Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 30000; Flight Crew Type 850

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Normal engine performance and indications on taxi for approximately 1 mile.  Normal engine performance and indications during engine run up.  Normal power settings and indications on takeoff roll.  Once airborne the landing gear was retracted.  Approximately 5 seconds after becoming airborne; experienced severe power degradation and aircraft was unable to climb.  Landed straight ahead on belly of aircraft and came to stop on center of runway approximately 200 ft. from departure end.  Turned off electrical master switch and key and exited the aircraft unharmed and waited for emergency vehicles.

C210 pilot reported a loss of engine power shortly after takeoff and landing on the takeoff runway with the gear up.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 389; Flight Crew Type 860

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

We were following other carrier's Boeing 777 for a planned seven-mile final.  The Captain had planned for a simulated AIII approach for training/currency.  The Captain was flying and we encountered some wake turbulence behind the B777; so Captain elected to fly slightly above the descent path; asked if I agreed; and I concurred. We were vectored to final; first heading 150; and asked if we had the field; which we called in sight.  Next vector was heading 220 to intercept final and cleared us the visual 24R.  The Captain stated we were slightly high due to the wake turbulence avoidance and began correcting.  The autopilot was disconnected and we began to configure.  The Captain then asked to verify AIII mode.  I went heads down; saw we weren't; and toggled to AIII.  During this time; we overshot 24R final slightly and began an immediate correction.  Simultaneously; Approach Control instructed us to fly a heading to re-intercept.  I do not remember the assigned heading.  The Captain intercepted final and the remainder of the approach and landing were uneventful. Perhaps we could have asked Approach for a slightly longer final as we remained above the 777 wake turbulence.  As Pilot Monitoring; at the critical phase of flight; I could have focused solely on the intercept to final rather than going heads down.

While the ATIS called for VFR conditions and we did have the airport in sight; it was extremely hazy. As I was transitioning my scan from the inside to the outside for the visual approach and back to the inside to check for configuration speeds; I briefly mistook Runway 24L with 24R and flew through the Localizer. I immediately corrected to re-intercept at which point the Controller called us to re-intercept from the other side. There was no conflict with other traffic that I know of.

B737-700 flight crew reported deviating from cleared track on approach to LAX. Wake vortex concerns and haze were contributing factors.


Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure; Manuals

I have run into an issue on [some B757s] when inputting an RNAV STAR on the route page during FMC flight plan loading. If the Flight Manual FMC procedures are not followed exactly when loading the arrival you get something on the route page that looks like the arrival but is not; and it leaves out the end of the arrival. The RNAV arrivals that I've seen this happen on are the GIBBZ arrival into IAD and STARs into my domicile airport.  I'm sure it is happening on others. The way most pilots load an arrival is: Arrival; Transition; and then runway; if you do that you get something like this: MGW Approach transition GIBBZ. If you load: Landing runway; Arrival; Transition you get this: MGW.GIBBZ2 MIKEJ or MATTC (depending on runway) which is correct. If you do it the former way the approach ends at GIBBZ which is wrong; the arrival makes a turn north or south depending on which runway you're landing on. I know I'm not the only one who has made this mistake as I have seen almost every First Officer make the same error. I'm sure you are seeing reports with this issue. I'm bringing this up because I think we need to get something out to the pilots about this and how it can rather insidiously look like the FMC is programmed correctly when it is not.

The reporter stated that for many years he and his fellow crewmembers routinely and successfully programmed STARs in the manner he described; loading the arrival first; any appropriate enroute transition and; finally; the planned landing runway--more or less in the order you planned to 'fly' the programming.  He was surprised to learn that SOP had been changed to require the runway to be loaded first.He now believes the SOP requiring the landing runway to be programmed first in the arrival sequence came about as a result of the newer; more complex RNAV STARs which frequently include what might be termed 'runway transitions' which provide tracks from the end of the common portion of the arrival to a fix from which vectors to the associated IAP are provided; i.e. a transition to the north of the airport to land to the south and vice versa.His experience is that when the runway/approach is programmed last that only waypoints/tracks which are part of the selected IAP are provided and not the 'runway transitions' shown only on the STAR chart.He advised he had not yet experienced a runway change occurring in the midst of flying an RNAV STAR; only when completing programming of his anticipated arrival routing while still at the gate prior to departure. In response to several requests his company eventually released a bulletin stressing the necessity of following the revised SOP.

A B757 Captain reported he had failed to recognize a change in SOP requiring the landing runway to be selected prior to selection of an RNAV STAR and any associated enroute transition.  Prior to becoming aware of the change he was experiencing difficulties programming STARs that included 'transitions' from the end of the STAR's common portion to the waypoint from which vectors are to be provided for the associated IAP.


Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

There is a long standing issue with Ground Taxi procedures at APA. Aircraft that require a run up are not taxied to a runway; but are taxied to a run up area adjacent to a runway prior to issuing the remainder of the instructions. Aircraft X was issued instructions to taxi to the north run up area via Alpha and he read back instructions. He taxied onto Taxiway A and proceeded past the north run up area and into the A1 ramp which was the old run up area; but according to the charts; is still part of the north run up area. Even though doing a run up in his location did not effect the operation or air safety; I instructed the aircraft to move 75-100 south to the north run up area and he complied. North run up area is incorrectly charted as the entire area north of Taxiway A2. An aircraft doing a run up in the A1 run up area is not a safety issue as the north run up area is only 100 FT from the approach end of Runway 17L. Even today; a Glassair began taxiing out of the north run up area to Runway 17L as I began to key and give him the instructions to taxi to Runway 17L even though he had not received a clearance. If you are going to make us do these procedures; that no other airport does; then fix the charts and put signs at the run up areas. Once it snows; the words Run Up will be covered and no one will know where the run up area is truly located.

APA Controller voiced concern regarding run up procedures and the inadequate signage for pilots regarding same.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6; Flight Crew Total 1300; Flight Crew Type 100

At three miles east of the airport Tower cleared me to land on Runway 18 from base; squawking 1200. Heard Cirrus shooting ILS cleared for option on 36. When I was about 1 mile out; Tower granted frequency change to Cirrus to JAX control. Asked me if I had traffic... At that time I was watching him depart to the North from 36 said I did. Tower said he would be climbing to 2;000 FT. I never heard a heading for the Cirrus. At 1/2 mile base a white plane appeared in my windscreen heading southeast; basically entering the 18 pattern wrong direction and just barely passed overhead. It was hazy and never saw him until then; after the initial sighting on his departure; of course I was setting up to turn final; etc. I said something to the Tower [a Cirrus type aircraft] just passed very close overhead; he said was under JAX control. When I landed I suggested to Tower that was mighty close. He never asked if I wanted to file anything. So when I got home later that day discussed with my colleagues and reviewed AIM. I would have thought Tower would have routed this guy away from landing traffic especially if his route of flight was reversed over the set landing pattern to the south for 18. I am a VFR pilot and don't know the details of these 'Missed approach' patterns; etc. We were the only two planes in the airport vicinity. I also had my landing lights on. The Cirrus pilot sounded Asian and was difficult to understand. We get many foreign students in this area of Florida. I think there may be some procedural issues here.

PA22 pilot reports a NMAC arriving OCF after being cleared for a left base entry for Runway 18 by the Tower; with Cirrus cleared for the option on 36 off an instrument approach. The Cirrus departs initially to the north but as some point turns southeast bound coming dangerously close to the reporter. The Tower indicates the Cirrus is talking to ZJX.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Approaching the SAILZ waypoint; our assigned altitude was 3500 feet due to previous conflicting traffic at 2500 feet prior to turning inbound to SAILZ. As we approached SAILZ; the FMS was tracking LNAV towards SAILZ; our altitude was 3500 feet and we were given a traffic call that VFR traffic was at 3000 feet at our 12 o'clock. At approximately 1.5 miles prior to SAILZ; the Controller instructed us to turn 20 degrees right due to the traffic. I believe our aircraft had just completed rolling out; so it seemed as though the Pilot Flying had indeed dialed in 20 degrees to the right. I failed to monitor heading select and we were still in LNAV directly towards SAILZ when we should have been turning to the right of SAILZ according to the instruction. At the time the Controller instructed us to expedite our turn; we received an RA due to the traffic at SAILZ; which was climbing to 3200 feet as we maintained level 3500 feet. We followed the RA guidance and quickly cleared the conflict. Additional distractions that contributed to the RA were: ATC radio congestion which distracted both pilots from following immediate instructions from ATC and confusion as to why other aircraft were conflicting our approach to land under IFR handling; despite the VMC day.I believe that VFR traffic should not be allowed to transit an IFR corridor at the same altitude as the inbound traffic to land. This poses a significant threat to commercial aviation and could result in a midair collision; clearly an unacceptable outcome for something that can be avoided.

