Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

On arrival into ZZZ; we were assigned the arrival and vectored directly to ZZZZZ; with instructions to cross at 12;000 ft. and 250 kts. from FL240. The altitude was set correctly; but the captain wanted to wait a little longer before descending. I was looking up information for the next leg in the ZZZ Procedures and didn't notice that the captain had waited too long to start a descent to meet the crossing restriction. By the time the captain caught the mistake we were unable to make the restriction without an excessive rate of descent. I contacted ATC to let them know we were too high; and they assigned us to cross ZZZ1 at 10;000 ft. and 250 kts. (As expected on the STAR). The second restriction was made.Everything was setup correctly; but I'd suggest that since we were in a VNAV-equipped aircraft for the past two days the captain got complacent in waiting for the TOD to let VNAV manage the descent; but we were in a 'classic' 700 and had to manually manage the descent.The Captain was using a steep descent; but within reason; with full speed brakes to try to make the crossing restriction; while not allowing the speed to climb up from the descent.

We were flying the arrival into ZZZ; however we were not given a descend via clearance. Instead we were given a clearance to fly direct to ZZZZZ and descend and maintain 12;000 ft. We had briefed the arrival and put 12;000 ft. in for the expected crossing at ZZZZZ1. When given the clearance direct to ZZZZZ and descend to 12;000 ft.; I as pilot flying selected DIR ZZZZZ in the FMS and put 12;000 ft. in R2. We confirmed it before executing then put 12;000 ft. in the altitude selector and confirmed it as well. I then continued the descent. I noticed that the snowflake and the 'banana bar' did not coincide with each other during the descent and realized that the FMS showed crossing ZZZ1 at 10;000 ft. but that ZZZZZ no longer showed 12;000 ft. in the FMS; the cause of the discrepancy. I increased our rate of descent but realized we would struggle to make the 12;000 ft. assigned crossing altitude at ZZZZZ. We immediately notified Center that we were going to be high and he then assigned us 10;000 ft. at ZZZ. We continued to descend and made the new crossing restriction at ZZZ with no problem. The flight continued without incident. I am not sure at what point the 12;000 ft. crossing restriction ceased to be in the FMS at ZZZZZ. I know I confirmed it with my pilot monitoring before executing the FMS. However when I noticed that the banana bar and the snowflake did not indicate what I wanted; it took me a moment to decide what the problem was. I mentioned the discrepancy to my pilot monitoring and we quickly figured out the cause of the issue. Unfortunately we were too close to ZZZZZ to descend to the assigned crossing altitude without a drastic rate of descent. That is when we asked ATC for relief on the crossing altitude and was given a new crossing altitude further down the line. I should have caught the issue earlier. I recognized that we were going to be high but was slow on the recovery. As a reserve pilot; before this trip I had not flown in over 3 weeks. I spent time in the manuals to remain comfortable; but I attribute this 'slowness' if you will on a lack of flying over the past 4 months. I do feel completely comfortable in the airplane; and upon realizing I was going to be high we immediately asked for some relief; which was the right course of action. However I should have noticed earlier that my VNAV reference and snowflake where not leading me where I wanted to go. For that I take responsibility. Having not been in the airplane much recently; it is a great reminder to remain vigilant throughout all aspects of the flight.

CRJ-700 flight crew requesting ATC revised clearance due to missing crossing altitude restriction.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 8.4; Flight Crew Total 650; Flight Crew Type 43

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object

We were doing our run ups before take off along side Runway 29 outside the markers and lost track of their location. The damage done to the prop was only one blade tip and I was able to fly back to my airport. Lowering the markers or having a designated run up area might have helped.

PA-28 pilot reported that during engine runup; propeller struck a runway marker; resulting in damage to one blade.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 68; Flight Crew Total 747; Flight Crew Type 571

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Cruising at 4000 feet en route to ZZZ. I had a friend with me that is also a pilot. He is IFR rated and we were flying on an IFR flight plan. Heard a loud thud and felt a heavy bump in the floor. The red master gear unsafe warning light and buzzer came on. The master warning light stayed lit the rest of the flight. Scanned the panel and found all instruments displayed normal values. Landing gear indicator lights were not illuminated. Tried to recycle gear by extending and retracting several times. When lowered; only the main gear indicators were lit; no nose gear. Was on with ZZZ Approach and notified them of the issue. They gave me a course change. I can't remember if it was 15 degrees right or the heading of 212. Requested and was approved for a low pass approach over Runway XL for visual on gear position. I lowered the gear for the pass once again showing only main gear indicators lit. It was reported back to me that the nose gear was down but of course unknown if it was locked. Decided to fly back around for a landing; performing some more maneuvers in an attempt to lock the nose gear. It was not successful. I [notified ATC of our situation] and was cleared for approach on [Runway] XR. I performed a soft field landing and cut the engine as I passed over the threshold. The prop quit spinning prior to the nose gear touching the runway. The nose gear held and I coasted to the first exit off the runway and was meet by emergency crew. Requested a tow and shut the rest of the plane down. Upon inspection; I discovered the upper drag link/gear lock had snapped in half causing the nose gear to fall down via gravity and spring assistance. The gear locking mechanism was no longer connected to the rest of the drag link making it impossible for the gear to lock in place. I have no idea why it did not collapse on landing but thrilled that it didn't. It should be noted that the replacement drag link from Piper is different than the original part on the plane in that the area that snapped on the old part is now much heavier in design. I wonder if this has be proven to be a weakness in the past resulting in a better design.

PA28R pilot reported landing with the landing gear unsafe warning light illuminated; and the nose gear light unlit. Problem was found to be failure of the nose gear upper drag link.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Approximately 30 minutes after takeoff; the #1 Flight Attendant called me to notify me that the passenger with the seat assignment XX had a portable oxygen generator. None of us knew this until then. The Flight Attendant checked that the passenger had enough batteries to last for the flight. I also instructed him to check if the device was approved for inflight; which it was. I have no idea if the gate agent forgot to tell us about the oxygen generator or if the passenger smuggled it in. But this is not the first time this has happened to me. With more and more handicapped passengers traveling it would be a good time to remind the gate agents to be vigilant and notify the crew about oxygen generators and lithium batteries in the cabin.

B737 Captain reported undocumented Hazmat transported by passenger carrying a portable oxygen generator. Gate Agent did not notify flight or cabin crew before gate departure. Flight crew was not provided NOTOC prior to pushback.


Workload; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Physiological - Other; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 ATC

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Flight departed and after takeoff we smelled a strange odor. After 10;000 FT the flight attendants called and said they were experiencing a very strong odor that was causing breathing problems and eye discomfort especially in the aft cabin. We donned our oxygen masks and immediately the Flight Attendant called back reported that one flight attendant had been involved in a previous situation with the same smell. At this time I elected to return to the departure airport. We proceeded with our checklist and returned for an overweight landing. The flight attendants said that unless we had not returned we would have had a lot of sick people. I asked for medical staff to meet the aircraft to check our flight attendants and any passengers that may require assistance. I do not know how to prevent this from reoccurring as this is an ongoing problem. I do have some comments as to issues we had dealing with this situation. 1- We had a lot of trouble with our oxygen masks. We all had trouble with the mask hitting our reading glasses. I tried taking mine off but this did not work as I did need them. My mask had smudges on the shield which made reading checklists and seeing the PFD very hard. During landing I had to remove my mask so I could see to land. Not good if heavy smoke had been present. 2- Communication with ATC; Flight Attendant; [and] Dispatch was very hard. We were confused by the toggle switch that is used for talking while using the masks. This took several minutes before we correctly used the switch. Having to turn your head to find the switch did not help. Boeing's switch on the yoke is better in that looking for switch is not required. 3- When using the oxygen mask all communication comes over the cockpit speakers. This made it very hard to hear. At times ATC was blocked by other communications with flight attendants and Dispatch. We found the only way to deal with this was to don our headsets over our masks. We adapted but this took time and caused confusion. 4- I feel we need more training using the oxygen masks. The simulator scenarios we have previously used did not simulate all the calls from ATC; flight attendants; and Dispatch simultaneously. It is very hard to create a scenario in the simulator with real life confusion. Communication was the biggest problem!

The Reporter stated that the oil leak was serious enough that the pilots were feeling physical effects exhibited as a tight feeling throat. He was unable to describe the odor except to say it was like no other odor he has experience before. It was not the typical dirty socks smell but none the less; very distinctive. He was told by a Mechanic several days later that the aircraft was test flown and grounded by test pilots for the same odor which forced a maintenance examination of the aircraft where the worn engine bearing was found.

