Flight Crew Total 1312; Flight Crew Type 1189

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

We left on time and had some weather to deal with on the way out. I check fuel balance upon going through FL180; as per recommend in the FM. There was a slight imbalance of .2.  Which was normal. We burned through the center tank fuel and I turned them off and rechecked the quantities. Same split. .2. After 10-20 minutes the Fuel Imbalance message came on the EICAS. It showed left tank at 14.3 and right tank at 12.3. That was alarming. I assumed a fuel leak because we didn't cross feed at any point on the flight. We watched it and ran the QRH up to the engine shut down. The QRH confirmed a suspected fuel leak. You could count the fuel leaving the right tank. The totalizer and fuel indicator both agreed on total amount on board-that was just a huge split in the wings so it was not a sensor issue. The CA immediately contacted dispatch for available places. Dispatch came back with ZZZ1. The flight attendants did check the wing and could not see any fuel leaking. We advised ATC and headed straight to ZZZ1. We were roughly 80 miles from the airport. The CA and I agreed to not shut down the engine since the fuel was leaking slowly. We kept the number 2 engine at idle and landed with two engines. We did check the roll and yaw tendency and it was noticeable but not uncontrollable before we landed- due to fuel split. Upon arriving in ZZZ1 the fire department could not find a leak and maintenance was trouble shooting for a couple hours and agreed there was no sensor problem we somehow were losing gas out of the right side. They weren't sure from were. We land and the right side was down to 9.8 and the left was at 13.7. We deplaned as directed a few rows at a time for unbalance problems that might occur and none did. Dispatch did come back and requested we continue to ZZZ- we agreed that was not a good idea. ZZZ1 was closer and we did not know the extent of the fuel leak - it seemed slow but we could not determine if it was going to get worse so we declined going to ZZZ and continued to our nearest suitable airport of ZZZ1.

B757 First Officer reported a possible fuel leak at FL340 when EICAS indicated a fuel imbalance. The crew elected to divert to the nearest suitable airport and landed with a 4;000 pound split between the right tank and the left.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 161; Flight Crew Total 4991; Flight Crew Type 4569

Workload; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 189; Flight Crew Total 2784; Flight Crew Type 792

Workload; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Airport; Chart Or Publication

Built and briefed the GRNPA1 arrival for ILS 25L. In quick order we were cleared direct to TRROP and for the RNAV visual 19R. We put in RNAV (GPS) 19R and quickly briefed the RNAV procedure as we were getting saturated. Captain recognized that we were really getting close to Nellis AFB. In very quick order we were told to confirm that we were doing the RNAV visual 19L. We quickly turned south as the controller gave us a heading of 190. The FO loaded the RNAV visual 19R as we were turning south to stay clear of Nellis AFB. By this time our aircraft was between TRROP and TOWEN. Simultaneously the Captain became concerned about the approach corridor to the LAS 25L/R; and Approach Control issued a heading of 260; the Approach Controller asked if we had the field in sight and cleared us for the visual to 19R; contact Tower. We performed a stabilized approach to 19R full stop. During debrief the crew noticed that the RNAV visual 19R on [our aircraft] FMC approach selection shows up as RNAV V 19R. In addition; JEPP PRO on the IPAD; with IPAD in the horizontal position; under approach selection; the RNAV visual 19L/R is not visible. The RNAV visual is listed under the general approaches; not under the RWY 19L or 19R approaches. When scrolled down to the RWY 19 approaches the RNAV visual is buried at the top of the page.My discussion with the LAS TRACON Controller he mentioned that their notes said to only allowed old 737 to do the RNAV visual approach to Runway 19L and 19R.

We then proceeded to JeppFD-Pro; scrolled to the approaches for 19 and selected the only RNAV approach to 19R I saw; which was the RNAV (GPS) Rwy 19R. We briefed this approach and discussed the proximity to Nellis AFB. Very shortly; the Captain mentioned we seemed be very close to Nellis. Almost simultaneously the controller came on and asked us to verify we were flying the RNAV Visual to 19R vice the RNAV 19R. I said 'verifying' and went heads down to check (although at that time I was pretty sure I had selected the incorrect approach). The controlled turned us to 190 heading. I realized there were two RNAV 19R approaches; one being a GPS while the other was a (V). I then loaded the RNAV (V) 19R and communicated what had happened to the Captain. While turning towards heading 190; the Captain said he was watching the 25 approach corridor. The controller then turned us right to 270 saying; 'I don't know where you are going with these vectors.' He then cleared us for the visual 19R and switched us to Tower.

An air carrier crew flying a GPS equipped aircraft flew the LAS RNAV RWY 19R after a late runway change and were told they should have flown the LAS RNAV VISUAL RWY 19R. The LAS RNAV RWY 19R is meant for non-GPS equipped aircraft.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 59; Flight Crew Total 915; Flight Crew Type 306

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

The Captain determined that post-flight; a panel was missing from the bottom of the aircraft. The preflight of the exterior of the aircraft was not my responsibility; therefore I was unaware of the aircraft's condition. That is the standard operating procedure.

CE560XLS First Officer reported an exterior panel missing post flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 2565

In my company's fatigue program it states that there will be PROACTIVE risk assessments of flight duty and rest requirements utilized by the company to avoid pilot fatigue. It also states that predictive assessments will use fatigue modeling software to verify alertness levels during trips and scheduling construction. Under the program the pilot's schedule leading up to the event; rest periods; work schedule; sleep opportunities and city pairs are a few of the factors to be considered to help avoid fatigue. In the above pairing I find it hard to believe that a trip that reports for duty [early] on day one would follow smart fatigue avoiding practices if no more than 42 hours later you report for duty [early] pilot domicile time. Stated another way in home domicile times. I wake up at 0430 to get to work on Wednesday; the next day I arrive on the West coast at 1300 I'm expected to sleep DURING THE DAY when I'm normally awake; and then report for duty at 0200 right in the middle of my normal sleep cycle. How can this pass any reasonable scrutiny; either human or software based?Per the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the company [Union] is responsible for ongoing discussions of fatigue events; or possible events. What is being done about these onerous two duty periods in one day trips? It's one thing to have a double duty day when the 'all nighters' is [Airport 1-Airport 2]; approximately two hour flight. But when the trip is a true all night flight it makes no sense. These trips should be eliminated in the line building stage and never make it into our bidding. It is very difficult for pilots; being highly motivated goal oriented people; to call in fatigued at the departure time. We have managed our naps during the day and generally feel fine at departure time. But the real question is whether we will still be alert at top of descent through landing. This is something we can only guess at when we are still 4 to 5 hours from landing. But you can be certain that with this type of trip we will definitely not be at the top of our game during a demanding time.

A-320 captain points out potential fatigue issues with certain flight pairings.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial

Troubleshooting; Workload; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Software and Automation; Procedure; Equipment / Tooling

During the flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ; we received Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) Terrain; Terrain; Pull Up; annunciator on the right downwind about to turn to base for the visual to Runway XXL at ZZZ right after ATC approved us for the visual. This flight was at night with clear sky and runway insight. We received the Terrain; Terrain; Pull Up alert approximately abeam midpoint between IF (Initial Fix) and FAF (Final Approach Fix) at above 2000 ft within about 3NM on the right downwind. The pilot flying (FO) immediately responded to the alert by clicking the Autopilot off and followed the appropriate recovery procedure. As soon as the pilot flying initiated the recovery procedure the alert was eliminated. Both pilot flying (FO) and pilot monitoring (CA) looked outside and we had no visual of any terrain. As a result of this alert; we were unstable for the approach and we made a decision to terminate the approach and get radar vectors for another attempt for the RNAV (GPS) Runway XXL. ATC; began to give us radar vectors to the right downwind with a descent to 3000 ft. At 3000 ft on the right downwind we received another brief Terrain; Terrain; Pull Up; annunciator. The pilot flying immediately initiated the recovery procedure and the alert was immediately eliminated. Pilot monitoring asked ATC if there is any known terrain at our current position and altitude or if anyone has reported [a] similar alert. ATC informed us there was no terrain and no reports. The pilot monitoring noticed IRS REVERTED white message on the PFD during the Terrain; Terrain; Pull Up; annunciator and repositioned the aircraft coordinates not certain if this would have caused the Terrain; Terrain; Pull Up alert. We continued the approach and landed safely with no further issues. ATC stated they will disseminate the information to identify if there is any known issue. Possibly address the IRS issue if it was related to the false alert. Also; it might be related to the 5G interference and need further look into.

