Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

During a visual approach to Runway 26; I performed a hand flown approach. The visual was backed up with the ILS approach for guidance while on the arrival. We were vectored off of the arrival for traffic avoidance and then vectored toward the field for a visual approach. We were about seven miles away from the field on a base leg a 5;000 FT AGL. When we were cleared for the visual approach to Runway 26. I thought we were a little high and close and in retrospect should have widened the approach out a little and configured more slowly and flown the approach profile closer to a 3.0 degree approach than was possible from our current position. I maintained altitude while disengaging the autopilot and auto-throttles and configured the plane for landing in an effort to increase drag and manage our descent more effectively for a landing. The approach maintained a steady rate of descent and configuration; but could not be considered a stabilized approach per the FOM. The approach was performed with the thrust levers at flight idle in order to reach the field in the touch down zone. While in the flare to land over the runway; normal configuration; I was attempting to effect a soft touch down; as well as landing in the touch down zone and in the process of the flare the stick shaker was activated as we touched the runway. The first officer called out a low speed warning as we touched down and the shaker was activated. Other than the slow speed and stick shaker event the touch down was uneventful. We exited the runway and taxied to the gate as normal. Fly the approach on profile per the SOP. I tried to compensate for the poor vectors to final when I should have asked to widen out the approach.

After fully configuring the aircraft for landing; we descended to the runway above the glideslope. As we approached the runway; I noticed that the airspeed was about 10 knots below Vapp and called out the deviation. By this time; we were already in the flare and the stick-shaker was momentarily activated as we touched down. Other than the momentary stick-shaker event; the approach was uneventful.In hindsight; I should have suggested getting vectored off of the approach or called for a go-around because of the un-stabilized condition of the approach.

An ERJ-175 Captain flew an un-stabilized visual approach following an ATC vector which left them high on final with idle thrust and a stick shaker in the landing flare.


Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

During cruise [at] FL390; Captains outer windshield shattered. Crew declared an emergency; descended when clear of thunderstorms; and diverted to [nearest suitable airport].

QRH did not direct us to land; but with ice and snow in [destination] it sure seemed like the safest action to take. Our safety margin into icing conditions had been severely reduced. Captains visibility was severely reduced.

MD-11 flight crew reported Captain's window outer pane shattered. An emergency was declared; and the flight diverted to a nearby suitable airport.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

We had a situation for Aircraft X due to and ENG 2 no dispatch message due to Ignition Channel B fault. When troubleshooting Maintenance found the connector/switch to the EHCL (Electro-Hydraulic cowl lock) broken. The MEL was applied for the ENG 2 Thrust Reversers. At this time there were no Maintenance personnel available to due an ENGINE run after they swapped E2 igniter plugs from channel A to B and B to A IAW the MEL. The Mechanics turned over the aircraft to the next shift to complete the Engine Runs. I arrived and retrieved the logbook and went with another mechanic to complete the Engine Runs. We performed the engine runs and called aircraft back into service approximately 30 mins prior to first departure of the day. We then recieved a call from [Maintenance Control] approximately 10 minutes prior to departure saying the pilot is reporting ENG 2 Rev INHIBIT message not being displayed on EICAS IAW MEL. Instead ENG 2 REV PROT FAULT displayed. The MEL that was signed off as previously c/w referenced AMM so we started there and found that it referenced AMM deactivation of the ICU(Isolation Control Unit). While following the AMM for Deactivating the ICU I saw that it said open Circuit Breaker and install a CB ring on E2 REVERSER CB as well as making sure the ICU inhibition lever was in the inhibit position with the quick release pin installed to make sure the lever is making contact with the micro switches. The lever was in the inhibit position but the quick release pin was not in the correct position. I moved the pin to the correct position and followed the last step of the deactivation process which was to make sure the E2 REV INHIBIT MESSAGE is shown on EICAS which it was. At this point I did not see in the ICU deactivation procedures of closing the CB and removing the ring as it was not in that part of the AMM. Instead of going back and referencing the AMM section the MEL had me go to and discussing with the other mechanic of whether or not we should close the CB we determined that it was not in the DEACTIVATION procedures so we should leave it open since the discrepancy was corrected. I should of referenced back the original AMM to make sure I followed the JOB CLOSE UP section as this would of told me to remove the CB ring and close it upon completion of deactivating the TR. Since the MEL was done by the prior shift I did not think to go back to that reference as I only performed the ICU deactivation even though I know that all AMM sections have a JOB CLOSE UP section. I also think the several Human Factors played a role in my error. The STRESS and PRESSURE of the plane being delayed after being [on ground] for a long period of time DISTRACTED me from being focused on reviewing my work and the AMM. I also had a LACK OF AWARENESS to realize the ICU deactivation did not have a JOB CLOSE UP SECTION. I think it would be helpful to add this section to the ICU deactivation part of the AMM to state if no other Maintenance is being performed to complete this section.

Technician reported misreading MEL procedures and not correctly accomplishing MEL procedures when deactivating a thrust reverser.


Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Weather

This event was a minimum fuel declaration to ATC on descent into BOS. At the gate before departure; our fuel required for takeoff was 3;980; ramp fuel was 4;930; and the actual fuel on board was about 5;200 LBS. The FMS showed we were going to land at a little over 2;600 LBS. It was a no alternate/no tanker flight. Weather in BOS at the time was not predicting low ceilings until later in the evening. We were filed for the QUABN1 arrival and BOS was using ILS 4R. Once in flight we were issued holding instructions at GDM VOR and I immediately slowed to our holding speed and the Captain and I discussed what our bingo fuel would be. I can't remember our exact fuel load at that time but it was somewhere around 3;000 LBS. We decided on a bingo fuel of 2;500 LBS with BDL as an alternate; it was just about 40 miles to our right. We entered holding at XA:37Z with an EFC of XA:45Z; which was later pushed back to XA:54Z. At some point during holding we got a response back from Dispatch which; after some discussion over ACARS; we all agreed on 2;500 LBS and BDL as an alternate. We were released from holding at about XA:50Z. We had not declared min fuel at this time. The whole time we were discussing fuel and our alternate options. Once on with Boston Approach; we were given a delay vector off of the arrival. I was the pilot flying but the Captain (the pilot not flying) was off the frequency saying goodbye to the passengers; so I didn't declare minimum fuel because I wanted concurrence with the Captain. I did query Boston Approach about the vector and let him know that fuel might be an issue. Once the Captain came back we had a quick discussion about our fuel. At that time we were put back onto the arrival but it was showing we would land with approximately 1;900 LBS. We decided to declare minimum fuel at this time due to the fact that we felt we could not accept any more delay vectors. At the time we declared min fuel we had just under 2;300 LBS on board. We were given an immediate turn toward the airport; Boston Approach said we were on a left downwind for the runway to be put in front of some other aircraft (the arrival crossed over the airport with a right downwind for the runway). We were given a shortcut of about 5 or 6 aircraft and landed uneventfully with approximately 2;150 LBS. I understand that this could be construed as an unanticipated holding event and that it's not a real problem. However; we operate in the busiest airspace in the country and this is where the airports are that we do this no alt/no tanker 2;400 LBS thing. There are always going to be 'unexpected' delays into PHL; LGA; BOS; and DCA just due to the nature of the airspace. My Captain and I have learned a valuable lesson from this event. Even though the weather was supposed to be good until late that night and everything else was supposed to be go according to plan; we should have asked for additional fuel just due to the fact that we were going into BOS. I am concerned because there doesn't seem to be any room for error. Next time I'll make sure I do have room for error; and I hope others might be able to do the same without learning the hard way.

A CRJ200 crew was given unexpected delays on a BOS arrival and declared minimum fuel because their dispatch fuel did not include an alternate or additional fuel.


Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 8; Flight Crew Total 70; Flight Crew Type 50

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I took off from ZZZ using Runway 18 with my destination to the north. I turned left crosswind then downwind; intending to depart from the area by maintaining a downwind heading until clear of the traffic pattern. During downwind abeam the runway; I continued to climb above traffic pattern altitude but did not announce the climb over CTAF.During upwind or crosswind; a Cessna (Aircraft Y) announced he was west of the airport and would be crossing midfield and entering into a downwind for [Runway] 18. He did not announce his altitude. I assumed he was at traffic pattern altitude and would be turning left and entering into the downwind. By midfield in the downwind myself; I was at about 1;800 ft. AGL and climbing. I did not see the Cessna until he was approximately 300 ft. directly ahead of me and 200 ft. above. I nosed over briefly to arrest my climb.I have since reviewed the AIM and AC 90-66B. I believe the Cessna intended to perform a descending teardrop turn to enter the downwind. This is a standard pattern entry. My own departure was nonstandard.I will use this experience to better judge traffic conflict and miscommunication risks.

