Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Procedure

Myself (PIC-PNF) and my SIC-PF; while operating a CE-560XL; experienced a failure of the right main landing gear to retract after takeoff from ZZZ during a positioning flight to ZZZ1 for an upcoming passenger trip. We diverted to ZZZ2 where the aircraft was placed in maintenance at the Cessna Citation Service Center. Five hours later I received a phone call from my Chief Pilot notifying me that a screwdriver had been found wire-tied to the landing gear mechanism.  Surprised that we had not spotted this during the preflight inspection; my SIC and I went back to the Cessna Service Center to examine the aircraft and talk with the Cessna mechanics to determine what might have happened. I believe I have an explanation for why the screwdriver was overlooked. First; I paid particular attention to the landing gear area; as well as the main cabin door during the preflight; since both those items had been worked on recently; and each had four or five repeat write-ups in the logbook. As is customary after any maintenance action; I am very diligent in ensuring that the aircraft is in a safe condition for flight. I know that my SIC operates the same way; being a qualified Airframe and Powerplant (A/P) mechanic himself. We have flown together numerous times and between the two of us have made a good team in spotting potentially hazardous issues with our aircraft. I didn't feel there was a problem with the landing gear system before operating the aircraft; even though most of my preflight time was focused on the main cabin door. The door hinge was damaged and it took some time in discussion with Maintenance Control; who had to escalate the issue to their supervisor; before they determined that we could operate the aircraft with a damaged main door because they had a 'letter' from Cessna stating that it was okay to operate with a damaged Main Entry Door Hinge Assembly; and that we didn't need any MEL; CDL; Non-Essential Equipment/Furnishings (NEF); Maintenance Carry-Over (MCO); ACI; AIN documentation etc.; for this condition (separate report filed). Because of the time it took dealing with Maintenance regarding the door; we departed seven minutes late. As we were lined up on the runway for departure; we spotted a flock of birds hovering over the runway touchdown zone and received clearance from the Tower to delay our departure until the birds flew away. When it looked like the birds had left; we commenced our takeoff. Just after rotation; however; we noticed a couple of small birds pass beneath us and we made a note to check for signs of a bird strike after landing. During climbout; my SIC/PF became aware of a slight rumbling feeling and the need for a large amount of Left rudder trim. At first we considered the possibility that we had struck a bird; but shortly discovered that the Right-hand Main Landing Gear (MLG) light remained illuminated. All signs now pointed to the right main gear having not retracted. My SIC flew the aircraft; maintaining a speed of under 200kts after trimming the aircraft to compensate for the yaw due to the drag of the extended gear. (Note - Cessna does not have a checklist procedure for this eventuality). Once we had the aircraft safely under control; I telephoned the on-duty Assistant Chief Pilot (ACP) for assistance and had a conversation with the ACP regarding our options.At this point the 'LO BRAKE PRESS' and 'ANTISKID INOP' and flashing Master Caution lights illuminated. The ACP (in conjunction with the Maintenance Director and Dispatch) and I agreed that the safest course of action would be to head north and land at ZZZ2 to take advantage of the better weather available and longer runway options. We were then re-dispatched to ZZZ2 by our Dispatcher. The weather at our departure and original destination and alternate airports was marginal in terms of visibility and ceilings. ZZZ2 had calm winds and higher ceilings and visibility. We had plenty of fuel to reach ZZZ2; so diverting to ZZZ2 was an obvious decision to make. All things being equal; ZZZ2 made for an ideal diversion airport given the availability of a Cessna Maintenance facility that would likely be able to facilitate an expeditious return to service for our aircraft; which would minimize disruption to our owners. The approach and landing at ZZZ2 were uneventful. After we extended the landing gear; the 'LO BRAKE PRESS' and 'ANTISKID INOP' lights extinguished; and we were able to land the aircraft without resorting to use of the emergency braking system; with no need to declare an emergency. During the postflight inspection; my SIC and I spent an especially long time examining the right landing gear area in an effort to determine any likely cause of our problems. He spend some time examining the gear area from the front of the aircraft looking for any signs of a bird strike; of which none could be found. I was on my knees behind the right main landing gear looking up into the wheel-well particularly at the strut to see if I could find anything amiss such as leaks; etc. I did not notice anything amiss in the wheel well; however; I did notice a fresh trail of oily fluid behind the landing gear area on the trailing edge of the flap. I spent more time looking in the wheel-well to see if I could determine the source of the fluid; but I could not. Maintenance Control instructed me to make a separate write-up for the fluid leak. After I had made the necessary write-ups; a Cessna Citation Maintenance Supervisor came out to examine the aircraft. He was aware of the gear problem and the fluid leak. He also spent time examining the landing gear area looking for problems and trying to track down the source of the leak. Neither myself nor my SIC; who were actively looking for problems in the gear area; nor the highly-trained Cessna maintenance expert also looking for problems in the gear area; noticed anything amiss. After a phone call from our Chief Pilot and a picture showing a screwdriver wire-tied into the gear Uplock mechanism; we went back to Cessna to look over the aircraft and speak with the mechanics. The Cessna maintenance supervisor told us that the Cessna mechanics didn't discover the screwdriver until the aircraft was put up on jacks in a brightly-lit hangar. Furthermore; the head of the screwdriver is dark black. When viewed from the rear (the position where I was kneeling when looking into the wheel-well area); that black circle is not something that stands out amongst all the other black parts in the gear area; you'd have to have been looking at the screwdriver from the side in order to discern its yellow body. Even then; the gear Uplock where the screwdriver was wedged is actually above the opening of the wheel-well; which explains why the mechanics spotted it once the aircraft was raised up on jacks; it's a lot easier to see if you're physically inside the wheel-well with your head in the recessed area; looking at it from the right angle. The Cessna Maintenance Supervisor; seemed to be of the opinion that this is not something that would likely be detected in a normal preflight; even if one were focusing attention on the gear area.Maintenance should examine whether wedging a screwdriver into the main landing gear Uplock mechanism and securing it to the Uplock switch with a wire tie is a safe procedure. The maintenance procedure of jamming a screwdriver into a main landing gear uplock mechanism should be modified such that a long; bright red flag be attached to the screwdriver to draw attention to it in the event that the screwdriver is not removed at the completion of the maintenance procedure. Maintenance procedures should include methods to account for all tools used so that all tools present before maintenance commences are accounted for at the completion of the maintenance procedure.

Cessna CE-560XL took off from ZZZ and diverted into ZZZ2 with the following:After takeoff from ZZZ; right landing gear did not retract normally. Right-Hand (RH) gear indicator light remained illuminated; other gear lights extinguished. Noted aircraft vibration and excessive yaw to right. 'LO BRK PRESS' and 'ANTISKID INOP' lights illuminated with flashing Master Caution light.  This aircraft was also previously worked in ZZZ; three days earlier; by Cessna mechanics from ZZZ2 for the following squawk:  In cruise; at FL400 the Main Landing Gear (MLG) Green RH Downlock light came on. It continued to flicker for 45 minutes.  During the same time the 'Low Brake Press' and 'Anti Skid' annunciators flashed on and off.  It stopped for about 15 minutes; then the anomaly occurred again for 20 minutes.  It stopped before descent. Upon inspection by technicians in ZZZ2; they found an awl tie-wrapped to the RH MLG Uplock switch; depressing the switch.  Recommend ensuring proper tools are used for troubleshooting.

A pilot and Maintenance Controller report a Cessna CE-560XL aircraft had diverted after takeoff due to the right main landing gear (MLG) would not retract. Maintenance later found an awl tool tie-wrapped to the RH MLG Uplock switch; that was depressing the switch.


Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Workload

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

First Officer was the pilot flying; I was the pilot not flying. Immediately after rotation we had a single chime accompanied by an 'EFIS COMP MON' caution message. We had taken off Runway 30R; and been given an instruction to fly heading 315. As I was assessing the situation; I saw that the First Officer was turning left to the position of the heading bug on his PFD. My heading bug showed; and logic informed me; that we needed to turn right for a heading of 315. At this point I requested and was given control of the aircraft from the First Officer; as my instrumentation seemed to be correct. We continued to receive a number of heading changes and altitude assignments in a short period of time; so it took a while to verify the proper heading by cross-checking all instruments including the compass. Once on an FMS course; we were able to correct the malfunction; and aircraft control was transferred back to the First Officer. ATC never queried our heading; and we were too busy trying to verify the instrumentation while complying with heading and altitude changes; to inform ATC of the malfunction. Once on course; the flight continued normally. This caution message occurs frequently while operating on the ground in MSP. However; this was the worst error I have seen to date. The time it took to correct was lengthened by the number of additional heading changes we received in a short time period after takeoff. While I think mandating that all takeoffs from MSP be performed in 'DG' mode would be an overreaction; it would probably have prevented the problem. Otherwise; I don't see how we could have avoided this occurrence.