An A330 returned to the departure airport after the pilots and flight attendants detected a strange odor. Maintenance determined that oil leaking around a worn engine bearing was entering the compressor section and then the air conditioning. The flight crew had great difficulty with ATC and other communications because of the oxygen masks.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

During takeoff we received an ANTI-ICE DUCT WARNING MSG. We continued the takeoff; finished the Climb Check Checklist. Captain ran the QRH while the First Officer was pilot flying and handling the radios. First Officer called Dispatch and Maintenance Control to inform them of the situation. We were directed by Dispatch to continue to our filed destination due to weather at other airports. Captain finished the QRH and requested an altitude of 14;000 feet to get out of icing. We were able to turn off the Wing Anti-ice and keep the Cowl Anti-ice on. While descending into our destination we received and ICE DETECT MSG and turned on the Wing Anti-ice switch to STBY. The Wing Anti-ice was heating the right wing on and off during the approach phase. Captain decided for safety to declare an emergency. We were given a clearance for the ILS. We never picked up any ice during the approach phase and landing phase of flight. QRH directed us to land with flaps 20 and flaps OVRD button on. Once we decided to declare the emergency; we didn't have enough time to notify the Flight Attendant due to the workload and flight conditions. We landed safely; told ATC to secure the Fire Rescue Equipment and taxied safely to our gate. Wrote up the discrepancy in our Maintenance Log and contacted Maintenance again to confirm the discrepancy.

A CRJ-200 ANTI-ICE DUCT WARNING MSG alerted during takeoff which was continued; but after completing the QRH; Dispatch directed that the flight continue to the filed destination with Wing Anti-ice OFF. During descent an ICE DETECT MSG alerted so the Wing Anti-ice was turned ON and emergency declared while the flight landed uneventfully.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 150

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Tower cleared us for a midfield left downwind for a touch and go on Runway 09. After turning on the downwind; we were cleared to land without any traffic warning. After established in stable conditions on short final; I looked out front and realized there was an aircraft on about a 200 ft low approach. We were way too close to them. I asked Tower if we were still cleared to land and the response I received was lackadaisical. He told us 'ummm yes you are.' I chose to go around with a left side step to avoid getting any closer to the aircraft on final. The rest of the flight was uneventful.

Flight instructor reported taking evasive action because of ATC's failure to separate BKV pattern traffic which resulted in NMAC.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 35

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

During GPS 24 practice approach the flying pilot lost situational awareness and started to descend rapidly thinking he was at the descent point. At first I thought he had a change of plan and was planning to land at a nearby airport. After a confusing conversation with ATC I realized he did not know where he was. At that point I took control of the aircraft and started a climb. Due to the confusion in the cockpit and windshear we got lower than I liked; about 500 FT AGL. A more complete briefing on the approach could have prevented this.

Instructor pilot; flying as a safety pilot in a BE55; describes a loss of situational awareness by the pilot flying and an attempt to descend to minimums early. The reporter assumes control and returns to a safe altitude.


Landing; Initial Approach; Descent; Takeoff / Launch; Taxi

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Rotten egg smell in aft galley during taxi; takeoff; descent; and landing. Only in aft galley.

B737-900 Flight Attendant reported a 'rotten egg smell' during takeoff and landing. Odor was localized in aft galley.


Vans Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 1150; Flight Crew Type 382

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

It was a training flight with a student. We finished run-up and taxied to the hold short line of Runway 14 on [Taxiway] B1. Runway 32 was in use so we scanned for potential traffic. The only traffic was Aircraft Y midfield downwind. I instructed the student to cross from [Taxiway] B1 to A1 on the departure end of Runway 32; on the ground. The student made the radio call and we began to cross. Suddenly we heard radio calls coming from Aircraft Y who was suddenly on final at about 600 ft. AGL. We were surprised because this plane had not been making radio calls except to announce he was on downwind. The student froze with confusion. At this point we were already on the runway so instructed the student to hurry and finish crossing the runway to get out of the way of Aircraft Y. Aircraft Y was then at 400 ft. AGL and continued to yell at us. Aircraft Y went around and everything was fine.I think this could've been avoided if Aircraft Y had made better/ more frequent radios call; if he had flown a normal traffic pattern; or if he had announced he was making a short approach. We would not have entered the runway if we knew a plane was on base or final.

Flight instructor reported entering a runway while another aircraft was on final; resulting in a ground conflict and a go-around.


Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Automation Overrode Flight Crew; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

On arrival into Mexico City; we were on the AVSAR4A arrival. After being cleared direct to MAVEK; the plane began a slight banking to the left and right while continuing direct to MAVEK. Within a few seconds of crossing MAVEK; approach queried us on our position as they showed us almost 2 miles off course. They issued us a vector of 140 to join the 164 radial off SMO. At this point the aircraft was still in NAV mode and showed it was turning to join the assigned course. However approach quickly queried us a second time to inform us we were now 3 miles off course and below the assigned minimum altitude for the area. Approach assigned a further left turn and told us to maintain VFR and to join the final approach course on this heading. At this point I; as pilot monitoring switched to 'green needles' and saw we were too far to the right and full scale deflection on the 164 radial from SMO. Right about this point the Captain disconnected the autopilot to join the final approach course as was shown on the FMS. The FMS showed us to be very high on a short final to runway 5R which did not add up to what our position and distance off the SMO radial showed. At this point I noticed a 'FMS DR' flag on our MFD. Upon seeing this I immediately called for a go around. The Captain immediately added power and began a climb. As we were climbing we reported a navigation failure to the approach controller. He instructed us to turn to a heading of 050 and to climb and maintain 12;000. Shortly after; he gave us a further clearance to turn direct to the SLM VOR and hold as published. At this point we once again had navigation troubles as the FMS was directing us in one direction while the approach controller was directing us in another. After tuning the SLM VOR we proceeded directly to the VOR and held without further navigational problems. At this point I ran the QRH for a Position Unknown which was the correct QRH to run for a FMS DR flag. This instructed us to inhibit GPWS terrain. While in holding; the FMS navigational performance degraded further and displayed 'FMS DR 5.0NM.' According to the MFD; our position was displayed nearly thirty miles from the SLM VOR where we were holding.The root cause was the failure of the GPS as we crossed the IAF of the RNAV/ILS 5R approach. By the time we had been alerted to the problem; we were already several miles off course.A contributing factor was MAVEK depicted as a flyover waypoint. Because of this we expected to cross over MAVEK with some overshoot as is natural of a flyover waypoint.I have experienced the aircraft bank to the left and right repeatedly only one other time. This was when the military was jamming GPS. In that instance we merely deselected the GPS and allowed the aircraft to continue strictly on RNAV equipment. In the future; if I begin to feel the aircraft waver on a course again I will make sure to immediately check the GPS equipment and RNP and to ensure we have adequate performance. Additionally I will cross check using ground based navigation aids.

Air carrier First Officer reported a GPS failure went undetected on the MMMX AVSAR4A Arrival until ATC issued heading and altitude vectors. A go-around was begun when the FMS DR alerted.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 8648; Flight Crew Type 8648

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 33; Flight Crew Total 8059; Flight Crew Type 5890

Distraction; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

While taxiing out to Runway XR at ZZZ I might have failed to hold short at the hold short line. The FO and I recognized the error at the same time. He yelled stop as I hit the brakes. Looking out at the line; it was difficult to tell if the nose of the aircraft had crossed over the line. The Tower was informed immediately. The Tower then cleared us for takeoff. No other issues. Both the FO and I had reviewed the bulletin for ZZZ about this problem and it still may have bitten us.  Other issues that may have affected our situational awareness was a last minute weight and balance issue that required us to stop on the taxiway to move passengers and get our numbers. Another issue is that I and the FO are starting to fly again after three months. It is taking time to re-acclimate to line operations. Even being aware of this and taking our time to get it done right; we may have still gotten bit by the error.

Approaching Runway XR hold line Captain began to apply brakes; so I thought he was coming to a stop. I looked down to bring up the legs page on my FMC and when I looked up again it was apparent he was not going to stop short of the hold line. I told him to stop and he brought the plane to an immediate stop. We had crossed the line by a few feet. Captain told the Tower we may have crossed the hold line and they asked if we could take an immediate takeoff; we said yes and proceeded to takeoff on XR without incident.

