Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 50

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I was on an IFR training flight with my student. We departed in Piper Arrow from ZZZ for Montgomery Field. Enroute; at ten thousand feet; the flight was challenging with strong headwind and strong downdrafts; having hard time maintaining altitude at times; and some IFR conditions; until we approached Julian VOR.About fifteen miles east of Julian VOR we experienced severe turbulence and downdrafts completely unable to maintain altitude. At this point we were losing two thousand feet per minute and I decided to make a diversion to the south where there was an opening in the cloud cover and terrain was low. I communicated my distress with the Controller who said that there was a Cirrus aircraft; which had the same problem and suggested that we turn south and try to approach Montgomery via V-66. Quickly we realized that there was no chance for us to cross the mountains as the downdrafts were persisting and the turbulence getting worse.My student was experiencing an anxiety attack and in addition to all other distress he couldn't hold his bladder any longer. I requested to deviate away from the weather toward a VFR airport where we can land and re-group. The Controller suggested ZZZ1 Airport; so we headed that way and safely landed. I never planned to go that far south and I was not familiar with the airspace; as I would have liked to be.After we refueled and evaluated the weather; the airspace; and our own physical condition we decided to return to ZZZ. As we took off from ZZZ1 we headed for V-66 and westward in order to stay away from restricted airspace and the MOAs. Since the airspace north of ZZZ1 is completely unfriendly to general aviation; I decided to circumnavigate restricted airspace by flying west and then north. I wish I took V-137; I would have avoided all turbulence; and stayed clear of restricted airspace.As we were in a climb; about five thousand feet; we hit incredible turbulence; like nothing I have experienced ever before. The Arrow was everywhere; on one side one second then on the other the next one. I grabbed the controls from the student; so I can keep the aircraft upside right. My student was vomiting in our VFR chart; and I was completely disoriented at this moment; with my attention divided between way too many distractions. When I called for flight following to get some help and stay out of trouble; I was already in restricted airspace. I made a one-eighty turn; but it was too late. Finally I got the vector I desperately needed to continue VFR to ZZZ where the rest of the flight was uneventful.

PA-28 instructor pilot reported encountering severe turbulence that led to an airspace incursion.


Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

This flight was conducted in one of our new aircraft which is AHRS [Attitude and Heading Reference System] equipped. Weather conditions were VMC at the field and throughout the New York area. The aircraft was light with only 36 passengers on board. We were cleared via the La Guardia Four Departure off Runway 13; Whitestone Climb. Per the departure procedure the initial assigned altitude was 5;000 FT. Prior to departure we were cleared to 'line up and wait' on Runway 13; despite this area having known magnetic anomalies. As we waited on the runway there were no messages posted to the EICAS and no flags on either PFD. The heading bugged on the PFD's matched with the known runway heading. The AHRS system was in MAG mode. Since everything appeared to be normal we did not switch to DG mode. The Tower released us for departure and the takeoff roll was unremarkable. Once airborne and passing through about 200 FT; the master caution EFIS COMP MON posted on the EICAS and the amber HDG flag appeared on the First Officer's PFD. At 400 FT the Captain turned to a heading of 180 degrees and at 600 FT the autopilot was engaged. At 2.5 DME off of LGA we turned to a heading of 40 degrees and once established on that heading accelerated to 250 KTS. The aircraft was 'cleaned up' per standard operating procedures. Established in the climb we turned our attention to the non-normal procedures for EFIS COMP MON. Given that the aircraft was light our rate of climb was rapid. ATC cleared us to 12;000 FT which was set in the altitude pre selector. As we tried work through the non-normal procedures it became apparent that none of the 3 compasses were in agreement. The standby compass's status was questionable as the high rate of climb and turns required in the departure seemed to keep it from rotating smoothly. Distracted and perplexed by this; neither pilot realized that the auto pilot had captured the initial altitude of 5;000 FT at the same time that we were cleared to 12;000 FT. The aircraft leveled off and started to accelerate. The First Officer was the first to recognize the trending increase in airspeed and called it out and the Captain immediately retarded the throttles. The airspeed had increased to about 285 KTS. Simultaneously; ATC again requested that we climb to 12;000 FT. The Captain complied with ATC's request which again resulted in a high rate of climb. Once again this seemed to give the stand by compass some issues. In the climb to 12;000 FT we were further cleared to 15;000 FT. Once level at 15;000 FT things settled down enough to complete the non-normal procedures and soon there after we were cleared direct to BIGGY Intersection to join our flight plan route. The remainder of the flight was unremarkable. Without question we exceeded the airspeed limitation of 250 KTS when the aircraft leveled off at 5;000 FT. But I also have concerns that given the fact that we had three different compass readings in the cockpit; on a departure that was heading dependent; we may have also failed to comply with the heading requirements outlined in the SID. There are two things that I feel could have been done differently that would have likely avoided this event to begin with and could have helped us out once we were in the air. First it seems that despite the fact that we had no issues during our time on Runway 13; given its history of magnetic anomalies we should have taken off in DG mode. Second; once airborne with our exact direction of flight in question; it would have been appropriate to alert ATC of our situation and seek their assistance to insure our compliance with the directional aspect of the SID.

A CRJ-900 flight crew experienced AHRS heading anomalies after taking off from Runway 13 at LGA following a period of LUAW. While assessing the heading issue; the aircraft leveled at their initial cleared altitude of 5;000 FT and the airspeed increased to approximately 285 KTS before they recommenced their climb to 12;000 FT as previously cleared by Departure. The approach end of Runway 13 northwest of the intersection with 04-22 is charted as susceptible to magnetic anomalies and was likely the progenitor of the event.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 48; Flight Crew Total 4751; Flight Crew Type 2510

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Had an engine failure in cruise; secured the engine (shut it down/feathered the prop/cut the fuel); did not divert (I was by myself); changed the destination (longer runways and that's where maintenance is located); didn't declare an emergency - ATC did. Landed - it was easy to see because of all the red lights (this airport has combined military/civilian fire and rescue and they love an emergency); landing was uneventful (darn near perfect). The fire trucks even followed me as I taxied around the terminal to the maintenance facility. In 25 years of flying that was the second 'roll the equipment' landing. I was returning from simulator flight training. I had just spent 2 hours doing single engine work in the simulator that afternoon. Nothing like being current in your training! Right-hand engine driven high pressure fuel pump failed. Replaced; right-hand engine checked good. Inspected left-hand engine high pressure fuel pump; checked good. Inspected left-hand and right-hand Fuel Control Units (FCUs); checked good.

A King Air (BE-9T) high pressure fuel pump failed in cruise so the pilot feathered the engine and diverted to an airport with long runways and emergency equipment.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 3200

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 25500; Flight Crew Type 14000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Airport; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

Pushed back into the alley between pier DX and C for one engine start. Ground Control issued taxi instruction 'Taxi to Runway 10 via Tango'. I had mentally noted that the BWI 10-7A (Nov14) page was incorrect; showing a runway where the new Taxiway Papa now existed; and that the present Taxiway Tango that used to be Papa.  But in my mind it didn't matter because Taxiway Papa was under big time construction. Confirmed with First Officer that Tango was initially the ramp and then split at Taxiway Alpha. I made a right turn incorrectly onto taxiway Alpha and after I was committed I realized that I had turned too early. Were just about to key the mike and tell Ground Control when they called us and told us we were on the wrong taxiway. We acknowledged the error and the controller scolded us and gave us new taxi instructions. We had previously briefed the airport Hotspots HS1 and HS2 on arrival. The plate label locations of the ARP symbol and the HS1 and HS2 made a bad problem worse; especially when Taxiways U2 and Papa were under construction.

We had just finished entering an extensive ATC weather reroute. We finished checklists and called for push back. We started an engine; completed the after start checklist and called for taxi. ATC issued the following clearance. Runway 15R via T hold short of P-1. I copied the clearance and read it back to the Captain. He said (I got it). He started to taxi and I went heads down to amend the release with Dispatch. ATC informed us that we were on taxiway A (Inner Taxiway). With the construction and lack of signage in a big open space; it looked correct. A new clearance was issued. Taxi to 15R via T; E; P. We were now at Hot Spot 1. The new signage is very confusing. We ended up using P-1; P; [and] 15R. I am not sure the renumbering of the taxiways in this area has helped eliminate the confusion. The new signage is VERY confusing. We continued taxiing; got an amended release; started the other engine; completed checklists and were on our way.

