Company Policy; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

A recent change to the B-737 Performance Manual authorizes standard (STD) thrust takeoffs with a tailwind 'provided the data in the Thrust/V speed section of the TPS (Takeoff Performance System) are based on a tailwind equal to or greater than the actual wind'. This exception is correctly explained on the takeoff card under 'Unplanned Tailwind Takeoff'. However; the SPAR matrix; (another quick reference tool in the Performance Manual) incorrectly shows that STD thrust takeoffs are permitted with a tailwind. The only exception listed in the Spar matrix for the STD thrust/tailwind combination is ball note 1 which states 'Check the list of conditions in --Use of STD thrust for takeoff is not authorized--'. This list used to include tailwind; but in accordance with the new TPS tailwind procedures referenced above it was removed with the last revision. Add the already present ball note 4 (provided the data in the Thrust/V speed section of the TPS are based on a tailwind equal to or greater than the actual wind) on the SPAR matrix to the STD thrust/tailwind combination.

Captain reported conflict in new aircraft performance manuals.


Light Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 10840; Flight Crew Type 6000

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

At approximately XA30 the Captain started both engines and gave signals to ground crew to disconnect ground power and clear the aircraft. The Captain called for the after start checklist. The First Officer read each item on the checklist and heard the correct response from the Captain for each item. On the checklist item 'Ground Equipment' the First Officer looked out the window and did not see the Ground Power Unit and tug or the ground crew members near the aircraft and announced 'clear right'. The Captain verified the call by challenging 'Ground Power clear?'. The First Officer responded 'yes; Ground Power is clear'. The First Officer then received the taxi clearance; read it to the Captain and the Captain acknowledged the clearance; completing the after start checklist. The Captain flashed the taxi lights to the ground crew signaling the aircraft was ready to taxi; the ground crew did not immediately respond. The Captain flashed the taxi lights a second time. The ground crew held light wands in a position that indicated the aircraft could taxi forward and the Captain advanced the propeller levers to begin taxiing forward. Within a few seconds; a collision between the ground power unit and the aircraft occurred. The ground crew gave signals with light wands to the pilots to stop taxiing. The Captain stopped the aircraft and shut down both engines.

A cargo flight Pilot reported the aircraft struck the Ground Power Unit when they began to taxi from parking. The reporter stated the First Officer and Ramp personnel reported the aircraft was clear of obstructions.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Busy traffic; visual approaches to both outboard and inboard runways; ZZZ 1; west traffic flow. DOWNE RADAR (DNYR) works XXL/R complex. A380 on ILS then visual to Runway XXL; A320 on ILS XXL to follow A380; CRJ-700 visual to follow A320; but land XXR. The LOA between ZZZ and ZZZ 1 states when a A380 or B747 lands XXL; provide at least 10 miles in trail to XXR; this is to allow the A380 to get clear of both runways. A320 was 7 miles behind A380; CRJ-700 was 1.5 miles behind A320; giving only 8.5 miles to the Tower to get the A380 off. The Tower calls and said he doesn't think it's going to work and to slow the CRJ-700. Meanwhile; it looks like A320 is going to lose required wake turbulence separation with A380 so the DNYR Controller cancels the approach clearance of A320 and has him track inbound. I tell DWNY; Tower doesn't think this going to work with CRJ-700; and suggested breaking A320 out since he was already too close to the A380 and moving CRJ-700 back over to XXL. The Controller waits until the A380 touches down; then asks A320 if he has the field in sight; A320 does; DNYR clears him for a visual approach and changes him to Tower frequency. CRJ-700 does end up going around because the A380 blocked XXR. After the Controller was relieved; I asked him why he still let the A320 land behind the A380 even though he was closer than 7 miles; and he responded; the A380 wasn't on his scope any more so he no longer had to provide for wake turbulence. Is there a ruling somewhere on the legality of this? It doesn't seem safe to me. He said he sees other controllers doing this (I have never witnessed this before) basically; if the in trail aircraft is closer than required wake turbulence; he thinks he can cancel his approach clearance; use normal IFR separation (1;000 FT) and once the A380 touches down it's like he never existed and the trailing aircraft is now cleared number one for the approach. I thought because the Tower had already warned us the CRJ-700 wasn't going to be able to land XXR; it would have been safer to break A320 out and let the CRJ-700 land 8 miles behind the A380 on the same runway. No gray area there. I would just like clarification on the wake turbulence behind a A380; if required separation is 7 miles; there can be no aircraft closer than 7 miles to that runway when the A380 touches down. Not this ticky-tacky cancel approach clearance/re-cleared visual when the aircraft touches down stuff.

Tower Supervisor described a questionable interpretation of the 'Wake Turbulence Separation' required when following an A380 on final.


Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 350

Departed U64 runway 16 with a left crosswind departure heading 210 to vortac TBC and was communicating and monitoring 122.8 at approximately 8;200 feet MSL; half way between BDG and U64; climbing to my cruise altitude of 10500. To the best of my very short glimpse; a white Cessna in the 172 to 210 class passed under us at my estimate of less than 50 no more than 75 feet. I estimate the other aircraft's heading to be 020 to 040. VERY CLOSE! I didn't have time to react or take evasive action. I was with one passenger who was not viewing out the window; until the last minute and was FREAKED! I didn't see the aircraft either until a -second after my passenger. I was trimming the aircraft; using 122.8 the Unicom tower frequencies for both mountains to the right of us and no communications on 122.8; and at that altitude the closest center is Denver would not be able to track you and I don't think that there is radio communication possible either from Denver at that altitude. I assumed that with the mountains covering most of the right side of flight no aircraft flying from the left side directly to the mountains and no aircraft using 122.8 in the area that I was in a safe zone and could monitor the instruments and continue to trim the aircraft. The aircraft in the area and at and below the mountain range height of 11;200 would or should be on 122.8. I believe what caused the problem was the other aircrafts lack of communication on 122.8 in the close proximity of the two airports either giving or asking for traffic advisory? It is very difficult I have been told to see an aircraft heading directly at you? If I could talk to the other pilot I would ask him; why he was not on 122.8 asking for traffic advisories; at that altitude? Me I will instruct any of my passengers; (more than once); to help me scan the area and keep an eye out for other aircraft! Making it part of my check list!

BE33 pilot climbing out of U64 experiences a NMAC with a Cessna at 8200 feet flying in the opposite direction. The Cessna was not detected in time to take any evasive action.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Before handing Passenger X a hand sanitizing wipe I gently reminded him that wearing a face mask is a requirement during boarding and throughout the duration of our flight. He complied and took his seat. Once the boarding door was closed I made the required announcement and completed a compliance check noticing that Passenger X had placed his face mask under his chin again. I kindly asked him to place his face mask on and reminded him of the required policy. He complied saying 'ok no problem.' I then made our departure announcement which included an introduction as well as the audio safety briefing. During the safety demonstration Passenger X stuck his head out into the aisle making a total mockery out of me (laughing/teasing) once again visibly displaying that he was not wearing a mask. I completed my final compliance check before takeoff and I explained to him that wearing a mask is for his safety; passengers; and crew. I also explained that if he continued to refuse to wear it I'd contact the Captain to have us taxi back to the gate.The FO made an announcement stating that we were fourth in line to takeoff and we continued to slowly taxi to the runway. I was strapped in my jumpseat and noticed that Passenger X stuck his head out in the aisle again with his face mask off. I immediately called the flight deck apologizing for breaking an FAR; but it was my duty to let them know that a customer was being non compliant regarding a safety policy. The flight deck said; 'no worries at all. We'll call Operations Control and determine next steps. stay tuned.' Shortly after I received a call back stating we were taxing back to the gate. There were two customer service managers that met us at the gate. Company representative stepped off to explain what took place. I was asked to step off the aircraft to explain. Customer service personnel stepped on the aircraft and asked which passenger I was referring to because Passenger X's seat was empty. He stepped into the restroom when I stepped off the aircraft. He came out of the restroom and was escorted off of the plane. Company representative thoroughly apologized to our remaining passengers and emphasized the importance of wearing mask. We resumed our flight and had an amazing smooth flight to ZZZ.

Flight Attendant reported that during taxi out a passenger refused several times to wear a COVID-19 protective mask and also mocked the flight attendant when he was reminded to wear the mask. The flight taxied back to the gate and the passenger was removed from the flight.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

On descent we were cleared to descend via the EMZOH 1 arrival to 4100 msl. FO (PF) had briefed the arrival and approach and we had both confirmed all altitude/speed restrictions were in the FMS. We began our descent and were in VNAV PTH. We were then given a speed reduction to 250 KIAS. PF opened the speed window and selected 250. I was looking through the HUD and was switching between EVAS and regular vision when I remarked that we seemed closer to the terrain than I normally thought. We then both noticed that ALL of our altitude restrictions on the arrival had deleted and we were approx. 1000 ft below the profile. We leveled off and informed Norcal who seemed to have no issue with us. They gave us a descent to 5600 MSL and a heading of 280 for the visual at OAK. FO and I extensively debriefed the event and neither of us can come up with an answer of why the restrictions were deleted. I have a call into a Check Airman to discuss this further as I can't figure this one out. Lesson learned is for me to spend less time in the HUD as PM and more time monitoring our flight path.

