Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

At around F230 we [encountered] icing [so] I turned on wing and cowl anti ice. Moments later received L BLEED DUCT warning. Captain ran QRH. QRH requires operating pack off and Isolation (ISOL) valve closed. It doesn't account for our MEL Ram Air Shutoff Valve which requires right pack OFF. Now without pressurization cabin altitude was climbing around 1;000 feet per minute. Which until we got our descent going and changed ISOL back opened and turned left pack back on cabin climbed to around 9;200 feet. We descended out of icing to around 12;000 feet. Captain had [advised ATC of] the descent and notified inflight crew which we had asked for 10;000 I believe; but after we realized we would get back in icing we decided to stay where we were to stay between layers and at around Total Air Temperature (TAT) 22 C. We asked ATC and they gave us 14;000 feet [because] of no anti icing equipment. Somewhere in the descent I asked the Captain to start the APU which could have also covered our pressurization but we elected to use the right bleed source instead; but had as a backup. The Captain had notified dispatcher via ACARS. We had plenty of fuel to stay at lower altitude.Company could fix airplanes in a more timely matter instead of sending aircraft into icing conditions with this deferral.

CRJ-700 FO reported loss of L BLEED DUCT which; when combined with an existing MEL; resulted in loss of cabin pressure. Flight descended out of icing conditions and continued to destination.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure; Chart Or Publication

While on descent; passing 12;000' at night windshield shattered. Ran QRH in compliance with all Company policies. While I was putting away the QRH under the trim wheel shortly thereafter; Captain disengaged autopilot and instinctively activated trim while my hand was still near trim wheel. RESULT: Fractured left hand of First Officer.FACTORS: I don't think he saw my hand down there. I had just said 'checklist complete;' and I can't remember if he said 'autopilot off' or not. Both of those statements could have triggered an extra level of caution; but honestly; it has never held that meaning for me before in this context. Fairly busy in approach stage of flight (radios; configuration; running checklists).

A B737 NG Captain manually activated the elevator trim and broke the First Officer's hand as the trim wheel turned while he stowed the QRH checklist away under the wheel following its use for a shattered windshield.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

As part of the preflight procedure; the cockpit was disinfected with the large isopropyl alcohol based wipes/ Lysol type wipes for the common touch points during preflight and post flight. As part of this cleaning; the headsets are cleaned with the wipes and dwelling or the boom is wetted. This created a situation where when the pushback crew called for pushback; the boom mike on the headset did not work. The handset was used. After a period of time before takeoff; the boom was tested again; leading to the possibility that the alcohol solution may have entered inside the boom mike and not dried thoroughly as part of the dwelling process. The same hazard occurred on the previous leg to the FO; and normal operation was restored after a period of time.

Air carrier Captain reported alcohol from cleaning products may be entering the boom mike causing the equipment to malfunction.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 400

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I was conducting an introductory flight in a Cessna 172 in day VFR conditions. I felt like the sound of the power was fluctuating on the climb-out but not enough to decide if it was real or in my head. The RPM gauge had a typical gentle wiggle from turbulence. It was my first time flying this particular 172. I had flown all the others in the flight school by this point but this one. I brushed the sound off as a quirk of the particular airplane. During one phase of the flight I demonstrated to my adept intro student a stable approach descent from 7;500 ft. MSL (2;000 ft. AGL). Carburetor heat on; power reduced smoothly to 1500 RPM; and I established the stable descent at 65 kts. with 30 degrees flaps. I then recovered by about 7;300 ft. MSL by going full power and turning carburetor heat off; and changing flaps to 20 degrees. A few seconds later the engine power started waning; which I was already on alert for. I immediately turned back toward the airport. By the time I completed the westbound turn the engine started shaking and losing power. 400 RPM drops with noticeable shaking every 10 to 20 seconds. I pulled carburetor heat for 30 seconds with no appreciable increase or decrease in power. I called 3 times over Tower frequency and told them I was returning to the airport. I went mixture rich; verified primer locked and fuel selector on both. Mixture rich seemed to help. I adjusted the carburetor heat and mixture several times on the flight back and neither seemed to make any difference. The engine would run smoothly for about 20 seconds and then shake and lose power for 5-10 seconds before coming back to life. I used the available power to climb up to 7;800 ft. until I was within gliding distance of the Runway and glided the airplane back. The airplane ran smoothly after I reduced the power and it kept running all the way in to Parking. I checked the weather conditions after landing and the relative humidity was 32% and the outside air temperature was approximately 65-70 degrees F.

C172 Flight Instructor reported engine power loss and returned to the departure airport and made a successful landing.


Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 3500; Flight Crew Type 1500

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

When I put the gear handle down nothing happened. I checked the circuit breaker; which was still in; and recycled the gear handle but still got no response. I pulled the breaker; placed the gear handle in the down position; and pumped the gear down; per the emergency extension procedure. I still did not have a safe gear indication. I could see the left main gear in the pilot's window; and I could see the right main gear by opening the right door slightly.I informed the Tower of the problem; and they suggested a low approach. I overflew the runway at approximately 200 AGL. The Tower and the crew of an ERJ on the taxiway advised that my gear appeared to be down. The Tower activated the emergency crews. While flying around the pattern; I tried pumping the gear a few more times and got a safe gear indication. I landed softly; and carefully taxied to the ramp.I advised my company of the situation and switched to a different airplane.

When the C-210's landing gear failed to extend via the normal system the pilot utilized the emergency gear extension to pump it down. A safe landing monitored by CFR ensued.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger; Person Flight Attendant

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Approximately 10 minutes before landing; I could smell an odor resembling wet socks (a malodorous sweet smell) from my jumpseat at 1L. At the same time I received a call from Flight Attendant 4 at 3L saying she smelled an odor at her door too. The fumes dissipated when the pilots were informed and made changes to cabin temperature/air. After landing and while taxiing I smelled acrid and pungent odor resembling fuel at 1L. All three other flight attendants smelled it at their jumpseats and pilots were informed. I experienced a dry cough and dry itchy eyes. The fumes dissipated as we reached the gate. A few passengers commented on the fume smell during deplaning; with one passenger saying he noticed it at both takeoff and landing. I had a dry cough yesterday that has gotten worse today; and I have started to lose my voice tonight. My eyes have been exceptionally dry as well. I am fatigued and generally don't feel at 100% healthy. No one met our flight from Flight Service; only Maintenance/ Maintenance Supervisors. I received a phone call that evening inquiring of it from Flight Service; which I attempted to return upon arrival in ZZZ; but did not get an answer. We did not feel so symptomatic yesterday to the point of requesting medical treatment upon arrival.

A321 Flight Attendant reported a fume event in which she experienced physiological issues.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 21.2

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Construction in the area severed a line that provided all communications; radar data and NAS connectivity to the facility leaving the facility with only 4 radio frequencies and no means of communication with the outside world.  The CIC at the time the event occurred determined the only way to communicate the status of the facility was via the use of personal cell phone.  A call was placed to the TRACON and the FLM was notified.  By the time the FLM arrived in the cab the decision was made; with coordination with the TRACON Supervisor that all coordination between the TRACON and Tower would be accomplished by personal cell phones and appropriate numbers were exchanged.  After a lengthy discussion the FLM finally decided to call an ATC ALERT and did so via his personal cell phone.  This condition continued for the next 14 hours; involving 10 employees; 4 personal cell phones and one FLM.  After 6 hours of searching the cut line was located and phone company was notified.  Phone company advised at approximately XA30L that the line would be repaired by XD30L.  Full service was not restored until [a day later].  During all this operations continued with little to no delay to the flying community.The next day an informal discussion among those involved came up with some ideas as to how to handle this situation in the future.  The item that has been banned from the operations is what helped both the IFR facility and us continue normal operations was a cell phone.  Granted the policy of not having cell phones in the operations is a good thing and events like this are very rare; we believe each facility should be assigned a cell phone and a wireless device that connects to the FAA network as an emergency means of communication (the FAA has the means and the capability). This could also be part of the facility evacuation plan in the event ATC service are relocated on the airport.  I think it would be a good idea for each VFR Tower to evaluate their procedures to see if they cover a total loss of NAS connectivity.

Tower Controller describes a situation where a line is cut that provides all data from adjacent facilities.  Use of cell phones were used to coordinate and move traffic.  The scenario lasted for 14 hours.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was working low volume traffic. There was a tour of three people in the tower cab which may have been a distraction. I had coordinated approval for a vehicle to work on Runway X/XY. A Citabria called ready to go Runway X/XY. I gave a quick scan of the runway and cleared the aircraft for departure on a runway heading forgetting about the vehicle that had been working for several minutes. Shortly after the aircraft had started his takeoff roll both the Ground Controller and one of the visitors said the vehicle was still on the runway. I cancelled the Citabria's takeoff clearance and held his position on the runway. He resumed his departure roll once the vehicle had cleared the runway and I had given him a takeoff clearance. I would recommend a thorough scan of the runway prior to clearing anybody for takeoff. I had just done a quick scan and missed the vehicle because it was parked along the edge of the runway. The runway in use memory aid was on the podium; but I did not glance at the podium when clearing the aircraft for takeoff. If I had been holding it instead it could have been prevented.

