Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure; Human Factors

Facility was mid-way through a 48 hour ERAM test. Received position briefing and relieved RADAR position. Went to invoke 'pref-set' (Preferential Settings) for this sector and there were none. I had apparently overwritten Sector X 'pref-set' the night before when using an atypical sector combination. I was using the previous Controller's 'pref-set' until I could update my own with 21 plus aircraft under my control. Air Carrier Y was in the middle of a 2 gate double arrival stream. Air Carrier X was an overflight 'swimming upstream;' requested a descent clearance to FL310 from FL350. Several of the south stream aircraft had been descended to FL320 to clear traffic; now given FL300 for Air Carrier X new requested altitude. The plan was to wait for descent on Air Carrier Y until past Air Carrier X at FL350; then Air Carrier X requested lower. Air Carrier Y needed descent due to proximity to arrival gate and Air Carrier X's lower altitude. Air Carrier X was given a left turn 15 degrees for his descent and cleared to FL330 interim. Air Carrier Y was descended to FL300 then given a gate crossing clearance of FL190. When Air Carrier X was established north of traffic; cleared to FL310; the RADAR Associate updated Air Carrier X route. The route was close to Air Carrier Y; but appeared to clear; so Air Carrier X was cleared on course to preclude a further conflict with aircraft on either arrival stream. Air Carrier X passed Air Carrier Y; both aircraft descending and appeared to clear with minimum separation of 5 NM. Recommendation; take more time to establish that correct ERAM 'pref-set' is available. Using another Controller's 'pref-set' is definitely a distraction and disadvantage. It would have been more prudent to clear Air Carrier x on course 'reaching FL310'; giving more time and altitude margin to ensure separation.

Enroute Controller described a probable loss of separation event during a ERAM testing period; the Controller listed the lack of Preferential Settings ('pref-set') availability as one causal factor.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Doing a line check and noted the low state of charge (32%) and the non-Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) cord being used from the cockpit power plug.Crew member insisted he started the trip at 100% and the one leg depleted his iPad to this level. I have no reason to doubt him. I do have huge concerns that the iPad is not up to the demands we are placing on it and the rush to remove QRH's will aggravate the problem. Note that this non-OEM cord is sold as an Apple-approved device; but; it's NOT an Apple OEM part. This cord is exceptionally long and will reach completely across the cockpit.

B757 Check Pilot reported noticing a crew member charging his iPad using an aftermarket cord; and expressed concern about that usage and about the rapid iPad battery discharge rate.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 32170; Flight Crew Type 120

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors

I was flying the PUFFR.PUFFR4 RNAV Arrival into Denver's Centennial Airport. I have flown this procedure many times in the past and am actually quite familiar with this arrival. I am kicking myself over this flub-up because I got caught up in helping a relatively new jet pilot learn the intricacies of flying an RNAV arrival and using the old school; but very helpful 3 to 1 descent planning and execution. The emphasis on this arrival was the descent planning and of course complying with the published restrictions.I will jump ahead here before I list the details of my flub-up. When I was asked to call the TRACON I asked the Controller a question or two. I knew the answers before I asked; but I asked these questions anyway. (1) Was I the first to have made this mistake? I said it is rare for me to be the trailblazer in the mistake department. There are usually pilots that had blundered the same mistake before me and there will probably be others to follow. (2) I took full responsibility; but when I asked ATC for the relief on the altitude restriction why didn't they say something RIGHT NOW. They knew I was blundering; but made no mention of it.I said that I have a partial fix to this RNAV Arrival that could offer some relief to perhaps a large percentage of the flub-ups. Please excuse my use of the word flub-up. I can't think of any other at the moment! Please refer to the PUFFR.PUFFR4 RNAV arrival that pertains to landing on Runway 17L at Centennial airport. This arrival when landing to the south is very intense. It is a high energy; go down and slow down arrival when landing south. When landing to the north it takes forever and you have time to knit a sweater; landing south it is a different matter and it is a poorly designed arrival.My last statement was confirmed by the Denver TRACON Controller who mentioned there are a lot of issues with this procedure. As I write this; I still take full responsibility; but I suggested to the TRACON a possible solution that will help with future pilots conducting this approach.Take out all fixes not associated with an altitude or speed restriction. Eliminate the SLMON FL210 restriction and show the SAYGE restriction at a hard FL210. If possible show the holding pattern at SAYGE and eliminate the SLMON fix altogether on this procedure. Either change the turning point at FFFAT to transition to landing on Runway 35R to DHATT which has the crossing restriction of 15;000 feet which would conform to the LADDA at or above 13;000 feet restriction and then the only restriction at HUUKK would be a speed change/reduction to 210 knots. If they can't make the changes I am suggesting simply use the coding PUFFR.PUFFR4 for landing on Runway 17L. That arrival would not have the intersection of FFFAT depicted. For landings required on Runway 35R; have a new procedure that is identical to the PUFFR.PUFFR4; but it would be used only for that runway. I suggest they call it the FLLUB.FLLUB4 for Runway 35R at APA.The reason I flubbed-up was because this arrival is overly complex and of course I could have done better. My goal is to print out this arrival and make the suggested changes and drive them over to the TRACON. I know it is not an easy thing to change a procedure; but this must be done. Why and how did a seasoned and usually very successful aviator make such a stupid mistake?We crossed SAYGE at FL210; MOKME at 17;000 feet and DHATT at 15;000 feet. All was well and I do not remember what took place; but as a guess between my flight instructing; running the approach checklist; perhaps a frequency change; sneezing. I looked at the distance to the next fix and said; we have got to get down to make the CREEQ crossing restriction. When it looked doubtful I asked approach for relief on the 11;000 foot CREEQ restriction. When I called on the telephone after the flight; I was told I asked for this when we were descending through 12;400 feet. I place no blame on the Controller; but I sure wish they would have told me I was messing up. They could have even said I was flubbing-up and stop your descent. How about 'climb and maintain 13;000 feet; you obviously need help flying this procedure!Of course what I did was I believed that FFFAT was the LADDA intersection. The airplane I was flying has an old Universal UNS-1D FMS and unlike the more modern displays doesn't show the altitude restrictions in printed form on the map. I have always said that there is nothing difficult to flying airplanes. If you take each and everything we do individually it isn't so hard. I guess you can say that about most occupations; flying; Air traffic Controlling; etc. But; when you put everything together it can get complex and of course once you fixate on one thing; you are destined to miss something important. That of course was I got ahead of myself and confused fixes.The fix I confused is a fix that does not even matter for the arrival and the runway we were going to land on. Get rid of FFFAT when landing to the South or as I suggested make the turn at DHATT. I am at the mercy of the higher ups on this one. I am a career aviator and must fly for a living for many years. What I would give to know that this flub-up perhaps might help others and I am off the hook. It just popped into my head the movie 'Catch Me If You Can'. You know where they put Frank in jail and then later the FBI realizes that he might be able to help them catch other crooks. I am not saying that I'm as good as Frank in writing hot checks; but I will offer my services to help the FAA clean-up RNAV arrivals anywhere where there is a history of possible pilot deviations. Similar to the hot spots on Airport Diagrams; could these reoccurring issues be highlighted on all instrument procedures plates?

A pilot reported he confused the fixes on an RNAV STAR and descended below a published restriction of the RNAV STAR.


Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

While descending through 2;600 FT on a 3-5 mile left base the EGPWS commanded 'obstacle; PULL UP!' Alert went away as soon as the descent rate was arrested. Crew elected to abandon approach and circle back to land. No further alerts were received and landing was uneventful. Passengers did not seem to notice and were unfazed by the event.

A C560XL flight crew responded appropriately to an EGPWS obstacle warning while on a left base to their destination.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Equipment / Tooling; Software and Automation

Possible confusion in planning and filing due to cut over to 5G.