Approaching MYNEE waypoint aircraft descended below altitude restriction of 7000 ft MSL. All altitude restrictions were somehow deleted during descent and wasn't noticed until descending towards terrain; altitude set in ALT Selector was 4100. Aircraft descent was arrested at approximately 5700 ft MSL and a climb was started. ATC was advised and we were given clearance to 5600 ft and given heading off of STAR and towards the airport. We are not sure why altitude restrictions were removed during the descent. FMC was properly programmed and arrival was briefed. Aircraft was on VNAV PATH and was descending normally. We were given speed restriction of 250 knots and the speed intervene window was opened and set at 250 prior to 10;000 ft MSL. Altitude deviation wasn't noticed until I as flying pilot thought we were getting too close to terrain south of the airport and a discrepancy was noted when altitude was compared to STAR. Autopilot was engaged with LNAV and VNAV selected. Both pilots were looking outside for aircraft and the landing airport; expecting a visual approach. Cross checking altitude restrictions by both pilots would have alerted us to the FMC dropping the restrictions while we descended on the STAR.

B-757 flight crew descended below the prescribed altitude on the arrival after all altitude limits and restrictions were deleted in the FMC for the EMZOH1 STAR being flown. Crew received new clearance from ATC after visually noticing the terrain proximity.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

I was working as TRACON Data for West in position of R1.  I did not notice my Controller drop the tag for Aircraft X.  About 5 minutes later; I coordinated a point out with Lone Rock sector control on Aircraft Y at 8;000 who would just clip our NW airspace.  My Controller; being busy and trying to clean up his scope for a position transfer to me; was dropping tags on several aircraft above our airspace.  He mistakenly dropped Aircraft X.A few minutes later; I was relieved of position and busy taking the position brief for R2 control position.  The new R1 TRACON Data Controller took a call from Lone Rock and was asked if he talking to Aircraft X.  He; of course did not know who they were talking about since the aircraft was a splat with no information.  The R1 Controller asked me if I knew who that was; and I not hearing with the noise in the TRACON; said something like; 'Of course not; that was a point out; I was thinking they were talking about the point out I took on Aircraft Y. Shortly after; the R2 controller figured out the splat was one of our aircraft and took corrective action to avoid the two aircraft getting any closer.The NOTAM that was produced for departing aircraft from OSH during EAA Experimental Aircraft Association contributed to this. Expecting dozens of aircraft to pick up IFR flight over DLL VOR at the same point at the same time is inviting loss of separation.  Many aircraft filed incorrectly; leading to much frequency congestion.  One pilot in particular; during my following 30 minutes on the R2 scope wanted to argue with me that he filed correctly; when he didn't.  Several aircraft were in Lone Rock and Dubuque sectors looking to pick up their IFR; requiring further point outs and coordination. Several aircraft required 6/10 [Flight Plan]  amendments in order to gain their flight plans.  Most aircraft were at same altitudes and required valuable frequency time for separation; to ensure they were at correct altitudes and separated from other IFR aircraft.  In short; the EAA Air Adventure is a set up for controllers at my facility.  The loss of IFR separation is almost inevitable given the volume; complexity and inherent confusion at certain heavy periods.  There is probably no recommendation I can give other than tell a certain number of aircraft to pick up IFR at different points; or just have them fly VFR."

MSN Controller reported issued relating to the Oshkosh fly in and departure.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 5950; Flight Crew Type 1800

Distraction; Fatigue; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

We missed the intercept to the final approach course possibly due to late arming of the autopilot. I requested a vector to re-intercept. ATC said no. He would have to box us back around. He assigned a heading and altitude. The first officer was the pilot flying in the left seat. The autopilot was disconnected. In the turn we entered an unusual attitude and were descending. It took several hundred feet to recover. As captain and pilot monitoring; I should have recognized the unusual attitude sooner. It's a busy phase of flight. I constantly monitor altitude and heading. In this incident I was not monitoring for that brief moment. The weather besides being IMC had also been quite turbulent which may have played a part. Also; [we had been on duty for 8 hours; and] the turbulence may have added to normal fatigue levels. As captain I fly with First Officers with varied levels of experience. My expectation that a turn to a heading and climb are common pilot tasks. I was caught off guard for that brief moment.

PC-12 Captain reported an altitude deviation and recovery from an usual attitude when distracted from monitoring the flying First Officer.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

We started both engines at the gate; taxied out to the runway and took off with nothing out of the ordinary happening. After the completion of the after takeoff checklist we ran the ice protection pneumatic test. During this test we had the red master warning chime; and noticed it was for the Number 1 bleed leak. We also smelled a burning scent. We turned the ice protection override knob back to auto; and closed the number 1 bleed valve. The Pilot Monitoring began to run the QRH while the Pilot Flying took the radios and the continued to fly the airplane. At this time we [Requested Priority Handling]; and began getting vectors back to the filed. By the time we finished the QRH we were able to get the bleed leak inscription to go away. We then landed without incident.

During the climbout we initiated the ice protection (pneumatic) test. While performing the test; we observed the 4 'open' inscriptions on the overhead panel; and then a few seconds after that an EICAS 'BLD 1 LEAK' warning message appeared on the EICAS. We also smelled fumes. We then turned the ice protection knob back to the 'auto' position and closed the Number 1 bleed valve which had a visible red 'LEAK' inscription illuminated. The Captain continued to fly the airplane; took the radios; and called for the QRH. I ran the QRH while the Captain [Requested Priority Handling] and received radar vectors back to ZZZ. While following the steps of the QRH; the 'BLD 1 LEAK' EICAS message extinguished. We landed in ZZZ without incident.

EMB-145 Captain reported a Number 1 engine bleed leak during climbout resulting in a return to departure airport.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.0

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Distraction

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure

The Tower is closed overnight from XA00 until XB00 time. When I opened the airport the approach lighting system was still in ground-to-ground. It should've been on pilot controlled lighting. The tower has a closing checklist specifically stating to put it in pilot control. The checklist was not followed. A few weeks prior I found the same issue with a different closing Controller In Charge. I am reporting to the Air Traffic Manager that we may have a trend of complacency on the closing checklist by CIC's. I'll encourage refresher training for all CIC's on their duties and responsibilities. Additionally; I will talk to the CIC involved with this situation.

The Tower supervisor reports controllers are not setting the airport lighting in the proper position when they close the Tower at night.


Flight Crew Total 8985; Flight Crew Type 4813

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

At cruise received HYD QTY EICAS. Reservoir (RSVR) light on left hydraulic system was illuminated. Status page indicated 43% quantity. Accomplished QRH HYD QTY procedure. Left Reservoir quantity continued to decrease slowly to 17% within 30 minutes. With regards to the note in the QRH; [we were] directed to HYD SYS PRESS-L checklist. After discussing this with First Officer; Dispatch and Maintenance [we] followed the HYD SYS PRESS checklist. Dispatch informed ATC of our condition and needs. I had the Lead Flight Attendant come to the cockpit and briefed her on the situation. No prep for evacuation was needed. I then made an announcement to the passengers of our condition and what to expect on approach and landing. I found the two checklists to be a little confusing. The HYD QTY checklist Condition: states hydraulic quantity is LOW. The note below directs you to the HYD SYS PRESS-L if left system fluid is LOST. Maintenance could not tell us at what quantity we would have no left system. Does the term LOST mean half; 40% or 100%? Some fluid was LOST and it was decreasing so we planned on the HYD SYS PRESS-L checklist. We did turn on the left system pumps when we put the landing gear and flaps down and then turned them off after a successful normal gear extension and flaps to 20 as required by the HYD SYS PRESS checklist. The Power Transfer Unit (PTU) worked normally and we had nose wheel steering upon landing. The tug was not needed but had been requested in case of no nose wheel steering. We had requested the longest runway and the First Officer made a fine landing there. The calculated landing distance was approximately 4000 ft. This problem would be helped by superior systems knowledge. The PTU uses hydraulic pressure from the right engine driven pump! I shut down the right engine as we pulled into the gate and lost nose wheel steering. Had to be towed in the last 50 feet. The manual also says on page that 'Without the right engine driven pump; PTU output may be insufficient.' Also Maintenance and I could not understand why there was 3000 PSI in the left system with the left pumps off. The Flight Manual states that the status page pressure indication will show PTU pressure when it operates.I believe the handling of the emergency went well by all team members involved. CRM was at work and crew duties [were] well defined. The verbiage in the QRH might be better thought out or at least better guidance on when to use which checklist. In the moment Fluid LOST is a bit vague and the difference in the two checklists is a flaps 30/25 landing or a flaps 20 landing.

B757 Captain reported losing hydraulic fluid and finding the QRH procedure to be confusing.