An air carrier Captain reported receiving Terrain Alerts on downwind on two approaches even though they were at altitudes above terrain and as assigned from ATC.  The alerts caused an unstable approach requiring a go around.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 2710

Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

While descending on the JAGGR3 RNAV arrival into Denver; all was well with planned RNAV RNP 17R loaded in the FMC. We had been cleared to descend via the JAGGR3 and had a discontinuity between QWIKE on the arrival and QWIKE on the approach as we had never yet been cleared for the approach. Somewhere around JAAAM (I believe) Approach Control told us to slow early to 210 KTS. This put us a bit high on profile and we were having to react aggressively to make the 11000 at QWIKE. About the same time we were cleared for the RNAV RNP Z 17R approach. I selected QWIKE for the approach (below the discontinuity) and attempted to place it just below QWIKE on the arrival (above the discontinuity) but it would not take. I am not sure if there was an accompanying scratch pad message but I then selected QWIKE below the discontinuity and placed it on top of QWIKE above the discontinuity and got an execute light. Confirmed with the First Officer (F/O) and pushed execute. Still not sure exactly what went wrong but the jet did not start the turn at STAAM but instead went straight ahead. After a slight delay to see that the autopilot was not going to make the turn; I disconnected the autopilot and hand flew the airplane for the remainder of the approach as it was clear skies and near unlimited visibility with the runway in sight. Just after I disconnected the autopilot and was beginning the turn; ATC asked if we were flying the RNAV Z 17 R and the F/O replied 'yes'. No more was said and we continued to landing. I have little doubt that some mistake was made and the FMC was misprogrammed in the rushed environment that was created by ATC but am not sure what it was. I did realize after starting the turn that there was a magenta line that also continued straight ahead in addition to the curved magenta line of the approach but it was not readily noticed in the hurried state we had been suddenly put in. I will investigate further when back in an airplane and with ample time to do so. I would like to stress that I can't really think of a time while descending on a descend via arrival into Denver that Approach Control did not change things up from published at least once; and many times there are multiple changes. This happens all the time in Denver and from talking to other pilots it is common to everyone. I can understand the occasional need to change a speed or altitude but this seems to happen every single time on arrivals into Denver. I feel it has become a safety hazard and it is not just me. Many pilots feel the same. These arrival changes are often combined with late approach clearances just like happened in this case. Why can't Denver just clear us to descend via an arrival and cleared for the RNAV XXX approach like many other cities do in what seems like far more congested airspace?

B737NG Captain reported a track deviation occurred on the JAGGR3 arrival into DEN. Reporter stated a late clearance change in a time-limited situation led to an FMC programming error.


Indicating and Warning - Flight & Navigation Systems

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 8478; Flight Crew Type 2749

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 93; Flight Crew Total 15800; Flight Crew Type 1935

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Overrode Automation

I was the PF (Pilot Flying) on this flight from ZZZZ1 to ZZZZ. On arrival into the ZZZZ terminal area; we were cleared direct to ZZZZZ and cleared for the ILS XXL approach. Weather at ZZZZ was reporting winds 280 at 12; few clouds at 3;000 ft.; altimeter 29.62; and no other significant weather. The initial approach was uneventful and we were fully configured and stable by about 1200 ft. AGL. At approximately 800 ft.; I turned off the autopilot and began hand flying. Then at approximately 700 ft. we received an audible wind shear warning that lasted for 3-4 seconds. This caught us both by surprise as there were no other conditions that would be associated with wind shear. There was no convective activity in the area; the weather was good; and the wind readout showed stable at 12 kts. The aircraft showed no airspeed fluctuation nor an increasing or decreasing trend vector; the thrust setting was normal; pitch attitude and vertical path were stable. During the alert; the weather radar showed a lot of red radar return that wasn't previously there; and did not correlate with what we were seeing visually out the windscreen. We both assessed the situation; and agreed that the alert was erroneous. At this point we were at about 300 ft. AGL; and the Captain told me to continue. I agreed with this assessment and decision; and continued to land normally. Not once did we receive any other indication that wind shear was present; it wasn't even 'choppy'. It was smooth all the way through landing. After reflecting on the event; I still believe that the alert we received was false. With that being said; as a crew; we probably should have discussed making a logbook entry and discussing the alert with the mechanic once we were parked at the gate in ZZZZ. Going forward if I encounter something like this again; I will handle it differently for a couple of reasons. First; the FOM does state that if a wind shear warning is received; to follow wind shear escape maneuver or to execute a normal go around. Secondly; I do not want to get into a habit of second guessing the warning systems on board the aircraft. Regardless of a suspected error; and as long as safety is not compromised; follow procedure then once at the gate; make a logbook entry for a suspected error.

We were operating this flight from ZZZZ1 to ZZZZ arriving approximately XA:30 UTC. Captain was PM (Pilot Monitoring) and FO (First Officer) was PF (Pilot Flying). We were set up for the ZZZZZ1 RNAV arrival for the ILS XXL. The aircraft (a B767) was empty and our landing weight was 198;100 lbs. VApp was calculated at 122 and VRef at 117. The weather was VFR. There was no convective activity; a few clouds at 3000 ft.; winds 280 at 12 reported on the field; and altimeter at 29.62. We were cleared to the fix ZZZZZ to begin the ILSZ XXL at 4000 ft. We intercepted the localizer and armed the APPCH. We continued to configure the aircraft for landing maintaining VFR conditions. With the aircraft fully configured for landing (Stabilized Approach criteria met) at approximately 700 ft. AGL we received a wind shear alert. The weather was VFR; and the winds at our altitude were showing stable at 12 knots. There was no airspeed fluctuation (including the airspeed trend line); the throttle position did not change; the thrust setting did not change; and the aircraft pitch attitude did not change. As PM; I did not elect to call 'Go Around' as the aircraft was fully stabilized; fully configured for landing and we were passing through approximately 300 ft. AGL with the PF hand-flying the aircraft. Given the situation with all of the present conditions and the state of the aircraft; I believed the alert was erroneous. I should have made a logbook write up on the EPGWS (Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System) to check for errors. There were no reports of any wind shear activity in the area and the weather conditions were VFR. Also given the location and state the aircraft was in; I thought it would create an unnecessary 'non-normal' situation that could have potentially caused more problems than just continuing the approach and landing the aircraft. As I stated above; the aircraft exhibited no indications for us to believe that there were any type of wind shear occurrences at the present time or in the immediate time prior to landing.

B767 flight crew reported a false windshear warning during fully configured and stable final approach to landing.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 9800; Flight Crew Type 1100

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Airport; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Upon landing at Waco airport on Runway 14; we proceeded to roll out on the full length of the runway. As we approached Taxiway B3; we were instructed by the Tower Controller to exit on Taxiway B2. At the moment; approaching B3 we assumed that B2 was the next taxiway turnoff. As we rolled off the end of Runway 14; we found ourselves on the overrun to Runway 14 (chevron taxiway marking). At this point we were approaching Runway 19 and slowed to stop to query the Tower Controller regarding our taxi instructions which did not include crossing Runway 19. Before we were able to question the Tower Controller; a second Controller instructed us to do a 180 turn on the runway and exit on Taxiway B3. As instructed; we complied with those instructions and proceeded to exit the Runway at B3. Approximately 1 minute later; the Tower instructed us to contact the Approach/Tower phone number to discuss a possible pilot deviation. We learned during that phone conversation; that the overrun for Runway 14 is a non-movement area. Further; because we had rolled out in this non-movement area; we were in violation of a runway incursion; even though we never moved on to the adjacent Runway 19 at any point. Subsequent to our phone discussion with the Tower Supervisor; we are still rather confused as to what we did wrong other then taxing on to the overrun portion of Runway 14. It should be noted there are no airport signs; directions or notes on the airport surface or more importantly; on our airport runway charts that identify this area as a non-movement area.

The reporter stated that he is still unclear what the runway incursion event was which the Controller referenced. His concentration was on the short field landing and at the time he was traveling at no more than 5 miles per hour and missed the taxiway sign so thought what turned out to be the overrun was Taxiway B-3. The reporter stated that the Controller whom he spoke with stated that they were having 'all kinds of problems with aircraft in that area.' What the reporter believes is that the signage on Runway 14 approaching the runway end should state that area is a non-movement area because it is not possible to see the overrun chevrons in a short aircraft.

A pilot landed on ACT Runway 14 and after missing Taxiway B-3 entered the area beyond the runway's end where he was given a 180 degree turn to Taxiway B-3 and advised of a runway incursion in the non-movement area.


Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Passing 10;500 feet on the arrival; slats were extended causing a pronounced roll.  The right hydraulic system quantity decreased to almost zero.  Pilot Flying continued to fly and talk to ATC; while Pilot Monitoring ran the R HYD Quantity low checklist.  Emergency was declared while running checklist.  We  were able to configure the aircraft to gear down and flaps 40.  An uneventful landing ensued.  Safety vehicles followed our aircraft to the gate.  A safety inspection was done by Safety Crew and Maintenance.   Emergency was terminated.