The Facility Manager was giving a tour to 2 people. I was working Ground Control (GC) and had coordinated a vehicle (C25) onto Runway X to fix a light. While C25 was on the runway; I taxied a Citabria to Runway X for a VFR departure. I had turned around to talk with the tour; we were discussing the towers South East of the field and their impact on our Conflict Alerts. I turned back around and scanned Runway X and noticed the Citabria was starting his takeoff roll. I pointed to him to ask if he was rolling because the vehicle was still on the runway; as I did that one of the people in the tour said there is a truck on the runway. As the Local Controller was cancelling the Citabria's takeoff I was telling C25 to exit the runway. Reduce the length of tours in the operating quarters. Have vehicles that will be operating on the runway monitoring both GC and LC frequencies.

Tower Controller cleared an aircraft for takeoff failing to note a previously coordinated vehicle still on the runway and necessitating a cancellation of the takeoff clearance.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 136.4; Flight Crew Total 136.40; Flight Crew Type 136.40

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Distraction

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 64.07; Flight Crew Total 2781.83; Flight Crew Type 2781.83

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

During preflight we received a planned DG printout (6 pieces/198.42lbs). I secured the printout to the glare shield above my Electronic Attitude Direction Indicator as a reminder. With two jumpseaters and a pushback operator difficult to hear/understand; I was distracted. Once we turned the dome light off I really didn't notice my reminder on the glare shield. We pushed back without the DG final; which usually prints up automatically with final weights. Apparently the ramp agent was unable to send his final report. We realized our mistake after engine 1 startup. We cleared a very congested ramp area at [ramp spot X] and had the final DG report sent to ACARS from dispatch while parked safely on the taxiway.

During preflight; we received a planned Dangerous Goods summary. The Captain reminded me that we needed a final dangerous goods summary before we departed. The final dangerous goods summary did not automatically print like it usually does; and the Captain and I both forgot about it before we pushed back. We contacted Operations to resolve the issue; and we were advised that the ramp was having a technical issue. We exited the ramp area since it was congested and we were unable to sit there and wait for the final DG summary. While on the taxiway; dispatch sent our final DG goods summary.

Air Carrier flight crew reported gate departure without required Final Dangerous Goods Summary.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Distraction; Confusion; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

The student had just begun his touch and go at ZZZ and we were on the climb out about to turn left to remain in the pattern. At 600 feet; the engine began to shake and sounded like it could shut down at any minute.  The power sounded like it had dropped by at least 500 RPM and then slowly came back up to around 2500 RPM.  At the first sign of trouble; I took the flight controls from my student and began to turn back towards the airport and ensured that we did have full throttle and the mixture was full rich.  Once I got the airplane up to 1;000 feet; I set up for a tight traffic pattern and landed on Runway XX.  Once we were off the runway; I decided to taxi back to the beginning of the runway and attempt to clean the spark plugs with our recommended fouled spark plug procedure after two attempts to clean the spark plugs the RH mags still dropped 200+ rpm and began to shake the engine and sound as if it was going to shut down.  The decision was made by both my student and I to taxi back to a ramp and shut down the engine.  The aircraft was parked on a ramp and we tried the fouled spark plug procedure again and still the RH mags where dropping by at least 200 RPM and violently shaking the engine. Once the engine was shut down; we stepped out and performed an inspection of the aircraft and noticed some sort of sticky residue seeping up onto the cowling that neither of us had seen prior to our departure from ZZZ1.  There was also a strong aroma of something burning like oil or rubber that could be smelt once you stepped outside and the engine began to make abnormal gargling and popping sounds after we had been outside for a few minutes and did not resemble anything I have heard come from a Cessna 172 in my 200hrs of flying it.  Looking at all of the abnormalities with the engine and determining that I; the PIC; was unfamiliar with the terrain around ZZZ and the remainder of the flight would take place over dark areas until we reached ZZZ1; I did not feel confident in my ability to safely land the aircraft somewhere in the event of an engine failure.  I called the Flight Supervisor on duty and requested the student and myself be flown back to ZZZ1 and the aircraft be looked at by Maintenance.

A Cessna 172 Instructor Pilot reported a rough running engine while conducting training; resulting in a return to the departure airport for a maintenance inspection.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 175; Flight Crew Total 400; Flight Crew Type 330

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While practicing ground reference maneuvers with my pre-solo private pilot student; I noticed a plane flying on a course that would intercept our maneuvering area. My ADSB-in noticed the plane and soon after I had visual contact. I made announcements of my position on the local CTAF that is used in that area; due to the proximity of the airport that the flight training is conducted out of. No response was made by the incoming aircraft. Due to my position I took controls from my student and altered our course to the right in an attempt to clear the area. Aircraft Y flew towards me as indicated by my ADSB equipment; as well as the small amount of visual contact I had as the aircraft moved to a chasing position. Slow controlled turns were made to try to get the aircrafts attention (I did not know if Aircraft Y had me in visual contact) as well as vacate the area due to this aircraft. The collision avoidance sounded multiple times that Aircraft Y was on a direct collision course with me; and indicating on my screen that we had less than 100 ft. of vertical and horizontal clearance. In the closest proximity I was unable to maintain visual contact due to the other aircraft being behind me; and slightly above me. This continued on for a period of somewhere between 3-5 minutes. No matter the direction I flew to try and vacate the area Aircraft Y stayed on my tail. All attempts to establish radio contact failed. The traffic eventually vacated the area to the south of our position.Looking back I should have called St. Louis Approach and let them know of the situation; giving them the opportunity to try to establish radio contact and let the pilot of Aircraft Y know we were a training flight that was not comfortable flying in formation as well as let ATC know that this aircraft was breaking the law and creating a dangerous situation for themselves as well as others.

C172 pilot reported an NMAC with another light aircraft.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 1920; Flight Crew Type 39

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

I departed ZZZ on an IFR flight plan to ZZZ1. The aircraft had sat for roughly 3 days over the weekend before this flight and was difficult to start that morning (battery seemed weak). 40 minutes into the flight; the first symptoms of an electrical malfunction began to show up. I was roughly 15 nm from the IAF for the RNAV XX approach into ZZZ1 at 8;000 feet MSL; in actual IMC with light to moderate rime icing. I had just switched from ZZZ2 Center to the CTAF for the ZZZ1 airport when the auto-pilot for the aircraft unexpectedly disconnected. All of the lights on the autopilot control panel went dark; and the autopilot would not turn back on. Initially; I decided to continue the approach by hand and have maintenance check the autopilot malfunction on the ground. After briefly troubleshooting the autopilot; I returned to my instrument scan. At first glance; my HSI indicated that I was on Heading/Course. Needles were centered and heading bug was situated at the top of the instrument. But when I looked over at the Garmin 430 GPS; it indicated that I was off heading by 20-30 degrees. By the time I looked back towards my HSI; there was a 'HDG' flag starting to flicker in the top right hand corner. I looked across the panel at the co-pilot's instrument cluster and noted that the co-pilot's artificial horizon was flopped over; indicating a 45* right bank and 20* nose up attitude. The co-pilot's side DG was also off by 90* from my magnetic compass. As I looked back towards the pilot's side instrument cluster; my HSI began spinning around and around like a top.At this point; I had obviously determined that several of my gyroscopic instruments had failed; and I had difficulty determining which instruments were trustworthy and which were not. From this point on; I did my best to maintain straight and level flight with my remaining instruments and the Garmin 430 GPS ground track. I looked out the window at my wings (I was still in IMC and light to moderate icing [at] this point) and saw that during my troubleshooting I had enough ice accumulation that small 'horns' of rime ice were begging to grow on the leading edges and my de-ice boots were mostly white with a layer of ice. When I pressed the switch on the overhead panel to activate my de-ice boots; nothing happened. I immediately switched back to ZZZ2 Center and [received priority]; advising them that I had gyroscopic instrument failures and inoperative anti-icing equipment. I requested an immediate climb in an attempt to escape the icing conditions and find visual flight conditions before my remaining instrumentation failed; along with vectors back to ZZZ (which I knew had good VFR weather conditions...ZZZ1 conditions appeared to be worsening when I had last listened to the automated weather). ATC was extremely helpful and professional. Immediately offering any assistance they could; giving me no-gyro vectors towards ZZZ and approving a climb to 12;000 feet MSL. I had difficulty maintaining a heading and climb pitch-attitude initially; but got vaguely stabilized within a few minutes. Once stabilized; I noticed that the left alternator light was on; I attempted to re-cycle the alternator master switch twice without success. I then began to load-shed all electrical equipment which was not absolutely necessary for the continuation of the flight; and I advised ATC that I had experienced an alternator failure. 	I initially broke out of the top of the cloud layer and entered VMC around 10;000 feet roughly 15 minutes after the first indication of electrical failure. I had to request a higher altitude shortly thereafter as the tops of the clouds sloped higher towards ZZZ. ATC cleared me for a block altitude 8;000 feet to 12;000 feet; then eventually up to 14;000 feet; and authorized any course deviations necessary for me to remain in VFR conditions.Upon leveling off; I was initially concerned about what appeared to be a fairly significant performance loss. My first assumption was that it was due to ice build up on the wings/tail. In a level flight attitude; at 38 of manifold pressure and 2400 rpm (typical climb power) I was only getting 120 knots indicated airspeed. 160 knots to 170 knots indicated is more typical during cruise flight at a much lower power setting (30'/2300rpm). I alerted ATC that I was seeing abnormally low air speeds. But after a quick glance at my GPS (which was showing a 230 knots ground speed) I realized that the airspeed discrepancy was most likely due to pitot icing. ATC confirmed that they were showing me with a ground speed in the high 220's. By this point; the aircraft was out of icing conditions and flying just fine in VMC. So most of the potential danger had past. The last thing I had to do was search around for a hole in the clouds so that I could get back into ZZZ (there was an overcast layer between my aircraft and the ground). With the help of ZZZ3 Approach; ZZZ Tower; and several other aircraft in the area giving pilot reports; I found an opening near ZZZ4 and circled down for a visual approach into Runway XXL at ZZZ. The vast majority of the ice which had accumulated on the aircraft came off in the decent due to higher airspeeds and increasing temperatures. I landed without further incident; parked the aircraft; and immediately took down notes regarding the order of events while they were still fresh in my mind. I then called the Chief Pilot to relay what happened."