B737-800 First Officer reported a track deviation resulted in an airborne conflict during approach into MDW.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Destination forecast predicted very windy and gusty conditions with strong crosswinds at the time of arrival. Various wind advisories were reported in the terminal area. During the arrival briefing I had checked that the crosswind did not exceed recommended aircraft crosswind limitations. Ten knots was added to Vref due to reported gusts; as a buffer and precautionary measure. The approach was stable all the way to touchdown with the occasional gusts and airspeed fluctuations from time to time. But throughout the approach the aircraft remained in a stable approach configuration. Right at touchdown (as the main wheels touched the ground) we experienced a significant gust of wind; forcing the right wing to dip. I immediately corrected with appropriate control input; followed by full left control input to keep the right wing from striking the ground. Full control inputs were made in an attempt to keep the aircraft stable and on the runway resulting in the engine pods #3 and #4 being scraped. The wind gust had momentarily exceeded the aileron authority at the time based on the airspeed during rollout. The gust happened so suddenly and quickly that there was not enough time to contemplate a go-around; except for immediately reacting to keep the right wingtip from dipping further and maintain some level of control and to keep the airplane on the runway. Upon further contemplation; a go-around would have put the aircraft in a less desirable condition at such a slow speed with the main wheels already on the ground. Consider delaying flights to arrive with more favorable weather conditions. Consider increasing crosswind limits to a more restrictive company standard.

Air carrier Captain reported the right wing engine pods were scraped during a gusty crosswind landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 12700; Flight Crew Type 175

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 2075; Flight Crew Type 500

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

We were cleared to fl340 for crossing traffic; on our way direct to LEATO intersection; northwest of FNT VOR.  We were not given any traffic to look for. After a few minutes we were cleared to continue climb to FL380. Not long around FL350 we hit one hard bump/jolt which resulted in passengers hitting their heads on the ceiling and one person also hitting her face on the table leaf that had folded during the encounter.  Right afterwards when checking for traffic I saw to the right of the aircraft out the window what looked like what was left of a contrail but could not see the generating airplane. I believe we had encountered some wake turbulence. After checking with the passengers they asked us to return to our departure airport due to a passenger injury. We asked ATC to return to our departure airport. ATC asked about the nature of injuries. When landing we told the tower that we had things under control and did not need any further assistance. I did not think the encounter was 'severe' as I still had my seatbelts fastened during the encounter and did not hit my head on anything. One of our company mechanics did a severe turbulence inspection anyway of the aircraft and did not find any defects; returning the plane to service.

We were cleared to climb to FL400. We asked for FL380 as our final. We were re-cleared to FL380. 300 feet prior to FL340; Cleveland Center asked us to maintain FL340. After a couple minutes they cleared us to climb to FL380. Shortly after we initiated the climb; we got a strong jolt from the left. We both looked out our windows and saw a contrail and determined that we had just hit wake turbulence. The weather was clear and there was no turbulence prior to the one strong jolt we received. The autopilot did not disengage. We did not have any warnings from our TCAS. ATC did not point out any traffic. We had two passengers on board. One had hit her head so we asked ATC for a turn back to our originating airport. The passenger ended up being fine and we landed at normally.

CE-560  Captain reported 'one hard bump' from a possible wake encounter at FL350 that resulted in a passenger injury.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

On our takeoff roll; prior to 80KIAS; we received an EICAS warning 'E2 OVERTEMP' and the associated warning bell.  The #2 ITT indicator turned red.  We rejected the takeoff and exited the runway. We ran all the memory items followed by the QRC and the QRH.  E2 EXCEEDANCE message remained on EICAS and the QRH procedure states 'do not take off; report to maintanence personnel'.  We contacted operations and returned to the gate.  Maintenance believed the cause to be the result of attempting a takeoff from a high altitude airport on a hot day with the right engine anti ice valve deferred in the open position. Somewhat later maintenance brought the aircraft back and advised they had downloaded the recorded and it had not registered a fault.  They had performed an engine run up and it was good. The plane was boarded back up and we gave it a second try. All indications were normal during engine startup and while taxiing both engines showed equal readings. The First Officer and I briefed and double checked everything we could think of to back ourselves up and be safe.We were cleared for take off on runway 25; I advanced the thrust levers normally and called 'set thrust'. The First Officer responded 'thrust set' and we both saw that all the targets were met and ATTCS was armed. I noticed that the ITT on the number two engine was higher than the number one engine and at around 60 KIAS the ITT indicator on the number two engine turned red and on the EICAS we both saw ATTCS NO MARGIN warning message as we got the master warning light and bells. Both of us called the message and I proceeded to abort the take off. We advised tower and we exited the runway normally; stopped on the taxiway and ran the memory items followed by the QRC and the QRH. We again contacted operations and returned to the gate

When dispatched with a deferred open right engine anti-ice valve the flight crew of an EMB-145 suffered an ITT over temperature prior to 80 KIAS on the takeoff roll.  They rejected the takeoff; returned to the gate for maintenance and suffered a recurrence of the event after maintenance had discovered nothing in the aircraft's maintenance system recordings.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

As we descended into ATL; we verified the arrival and the FO (First Officer) briefed an approach to runway 08L. After checking on with ATL Approach; we were assigned runway 10; which surprised us but was no big deal. We changed our landing runway; the approach; and the arrival in the [Flight Computer] and continued; verifying the arrival and re-briefing the approach.As we approached 11;000 feet; we noted a high LP engine vibration on the Number 2 engine (approximately 4.2 on the LP vibration monitor; which resulted in an amber indication); which was not a surprise to us based on a history of Number 2 engine vibration and the fact that there was an Engineering Authorization in the maintenance logbook as well. After consulting the QRH; the vibration reduced and turned back to green while we were downwind; about abeam the airport; without any pilot action to correct it. During this time; ATC cleared us to descend to 7;000 feet; and notified us to expect about an 8 mile final.As we descended; I noted in my head that it sounded like a pretty tight final for ATL and for our relative position; since we were abeam the airport on downwind at that time. I expected a slam dunk; but I didn't verbalize that with the FO; but I noted he was descending in FLCH; which indicated to me he had noticed it would be pretty tight too. The controller turned our base at about 8 miles; descended us to what I recall to be 3;000 feet and turned us to a 030 heading. The controller then told us to advise the field in sight. The FO began slowing the aircraft in anticipation of configuration. I was just about to do some mental math to see if we were high at this point; when the FO advised the field in sight.Simultaneously around the time we called the field in sight; we got a TCAS TA for an aircraft at our 10:00-11:00 position around the same altitude; were assigned a 070 heading; and I believe we may have been cleared for the approach at that time. As I read back the clearance; I scanned for the traffic; and discovered the traffic at about 11:00 moving to our 12:00; a few hundred feet below. The traffic appeared to be converging on us. I thought he was heading toward our flight path and had flown through the 09R approach course. The FO and I were both focused on the TA; and had not noticed the approach was not armed on the [Flight Computer]. I directed the FO to stop his descent; level off and queried ATC. I also instructed the FO to turn right back toward the final approach course; since I realized we had at this point flown through it because of our focus on the TCAS TA/scan for traffic. I'm honestly not sure how near the approach course we were when I first saw the other aircraft. I don't think we had yet flown through the final approach course; but it is possible we did. Everything happened very rapidly. We did unintentionally cross our final approach course. We never got an RA; however we did get within 600 feet vertically of the other aircraft.ATC gave us vectors back toward the final approach course; we rejoined it. Due to being high at this point; we elected to discontinue the approach and get vectors back for another approach; which went normally.There were several factors that led up to this event. To start; we were going to a runway we were less familiar with. It is much more common to land on the north or center runway complex in ATL when arriving from [the north] than the south complex.I was unnecessarily distracted during a high workload phase of flight by the engine vibration. That reduced my situational awareness once I returned from working the QRH. I was playing catch up; so I could be a good pilot monitoring during the approach.Even though the controller warned us it was going to be a tight approach; it is still difficult to configure for them because of the high speed ATL prefers. The FO did well trying to prepare for that; however it was another threat.The 65 degree intercept adjusted to 35 degrees by thecontroller when so close to the final approach course was another threat because it required immediate action; and one interruption can cause the chain to break; missing the approach clearance/arming the approach; furthermore; it was difficult for me to see the airport from my side of the aircraft to know how near the final approach course we were. Due to being distracted by the TA and visually acquired traffic; I also missed the 'localizer alive' call; as the pilot flying.Another factor was the high descent rate necessary to prepare for a stabilized approach. That descent rate was what triggered the TA in the first place; I think. If we had been less focused on trying to get down; we probably also would have noticed we didn't have the approach or LNAV armed on the [Flight Computer]; and the aircraft heading for 09L might have not appeared as if it was blundering toward us. It is very possible it was an optical illusion when I first saw the aircraft.There are several things I have already learned from this experience; and I intend to use them to prevent this from happening again. First; I will include in my threat forward section of our briefing that parallel approaches are a threat. It is something we would talk about extensively when briefing a PRM; but it was something we excluded unintentionally in a visual approach briefing. I'll also include how common it is to get approach clearances in ATL that leave you high and fast. It's not uncommon to use a non-standard configuration sequence (such as gear first) in ATL. Finally; I'll also brief a potential for a runway change and the pertinent information on the approach for the secondary approach to better prepare. Briefing each of these items will help set the stage for a successful approach.I should have been focusing more on our lateral course than our vertical path as well. That was an important part of my situational awareness that I unintentionally allowed to break down. I find it is best to often intercept a course in LNAV because the automation will do a much better job intercepting the course from a large angle intercept (such as 65 degrees) than the LOC function; and it's not uncommon to be distracted during the final approach course intercept phase of the flight because of radio chatter/high workload/etc. One tactic I personally use when I'm PF is keeping my hand on the glare shield with my finger near the LNAV or APPCH button on the intercept to these parallel approaches because I know it's not uncommon for aircraft to blunder through the final approach course.There are a few ways ATC could prevent instances like this too. It is far too common to be held up high in ATL; with an assigned speed that is rather fast. This increases the pilot workload dramatically. Earlier descents or longer final approaches would certainly help alleviate this. Additionally; a clearance something like 'turn right heading 070; join the runway 10 localizer; and advise the field in sight' might act as a barrier to unintentional blunders through the final approach course. Finally; concise controller radio use might also help during times of high traffic. I know it's not always possible; but there was a lot of radio chatter during this event; and it may have contributed to the timelines of everyone's reactions.