Air carrier Dispatcher reported a possible mistake while processing a flight's documents during the 5G crossover period.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 129; Flight Crew Type 11000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Type 7000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were given clearance from ZZZ Tower to 'taxi into and hold; Runway 25R; keep proceeding Company aircraft in sight.' After having lined up; stopped; and holding on Runway 25R; I kept my eyes on the proceeding Company aircraft taking off while reaching down to set the parking brake and inadvertently moved number one start lever off the START position causing number one engine to roll back. Realizing what I had done; I immediately placed the number one start lever to CUTOFF and directed First Officer to request Tower that we needed to clear the runway; and he immediately made that request. Just after that transmission; ZZZ Tower issued takeoff clearance but we declined the takeoff clearance and again requested that we needed to clear off. We were given taxi clearance and we cleared the runway at Taxiway B1 and no aircrafts were in the vicinity. Tower asked if we needed assistance and we declined. We subsequently cooled and cleared the affected engine and accomplished engine start; made a PA to the Passengers; waited for Ops Limit of two minutes; and accomplished Before Taxi and Before Takeoff Checklists and then took off. All engine parameters were normal.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

The Captain inadvertently selected the #1 start lever instead of the parking brake after lining up on the runway while focused on the instructions to keep the preceding company aircraft in sight.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Staffing

I was trying to be helpful staying on overtime to help dayshift wing walk Aircraft X into the hanger because they didn't have enough people to do so. The plane arrives back from the gate to the hanger. We hook up the tow bar with tug to start moving the aircraft inside. Me and Person 2 were the only wing walkers and Person 3 was on the tug. Person 3 didn't have a tail walker. So he starts moving the plane inside the hanger nose in. Well; as Person 3 is moving the plane he angles the plane to me so he clears Person 2 side because the hanger doors were not opened all the way. After Person 3 clears Person 2 wing tip on his side; he cuts the wheel so the wing tip on my side would clear. Well when he cut the wheel; he could no longer see me and if I went in his line of sight I would no longer be able to see if the wing tip clears; so Person 2 was walking to my side so he could tell how much clearance we have and that's when I crossed my arms and said cut it stop because the wing tip was going to hit the hanger door and Person 3 kept moving with the tug and hit the hanger door with the right hand wing tip and Person 2 even seen me cross my arms and he didn't say anything to the tug driver.The tug driver should have had a tail walker before tugging the aircraft and the hanger doors should have been more open but Person 3 said it was enough room  also Person 2should have told Person 3 the tug drivers I had my arms cross to stop.

During tow of CRJ-200 aircraft into hanger; wing tip contacted hanger door.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 28000; Flight Crew Type 2500

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

This was a ferry flight in a 767 with the winglets. Weather VMC and direct crosswind of 15 knots. Some discussion with load planning on taxi out as they seemed to be unfamiliar with planning numbers for a ferry flight. Trim was 1.8 which is quite a bit further forward than normal. Normal start of takeoff roll with a slight input forward stick and slight aileron into the wind. Speeds were 118 124 136 for very light weight. First Officer called V1 and at this time the aircraft lifted itself into the air without any input from me and well below rotate speed. Started pushing forward on yoke to lower nose and aircraft began to drift/skid toward the downwind side of the runway. Would not climb; controls extremely mushy and as I pushed the nose further down it settled back on the mains back on the runway. Speed began to build and gently flew plane off the runway with still nose down elevator input. Remainder of climb uneventful and upon leveling off; trim setting on autopilot was in the 3.5 to 4.0 range. Sent a request to inspect aircraft and cargo holds upon arrival. They said all cargo bays were empty. As I looked around the aircraft I noticed that the nose strut was fully extended and the aircraft was slightly tipped toward the rear. This after a normal landing with autobrakes 2 and a fairly rapid deceleration. In my entire career this is the closest I have ever come to loosing control of an aircraft which could have resulted in destroying the aircraft. I just barely saved this one.

B767 Captain experiences an early lift off on a ferry flight as the First Officer is calling V1. The aircraft touches down again before finally becoming airborne and continuing to destination.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

We were cleared to taxi via Charlie onto Runway XX and hold short of Runway YY. We taxied onto Runway XX took a left and I said clear left after I saw company taxi across Runway YY; and my co-pilot said 'watch out for the guy on the right!' I saw a Cirrus approaching Runway YY and slammed on the brakes. I heard my Lead Flight Attendant let out a yelp and lifted off the brakes after I heard her scream and crash into the flight deck door.As I let off the brakes the Cirrus was 100 FT above us and well beyond the nose of our airplane. I mistakenly crossed over onto Runway YY. I saw no more danger so I continued to cross so I would not be in the middle of the runway. We stopped after that and contacted ground who told us to write down a phone number and contact Tower at our destination. We landed in [the airport] and I made the phone call immediately to Tower. I talked to a very nice gentlemen who said he wished he could handle this in house but it he would have to pass it along to regional office and then to the FSDO. I told him I was in the wrong and accept full responsibility. He said 'unfortunately these things happen.' I then contacted both chief pilots.

I believe both the Captain and I had become accustomed to having the same taxi instructions for the past five days in a row. To the best of my knowledge; we are routinely cleared for that taxi route without holding short at Runway YY. I think that we got too relaxed in the comfortable environment and failed to verify with each other our complete taxi instructions at every intersection. Slowing down and verbal verification between the Captain and First Officer of runway crossing/hold short instructions are undoubtedly key. Also; to always review written down taxi instructions at each and every runway or taxiway intersection prior to entering that runway/taxiway.

While taxiing on intersecting runways for takeoff; an MD-83 flight crew experienced a close encounter with a Cirrus on final to a runway they had been cleared to hold short of. Fatigue induced complacency and familiarity were cited as contributing factors.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Weather

Operating on night configuration and I had assumed control of TRACON's airspace. Aircraft X and Aircraft Y were tied looking for approach clearances into AGS. Aircraft Y had already been assigned direct field and descent clearance so I gave Aircraft X holding instructions to wait for Aircraft Y's cancellation/down time. Aircraft X's pilot seemed irritated that he had to hold for a clearance into AGS at midnight.I informed the pilot that the Center can only provide services one in/one out. I issued Aircraft X holding instructions. A short time later Aircraft X's pilot inquired if could he cancel his IFR flight plan and proceed VFR into AGS. I informed him that he could at which point Aircraft X cancelled his IFR flight plan and continued his flight VFR. Aircraft Y was proceeding on a Visual Approach clearance into AGS. Sometime later Aircraft Y reported weather conditions did not permit him to go in visually and he had already began his turn away from AGS and started a climb out towards the ILS. I issued Aircraft Y a clearance direct to the initial approach fix for a procedure turn inbound. Aircraft Y later reported that an aircraft had descended through his altitude in close proximity going into AGS. He was concerned the pilot of that aircraft could not see him. I informed him it was most likely the aircraft which had cancelled IFR and was proceeding VFR into the field. Aircraft Y continued on to perform the ILS approach. Before leaving he voiced his concern that there were definitely IFR condition at AGS.

ZTL Center Controller reported an IFR aircraft going missed from a visual approach had a VFR aircraft descend through his altitude in IMC.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 192; Flight Crew Total 3656; Flight Crew Type 1181

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Prior to pushback from the gate; at night and in the rain; the pushback crew had a hard time hearing me on the headset and repeatedly asked me to speak up. They came through to me intermittently and then just before push; communications seemed normal. As we were pushing back parallel to the gate; ramp requested we push deeper to give another aircraft room to push. I passed along this info to the pushback crew and received no response. The aircraft was stopped in the normal push position (not the newly requested position) and I could tell that the push crew was trying to communicate with me but nothing was coming through. Again; I said (loudly) to push us further back. I received no verbal acknowledgment; but we did eventually push further back. After we stopped I received no communication to set brakes. I could see confusion on the ramp and someone gave me the 'stop' sign. I set the brakes; then the tow bar was disconnected and someone ran out to show me the bypass pin as the tug pulled away. In the meantime; we tried to contact Operations to have a new headset brought out to the push crew; but by then we were understanding each other with hand signals. The difficulty was that it was raining and the pushback crew was standing to the side of the cockpit where we have no way to clear the windshield and I could barely see them through the window due to the rain.

B767 Captain reported that a faulty headset resulted in a communication breakdown with the ground crew during pushback.


Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

During takeoff (rotation); both windscreens shattered. We were able to see out of both sides. We climbed straight ahead and notified ATC of the malfunction and stated our intentions to return to the departure airport. We requested vectors back around to give us time to run the QRH; send the diversion report; ACARS Dispatch; run checklists; [alert] the Flight Attendant; notify passengers; etc. We did declare an emergency. Once we were ready; we let ATC know and we were vectored for a visual approach to the runway. We were experiencing moderate turbulence due to high winds in the area so I decided to land overweight so as not to stay airborne any longer than we needed to. We landed on the runway (smooth touchdown 200 FPM) with no further problems and taxied to gate. Called Maintenance and wrote up the defects and overweight landing. We swapped aircraft and did our turn with no problems. Both the First Officer and Flight Attendant did an excellent job during the event. [We had] slight vision impairment due to shattered windscreens [also] gusty conditions on the ground and turbulent in-flight conditions. I have never seen both windscreens shatter like that before.

The winds were gusty out of the west-northwest at 25-30 KTS and the reporter stated that he had rudder and aileron inputs to counter the weather veining. When the nose came off the ground during rotation; the reporter stated; 'It was like someone flipped a switch that made both windshields crack simultaneously.' He personally suspects that the fuselage may have been momentarily tweaked by the wind and the crosswind corrections. The windshield heat was ON and the OAT was around 50F at the time of the event. The mechanics stated that they had never seen simultaneous windshields crack.

