC. While on the airway; just to pass the time; the captain and I discussed possible diversion airports around us... Where could we go land if we had to; right away? As we approached MLF VOR on J58 going westbound; we noticed there were very few diversion airports to consider. There are a few airports that are far away; such as SLC and LAS; that we customarily use as diversion airports if need be. But if we had to put the plane on the ground NOW; were could we go? Upon closer examination of [chart product]; we discovered two airports that were available and closer to us; just south of J58 near MLF VOR...CDC and SGU (Cedar City; UT and Saint George; UT). Both were suitable enough to land on in the event of a fire. They were not our company's stations; but the runways were long enough (8600 and 9300 feet respectively; both 150 ft wide). However when we tried to access approach charts in the unlikely event we needed to shoot an instrument approach; we discovered that 'Terminal Charts Not Available' was displayed in [the charting product]. We could see the runway numbers and the runway lengths; but we could access no charts; no airport diagrams; no instrument approaches; etc. We would be 'in the blind' so to speak if we truly had to drop in and land because of an on-board fire. Which lead us to the next question; WHY? Why do we not have charts for all of the airports in the U.S.? Why does the popular general aviation app on the iPad called FOREFLIGHT have the ability to show the airport diagrams and instrument approaches for these two airports; but [our charting product] does not? Is this an economic issue; i.e. it costs too much money for that subscription; or it would require an iPad with more storage? We are professional aviators who are charged by the FARs to land at the NEAREST SUITABLE airport in certain emergency situations. It is unfathomable to have that responsibility and not have the tools at our disposal to execute such a plan. I realize that airports are a dime a dozen in the East and Midwestern portions of our country; but that is not the case flying westward over the mountains. And since those options are so limited; we must have access to those same airports that are available to the general aviation pilot. In this case; the NEAREST SUITABLE airport would be disregarded simply because we did not have the necessary charts to safely execute an approach and land on a perfectly-suited piece of concrete. And to simply disregard the NEAREST SUITABLE airport in this case; is simply inexcusable. Provide the necessary tools to execute what the FARs require. In this case; airport terminal charts.

Air carrier First Officer noted his company's iPad charts do not include suitable emergency diversion airports in the area between DEN and SLC.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

We finally got going [after being delayed]; boarded; and pushed back with no faulty indications. Taxied out and took off runway XXR. At rotation; heard the click of a generator coming offline. Continued climbout; at thrust reduction altitude 2 ECAMs appeared: 'ELEC IDG 2 OIL LO PR' & 'ELEC GEN 2 FAULT'. The IDG2 was illuminated with a fault; we ran the ECAM as we continued to climb out. We disconnected the IDG and started the APU to get another generator going. As we climbed out; the APU came up and carried the load. At this point we discussed our options; I contacted Maintenance and Dispatch via ACARS; talked to the flight attendants and people. We climbed up to an altitude of FL230 and looked at new fuel burn of having to go all the way across the country to [destination] with only one working engine generator. We would've had to stay lower and run the APU the entire way; burning all of our contingency fuel doing so; even knowing there was weather to deviate around on the way and no buffer should something else happen. Dispatch requested us to continue to [destination]; but I was not confident in that plan. So; for safety of flight and fuel burn and also not knowing what had gone on to cause the IDG to fault; we decided to return to ZZZ. We burned a little fuel while up there getting vectors from Approach; and requested a return to ZZZ with no emergency at this time; but requested they have fire and rescue standing by. They coordinated it; and since we figured it was going to take an hour and a half to burn the gas; we elected to run the overweight landing checklist and return overweight. We took a few vectors; then guidance back for a landing on Runway XXR ZZZ. Right outside ZZZZZ intersection; and ADV white message started flashing along with the ENGINE page on the ECAM. ENGINE 2 had developed an oil leak and rapidly lost most of its oil. The ENG 2 oil quantity got all the way down to 2.4 quarts. To attempt to ease the load on ENG 2; brought the thrust back to idle and continued approach at low power setting as long as possible. We unloaded the packs to the APU; watched our vertical speed and had a smooth touchdown on Runway XXR at a weight of 141.3. ENG 2 oil levels at touchdown were 2.3 quarts and pulsing on ECAM. Fire and rescue saw no problems with us; but did follow us to the gate. We shut down ENG 2 on taxi in. Upon arrival at gate; maintenance met us and immediately recognized that the IDG had clearly been over serviced before departure. Oil was all over the engine; streaking down and back all over it. They told us the IDG 2 had probably blown and when that happened; the pressure increased eventually and cause the strain on an oil seal in ENG 2 which led to our OIL leak. They began repairs and changing seals; with an estimate of at least 3 hours for a fix.

On takeoff role I heard a 'click' sound as if electrical power had been transferred (when EXT power is transferred to APU). We continued takeoff role. On climb out I briefly looked at the overhead panel and noticed GEN2 fault and IDG2 fault. At 1000AGL we received the ECAM message confirming both faults.We continued the SID as briefed while captain ran ECAM and COM. We then discussed options and the captain communicated with ATC; OPS; MX. Due to altitude restrictions to FL330 and needing to run the APU as a substitute for GEN2 for the remainder of the 3.5 hour flight to [destination] we concluded we did not have enough fuel to continue the flight. This was against dispatches recommendation to continue. At this point we were vectored off the SID and descended to FL120 with the intention of burning fuel due to being overweight for landing. After attending to the mechanical failures and running checklist and discussing options we then evaluated our current fuel and time to burn it off to land under max landing weight. We realized that we would have to fly for an estimated additional 1.5hours and concluded the best course of action would be to land overweight and comply with overweight landing procedure. We then were assigned the ILS Runway XXL approach followed by a runway change to Runway XXR (the longer runway) for a visual. On final approach we then noticed ENG 2 oil QTY had dropped down to 2 qts. We concluded that there was a rapid oil leak. The captain monitored the oil qty while I flew the approach. We landed without incident.