Single air taxi pilot in IMC and icing conditions reported an alternator failure.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 17C

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

I was the pilot monitoring on this flight as the first officer (FO) was flying. On the SEEVR2 arrival Fort Worth center gave us a clearance to descend via the arrival with no speed restriction until BRDJE. I asked the FO what he wanted to do. I didn't get a clear response and I said we could delete the speeds on the FMC by typing '/' and the altitude crossing restrictions. He did this; however in verifying the crossings we both missed that he put the THEMM restriction on SEEVR. During this time the relief pilot was busy putting entries in the log book and didn't witness it. It wasn't until reaching SEEVR that we saw that we were too high. At this time center handed us off to approach control; who then told us to expedite to 6;000. Nothing was said other than this. We were able to get down and make a normal approach to 17C. Of course that is not to say we weren't wrong. I am not sure why I suggested deleting the speed restrictions in the FMC and not using speed intervene; especially considering the number of crossing restrictions on the arrival. I will never touch crossing restrictions in the FMC in the future and will always use speed intervention when the speed restrictions are lifted.

B777 Captain reports being cleared to descend via the SEEVR2 Arrival and delete the speeds until BRDJE. The speeds are deleted in the FMC legs page; but the crossing restriction for THEMM is inadvertently placed on SEEVR.


Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

We had deadheaded outbound; [and] then we were to fly the leg back; switching positions with the crew that flew us out. Our deadhead departed at 2015 local and the return departed at 0100 local time. The Captain was the pilot flying and preferred to fly manually; engaging the autopilot only during the cruise portion. Normal SOP calls for the use of VNAV during the takeoff and departure phase; but the Captain preferred FLCH. Standard callouts were somewhat confusing due to the variance from SOP and the fact that it was late at night. The same procedures were used--with the Captain preferring to use FLCH without the autopilot--during the approach. Even though we had only flown one leg; our fatigue level was higher than normal due to the time. The approach was done manually to the final configuration with flaps 25 instead of 30. The problem occurred in the final flap selection. We both called flaps 25 and closed that portion of the checklist but; in fact; flaps 25 had not been selected; only flaps 20. The GPWS [configuration warning] went off alerting us to the fact that flaps 25 had not been selected. My first instinct was to select flaps 25 and that is what I did. The GPWS alert went away. However; the Captain elected to do a go-around. A decision I supported. We went around and successfully landed the aircraft.I believe; given the time of the landing; this is an example were more automation should have been used. It is not a case of overreliance on automation. The autopilot should have been used until a point was the glideslope had been intercepted. It was close to work overload to have the non flying pilot running checklists; selecting different flight director modes; setting altitudes and choosing all airspeeds to comply with flap settings and configuration changes. Reaching across the cockpit to set airspeeds on final approach may not have been the best course of action; given the time of day this flight occurred.

At about 400 FT AGL on final to Runway 30 in perfect VMC weather and choppy air; [we received] a sound warning and EICAS message--paraphrasing--'FLAPS NOT IN LANDING CONFIGURATION.' An uneventful go-around was immediately executed and another approach; uneventful; again with flaps 25; was completed to a full stop. The flap handle appeared to not have been in the FLAPS 25 detent as planned; and briefed and executed by about 1;300 FT AGL. The approach was easy; not rushed; no traffic in front or behind and perfectly stabilized. The choppy air; for whatever reason may have resulted in the First Officer not fully deploying the flaps to the 25 detent; and upon completing the Before Landing Checklist; again; chop; darkness; parallax may have resulted in myself not realizing that the flaps were not fully on the 25 degree mark.Our procedures are excellent; just need to check; check and really check!

At the end of an all night turnaround the flight crew of a B757-200 executed a go-around when they received a flap configuration warning at approximately 400 AGL on final. The reporters disagreed as to whether the conduct of the approach was optimum from a CRM/SOP perspective.


Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

While taxiing to Runway 34R in Seattle we came very close to being taxied into by a Dash 8. We were just past intersection N on Taxiway B when I saw the [other] aircraft start to taxi toward us from Taxiway W. We didn't hear the Ground Controller give instructions for the [other] aircraft to follow us or for us to follow them to the runway. My FO was going through his briefing as he was to be the pilot flying; while I [was] following along while taxiing. I happen to catch the Dash out of the corner of my eye to our left. They were moving from their position on Taxiway W and I figured they were just getting moving in order to slip in behind us on Taxiway B and would follow us. Then I realized they were not aware of us as they were moving toward us now at rapid closure at an angle that I figured if I were to stop; they would have hit us. It was happening so fast at this point I didn't have a chance to say anything to [the other aircraft] or Seattle Ground Control. All I could think of was to get into a position where the [other] crew would see us; which they fortunately did; and stop. As I mentioned; from the angle and speed they were approaching us I figured if I were to stop; they would have hit us as it appeared the FO in the [other] plane was not looking to their right and I'm not sure were the Captain of the [other] plane was looking. The [other] crew mentioned to the Seattle Ground controller that it would have been nice to have been given a 'heads-up' regarding us as it was a very close call.I think if the [other] crew had been looking to see where they were going they would have seen us. If I had not assumed they were going to follow us; I would have stopped and found out for sure before continuing to taxi. I don't want to point fingers; but it seemed apparent the [other] crew was not looking to their right as they approached the active taxiway. I'm not sure if Seattle Ground told them to follow us or what. We don't recall hearing either way.

I looked up and could see a [Dash 8] taxiing out of the ramp; towards us at an angle. He didn't seem to see us; and was getting uncomfortably close. I said something to the effect of 'We better stop!'; but the Captain (who had a better view of the situation from the left seat) decided to continue so as to get into the [other] pilot's field of view. In hindsight; I believe that this was the right course of action. They did finally see us and stopped. Our wingtip must have missed their aircraft by only a few feet.

B737-900 flight crew reported a near-collision with a Dash 8 while taxiing.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 181; Flight Crew Total 6307; Flight Crew Type 10

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Ground Incursion Runway

While training a student in the pattern at F45; a Cessna 172 taxied across our runway while we were executing a touch and go. I noticed the aircraft as the student was setting takeoff power at approximately 35 KTS. I yelled stop over CTAF with no response. I didn't have time to be more specific. The C-172 was taxiing west along Taxiway K paralleling Runway 8R/26L and we had heard no prior radio call. I was executing a touch and go on Runway 13. Winds were reported at 120/7 on AWOS. I was the only other airplane operating in the pattern at the time. A helicopter was also doing air work in the area; two other airplanes had recently landed on Runway 13. My student had made all of the appropriate radio calls; including a final call about one mile final. I did de-brief that the landing light was not on for the landing. At the time the aircraft crossed in front we were at a speed that a continued takeoff would have used less runway than an abort. The aircraft were not at risk of a collision as the crossing aircraft was moving at about 10-15 KTS and was about 1;500 FT down the runway. We rotated prior to Taxiway J. I believe the C-172 was taxiing to Runway 8R; but then later on taxied to Runway 13 as multiple airplanes were arriving into the pattern for Runway 13.I believe that F45 is in need of a Tower. It is one of the busiest uncontrolled airports in Florida. The runway layout and weight restrictions they have make it so airplanes are required to use intersecting runways regardless of the wind. There are frequent near-misses and various aircraft using non-standard traffic patterns. This all added in with the high volume of training is making F45 a very dangerous place.