Air carrier flight crew report of being pushed back between pier DX and C reports being cleared to taxi via Taxiway Tango to Runway 10 but turns early onto Taxiway A instead. ATC issues new taxi instructions. Taxiway construction and airport Diagram clutter were cited a contributing factors.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.5

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

I received an IFR release on Aircraft X; who was departing BUR on the OROSZ 1 SID (right turn heading 210 off Runway 15). After clearing the aircraft for takeoff I shipped the aircraft to SCT. As I did that; I noticed that at the same time my target was acquiring on the scope; a PMD departure was tagging up off VNY Runway 16 (left turn heading 110). The two SIDs conflict with each other and by default SCT will only release one aircraft at a time. However; it was a slow morning and it's not unheard of for SCT to release both at once when they're not busy and manually vector the aircraft off VNY to the west to keep them away from the BUR departure. That is very rare; but I've occasionally seen it and I figured that since it was a very slow morning; that must have been what SCT was doing. It became apparent that they were not doing that; as I saw both aircraft converging and climbing to the same altitude (4;000 feet MSL). I didn't want to reach out to SCT and bother the controller working the Valley Sector while they worked the problem out.At that point; the SCT Valley controller reached out to me on the shout line and told me to turn Aircraft X to a 340 heading now. I replied that I had shipped him off departure end; but I would reach out and try again. I transmitted for Aircraft X to turn right heading 340 immediately. Aircraft X replied to me; as apparently he had never taken the frequency change. He read back the turn to 340; and I issued a traffic alert for Aircraft Y off VNY; who was now at about 2 miles and still converging. I told him to maintain visual separation (even though both aircraft have the same initial altitude of 4;000 feet. I knew separation was lost but I just wanted to make sure they wouldn't hit). Once Aircraft X was established on his heading of 340 and pointed away from Aircraft Y; I re-shipped Aircraft X to SCT. Separation was definitely lost.Don't assume what another controller is doing. As soon as I saw the PMD departure off VNY; I should have called Valley and asked if he wanted me to do something with Aircraft X before shipping Aircraft X.

Burbank Tower Controller reported that an aircraft departed Burbank and became an airborne conflict with a Van Nuys departure on the same routing.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Work Refused; General Maintenance Action

COMAT shipment of [airline] employee contained undeclared items; ion batteries and chemical sprays.

Airline Ground Personnel reported COMAT [Company Material] contained undeclared Hazmat.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Air Carrier X was instructed to go around after company aircraft following him visually came within proximity of Air Carrier X on final. The following aircraft was asked if he still had company aircraft in sight. And; following a period to allow for response did not do so in a timely enough manner as to provide reassurance that the aircraft in fact did indeed. Air Carrier X began to argue as to why he was being sent around. Impress upon pilots the need for compliance to directives given and that questions regarding such; that are inconsequential to safe operation of aircraft; can wait.

Tower Controller expressed concern regarding an Air Carriers questions during a go around instruction; the reporter noting these questions should be ask at a later time.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

When the crew arrived at [the aircraft]; Maintenance Control had deferred the ground idle portion of the EEC's (Electronic Engine Control). Myself as the Captain looked over the DDG (Dispatch Deviation Guide); talked with the two mechanics on board and found that everything was written off properly. The Mechanic and I discussed the ramifications a little bit on the referral. The plane blocked out on time with a normal engine start and normal taxi to [the] runway. However upon takeoff clearance and bringing the thrust levers up to approximately 70% we noticed the right engine was accelerating quicker than the left engine. It wasn't exceeding any limitations but still as the Captain and because we had the deferral concerning the situation ; I felt it would be better/ conservative to just bring the thrust levers back and taxi off the runway and discuss what was actually going on with the mechanics in a safe environment on the taxiway and that is what I did. I asked the First Officer to cancel takeoff clearance and that we would like to clear the runway and discuss a possible maintenance issue. So we cleared the runway; I spoke to the mechanics about the situation and it is quite common on most of the 767 200s for the right engine to accelerate quicker than the left engine. I don't know why this is but I've noticed it on many different airplanes. So we cleared the runway.I spoke to the mechanics about the situation. I remembered talking to Maintenance Control the day before and he informed me there are no time limits for the engines to accelerate together. At this moment on the taxiway I confirm that with the two mechanics that only the two engines had to match and then accelerate uniformly after takeoff thrust button was pushed and takeoff power is set. After clearing the runway there were no checklists to be run since there are no EICAS messages or abnormal events. I just wanted to understand that everything was fairly normal. The break chart was not needed to be consulted since we never really release the brakes for takeoff. Takeoff power was never set. By definition in the FOM a rejected takeoff was never really performed since take off power was never set however I am going to treat this like a rejected takeoff just in case. The two mechanics and the First Officer and myself discussed that we would perform the takeoff again.... let the engines both stabilize at approximately 70% and then push the takeoff thrust button and if the engines accelerated absolutely perfectly symmetrically to takeoff thrust then we would continue the takeoff. This is exactly what happened on the second takeoff and this is normally what happens on most of the 767 200s. The engines do not accelerate to 70% symmetrically all the time but they do accelerate from 70%to takeoff thrust symmetrically. Maintenance Control and the mechanics confirmed there is no time limit to where these engines have to accelerate to the 70% setting. The takeoff was normal.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Captain reported a rejected takeoff after number 2 engine acceleration lagged significantly.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 217; Flight Crew Total 12827; Flight Crew Type 7028

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Total 6308; Flight Crew Type 2674

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Content Locker update was released during crew rest about 5 hours prior to push. I loaded this with hotel Wi-Fi (took about 1 ½ hours to download). After this download a message came out that a new AirWatch update was also being released (this happened while downloading my paperwork). A second release was loaded on flight deck with Cellular data. [During] pilot briefing all iPads were placed in airplane mode. At level off I attempted to open [iPad] to discuss IOE items with Captain student. To my surprise AirWatch now does some type of Authentication Request but we don't have Wi-Fi so it fails. 3 out of 4 iPads cannot open. No 777FM; FOM; WOM…nothing! I would love to have had FAA on board asking to see my FM; FOM; WOM.

We requested and received a waiver via [Dispatcher] to continue the flight with only one working EFB. The one working EFB belonged to a check airman which has a different software load. It is highly likely that if we hadn't had a check airman onboard we would have had zero working EFBs! Fortunately the flight proceeded uneventfully.

B777 flight crew on an international flight reported 3 of the 4 onboard iPads were unusable following a software update. The working 4th unit was on a different software version.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7.0

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airport; Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals

Aircraft X was cleared for a visual approach When there was a restriction to land only scheduled Air Taxi aircraft into the airport. No General Aviation aircraft allowed. The pilot cancelled their IFR clearance and landed at the airport without further incident. Because the NOTAM doesn't specify that the airport or runway is closed Controllers do not put an X In the map display depicting a runway closure since the airport is only with a restriction on who can land such as air taxis only.Even if the information was displayed on the IDS; this information was visible in another page that is not actively being used when we are controlling traffic. And since it is not required to display an X showing the airport closed it is very easy to forget these limitations. We should not allow airports to place ambiguous restrictions that place the pilots or controllers wondering who should land or not at an airport and this responsibility should not be placed on the air traffic controller but rather on the pilots responsibility to be familiar with NOTAMs regarding airport restrictions. In the future; I will use memory joggers such as writing down on a strip the information to have it always visible and avoid any misunderstandings in the future.

A Center Controller reported they cleared a corporate jet aircraft for an approach to an airport that only authorized Air Taxi operations.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 5028; Flight Crew Type 289

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

On a visual approach to runway 19 at MKC; we were flying on a extended (wide) right base for runway 19 in a descent and were about to start leveling out when ATC (MKC Tower) gave us a minimum safe altitude warning (MSAW). Tower advised us to level out or climb and to check our altimeter setting to the local. I leveled the airplane and began a shallow climb while checking my altitude and surroundings. The altitude we were at wasn't too low for the local terrain. Nor was our altimeter setting off. The aircraft that was being flown is equipped with a terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) that wasn't triggered at any point in the flight. We continued our approach; joined the visual glide path; and landed without incident. Later; after some research; I learned that MSAWs can be triggered based on descent rate. Our descent rate may have been high during the visual approach. In the future; I will do better to monitor and control my descent rate; especially in wide patterns to urban runways.

Pilot reported receiving a minimum safe altitude warning from ATC during a visual approach for landing.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 255; Flight Crew Type 240

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace

During the climbout Departure gave instructions to turn left heading 080 and climb to 7;000 feet. At around 4;400 feet my climb started to degrade and airspeed started to decrease. I quickly realized that I was now in a downdraft and I was unable to maintain at least a 500 FPM climb. As the flight progressed the Controller asked if I had the mountain ahead of me in sight and I told the Controller I did. The Controller thence gave instructions to turn west and continue my climb to 7;000 feet and once over the Airfield to turn south.Once on the heading of 180 the Controller gave instructions to turn 080 and continue my climb. According to the Controller I went below the Minimum vectoring altitude causing a deviation. After reaching my cruise altitude I realized I failed to communicate with ATC when I was unable to continue a safe climb while in the downdraft and nearing mountainous terrain. It was truly a lesson for me to speak up and talk to ATC when in this situation. I took for granted that although operating in VMC conditions and under the direction of ATC; safety and communication will always remain the key to flying safely.