Air Carrier Captain reported overflying the final approach course due in part to a TCAS TA and discontinued the approach.


Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Dispatch

Time Pressure; Workload; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

On Flight X to ZZZZ. Weather was marginal with thunderstorms in the area. It's our understanding that an aircraft blew a tire on XXR; which in turn closed down the runway. With weather in the area; ATC began holding aircraft. After a while in holding we were eventually cleared in. My First Officer spoke fluent Spanish and began hearing that they were assigning the VOR DME XXL Approach.  We do not have that approach in our manuals at Company.  We briefed the RNV GPS or ILS DME XXR with a side step to XXL. Upon reaching 12;000 feet; we were cleared to intercept a radial for the VOR DME XXL Approach. We advised ATC that we were unable to accept that approach and asked for the RNV or ILS XXR to side step to XXL. There was confusion with ATC with what exactly we were asking. They continued to inform us that XXR was closed; which we were aware of; after many attempts to request the RNV or ILS XXR we were instructed to hold. Meanwhile the entire time this was transpiring we were heading straight into the weather and also worried about the mountains in front of us. After we were given holding instructions; I decided we didn't have enough fuel to sort the mess out; so we requested a diversion to ZZZZ2. After a long and confusing delay on the ground we were able to return to ZZZZ. It would have been a much longer delay and possible overnight if my First Officer weren't fluent in Spanish.If we had the VOR DME XXL/R in our manuals this entire event would have been avoided.

Flight X sent an ACARS stating 'Runway closed do to weather and would be holding 10 minutes.' Actually the runway was closed due to a disabled aircraft with an estimated reopen at XA:30 and that aircraft should expect holding up to 45 minutes. Flight had approx. 10.0 Fuel on Board (FOB). I tried using our flight plan reroute tool but had no success. I next used our computer to achieve fuel burn numbers. The point that I was successful; the flight crew decided to divert to ZZZZ; FOB 8.4 At XA:37 the crew changed their decision and decided to head back into ZZZZ. Facts I knew at this point. The airport was open. Arriving aircraft were going to be given priority. XXR was still closed. What I learned from the crew is they asked for a sidestep to XXL. The tower said that was not possible. They continued to give him a VOR approach.Fact I learned after doing research. In our [EFB] it shows available a VOR approach. When a dispatch chief showed me what approaches are in the pilots EFB; there is no such plate available. At XA:59 the flight again headed to ZZZZ FOB 6.8.I asked them if they were diverting; they responded with a question. Is there a frequency. I could come up on? I was not able to establish that frequency before they landed in ZZZZ. FOB at touchdown. 4.7

After holding for a closed runway and with foreign ATC confusion about available approaches (assigned VOR approach not available in crew's EFB); crew diverted to an alternate airport.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was conducting OJT on Final Center. CE500 was on the west downwind for Runway 01C at ZZZ my trainee turned CE500 to a 090 heading and descend to five thousand from six thousand. After several miles it appeared that CE500 was not turning; the pilot was questioned if they were turning and he responded yes; he was then instructed to turn to a 040 heading and intercept the localizer for Runway 01C. After several more miles of a very slow turn; CE500 was told to increase his rate of turn and maintain five thousand and that he was sequenced in front of six thousand traffic straight in (CE560). At this point I told the trainee to turn CE500 out and re-sequence him because of his slow turn. CE500 was turned to a 300 heading and told to maintain 050 at which point CE500 began to climb out of 052 and still heading East. CE500 was then told to descend immediately to 050 and to expedite his turn to 300 and told about traffic at his 3 o'clock and three miles at 060. CE500 continued to climb through 057 to 064 and still not turning to the West. I then took the frequency and told CE560 to turn immediately to a 090 and called traffic at 12 o'clock and 1 mile climbing out of 064 a Citation. They answered that they were responding to a TCAS/RA. After CE500 final turned to the West; the trainee turned him back on to the downwind but the turn was too tight and it resulted in CE500 begin to close to Aircraft Z on the straight in on Runway 01C. After the upsetting situation with CE500 and CE560 I should have kept the frequency until all situations were resolved and we could be relieved of position duties. By letting the trainee resume working; and that fact that I was still thinking about what had just occurred; I missed the shallow turn on CE500 which put them to close to the final.

TRACON Controller described a TCAS RA event during a training session with parallel approaches in use; the reporter noting that he should have continued to work the position after the initial TCAS RA in lieu of returning the position to the trainee.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 26; Flight Crew Total 144; Flight Crew Type 51

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Excursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I took off from ZZZ airport on Runway XXR and experienced a power-loss at 100 feet of altitude.I put down the nose and landed my aircraft in a controlled manner on the grass in the prolongation of Runway XXR. There was no injury; nor any damage to the aircraft or any airport property. This event does not meet the definition of an 'aircraft accident' under 49 C.F.R. Part 830 since there were no 'serious injuries' and no 'substantial damage.

Vans RV-12 pilotreported 'power loss at 100 feet during takeoff.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On arrival in to LAS there was a thunderstorm with virga and potential hail on the course near FUZZY. The Controller issued a descent to 11;000 FT. As we were descending we saw the need to deviate due to the downdraft; rain and possible hail while we were in VMC conditions and with the terrain in sight. Our radio transmission failed to let the Controller know we had the terrain in sight; which alarmed him. We were asked to contact the Approach Supervisor on the radio. We apologized for not having told him we had the terrain in sight.

During descent on the SUNST 3 Arrival into LAS; we were deviating for weather near the FUZZY Intersection. At the time; we were deviating in visual conditions and could clearly see higher terrain to the east of the FUZZY Intersection. Descending through 14;000 FT; I told ATC we were turning 'about 10 left for weather'. The pilot flying turned more like 40 degrees; and went out high right of descent; we may have caught ATC off guard and they issued us a low altitude alert to stop our descent and turn right. At no time did we get any alerts in the cockpit. As ATC was issuing the alert; we were already leveling off at 12;000 FT and turning back toward the STAR. I think I could have told ATC that we were VMC and also made sure I understood what the pilot flying was planning on doing. Had I expected more then a 10 degree turn I would have suggested that we turn right.

B737 flight crew reports deviating for weather during the SUNST 3 arrival to LAS without properly informing ATC of the magnitude of the deviation and the fact that they had the terrain in sight.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Chart Or Publication; Weather; Human Factors

There was an active SIGMET that was not known to the sector I was relieving. A SIGMET for forecast severe turbulence between 25000 and 40000 feet. The SIGMET potentially affected every aircraft in the sector. It is a position responsibility of the Controller in Charge/Front Line Manager to enter and update SIGMETs in ATOP platform. Since the position responsibility was not fulfilled; I requested the Front Line Manager that the SIGMET be entered in the system. I was going to enter the SIGMET and was told 'NO.' Refusing to do this has very serious safety implications if not done correctly every time. It appears from the incident described that one or more people who are qualified to work the position but do not know their position responsibilities. This particular incident also indicated a disturbing lack of teamwork or regard for the safety of air traffic. This has recently been brought as a 'problem' in the high area and it would appear it is not being properly addressed. I filed a similar ATSAP about 2 years ago and again it has not been properly addressed. The Front line Manager did not like the way that Russia writes the geographical parameters of their weather information so they made the decision to not give the pilots or the controller the information.Train or re-train qualified Front Line Managers on their position responsibilities. Re-training on significant meteorological conditions. Train team concept/support of operation. Enter and update SIGMETs; and do the rest of SOP ATOP Front Line Manager position responsibilities.

