Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge

Deplaning; Safety Related Duties; Service

Fatigue; Confusion; Physiological - Other

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Airbus 319 flight. Right after take off Flight Attendant B and I noticed a smell of burnt plastic; electrical; with a hint of nail polish. It became a hunt for us to find the smell. We checked the drain; the trash; behind the coffee pots and could not figure out where it was coming from. The B Flight Attendant went on the back to do the service and I stayed up front to serve First Class and the first three rows in coach. Being the super stew I am I was trying to find the source of the smell. I did not even think about it being the toxic fumes because it did not smell like the other toxic fumes I have smelled before. I called the flight deck several times to let them know of the odor. When B and C Flight Attendants finished the service I came through with trash and asked B Flight Attendant to come forward and smell and she also called the flight deck to have one of the guys come out. B noticed the smell at row three and the Jumpseater came out to confirm that there was an odor and he could not find the source as well. Upon landing I had a ragging headache and felt nauseated. I had to reach for a trash bag on final because I thought I was going to get sick. Doors open and I do not remember passengers deplaning. I did see the Mechanic and told him of the odor. He told me it was the trash bin and I said no. He said yes it is and had the cleaners clean the trash bin and said we were good to go. He said it was a fishy smell and that he took care of it and nothing was wrong.Kudos to the Captain for saying we were not taking this aircraft because he the smell in the flight deck upon landing. After getting fresh air I felt fine and even the other crew members said I looked better. We were now on a dead head to our crew base and since the flight is full; I took the jumpseat to help the agents out and to catch up with the crew. All was fine at first but during the flight I noticed my mind was not as sharp as usual. After landing and standing up is when it hit me. My legs felt very weak and my head was much clouded; disorientated; and my memory is gone of deplaning. Something about the pressurization upon landing triggered more symptoms. I went down to crew services where I asked about the hospital but very vague because I don't remember. I drove myself to the hospital (should not have) and it took every bit of energy and skill I had. I was so disoriented in the parking garage that someone had to help me to the emergency room. Symptoms ... nausea - headache - spacey - could not focus - heart rate increase - feels like someone stepping on my chest - blood pressure sky rocket - did not have quick recall - equilibrium effected - knee joints very achy - slurred speech - trouble articulating words - dazed and confused with a plastic; burnt electrical taste in my mouth. I was the only crew member affected because I stayed up front.

An A319 Flight Attendant became very ill then drove herself to a hospital following exposure to a complex odor resembling burnt plastic and electrical with a hint of nail polish.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20.6; Flight Crew Total 336.4; Flight Crew Type 2.7

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Upon landing long; student without instruction; decided to do a takeoff ; without retracting full flaps; carb heat hot; unbeknown to instructor; instead of power he pulls forward mixture that affected partial RPM (was set for high altitude operation) with about a 1;000 ft runway left and not enough speed I (CFII) regain control pulled power; Mixture and deviate to right pass the runway; gravel into short vegetation where I aggressively turned right 180 degrees to preventing hitting airport boundary fence (10 feet away). The plane made a stop without structural damage; there were no physical injuries; the only sustained damaged was to left main wheel brake caliper pressure release nipple and a flat right hand tire.

Flight Instructor reported a runway excursion occurred during a training flight when the student attempted to take off again after landing.


Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We had an avionics issue which almost caused an altitude deviation. We were assigned and told to descend via the arrival. The arrival was entered into the FMS and double checked. The arrival was flown on autopilot in VNAV mode with auto throttles on. We noted that the FMS altitude at ZZZZZ intersection was correct; 4000; but was noted in yellow; not in magenta as all other altitudes were. This normally indicates that the FMS has noted an issue; which we believed was caused by the ILS Runway XXC being loaded with an altitude of 5000 at ZZZZZ1 intersection. Normally the FMS/VNAV will still drive the aircraft to a YELLOW altitude but alert the crew that the altitude is in conflict with another altitude. The aircraft leveled at 6000 at ZZZZZ2 intersection as it should have; the FMS calculated a top of descent for 4000 but then leveled at 5000. We quickly disconnected the autopilot and manually descended to 4000; which I believe was completed by ZZZZZ intersection. The flight director and FMS still were showing 5000 even though the altitude selector was set to 4000 at the beginning of the VNAV descent over ZZZZZ3 intersection. I don't believe any altitudes were busted nor did ATC make any note of our progress. This is another example of the issues of flying 3 different aircraft; with 3 very different avionics; 3 different engines; 3 different checklists; 3 different QRH books; 3 different flows and SOPs; and 3 different sets of limitations. It has been over 2 years since we acquired another aircraft type at [Company]; we have not implemented safety considerations for the crews who are required to fly all 3 aircraft. In fact the company has applied pressure to the crews who have expressed safety concerns regarding their ability to safety fly all 3 aircraft. I have been told that I must fly all three aircraft regardless of my safety concerns. Only one member of management has supported my concerns and stated that I can deny flights in any aircraft that I feel uncomfortable in. However this puts pressure on the crews. Safety is created by good policies and by removing pressure; not applying it. I know many other [aircraft type] crew members are concerned that [Company] is not taking this safety issue seriously and dealing with the situation in a timely manner. 2 years is not timely; nor should known legitimate safety issues take a back seat to staffing issues.