We had to ask ATC three times before they finally gave us a vector back East due to other traffic; despite us already declaring an emergency and reporting the turbulence. After running all appropriate checklists and contacting our company and operations we returned to departure airport where the Captain made a very soft over-weight landing. According to the Flight Attendant some passengers were crying and one had vomited in the aisle. In addition to the obvious threat of obscured vision and extreme damage to the windshields as well as the uncertainty of the structural integrity of the inner panes; several other threats occurred. The wind and turbulence in the area this day was horrible with some of the worst turbulence I have ever experienced giving me more doubt about the safety of the windshields. It was a dual FMS aircraft and while I was attempting to type the diversion report; the ACARS on my side failed. I then had to reach across the thrust levers to type on the Captain's side where it was difficult to type especially with the turbulence. The CDU initially did not accept the text I had just typed and was attempting to line select. Both of these latter problems from my experience are rather common and have not been fixed or not even addressed to my knowledge. In an emergency especially; I feel our safety was degraded by the failure of the ACARS and time I wasted sending a diversion report on equipment that was not working properly. Overall I feel the Captain and I had good CRM and worked well together. He was very calm and procedural while delegating responsibility to me as he continued to fly. I am honestly very concerned about the safety of my Company and in particular about the maintenance practices of this airline. I have noticed more MEL's on the airplanes and more incidents occurring due to cutting costs.  Understanding that mistakes happen; I am angered that both windshields would break on takeoff with no apparent cause besides design flaw or improper maintenance endangering the lives of the passengers and crew. I have been flying the EMB-145 for nearly 5 years and as a pilot I am not phased by that much; but I was admittedly scared by this event.

Both forward windshields on an EMB145 shattered during rotation for takeoff. An emergency was declared and the aircraft returned to the departure airport after delayed ATC vectors in moderate to severe turbulence.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 4240; Flight Crew Type 30

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Well making an approach to Runway 02 at night impacted tops of tree branches on short final landed safely no injuries to pilot or passengers. I will be taking additional training with a CFI regarding approaches and landing at night.

The reporter stated that he had flown into this airport before and knew about the trees. He simply got too low on the approach. The only damage was dent in a wing.

A pilot reported impacting tree branches on short final during a night visual approach followed by a safe landing with no injuries.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Airport; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

During taxi; the clearance was E; R; D. Approaching the sign for R; the taxiway immediately to the right was the correct one. From our position it appeared that there was ground access (in green) only beyond that position. After turning onto that taxiway it was apparent that the turn should have occurred after the sign. The aircraft was stopped. Ground Control came on and said; 'That's not R.' We answered we realized that as the turn was completed. We were told to hold for a 'follow me' vehicle. We were guided back to E. Ground then cleared us via E; R; D to the gate. We apologized. He said that we were not the first to take that turn and probably won't be the last. The signage was misleading; the view indicated blockage beyond the point. Not stopping before the turn to verify with Ground Control. The problem remains that we were using the airport chart and still made the wrong decision.

LAX Taxiway R signage on Taxiway E misleads pilots to taxi into Taxiway E-13 because the sign is closer to E-13 than R.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 9000

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

[We were] established on final [when] I called for the gear down; landing checklist. The Captain lowered the landing gear handle and we both noticed the left main landing gear light did not illuminate. After a very brief discussion we both decided not to attempt a landing. At approximately 1;000 feet we executed a normal go around and were cleared to 4;000 feet. At 4;000 feet we were vectored by ATC allowing time to declare an emergency; execute the Gear Disagree [checklist] and review the Partial Gear Landing checklist. After executing the appropriate checklists we were vectored to final; executed an uneventful landing and stopped straight ahead on runway.

[On final; after placing gear handle down] left main gear light did not illuminate. Pressed the light fixture and light did illuminate while being held in. Test switch on overhead panel would NOT illuminate the light. Between 1;000 feet and 500 feet we elected to go missed approach. Did a normal go around and accepted 4;000 feet and vectors. Advised flight attendants what was happening. Prior to downwind gear lever placed down with same results. Pressed light fixture numerous times with same results. Accomplished the Gear Disagree checklist including alternate gear extension with no improvement in the condition. Declared an emergency; asked company be notified and equipment standing by. Said we would stop straight ahead on the runway. Flight attendants told to prep for emergency landing with possible left gear collapse. Inside 500 feet I advised BRACE over the PA. Landed without incident. Advised [passengers] over PA to remain seated. Stopped on the runway. Met by crash equipment and awaited for Maintenance to arrive and pin all three gear. Taxied to gate without incident.

A320 flight crew reported left main gear light remained out after gear extension. They ran appropriate checklists; declared an emergency; and landed normally.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Ramp

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action

I was a bit frustrated that the Ops Agent wanted to leave 60+ plus customer bags due to the broken carousel at the front of the airport. Even with Dispatch approval for 10 late departure; the Ops Agent said higher ups wanted the flight to leave on time. It seemed a bit arbitrary. I believe I mistakenly released the parking [brake] during rudder pedal adjustment. I don't know what caused the aircraft to roll backwards. I applied [brakes] and the aircraft stopped about 12 feet back from original position. I observed no damage to Captain's pitot probe or angle of attack sensor. Ground Crew confirmed no damage. Safety walkaround completed. No damage. No injuries. No call from ATC. I am self-reporting to improve safety.

B737-800 Captain reported an inadvertent release of the parking brake; allowing the aircraft to roll forward.


Flight Crew Total 12080; Flight Crew Type 10870

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

I was the Pilot Flying as FO; and the CA was Pilot Monitoring on our final leg to SNA. Prior to our initial descent into SNA we had conducted a thorough arrival and approach briefing which reviewed the terrain located in the vicinity of the final approach course; and also GPWS cautions and warnings (as well as the appropriate recoveries to me made in the event of a GPWS caution or warning). The CA has also commented that with the new DSNEE routing careful caution should be made to the rate of descent; as a high rate of descent could cause GPWS alert. We were cleared for a visual approach to runway 20R at SNA and I had asked the CA to extend BONKE in the FMGC. I maneuvered the aircraft in heading mode just outside of LEMON intersection. The CA set 2200 as the MSA at LEMON; as we continued our descent; I shifted my heading about 5 degrees (still inside BONKE); just as the ALT displayed; a 'terrain; terrain' warning sounded momentarily. We both had visual of the terrain; and also noted the Radar Altimeter reflecting a positive trend as we continued the approach. After a successful approach the CA and I debriefed the event at the gate. We should have set 2800 as our ALT in the FCU as my intercept angle to the final approach had changed by a few degrees vs the lower 2200 at LEMON. This was a positive learning experience; especially as a new FO.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A320 flight crew reported a terrain warning during a day visual approach to Runway 20R at SNA and continued the approach to landing while the terrain warning quickly silenced.


The lack of taxiway signs at CHS needs to be addressed. We were day VFR with unlimited visibility so we were able to figure out where we were and where to go. In low visibility conditions or at night; however; the potential for a serious problem exists. Our clearance was to taxi to Runway 21 via B; C; A and cross Runway 33. Taxiway B is not marked at all. There is no sign indicating [Taxiway] C until after you turn onto C. Then the worst situation is there are no signs at all for [Taxiway] A until way after you turn onto A (your best guess) and come up on Runway 33. You don't see that sign until you have been taxiing for a while.

An air carrier Captain advised the Taxiway signage at CHS is inadequate and could be hazardous under low visibility conditions.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Departed and was in slow climb/cruise. Could hear what I thought was an unusual noise. Removed ANR headset; put it back on; I thought maybe-maybe not-not sure. Just had sense something wasn't right (gut). I fly this particular regularly. Scanned all instrumentation. Engine has a chip detector. Moved throttle; prop and mixture. I could find nothing amiss. Shortly thereafter-severe vibration; total loss of power; oil on windshield. Knew ZZZ airport immediately behind me- initiated return to ZZZ. Total time from thinking something was wrong to failure was about 2 minutes. I came up with that time based on I knew where I was when I detected something to where I was when failure occurred and I knew my ground speed. So that time estimate is not a guess. Landed successfully on all three tires at ZZZ. Examination revealed failure of connecting rod bolt on #2 cylinder. Not sure how that could have been discovered prior to flight; engine was well maintained and well within TBO limits. Human Factors- experience and training played out well. I always try to have some kind of an idea of where to go in such an event. I try to fly to minimize risk of off airport landings; whether that be by altitude or route. 6 miles 140 kts. Startle factor- I failed to set up best glide as quickly as I had wished. While I was pretty sure I had good margin to get back to ZZZ that was not confirmed until I completed the 180 turn to get headed back to the field. A glance at the airspeed at that point was when I realized I had not yet established best glide.

Bonanza pilot reported an engine failure resulting in a forced landing.


Gulfstream Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Y was in a MOA 500B590.  Aircraft X was in a block 490B510 and flew into the airspace that Aircraft Y was in.  I thought you had to miss the airplane but apparently you have to miss the whole airspace; which can be the whole state of ND.  Aircraft Y and Aircraft X were 141 miles apart.  I think this is ridiculous. Miss just the airplane.