MD-82 pilot reports a pronounced roll when slats are extended; followed by the right hydraulic quantity going to zero.  An emergency is declared and the crew is able to land normally with full flaps and slats.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Immediately after takeoff rotation; aircraft experienced a major electrical failure. We lost 5 of the 6 DUs; so I transferred control to the FO who had a working display. In addition; we had numerous alerts for many malfunctioning systems. During climbout to 10000 ft; we also experienced a flight control malfunction. Between 7000 ft and 8000 ft while retracting the slats and accelerating from 220 to 250 knots; the aircraft rolled to the left; requiring a 1/2 to 3/4 yoke input to maintain wings level. We leveled off at 10000 ft; tried to determine what was functioning and what wasn't; and [advised ATC]. QRH consulted. Then we were vectored by ATC for an ILS to landing.This aircraft has a long history of electrical malfunctions; including two MELs this morning before we took off. Maintenance also fixed a hydraulic leak last night after we brought the aircraft in.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

MD-11 flight crew reported they had an electrical failure shortly after takeoff followed by a slat malfunction. Crew returned to departure airport.


Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

The aircraft was at 5;000 feet on an a downwind operating under IFR conditions with the final Savannah Approach Controller.  A weather cell was in front of us approximately 15 miles away.  We advised we would need right deviations.The Controller had both VFR and IFR aircraft under his control.  I observed an aircraft in our vicinity on our TCAS with a sporty vertical closure rate.  The aircraft was identified as a small aircraft.  The pilot was informed to stop the climb at 4;500 feet (this tells me the pilot was cleared to a higher altitude which would have conflicted with our flight).Though the pilot flying was the First Officer; as the closure rate continued and the colors/threat level changed; I verbalized and disconnected the aircraft autopilot and added a small amount of thrust as we received a red TCAS and a subsequent climb command.  I informed the FO to start climbing (I had a little pressure on the yoke to begin the climb).  A smooth climb initiated respecting the RA information.  Once the conflict was resolved; we leveled off (approximately 6;500 feet) and maintained our course heading (270 degrees). Sometime during our climb and a lower workload; I communicated our TCAS RA to ATC.  We were then given a descent to 4;000 feet.  According to the First Officer; the RA depicted our vertical separation of -200 feet.  With that information; in my opinion the event qualified as a near miss.  When workload permitted; I simply advised our event was a near miss.The Controller responded the conflict aircraft was supposed to stop at 4;500 feet.  The conflict aircraft then communicating and over-talking on the frequency.  I simply noted we are all fine----we would like to clear up the frequency.The flight landed without incident.  During deplaning; I listened for passenger comments to determine if anyone was aware of the alert.  I could not determine any customer who asked about the event during the approach phase.  Later in the day; I asked the Flight Attendants if they noticed or heard anything unusual going into SAV.  The lead FA was not aware of anything.  The rear FA noted she felt the aircraft climb for a short period.  Their feedback is consistent with the physics felt during the climb.Dispatch was notified.  No delays were encountered for our return flight to NY.Cause: Controller workload and frequency congestion.  The conflict aircraft also operated under VFR conditions when it was extremely hazy with weather surrounding the area of conflict.  It is easy for me to opine the aircraft should have operated under IFR; however; that is a biased opinion.Suggestions: Clearly our manuals provide the guidance and years of experience provide intuitive actions.  Regrettably; we have not reinforced the 'positive aircraft control' concept in our training evolutions; even after documented events with similar recommendations.

CRJ-900 Captain reported climbing in response to an RA with an aircraft 200 feet below them on arrival into SAV.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

[We were] cleared direct to MOD (or OAL) for SFO arrival. We were either in descent or temporarily level preparing for descent. At some point TCAS displayed 'TRAFFIC; TRAFFIC' and yellow TCAS showing target 300 FT above our altitude and descending; from right to left; nearly directly above us and moving VERY quickly. TCAS showed approximately 2 dot (target) movements (thereby giving indication of FAST movement) before disappearing from scope and never reappearing. Crew immediately looked for traffic visually but saw nothing. No RA. Crew assumed it was a spurious TCAS error and continued arrival. After landing; a passenger asked the Captain if we experienced a near midair collision since he visually saw an aircraft out his window VERY close and rapidly heading away to left at about the same time we had our incident.

The Reporter stated that after the fact the crew assumed a military aircraft was involved because they were near the Sierra Nevada Range and at times there are military aircraft in that operate VFR in that area. He emphasized this was a guess on his part.

A First Officer reported a TCAS TRAFFIC alert and near miss at FL200 while direct to MOD for a SFO arrival but the crew assumed a TCAS error until a passenger later reported seeing traffic pass nearby.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 49; Flight Crew Total 343; Flight Crew Type 24

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I was relocating Aircraft X across the field at ZZZ from the West Ramp to the East Ramp via Taxiway's A; V; and B. I had reviewed the airfields AWOS/ Weather prior to taxi and was communicating on CTAF frequency.The incident occurred after I had crossed the approach end of XXR and taxing along Taxiway V prior to XXL. During my taxi across both of the parallel runways and taxiways; I was communicating my intentions with CTAF. Prior to crossing the XXL/XXR runway at Taxiway V to B I called my intentions over CTAF and checked both of the approach ends of the runway (including all visible portions of the runway). Upon confirming they were clear; I proceeded across the hold short line of XXL towards Taxiway B from V when a Cirrus SR-22 crested the hill of XYR and became airborne. I immediately stopped my aircraft; coming to a halt after the hold short line (~15ft) but prior to entering the main portion of the runway. I proceeded to stay put in the event the aircraft taking off had to make an emergency landing with the remaining runway. The cirrus continued their climb out overtop of my aircraft and continued on the upwind for runway XYR and departed the area. Prior to seeing their aircraft become airborne; I had not heard their aircraft communicate over the CTAF frequency. I did however hear an aircraft in the downwind at the time; and later the Cirrus involved in this incident call their upwind (This call from the Cirrus was after they had flown over my aircraft). Some things to note:1) ZZZ is normally a Class D airport with operating control tower; but due to COVID-19 - The control towers hours are limited. I believe that if the tower was still in operation; this incident would not have taken place.2) The XXL/XYR Runway has an elevation change of 15 feet with XXL being at XXX feet and XYR being at XXY ft. It was difficult to see the XYR entrance to the runway from my position on the XXL side; taxiway V. There also appears to be a hill about halfway down the runway. This hill; the elevation change; and the fact that the Cirrus was a dark gray and blended in with the Asphalt environment; on top of the lack of a CTAF call for take off led to this event taking place.I firmly believe that if the tower was in operation at this time; and the Cirrus was communicating over CTAF no incident would've occurred.

Pilot reported a critical ground conflict with a non reporting departure aircraft.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 135; Flight Crew Total 797; Flight Crew Type 362

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While on the inbound leg of the procedure turn for the VOR-B Practice approach; a fuel imbalance was noted. The instructor made the decision to switch fuel tanks; and notified the student that this should be done. This action was not observed due to scanning outside for traffic as the student was under the foggles. After approximately 30 seconds; the engine failed due to fuel starvation; as the fuel selector was placed into the off position inadvertently by the student who was task saturated and had initially trained on a 172; where tank imbalances were rarely a problem. After unpowered flight for approximately 30 seconds; the instructor realized the problem; and put the fuel selector onto the left tank. Afterwards; the aircraft was then flown to it's home airport after an assessment of the situation revealed no further issues with the engine.This could have been prevented in a number of ways; namely that the fuel tank switch should have been observed by the instructor; the student should have been briefed on this topic specifically; and the tank switch could have been done in a non-critical phase of flight. These items should be at least brought up in future instructor training; as it could easily happen across aircraft types; and can lead to significant issues.

A Flight Instructor reported his instrument student moved the fuel tank selector to the OFF position while attempting to change engine fuel sources. The Instructor determined the engine failure cause and restarted the engine.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

I was working two low positions combined. Traffic and workload became so busy the sectors needed to be split. Multiple military aircraft were requesting clearance into a Military Operation Area (MOA); VFR aircraft looking for flight following; IFR aircraft looking for clearance off the ground; lifeguard aircraft looking for IFR clearance; coordination needing to be done with other facilities; and other duty requirements needing to be done. The Supervisor never came over to the sector to see if the time was appropriate to be split; or to see if a D-Side was needed. The Supervisor just split the sector. I told the Controller splitting the sector from me that traffic and workload was too busy to be split and to tell the Supervisor that I could not split the sectors at this time. The Supervisor went ahead and split the sectors; creating an even larger workload for me all at once. I started the recorded position briefing with the statement 'it is too busy to open this sector.' after several minutes of attempting to complete the split; I was able to finish the briefing and split off the sectors.After the sectors were split; I asked the Supervisor to come over to me; so I could speak to him as I was still on position. I told the Supervisor that he waited too late to split the sectors and that it was the worst possible time to split them; when he did. The Supervisor then told me that he would have me relieved and to meet him in the supervisors office to talk about my sub par performance; as I did not answer land-lines during the busy period/splitting of the sectors. I recommend that the Supervisor comes over to the actual sectors before splitting them and gets a first hand look of the situation before automatically splitting the sectors based on what the Traffic Situation Display (TSD) System is telling. The TSD could indicate that a sector (especially a low altitude sector) is busy; when in fact it is very slow; and vice versa; the TSD could show low numbers when in fact the sector(s) could be overloaded with aircraft/workload. The Supervisor could also have put a D-Side on position to help me split the sector; which would have allowed for the land lines to have been answered; eliminating me receiving a performance discussion because I did not answer the land-lines in a 'timely' manner.