Pilot flying PA28 aircraft reports NMAC in airport traffic pattern.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure; Manuals; Logbook Entry

I received an ACARS transmission stating that Aircraft X; a B717; was experiencing an Altitude problem with its Integrated Standby Instrument System (ISIS). I searched the Fault Isolation Manual (FIM) for a procedure which mirrored the discrepancy described in the transmission. In my search I found FIM 34-11; Task 801; Attitude Problems-Fault Isolation which I inadvertently read as Altitude Problem. After reviewing the FIM Task; I did not feel the procedure included sufficient steps to perform a complete check of the system. Given that; I took an additional step and consulted the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) looking for a procedure that would perform a more thorough Check. I used Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) reference XX-XX-XX; sub-task XX-XX-XX-XXX-XXX; Operational Test of the ISIS because it provided a more comprehensive system test than FIM 34-11; Task 801. I contacted the Mechanic on site and discussed the problem Aircraft X was experiencing. I faxed him the paperwork which included the FIM reference along with the AMM reference. In an effort to avoid confusion on page two of the AMM; I marked through the Functional Test procedures with an 'X' indicating that these steps will not be performed. When the Mechanic received the paperwork; he called and we discussed the current status and the [Flight] crew comments that the system was now functioning normally. I gave verbal instruction to the Mechanic on how to test the system even though it was reportedly not in working order. The Mechanic performed the test and reported that the system checked out and was operational; at which time we signed-off the discrepancy together. One week later; it was brought to my attention that some questions had been raised surrounding the incident; I was confident that the system was properly checked and felt the inquiry would be dismissed without merit. It was not until I looked more closely at the title of the [Test] procedure that I realized; to my dismay; it read Attitude and not Altitude.

A Maintenance Controller reports he inadvertently misread a Fault Isolation Manual (FIM) Chapter 34-11 AttitudeFault Isolation Problem as reading Altitude Problems; while researching a Test procedure he later used to sign-off a B717 aircraft with an Altitude discrepancy in the Integrated Standby Instrument System (ISIS).


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

We had just finished pushing from the gate. We were about to taxi out when a Ramp Agent knocked on the nose of the aircraft and motioned us not to taxi. We had no idea what the issue was and watched as he brought a tug back to the aircraft and plugged in a headset. He told us that he was passing by on another tug and saw us getting pushed back into the blast fence. Our own push crew didn't even notice it. We pulled back into the gate and had the aircraft inspected. Maintenance and ground crews noticed a dent in the APU exhaust.

It was a normal three-person ground crew with wireless headsets push from Gate XX. The pushback seemed normal. The ground crew had cleared away from the aircraft as normal. The engines had been started and all checklist run. Just as we were about to release brakes for taxi; we heard a hand rap on the aircraft nose. I looked out to see a totally different Ramp Agent that had not been part of pushback crew; standing giving me a 'do not taxi' hand signal. I held my position. He ran over and got another Ramp Agent; the tow bar; a headset and the pushback tug. When he plugged in the headset; I asked what was going on.That's when he told me that he had been driving by on his luggage tug and noticed the aircraft tail was rapidly approaching the blast fence. He had attempted to get the Wing Walker's attention but to no avail. He saw the tail impact the blast fence. Apparently; the pushback crew never saw him or the tail on the blast fence. He had run forward and luckily intercepted us before releasing brakes. After shutting down the engines and being pulled back to Gate XY; Maintenance inspected the tail area. The shroud around the APU exhaust was indeed bent and showed signs of impact with the blast fence. I wrote up the defect in the logbook and handed over the aircraft to Maintenance.

B737-800 flight crew reported Ramp Agent alerted them that they struck a jet blast fence during pushback.


ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

A C17 was on IR326. Shortly after point 'D'; the PUW280016; the flight plan was dropped from ERAM. I noticed the lack of a Data Block fairly quickly but there was only about 15 miles from where the route enters Chinook Approach's airspace. As this flight is in RADAR coverage continuously; there is no requirement to post a flight strip. The flight plan information had also dropped out of the EDST so it was quite a scramble to coordinate with Chinook Approach and get the flight plan back into the system. When I reported the incident to the ERAM Subject Matter Expert I was informed this was the third time this route had been dropped by ERAM that he was aware of. The most recent was on another aircraft with in the last two weeks. The possibility that this flight plan could be dropped by ERAM has not been briefed to the work force. Do not let aircraft fly this route until the software has been fixed to prevent this from happening.

ZSE Controller described an unsafe condition report involving ERAM and dropping of flight plan data.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 3850; Flight Crew Type 235

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 6800; Flight Crew Type 400

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

We were one of a very long sequence of departures off of Runway 25R at LAS. There were at least 10 departures cleared in front of us (mostly transport category jets; 737s; A320s). We were cleared to depart Runway 25R very soon after departure of an A320 from the same runway. We were informed that we needed to maintain visual separation; and given a wake turbulence advisory. Without delay; we departed 25R. After clearing 400 FT AGL; I asked the First Officer to move flaps to 7 degrees (leaving slats extended). I elected not to clean the aircraft any further; so I could maintain a steeper than usual climb profile and ensure remaining above the climbout profile of the A320 in front of us. I maintained visual contact; and also visually determined that I was above the climb profile of the aircraft in front of us. This was a bit more difficult than I had planned because the A320 seemed to be climbing at a fairly low airspeed.Despite my precautionary steep climb; as I leveled off at 7;000 FT MSL we hit some turbulence that I suspect was wake turbulence related. Aside from this turbulence; the initial and subsequent climbout was fairly smooth. I would characterize what we encountered as fairly mild; it required no extreme unusual maneuvers to counteract; though our level off required significant nose down pressure; as well as some roll input. We also overshot our level off by 100 or 200 hundred feet.While I was surprised by this encounter; I was prepared; as I was consciously attempting to avoid the climb profile of the aircraft in front of me. That said; I was still somewhat unnerved by this; as I worry the encounter could have been significantly worse had we been even slightly lower and hit more of the core of the wake. I think this could have been avoided by ATC using more than one runway for departures (even though its common to use both 19R and 25R for simultaneous departures at LAS; ATC was only using 25R that afternoon). Another contributing factor was my decision to depart as soon as I got the Takeoff clearance; versus asking Tower for an additional 60 or 90 seconds before departing. In retrospect; I was keenly aware of the 10 plus airplanes sitting on the taxiway behind us waiting to depart; and chose to use a steep climb to avoid wake turbulence; versus making everyone else wait a bit longer. I believe that was a mistake.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A Falcon 900 encountered wake vortices from an A320 departing LAS.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 6100; Flight Crew Type 29

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We were in a Cherokee 6 (PA 32-300) conducting training flight. This was our second training flight. The first training flight was last month and we flew 1.5 hours Hobbs with 8 landings. This flight lasted 1.3 hours Hobbs with one landing followed by a second takeoff. We were setting up for one final landing. Everything appeared to be going well. We turned final and shortly after as we neared short final; my student reached down and quickly changed the fuel tanks from the right to the left. This was done so quickly that I could not stop him. It was also confusing me; too; since we stressed not to change fuel tanks on final near the ground. I was about to correct this but we were nearing short final and I believed everything would be fine the last 200 FT and I would discuss this once on the ground. We were now very short final and the student remarked that he had no power. At this point on very short final; we were a little high at first; the runway straight in front of us appeared easily reachable. We immediately set up for best glide and continued; not wanting to make anything worse. We continued and did make a safe landing; but it was about 10 FT short of the paved runway. We landed on the main wheels on solid ground covered with grass just before the paved section. We did bounce once and settled back on the main wheels; careful not to hold the nosewheel up as much as possible. The propeller never made contact with the ground. We continued moving straight ahead on the paved surface and went about 400 FT on the runway before the prop stopped rotating. We informed the Tower that we had [our] engine stop and we would try a restart. We successfully restarted the engine and taxied back to parking. We noticed no abnormalities while taxiing back. After shutting the engine down; we carefully looked for any damage to tires or airframe. We observed nothing. We then informed the flight school. There was no accident or injuries.

A PA32 Student Pilot changed the fuel tank transfer at 200' on final before his instructor could comment and the engine quit due to fuel starvation so they landed straight ahead just short of the runway causing no damage.


Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Procedure

FA3 identified a bag being brought on board as carry on which exceeded the allowed size for carry-on baggage. FA's 1 and 3 asked the passenger to allow us to check the bag to final destination. A member of management who was on the jet bridge ordered us to allow the bag to remain in the cabin despite its size; stating 'this is a leisure market; we don't need to check that bag. Sometimes we need to do what's more convenient for the customer.' He further stated 'the agent allowed it so we have to allow it' Both myself and FA 3 related flight service manual policy regarding carry-on bag surveillance being joint responsibility between agents and cabin crew. This member of management continued to argue that we were wrong; even after being shown the rule in the in-flight manual.The event occurred because a member of management was more concerned with customer service than FAA regulations regarding carry-on baggage. Management needs to trust that their flight attendants are trained properly and not second guess them in front of passengers. Management should not attempt to bully cabin crewmembers into violating FAR's.