A ZMP Controller reports of a loss of separation because a UAV was in a MOA and another aircraft was in the same MOA. The aircraft he was in control of was inside of the MOA and should not have been.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3; Flight Crew Total 985; Flight Crew Type 50

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Performing a wheel landing in C120. During landing rollout right crosswind caused aircraft to veer right. Aircraft pitched forward causing propeller to strike runway surface. Aircraft continued to veer right until main wheels contacted soft grass on right side of runway. Aircraft flipped inverted on right side of runway. Aircraft occupants where not injured.

A C120 pilot reported losing control during rollout resulting in a runway excursion and the aircraft flipping onto its back.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 18700; Flight Crew Type 3800

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

While flying from ZZZ to ZZZ1 a 7 mile flight at 700 feet. I attempted to change Fuel tanks from Left to Right while passing the off position the valve stuck in the off position; it would not budge. The engine quit and I made an uneventful landing in a pasture. The pasture was smooth so the aircraft was fine. I found a #8 PK sheet metal screw was lodged under the handle while trying to change tanks. I dislodged the screw and flew the aircraft out of the pasture.The fuel selector in this model of Mooney is located on the floor under the pilot's legs it is difficult to reach. Also; the valve handle is in a recessed plastic fixture that allows things like this screw to collect.

M20E pilot reported that while attempting to switch fuel tanks from left to right the valve became stuck in the off position.  The engine quit and the pilot performed an off-airport landing. Post landing; the pilot found the cause was a sheet metal screw had lodged under the fuel selector handle while trying to switch tanks.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 2100; Flight Crew Type 550

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; General Maintenance Action

Aztec developed sudden right engine loss of power; likely due to fuel issue; but investigating now. Fuel flow dropped; aux pump activated and fuel tanks changed. While in IFR conditions; descended unintentionally to 8;000-8;500 ft; regained control; and reclimbed to 9;000. Event recurred 1 time within 10 min; and engine then regained power.Requested 5;000 for duration of trip into VFR conditions at destination; rather than immediate landing into poor visibility and unfamiliar; small airport; as engine condition had stabilized. Landed uneventfully at ZZZ and plane to go for evaluation [3 days later]. I suspect fuel line issue; or possible ice crystal formation in line? All sumps tested pre and post flight; with no water discovered.

PA23 pilot experienced an unexplained power loss on the right engine at 9;000 feet. The aircraft was allowed to descend from assigned altitude while troubleshooting before engine power was restored and assigned altitude was regained. The event repeated within ten minutes; but the reporter elected to continue to the destination with VFR weather.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 37; Flight Crew Total 1745; Flight Crew Type 1017

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

I experienced a significant in flight oil loss in a Cirrus SR22T aircraft.  On the flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 airport about 20 minutes into the flight; at 5;500 feet; running at 75% power cruise; the aircraft oil pressure gauge showed a lower then normal oil pressure reading of about 37 PSI.  Still in the green arc but low for this power setting.  In the next few minutes I monitor the oil pressure gauge closing and noticed it very gradually move down to 32 PSI (very close to the bottom of the green arc).  I then move the mixture to full rich to see if that would have help with the oil pressure.  It in fact made it worst as aircraft started some slight propeller RPM surging.  At this moment I  contacted TRACON; moved throttle to idle and started a VFR decent to ZZZ2 airport (which was less then 5 nm away).  The oil pressure went into yellow arc.  Keeping the throttle at idle for rest of descent flight; I spiraled down to a landing at ZZZ2; I was handed over to Tower who were very accommodating in giving me priory to my choice of Runway 25R.  The engine never quit; and I had enough power to taxi off the runway.  Upon exiting aircraft it was evident of the significant oil loss. The oil cap was securely on; the top of engine was clean of oil.  The dip stick was showing approximately 2 quarts of oil left.  It appeared most of all the oil had exited the pilot side exhaust.  Aircraft has 23.2 flight tact hours since it's annual inspection. The start of the flight showed 6 3/4 qt of mineral oil.

Cirrus SR22 pilot reported an engine oil pressure anomaly which necessitated a diversion to the nearest suitable airport.


Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Weather

Wearing a mask; difficulty breathing indoors; and outdoors in 90+ degree weather. Lack of oxygen; creates confusion and lack of situational awareness. Social distancing should be practiced and mandatory masks should be repealed. Mask optional.

Ground employee cited several reasons why face masks should be optional.


Exit points from NATS (RESNO and NETKI) are not on the current pltoting charts. They are on a an older plotting chart. They do exist on our flight plan/release. They also exist in our FMC NAV database; which is current.

The reporter stated that his current chart publication date is March 2015. His previous chart; he believed; had a December 2014 publication date and did include both RESNO and NETKI. The two waypoints were plotted manually. He and his crew were experienced on the North Atlantic routes and recognized the omission; but he wonders about a possible track deviation with others not so familiar.

A pilot reported that the North Atlantic Plotting Chart date March 2014 did not include EGGX airspace entry waypoints RESNO and NETKI. The waypoints were in the FMC and on the flight plan.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

I was giving a demo instruction flight to a potential buyer of this aircraft. I was instructing and monitoring the RNAV approach. We were cleared for the approach and inside of ZZZZZ. The airspace and frequency was very busy. I was looking for traffic when we received a minimum vectoring altitude alert by the Tower or ATC. I immediately took the controls and initiated a climb from 1;900 feet to 2400 feet (we intercepted the glide path). After landing I called the tower who told me they were only concerned as we were getting low. They stated it was 1;700 feet however when I took the controls I noted 1;900 feet on the altimeter. They advised no action would be taken. I had them call TRACON who said the where same. It was VMC when this event occurred.

PA46 flight instructor reported descending too low on approach resulted in a low altitude alert.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Approach control cleared us for the approach (Rwy 27L); caution wake turbulence following a Boeing 757; maintain 180 knots until TAFFS; contact tower control at TAFFS. We then switched the frequency to tower; and continued the approach. Tower called us prior to TAFFS and told us to go back to approach control. We returned to approach control and he told us to slow to 170 knots until TAFFS and we should have stayed with him till we got closer to TAFFS so we would have heard him when he wanted us to slow an additional 10 knots. If Pilots are told to contact tower and call at a certain fix inbound; then we have to switch frequency at some point. The approach controller assumed I would stay with him longer than I did. However; when he called for us we were no longer with him; because he did not ask for us to stay with him.

As the pilot flying during a visual approach I was 'heads up' and did not notice that the captain immediately switched to tower from the approach frequency. Moments later; tower transmitted a call to us asking if we were on and asking us to switch back to approach control. Chicago approach when contacted had a 10 knot speed change and explained the significance of the phrase 'contact tower at...'No significant aircraft separation was an issue; as the speed change seemed to be for wake turbulence reasons; and no further communications about the incident came from approach or tower; other than approach grumbling something about '...the third one today...'In a debrief of the incident the captain said he has always switched immediately to tower when given that instruction; and we discussed what Chicago approach expects him to do.In our debrief we discussed the fact that Chicago is one of a very few places that uses that procedure for transferring to tower. Also we discussed that depending on the weather conditions the approach controller will give 2 different clearances:'..contact tower at...' meaning stay on approach and switch to tower at the OM.'...contact tower now...' which when complied with TOWER will acknowledge and then say 'report at...' OM.The different clearances depending on weather conditions for this specific airport lead to an expectation bias on the part of the captain. As the pilot flying I should have been monitoring the radio selection.

An Air Carrier flight crew on approach to Runway 27L at ORD is issued a 'contact Tower at the TAFFS intersection' clearance. The Captain switches to Tower immediately after and is told by ORD Tower to go back to Approach Controller. C90 Controller reminds them of the importance of not switching frequencies too soon.


Beechcraft Twin Turboprop or Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

We were in cruise 3 miles north of the shoreline near TJAB airport. We usually stay north of the shoreline due to parachute activity at TJAB going to and from TJSJ and ZZZZ. We normally get advisories of jumping activity and we tell them we are staying north or San Juan Center gives us direction to stay away from the area. Today; we were at 4;500 feet MSL in cruise 3 miles north of the shore heading west bound. We had flight following from TJSJ in route to ZZZZ. We were on with San Juan Departure at 119.4. We heard a King Air at 10;000 feet reporting jumper away at the same time we were passing by. I was looking out my window to see if we could see them. No visual contact. We did not get any traffic advisories from ATC. Suddenly; I spotted the King Air at my 7 to 8 o'clock about 500 feet above me heading right for me but in a turn back to the coast line. I was close enough to see the tail number. I took immediate action and turned right to give us some space. I do not believe the King Air saw us as his belly was mostly pointing to us. A few moments later; ATC switched us over to San Juan Center at 118.75. We did not mention it over the frequency; but some of our passengers noticed how close the plane was. It was VFR; however; this plane was also on frequency and squawking a code and no advisories from them. We were extremely close. The flight ended in safety but wanted to file a report anyway. Lack of advisories from ATC. Luckily we were watching for it or something might have happened.