After departure the pilot of a C172S was not able to maintain the required climb performance because of downdrafts in mountainous terrain; and additionally failed to stay in contact with ATC. Upon reaching cruise altitude the Departure Controller informed him that he had descended below the MVA.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 2150; Flight Crew Type 300

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Given an 'immediate takeoff' clearance for Runway 23 APF at XA:55z. 20-30 seconds into the takeoff roll we are instructed to cancel our takeoff clearance and then immediately abort. A few seconds later we observe a light transport jet landing on 14; cross in front of us at a very high speed.The controller was noticeably over-saturated with the sheer volume of air traffic and this happened during a runway change (from 14 to 23).

First Officer reported a critical ground conflict event during takeoff roll with a landing aircraft on an intersecting runway. Pilot immediately rejected takeoff when tower cancelled takeoff clearance.


Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

This was our last leg of a 4 leg day. The weather was quite warm but perfect. All events leading up to the rejected takeoff were normal. As the CA and pilot flying. I was given the takeoff clearance. The winds were light; less than 10 knots and almost directly down the runway. Just prior to the First Officer (PNF) calling V1 the airplane started to feel different. It was requiring more rudder to maintain center line and I started to feel a vibration and an unusual noise coming from the aircraft. At V1 I started to lose directional control and aborted the aircraft with maximum braking and maximum reverse. I knew that we had blown tires [at] this point. The aircraft became more difficult to control as we slowed but I managed to keep it [on] center line. The First Officer (PNF) immediately called Tower and told the passengers to 'Remain Seated; Remain Seated' We immediately checked the brake temperature and surprisingly they were all in the green. We ran the aborted takeoff checklist and asked Tower to roll the trucks. There was no indication of fire as the fire handles were not illuminated and per the Fire Department there was no smoke. We shut down the engines and kept the APU running for aircraft cooling as it was extremely hot. The passenger deplaned on the runway with the help of the awesome staff of the Fire Department. After the passengers deplaned we spoke to maintenance and completely powered down the aircraft. We left it disabled on [the runway] with the Fire Department and Maintenance staff.This event; in my opinion; went very smoothly. All procedures were followed and there were no injuries. I managed to keep the aircraft [on] center line and under control. Although it's nearly impossible to prevent what occurred to us. Continuing to have simulator events with different scenarios happening at V1 or just prior is helpful. I recall doing this only just recently in the simulator. I believe it was helpful in my reaction and handling of the aircraft.

EMB-145LR Captain reported rejecting the takeoff just prior to V1 when he experienced blown tire or tires.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 410; Flight Crew Type 9350

While approaching ZZZ at approximately 3000 feet we reported the field in sight and were cleared the visual to XXL by Approach Control. I set up the MCP to capture final using LNAV and VNAV and set 1500 feet in the altitude window. The autopilot didn't seem to be capturing the magenta glide path symbol; and the ILS GS (Glideslope) diamond showed us slightly high on GS; so I decided to click off the autopilot and capture the GS and Localizer manually. Localizer was selected on the MCP and I started down the GS. I needed approximately 20 degrees of bank to intercept the Localizer. As I turned the control wheel; I noticed a definite binding in the ailerons anytime I went beyond 15 or 20 percent of wheel throw (eventually turning in both directions to align the aircraft). In retrospect; the controls felt very similar to the forces required during the use of control wheel steering. I mentioned to the FO (First Officer) that the ailerons felt weird and a little stiff; but completely controllable; so we continued. Once established on final; and while making only small corrections with the control wheel; the control wheel felt completely normal. The aircraft remained completely controllable at all times with normal aileron feel as we approached the runway. The landing was uneventful. Once at the gate; Dispatch; Maintenance Control; Chief Pilot; and local Maintenance were notified; and logbook entries were made. The aircraft was taken out of service for inspection and repair.This report is being filed in the interest of safety because it involves an unknown flight control abnormality; or possible operator error unknown at the time of occurrence.

B737-700 Captain reported aileron stiffness while hand flying an approach.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On the DRLLR ONE arrival into IAH. We were on the arrival with no issues until we hit DOMNO. The arrival was loaded correctly into the FMS. When we hit DOMNO the FMS was supposed to cycle us to VLDEZ. The airplane started to make the turn but as soon as it did; it deactivated LNAV and went into roll mode. I immediately took corrective action by going into TCS mode and manually continuing the turn. We had a high tailwind so this delayed turn took us enough off course for ATC to ask us if we were in the turn. We advised them we had but we had an autopilot malfunction. Nothing was reported after that and the flight continued normally once we were back on course. We asked ATC if anyone else had the problem at DOMNO and they said that three other company aircraft that day had the same issue. The biggest threat is flying these RNAV arrivals in our aircraft with avionics that are not capable of flying these arrivals. Our aircraft are too far out of date and should not be flying these. There was nothing that the pilot flying or pilot monitoring could have done in this instance since the issue didn't occur until when we were over the point. Upgrade our avionics.

EMB145 First Officer experiences the autopilot switching from LNAV to roll mode as the aircraft passes DOMNO turning toward VLDEZ on the DRLLR 1 RNAV to IAH. ATC detects the track deviation and advises that previous company aircraft have had similar issues.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 650; Flight Crew Type 60

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

I was cleared for landing and was on final approach. I previously lowered the landing gear approximately three miles out. I know this because I remember engaging the landing gear switch and adjusting the trim and power for the altered handling as a result of the landing gear lowering. Also; after the incident; a tower personnel confirmed that the tower had confirmed that my landing gear was down before I landed.As I landed; the gear gave way and collapsed causing the aircraft to skid down the runway on its belly. This caused me to block the only runway and resulted in the closing of the airport for approximately 2 hours until my plane could be removed off the runway.My Comanche had recently passed its annual and I had passed my flight review within the last month. I was not fatigued or in any way impaired. I had made a short flight to get gas and was returning to where I hangar my plane.

PA-24 Comanche pilot reported a landing gear collapse upon landing for unknown reasons.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

During cruise flight at FL330 in IMC/icing conditions; the first indication of a problem was an amber IAS cross-side mis-comparison warning on both the Captain and First Officer's PFD. This was shortly followed by an autopilot/autothrottle disconnect and various alerts that included but were not limited to A/P UNAVAILABLE; RUDDER LIM FAIL; and unusual airspeed indications for the flight conditions. After the autopilot disconnected the airplane pitched up slightly resulting in an altitude deviation and an amplified discrepancy between the Captain and First Officer's airspeed indications. We requested a block altitude from ATC and advised we were trying to assess a problem with erratic and unreliable airspeed. The block altitude was granted and RSVM capability downgraded. After stabilizing the aircraft using known pitch and power (N1) setting we believed the Captain's airspeed indications to be malfunctioning and the First Officer took over pilot flying duties. We requested a descent to FL250 to increase the range between the high and low speed footers as well as the range between the pitch and PLI. During the descent we referenced the QRH for the AIRSPEED: LOST; SUSPECT; OR ERRACTIC emergency non-alert checklist. The descent to FL250 brought us to VMC conditions and warmer temperatures at which point all abnormal indications cleared.Captain and First Officer agreed to maintain VMC conditions and divert to a VFR airport. After coordinating with dispatch and Maintenance Control we diverted to ZZZ without further incident. At the first indication of an IAS mis-comparison; the autopilot/autothrottles should have manually been disconnected and the aircraft flown using known pitch/power (N1) settings. Nor should further attempts been made to re-engage the autopilot. The uncommanded disconnect and initial attempts to re-engage created numerous aural warnings and an unnecessary distraction during a critical time to assess the abnormal condition.

B717 First Officer reports inaccurate airspeed indication during cruise at FL330 in IMC with loss of autopilot and auto thrust capability. ATC is advised and descent to VMC is initiated. Once clear of icing conditions the Captain's airspeed indication returns to normal but the crew elects to divert to a suitable alternate.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 900; Flight Crew Type 300

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Taxiway

[I was] approaching from the west; straight in on Runway 7. This is a remote airport mostly used by ag sprayers. Runway numbers are scuffed but visible; no center line. I land. At far end of runway [is] a large chain link fence gate; I taxi through it and discover that I have landed on a taxiway; the 'old' runway. The new current runway is ahead of me over a slight rise; not visible from the west when on approach to what first appears as 'the' runway. The nearest ATIS reported calm winds; which is why I did not first circle the airport; this was my mistake. Most confusing to me is that the 'old' runway numbers were still visible on the pavement (not painted over black or completely scrapped off). Yellow painted arrow(s) or even a yellow centerline would have been helpful.