Air carrier flight crew reported a runway incursion.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

We were climbing out on the SID when we realized that our onboard weather (WX) Radar might be inoperative (INOP).  Just then; ATC asked us if we would like to deviate left or right around WX.  We asked if we could stay on our present heading (HDG) 325; which was a left deviation; and that our radar might be INOP.  He cleared us to continue; and advise. Unbeknownst to us are present HDG would take us direct to ZZZ.  The importance of that will be apparent; shortly.I transferred control to the First Officer (FO) and began to troubleshoot the problem.  Finding no approved procedure I contacted Dispatch. They advised that if we cannot continue to ZZZ1; we should consider a divert to ZZZ.  I determined distance; checked WX; and did a non-standard landing assessment.  All were satisfactory; we would be under maximum landing weight (MAX LDG WGT) and outside visual reference showed no convective activity ahead; to the horizon.  I notified dispatch that we agreed. Dispatch amended our release for diversion to ZZZ and we informed ATC. At this point we were approximately 94 nautical miles from ZZZ. I asked the FO to handle the radio while I briefed the Flight attendants (FA's) and the passengers (PAX). I briefed the FA's that we were diverting for INOP WX radar and that it would be a 'Precautionary landing'. The FO was already given a routing to ZZZ so I had an accurate arrival time. Next; I briefed the PAX and I sent the diversion report to dispatch.After; completing my briefings I rejoined the FO and he briefed me; that we were cleared direct to STAR and descending to 24000. We were told to contact ZZZ approach.  I informed them of our situation and notified ATC.  We completed the arrival briefing and accomplished the Descent Checklist.  I called ZZZ operations to verify that they had been informed of our arrival and reconfirm our gate assignment.  I asked them to send a Customer Service Manager to help with the PAX.  We landed and taxied to the gate without further incident. Roughly two hours later we departed for ZZZ1 and landed there; also without further incident.The reasons for submitting this report are as follows.                                                 1.  To voluntarily share the details of our event so that the program can glean important data; and use it to remedy any deficiencies or discrepancies discovered.2.  To afford me the protections guaranteed by the program; should; during the course of it's review; company discover that any actions or omissions on my part; though inadvertent and unintentional be determined to be in violation of applicable FARs or company policies.

During climbout; we realized weather (WX) radar was not working. Captain (CA) transferred controls to FIRST Officer (FO) and began to troubleshoot. No approved procedure was found in QRH. CA coordinated with dispatch; who recommended ZZZ as a divert. We [notified ATC] and requested divert to ZZZ. Cleared STAR. Landed without incident. Once at gate; we coordinated with dispatch and maintenance. Once WX radar system was reset; we continued to original destination ZZZ1.System failure: Consider adding circuit breaker reset for this system in QRH. This ended up being the corrective action taken by maintenance and could have avoided diversion and lengthy delay.

A319 flight crew reported diverting due to weather and the weather radar failing.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Troubleshooting; Fatigue; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling; Company Policy; Aircraft

A B767-300 on approach; [flight] crew received SLAT ASYM message on EICAS with accompanying LEADING EDGE light [illuminated]. Leading Edge devices were locked-out. After trouble shooting in accordance with the Fault Isolation Manual (FIM); I determined Proximity Switch S281 was faulty. This event used up more than an hour. A replacement proximity switch was obtained from the Fly Along Kit (FAK) and temporarily installed to prove trouble shooting efforts came to the proper conclusion. Trouble shooting was accomplished in accordance with the FIM 27-81-00 and in coordination with Maintenance Control. The switch was replaced in accordance with Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) 27-88-01. According to the Schematic Wiring Practices Manual (SWPM) 20-02-10; [Proximity Switch] S281 and its associated wiring are located within a flammable leakage zone. Also; I consider this as Primary Flight Control wiring addressed in SWPM 20-14-11. SWPM 20-30-00 states that all connections in a Flammable Leakage Zone must be sealed. I had no splices or tooling available in the FAK. I believed the Raychem splice to be appropriate for this application. Also; the Raychem splice was used in the original installation. I was able to procure the splices on the airfield. I was offered an automotive crimper and a hair dryer to complete the task. I declined. Tooling needed to be sourced elsewhere. I was able to source the crimper; but not a proper heat source.Maintenance Controller X instructed me to make the connection and the seals would be completed when the aircraft arrived. I asked him how he wanted it documented and he advised; 'You just did.' I covered the splices with adhesive tape and zip ties. Shortly thereafter; I went to the hotel where I had a bath; food and 2 hours of rest. I returned to the aircraft to complete my maintenance activity and discovered the same fault had returned. Upon opening the wing panel; I discovered the splices were exposed and shorted to each other. I needed a heat source to complete the seal. At this time I was on the telephone with Troubleshooting Engineer X. He instructed me to use a lighter. I refused; and he insisted that I do that. Engineer X told me; 'I do it all the time.' I went so far as to tell him I had an audience. He said; 'Put your back to them!' At this point I used an open flame in the leading edge of the wing to complete the heat shrink of the seal [material].I felt strongly at the time that not doing so would cost me my job. I did it; sleep deprived and under extreme duress knowing that not doing so would be at the expense of my job. The Director of Maintenance (DOM); called me into a meeting that resulted in my suspension. He told me that I should have explored the use of butt splices and that 'a Flight Technician has to be resourceful.' I have no authority to deviate from the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) or the General Maintenance Manual (GMM). I had no documentation to allow me to deviate from the steps that I took. I returned the aircraft to service in accordance with the documents available to me. In my meeting with the Director of Maintenance; there was no discussion of my method of sealing my splices. At this time I am suspended pending possible termination.

An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) reports about improper maintenance practices he was directed to follow under threat of losing his job; after a B767-300 aircraft arrived with a SLAT ASYM EICAS message and LEADING EDGE light illuminated.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 7150; Flight Crew Type 3000

While in cruise profile approximately 5NM N-NE of FSD; crew identified a blue & red drone passing by the right side of the aircraft. Aircraft Radar Altimeter was indicating 1100 [AGL]. Drone passed within [estimated] 200 feet of the aircraft at the same altitude. No previous recognition of the drone and no evasive action was initiated.  Event reported to FSD TRACON and subsequent followup with FSD ATCT personnel. No further information available to the crew.

Helicopter pilot reported a NMAC with drone.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

During the initial descent into BUF approximately 100 miles west of the field at FL290 the radio altimeter briefly gave an erroneous indication of 300-400 ft. lasting 2-3 seconds. After a conversation with the Captain we both thought this was due to the 5G interference given that the RA had not shown any other signs of malfunction and the incident did not re-occur. We made a report to ATC so that they could file it and other pilots in the area could be made aware. Because we did not believe this was an aircraft Maintenance issue we did not consider a Maintenance write up in BUF. The flight continued and landed without further irregularity. If the 5G interference had not been such a recent point of issue and discussion within the industry we would have more than likely concluded that there was an issue with the RA and written it up at BUF; but with 5G in the forefront of our minds we assumed that it was to blame. In hindsight as pilots we are not qualified to determine what is and what is not 5G interference and should have written it up; if even only as a precaution. We had no intention of hiding a Maintenance discrepancy and of course in the moment if we had thought the airplane needed Maintenance we would have taken proper action. Going forward I will ensure that all erroneous RA indication are brought to the attention of Maintenance regardless of the situation.

Air carrier First Officer reported that during initial descent the radio altimeter displayed erroneous indications. Reporter stated they did not complete a maintenance write up because they believed the event was due to 5G interference.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 420; Flight Crew Type 340

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Police / Security Involved

This was a [long] cross country flight [with] an overnight stay planned [near the midpoint] at airport ZZZ. I was PIC flying right seat and my brother; a post solo student pilot; was at the controls in the left seat. About 3.5 hours into the flight and approximately 30 miles short of a planned fuel stop at airport ZZZ1; the engine lost power and did not restart on subsequent attempts. With the help of my co-pilot brother; we identified and then I landed on a gravel road. The airplane was not damaged and both occupants uninjured. Inspection of the fuel tanks revealed no fuel. Cell phone calls to the County Sherriff's office resulted in a deputy bringing auto gas (plane has STC for 87 unleaded) and we fueled the plane and made it safely to ZZZ1. We stayed overnight and proceeded to our final destination the next day without further incident. Cause of error was my failure during preflight to question the dipstick readings which indicated less fuel than I normally expected after a 'top off'. I have learned a hard lesson rather cheaply and I will never again let 'get there itis' override sound judgement. I hope this could be a valuable cautionary tale for others as I thought something like this could only happen to other pilots. I owe a debt of gratitude to my commercial flight instructor for helping me to develop the skills that saved our lives. Another deserving of mention was an aviation mechanic who went over the aircraft and enhanced the safety of our continuation.

A general aviation pilot reported having to make a forced landing on a public road; due to fuel starvation resulting from inadequate preflight planning. No injuries or aircraft damage was reported.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Per build up team at the company cargo warehouse; they received a PMC [large pallet] containing 2 boxes of non DG (dangerous goods); 6 boxes of excepted quantities and 131 total individual boxes of dangerous goods in limited quantities (totaling 139 boxes) was loaded on board the aircraft in one LD7 in one compartment in ZZZ over-exceeding pit limit for DG.