A CRJ200 departed MSP Runway 30R and at rotation CAS alerted EFIS COMP MON; which the crew corrected enroute.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors

I was working AR-V; the final for 26R ATL. We've been using Fusion on final for some time. Today; the LZU ASR feed is in IBI [Interim Beacon Initiative] mode. We were getting a lot of aircraft within 10 miles of the airport jumping; identing; and seeing a lot of false primary targets (that would be there for less than 10 seconds; then disappear). I got Aircraft X in the downwind; and told him 8-10 mile base. He hurried down. I had Aircraft Y fed in the base (too fast; but they were training and it wasn't unworkable). I turned Aircraft X from downwind to base to hit the gap and keep him tight behind his traffic. I waited and waited to see the turn; but didn't. When it was past time to do something; I told him to stop his turn if he hadn't started it. He said he was through a 150 heading. Just after he unkeyed; the tag jumped and showed him southbound. He was in the hole fine; I got Aircraft Y to see the traffic and follow; and all was OK.I said something aloud; and the AR-A controller had been watching the whole thing. I commented something like; 'I must be crazy'; and she said; 'No; I was watching it; I saw the exact same thing'. She commented that she was watching it because it [would create a problem] if the aircraft wasn't turning (exactly why I made the transmission I did). We talked to the third final controller (AR-O); and we all agreed the presentation was unacceptable; and we advised the supervisor on the wall we were going to go to single sensor; ATL ASR on all three final positions.When I got the briefing for the position; the controller on position said there were issues and he was seeing the same thing. He had a lot of histories on his tracks; and you could see them jumping up to .5 miles away from what appeared to be the track the aircraft was taking. I'm all for switching to fusion on final; but when the tags jump this much; it's unacceptable. The replay won't show anything because they look at it on a single sensor (ATL); so it won't see the fused display I was seeing. LZU was brought out of IBI mode as I write this and Tech Ops enabled the Mode-S and then put the finals back on fusion.

While working Final A; I noticed the radar was jumping around more than normal. We were on Fusion which has been known to more noticeably jump than on other sectors. Specifically; I watched two aircraft being worked by Final V. The aircraft on the downwind was turned in front of an aircraft on the base. This operation is normal and usually not a problem. However; it appeared the plane was not turning as directed. The controller questioned the aircraft and instructed the pilot to not turn if he hadn't started the turn already. Then the radar jumped and the aircraft was suddenly squared up on the base. The aircraft was exactly where he was supposed to be and there was no event. This could have led to a serious safety situation. The Final V Controller; the O Controller (the middle final); and I decided to go to single sensor instead of fusion at this moment. To have a radar presentation that is more accurate.

A80 controllers report of using fusion radar on the final sectors.  Controller turns an aircraft into a hole; the aircraft did not turn as the controller thought it would; then jumped showing it on a different then assigned heading.;  The controller had visual separation so all was good separation wise; but didn't like the way the aircraft jumped.  Controller exclaimed and another controller also saw what happened.  Controller thought the jumping of radar targets on final is unacceptable.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security

FD (Flight Deck) door became jammed when CA (Captain) came out to use the lav & would not open. CA had me remove the pin from the inside; he had to rip the door open to gain access to FD. We propped door up in the opening & to ensure it stayed in place for landing I took the beverage 1/2 cart; placed it sideways; with brake on; against the door. The CA was aware & agreed with this decision. We landed safely & without incident.

E170 flight crew reported Flight Deck door malfunctioning in flight.


Challenger Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 92.8; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 96

Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 6500; Flight Crew Type 100

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

[We were] departing TEB Runway 24 via the RUUDY4 departure on the initial climb and course. We were set up for; and had briefed that we would engage the autopilot to fly the RNAV SID. After takeoff and gear up we engaged the autopilot with NAV and VNAV selected and turned the Autothrottle System ON. At the first fix where we were to make a 20 degree turn to the right to intercept the 260 degree course to the next intersection (WENTZ) at 1;500 FT. It was at the unnamed point where we were to turn from 240 to 260 that we recognized that the autopilot was not initiating the turn or level off. The pilot flying disconnected the autopilot and immediately turned the airplane toward the WENTZ Intersection and arrested the climb. At that point we were above 1;500 and near 2;000 FT so he continued to nose over and bank the airplane to get back down to 1;500 FT. At this point ATC was talking to us and giving us instructions to descend to 1;500 [FT] and take up a heading of 280 which we did as promptly and safely as possible.The contributing factors leading up to the event was primarily the failure of both of us to recognize that the FMS was not selected to the right mode of navigation. Thus the autopilot did not fly the prescribed and expected course. The deviation from the departure profile; though caught by both of us relatively quickly; was not easily remedied due to the nature of that section of the departure and the performance of the airplane. To correct the causation of this situation the crew will need to adopt a departure briefing that includes the Navigation Mode of the FMS.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

A CL60 departed on the TEB Runway 24 RUUDY 4 SID but because an incorrect FMS Mode as selected the aircraft did not level at 1;500 FT nor turn to the 260 heading. The pilot flying was correcting as ATC called with a track and descent clearance.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 2500; Flight Crew Type 53

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

I started the engine of a Searey LSA Amphib; picked up the ATIS; asked for my taxi clearance and requested touch and go in the sealane. I was issued a squawk code and cleared to taxi to the runup area. After runup; I contacted ground and was instructed to contact tower which I did. The Tower cleared me for takeoff; left traffic. I took off made left traffic; and was cleared for the option; sealane south. I prepared for and made a normal approach to landing on the sealane. As I was expecting to touchdown on the water; the airplane flipped over and water came in on me. I removed my harness; pushed the hatch back and swam out. Some men on the side of the sealane asked me if anyone else was in the plane. I told them no.  Inadvertently and unintentionally; I did not consult a checklist prior to configuring the aircraft for approach.  After the mishap; the aircraft was floating upside down.  The landing gear were extended.  It is likely I did not raise the landing gear before making a water landing.  As a result of this situation; I have resolved to utilize appropriate checklists no matter the simplicity of or my familiarity with any aircraft. It doesn't take that long and the consequences of failure to do so are potentially serious.

Searey LSA Amphib pilot reported landing on the water with the gear down; causing the aircraft to flip over onto its back.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 31; Flight Crew Total 51; Flight Crew Type 32

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

At XA:10 Local time; I made my communication to enter runway XX at ZZZ. I checked to make sure the runway was clear and there was no traffic inbound for landing that had not communicated on the field frequency. I was practicing a short field takeoff; so I rolled onto the runway without stopping and applied full power and pitched up. After I had rolled about 100 feet; I noticed a small; tricycle gear; experimental aircraft cross the hold short line and pull onto runway YY. I promptly aborted my takeoff and back-taxied to the beginning of the runway and exited on the taxiway. The other pilot also turned around and exited the runway. I taxied back across the hold short line and turned my aircraft around. I then attempted to radio and communicate on [frequency] to talk to the other aircraft and coordinate an order of departure. I made several calls and eventually they communicated on the radio. Their signal was somewhat broken; but we were able to resolve the scenario and safely coordinate who would take off first. The pilot of the experimental aircraft insisted that I take the runway and depart and first and apologized for entering the active runway without communicating. No injuries or damage occurred. The entire event could have been avoided by the pilot of the experimental aircraft listening to and communicating on the field frequency and looking for traffic on the runway before crossing the hold short line.

Pilot reported on take off roll he saw another aircraft opposite direction cross the hold short line and attempt to line up.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

We were on a visual approach to Runway XX at ZZZ.  During the approach we received a GPWS Caution 'Terrain' or 'Too Low Terrain' just after the '500 ft stable' call. As the PM (Pilot Monitoring); I failed to call for a go-around.  The PF (Pilot Flying); Captain completed the approach and landing uneventfully. Everything about the approach was normal and I have seen it many times in my 3 years here. PF was stable at 100 ft above field elevation as well as at 500 ft above field elevation; the only exception was that the winds that had recently shifted and gusting were causing the airspeed to deviate by plus or minus 10 knots; but not dramatically.  The fact that we were visual with the runway; on path and speed and properly configured; made the GPWS caution surprise me. After hearing it; I reverified that we were within all our approach criteria and it appeared safe so I did not call for the go around. However; being that it was not day VMC; I should have called it. In the future I will be sure to comply with the GPWS alert immediately and call for the go-around.

B757 Captain reported a GPWS warning on final approach and elected to continue to land instead of calling for a go around.


B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 132; Flight Crew Total 14429; Flight Crew Type 1047

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 166; Flight Crew Total 9724; Flight Crew Type 558

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe

After normal touchdown; tower told us to use Taxiway Y to exit the runway followed by another instruction to expedite due to traffic on short final. I immediately increased our speed but had to slow to make the 90 degree turn onto Taxiway Y; just as we were making the turn tower instructed [aircraft on final] to go around.

Upon arrival we were cleared for approach and landing. The Captain was flying. We configured for Flaps 30; Brakes 3. We landed before sunrise. Weather was partly cloudy. Taxiway X; the midfield highspeed exit; was closed and barricaded for construction. There was no reference to the closure mentioned on the ATIS. We were NOT notified that the spacing with the aircraft behind us was an issue. Approach and landing were uneventful. During roll out deceleration was normal. We approached the intersection of taxiway X at approximately 80Kts with the autobrakes OFF. Just prior to our arrival at Taxiway X; the tower advised us to expedite to Taxiway Y and exit the runway. We discussed that Taxiway X was closed; we saw the barricades and red lights as we approached Taxiway X. We proceeded to Taxiway Y. However; the distance between Taxiway X and Taxiway Y is significant. We adjusted safely speed to expedite our exit at Taxiway Y. As we approached Taxiway Y we heard the tower advise [aircraft on final] to go around. We exited the runway at Taxiway Y and taxied to the gate.