A small single-engine pilot landed on the 'old' Runway 7/25 at 35S. The old 7/25 is now used as a taxiway for the new runway; also designated as 7/25. The new runway is located to the East and is displaced by a few hundred feet south. Runway numbers remain visible on the old runway was cited as a contributing factor.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Taxiway

After engine start it started lightly raining. I inspected the front aircraft surfaces including the radardome; wipers; and the non-heated aft window to determine if the rain was freezing and it was not. Also I opened the window and felt the lower fuselage [which] was wet with no ice present. As we taxied out to runway 01L via Charlie Delta we observed a car on the runway doing a contamination check. The aircraft was readied for takeoff and we were informed 01L was now closed with Mu reading below 20. We inquired about 1R and we were told it was chemically treated and may be better. I decided to taxi down 1L toward the ramp. During the taxi; First Officer (FO) and I discussed the need to deice before departure and whether or not to taxi directly back to the ramp. Tower instructed us to exit 01L at Bravo while we formulated a plan of action. Taxi to 01L and the taxi down 01L were normal with braking action fair. The turn on to Bravo was normal. Once on Bravo the aircraft started to slide and weather vane. I used a little differential thrust and braking to try to keep the aircraft on the centerline but the right downwind wheels left the taxiway. I set the parking brake and made a PA announcement to the pasengers informing them of the situation. We informed the tower of the situation and reported braking action on Bravo was nil. [A few minutes later] we were informed by the tower that the airport was closed with braking actions on all runways nil. A Medivac [aircraft] diverted and after about 30 minutes of worsening conditions an [air carrier] jet diverted also. From the time of the incident till when we departed for the hotel no other aircraft took off or landed in the airport remain closed.Initial reports from ground personnel stated that the #4 wheel was off the taxiway but after further inspection both wheels were in the dirt. The wind was 90deg off the left wingtip at 30+ gusting to 40. This force kept pushing and digging in the right wheels. Multiple PA's were make and the Passengers were kept informed thought the process. (FO) and I coordinated with tower/ground control; company operations; fire and rescue; company dispatch; Maintenance control; and the duty pilot. Logbook write-ups were made. We initially planned to tug the aircraft back onto the taxiway and tow it to the gate with passengers onboard but the presence of freezing rain and the condition of the taxiways made that impossible. After consulting Maintenance control we decided to bus the passengers to the terminal after the taxiways were deiced and cleared. Company personnel arrived and dropped the aft stairs and I consulted face to face with fire rescue and solidified the plan to deplane the passengers. While the busses were readied; I completed a walk around and installed the gear pin at the direction of Maintenance control. I then made a logbook write-up reflecting that. The taxiways needed to be deiced before the busses could safely be brought to the rear of the aircraft. All passengers and crew were deplaned without incident and injury. (FO) and I volunteered to stay behind and ride the brakes for maintenance control. I sent the flight attendants to the hotel and (FO) and I stayed behind. After approximately 45 minutes taxiway Bravo was deiced and a tug was attached to the airplane. After several attempts to pull the airplane out; the wheels appeared to be frozen in place and the tug was having trouble gaining traction. The decision was made to leave the airplane where it was. I called maintenance control to remind them to drain the potable water system due to the cold weather. After the situation was again reviewed with the mechanic on site we have left the airplane in his care with the APU running; packs on; all other systems secured.

Captain reported his aircraft slid off the taxiway in icy conditions.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 91; Flight Crew Total 904

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were holding short of Runway 21 waiting for traffic landing [Runway] 21. A Warrior pulled down to Runway 3. I asked multiple times what he was doing and no answer. He finally said he's going to takeoff [Runway] 3. I advised him that there are 3 aircraft (2 planes including us and a helicopter) for patterns for [Runway] 21. A moment later he pulled onto the runway and started to takeoff. He called that he was taking off after rolling halfway down the runway. There was an experimental on a short base to final for [Runway] 21 that had to cut his base really short to evade the aircraft taking off [Runway] 3.

GA aircraft flight instructor holding short for takeoff at JNX reported observing an aircraft take off in the opposite direction of the runway being used for landings; causing a landing aircraft to take evasive action.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.0

Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

Working sectors with an average traffic volume. I'm watching Aircraft X flash at New York TRACON; Newark Area and they have still not taken the handoff. I think this is odd because they have taken the last few from me without any issues; Aircraft X is level at 7000 feet and at the appropriate speed. So I call for the handoff; and get no reply over the line. I look up above me to the TSD (A zoomed out picture of our area which shows New York traffic as well). The New York approach controller only has 3 airplanes. I had to make a few clearances and I call again on the handoff; no response at all. Now I have the Controller-In-Charge's attention because he hears me calling for handoffs and not getting a response. I have to spin to the airplane now to avoid hitting New York approach airspace; I didn't think it was worth even calling for a point out because they were not picking up the line. I thought maybe they had the speaker turned down and could not hear me calling which frequently happens and is a separate issue with New York Approach. Aircraft X turns his aircraft 180 degrees in the other direction to avoid hitting New York approach airspace. Still nothing from the New York approach controller; the Controller-In-Charge is now calling New York Approach to figure why A) They are not taking handoffs and B) Why they are not answering the line. While the Controller-In-Charge is on the phone with the supervisor down in New York Approach the controller comes on the line and says 'you gotta ship the guy over SAX.' I get on the line and say 'that would have been nice to know; I can't read your mind.' The New York approach controller tells me to put Aircraft Y on a 080 heading and ship him; which I do. Now I am turning out 4 airplanes going to Newark Airport because the New York approach controller can't simply pick up the line and say request communications on Aircraft X. As the Controller-In-Charge stated on the line with the New York approach control supervisor I'm tired of playing this game. This is not how you control traffic; this is not how you work together; and this is not safe. New York approach works under their own rules which compromise safety constantly. Examples are turning off frequencies and not monitoring them when combined up; turning the speaker down on position to not hear other facilities calling; the example above when they need something (aircraft communications; need Boston ARTCC to hold aircraft) their solution is to let the next aircraft auto-handoff until it creates an unsafe situation or no notice holds.Four aircraft we vectored and one 180 degrees in the wrong direction because this New York Approach controller couldn't pick up the line the request communications with the aircraft. He wasn't busy; he was trying to teach me a lesson? So next time when I don't know if I shipped the aircraft or the aircraft didn't take the frequency change without me knowing I will figure it out? This is pathetic; there are people on these planes; companies paying money for fuel. There are enough delays into Newark without things like this happening. I'm tired of them creating unsafe situations for no reason.

N90 TRACON would not take a handoff from ZBW ARTCC. The Center Controller had to issue delaying vectors to the aircraft and subsequent in trail aircraft to avoid N90 TRACON airspace.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 20

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

While entering upwind for Runway 18 the engine suddenly quit. An uneventful power off landing was accomplished on Runway 9.The reason for the engine quitting was fuel exhaustion! Prior to the flight a preflight inspection was completed and it was determined that there were two hours of fuel on board for a one hour flight. This was determined by checking the fuel totalizer (indicating 25 gallons onboard) and the aircraft log (that indicated two (2) hours of flight since the last top off). Both sources agreed with one another that at a 12 GPH fuel burn there was adequate fuel for a one hour flight.There was no way to accurately stick the tanks; due to their position/angle when on the ground. The clear tube float gauges have not proven to be very accurate and were looked at; but the decision to make the flight was made using the two means previously addressed; which were referred to in the past and proved accurate.Several things led up to this incident. First; the plane's fuel tanks are placarded to hold 50 usable gallons. Upon landing I could only put in 41.5 gallons. With 2 hours out and a flight planned for one hour; this still should not have presented a problem.The only other explanation is that the tanks were not completely 'topped off'; making all other calculations invalid. The totalizer will also have to be re-calibratedThough the outcome was OK; this was a very embarrassing moment for a Gold Seal Master CFI; who is always preaching 'time in the tanks' and who flies conservatively in every other way.When pre-flighting other aircraft I fly will continue as usual with a visual confirmation of the fuel quantity. For this aircraft and others that are not easily 'sticked' or visually inspected; I will be more cautious on determining how much fuel is on board and will adjust expected endurance figures downward.