A CRJ advised A80 on initial contact he was unable to shoot a PRM approach. The PRM USERS page in the approach plate book advises crews to let the Center know AT LEAST 100 miles out in case a crew isn't able to shoot an ILS/PRM approach. The ILS/PRM approach was on the ATL ATIS. A person on the wall said this wasn't the first time a CRJ crew has stated this late. They also alleged that on occasion CRJ crews would say this simply to get the far north runway and get to parking faster. This is the only reason I share this with you. This crew would have got 27L and been at their gate probably 8-10 minutes sooner if he had shot a PRM approach. I adjusted speed on several other arrivals and probably added a couple of minutes flying time per airplane behind to accommodate this aircraft. In all; the users (including CRJ) probably added 30-40 minutes of delay because of this request. Please share with these Carriers that if this is going on and it is UNACCEPTABLE. It adds to workload at a time when we don't need it.

A80 Controller voiced concern regarding one airlines failure to provide timely coordination with ATC reference non participation in PRM procedures.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft

Just south of the 'Bridge' NDB in New York underneath the Class Bravo I realized my alternator had stopped working. I was underneath the Class B shelf in New York. I was at about 350 MSL trying to stay under the +500 FT shelf of the Class B heading east. I was south of the shoreline. I went to my checklist and started to shed the load and tried to get it working again by popping the circuit breaker in and out. I did this twice but the alternator would not come back on. The load just kept reading zero. When I hit Long Beach I started my climb up to pattern altitude for a nearby airport. This is when I had total electrical failure. I was out from underneath of the 1;500 FT Class B shelf and I began to climb to 3;600 because I wanted to be 1;000 above the airport's Delta airspace and wait for light gun signals. I tried turning the radios on again and they came on very briefly only for me to report to Tower saying my radios would probably go out again but I did get cleared into the airspace. Not sure if they even heard me say; 'I may lose communications again.' It was in that brief moment that the radios came on that I realized I had drifted into the Bravo and was now above the 1;500 FT shelf. I immediately descended to pattern altitude. After I lost all my radios and NAVAIDS in the dead of night; I lost situational awareness and did not realize I had drifted into the Bravo. If it was during the day this might have been avoided; but in the night it was hard to reference myself. I didn't panic because I knew I would still have my engine but as a first timer of such a situation happening and being night time I don't think I took the necessary precautions that I should have taken now when I look back. I should have called Approach up as soon as I saw I had an alternator failure. It may have lessened the blow of buzzing the Bravo; if at all.

A pilot reported his aircraft's electrical system failed during a night VMC flight beneath NYC Class B near BRIDGE NDB and although he attempted to exit the airspace; ultimately entered nearby Class D as well as NYC Class B.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Unqualified techs assigned to work ETOPS ref GMM xx-xx-xx Section X Item X.

Technician stated that Company is using non ETOPS qualified technicians for ETOPS required checks per GMM.


Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

After reaching top of climb; Operations notified myself and the Captain via ACARS that the flight release was not signed prior to departure. Earlier; during our crew brief; the Captain asked if I had reviewed the release. I answered in the affirmative. He said he would print it out via the iPad app due to our COVID-19 procedures. This is 'our' usual work-flow due to COVID procedures - we each review the release on our iPads individually and then discuss any concerns prior to the Captain signing and printing the release from his iPad.Technology challenges that are being experienced due to COVID-19 procedures. [We] are used to reviewing the release on screen together and Captain's sign via a network computer. Using the iPad is not as reliable.We should not be sent a final manifest unless the release has been signed. I'm not sure if the work-flow for the manifest being signed includes steps completed by operations/dispatchers; or if it is automated through the system ramp agents use; but add a 'checklist' step that checks for a signed release would 100% prevent this from happening in the future.

Air carrier First Officer reported being notified that the flight release had not been signed prior to departure. The FO stated that technology challenges as a result of COVID-19 procedures contributed to the event.


Maintenance Avionics; Maintenance Inspection Authority; Maintenance Repairman

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Routine Inspection

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft X.  50-DIP (Defer In Place) LP XXXXXXX refers to a temporary repair carried out on a damaged sidewall lining in FWD (forward) cargo bay; location: 12L; panel number: 121EW. ECRA (Engineering Change Request Authority) 5011-01106 PART 1. (2) And PART 1A states: 'Notify load planner that no cargo is allowed at ULD (Unit Load Device) positions 11P; 12P; 11L; 12L; or 13L. Ensure that cargo must not be placed within 5 feet of the discrepant panel in the forward; Aft; IB; or OB directions. If required for weight and balance purposes; ballast can be loaded within the restricted area.' Aircraft X arrived at ZZZZ with 4 ULDs loaded in the prohibited positions 11L; 12L. To make matters worse position 11L contained a Self-Temperature Controlled Envirotainer - this has an integral battery pack immediately adjacent to the Temporary Repaired Sidewall Panel! There are serious safety concerns here. It appears this was not picked up by or prevented by any of the included departments.ZZZZ Maintenance Operations team reviewed this LP and ECRA because it auto generated LP XXXXXXY due to the M meter applied to the original LP XXXXXXX. Upon informing Station Operations it was apparent that they and Central Cargo Loading were not aware of ANY restrictions within the FWD cargo bay.So how did this arrive at ZZZ with ULDs in these prohibited positions? And why; with meters A (dispatch) and L (loading) applied to the 50-DIP LP XXXXXXX; were the relevant departments not made aware of this restriction; only Maintenance???? Is it because the meters were applied a DIP (Carry)? This issue does not seem to occur when an MEL is applied to an Aircraft.

Maintenance Technician reported communication errors between departments over a MEL that restricted cargo form being loaded within 5 feet of a damaged sidewall panel and which subsequently was loaded and flew in service.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 3800; Flight Crew Type 7

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action

I departed in a Cirrus SR22 with no passengers on a VFR Part 91 personal training flight. The weather reads as follows; ZZZ 17011g18 10SM Few 050 BKN 150 BKN 200 19/15 29.87. After departing the airfield I proceeded northbound. Approximately 5 minutes into the flight; I saw the ALT 2 Light Steady ON. I performed the ALT 2 Steady ON checklist. After performing the checklist; it was determined that the matter would remain unresolved. I then turned back for my departure airport to land as soon as practical as this is the final step in the checklist. I announced to Tower my call sign position; current ATIS information and that I had an Alternator 2 failure and would like to return to the airfield for landing. The Tower then cleared me to set for a straight in approach for 15. Several minutes later Tower said to please state the problem again. I responded that I had an alternator 2 failure 'and that it shouldn't be a problem; but I would like to return to the airport.' Tower responded with 'I heard you say it wouldn't be a problem; but just for our end we are going to go ahead and call an alert and have persons standing by; please say persons on board and fuel remaining'. I responded with; '1 person on board and 3 hrs fuel remaining'. I did not declare an emergency or request equipment to be standing by.  It was several minutes later that I was cleared to land. After landing I proceeded to the hangar ramp and was met by a fire truck. I debriefed with the emergency personnel and no further requests were made by emergency personnel or ATC. Following landing I contacted the Chief Pilot and he arranged the maintenance to be performed.

A SR22 ALT 2 alerted a generator two failure after takeoff so the pilot returned to the departure airport after completing the ALT 2 Steady ON checklist.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Passenger

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; General Maintenance Action

There was a fume event on the aircraft during the approach to ZZZ and the flight crew was not made aware of the event until after arriving at the gate.  FA1 (Flight Attendant 1) smelled a strong musty odor in the forward galley when the gear was extended on the approach.  FA4 and several passengers in the mid cabin smelled a strong rubbery odor.  FA4 said that she first smelled it before the gear was extended.  The odor dissipated after approximately 5 mins and no one required medical attention after landing.  During the event; the FAs discussed informing the flight crew with some deadheading pilots and they decided to wait to inform us until after landing since we were on the approach.  I was the FO (First Officer) on the flight and I was first informed when around half of the passengers had already deplaned.  The CA (Captain) had already left to catch his flight home.  I gathered information from the FAs and two of the DH (deadheading) pilots.  I called Maintenance on the radio and wrote up the issue in the AML. After I had left the aircraft; I submitted a Smoke; Fume; & Odor Form and called Maintenance Control to verify that they received the form.Crew communications -- The FAs made the right decision to delay informing the flight crew about the fume event since we were on the approach; the fumes had dissipated with no corrective action; and none of the passengers or crew required medical attention.  However; it would have been better if the flight crew had been informed of the event immediately after arriving at the gate.Maybe there could be a discussion during FA recurrent training about appropriate times to communicate events that happen during sterile flight deck periods.

We parked at gate; completed the shutdown checklist. I left for a commuter flight. My FO texted me about 20 minutes later that the FAs had reported a possible smoke/fume event just prior to and during gear extension. They did not inform me or the FO until after I had left the aircraft. No injuries reported. My FO proceeded to call Maintenance and fill out smoke fume event form. I should have taken a moment prior to leaving aircraft to talk with the #1 FA to make sure there were no write ups prior to deplaning. I am fortunate that there were no reported injuries and every one was ok.Though we finished our required tasks it is always prudent to make sure everything is cleared before leaving the aircraft.

A321 First Officer reported being notified by a Flight Attendant during passenger deplaning of a strong rubbery odor" which was noticed during final approach. First Officer notified Maintenance; completed necessary documentation; and relayed information to the Captain."