ZAN ARTCC Controller reported their Front Line Manager refused to disseminate pertinent SIGMETs to the appropriate sectors.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency

At 17;000 feet we got a brake overheat warning message. At the same time; ATC cleared us to climb to FL300. The captain pulled out the QRH and ran the procedure. When it asked us to lower the landing gear; the captain decided to hold off on lowering the landing gear due to the fact that we were in icing conditions. At this point he read the rest of the checklist and noted that the brake temp was fluctuating between 7 and -1 and leveled at 1. The captain pressed the brake overheat warning reset; the indications went away and did not return. At this point we were at FL300 and the captain contacted maintenance and dispatch. When the checklist was first read we thought that we needed to divert. At this point the captain told ATC that we wanted to divert to ZZZ; and declared an emergency. He re-read the check list and noticed that it did not state to 'land at the nearest suitable airport' but just ended. So the captain called ATC and took back the emergency call as well as the diversion; and we continued to destination with no event. The divert call and the take back call was less than 5 minutes. The threats were icing conditions; the brake overheat warning; and communication with maintenance and dispatch. The error was miss reading the QRH. I should have been more engaged in the decision process and look over QRH procedure when I have time.

After leveling off in moderate icing conditions at 17;000 feet and awaiting further clearance to climb; the Master warning message of Brake Overheat sounded. Opened up QRH to run down the procedures. BTMS readouts indicated from left to right 0 / 1 / 1 / 'Red' 7. Then the right outboard temperature fluctuated between 7 then to 1 and then ran through a random order of numbers; but none exceeded 7. Flight then cleared to climb to FL300. Looked at QRH procedures of slowing to 220 knots and lowering landing gear; then Captain stated 'We're in icing conditions' We've been in the air for 13 minutes or so and it's -27C outside. Captain requested the First Officer (FO) to increase his rate of climb in hopes to cool right outboard brake. Captain then asked FO 'did you notice any aircraft pull to the right on Takeoff roll?' FO stated that he didn't notice any asymmetric pull. Captain stated that it probably didn't have a stuck or dragging brake. Captain read through the QRH and decided to press the BTMS warning reset button and asked the FO 'Do you agree?' 'We're almost in the Flight Level altitudes and in moderate icing conditions and it wants us to slow to 220 knots and lower the gear.' Captain further stated; 'It's probably an indication error but if it's not after resetting the BTMS warning button the brake readouts should come back. FO agreed with resetting the BTMS after thinking about it for about 30 seconds. Captain pressed the BTMS reset button and all brake indications went away. 2 minutes after BTMS reset FO stated that 'He could go in the back and look out the right rear side window and have a view of whatever might be going on.' Captain replied; 'It couldn't hurt and we have an extremely light load'. FO returned to flight deck and stated that he didn't see anything unusual. Aircraft leveled off at FL360. Captain stated; 'We have another 2 hours to go; maybe we should talk to Maintenance Control.' Captain sent an ACARS message to maintenance stating that we had a small problem with a Brake OVRHT message. Captain stated to FO that he was trying to open up some dialogue and bounce some ideas in troubleshooting. After some minutes Maintenance replied with 'Copy that Captain Follow QRH'. Captain pulled the QRH from the glareshield and looked over at the bottom of the QRH and saw Land at nearest Suitable Airport. Captain stated; 'Okay looks like we'll have to divert'. Weather at first alternate airport was 3/4 SM snow 025 OVC and at the second alternate the weather was clear and cold. Captain requested to divert to the second alternate for maintenance and Center cleared flight as requested. Center inquired of the nature of the maintenance and Captain stated that 'We had a Brake Overheat message and that we would have to run some procedures and remain away from icing conditions to drop the landing gear.' Diversion message was sent to dispatcher. Center inquired. 'Are you declaring an Emergency?' After about 20 to 30 seconds; Captained responded with; 'Yes; we're declaring an Emergency'. Flight cleared down to FL300. After about a minute or so Captain reread the QRH from beginning to end and saw that he was looking at the 'NO' column. Maintenance sent an ACARS message; 'Captain are you continuing to receive the Overheat Warning?' Captain replied; 'No'. Captain and FO discussed the situation again. Captain stated to First Officer to slow his descent. After about a minute of discussions Captain decided that the brake indications were false and reconsidered his decision to divert and the Emergency Declaration. Captain notified Center that we were going to continue to the original destination and cancel declaring an Emergency. He further stated that they misread the side print. Flight remained at FL300 until clearing traffic then climbed FL340. Aircraft landed at destination without further incident and was met by contracted mechanic at the gate. In post flight inspection workarounds by both First Officer and the mechanic; no defectwas found. Captain called late shift Maintenance controller on the phone and log sheet was documented.Moderate Icing conditions played a major factor; bottom layer was approximately 3;000 feet and aircraft did not leave icing conditions until around FL290. QRH checklist is written for a phase of flight right after takeoff and not in icing conditions. Lowering Gear and then retracting gear while in icing conditions could have damaged aircraft with ice adhering to gear or ice breaking off from gear with possibly FODing the engines. Maintenance's robotic answer to follow QRH was not conducive to Captain's attempts to expand CRM outside the flight crew. Not sure if MCC was busy or properly staffed. The Brake OVRHT warning QRH procedure should be modified. Last section states to retract gear. Other Emergency/ WARNING procedures that don't end with an Emergency landing or continue with Abnormal procedures; usually end with 'No further action is required.' I learned that not all situations are clear cut or cookie cutter situations. Sometimes my desire to do everything possible sometimes could end in second guessing myself.

CRJ-700 flight crew reported they received a brake overheat warning on climbout. After troubleshooting the decision was made to continue to destination.


Installation; Testing; Work Cards; Inspection

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

After a [GE CF34-8c engine] Fan Pin change; the CRJ-700 [aircraft] was pulled from hangar for engine runs. After the required idle time [run]; the throttle was advanced and that's when the vibration indicator went to 1.2; the damage was done. It occurred about XA:30AM; September 2013. I was Left (LT) seat; Mechanic Y was Right (RT) seat. Procedure was not followed. [Recommend] making it a Quality Control (QC) Inspection 'Buy Back' for tool removal on Work Card. Graveyard.

Regarding an incident occurring September 2013; at approximately XA:00 A.M. which involved the Right Engine on a CRJ-700 aircraft. I had performed a Fan Blade Pin change on the Right Engine in accordance with the appropriate Work Card. When all other work had been completed by other members of the assigned crew; Mechanic X and I; [Mechanic Y]; took the plane out for the Engine Vibration Check. Mechanic X sat Left seat and I was Right seat. Mechanic X started the Right Engine first; as it was to idle for five minutes before testing. We taxied the aircraft to the testing ramp and after the required time had elapsed we began the test by increasing the engine speed to full power. All indications up to this time had been normal registering a vibration between 0.1 and 0.2. After several seconds at full power; the vibration began to very quickly increase to 1.1 at which point Mechanic X decreased power back to idle. The indicated vibration returned to a normal 0.1 to 0.3. After allowing the engine to stabilize at idle for several minutes he attempted to increase power once again. This time the vibration level climbed excessively along with the speed of the engine. We decided at this time to return to idle speed and return to the hangar to determine the problem. Upon arrival at the hangar it was discovered that extensive damage had occurred within the engine. I very quickly went to my tool box and discovered [that] a ratchet I had been using to perform the pin change was missing. I then went to the acting Supervisor's office and reported the damage and my missing tool.  Several factors may have contributed to this incident. It was very early in the morning; on my first day back to work after my three days off. This is a job I have performed often; overconfidence; or complacency may have figured in. Tools should be inventoried and accounted for before an incidence occurs not after. To prevent it from happening again; make absolutely sure someone else checks behind you; especially if you are tired. Graveyard [shift].

Two Aircraft Maintenance Technicians (AMTs) report about extensive damage that occurred to the Right Engine of a CRJ-700 aircraft during full power engine runs; after a Fan Blade Pin change had been accomplished on their GE CF34-8C engine. One of the Technician's later realizes a ratchet used to perform the pin change was missing.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Working Arrivals; VFR weather with very good visual approaches. The session was very busy with westerly winds complicating the situation. The bases were fast and compression on the final was substantial. Aircraft X requested an ILS autoland approach for currency. I cleared Aircraft X at the marker for an ILS approach and assigned him 160 knots to 5 mile final. I brought Aircraft Y behind him and slowed the aircraft down early to maintain Wake Turbulence separation. I cleared Aircraft Y for the visual approach with 5.5 miles separation and assigned the flight 160 knots to 5 mile final and I instructed him to contact the tower. As I monitored the final I realized that Aircraft Y was compressing too much on the heavy Aircraft X; I immediately called the tower and I instructed them to break Aircraft Y out to a 270 heading and to climb and maintain 4000 feet. Aircraft Y was still within the Wake Turbulence parameters at 5.01 NM behind the heavy. The local controller replied 'I think we have visual...hold on'; 5 second break then 'Yes we have visual'. I let it go and it compressed further to 4.8 NM. As I thought about the situation and knowing that the Tower controllers cannot waive wake turbulence separation unless the aircraft waives it with visual separation I was left wondering if that is what the tower meant. As this was a specific occurrence due to bad winds and compression I see no recommendation I can give. This was a very busy session with difficult winds; maybe there should have been a consideration to using a different runway.