Air taxi Captain reported an NMAC with a King Air in the vicinity of TJAB airport.


Medium Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Aircraft X was level climbing to 9;000 FT direct PTW in front of Aircraft Y about 5 miles. Aircraft Y was out of 10;000 FT climbing to 13;000 FT. When Aircraft Y vacated 11;000 FT; I climbed Aircraft X to 11;000 FT. After about a minute or two I noticed that Aircraft Y stopped his climb at 11;400 FT. It appeared that the Aircraft Y stayed at 11;400 for about a minute before starting his climb again. I had already switched Aircraft Y to ZNY Center; so I could not ask him to expedite his climb. When I noticed Aircraft Y leveling off at 11;400; I noticed Aircraft X vacating 10;000 FT. I advised Aircraft X to stop his climb at 10;400 FT. The pilot acknowledged and read back maintain 10;400 FT. It appeared that Aircraft X climbed to 10;600 FT before descending back to 10;400 FT. After calling the ZNY PTW Sector to ask if they knew why Aircraft Y stopped his climb; they replied they didn't know; he checked on and said he was climbing to 13;000 FT. It seemed that the stop climb from Aircraft Y at 11;400 was a direct result of the possible loss of separation.

Aircraft Y departed Runway 27L on the SID (268 heading) climbing to 5;000 FT. I radar identified him. Aircraft Z departed Runway 27L on the SID (268 heading) and I radar identified that aircraft and climbed him to 10;000 FT. I made a couple of other transmissions to other aircraft then came back to Aircraft Y and climbed him to 10;000 FT. After making several other transmissions to other aircraft I noticed that Aircraft Z was gaining speed and catching up to Aircraft Y. I advised Aircraft Z to reduce his speed and issued a turn of 210 degrees to avoid the potential conflict. I had Aircraft X that departed Runway 35 on a 310 degree heading prior to Aircraft Y departing Runway 27L. I wanted to climb Aircraft Y to top Aircraft X going to the same fix; PTW; so I keep him on the SID for a few extra miles. Due to the faster aircraft behind Aircraft Y (Aircraft Z); I should have issued a 290 degree heading to Aircraft Y. This would have prevented the possible loss of separation.

PHL Controller reports of loss of separation between two aircraft under his control. Use of anticipated separation was a factor. He then reports of a second incident involving a third aircraft where speed control and vectoring play a part in another conflict.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

The airport manager at [our destination] brought to my attention that the previous day's [load planning on a charter flight] had given us the incorrect number of loaded bags in the aft cargo. They told us (the crew) they had loaded 89 bags aft with 160 people on board. That bag count seemed low to us as a crew and we questioned two ground crew members if that was in fact correct and they confirmed the correct bag count aft. The airport manager informed us the crew today that there were approximately 50 additional bags aft that were not accounted for.The station should be trained on the proper bag loading procedure. There should also be a [company] ground supervisor to be able to possibly ride along on these charter flights to supervise the ground personnel that are not accustomed to [company] flights.

The ground handlers in [this airport] are horrible. We cringe every time we see [this airport] on our schedule. They are disorganized; an embarrassment to [company]; and after this flight; [I believe] they are unsafe. Any time we have a complaint about the ground handlers on these charter flights we are told; 'well they are the cheapest so we are not going to switch ground handlers'. Every other airline operates out of [this airport]; there has to be a better and safer option than [the company] that we are currently contracted with at that airport.

MD-83 flight crew reported they were told after completion of a charter flight that the contract ground operations company at the departure airport gave them incorrect information on their weight manifest.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Chart Or Publication; Airport

The Captain and I were unfamiliar with this airfield so we reviewed the Jeppesen charts and NOTAM's in detail prior to departing. After landing and then turning into the Mobile Downtown ramp on Taxiway H; we noticed several GA aircraft and barriers in the area where the chart shows a left turn in the ramp. In addition; there is a taxi line that continues straight where the chart depicts the left turn. This taxi line is not depicted on the Jeppsen chart so we assumed it was the temporary taxi line mentioned in the Company NOTAM. After proceeding on that taxi line; we questioned whether this was correct and the Captain stopped aircraft. We called the company ramp and the individual said he would call the contractor. Ground personnel drove out to the aircraft; placed chocks under the wheels; and we shut down. After deplaning; we asked the Contractors if we were supposed to turn left earlier and they said yes. They also said this has happened numerous times previously.Unfamiliarity with the ramp combined with the construction; barriers in the area the chart depicts a left turn; and an actual taxi line that is not depicted on our charts led to our mistaking that taxi line for the one mentioned in the NOTAMS.

We had reviewed everything thoroughly. Upon entering the ramp; we noticed small airplanes and construction barriers in the area where a left turn is shown on the chart. There is an actual taxiline that proceeds straight and we followed that line; believing it was the temp taxilane from the NOTAMS. I stopped the aircraft when I questioned if this was the correct route. The First Officer contacted the ramp and they called the contractor who chocked the wheels. I shutdown and they brought stairs over. After leaving the aircraft; we asked if we should have turned and the contractor said yes; but this has happened many times before.A lot of construction combined with incorrect chart depiction and confusing NOTAMS.

Air carrier flight crew reported BFM airport has temporary taxiway lines that do not match the Jeppesen Chart or NOTAMs.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors

As we were holding short for departure Runway 24 after completing the required check lists the co-Captain briefed our clearance including the RUUDY4 departure procedure. We use our FMS for flight guidance; pre-loaded with our assigned departure procedure and flight plan received from TEB clearance delivery. We had the flight director in heading mode for 240 degrees and 1;500 FT set in the altitude window.We were cleared into position on Runway 24; awaiting traffic landing Runway 19 and completed the Line Up Checklist prior to Tower clearing us for takeoff. Our SOP is to hand fly the take off until at a safe altitude for autopilot operations; 500 AGL as long as all systems are functioning properly. The co-Captain was performing the after take off climb check when TEB Tower switched us to Departure as we climbed through 400 MSL. I asked the co-Captain to confirm the turn towards WENTZ while he was calling NY Departure. However; he did not hear my intercom communication since his push to talk button was depressed calling Departure. After asking a second time to confirm the right turn to 260 degree confusion of RUDDY 4 departure procedure and TEB8 departure procedure co-Captain says to climb to 1;500 MSL and then turn right 280 degrees.  Finally ATC contact was established only after we missed the turn to WENTZ. ATC cleared us to turn right to a heading around 300 degrees and advised that we had missed our 260 degree intercept heading. We got out of our routine and we missed the autopilot command to turn towards the departure route since we were still in heading mode on the autopilot.We could have avoided missing our turn if we had had better communication between us on conducting the departure procedure and should not have gotten fixated on contacting ATC during a critical phase of flight.

A corporate jet flight crew failed to comply with the RUUDY SID from TEB.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Type 10500

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Type 7200

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

While departing DEN on the EEONS4; ATC cleared us out of our PDC limit of 10;000 to 'climb via SID to FL230.' As the pilot not flying (PNF); I was errantly thinking 'maintain FL230;' which would have been an unrestricted climb. The pilot flying (PF) was hand flying the departure; so I dialed 230 in the MCP and perceived I coordinated with the PF to delete the intermediate altitudes; thinking they were no longer necessary. The PF apparently wasn't really hearing what I was saying because he verified the steps before I executed them. He was busy hand flying and watching the altitudes on the departure and attempting to comply with them. Because I had deleted the 12;000B restriction at SHOBO; the flight director was climbing steeply toward that restriction. The PF attempted to level off there; still (correctly) believing we needed to comply; but the climb rate exceeded his ability to smoothly level off at 12;000 and we overshot the level off at SHOBO by 300- 400 feet before correcting down. The Controller seemingly did not believe we were leveling off; so he issued a vector away from the fix and asserted we had been cleared to 'climb via' and not an unrestricted climb. After I acknowledged the vector; he cleared us to climb unrestricted to FL230.I made errant entries to the FMC because I mixed up the definitions of climb clearances. Ironically; I had just reviewed the study guide regarding the 'climb via' preceding a 'climb and maintain' altitude earlier in the day. Perhaps my mind had locked on the answer to that question and thought this was the same situation. In the future; I will need to double-check my thinking of such clearances. I will also reconsider the PF's task loading in coordination events where I want him/her to verify something while they are hand flying. Looking back at the climb definitions I certainly knew what each meant; and have periodically reviewed them; yet I still misapplied them in this circumstance.