A UPF7 pilot landed dead stick after the engine failed due to fuel exhaustion while entering the pattern.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Rotorcraft

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 7300; Flight Crew Type 1750

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Environment - Non Weather Related; Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Departed IFR from the airport and climbed through a layer at about 800 FT AGL and transitioned to VMC conditions on top at about 2;000 MSL with 20+ miles of visibility. Conditions were VFR along the route. I maintained my IFR clearance as an additional safety mechanism; in case there was a need to abort the flight for weather.... I began to see a layer of some type of obscuration in the general area of our destination. I could see the local airport; however the hospital was obscured by this low layer of obscuration. Although; I could have made a VFR descent into the airport; I did request a clearance for the approach into the airport. This provided an opportunity for currency reasons; and it would allow me to better position myself in relation to the hospital. This area is very dark at night.... Numerous oil derricks have been erected in the area and I wanted to make sure I was clear of any obstructions during the letdown. Once we were cleared for the approach; I executed the holding pattern maneuver and established myself inbound on the procedure. Around this time we decided it was best to cancel the flight and return home. I initiated a go around and notified Center I was going missed and wanted to return home. I executed the initial portion of the missed approach procedure for practice. As I was reviewing the procedure again; I noticed the small note on the approach plate stating the procedure was NA at night. I had previously noticed the remark regarding the visibility reduction for helicopters; however; I missed the note regarding the night time restriction. The entire portion of the procedure I did fly was executed in VMC conditions. The aircraft interior lighting design is not the greatest; and is further complicated by the NVG modification. You have to scan documents across the lighting in order to read something at times. I decided it was time to re-invest in a new lip light to greater increase the lighting in the cockpit at night; and to better scrutinize the plates regarding the small notes.

Medical transport helicopter pilot completed a published approach procedure and missed approach at destination airport in night VMC before noticing that the procedure was not authorized at night. Pilot attributed the error to inadequate cockpit lighting.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 69; Flight Crew Total 10301; Flight Crew Type 2994

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

During cruise flight attendants were seated by Captain due to continuous light chop with reports of moderate chop ahead. After close to an hour of flight attendants being seated; we experienced a momentary encounter with moderate mountain wave turbulence where the aircraft banked about 20 degrees and airspeed increased 10 to 15 kts. Event lasted about 10 seconds. Pilot spoke with FAs (Flight Attendants) and they all said they were fine as well as all passengers. Everyone was seated during the turbulence encounter. Later in the flight a FA said her neck had some pain and she thought it was due to the turbulence encounter earlier. She said she was ok to perform her duties for the remainder of the flight and for her return flight. Dispatch and the station were notified; and a FA supervisor met the aircraft to discuss the incident/injury with the flight attendant.

Air carrier First Officer reported that an encounter with mountain wave turbulence cause a brief loss of control and resulted in a Flight Attendant injury.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

We were on a visual approach. The Approach Controller had kept us high; so it was going to be a rather quick configuration sequence to ensure a stable approach. As we ran the Before Landing Checklist we observed that the flaps had only extended to 2. The Captain initiated a go-around and we informed ATC of the issue; and requested a long downwind to run through the appropriate procedures. We requested that we have a clear runway as we wanted to avoid any more go-arounds. We then ran the QRH procedure for Flap Disagree; which eventually directed us to use alternate flap extension. During the extension; the flaps failed around 5 instead of going to the desired 15. We updated the landing data accordingly and commenced the approach.Somewhere along the way (as we were on a short final) I saw an aircraft in the touchdown zone. I confirmed this with the Tower Controller and he informed me that the aircraft was in the air and was going to sidestep. As we neared the runway it became evident that the aircraft was in the air and we were able to land without further incident.With that said; it seems like there was a significant ATC error that may have compromised safety. It was an odd choice to issue a takeoff clearance directly in front of an aircraft [requiring priority handling]; especially when 2 other runways were available. Furthermore; it was a light single engine aircraft; so his low takeoff and climb speed combined with our faster than normal approach speed resulted in a rapid closure rate. In the event of a go-around we would have lost sight of him; and we would likely have posed a significant wake turbulence hazard for him at a very low altitude. Finally; I do not recall the normal advisory from ATC that there would be a departure prior to our arrival; which would have at least given us time to consider the situation and modify plans.As Pilot Monitoring I could have done a better job with the monitoring part. Things were moving pretty quickly during the landing configuration process and I did not adequately monitor to ensure that the flap handle and indicated flap position were in agreement. It was a breakdown that should have been caught prior to the checklist. It would not have changed the outcome; but would have provided a better safety margin. ATC should not use a runway when an aircraft [requiring priority handling] is on the approach. The reasons stated in the narrative offer a good reason. Furthermore; task saturation for the crew with the malfunctioning aircraft may cause degraded situational awareness; so it is best not to have additional distractions. If ATC did give a traffic advisory; for example; we did not hear it. So from a human factors stand point; it might be best to assume that the crew is operating in the yellow.

B737-700 First Officer reported a trailing edge flap issue and poor handling of landing priority by ATC.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Removal and Replacement (R/R) of # 2 Brake was difficult to remove from the [left Main] Landing Gear (MLG) axle. I; Mechanic X; inspected the axle sleeve; but found no obvious damage.  We installed a Serviceable Brake Assembly and Wheel Assembly. One of the Mechanic's working on it went upstairs; signed the Logbook. After a few hours in; I received a phone call from one of the Mechanic's working on the brake to let me know that he and a Supervisior looked over the Unserviceable brake and noticed four axle bushings for the Brake Alignment studs were stuck to the [removed] brake. I talked with the ZZZ1 Supervisor and let him know what had happend. He told me that he was already aware of it; and it would be addressed. Alignment pin bushings seperated from axle flange. Recommend Inspection of Axle Protective Sleeve and Axle Hub and Bushings for proper installation. Thru flight operation.

Reporter stated he doesn't recall if the bushings on the Brake Axle Flange have a collar; or; are the flush face type. They are part of the Main Landing Gear (MLG) Assembly.  His Air Carrier issued a Maintenance Alert for mechanics to look for flange bushings when they remove brakes. But their Engineering group has not indicated whether Airbus would make a revision to the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) to check for bushings on the Brake Alignment pins. There are three bolts with nuts securing the brake to the brake flange (not counting the alignment pins).

I; Mechanic Y; was assisting in replacing the Brake Assembly on an A320 aircraft due to both of the Wear Indicator pins missing.  We determined it [brake] need full replacement.  During the removal process; please note that it was very difficult and hard to remove; taking longer than usual to remove the brake assembly.  When the brake assembly was removed; I was installing the new brake with Mechanic A.  After the brake assembly and wheel were installed; I cleaned up the area and got the tooling put away.  We then returned to the Shop; where we spoke with Supervisor X; who opened up the [Brake] container and noted that four of the Axle Flange bushings were still stuck to the brake.  However; the A320 aircraft had already departed to ZZZ1. Supervisor X contacted Maintenance Control and ZZZ1 Supervisor. Was unaware bushings had separated from Axle Flange and the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) does not specify to inspect axle flange bushings for proper installation. Recommend updating Maintenance Manual (M/M) to reflect an inspection [procedure] of protective sleeve and Axle Flange and bushings for proper installation.

Three Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (AMTs) report that four bushings had separated from the left Main Landing Gear (MLG) Axle Flange when the # 2 Inboard Brake was removed.  The bushings had remained stuck to the removed Brake Assembly alignment pins and were not noticed until the A320 aircraft had departed.


Situational Awareness; Workload; Troubleshooting; Fatigue; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were on leg six of a 13.5 plus hour duty day. After departure and during climb out; I noticed a CHK POSITION message on the PFD and FMS. Also; due to the nature of the departure; I noticed the FMS was in INHIBIT mode and so; having taught all the right classes on the threats associated with inhibited FMS ON; I briefed that just in case they gave us a heading to join the SID down track. After this; we became busy with ATC and were given on course. I do not remember if the CHK POSITION message disappeared or not. As we continued; I was feeling tired. Then; as we progressed enroute; I noticed again that the CHK POSITION message was present. So I mentioned to the First Officer that the message was appearing. He hadn't noticed it until then. So; I said it may have been on since takeoff; but we may have been tired to notice it. So; I said we can correct that. I looked at the set position line on page 1 of POS INIT; and noticed dashed lines. So; I told the First Officer; we can update that by going to the 2nd page and dropping the GPS position into the scratch pad and put it in the set position line on page 1. But as I put the GPS position into the set position line select; for some reason; the FMS position shifted. All of a sudden; the previous intersection was behind us and the map on the MFD shifted as well. The airplane went toward the next fix. I was looking at the FMS when the First Officer said; the FMS shifted and the airplane was turning. There was a moment of confusion at that time. I thought I'd done something wrong and immediately I centered the heading bug and asked the First Officer to ask ATC for a heading. He stated to ATC that we were having some issues with our FMS and requested a heading. They put us on a heading to the south east; I believe. Then within a few seconds of all this happening; the FMS returned to proper position. Again; I do not remember how many seconds it was; but we weren't on the heading for much time when the FMS regained proper positioning. So; we told ATC that it looked as if the FMS was working normally; and we were given direct to cypress. I made sure that as we came over a fix that ATC verified our position on radar as accurate prior to continuing on the arrival. Then; I requested a second position check over deeds from ATC; which they confirmed as accurate. We continued to our destination for a visual approach. After landing; we contacted Maintenance. In hindsight; there should have been some issues that we may not have been prepared for. It was only in cruise that I noticed how tired I was. Perhaps; I should have stated that a little earlier and cautioned my First Officer that we need to be extra careful. The only reason I updated that position was because; unaware; I thought it may have been on all the time after takeoff and we may not have noticed after my initial awareness. Also; though I noticed this message after takeoff; I realized later that I didn't mention that to the First Officer; but I did mention the FMS was in inhibit on departure. It is very difficult during these long days to decipher between tiredness and fatigue. My experience has taught me that in critical phases of flight I tend to pay detailed attention and brief thoroughly during these long days. But when that phase is over; there's a tendency to settle down from that peak awareness of possible threats and enter into a more relaxed state to identify threats. So; to prevent errors and improve recognition of them; conversation of flying duties needs to take place. For example; though I do not know why the map shifted; perhaps I should have talked to the First Officer earlier when I saw that after takeoff the CHK POSITION message was on. Then perhaps; if he said he hadn't seen it all the while after takeoff; then maybe I would have left it alone and eventually it would have corrected itself. Also; before I push or reset any more positions; I will be asking if we accurately show on course. Invariably it always does; but I didn't think of all these points in flight at the 13th hour of six legs. I'll definitely be briefing my First Officer on these issues in the future.