Beechjet Captain reported disconnecting the autopilot on descent when it leveled above the cleared altitude; and expressed frustration with flying different aircraft with different engines; checklists; QRH books; flows; SOPs; and limitations.


Toilet Smoke; Overheat; Fire Detectors & Warning

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

After reaching 1;100 feet after takeoff; we got the 'LAV SMOKE' master warning. I notified ATC and leveled off at 2;500 feet. By that time; the warning was gone. A few seconds later; it came back. I called my Flight Attendant to see if she noticed any smoke or smells from the lavatory. There was no indication of a fire. During takeoff; the lavatory door popped open; so it was easy for her to see. During this entire situation; we continued to verify there was no smoke or fire. The warning continued to go on and off and [we] elected to return to [departure airport]. We did not declare an emergency because there was no evidence of a fire. However; I still requested the fire trucks to meet our aircraft just to be sure there was no indication of a fire near the lavatory; including the baggage compartment. I still ran the 'lav smoke' QRH and pulled the associated breakers as well as the 'overweight landing' NAP checklist. After I completed all the QRH checklists; I set up the aircraft for the approach including the overweight landing speeds that was given by ACARS. I advised my Flight Attendant that the trucks will meet us just to check the aircraft. After the landing; we exited the runway and taxied where the trucks inspected the aircraft. Before the trucks appeared; I notified the passengers of the situation and advised that the trucks were there as an extra set of eyes to make sure the aircraft is ok. After inspection; there was no sign of a fire or smoke and we received a new gate to taxi to. Overall; I believed my crew and myself handled the situation very well.

EMB-XRJ Captain reported returning to departure airport after receiving a LAV SMOKE master warning that later was found to be a false warning.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Working Local Control 2 with no other traffic I had noticed that Aircraft X had landed on [Runway] 9L; exited at [Taxiway] B8; turned west on [Taxiway] B; and then stopped at [Taxiway] B7 for reasons unknown. I assumed that the pilot was unfamiliar with the routing to the terminal/gate and it was confirmed when I heard Ground Control again give the clearance of 'Taxi via B; Runway 18; C. Hold short Runway 9C.' I then witnessed Aircraft X continue his taxi at an apparently higher than normal rate of speed as he turned onto Runway 18. I then witnessed Aircraft X well past the hold short line of my Runway (9C) before they came to a stop. I could not have been able to use the runway when and where they had stopped. Again; I had no traffic at the time. I did not at any point unnecessarily withhold my crossing clearance for Ground Control; I merely wanted to witness the aircraft perform as instructed with the speed exhibited on his turn southbound on Runway 18. Taxiing continued after my crossing coordination was given without incident to the terminal. This is a continuing issue with Runway 9C and I've been chastised for my efforts in attempting to bring light to this safety issue before. I've deviated at least one other pilot for the same infraction and when I mentioned this particular instance to the CIC; I was met with indifference and basically told to not worry about it. The promise of paperwork and increased scrutiny had at least 2 CPC's in the cab at the time convinced that ignoring the problem was the best solution as opposed to be open and honest about the safety culture we are attempting to create.We need more enhanced runway protections for Runway 9C/27C to include guard lights (wig-wags) or the runway needs to be closed. I'm not certain that guard lights like the ones I envision are even usable in runway-to-runway applications. This is a continuing issue and it's only a matter of time before there is an accident because of it.

Discussed taxi clearance with reporter and he stated that he should have told the aircraft to hold short of 9C before stating to the pilot; 'Taxi via B; Runway 18; C. Hold short Runway 9C.'. Clearance should have read; [Taxi via B; left on Runway 18; hold short of Runway 9C; expect further instructions from there]. Controller also stated this is an ongoing problem and that maybe some kind of lighting might be used during construction periods.

Local Controller observes traffic that was possibly unfamiliar with the airport taxi across hold short lines and enter active runway; causing Ground Control to reissue clearance.


Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On landing rollout [Runway 28] I assumed control of the aircraft and we both heard Tower direct us to exit at Runway 20 (I could make it safely). I started to make the turn and immediately saw a light aircraft landing on Runway 20. I immediately corrected the aircraft track back on Runway 28 and immediately requested taxi clarification. It was a directive NOT to enter Runway 20 (in broken English). Both of us where shaking about the possible outcome if we had made that turn. I made the next turn off and held short of Runway 20 as directed by MMGL Tower. While looking back at the contributing factors; I am convinced this incident was due to stress directly related to [company issues].

After landing Runway 28 at MMGL; an Air Carrier flight crew believes they heard an ATC clearance to exit on Runway 20. In fact; it is a clearance not to enter Runway 20 as a light aircraft is landing.


Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

I was on 3rd break during an international trip. I awoke to go to the bathroom. A flight attendant stopped me and asked if I knew what the issue with the plane was. After hearing this; I called to the front and asked what was going on. They said to come up and they would fill me in. I did. I sat down in the right seat and noticed we were on arrival at 20;000 FT somewhere over PA. I was told that we lost the left engine hydraulic pump; followed by the left hydraulic quantity over Canada. Checklist had been run; conferences calls made on SATCOM and landing data performed. The decision was made to land at destination and taxi to the gate. After reviewing checklist with the list of lost items; I saw nothing to prevent us from safely doing this. I accomplished the pilot not flying duties until an uneventful full stop.

B767 First Officer is informed by the flying crew upon returning from the third break; that the left hydraulic system has failed and the flight is continuing to destination.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

[The] First Officer (FO) [was] flying. On approach; [the] FO called for the landing gear. Nothing happened with movement of the gear handle. NOTHING. [The] FO leveled off about 1;700 feet and we told Tower that we would be taking it around because the landing gear did not come down. On go-around; ECAM went off with landing gear NOT down [and a] Gravity Gear Extension Warning. After turning downwind; we changed control of the aircraft. FO ran QRH while I requested priority handling and coordinated with ATC. After completion of QRH for gravity extension; [the] nose wheel did not indicate down and locked on overhead panel. We discussed it and decided to conduct a low approach for visual inspection.On go-around; ATC advised us that nose gear appeared down and shortly after; down and lock indicators on overhead went green. We advised that we were ready for approach and landing. However; nose wheel steering was inoperative and we attempted to differential brake clear of the runway at a high speed taxiway but would stop on the runway if; at any time; it appeared that we were unable. Landing was uneventful and we cleared at high speed. ATC asked for a turn once clear. I think we said something to the effect of unable and if we were clear of the runway we were going to shut down where we were. Taxi to gate [was] uneventful. Aircraft Malfunction. Landing Gear System Failure.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier Captain and Dispatcher reported aircraft had a landing gear problem but had a safe landing.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

A B737 landing Runway 30R in the flare; ASDE-X alarmed with known vehicle on a closed taxiway putting up barricades. I should have sent the B737 around according to procedures. However; I saw the vehicle and it was not going on the runway and the B737 was so close to ground that issuing a go around would have been unsafe in this phase of flight.

STL Controller elected not to issue a go around to an Air Carrier about to flare when the ASDE-X alarmed apparently due to an airport vehicle operating on a closed taxiway.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Aircraft was being vectored for an RNAV approach to Runway 17 from the east; after looking up the approach plate and seeing that the crossing altitude at the IAF HOXID was 2000 I cleared him to cross HOXID at 2000 cleared approach.  The aircraft started his descent for the approach out of 3000. The Low altitude/conflict alert alarm went off when the aircraft was at about 2800 in a 3000 foot MVA that is only a few miles east of HOXID. I issued the low altitude warning and climbed him back to 3000.I had my MVA map off at the time of the event. When I looked up the approach plate and saw the altitude was 2000 at the IAF; I did not realize the MVA would be a factor that was east of that point. I immediately saved my preference sets to ensure that my MVA map would remain on at all times.

I90 TRACON Controller reported an aircraft experienced a CFTT near HOXID intersection.


Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 5500; Flight Crew Type 400

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 24000; Flight Crew Type 840

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Simulated Emergency Descent I was taking 6 day recurrent training with a TBM 850 instructor. My instructor filed an IFR flight plan (from the air) in the vicinity of STV with Houston Center in order to climb on a heading to FL280 to practice a simulated emergency descent to 14;500. The practice simulated emergency descent procedure was approved by ATC with block altitudes and on a heading via radar vectors. I was in the left seat and my instructor was in the right seat. My instructor called out simulated 'master alarm' and 'Cabin Pressure' on the CAS; I identified the problem and we both donned oxygen masks; had our headsets on and switched the headset microphone to the oxygen mask transmit position. Due to oxygen breathing noise; it was hard for me to hear my own voice because of breathing feedback. The instructor had agreed to handle all radio communications during my recurrent training. My instructor filed the IFR flight plan for the simulated emergency descent procedure. I reasonably expected him to continue using the radio to communicate with ATC. This was the understanding between us. The instructor thought he communicated with ATC that we were starting the procedure and vacating FL280; but (not known to us) the microphone in the instructor's oxygen mask did not work so ATC did not hear the instructor's radio transmission. We started the procedure and vacated FL280 for 14;000. We started down and when passing through FL270 ATC questioned our descent. We leveled off and climbed back to FL280. The controller said he did not hear our request to start the simulated emergency descent and to start down (vacate FL280). We explained to ATC what had happened. Then we requested to start the simulated emergency descent procedure with ATC and descended from FL280 to 14;500 without incident and terminated the simulated emergency descent maneuver and canceled IFR with Houston Center.