B787 flight crew reported being told by Tower to expedite their exit off the runway well into their landing roll. Aircraft on final behind them was issued a go-around.


Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft

An unusual TCAS indication on the takeoff roll resulted in aborted takeoff but this indication only lasted a couple of seconds. This situation resulted in aborted takeoff for safety consideration. Came back to Runway 26L and made normal departure to ZZZ airport.

Pilot reported an unusual TCAS indication on takeoff roll resulting in an aborted takeoff.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 2190; Flight Crew Type 2184

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

I was approaching FNL from the southeast with the intention to land. When 10 miles out and at pattern altitude; I called the temporary Tower to report my position and intentions. I was instructed to report 4 miles out. When 4 miles out; I reported and was instructed to enter the midfield left downwind for Runway 15. I was also informed to look for departing traffic headed to the northwest. Suddenly; my ADS-B traffic alerted me to traffic at same altitude; same position. I saw a low wing aircraft at the top left of my windscreen headed for me. The other pilot dived and passed approximately 300 feet under me and continued seemingly barely missing two water towers seemingly flying between them.  It should be noted that the tower at FNL is temporary and has no current access to radar but relies on visual observation from the ground level. Though; radar has been installed; it has not been certified for almost a year now due to FAA imposed Covid restrictions. Seems to me that having radar access would have avoided this situation and not having radar is likely to lead to similar such close calls.

GA Single Pilot reported an NMAC event with departure traffic while entering landing pattern. The temporary Tower without radar access was a contributing factor.


When the decision was made to divert the aircraft we were sent an amended release; which I accepted. But we never were sent NOTAMs or weather. The opinion that I get on the line is that we are very quick to make decisions to move aircraft and then once the aircraft is on the ground; 'Well; everything worked out fine. What's the next crisis.' How is it that we can divert an aircraft but there is no internal process that must be completed before the final decision is made? Why; in this day and age of electronics; do we rely on the Captain in an often times very dynamic environment; having to go through a mental checklist to make sure everyone else has done their jobs? Our Dispatchers are responsible for multiple flights and it is not any more reasonable to expect them to mentally remember everything that must be accomplished to divert an aircraft. Why doesn't it work more like this: 'Captain; this is your Dispatcher. There is discussion that the company wants to you to divert to ZZZ. I am sending you the NOTAMS; field weather; en route weather; anticipated flight routing and fuel burn. I have already reviewed all and the field conditions and they are... and I do not see any safety issues with the possible divert. No alternate is required. After you look over the information let me know your thoughts so we can jointly agree; or not agree to divert the flight to ZZZ.'

Air carrier Captain asked for more efficient and helpful input from the company when a divert decision is made.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew; Person Passenger

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

I was performing the inflight beverage service on a mildly bumpy flight from to LGA. The pilots had informed us we should be aware but no severe turbulence was expected. I got to row 18; served the CD side cups of coffee and was preparing to move to row 19 when there was a loud bang and the plane dropped. I flew up and hit the ceiling. I do not recall the moment of impact but this was relayed by the passengers to me after the fact. The cart topper and beverages went everywhere. I managed to get myself wedged between two seats on the ground as the plane dropped again. At this point the pilots called back to check on us. The other Flight Attendant answered that call and made an announcement indicating that the bumps would continue but should lessen in a few minutes. Once they did; I got up and finished the service while checking on the passengers. I specifically asked the couple in 18CD if they needed ice or medical attention as I had just given them coffee when the bumps hit. They declined. I made it back to the front of the aircraft where I told the other FA (Flight Attendant) what happened. Shortly thereafter I also notified the flight deck of my situation. They asked if we needed to divert; as I was still feeling the adrenaline I declined. They insisted I fill out the OJI (On the Job Injury) form when we landed which I planned to do anyways. The other FA also walked through the cabin several times to help me ensure all passengers were ok. Once we landed; I did go out on OJI.Unexpected severe turbulence caused the plane to drop about 200 ft. or so rapidly.

A Flight Attendant reported she was injured in turbulence while performing duties.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Agents filled seats X2 and X5 with upgrades on flight that wasn't full. Per social distancing guidelines these seats should have remained empty.

Flight Attendant reported that agents filled seats that; per social distancing guidelines; should have remained empty.


Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning; Design

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft

Our maintenance organization is based overseas. We had encountered 6 serviceable magneto failures - the latest was a twin mag failure - the pilot landed the aircraft just short of a runway and no damage to the aircraft and the pilot. Upon examination of the records I discovered that the aircraft engine had 30 hours since major overhaul - in theory the mags are new. Examining the other mag failure of the previous incidents demonstrated that those failures had taken place well within time life limits of the components.  Looking into those facts it appeared to me that the mag failure is attributed to heat - we removed 2 perfectly airworthy mags and requested a magneto shop to run them for few hours- the first mag failed after an hour or so and the second failed 5 min later. Corresponding to the flight time of the twin mag failure aircraft.  It appears that once the mag reach certain temperature a breakdown of the internal insulation take place - further investigation of records show that whilst the mags are new in the context of unused - yet they are old Russian military stock. I presume that calendar life of the materials used had been exceeded.  The aircraft Yak 52 is an old Russian military trainer that can perform basic aerobatic and has the appearance of a war bird hence its attractiveness - it is used by the owners generally for short duration flight (up to an hour or so)- hence the low reporting - the mags don't get hot enough for the breakdown to surface.  We raised a report with the UK CAA - and requested them to alert the industry- the above constitutes a real risk to human life - so far they had failed to notify the international community. As many Yak 52 aircraft are flying globally and under different registration including the N reg - and as the risk to life is real could you please advise us as how to progress our attempt to inform the global GA community on your platform.

Technician reported several instances of magneto failure causing engine shutdowns.


Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

At about 4;000 FT in the initial climb the rudder trim went full left uncommanded causing the plane to yaw. The Captain then tried to correct and then the rudder trim went full right uncommanded. We immediately notified ATC and returned to our departure airport. The Captain was the pilot flying and the autopilot was not engaged.

The reporter clarified his report to advise the full scale deflections were 'momentary' and stated he 'believed' there was an actual full scale deflection of both the rudder trim indices and the rudder trim itself but was unable to describe the actual flight control response and the opposing input required by the Captain (the pilot flying) to maintain an in trim condition.

The flight crew of a CRJ-700 returned to their departure airport after experiencing uncommanded full travel rudder trim to both the left and right.


Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

We were cleared to land on Runway 6 in TEB. The pilot flying landed the plane allowing the crew to take an exit on Taxiway Bravo. The clearance was; 'Turn left on Taxiway Bravo and hold short of Runway 1.' As we exited Runway 6 and were pulling up to hold short of Runway 1; the crew realized the separation between the clear line of Runway 6 and the hold short line of Runway 1 was minimal and too short for the plane to be clear of Runway 6. By the time I was able to apply full brakes and stop; the midpoint of the aircraft crossed the hold short line of Runway 1. There was an aircraft that had been cleared for takeoff on Runway 1 and due to our deviation; the departure clearance was canceled.I highly suggest that this taxi clearance be avoided in all circumstances. I think that anytime there is an airplane on Runway 1 that Taxiway Bravo shall not be used for aircraft exiting Runway 6. ATC should instruct all operations to taxi to the end of the runway and told to hold short of Runway 1. If Taxiway Bravo is to be used; the instructions should say; 'Turn left on Taxiway Bravo and cleared to cross Runway 1.' There should never be a clearance to hold short of Runway 1 because it is physically impossible for any aircraft to be fully clear of Runway 6 and to hold short of Runway 1. The distance is less than 3 feet between the two lines.

Civil Jet landing Runway 6 at TEB was instructed to turn off at Taxiway B and to hold short of Runway 1. During the attempt to clear the landing runway the flight crew crossed the hold lines for Runway 1 causing an aborted takeoff.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

This report is related to a safety concern over mPilot training and information in the Training Bulletin. In the spirit of potential safety problems; this report is being submitted.First and foremost; the mPilot training that was issued as a CBT was good; but did not cover much of the information listed on the 16 question test required by the company at it's completion. An example is a question relating to where to find the ARINC map in the mPilot app. This information is crucial; and is not covered in the CBT. It could be the difference between making a prudent informed decision regarding an ill or dying passenger with medlink and making a poor uninformed decision. This is just one example.Along the same lines; the training bulletin published by the company makes reference to time critical information that takes several steps to locate within the app. One example is the Inoperative Component Table for adjusting approach minimums. If you follow the guidance of the Training Bulletin; it takes at least six steps to locate this time critical information. Another example is the Cold Temperature Correction Table. It takes several steps to reach; can be bookmarked; but will drop the bookmark if there is a revision to the cycle. Filing for an Alternate info also suffers from complicated steps to locate it as does the aforementioned ARINC frequency map.In addition to all of this; as we all know the Lido product is complete with a reinvention of charting philosophy; location of pertinent info; phraseology; different terms (as mentioned in the same training bulletin); and new acronyms that in some cases have different meanings than their Jeppessen counterparts. I'm trying to picture some of our new hires and current pilots navigating this product based on the company's provided training and it is unnerving. Even our most professional and seasoned pilots will balk at finding some need-to-know information.Let's not have another flight ops 'hiccup'. It's one thing to have software that may cause delays or cancellations and an airplane stuck at the gate. It's quite another to have 'hiccups' in pilot tools and resources to be used from the time the plane pushes back to when it parks again. Please reevaluate the product's navigability and the training involved in validating pilots.