A fatigued CRJ200 Captain noticed the FMS CHK POSITION alert on after takeoff but failed to take action or notify the First Officer until well into the flight when the GPS position was used to update the FMS.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We received taxi instruction to taxi to Runway 32 via H from apron. We taxied per instruction. The captain and I visually verified via the Jeppesen chart that taxiway H does not cross Runway 27. There were no messages; NOTAMs; or any special considerations in the iPad advisory pages. The flight taxied to Runway 32 without problem. This report is written due to crew confusion regarding nonstandard markings on taxiway H and Runway 27 approach. Taxiway H and the intersecting taxiway that leads to Runway 27 clearly indicate taxiways on the Jeppesen chart. This lead to crew confusion on Taxiway H in the vicinity or Runway 27 approach. The 27 approach hold short markings were well worn and badly chipped. The markings were very difficult to see until aircraft was within a few feet of them. We don't believe any error took place. This report was created due to crew confusion of that potential hot spot of Taxiway H and intersection of the taxiway leading to Runway 27. We would have verified crossing of Runway 27 approach to eliminate unexpected confusion.

Cleared to taxi to runway 32 via taxiway H. No mention of any hold short. (I have been flying into Nassau [for many years] and have never used Rwy 32; but due to winds behind a tropical storm). My review of the taxi diagram showed that taxiway H does not cross a runway. It does however cross a taxiway that becomes runway 27. There are no pavement markings at the intersection. I taxied all the way to 32. There were no runway 27 approaches in progress; and no remarks or questions from ATC; no traffic conflicts. I was sure of the clearance; but retrospectively I wish I would have verified before crossing. Vague taxi diagram and pavement markings. Perhaps a clearer taxi instruction; clearer taxi diagram; and pavement markings if this is indeed a runway crossing.

A319 flight crew reported the hold short markings for Runway 27 on Taxiway H at MYNN (Nassau) are badly worn and hard to see.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload; Time Pressure

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Weather

This report is not intended to be specific to this particular flight; but to our operations in general.  I believe the company's continuous and increasing use of ACARS to report system anomalies not related to flying the aircraft is causing a safety hazard.  It began with the first flight of the day aircraft condition reports that are now mandatory via ACARS; and has now become a major distraction with delay reports.  It is unreasonable for the company to insist that pilots report delays; especially when they are well known; while in flight.  Yesterday was a prime example: we were ground stopped due to TSTMS and were given a 2 hour delay EDCT.  The flight back was very challenging with an amended RNAV departure in mountainous terrain; a radical ATC change to our flight plan; and a lot of weather to deviate around for the last half of the flight.  The ACARS was continuously chirping (making loud ACARS noise) enroute while we were busy trying to manage our fuel and deviate around weather.  It wanted to know why we were 2 hours late.  This requirement; combined with the other non-flight related ACARS prompts are causing distraction and are increasing pilot workload.  Considering that our workload has already dramatically increased of late due to all the various and ever-changing RNAV arrivals; these non flight related ACARS functions should be immediately discontinued.

An EMB-145 Captain described the safety hazards; distractions and increased flight crew workload because of the Company requirement to ACARS non flight related anomalies even when the causes are well known.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A small training helicopter departed Runway 2 without a clearance. Most fixed wing traffic use our parallel Runway 29 or 11. Runway 2/20 is a short runway; 3;600 FT at an airport with a field elevation of 5;673 FT. It is used primarily when we have strong sustained winds out of the North/South. Both helicopter schools are physically located on the north end of the airport. Our standard procedures devote the northern most 800 FT of Runway 2/20 for helicopter use. It is a system that works well; keeping the helicopter students away from most fixed wing movements; both airborne and on the ground. When the helicopters depart Runway 20 they make a 90 degree turn well north of the parallel runways. When they depart the northern most part of Runway 2 they are already well north of the parallel runways. When they depart Runway 2 there is considerable lag time between the clearance being issued and the helicopter actually getting airborne. It can; and usually does; take a couple; maybe a few; minutes to enter the runway; hover taxi south several hundred feet; turn around; and actually start departure roll. From past experience; I have learned that a significant time delay between the issuance of a clearance; and its actual implementation; can be hazardous. In several past errors the notable time delay between the clearance being given and its actual impact was a major factor. Though infrequent; both helicopter schools have departed without clearance before. ATC should provide a briefing that explains the difference between a controller movement area and an uncontrolled area. From a controlled area; the pilot must await the word 'cleared'. No other word authorizes and actual arrival or departure.

A BJC Controller described an unsafe condition with regard to the time delays utilized by helicopters to cross runways and/or depart via a runway.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

During takeoff roll on runway 20R I noticed a helicopter starting to depart from the northern parking apron (our right side) and I noted to the FO to 'keep an eye out on that guy; it looks like he's taking off'. The FO agreed that he looked to be taking off. As I rotated; the helicopter also became airborne at roughly the same rate. As our distance closed it appeared that the helicopter was drifting closer to the runway. I continued to pitch up to approximately 18 degree. I was unable to maneuver left because I knew there were small single engine acft landing and departing runway 20L and I could not determine if that area was clear. As I continued to increase pitch our vertical speed increased enough that I felt that we would out climb the helicopter. As we passed by one another it looked as if the helicopter had corrected and was heading away from us. The FO estimated that the helicopter was as close as 100' or less from our wing tip was we passed. Tower should not have give both acft clearance to takeoff. The difference in time could have been as little as 30 to 60 seconds and the entire event would have been avoided. SNA at that time was incredibly congested with numerous GA training acft in the pattern using both runways. Allowing a regional jet and a helicopter to depart at the same time in close proximity just added fuel to the fire and I feel it was completely unnecessary. One thing I really wished I would have done was increased throttles to max at the point I felt the traffic was a factor. Also in future I might consider rejecting the takeoff off clearance if I hear a helicopter getting a takeoff clearance from that apron at the same time.

Took off 20R at the same time a helicopter was cleared to take off off the northern ramp to the right of us. Captain told me to keep an eye on him. As we took off so did the helicopter and it seem like he drifted toward our runway. Captain pitched up to 18 degrees nose up and the helicopter was turning away but still appeared to be drifting toward us. We definitely appeared to be out climbing the helicopter and it finally turned and flew away from us as we passed. Looked like about 100 feet worth of separation. Tower could have waited to clear one of us. Or the helicopter could've not drifted toward the runway. Also we could have put power to max to ensure we out climbed the aircraft.

E175 Flight Crew reported a NMAC with a helicopter on take off.


Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 165.85; Flight Crew Total 1287.50; Flight Crew Type 1287.50

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Upon completing a preflight walk around; my First Officer informed me that there was a hydraulic leak in the Right Wheel well; and 'puddle' underneath. He was trying to count the drips to quantify the extent of the leak; but I felt it was important to have Maintenance evaluate to see if it was within any limit. We contacted Station Maintenance and filled out an ELB write-up. This was 27-25 minutes prior to scheduled push. Approx. 10 minutes after push; without ANY contact by Maintenance personnel; I received an MRD that said that there was 'water' coming from the air conditioning; and the HYDRAULIC leak was cleared. This created confusion; as the First Officer; who is approx. 6 months on the line was sure it was hydraulic. I went down and inspected the area and there was a puddle of hydraulic fluid with a leaking component above it. I contacted Station Maintenance and asked for the mechanic to return to the aircraft where I pointed out the HYDRAULIC leak. Subsequently; fittings were tightened and we were on our way. Had we given in to operational pressures to minimize the delay and trust the erroneous MRD we would have flown over 5 hours overwater with a known hydraulic leak. While mistakes happen to everyone; had the mechanic attempted to resolve the discrepancy in the write up; as we did; we could have resolved it as a team.