TRACON Controller reported of two aircraft on final that were going to lose wake turbulence separation. TRACON Controller advised Tower Controller to break the trailing aircraft out and relayed go around instructions. Tower Controller advised TRACON Controller they would apply tower visual separation between the aircraft.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 300; Flight Crew Type 2

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

I was a passenger in the right seat; I hold a private pilots license with X00hrs total time. Only Y hours in a Cessna 210.Pilot botched the landing; bounced once then landed on the nose. Aircraft made a hard left turn. Pilot showed no actions to straighten out the aircraft. As it was apparent we were exiting the runway I intervened; giving full right rudder and pulled aft on the yoke to avoid a nose gear collapse. The plane crossed taxiway then down the embankment. Aircraft rolled out in the dirt between [the parallel runways]. The pilot took command of the aircraft at that point and taxied back on to [the runway] where we were instructed to taxi off and hold short of [the parallel runway]. Aircraft was taxied to parking were it was tied. I did not observe any damage nor did I hear about any property damage.

Private pilot rated passenger reported he took the controls after the flying pilot lost directional control on the landing roll and departed the runway surface with no damage or injuries.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

I checked in with the gate agent prior to my flight to ZZZZ.  I don't recall if any passengers were boarded but there were no passengers that I remember waiting to check in because it was still pretty early.  As I walked down the jet bridge I noticed a Flight Attendant walking the opposite direction.  I had not met her prior as I had not been to the aircraft yet.  She told me she was trying to get better cellular reception so she could complete her COVID-19 form which is required for entry into ZZZZ.  When I boarded the aircraft; I met the other two FAs.  At no time did I notice any passengers boarding or on our aircraft.  After checking the aircraft maintenance log; flight documents; etc. I briefed the A FA.  I only briefed the A FA as passengers were now being boarded.  I assumed the other two flight attendants were on board.  I was completely unaware that we didn't have minimum crew while boarding.  Approximately 10-15 minutes prior to departure; the A1 FA informed me that she was informed that we had boarded without minimum crew.  I think the COVID-19 online form (for ZZZZ) was the reason that caused this problem.  I fly this trip nearly every week and it's generally always a bit of a scramble at the last minute to get the form completed by all crew members prior to departure.  In addition it is a very difficult form to electronically fill out for the first time.  I believe the FA was only trying her best to complete the form prior to boarding. Perhaps a reminder to both cockpit and cabin crew that a COVID-19 declaration form is required for entry into ZZZZ.  And that the form takes a while to complete as it NOT intuitive and can take a few attempts to complete it and requires sufficient WiFi or cellular signal.

Air Carrier pilot reported the aircraft was boarded without minimum FA crew because the FAs were late completing COVID-19 declaration form.


Piper Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 26; Flight Crew Total 420; Flight Crew Type 192

I was cleared for takeoff and fly runway heading out of the class delta airspace of ZZZ. Their radar was out of service so all departing aircraft were cleared to depart runway heading until exiting the class delta. I was cleared after a twin piper got cleared the same way. The piper started deviating south south west out of the class delta. I reached the same altitude and once outside the class delta noticed the piper suddenly turn left towards me [at] roughly the same altitude. I descended to avoid the aircraft and turned away. My collision avoidance system warned me multiple times about the traffic conflict once the other aircraft turned towards me.Going forward in the same situation I will maintain a slower speed so that I will remain behind the slower aircraft until I have a clearer picture of their intention.This also highlights that this situation is far more tricky than flying out of an uncontrolled field where aircraft continuously communicate their intentions.

SR22 pilot reported an NMAC during takeoff requiring evasive action.


Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Workload; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Weather

While at cruise; right about to begin descent; or right after beginning descent; we received a 'ENG L BRG OVHT' message. at the time we were IMC; with moderate rain; and light turbulence. We had a hard time communicating with ATC because of suspected static build up on the radio; but after referencing the QRH and understanding the nature of the situation; we notified ATC and requested further descent to 10;000 ft. the QRH ultimately instructed us to shut down the engine; and as we descended further we gained normal communications with ATC; and even encountered VMC conditions. We notified tower we would be stopping on the runway; and after the all clear from the fire department we taxied in without further incident. I'm unsure of what caused the issue. The only thing I can think about is the heavy rain we flight through multiple times that day. It could have been a bad sensor is what maintenance suggested.

An Air Carrier pilot reported an 'ENG L BRG OVHT' message and shut down the engine. The pilot reported difficulty communicating with ATC due to radio interference.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Type 23000

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Takeoff rejected due to autothrottle disengagement. Throttle advanced normally; then paused; then reduced to idle at 30 knots. Cleared runway.

We were cleared for takeoff. Upon power up; we received an Autopilot Disconnect Alert and we rejected the takeoff well below 80 knots.

B737 MAX 8 flight crew reported an uneventful rejected takeoff due to an uncommanded auto-throttle disengagement.


Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

The nose of the aircraft slide across the hold short line of [Runway] XXR. We advised Tower that the nose came across the hold short line. They issued an abort for a AC that was just issued a take off clearance on [Runway] XXR. The Tower thanked us for letting them know soon because the aircraft did not initiate the takeoff role. There was active snow and the hold short line and sine was covered in snow. As I preceded to stop the aircraft it was on ice so it slide to a stop just past the hold short line. The nose was between 5 feet to10 feet past the line The taxiing was difficult because of all the snow very slippery there were many times that the ac was slipping. It would have been nice if the taxi services were plowed and treated. The hold short sine was covered in snow and was difficult to see with the active snow.

CRJ-900 Captain reported sliding past the hold short line for the active runway and informing the Tower Controller who instructed a landing aircraft to go around.


Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

On this flight almost immediately after the safety demo we heard the engines revving and tried to make it to our assigned jump seats as soon as possible but 3 of the crew were unable to. Two crew members strapped into vacant passenger seats and the Flight Attendant sat down on the floor bracing herself.

PA for Flight Attendants (FA) to be seated was not given or it was made but did not broadcast.On this flight and almost immediately after the safety demo we heard the engines revving and tried to make it to our assigned seats as soon as possible; but 3 of the crew were unable. 2 crew members strapped into vacant passenger seats and [one FA] sat down on the floor bracing herself.

An air carrier Flight Attendant reported the flight began takeoff roll without allowing sufficient time for the flight attendants to get to their jump seats.


MD-90 Series (DC-9-90) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

We had strong storms moving through the area and were in [irregular operations] conditions. I informed my lead that I was very unfamiliar with the borescope job. My lead told me that I would learn it tonight. We got assigned the airplane around XA:00 pm; 2 hours later than normal. We were under a lot of pressure because the airplane had a first flight and had a large work package on the airplane that night. I had removed the first plug when inspection came by and told me that I had removed the wrong plug. I reinstalled that plug and continued on to remove the correct plug. Inspection came back and did their inspection. I reinstalled the borescope plugs and missed installing the plug in question. I didn't have very good lighting because I didn't have my headlight and was using my regular flashlight. I thought that I had installed the plug because earlier I had removed and reinstalled a very similar plug that was located close to this plug. It was about XF:30 am and we were feeling the pressure to finish the airplane and have it ready for first flight so that we didn't get in trouble for causing a first flight delay. A day shift mechanic ran the engines and did not note anything out of the ordinary. The discrepancy was discovered later in the day when the blow open panels on the thrust reverser were found open during a walk around at another station. I am not sure of corrective actions. I am new to the Line Maintenance environment and am still adjusting to the work and the pace. I have been very sick during my previous days off with very strong head and neck pains and had gotten very little sleep. This night and the night before we had a lot of rain and lightning coming through the airport which made it difficult to work. I have been mentally loaded down with a lot of stuff at home. I bought my first home about a month ago; [and] we have six puppies running around. My wife is having a lot of pain and lack of sleep because of ongoing dental work. I did not have good lighting and it was hard to see what I was doing. The issue in my opinion was caused by fatigue; inexperience; lack of lighting; and mental issues that come from my home life. In the future better lighting and a positive way to identify borescope plugs that have been removed such as a compartmentalized parts box to hold the individual plugs and their hardware while they are out of the engine. I will use this method in my future maintenance whether it is a company issued or personal box I keep for these purposes. I will definitely take more time to make sure my task is accomplished safely and correctly and I will do a better job of concentrating on what I am doing.