A Flight Attendant reported a Company Manager ordered that an oversized carry on be allowed in the cabin even after company policy and FAR were directly identified.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

B737-800 APU Fuel Inlet Line; [electrical] wire bundle too close to [fuel] line per Standard Wiring Practices Manual Chapter 20; minimum of 2' inch [clearance] cannot be met.

Reporter notes the inability to maintain a 2' inch clearance of an electrical wire bundle from an APU Fuel Inlet line on a B737-800 aircraft; as required by their Standard Wiring Practices Manual Chapter 20.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

I accepted the handoff on Aircraft X descending to 27000 feet. I noticed the aircraft in a right turn and was called by ZNY N56 stating that they are going to spin Aircraft X because of Aircraft Y. I said roger but did not see the aircraft they were referring to. This was because this aircraft; Aircraft Y was still at 36000 feet landing BOS. This aircraft should have been at 27000 feet. Nothing was coordinated with this descent from N56. What made this scenario dangerous was the N56 controller spun Aircraft X into the rest of their line of BOS arrivals that were at 27000 feet.The conflict alert was going off constantly during this time with no coordination from N56 controller as to what the plan was for this aircraft that I had the handoff on. I was pointing out Aircraft Y to other sectors down the line and N56 ran another aicraft into my airspace at 27000 feet without a handoff. I do not know if point-outs were made to other appropriate sectors from N56 but given their lack of coordination; I would assume other sectors were not coordinated with as well.  This problem seemed like it was a typical issue. Either Aircraft Y went NORDO; controller didn't realize Aircraft Y was landing BOS or Aircraft Y did not start his/her descent. The part that makes this dangerous is the lack of coordination from N56. I have been at ZBW for just under 10 years and it seems like myself and the rest of the controllers here at ZBW have just accepted that ZNY does not like to use landlines and are very hard to get on the landline. This culture is the same with N90. I don't know how to fix this long-standing issue. But this lack of coordination and communication to other controllers as to what N56's plan was for this BOS scenario is what made this scenario reportable and dangerous. I could not help to solve the problem because I could not find out what the controllers plan was. From my end of the scenario; it appears that if the N56 controller spun Aircraft Y who was too high anyway; this would have been a lot less dangerous.

ZBW Center Controller reported communication issues with ZNY leading to an aircraft entering his sector without coordination.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 187; Flight Crew Total 8532; Flight Crew Type 8532

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Following an MEL on leading edge flaps; received a Takeoff Configuration Warning Horn on takeoff roll below 100 knots. Rejected takeoff and returned to gate. No emergency equipment required.

After the leading edge flaps had been MELd; a B737 Flight Crew rejected a takeoff below 100 knots due to a Takeoff Configuration Warning.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 270; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 2475

For the second time in as many attempts; I experienced a failure of both FMS-1 and FMS-2 while 'cleaning up the box' on approach into CLE. Please see my previous ASRS report for details; as this was an exact duplicate of my previous experience. Please note in my previous report; that both my First Officer; along with both the outbound Captain and First Officer had all experienced similar failures recently. Additionally; the mechanic who met our flight in CLE told me that he has seen a sudden spike in these failures. There is obviously a problem here. From my limited experience; it appears that the problem is associated with only certain airports.

A320 Captain experiences a dual FMGC lock up while attempting to 'clean up the box' during vectors for approach. This is the second occurrence the reporter has experienced recently.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

During climb thru 1;400 MSL; number 1 engine; left engine; flame out. After confirming left engine had failed; left Engine Stop and Feather was pulled; left prop went to feather. ZZZ Approach was notified of the situation; requested priority handling; I entered on a left downwind for Runway XX; followed QRH procedures and landed without any further issues.Identification - Left engine power lost; left propeller was showing NTS; right rudder pressure was needed to maintain heading.Cause - Left engine component cause it to failed.

SA-227 Captain reported the left engine failed during climbout resulting in an immediate return to the departure airport.


Upon landing both the captain and I noticed the plane shaking/vibrating quite a bit. After slowing the plane down to a normal taxi speed; the vibrating ceased; however both the captain and I knew something was not exactly right with some part of the landing gear. The captain mentioned taking extra care when looking at the landing gear on the post flight walk around. Before exiting the plane; a passenger had mentioned that he saw the some of the tire shred off on the takeoff roll. Upon exiting the aircraft; I immediately noticed the left main inboard tire had something wrong with it. After looking at the tire more closely; we noticed half of the tire tread had shredded off the tire completely. Some of the debris damaged one of the rear wheel well doors and the gear fairing.

After landing and once at the gate; during the post flight walk-around we found that the left inboard main tire had blown and had caused damage to the aft gear door and landing gear fairing. As passengers were leaving the aircraft; a passenger had mentioned to the First Officer that on takeoff roll the inboard tire was wobbling. As I reflect back; I do recall a small amount of vibration during rotation; but nothing that raised alarm. The touchdown was normal with a little bit of vibration at which point I mentioned to the First Officer that we'll have to check during the post flight walk-around to see if there are any abnormalities. It was brought to my attention that the tire that had blown was a retread tire. While I am not an expert on tires; it was explained to me that this appears to be a trend with re-treaded tires.

DHC8-400 flight crew experiences vibration during landing roll. Upon arrival at the gate it is discovered that one of the left main tires has shed half of its tread. A passenger volunteers that he saw something fly off the tire during takeoff.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 900

Workload; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Pushed on time; taxied out uneventful and with no indication of ground delay by neither company nor ATC. Upon arriving at Spot 1 on the West Ramp; Clearance Delivery expeditiously handed us to Ground; also giving no indication of delay. Once on ground; Controller indicated ATC was going to unilaterally ground stop all flights but still had us taxi to 15L. Weather was excellent with just a cell visible to the distant northwest. This cell proved problematic for IAH airspace so even though our direction of flight and route of flight were CAVOK; ATC would not allow us to depart because all the north bound flights were already clogging the runway entrances. So we sat in line behind all the northbound flights; shut engines; and waited an hour along with everyone else. The cell passed directly overhead and as it traveled south it grew quickly. Winds shifted so ATC had everyone start engines and taxi to the RWY 33 complex. We were assigned 33L and were cleared for takeoff 90 minutes after initial on time push. But by now the storms were over our direction of flight. We were given and accepted a southwest heading by Tower. Then departure cleared us direct an enroute intersection. We accepted. We were in IMC now climbing through 10;000 feet and Captain; as PF; accelerated in ECON climb to 280 knots. Our weather RADAR showed two intense cells ahead and we saw ATC's clearance was to send us between them. We asked to deviate with discretion and ATC granted deviations and direct when able. The cells closed together as we were between them and we experienced severe turbulence for approximately 30 continuous seconds. We were configured for penetration with our harnesses on; flight attendants seated; seatbelt sign on; airspeed 280 and engine ignition continuous. After 30 seconds we were in total clear air; unlimited visibility and the turbulence immediately ended; consistent with a thunderstorm penetration. It took another 60 seconds to notify ATC as all unsecured objects in the cockpit were scattered. Headsets were blown off our heads and I reached for the hand mic; turned on speaker to full and told ATC we had severe turbulence; maintaining 16;000 feet and to standby for our report. They said roger but never passed along our PIREP to other aircraft; just as they never passed along the PIREP for those aircraft preceding us that went over our same route minutes before. After assessing any immediate damage; I assumed PF duties and Captain called the flight attendants. They were cleared to check cabin now that it was smooth. No reports of injured passenger or crew; however; the lav doors blew open and all the holding tank contents sprayed into the lavs; onto the flight attendants and up to the cabin ceiling. In the cockpit there was one cup of ice water that now covered the center console and First Officer comm panel. All flight bag contents were emptied onto the floor and charts covered the cockpit floor; dash; and cubbie holes. Captain coordinated with Operations and determined it was best to return to IAH for required inspections; clean up; and a re-crew. Did not ask for emergency handling; just an expeditious return to field; and we were at least 4000 pounds under landing weight upon touchdown.

[Narrative 2 contains no additional information.]

An Air Carrier crew encountered severe turbulence between to thunderstorm cells at 16;000 feet climbing and because of aircraft lavatory and flight station disarray returned to the departure airport as a precaution.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 230; Flight Crew Type 150

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

After landing and requesting a taxi clearance we were instructed to do a back taxi for a departure. We took off without getting the proper clearance from the controller. Tower informed us of the requirements for the takeoff clearance for the next time we needed to back taxi.