A flight instructor training a student on touch and go landings on Runway 13 at F45 was alarmed when a C-172 crossed their runway westbound on Taxiway K as the student was applying takeoff power. The reporter cited this event as common at the non-towered airport and a demonstration of the need for an Air Traffic Control Tower to be opened.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 203; Flight Crew Type 185

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Taxing after landing. During after landing taxi; while attempting to turn right on to a taxiway a wind gust lifted my right wing and caused the plane to plant its left wing tip on the ground and make a 180 degree turn damaging the left wing and the propeller. Winds were reported as 190 at 22 gusting 32. Every attempt was made to taxi with proper aileron correction and to maintain speed at or below a brisk walk. I immediately turned off the engine and requested assistance from them ground controller. Airport personnel and fire department officials assisted in holding the wings down and walk it into the FBO.

Light Sport Aircraft pilot reported that a gust of wind during taxi resulted in a loss of control and damage to the aircraft.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 500

For such a nice daytime airport Johnson County Executive - OLATHE; KS OJC has terrible airport markings and signage for night operations. Surface markings need reflectant added to striping. It would be great if modern ICAO/FAA compliant hold bar signage and surface red rectangles could be added. It is very difficult to be sure where the taxiway exits from the runway are located. How about using some Airport Trust Fund Money to improve the signage; lighting and hold bar markings at OJC?  How about some improved high contrast taxiway markings?  How about some runway lead off lighting and runway centerline lighting?? How about some yellow lighted taxiway markers?  Surely in the wealthiest county in Kansas the county government can provide first class aviation facilities - Even if you operate [at OJC] frequently it is very easy to mistake a grass infield area for a taxiway with the way that the taxiway lighting is arranged - especially on the south end of the runway. This is not a up-to-date state of the art marked airport. Could use some big improvements that would add dramatically to the usefulness and safety of night operations.

C172 Instructor believes that signage; markings and lighting at OJC are not up to current standards.


Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Workload

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure

During route verification; neither I nor the FO noticed the change in departure from SNOBL3 to YOTES3. Tower cleared us for takeoff and to maintain sight of [Company] who was still rolling down the runway. At GOALY; where the SNOBL3 and YOTES3 diverge; we were given direct to MRBIL; which we said was not on our flight plan. Got a heading from Departure as we figured out how to get back on the correct departure. Everything normal after that. ATC did not tell us of any conflicts with other aircraft. Our ground track should have been close to our cleared ground track as we notice the discrepancy at GOALY.First flight ever with ZZZ based flight attendants which put me in an unfamiliar environment. Also; had a [Company2] aircraft which has numerous differences from the [Company1] aircraft. Had several maintenance and customer service issues to deal with that caused numerous distractions to my cockpit preparation. These pressures made me rush some items to free up time to deal with the other non-routine items.Just need to slow down and try to limit distractions; but with merger and constantly changing procedures within the company and the ATC environment; everything needs attention which makes it hard to focus on one item at a time. Also; why are so many arrivals and departures being published with so many restrictions? It seems every airport is building their own special procedures; which takes additional time away from our normal procedures as we try to find any restrictions for a particular airport. I know that I spent a lot of time reviewing the departure as it had an altitude restriction; unfortunately it was the wrong departure.

Captain loaded the box and I watched him verifying the fixes by scrolling through fixes. We never cross-verified the departure off of the PDC paper that was lying right in front of the thrust lever quadrant the whole time; in plain view.

Air carrier flight crew attributed departure on wrong SID to distractions caused by maintenance issues; customer service issues; new company procedures and aircraft differences.


During my preflight inspection; while setting the landing altitude in the pressurization panel; I set what I thought was 20 feet for landing. I noticed something looked odd; but couldn't really identify what was out of place. As far as I knew; there are only 4 available digits; so I set 0020.After leveling off and cruising at FL370 for 11 minutes we got a cabin pressure warning. After donning the O2 mask; we started to diagnose the problem. The cabin altitude was steady at 10;000. Shortly after that it finally dawned on me what had previously looked odd about the landing altitude selector. There are not 4 digits; but rather 5 on the selector. The first rotating digit is significantly wider than the following 4 (about 1 inch wide vs an 1/8 of an inch). I had assumed it was stationary; but it's not. When I started the preflight the 10;000 digit was already displayed. So as I rotated the elevation down; I unknowingly stopped at 10;020 feet instead of 0020 feet.Needless to say the pressurization panel worked as advertised. We set 0020 and the pressurization returned to normal. As a precaution we requested clearance to descend to FL330 while the pressurization stabilized. After coordination with Dispatch and Maintenance; we returned to FL370 and continued to destination.My failure to originally trap the error during the preflight cannot be overstated. I take full responsibility for the error and it certainly is a lesson learned. My only questions and concerns for future crews is; why was the controller set above 10;000 feet in the first place? There's no operational reason to do so; since the highest fleet wide landing limitation is 9;500 feet. Is there some maintenance check that requires it? If not; why is there even a 10;000 digit; if it can't be used? Lastly; since there obviously is a 10;000 digit; why is it not consistently labeled as the following digits? The 10;000 digit is either blank or 1. In other words; to set 20 feet you currently set (blank;0;0;2;0). If it were consistent; you would set (0;0;0;2;0).Bottom line; lesson learned; won't happen again.

B757 First Officer reported incorrectly setting the landing altitude in the pressurization panel; resulting in a cabin pressure warning which was rectified after the correct landing altitude was entered.


Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 6

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft X was a departure off of APA who I got on a 320 heading climbing to FL120. I then got another aircraft who departed APA also on a 320 climbing to FL120 (Aircraft Y). I climbed Aircraft Y to FL230 and was climbing through an arrival descending into DEN. I was watching his climb rate to ensure separation there; and sent Aircraft X direct to Baylor thinking I had already climbed him to FL230. As I was watching Aircraft Y climb; Aircraft X asked for higher. I saw he was level at FL120 and issued a climb to FL230 and a turn to 320 [heading] to avoid the 13;500 MVA.He didn't do either of those things quickly; so I issued a turn to 330 [heading] and then further right to 350 [heading]. Aircraft X entered the 13;500 MVA approximately 3/4 of a mile climbing out of FL132 before exiting into lower MVA again. I didn't issue a safety alert because I didn't feel that he was in unsafe proximity to the terrain and was doing all the maneuvers he could do to climb as per the situation. I feel like a complete idiot letting this happen with just two aircraft on frequency. Don't get complacent!

D01 TRACON reported an aircraft not following directions and entering a lower Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA) for a short while.


Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Event occurred on SHEAD RNAV Departure from Runway 25R at LAS. We had selected LNAV before takeoff roll and 7;000 FT selected in altitude window. Clearance limit was FL190 with all the depicted altitude restrictions. Just leaving ROPPR at 7;000 FT (Altitude Hold); Departure told us to delete the ROPPR restriction (we'd already met) and the MDDOG restriction at 9;000 FT. We deleted the MDDOG altitude on the CDU and selected FL190 in the altitude window. We then selected VNAV and VNAV speed was on the scoreboard. The next fix; TARRK; was a magenta BOLD 11;000 FT. Neither one of us caught the aircraft climb through until about 11.4K; at which time ATC asked why we weren't complying with the TAARK restriction. We descended from approximately 11.6K to 11;000 FT. Both of us didn't understand why the aircraft did not level at 11;000 FT. Again; you can't monitor enough in dynamic flight. We could have selected 11K in the altitude window; but we felt we made no system errors. [Should have had] more intensive monitoring of NAV and autopilot systems during dynamic flight by both crew members.

Do not trust the autopilot to level off as commanded. Be careful to only put the most next restrictive altitude in the MCP.

A B737-700 autopilot failed to capture the SNEAD 7 11;000 FT TARRK constraint event though it was in the FMS with FL190 in the MCP.


Indicating and Warning - Flight & Navigation Systems

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

We were cleared for takeoff. We ran the Before Takeoff Checklist and taxied into position for takeoff. As I advanced the thrust levers to takeoff thrust; we got the aural warning 'TAKEOFF BRAKE' and the associated EICAS warning message. I aborted the takeoff at very low speed; contacted the Tower Controller and advised them of the abort. We taxied off of the Runway at B4; made the turn onto B; stopped the airplane on B and ran the Aborted Takeoff Checklist. After we had finished the checklist(s); we verified that the brake had indeed been released and that there was no indication of the brake being on. We also noted that we had pressed the TAKEOFF CONFIGURATION button just prior to takeoff; and that we had heard the 'TAKEOFF OK' aural message. The Captain then called Maintenance. The Captain filled out the logbook; and reset the brake system in accordance with Maintenance guidance. Once we had complied with maintenance procedures; Maintenance cleared the airplane and we got ready for another takeoff. We re-ran the Taxi Checklist and the Before Takeoff Checklist. We then completed a successful takeoff and proceeded to destination. There was no indication of the brake system being engaged prior to thrust lever advancement. I think we responded appropriately and effectively to the situation.