Enroute Controller described a very busy session on combined positions when a Supervisor directed the positions be split without observing the sector and/or exploring other alternatives; i.e. first providing a D-Side.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Being involved with pilot safety I have noticed a placement marking appearing underneath the 1L passenger doors on our Airbus aircraft. Not really sure if this is showing up on the other aircraft fleets. In talking with an agent I was informed the marking represented a placement of the loading bridge. The problem here is in 3 days I saw absolutely no consistency in the placement of the jetways. Some seem to have a one inch or so step down; some four to five inches. Some jetways were against the aircraft some had a couple inch gap. I suspect we have set up a scenario where someone is going to fall flat on their face or a young child is going to catch a foot or some such thing and break a limb.  Can't imagine where this idea came from. Can't see where any SMS was applied. Would question what kind of training was involved with the agents; or was there just a note to use this marking. Seems like an idea without any other thought process. Someone needs to talk to Ground Operations Management and also Station Managers or hub VPs and see where this came from and what is the process involved with the jetway placement. If Airbus fleet only should the Fleet Captain or designated Senior be brought in for SME.

An Airbus Captain reported a fuselage marker beneath door 1L for Ramp Agent jetway parking guidance but continued inconsistent jetway parking adjacent the aircraft may lead to passenger injury during loading and deplaning.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

After pushing back and ready to taxi; informed by ground that Tower wanted us to call them. Tower was concerned that we may have pushed back onto the taxiway from [gate] without clearance. We had followed procedures outlined on MIA JEP CO Airport Info. In brief; procedures indicate to call 'Miami Gates' for pushback from [parking] then contact ground for taxi. At this time; I can specifically recall what Gates said. I do know there was nothing out of the ordinary; and nothing said seemed different than expected. We pushed onto taxiway; started engines without incident. Upon requesting taxi clearance we were asked to contact Tower by phone. The conversation was informative. We were told we should have obtained clearance from Ground for push; Miami Gates was not authorized to issue push clearance. I explained that I believed we were clear to push; but that I may have been in error. Tower said that there was no issue. The identified JEP CO page is misleading. Even though [the gate] isn't specifically identified; [other spots] are. [The other spots] are located in the same general area; so I used those procedures. The procedures seem unambiguous and nowhere indicate to call Ground for pushback clearance. The note to view positive apron control and pushbacks doesn't give any further guidance for [these] spots. Update identified CO page to reflect proper procedure.

Air carrier Captain reported no published procedure for pushback from gate.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 157; Flight Crew Type 19000

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Flight was uneventful until we had been at cruise; FL380; for about 40 minutes. Number 2 engine vibrations had been at .4 and vibration went to 1.7 accompanied by a slight grinding type noise from Number 2 engine. After about 45 seconds the noise stopped; vibrations stayed at 1.7; and all indications remained normal until about 180 miles east of our destination. ATC gave us a descent to FL360. When power was retarded; the vibrations went to 3.5 accompanied by a grinding noise from Number 2 engine. Shortly thereafter; the Number 2 engine oil filter bypass light illuminated. Per the QRH; we retarded the power slowly. The oil filter bypass light remained on even after power had been at idle for a short time. We shut down the engine and diverted to a nearby airport. An emergency was declared and the divert and landing were uneventful. After exiting the runway; CFR personnel examined the exterior of the Number 2 engine and the aircraft in general and advised there was no visible damage. We taxied to the gate and deplaned the passengers. A subsequent inspection discovered obvious internal engine damage.

A B737-700 experienced significant vibration in the right engine which became excessive and illuminated the oil filter bypass light when thrust was reduced to idle per the vibration checklist. The flight crew declared an emergency; shut down the engine and diverted to a nearby airport.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 354; Flight Crew Type 5000

Upon completing my walkaround; I noticed there were FOUR vortilons on the left wing versus THREE on the right wing. Our manual (AOM) (Aircraft Operations Manual) states that there are three installed outboard of the engine. This was the second time in about six months that I noticed this on a walkaround. As I entered the jetway; I informed the Ops (Operations) Agent that there was a Maintenance discrepancy and that boarding should be stopped. Six months earlier; we ended up deplaning Passengers and Jumpseaters as the aircraft was taken out of service.I informed the Captain of the discrepancy and informed him of what had happened six months earlier.  Back then; I had 5 vortilons on one wing and three on the other. Although I never got any feedback of the outcome of that particular event; I suspected that a MAX slat had been installed on the NG (Next Generation). I suspected that because the next aircraft we were assigned to was a MAX and the slat in question looked identical to the one on the NG. For what it's worth; our MAX AOM is incorrect in that it states there are three vortilons per wing. There are actually 5. I submitted a report and received an email telling me the manuals would be updated. The MAX AOM is still wrong.Back to my NG in ZZZ. The Captain called Maintenance Control and was told the slats were interchangeable. I actually talked to the Controller as well and told him what happened a few months earlier. He informed me that Company had received guidance from Boeing and told me again that the parts were interchangeable. He mentioned that there was more than one aircraft flying around like that and that he got a call about it every day. I suggested that some sort of guidance should be shared with the pilot group; so that we were aware of the discrepancy between the books and the actual aircraft. I have ZERO written guidance in front of me. The only thing I have is the Maintenance Controller's word; yet for whatever reason it doesn't sit well with me.  I hope to receive feedback; and more importantly; I hope guidance is shared with the entire pilot group (at least update the manuals).

B737-800 flight crew reported the number of vortilons installed on the left wing was different than on the right wing and may be a 737-MAX slat.


Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

On the ILS approach to Runway 36 at Quito (SEQM) in VMC at night; I was very distracted by the bright lights along the highway just west of the runway. Minor deviations of glide slope and localizer were experienced between 300 FT and 100 FT AFL. If I had been in IMC to minimums; I believe the distraction could be hazardous.I think there should be an advisory to pilots regarding these lights and a request to the airport authority to shield or dim the lights. The new Quito airport is not in your database.

Air carrier Captain advised that highway lights angling across the approach to Runway 36 at SEQM (Quito; Ecuador) are bright; distracting and contributed to modest track/alt deviations by the pilot flying making a VMC approach. The reporter is concerned the deleterious effect would be greater during low minimum operations.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Was on an IFR flight plan to ZZZ; had to divert for an embedded line of thunderstorms with heavy lightning. We were on a west heading to avoid the storm; when we decided to divert to ZZZ1 for passenger comfort. Center cleared us into to ZZZ1 on the visual; during the downwind leg we lost the airport in the low level clouds that pushed in; so we asked to go to ZZZ2 that is 15 miles to the north. ATC cleared us into ZZZ2 on the visual; we stayed on our IFR flight plan and told ATC we would cancel on the ground in case we couldn't make it in. Once we landed I noticed the taxiways were blocked off. I let one of the passengers out that was feeling ill to relieve himself. A construction worker appeared and claimed we landed on a closed runway; I asked him where the X's were on the runway; he claimed they put them in the dirt and weeds off the end of the runway so they did not have to move them when they were seal coating the runway. After my passenger was feeling better we fueled up and taxied out and took off; on climb out I did notice that there was an X about 100 feet off the runway in the grass. We contacted Center and they asked if we were aware that ZZZ2 was closed; I informed them that we figured it out after the fact. ATC then opened up a new IFR flight plan to ZZZ and we continued our flight without any further issues.

GA pilot reported landing at a closed airport after receiving ATC assistance on an IFR clearance.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 22.6

Confusion; Distraction; Workload; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Thunderstorms in the CLT area. CLT approach shut us off with about 5 aircraft inbound; the closest about 15 miles away from airspace boundary. I cleared Aircraft X to hold at BTSEY with detailed holding down to 130; with Aircraft Y established in holding at 120. I noticed that Aircraft X was below the assigned altitude; and questioned the pilot. Aircraft X acknowledged and climbed back up to 130. Approximately 30 seconds later Aircraft X descended back down below 130. I don't believe separation was ever lost with Aircraft X and Aircraft Y. At this point the frequency was very congested (another CLT holding aircraft low on fuel); so I vectored Aircraft X out to the east just to get the aircraft into an area that had no other aircraft. The pilot of Aircraft X did not demonstrate to me that he could keep the aircraft level in a holding pattern. About 5 minutes later; I turned the aircraft left to a 280 heading to reestablish holding; and then went on to other things. When I looked back; Aircraft X had turned due south; directly into CLT approach. I attempted to correct the pilot and turned to a 010 heading (I believe). After 20-30 seconds; I didn't see any start of a turn; so I continued the turn to a 340 heading with emphasis. I was very busy on the frequency and do not know if my D side coordinated with CLT approach before the aircraft entered their airspace; but don't believe it happened in a timely manner.