Pilot reported departing the airport without ATC clearance for take off.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

We were on arrival into ZZZ at 6;000 MSL when ATC requested speed 190 knots. The PF (Pilot Flying) called for flaps 1. Shortly thereafter we received a SLAT FAIL EICAS message. The PM (Pilot Monitoring) gave radios to PF and ran QRH SLAT FAIL which lead to QRH FLAP FAIL (SLAT FAIL). PF requested delay vectors and informed ATC of our issue. We were unsuccessful at clearing the EICAS message and therefore prepped for landing with SLAT 0 and FLAP 1. We did our best to follow QRH accurately without rushing however we were mindful of our fuel situation that showed landing with 2;800 pounds. At that time we requested the longer runway XXL. We calculated approximately 6;000 feet of required landing distance; runway XXL is [nearly double that.]We asked ATC to update our company; we didn't have time to send them an ACARS due to our limited fuel; we prioritized landing safely. It was raining and 800 feet broken in ZZZ. We updated our flight attendants and made a PA to passengers about the emergency and our higher landing speed.We landed uneventfully and taxied to gate without overheated brakes. We contacted company Dispatch; Chief Pilot; and Maintenance to write up SLAT FAIL.FO (First Officer) and I called in fatigued thinking it would be safest to not fly our [next] leg of the night and get some rest. We were grateful for the safe outcome and appreciate the help from ATC; our crew; and passengers.ATC asked us to keep our speed up for sequencing and we felt a little pressure from that but we ended up saying unable. We wanted to make sure we would be able to slow to the appropriate approach speed for a safe outcome. After landing we did not see fire trucks; in hindsight we could have requested them specifically just in case our brakes got too hot causing a need for ARFF (Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting.) We expected trucks to be rolling when we landed.

Flying on the arrival into ZZZ; we were asked to slow to 190 from 210 knots on our way to ZZZZZ at 6000 ft. PF (Pilot Flying) asked for Flaps 1 when a SLAT FAIL EICAS message popped up. PF took over communications; flight controls; and asked for delay vectors while PM (Pilot Monitoring) pulled out the QRH and started running the appropriate checklists for FLAP FAIL (SLAT FAIL). EICAS was showing FLaps 1 and Slats 0. We [notified ATC] when the QRH procedure was not successful. Following the calculations to find new approach/landing speeds at 70k lbs (162 knots) for a wet runway and also new landing distance of 6000ft; we decided we wanted a longer landing distance and requested XXL. We inputted the new approach in the FMS; confirmed ILS frequency and approach course and conducted a quick briefing. Aware that fuel was getting low; we asked to be vectored for the approach. We were vectored for a 23 mile final with 2800 lbs of fuel. ATC did an excellent job with delay vectors and were able to turn us in for the approach as soon as we asked. The PF asked ATC to notify company of our [situation] and the Captain called the FAs (Flight Attendants) and briefed them. The Captain also made a PA to the passengers to make them aware of the fast landing that was going to be made. On the 23 mile final; the PM read through the QRH again and noted the 10 degree pitch limit and ATs (autothrottles) off for final approach. We slowed to landing approach speed 15 nm from the runway and maintained that speed through the approach. We broke out at 800 ft AGL and landed without incident. PM gave call outs of pitch changes as the airplane was in the flare and landed. Brakes were not overheated and we taxied to the gate.

EMB-175 flight crew reported receiving an EICAS message for SLAT FAIL on approach.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Training a Developmental during Wake Turbulance RECAT; a B757 was facing north on Taxiway X. I instructed the Developmental to clear the B757 for takeoff on Runway XXR. The aircraft joined the runway at a speed that has not been the norm with the rest of the fleet. The B757 is a CAT 'D' and was following a CAT 'C' aircraft. I am not sure that separation was lost; but from the naked eye I believe that the aircraft did not have enough spacing with the previous aircraft. We were under pressure to fully utilize the Wake RECAT reduced separation; and on the first day of working this position since the new changes; and the Developmental's first day at this position as well; the timing required is still being understood on a learn-as-you-go basis. Recommendation is to allot for more time between departures until the separation and absolute timing is established.

Tower Controller described a RECAT Wake Turbulence event unclear if a loss of separation actually occurred; the reporter noting pressure to fully utilize the new reduced separation requirements.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I had to make a tight spin out of the gate with a Dash 8 behind me and a CR9 in front of me. While making the turn with minimum and idle thrust; and keeping an eye on the ground crew; I crossed the line from the non-movement area onto Taxiway A before receiving a taxi clearance from ground. The First Officer (FO) was calling ground as we started our movement; and I was expecting to receive a taxi clearance quickly. Additionally; I did not realize how close the border of the non-movement area was to our gate. Unfortunately; the FO's headset was not plugged completely in and his first couple transmissions to ground was unsuccessful. As I realized I was now halfway onto Taxiway A; and the FO wasn't transmitting; I keyed the mike and got a taxi clearance immediately. There is no indication on the 10-9 diagram nor on the 10-7 pages of where the non-movement area ends. The main thing I can do to prevent this from happening is a behavioral and habit change. I'm used to; and in the habit of; expecting there to be plenty of room to make a turn off a gate before entering a movement area. I the future I will make a habit of calling ground to receive a proper taxi clearance before any aircraft movement regardless of how familiar I think I am with the airfield.

CRJ-700 Captain reports inadvertently entering the movement area during a U turn out of the gate at ELM due to the close proximity of the line and the First Officer's calls for clearance going unanswered.


Mooney Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3; Flight Crew Total 300; Flight Crew Type 150

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Landing gear collapse on landing. It is possible the gear was not locked in the down position. On contact with the runway they retracted. This plane has manual gear lever. The gear is spring loaded and with a bounce it retracted. Minimal damage to aircraft; landing gear collapsed on landing.

A 1964 M20C with a manual landing hear lever landed gear up after the gear retracted following a bounced landing.


Workload; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related

We received a change of runway and ATIS change during pushback following engine start of number 2 engine.  Single engine taxi was planned and information was briefed and changed in the performance computer and the CDU after engine start; but before the Before Taxi checklist was called. After making all the changes to the performance computer and CDU reviews were made; numbers and flap settings were still the same.  I missed calling for the checklist and when as we switched from Ramp Control to Ground Control for taxi instructions; we immediately saw that the flaps were not set for takeoff.

A B737-700 crew became distracted during pushback by a runway and ATIS change. During single engine taxi they realized the performance computer and FMC distractions caused them to miss lowering the flaps.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 17

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 10000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On the PURBL transition to the ILS 17; the PF notice that the aircraft was descending below the approach profile altitude from BLSSM to BLUUM. The PF arrested the descent and climbed back to a safe altitude. ATC then called and reminded us of the minimum safe altitude. PM notice that the altitude at BLUUM in the FMC had magically changed to field elevation. We were navigating in LNAV/VNAV; speed intervene activated with the autopilot engaged. An uneventful; stable approach and landing was performed. Altitudes and fixes were reviewed by both pilots during the approach brief. Cause of deviation in the FMC; from what we can determine is PFM. No explanation. One can prevent this from happening by believing nothing; ever. 'Constant Monitoring' would have prevented this event.

Air carrier flight crew on the ILS Runway 17 to MHT noticed the aircraft had descended below the minimum safe altitude (MSA) prior to BLUUM with LNAV/VNAV and SPD INT active. The crew noticed field elevation had replaced the BLUUM altitude in the FMC and climbed back to the MSA as ATC alerted.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Total 3600; Flight Crew Type 1250

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

The airframe we were operating had the number 2 pack MELed. In cruise flight the FA (Flight Attendant) called up and said it was warm in the back. So I adjusted the temperature on the number 1 pack to cool it down in the back. After a few minutes of no temperature change I set the number 1 pack into manual mode. After doing that the number 1 pack shut off. We were at 25000 ft. The cabin altitude climbed from 3500 to 7000 in a matter of seconds. I quickly selected the pack off and on to reset it but it stayed off. We began a descent with ATC and decided to divert. After descending for a while the pack came back on. We decided to make a precautionary landing anyways.

EMB-145 Captain reported a cabin pressurization issue after the sole operational pack failed to cool the cabin and malfunctioned.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1400; Flight Crew Type 300

Confusion; Distraction; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Airport; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

34R/16L has new LED centerline lights. They are so bright and intense on their lowest setting (confirmed by tower) that it makes final approach to landing difficult at night.The main problem is that the runway edge lights have not been replaced with the newer style LEDs... so you can barely even make out the runway edge lights; whereas the centerline nearly blinds you!The lights (centerline/edge) need to be the same type of bulb so that the light they produce is the same intensity. This would make judging the flare at night in a such a critical phase of flight significantly easier.

A pilot landed on RNO Runway 34R/16L and reported the new LED centerline lights as too bright. The centerline LEDs obscured the runway ledge lights and made landing height estimates difficult.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 12318; Flight Crew Type 5704

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

We had pushed off of gate. After calling for taxi; ground control instructed us to taxi to runway via X; Y; behind another air carrier. I read back the instructions. The controller then issued new instructions. We were to taxi to [runway] via Z; A; Y; behind the other aircraft. I read back the instructions and the Captain then verified the instructions by repeating them to me. We started to taxi via Z. I then saw that the Aircraft Y had turned onto taxiway X heading east toward us. The distance from taxiway Y to Z on X is rather short. I became concerned that perhaps the Captain hadn't noticed the other aircraft had turned onto taxiway X. I told him we had to stop for the Aircraft Y. Due to the timing and short distance involved an abrupt stop was necessary to avoid encroaching onto the taxiway in front of the other aircraft. After the stop I called the cabin to see if the flight attendants were okay. The flight attendant I spoke with informed me that she was injured and that she believed all the flight attendants were injured. I asked if they needed medical assistance and she said yes. I informed ground we had possible injuries and needed to return to the gate. I then called operations to inform them of our return and to have medical assistance dispatched to meet us. We returned to gate where the flight attendants were taken to receive treatment.