EMB145 First Officer reports a takeoff warning when power is advanced for takeoff and the takeoff is immediately rejected. The Takeoff Configuration Test button had been pushed prior to taking the runway with Takeoff OK enunciated. Nothing can be found out of position and the second attempt is successful.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Airspace Structure; Weather; Procedure; Human Factors

The airspace was very complex.  It was a 10 out 10 on complexity and the military took all the airspace that was touching the sector all up to FL430.  Also; the Pine South Altitude Reservation (ALTRV) was active from FL190-FL220 and the Palatca MOA's were active SFC-FL230 and the Finns ALTRV was active FL190-FL220 and Sealord was not taking any pointouts through the ALTRV or the adjacent Special Use Airspace (SUA).  Also; there was numerous weather deviations and departures from MCO were needing to fly at least 5-8 east of the normal routing and other departures did the same to avoid the weather.This created more difficulty to get all arrivals down below the ALTRV.  This particular scenario had Aircraft X landing MLB from over CRG and the northwest.  Aircraft X came over at FL320 and Greencove sector could not get him any lower because of northbound traffic at FL310.  Had that traffic not been there we could have got lower and started him down sooner to help with getting under the ALTRV and around Aircraft Y. Aircraft Y needed to stay east of precipitation near CRG.  As soon as Aircraft X passed the northbound traffic at FL310 I descended him to FL280 and that was the lowest I could go because of another deviating aircraft that departed.  So As soon as Aircraft X cleared that traffic if you measure the distance from passing that traffic to where he needed to be under the ALTRV it was 15;000 feet and 40 miles and Aircraft X was doing 8 miles a minute groundspeed. This requires a 3;000 fpm descent and that's without any traffic in the way.  That descent rate is steep and some aircraft are not able to maintain proper safety margins doing it.  Also; aggressive vectoring is not available because of the warning areas active.  So a very precise vector is needed.  After measuring distances during Falcon review Aircraft X could have been vectored a maximum of 5 miles east of his course in order to maintain 6-7 miles separation from Aircraft Y and to maintain 3-4 miles from the SUA.  So as you can see this scenario is very difficult I gave a 10 degree vector to Aircraft X and descended him to FL240 to avoid Aircraft Y who was at FL230 and maintained vertical separation.  I put the hoop on Aircraft Y because the general rule of thumb is to put the halo on the aircraft you are missing.  However since the aircraft were on more of an opposite direction course the hoop needed to be on Aircraft X instead because of the angle.  However; this created a miscalculation for me appeared to be able to maintain the standard separation of 5 miles.  I descended Aircraft X to 15;000 feet and then some time after the conflict alert went off.  It appeared there was more than 5 miles because of the halo placed on Aircraft Y but I went ahead and vectored Aircraft X another 10 degrees left and expedited him through FL220.  Both aircraft were about 4.8 miles and 600 feet after review of falcon with the supervisor. The situation was always in control just very difficult and misleading information; there was no TCA events.  Once Aircraft X was clear of Aircraft Y; I cleared him back to LAMMA and had to expedite him under the ALTRV.  Aircraft X cleared the ALTRV and was shipped to Orlando Approach at the appropriate time.1.  Whenever the South ALTRV is activated by the Military a restriction should be put on MLB landers from the Northwest over CRG to be FL280 or below.  This would facilitate in having enough time to get the airplane lower under the ALTRV and if there is other traffic in the way. 2.  Also; whenever the South ALTRV is activated all MLB arrivals should be put over MILIE intersection into the states sector for sequencing with MCO arrivals would be the best traffic management initiative.3. Turn Aircraft X 20 degrees left instead of only 10 degrees and try to point out the aircraft to Sealord Control near the warning areas.

A Jacksonville Center (ZJX) Controller describes an airborne conflict caused by not being able to vector traffic due to weather and an Altitude Reservation (ALTRV) in close proximity to both aircraft's flight path.


Mooney Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 16; Flight Crew Total 39; Flight Crew Type 39

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Student Pilot on Final Approach was on approach ATC informed Mooney if they had me in sight. Mooney answer he did not; until I was over the numbers in a stable configuration to land. Mooney acknowledges he has visual on me; as I am about to flare to touch wheels down ATC calls in to Go around if able. Thinking the faster more powerful Mooney is barreling down behind me; I acknowledged the Go Around. As I am climbing out; I noticed a shadow beside mine very close and realized the Mooney was also climbing beside me. ATC advised me to steer right and money to steer left I called in on the climb to ATC to advice what turn to make and was advised to make a right downwind after entering traffic pattern right. I also overheard ATC instruct Mooney to enter Left Down wind. As I made my right crosswind turn; I observed Mooney also turning right and about to face my general direction so I called back into tower and advised I will be making a left turn instead. Now facing the southeast; ATC called in to ask if I were flying South East and Why; Advised ATC that I was Avoiding traffic from MOONEY to maintain separation. ATC advised to go to left downwind after instruction the Mooney to do the same again but this time cross-field and was given the instruction to land on Runway 31 and hold short of runway 27. I continued to identify to ATC that I am a student Pilot on a solo but was confident I could pull the crosswind landing and hold short as the distance to 27 was at the top of my cleared runway assignment. I felt; as a student Pilot; ATC should have instructed the Mooney to go around or do a 360 on approach to same given runway to gain more separation.

C172 student pilot reported a near midair collision with a Mooney while on final approach and go-around.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The Company's refusal to cater the aircraft with crew meals; or provide a mechanism for Pilots to easily obtain food on international 'turn' pairings is a huge safety issue. The duty days on these pairings are long to start with; and with delays; can easily result in a duty day of 12 hours or more with the pilots having no easy access to food.  This is a problem in two ways.  First; because the Company has made no easy access to food possible; Crew Members spend the time in between flights jumping through all the customs hoops; etc. to get food.  This; combined with the natural time pressure of airline ops; presents a distraction from properly preparing for the flight.  Secondly; if a Crew Member decides to not go through the hassle of the customs process; he may go hours on end without eating resulting in a situation where he is actually unfit for duty without realizing it. Low blood sugar is an insidious problem; much like fatigue.  The Company's answer to the problem is for the pilots to always pack their own food before the trip.  This is simply not possible in many cases due to the realities of airline operations.  Secondly; the Company provides no cold storage to safely store the food.  This can lead to airborne food poisoning of pilots.Company must arrange for industry standard practice of ensuring suitable; nutritious food is provisioned on the aircraft and stored safely so as to prevent food-borne illness.

Air carrier pilot stated he felt his company's refusal to board crew meals on international turn flights poses a safety risk.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

I had just opened Local East 1 at the start of the day shift. I was briefed on closures which included taxiways M3; M4; M5; EL between RWY 17R and RWY 17C and M between M3 and M5. I cleared Aircraft X to land on Runway 17C and advised him of the taxiway closures and asked that he plan to exit at M6. I then cleared Aircraft Y to land and advised them to plan the same exit. On landing; Aircraft X advised that M6 was coned off and not usable. I sent Aircraft Y around ; but noticing that they may have touched down and seeing that enough of Aircraft X appeared to be on the un-coned portion of M6; advised Aircraft Y to disregard. Aircraft Y did go around. DFW Airport Authority said that M6 was closed and they just forgot to tell us.

DFW Tower Controller reported a runway incursion with two arrivals on the same runway.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 1440

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I took off [and] departure was without incident and all instruments were in the green. At 400 ft. I pulled the prop lever to 2500 rpm; proceeded to turn on course and called Departure for IFR clearance. I received clearance via radar vectors. I did my cruise climb out at 120-125 kts. and performed checklist. Everything was running normally. At 5;000 ft. I switched the fuel pump to low.While I was climbing through 8;000 ft.; I noticed that the aircraft began moving back and forth. Trying to ascertain what was going on; I looked at the Engine Analyzer I noticed that cylinder 5 and 6 were running in the red and that the oil temperature was in the red as well. I concluded that I needed to figure out a way to cool the engine and confirmed that cowl flaps were open. I turned on the fuel pump on high because I noticed the fuel flow was now between 20-21gph and it needed to be 35gph in the climb. I also decided to not continue and find the nearest airport. I checked on the GPS and saw the nearest airport 5+ miles south from me. I contacted Departure informing them that I need to divert due to a hot engine. I was instructed to descend to 3;000 ft. and expect vectors. I proceeded to make a steep descent to aid in the cooling of the engine and pulled the power to 20inches [and] the propeller to 2000 rpm to ease off on the performance a bit while descending.Departure asked me if I needed assistance and I told them that I did not need any at the time. I was cleared left turn direct to [diversion airport]. I notified [ATC] when I had the field in sight and was cleared for the visual for. I set up the RNAV as a backup to the visual. For the approach I brought the props back to full forward and the throttle at 17'-18'. The temperatures had dropped during the descent and remained normal during the approach. I landed without incident and taxied to the ramp where I kept the engine running. I called the owner to inform him of what had taken place. He asked if possible and if comfortable if I could bring the airplane back to [home base]. I told him that I could try as I saw that the temperatures had gone back to normal and that I would do a run up before take off and make sure that everything was performing normally. Cylinder 5 and 6 indication was back to normal. I was at GPH for 15 min and taxied back and did a run up. Everything read normally; nothing was overheating and departed VFR. [Distance enroute] is about 20 miles and the plan was to go at 2500 feet to stay below the Bravo. I departed from on Rwy 18 and there were no issues during the take-off roll nor were there any issues in the initial climb out. When I got about 4 miles out I noticed that the temperature of cylinder 4 began to rise not as high as cylinder 5-6 earlier however it was significantly above all the other cylinders including cylinder 5-6 at the time. I was approximately at 1200-1300 ft. I continue to climb and reached approximately 1700-1800 feet however the moving back and forth of the airplane from earlier started up again [and] the aircraft began to behave sluggishly. I began to look for a place to land at which point the airplane began to shake and I was unable to hold altitude. I was descending 300fpm. My initial thought was to land in the fields however due to the rains and the possibility of high corn stalks I surveyed the light poles and powerline poles and thought from the position I was in that the next best option I saw was to land on [a highway]. As I came in on a right base to the road the engine gave out; I was at about 90 kts. and dropped the gear. I tried to line up with the road as much as I could however ended up coming in at maybe a 10-20 degree angle. Due to low airspeed as well as how fast things were unfolding I did not want to get into a stall situation by banking more so my concern at that point was to get the aircraft on the ground as straight and level as possible. As soon as the plane touch the road; I lost directional controlof the aircraft as it skidded into grass area on the side of the road. On the ground I turned masters; mixture; tanks and exited the aircraft.