Airline Ground Personnel reported Dangerous Goods quantities loaded in cargo compartment exceeded compartment Dangerous Goods limit.


First Officer; Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

I was awakened from the bunk approximately 3 hours into my rest and called to the flight deck by the Captain. Once we opened the bunk door there was a strong acrid metallic smell in the cabin. Most likely Potassium Hydroxide (Toxic) fumes from the main battery. Once on the flight deck I and the other IRO were apprised of the situation. Fumes and the main battery discharging with a list of associated system failures. The two IRO's started looking for alternate airports. There were not a lot of options. The closest was not a good option; but with Dispatch and Maintenance concurrence we agreed on ZZZZ airport with another airport as a backup in case the weather went south. At this point we told ATC that we were changing our destination to ZZZZ. Landed overweight smoothly. APU would not start. No nose wheel steering. Towed to hard stand. Passenger got off. Crew and FAM's spent 8 hours waiting to deplane. FAMs required [staying] on AC until next day.

Enroute the main aircraft battery started to overheat and discharged. This lead to multiple systems failures. Non normal checklists were completed. An emergency was declared and the flight was diverted to a suitable airport in ZZZZ. Landing was without incident and the aircraft was towed to the ramp.

B777 flight crew reports a main battery overheat and discharge causing multiple system failures and fumes in the cabin and flight deck. Flight diverts to a suitable alternate.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Fatigue; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Staffing

The Supervisor noticed that the controller working Sector 36's shift ended. He immediately informed me; the controller working Sector 27; that he intended to combine Sectors 36 and 27 and I would be working both sectors combined. I did my part to combine the sectors and relieved the R36 controller. I then proceeded to work the two sectors overloaded for about 25 minutes. The sectors had a combined 25 aircraft in them during one 15 minute period when the maximum MAP value for that combination is 15 aircraft. The Supervisor's hasty decision to combine the sectors to avoid having to pay holdover overtime to a controller led to a potentially unsafe situation.The Supervisor should have anticipated when the R36 controller's shift ended and found a way to relieve him that didn't involve heavily overloading the combined sectors. He could have paged a different controller to relieve that controller or opted to use holdover overtime to keep a controller past the end of his shift. Instead; he chose the least safe option; and overloaded two combined sectors. This is a standard practice in this area and is especially common with this particular supervisor. When I asked him about his reasoning; he informed me that he was too busy with administrative paperwork and his emails to monitor the operation closely. This is also a safety issue; as the Supervisor's primary duty is to manage the operation effectively. The Supervisor should receive skill enhancement training in his duty priorities as well as properly managing controller workload.

ZDC Center Controller reported sectors were combined as a shifted ended causing the sector to be overloaded above the designated traffic limit for that airspace.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA

During climbout from CVG; we were given a climb to 13;000 feet and cleared to WADAL intersection. Passing out of 9;000 feet (climbing at 1500 feet/min) we were told to contact Indy Center on 135.57. We checked in with Indy Center (135.57) and stated we were climbing to 13;000 feet. Passing through about 10;000 feet; the TCAS gave an aural TA warning and the display popped up on the MFD.  It showed an aircraft 800 feet above us descending at our 12 O'clock position towards us (about 6 miles out). At the same time; Indy center issued a turn 15 degrees to the left. Simultaneously we got a descending RA (indicating 2;000 feet/min down). I commanded my OE student to immediately disconnected the A/P comply with the RA; which he did. As we were descending per the RA; we visually acquired the aircraft as it pop out of the clouds at about 200 feet above us. It passed off our right side and directly over us. This appeared to be low wing aircraft; single engine type. This aircraft was squawking 1200 and appeared to be VFR.  They nor Indy Center were not controlling this aircraft at the time. I did speak with the Indy Center manager afterwards; he was unaware at that point what had transpired.Cause - VFR aircraft not controlled by ATC and flying in the clouds without an IFR clearance.Suggestions - I learned the importance of always complying with TCAS instructions in an expeditious manner. Had we not done this and utilized our training; it may have ended poorly.

Air carrier Captain reported an NMAC with a VFR small aircraft during departure from CVG airport.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 190; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

AT 7000 feet on MILTON STAR we were cleared to descend to 3000.  We began descent and were told to turn left 15 degrees.  We saw a target on TCAS and visually confirmed we were turning and descending away from the target.  The traffic triggered a descend RA.  The first officer flew the procedure per SOP which matched what we were already cleared to do.  We did not have to deviate from our clearance.  We continued with an uneventful landing at LGA.

Got a TCAS TA and while visually looking for traffic we received clearance to descend to 3000 feet.  We began descent then we were given 'turn left 15 degrees' by ATC. Received TCAS 'descend' RA and I expedited descent and followed commands on PFD. I saw the aircraft passing by our right wing and approximately 400 above us.

A B737 inbound to LGA on the MILTON STAR suffered an NMAC with an unidentified aircraft while complying with an ATC clearance followed by TCAS TA and RA alerts.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Equipment / Tooling

During descent water dripping from Captain's side window on EFB causes it to randomly switch to unwanted display modes during critical phases of flight. Condensation from window frame drips on EFB. It is mounted in a very poor location where the lower corner interferes with captains left leg during landing. It covers the rudder height adjustment switch and condensation drips on it during descent.

The ERJ Captain reports that the EFB is installed in a poor location that is subject to water damage among other things.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 15

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 6

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I had just relieved another controller and during the briefing I was told that Aircraft X was issued 9;000 feet which is the standard altitude that CASTA departures climb to.  I was also told that Aircraft X was in a vector for spacing with the CASTA departure in front of him; due to insufficient spacing provided by LAX Tower.  I was vectoring Aircraft X back to join the SID at the AJAYE intersection.  Aircraft Y was inbound to LAX at 10;000 feet.  I saw that aircraft and was trying to get Aircraft X in front of the Aircraft Y so he wouldn't be what I thought would be 1;000 feet below the super aircraft.  As I was vectoring the aircraft I observed a few hits at 9;000 feet which was the expected altitude for Aircraft X to be at.  As I cleared Aircraft X direct AJAYE I noticed his altitude was 10;000 feet; climbing.  I questioned Aircraft X and he told me that he was cleared to 13;000 feet.  He told me that he had the aircraft in sight and was continuing his climb.  I coordinated the altitude with the next sector since that was not the SOP altitude.  I then switched Aircraft X to the next controller.I don't know.  It was just a mistake by the controller during the briefing.

I was concerned about not get the spacing from the Tower I turned to the Supervisor to let them know.  As I was doing so I climbed the Aircraft X to 13;000 and it should have been 9;000.  I had a plan to build spacing so I gave the Aircraft X 13;000 and 230 knots.  My plan was to go runway heading so I accidentally gave him 13;000.  When he was reading back the altitude Tower buzzed in my ear so I didn't hear the read back.  I didn't know about the loss of separation between the two aircraft because I went on break.  When I brief my relief I told him Aircraft X was stopping at 9;000.  He turned the aircraft thinking the aircraft was going to stop at 9;000.  The aircraft turned and was still climbing and the other aircraft was descending. I should have restated the altitude when Tower got in my ear and I didn't hear the read back.

Two reports of an aircraft that was doing what it was told to do.  The error was the departing aircraft was assigned the wrong altitude and came close to traffic that was level on an arrival.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; General Evacuated; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

During preflight a single pop sound was noted along with a noticeable change in the sound of airflow in the flight deck. Very shortly afterward smoke was observed entering the flight deck from the air vents. The packs were selected off and after a short period of time smoke was still observed entering the flight deck. The recirculation fans were then selected off.The odor of the smoke did not appear to be an acrid electrical smell. The smoke did not diminish and the packs were reselected on. When the packs were reselected on; the level of smoke intensified. The packs were immediately selected off and all personnel were advised to immediately exit the airplane. Crash Fire Resource (CFR) was notified and the aircraft was completely depowered.CFR arrived at the aircraft and began the process of finding the source of smoke in the cabin. The onboard mechanics sourced steps and opened the APU access doors as the APU was suspected to be the source of the smoke. When the APU access doors were opened; large volumes of smoke poured out of the APU compartment. CFR examined the APU compartment for evidence of fire and no fire was noted. The aircraft cabin doors were opened to vent the smoke in the cabin. CFR released the plane back to the crew.

Captain reported malfunction of the APU at the gate resulting in smoke throughout the aircraft. Crash Fire Rescue (CFR) was called while personnel left the aircraft. APU was shut down.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 1400; Flight Crew Type 1400

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Workload

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft rolled on the runway and the pilot flying applied full power. After rotation; engine began running rough and the airplane was climbing at 100 FT/min. The airplane climbed to 400 FT over the runway and stopped climbing. Engine continued to run rough and Instructor on board decided to return for a landing on the active runway. The pilot flying turned right crosswind; and the Instructor advised the Tower that the airplane had trouble climbing. We made right traffic at 400 FT and made a short approach; landing on the active runway. The aircraft landed safely and taxied to a maintenance facility.