Our aircraft had a heavy work package; weather conditions were very bad and we started late work due to the late aircraft arrival. Neither of us had completed an engine borescope [on this model] before. While [the other AMT] was doing the borescope; I start doing the rest of our work package. [The other AMT] made a phone call to the borescope team Inspector to make sure which plugs needed to be open but he opened the wrong plug by accident. After the borescope team inspector performed his inspection [the other AMT] missed the wrong plug to install it back. We performed an engine run and leak check; and we didn't find any leak. I trusted his work and signed the inspector block. We both were working hard to put the aircraft back to service on time.

Following an engine borescope inspection; the Maintenance personnel neglected to reinstall a borescope plug.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 3330

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

While conducting a practice VOR A approach to FUL in VFR conditions with a safety pilot onboard I was executing the published procedure turn and made a left turn inbound instead of a right turn as published on the approach plate. I had set the approach into the GPS to use for situational awareness only and was using the SLI VOR for navigation since this was a VOR A approach (not a GPS approach). The [GPS] displayed the procedure turn; but since the aircraft was past the point where the initial turn outbound was drawn on the display; it appeared that a left turn was needed to follow the graphic displayed on the GPS screen. I blindly followed the graphic display instead of confirming on the approach plate the correct direction to turn inbound. SCT Approach immediately queried us on which direction we were turning inbound and pointed out that the procedure turn should be a right turn; not a left turn. This is a good lesson in not blindly using technology and to always cross check to confirm you are flying what is published on the approach plate.

Pilot made incorrect turn to initiate the VOR A approach to FUL due to misinterpretation of the GPS graphic display.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 20100; Flight Crew Type 12000

Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Airport; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

During our takeoff roll out of ZZZZ; we used approximately 99.8% of the runway (which is OVER 12;000 feet!) and ALMOST hit the runway end indicator lights. I'm assuming we probably missed them by about 2-3 feet if that much. We ran the numbers and reviewed them several times prior to takeoff. The engine spool up and takeoff roll was uneventful. The difference between V1 and VR was around 20 knots or so if I remember correctly. Had I not rotated at EXACTLY VR we would have run over the runway end indicator lights even though they're is several hundred feet of overrun which is NOT on our charts. Had we not seen the REIL's and rotated when we did; we would have hit them. The lights tend to blend in with the overrun. To say this takeoff got our attention is an understatement. I've noticed the SABRE data is getting to the point where we use every available inch of runway on many of our departures. I never remember this happening under the old system. It is uncomfortable to say the least.

Reporter stated he had not been to this airport before; and that a Check Airman was in the other seat since this was his checkout. He stated that Sabre indicated flaps 1 for takeoff; but they chose to use flaps 5. He reiterated that the takeoff numbers were run several times and that all else seemed normal; except the length of the takeoff roll. He stated that Sabre often times provides takeoff data where the aircraft uses the entire runway to become airborne. Runway 13L was NOTAM'd 3;500 ft short at the departure end; but was not in the 'numbers' generated by company methods. Runway Length was actually about 9;000 feet. Stated that the company data was predicated on the full runway being available and speeds were based on flaps 1 from Company data.

Departing in a 737-700; we used up the entire 12;500 ft of runway for our takeoff roll. The aircraft lifted off at the very end of the runway and I would estimate we were only several feet above the runway end lights. ZZZZ field elevation is [over 8;000 ft]. Our takeoff weight was about 3000 [pounds] below our MTOW. Planned takeoff data showed Flaps 1; bleeds on; with [a] slight headwind. Actual takeoff data gave us Flaps 5; bleeds on. I used zero for the wind to be more conservative (both data messages are attached). I do not recall the actual wind the tower gave us with our takeoff clearance; but it was not a tailwind.Engine and takeoff acceleration seemed normal (for the altitude) but we still used all of the runway. At the 'rotate' call we were rapidly approaching the runway end lights. The PF (other pilot) made a normal rotation; just clearing the lights. At cruise we discussed if we had done anything wrong or if we should have done something differently to not use so much runway. Everything we did was correct. I wanted to bring to attention the fact that in this event Sabre planned us very close to actual runway length. The flight was below planned takeoff weight; on a cool day with a high altimeter setting; using a greater flap setting than Sabre had initially planned for us; all favorable conditions for takeoff performance. The pilots have no knowledge of how much runway Sabre is planning on using. If I had known it was this close; I would have requested new data with a different bleed and/or flap configuration.

A B737 flight crew used their company's procedure to calculate takeoff data for a high altitude airport. They subsequently chose a better flap setting for the runway and still used all the runway to become airborne; almost hitting the runway end identifier lights. They reported that the situation was not uncommon to use all the runway to become airborne when using the company generated takeoff data.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 2400; Flight Crew Type 700

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure; Airport

Aircraft X entered the right downwind. A helicopter was working in the right traffic pattern for a taxiway. The helicopter proceeded on the go for the right downwind. I issued traffic to Aircraft X advising him about the helicopter. He reported the traffic in sight and entered the downwind and descended to 900 feet; which is below the pattern altitude for fixed wing as per the Standard Operating Procedures. When Aircraft X got on the ground they advised ground control that they had to make an abrupt maneuver to avoid the helicopter. I would advise the helicopter about Aircraft X; and let Aircraft X know that pattern altitude is 1;100 feet; so in future scenarios they don't descend into traffic that they reported in sight.

I was flying with a student in a training aircraft arriving to land via a right pattern. On entry at 45 degrees to a right down wind I had a red helicopter flying parallel to us further away on the down wind and much slower. We received clearance to land from the Tower while we were on the downwind. As we were about to reach abeam the helicopter; the helicopter made a right turn toward the airport. The student pilot was flying the aircraft. I had to take the control; and abruptly full power climb to avoid the helicopter. We climbed about 200 feet. Subsequently; the student pilot landed the aircraft. I notified the Tower; and had a discussion with the Tower Supervisor.

BED Tower Local Controller and a flight instructor reported a descent below the published pattern altitude resulting in an NMAC.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 800

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

I was on an IFR flight plan to UMP and in contact with ATC at the time of the incident. Descending through 3;200 MSL; heading 180 degrees and around 4 miles NE from UMP; a disc shaped object approx. 16 inches to 2 feet across passed within 100 feet of my right wing tip and was at or very close to my altitude.  The object passed very quickly; but I had time to point it out to my wife (acting as co-pilot at the time. She holds a private pilot certificate and is IFR rated and current. Approx. 1;000 hours as pilot in command). It was the opinion of both of us that the object must be a drone and not a balloon or kite. I advised ATC of the incident.

A pilot reported a near miss with a UAS while descending through 3;200 feet on an IFR flight to UMP.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 103.4; Flight Crew Total 6494.8; Flight Crew Type 51.3

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220.3; Flight Crew Total 7310.0; Flight Crew Type 7310.0

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

At FL 350 the right engine rolled back. The appropriate enroute emergency procedures and Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) procedures were conducted. The engine responded to throttle movement at FL245 and I leveled at FL240. An uneventful; overweight; 2 engine landing ensued.

At FL350 Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) TEMP -48 C Right engine Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR) indicated 1.90 +; all other engine indications rolled back to what appeared to be idle thrust. Engine anti-ice off at time of rollback(-48C OAT). Ran Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) checklist. Engine Anti-ice engaged as we began our descent off the airway. Engine parameters on right engine showed normal response to thrust lever descending through FL 250. Descended to FL180; proceeded direct to airport; and made an overweight landing.

At FL350; Engine anti-ice turned off; Right Engine parameters rolled back; turned Engine anti-ice on; descended to FL250 and regained engine control.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 23; Flight Crew Total 185; Flight Crew Type 37

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

I tried to crank for my flight to ZZZ. The battery was low so I turned everything off and used only the master switch to crank it and the plane started. I checked the alternator and it was charging properly at 35 Amps (which I was told was okay to fly). I left to go to ZZZ with 84 gallons of fuel. My outbound flight was uneventful. I decided not to stop so I performed a touch and go at ZZZ and started my return home. During my return; I experienced flickering of the avionics system several times. At one point I lost power to the screen for about 10 minutes and then it suddenly recovered. I did check the alternator the entire flight and at this time the alternator was functioning appropriately.Upon my arrival I decided to do a few touch and goes. I was instructed by the Tower to use a right pattern for landing. I did about 6 or 7 of these. On my last touch and go at; after taking off I lost power again to the avionics screen. I was at approximately 100 feet when I experienced significant loss of engine power. The engine never stopped running but the loss of engine noise was prominent in my headset with a change in RPMs. I notified the Tower; but heard no reply. I could feel the airplane start to sink immediately. I pushed the yoke forward and touched down past the beginning of the Runway. The plane then rolled about 75 yards into the wet and muddy terrain. The landing was uneventful. I had no injuries and upon my inspection; there appeared to be no damages to the airplane. I am not sure what the cause of the significant decrease in power was. In my notes; fuel tanks were switched appropriately. The loss of avionics power to the screen was nothing new. It happened to other pilots. The plane was taken for inspection and the mechanics could not find any reason for this to happen.