On takeoff roll; I lost my navigation and heading display. After takeoff; my navigation display returned and continued the departure. After flap retraction; I tried to engage the autopilot and was unable to do so on the First Officer's side. Was able to engage to Captain's side and while troubleshooting ATC gave us a heading of 100. We misunderstood while troubleshooting and the Captain selected a heading of 010. ATC prompted us on our heading and told us that was incorrect. ATC then gave us a turn back to heading 010 and assigned us a lower altitude of 13;000 for traffic on the arrival. We continued on the EEONS 4 RNAV; in LNAV/VNAV with the autopilot off. Just prior to ROYYL; ATC instructed us to climb to FL230 via the SID. The instruction was misunderstood; and the pilot monitoring deleted the altitudes in the FMS. I noticed there may have been an error in the climb instructions so I referred to the SID on my Electronic Flight Bag to comply with the altitude restrictions. As I was checking to see what altitudes I needed to comply with next; I overshot the altitude at SHOBO (at or below 12;000) by approximately 350 feet.When having an issue with the PF's instruments; next time I will hand the controls to the non-flying Pilot prior to troubleshooting. No loss of separation and we continued the climb out.

B737-700 First Officer (FO) experiences a navigation display failure during takeoff which quickly corrects itself once airborne. ATC assigns a heading of 100 but the Captain sets 010 in the MCP which the FO does not detect due to troubleshooting the navigation display problem. Later in the EEONS4 departure; ATC assigns a climb via to FL230 which the Captain interprets as a climb to FL230. An overshoot occurs at SHOBO.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

Aircraft X was originally a DYAMD3 arrival into SFO. Sector 33 was told to put the aircraft on the YOSEM3 arrival and that meant the aircraft would go to 28L. Once Sector 34 accepted the hand off there was discussion of the 5 metering number on the aircraft. The number was ignored as the operation board showing SFO DYAMD3 (TBM) or metering and the YOSEM3 (Off). Since the Board we follow showed YOSEM as off (in the past we ignore the meter number as the computer thinks the aircraft is on the DYAMD3 we did not slow or turn Aircraft X to bleed the number to a 1 or 0. As the aircraft approached the point for the descend via; the CIC advised that the flow control unit called and said the '5' is real and we need to bleed it. I immediately called Cedar sector at NorCal and explained the situation and asking if she could take the aircraft at 250 knots and work accordingly. She agreed and the R controller followed the CIC persistence to spin the aircraft and Aircraft X did a 360 at FL340. Fortunately; the sector was not too busy and it worked out but for crying out loud this was a major gaff and we need some direction in the future and not 'last second.' Number one; if I coordinate with the sector (Cedar at NorCal) that should be good and the CIC not question me and believing me to ignore their instructions or flow. Secondly; the Supervisor needed to pass onto the CIC or the Sector 33 controller to bleed the 5 off and turn the overhead board on to show YOSEM (TBM)! Finally; flow control in our center knows that sector 33 takes care of all the spacing and should have made a more timely call to the CIC when sector 34 took the Hand off and not so late that the aircraft was getting ready for final descent into SFO. We never ever wait that long to bleed a 5!

ZOA Center Controller reported confusion relating to an aircraft on a non-metered route that had a 5 minute loss time.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Workload; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

On descent into DFW arrival [was] changed due to north flow. Experiencing moderate turbulence. Requested lower altitude to try and get out of turbulence. Clearance was direct VKTRY; descend via the JOVEM. Both FO and I still thought VKTRY was the proper arrival. Moderate turbulence was a giant factor on our early descent. 10000 ft was selected in the altitude preselect. On the descent ATC asked what altitude we were descending to. At that time we answered 10000 for VKTRY. He then told us we were supposed to be on the JOVEM and to be at VKTRY intersection between 15000 and 18000. At that time the FO and I immediately climbed back to 15000. The FO and [I] were distracted with moderate turbulence. We did not review the new arrival before we descended. Honestly it is a mistake anyone could have made given the circumstance. The autopilot had kicked off along with a SPS Advanced caution on the EICAS due to moderate turbulence. We were trying to find smooth air for the safety and comfort of our passengers. We could have been more vigilant on reviewing the arrival procedure.

One thing that I personally find potentially confusing for pilots on these new arrivals; is that for two different arrival procedures; there are the same fixes with different crossing restrictions. For example; these NW arrivals into DFW are the JOVEM3 and new VKTRY1; with JOVEM3 being for north flow and VKTRY1 being for south flow. These arrivals have several of the same fixes; located at the same positions; with the same names. However; they have different crossing restrictions for each arrival. It is relatively easy to think the arrival in the FMS is correct; or that the chart you are looking at is correct; by simply just viewing the relative layout and verifying the names of the fixes. When in fact; you actually have the incorrect arrival programmed; or have the incorrect chart out; due to the landing flow at DFW.

EMB-145 flight crew reported track and altitude deviations resulted when they misunderstood the ATC clearance on arrival into DFW.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6.0

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I had track control of Aircraft X but the aircraft was still 20 miles outside of my airspace. I was also working Aircraft Y a departure who was in my airspace and climbing along the SID. Aircraft X said 'Center; Aircraft X'. I said 'go ahead' with no callsign. Aircraft X says 'we need to divert' with no callsign. I am looking at Aircraft Y the whole time and think that is who I am talking to. I cleared Aircraft Y 'via right hand turn to ZZZ...' and gave him a descent. Aircraft X read it back with no callsign. After a minute I notice Aircraft Y had not made a turn which I thought was strange. I verified with Aircraft Y that they were the [the aircraft in distress] and Aircraft X answers 'affirmative' which further diluted the situation. Shortly after Aircraft Y questions 'if they are still with me'. At this point I realized they were not the [the aircraft in distress] and scanned and saw Aircraft X in a right turn and in a descent. My radar Assist and I quickly coordinated with the involved sectors the emergency aircraft and what they were doing. I learned that by me saying 'go ahead' instead of using Aircraft Y's callsign from the beginning may have contributed to the situation. However; when I subsequently used correct callsigns Aircraft X answered for Aircraft Y anyway which is an example of how workload and emergency's have a tendency to add risk.

A Center Controller reported he misidentified an aircraft when the plane did not use their call sign when responding to instructions.


Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

During our arrival into MMZH we discussed how they keep you high and I asked if he wanted me to request an early lower altitude he asked me to wait which I did. He finally had me request it and we ended up being high. Instead of using VNAV to maintain the descent profile he elected green vertical speed. I pointed out several times we were above the vertical path. He stated he had it and would extend out if needed (26 does not have any type of approach for backup). We were extremely high when he began making the turn diving the aircraft. I had suggested prior possibly adding flaps and slowing up which was ignored we were around 5;000 feet when he nosed the aircraft over. At 2000' off the ground we were in an 1800 FPM dive. I said 'we should probably go around'. Approaching 1400'; The thrust levers were advancing as he still had the flight director on and the aircraft though we were still trying to climb he was ignoring the flight director.  We were way high 4 white I called Go Around. AROUND he stuttered flaps 2 never making the appropriate call. Almost immediately he began a hard left turn towards the mountain in the water I'm telling him 'Level the wings what are you doing' at this point the flight director and Flight path vector are full right and were divining; Airspeed is approaching the upper limit. I was not making any further configuration changes while we were headed into an unusual attitude. I'm telling him 'your about to over speed the aircraft as the turn continues. I decided if the high speed alert went off I was going to take the controls. He managed to regain control of the aircraft but still seemed bewildered. He rushed into the second approach and once again had an excessive rate of descent. I started to call for the second Go Around when he placed his hand in my face. The aircraft was settling down and near the stabilized parameters. I placed myself in a position to take the controls if need be and we landed. It was rough with swerving (though this was typical for every landing he made on our trip). He also routinely taxied at high speeds and seemed very rushed. The captain also stated several times on the trip that 'I've probably used up all of my goodwill' he also made statements about not knowing the aircraft well. He seemed to be struggling with the automation. After we landed he stated he was looking at the altitude I asked why he wasn't following the flight director and why he was turning. The Captain also asked me at the end of the trip 'Would I still fly with him' He seemed to lack all confidence in his abilities as a Captain.Captain lacks understanding of aircraft automation and procedures and company policy.

Air Carrier First Officer reported two unstable visual approaches by the Captain flying into MMZH. The first ended in a go-around and the second was almost another go-around when the Captain settled the aircraft down to near stabilized parameters.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

After completing the climb checklist; the First Officer (Pilot Monitoring) pointed out that the two FMS's were not aligned and that hers showed us left of course. Given that information; I failed to tell TRACON that we were unsure of the accuracy of our navigation instruments. First Officer monitored the #2 FMS and emphasized that it was continuing to show off course; with the course deviating to the east. Just at the point that I was going to heading mode to turn in a more westerly direction and let ATC know that we were concerned about our navigation instruments; the Controller gave us a turn to the west and told us we had been .10 off course and then drifted to approximately .20 off course to the east. The responsibility for this deviation rests solely with me. I was given excellent information by the First Officer and failed to act upon it when it was first offered. I do not know why the course diverged from that of the NELYN 3 departure course. Q parameters were met and both FMS's were GPS. If there is a .1 variation in course deviation on an RNAV departure (or arrival) immediately ask ATC for heading information as navigation capabilities are suspect.