Pilot reported executing a forced landing on a highway after experiencing power loss associated with high cylinder head temperatures.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

The First Officer was the Pilot Flying. We were on vectors to Runway 18 Left. The Autopilot was on. When Flaps 20 was selected the Aircraft rolled to the right. The FO (First Officer) verbalized I am disconnecting the Autopilot to see what we have. He then made sure the Rudder trim was centered; The Aileron Trim was centered. Thrust was symmetrical flaps were symmetrical no lites. Yaw dampeners no lites Spoilers were stowed. The only thing was we could not arm the Autobrakes. There was no effect on the amount of Aileron control wheel displacement required to maintain level flight. When Flaps 25 - Then Flaps 30 were selected the roll increased to the right. The control wheel was displaced 4 - 6 units to the left on final approach to landing. The FO had to hand fly the approach. The winds were from the right at about 17 kts. The FO was a very skilled pilot; due to his extensive Air Force background and his commercial experience I had him remain the Pilot Flying. We landed without incident. We taxied to the gate. We were met by Maintenance. We had some rups in the AML for the cabin. The FO Said that we should put this uncommanded roll in the AML in the interest of safety. Maintenance also stated that due to the history with this same issue put it in the AML. I then put the write up in the AML and released the aircraft to Maintenance. Maintenance stated [aircraft] is an old bird but we can fix it. I usually do not submit a [report] for a AML entry but I was contacted by Safety and asked if I was submitting a [report] for Aircraft X. I asked Why? Safety stated that since I wrote up Aircraft Y In ZZZ and in ZZZZ that took the Aircraft out of service for quite some time. [Safety] stated that this write up in the AML for Aircraft X went right up to the Flight Department and that they feel that I am Just writing up aircraft. This is very disheartening to me; I have been a Captain since 1985 with the Airline. In the interest of safety for all concerned this needed to be put in the AML.

Captain reported after writing up an aircraft maintenance log entry for an uncommanded  roll on approach; he was questioned by the company about just writing up aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 193; Flight Crew Total 3421; Flight Crew Type 2877

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 221; Flight Crew Total 6330; Flight Crew Type 3528

Downloaded paperwork for flight. Flight was routine till approach and descent into ZZZ. Enroute; I reviewed the mountain flying guide and 10-7 pages for approach to Runway XX. A note in the flight plan - Dispatcher remarks - was also reviewed: Runway XY not authorized for Airbus aircraft at night. We planned and briefed night visual backed up by the ILS Runway XX with a long straight in final. Talking to Approach; descending through 13;700; [Approach] asked if we had airport in sight. We did and they cleared us for the visual to Runway XX. Abeam/over [the] airport; [we were] told to contact Tower. Tower offered a right downwind to Runway XY [but] we declined because of the note from Dispatch stating [that] landing on XY [was] not authorized at night. We had good visibility and could see the outlines of the mountains from the full moon through the thin overcast. Captain continued to fly up the valley and proceeded to do a left 180 degree turn at approximately 10 DME from airport with ground contact and visual reference to the airport. I monitored the PFD (Primary Flight Display) and terrain clearances during the turn and we were above all terrain; green on PFD during the course reversal. We configured early and proceeded with an uneventful landing.Once on ground we debriefed the arrival and both agreed that we should have taken vectors to final or just requested the ILS to Runway XX. We both assumed that Approach would have provided assistance; vectors to final; per the 10-7 pages. I know we have the final say and should have just done a go around toward the airport and contacted Approach for a vectored ILS approach.

We had planned and briefed a night visual/ILS into Runway XX. Our plan was a long straight-in approach over either fix ZZZZZ; 25 NM; or ZZZZZ1; 17.5 NM. About 3 NM south of ZZZ; we had been descended from 15;000 ft. We leveled off at 11;000 ft.; near the grid MORAs of 10.6 to north; 10.8 to south; and 9.2 to west; descending through the thin ceiling around 13;800 ft. Approach Control asked if we had the airport in sight; which we did. They then cleared us for a visual approach to Runway XX and to switch Tower frequency. The visibility was exceptional and we continued northwest up the valley towards ZZZZZ1. [The] altitude recommended at ZZZZZ1 is NLT (No Later Than) 8;600 ft. with a continuous 3 degree glideslope to the runway from there. We descended to 8;600 ft. Using ground references we did a 180 degree U-turn/teardrop and proceeded to an uneventful landing. Initial turn had us too high so a return to the northwest and second U-turn/teardrop put us on an acceptable profile.In retrospect; the maneuvering of the aircraft in that fairly tight valley; at night; even knowing the floor was 3;600 ft. plus or minus; and keeping good situational awareness of the nearby higher terrain; was unwise. We should have maintained as briefed/planned and asked ATC for vectors to either ZZZZZ; ZZZZZ1 or to a point to intercept the straight-in ILS XX.The 10-7 pages recommend this 'vector to a straight-in approach.' We both; the FO (First Officer) and I; assumed that Approach was going to provide that assistance; which the 10-7C page states is normally provided. The 10-7 pages also state that maneuvering space is tight; which we verified; but there is some room; providing airspeed is kept low; altitude is kept reasonably high; [and] awareness is kept extremely high. The 10-7 pages get confusing and seem ambiguous or contradictory at times. The 10-7D illustrates a visual approach into Runway XX; not to be used at night; maneuvering the aircraft in the valley northwest of the airport; when the 10-7 states that all maneuvering must be done south-southwest of the runways?Our flight plan added to the confusion; [stating]; 'Runway XY not authorized with Airbus aircraft at night.' Yet the 10-7A page illustrates options for Runway XY VMC landings. Runway XY was in sight with plenty of time for us to maneuver south-southwest of the runways and land Runway XY with favorable winds.I believe at ZZZ1; it states [that] for Runway XZ; visual approaches at night are prohibited for Airbus aircraft. ILS only. A similar note for ZZZ would alleviate much of the confusion. The ZZZ 10-7 pages can be misinterpreted; especially when our Dispatcher; whose data should be more current than those 10-7 pages; records no visual approach to Runway XY at night. Uneventful approach and landing; but a good lesson relearned about not allowing ATC to paint us into a corner.

A319 flight crew reported confusing airport charts and lack of ATC assistance on approach.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

RUD TRIM 1 Failure inflight. Felt several uncommon yaw inputs followed by a right rudder trim input of 3.5 that held the aircraft in a slip at FL340. [Advised ATC] and we diverted from the intended destination to ZZZ for the longer runway.Maintenance kept signing off all the tale tell signs that this was happening. It appears ours was more severe and the only one where the aircraft was held in a yaw.

A321 Captain reported experiencing a rudder trim failure in flight requiring a divert to a suitable airport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

After noticing on the smart load the bags were moved from pit 3 to pit 4; I also noticed the flight was not showing returned to the block. So I called the Operations Agent to verify that the aircraft was returned to block and she confirmed it was not; stating that the Ramp was out in the alley - taxiway - moving the bags. This is in my opinion a safety concern - approaching the aircraft with ground equipment; other than push tractor; outside the gate envelope; is unsafe for a numbers of reasons: engine shut down; wheels chocked; fire extinguishers; traffic; etc.

Air carrier Ground Personnel reported safety concerns regarding location of ground equipment outside gate area.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 45

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 24000; Flight Crew Type 600

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

Prior to coast out at FL370 I received a call from the Lead Flight Attendant. She advised that they had a smoky smell in the aft galley. She stated she thought a plastic lid was left in a galley oven. She would keep us advised. Approximately 5 minutes later she called the cockpit and asked to pull the galley oven circuit breakers so they could spray the halon. The Captain asked if there were flames and was told yes. The Relief Pilot was woken and dispatched to the galley. Diversion was planned. Relief Pilot reported dense smoke and the use of 2 halon bottles to suppress the fire. Diversion was executed and safe landing made. Firefighters entered aircraft and determined fire to be extinguished and confined to inside oven. No evacuation performed.