Air carrier pilot stated that the training provided by the company for the new Lido app for the iPad; was inadequate and that critical information often requires too many keystrokes to bring up.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 57; Flight Crew Total 5169; Flight Crew Type 320

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft X was prepared for and flown on an Avionics Validation flight; after installation of an STEC 3100 Autopilot system. The validation flight was required after installation by the STEC 3100 according to the installation directions to validate operation of the system. This aircraft's POH and instruments are calibrated in MPH as the primary reference.During this flight; the aircraft suffered a dual engine loss-of-power due to fuel starvation. Aircraft was recovered normally.Mission planning was completed; including review of flight requirements; weather; NOTAMs; calculation of take-off and landing data; and planned flight profile. The aircraft POH was reviewed and a flight data/line-up card with critical and operational information for this aircraft from the POH was prepared. Pilot used Twin Cessna Type Group Risk Assessment tools (TTCF FRAT); as well as FAA Handbook H-8083-2 Risk Management and ADM tools for mission planning. Pilot did a complete cockpit orientation using the POH.Fuel was checked during planning. The main (tip) tanks were physically checked and appeared to be 2/3 full; which corresponded with the indicated gauge readings of 200# of fuel; the aux (wing) tanks were also physically checked and appeared to be full to the filler necks; corresponding with the approximately indicated 120# of fuel. The aircraft is placarded at 50 gallons in the main (tip) tanks; approximately 300#; and 20 gallons in the aux (wing) tanks; approximately 120#. Total fuel was planned at 640#; with a 150# reserve (60 minutes of fuel at 65% power - 147pph; 2450 RPM; 20' MP at 10;000'; this is a conservative approach based on a higher power rather than 20'; 2300rpm and 133 pph).Mission planning was based on a 65% power profile; with intermittent use of 75% power; a 160pph fuel burn for the entire was used for calculations; in excess of the 147 pph in the POH for 65% power. Effective flight time was planned at 3.0 hours; based on 490# of fuel available at 160 pph.Preflight was ref the POH; all lights and systems were ops checked. 2 qts of Phillips XC 20W50 oil was added to the left engine to bring oil level to 11 qts (12 qts total). No leaks or abnormal issues were noted in the preflight. Fuel gauges appeared to operate normally with previously stated fuel levels.Engine start and ground operations were normal and in accordance with both the POH and owner supplied checklist(s); additionally; the Pilot referenced additional Twin Cessna Type Association recommended checks and pre-takeoff reviews (Go/No-Go criteria; abort criteria and steps; engine failure on Takeoff steps; etc...).Takeoff was normal at approximately XA15 hours local; with aircraft achieving Go/No-Go check speed early (75% of calculated takeoff speed in under 50% of calculated takeoff roll). Engine indications were nominal; and performance was nominal. Aircraft gear retraction and clean-up was normal. A VFR departure was initiated; climb profile was set to 10;500 and engine and aircraft performance was normal within POH parameters.The working area was visually cleared; with ADS-B monitoring confirmed; and monitoring of Departure frequency for situational awareness. Area work was commenced after clearing turns and referencing the STEC checklist. Fuel at commencement of area work was approximately 180# per side; with mains selected. Area work progressed uneventfully; with normal aircraft and engine performance. Area work took longer than planned; requiring approximately 60 minutes to complete.At approximately XB:20 hours local; an IFR pickup was made with Approach to conduct the remaining flight requirements (A VOR approach; an ILS approach; an RNAV approach). Systems checks were normal; fuel indicated approximately 120# per side; as expected based on preflight fuel calculations and the flight parameters used to that point. 20'; 2300rpm and 130pph was set inbound for cruise.Inbound to the VOR; AUX tanks were selected; the AUX Tank indicator lights illuminated as expected; and the fuel indicators reflected AUX fuel loads of approximately 120#. Pilot used the tank gauge select switch to check MAIN fuel levels; which were also at 120#. Weather was checked using ATIS; showing approached to RWY XX. Pilot executed a check for arrival; and a check to review the approach. Missed approach instructions back to Radar were obtained.The VOR RWY XX approach was flown inbound. Approaching the Final Approach Fix (FAF); Pilot selected MAIN tanks; the AUX tank lights went out as expected; and Mains showed approximately 150# of fuel as expected (excess fuel from the engines cycles into the MAIN tanks from the AUX tanks). Aircraft was configured normally with Gear; 15' flaps; and lights. Pilot conducted a GUMPS check confirming Gas (Mains and adequate fuel); Undercarriage (Three green); Mixture (full rich - Pilot also confirmed EGTs and CHTs in lower range); Prop (prop full forward and matched without prop synch); and Speeds (120 kts on final approach).Approach and subsequent missed approach were normal. Aircraft cleaned up and accelerated normally in all respects. At level off; Pilot selected AUX tanks to continue fuel management and transfer usable fuel to Mains. AUX tanks indicated approximately 115# each side; and AUX tank lights illuminated normally. Mains checked at approximately 130# each side. 22'; 2400rpm and full rich was set. Vectors to an ILS RWY X (opposite direction) were requested and approved; [arrival] and [approach] checks were accomplished as before. During vectors; assigned 7500 until established on the ILS; RPM was reduced to 2100-2150 to reduce speed for approach. On the final vector to final; RPM was increased to 2400 to check and maintain airspeed.On final; outside of the final approach fix; and prior to configuration; with the localizer course aligned; and prior to glideslope intercept (GS live but not descending) the aircraft was being slowed to configuration speed; airspeed was approximately 140 mph (Flap limiting airspeed for 15 flaps is 180; for gear and full flaps 160). Aux tanks were still selected; normal technique is to select mains prior to configuring as on VOR 21. Aircraft was on Autopilot to validate STEC 3100 operation on an ILS.Fuel indications at this time on AUX tanks was 50# right (approximately 10 gallons) and 80# left (approximately 13 gallons). Engines were set at approximately 22' of MP; with RPM approximately 2400; and mixture was still rich from the last approach; and radar pattern operations.At this point; pilot sensed yaw to the left developing. Pilot cross-checked engine instruments and saw left RPM had decreased to 1700 rpm; and left fuel flow was decreasing; Oil temp; oil pressure; and CHT's were all in normal range. Pilot cross checked airspeed and found it decaying but above blue line of 116mph; due to the loss-of-power on the left engine. Pilot notified the passenger (the Avionics Repairman);' We're losing a motor'.The aircraft at this time started to rapidly enter a left wing low; nose low; left yaw attitude.Pilot toggled off the autopilot and yaw dampener; and initiated the single engine loss recovery procedure by simultaneously raising the left wing to a minimum 5' bank to the RIGHT; applying ½ ball rudder trim with rudder pedals; and selecting full power; full prop; and mixture full rich (3-full-forward).The aircraft achieved level flight; and descent was checked; airspeed had decayed from 140 mph to approximately 120 mph; with an altitude loss of approximately 100'; and a heading change of 20' to the left of ILS course.At this point; the right engine suffered a loss of power; with RPM decreasing. The aircraft yawed heavily to the right; with a corresponding rapid right wing drop and rapid nose drop; due to the power loss on the right engine with left engine loss controls input.Pilot checked power-pitch-mixture full forward and leveled the wings. Pilot verbalized 'Pitch to 120' to obtain an airspeed above blue line. At this point; Pilot made a rapid radio call. 'Tower; TA we lost both motors'. Pilot initiated this radio call to notify Approach of the situation; and to initiate an increased level of monitoring; due to the low altitude and surrounding terrain. The call to 'Tower' was in error.Pilot then pitched to maintain flying airspeed above 'blue line'; airspeed had decreased to approximately 110 knots. Pilot regained airspeed of 120 mph; with a loss of 100 additional feet. Pilot simultaneously initiate main.During this time; Approach made a radio inquiry; Pilot requested that they 'Stand-By'Upon selecting the right tank to main; the right engine recovered full power and momentarily drove the aircraft towards a left roll; left yaw; nose down attitude. Pilot initiated a left wing up attitude to counter the forces while simultaneously selecting left tank to main. The right engine recovered full power and the Pilot recovered the aircraft to level; full power flight.Pilot then recovered to 140 MPH; recovered to being on localizer course (from ½ dot right); and to FAF/GS intercept altitude. Pilot did this to ensure operations within protected airspace; and to fully utilize course and GS information for safety.Total altitude loss was approximately 300' during this incident; with airspeed decaying during the loss of the RIGHT engine to approximately 109 mph; below VYse but above best Single Engine ANGLE of climb (108); recommended single engine speed (105) and minimum single engine control speed (86).Total duration of the incident was less than 30 seconds; from first indication until full two-engine recovery.Pilot then notified approach that power had been restored and that the aircraft would continue the approach. Approach switched aircraft to Tower. Pilot initiated a normal configuration for the approach; and flew the ILS - opposite direction to the localizer MDA.Tower asked if Pilot 'required services'; Pilot stated no; power was restored. Tower asked if Pilot would be making the approach a full-stop. Pilot declined; due to the approach being an opposite direction approach; and there being a tailwind. Pilot chose not to accomplish a circling approach due to the lack of daylight; and not having briefed the circling approach.Pilot executed the assigned missed approach back to radar and requested the RNAV RWY XX with a turn in holding. Pilot requested this to allow for a cockpit and systems check in controlled airspace; without rushing; to ensure that all systems were in order.Pilot and Passenger reviewed appropriate checklists and used the time on vectors to ZZZZ1 to run checklists and make initial assessments. Pilot made an initial assessment that the cause of the power loss was likely fuel starvation from the AUX tanks; despite the AUX tanks showing 75# left and 60# right. main tanks at this time showed approximately 150# each side.Pilot ran fuel calculations and determined that sufficient fuel remained in main tanks to permit a normal approach and landing. Pilot checked all CBs and switches; and confirmed all systems appeared to operational and with normal function.With the systems confirmed; Pilot ran [arrival] and [approach] checks for the RNAV RWY XX approach. Pilot requested to proceed directly inbound rather than execute the turn in holding; since the desired systems checks and prep for landing had been accomplished.Approaching the Final Approach Fix; Pilot extended gear; the right main gear was perceived as slow to extend; Pilot checked the bulb; which tested good; and stated; 'We've got a bad gear' to the Avionics Technician; and recycled the gear for a good down-and-locked indication. Pilot may have inadvertently keyed the mic when discussing gear with the Avionics Technician. Pilot reported Final Approach fix with gear for a full stop RWY XX. Approach and landing were uneventful.On shutdown; AUX tanks continued to indicate 80# left (13 gallons) and 60# right (10 gallons); physical check of these tanks showe