Taxiing from gate Ground Control instructed taxi X; Y [to] runway behind Aircraft Y. We saw traffic on Y abeam us and as we turned to enter Z Ground stated to taxi Z; A; Y [to] runway behind Aircraft Y. During all this time we assumed traffic was taxiing to [runway.] As I was eyes left to look for traffic on X and A and then centering slightly nose right about 1230; FO stated are you stopping for the other aircraft. I was stunned the traffic was there on X immediately stopped. Ground speed was 3-10 knots which resulted in injured person and galley noises. FA called to say there's 4 injured FAs and we need to return to the gate and have paramedics meet the plane. We returned to the gate and called for paramedics. Four FAs and one passenger were injured and sent to the hospital; eventually being released. I called the appropriate people and company for assistance.

A taxiing B757 Captain did not see an aircraft which they were cleared to follow. After the First Officer pointed out the developing conflict with it; he executed an emergency stop which injured four flight attendants and one passenger.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 2300; Flight Crew Type 150

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Weather; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

Was cleared for the VOR Rwy 04 approach to PIE. This was my first time flying this approach. Approach was dialed into GPS though this is not a GPS overlap approach. VLOC was enabled on GPS. Was using government approach plate. There is no FAF on this approach but there is a step down fix at 3.5 DME called JULSO. GPS provided a fix called FF04 with a distance. I know that GPS approaches need a pseudo fix when there is no designated final approach fix but this was not a GPS approach. I falsely assumed that FF04 was referencing the PIE vortac which is the IAF and MAP. Thus when the GPS distance to FF04 dropped to 3.5 I started my descent to the MDA assuming I was at JULSO. The display I was using on the GPS was one that did not show a moving map but rather time/distance/xtrack/GS/pseudo CDI so I did not have a way to visually confirm I was at JULSO. Tower advised me of an altitude alert. I was at 500 feet which is above minimums when past JULSO. Unfortunately; I was not past JULSO. Fortunately; I was VFR once below 1200 feet so there was no danger of collision with terrain or manmade objects. When advised of the altitude alert I switched to my flight plan page and saw JULSO in the sequence. By this time I was then at JULSO and proceeded with the landing as usual. Since this was not a GPS approach I am still perplexed why the GPS includes a pseudo fix and why it simply did not reference JULSO or PIE VORTAC. I do not use Jeppesen approach plates but I am told they show the pseudo fixes on the approach plates. Had this pseudo fix been shown on my government approach plate it would have eliminated all the confusion. I am trying to access a Jeppesen approach plate for the PIE VOR Rwy 04 approach to see if indeed they show FF04 on it since again; this was not a GPS approach.

While flying a VOR approach in VMC conditions; GA pilot misinterpreted the GPS approach presentation and descended early. This resulted in flight below minimum altitude for that location and subsequent ATC altitude alert call. By the time the radio call for the altitude alert was completed; the aircraft was inside the FAF and at a safe altitude.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

We had just closed the FWD cabin door prior to pushback; when the No. 1 Flight Attendant alerted the cockpit crew that the cabin was filling with smoke.  The Captain instructed me to notify ramp to have the jet bridge brought back into boarding position. As I was notifying ramp via the radio; the Captain and No.1 Flight Attendant were discussing evacuation.  Smoke began to enter the cockpit and a decision by the Captain and No.1 Flight Attendant was made to do an emergency evacuation due to the amount of smoke and the delay in getting the jet bridge back into position. Allowing the gate agent to remain at the jet bridge till the plane is pushed back could provide another avenue of exit/safety if this was to occur again.

After the cabin door was closed and we were preparing for pushback; the number one Flight Attendant stated that there was smoke in the cabin. After confirming the smoke; we called Ramp Control to have the gate agent return and reattach the jet bridge to the aircraft to remove the passengers. We also requested emergency vehicles to meet the aircraft. The smoke continued to get thicker pretty quickly so the number one Flight Attendant and the Captain elected to evacuate the aircraft.

MD83 flight crew was informed by the Lead Flight Attendant that the cabin was filling with smoke as the crew is preparing for push back. The jetway was unable to be moved into position in a timely manner and the Captain elects evacuate at the gate via the slides.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22.1; Flight Crew Total 31.4; Flight Crew Type 31.4

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

I was flying on my first solo flight.  I had just completed my first pattern and landing when I had the excursion.  Everything looked fine until I touched down and lost directional control.  I attempted to use the rudders to bring the airplane back to centerline but the oscillations got bigger; and that is when I exited the runway.

A Student Pilot; on first solo flight; reported losing control during first landing; and exiting the runway surface.


Conflict NMAC; Conflict Airborne Conflict

At 1100ft MSL on LOC and slope for ILS 27 IAH I saw a drone. It passed off the left side of the nose by 15ish ft. It was white with black and green decals/paint. We were close enough I could even see a GoPro type camera on it. It passed off our left without further incident. Was shooting ILS but in VMC conditions. When I saw it I originally said bird. My FO looked on my side and saw it as I said it was a drone. I reported it to IAH tower on 135.15. Then landed without incident.

While flying an ILS approach in VMC; crew encountered a drone and reported the sighting to Tower.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload; Time Pressure

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 165; Flight Crew Type 24000

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

On arrival at ISP we encountered very gusty wind conditions complicated by a wet runway. We selected the best runway based on length and stopping although this put the wind as a crosswind. Just inside the FAF we encountered a wind shear warning and I immediately performed the recovery maneuver. I was out of the wind shear quickly; but the big upward vector I elected to smooth out the climb recovery; and went to approximately 2;600 feet and then began a slow descent back to 2;000 feet as the missed approach altitude. We cleaned up normally. We were right at divert fuel so we immediately began the coordination to go to [our alternate airport].Here's the problem. That divert gas is based on direct routing to the correct altitude. We were held down and slow climbed off vector for minutes; all the while trying to explain we were minimum fuel and needed priority handling. We finally were given FL200 (six thousand short of planned divert altitude). The Captain did a great job of trying to find another divert location ([our alternate] at the time was holding traffic due to traffic saturation). We finally received priority handling and landed without further incident.[We are not] accurately predicting the fuel needed to divert in this busy northeast corridor. We need smarter; location based divert fuels which anticipate expected routings and altitudes. We don't need a primary plan which will require declaring fuel minimum to execute it. I know as an FO I will be much more proactive on this in the future. It was a square corner that was unforeseen at takeoff.

We were cleared ILS Runway 24 at ISP; via 2 NM. Ceiling 400 feet AGL; winds 70/28; gust 48 with moderate turbulence on final. At approximately 800 feet MSL we received a wind shear warning and immediately executed a missed approach using wind shear avoidance techniques. Autothrottles were not engaged during the approach due to turbulence and airspeed deviations. As the PM; I announced the missed approach to the Tower; who after a few seconds cleared us to climb to 2;000 feet MSL on runway heading; and gave us a frequency change to Approach. With the aircraft power setting we used; due to wind shear; we overshot the 2;000 feet MSL cleared altitude to 2;600 feet MSL. I advised Approach on our check-in that we had overshot the 2;000 feet MSL clearance and were correcting. We then proceeded to coordinate a divert to [our alternate] for fuel.Dispatch taxi burn at the departure airport is too low with a single runway for departure for all carriers. We had to adjust our minimum takeoff fuel by 300 pounds due to delays; when we were given a taxi burn of 300 pounds; plus Dispatch added 200 pounds. Even single engine taxi didn't help. Enroute fuel burn is too optimistic; with a planned Top of Descent too close to ISP. ATC routinely starts us down 100-120 NM earlier than the flight plan estimates. A divert fuel burn from ISP to [alternate] assumes a direct routing and climb to optimum altitude. This will not happen in this crowded airspace without declaring minimum fuel! A more ATC regional divert fuel planning calculation needs to be formulated for these crowded airspace considerations.

A flight crew executed a wind shear warning go around at ISP and because of strong winds diverted to nearby airport; but declared minimum fuel because alternate fuel planning in the northeast corridor is not realistic considering traffic and ATC workloads.


Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

In the process of conducting New Hire First Officer (FO) Initial Operating Experience (IOE) we were cleared for the visual approach to Runway 18R in DFW. The IOE student was Pilot Flying (PF) and I was Pilot Monitoring (PM). I was verbally guiding and assisting IOE student in configuring for the approach and correcting several mistakes he was making along the way. Student was still not very timely in executing recommended configuration changes. As a result we ended up at 1;000 feet AGL being 3-5kts fast and full-scale deflection high on the electronic glideslope and VASI.  I called '1;000 feet - UNSTABLE' but the student did not react. He was frozen-up and not reacting as expected. Couple of second later I repeated the '1;000 feet - UNSTABLE' call and as the student again did not respond I called 'Go-Around; Flaps 2' and selected flaps 2. Then I called 'Positive Rate - Gear Up!' and selected gear up. Student finally contributed to the Go-Around by pressing the Takeoff Go Around (TOGA) buttons. As he did not call for any lateral or vertical modes I announced and selected 'HDG' and 'FLCH'.ATC instructed us to fly runway heading and maintain 2;000 feet. As we received that instruction we were already climbing out of 2;300 feet. I told tower controller we were 2;300 feet already and inquired if they would like us to descend back down to 2;000 feet. Tower controller instructed us to fly runway heading and maintain 3;000 feet. Both student and myself were task-saturated and scrambling to keep up with heading changes and instructions from ATC; FD & Guidance Panel configuration; and completing the Go-Around maneuver. As I was working hard to complete PM and at least half of the PF duties at the same time I did not notice that student was not leveling off at 3;000 feet. I became aware of that fact as we were passing through 3;200 feet and immediately advised student to correct altitude and descend to 3;000 feet. Student corrected promptly but by the time climbing trend was reversed we were around 3;300 feet before starting the descent to our assigned altitude of 3;000 feet. Within approximately 10-15 seconds we were back down to 3;000 feet and level. The remainder of the Go-Around and subsequent visual approach and landing were uneventful.During simulator training students should be exposed more to unplanned and unscripted Go-Around events so they can overcome the startle factor easier and be prepared for a Go-Around on any approach.  I should have noticed the lack of a level off and intervened before crossing 3;000 feet.  Perhaps I should have turned the Auto Pilot on earlier to assist with level off at proper altitude instead of allowing student to hand-fly most of the Go-Around after becoming clear that his performance was inadequate.

[Report narrative contained no additional information]

An EMB-175 flight crew reported overshooting their cleared altitude during a go-around that was executed because of an unstable approach flown by the new-hire First Officer.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft X checked in on the ILS approach. I issued him a landing clearance; requested current flight conditions; and issued the RVR. A couple minutes later on the approach I received a Low Altitude Warning. I immediately issued the Low Altitude Warning and the altimeter. Aircraft X responded with roger. I noticed that Aircraft X continued to descend and upon reaching 600 ft at about 4.5 miles out on the ILS approach; I suggested that he climb and begin the missed approach. The pilot responded in the affirmative but still continued to display on the radar that he was descending and then hit 500 ft at about 4 mile final. I double checked again that he was flying the missed and received an affirmative response. It was then that the pilot again responded that he was going missed approach. I immediately coordinated with Approach that I advised the pilot to fly the missed approach; received instructions from them to use the published missed approach and for Aircraft X to maintain 4000 ft. I issued the instructions and shipped Aircraft X back to Approach.I have no idea what the pilot was doing or what he was looking at on his equipment to create this situation. I am not sure what I could have done differently. I am pretty sure I saved this dudes life!

HIO Tower Controller reported issuing Low Altitude Warning to an aircraft on the ILS descended below the glideslope.


Relief Pilot; First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 10500; Flight Crew Type 7000

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I had just finished my break as IRO (International Relief Officer) and gotten into the FO (First Officer) seat to relieve him for his break as we were approaching our 030W waypoint. I had been briefed by the Captain and our Oceanic Clearance was as filed. In the process of way point passage; we realized that our next way point in the FMC was X1N040W when the oceanic clearance had been X2N040W. We immediately entered the proper coordinate in the FMC with no idea how it was changed and began navigating to it. Within a very short period of time; we were queried by Center as to what our next way point was. We stated the X2N040W coordinate and were told to proceed to X1N040W. Neither myself nor the Captain had been aware of any route change before this occurred. To my knowledge; any deviation was very minor and did not conflict with other traffic.

I was Captain for this flight; pilot flying; and was assisted by my regular FO (First Officer); and an IRO (International Relief Officer). The flight departed normally; a few minutes early. We had a deferred APU air system and had to coordinate for a ground source of air and cross bleed start. We worked well as a crew handling this non normal. We departed and climbed to our cruise altitude of FL320. 90 minutes prior to oceanic entry; we requested our oceanic clearance. It was received very quickly and was for exactly as filed; no changes. 90 minutes later; just as we were crossing our oceanic entry point; everything was nominal; the FO (IRO was on break); CPDLC was signed in. [2 minutes later]; we got a CPDLC message saying 'Cleared to [exit point] via route clearance' to which I thought it was our normal; but differently stated verify route message. I said accept; and the IRO hit 'load' (I thought it was an 'accept' prompt) and execute before I noticed it was a load button and I never saw the execute action it was so quickly done. Then we got 5 different CPDLC messages; some of them repeats; about verifying route etc. [for the next 10 minutes]. It was somewhat confusing so many messages. At no time; did any of the messages say there was a change to our clearance. In verbal communications with ATC; no one emphasized; let alone mentioned; there was a change to our clearance. None of us knew this. As we crossed 30West; in ATC with a squawk and VHF communications; we also had a swap out of FO's and one's break was over; and the next one was about to begin. My regular FO took the FO's seat. I was PF (Pilot Flying); and I use a technique I learned on my OE crossing experience of having copied the route in the blocks to RTE 2; I then modify RTE 2 to add my 2 degree check points to display on my ND. At 30W; the 32W check point didn't align with the magenta line. FO and I started to scramble to solve this problem. He went to the flight plan; and the points in it didn't match what was in the FMC. We thought the FO on break might have made a mistake in key entry (even though it was all verified properly before). All I knew was I didn't think I was where I was supposed to be. I turned the plane towards the path I thought we should be on; what was in the flight plan. The FMC was 'corrected' to the mental model of what we thought it should be. It was at about this time Oceanic control on VHF said to us; it appeared we weren't flying to our proper point; and cleared us direct to it; X1N040W. The flight plan and what our oceanic clearance was for X2N040W. We told him this was different for us from our flight plan and clearance. He said it was a change; but it was news to us. It was only going through the log of CPDLC we found the error. On the [earlier ACARS] message; on the green screen; I doesn't say what the points are; or that this is a change; but when you print it out; you see the points and because it was executed so quickly (again; I thought it was an 'accept'); I didn't realize it was loading these new points. Once we got the FMC aligned with the new and proper clearance (again; never were we told with anyone we were communicating with this was a change to our original and filed clearance); I called the dispatcher on the SAT phone to see if he knew of this change. He looked; and didn't see any evidence of change. I gave him the new points; he ran the numbers through [the FMS]. As for the actual transgression; I don't think we deviated more than a few miles for either course; and there was never any conflicts with any other aircraft (there weren't any around). Oceanic control didn't seem to have an issue; and cleared us direct to the way point we needed to go to. I don't know if we were indeed in Radar contact; but we had the makings of it.

B767 flight crew reported a communications breakdown between flight crew and ATC resulted in deviation from assigned ATC clearance.


Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Maintenance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter FOD

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure

As I was assisting with the pneumatic air start I noticed engine one was running with aircraft [pneumatic] hose underneath the engine. I pointed my finger towards the Lead to let him know about the engine. The lead waved both his hands in the air as if don't worry. As I disconnected the pneumatic air start; the Lead walked over to disconnect the aircraft hose. Within seconds; engine one ingested the aircraft hose.

During a pneumatic air start; a Ramp employee alerts his Ramp Lead that the air hose was lying under Number 1 Engine.  Air hose was ingested by Number 1 Engine after Lead attempted to disconnect the pneumatic hose after the air start was completed.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Airport / Aerodrome / Heliport; Recreational Club / Fixed Flying Site; Aircraft / UAS

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

While taxing to parking on NOTAM closed runway UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) operator was flying UAV RC (radio controlled) aircraft over parked aircraft just beyond person directing parking.  My passenger also stated UAV was too close for safety.I stopped aircraft waiting for UAV to be moved but person directing parking was not observing conflict.Called on UNICOM to have something done but no response.  After UAV was further away; parked aircraft and commented to person directing parking about danger of proximity with UAV but he stated he didn't see UAV as he was watching my aircraft.Pilot of aircraft behind my aircraft acknowledged that UAV was too close for safety.UAV pilot stated that the runway was closed and that they were given permission to fly by airport authority but denied flying over parked aircraft.Airport manager stated that RC group all stated that the model was not flown over aircraft.Friends in main hangar stated that they witnessed aircraft over parked aircraft also.Airport manager stated that he talked with RC group and discussed incident but believed that parallax view was involved.

Reporter stated aircraft were being parked on a runway which was closed per published NOTAM for an event. A fixed wing RC aircraft was conducting aerobatics while flying in the vicinity of the closed runway as well as parked and taxing aircraft.

General aviation pilot reported a UAS flying overhead while parking their aircraft. Reporter was concerned with the proximity of the UAS to aircraft.