ZTL Controller reported of holding aircraft for CLT due to thunderstorms. One aircraft was assigned holding instructions but kept on busting altitude. Controller moved aircraft away from other traffic and then the aircraft did not fly as instructed.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 800; Flight Crew Type 50

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

I was flying the aircraft for a 'comedy' air show demonstration; in which the airplane is operated as if the pilot has never flown an aircraft before. This naturally involves atypical; erratic maneuvering both on the ground and in the air. The departure and flight portion of the act was normal. After landing and during taxi up toward the fence separating crowd from taxi area; I kept the tail off the ground (this is a tail dragger aircraft); taxiing on only the main gear; maintaining moderate throttle and some braking pressure. I made a turn to align the aircraft to the fence; slowing and positioning the airplane with a tailwind. As I neared a stop; the airplane pitched down excessively; rocking forward on the main gear. I reached full up elevator control and realized I had no further control to prevent a prop strike. I lowered the throttle to idle and turned off the magnetos very near the moment the prop struck the ground. The airplane pivoted up; 'standing' on the two main wheels and the propeller. I remained seated throughout the event and was uninjured. There was no undue safety hazard to those on the ground. During the performance; the wind speed had increased. Prior to takeoff; the winds were low enough as to cause no impact to my performance; even with the planned parking with a slight tailwind. Evidently; the wind got worse while I was in flight (about 8 minutes) and I wasn't able to determine that from the visible flags as I approached the parking position. Additionally; I was taxiing with the tail somewhat higher than normal; leaving the airplane more susceptible to impact from tailwinds. Finally; it's a normal part of the act that the ground crew grabs the tail to lower it manually to the ground while I sit stationary; but in this case; some crew grabbed the wing tip and pulled down. Video suggests this may have contributed to the unarrestable pitch-down; as these occurred simultaneously.It should be understood that; as a comedy airshow performance; typical tail dragger taxi best practices; such as pinning the tail to the ground; taxiing slowly with specific control surface deflections per wind; etc.; are deliberately not always followed. Frequent practice in all conditions generally allows uneventful operation of the airplane in nonstandard taxi operations; but the nature of the act does leave the aircraft more susceptible to environmental changes than usual.I did not adequately perceive the worsening wind conditions and therefore did not adjust my taxi-up plan accordingly. In the moment of the pitchover; I did not act quickly enough to release the brakes; which may have arrested the pitchover and prevented the mishap. While I've always known intuitively this would be the best course of action; I was unable to perform this action in the actual moment; which probably lasted 2 seconds or less. I also feel that I did not give myself enough time to mentally prepare for the act; spending too much time in the audience; and could have been better focused.In the future; I will pay closer attention to the windsock and flags at the end of the act to ensure winds have not worsened since takeoff. On windy days; I will also make it a point to taxi with the tail lower; or in extreme cases; omit the tail-up taxiing entirely; and park with the nose into the wind if necessary. I will also make it a point to brief myself on contingency actions prior to flight; if I run out of pitch-up authority while taxiing; I will release the brakes immediately. I will also give myself more time prior to flight to get focused and ready.

Pilot reported that a tailwind during an air show demonstration resulted in a prop strike.


Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

This is an example of an arrival that should be simplified. There are too many crossing restrictions and to properly brief it takes time; especially when changes occur. In our situation we were expecting; according to the ATIS either Runway 36R or Runway 5 off the [tailored for the air carrier] STAR. We briefed both at altitude; verifying the fixes against what was in the FMS. During initial descent; however; we were told to pick up a new ATIS and to now expect the Runway 23 ILS with the appropriate transition. (Note: The weather was also minimums for the ILS and had a tailwind so we took some extra time making sure we thoroughly briefed and understood the approach) Loading the box with the new runway/approach/arrival transition; picking up the new ATIS; re-briefing the entire arrival; cross checking the restrictions; all while flying the airplane; frequency changes; etc. creates a huge workload and makes it easy to miss any discrepancies. In addition; during the descent we were told to cross MAJIC at 13;000 instead of between 13;000 and 17;000 as charted. No problem if you have plenty of time; but in the real world often you don't. It is easy to miss that seemingly small distinction in the box which could lead to a deviation. Bottom line: Either simplify the arrivals or stick to them without changes; which is not realistic in the real world with frequent weather and traffic challenges.

The Captain of a ERJ-190 expressed his concern regarding the complexity of a tailored STAR arrival at CLT. He believes it should either be simplified or utilized only in its entirety without ATC directed modifications or interruptions. He believes this arrival is an 'example' of other complex STARs as well.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 18350; Flight Crew Type 1000

Runway 8-26 at GVT has been marked closed for several years; but has been in continuous use by many local pilots at their discretion during high wind conditions that make 17-35 unsuitable. A few years ago a company; an airport tenant; erected two 70 foot high towers with a wire antenna array suspended across the approach end of Runway 26. Although the wire is marked with power-line balls; it remains a very low visibility hazard. Several pilots not aware of the hazard have reported narrowly missing the obstruction.The obstruction is not charted on any of the terminal approach procedures or airport diagrams even though it is higher in elevation than other charted items. The obstruction is not listed in any NOTAM.As a minimum; the obstruction needs to be listed in NOTAMs and the Airport Facility Directory notes for GVT.

A user pilot reported that an airport tenant had erected 70 foot high towers to the east of the approach end of a runway that has been closed for a number of years. He reported that the closed runway 'had been in continuous use by local pilots 'at their discretion' during high wind conditions...' which make the actual open runway unsuitable.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 14.5

Confusion; Distraction; Fatigue; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Working three combined sectors. Weather on west and east side of the sector with multiple departure traffic deviating into sector. Sectors handling metropolitan area traffic were in holding and deviating into the airspace. Other sectors very busy also coordinating point outs; departures; arrival traffic all deviating for squall line running throughout the sector. I was extremely and excessively busy; using multiple frequencies; aircraft were blocking transmissions and read backs. The landline and override calls were too much workload to manage and continue to perceive; assess; and plan control actions. I asked for a Radar Assist Side than in an attempt to regain control of the sector. This assistance came after separation loss with Aircraft X and Aircraft Y.Sectors should not be combined when such workloads and weather conditions exist; traffic safety was significantly compromised. Controllers coming on shift should get weather and game plan briefings. Staffing levels should exceed the potential traffic problems verses the way; the FAA normally staffs sectors and commits controllers to working beyond human ability that would ensure safer conditions for the users of the N.A.S. (National Airspace System).

A Controller working three sectors combined had less than required separation between two aircraft during a period of weather deviations and higher than normal workload.


B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

[Company] needs to assign qualified techs to ETOPS per 03-XX-XX.

Technician reported that Company is using non-qualified technicians to perform ETOPS checks.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 10100; Flight Crew Type 250

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

We were cleared to FL340 and my copilot was Pilot Flying (PF). We started encountering turbulence and my copilot disconnected the autopilot for a smoother ride (A/P very sensitive to turbulence). Turbulence was occasional moderate. 1000 ft call was made and acknowledged by both crew at FL330. We received from ATC traffic advisory at FL350. We had the traffic on our TCAS (TCAS II). We saw the traffic at 2-3 o'clock and passing behind us on our right wing. The traffic was not a factor. No TA or RA on TCAS. My First Officer (F/O) started reducing pitch and pulling the throttle back to [Max Cruise Thrust] MCR to level off at 340 and I saw a large ascent (updraft). My F/O corrected by pitching down using the electric elevator trim (low speed mode when pitching down); avoiding pulling negatives Gs on the airframe. Using the electric trim was not quick enough and the aircraft kept climbing to 300 to 500 ft above FL340 to the point forward pressure input directly on the yoke and the aircraft finally settled down to FL340. The recovery from the event was smooth with no impact (Gs) on anyone on board. In the meantime ATC called to tell us that we were deviating from assigned altitude. Shortly after; ATC cleared us to FL400 where the ride was much smoother. Updraft or wake turbulence from the crossing traffic at FL350. The encounter happened when the traffic was behind us.

LR60 Captain reported overshooting cleared altitude in climb to FL340 after encountering wake turbulence from a wide body transport aircraft.


Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Person Dispatch; Person Ground Personnel

Received call from CLP agent Mr. X stating that Bos ops had a discrepancy showing how air carrier flight X was loaded.  Mr. X stated that they were showing aft bin empty on their close out and after flt was airborne; 1400 lbs showed up in aft cargo compt. The flight was still within limits but this could have been a big problem for wt & bal CG limits.  Bos ops needs to be a lot more careful with how they close out a flight.  Luckily it turned out ok.  Somebody in Bos ops is not talking to the ramp agents loading the aircraft. Better communication between Bos ops and ramp agents.