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 49; Flight Crew Total 242; Flight Crew Type 242

Training / Qualification; Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 42; Flight Crew Total 837; Flight Crew Type 837

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Airport; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

After landing; while taxiing to park at ZZZ [airport]; we forgot to contact ZZZ Ramp for entry lane assignment before entering the ramp. Threats leading to omission: Reserve pilots; reduction of flights leading to reduced proficiency/recency; limited experience at ZZZ as ZZZ1-based pilots; lack of thorough identification of requirements during arrival brief. During the arrival brief; we failed to mention an operations note to 'Contact ZZZ Ramp for entry point assignment.'Due to renovations at the terminal; we should have briefed the ramp entry/exit procedures in advance and highlighted the terminal construction and area as a threat to mitigate. This was the last leg of our trip. We were assigned Gate X at the end of Terminal XX.  There was no traffic in/outbound as we taxied in; and as we approached lane Y on Taxiway A heading toward Gate X it was completely clear with what appeared a direct entry to the gate. This may have contributed to us thinking our Ground Control taxi clearance was sufficient.  The unusually short taxi with no traffic erroneously led us to believe our ground taxi clearance took us all the way to the gate.

After landing; and while taxiing to the gate; in ZZZ [airport]; we forgot to contact ZZZ Ramp Control before entering the ramp.  Threats that led to this omission were: being on reserve; and because of the reduction in flights; this was the first trip for both of us in many weeks; and we were both admittedly rusty in our procedures. Being ZZZ1 based; we don't fly into ZZZ often. During our arrival briefing we failed to mention the operations note that requires a call to Ramp Control. Since the renovation to the ZZZ Terminal; there have been recent changes to the procedures for exiting and entering the Ramp; and knowing this we should have briefed those new procedures in advance.  This was the last leg of the trip.  Our assigned Gate X; was at the very end of Terminal XX;; and appeared to be a direct access from Taxiway A; which may have contributed to us thinking that access was controlled by Ground Control; when in fact the access to the gate was through lane X; which was controlled by ZZZ ramp. After landing; we were given instructions by Ground Control; to; 'Taxi to the gate via 'taxi route' with no mention of lane X; or Ramp Control; which led to our complacency in omitting their call. Also; after landing; we both remarked at how unusually empty ZZZ was of traffic; we appeared to be the only aircraft moving on the field; which allowed for an unusually short taxi to the gate at the usually crowded ZZZ; this also led us to forgetting that there was a Ramp Control around the terminal.

Air Carrier flight crew did not call Ramp Control prior to entering the ramp area.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 21; Flight Crew Total 107

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication

I had a possible unintentional TFR violation by clipping the corner of a sporting TFR in ZZZ. I assumed the TFR wasn't active due to COVID-19 and there not being over 30;000 people in attendance in the event. I make my flight plans on Foreflight and didn't see an active TFR in the area. However; I later realized I didn't see the TFR because I didn't have TFR's turned on on Foreflight. I now have that setting turned on on my iPad. I will prevent another occurrence like this by making sure my settings are turned on properly and by being more diligent in my flight planning both on the ground and in air.

Pilot reported a sporting TFR airspace incursion due to not having it selected on the app being used.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 4159; Flight Crew Type 17

Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 400

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Workload

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

[We] were assigned to retrieve the aircraft from the airport where the airplane had just been repainted. Extensive inspections were conducted by licensed mechanics during the two days prior to flight in order to ensure that the aircraft had been reassembled correctly and was fit for flight. For the flight; the Captain was pilot flying and the First Officer was pilot not flying. A weather briefing was conducted by the Captain and conditions en route were anticipated to be clear but breezy. The aircraft departed Runway 21 weighing 25;325 LBS (Aircraft MGTOW 26;900 LBS). Approximately 90 seconds after liftoff; both crewmembers smelled 'something hot/burning.' There was no visible smoke; but the source of the odor could not be immediately identified and a decision to return to the field was initiated approximately 2 minutes after liftoff. The return was coordinated with the Tower; who issued a clearance to enter the right downwind for Runway 21. Approximately three minutes after takeoff; while entering the right downwind for Runway 21; the right engine oil temperature was observed to be climbing rapidly above normal indication. Tower was handling other traffic in the pattern for the same runway; so given the possibility that two separate failures were now in play; the crew declared an emergency in order to ensure that access to Runway 21 would not be accidentally delayed. The approach and landing were normal and the aircraft cleared the runway and returned to the ramp normally.

[Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]

A DC3 crew departed on a training flight but declared an emergency and returned to land after a hot burning smell was detected followed by rapidly rising oil temperature. The approach and landing were normal.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

I was chief Dispatcher on duty when this position flight was enroute to ZZZ1 and about 30 minutes out at the time of event. MEL 24-X-X was on the aircraft prior to departure that inop the Number 1 generator. Crew reported over radio that the APU generator had failed and crew was down to Number 2 generator. Dispatcher referenced the QRH and found there was no procedure for this generator fault combination.At this time; I elected to get the Chief Pilot involved and explained the situation to him. After examining the QRH; it was decided that we were good to air return the aircraft to ZZZ as there was no procedure to follow up with. After discussing event with Director of Dispatch; it was realized that the aircraft should have gone to 'nearest suitable airport' per QRH CI.1.3. 3.Suggestions: I suggest that a comment be put in MEL 24-X-X stating that in the eventuality of losing another source of electrical power; the aircraft will need to proceed to nearest suitable airport. Also; a similar comment could be put at the beginning of QRH 6.4 (where the crew would probably go to) that would state if 'you are on single source of electrical power you must proceed to nearest suitable airport. I feel that something this important needs to be listed in multiple places.

Flight was enroute to ZZZ1 when the pilot contacted dispatch via VHF company frequency and stated they had lost the APU generator. The aircraft had the Number 1 engine driven generator on MEL 24-X-X and the QRH was consulted. The Chief Dispatcher and the Chief Pilot were consulted as a result of the phrasing stated in the QRH and a combined decision was made to have the aircraft return to ZZZ. The aircraft landed without further incident.Suggestions: The Chief Dispatcher has filled out a safety report pertaining to this decision as it pertains to nearest suitable airport with a single electrical source. After the fact; it is our understanding that nearest suitable airport of diversion does pertain to the condition the aircraft encountered.

Dispatchers reported directing flight crew with only one electrical generator source to return to departure airport instead of nearest airport.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

At approximately 16;000 FT the 'Tail Comp Temp High' light illuminated. We accomplished the memory items; requested a return to [the airport] with ATC; completed the Tail Compartment Temperature High Checklist; overweight landing checklist; reviewed the RLW [Regulatory Landing Weight] and CLW [Certified Landing Weight]; advised the flight attendants; completed all normal checklists and landed uneventfully. ATC originally asked if we wanted to declare an emergency. I told them we had a warning light and requested a return to [the airport]. Even this simple request required 3 calls. While flying and dealing with both ATC and now a pressurization flow light; which I believe was directly attributable to the found leak and loose clamps in the High Pressure Pneumatics System. After the initial turn to go back to [the airport] they asked a second time if we wanted to declare an emergency; this about 3 minutes later. I told them that the Captain was VERY BUSY running the checklist to try and put out the light. I told them as soon as the Captain and I were in a position to make that call we would tell them of our official request for either declaring or not declaring an emergency. About 4-5 minutes into the procedure; and after we were on about a 25 mile final; the Captain got on the radio and told them we wanted to declare an emergency. That he wanted the fire equipment to be ready; and that the warning light had just gone out. We were back on the ground approximately 11 minutes after first encountering the warning light. The warning light extinguished after approximately 2 minutes following the checklist procedures. When we switched to Tower; the Captain confirmed that we wanted to declare an emergency and that he wanted fire trucks and also advised that the light had extinguished and the trucks were a precaution. There was some difficulty with the language which was outside the normal day to day ATC communication. In fact; the Tower asked us a question about half way to parking. We both looked at each other and asked what she had said. Neither of us understood what she had asked and we still weren't completely done with this emergency yet. So I said 'we have 142 people on board and 28;000 LBS of fuel; is that what you wanted to know?' And that was the end of the conversation. So we assumed that was taken care of. After landing we parked at a hardstand and shut down all engines. Now; there is No APU; because of the high temperature warning light; and the pneumatic cross-feeds are also closed; as to prevent exacerbating the problem. Of course the ground GPU didn't work. Now we're on a hardstand with NO Power. So getting anything accomplished after shutting down the engines was a very BIG chore given the situation and language barrier. We requested that the aft stairs be dropped and the fire crew to inspect the area with company personnel. We deplaned the passengers via the forward door onto buses. The local authorities expressed concern that they would have liked to know more about the emergency and our needs prior to landing. Again it took approximately 11 minutes from warning light to touchdown. I believe we handled this whole situation with great skill and CRM. If there was any shortfall; it was the communication gap between us and ATC. And I don't think it had any direct outcome of the situation on the whole. It seemed as though ATC wanted a running commentary at times; which we were too busy to do. Fly the airplane first (pilot flying; i.e. ME). Take care of the QRH Warning next (pilot not flying; i.e. Captain).