Cessna 310 pilot reported that both engines failed sequentially after the pilot left the fuel selector on AUX tanks during an approach. Pilot stated that after switching back to MAIN fuel tanks; power was restored in one engine and a single-engine approach was continued to landing.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

About 110 northwest of ZZZ; Center Controller asked us to descend to FL360. I asked if pilot discretion ok. Controller said descend now to FL390; then pilot discretion to FL360. PF (Pilot Flying) started to descend; and Controller asked us to descend through FL400 within 4 minutes. I acknowledged that request; and PF set up a descent which would have us through FL400 in about 3 minutes. After 1.5 minutes; Controller requested us again to be through FL400 in 2 minutes. I replied; 'No problem.' Then he requested us to cross 90 miles west of ZZZ at FL300. As I was entering the restriction in the FMC (Flight Management Computer) the Controller said turn left 20 degrees for spacing; and then asked us if there was a problem. I did not realize that he was referring to the 90 mile crossing restriction. I thought he was still talking about the requirement to be at FL400 within the original 4 minute limit; and we were through FL400 and leveling at FL390; so I responded with; 'No problem.' He then asked if we could still make the restriction of 90 west of ZZZ. I told him I did not know as we were on a heading of 20 degrees left. He then cleared us direct ZZZ. We were now approximately 93 miles west of ZZZ at FL390; so I told him that now that we were direct and only a couple of miles from ZZZ; that we could not make the restriction. He then said; 'That's why I asked you if there was a problem.' We had thought when he asked us that question he was still talking about if we could make the FL400 restriction in 4 minutes. He then said to descend to FL300 now; and told us that he was referring to the FL300 altitude as he had conflicting traffic. I told him I was sorry for the misunderstanding and confusion and that we were now level at FL300.A misunderstanding between the Controller and the two pilots; of the altitude requirements due to the Controller turning us to a heading on descent; which then removes the crossing restriction. Then clearing us direct to ZZZ and requiring us to meet that same restriction when we were too close to possibly make the restriction. As well as a total misunderstanding between the Controller and the pilots of which part of the descent restrictions he was referring to when he asked us if there was a problem. Controller more clearly defining what he was referring to when he asked us if there was a problem. Pilots ensuring what the Controller was referring to when he asked if there was a problem.

CE750 pilot reported misunderstanding ATC instructions and missing altitude requirements.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft X [requested priority handling] while enroute to KTN from an airport in the lower-48. The pilot reported a loss of navigational avionics including the heading indicator; and could navigate solely by compass heading. Using a series of no-gyro vectors; I attempted to guide the aircraft over the airport in order to establish visual contact with the ground to allow for a visual approach or cancellation of IFR. Without the use of navigational equipment; I assumed that all instrument approach procedures would be impossible.During the initial vectoring; the pilot reported a momentary loss of engine power. He was able to restart the engine; which remained functional for the duration of the flight. When the pilot was over the airport at the minimum IFR altitude but could not make visual contact; I guided him to an area with a lower MIA in the hope that he would find visual conditions. After a descent in the lower MIA area; he indicated he was beneath the cloud layer and I gave him further instructions based on the aircraft being in VMC even though he had not cancelled IFR. This included allowing the pilot to continue a descent below the MIA while I continued a series of no-gyro vectors utilizing the terrain map on my display. I attempted to keep the aircraft over the water while maneuvering to enter the Tongass Narrows from the north. This stretch of water leads directly to the airport and is regularly used by VFR traffic operating locally. While maneuvering; the pilot lost visual contact with land. I issued a climb instruction to regain the MIA altitude; 060; over the airport in order to recover adequate separation from the terrain. Shortly thereafter; with the pilot level at 060 and flying over the airport; a Company A pilot [in] Aircraft Y called on frequency with weather information and indicated he could see the aircraft as it passed overhead. Additionally; a local frequent flyer; Aircraft Z; was instructed possibly by KTN FSS to abandon its VFR approach to Runway 11 and continue southeast toward the aircraft [with priority handling] and [to] join my frequency. I utilized that aircraft as an airborne spotter to aid in guiding Aircraft X into the airport from the south below the MIA.At this time; the pilot of Aircraft X advised he had approximately 13 gallons of fuel remaining and was exhausting it at a rate of 18 gallons per hour. Given the limited fuel quantity; lack of navigational options; and uncertain weather; I determined I would have to take the aircraft on the most expedient path to the airport. The pilot of Aircraft Z was VMC in the same area; having climbed from less than 1;000 ft. north of Runway 11 to nearly 4;000 ft. all while over terrain. Depictions on the Company A RNAV M 29 approach plate indicated that the terrain was no higher than 3;000 ft. in the area Aircraft X needed to fly across in order to reach the airport. Using the information provided by Aircraft Y; Aircraft Z; and the approach plate; I felt it was the last reasonable option to guide Aircraft X north toward the airport; over terrain at 4;000 ft.Aircraft Z established visual contact with Aircraft X about 10 miles south of the airport and remained in close proximity. The pilot of Aircraft X reported the airport in sight while heading north over Gravina Island near Nichols Passage and Blank Inlet at about 4000 ft. Shortly thereafter; we received confirmation from KTN FSS that the aircraft had landed safely on Runway 29.I am not sure there is much I could recommend that would prevent future [priority handling] of this type. It is not uncommon for pilots to encounter difficulty in Southeast Alaska; particularly those unfamiliar with Alaska flying. Perhaps more robust outreach to pilots from the lower-48 concerning the multitude of factors that present greater risk in the area is warranted. Weather; procedural and service limitations; lack of suitable landing sites; and the need for greater safety margins could all be presented to summerleisure flyers who visit our airspace.The pilot of Aircraft X performed incredibly well during a challenging situation. The pilots of Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z were crucial to my situational awareness and contributed directly to the successful resolution of this incident. KTN FSS and my colleagues at ZAN provided timely and useful assistance. All are to be recognized and commended for their efforts.

ZAN Controller reported providing vectors to an IFR aircraft that after losing its navigational avionics; experienced a temporary engine failure; and was also low on fuel.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Departing TEB Runway 24 on the RUUDY 4 departure; the pilot flying began a left turn at approximately 400 FT AGL; following the command bars. The pilot not flying questioned the reason for the turn and the pilot flying began a turn back to the desired course. The heading change was about 20 degrees to the left before it was reversed. ATC questioned the reason for the left turn; and the pilot not flying replied that it was a mistake. The flight continued to it's destination without further difficulty. Upon arrival at the destination line service advised that ATC wanted a phone call to discuss our TEB departure. The PIC made the call and was advised of a possible pilot deviation. PIC notified the Assistant Chief Pilot of the event. FMS vertical and lateral modes were verified as per checklist requirements prior to departure; with LNAV selected. Pilots must have a mental picture of the departure profile to prevent course deviations in the event of erroneous flight guidance information.