We received notice from the Purser that we had smoke in the rear galley. This situation escalated into a full blown oven fire which necessitated use of the PBA and halon fire extinguisher. A flight attendant put out the fire; but smoke was severe and we had one passenger and two crewmembers suffering from smoke inhalation. We decided to divert to the nearest suitable airport. We received clearance [for our divert]. All pertinent checklists were completed prior to landing and we landed the aircraft 5;800 LBS overweight. We decided it was more important to make a timely landing than waste time dumping fuel. We kept the speed up during descent exceeding 250 KTS below 10;000 FT and received permission from ATC to do so. I would have exercised my Captain's emergency authority to do so anyway. We requested emergency personnel to escort the plane to the gate area and did not need to perform an evacuation. The flight attendants did a very good job of fighting the fire. The two first officers also performed admirably during this incident.

B777 flight crew is informed by the Purser of an oven fire in the aft galley. A great deal of smoke is generated and two halon fire bottles are used to extinguish the flames. Flight diverts to the nearest suitable airport.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Really cold rainy and busy; heavy night and a bit tired. My B737-700 aircraft had a scheduled Maintenance Overnight Check [with] an in the [Log] book write up: 'Left Engine Oil Bypass Light illuminated prior to landing.' I checked circuit breakers (c/b) and opened the engine. Checked oil clogging Indicators; non-popped; checked oil filter bypass switch and drains clogging; transmitter electrical connectors; oil pressure sensor and Cannon plugs. I proceeded to call fellow Mechanic Y to assist me in removing the scavenge oil filter bowl; but we were unable to remove the filter bowl; so I then told Mechanic Y to proceed to run the engine and monitor the Indications in the flight deck while I visually Inspected the engine during the run for several minutes. Having found no abnormalities and no Indications of a problem and no oil bypass light came on. I then called my Supervisor and told him everything we had done and that we could not duplicate the problem and that everything checked out good; but that we were unable to remove the scavenge filter bowl and that it might break during the removal so if he could call Maintenance Control and let them know the situation and what our next step would be. Minutes later in the presence of Mechanic Y; our Supervisor told us that Maintenance Controller X; had checked history and had found none and that after all we had done and if we could not duplicate the problem; to go ahead and return Aircraft to schedule service and that I could reference his name in the Sign-off. So my Sign-off was as follows 'Ran Engine per MM for several minutes; could not duplicate; Aircraft Released to Service per Maintenance Controller X.' The next day I arrived to work; unbeknown to me; I looked at the work board for the night and saw that Aircraft X had had an air return and that it now required and engine change so seeing all this I decided to write a report. I believe that I tried to do everything I could and even got assistance from a fellow Mechanic; informed my Supervisor and Maintenance Control. I should have removed the filter bowl at all cost; even if it meant delaying the aircraft; safety always comes first. I honestly regret not doing this; a lot of safety issues; time; money; manpower and heartache could have been avoided.

A Line Mechanic describes his efforts to determine the cause of a Left Engine Oil By-pass Light that illuminated on a B737-700 aircraft prior to landing. Aircraft was released the following day; but required an air turnback; resulting in an engine change.


Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Filed flight plan was to LCK. Upon contact with Columbus approach initial vectors appeared to be for LCK; however; I thought I heard to expect the visual to runway 28R (there is no 28R at LCK). My First Officer (FO) said he heard 23R (which is appropriate for LCK); and I did not question it again. Then on right downwind to what we thought was LCK we were being kept very high in relation to LCK and I quickly realized we were being vectored to runway 28R at Columbus Intl. (CMH). We told approach that it appeared we were being vectored to the wrong airport; and that we were going to Rickenbacker. They asked us if we wanted to change our destination and we said we needed vectors to Rickenbacker. We were then given an immediate heading for a right base to 23R; and an immediate descent to 3;000 feet. I immediately command 'gear down' because I saw what was coming. The vector took us through final; but we had the field visually and were ultimately cleared for the visual approach to LCK 23R. We were stable at 500 feet and no further problems ensued. During our debrief we tried to understand why Columbus approach thought we were cleared to CMH vice LCK. What hit us was that earlier in the flight we changed our route with Indy Center in order to deviate for weather. We were cleared to Cincinnati and then Columbus. We did not realize center meant Columbus Intl and we didn't even think to question the clearance. Later we were cleared to the airport after the weather deviation- again; we didn't know he meant Columbus and LCK was on a direct line to CMH so it was never questioned. Apparently; during our reroute Indy somehow thought we were changing our destination although we never specifically stated those words.We should have questioned the initial runway assignment upon check in with Columbus approach. Also; when cleared to the 'Columbus Airport' by Indy center we should have verified they meant 'Rickenbacker'..Confirmation of all clearances and complete use of standard phraseology.

Attempting to avoid weather enroute; we requested a reroute to Columbus. Clearance was received and given the GAILL2 arrival. After deviating again for weather; we received vectors to final. Controller was busy and we were told to expect '28R' however I read back '23R'. There was weather to the east of our destination; so being vectored to the west seemed logical. Once reaching 6;000 feet abeam the field we verified the controller was vectoring us to 23R at LCK. We were asked if we wanted to changed our destination. We stated we wanted to land at LCK and was given a right turn and cleared for the visual 23R.Miscommunication. Requested a reroute to Columbus and received it. During the reroute our destination was changed in the ATC computer to Port Columbus.Re-state airport specifically when doing a re-route when there is more than 1 airport in the same city.

Flight crew received a new clearance enroute to avoid weather. During vectors to final approach they realized that the vectors were for the wrong airport. Destination airport was apparently changed by ATC when the new routing was issued.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 2100; Flight Crew Type 2100

I was approximately 7 miles northwest of OFP flying VFR on a 1200 mode C transponder code direct at 3;000 feet MSL on the extended center line of Runway 16. I was in cruise flight about to descend to the OFP traffic pattern for Runway 16. I was monitoring Potomac Approach on 126.75 but not in contact or receiving traffic advisories from Potomac Approach. The controller was talking to a Boeing 737. The controller called out traffic to the B737 ahead at 3;000 feet. I looked back and there was the B737 at my 5 o'clock position a few hundred feet away at the same altitude. I immediately descended and turned to the left and observed the B737 climbing to the right. I was very surprised that such a large aircraft got so close and that they were at such a low altitude so far out from RIC (over 20NM). I would have thought the controller would have vectored the B737 away from my VFR aircraft much earlier. I called the Approach Control Supervisor and was told that this was common altitude that they use for approaches to Runway 16 at RIC. Fortunately there was no harm but I wanted to advise that vectoring large and fast aircraft in proximity to OFP at or below 3;000 has the potential for serious traffic conflicts.

Cessna 150 pilot reported an NMAC with a B737 being vectored for approach to RIC.


Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload

Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

On the final approach for Runway 35 with complete landing configuration; full flaps down; airspeed at 72 KTS and maintaining runway heading. When I entered the ground effect; I over steered the plane by using too much yoke control to land; instead of letting the air. As a result the plane lost ground effect; did a hard landing entered in a ballooning pattern; inadvertently the plane went off the runway to the left. As the plane glided off the runway I was able to manage it; I immediately switched to flaps up then applied full throttle. In the process of building airspeed over a unstable terrain; (dirt) the nose of plane bounced up and down. Once I was near rotation speed; I pitched up and was able to enter a normal climb and retain full control of the aircraft. I did a go around and safely landed the second time. After doing a walk around of the aircraft the only damage that stood out were the props; one of which was bent about 4 inches at the tip; the other blade was chipped about 4 inches of the tip.

A Student pilot lost control of his Tiger AG-5B during landing practice at a high altitude airport then bounced; exited the runway but was able to go around and return safely to find both propeller blades damaged.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 5; Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 15

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airport; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft X awaiting takeoff. TRACON calls and changes the heading turn left heading 270 to turn right heading 310; which was relayed to me by the Ground Controller; written on the strip and on my pad. Aircraft Y; an aircraft based at this airport (though quite probably not flown by a pilot from this airport) lands; and begins to turn left onto a taxiway which is NOTAMed closed and has been for a couple of months. I issue a right turn onto the crossing runway into our 'bailout' area; and instead of turning right; as I am instructing; he starts a left turn onto the closed portion of a runway  which  is also NOTAMed closed and has been for a couple of months. I have to insistently; and probably not as politely as I should have; tell him to turn right. All of this because I have traffic bearing down on final; but it is not yet imminent. He exits; finally; and we are good. I get Aircraft X onto the runway; LUAW (Line Up And Wait); and clear him for takeoff. On departure; he makes a hard left turn (60 degrees of bank if not more) right into traffic on the downwind. Since I switched him early because I had no conflicts; I have to get on the line to find out what is going on while also issuing a traffic alert to the C172 who is in the way. He finally turns westbound; and I cannot remember if he got the 310 heading; which would have solved everything. Unfortunately; the CIC (Controller In Charge) was also engaged in the issues with Aircraft Y who could not follow directions.Due to the distraction by Aircraft Y; I should have referred back to the strip before launching Aircraft X. I failed to scan my pad and the strip to ensure I issued the heading. Furthermore; I showed a bad example as I am a FLM (Front Line Manager). It is my job to be better than my controllers; and yet I am human.