Dispatcher reports receiving updated weights for a flight after aircraft had taken off. Report cites lack of communication between load planning/ground personnel as the main problem.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight was ready for me to plan the load as a weight restricted flight. I communicated this to the station and told them exactly how many non revs they could put on. I monitored the flight and closer to departure; the station confirmed their final bag count with me and we decided to put on 16/144 including non revs. (Prior to this; the Dispatcher conferenced me in with the Captain and he insisted his paperwork did not show a weight restriction and he wanted to fill up his seats. I told him that he could not take all non revs based on the information I had but I would try to get on as many as I could.)Apparently dispatch and the captain talked again and dispatch told the captain that there were 19 kids on board so he took it upon himself to tell the station to load up all seats because he had the extra weight. This was not true because the kid weights were already in the system. This caused him to be overweight and dispatch had to run another release but she couldn't get the weight completely down. He pushed and was on the runway refusing to come back to take off people or bags. The dispatcher ended up doing 4 releases to get him on his way legally. The flight ended up being 55 min late due to a captain not allowing me to do my job as a load planner. The extra non revs and their bags he insisted on taking caused the aircraft to be overweight and delayed all our revenue passengers.

Flight had weight restriction and communicated with station Operations with 164 passengers. Pilot and dispatch had conversation about (19)KIDS weights and pilot decided to make a full flight without asking load planning which created a 840lbs. overweight condition. Pilot is arguing with load planning about half KIDS weights which already in the system. Pilot demanding not to take non revenue passengers off from flight and causing longer delays. Aircraft pushed without weights which was still illegal.

The Load Planners reported a flight that pushed back 840 pounds over weight because the Captain wanted to accommodate all of the non-revenue passengers.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 500

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport

While landing at the Winchester airport (BGF) on runway 18 at night with the runway lights set to medium intensity the new LED runway lights began to flash. As I continued the approach; I noted that the flashing was as a result of my fluctuating the propeller RPM. FYI; my airplane has a 3 bladed propeller. As I adjusted the propeller RPM on the approach; at in and around 22-2300 RPM; the runway lights could be dimmed to near off. As the RPM fluctuated; the flashing rate could be adjusted! At times of low visibility on a dark night; this could be catastrophic! When the pilot is just breaking out of the weather; the dimming or flashing of the runway lights could be conceived at re-entering the weather causing a go around.

Pilot reports of problems associated with landing and LED lights flashing while on final.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

ATC expects flyover and the FMC reads flyby (SID depicts flyby)We were issued an obscure clearance out of San Jose which read SJC 2 departure to the MOONY intersection back to the SJC VOR and onward to the BMRNG intersection. The MOONY intersection is not a fly over way point so the FMS turned back to the north towards the SJC VOR well short of the way point. This brought the attention of the Controller who explained to us that we were off course turning 20 miles north of this 180 degree turn as the FMS is designed to do since it is not a fly over waypoint. He advised us this is a nav deviation and he would be filing paper work on it and advised us to do the same. I called NorCal once we were en route and had a constructive conversation about what went wrong. [The NCT representative] explained that this has happened before and I explained why the FMS turned when it did. [My First Officer] pulled up an article explaining how the FMC/FMS works which depicts a very similar scenario. I asked [the NCT representative] if he had seen this publication. Whether he has seen it or not; I did suggest that a track needs to be published depicting a fly over waypoint for the MOONY intersection or realistically a point closer to the VOR than the MOONY intersection. By the time we turn downwind on this departure we were at 7500 feet well clear of inbound traffic as well as the terrain.

The easy fix to this issue would be to assign a valid transition on the SJC2; either PXN or AVE which would allow the FMS to proceed all the way to MOONY instead of smart turn to SJC. ATC could issue a radar vector to to SJC as time permits.Another solution would be to revise the SID to modify MOONY to a fly-over waypoint.A third possibility is to add MOONY as a valid transition with a manual sequence heading after MOONY.The primary issue is that the personnel designing the SID do not consider fly-by vs fly-over.

CE-680 flight crew reported ATC indentified a track deviation when the FMC performed a fly-by rather than a fly-over departing SJC.


The 45 minute check in is not long enough to conduct a safe and thorough preflight. Not if you follow the checklist in the iPad. Add to that KCM [Known Crewmember security check] being closed (+10 mins) Farthest gate in the terminal; a major winter storm at your destination; and two computers unable to print flight papers because of an error. Adds up to a crew delay every time; including this flight. The co-pilot going to the jet to get it ready while the Captain does all the preflight paperwork by himself is UNSAFE; but is becoming the EVOLVING SOP at this company.

B757 Captain laments the 45 minute check in for the first flight of the day as insufficient for a variety of reasons.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Type 20000

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

While climbing out on ZZZZZ Intersection Departure off of 7L; we began to smell a fairly strong odor/fume in the flight deck. As we continued our climb the odor seemed to clear out of the cockpit. I could not smell the odor. Several communications with the cabin crew confirmed the odor was still present; and stronger towards the back of the aircraft. We then requested clearance back to [departure airport]. We donned the oxygen masks. ACARS was not working; so we had to use [an alternative method] for our landing performance; which added to our work load. Communication with the cabin crew; ATC; Dispatch; arrival programming ; and performance; ATIS; Descent and Approach Checklists; and [landing performance calculations] kept us at a fairly high-task loading throughout the event. I had an extremely experienced; exceptional First Officer who kept us in the Green while I was task loaded with all communications; checklists and performance data. After landing we requested [ground] vehicle follow us to the gate for any signs of smoke. There was none. Our cabin crew stated there were no signs of lasting ill effects with any cabin crew members or passengers.

B737-700 Captain reported returning to departure airport after fumes and odor were noticed in the cabin and the cockpit.


Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

On the climb out; ATC had us restricted to 250 knots while we were climbing from 10;000 feet to 17;000 feet. They gave us normal speed out of 14;000 feet. On the climb we started to get very sharp bumps and they started to get closer and more intense. We both thought it could be wake from the plane ahead as the winds were a direct head wind of almost 60 knots. We told ATC and got a vector off as a precaution before it got worse. I called the FA (Flight Attendant) later and everyone was fine. We notified the Dispatcher about it to notify [Operations Control]. We continued to [our destination] with no other issues and landed safely. On the ground; I called the Chief Pilot per the reportable events.

EMB-175 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence climbing out of DFW.


ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

This was a simple clear cut error that occurred during a skill check on North RADAR. I was working Local Control. C182 was cleared for take off and assigned runway heading. North RADAR immediately turned C182 on course (approximately 290) and assigned FL100. When C182 crossed the 3 NM circle around an antenna farm his altitude indicated 1;300 FT-1;400 FT. The highest antenna is 1;549 FT. EVEN IN THE FRONT PAGES OF THE APPROACH PLATES; IT INSTRUCTS PILOTS NOT TO TURN WEST UNTIL LEAVING 1500 FEET!!! The .65 clearly says; in the paragraph titled 'vectoring below the MVA' that we can discontinue lateral separation AFTER the aircraft has reported or is observed at an altitude above the obstruction. C182 was turned right at the obstructions when he was below 500 FT. What led to this event and why it happened? The answer to that question is the reason why I am writing this report. There has been a disagreement on who is responsible for separating a ZZZ departure from obstructions. Is it the pilot or the Controller? Over the years; when I attempted to address this issue with the Management team; this is what I have been told: 1.)'Do what's best for your career.' 2.)'We have a waiver from FSDO that allows us to do that.' A FLM really did say that. 3.) 'We have a 'diverse vectoring area' that allows that. Of course I asked to see the LOA; LOP; Directive; or where ever it is documented and he could not find it. 4.)'It is the pilot's responsibility to miss the antenna' 5.)' It is just a technicality; why do you care?' 6.)'The chances of hitting one of those antenna is almost zero; 'The Management team; some past and some present; really don't know the rules or don't care. I have seen and REPORTED several aircraft that literally flew between the antennas. Sooner or later someone is going to hit one of those antennas if we don't get this straightened out. My recommendation is simple. DON'T TURN THE AIRCRAFT UNTIL THEY ARE ABOVE THE OBSTRUCTIONS!

