ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

I arrived at Polar to relieve a Controller and found out that we were holding aircraft for ORD. After getting the briefing and finding out that ZAU only had two of the three sectors open that they could have open I questioned my Supervisor and TMU Manager about us holding airplanes 300 miles from ORD when ZAU had an unopened sector 200 miles closer to ORD that could be used for holding. We had one aircraft divert to their alternate airport because of fuel. In the past we have asked for assistance from the Command Center with saturated sectors and we were told that; 'Unless you have all your sectors open; you do not need any assistance.' Have ZAU open all their sectors and hold these aircraft closer to their destination so aircraft don't have to divert to their alternates.

ZMP Controller described a holding event for ORD claiming that holding in ZAU's airspace much closer to ORD was more reasonable.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Passenger; Person Flight Attendant

When number two for departure with light snow; fog; and limited visibility the cabin crew hit the alert chimes multiple times. I answered the interphone and F/A (Flight Attendant) told us that the left wing was on fire. He further stated that a passenger had informed him of this and he too saw a fire. I had no indications of a left engine fire; I saw no evidence of a fire out of the window; but out of an abundance of caution I shut down the Left engine. I called Ground Control and requested the fire trucks telling him we had a report of a fire on the left wing. I asked the Tower to tell me if they saw anything. They could not see us due to the poor visibility.Since I could not see the fire; I asked the F/A to tell me exactly where the fire was. He said that the wingtip was on fire and that smoke was pouring out of where the fire was. I looked carefully at the left wingtip. The red position light appeared as if it were a flame; due to the blowing snow and fog. Furthermore it appeared as if white smoke was coming off the position light. I turned off the light and asked the cabin crew whether there was still a fire? They said 'No'. I turned the position light on and they reported a fire again. Off; and they said the fire was out.I have to say that it did look like a flame and smoke. It was obviously the position light but there was a possibility that it was an electrical fire that popped up each time the light came on. Although that was unlikely; I felt it had to check it out. I; of course; kept the customers informed once I was pretty sure what the situation actually was. They remained calm. After twice asking the status of the fire truck; eventually one truck meandered out and parked 200 feet in front of the aircraft and sat there doing nothing. I instructed (we had early on confirmed with Ground that the truck would be on Ground frequency) the fire crew precisely what to check. They eventually got out of the truck pulled on their gear and wandered over to the wingtip with an IR (Infrared) Camera.I turned on and off the position light and they confirmed it was all normal and there was no heat (IR Camera) and no flame/smoke; although it still appeared as a fire to the cabin. I thanked the fire crew and contacted Dispatch. I told my Dispatcher the situation and told him I thought we should go. He agreed. In coordination with the cabin crew; I went to the back; talked to the passengers who saw the flame and told them exactly what was going on. We then re-did our checklists; got new data for Brake Condition 2; and did the Departure Plan Checklist. We then departed uneventfully approximately 40 minutes late.It really did look like a fire; especially to untrained eyes. I have to commend the cabin crew for keeping me informed and the passengers calm. They did the right thing. Unfortunately it caused a big delay.

B737 Captain reported being informed of a possible fire on the wingtip by a Flight Attendant which turned out to be an optical illusion from the red position light due to the weather.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 227.7; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 6000

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

The ground problem began when the Ramp Agent came to the cockpit to tell us he was loading batteries in the rear pit and he had specific procedures to follow to surround these with a certain number of bags. He thought these were lithium batteries but wasn't sure; but he was told these batteries were hazardous material. However; he was sure that these items were not dangerous goods so we departed with his assurance. Once airborne; I began to question my trust in the agent and should have asked more people to be involved in determining the classification of these items.ATC then gave us many more unnecessary threats upon entrance into ZZZ airspace; rerouted [RNAV Arrival ZZZZZ3] which added 15 mins and cost over 1000 lbs. of gas. This put us at 4.9 EFOB. I stated that I could then accept no delays and asked for reason for reroute. Gate deconfliction was given as reason and then we were rerouted back to [RNAV Arrival ZZZZZ3]. Shortly after this we were reissued [RNAV Arrival ZZZZZ2] and a descend via. We followed the STAR plate and set up for [Runway] XXR even though this runway was NOTAM'd closed - bottom parameters at HOOTI 210/6000 . Upon contact with ZZZ approach; we were given Runway XXL assignment with no change in descend via - bottom parameters at ZZZZZ1 210/8000. Then as we continued closer; we were given Runway XY with no change in descend via - bottom parameters at ZZZZZ2 210/4000. The ONLY reason we did not have an altitude violation was due to our VVM and attention to detail. Flight landed and taxied to gate without further incident.

A320 Captain reported receiving unspecified batteries from Ramp Agent who erroneously informed flight crew batteries were not classified as Hazmat. Flight departed without information verification.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 30000; Flight Crew Type 2378

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 154; Flight Crew Total 7589; Flight Crew Type 1125