MYF Local Controller forgot to issue a revised departure heading to a departing aircraft.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure

I want to take the opportunity to express my concerns regarding pitot tubes covers and inspection requirements and that is...here at ZZZ we have airplanes that sit on ground for more than XX hours and therefore need pitot inspections before departure as the GPM XX.XX.X states and are accomplished...our concerns rely on the fact that these same airplanes are not scheduled to depart until most of times well beyond a substantial period of time on ground and as mechanics we feel that signing the pitot inspections well before hours (i.e.; 4 hours; 6 hours; 8 hours; etc.) before departure is a safety concern because these same aircrafts are sitting on remote pads of the airport without pitot covers since ZZZ has no covers available or NOT enough!! We cannot have; for safety reasons; mechanics signing pitot inspections when airplanes are not scheduled to depart for another 5 or 6 hours until departure time...what guarantees that bugs or other forms of FOD is not gonna get inside those tubes after having signed for the inspections in the AML Logbook??  We have brought this issue with ZZZ management but they tend to believe that because the GPM XX.XX.X states 'Before Departure;' this 2 word sentence to them means: 'ANY time the Aircraft is linked in [the system]'...which we STRONGLY DISAGREE...since again departure times are well beyond the 6-8 hours before departure.  We as maintenance Mechanics would be in jeopardy of putting our licenses on the line if something was to happen with pitot systems after signing for the inspection and still have aircrafts sitting on ground for another 6-8 hours uncovered.  We strongly recommend the GPM XX.XX.X be revised with specifics regarding Pitot Inspections and sign offs.  I want to thank the many individuals in your department for keeping us informed with updated info on issues that pertain to aircraft maintenance.  We hope that this particular issue gets resolved for the sake of everyone in maintenance and our flying public.These events are recurrent.GPM needs to be specific about their definition of 'Prior to departure.'  We strongly suggest the inspection be performed with aircraft on gate prior to departure (2 hours) and notate it in AML log.

Mechanic reported that after pitot inspections are accomplished prior to departure; aircraft frequently sit on the ground for hours with no pitot tube covers to protect against contaminants.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Total 7000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Equipment / Tooling; Manuals; Company Policy; Procedure

Prior to boarding; the FA (Flight Attendant) notified me that there were 4 infant passengers that would be on our flight. She also stated that there were only 3 infant life vests on board the aircraft. I relayed this information to the Gate Agent and she told me she was aware of the situation and would notify a manager. A few minutes later; a manager came to the aircraft and told me that she would not be able to deny boarding and I told her that I would call Dispatch to see what could be done. The Dispatcher and I read the FA manual pertaining to infants and found a statement that allows additional infants to be carried as long as there is an open seat adjacent to the child without a life vest. This statement caused concern for Dispatch; the FA and I because it seemed out of touch with the safety culture. In the unlikely scenario where we were to ditch the airplane in the water; a person traveling with an infant is expected to evacuate the airplane through an over-wing exit while carrying their infant and 2 seat bottom cushions. We also thought of how difficult it would be for an adult clinging to their cushion in the water while somehow trying to put their infant onto another cushion. We agreed that the information contained in the manuals was not very clear on this subject and decided the safest course of action would be to have Maintenance bring us an extra life vest. We incurred a 10 minute delay. Took safest course of action when the manuals/procedures lacked clear instructions. The information pertaining to this subject is contained in AOM (Aircraft Operating Manual) 2 under the miscellaneous chapter. This was difficult to find and should be copied to the AOM 1 or FOM (Flight Operations Manual) so that it can be accessed easily during a situation such as this. The manual also does not specifically state that a seat bottom cushion should be used as a flotation device for an infant.

EMB-145 Captain reported being notified by the Flight Attendant that the aircraft was short 1 child life vest prior to departure.


Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Pilot was a solo student pilot. He had a stable approach until round out in the flare. During the flare student pilot drifted to the right of centerline and stayed on the right side until touchdown. After touchdown the student pilot attempted to correct for being right of centerline by applying left rudder; but did so with too much left rudder causing the plane to veer left across the runway and into the grass. Upon entering the grass the props struck the ground. Student pilot then [advised] ATC telling them he went into the grass; and then corrected to get back on the runway and came to a stop.Remedial training on landings; crosswind landings; and rudder control upon transition from landing to taxiing. Propeller blades struck the grass/ground left side of runway and bent the tips of the blades.

C172 flight instructor reported his solo student lost control of the aircraft after landing and departed the runway and damaged the propeller.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ZDV called me and informed me that Aircraft X; deviating en route was indecisive and having trouble with the weather. They gave me control and shipped me the aircraft. Aircraft X decided to divert to GCN due to the weather. They were IMC and asked for vectors through the Grand Canyon flight free zone corridors. I issued a vector. Aircraft X then asked to descend as low as possible. I informed them the lowest IFR altitude available and descended them. I observed the data block's altitude to read 300 feet below the MIA (Minimum IFR Altitude) and attempted to contact the aircraft. After several attempts to communicate with no response another aircraft on frequency told me they could hear Aircraft X responding to my calls though I could not hear them. I had the other aircraft inform Aircraft X of the MIA and told them to maintain that minimum altitude. I reestablished contact with Aircraft X a couple of minutes later and then was able to vector them to the initial approach fix for the ILS Approach to Runway 3 at GCN. They were cleared in for the approach and after giving them the frequency change they ended up going missed approach. After climbing back up to 9000 feet (the MIA in that area); I vectored them back to the IAF for the ILS approach again. I cleared them for the approach and before I could give them a frequency change; we lost communication again. I informed the Supervisor of the situation and they attempted to make contact with the FBO at the airport as the Tower had already closed for the night. A few minutes later; we were called by flight service stating Aircraft X had landed. The inability for myself and the pilot to be able to communicate due to the radio limitations in that area of my sector is the main contributor to this safety event. Though the pilot sounded nervous and was dealing with weather; they appeared to follow the instructions they had heard. I believe that improvements to the radio as well as radar coverage in that area would help prevent similar situations in the future.

ZLA Center Controller reported insufficient radio coverage in their airspace caused confusion when vectoring an aircraft that was diverting due to weather descended below the Minimum IFR Altitude.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110; Flight Crew Total 12200; Flight Crew Type 6500

Distraction; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

While climbing thru FL270; a CABIN ALTITUDE warning occurred. At the time of occurrence we were operating with only the right pack. We did not get a bang or loud noise indicating a rapid decompression. The FO (First Officer) was the flying pilot. We immediately put on our oxygen masks. After a brief moment; we established crew communication. We [coordinated] with Center for a cabin altitude problem and started a descent to initially to 12;000 feet then down to 10;000 feet as required. Due to fogging of both of our eye shield portion of the full face oxygen mask; made reading the checklist and cabin altitude and rate display unreadable (after the post flight crew debrief; the FO revealed his mask was not fogged but he still had difficulty reading). The FO did an outstanding job doing an immediate descent from memory. While descending; notified Center our intention to return to ZZZ and received a heading direct back ZZZ. Shortly after initiating the decent; we turned on the left pack but did not feel any change of cabin pressure. During our level off at 10;000; the CABIN ALTITUDE warning extinguished. We took off our oxygen mask and used regular headsets for the remainder of the flight. We checked with each other; whether we had any physiological problems and determined we were both fine. We heard an unusual air hissing noise which could not be located. We requested an ILS to XXL with fire trucks assistance. After clearing the runway; notified ground control. We taxi back to ramp nine. After shutdown and secure gave a brief report to the fire crew. Gave a full debrief to maintenance at the aircraft.

B757-200 Captain reported a pressurization malfunction which resulted in an immediate descent; and a return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 10800; Flight Crew Type 200

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft

Engine Failure at 600 feet on final; In the moment I had a conflict between running an engine failure checklist or choosing a suitable place to land; I started throttle forward-mixture forward carb heat; but due to altitude and the location of the fuel selector; all my attention was on a safe landing.  The outcome was no bodily injury and no property damage.  I am not completely certain what caused the engine failure; however I believe running a pre landing check list a bit earlier in the landing phase is always a good idea.

A PA-28 Pilot experienced an engine failure on final approach. He comments on the demands between performing an engine failure checklist and locating a suitable landing location.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 180; Flight Crew Type 10

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

Upon third stop and go landing while practicing a power off 180 landing; the flight control column failed before another takeoff was made. The flight controls were stuck in the full aft position and could not be pushed forward. Before full power was applied; the takeoff was aborted and the aircraft was taxied back to parking. There were no problems with the flight controls on any of the landings before the incident. There were no injuries between the instructor and I.

BE33 pilot under instruction reports rejecting a takeoff at low speed due to the control column becoming stuck in the full aft position.