Training for proper use of emergency equipment for emergency descent. We were vectored to an area to do training for the procedure and when the exercise was initiated we were donning the equipment to establish communications with ATC and on the intercom and the autopilot was selected off to prepare the descent. The distraction of the cabin noise and oxygen mask application during the communication that was being transmitted but was not confirmed with ATC; and we started to descend. I caught the descent and returned to the altitude and then we got the confirmation to descend to complete the maneuver. We had trained and prepared previously in detail for the maneuver. I had asked for the vector and received that to airspace that was out of the way. A flurry of ATC communication with other aircraft and microphone in the mask noise made the ATC acknowledgment difficult. The next training event I will be sure of the clarification before on the normal headsets instead of on the mask microphones.

TBM850 instructor and student plan and request a practice emergency descent from ATC; starting from FL280. Oxygen mask noise prevents proper communication with ATC and the descent is initiated without approval.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

On approach to final to PHX Runway 25L; aircraft was targeted by a high intensity ground based laser while descending through 4500 feet. Laser emanated from a residential area approximately 10 miles south of the 25L approach corridor. Laser was pointed directly at cockpit using the aircraft landing lights to take aim. At initial detection; Captain (PF) rapidly ducked head into cockpit while First Officer tried to pinpoint exact location.  Unfortunately; FO suffered corneal burns to his right eye in doing so.

Approaching DERVL intersection saw a flash at 12 o'clock. Looked up and realized that there was a green laser tracking and hitting us from the front-center. I covered my eyes and looked down and commanded 'laser - look down' to the FO. He had already been hit in the eyes.

A320 flight crew reported being targeted by a laser on approach to PHX Runway 25L that resulted in corneal burns to the First Officer's right eye.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 25

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

The approach to runway 34 at SLE has terrain and obstacles in the final approach path. Some terrain/obstacles extend nearly into a 3-degree glidepath within 1 mile of the runway. During a flight with a pilot who was not experienced with this approach; this pilot did not clearly perceive the terrain/obstacles that encroached on a typical 3 degree glidepath. When this pilot attempted to visually fly a typical 3 degree glidepath to runway 34; this resulted in flying in close proximity to the terrain/obstacles; including alerts from the aircraft's terrain alerting system.During the debrief of this event with the pilot; we reviewed the chart supplement publication for the airport. The supplement includes the following information: 'Runway 34: REIL. PAPI(P4L)--GA 4.0?? TCH 42??. Tree.' This is in the section for Runway 16-34.'LGT Runway 34 PAPI OTS indef.' This is in the SERVICE section.'Rising terrain and trees west and south of airport; including extended centerline of Runway 34.' This statement is in the remarks section.It seems unusual that Runway 34 would be advertised to have a PAPI with a 4 degree glidepath; only to have this indicated as indefinitely out of service in a separate section.Given the nature of the terrain/obstacles in the approach path; having an operational PAPI (with the higher 4 degree glidepath) would have been helpful during this this approach. It's not clear why the PAPI is out of service indefinitely and why it is confusingly documented in the chart supplement. Although this approach occurred during daylight conditions; the PAPI would be even more valuable during night approaches to this runway. The terrain/obstacles in the approach path may be less visible at night.

A flight instructor reported that the approach to a runway has terrain and obstacles in the final approach path.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

[We have] inadequate training/confusing manuals for ground and flight crews pertaining to hazmat documentation. [Our] new procedures for cross checking how many NOTOC's; and what the paperwork says has caused problems. Latest manual changes made it worse. Between myself; rampers and the Duty Manager; we could not resolve the paperwork issues. Therefore; hazmat was supposed to be removed. However; the ramp agents just 'pretended' to remove hazmat. When we landed at destination; hazmat was found in cargo during post flight.

Air Carrier Captain believes latest manual changes have made Hazmat NOTOC's even more difficult to comprehend. When legalities cannot be determined; the hazmat is asked to be removed; but the ramp agents do not comply.


Inspection; Installation; Work Cards; Testing

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Aircraft X and Aircraft Y  Name; Name1Troubleshooting MLG Bay OVHT Caution MEL on Aircraft X Myself and Name1 gathered all reference material off of [manual] and AMM to use to troubleshoot issue. Started to check loops in wheel bay; found to be good moved on with [manual] to change Gear OVHT Controller. Performed operations and functional test of system; found that warning fail test switch worked. Tested the OVHT warning on landing gear panel in center pedestal; which was found not to be working. So was instructed by acting supervisor for the night Name2 to swap landing gear panel from Aircraft Y which was also in the hangar as well as Aircraft X. We found that swapping the panel to test on Aircraft X did not help resolve issue; then proceeded to put the panel back from the aircraft it was on. Next we decided due to time we get caught up on all paperwork to where we were to get prepared for turnover for first shift. As we were discussing turnover Quality Control (QC) Name3 questioned about the swapped panels; which he then informed us they needed written up as well as a landing gear operations test which is also an RII item. We were unaware of the write up and operations check at the time; then we informed our Supervisor Name2 which then he told us to forget it and not to say anything. Then after further discussion he informed first shift Supervisor as well as the QC department. We then corrected our mistake by writing up both planes for the maintenance done and performed operations checks.I was made aware of the issue by QC Name3 3rd Shift. Event occurred due to acting Supervisor of the night Name2 instructing to swap landing gear panels to use for troubleshooting. Also inexperience with manuals and MEL task assigned for the night.When QC Name3 questioned about panels being swapped for troubleshooting purposes; we then informed Name2 of the issue to write up the maintenance done. Which then he told us to forget about it and not to say anything; then after further discussion he informed first shift Supervisor as well as the QC department.