An A319 flight crew were alerted by two ECAM messages: 'ELEC IDG 2 OIL LO PR' & 'ELEC GEN 2 FAULT.' They ran the ECAM checklists and brought the APU online for backup electrical power. They elected to return to their departure airport. During arrival they were alerted to the fact the ENG 2 had developed an oil leak. They landed overweight; but uneventfully and secured the number 2 ENG on taxi in.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 8805; Flight Crew Type 6084

During climb out; aircraft's right generator and associated IDG (Integrated Drive Generator) failed. The right IDG was disconnected. Associated checklist item. 'APU selector if available start'. APU was started. If APU were to be used for the remainder of the flight; a diversion would be required. After all checklists were completed and situation stabilized; myself and the other [relief pilot] proceeded to crew rest.Upon return; we were briefed on the resolution to this problem. Captain; Dispatch; [Maintenance Control] and fleet managers were conferenced into satcom discussions. As reference; MEL required the use of the APU for the entire flight. However the MEL was disregarded due to it being a dispatch requirement. Crew guidance of this problem was therefore the checklist; 2.XX.X. Eng gen off L. The question arose as to the interpretation of 'APU selector if available start'. This statement appears to give discretion to the crew. If the APU was required for flight; I believe the checklist would be written; 'APU start. If not available; consider divert.' What is the meaning of 'if available'? Does this allow for operational considerations? Checklists rarely state 'if available' to any item.Via conference call; it was agreed by Captain; Dispatch; [Maintenance Control] and fleet managers that the APU was not required for the remainder of the flight. I believe we used excellent CRM and all available resources to reach this conclusion. However the vagueness of the checklist was enough to warrant writing this [ASRS Report].

A Boeing 777 pilot reported an electrical system anomaly that was successfully managed despite ambiguous Flight Manual and MEL guidance.


Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I inadvertently flew in HOU airspace while transitioning frequencies with ATCs.

Reporter indicated after landing and returning to flight school they were made aware of the airspace incursion.

GA pilot reported they were in cruise flight and inadvertently flew into HOU controlled airspace without a clearance. Pilot learned of the error during post-flight.


Flight Crew Total 16472; Flight Crew Type 486

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

On climbout; passing through a layer of clouds; we took a direct [laser beam] hit to the cockpit. I caught a direct hit to my right eye for one second. [I experienced a] slight tingle to the right eye; but no vision loss or distortion. Prior to departure; we briefed a possible green laser event as a threat. ATC [was] advised at the time; of the event.

Air Carrier Captain reported a laser incident while climbing out of SBGR.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

On takeoff leg immediately after; Gear and Flap retraction we received the 'Flaps' aural warning. After 1;500 feet AGL we divided the duties with the First Officer (Pilot Flying) and talking to ATC and the Captain accomplishing the QRH procedure. The Flap Disagreement light was noted. The QRH procedure recommended we select the flaps back to the last position which was flaps 15 for takeoff. After selecting Flaps 15 and with the Engine Power reduced for descent for landing. Back in ZZZ; the aural warning stopped and Flap Disagreement light went out. QRH procedure was completed and recommended to land immediately. After landing; we left the flaps at 15 and taxied to parking. Logbook entry completed and Maintenance was unable to duplicate the problem. Aural Warning on Takeoff leg after Flaps were selected to Up. Malfunction of the Flap Control computer is a possible cause.

Captain reported a flaps aural warning after flap and gear retraction; causing an air turnback and precautionary landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 111; Flight Crew Total 23630; Flight Crew Type 9000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 192; Flight Crew Total 11186; Flight Crew Type 831

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

While at 8000 feet turning base ATC asked if we had the runway in sight. Pilot Flying (PF) said yes; and I (Pilot Monitoring) reported Runway in sight. ATC cleared us for a visual approach. PF asked me to set 7000 feet I did and then I turned to my IPAD to check tower frequency; taxiway exit; etc. (we had had a Runway change from XYL to XYR); the PF turned off the FD and Auto throttle and descended fairly quickly and too early to 7000 feet. We were probably 10-12 miles from the Runway. ATC called to alert us to the low altitude and asked to climb to 7500 feet. PF did and we proceeded with the approach without further incident.

B757 flight crew on visual approach descended below glideslope. Approach Controller alerted the crew that they were too low.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

We began the takeoff roll [and] after Captain called 'set takeoff thrust'; I made a small adjustment and called 'thrust set'. There was a sort of thud sound as I called '80 knots'. The Captain rejected the takeoff almost immediately after the callout; and the smell of something burning filled the aircraft. I told ATC that we were rejecting and we came to a stop on the runway. Querying the Tower; he said he saw no smoke. The engine indications were normal at idle. We pulled off and asked him to roll the trucks to see if we might have anything else that warranted immediate attention. Afterward we taxied to the gate and performed an inspection of the left engine. At least three blades of the fan were damaged. We contacted Maintenance and eventually swapped aircraft.

On takeoff; we ingested a large bird into the Number 1 engine at approximately 75 to 80 knots. Immediately heard a change in the sound of the engine and felt a vibration. Also; the cockpit and cabin were filled with the smell of the bird. I elected to reject the takeoff. We cleared the runway and asked the Tower to have emergency equipment verify that there was no smoke from the engine or tires. We checked brake cooling. No smoke reported so we taxied to the gate. The aircraft was removed from service by Company Maintenance.

B737 flight crew reported ingesting a large bird at 75 knots on the takeoff roll and rejecting. Upon examination by Maintenance; the left engine was found to have at least three damaged fan blades and the aircraft was taken out of service.


Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 9000

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

Approach told aircraft to increase speed to 310 knots. The aircraft complied. About 10 minutes later the controller instructed the aircraft to slow to 210 knots and then cleared aircraft direct to ZZZZZ. The aircraft crew complied. Then the controller instructed the aircraft to turn to heading 180 degrees. The crew complied. Then the controller cleared the aircraft direct to the same fix. The crew requested direct to the next fix due to the intercept angle. The Controller approved the request. The Controller then switched the aircraft to the final controller. The crew requested at least a 10 mile final. The Controller then turned the aircraft to a base leg. The crew requested a lower altitude and a slower speed. The controller denied our request. Finally the controller gave the aircrew permission to slow and the crew was able to get aircraft stabilized prior to final approach.This is happening repeatedly in where the controllers are pushing aircraft and flight crews so the facility can maintain a high arrival rate despite the fact this compromises overall flight safety. The Airline; the Union and ATC know the problems but they fail to address it. I have repeatedly brought this to the attention of supervisory personnel and I continue to be told that there is not a problem. Safety is being compromised and there will be an accident unless this gets addressed.

A320 Captain reported a safety of flight issue due to excessive control instructions by the Final Approach Controller.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Airspace Structure

Airline company policy prohibits pilots from doing a Visual Approach at night. Our procedure with Center is for them to cross the initial Approach Fix at 14000 feet which works great if I am able to vector the aircraft and descend them for a Visual Approach. If they need the RNAV/GPS approach they usually can't make the descent at 14000 feet causing an unstable approach and go around. Aircraft X came over the fix at 14000 feet. I vectored the aircraft to the south for descent. After I got the approach request from them I told them to expect direct to a fix when I got them lower and that they would start the approach from there. I issued a 330 heading when able direct and I asked the pilot to advise when they had the fix dialed in and were direct to the fix. The pilot advised that they were direct. I told her to cross at 8000 feet cleared for approach. I then gave the relieving controller the position briefing and I stayed for my 2 minute overlap and then stayed in the room for Controller in Charge. We were the only controllers on duty. I observed that at the fix the aircraft appeared to be turning the wrong direction. The controller and I watched and waited for a second to see if aircraft would correct it did not appear to do so and the controller issued a right turn to turn the aircraft away from the depicted obstruction. This company needs to change company policy or make it widely known. Their policy is unsafe and creates unstable approaches because they create policy and do know anything about facility Letters of Agreements or standard operating procedures and tie everyone's hands. I am not new to air traffic but what I am new to is the pilot not being able to fly the airplane. It appears to me that the aircraft is flying itself. I am not sure that all controllers at Center are aware of this company policy and therefore don't coordinate when the aircraft requests a lower altitude for the GPS approach. When I spoke to the pilot he stated that he had asked for lower and for the approach and that ZAB told him to make the request with us. I took the handoff about 8 miles from my boundary and the pilot did not check in right away and by the time I got the aircraft it was too late to clear them from the Initial Approach Fix. I usually coordinate on my night shifts prior for aircraft to be at this fix at 11000 feet for the GPS with Center but I forgot to do it this time causing this situation to become an issue. This is not the first issue that we have had but it is the first issue that I have had that caused the aircraft to have a Minimum Vectoring Altitude violation. I have given this approach clearance many times. I never expected the aircraft to pass through the fix.

TRACON Controller reported an aircraft turned off course after being cleared for approach and was below minimum terrain avoidance altitudes.


Initial Climb; Landing; Takeoff / Launch; Taxi

Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Workload

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Declared Emergency

We were getting ready to push off the gate. We were all closed up and ready to go. A Ramp Agent told the Captain that it appears something is leaking on the right gear strut. [We] Powered the hydraulic system down and called Maintenance Control. They arrived in just a few minutes. Said they were not sure where the leak was coming from. Asked that the Captain turn the hydraulic pumps back on. After a few minutes they asked us to lower the flaps. After several more minutes they asked the Captain to operate the speedbrakes. After that they asked us to raise the flaps and power down the hydraulic system as a speedbrake actuator was leaking. They took care of this problem. Came to the cockpit and signed off the logbook. We taxied out for takeoff on Runway 17R. The Captain was the pilot flying. We started our takeoff roll and everything was normal. The airplane was accelerating normally. As we accelerated and were approaching V1 I called out 80 knots. The Captain looked down at his Standby AS indicator and we were now at V2 +.  The best course of action at this time was to rotate and climb as opposed to aborting above V2. The Captain rotated and we agreed my airspeed was in error and I started making callouts based on the Captain's airspeed indicator. Shortly afterward we raised the gear and continued a normal climb. Selected LNAV at 400 feet. Shortly afterwards we got the Aural and Visual EICAS warnings with IAS DISAGREE annunciated. This continued as we cleaned up. We both went through the Airspeed Unreliable Memory items. Referenced the Rudder Ratio procedure then verified we completed the checklists per the Boeing 757 QRH. As my airspeed gradually caught up to the Captain's we started getting more EICAS warnings. Now we had a RUDDER RATIO as well as the MACH SPEED.  We declared an Emergency and wanted to level off at 5;000 feet. We had already been handed off to Departure. He told us to maintain 5;000 describe our situation when we had time. We took a heading of 200 degrees. The Captain turned the autothrottles ON and turned on the center autopilot. Carefully guarding the controls and throttles. They seemed to work normally and make the appropriate corrections based on the Captain's selection of airspeed. We needed some time to work this problem as there were several systems now failed and we needed to come up with our best assessment the best that we could.  Departure turned us gradually east. We changed our speed up to 270 knots and then slowed to 230. My airspeed constantly lagged behind the Captain's and every time there was it sensed a 6-8 knot difference the EICAS would annunciate IAS DISAGREE.  The Captain called the Number 1 Flight Attendant and told him we were going to have to return to the departure airport. Gave him his TEST items and reassured him everything was fine.  We slowly descended to 3;000 feet when north east of ZZZ. We requested a 10 mile final. The Captain started configuring and used 30 flaps and no autobrakes. Our weight was 203;000 at this time. Ref + 5 = was 139 knots. We had a slight cross wind from the east. Glideslope on the overhead IRS and on the CDU POS REF page agreed.  Intercepted the Localizer and then glideslope. Fully configured. Touched down on 17C at 141 knots. Full reverse. The aircraft decelerated normally. The Captain did not use any brakes until about 70 knots. We slowly exited the runway and stopped in the middle of the high speed and Taxiway Mike as this would give more room for the ARFF to work with. The Captain told the passengers to remain seated. Called the Number One and told them the same and do not let anyone get up. The Fire Chief checked in promptly said we looked OK; however there was a little smoke from the area of the right main gear. He investigated it and determined it was nothing serious. He used his infrared scope thing to check brake temps. The left main was 200 C however he said the right main was showing 800-1;000 C. We decided that cannot be right; everything would be melting and fuse plugs would have blown by now. The APU was running he asked us to shutdown the engines so he could put some fans on the right main gear ASAP. We did as he instructed. I called Ramp and told them that we would have to be towed from our present position. We agreed that the temperature given to us on the right main gear had to be in error.  He checked back in and said the temperature on the right main had dropped down to about 150 C and the left main gear brake assembly was about 100. Maintenance said it would be at least 15 minutes before they could get a tow bar and get to us. The Fire Chief said that the situation was well under control and if we wanted to start our engines back up and taxi on our own; we could at our discretion. We started our engines and went to the gate. We were met by several mechanics as well as a Maintenance Supervisor. We told them what happened the best that we could. The Captain made several entries in the logbook and we were finished flying for the day.