MD80 First Officer reports a 'Tail Comp Temp High' light climbing out of 16;000 FT. The crew elects to return to the departure airport and experiences some language difficulties with the basic English capabilities of the foreign controllers.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Enroute; we experienced a CABIN ALTITUDE amber CAS message that caused us to defer the AUTO function of the cabin pressurization system.  The system was not reacting appropriately to the schedule when in HI ELEV mode and displayed the message inappropriately; we thought; given the information in the Operations Manual and the QRH. MX shared with us an identical account by a crew on a different tail number. While the SIC was delivering a forgotten box to our inbound passenger and fielding questions from a charter crew looking for assistance in getting their passengers to their destination after an AOG; I completed the deferral and began to tackle another possible MX issue. With that resolved; I began to review the Operations Manual procedures regarding the use of Manual Mode of the pressurization system. The SIC soon joined me in the cockpit where I reviewed with him the procedures and asked that he peruse the OM [Operations Manual] to make sure I didn't miss or misconstrue anything. I briefed the SIC of the Note (in the FS PTM) regarding placing the CABIN ALT Toggle Switch into either UP or DOWN for more than 6 seconds 'causes a pronounced and startling change in the rate of cabin climb or descent'. The OM [Operations Manual] doesn't note this; however; elsewhere; it notes a 'dramatic' change in rate. Since we were at 9;000 MSL for takeoff we briefed not climbing out at an excessive rate so as to be able to keep up with the cabin altitude adjustment. We were also aware of the fact that we didn't wanted to delay a normal climb from the airport. We discussed that we were unaware of how the Manual Mode would react and the effort it was going to take to adequately control the cabin. The SIC expressed some reservation conducting the flight given the lack of training in the actual operation of the Manual Mode. After takeoff; given the climb rate of the jet and the need to immediately control the cabin down to below airport elevation; I found it difficult to set an acceptable rate. Frustrated; I found myself controlling the Manual Mode into the 'startling and dramatic' range and the cabin went to a below sea level range. I managed to get it back to a positive climb rate as we continued our climbout. As we were passing FL250; I felt that the cabin was at lower altitude than normal and began to raise the cabin. It was difficult to adjust the rate up beyond the current climb rate with short toggle applications. I directed the Pilot Flying to manage the radios as I maintained attention to the system. We were passing FL275 for FL290 when the Pilot Flying asked to return to FL270. ATC cleared us back to that altitude. We were thinking a stable altitude and power setting would ease control of the system. Once again; I controlled it into the 'startling and dramatic' range. The cabin climbed dramatically setting off the red CABIN ALTITUDE message. The Pilot Flying pushed the nose over to begin a descent and we donned the masks. I believed we could simply get to FL270 and regain control of the cabin instead of an emergency descent. The Pilot Flying descended to FL260 and leveled off since I was asking why he was descending.  The cabin rise and call to ATC to get a return to FL270 by the Pilot Flying couldn't have happened together at a worse time. The two of us were working separate issues at that precise time and I feel that it divorced us of the greater picture if not for a brief span of time. At FL260; I informed ATC that we were trying to manage a pressurization issue and asked to descend to 17;000. Once at 17;000 [feet] we felt we had stabilized the cabin and continued to [destination].Do this in the sim. Startling and dramatic doesn't even describe how fast the rate changes. While I felt like I didn't get close to the six seconds of input I wonder if repeated attempts close together pushed it towards that threshold. The SIC and I discussed the flight after we landed. While I felt informed about the procedures and he felt 'untrained' we should have reached out to the Fleet Director for additional information and advice.

The Captain is seeing and hearing that I'm not happy about the decision to MEL this item; but is not taking my thoughts and opinions into consideration.On departure; my ears immediately began popping; and I saw that the Captain was having difficulty controlling the rate of cabin climb with the cherry picker. A few minutes later climbing through FL180; I felt tremendous pressure in my ears and pain behind my eyes. I looked at the cabin climb rate and it was maxed out at 9999 FPM. A short while later; things stabilized and it seemed like he got it under control. We leveled off at FL270. A few seconds later; I once again felt sharp pain in my ears and eyes; and the climb rate was maxed out once again. Now; we instantly had a RED cabin altitude CAS message; and the cabin altitude was around 13;500 ft. I donned my O2 mask; and my training kicked in. I initiated an emergency descent. The Captain; however; had his hand on the controls and was applying back pressure while instructing me to level off. I wasn't understanding at the time why he was arresting the descent; and it caused an enormous amount of stress and anxiety in the cockpit (for me at least). Apparently he got the cabin alt back down to an acceptable level; but I wasn't aware of this. We only descended 1;000 feet below our assigned altitude and advised ATC of our pressurization issue. We flew the rest of the way at 17;000 feet; and had no further operational issues. Upon arriving to my hotel room; I my ears were completely blocked and ringing; I had pressure behind my eyes and my vision was blurred.We should have never been instructed to MEL this item without some sort of training on how to run the system in manual. This was a flight for [Flight Test] pilots only! I want to make sure this never happens to anyone again. We were both completely unprepared for how sensitive the system would be in manual; and the consequences of not performing this procedure correctly. I am frustrated with [Company] for allowing this to happen. I am also frustrated with my Captain for not respecting my 22 years and 10;000 hours of flight time; by downplaying my concerns. I'm lastly disappointed with myself for not trusting my gut and being more assertive by refusing to do the flight.

CE680 flight crew reported difficulty controlling the cabin pressure using the manual backup system; and the FO reported pain in his eyes and ears as a result of the pressure fluctuations.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Type 1024

Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

After reviewing the Aircraft log for Aircraft X; I concluded that I was unable to operate the aircraft due to MEL and the maintenance notes associated. The aircraft had been operating with this MEL and was to continue operating for another 2 days before getting fixed. The aircraft arrived from a 24 plus hour maintenance delay down in ZZZZ due to a hydraulic issue. I felt the prudent thing for Aircraft X was to have some time at a maintenance hanger to address MEL before operating another revenue flight. We were swapped into Aircraft Y and I was unable to select Aircraft X for this report. Just want to make sure there is no confusion.

A319 Captain reported refusing the aircraft due to an MEL that he did not feel was addressed correctly.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 176; Flight Crew Total 21500; Flight Crew Type 447

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Manuals

I am submitting this report because there are similar sounding fixes on the RIKKK4 RNAV departure in Denver. Two fairly similar sounding waypoints on the same departure. There was no course or heading deviation; but we came close due to confusion over a hear-back issue over our initial ATC clearance which was to proceed direct RIKKK. On Departure off of Runway 25; we were expecting the clearance: Runway 25 RNAV MUGBE clear for takeoff; but instead we were given 'on departure fly heading 350 Runway 25 cleared for takeoff. We departed and flew the assigned heading. After several minutes; we were cleared direct to RIKKK as filed. I read back; cleared direct RIKKK; and then looked down at my FMC as I was the Pilot Monitoring and on the bottom of page 1 of my legs page in the FMC I saw the waypoint 'RINKR.' I assumed that was the fix ATC wanted me to fly to thinking that I must have misunderstood the pronunciation of the waypoint ATC wanted us to fly to. As I began to select RINKR; my relief First Officer questioned me and asked if it was RIKKK or RINKR? I Confirmed with ATC and knew it was RIKKK. We selected direct RIKKK and proceeded on course as filed. At no time did we ever turn towards or execute direct RINKR; but very easily could have made this mistake. Please share with ATC for their general awareness that the naming of these two waypoints are too similar. I hope that these fixes may get an updated name sometime in the future to prevent an unnecessary hear back human factors navigational error.

Air carrier Captain reported a DEN RNAV departure with similar sounding fix names RIKKK and RINKR caused confusion.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 24

Workload; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft X checked on descending to 14000; and was issued the MSN altimeter. Soon thereafter MKE approach called up and said point out approved on Aircraft X. At this time we noticed that Aircraft X was at 13100 instead of his assigned 14000. We queried the pilot as to his altitude and he replied that he was level 140. We informed him that we showed him at 13100 and he said was descending to 13000 and requesting lower. We told him to maintain 13000 and that we'd have lower for him in a couple of miles. We then noticed that his altitude was varying between 12000 and 13000. When we issued 11000 and to switch to MSN approach; we received no response for several minutes and several attempts by us and MSN approach both. When he finally checked back on; we shipped Aircraft X to MSN approach. Upon further investigation and a call back from the pilot; it was discovered that the pilot had initially input the altimeter incorrectly as 30.43 instead of 29.43 causing his altitude to be 1000 feet off. Then the pilot tried to switch over to get the MSN ATIS and we lost communications until he came back over.