FMS vertical and lateral modes were checked as per checklist prior to departure; with LNAV selected departing TEB Runway 24 on the RUUDY 4 departure. After takeoff; climbing through 400 FT; the command bars indicated a left turn. The command bars were initially followed. Pilot not flying questioned the turn and the pilot flying quickly returned to the desired course. The heading change was about 20 degrees to the left before it was reversed. ATC questioned the reason for the turn; and the pilot not flying replied that it was a mistake. The flight continued to its destination without further difficulty. Upon arrival at our destination; line service advised that ATC wanted a phone call to discuss the event. PIC called ATC and notified the Assistant Chief Pilot of the event.

A First Officer mistakenly followed a flight director left turn command after a TEB Runway 24 RUUDY 4 takeoff; but the Captain alerted him so that he turned to the correct heading as ATC took note of the error.


Workload; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Confusion; Distraction; Workload; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

During descent to Airport ZZZ; weather was reported as 200 OVC 1/4 mile visibility. NOTAMS indicated TDZ RVR OTS. Crew discussed CAT I minimums and the fact that there was no mid RVR but rollout RVR was reporting between 1800-2200 RVR at various checks. Captain was Pilot Monitoring (PM)/ First Officer was Pilot Flying (PF).  Late in descent; Dispatch sent a message that other aircraft had not gotten in; but were trying again. They also changed our alternate from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2 and we did not receive fuel plan of 3;700 pounds burn until below 5000 feet. We had sufficient fuel to fly the approach; missed approach and divert and arrive at ZZZ2 with 5;000 pounds. Approach was stable; the missed was well flown and ATC coordinated divert. Low altitude easterly profile awaiting climb clearance; strong headwinds enroute; along with cruise altitude hold down due to moderate turbulence all contributed to higher than planned fuel burn. Plus ZZZ2 was in single runway operations to Runway XY. Enroute we requested ATC shortcuts; and advised Center that we would be minimum fuel by the time we got to Approach. Our projected on deck fuel was now 4;300 pounds. When [Approach] asked us to descend to 3000 feet; vector off course and slow to 170 knots while we were still 22 miles from the field; I [notified ATC of our low] fuel to expedite handling. They cleared us to land and we were on deck with 4;300 pounds.Forecast visibility would have been suitable for the approach but with TDZ RVR OTS; Crews were left few options.  The late change in alternate compounded late arrival flight deck tasks. Dispatch comments regarding other Company aircraft attempting the approach gave Crew mixed signals. A review of airport configuration when no mid RVR is available.

Weather was forecast to be IFR but not near minimums. Alternate on release was Airport ZZZ1. At cruise we received word that weather was down to CAT I minimums. RVR 2800 V 4000. We elected to continue and to monitor the weather as it was above minimums and forecast to be better upon our arrival. Prior to descent the weather was now '' mile and RVR 2000; still above minimums of 1800. The ILS to Runway XY was planned and briefed based on similar weather. During descent we were informed by Dispatch that a Company aircraft had gone around at ZZZ and was going to try the approach again. This gave us the indication that they must have felt it was borderline to try another approach. We never heard back from Dispatch as to whether that aircraft diverted or not (they did). Dispatch did ask us to change our divert destination to ZZZ2. They gave us a fuel burn to ZZZ2 of 3;700 (vs 2;500 for ZZZ1). Our fuel state had us projected to be at the FAF with approximately 9;000 pounds of fuel. We accepted the new divert based on the 3;700. Also during the approach we were informed that the TDZ RVR at ZZZ was not working and that the Rollout RVR was the only available RVR for reporting. It was reporting 2000 RVR. Since ZZZ does not have a mid RVR we assumed that this would be adequate to shoot the approach; however; the FOM does not address this issue. Only that the mid can be substituted for TDZ for CAT I Approaches. It is not clear what to do if the airport does not have a mid to substitute. The resulting approach was uneventful and stable and we went missed approach at the DH as we never broke out. The go-around and re-filing with ATC were fairly uneventful; however; the standard routing to the southwest was used which has you climb due east and cruise at 8000 feet to 10;000 feet MSL for approximately 20 miles before turning towards the destination. As we climbed up we were capped at FL300 due to traffic. Our fuel projection showed 4;700 at ZZZ2. Despite our best efforts to shorten the distance flown and stress our lower than normal fuel state we were continuing to drive our fuel state at ZZZ2 down to the low 4;000 range (from 4;100 to 4;300). There was a 50-60 knot headwind on the arrival even down as low as 10;000 feet MSL and were not sure if Dispatch's 3;700 fuel estimate took that into account. During approach maneuvering with Approach we explained our fuel state and were told we were number one for the runway at approximately 30 miles out and sent direct to the field. When asked how much fuel we had in minutes we answered 'one hour' as at the time we had approximately 5;000 pounds of fuel on board. Soon thereafter (at approximately 20 miles out) we were then vectored off the direct course and told to descend and slow. At this point our fuel projection dropped below 4;000 at which time we [notified ATC of our low] fuel and were given priority handling and sent directly to the runway. We landed with 4;300 pounds of fuel and were asked to call Approach after we blocked in. The Captain called and talked to a Supervisor. I was not privy to the conversation other than that the 'one hour' estimate was confusing to them. Apparently they were satisfied with our explanation as to what happened.Better coordination with Dispatch on divert information and planning; we might have been able to make a quicker divert decision; had the projection for fuel burn been more accurate. We were never sent a divert plan ACARS from Dispatch. Just two messages one saying 'want to change divert to ZZZ1'; and; another a few minutes later saying 'fuel to ZZZ1 3;700.' Divert plan information should also include routing used and attitude we should plan for (conservative estimates of course). Also; if FOM prohibits shooting approach without the TDZ RVR at ZZZ; then this should be clearly stated somewhere so that both Dispatch and the Crew are aware and can plan accordingly.

A B737 crew executed a missed approach because of lowering visibility. Dispatch revised the alternate airport to further away but with sufficient fuel the crew headed toward it. Enroute higher than forecasted winds made alternate arrival fuel lower than forecasted.


Person Manipulating Controls (UAS); Remote PIC (UAS)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days (UAS) 3; Flight Crew Total (UAS) 3; Flight Crew Type (UAS) .25

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fly Away (UAS); Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Lost / Unrecoverable (UAS); Aircraft Lost Link (UAS)

I performed my pre-flight check before flying the Mavic 2 Pro drone. My mission was to capture photos from each corner of the property and over the swimming pool area. My usual pre-flight check list before every flight is:1. Check for any airspace restrictions; TFR; NFLZ; any max altitude requirements; etc.2. Request approval with FAA if my location would be in any controlled airspace (my location was not in controlled airspace).3. Be sure all 4 propellers are secure and not damaged.4. Battery is fully charged.5. Check for any magnetic interference.6. Set my RTH.7. Make sure drone is connected to controller.8. Be sure my remote pilot license and current certificates are on or next to me before flying.9. Take off and hover drone to about 5 feet and check that all controls are functioning.10. Fly mission.I recalibrate the drone after about every 6 to 8 flights. This was my 6th flight before I would recalibrate again before the next flight or two.Before taking off; the property manager and I had people that were swimming in the pool move to a covered area temporarily for their safety.The property manager was not part of the mission and not a VO (visual Observer). I performed my pre-flight check; and I began my mission and captured a couple of photos of the swimming pool area first at 380 feet or 116 meters directly above the pool. I was controlling the drone from the ground inside the pool area.Next; I flew the drone South to the back of the property to take pictures of the playground area. As I was flying the drone to where I wanted to go; the property manager watched over my shoulder at my controller screen to see the view of the property. Once I flew over the playground; I yawed the drone 180 degrees to frame up the playground in my camera with the rest of the property. At this point; the drone was hovering at 357 feet (109 meters) above a wide open area of land with trees with the camera pointing North West. I took my photos; then I yawed to face the camera West and began flying to the next corner of the property to where I would yaw to point the camera North East for the photos. (The pool area would be the far North East corner where I was controlling the drone from this angle when I would take the photos.)About 5 seconds into this direction (West); my controller beeped; and I looked down. The property manager was still watching the controller.  We saw the camera on the drone flip up at the propellers and the app froze. The Kittyhawk app (now called Aloft) displayed 'Drone Disconnected' at the top of the screen. I quickly hit the RTH button on the controller; but the app was still displaying 'Drone Disconnected' and the RTH button would not activate. At this time; I looked up to find the drone; but I could not see it anymore. Since the controller disconnected from the drone; I presumed the drone fell to the ground; and the property manager and I (and two of her maintenance workers) performed a search where we thought the drone may have crash landed in the fields.We notified the owner of the land where we were searching as well as a restaurant closest to the fields and asked them to be aware of a possible drone on the ground or in the trees and to notify us if they find it. I also tried connecting the controller to the drone while we searched; but it would never reconnect.The weather was partly cloudy; 92 degrees; and Wind 7 mph during the flight. Further south where I took pictures from the playground area were two towers; but the drone was nowhere near them.The drone did not log the duration of flight; but it was about three or four minutes into the flight when the malfunction occurred.