A B757-200 First Officer airspeed indication error was detected at V1. The takeoff was continued and during climb EICAS alerted IAS DIAGREE; RUDDER RATIO and MACH so an emergency was declared; the QRH completed and the flight returned to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We were cruising at FL240 about 20-30 minutes from landing when my First Officer noticed smoke coming out of my upper vent next to my window rail; when I turned to look; the smoke got worse and within seconds the flight deck was filled with a grey/dark brown smoke and an electrical burn smell. We immediately put our oxygen masks on; [requested priority handling] with ATC; requested direct to the airport and lower altitude. I called my Flight Attendant and told her we had smoke in the flight deck; to get the cabin ready and that she had 10 minutes. My First Officer and I performed the cabin fire/smoke memory item; followed by the appropriate QRH procedure. At 10;000 ft. the smoke dissipated but the burn smell continued as well as a hazy type of smoke but visible in the flight deck. Upon landing the fire trucks were waiting by the runway and no more smoke in the cockpit; we also opened the windows and no fire indication we continued to taxi to the gate. The fire department inspected the aircraft and concluded there was no fire indication but a very strong electrical smell in the flight deck. We deplaned normally; grounded the aircraft and later on all three of us got checked out by medics at [Company] main office. We always had control of the situation without any undesired aircraft state; everything happened so fast; and we managed to land the aircraft safely with no injuries; but I do have to admit that the oxygen mask and smoke goggles is a very poor design; it took us a little work to get it right. I also noticed when on initial call to my Flight Attendant; I forgot to tell her we had [requested priority handling]; but told her the problem in the cockpit and the time she had to get the cabin ready for a normal landing.	I learned that all the emergency and CRM training pays out at the end.

EMB-145 Captain reported smoke and electrical fumes in the cockpit resulting in an expedited approach and landing at the destination airport.


Workload; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met

I wrote an ASAP a few months ago on this subject; and I am writing again; because I cannot over stress the importance of this subject. We were cleared to descend via the BOOSH RNAV STAR into STL in our CRJ900. Prior to the flight; we had spent approximately 15 to 20 minutes reviewing and planning the very complex arrival. Enroute; we reviewed the arrival again for several minutes prior to being cleared to 'descend via' the STAR. During the arrival; I was very busy monitoring the progress of the very complex arrival; getting things on the aircraft ready for approach and landing; making and getting calls from the cabin; calling ops; getting ATIS; programming the ACARS and FMS; setting speeds; briefing the approach; and the list continues. During that time; I felt it necessary to prompt my First Officer several times on restrictions I felt he was verging on busting (or setting himself up to be unable to make another subsequent restriction) had I not said something. This caused many interruptions to my other duties; which made them take MUCH longer than they normally would; and kept me from giving the necessary attention to the arrival that it requires. I don't particularly fault my First Officer for being behind the airplane. I more fault the difficulty of the complying with the arrival at all in this aircraft. What would have happened on this flight; if my First Officer; who is new to the CRJ and is still getting used to it; was with a sub-par Captain? You can bet there would have been at least one; if not multiple busts on this flight. Because of the complexity of the situation; it is certainly possible that I; too; may not have caught one or more restrictions; as I was; again; distracted by other high priority tasks. I don't believe we violated any restrictions. However; I cannot say with certainty that we did not. As we neared 10;000 FT; I felt it necessary to advise ATC that we may have difficulty meeting some of the subsequent restrictions. The Controller immediately gave us a heading and altitude which took pretty much all of the heavy workload off of us. A intense workload I don't feel we should have had in the first place. I DO NOT believe that we should be flying these VERY COMPLEX arrivals in our aircraft. The CRJ is simply not equipped for them. They are so complex they require nearly 100% attention by both pilots during nearly the entire arrival. I understand that the arrivals may work well enough with an aircraft with autothrottles and autopilot coupled VNAV. We have neither which GREATLY increases our workload. My VERY STRONG recommendations are: (1) a new flight release equipment code be designated for autothrottle and/or autopilot/coupled VNAV aircraft (either one group code or two separate codes). (2) Mandate that in order to be filed; cleared; or fly these complex arrivals both the autothrottles and autopilot coupled VNAV must be operational. (3)All other aircraft must be cleared via some other form of navigation. Here's a little perspective on the matter. An aircraft without GPS [or DME/DME/IRU] may not fly these arrivals. Why? Because lesser avionics lack the required track accuracy! Question: Is compliant vertical navigation less important than Lateral navigation? I certainly don't think so. Here's a little more perspective. If the controller were to individually issue each altitude and speed restriction on these arrivals as we approach them; each aircraft would need a dedicated controller; since the controller wouldn't have time to do anything except issue new clearances; that's how frequent the restrictions come. Should flight crews be required to be that busy? That we have to check; crosscheck; and crosscheck again multiple times all the way down the arrival? There is just too much complexity and too much potential for error. Until this problem is fixed; in the future I will have to see what my options are; but my current plan is to advise the controller that I am unable to accept a clearance to 'descend via' on these complex arrivals. If ATC asks why; I'll simply advise that our aircraft are not equipped for such complex arrivals; and I don't feel I can assure that I can comply with all of the required restrictions as a result. I wish I knew of a better option for me; but I don't. Every time we fly one of these arrivals we are setting ourselves up for a potential violation at nearly every fix; because one deviation increases the potential for another on the next. If we misjudge one; we may not make the next one. Finally; I don't understand the reason for the complexity of these arrivals. If each restriction is truly necessary there must be a real safety concern involved. If there isn't a real need--and busting an altitude or speed isn't a major safety issue--then why on earth do they make them so complex? If the complexity is really necessary; either issue these arrivals to aircraft equipped to fly them and keep the rest of us off of them or; at the very least; do not require that we 'descend via' when on these arrivals. Something needs to be done before something tragic happens.