While on a return FAR Part 91 flight Madison; WI (MSN) while working with Chicago ARTCC and descending through FL260; I had received a 'descend and maintain' clearance to '14;000 feet'. Earlier; somewhere just east of Lake Michigan; I listened to the (MSN) Automated Terminal Information Service (ATIS) briefing three times; as a result of being distracted by the routine ATC communications; check-ins; clearances and the ATIS interruptions due to the not uncommon frequency crossover from other nearby ATC facilities. As I normally do; I dialed the altimeter setting in the standby altimeter as a reminder for when transitioning from pressure to indicated altitudes. Passing just below FL180 I set both primary altimeters to 30.44' referencing the standby altimeter setting. The autopilot leveled the airplane at 14;000. Within approximately one minute of my level-off; the controller asked 'Aircraft X say altitude'; which after quickly verifying; I replied '14;000 feet'. Almost immediately after that; the controller stated that he showed me at 13;000 feet. Assuming the controller's information was correct; I asked for amended clearance to 13;000 and was eventually given it. I switched back to the MSN ATIS on the number two communications radio to check the local altimeter setting and distinctly heard 29.44 inches which would have cause the discrepancy.While there is no excuse for my mistake; I believe there are extenuating circumstances that may have contributed to my incorrectly setting the altimeters. 1. It had been a fairly long day with an early show time at the airport which was probably a factor. 2. While setting or verifying my transition altimeter setting; I was fighting a bright sun over a reflective lower cloud deck which made it more difficult to see the small LED digital display of the standby altimeter. I had effectively blocked the sun while sitting upright; however when leaning forward to adjust the standby altimeter I had the full effect of the sunlight. 3. The sunglasses that I was wearing; were not very compatible with the small colored display of the digital standby unit and in retrospect; combined with the suns glare; may have caused me to think I dialed the correct setting when in fact it was off 1 inch Hg after listening to the ATIS.When transitioning through FL180; especially on descent; I should have re-verified with ATC; ATIS or the onboard aircraft weather information the latest barometric altimeter setting as opposed to relying on one source of information.

ZAU Controller and pilot reported the aircraft was at the wrong altitude due to an incorrect altimeter setting.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 50

Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 750; Flight Crew Type 500

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

We had been doing pattern work; we were on our third landing. We made radio calls on downwind; base and final; while looking for traffic. On final we were on glide slope for 36 when all of a sudden I see a crop duster plane off to my left make a sharp left turn to avoid hitting us. We did a go around and departed to the northwest to head back to our home airport.

My pre-private student and I had flown from our home airport to practice landings and non-towered operations. We made appropriate position reports and entered left downwind for Runway 36. While on final for our second touch and go we observed a yellow crop dusting aircraft fly over the center of the runway at approximately 500 AGL; then turn directly into a very very tight left downwind for 36. This aircraft did not make position reports; and of course may not have had a radio to hear our reports. We completed a touch and go on the runway; and when we returned to downwind we saw the aircraft taxi clear of the runway and to a ramp area with several large trucks; presumably to refill for another mission. After making a normal pattern at 1500 MSL; we made our way to final for another landing. We observed no traffic on the runway; on final; or ahead of us. At approximately 200 AGL a second yellow crop dusting aircraft descended towards final from above us and behind us; overtaking us and momentarily establishing a position approximately 50 feet ahead and to the left of our aircraft; also established on glide slope for landing; before making a sharp left bank to avoid a collision. We waited until clear; executed a go around; departed the area straight ahead while climbing; then proceeded northwest to return to our airport. After observing the first aircraft my student and I specifically discussed that some aircraft do not have radios and that making reports in the pattern is not required at non-towered airports; and reminded the student that vigilant scanning was necessary. Neither myself nor the student believe we could have avoided the situation. I believe that we followed the exact procedure from the AIM for non-towered airports; we both were aware to look for traffic; and in particular I was looking for traffic while the student was landing. I believe that the other two aircraft were conducting unsafe operations that have been observed in crop dusting operations in an attempt to save time.

DA20 Instructor with student experience a NMAC with a crop duster at low altitude on final approach. Evasive action is taken by the crop duster and the DA20 crew goes around and returns to their home field.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Procedure

It was brought to my attention that; a digital message in reference to adding a work order for LED light installation was not applied. I do not remember my work load for the day; but I do know it was my second day on duty by myself with over 150 flights. Unless someone else had opened the digital message I can only assume it was me that read the message and did not apply the work order.Suggest that the desk be staffed in a manner that we can safely do our work; even in the financial times the company is in now. During the lack of manpower I need to tell myself to not to take on more of a workload than I can handle.

Technician reported a work order was missed and not completed.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 267; Flight Crew Type 267

Pushed slightly late and had determined we would need to deice. ATIS reported -SN; but it looked like very light rain mixed with SN. The temperature was 1 degree C. We considered using Type 1; but due to holdover time and the extremely slow process of deciding in PHL; we decided to use Type 1 then 4. Other than taking more time than anticipated to deice; the process was uneventful. Taxi and takeoff were uneventful; but right after we took off; I checked our gas and noticed we had taken off below min fuel for takeoff. This was due to the wait time for deicing. Because we were dispatched with landing fuel well above 5;000; I wasn't worried about our arrival fuel. We landed in excess of minimums.

Our flight was delayed by about 30 minutes for flight attendant crew rest. The PHL METAR was reporting light rain and snow and three quarters of a mile visibility. Deicing was required and we knew that since we were departing Runway 27; there would be a long taxi and some deicing delay. Preflight and taxi out were normal. We taxied out on both engines with the APU off. The Captain and I discussed whether we needed Type four or just type one fluid application. There have been some changes in our winter operations policy this year as in previous years so we referenced the cards and the reference handbook and made multiple checks of the METAR and even called Tower because we felt that it was not an accurate reflection of the actual precipitation. We decided on Type IV anti-icing. There was only one aircraft ahead of us in the deice bay we were assigned. It still took over an hour from engine start to completion of the deice/anti-ice process. Very; very slow process. Incredibly wasteful. Neither of us remembered to crosscheck the required takeoff fuel on the Dispatch Release. During the departure; we received an FMC alert that we were close to reserve fuel for landing. That is when I first realized that we might have taken off below the takeoff fuel printed on the Dispatch Release. The rest of the flight was uneventful and we landed with fuel well above the required reserve. Basically; we burned through our contingency fuel; dispatch add fuel; and extra fuel; in addition to our plan taxi out; so we should have called Dispatch to revise the release before takeoff.

B737 flight crew reports departing with less than the Dispatch required fuel load due to a long taxi and deicing prior to takeoff. Although there was sufficient fuel on board for the flight the actual fuel on board was not compared with the dispatch release just prior to takeoff.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I filed [the] flight LAX/ZZZ on Route 22 [so] as to not use the LOOP9 departure due to the later departure time. Route 22 was compliant with the existing; at the time; ZZZ Wind Route. ATC issued a reroute over TRM-PKE-DRK-J134. I built the re-route; but I could not profile the altitude down low enough to get below the turbulence which was from FL270-350. The ATC re-route when through blocked airspace between PKE and DRK below FL280. I needed to file at FL250 to avoid getting turbulence indicators of '3' on my flight plan. I had to call ZLA and then I had to call our ATC desk who had to call the Command Center to get approval to file the original route at FL250. This all took a lot of time to coordinate between all parties involved. ATC did not take into account the turbulence in the LAX area when issuing the reroute.ATC needs to taking into consideration turbulence and thunderstorms when issue mandatory re-routes so it does not become a safety of flight issue.

Air carrier Dispatcher reported it took a long time to get the needed planned altitude from ATC to avoid an area of turbulence.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 150; Flight Crew Type 150

Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Upon landing; the aircraft bounced. I attempted to salvage the landing with the appropriate attitude and a very little bit of power to soften the next landing attempt. The plane bounced again. This got me nervous; I remembered I shouldn't try to save a balked landing. (And this is why) On my attempt to go-around; I applied full power (I do not remember if I turned off the carb heat) I did not raise my flaps at all. Left turning tendencies were in full effect as I tried to fly out and go-around. As soon as I flew out of ground effect; the plane dropped (as it should) onto the grass between the runway and Taxiway Alpha. I successfully and safely brought the aircraft to a safe stop on the grass and then proceeded to an intersection towards Taxiway Alpha. I brought the aircraft to a complete stop immediately after the hold short line and requested to bring the aircraft back to the south ramp in order to park the plane. They approved my request. I asked if any report had to be made. The Controller did ask me to call the Tower after; which I did.

During landing this 150 hour Cessna 172 student pilot bounced; applied bounce recovery techniques; bounced again; decided to takeoff; and after an unsuccessful go-around attempt came to a stop in the grass off the runway.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 49; Flight Crew Total 7968; Flight Crew Type 153

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

I was watching from the ground near the hangars on the north side of Runway XX.  My student had completed two successful patterns to a full stop.  On his third final approach; he appeared to be on a normal descent until approximately 100-50 feet AGL.  The aircraft then appeared to increase descent towards the runway.  He pulled the aircraft to level flight just before the aircraft touched down.  The aircraft touched and bounced back into the air.  My student lowered the nose as the aircraft started to descend.  The aircraft began to porpoise.  On the third porpoise; the aircraft departed Runway XX on the left hand side; the nose gear collapsed and the aircraft came to a stop just off the runway.I need to re-enforce with this student what to do when the aircraft bounces.  A pitch attitude above the horizon must be maintained throughout the bounce and a go-around must be initiated.