Flying visual approach; with GPS RNAV as backup as well as PAPI; cleared for the visual with traffic in front. First Officer is fairly new to airplane. I had to talk him through setting up the FMS for the approach as we were cleared for the visual; with a request to maintain 170 KTS to the FAF. He got it set up and I armed NAV; and joined the approach. We were established on course so I dialed in the MDA. I then transitioned outside looking at the traffic in front of us. I had previously flown this approach in IMC and had noticed that the track did not align with the runway and the vertical path started us down early; so I was looking to see if it did it again. Autopilot was still engaged. I noted that the NAV had us aligned between 36L and 36R; which was the same as I had previously experienced. I also noticed that we seemed to be low; on the approach; which also matched up to what I had seen before. A moment later I realized that it was quite low (below a 3 degree glide slope) and then that we had not crossed the FAF. I then realized that I had neglected to re-engage PROF [MD-11's version of VNAV is called PROF]; we had been in PROF; but then ATC gave us a descent; so I had transitioned to a V/S as we were off the path. We had descended a couple of hundred feet under the FAF altitude before I noticed it; turned off the auto pilot and returned to the path. At the same time the jumpseater said 'you are below PROF' continued to uneventful landing.While being tired was probably part of this; a few things contributed to it. A new (to the airplane) First Officer; who was a bit behind and missed it; I was on a visual; so really heads up. In IMC this would not have happened. There is nothing really wrong with our procedures; this was an error that was captured; and it just should have been captured sooner. My expectation bias that the approach had problems contributed to me wrongly assuming that it was the procedure design and not operator error that was causing the deviations (vertically; anyway). Having to spend more time watching the First Officer to ensure he was doing all that he needed to do added some distraction. The visibility was hazy; so we did not have a very clear picture of the runway; PAPI; etc.; and that also led to the illusions that it was not quite a far off as we were. This would make a good simulation event as there are some valuable lessons learned as to flying a visual more like IMC.

MD11 Captain reports getting low during a visual approach in hazy conditions with the autopilot engaged and ostensibly programed to fly the GPS RNAV approach. Vertical speed had been used for descent and PROF had not been reengaged to follow the vertical path.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Somehow the FMS kicked out several fixes that were previously in the flight plan route as both the Captain and I checked the route and all fixes on the ground before the flight. All fixes were there before we departed. As we were climbing we were assigned a new ATC frequency and the controller said he was showing us 2 miles off of our filed course; that's all he said then he passed us over to another controller and he said that he was showing us 3 miles off course; we then asked for Direct to STL as that was the fix we were going to on J134; that was approved with no issues. We got out the paper chart to verify proper course and fixes along with the filed flight plan and legs on Flight release. It seems that the FMS somehow kicked out several fixes on J134. Both the Captain and I checked all of the fixes in the FMS with the flight release and PDC on the ground before the flight and all fixes were in the FMS.

The crew verified all FMS fixes in the flight plan route prior to departure. During the climb out ATC advised the crew of a track deviation. The crew requested and received a new clearance for direct routing.


Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Other; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Dangerous Goods was tendered by Cargo Operations and was planned for passenger flight. Load Crew rejected shipment as it was found to be labeled for cargo only aircraft.

Air Carrier Ground Personnel reported rejecting DG cargo assigned to passenger flight with labeled for 'cargo only aircraft'.


Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

Passenger came to the flight deck after we landed. Said he worked for the FAA and said that he saw a drone pass on the right side of the aircraft.  Said it was about 3 feet wide and a quadcopter. From the description from the passenger of where we were when he saw it I am guessing that it was before the approach. I am guessing we were between 5000-3000 feet. I informed the flight duty officer and base manager who were going to tell act.None

A321 Captain reported a passenger informed the flight crew of a airborne conflict with a UAV during the arrival phase of the flight.


Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Human Factors

Some Cessna CE560XL aircraft have been modified by installing what appear to be non-OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer's) cockpit seats. These newer seats will not adjust downward sufficiently to accommodate a safe seating height for taller pilots. This condition is known; but not acknowledged by Air Carrier Management. This day I was assigned to Aircraft X; a CE560XL aircraft that has been modified with the newer non-standard seat. Upon entry to the cockpit I found that the seat; at its lowest position; was excessively high. This height forces me into a position from which it is unsafe to operate the aircraft. Specifically the safety issues include: 1) The excessive height places my head into dangerous proximity to the stainless steel cockpit visor rail. In Aircraft X this day; the visor rail was below my eye line. Should in-flight turbulence occur (it was both forecast and observed along our route this day) the possibility of head injury due to my head bouncing off this rail would be extremely high. 2) Due to the excessively high sitting position; the top half of the engine instruments panel is obscured by the glareshield. Normal posture and reasonable head and body movements will not bring the panel into a normal scan. In order to see the instruments I have to scrunch down and turn my head sideways in order to look under the glareshield. 3) Due to the excessively high sitting position the flight control yoke contacts my legs and knees during some actuations. I am not able to operate the flight controls through their full range of motion. In a crosswind landing situation this problem would be even worse due to the control position requirements.4) I am not able to adjust the seat to obtain a usable alignment of the fixed reference marks (orange balls on the windscreen center rail) as required by FAR 25.773.d I brought this situation to the awareness of the CE560XL Assistant Chief Pilot (ACP) on duty. Additionally I mentioned that even among the new seats this aircraft seat is excessively high. I indicated that I wanted to request Maintenance because I suspected a jammed adjustment mechanism. In response; my assignment was quickly removed from my duty line. I was told not to write the aircraft up since I no longer have custody of it. Management is fully aware of the problems caused by the installation of these non-standard seats. I first encountered the issue in December 2011. In a phone conversation with my Chief Pilot I learned that the situation was known. Twelve weeks later I was brought to ZZZ1 for a meeting with my Chief Pilot. The purpose of this meeting was to 'take body measurements' and determine if the seat height issue was valid. These 'body measurements' were limited to a highly inaccurate measurement of my sitting height performed by the Chief Pilot. This was done with me sitting on a bench with a tailor's fabric tape measure. I was not shown the measurement or told the results. A blurry photograph was taken at the time. During our meeting; the Chief Pilot insisted that the new seats had the exact specifications of the OEM seats; even though they were clearly higher than the OEM seats. The Chief Pilot suggested no alternative solutions to this problem during our meeting. I believe the purpose of this meeting was to lay the groundwork from which to discipline pilots for refusing to fly these unsafely modified aircraft. I believe that due to my safety objections on this day the company may subject me to discipline for refusal of a flight. Suggest that: First; acknowledge that there is a significant problem with the seats chosen to replace the CE560XL OEM seats. They are clearly not the same and pose a significant safety threat. The problem exists among most pilots who are 5 FT 09 inches or taller. Management is fully aware that a problem exists; yet there has been no communication with the affected pilot group or solution proposed. Management seems to want to deal with this only when a pilotspecifically brings it to their attention - and then only for that pilot. I believe there are many affected pilots who have not expressed concern to management and therefore continue to be placed into potentially unsafe situations. Second; replace the non-standard seats with seats that conform to the OEM specification. In the interim compile a list of the affected aircraft and do not assign pilots above a certain height to these aircraft.

A pilot reports that some of their Cessna CE560XL aircraft have been modified by installing what appears to be Non-Original Equipment Manufacturer (Non-OEM) cockpit seats. The newer; non-standard seats will not adjust downward sufficiently to accommodate a safe seating height for taller pilots. Visual and flight control yoke restrictions were also noted.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was working the Radar Position at Nepta Sector 30.  Several aircraft I was working were routed through the W155A and W155B airspace that I was showing inactive until XB00Z (posted on the SIA).  One of the aircraft; Aircraft X; was showing an airspace alert for W155A even though the SIA board was showing that W155A wouldn't be active until XB00Z and Aircraft X would be clear of the airspace by approximately [50 minutes earlier].  I inquired with the West Area supervisor why we were getting early alerts for the airspace.  I was relieved off Nepta Sector 30 and while in the process of assuming the CIC position from the West Area; the supervisor was told by the Missions Specialist controller that she had released W155A at or below FL320 early starting at XA00Z.  The West Area supervisor had no prior request or notice from the Mission Specialist controller of this time update and informed the Mission Specialist controller that she was unable to release the W155A airspace before XA+20 due to several aircraft that were currently being worked by Sectors 30 and 11 within W155A.  The Mission Specialist controller disregarded the West Area supervisor's instructions and allowed the W155A airspace to Activate at XA00Z.  The STMC came to the West Area to inform the west area supervisor and myself that the airspace could not be recalled and it would be activated at XA00Z.  The STMC approached the Brewton (11) sector to observe the aircraft that were within and about to enter W155A airspace.  The Brewton controller was distracted from the traffic when he was informed that the airspace was going to be activated within 5 minutes.  The Nepta controller was continuing to work on the other side of the area without coordination that the times were being updated.  The STMC asked the Brewton controller to point out the impacted flights to Seabreeze control (controlling agency of W155).  The Brewton controller had to leave the frequencies several times to call the Seabreeze controllers and coordinate several pointouts and then coordinate this information with the Nepta controller.  Both controllers were distracted by this situation and were not able to concentrate on working their sectors.  The controllers also had additional workload tasked on them to ensure that the Seabreeze controllers were aware of the aircraft that would be transiting through the W155 airspace and quickly ensure that other aircraft they were working were rerouted around it.  Neither controller were sure that ZHU sectors were informed in a proper amount of time to reroute around W155A and B.  The Missions Specialist Controller and the STMC positions should provide areas proper notice for future SUA airspace release requests.  The Missions Specialist Controller released ZJX airspace to a military controlling agency without the proper approval from the areas controlling this airspace.