The reporter could offer no explanation for the discrepancy between the two FMS's but indicates that it does occasionally happen in this aircraft.

Embraer Captain experiences a track deviation departing DFW on the NELYN 3 departure. A slight discrepancy existed between the Captain's and First Officer's display with the First Officer's apparently correct; according to ATC.


Distraction; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Maintenance Action

On climb out left engine failed. We were climbing through 17;000 feet when failure occurred. [Advised ATC] and we diverted to [nearby airport]. All QRC checklists were complied with. Landing was uneventful. No passengers on board.When we checked the oil sight gauge after landing it was showing approximately 1/3 quart low. The engine was absolutely covered in oil on the outside of the cowling; inside of the cowling; and it was actively dripping from the engine. The FBO placed several buckets under the engine to catch the oil. There was clearly more than 1/3 of a quart of oil in the buckets and the 1/3 quart low indication was what was indicated before departure. I would suggest an investigation to see if there is a problem with the sight gauges.

The engine failure occurred during a ferry flight. Captain was acting as the PIC/pilot monitoring and I was acting as the SIC/pilot flying. The event occurred during initial climb between 17;000 and 17;500 feet. The number 1 engine made a mechanical squeal; rolled back and seized. This was during the span of several seconds. Autopilot was disengaged; the pilot monitoring [advised ATC]; and the engine failure QRC was run. We were cleared to level at 17;000 feet. ATC advised that [nearby] airport had VFR clear weather and 20-30 miles away. We accepted this as a suitable airport and we're cleared at pilot's discretion to 3;000 feet while being vectored for a visual approach. We were then cleared to 2;300 feet. We accomplished the single engine approach and landing checklists. After approach and landing to runway we taxied; parked and contacted the necessary parties.During inspection of the aircraft we observed that a large quantity of oil was leaking from the cowling of the affected engine. However; the oil sight gauge was showing a half quart of oil low. We both found this did not reflect the amount of oil that had been lost.

A Citation jet flight crew reported the failure of an engine due to an oil system malfunction. The engine was secured; and a successful diversion to a suitable airport was accomplished.


Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Climbing through approximately 1;000 FT AGL the TAIL COMPARTMENT OVERHEAT warning illuminated. While continuing the initial climb and receiving vectors for the departure the memory items were completed. The warning did not extinguish and we continued with the QRH checklist. The warning did not extinguish until the right engine throttle was retarded to idle. We stopped the climb at 11;000 FT; declared an emergency; and told ATC we needed to return to the departure airport. We also got vectors to delay in the vicinity; to comply with checklists and to contact company etc. We also needed to prepare for an overweight landing which included performance data; missed approach flap settings etc. The First Officer was the pilot flying and I asked him if he was comfortable flying the approach and he said yes. He continued and flew a nice approach. (Senior FO) After landing the emergency equipment followed us to the gate and saw no smoke coming from the aircraft confirmed by ground control. We deplaned the passengers with no incident; contacted Maintenance; Dispatch and the Duty Pilot; and filled out the aircraft log book. The flight attendants were kept informed through the PA and interphone. They reported a calm cabin during the event. A tail compartment overheat is not an unusual event in an MD80 on hot days and would normally extinguish after the memory items are completed. In our case the day was not very hot 82F and the warning did not extinguish after the memory items. Unless Maintenance can inspect the aircraft in a different way I am not sure if this event could be avoided. The one suggestion I have is to give references at the end of the checklist on overweight landings. This event seems to occur on climb outs requiring an overweight return. In our case we would have had to burn off fuel for one hour to get us down to our max landing weight. With one engine at idle and a overheat situation the overweight landing was completed.

A MD-80 TAIL COMPARTMENT OVERHEAT warning alerted after takeoff but after the memory items were complete; the light did not extinguish until the right thrust lever was retarded per the QRH. An emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Controller In Charge (CIC) was combined at Ground Control (GC) for lunch breaks. I was working Local Control (LC) with no traffic on frequency. Ground Control requested to cross Runway 1 with a mower. I scanned the runway and final; checked my pad then approved the crossing. It seemed like a few minutes went by when a Challenger called ready and requested a back taxi for full length (about 800 FT) at Runway 1 Bravo Intersection; due to construction Alpha Taxiway for full length is closed. Again; I scanned the runway; final and checked my pad and cleared the Challenger for back taxi and takeoff. While the aircraft was back taxing; Approach called to APREQ an opposite direction arrival about 40 miles away. I expanded my RADAR to see the target. As I was approving the APREQ I observed the Challenger slowing to a stop about 2;500 FT from the approach end. I wondered why he was doing that until I saw the mower come from behind the Tower window stanchion. Delta Taxiway where the mower crossed runs east/west and is almost completely obscured by the window stanchion in front of the LC position. The GC/CIC was busy issuing clearances had apparently cleared the mower from a great distance from the runway and it took longer than I expected for him to get across. The GC/CIC was busy and did not observe the incident. The pilot turned around for full length and departed without further incident. The GC should have waited until the mower got to the runway before requesting the crossing. I should have slid the 12 inches to the right or left and looked at Delta Taxiway.

I was working Controller In Charge (CIC) and Ground Control (GC) combined. A mower asked to proceed south on Taxiway Lima and cross both runways at Delta. I said to Local Control (LC); 'Cross both runways at Delta?' and LC replied 'Cross both runways at Delta.' I cleared the mower across. I don't know how I missed this; but sometime soon after I cleared the mower; LC cleared a Challenger for take off on Runway 01. I did not hear this clearance. But I did hear the Challenger say something like; 'There's a mower on the runway in front of us.' Well; that got my attention. When I looked up; the Challenger was approximately 1;000 FT down the runway and moving at taxi speed; having obviously just aborted a takeoff; and the mower was still crossing his runway. I feel bad about not having LC's back as CIC; and embarrassed that the event occurred at all. I haven't yet listened to the tapes to determine exactly what was going on to account for why I didn't hear LC give that take off clearance; though I know that in that general time frame I was issuing a lot of IFR clearances. It is possible that I was issuing a clearance when LC spoke to the Challenger. Looking back; I remember that the mower asked to proceed some distance on a parallel taxiway and then cross. What I asked LC for was a crossing; and I did not indicate to LC that the crossing was not immediate. I think this probably contributed to the error. I suspect that the LC had assumed that enough time had elapsed by now that surely the mower had finished crossing; also; there is a pole in our Tower; from LC's seated position; blocks the view right down Delta Taxiway (which the mower was on; and I suspect that the mower was simply missed by LC when he did his runway scan. Had I indicated to LC that the crossing was not immediate; or had I waited until the mower was at the hold short lines before coordinating the crossing; perhaps this event would not have occurred.

Local Controller and Ground Controller described an aborted takeoff event when an aircraft observed a mower crossing down field.  Failed coordination between Local and Ground reportedly led to the occurrence.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 159; Flight Crew Type 9000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action