We (Myself and Name) began our night troubleshooting a gear overheat caution on Aircraft X. We did so following [manual] and AMM references to determine the cause of the caution; we suspected and replaced a gear overheat control. We documented this process through NRWC (Non Routine Work Card) and continuation cards. The issue was not resolved; and it failed upon operational check. At this point we discussed with our third shift Supervisor/lead (Name2) and we; using the wiring diagrams and [manual] began to suspect that the gear control panel could be the source of the fault. The fault was that the gear fail switch worked properly while there was no relevant gear warn indicators from its respective switch. Name2 told us we should attempt to confirm by swapping control panels with another Aircraft in the hangar; Aircraft Y. We did so; this did not correct the issue; so we returned the original control panels to their respective aircraft. We then spent some time discussing possible next steps and causes of the fault; our next step was to ensure our paperwork was accurate and up to date. Preparing to turn work to first shift Supervisors Quality Control (QC) inspector (Name3) questioned us about the panel replacement we had done earlier. He informed us that the job required an operational check that was also a required inspection item. It was at this point that we realized that we had not created a write up and consequently were unaware of the operations check required. After discussing with Name3; we informed Name2 and brought attention to our mistake before either plane had flown or had passengers board. We moved from there with the help of first shift supervisors and the QC department to rectify our mistake and ensure that the required checks as well as the original write up were properly performed; inspected; and documented. Discussion with 3rd shift QC brought to our attention that the panel swap had not been properly documented and required additional operational checks in order to be signed off correctly.Lack of experience working on specific systems and protocol for swapping parts; combined with not questioning instructions from our Lead Mechanic/Acting Supervisor.The help of the QC department in helping us catch and rectify our mistake was invaluable and appreciated. When informing the third shift lead/acting Supervisor we were working with we were told to 'forget it'. We were able to correct our mistake by expeditiously informing first shift Supervisors and assuring that the required checks/maintenance actions were completed correctly and properly; as was all subsequent paperwork.

Technicians reported that during troubleshooting an aircraft for erroneous fire warning indications; the supervisor on duty directed them to not document the swapping of components used so as to not have to comply with a landing gear operational check that was required and would require an RII action.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 1300; Flight Crew Type 300

I was landing at Deer Valley Airport in Phoenix; Arizona.  I initially contacted the North Runway Tower as advised on ATIS for arriving aircraft.  I reported approximately 10 miles north of the airport and was instructed to enter a right base for Runway 25L as Runway 25R was closed for construction.  When on approximately a 2-3 mile right base to Runway 25R; I was instructed to orbit north of the center line of Runway 25R.  I did not fully understand the request to orbit north of Runway 25R.  I made a left 270 to a heading of approximately 270 to establish a pattern just northeast of Runway 25R. This left turn resulted in a near miss with another aircraft on base to Runway 25L.  At this time the Tower instructed me to fly southwest to approximately the center of Runway 25R.  I then was changed from the North Tower frequency to the South Tower frequency on right base for Runway 25L.  When contacting ground frequency I was instructed to call the Tower.Misunderstanding of orbit North of Runway 25R centerline.  1) Clarify misunderstanding or confusion with Tower as soon as possible 2) Utilize communication via e-mail to local pilots by the Deer Valley Pilot Association to alert the pilot as to the anticipated traffic pattern changes occurring with closure of Runway 25R3) Clarification of phraseology by Tower e.g. 'make right hand turns North of Runway 25R rectangular pattern'   OR 'turn right to enter rectangular orbit with right hand turns North of Runway 25R'.

While on a right base for for Runway 25R at DVT; pilot is instructed to orbit north of the center line of the Runway. A left turn is initiated resulting in a NMAC with another aircraft on base for Runway 25R.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 8800; Flight Crew Type 5800

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Ground Personnel; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

There was traffic with no communication; we saw them so close. The evasive action was smooth and we continued with our approach. It is important to tell you that ATC advised us about traffic without altitude information in the area. I think that this event occurred because of the distraction of the other aircraft in the communications and in the airspace class that they were flying.