PA32 pilot reported a significant loss of engine power on initial climb and made a forced landing past the end of the runway with no injury or damage.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

After block in I dropped my ink pen; it bounced off my shoe and went through the large hole beneath the footrest.  The Airbus used to have black bristles that would prevent objects from entering the holes on each side of the footrest(s); they have been removed over the past few years.  The current large opening on each side of the footrests is large enough to fit your iPad through and could interfere with flight control linkages.

A320 Captain reported dropping a pen into a large hole beneath the footrest. The bristle seals have been removed exposing large opening.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Manuals

We were given late ATC instructions to hold south as published over HOLEY on the KORRY3 ARRIVAL inbound to LGA. Both my First Officer (FO) and I had our EPUBS zoomed in tight into the holding fix trying to locate the published hold but could not see any. We were focused on the fact that there was no number next to the fix in order to reference that the hold was depicted in another location on the chart.The ATC frequency was extremely congested and we were not able ask where the hold was published for a while. We finally were able to contact ATC; who only asked us if we had the latest charts. Another aircraft on the frequency told us 'It's at the top of the chart.'We zoomed back out and were able to see unreferenced new holds at the top of the chart; far from the fix. Both LGA STAR's KORRY3 and GATBY1 have remotely published holds that are not referenced by numbers next to the fixes. On paper; these holds may seem obvious to see. However; as we use computer tablets to zoom into Hot Spots for navigation; these depictions are easy to overlook when given a late clearance.We learned to zoom out the whole chart if we are unable to located fixes. However; the next crew that gets a rushed clearance may find themselves in same issue. Please ask Jepps to add numbered references next to these fixes.

A CRJ-700 Captain reported not being able to find a published hold on the EFB chart. Eventually they discovered they had zoomed in too far and the hold was published out of view on the chart.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

[We had a] go-around and diversion due to SFO ceiling at 400 FT AGL. Only approach available was LOC DME 28L; MDA of 460 FT. On approach at [our diversion airport] we were showing an EFOB at [our diversion airport] of 4.2. I declared a low fuel advisory because an unnecessary go-around would put us back in [our diversion airport] with about 3.0 FOB.The event occurred due to the continued inadequate facilities provided by the San Francisco Airport.

The reporter stated that SFO operations are back to normal with the ILS up and running. There is also a new ILS on Runway 28L (he believes) with a lower glide path which allows aircraft to be closely spaced trailing on Runway 28R with a high angle (3.0) approach thus keeping the trailing aircraft behind and above the lead aircraft. The day of this event he was extremely frustrating with the series of events which lead to the diversion and so this report was submitted.

An Air Carrier Captain executed a go-around on the SFO LOC DME 28L at minimums (460 FT) and because no other approach was available the flight diverted to a nearby airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 12500; Flight Crew Type 90

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Approximately 5-8 minutes after I received the 'chocks in' signal the aircraft started rolling back! All parking checklists were completed and my First Officer was in the cabin as passengers were leaving. I was getting out of my seat when I noticed that the aircraft was moving and my First Officer was shouting to set the brakes. I immediately returned to my seat and set the parking brake. The aircraft had rolled back about 2 feet. We immediately stop disembarking passengers and repositioned the jet bridge. Fortunately there were no injuries or aircraft damage. I spoke to the Ramp Supervisor who informed me that their procedure is to only chock the nose wheel. The main wheels are chocked sometime after the 'chocks in' signal is given to the Captain. I found this surprising since I was expecting all wheels to be chocked before I received the 'chocks in' signal.

Five minutes after gate arrival and receiving the chocks in signal; the Captain was about to leave the cockpit when he detects the aircraft is moving and quickly sets the brake. After repositioning the jetway the Captain learns that only nose wheel chocks were in place and were apparently not adequate for the slope.


Flight Crew Total 9260; Flight Crew Type 1905

Distraction; Workload; Time Pressure; Fatigue; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Work Refused

Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure; Weather

Destination airport ZZZZ was temporarily closed due to thunderstorms. With more than 20 aircraft ahead there was no chance of landing during the next lull after which more cells were bearing down on the airport. ZZZZ1; although not closed; was also reporting storms. ZZZZ2 was closed. We consulted with the dispatcher and diverted to ZZZZ3.By itself the above events don't merit a report. The facts imply no regulatory or safety concerns. However; this report is not about a simple divert; but interference and misinformation that contaminated the process. Well on our way to ZZZZ3 we received a dispatcher message that the Operations Manager preferred we divert to ZZZZ4. I strongly support a dispatcher's willingness to utilize various resources and inputs to inform his input and recommendations. I even understand; particularly if caught unaware; that his initial opinion might change. But this message was noteworthy in that the Dispatcher conspicuously eschewed ownership but passed it along anyway.The Ops Manager's preference was not the safest alternative or even remotely equivalent. Case closed. An unplanned border crossing between hostile countries is a risky endeavor. More likely than not; ZZZZ4 would simply deny incursion. Landing a United States airplane and crew [on foreign soil] should not be taken lightly. And only dire circumstances merit taking a planeload of [foreign] nationals to ZZZZ3. Such issues impose risk for the plane; passengers and crew. Even the best outcome would ultimately require Captain's authority to escape. By my estimation the best case would be for ZZZZ3 authorities; after some delay for interrogation; to insist that the airplane depart. I would have no choice but exercise emergency authority to exceed regulatory duty limits notwithstanding certain fatigue. After I rejected the alternative; the Dispatcher passed a message from the Ops Manager that ZZZZ3 would not allow us to land. Purportedly; they had too many airplanes on the ground already. If we persisted to ZZZZ3 landing clearance would only be given for [priority status]. I replied with a willingness to oblige; if necessary. But I was not persuaded by the twisted logic that ZZZZ3 would turn us away and ZZZZ4 would welcome an incursion with open arms. Next we were warned that customs would not clear the flight in ZZZZ3 and occupants would be required to remain onboard. This also did not persuade me to reverse course to [departure airport]. Of course; in reality we encountered no resistance from Air Traffic Control. Safely on the ground I now welcomed input from the Ops Manager. I spoke directly to her. Surprisingly; the discussion revealed her to be a very intelligent woman. So I doubt she was oblivious to the challenges diverting would create.She blamed our staff in ZZZZ3 for prior misinformation but was adamant about her second warning that neither passengers nor crew would be allowed to deplane. On that basis; to keep the option alive; we prepared for a possible return. However; a return flight could only be conducted under [my] authority as doing so would exceed regulatory duty limits. So I also obtained documents authorizing regulatory exemption on the premise that passengers and crew were hostage to the aircraft. More than a little suspicious of information being passed; I let it be known I would independently verify the facilitation issue. And when time allowed I did exactly that. The reality was again much different than what had been represented. I was told passengers and crew could all deplane. However; there was some noise about immigration officials possibly holding passports of deplaning occupants but this; too; was soon resolved. I again spoke directly to the Ops Manager. When informed that deplaning would be allowed with the possible holding of passports she said that's what she meant when she warned ZZZZ3 would not clear the flight. She claimed that equated to occupants being hostage on theaircraft. From a regulatory perspective; allowing crewmembers to deplane into crew rest is the polar opposite of forcing the crew to remain on the airplane. The actual circumstance did not qualify for regulatory exemption. I immediately ceased all efforts to further extend duty under the regulatory exemption. We had been on duty for 21 hours and 44 minutes when the return to [destination] was cancelled. The flight was planned for 2 hours and 9 minutes.

Air carrier Captain reported diverting because of thunderstorms. After almost 22 hours on duty; the crew ceased attempting to get clearance to destination; a 2 hour flight; despite company personnel threats about dire consequences for failing to depart.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 213; Flight Crew Type 11000

Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

VOR approach Runway 8 Pensacola. At minimum call; FO called runway in sight. Looking for the runway; FO said slightly to your right; still not picking up the runway entered a small cloud and at the same time got Obstacle Obstacle. At this time executed the recovery maneuver and went missed. Not sure what happened; may have descended a little too fast. With weather marginal and non-precision approach; newer model aircraft would be safer.

We were flying the VOR Runway 8 approach into PNS. We had already been handed off to Tower and cleared to land. We crossed the SAUFLEY (NUN) VOR on speed and fully configured. My Captain was the Pilot Flying with the autopilot engaged. Upon crossing the VOR; he started his descent to our Derived Decision Altitude (DDA) of 850 feet. As I called minimums we 'broke out;' and I could see the airport. As we went visual at minimums my Captain asked; 'Do you see the airport'? I replied 'Yes.' He asked. 'Where is it'? As I tried to point it out; we returned to IMC and I lost visual with the runway. We are now approximately 700 feet MSL.As I started to call for the go-around; we received a GPWS Obstacle Warning. My Captain initiated the escape maneuver and climbed out straight ahead. Once clear of the warning; we declared our missed approach to Tower and diverted. The flight landed with no other abnormalities noted. I should have called for the go-around as soon as my Captain asked 'Do you see the runway.'