On departure from DEN a fuel imbalance was noted between the main tanks.  We departed with the main tanks full and 1;700 pounds in the center tank.  When I noticed the imbalance; the tanks read: number one 11.8; number two 10.6 and 400 in the center.  We considered the fact that it was a gauge problem; or possibly that fuel was being transferred from the center into the wing tank.  I turned off the center tank pumps and began cross-feeding to get within limits. During this time we analyzed the fuel system schematic and considered that the center tank scavenge jet pump might have malfunctioned and was allowing fuel to transfer from the center tank to the number one tank.  Once the fuel was balanced; I turned on the center tank pumps to burn the last 400 pounds and again and saw the number one tank fuel quantity start to increase. During this time there was roughly a 500 pound imbalance after the center tank was depleted. I centered that imbalance one last time through cross feeding.  We went into the QRH for guidance and additional information.  The fuel burns were close; the pumps were configured correctly; cross-feed valve was operating correctly; and the fuel audit revealed us arriving with more fuel than planned into ZZZ; thus discrediting the possibility of a fuel leak.  We did decide to time for 30 minutes per the QRH to verify the imbalance was less than 500 pounds.  After 30 minutes; the imbalance was negligible.  We continued on to ZZZ with the fuel gauges matched and no abnormal indications.  We sent a MX request regarding the issue; and asked them to meet us at the gate.  Prior to TOD it was determined that we would be overweight slightly for landing.  We configured early and requested delay vectors from ATC to burn off the extra fuel.  After a period of time in which the Fuel On Board (FOB) indication should have come down enough for landing; we noted the number one main tank again increasing in quantity.  At this point; once again questioning the accuracy of the fuel gauge; we decided to expeditiously land and deal with the fuel issue at the gate.  We requested and were cleared for the visual approach.After an uneventful landing; the number one fuel quantity indicator began to fluctuate between 1;200 and 4;000 pounds and the number two gauge was at 4;000 pounds.  Parked at the gate; the gauges read: number one 1;000; and number two 3;900.  We coordinated with ZZZ Ops and had the Fuelers standby until Maintenance had a chance to troubleshoot the problem.  Maintenance showed up and verified that both the flight deck gauge and the wing gauge matched.  Sticking the wing tanks confirmed that this was in fact the current fuel quantity.  Maintenance then MEL'd the fuel gauge in the logbook and we observed the fueling process sticking the tanks; as per the MEL; with an Info Only write-up for the (M) procedure in the logbook.I truly believe that expectation bias was a major factor leading to this issue.  For years I have cross-fed fuel using the same procedure; with the same outcome.  This was no different.  As I cross-fed; the gauges reacted as expected.  The problem was the rate that I was transferring was greater than that indicated due to the malfunctioning gauge.  After I thought we had 'fixed' the problem; the gauges seemed to be responding correctly and were matched; my thoughts drifted from the original issue.  I also feel that my 'outside the box' analysis of a possible malfunctioning center tank jet scavenge pump should have been avoided.  The fact that the number one tank increased by the amount of fuel in the center tank each time the center pumps were turned on was pure coincidence.  Adhering to strict QRH checklist discipline would have prevented this.  Hindsight is 20/20 and it's much easier to evaluate my actions now.  The chain should have been broken early with the detection of a fuel quantity greater than the tank capacity.  This thought did cross my mind; but the responseto the action that I used (cross feeding to balance) gave me the result that I expected; expectation bias.The main action that I will institute after this event is a thorough analysis before I crossfeed fuel.  The givens are fuel flow in pounds per hour versus how many pounds to match the tanks.  With this information you can obviously predetermine a time.  There is no doubt in my mind that I will time each crossfeed operation from now on.  I will also involve Dispatch and Maintenance Control early on in a complex event such as this.  My plan was to contact them after the 30 minute timing (per the QRH) if there was a fuel imbalance.  There was not.  Contacting them early on would possibly have changed my mindset toward the issue and given justification for allowing the presumed imbalance.  The last item is checklist discipline.  Even though I had a presumed action that would rectify the problem based on experience; I should have referred to the QRH initially (even for something as routine as balancing fuel).  This could have been the break in the chain that would have determined a different outcome.

I suspect that there may have been a cumulative fuel imbalance occurring for a few legs prior to us receiving the aircraft which went unnoticed by us; the fuelers; or previous Crews. All fuel audits were performed by us and our Agents and appeared normal. But with misleading information on the gauges it is possible that there was never the appropriate amount of fuel in the left main tank even though it indicated full.I feel that the Captain and I worked well as a Team; and used all available resources to bring the aircraft safely to the gate. The only possible suggestion I have to prevent this in the future; besides drip sticking the tanks between every flight (which I know would be impractical; is to publish a table in the QRH; or appropriate manual which lists the fuel flow; and time to balance 200 pounds; 500 pounds; and 1;000 pounds; or something similar so we can time how long we transfer fuel; and know about how much should be transferring so Pilots can cross-check that with the indication system. I know that may be reaching a bit; but that may have been helpful to us in that particular situation.

B737 flight crew reported difficulty accurately trouble shooting a malfunctioning fuel gauge.


Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Airport; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather; Human Factors; Procedure

The flight was cleared to line up and wait on Runway XL while Aircraft Y was on short final to [Runway] XR. A short time after stopping in position on the runway; the flight was cleared for takeoff.  Takeoff was normal and the flight proceeded to climb to 500 feet and I was just about to initiate the right turn to 060 degrees as required by the ZZZZZ X departure. As I looked to my right; I could see Aircraft Y; on a go-around and apparently flying the runway heading; overtaking us at our altitude and in a position that was; in my opinion; much too close and a very real threat.  Just as this was happening; the tower instructed us in an urgent tone to turn left to heading 360 degrees.  I immediately initiated the turn; hand flying; as the Captain dialed it in with the heading selector. With that action the threat was over; our flight turned away to the left as the Aircraft Y overtook us in both distance and altitude.  The Captain and I learned through the ensuing communication between the Tower and Aircraft Y flight that it had gone around due to a strong wind gust.I have had a considerable amount of experience flying in and out of ZZZ over the years while I was employed by with another company.  It has always been customary that Tower controllers stagger the takeoffs on Runway XL with the landings on XR.  I have noticed that takeoffs usually are cleared as the parallel runway aircraft are either actually landing or rolling out.  This is just what I have noticed through the years and I do not have actual knowledge of Tower procedures at ZZZ.  Because our flight was lined up on Runway XL; I could not see the landing traffic.  When our flight was cleared for takeoff; I made the assumption that the parallel traffic was landing and not going to be a factor.  However; when Aircraft Y went around; it quickly began to overtake us and could have been a real threat to our flight.  With the excellent visibility at the time; I am certain that the Aircraft Y pilots could see us; but it was still very concerning that our two flights got so close.  I am concerned that there was possible loss of situational awareness on the part of the Tower Controller or a deviation from standard ATC procedures.  When Aircraft Y aircraft unexpectedly went around; an unsafe condition could have quickly developed.  This is especially concerning because the SID procedure requires a turn across the parallel runway's extended centerline.I have some concerns that during this COVID pandemic and the resulting slowdown in air traffic; that both flight crews and ATC are no longer operating at the highest levels of attention and situational awareness.  This reinforces in my own mind that absolute adherence to standard operating procedures is so very important and is a major barrier to safety of flight events when unexpected actions occur.  I cannot say for sure; but I believe that our flight was cleared for takeoff too early and when Aircraft Y landing on the parallel runway went around; the situation developed quickly into an unanticipated loss of separation.  I hope that procedures at ZZZ Tower are reviewed and adjusted so that this situation does not develop again.

Air carrier First Officer reported an aircraft went around due to winds; while they were departing a parallel runway causing an airborne conflict.


Beechcraft Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 54; Flight Crew Total 290; Flight Crew Type 180

Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was approaching my first visit to MRY on an instrument flight plan at night. The METAR indicated VMC; however as most of the 2 hour flight was above an under cast; I had been focusing on the ILS 10 approach with circle to land based on winds. I spotted the beacon about 10 miles away at my 2 o'clock and was cleared for the visual.When I switched to Tower they offered Runway 10 with calm winds; but as I had the circle to land in my head and had the airport in sight I said I would stick with 28 and turned on a 45 for the downwind. I was so focused on the possible instrument approaches I would shoot upon arrival that I did not study well enough the visual approach issues such as the high terrain to the west and the 1;000 feet AGL pattern altitude. Tower called low altitude alert to me as I started seeing terrain indications on my iPad and I took immediate evasive maneuvers by adding throttle and stopping my descent. I was flying over a dark hill and did not have a visual reference as to my low altitude. As a new instrument pilot I need to be more aware of the obstacles around the airport even if they are not on an approach or missed approach segment.

The pilot of a single engine Beechcraft reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC during a visual approach in MRY due to lack of familiarity with the area and distraction by the anticipated weather conditions.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 320; Flight Crew Type 200

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

While climbing to my cruising altitude after departing ZZZ1; and contacting Approach for VFR Flight Following; I noticed the strong smell of what I thought was exhaust fumes. I began a scan of all my engine information (all engine systems and sensors reporting safe and normal operation); my aircraft's carbon monoxide detector (no indication of CO present) and visually checking the cockpit. Upon looking beneath the pilot and copilots panels; near the rudder pedals; I saw grayish smoke. I immediately contacted Approach and informed them that I had smoke in the cockpit and that I was planning to land at ZZZ. My reasoning being that if emergency services were required should the situation worsen; ZZZ would likely have the better assets and response compared to turning back to ZZZ1; an unattended airfield. I then moved my air vents on the doors of the aircraft to provide ventilation to the cockpit; and confirmed that no cabin heating was on. No fire was observed. From my recollection; [Approach] promptly acknowledged my transmission and asked if there was anything they could help with further. [Approach] then provided the airfield's position; distance; and weather. I was cleared to land straight-in for Runway 7 shortly before being handed off to ZZZ Tower. While speaking with the Tower; I noticed that the smoke appeared to have dissipated (possibly due to nose down/lower power setting; I was unsure at the time) and informed Tower that I should be able to exit the runway at the first taxiway. I was able to land the aircraft normally given the circumstances and exit the runway. Upon clearing the runway and taxiway I began my shutdown procedures and exited the aircraft promptly. Firefighters approached and evaluated the aircraft and my condition. Upon opening the cowling and looking at the engine the exhaust system appears to have cracked and failed. A large piece of the exhaust down pipe appears to have broken off and the exhaust fumes collected in the engine compartment; likely resulting in the smoke I saw in the cockpit. I did not declare an emergency; but one was declared on my behalf. I was able to land safely and no one was injured. This experience has given me serious doubts regarding honest communication of an in-flight issue with controllers if the outcome is this burden of information and reports. Thank you for your time and for this program.

GA Pilot reported smoke accompanied by strong exhaust fumes in the cockpit during initial climb.