Flight instructor reported observing his student during first solo flight lose control of the aircraft during landing resulting a landing gear collapse.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

It was the Captain's leg on a return flight from ZZZ when we were given the ZZZZZ3 SID. We were given a standard take off clearance from Runway XXL (no heading; altitude; or fix to fly) and I; as the pilot monitoring; engaged the autopilot modes as directed. When I engaged the NAV mode; it did not arm FMS but instead HDG mode. After double-checking I correctly engaged NAV mode; we were still in HDG with the only white needle navigation being from ZZZZZ to ZZZZZ1 and then on the rest of the departure. Since we were still in HDG mode with what I remember was runway heading bugged; we were heading directly for the terrain off of the departure end of XXL. We received hasty instructions from ATC to turn left immediately to get away from the terrain; which we complied with. We were in VMC and could clearly see the terrain; which we had already climbed above when the instructions from ATC came through to start the immediate turn. We never received a GPWS terrain alert. Once established heading back to ZZZZZ on the departure; the Captain had disengaged and reengaged the NAV button to finally arm FMS mode. ATC then advised us to resume the departure and continue our assigned climb altitude to 17;000 feet. No further communications between us and ATC about what had happened. The rest of the flight went on normally and without incident. Really make sure on RNAV departures that when you select the NAV button that the FMS mode activates and if needed spin the heading bug to the headings provided on the charts to avoid conflicts like this.

Air Carrier First Officer flying CRJ-900 aircraft reported flying toward terrain on departure.


Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

After moving Aircraft from hangar spot to the gate; I was pulling away from aircraft; stopped to let my partner in tug; and then proceeded to leave gate. Had to stop because steering in the tug locked up; could not turn steering wheel. This tug is a Hybrid with drive by wire technology. I was able to regain steering by turning off tug and recycling the computer. The problem came up again some 50 feet later when I stopped again. Had this happened while towing an aircraft there would have been major damage to an aircraft as well as injury to employees.

Tug Driver reported their drive-by-wire tug lost all steering due to a malfunctioning computer.


Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

On taxi out to RWY XXL from north end of airport taxiing east bound on Bravo was advised to turn right onto Lima south bound. Was told to give way to traffic nearing Bravo. Was looking for traffic and conducting minor cockpit workload when we passed Lima taxi way just enough to not be able to make the turn. Advised ground that we were on Bravo not Lima if they could work with that. They advised no issue to continue on Bravo.  My fault that I missed the taxiway. Signage to me was slightly confusing but not enough to have made an appropriate turn onto Lima taxiway.  We are aware of the confusion that this intersection can cause for us but I made the mistake with the clearance I was given.

After pushback from Gate X at ZZZZ we were given taxi instructions to taxi Hotel turn right on Bravo then Lima short of Lima2. We inadvertently missed Lima and continued on Bravo and notified ground control that we missed Lima taxiway. They said no problem and gave us new taxi instructions to Runway XXL. We continued to taxi to Runway XXL via the new instructions without incident. We may have missed taxiway Lima because it can be confused with a ramp entrance.

Flight Crew flying 777-200 encountered taxiway incursion during taxi for takeoff.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Data / Clearance Delivery; Supervisor / CIC; Local; Ground

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Working the tower CAB combined; I was filling the role of clearance delivery; local control; ground control; and tower CIC (Controller in Charge). There was an average amount of traffic for the time of day; and it was picking up. As it got busier I was moving around the tower cab more. This movement caused a yellow jacket wasp; maybe two; to stir and start flying around the tower. As I do not know if I am allergic to wasps or not; this was very concerning. This also created a very distracted work environment and a possibly unsafe situation for the aircraft that I was controlling. This is a reoccurring event and management has been notified. The city manager left a spray can of insect killer as the 'remedy' for the situation. This is not a solution at all; but it was what was available since they were flying over my head and dive bombing me. I had to spray the wasp as it landed on the window. This also created an issue as the spray ran down the window and partially obstructed the view out of said window. There is a current UCR (Unsafe Condition Report) on file for this same issue; as it has happened a lot in the past. Fix the holes in the tower cab allowing the wasps and other insects to enter from the outside.

Tower Controller reported wasps flying around the Tower Cab create an unsafe distraction.


Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Workload

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency

It was the last leg of a 4 leg day and the First Officer was the pilot flying and I was the pilot not flying. We had departed off of Runway XX. As we passed through 12;500 FT we heard a loud bang and subsequently felt a shutter of the aircraft. The First Officer and I brought our attention to the engine gauges and saw the right engine slowly rolling back with the EGT above 700 degrees Celsius. At this point we had climbed up to approximately 13;300 FT at which time the First Officer had started a level off and stated he would be descending back to 13;000 FT. I contacted Center and declared an emergency stating that we had a right engine failure and that we would be leveling off at 13;000 FT. The Controller asked if we could descend down to 11;000 FT and I said; 'No; not at this time; we need to check things out and start running the checklist.' The Controller then asked where we needed to go and the First Officer and I agreed to turn around and head back to the departure airport. I had pulled out the QRH and opened the Engine Flameout; Failure or Shutdown Checklist and began to work. Though N1 and N2 were wind milling; it was evident that this was a severe damage situation because of the loud bang; shutter and the EGT peaking in the 730's. We agreed that we should not try to restart and just proceed with the severe damage shutdown. I began with N2 in the checklist and verified with the First Officer that I had the right throttle. We confirmed it and I pulled it back. The throttle moved; but once it got to approximately 2 inches from the idle stop it started to bind. At the idle stop position I let the throttle go and it slowly worked its way back up to the 2 inch spot. N3 on the checklist stated to turn off the affected engine fuel control lever. Again; I verified with the First Officer that I had the right fuel control lever. He confirmed and I pushed in the button and tried to move the lever but it was locked in the ON position. I tried again with no success. N4 in the checklist stated that if severe damage was suspected then pull the Fire Lever but do not discharge the fire bottle. This was also verified and the Fire Handle was pulled. At this time the engine was fully secured. No fire ever occurred during the flight.Eventually we got a call from the Lead Flight Attendant and I explained that we had an engine failure and that we would be heading back to the airport. I also said that we were still running checklist and I would update the flight attendants along with the passengers in a few minutes. I continued where I left off and once I got to a point where I could take a break I updated the flight attendants again and then updated the passengers. On the PA I explained that the right engine has failed and we would be heading back to the departure airport. I asked that everyone stay in their seats with the seatbelts fastened and to adhere to any instructions that the flight attendants may give during the remainder of the flight. My final update to the Lead Flight Attendant was that the engine was secure and that we were landing single engine and that there would be no evacuation plans but we will be stopping on the runway. The Lead Flight Attendant acknowledged and I asked her if there were any questions she had. She said that she did not have any questions and we hung up. I had completed the checklist and the First Officer had maneuvered the aircraft on a slightly long downwind to allow for configuring. At this point I took over the radios and verified with the Tower that the trucks were ready and informed that we would be stopping on the runway. The First Officer landed and we came to a stop. We asked the Tower to have the emergency team check for any hot spots. At this time we also updated the passengers and asked that they remain seated with their seatbelts fastened. Once we were given the all clear we taxied to the gate and deplaned.I want to comment on the CRM portion of this flight by stating what a great jobeveryone did. The First Officer from the start of the event had control of the aircraft at all times and was able to land the aircraft without incident. Our training and teamwork fell into place after the surprise of the failure was realized. After talking to the Lead Flight Attendant about the occurrence I feel her timing was well planned. The first few minutes for us were busy and she stated that she held off from contacting us for a few minutes. I think she said she waited 3 minutes before making her first call to us so we could take care of the situation. That small time frame was perfect to allow us to asses the condition of the aircraft; communicate with ATC and start working in the checklist. When she did call I had time to quickly update her about what was going on and she remained calm and collected. This in turn gave me the confidence that the flight attendants had everything under control in the back (i.e. one less thing for me to have to think about.) Subsequent updates where handled the same way with conversation that was short and to the point. All around I think the communication between the pilots as well as between the pilots and flight attendants made for a smooth and effective outcome for this situation.

A MD-80's right engine failed during the climb; so an emergency was declared; the QRH completed and the flight returned to the departure airport.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

I was the CIC at ZZZ Tower and Approach Control. I was working the East RADAR position. ZZZ normally closes at midnight but on this evening; two arrivals were inbound due at midnight and the Center requested that I work the aircraft past normal closing hours which I did. This is fairly common as ZZZ has better RADAR; equipment and experience to handle multiple arrivals. I worked the 2 regional jets in and coordinated with the Center Controller that ILS 15 was the approach in use and that the two arrivals did pick up the visual approach. I also told the Center that the ILS Runway 33 was still 'NOTAMED OUT OF SERVICE' as it has been for some time. I did the closing broadcast and proceeded to finish the facility log and close the facility. Moments later; the Tower Controller called me on the phone and told me that he was having trouble getting the pilot controlled lighting to work. We switch our lighting panel over to pilot controlled when we close every night. I looked on the RADAR and saw Air Carrier X was about 20 miles south so I went immediately up to the Tower to try and help the Controller fix the lighting or at least set it on for the night for late arrivals knowing I had time to do it before the aircraft arrived. I got up to the Tower just as Air Carrier X was calling on the CTAF frequency; so I instructed the Tower Controller to answer and advise the pilot that we were having trouble with the pilot controlled lighting and we could set it to Step (3) or whatever the pilot wanted. The pilot said put it on high step (5) which we did. At this time; I noticed that the flight track of the DH8D was turning to the Southeast (away from the ILS 15 course) and level at 4;000 FT. Since the pilot was turning away from the airport and above the clouds (weather was rain and ceiling about 2;800 at the time); I attempted to reset the lighting panel and try to restore the pilot operated lighting. I was successful at this and pilot controlled lighting was restored. Air Carrier X was continuing to track Southeast and I was very concerned as the highest mountains are just 15 miles East/Southeast of the airport with some peaks above 4;000 FT. We tried to call the pilot on CTAF but got no response. When the DH8D continued through ZZZ's 3;700 MVA; I grabbed the ATIS handset and plugged into the Ground Control position and called the Center on the shout line. The Controller answered and I told him to climb the aircraft immediately as it was in high terrain and well below any MVA or safe IFR altitude. The Controller didn't react much so I told him twice more to climb the DH8D as it was previously close to terrain. About 10 seconds later the aircraft started to climb and got above the mountains. The MVA there was 5;400 FT and I think the Center's MVA is 6;400 FT. The DH8D had no idea how close a call they had last night. I reviewed the flight path today and it was frightening. I reviewed the voice tapes to confirm in my mind what happened. It was as I remembered. Some co-workers went on LiveATC and listened to the Center Controller and they said he approved Air Carrier X to do the unusable ILS 33 approach and never changed the altitude. If the pilot controlled lighting had not had a problem; who knows if we all would be seeing what happened last night on the news. Unfortunately safety issues at ZZZ and other facilities are increasing. With some controllers it is a frequent occurrence. What happened to personal responsibility and accountability?