Part 107 pilot was flying UAS when a lost link occurred. Pilot was unable to reconnect to the UAS and it was lost/unrecoverable.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

To my surprise we now deice at the FBO in the 'Deice Pad GA'; vs the deice pad at the end of [Runway] 28R. 1. The area is not that large. It's sized for general aviation.2. As configured this day; a 180 degree turn was required.3. As you might guess there is snow on the ground. So most markings are not visible and it's slippery. 4. The vendor prepositions their two trucks in the small area.  So when you enter the pad; you are taxing the aircraft towards one truck with a guideman in the bucket and there is another truck off your left wing. Both trucks are moving also. Then you swing a left 180 making sure you are not skidding; not going to hit a truck with your right wing and then stop the jet so you run into the truck that is not positioned in front of you. Whoever evaluated this as a viable procedure did not take into account the size and conditions (snow) as well as the truck positions.

Air carrier Captain reported that the new area being used for de-icing presented several safety hazards; including a slippery surface and a small area for maneuvering the aircraft.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

While climbing out of SLC via the LEETZ 6 departure we encountered either wake turbulence from the aircraft ahead or severe environmental turbulence. The auto pilot disengaged and while hand flying the aircraft trying to keep the aircraft under control we missed the initial fix; PPIGG; by approximately 1.5 to 2 miles. SLC departure queried us and advised we were off the departure. They issued a heading to rejoin the departure and nothing more was said of the situation. There was no loss of separation from other aircraft. It was a VMC day so we were never in danger of terrain contact with all of that in full view.In hindsight; we should have advised ATC of the encounter with turbulence and let them know we had to deviate to get the aircraft under control. We were so preoccupied with dealing with the situation that we never advised ATC of our actions.

C525 Captain reported a track deviation during climb from SLC when they were distracted by turbulence or a wake vortex encounter.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Upon reaching the airport I was told that a plane had a hydraulic problem. I arrived at the gate and was informed that we would be taking the aircraft that had the hydraulic issue. When we got to the plane the log book was not in the cockpit so we contacted maintenance and requested the log book. They said they were finishing up with it and they would be out soon. A mechanic arrived with the log book and we asked him to brief us on what happened to the aircraft and what was accomplished. He told us that a Hydraulic line on the Green system was resting on another line. There had been a Teflon shield between the two but one line had worn through the Teflon and subsequently wore a hole in the other line causing a leak. I looked at the log book and confirmed the write up and corrective action that replaced the line and returned the aircraft to service. During preflight the green Hydraulic pressure indicated in the normal fill range. I discussed with the FO (First Officer) our plan which would be to check the hydraulic system after startup; during taxi and prior to takeoff. We did this and each time we checked all conditions were normal. We agreed we were O.K. for a takeoff and continued and for this leg the FO would be flying. After takeoff the gear and flaps were retracted on schedule without issue. Once we were turned north and passing through 3000 ft. I chose to check the Hydraulic system in the clean configuration. The green system hydraulic quantity was showing a significant change from what was indicated on the ground. It was indicating just above the amber range. I told the first officer that we would be leveling off and set the altitude to 5000 ft. Because of the recent occurrence with the same hydraulic system; my FO and I chose to [advise ATC] and make plans to return to the field. Not knowing if the fluid was draining out or not my first officer asked if we should go ahead and extend the gear while we had fluid and pressure. I agreed and we lowered the gear. At that time we received a master warning 'Landing Gear Not Down Locked'. The red warning lights above the gear lever were illuminated as well as all gear positions on the wheel page. After approximately 30 to 40 seconds the gear finally extended fully and we started to see green indications but it still took a few more seconds for the gear doors to close after that. Once that was complete the ECAM Fault disappeared and we had a normal working aircraft. The Hydraulic page was showing that the hydraulic fluid in the green system was not higher than it was before with a clean aircraft. We chose to configure to flaps 1 at that time as well and during the extension we monitored the hydraulics with the indications stable. ATC was updated that we did not have a total loss of fluid but were at a reduced level. Since we were in a normal state with the aircraft ECAM we started to move forward with our next decision. The aircraft was currently overweight for a landing and we had to determine whether or not to make an overweight landing. ATC was able to get us set up for holding so we could address the issues. I pulled out QRH and from what was stated we determined that it would be safer to burn the fuel off and get below 142;000 lbs and make a normal landing. I ran the numbers in the MCDU (ACARS) and at our current weight the performance worked and at 142;000 lbs the numbers worked for a landing. I set up the aircraft for an ILS approach and I briefed the FO that I would be taking the controls for the approach and landing. I asked him to request that [ATC would] give us time to configure in the event something would happen to the green system. We planned to start configuring either on a downwind or the base (Flaps 2). I briefed that once we were established on the approach we would configure prior to GS intercept to verify the systems were working properly prior to landing. I had previously called the FA's (Flight Attendants) and updated them with whatwas going on and what the plan was. At that time; I told them the landing would be normal with no brace and that I would update if there were any changes. I then made an announcement to the passengers to what was going on and reassured them we were operating normally but would need to burn off fuel prior to landing. I continued to update the FA's and the passengers regularly through the remainder of the flight. During our downwind vector I was watching the TCAS and noticed there was a target at our 12 o'clock 500 ft below but climbing. The target was about 7 miles and the altitude got to 300 ft. I called [ATC] and informed them of the target and they gave me an immediate 90 degree turn to the right. I saw the target at the 5 mile rage indicating 100 ft below and in the turn we received a TCAS Alert (TA). We made contact with the aircraft and saw it pass off of our left wing.We were vectored onto the approach course and configured as planned. All conditions were normal and I chose to disconnect the A/P and hand fly the rest of the way to the runway. We touched down and the roll out was normal except we received a Master Caution 'Landing Gear Disagree'. We observed that the Hyd and Wheel pages were all showing green and normal indication and continued to taxi. The Green system still indicated the lower quantity that was seen in the air. We stopped at the gate and continued the shutdown process.Once maintenance came aboard we explained to them what happened and they said that it sounded like that was still air in the lines from the previous hydraulic issue the day before.At this point I was mentally spent/fatigued and subsequently left the aircraft without making a log book entry. My FO called me and asked if I had made the entry and [I] said no. I was still at the airport and I asked the FO to come with me to confirm the log book entry. We filled it out in the maintenance shack and left for the day. Possibly had my head down too much. Completely focused on the matter at hand (Overly Consumed). Needed to step back; take a drink of water every once in a while. As a result of not doing this I was completely depleted once we got to the gate.

MD-80 Captain reported returning to departure airport following loss of Green hydraulic system.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8.0

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

Aircraft X called up VFR about at 9000 or 9500 feet to pick up an IFR clearance. He was radar identified and issued clearance with a descent down to his requested altitude of 7000 feet and then shortly after given a communications changes. After we were relieved from the sector we were called back to be learn that the aircraft had entered the northern section of a 7200 foot Minimum IFR Altitude (MIA) and was not in communication range of either sector since their frequencies are highly marginal between these two airports. Although; another sector was able to relay quite quickly through another aircraft and issue the safety alert and climb.We have to constantly work as a team and help each other ensure that operations are safe at all times and avoid getting complacent. Alaska is filled with large areas where small aircraft even when flying IFR are unable to talk to ATC and in some cases there is no way to establish radio contact with the pilot. This situation was not a super busy session at all and should have been easily caught by one of us on the sector; which none did. We must never let our guard down and constantly double and triple check what trainees are issuing to these aircraft.

ZAN Controller with a trainee issued a descent to an aircraft which was below the Minimum IFR Altitude for its route.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Ground Personnel; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

While being pushed back from the gate and cleared to start engines we noticed the Blue System Jam light had illuminated on the SERVO CTL panel. We completed the start sequence and I informed the push back crew we had a problem and asked them to hold on. During this exchange I could barely hear the tug driver due to excessive engine noise. I asked him to position the Mic closer to his mouth. At this point we turned our attention to the Jam light. We contacted maintenance and following their trouble shooting procedures (cycling Jam switch on/off while moving controls) we were successful in fixing the problem. Jam light extinguished. We were now ready to Taxi. I turned the Taxi light on; scanned my side of the airplane announcing it clear; released the parking brake; and began to apply power. I immediately heard the ground crew calling me on the intercom. I quickly stopped what I was doing. I do not think the airplane moved thanks to the quick response by the tug crew. The tug was not connected. I asked the driver if everything was ok and he said yes. The tug crew then cleared off on my side and we continued our taxi. I forgot I requested the tug crew to remain in place while we addressed our problem. I believe this can be prevented by creating a reminder (e.g. a cup; twist tie; etc.) on the throttles. Since keeping a tug crew in place is not the normal habit pattern better briefing between aircrew would have focused greater attention on the fact the pushback crew was still in front of the aircraft.

A300 Captain experiences a maintenance issue during pushback and asks the pushback crew to standby. The problem is quickly resolved but the Captain forgets the crew is standing by and attempts to taxi. The pushback crew quickly informs the Captain of their presence and no damage or injuries result.


ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

At FL380; between PNH (Panhandle) and ZUN (ZUNI); received ATC Fault and GPS EICAS. Ran QRH. Faults did not clear. Contacted ATC. Jamming confirmed by ATC. Passing ZUN; ATC Fault and GPS malfunctions cleared. No further problems remainder of flight. Submitted AML (maintenance log) entries for ATC Fault and GPS EICAS at ZZZ1 in accordance with FOM. Possible jamming from White Sands.

Air carrier Captain reported receiving a GPS EICAS alert related to possible jamming from White Sands.


FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 30

Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Type 18000

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Descending into LGB on the DSNEE arrival; we were cleared to descend via the arrival. Captain was Pilot Flying. First Officer was Pilot Monitoring. ATC cleared us to descend via the arrival for Runway 30 but didn't specify which approach to expect. ATIS stated runway in use but not approach type. Captain loaded and briefed the RNAV (Z). While descending via; and inside the branch point for the arrival; Approach Control cleared us for the ILS via the arrival. At that time we were in VNAV/LNAV with the lowest altitude on the arrival set in the MCP. Our position was a few miles East of MCKYE and descending.Upon receiving the clearance the Captain quickly loaded the ILS and executed it without verifying there were no resultant discontinuities. Because we were inside the branch point of the arrival a discontinuity did appear; even though we were going to the same runway. Once the execute (EXEC) button was pushed the discontinuity appeared and VNAV disconnected. Because we were descending at the time; we continued to descend. The crossing restriction at MCKYE was at or above 7200'. The aircraft descended to roughly 6800' before the Captain corrected and returned us to the correct altitude. We were back up to 7200' prior to MCKYE. After correcting the flight path; the correct approach was loaded in the FMC and the remainder of the flight was uneventful.Proper verification prior to execution would help prevent this type of event from occurring again. Make sure both Crew Members have seen the changes and agree on them before pushing EXEC. Also; once the arrival has commenced do not execute any FMC changes unless you are on the LEGS page and have cleared any discontinuities resulting from the approach or runway change.

We were on the DSNEE 4 Arrival for LGB and had previously entered the RNAV Y MIDDS transition (I did not close the MIDDS discontinuity per SOP). Weather was IMC due to fires in Southern California. We had been cleared to descend via and 4000' MSL was entered in the MCP window with VNAV PATH. Approximately 1 NM prior to DSNEE waypoint; we were given clearance for the ILS to Runway 30. I re-entered the arrival with the MIDDS transition for the ILS and immediately got a VNAV discontinuity from the FMC due to the re-entry. We were working on closing the discontinuity when I noticed the aircraft had descended 400' below the MCKYE restriction of 7200' MSL; approximately 3 NM prior to MCKYE. I immediately initiated a climb back to 7200' MSL to MCKYE and continued the descend via arrival. We did not see any traffic conflicts from TCAS and ATC did not mention anything.Expect the unexpected. I should have entered the next restriction altitude in the MCP before making changes to the arrival. Even though I did not expect a discontinuity; it would have been prudent because we were on the arrival and close to a fix with a restriction. Surprise at the discontinuity delayed action. I should have concentrated more on the restrictions and less on the FMC.

Flight crew reported momentarily descend below required altitude on the DSNEE FOUR arrival while programing FMC for a change from RNAV to ILS approach into LGB.


Flight Crew Total 7442; Flight Crew Type 5398

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 1424

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

On climbout through 4;000 feet; the flight attendants in the aft cabin called to say they had a strong electrical odor in the back of the aircraft. In less than a minute; we smelled it in the cockpit. We donned the O2 masks and ran the Smoke/Fumes checklist. [Advised ATC] and received clearance to return to ZZZ. Shortly into the checklist; the flight attendants in the back called again to say they were still getting the strong effects of the electrical odor. We landed ZZZ; and taxied to the gate to deplane.

After takeoff into IMC conditions and at approximately 3;500 feet in a climbing left turn; the Flight Attendant broke sterile cockpit to notify us pilots that there was a strong electrical fire fume smell. I was First Officer and was pilot monitoring so I took the FA's (Flight Attendant) call. I told her I will tell the Captain. I told him but as I was in process; we both confirmed we smelled it too. I said 'Smoke/Fumes' IMMEDIATE ACTION CHECKLIST' and we donned our O2 masks as I grabbed the QRH to run the checklist. The Captain called for flaps up and after takeoff checklist so I paused from QRH to clean up the aircraft from takeoff and run the after takeoff checklist. The Captain was pilot flying and took radios and [advised ATC]for electrical fumes. ATC vectored us to ZZZ. I programmed new airport in FMGC; answered message to Dispatch; got landing data etc. Then Captain briefed approach; we did descent checklist and I then became pilot flying while Captain completed the Immediate action checklist and QRH.We did not have smoke; only strong electrical fumes. Then FAs called and said their eyes were burning. We got our vector to intercept and cleared ILS to maintain 5;000 feet until ZZZZZ maintain 170 knots to ZZZZZ1. Then FA's called again to say they were feeling really sick. Captain said we were almost there. The TCAS displayed We were behind an aircraft landing ZZZ. Weather was about 200 feet above minimums. We were IMC in rain the entire flight. We landed and taxied to the gate and deplaned.

A320 flight crew reported flight attendants detected fumes on climbout; returned to departure airport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Due to unrelated complex MEL/ground equipment issues; the flight left the gate solely for the purpose of heating the cabin using engine bleeds (APU and ground heat unavailable) and to complete aircraft deicing due to frost from overnight.  This was completed.  After deicing and warming the aircraft; the flight returned to the gate to board PAX and depart.  While at the gate; ice was still observed adhering to the fuselage in proximity to the main cabin door by both PAX and ground crew.  In addition; a deadheading (DH) pilot also observed ice.  Further examination showed that while the wings were clean and clear of contaminants; ice was still in fact found on the upper forward fuselage; and in the vicinity of the vertical stab.  The contaminant was not just frost; but appeared to be ice accumulated during an approach previously.  The aircraft was deiced again and the Ice Crew was instructed to do a more thorough post deice inspection. The Ice Crew did a good job of removing the frost.  However; the combination of extreme cold (below zero F) and night conditions for de-icing made it difficult for them to see and remove the extra contaminant.  The obvious threat is failure to comply w/ clean aircraft concept.  Had this flight been proceeding out for T/O (as is almost always the case) it would have left with contamination.  I do not consider this to have been a very high threat IN THIS CASE as the wings were clear and the horizontal stab appeared to be so as well; however; it is obvious that in a different scenario with other contaminants missed during the post deice inspection report an incident or accident could occur.  The station crew and de-ice crew did not seem to rush the job or seem negligent in any way; I believe the conditions and scenario created a situation where extra vigilance was required and they did not catch the ice.In the northern cities we sometimes find ice accumulation from the previous evening's approach when the conditions include extreme cold.  It is generally considered not a big deal; as we frequently deice for this or; as in this case; frost.  In the future; if deicing for frost; we will verbally verify the crew is aware of the extra contaminant and the inspection verifies the removal of such.

After de-icing of the gate; a CRJ700 Captain reports returning to the gate to board passengers. During boarding significant ice is noticed still adhering to the fuselage and a second de-icing is accomplished prior to takeoff.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue

Taxiing into the gate; the visual docking system was reading STOP" but the marshallers were continuing to wave us in.  Stopped and called OPS who said they were looking into it.  Marshallers continued to wave us in.  Had to call OPS again; who said they weren't sure if it was working.  We advised them to turn the system off so we were not receiving conflicting information; and after several minutes of all the marshallers trying to wave us in; one of them finally went over and reset/turned off the system.  We discussed the situation; and being good daylight visibility; taxied in using the marshallers only. This is not the first time I've had conflicting information between ground crew and the system; usually with the display advising "STOP".  I am not Seattle based so don't see the system every day but I have used it fairly often; and I think we are just setting ourselves up for potential issues if we get in the habit of not trusting or ignoring the system sometimes and relying on it other times.  The system should either be working and used or completely off when we're relying on marshallers."

During taxi into the gate; airline pilot reported receiving conflicting directions from the marshaller and the automated docking system.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

We had landed Runway 28. Crossed 27L and was holding short of 27R; note it being the long Runway in Atlanta. It was a very busy day; especially with deicing. After a plane was cleared for takeoff on 27R; it lifted off somewhere halfway down the Runway or before. Before the plane was barely off the ground; still not far down the Runway; were cleared to cross at intersection T. I read it back; scanned the Runway and noticed the plane taking off had just lifted off; 100-200 ft.; maybe; and was still not even close to our intersection; maybe S or U intersection; taking off west. I hit the breaks after we passed the hold short line seeing this. The captain inquired and I said 'it hasn't crossed yet'. After what felt like 5-7 seconds it passed and we continued without incident. In the moment I believed this compromised safety and possibly was a Runway incursion because the plane taking off had not passed us yet. I believe the pace Atlanta needed to keep up with to get planes moving caused this premature clearance to cross. They were telling planes to read back call signs only; which I didn't hear until after the clearance was given. I would probably scan before starting aircraft movement and keep my attention on the radio to keep better situational awareness.

Pilot reported receiving a runway crossing clearance while another aircraft was on take off roll and had yet to pass the crossing intersection.