A CRJ900 Captain expressed serious concerns about the ability of his aircraft to comply with the complex and numerous altitude/airspeed restrictions on OPD RNAV STARs such as the BOOSH at STL. He asked valid questions as to why there are distinct requirements for lateral navigation accuracy (GPS or DME/DME/IRU) but no equivalent requirements for airborne autoflight/VNAV systems which would enable equally precise vertical navigation.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Total 600; Flight Crew Type 520

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Landing in daylight clear dry conditions; first flight in aircraft after annual completed; second landing after 10 minutes flight from repair shop; approach speed 85 KTS with full flaps. On touchdown as brakes were applied the main wheels locked up and left main wheel deflated causing aircraft to veer suddenly to the left. At first I thought the landing gear was folding up so I applied power to lift off to recheck gear down status. Aircraft continued to veer left and left runway so I powered down the engine and allowed aircraft to come to a stop in the grassy area adjacent to the runway. Damage occurred to the wings and landing gear; not sufficient to adversely affect flight characteristics of the aircraft. Two runway edge light stanchions were slightly damaged.

On the first flight after the annual inspection; a BE35 pilot experiences locked brakes at the first application and a tire failure. A runway excursion occurs dausing damage to the aircraft and airport property.


Eurocopter AS 350/355/EC130 - Astar/Twinstar/Ecureuil

Time Pressure; Other / Unknown; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

[I] accepted a scene flight request. Aircraft had not flown in two days and conditions were humid so I began cold-start procedure. Engine lit off quite suddenly with a detonation and T4 spiked instantly. I immediately brought fuel flow control lever back and T4 indicator dropped just as quickly. I did not bring Fuel Flow Control Lever (FFCL) all the way back to the stop - just enough to bring the temperature down and continue with the start-up. At flight position; I noticed the Vehicle and Engine Multifunction Display (VEMD) indicated 'Overlimit Detected'. I knew the spike had been less than one second; and temperature; Tq; NG; pressure; and NR all indicated optimal function. I informed the flight crew what had occurred and that in my estimation we were ok to proceed. They concurred. At hover I checked power and pressures/temperature; and all systems were as expected. We flew to the scene which was about 10 minutes away; landed and shut down. Patient was loaded onto the aircraft and I started up again. Start-up was normal; and patient was flown to [a hospital]. Lead Mechanic performed the prescribed Turbomeca check procedure and determined that no damage had occurred. Although I felt certain that no damage had occurred; and that the 'Overlimit Detected' indication was benign; I should have shut down the engine; aborted the mission; called the Mechanic immediately; and written the event up. As I look back; I realize what factors affected my decision to disregard this sensible course of action; and to proceed with the flight. I made the wrong call. I was eager to fly. I logged less then 3 hours the last month - weather; mechanical issues; staffing; and being at a generally 'slow' base got me chomping at the bit. Safety is the prime directive. My crews trust me to keep them safe and to make good decisions; and not to push capabilities or bend rules so that we can go flying. When I was an instructor I would tell my students 'It is only a mistake the second time you do it. The first time it's a learning experience.' The second time; well; I'm going to remind myself of that.

AS-350 pilot experienced a hot start; saw no adverse indications; and continued the flight. After landing; concluded that the flight should have been aborted.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 245; Flight Crew Total 13700; Flight Crew Type 4100

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 500

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Right engine failed and overheated during climbout approximately 2;000 FT. Declared [an] emergency. ATC told us there was no designated area to dump fuel. Entered holding at 4;000 FT. Dumped fuel for approximately 25 minutes until below landing weight. Returned to the departure airport.

Remained at 4;000 FT due to traffic; duty saturation.