Controller voiced concern regarding currently utilized departure techniques with regard to MVA; diverse vectoring area and obstacle clearances; the reporter noting the confusion needs to be clarified.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

About 30 minutes prior to scheduled push; I noticed a ramp crew outside pointing at the power cord and giving inquiring thumbs up. Since he did not perform the 'disconnect ground power' signal; the APU was running and bussed up; and it was so early before push; I thought he was asking if the power was good. I gave a thumbs-up and connected the ground power. About 15-20 seconds later; the Ramp Agent pulled the ground power. The APU was still running so transitioning back to APU Gen was instantaneous. About 15 minutes later; I was in the restroom and heard some insistent knocking on the aircraft. I could hear the Captain move from the galley area to the cockpit. Apparently; the ground crew had pulled the chocks and the aircraft rolled three to four feet backwards before a Ramp Agent could jump on the tug and stop it. Fortunately; no damage was done no injuries occurred but the forward service entry was partially blocked. Since the door could not be closed; the aircraft had to be towed forward to allow door closure. I am not sure when the chocks got pulled but suspect it may have happened when the power was pulled since the Ramp Agent was way out of sequence timing wise and used a completely non-standard signal when he pulled the power. We were very lucky no damage or injuries occurred. Passengers actually didn't even notice since the roll was very gentle.Have Ground Crews use standard signals for disconnecting power and pulling the chocks if not in voice communication with the cockpit. Brief the Ramp Agents on the importance of knowing the parking brake is on prior to pulling the chocks. Chock the tug and don't remove the chocks until the tug is running.

A B737 First Officer reported that ground personnel prematurely removed ground power and chocks prior to pushback.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.5

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Z; was orbiting [nearby] for a practice parachute jump. There was not a TFR in effect for this operation. The schedule I had showed that the jump would happen from 5;500. Aircraft Y; was on final to 27R. Aircraft X had called me 10 south of the airport for Class Bravo transition; north of the 27R final approach course and the [area of orbit]. When Aircraft X was about 3 miles south of Aircraft Y; I issued traffic. Aircraft X replied that he was looking. I asked Aircraft X if he could turn 15 degrees right; as this would point him at Aircraft Y's tail. He replied that he could. I issued the instruction; and then updated the traffic call to Aircraft X. Aircraft X reported the traffic in sight and that he could maintain visual separation. I told Aircraft X to maintain visual separation from and pass behind Aircraft Y. All of these calls where within about one minute. The 15 degree turn/passing behind Aircraft Y; put Aircraft X as close to going over top of the [orbit area] as he could have been without trying. During this time; I noticed that Aircraft Z was still at 4;500. As Aircraft X was passing the [orbit area]; another controller said that he could see the jumpers coming down. Aircraft Z was still at 4;500; and I was given no notice that jumpers where away; or that they would be jumping from any altitude other than 5;500. The only plan effected to separate traffic from the jump zone; was to have all PHL arrivals land 27R; and to have Aircraft Z remain north of I-95 (which runs between the [orbit area] and the 27R final). Aircraft Z notified the approach controller one pass prior to jumpers way. The approach controller did not notify the tower. While I was expecting to receive notification; the approach controller thought that the TRACON supervisor would notify the tower supervisor. This did not happen. There were not any pre-planned notification procedures.

PHL Local Controller reported a loss of separation when a helicopter passed under an aircraft transporting skydivers. The Controller had not been advised that the jumpers had exited the aircraft. Reporter noted a lack of communication between TRACON and Tower supervisors.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Other CFII

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 730; Flight Crew Type 550

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Workload

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

We were coming back to ZZZ (our base) from ZZZ1. We were assigned ZZZZZ Arrival. Shortly after crossing the shoreline; Tower told us to maneuver toward a landmark to follow the traffic. After we made our turn; Tower asked us to if we have the light transport traffic in sight; my student pointed out a traffic to me and I radioed the tower that I had the traffic in sight. Tower then told us to cross behind the light transport traffic and cleared us for Runway XXL. After the traffic my student pointed out passed in front of us we angled toward the base leg. then I realized that traffic is not a light transport. Then I inspected the final for Runway XXR and saw a light transport about 250 ft. below; and about 500 ft. north east of us. I took over the airplane and maneuvered to avoid flying in front of the light transport. [The] maneuver was successful and we flew behind them. Shortly after the evasive maneuver Tower asked us again if we have the light transport traffic in sight; I told them 'We do have [light transport] in sight' We proceeded to land on Runway XXL.In retrospect; I shouldn't have told the tower we have the traffic in sight without positively identifying the light transport. A good radio transmission  would be 'we do have a traffic over X location please confirm that is our traffic.'

Flight Instructor reported a NMAC in the traffic pattern. The Instructor and student misidentified the aircraft they were to follow per ATC. The Instructor took control and maneuvered the aircraft into the correct traffic pattern flow.


Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Procedure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Airport

During our descent through 10;000 feet into ANC after our arrival fix (GASTO) we received an unexpected runway change from 7R to Runway 33. While being vectored to a visual approach we were given a heading of 070; maintain 4;000 feet to intercept and track inbound on the 7R LOC. The clearance made no sense as we had already changed nav frequencies to our assigned runway. We changed back to the 7R LOC only to realize that it was not emitting a signal and did not identify audibly. While trying [to] query ATC we visually tracked inbound to Runway 7R until further clearance was given. During this time both pilots became distracted and we descended below our assigned altitude. Due to the visual conditions; the runway change and the bogus clearance I failed to back up the pilot flying and failed as the PM (Pilot Monitoring). No mention of the deviation was made by ATC. In an effort to comply with a confusing ATC clearance we became distracted from our primary flight duties of flying and monitoring.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

A B737 crew reported while descending through 10;000 feet to ANC Runway 7R; ATC changed their Runway to 33. Confused; the crew began setting up for Runway 33 when ATC cleared them for a Runway 7R visual approach; [and to] track the localizer which they discovered out of service. By then seriously distracted; the crew descended below their assigned altitude.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 1750

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Using the aviation layer of an app called 'MyRadar' I noted the previously existing TFR was no longer displayed though a nearby TFR was. As I am a member of the local Fire Protection District this made sense because no planes were flying and the helitack crews that were formally stationed at our airport were no longer present or flying.Feeling comfortable; I certainly won't give it credibility in the future; with the lack of TFR on MyRadar as well as my observations and knowledge about aerial firefighting activities being suspended I proceeded into the TFR on the assumption it was terminated. When I landed a friend notified me that he thought he saw the TFR on another app. I called Flight Service and discovered the TFR was indeed still in effect. In the future I will cross check several apps and/or flight service directly.

C185 pilot reported inadvertently entering a TFR that he thought had been terminated.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Confusion; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Approximately five minutes prior to the event occurring; I relieved the previous controller in which a position relief briefing was given.  The previous controller had Aircraft X on a vector to follow Aircraft Y into CLT due to WX and winds being more favorable for Aircraft Y to be ahead of Aircraft X.  The previous controller stated that Aircraft Y was proceeding direct; however it was not made clear if Aircraft Y was proceeding direct CTF or BOOZE intersection; which is 5NM west of CTF on the arrival.  CLT is hosted by ZTL; and there are known interface issues between ZJX and CLT transitional aircraft.  Due to these issues; ZJX is unable to amend flight plans on the HUSTN or CTF arrivals into CLT.  Because ZJX is unable to amend the flight plans; when aircraft are cleared direct these fixes on the STARS; the updated routes are not input to the NAS.  Once I observed Aircraft X 5NM behind Aircraft Y; I cleared Aircraft X direct BOOZE.  At this time both aircraft were within 20NM of BOOZE and descending to 110.  I then observed compression between Aircraft Y and Aircraft X and instructed Aircraft X to reduce to 250KTS.  Once the speed restriction was issued; I also noticed Aircraft X was on more of a course direct CTF rather than BOOZE; which I thought Aircraft Y was proceeding to.  I then cleared Aircraft Y direct BOOZE and Aircraft X a vector 20 degrees right of course.  At this point; separation was lost.  Once I gained lateral separation; I cleared Aircraft X back direct BOOZE.Route amendments should be allowed on aircraft transitioning from ZJX to CLT airspace; and all information should be relayed in relief briefings.

ZJX Controller reports of automation that does not work well and causes confusion with controllers if aircraft are or are not direct certain fixes.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

All crews should be informed and knowledgeable about emergency procedures in order to be prepared for such unexpected events in flight.After an uneventful preflight preparation and exterior inspection we departed ZZZ; myself as Pilot Flying and the Captain as Pilot Monitoring. We climbed to planned cruise altitude without issue. Shortly after reaching cruise and just south of ZZZ1; an ECAM message and associated chime presented on the lower ECAM screen indicating 'ENG 1 SYSTEM FAULT'. We worked through the indicated actions and referenced the COM procedures. As the engine was reduced to idle thrust only; we began a descent and began diversion planning as it became clear that we could not continue to ZZZ2 with this issue at the lower altitude required on a single engine at ZZZ3. Initially ZZZ was selected; but while I was flying and communicating with ATC the Captain in consultation with the dispatcher elected to divert instead to ZZZ4. With plenty of time to prepare we did all necessary tasks for the diversion and proceeded to an uneventful landing on ZZZ's longest runway; XXR; with fire/rescue services on standby. After landing with no issues we taxied to the assigned gate and shut down the aircraft without issue.