B737 Captain reported Maintenance incorrectly identified leak resulting in Captain recalling maintenance to return to fix hydraulics.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Received call from [Maintenance] stating that they had received a SATCOM call from Aircraft X regarding their left IDG (Integrated Drive Generator) not working. Crew spoke to [Maintenance] directly; I was not involved in the conversation; though I should have been. This flight was still in an ETOPS area of operation; and IDG problems have an ETOPS impact and if the crew was required to start the APU; would have a fuel impact. Because [the crew] spoke to [Maintenance] without Dispatch on the line; no position report was obtained; either. After the fact; [I] figured out that a SATCOM call which came in earlier at another desk was the airborne Aircraft X. However; at that time; there was another flight of a different flight date on the ground and it was thought that was the flight calling; not the one in the air. In any case; the airborne Aircraft X crew apparently was offered to be transferred to their Dispatcher (which would have been me) but insisted on being transferred directly to [Maintenance] instead. I didn't realize what had transpired until after [Maintenance] contacted me.Not sure what happened or why crew did not involve dispatch in their communication with Maintenance. Fortunately; there was no operational impact and flight continued uneventfully to ZZZ. Remind crews that when they have an issue enroute; unless an immediate emergency or something else that doesn't permit; they need to keep their dispatcher in the loop and involved in order to ensure proper operational control is maintained.

Dispatcher reported flight crew neglected to notify Dispatcher of an engine component failure during flight. Flight crew contacted Maintenance directly.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Manuals; Procedure

When considering damage (dents) within the Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM) area of a Boeing aircraft the following references are used; Structural Repair Manual (SRM) 53-00-01-1A-1 Allowable Damage; SRM 51-10-03 RVSM Skin Waviness Inspection and SRM 51-10-01 Aerodynamic Smoothness Requirements. A review of the requirements for RVSM flight based on SRM 51-10 requires a repair to be accomplished whenever the damage (dent) is outside SRM 53-00-01 Allowable Limits (reference Paragraph-3; B; 'NOTE'). SRM 53-00-01 Detail III requires a dent to be 10' inches or more from a cutout and 3' inches or more from a skin splice; as measured from the nearest fastener hole centerline to the edge of the dent periphery. If you layout the allowable areas within the RVSM that meet this requirement without requiring a repair; it's a very small area at the front end of the RVSM box. This whole process of RVSM determination for flight is very complicated and easy for anyone to make a mistake due to the process of qualifying a dent.  The requirements for other types of damage (NICKS; GOUGES; CORROSION; SCRATCHES and SCRIBE LINES) do not have the 10' inch rule described in SRM 53-00-01. This is just an informational statement for the purpose of making aware the potential for error. No known event has occurred; but a review of aircraft RVSM deferrals should be accomplished. [Recommend] Training; Training; Training. The RVSM area is very misunderstood due to the number of references required to determine the condition.

A Line Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) describes the difficulty involved when considering damage (dents) that lie within the Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM) areas of an aircraft's fuselage; prior to continued flight. AMT notes that references involving Structural Repair Manuals (SRM) 51-10-01 and SRM 53-00-01 can be misunderstood; more training is necessary.


Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Human Factors; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Aircraft

We departed for an empty reposition leg from ZZZ - ZZZ1. Climbing through approximately 10;000 feet we began to experience compounding failures. First; our 60 Hz Converter failed; our left and right packs turned off; [and] our cabin pressure controller defaulted to manual control and would not reset back to auto. Our cabin began to climb excessively; cabin pressure low illuminated; cabin oxygen on - I immediately initiated a turnaround back to ZZZ and began a descent. We advised ATC and landed back at ZZZ. After several days of maintenance; it was discovered that the Mechanic assigned to fix our aircraft installed an unapproved E-INVERTER which was not listed in the IPC (Illustrated Parts Catalog) for a GIV and did not properly secure a cannon plug. These issues were later fixed by the Gulfstream FAST.From a pilot perspective this was unavoidable. The errors that occurred here are solely on the maintenance side. The IPC should have been consulted prior to ordering and installing any part on any aircraft. This did not happen.

GIV Captain reported an air turnback after multiple electrical failures that were caused by a Mechanic installing an unapproved inverter in the aircraft.


ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Aircraft Automation Overrode Flight Crew; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

Using CPDLC to receive clearance from SAN. Filed clearance was POGGI5.JLI. Received via CPDLC: 'POGGI5.IPL. THIS IS A REVEISED CLEARANCE..AFTER PXV CLEARED AS FILED.' We then accepted the clearance using the ACCEPT prompt and the clearance downloaded to the FMS. However what downloaded was POGGI5.JLI.IPL.J18...etc. This was what we flew on departure and approximately 1 1/2 hours later were given a number to call by ABQ center.I contacted LA ATC upon arrival and was told that we were not supposed to have flown to JLI; but POGGI5 to IPL. According to the LA OPS Supervisor this same error had been made by another aircraft within the previous 2 weeks. Upon additional contact; she stated that they believed that SAN tower had erred in providing our clearance and that they were continuing to investigate.This was my first time using the CPDLC for a clearance. Following the provided guidance step by step; we believed that the proper clearance had downloaded as there were no prompts to change any portion. We both commented on the fact that there was no way to print out the clearance and therefore have a hard copy available. The ACARS ATC page breaks it up onto 3 pages adding to possible confusion. In addition; the previous ACARS clearance format of: FILED CLEARANCE followed by REVISED CLEARANCE... was much clearer on where changes were made. With the new CPDLC of automatically downloading and accepting makes possibility of errors greater as we observed. My technique for avoiding recurrence will be to verbally confirm any revised clearance with ATC in the future; negating the intent of CPDLC/ frequency congestion; as my first use of CPDLC has resulted in my filing this report.

B737-800 flight crew reported receiving a revised route clearance from SAN Clearance Delivery via CPDLC. The clearance was accepted via the accept prompt and was automatically downloaded to the FMC. The route downloaded was the original route which the crew does not detect until ATC pointed out the error 90 minutes into the flight.


Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

I was discussing changing the active runway with the Local Controller because of wind conditions; 020 at 15g20. We had a few larger aircraft inbound and they all like to use the longer runway so we stayed on Runway XX for the time being. A VFR aircraft entered the VFR traffic pattern to land and full stop left traffic Runway XX. We were wondering why the RADAR Controller did not give him Runway YY for the winds. I observed the aircraft on final with the binoculars to check gear down; next I hear the Local Controller tell the aircraft to enter left downwind for Runway YY. The PA32 apparently slid off the runway and took out a light on his go around. I do not believe there were any reports of Low Level Wind Sheer (LLWS). This happened while we discussing changing the runway.

A Tower Controller described a runway excursion that occurred when traffic made a touch and go exiting the runway and hitting a light.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

After takeoff on the ECAM indicated a main deck cargo fire. Jumpseaters (after debrief) said there was a thick air conditioning (AC) pack smell. We stayed with tower [and] did a left traffic pattern for an overweight; visual approach. Fire trucks met us on the runway and told us they saw no hot spots. Taxied back to the gate.Pack Smoke/Mist

After takeoff in an Airbus A300; the crew got an ECAM Warning of a 'Main Deck Cargo Fire'. There was a thick Air Conditioning Pack smell.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Total 2015; Flight Crew Type 18

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 115; Flight Crew Total 3500; Flight Crew Type 100

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We departed carrying passengers to Key West; FL. Once within range; we were handed off to Navy Key West TRACON. We started to receive vectors for final approach to Runway 27 at EYW (Key West Airport) while descending down to an assigned altitude of 1;600 FT. We were in an area with extensive cumulonimbus buildups and were given authorization to deviate east while descending. Once clear of a particular area of buildups; we were assigned a heading of 180 for a right base into Runway 27. Once below 2;000 FT we saw a runway in the orientation of the intended destination airport and called the field in sight to TRACON. TRACON then cleared us for a visual approach into Runway 27 and immediately handed us off to Key West Tower. I changed to Tower frequency and attempted to establish communications; but was unable because of ongoing communications between the Tower and another aircraft. After Tower finished issuing clearance to the other aircraft; two way communications were established and we were cleared for landing on Runway 27 as we turned base to final. The runway alignment appeared to match the intended airport and we continued our final approach and landing. We had the RNAV 27 approach loaded into the FMS but had no RAIM. During the landing; I was focused on making speed and descent rate callouts and ensuring the aircraft was properly configured for landing. I attempted to verify the landing runway by reading the numbers painted on the runway but was unable to clearly see them because the runway was faded. We continued the landing; touched down; extended spoilers; and deployed the thrust reversers. After this action was taken; we realized we had landed at the wrong airport due to the length and width of the runway. The Captain then brought the aircraft to a stop and cleared the runway. We then contacted Navy Tower on 121.500 and complied with all requests and instructions. I could have had a positive impact on the situation had I acted differently. The runway centerline seemed to line up with our intended destination runway but something didn't feel right. I could have expressed those concerns clearly to the Captain or just stated 'go-around' to ensure we were both on the same page and executing the correct approach to the correct airport/runway. I also could have backed up the FMS with DME from the Key West VOR but did not have it tuned in. It could have provided additional situational awareness a potentially prevented the issue.