A B777 right engine failed and overheated at 2;000 FT after takeoff so an emergency was declared; fuel dumped and the flight returned to the departure airport for an uneventful emergency landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 235; Flight Crew Type 10000

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Time Pressure

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

It was a cold 20 degree C early morning. Upon arrival at the aircraft; I took a quick glance at the aircraft surfaces and didn't notice any frost. After my First Officer completed his walk around; I asked if he saw any frost and he said 'No'. During cockpit preparations we were distracted by items like the Flight Attendants requesting more ice; then later they asked for a new credit card battery replacement; then the ground power failed; and finally we noticed the Mode Control Panel (MCP) had no power. Maintenance took about 30 minutes; delaying the flight past scheduled departure. We taxied out and after notifying the flight attendants that we were ready for takeoff; the flight attendants informed us a company commuting Pilot told them there was frost on the wings. We returned to the ramp for deice. I believe the one hour time that elapsed from the preflight walk around to the takeoff; frost must have formed; and my First Officer and I failed to double-check before takeoff. We almost performed a takeoff with frost on the wings; but with help from our commuting Pilot; we averted the dangerous event.

I suppose there was enough time for some frost to form. The conditions were conducive to frost as well; i.e. calm winds. When the report was made to us that frost was on the wings; we again looked at the representative surfaces and could not see frost. But; obviously the Pilot wouldn't have gone through the trouble to report it to us if he didn't see frost.

Although their B737 was free of contamination during preflight by the time the flight crew taxied out; following servicing and maintenance delays; they were advised by a deadheading pilot via a Flight Attendant that there was frost on the wings. They returned for de-icing.


Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency

After takeoff we climbed to FL320 and [a little later] the Captain informed me we had a fuel config light and he was going to balance the fuel. When I looked at the EICAS display I noticed left engine messages associated with an engine failure and engine NI; N2; EPR winding down. I advised the Captain (CA) of engine status. I also noticed the auto throttles retarding towards idle and informed the CA I was turning the autothrottle arm switch off and he advanced operating engine back towards MCT (max cruise thrust). The CA called for the engine failure checklist and after talking to ATC and [advising of our situation] and requesting vectors to a nearby airport it was performed and completed. We attempted an inflight restart with no success. During descent checked fuel balance per the non-normal checklist. Got vectors for an ILS; completed deferred items on the checklist and landed normally.

The flight crew of a B767-300 suffered a left engine flame-out in cruise flight at FL320; performed an inflight shut down and an unsuccessful relight procedure; declared an emergency and diverted to a safe landing.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Type 9400

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

On our descent into LAS; out [of] FL240 we encountered a short pocket of moderate chop; maybe light turbulence. It didn't last more than a second; maybe two. Before we started down; I asked for ride reports into LAS. ATC replied 'no adverse reports on the descent.' We just left the thunderstorms in the LA area; and even though LAS had high clouds; you could see clear all the way into the airport. The turbulence came out of nowhere; it might have been someone's wake. The C Flight Attendant called; and told us that the B Flight Attendant got injured; she was sitting in the cabin; and she was going to stay there for arrival. The C Flight Attendant was going to take her position (on the jump seat). She didn't require medical attention. Because that injury prevented her from performing her duties; I decided to call the EMT's so they could make sure that she was ok. Truly; the only thing that could've prevented this was having the Flight Attendants sit throughout the whole flight. But there were no reports of turbulence on the descent. The flight through the desert was smooth. They sat through the departure part of the flight; and got up when it got smooth. There was not a single piece of information to have them sitting down.

B737 NG Captain reported a Flight Attendant was injured during an encounter with turbulence; possibly wake-related; on descent into LAS.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 580; Flight Crew Type 565

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After entering left downwind Runway XX ZZZ; Aircraft Y was seen approaching the airport from the North. When I was abeam Runway XX approach end; Aircraft Y was traveling southbound; approaching my aircraft head-on; co-altitude; and had made no radio calls. Aircraft Y then turned eastbound and reentered the pattern behind my aircraft. I made standard radio calls while in the pattern. I estimate that the other aircraft came within 300 ft. nose-to-nose from my aircraft. I did not have to maneuver and was able to maintain my downwind track.

Pilot reported a near mid air collision with another aircraft while on final approach.