An A320 on approach took evasive action to a near miss TCAS RA east of LAS from ATC identified traffic which did not report altitude information.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

After ramp was loaded I communicated to Pilot was ready to push. Pilot said brake release clear to push to 6A and double confirmed if 6A is ok I said yes and is clear for push. As I was pushing the plane. Suddenly the move team with [another airline] passed by without noticing we were at 6A. So I stopped the plane; move team was right on our path and stopped for gate acceptance. At this moment pilot decided to change from A to centerline. He confirmed with Tower and relay back to me and he said after the [other airline] passed and got into its gate safely brake release and clear to push. As I was pushing forward and angling the plane; Wing Walker 2 was not visible so I stopped and decided to pull back the plane to the 6 centerline. As I started to move back a stop signal from [Other Airline Crew] said I hit the plane. The [other airline] crew gave the signal stopped after the accident already happened. When I looked back Wing Walker 2 was halfway towards 6 centerline. Wing Walker 1 was by wing side guiding.

Tug Driver reported confusion and loss of sight of wing walkers resulting in a collision with another aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 191; Flight Crew Type 191

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 213; Flight Crew Type 213

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Prior to takeoff; I informed the flight attendants that I would like them to remain seated until cruise altitude due to the weather in the ZZZ area.  We pushed off of Gate and took off on Runway X.  Prior to takeoff I notified the flight attendants with a 'ding' and observed their response; over the PA; that we had been cleared for takeoff and completed the Before Takeoff Checklist.  As expected; we encountered light turbulence during the climbout to cruise altitude.  Passing FL350; the flight attendants 'dinged' us and asked us if it would be OK if they got up.  At this point they informed me that they had not completed the oxygen demo briefing and that they would like to get up and do it.  I agreed that yes it needed to be completed and they did.  I said that we would talk about what had happened and why when we landed.  Once in (city); I asked them what had happen.  They said that in the middle of their briefings some passengers required some attention and put them behind.  It took six minutes from pushback to takeoff.  Once they had the situation solved; I 'dinged' them and they agreed amongst themselves that they would complete the oxygen demo brief after takeoff and below 10;000 feet.  I didn't know we could do that; but they said they could.  At that point they made the cleared for takeoff brief signaling to me that they had completed their cabin preparation and were ready for takeoff.  After hearing their story; I explained to them that 1) had they continued the oxygen demo brief after I 'dinged' them; I would have known they were not ready and would have delayed the takeoff; or 2) don't make the cleared for takeoff briefing and contact the flight deck and let us know that they required additional time to prepare the cabin due to some passenger issues.Although the First Officer and I were unaware of the situation until passing FL350; this event could have been avoided if the flight attendants had a better understanding of our procedures and if the pilots were more consistent in applying the Before Takeoff Checklist.  As I explained to the flight attendants their options prior to the event; why we 'ding' them and what we expect to hear to continue with the takeoff; they said that they didn't believe that all pilots would have waited for them to complete their duties.  They felt or believed that some pilots just hit the call button and takeoff without even monitoring the PA.  So possibly a Crew Briefing Bulletin emphasizing our before takeoff crew procedures and the importance of the flight attendants' duties being completed prior to takeoff and the pilots verifying that they have been completed.

[Narrative #2 contains no additional information.]

A B737 took off after a six minute taxi during which time flight attendants handling a passenger issue were unable to complete the oxygen demo and because of turbulence remained seated until FL350 when the oxygen demo was finally completed. The flight attendants failed to notify the Captain about the oxygen demo situation until cruise.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 248; Flight Crew Type 248

I was performing landing work in prep for a checkride at ZZZ. My Instructor and I took off from a touch and go on XXR. We were instructed to follow the aircraft ahead of us in the upwind and make right traffic. We located the aircraft as it turned to crosswind. I extended upwind and climbed to 1;500 MSL - about 600 AGL - before it was safe to start my crosswind. I made my crosswind and continued climbing; entering downwind about 1;600 - 1;700 MSL. I had an Instructor on board. I was flying right seat. During this time I heard another aircraft cleared for take-off and directed to follow me. [The] Instructor was handling radio calls due to feedback on my radio mic.Once in downwind; I got a traffic alert on the Garmin 650 in my aircraft. Finding that odd I looked to my right and about 100 - 200 ft. below me and 200 ft. to my right I saw an aircraft climbing and turning as if to enter downwind as well. My Instructor was on radios and notified ATC who directed us to turn north. We did so and cleared out of the area; mitigating the traffic conflict.

C-172 Pilot reported encountering a NMAC event during landing practice and performing a successful evasive maneuver.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 145; Flight Crew Total 12766; Flight Crew Type 9456

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 188; Flight Crew Total 12714; Flight Crew Type 9520

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were on final outside of ZULAB on centerline of runway 31R and cleared for approach to the runway. We were originally cleared for ILS 31R and later cleared for visual to 31R with no traffic pointed out by ATC. Outside of ZULAB I saw an aircraft to our left on TCAS at 2000 feet while we were at 3000 feet. We had been given a speed assignment till 5 DME. I shortly acquired that aircraft. It was below us wandering into our final approach path. I asked the first officer to ask ATC what their intentions were for that aircraft; still in front and below us. ATC didn't immediately answer but when they did they said they were not talking to that aircraft. Absent any direction by ATC I decided to maintain 3000 feet and slow back to final approach speed to give ATC time to sort out the issue. The aircraft that had wandered into our final continued to turn left and moved out of our approach path and flew toward the 31L final path. Having slowed and configured for landing I waited till the aircraft was visually out of the 31R approach path and then descended to the runway and landed normally. Our safest course of action was to stay in a position that gave us a view of the wandering aircraft. If we had executed a go around we would have lost sight of the aircraft and not been able to react to any of their movements; up; down; left or right. And absent any directions from ATC we choose the safest course of action.