We were receiving vectors to the final approach course for EYW Runway 27 and were heading straight toward a cumulonimbus buildup. There were many buildups in the area. The base of the clouds was around 2;000 FT MSL. We asked to deviate to the east and when we passed the buildup we were given an assigned heading of 180 for a right base entry to final approach course. When we descended below 2;000 FT MSL to the assigned altitude of 1;600 FT MSL we saw a runway in the correct orientation. We called field in sight and were cleared for the visual. We were told to contact the Tower and there was a delay contacting Tower because he was giving a clearance. Once contact was made we were given our landing clearance as we were turning base to final. We had the GPS approach 27 loaded; but had no RAIM. The runway seemed to line up with the approach course and I was looking outside at the runway for the visual approach. I was focused on the approach end of the runway knowing I needed to land on the numbers to have plenty of runway to stop. The numbers were faded and all I saw was the 2 and the course lined up. We touched down; extended the spoilers; and deployed the thrust reversers. When I realized we were at the wrong airport I exited the runway and stopped on a taxiway. We called Navy Tower on 121.5 and received a frequency for the Tower. We contacted the Tower and complied with all requests and instructions from the Tower. Other factors contributing to this problem were a physiological need to use the restroom and being too focused on landing on the numbers to stop in a short distance. I should have been more aware of the DME on the FMS to know I was too far out. Approach Control could have talked to us for a few more miles before handing us over to Tower.

Business jet flight crew reports landing at NQX Runway 25 while attempting to land at EYW Runway 27.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 5500; Flight Crew Type 2000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

I was assigned to fly a charter flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ on the morning of DATE. Weather for the trip was variable; as I recall; with good VFR in ZZZ2; and possible lower conditions west of ZZZ2 toward the destination. I chose to fly the last segment of the trip VFR; because the weather looked acceptable; based on conditions at departure time; and I wanted the flexibility to maneuver around and change plans at the destination.  I asked for a runway condition report from Flight Service before departure; but they said there was no report in the system. I chose to depart with the intention of getting a runway condition report en-route; and land at ZZZ2 if no report was available.The initial part of the flight was uneventful; but approaching ZZZ2; I asked ATC again for a condition report. They read me a report of 8 inches of wet snow on the runway. Based on this report; I decided to land in ZZZ2; and wait for better conditions.  Flying into ZZZ2; I called the company agent in ZZZ2; and asked if he had any information from other pilots about runway conditions in ZZZ. He indicated that the ZZZ maintenance contractor was probably plowing the runway already. Based on this info; I decided to continue; with the intention of calling the plow operator on the radio approaching ZZZ; and getting an up to date report. If I was unable to talk with the plow operator; then we would just turn back and land at ZZZ2.  About 20 miles out from ZZZ; the plow operator answered my radio call; and said that he had just started plowing. He said that he would have the runway plowed full length in about 15 minutes. He said he would do 2 passes and that would be plenty wide enough. I decided to circle over the low terrain in the valley east of ZZZ while the plow operator finished the job. Returning to ZZZ2 to wait would have meant about 20 minutes of flying back to ZZZ2; and a further 20 minutes to ZZZ again.  I flew a few circles about 10 miles east of ZZZ; and the plow operator called back on the radio; to say that he had just finished the full length of the runway.  The weather was variable. Ceiling was indefinite; with reported ceiling at ZZZ between 1;000 and 1;500 ft. Visibility east of ZZZ was variable between about 2 and 5 miles with snow showers. ZZZ was reporting visibility between 1 1/2 and 2 1/2 miles; so I was expecting the visibility to go down as I approached ZZZ.  I set up the airplane for landing; and lined up on final approach for Runway XX. About 2 miles out; I got sight of the town and the runway on the far side of the river. The light was dim; with light snow and the terrain was visually featureless. The runway area was a field of uniform white; but I turned on the runway lights; and could make them out clearly enough.  I aimed for the center between the runway lights; descended; started the landing flare; and pulled the power back to idle. Just at touchdown; the left main wheel descended into the berm on the left side of the runway; and the airplane started yawing to the left. I applied hard right rudder to keep the airplane under control and steer toward the plowed portion of the runway. The airplane then yawed to the right; onto the plowed portion of the runway. But there was not enough traction or rudder authority to stop the yaw to the right. The airplane slid down the runway while decelerating and yawing approximately 180 degrees to the right.  The main wheels probably got enough traction while moving backwards to pull the airplane to the east side of the runway; because the airplane came to rest in the snow berm on the east side of the runway; having yawed a total of about 270 degrees. The event involved smooth; rapid deceleration; but no impacts or abrupt motions. I did not notice any change in engine sound or operation during the event.  The engines were still running at idle when the airplane stopped moving. I shut down the engines and secured the airplane normally.  We dug out a path in the snow to pull theairplane out; and I taxied it onto the ramp. The ramp had only been partially plowed; and flat light conditions still prevailed; so I walked the path to the ramp before taxi; and noted a route that would get the airplane safely off the runway. I taxied the airplane slowly onto the ramp; but I could not see the berms on the ramp while taxiing; and inadvertently ran the right main wheel slowly into a berm at an angle. I stopped the airplane and shut it down as soon as I felt the wheel start to drag. The right propeller contacted the soft wet snow at about 2-3 knots forward speed; and at idle power (about 1;000 RPM). The propeller displaced some snow; but this did not slow down the engine and put no significant load on the propeller.  There were no other anomalies in engine operations or aircraft taxiing. I then called our Director of Operations (DO) on a borrowed satellite phone. I described the event and situation to him; and did a preliminary assessment of the airplane. I did not see any evidence of damage or structural deformation; and I passed that information to him. He told me to do a thorough inspection; and if I found any evidence of structural issues; they would send a maintenance crew out to assess it. He said that if I was satisfied with the condition of the aircraft; then I could fly it back to ZZZ1.  Some snow had been thrown up into the wheel wells during the event; so I removed the snow and inspected the condition of the landing gear hardware and attachments. I also did a visual assessment of the straightness and parallelism of the landing gear system.  I found no evidence of any structural deformation. I looked for: deformation or bending of the landing gear struts and links; cracks of any kind; bending; buckling or oil-canning of the skins; [and] any evidence of deformation (such as cracked paint) at the interfaces between brackets and primary aircraft structure. I found none of these.  The aircraft wing flaps were retracted during initial shutdown; per normal procedure. Some snow was apparently trapped between the left flap and wing; which compressed and re-froze. I removed as much of the snow and ice as possible; with help from one of the passengers; but we were unable to get the flaps to move from their retracted position.  I also walked up the runway to see what I could learn from the runway condition. I found the groove in the snow; where the left main wheel first contacted the snow berm. It started a few feet outside of the face of the snow berm; but well within the line of the runway lights and tracked towards the runway centerline. I found no tracks of the wheels on the plowed surface of the runway; and no evidence of the airplane contacting the right side (west side) berm. It is clear that the airplane was on the runway surface during the entire event.  I walked up to the runway threshold; and found that the plowed section of the runway was not centered in the space between the runway lights. I paced off the distance from the berm on each side to the innermost runway threshold light. The berm on the west side of the runway was 5 paces (about 15 feet) in from the innermost threshold light; while the berm on the east side was 10 paces (about 30 feet) in from the innermost threshold light.   In addition; the berm on the east side appeared to curve toward the runway centerline as it progressed in the landing direction on Runway XX.  So while landing on Runway XX; the left side berm was closer to the runway centerline than the right side berm. I was a bit off runway centerline to the left; and the left berm was off center to the right. This combination; along with the flat light conditions caused the left main wheel to contact the berm during touchdown.  I returned to the ramp and called back the DO. I reviewed my observations and plans with him. I planned to take the airplane up solo and fly around the pattern; to assess its condition and operation. I then planned to fly to ZZZ2 for more fuel. I planned to not retract the landing gear; for fear of the moisture in the landing gear hardware (wet snow and water) freezing at altitude and rendering some piece of hardware inoperative. Both takeoff and landing with flaps up are normal operations for the aircraft; and the planned runways were adequate for flaps-up operations; so I elected to proceed; even though the wing flaps were inoperative. The DO concurred with my plans; and I consulted with my passengers and got their agreement; so that's what we did. We returned to ZZZ1 with no further difficulties.

Pilot reported losing control of aircraft after landing when the aircraft hit a snow berm that hadn't been cleared off the runway correctly.