A320 First Officer reported an in-flight engine problem required a diversion and single-engine approach and landing.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 142; Flight Crew Type 15000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Cruising at FL360; we noticed a burning smell or fumes in the cockpit. Flight attendants called and smelled the same fumes in the cabin. I asked if they had any visible smoke in the cabin and they reported no visible smoke. We had none in the cockpit. The First Officer and I donned our oxygen masks; declared an emergency; executed the Smoke/Fire/Fumes Checklist; and diverted to ZZZ with emergency equipment standing by. Landing was uneventful emergency equipment saw nothing abnormal and we taxied to the gate and deplaned. Maintenance logbook entry made. I was the Pilot Monitoring. From the time of the smell of smoke and the donning of the oxygen masks to the time we landed; time becomes a precious commodity. Working the descent; declaring an emergency; and navigating a divert to a destination 35 miles away from FL360; executing a Smoke/Fumes/Fire Checklist to control/contain the fumes; programming the FMC; getting weather; choosing a runway and getting landing data; talking to the flight attendants and passengers; there becomes a priority in the order these things happen and the order of communications. All this happens in less than 20 minutes to the ground; which feels like 5 minutes. Dispatch felt left out but I had no time to TYPE an ACARS message. Instead I choose to call Ops and have them call Dispatch and tell them we were diverting for fumes in the cockpit and to expect us in less than 10 minutes. 'This killed 2 birds with one stone.'

Cruising at FL360 we smelled something burning in cockpit. No other indications. Flight attendants called on interphone to alert pilots of strong burning smell. Donned O2 masks; readied goggles; ran QRH; and told Center we needed lower and then declared emergency. Since ZZZ was only 35 miles away; we elected to land there. I flew the aircraft while the Captain ran checklists and computed landing data; and communicated with flight attendants and passengers. Had equipment waiting on us. Came to a complete stop on runway so emergency personnel could look over exterior of aircraft. As soon as we determined the plane was safe to taxi; we proceeded uneventfully to the gate where all Passengers disembarked. Mechanics later found a burned up TR 3 [Transformer Rectifier] on the plane.

B737-500 flight crew detects a burning smell at FL360 and elects to divert to the nearest suitable airport while descending and performing QRH procedures.  Maintenance discovers a burned up TR3.


Flight Crew Lighter-Than-Air; Flight Crew Sport / Recreational

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6; Flight Crew Total 3493; Flight Crew Type 26

Aircraft X was checked for full fuel; [had] no obvious damage; [and] all [the] paperwork and flight manuals [were] onboard. [The] flight crew briefed and checked weather [and] met [the] passengers for a fun balloon flight. [We] checked 6 people in; [and] all [of them were] wearing masks and abiding by COVID rules. [I] checked [the] temperatures of all [the] passengers; including myself; and all were under 98.5. Temperatures were taken by the pilot.We left for a takeoff field down by [the highway and interstate]. [I] arrived and found 3 other balloon companies there. [The] passengers [were] briefed and [we] started the inflation. Since we arrived late and had the largest balloon; I was about 10 minutes behind the other balloon company's for takeoff. [We] took off [and] assented to approximately 500 ft. at 350 degrees. I was in communications with the other balloons via radio. They advised to stay at 500 to 600 ft. AGL for the best wind direction and speed.Flight was uneventful for about 40 minutes. The other balloons started to say that winds were becoming erratic and slowing. I was on line to land near another pilot when we slowed to a crawl and turned about 10 degrees to the right. I was over a golf course and did not want to land due to [the] marshy ground below us. I started to ascend to 800 ft. to see if I could get a little speed or change direction. There was no change there. I descended to 100 ft. and still nothing. I varied altitude several times to get something. While I was doing this I was stepping on my deflation line and it had come partially open. My next descent was from 200 ft. and with my vent partially open I could not stop my descent and hit the water.Once in the water; I realized that the top was open and closed it. Of the man and woman couple; the wife partially exited the aircraft and was promptly pulled back in by her husband and 2 other passengers. She ripped her pants and lost her cellphone. No injuries. The 2 'other' passengers had no problems. Of the mother-daughter couple; the mother hit her knee - she would not tell me which one. I asked her 3 times if she needed medical assistance and she refused all 3 times. Stating 'I'm OK' or 'I'll be alright.' As the balloon came out of the water; the balloon turned 140 degrees to the right; coming to a heading of approximately 165 degrees at 1/2 to 1 kt. We landed 6 minutes later. Assessing once again; the lady who complained about her knee stated 'I don't need any help or need to go to the hospital.' All passengers were in high spirits due to their 'adventure.' All 6 passengers had gotten their cellphones wet and one was lost. No damage to the aircraft except getting a bath.

Balloon Captain reported a successful recovery from an inadvertent water landing.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

At approximately 10 miles NW of ZZZ1 receiving vectors for final approach to ZZZ ILS RWY XXL; we were cleared to 5;000 feet. The First Officer; as the Pilot Monitoring; selected 5;000 in the altitude window and pointed at it. I; as the Pilot Flying; pointed at it and said '5;000'. I selected FLCH and the aircraft began descending to 5;000 from 6;000 [feet] Note; the Pilot Monitoring was using the radio call 'xxxx; Heavy'; while ATC was repeatedly using only our call sign without the qualifier 'Heavy'. Also note that there was a flight another company aircraft immediately in front of us getting vectored by same controller to the same runway. As such; just before the FMA annunciated Altitude Capture (ALT CAP) at 5000; ATC evidently cleared the company aircraft to descend to 3000 and cleared THAT AIRCRAFT for approach. Since ATC was not using the word 'Heavy' for us; and because of the similar sounding call signs so close together; the Pilot Monitoring selected 3000 in the altitude window and responded to the ATC clearance. I was not clear which call sign ATC said. I had noticed the Pilot Monitoring selected 3000 and was waiting for the response from ATC. I became fixated on listening for ATC; and then realized that under these conditions; being at 5000 and still about 10 miles from ZZZ1; it would be highly unusual for ATC to clear us to descend to 3000; and that we must have responded to the other aircraft's clearance. Now; since the Pilot Monitoring had selected a new altitude in the window before ALT CAP was annunciated in the FMA; and FLCH was engaged; and since the Pilot Flying was distracted and did not notice this; the aircraft descended below 5000; which was our actual clearance. By the time the Pilot Flying reacted and descent was arrested; ATC realized that we were descending erroneously and re-emphasized our clearance to only 5000. We noticed that we had descended to 4600 before descent was arrested and climb initiated back to 5;000 [feet]. Flight continued without incident to landing. No conflicts were noted.

I was the Relief Pilot sitting behind the [Pilot] Flying and Pilot Monitoring. We were about ten miles from ZZZ1; inbound to ZZZ for an ILS to XXL. The airport had just switched runways from [Runway] XYR to [Runway] XXL for arrivals and there was a lot of aircraft to be sequenced into the area. The frequency was very busy. VFR conditions allowed for tight spacing. Another company aircraft was ahead of us in line for approach. We were descending to 5;000 [feet] direct to ZZZ1 and the Pilot Monitoring answered a clearance to descend to 3;000 [feet] and cleared for the approach to [Runway] XXL. He dialed 3;000 [feet] in the altitude window and pointed at it; as is our procedure. I knew it was really early to be cleared for the approach and I knew there were aircraft in line ahead of us. As I began to speak out about my concern; I saw the Captain hesitate at the panel (altitude and approach mode) and he questioned the same things. We all realized it must have been for company aircraft and he only heard a portion in the congested frequency transmissions. By then the aircraft had reached 4;600 [feet]. The Captain (Pilot Flying) was already correcting. He corrected the altitude and they eventually were able to confirm we should still be at 5;000 [feet] with Approach. The rest of the approach continued uneventfully.

B-767 flight crew reported complying with an ATC descent clearance intended for a company aircraft.


Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Control cleared us direct to GADSI. Captain read back GADSI phonetically and we proceeded direct. 10 minutes later Control said we were supposed to go direct TASMI. We were given a vector to intercept on course. No further action or unusual events ensued.Misunderstanding and language issues on behalf of Controller.Perhaps change one of the names of either point GADSI or TASMI to sound significantly different. Controller could perhaps pay more attention to a phonetically spelled read back.

A hearback\readback breakdown in communication between a B777 flight crew and ATC resulted in a temporary track deviation in the Middle East.


Flight Attendant Airline Total 17.9; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 1; Flight Attendant Total 17.9; Flight Attendant Type 100

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Passenger; Person Flight Attendant

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

A man was leaving the aircraft and he hit his head. There are 2 factors contributing to this man hitting his head. 1. Low clearance of the doorway on the Dash 8. 2. He was wearing a baseball cap which may have prevented him from seeing the low clearance.

A Dash 8 Flight Attendant reported a deplaning passenger struck his head on the top of the doorway as he was exiting. The reporter cited the low aircraft doorway and the possibility the passenger's baseball hat obscured his view as possible causative factors.