Tower Controller described a below MVA event claiming controller personal responsibility is on the decline as well as accountability.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Received verbal clearance on ground. Richmond read fixes and did not spell. Route was completely different than filed. I thought GREKO was a fix I was issued and read it back. As a crew we dual verified clearance and distance was close to what it should be. Enroute ATC cleared us direct GREKO. Shortly thereafter; Controller asked us where we were going. We told Controller GREKO. I told my partner to spell the fix for Controller and he did. Controller informed us it was GRACO; not GREKO and gave us a heading. There were no traffic or airspace conflicts that I was aware of.

Citation 560XL pilot reported fix they thought was GREKO; but was actually GRACO; causing confusion.


Flight Attendant Airline Total 6; Flight Attendant Total 6

On our flight I saw a passenger was crying while I was is the middle of doing our demo. After we finished our demo I asked her what was wrong and she stated that she had some anxiety about flying and had a rough flight on last flight from (city). I offered her a ginger ale beverage and she accepted and I told the young lady if there is anything that I can do to make her flight more comfortable to don't hesitate to let me or the A Flight Attendant know. I then went to advise the A Flight Attendant of the situation on how the young lady was feeling some anxiety and that she was a little shaken up. The A Flight Attendant then asked her age.  The young lady told her that she was only 20 years of age. Then the A Flight Attendant; insisting and I Quote 'Your close enough!! Don't worry I'll Take Care of You!!!;' told a 20 year old that she would make her an alcoholic beverage after the young lady told her she was ONLY 20 years old.  The young lady's Clinical Counselor that was traveling with her was very appalled and thought the comments that the A Flight Attendant made to offer her an alcoholic beverage was very inappropriate. The Clinical Counselor did advise me that she will be writing about the whole encounter. I then apologized on behalf of myself; the A Flight Attendant and the entire company for the statements that she made to the young lady.I did advise the Captain about the whole situation.The A Flight Attendant should have never offered a beverage to an under 21 year old passenger especially when she advised her that she was under 21 years old.  She could have simply stated to her that if there was anything that I could do to make your flight more comfortable please let her know.

EMB-175 Flight Attendant notices a young lady crying during the safety demonstration and inquires as to the cause. She is informed that the lady is a fearful flyer and the A Flight Attendant is informed. The A Flight Attendant; after learning that the young lady is 20 years old; offers an alcoholic beverage in violation of company rules.


ARTS ll Limited RADAR limited in today's aviation standards. I was a CPC at a large facility for many years. I transferred to a lower facility for family reasons. The RADAR display at this lower level facility is a disgrace to the FAA; air traffic controllers; and the flying public. The display is unreadable; the sweep is outdated and the equipment is from the 1960's. With the preference on aviation safety and NEXTGEN; this facility needs to be RADAR updated. This is unacceptable. Cell phones have a better display and capabilities than this RADAR. What event will it take to update this equipment and at whose expense; the flying public; air traffic controllers; or the FAA when a disaster happens because of the outdated equipment. Coming here is like coming back to the dark ages; the twilight zone; prehistoric ages.

TRACON Controller using ARTS 11 Limited RADAR voiced concern regarding the outdated equipment; indicating this subject equipment is unsafe.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 7; Flight Crew Total 7; Flight Crew Type 7

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Airport; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication

I looked up the address on FAA/UAS S Chart. I misinterpreted the LAANC grid. I thought below 400 feet was Class G airspace. This was discovered by the company that does monthly reviews. The manager of this program brought the violation to my attention. We got together and discussed misunderstanding of the airspace and will get the authorization in the future.

A Drone pilot reported a Class B airspace violation.


Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Passing approximately 8;000 FT MSL; I (the Captain) noticed what appeared to be the image of a small flame in the left side window; behind my iPad.  Smoke began to appear. Initially I thought the source of the flame/smoke was the iPad.  I moved my head forward to look behind the iPad.  I noticed glowing ember and sparks coming from the forward bottom of the left sliding window (Number 2 window).  I removed my iPad to better see the source.  I called out smoke to the Cockpit Crew (myself; the First Officer; and a Check Airman jumpseater) and we donned our oxygen masks. Smoke goggles were not donned.  The smoke was not thick enough to warrant the usage.  Also; the ember had started to die out by the time we had completed putting the oxygen masks on. I grabbed the Dispatch Release and put out the ember.  The smoke stopped.  We ran the Smoke/Fire/Fumes Immediate Action Items and Checklist. Left side window heat switch moved to off.  Heat source burned out and smoke dissipated. Decided to return to the departure airport. Flight attendants and passengers briefed of the situation and reassured that the source of smoke was identified and stopped; that as a precaution we were returning; and that we plan to taxi back to the gate normally. When asked; one of the forward flight attendants noted that she smelled smoke; the other did not. ATC advised of the situation and that the smoke had stopped. An emergency was not declared.  Fire trucks were not requested. We requested vectors back to Visual/ILS 6. Jumpseater completed landing calculation duties. Landed below max landing gross weight. The rest of the flight was uneventful and we taxied back to the gate. We had some difficulty establishing crew communications using the masks.  It took about 15 to 25 seconds longer than I would have expected for us to set the switches correctly and at an appropriate volume using the overhead speaker.  For me; I had inadvertently moved my boom/mask switch back to boom while reaching for the R/T-I/C switch.

I turned on the autopilot; leveled at 10;000 feet and the Captain began the Smoke; Fire; Fumes Checklist. I took over ATC communications. I asked ATC for a return to the departure airport. The Captain knew the source of the smoke and per the checklist had turned the affected window heat off. After a few minutes with the mask on the smoke had dissipated enough to take the masks off. We had already begun our descent from 10;000 feet. The Captain during the course of the Abnormal Checklist asked both me and the jumpseater (a Check Airman) if we agreed we should turn around. We all agreed that a return was in order. We landed uneventfully 18 minutes after takeoff.  We deplaned normally upon returning to the gate and conferred with Maintenance. Also; we never did don our smoke goggles. Visibility was never restricted or impeded in any way; so per the immediate action items; they were not needed.I don't think anything could have been done to prevent this malfunction. As far as crew actions; I think we handled the whole situation according to SOP and the Abnormal Checklist. Perhaps we could have left the masks on until taxi in just to make sure there were no dangerous fumes that could have impaired us.

A B737-300 Captain's sliding window heat electrical attach point produced a bluish smoke and glowed amber; so the window heat was turned off. The Smoke; Fire and Fumes Checklist was completed and the flight returned to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 22930; Flight Crew Type 13410

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action

With clear weather at SEA we decided to do a practice auto-land. We briefed; setup; and advised both Approach and Tower of our intention. Just after my 150 foot call the autopilot and autothrottle disengaged. I took control manually. The landing resulted in a bounce with a subsequent touchdown. I entered the unsuccessful auto-land in the maintenance logbook. The landing was not good from a pilot's perspective but was not hard by Maintenance definition. There was no aircraft generated advisory message or visible indications of a hard landing. The Maintenance Technician confirmed that oil marks on the landing gear struts only indicated partial compression. Other than some light hearted remarks there were no complaints of injury by passengers or crew. This event has completely changed my opinion of our current auto-land procedure and the need for our pending change. The maintenance BITE revealed that the automation disconnected because the Captain's Radar Altimeter failed at 75 FT. I had not yet said that I had the aircraft but it was so close to that point that the First Officer thought that I did. Thankfully and to his credit he verbalized that I was now the pilot flying. Fifty feet is not the place for a transfer of control especially when it is from automation to First Officer to Captain.

Air Carrier Captain experiences autopilot disengagement at 75 FT during an auto land approach in VMC. A firm manual landing ensues after a small bounce. Maintenance determines that the Captain's radar altimeter failed at 75 FT causing the autopilot disengagement.