A C-150 engine began running rough after rotation permitting a 100 FT/minute; so the pilot turned downwind at 400 FT to land on the active runway while the Instructor advised ATC about the flight's difficulty.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

I was assisting [the] purser during boarding by welcoming customers and distributing small hand wipes sanitizer. I was there until only [a] few customers were left to be boarded and I told [the] purser that I'm going to do my exit row verification-briefing. As I walked there a passenger that was standing on the isle row 10 approached me and asked if she can have one of these open seats on row 10 D; E; F instead of sitting between two people. I told her to sit on her assigned seat while I go check on CSR at the front if we can accommodate her request. I proceed to the front door; CSR wasn't there so I spoke to purser about the customer request and went ahead and accommodated her request. After talking to her; I walked past by my exit row without briefing my passenger. As I was sitting on my jump-seat doing my silent review; I realized that I was supposed to do my exit row-briefing. As soon as we reach 10;000 feet and were cleared to get up; I went straight to my exit row and apologize to our customer and did my exit row verification-briefing and informed purser and other crew member. I know it is not an excuse [but] we were busy and it slipped my mind. I promise to do my best and to be extra careful.

Flight Attendant reported not completing the exit row briefing until airborne because of distraction caused by moving a passenger to a different seat.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 29; Flight Crew Total 1053

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

I was sitting in the right front seat of Aircraft X from ZZZ to ZZZ1. Aircraft X was at FL450 and just received instruction to descend at maintain Flight Level 240 over I believe ZZZZZ. As the Captain pulled the thrust levers back approximately 3/4' Aircraft X was vacating Flight Level 450 and started to descend; I watched the number two engine N1 and N2 continue to decrease while the number one engine N1 and N2 remained consistent with the selected thrust lever position. The Captain immediately noticed this at this time and I grabbed the emergency checklist book and opened it up to 'loss of engine at altitude during flight'. I read off the items listed and the Captain completed all the listed tasks. Once those were completed; I read off the items for restarting procedures. Upon reaching Flight Level 250 the engine was restarted and the flight continue to destinations; ZZZ1 and landed without incident or any other anomaly. The take away from this experience was; that in any event such as this; it is extremely important to have the cockpit organized and know where specific checklist items are in case there is a need.

CE525 pilot reported an inflight uncommanded engine shut down and subsequent engine relight; and continued to destination airport.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Descending on the ZZZZZ STAR into ZZZ told to descend via and to plan [Runway] XXR and the ASEL had 6;000 feet selected. I programmed the ILS XXR off of ZZZZZ1 which had 10;000 feet. as lowest altitude. A DISCONTINUITY separated the two. ATC queried if we were descending on the STAR just shortly after a level off above or at 10;000 feet just before ZZZZZ2 and we began a discussion why it wasn't continuing a VNAV decent to be below 9;000 feet at ZZZZZ2. We also simultaneously received two large ATC assigned speed reductions right around this time. We weren't able to make ZZZZZ2 BELOW 9;000 feet with the VNAV not keeping us on the path and the two drastic ATC slowdowns. We advised Approach Control that we missed it and that the crossing at ZZZZZ3 would be tight. We lowered gear and brought flaps in and were close to the required altitude at ZZZZZ3. I delved into trying to determine why the VNAV failed to descend below 10;000 [feet] on its own. I then determined it to somehow be related to the 10;000 [foot] minimum altitude between ZZZZZ1 and ZZZZZ4. I was later made aware of how this had been discussed in a safety bulletin. I have learned the FMS will look at the altitude on the other side of a DISCONTINUITY and observe it and not descend below it. I believe it's a horrible design as we often try to provide long finals with waypoint and altitude data when being vectored around on potentially long downwinds. Seems to defy the purpose of a Discontinuity. In the future will ensure approaches do not contain waypoints with higher altitudes then those depicted on the Arrival; even when a Discontinuity is present.

Global 6000 Captain reported FMS discontinuity which prevents crews from FMS guidance between STAR and IAP. Captain reports this as a known safety issue; and a horrible design.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 15

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14; Flight Crew Total 10470; Flight Crew Type 1804

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

I was acting as the pilot not flying on a Part 91 flight in our corporate jet.We departed TEB on the RUUDY 4 RNAV Departure. The departure was properly set in our dual FMS system. Both myself and the pilot flying verified the information was correct prior to takeoff. The SID requires a 240 degree heading to join a 260 degree course to the WENTZ intersection and level off at an altitude of 1;500 FT. Shortly after climb out; we had joined the 260 degree course and were then handed off to the New York Departure Controller.I completed the after takeoff checklist and noticed we were on course to TASCA intersection as indicated on my MFD at which time I selected 2;000 FT on the altitude pre select. I verified the pilots information was indicating that TASCA as our next fix. I then contacted New York Departure and reported climbing through 1;600 FT for 2;000 FT. The Controller advised that we needed to be at 1;500 FT as per the departure procedure. I then advised we were correcting and selected the altitude preselect to 1;500 FT and the pilot flying immediately disengaged the auto pilot and within seconds we descended from 1;800 FT back to 1;500 FT. I then selected 'direct to' WENTZ Intersection on both FMS systems and realized we were still 1.6 miles from the WENTZ intersection. We crossed WENTZ at 1;500 FT and then selected and climbed to 2;000 FT and crossed TASCA. The Controller mentioned traffic was off to our left which we had no visual contact with. I did verify the traffic on TCAS but there was no conflict and no evasive maneuvering was required.

I was the acting pilot flying.I saw the next fix on my MFD as TASCA and (with the autopilot now engaged) reset the altitude select from 1;500 FT to 2;000 FT; the required altitude at TASCA.I then hit the direct to button on the FMS and realized we were still 1.5 miles BEFORE WENTZ.

A Learjet 45 flight crew flying the RUUDY RNAV SID from TEB climbed above the mandatory 1;500 FT MSL restriction prior to passing WENTZ. The pilot flying had noted TASCA as their 'next' fix and unilaterally selected its 2;000 FT MSL crossing restriction in the altitude select window. When alerted by ATC the PF realized they were still 1.6 NM from WENTZ which was still the active waypoint. Worth noting in the individual narratives is the conflict as to which pilot performed which actions.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 102; Flight Crew Type 102

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Aircraft; Airport; Human Factors; Procedure

On the listed date and approximate time; I was conducting pattern work and landings. My wife was with me as the passenger and as I turned from Left Crosswind to Left Downwind for the runway my wife pointed out that Aircraft Y had crossed under my plane from my right and entered left downwind parallel to me and between my plane and the runway. It was at that time that the pilot made his very first radio transmission that he had entered the downwind; would take number one and 'had me in sight'. I asked him what he was doing and if he needed to get in front of me and he said that he would get in front of me to do a short approach for a touch and go and get out of my way. Prior to this radio transmission there was no radio contact with traffic in this pattern and certainly no attempt to communicate with planes or get into the normal pattern. The pilot simply flew under me; passed me between my plane and the runway; and took the number one spot. Had my wife not seen the plane and pointed it out; I would not have seen it before it gained altitude to get ahead of me.There was absolutely no reason for his action other than he had the ability to do so and obviously had no intent to use acceptable communication with other aircraft and or follow normal pattern flight for landing. No [priority handling was requested] and no warning was given as to why he was flying under me in a very maneuverable airplane; to overtake and pass my plane.This is not the first time I have observed this particular pilot display this type of flying behavior and I believe he poses a great risk to the many pilots; both experienced and student/inexperienced; that utilize this airport.

Pilot reported an NMAC in the traffic pattern at a non-towered airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 55; Flight Crew Total 7436; Flight Crew Type 7436

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

While approaching Runway XXL in ZZZ we were given takeoff clearance while simultaneously being given the Runway Awareness Announcement that is installed in the MAX.  This prevented us from fully hearing our clearance.After flying the MAX since its return; I have experienced the installed awareness functions interrupt communication approaching the runway 50% of the time.  Predictably; in each instance; we have had to stop and ask ATC to repeat these clearances.I see real communication risks and hazards with this system as it currently functions in the MAX.1) When rolling out on shorter runways; it will call out runway remaining at 1000; 500 and 100 feet.  A certain risk that these calls could prevent the hearing of ATC taxi instructions likely to happen at this time.2) All calls from the system (runway awareness; altitude chimes) are wired into the headsets which completely obliterates any communication that happens simultaneously.  While not on this particular flight; we were listening to an important ride report from another aircraft when the altitude chime went off in our earpiece.  We initially missed the information because of it.