ZJX Controller describes a situation where aircraft were in or in close proximity to a warning area and the lack of coordination leading up to the airspace becoming active.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS 03R

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 69; Flight Crew Type 1648

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance

I checked in with Tower on the ILS 03R. They said 'Continue 03R'. I had trouble understanding the Controller and said 'Understand cleared to land 3R?' They said 'Negative; continue for 3R'. I acknowledged the 'continue.' There was a lot of communications in two different languages and the English was challenging to understand. Approaching 1000 feet we were fully configured; landing checklist complete. I had not heard a landing clearance; and had not acknowledged a landing clearance. I noticed the preceding aircraft had cleared the runway. During the 1000 foot call we set missed approach altitude and emphasized internally we hadn't thought we'd received a landing clearance. I tried several times to attempt to get clearance but could not get a response from Tower as there was continuous communications on the frequency. Other aircraft were cleared to land on 03L and there was a long clearance given to another aircraft. Passing 500 feet we were stable and still on autopilot. I tried to break in on the frequency again but they cleared another aircraft into line up and wait after the 737 (us) landed on 3R. The Captain directed me to try again around 100 feet but the frequency was in use. There is certainly a chance in there I stepped on the actual landing clearance. The Captain ascertained that we were most likely cleared to land and that to go around at that point with it being night time; terrain at the departure end; and the issues we were having understanding the Controllers that the safest course of action was to flare and land. We landed normally and taxied uneventfully to the gate. I understand the Captain's thought process and decision; I will say it still surprised me as I was in a go-around mindset at the time.

B737NG First Officer reported landing without a clearance in MPTO after experiencing communication difficulties with the Tower.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 113; Flight Crew Type 1259

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 172; Flight Crew Total 940; Flight Crew Type 465

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

On arrival on the TELLR2 Arrival; 10 miles prior to CRAGG ATC requested us to slow to 210 KTS and then expedite to 10;000. The Captain slowed to 210 and then expedited to 10;000 by switching from VNAV to LVL CHG. Shortly after we were cleared for the approach. I put 7;000 in the MCP for the FAF altitude at CORDE. At approximately 9;700 feet I noticed we were below the published minimum altitude of 10;000 and advised the Captain. At 9;300 feet he started a climb back to 10;000. The error we made was not going back into VNAV after being cleared for the approach.

Neither of us noticed being out of VNAV and we descended to 9;300 feet before we changed the altitude back to 10;000 which was the minimum altitude prior to our next fix.

Air carrier flight crew descended below a STAR published minimum altitude due to being in FMC LVL CHG rather than VNAV mode.


While on the RNAV (GNSS) RWY 08 at MDPP; just prior to KELSO FAF we received a terrain; terrain; pull up pull up warning.  An escape maneuver was executed and the aircraft leveled off at approximately 4;000 on the RNAV (LNAV) approach path to the runway.  A missed approach was declared to Santo Domingo Control.  The aircraft broke out into VFR conditions over the airfield; called the field in sight and entered a downwind to land visually.  	The MDPP Briefing Page provides a caution to B757/767 aircraft regarding 'nuisance GPWS warnings;' and suggests that the aircraft 'must be configured for landing no later than the PP351;' the turn to final.  This note should be made more forceful.  Terrain terrain; pull up; pull up is hardly a 'nuisance' warning when IMC.  It is a life saving warning that cannot be ignored.  If it were made clear that the warning would be terrain terrain; or more forceful in its language to dictate non-standard approach procedures we may have fully complied with the Briefing Page notes.  Instead we intercepted the RNAV approach course at 180 knots; flaps 15.  Although we were stable with the auto-pilot/LNAV/VNAV our terrain closure rate still triggered the warning.  If the tolerance on this approach is so tight that the approach speed of the aircraft determines the safety margin then I argue the tolerances are unacceptably tight.  This approach procedure should be removed from the authorized [approach procedures]. Either way; I will personally never attempt that approach again; fully configured or not. The VOR 26 with a circle to land is 1;000 times safer.  [The RNAV] is an unsafe procedure.

B757 First Officer experiences a terrain warning approaching KELSO during the RNAV Runway 08 approach to MDPP and takes evasive action.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Similar sounding call signs are going to cause a serious accident if action is not taken. I estimate 20 plus aircraft in my sector during the time of incident. The sector should have been de-combined but the FLM was not engaged. I issued a descent clearance to Air Carrier ZXX from FL330 to FL310 to get them under the A330 who was descending to FL320 landing MDPC. Opposite direction to Air Carrier ZXX was Air Carrier XXX at FL340 who took the descent clearance for Air Carrier ZXX; FL340 descending to FL310. So Air Carrier ZXX is still at FL330 with the A330 converging and descending through FL340 for FL320. It was too late to stop the descent of the A330. I screamed at Air Carrier ZXX to begin the descent thinking the pilot thought it was a PD. Air Carrier XXX heard this and realized what was going on meanwhile he was opposite to Air Carrier ZXX. Now these two were both descending to FL310. Air Carrier ZXX barely got under the A330 in time and now Air Carrier XXX started climbing back up to FL340. Air Carrier XXX said I had told them initially to descend to FL310 and they had read it back. Regardless who did what; that was very close and unsafe and was a direct result of this similar sounding call sign madness that plagues our industry. Please make this situation a top priority to mitigate. ZSU has the same call signs everyday and it is reported dozens of times and nothing happens.

During flight we were advised by San Juan Center that Company Flight ZXX was on the same frequency. We acknowledged; as did Flight ZXX. Approximately 5 minutes after level off at FL340; ATC issued a descent to FL310 for traffic to Flight XXX (our callsign). We acknowledged and used our callsign and begun a descent to FL310. About three minutes later; as we were leveling at FL310; we heard ATC question Flight ZXX about why they had not started their descent. They said they had not been given a clearance and were immediately directed to descend and turn for traffic. I realized that the Controller had given the descent to us instead of Flight ZXX. I questioned ATC as to the altitude he wanted us at and pointed out that he had given Flight XXX the descent not Flight ZXX. He immediately told us to return to FL340 and expedite through FL320. The Controller got confused by the similarity in the call signs. Maybe we could investigate our flight numbers and routes to try to reduce the number of similar call signs in close proximity to each other.

ZSU Controller voiced concern regarding the continued use of similar sounding call signs by aircraft operating within their airspace citing a recent conflict resulting from similar sounding call signs.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 23

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X was released off BDR RWY 6 (BridgeHaven6 SID); Tower assigns 2;000 feet on departure.  A VFR helicopter on a discrete code was east of BDR by approximately 5 miles; heading approximately 060; indicating 3;000 feet when I released Aircraft X.  At approx XX00Z; without coordination or warning; the VFR helicopter suddenly turned to a heading of approximately 330; towards JSD; and began descending.   While this heading was sufficient to keep the helicopter out of BDR's Class D airspace; it would put the helicopter only approximately 0.1 NM outside of it.  More importantly; the helicopter was descending into the BDR departure corridor; just as Aircraft X was becoming airborne.  When Aircraft X checked in on the frequency; I instructed him to maintain 2;000 feet and indent; at this point the helicopter was indicating approximately 2;500 feet just east of the departure corridor for BDR RWY 6; and I was expecting JSD Tower to instruct the helicopter to maintain that altitude until west of the departure corridor.  Instead; the helicopter continued descending; again; no coordination; no point-out; and no communication from JSD Tower; towards the departing Aircraft X.  I had to issue an evasive turn to the southeast (heading 120) to Aircraft X and issue a Safety Alert.  Targets merged 5 NM northeast of BDR (MILUM intersection); both aircraft indicating 2;000 feet.  This is an on-going problem with JSD Tower; whereby N90 controllers have to give evasive maneuvers to IFR aircraft under our control to avoid VFR helicopters under JSD Tower's control.  Recommend that JSD Tower keep their traffic clear of arrival and/or departure corridors of the adjacent area airports (BDR; HVN; and OXC); and give vectors and/or altitudes to its helicopters to stay out of the way of N90 traffic.  When either of these options are not possible or practical; JSD needs to coordinate with N90 ISP Sector (they can reach us on the land line) when they have to maneuver there helicopter traffic around or across arrival or departure corridors of the adjacent airports (BDR; HVN; and OXC) or when they become aware that one of their helicopters is in conflict with N90 traffic; in accordance with FAAO 7110.65 procedures.

N90 Controller reports of a NMAC due to a helicopter that isn't coordinated that descends through the departure corridor of a close proximity airport.