An air carrier crew on final to JFK Runway 31R reported another air carrier over shot Runway 31L final and flew 1;000 feet beneath them on final. ATC was not talking to that aircraft nor relaying traffic information.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 5000

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

We were being vectored for the ILS to runway 17R. While on a west downwind; on a heading of 320 degrees and at an altitude of 4900 feet; (1500 meters); we noticed we had not been given a turn after the last aircraft on final approach had already passed abeam us. We made a radio check with Shanghai approach to see if they had forgotten to turn us. We did not receive a response; so after one more attempt; we switched to the tower frequency posted on the approach plate (124.35) and attempted to call them. We did not receive a response from them either. After two more attempts we attempted contact with approach on 121.5 and for a frequency to contact approach. We were given 123.6 and immediately reestablished contact. We were given vectors to intercept the localizer and then cleared for the approach. When we were switched over to tower frequency; the frequency was different than 124.35; which is the frequency posted on the approach plate for the ILS to runway 17R. It might explain why we did not receive a response on that frequency when we attempted to contact them earlier. The flight proceeded without any further problems after re-establishing contact with Shanghai approach control.

Air carrier Captain reported while on a vector to ZSPD ILS 17R; the crew did not get a response from approach so they switched to the Tower frequency on the approach plate (124.35) and did not get a response either. Captain reported approach gave the crew a different Tower frequency than what was listed on the approach plate.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While being pushed back from the gate; we received a reroute for weather. I was listening to the clearance and writing it down. I heard the ground crew who were on headset with me tell me to 'set brakes'. I complied and set the brakes and read back 'Brakes set' and requested that they stay hooked up because I was in a NEO and wanted to make sure the engines started before they disconnected. We then proceeded to start the engines and during that process I told the ground crew they could disconnect. My mind went back to watching the first officer input the reroute into the flight plan. While I was distracted with that I heard the ground crew ask if they could disconnect and I immediately reached down and turned the parking brake but turned it the wrong way. I thought I was setting it but actually turned it off; but my feet were on the brake petals and the aircraft didn't move. At the same time the ground crew told me to set the brakes as they saw that I had actually released the brake. I apologized and asked if everything was ok and they said it was. Pay more attention to what I am supposed to be watching and think prior to just turning a knob.

A320 Captain reported that when asked to set the brakes he turned the handle the wrong way.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Inspection Authority; Maintenance Airframe

Maintenance Inspector 10; Maintenance Lead Technician 10; Maintenance Technician 10

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Human Factors; Manuals; Chart Or Publication

Maintenance was performed on aircraft left hand engine on December 2014. The [Technician] (Tech) performed scheduled maintenance replacing the right igniter on the # 1 engine. I inspected the igniter installation as well as the internal compressor fairing installation. When the Tech completed the close up; I followed up and inspected to verify the engine core access panels as well as pneumatic ducts removed to gain access were installed and secured. I performed post maintenance engine runs and leak checks as required with no discrepancies. [Three days later]; the aircraft experienced compressor stalls inflight causing the aircraft to [make] an unscheduled landing at a field other than the intended destination. This was the 3rd flight since this engine maintenance had been performed. After the landing the aircraft was inspected to determine the cause of the compressor stalls. It was determined that the HPC stage-5 air non-return valve was installed incorrectly on the left hand engine. This was corrected; engine inspections were accomplished and the aircraft was returned to service [two days later.]This valve was removed as part of the duct work removal and is fitted internally where two ducts join; held by a single clamp. The removal of the ducts is an 'as needed' item in the procedure for the scheduled igniter maintenance check. The technician reinstalled the valve incorrectly after the inspection was completed and with the duct work installed; I was unable to see the valve was installed incorrectly. The valve is a smaller diameter than the duct and can easily be installed reversed. The technician failed to refer to maintenance manual for proper installation procedures. In addition; I considered this a follow up procedure to gain access as needed and felt that after the inspection of the igniter installation; a follow up inspection of the close up was sufficient. Additionally while this tech has limited experience on this aircraft; he has over 30 years experience working similar equipment and systems. All the revised aircraft and engine maintenance manuals were made available.I feel that the technician's complacency and lack of awareness during the removal and replacement procedures caused him to install the valve incorrectly. I was handling other; more critical; engine inspections on this aircraft and trusted the techs experience to install the ducts. I also feel the [Maintenance] Manual does not address the direction of the valve installation. Depending on power settings and aircraft stage of flight; an incorrect installation of this valve will cause compressor stalls which will in turn cause loss of power. I feel that makes this a critical installation and the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) should have a note to address the directional installation of the valve. I was aware there was an issue with the engine and was notified [approximately twenty days later] by the aircrafts' Chief Inspector of their finding and a request for us to investigate. Our Chief Inspector is reviewing the incident. He met with the local FSDO to make them aware of this occurrence and he will present his plan of action to the required parties when completed. The removal and replacement of the igniter plug references the removal of the ducts.