Reporter stated that the volume of the advisory announcement is about 25% higher than a typical voice communication. There does not appear to be a way to change the announcement volume; nor is there a way to route it through a speaker instead of headset. Reporter stated they have experienced multiple events where the advisory interfered with communications and situational awareness.

B737 MAX First Officer reported they were unable to fully hear the takeoff clearance because the runway awareness announcement was given at the same time. Reporter stated that system calls come through headset and interfere with simultaneous communications.


Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Parallel visual approaches to [Runway] 16R and [Runway] 16L. Left traffic; an A319 encroached on our side; we had them in sight as they continued to overshoot. We leveled off and executed a go-around as they flew underneath us and overshot our localizer as well. We did not hear any communication from them as they likely were already on Tower and we were still on Approach. ATC then informed us of their encroachment and asked if we wanted to go around. We told them we were in the go-around. We had an estimated separation of [approximately] 200 feet.

On visual approach to Runway 16R in Denver. ATC pointed out traffic on base for [Runway] 16L. Visually acquired traffic and saw him begin to turn for the runway. Everything appeared normal. Got a traffic alert and followed shortly afterward with a RA. The traffic was still in sight and what looked like turning for [Runway] 16L. RAs are pretty common on these two runways and having the aircraft in sight usually makes it a nonevent. However; this time the traffic continued toward us; so we executed a go around. I am guessing on the separation because I was looking out the window; but it seemed to be about 200-300 feet beneath us.

A CRJ Air carrier flight crew reported another carrier overshooting final approach on a parallel runway led to a NMAC and go-around.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 229; Flight Crew Type 8988

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 181; Flight Crew Type 6000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We were cleared the visual approach to Runway 28. There was a rain shower on final. The FO was flying and had the runway and airfield in sight. We could see through the rain shower and were cleared to follow the preceding aircraft; which we had in sight; they were also cleared the visual. At approximately a six mile final we entered the rain shower and lost sight of the runway momentarily. The aircraft was stabilized and coupled to the approach mode of the autopilot. In the time it took to realize this fact we were in the clear and had the runway in sight. The aircraft and approach were stabilized and the rest of the approach and landing were completed uneventfully.In the future when dealing with questionable weather; I will request the instrument approach if there is any possibility of being unable to comply with visual flight rules. In addition; I will make the request early during the approach as the radios were quite congested; and I was unable to query the Controller about the preceding aircraft's ability to keep the runway in sight.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

B737 flight crew reported losing visual contact with the runway after entering a rain shower on final during a visual approach to ATL.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.0

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

I was sequencing multiple arrivals to ZZZ; 2 regional jets and a flight of 4 military aircraft. Aircraft X was on vectors for sequencing; restricted to VFR at 3500 feet and I issued a speed restriction of 210 knots for spacing and Aircraft X acknowledged. Aircraft Y continued to slow on final due so I instructed Aircraft X a speed restriction of 180 knots and was told 'unable' but they offered to make a right 360 degree turn instead. I approved the maneuver and on roll-out from the 360 degree turn to the assigned heading they increased their airspeed to over 300 knots ground speed. I again asked them to reduce their airspeed to 210 knots and to proceed to initial but they never took the speed restriction; at this time; Aircraft Z called airborne off of ZZZ1 to pick up his IFR clearance. I told Aircraft Z to maintain VFR at or below 3000 feet for Aircraft X traffic above him and made the traffic call. Aircraft Z called the military aircraft in sight and was told to maintain visual separation. Aircraft X was too close for spacing behind Aircraft Y due to their speed and told me they were doing a left 360 degree turn. I told them to fly a heading of 320 degree for traffic (Aircraft Z) and was ignored. I told Aircraft X again to fly heading 320 vector for traffic; made the traffic call and was ignored a second time. Finally; Aircraft X asked where the traffic was and I told them a third time to fly heading 320 to avoid the traffic (Aircraft Z) and was acknowledged on the third time I gave them instructions. Once Aircraft Z was clear of the Aircraft X final; I gave Aircraft X direct to initial and the descent.The military aircraft have on numerous occasions not responded to instructions when they aren't given their exact request. They need to understand that they are not the only aircraft we service and all attempts are made to accommodate their requests but they need to comply with ATC instructions.

A Controller was vectoring a VFR flight of four military aircraft in Class C airspace for sequencing. The aircraft made a 360 degree turn for spacing which put them into a potential conflict with an IFR departure off a nearby airport. The Controller restricted the altitude of the departure and the military flight to ensure separation. The Controller attempted to vector the military aircraft for sequencing and away from the departure traffic but they would not respond to the instructions. The military aircraft attempted to maneuver on their own and ignored the Controller's speed assignment. After several attempts the Controller's vector instructions were acknowledged and complied with.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Immediately at touchdown; I (FA1) smelled a pungent chlorine smell that began to burn my sinuses and throat. I covered my mouth and nose with my sweater sleeve and waited for the seat belt sign to be turned off. At the monitor and challenge all call; FA4 told me to tell the Captain that there was a strong chlorine odor at the back of the aircraft. After the all call; I looked around the corner to see the flight deck door was already open. While waiting for the agent to arrive; I told him about the odor. He said that upon landing; when he turns the APU on for AC in the cabin; residual air from the engine enters with it. I asked him 'bleed air'? He answered 'yes.' After deplaning; FA4; complained of burning eyes; sinuses and throat; I noticed a cough that began that evening. The 3 of us noticed that it was our aircraft in the morning and notified crew scheduling that we were unwilling to work on that aircraft in the morning. The agent and ramp worker in charge notified the mechanics. I believe that our Captain also mentioned it to the mechanics. The agent also called the paramedics who took our blood pressure and oxygen levels. The company executives would have to take this ongoing problem and the dangers and injury that it causes its crew members and passengers seriously and fix the problem.

A319 Flight Attendant reported pungent chlorine odor and burning of sinuses and throat immediately on landing.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

After arriving at the gate; I left the number 2 engine running after leaving the aircraft. The First Officer and I read the Shutdown Checklist and it called for thrust levers idle; [but] I did not confirm that the engine was actually shut down. I found out that it was left running from the next flight crew taking over the aircraft about 20 minutes after I had left the aircraft.I think that this happened due to being fatigued. We had worked 8.78 hrs of flight time and 13 hrs on duty yesterday followed by a minimum rest. On the approach; I had made a few minor errors that the First Officer caught while going over the Descent and Approach Checklist; one of them being fasten seatbelt sign. I felt fine leaving [the departure airport] being fully alert and about half way through the flight I could feel the fatigue setting in. Either way this could have been prevented by checking that the engine is actually off when the Shutdown Checklist is accomplished.

The number 2 engine was left running after leaving the aircraft. I had read the Shutdown Checklist but we had not confirmed by reference to the gauges that the engine was actually shut down. The crew that was flying the aircraft after us arrived about 20 minutes after we left the plane and they called the Captain to advise.The Captain and I had 8.78 hours of flight time the day before and had to rise early the next morning for this flight. I believe that fatigue was a significant factor for this event and I could see signs of fatigue in both of us on this final leg of the day. This could have been prevented if we had checked the gauges to confirm that the engines were shut down. On my post flight walk around; it was very loud at our gate with ours and many other nearby aircraft APU's and engines were running. I do look up at the engine to check the blades when I am near the nose of the aircraft. The galley truck was blocking my view of the engine #2 and after I went around the truck; I continued inspection starting with the side of aircraft; leading edge and landing gear and did not look up at the engine blades.Checking the gauges at shutdown and visual checking the engine on post-flight could have been prevented this event.