Final Approach; Initial Approach; Landing

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Two separate events occurred on this flight that are of concern to me. My recollection of positions; altitudes; and airspeeds are approximations and are not to be taken as fact without review of the associated data. 1) Our arrival into the ZZZ terminal area was not idea to begin with. Center kept us unusually high and we agreed that this could develop into a problem. We were well in excess of 10;000 ft. AGL at 30nm away from the airfield; and upon seeing the rotating beacon and airport lighting at approximately 15 nm away; I became concerned that we wouldn't arrive on final approach to Runway XX at an appropriate altitude to conduct a stabilized approach. I voiced this to the Captain and after brief discussion we elected to continue with the goal of seeing how it ended up looking on final. Approach Control noticed the problem and asked if we could make it; I responded that we were going to continue. We were cleared to ZZZZZ intersection (the final approach fix on the ILS Runway XX) and nearing that waypoint; we conceded to the fact that we were far too high for a stable approach to result. I estimate our altitude at this point to be well in excess of 3;000 ft. MSL. We joined the localizer fully configured with Approach mode selected on the FCP and LOC/ ALTS on the FMA (Flight Mode Annunciator) (with GS armed); but quickly elected to discontinue the approach due to our height. I communicated this with the Tower Controller and he instructed us to simply 'make left traffic.' Although we didn't discuss it; I am confident that we both silently agreed that this wouldn't be considered a go around situation due to our altitude; and proceeded as if we were just making our own vectors for a visual in a manner resembling a traffic pattern thus neglecting pushing the TOGA (Takeoff/ Go-Around) buttons or performing the go around checklist. However; we did begin to reconfigure the aircraft by retracting flaps and gear. On the midfield upwind leg; I estimate our altitude to be approximately 2;000 ft. MSL when the aircraft suddenly pitched up and airspeed began decaying; this happened quickly twice and I called out 'Check speed.' Autopilot was engaged and this un-commanded pitch startled the both of us as we thought we were in ALTS (as aircraft control was suddenly our primary concern; we didn't notice any changes to the FMA). The Captain disconnected the autopilot and corrected the attitude before a stall was indicated and we continued on our upwind climbing back up to an altitude more like 3;000 ft. MSL. Once things settled down; I realized that GS had become active and the aircraft was probably pitching to seek a high glide slope reflection. This pitching event and subsequent decay in airspeed made a somewhat stressful situation even worse; and likely distracted us from complete attention on task management. 2) On a midfield downwind; we began to reconfigure for landing; and the Captain began a gradual descent towards 2;000 ft. MSL; the FAF (Final Approach Fix) altitude. In this this descent; at an altitude I recall to be approximately 2;200 ft. MSL; a GPWS (Ground Proximity Warning System) 'obstacle' aural alert sounded; followed quickly by a 'pull up' command. At this point; the Captain leveled off and began pitching up for a climb and; with my free hand; I advanced the thrust levers. Moments later we were clear from whatever obstacle was detected and continued on our base and final leg for a normal landing. Our reaction as a crew to the GPWS command could definitely have been more swift and assertive; and this may have been because we were still in a state of disbelief caused by the un-commanded pitching on the upwind leg not long ago. Later; after thorough review of the approach plate; and the accompanying obstacle imagery; we were still unsure what could have caused this GPWS alert.1) Any time an approach is discontinued; regardless of altitude; it is a go around. As such; go around procedures must be followed. If this decision ismade at sufficient altitude in VMC; then a climb may not be necessary; but the TOGA buttons should definitely be pushed in order to reset the FMA. The un-commanded pitching we experienced on upwind was a direct result of our failure to do so. Also; I should have been more assertive with my concern that the arrival was going to result in us being excessively high when I noticed minutes ago and miles away from the airfield. An easy fix that would have prevented this is just to request vectors off course or even a 360 degree turn to lose altitude. I am still a relatively new First Officer and I feel that it isn't normally appropriate for me to tell a Captain how to conduct their arrival; but I will definitely be way more vocal when I sense an undesired situation developing. 2) When a GPWS aural sounds; it must be addressed immediately. We did follow the command; but it could've definitely been done more expeditiously. There's no time to doubt these warnings or even look for an obstacle. If the GPWS sounds; you're too low for your position and it must be corrected swiftly. Although the Captain was busy levelling off then seeking a climb attitude; I shouldn't have hesitated to jam the thrust levers into the MAX POWER detent as I did. This entire procedure should be much more sudden and no confusion can be tolerated. Also; I will not hesitate to take control of the airplane to initiate a full power climb if I am unfortunate enough to experience another one in the future; regardless of who's flying the aircraft.

First Officer reported ATC held the fight too high creating an unstable approach situation. There was an accompanying malfunction with the autopilot system.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 66; Flight Crew Total 3055; Flight Crew Type 1020

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

When checking on with Departure after a normal takeoff and climb; ATC informed us that ground personnel reported sparks exiting from our right-hand (Number 2) engine during takeoff. We observed no abnormalities of any kind to indicate a problem (vibration; noise; engine parameter readings; power output; etc.). After a short discussion; we elected to return to ZZZ as a precaution and received vectors for ILS Runway 31R. We continued to monitor engine indications closely; but at no time observed anything abnormal. ATC asked us numerous times if we required assistance or would like to request priority handling; which we declined as there seemed to be no cause for alarm or need for priority handling. A short time later ATC advised us that ZZZ Tower was treating us as a priority aircraft anyway. The remainder of the approach and landing was uneventful. Emergency vehicles escorted us back to the FBO ramp; but did not observe any signs of engine trouble. Shutdown was normal; and a post-flight inspection of visible engine areas revealed no abnormality. A subsequent borescope inspection by Maintenance Personnel revealed 3 missing blades on the Number 2 engine high-pressure compressor and general damage to the entire compressor due to those blades separating during engine operation. I later learned that this is a known issue for this engine.

C525 Captain reported and return to departure airport after ground observers reported sparks coming from the Number 2 engine tailpipe on takeoff.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Confusion; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

An aircraft checked on climbing via [ORCKA SID] to 13000 feet; but stopped at 12000 feet. It should have been climbing to 23000 feet. TRACON Supervisor called and said the aircraft was cleared direct to LAX climb via the ORCKA.

ZLA Center Controller received a handoff on an RNAV departure climbing to the wrong altitude.


Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Private; Other SEL

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 3050; Flight Crew Type 1550

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Chart Or Publication

I was traveling eastbound over the south end of ZZZ 4800 feet under broken cumulus clouds at 6500 feet.  I was monitoring the ZZZ1 glider CTAF flying with Mode S transponder squawking 1202. I monitor Fore-flight to provide TFR's and NOTAMs.  No TFR's or NOTAMs were noted. A falling skydiver appeared at 11 o'clock out of the cloud deck. I attempted to turn right and another appeared at 3 o'clock. Then it appeared a half dozen or so were falling around and past me out of the clouds. I continued east to leave the area and then saw skydivers under canopy headed north toward the airport ahead of me. They had fallen in the blue sky area south of the airport. I may have passed one closer than 500 feet but can't say for sure.  Next I saw the Drop plane headed north to the airport in front of me wag his wings acknowledging he had seen me. I could not see the jump aircraft before the jumpers exited the aircraft at 12000 feet or so; because they were above the cloud I was flying under. Many of the jumpers fell through the cloud and I did not see them until they fell clear 1500 ft above me.ZZZ TRACON was probably monitoring the operation however failed to see my transponder or provide alerts to traffic in the area not listening to approach control. It is impossible to see and avoid jumpers falling through clouds.  It is impossible to see the jump aircraft above the clouds.Jump operations should not be allowed in uncontrolled airspace with clouds when see and avoid rules are to be followed.