An Aircraft Maintenance Inspector reports a Gulfstream G-V aircraft experienced Left engine compressor stalls inflight; requiring an unscheduled landing at a field other than the intended destination. A High Pressure Compressor (HPC) Stage-5 Bleed air Non-Return Valve was installed in reverse on the Rolls Royce BR710 engine. Maintenance Manual did not address the valve's air flow direction during installation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 7800; Flight Crew Type 500

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

We were flying the ILS to runway 6 at TEB. I briefed the approach noting the 1500 crossing restriction at DANDY. We were vectored to intercept the localizer approximately 20 miles out of the final approach fix. The localizer captured a false signal causing me to go to heading mode and sort out why we captured a course clearly not our intended one. Instead of reloading the approach to runway 6 the pilot monitoring manually input the fix VINGS for situational awareness; for some reason DANDY was no longer displayed. The altitude select was not changed from 2000 ft to 1500 ft. We were then cleared for the runway 6 approach; at 2000 ft MSL and captured the glide slope. The false localizer earlier caused me to check that we were actually capturing the correct approach. Additionally the phase of flight we were in was cause for me to be focused on flying the approach. As we crossed the location were DANDY was the tower called it to our attention that we were supposed to be at 1500 ft. I realized I was still almost 300 ft to high. I uncoupled the auto pilot and hand flew the aircraft down to the correct altitude. The localizer capturing a false signal started a chain of events that appeared to be at the root cause for the altitude deviation. Because of the false signal we were monitoring and confirming our instruments to the extent that caused us to fly the approach as a normal ILS after capturing the glide slope. The altitude select was never changed from 2000 ft to 1500 ft which could have given us additional awareness of the crossing restriction at DANDY. Not having DANDY displayed on our displays added to the deviation.In the future I'll make every effort to not allow a time compression to compromise an approach. Confirm that the approach is loaded properly and that approach fixes are not manually inserted; also confirm the altitude select is displaying the crossing restriction altitude. If needed ask for a delay vector to insure both pilots have and share a clear mental model of the approach.

CE750 Captain reported becoming distracted after capturing a false localizer signal during the ILS Runway 06 at TEB. The mandatory crossing altitude of 1500 ft at DANDY was forgotten and the fix was crossed at 1700 ft.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 146; Flight Crew Type 146

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Our Clearance out of PHX was to depart on the KATMN5 Departure; climb via the SID. The KATMN5 has a top altitude of 8000 feet and a crossing restriction at VANZZ intersection of at or below 8000 feet. Both were briefed and 8000 feet was set in the altitude window. After takeoff we were handed off to PHX Departure. As we began to turn left towards DAVZZ intersection; PHX Departure gave us the revised clearance to 'climb via the SID; except maintain FL210.' We read back the clearance; I asked for VNAV on the automation; then we put FL210 in the altitude box; and I engaged the autopilot.At this point we had a miscommunication about the clearance and I thought PHX Departure wanted us to 'climb and maintain' FL210. Both the Captain and I questioned each other about the clearance; and then removed the restriction of at or below 8000 feet at VANZZ because of a misunderstanding of the climb clearance. We were then given (by PHX Departure) that we had traffic around 2 o'clock. Traffic was in sight and we were climbing around 3000-3500 FPM because we were light. We then received an RA with the traffic; which we complied with; and maintained visual separation. Shortly afterwards; PHX Departure told us that we needed to maintain 8000 feet at VANZZ. We explained that we believed he had given us a clearance to 'climb and maintain' FL210 which removes all restrictions. At that point we realized that we had made a mistake and misinterpreted the 'climb via' clearance.

Air carrier flight crew reported they exceeded an altitude restriction while on the KATMN5 SID.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 48; Flight Crew Total 48; Flight Crew Type 48

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

I was practicing a precision landing on Runway 24. The reported wind at the time was 210/13 G17. At 300 FT the approach was stable on the glideslope and runway centerline with an approach speed of 66 KTS. I continued with the approach and glanced at the wind display on the PFD which indicated a wind of 210/11. Upon landing I touched down; main gear first; on the 1;000 FT markers; and then shortly after the nosewheel touched down; I experienced a gust of wind which lifted the right wing. I used aileron control to try to correct this but was unable to prevent the aircraft exiting the left-hand side of the runway. I applied the brakes but was skidding in the dirt. The aircraft came to rest beside the runway facing a heading of 060. I was able to taxi the aircraft to the parking area.

A PA-28 student pilot lost control of the aircraft after touchdown when a gust lifted the right wing which resulted in the aircraft exiting the runway.