EMB-145 flight crew reported they failed to shut down the Number 2 engine when they left the aircraft at the end of their duty day. Fatigue was cited as contributing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Type 4918

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

I wanted to write an FSAP and PDR concerning a situation that occurred this morning. I'm very very upset and concerned with this situation and hope that the appropriate actions are taken SYSTEM WIDE to make sure that this doesn't happen again. I've spent over 20 years trusting our de-ice crews and after today; that trust is gone. I believe; because of this incident; we ABSOLUTELY NEED to go back the way of doing a pre-contamination check of the wings prior to takeoff; not just look at the nose! We arrived to the aircraft this morning which had been sitting on the gate since the previous morning. It had approximately 24 hours of ice/snow; etc. accumulation due to a cancellation the day before. Operations was advised of the need for de/anti ice. We pushed off the gate and because of the accumulation; it took almost an hour to deice with Type 1; and an additional 30 minutes for Type 4. Iceman said that deice was complete and relayed the required information. Shortly after I received a call from the lead Flight Attendant; letting me know that a deadheading pilot (non-company) had rung his call button to advise us that there was still frozen precipitation on the wing. I immediately went back to verify and was incredulous at what I saw. All across the top of the wing; from wing root to about 7-10 feet from the fuselage was a layer (on both wings!) of frozen adhering precipitation. Again; this is AFTER iceman told us that the deicing was complete. This can be corroborated by the deadheading pilot.I went back to the cockpit and immediately called iceman and told them of the situation; and that we needed deicing again. The driver (whom I was communicating with) had said that he couldn't see the top of the wing; but he would relay to the sprayer (he had mentioned that he had 30 years of experience at some point in our conversation). They proceeded to give us a 2nd de/anti ice and when done; came back with the required information. Having lost all trust with the individual that had deiced us twice now; I requested from the 30 year; experienced driver to switch positions with the bucket sprayer. He said no problem. After about 20 minutes; he came back to us and let us know that the aircraft was now clear; but that he had to spray the tail again. This is unacceptable.I'm no expert on when an A320's performance will be degraded to the point of a hull loss; but I will tell you I would have personally blown one of the slides to get off the aircraft if a crew would have continued to the runway with our situation. To say I'm extremely dismayed at the situation would be an understatement.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

A319 flight crew reported their aircraft had been sitting at the gate since the morning prior and had 24 hours of accumulated ice/snow. The flight crew noticed after the de-ice procedure that ice remained on the wing from the fuselage outward about 10 feet.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 1500

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

At 50 FT AGL we got a R ENG FUEL FILTER EICAS. [We] continued departure through clean up and after takeoff checklist. [We] went to QRH. QRH directed us to land at nearest suitable airport. [We] initiated at return with ATC. [We] notified Flight Attendant and passengers. [We] consulted with Dispatch [and] Maintenance Control. Completed approach preparation and briefings; and made a normal approach and landing.

On rotation; we had a R ENGINE FILTER BYPASS caution. We ran the checklist; contacted Maintenance Control and Dispatch; and returned without incident. Maintenance was waiting at the gate and quickly replaced the fuel filter. The Captain was on the jetway coordinating with Dispatch; a Duty Manager; and the agents. I was getting the aircraft ready and loading the box when two mechanics came in and said that they needed to start the right motor. They asked if I wanted to help and I said 'of course.' We made sure the aircraft was cleared by the mechanics on the ramp and I told Ramp Control that we were starting a motor at the gate. I made sure that all the checklist items were done and I helped start the engine without any problems. I had assumed that the mechanics were in charge of the engine start; but I did not realize that they could not do it with passengers onboard. I guess the mechanics were unaware of that rule; or they thought I could start the engine without the Captain. The Duty Manager was notified and already at the gate. There was never any danger; but the procedure was not followed properly.

Air carrier flight crew experiences a R ENGINE FILTER BYPASS caution light just after rotation. QRH procedures are complied with and flight returns to departure airport. The filter is replaced by Maintenance and the engine is run up with the First Officer's help. It is learned after the fact that engine run ups are not permitted by Maintenance with passengers on board.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 31.4; Flight Crew Total 153.5; Flight Crew Type 138.4

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was landing Runway XX at ZZZ; and there was a gust of wind from the left just as I was touching down. I hit the left brake just slightly and began to swerve. I corrected and used aerodynamic braking. I was still veering off to the left so I aimed in between the lights as I braked; and elected to roll to a stop into the grass at the intersection of RWY XX and Taxiway XX at a 45-degree angle so that I would not cause any damage.   Tower asked if I needed any assistance; and I requested assistance so that everything could be checked out properly. ARF came down and helped push my plane back into the runway. The examined the grass; runway; and plane and found no damage or leakage.

Piper Warrior pilot reported loss of control of aircraft during touchdown due to a wind gust.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 127; Flight Crew Total 1270; Flight Crew Type 945

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I am an instructor. My student was endorsed and was going on his first solo cross country flight. The event took place at Willow Run Airport (YIP). Student was told to taxi to runway 5L via taxiway Charlie from the west ramp. Student taxied as instructed. When requesting take-off clearance; student was given clearance to take off on runway 5L from the taxiway charlie intersection. Instead of taking off on runway 5L; student mistakenly turned the wrong direction on the runway and took off on runway 23R. As soon as the tower controller noticed the mistake he then cleared the student to take off on runway 23R. Both ground and flight instruction has been given to the student. He now knows his mistake. We discussed he must verify runway direction using compass or heading indicator prior to takeoff the ensure he going the correct way on the runway.

C172 instructor describes an incident with his student departing on his first solo cross country flight YIP. After taxiing via Taxiway C the student is cleared for takeoff on Runway 5L from Taxiway C but turns right and takes off on Runway 23R.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I was on Local Control. Ground Control was combined with Flight Data and Clearance Delivery. There was a stand-alone Controller in Charge.Aircraft X was rundown for an IFR release. The release was granted by ZZZ TRACON and Aircraft X departed from ZZZ to ZZZ1. At the time ZZZ1 had a ground stop [GS] due to COVID cleaning and we did not coordinate a departure time with TMU.Prior to Aircraft X taxiing; there was a strip printed from TMU stating that there was a ground stop to ZZZ1. That strip was placed near the Status Information Area by the Ground Controller.During Aircraft X's departure roll ZZZ TRACON called over on the shout line to advise us of the ground stop and that is when we became aware that Aircraft X should have been delayed on the ground.We as a Tower team did not catch that Aircraft X needed to be delayed and we should have been more observant to the ground stop strip and requested a departure time from TMU for Aircraft X.I recommend that when a GS is in effect that the GS is displayed on the SIA [Systems Information Area] and that a strip is sent to all facilities at the same time. Often we will receive a flight strip with a CFR; GS; GDP...ect.; but the information is not displayed on or SIA for several minutes if at all.

Tower Controller reported an aircraft got off the ground that was in a ground stop due to its destination airport being closed for COVID-19 cleaning.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

We departed from ZZZ as scheduled. An hour into the flight; we were cruising at FL380. We received a call from the Number 1 Flight Attendant letting us know that there was an odor in the back of the aircraft that smelled like burning wire. He said he could smell it from about 3 rows from the aft galley. No smoke was seen. The Captain asked about the 2 flight attendants in the back. The Number 1 stated they felt a little nausea and headache; but they were doing okay. At that point; the Captain elected to [advise ATC] and land at ZZZ1. We were about 40nm from ZZZ1. I continued flying while the Captain coordinated with ATC; the Company; and the flight attendants. Captain also made a PA to the passengers. We were given radar vectors to land on RWY XXC. We landed uneventful on [Runway] XXC and stopped on the runway. We talked with ARFF and had them check the aircraft for smoke and anything out of the ordinary. ARFF said they saw nothing and we continued to the gate with ARFF following us. Once parked at the gate; the passengers deplaned. The two flight attendants in the back deplaned and were met by the EMTs and checked out. Maintenance boarded and checked the aircraft for possible sources of the smell. In the end; they said it was a power port that was overheating.  Throughout the event; there was no change reported in the strength of the odor.

B737-800 First Officer reported Flight Attendant notification of 'burning wire' fumes in the passenger cabin. Captain executed an uneventful diversion after flight attendants in aft galley reported physiological symptoms.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 97; Flight Crew Type 12000

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Departed ZZZ Runway XX; Flaps 5. Reaching 1;000 ft.; I called for flaps 1 and subsequently attempted activation of the Electric Trim switch. Left yoke stab trim did not function. Asked First Officer to try his yoke trim switch. Neither trim switches functioned. Ran QRH procedure for Stabilizer Trim Inoperative. ATC was notified of flight control problem and [priority handling requested]. A large amount of questions were asked during the initial run of the QRH. The QRH gives a condition: Both of these occur:Loss of electric trim through autopilot.Loss of electric trim through the control switches.As we got vectored off the departure procedure and distracted by ATC questions pertaining to the nature of our [situation]; I didn't fully hear the initial reading of the condition calling for both of the above. As I had a heavy yoke from the takeoff configuration; I choose not to negative G unload the aircraft and turn on the autopilot. By not turning on the autopilot; I wasn't able to fully comply with the QRH conditions. QRH was continued and Stab Trim Cutout switches were selected to cutout. With the Cutout switches in cutout; the autopilot was not available.During our debrief and review of the QRH procedures it was discovered that the QRH called for loss of both items; loss of autopilot and flight control switches.

B737 Captain reported failure to fully comply with QRH procedure following a pitch trim failure.