B737 flight crew experiences a GPWS obstacle warning during the VOR Runway 8 approach after descending below MDA prior to having the runway clearly in sight. A go-around is initiated and the crew diverts to their alternate.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 45; Flight Crew Type 45

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

A student pilot solo had a runway excursion incident during his third solo flight in the traffic pattern at ZZZ. Student had been instructed to perform only full stop taxi back for the pattern work and he had complied accordingly. The ATIS during the time of event was reported at 120@08 which was within the the limitations listed in the student's endorsements. After about 1 hour of solo flight in the pattern for [Runway] XXR; student described that when the aircraft touched down on the runway after a landing; he was not able to maintain directional control using the rudder. The aircraft veered off to the left of the runway; the left main wheel got onto the grass and impacted a runway light. The student then promptly corrected the aircraft back onto the runway and came to a complete stop near the intersection of [Runways] XYR and XXR. The Tower asked the student to stay in position and wait for the first responders.The student is safe without any form of injury and the aircraft is intact with no substantial damage. Student was able to taxi back to the ramp with the aircraft after the incident while followed by the airport operation vehicles. All documents and required information from the student and the instructor has been provided the to Airport Operation personnel.The flight hours provided above is the student of the incident. The person submitting the current report is the instructor on behalf of the student.

Instructor of a C-152 Single Pilot trainee reported that the trainee had a runway excursion including striking a landing light during their landing rollout.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Procedure; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Face masks may be used during flight as a preventative measure against the spread of COVID-19. This poses significant safety compromises.The over/continued use of face masks has been linked to unconsciousness due to insufficient oxygen intake/excessive carbon dioxide intake.Masks also cause communications barriers in already noisy fight decks. Should an explosive decompression occur; time of useful consciousness at typical flight levels is approximately 15-30 seconds. Time is critical. Modern airliners utilize quick-don pilot oxygen masks for a reason. Has the FAA conducted extensive testing verifying face masks will not interfere with oxygen mask use? If not; face masks must be removed before oxygen mask use. A process that will take critical time at a critical time. Should the face mask be pulled down below the chin or should it be remove above the head? How will a tied face mask be quickly untied?  Pilots have received zero training in these tasks. These questions pose serious risks until they are analyzed.Because of the extreme risks to flight safety should oxygen masks be immediately required; the FAA must immediately intervene and prohibit face mask use during flight until they have specifically tested various face mask types and determine which; if any; are safe for use in flight.

Air carrier Captain reported significant safety compromises with wearing face masks during the COVID-19 pandemic and associated problems with oxygen masks.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 72; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

I was the pilot not flying for the approach and landing in CYMX. It was an uneventful landing and rollout. The ATIS was reporting light freezing rain and Tower informed us the runway had been treated. He also informed us that some taxiways had not yet been treated and they might be slick. I reported braking action good as we exited the runway. Taxing to the ramp was initially uneventful until we hit a slick spot on Taxiway J. This taxiway had not yet been treated. Our taxi speed was very slow at this point; so it did not cause a problem. There was a 757 taxiing to the ramp in front of us and he appeared not to have any problems taxiing so we continued our taxi at a very slow speed. We made the turn onto Taxiway F. About halfway down F the Captain informed me she 'was standing on the brakes.' The aircraft was not responding; at this point she applied the parking brake and still the airplane did not respond. Now the airplane began to slide sideways to the left and the Captain applied reverse thrust and the airplane came to a stop. We called Tower and advised them of the conditions on Taxiway F. We also advised we would be shutting down the engines and we would need to be towed to our parking spot. They offered to have one of their trucks come treat the taxiway in front of us so that we could continue our taxi. We declined and requested the tug come out to our position and tow us in. When the Maintenance personnel arrived to hooked up the tug they told us that we had hit one of the blue above ground taxiway lights as we slid sideways. The aircraft never left the prepared surface and there was no damage to the aircraft. The only damage was the broken taxiway light. The taxiway was treated and we were towed to parking. After we secured the aircraft the gateway personnel said they often have problems with freezing rain and slick taxiways. They said you can call Tower and request a truck come out to treat the taxiways in front of the aircraft as you taxi to the ramp. I think this information about the truck treating the taxiways as you follow him to parking needs to be on the Briefing page. This incident may have been avoided had we known.

Upon arrival in CYMX; the good weather on descent had materialized into light freezing rain/rain. CYMX had treated the runway and we landed uneventfully on Runway 06. (Receiving a bleed leak 2 on short final which also removed our wing heat). The braking action was good and we taxied clear of runway at B5 and slowly moved towards cargo ramp. CYMX was treating the taxiways and said there might be some slick areas especially where they had not treated. We reduced our taxi speeds for the conditions to extremely slow 1-5 to ensure we could always stop and get a tow; if necessary. A cargo jet had just taxied in prior to our arrival with no issues. I made the last 90 degree turn onto Taxiway F and slowed to enter the ramp. About halfway down the decline; [the] jet wanted to pick up extra speed and I applied my brakes [but] received no feedback. The aircraft slid slightly to left and I used brakes; parking brake; etc'' and finally came to a stop where we called for a tow and shut down. Maintenance informed us when they got on headset that we had knocked one of the above ground blue taxi lights off; but no damage to aircraft tire and the light was returned to security for reinstallation. We were tugged in and able to exit aircraft safely. Ramp personnel informed us; after the incident; of an option of a gravel truck to proceed us for traction since this had been an ongoing issue in CYMX. This information would have been nice to know. We were queried about treating taxi route in front after we stopped so we could continue our taxi but we declined and maintained the decision for a tow.

Widebody flight crew reports sliding on a slippery taxiway during taxi to parking after landing at CYMX. A taxi light is damaged and the the aircraft is towed to parking.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 195; Flight Crew Type 1004

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

At about 1;000 feet above the ground in a shallow left turn; a loud explosion was heard. Simultaneously; the aircraft shuddered; yawed; a bright flash of light from the right side of the aircraft happened; and I felt it in the flight controls. My first assumption was an engine failure; no airspeed decay occurred; our pitch attitude was not effected by an expected loss of thrust; the airplane flew normally. It takes about 2 seconds to determine the aircraft is stable; and I then reviewed engine indications. Both First Officers were closely looking at engine indications (no abnormal indications were noted). EPR was normal; fan speed was normal; temperatures were normal; oil pressure and quantity was normal; vibration sensors were not giving abnormal indications. The cabin altitude was holding steady; we retracted flaps from 15; 5; 1; and up with no adverse effect. Both Packs operated normally; cabin pressurization was normal.We initiated a satellite call with [Maintenance Control]; the only telemetry available was the start of the takeoff roll with power set for takeoff. [Maintenance Control] noted no abnormal indications; and his data were limited to the start of the takeoff which was before the event itself.We spoke with Cabin crew; they remarked the passengers were alarmed and scared. [Monitoring Pilot and Relief Pilot]; communicated clearly; and described the loud bang shudder and flash of light that was seen illuminating the cabin. His observations were confirmed with other cabin crew members who were in other areas of the aircraft.Knowing we were 80;000 LBS over landing weight; we did not attempt to rush the return for landing. We climbed to an altitude of 31;000 feet. We made the decision to return out of caution; the assumption of a compressor stall was our best guess. The flight deck crew (all agreed) had no compressor stalls to compare to this; and this was violent. Could we assure you that a compressor stall was what occurred? No; it was only a best guess. We felt caution was our best option and chose to return for landing. I [advised ATC] and ATC accommodated our request for vectors; and airspace to jettison fuel.I want to interject; about speaking with a few passengers. They were unanimously happy to be on the ground and several had tears in their eyes. I cannot express the professionalism and exceptional work of the cabin crew who prepared for our return to ZZZ; they did an excellent job helping our customers remain calm.One passenger who was seated behind the wing; described in great detail the fire ball he saw leaving the right engine. He said this with tears in his eyes; and with his infant son sleeping on his shoulder. That was the most emotionally charged moment of the entire event for me.We reported the mechanical discrepancies in the ELB of an overweight landing as well as the engine surge/stall condition. After landing; we inspected the exterior of the aircraft; with emphasis on the engine itself; tires; and pack inlet and nothing looked abnormal.All in all; it was not a very exciting [situation]; the engine surge/stall was loud and attention getting but everything was handled well; and we returned safely to ZZZ. We used the Diversion Guide; as well as the Emergency Checklist for fuel Jettison; otherwise; all normal checklists were used.

B767 Captain reported an engine compressor stall after takeoff that resulted in a return to the departure airport.