A Glider pilot reported near midair encounters with skydivers.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 22L

Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Cleared for a visual approach Runway 22R. Set in the FMGC was ILS 22R and 3000 feet was set in the FMC. Upon contacting Tower; flight was cleared for the ILS 22L glideslope inop by Tower. The auto-pilot was disconnected and the aircraft hand flown to intercept and descend for landing on 22L. There was no glideslope to intercept so out of 2600 feet descending the power came up as the aircraft wanted to climb back to 3000 feet as the flight directors were still on. Max flap speed was exceeded and a nose up and go-around was initiated to alleviate the exceedance.The First Officer was putting in the new ILS and was heads down. After resetting the FMGC the First Officer ran the landing checklist and upon calling the altimeter realized the airspeed and immediately called the situation just as it was about to happen. Task overloading on the First Officer prevented the realization of the situation earlier.

After initiating descent on a visual approach with glideslope out of service; an A319 Flight Crew initiated a go-around when flight director caused airspeed increase and climb to intercept altitude set for ILS to previously assigned runway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 223; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 12036

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 142; Flight Crew Total 12391; Flight Crew Type 12391

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Captain and I [deadheaded] to ZZZ to pick up a 737-800 to ferry back to ZZZ1 due to a loss of system A hydraulic fluid. Preflight showed no leaks and everything ok with the aircraft. I was PM and upon takeoff the Master Caution light came on for engine driven hydraulic pump for system A. The light went out and continued. Abeam ZZZ2 the master caution came back on for engine driven hydraulic pump number 1 system A. I pulled out the QRH and ran the Hydraulic Pump Low Pressure checklist which had us turn the pump switch off. With quantity and pressure still good using the electric pump we decided to continue to ZZZ1. Maintenance techs on the aircraft agreed with the decision. Soon after passing ZZZZZ intersection the number 1 Engine Oil Filter Bypass indication on the upper engine MFD illuminated. I pulled out the QRH and we decided to request a lower altitude since we knew we could not maintain level flight with one engine at idle. We asked for a descent to FL 200 and told them we were working on a problem with our left engine. Since the OIL FILTER BYPASS indication remained illuminated the next step per the QRH was to shut the engine down. As a result we had to land at the nearest suitable airport. We decided that ZZZ3 was the best choice since it was close the weather was good and we were both familiar with the airport. I continued with the checklist as [the Captain] flew the aircraft; [requested priority handling]; and requested the diversion. We were cleared direct to the airport and a descent to FL 70. Shutdown and descent proceeded normally with me accomplishing the shutdown and [the Captain] continuing to fly and maintain communication with ATC. We then moved to the one engine inoperative and landing checklist which included calculating single engine landing distance. Hydraulic system A at this point had gone down to 25 percent. We prepared for the possibility of losing total system A pressure and a manual gear extension but was not a factor as the gear operated normally; [the Captain] performed a visual approach and landing with a safe landing in ZZZ3. We then sent a message to dispatch via ACARS that we were safe on the ground.

First Officer and I deadheaded to ZZZ to pick up a 737-800; which had been down for maintenance due to failure of the number 1 engine driven hydraulic pump failure and loss of system A fluid. Upon arrival we did our normal preflight and found no problems with the aircraft. The 3 Tech OPS employees who fixed the aircraft were embarked and we prepared to fly.Start up; taxi; and takeoff were normal. I was flying pilot and [First Officer] was monitoring. Early in the climb master caution light for the hydraulics came on and [First Officer] noted that the low pressure light for the engine driven hydraulic pump on engine 1 was on then quickly went out. Thinking it was anomaly with sensor and hydraulic quantity and pressure normal we continued. We were abeam ZZZ2 and the master caution for Hydraulics once again illuminated and [First Officer] noted the Low Pressure light for engine driven hydraulic pump on the left (number 1) engine was illuminated and stayed on. [First Officer] pulled out the QRH and proceeded to run the Hydraulic Pump Low Pressure checklist which lead to the pump being turned off. With quantity and pressure still good using the electric pump we decided to continue. We did get one of the Maintenance Techs to come to the flight deck and we showed and conversed with him about the issue. Nothing changed our thought process so we continued.Soon after passing ZZZZZ intersection and headed directly to ZZZZZ1 intersection; the number 1 Engine Oil Filter Bypass indication on the upper engine MFD illuminated. [First Officer] once again pulled out the QRH and we decided I would continue to fly and talk and he would run the checklist. We were at FL300 and decided to request a lower altitude as we knew we could not maintain level flight for long with one engine at idle. We asked for and received a descent to FL200 and told him we were working on a problem with our left engine. [First Officer] worked our way through the checklist resulting with the OIL FILTER BYPASS indication remaining illuminated. Per the checklist the next step was to shut down the engine and as a result of that we would need to land. We chose ZZZ3.[First Officer] continued the checklist as I [requested priority handling] and requested to divert. We were cleared direct the airport and a descent to 7;000. Shutdown and descent proceeded normally with [First Officer] completing the shutdown checklist. With the engine secured we moved on to the one engine inoperative and landing checklist to include the non-normal single engine landing distance. As we got closer to ZZZ3 the hydraulic issue took another turn. The quantity began to change first climbing to 106 percent and then slowly starting to decrease to mid-70 percent and then working its way down slowly till as we were coming down final it was in mid-20's. [First Officer] brought up the possibility of losing the 'A' system; so both of us were both prepared should that happen. Fortunately we did not have to run that checklist. Visual approach and landing was uneventful and normal. Landed and taxied to parking spot.We sent a message to Dispatch using ACARS that we were safe on the ground. The call I got after we had been on ground for 15 min. or so from the FODM gave me the feeling that it didn't go through but it was sent. It was confirmed by maintenance that in fact the 'A' system was depleted to about 25 percent and still leaking.

B737 flight crew reported inflight shut down and diversion due to hydraulic system failure.