Party1 Maintenance; Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Logbook Entry

Was supposed to operate a B757 aircraft from ZZZ to ZZZ1 September 2014. The aircraft had an inbound write-up that 'Captain's crotch seatbelt cannot be securely tightened.' Also in the aircraft log history; there was a write-up from the day before; 'Captain's crotch seatbelt became disengaged from seat;' which was signed-off by ZZZ1 Line Maintenance saying 'reengaged captain's crotch seatbelt; checks O.K.' When the aircraft arrived at ZZZ; maintenance personnel signed-off the inbound write-up with 'Accomplished- seatbelt operation normal.'  However; once seated for departure; I attempted to secure the belt and tighten it. I was unable to; and when I got up and removed the seatcover I soon discovered the belt was installed completely backwards; with the end that I was supposed to pull to tighten; installed into the slot in the seat. THE ONLY THING SECRURING THE BELT WAS THE FOLDED END; WHICH WOULD INSTANTLY PULL THROUGH THE SLOT AND GIVE WAY IF SUBJECTED TO ANY SIGNIFICANT FORCE. The seatbelt was written up once again and maintenance came out to the airplane and was shown the incorrect installation of the belt. They then decided to swap seats with another aircraft. Once they removed the bad seat it became immediately clear that WHOEVER CLEARED THAT FIRST WRITEUP IN ZZZ1 IS EITHER INCOMPETENT OR INTENTIONALLY MISREPRESENTED THEIR ACTIONS AS AN AIRWORTHY REPAIR. That aircraft should not have been flying with the center belt just stuffed into the slot like it was. The failure to install the belt properly not only compromised safety; but also caused a significant and needless delay once I discovered it after it had once again been signed off as airworthy. Whoever was responsible for the 'reengagement' of the belt at ZZZ1 should not be allowed to work on our aircraft until appropriate action has been taken to ensure they will not repeat such fundamental error. I have no idea what ZZZ Line maintenance did before they signed it off the first time either; so they are to blame also. This event illustrates a lack of attention to basic aircraft maintenance procedures; inspection and repair. Maintenance Control management should be embarrassed that this problem was diagnosed by a pilot after being improperly handled THREE times by their staff: 1) whoever failed to properly install the belt to begin with. 2) Whoever in ZZZ1 that 'reengaged' the belt and signed-off the first write-up. 3) The last signoff by ZZZ Line Maintenance right before I attempted to fasten the belt for pushback.

Reporter stated the Captain's crotch seatbelt was not properly secured due to the lack of heavy safety wire that must be installed to hold a retaining rod that secures the seatbelt webbing end in place; under the seat. He continues to see an increase in maintenance work not properly accomplished; but signed-off including improper deferrals by Maintenance Control. There seems to be a culture change in the workplace with mechanics that is affecting the quality of their work.

A B757-200 pilot questions whether maintenance incompetence or intentional misrepresentation by Maintenance was responsible for three separate logbook sign-offs involving a Captain's crotch seatbelt that was installed backwards and not secured under the seat. Captain notes the event illustrates a lack of attention to basic aircraft maintenance procedures; inspection and repair.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 1300; Flight Crew Type 1200

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Incursion Runway

During taxi on ground control I crossed the hold line to runway 04R at SFF without clearance. This occurred as I was changing to tower frequency as instructed by ground. After crossing the hold line I immediately stopped and turned around. There was no other traffic at the airport. I believe that I was distracted by changing radio frequencies while taxiing. In the future I will stop taxiing to set radios to requested frequencies. I am an instructor and will review this with students and pilots getting flight reviews.

Instructor pilot reports crossing the hold line for Runway 4R at SFF (a complex intersection and HS1); while changing frequency to the Tower at Ground Control's request.


Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 132; Flight Crew Type 72

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I was on a VFR cross country to ZZZ. Upon reaching the area of ZZZ I was in contact with Center for VFR flight following. Once getting the airport in sight; I tried several times to get [Center] to release me to squawk VFR and change to the CTAF. I was told to standby 3 times over a several minute period. I announced my intentions one more time and that I was switching to CTAF and squawking VFR; which I then did. Once on the CTAF; I was at 3;500 MSL (1;300 feet above pattern altitude); I announced that I was going to enter a left downwind for Runway XX. The winds were calm at the time of my arrival. I then proceeded to make the proper calls in the downwind; base and final legs for Runway XX. I never [saw] any other traffic or heard any response on the CTAF. Upon touchdown; I was preparing to initiate a touch and go when I looked up to see a tailwheel Cessna on a short final for Runway XY. I then announced again that I was still on the runway. The Cessna continued with no response. I slowed the airplane rapidly and exited onto the parallel taxiway at the nearest connector. The airplane then landed on XY. No further event occurred and I departed the area to continue my cross country. I would like to repeat that I made all the appropriate calls and never heard anything from the Cessna neither before or after the event. I contacted Center upon my departure for VFR flight following and continued my trip.

PA-28 pilot on landing rollout at a non-towered airport reported an aircraft landing in the opposite direction on the same runway.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Air Traffic Control Non Radar 41; Air Traffic Control Radar 40; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 55; Flight Crew Total 6800; Flight Crew Type 800

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

While being vectored at 6;000 ft was instructed direct PMPKN; climb to 11;000. I entered in the GPS data base PUMKN and turned and climbed. Within minutes controller said 'Where are you going?' I said; 'PUMKN.' He said; 'Turn to 360 and descend immediately to 6;000'.The PUMKN point is an actual fix; though different than PMPKN. I feel Chicago Controllers need to be careful assigning this fix if anyone else has done this. It was however totally my error.

Beech 90 pilot reported of similar sounding fixes. The pilot entered PUMKN; located to the west in Iowa; rather than PMPKN; north of PWK; which made Chicago TRACON question where they were going.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Workload; Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

A go-around was initiated during visual approach to XXL in ZZZ following unexpected disconnection of auto pilot; unable to manage speed; and fault indications we think were associated with MELs. Decision was made to go-around at about 800 ft above TDZE (Touchdown Zone Elevation). Nav data was lost during go-around so we requested vectors for a visual back to XXL and landed. Altitude was exceeded by 275 feet during the downwind vector and speed reached 267 KIAS at 7000 MSL while attempting to re-engage the auto pilot and auto thrust. Landing was made without incident. Associated faults listed on the maintenance printout included; FLT/CTL SEC 3 Fault; FLT/CTL; Anti Ice Stby Pitot; Auto FLT AP (Autopilot)/ A/THR (Autothrottle) Off; Cab PR LDG Elev Fault; L/G SYS Disagree; and Vent Blower Fault. L/G SYS disagree and Vent Blower Fault were displayed on ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor) during landing roll. SEC 3 and Anti Ice Stby Pitot were MEL'd. Flight crew is unsure about what caused the malfunctions. Better communication and more efficiency reducing level of automation would have helped during the go-around procedure.

Arriving to ZZZ; we were cleared for the ILS XXL Approach. Turning onto final; the speed button was pushed; but 'Managed Speed' did not engage. At that time I realized I had not 'Activated the Approach' and then did so. 'Managed Speed' still did not engage and the 'Reference Speed' was set. We configured the A/C for landing. At that time; or soon after; both FMGS's (Flight Management Guidance System) dropped off-line; several warnings; cautions and alarms annunciated; and we performed a go-around. It was a challenge figuring out what was going wrong. I informed the Tower of our go-around and he cleared us to 7000 feet. Tower asked for a reason and I said 'standby.' Maintaining altitude and speed was challenging as the aircraft systems were not responding as we expected them to. After being turned over to 'Approach Control;' I informed them our go-around was due to several system and radio issues. A 'Raw Data' Approach was performed. Seconds after touchdown; the 'Landing Gear Disagree' and 'Vent Blower Fault' Illuminated on the ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor). After exiting the runway; I preformed the QRH procedure for the Vent Blower. The other ECAM item went away. We then taxied to the gate.

A319 flight crew reported executing Go Around during approach due to Autoflight system and both FMGSs failures. The Go Around provided unexpected challenges to the flight crew.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 26000; Flight Crew Type 15000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport; Airspace Structure

When checking in with MCO final Approach Control we were given speed reduction 190 to mkr (Marker Radio Beacon); Drones reported near ORL Executive; all traffic now arriving Runway 17L and R. Cleared visual Runway 17L maintain GS on approach slow to 170. Caution traffic on right to Runway 17R; contact Tower on freq. We received our landing clearance for Runway 17L. Second birds on path siting. We were on ref and GS. About 1;100 ft. I realized we weren't fully configured. Called for gear/F3 then F Full/Landing checklist. Landing checklist completed by 800 ft. We were still at ref and on GS fully stable; we landed normally and taxied off at Taxiway F. We received no alerts during approach.I believe we were distracted more than usual as well as feeling a little tired that afternoon. I will most assuredly use this experience as a learning example of avoiding potential complacency by carefully applying our procedures to prevent any re occurrence going forward.

Air carrier Captain reported failing to properly configure for the approach due to distraction and fatigue.