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The airplane was dispatched under MEL (Minimum Equipment List); left Bleed Sensor Status displayed. I read the MEL and looked for any associated procedures. There were no unusual procedures; just that we may see a status message about the bleed sensor. There is however; a note at the bottom of this procedure stating in bold letters that the Associated Duct Pressure will be imperative. This should have been a clue that this was a bit more complex than it seemed. After engine start; we got an L Bleed Pressure EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System) message. Remembering the note I had read earlier; I assumed that was part of the MEL hence; normal in this situation.We departed with no issues on a beautiful 10 hour flight to ZZZZ. After a few hours in flight; we began a discussion about this MEL and the fact that we had departed with a bleed inoperative or a least not producing any air. Are there not some sort of altitude restrictions or takeoff weight restrictions etc with a bleed inoperative? More importantly; was that bleed supposed to be inoperative just because some sensor wasn't working properly? We wondered; can the bleed be reset now that we were in flight?We opened a discussion with [Maintenance Control] about all of this. They studied it and came back with a response. They felt that it was actually the HPSOV (High Pressure Shutoff Valve) that caused the bleed trip on engine start. This is associated with the EICAS Status message we had earlier; but slightly different. Had we returned to the gate after engine start; we would have probably been dispatched under a different MEL procedure; PRSOV (Pressure-Regulating and Shutoff Valves) inoperative. This MEL procedure is the one with all of the various takeoff weight penalties and altitude restrictions. [Maintenance Control] felt that the bleed trip could be safely reset in flight by simply turning the bleed switch off and then on.After a bit more discussion; we tried it. The bleed trip was reset and we had normal indications on both bleed systems for the remainder of the flight with the exception of the EICAS status message Bleed Sensor. My issue is that if we have a condition that can cause a bleed to be inoperative; shouldn't we follow all of the procedures associated with a bleed inop? In retrospect; I probably should have called [Maintenance Control] right after engine start and asked all of those questions.

After push and engine start we got a L bleed engine caution; we discussed this and associated it with the current MEL. We departed without any issue and climbed up to altitude without problem. In cruise there was a further discussion and [Maintenance Control] was involved. They advised that it was ok to reset in flight which we did. The flight continued without the caution returning; and we landed uneventfully. After further discussion with the crew after flight we should have called [Maintenance Control] after push back; since the actual problem was unclear. Was it a bleed valve or the sensor; what cautions and or status messages would we see?

B777 Captain and First Officer reported a problem with the aircraft; checked with Maintenance; departed but when airborne after more discussion decided they should have stayed on the ground to have the problem looked into more.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

After normal run-up; [we] experienced a total electrical failure. During startup we could tell the battery was low due to slow prop cranking but it fired fast. During run-up everything was normal per the laminated checklist. After takeoff clearance cleared for takeoff fly straight out; as I announced no more usable runway; positive rate; gear up; [the other pilot] selected gear up; whereupon electrical failure occurred. Both pilots verified total avionics failure. [We] verified 80 knots for upwind. At 3;000 feet we began right crosswind to downwind; keeping eyes on Tower. Remaining at 3;000 FT downwind; we began left circles midfield. [We] exchanged controls and verified the emergency checklists for electrical failure and gear down extension. Checking for Tower lights; during the 3rd circle I called Dispatch on cell phone to forward information to Tower on the situation. During the 4th circle we received a green light gun signal for landing. At approximately 100 FT we did a low pass for Tower to verify gear down. During go-around; I called Dispatch to verify and the Dispatcher forwarded the verification for gear down from the Tower. At midfield we received the 2nd green light gun signal. Executing normal approach and landing; I verified checklists out loud and airspeeds upon short final. The landing was uneventful. After clearing the runway using no brakes we received a green light gun signal and taxied straight into the ramp where maintenance personnel signaled to continue taxiing to the ramp.

Two pilots in a PA28 Arrow experienced a complete electrical failure after takeoff. They performed the appropriate checklist and circled the field anticipating tower light gun signals. One pilot used his mobile phone to relay information on their issues and requested landing gear position confirmation. They then received a light gun signal and landed normally. They reported to suspect that the new alternator had seized.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Type 1524

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

We were pulling into gate XX at ZZZ. Had engines at idle the entire time. The accu-park system was on and giving us proper guidance. With about 40 feet remaining on the sign; I noticed out of the corner of my eye a marshaller standing off to the left giving me the stop sign. We stopped with about 35 feet showing left on the parking system. We were getting conflicting information from the marshaller and the parking system. The marshaller was giving us the shutdown engine sign; which we did while querying ramp/ops if they had any information. After the marshaller plugged in; he said we would have hit a catering truck which was off to the right. The safety zone was clear when we were making the turn in and the FO (First Officer) said we were clear as we were nearing the gate. There was an aircraft at [the adjacent gate] with a catering truck at door 2; which could have moved giving the marshaller concern. I have 2 safety concerns about this evolution. One; if there was a truck in the safety zone; the system should have given us a STOP signal. The second; I barely noticed the marshaller giving us the stop signal; as he was off to the left and I was concentrating on the parking system. If in fact there was a chance of hitting anything; he should have been much more visible about getting our attention or been able to turn off the parking system. After we towed the rest of the way to the gate; I talked with him on the interphone and stated these concerns. He stated the shutoff for the parking was on the other side of the jetbridge; and he understood my concerns.

B737 Captain reported a ramp employee gave the stop signal while taxiing into the gate using the accu-park because a truck had pulled into the safety zone.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Climbing through FL200 felt a pressure bump. We heard a 'flapping' sound and immediately had the EWD (Engine Warning Display) display the Pressure page and it was showing the cabin climbing at 4100 fpm+. That cleared itself and we both agreed to stop our climb at FL220. Selected the Pressure page and it showed the cabin still climbing at 500-600 fpm and the cabin altitude at around 4;500 feet. We watched it continue to climb and decided that there was a malfunction in the system but had no ECAM warning associated with it at that time. We decided the best course of action was to descend immediately and return to ZZZ. The First Officer was the Pilot Flying and he took control of the plane and the radios while I called the company (ZZZ Ops & Maintenance Control as well as the Dispatcher). I then notified the #1 F/A that we were returning to ZZZ and we had had a pressurization malfunction but to expect a normal flight back to the airport. The First Officer received a clearance to descend and a turn back to ZZZ. We prepared for a normal approach to [Runway] XXR and landed without further incident. Our landing weight was approximately 127;000 lbs well under our max landing weight. Cause - Simple mechanical malfunction. But a contributing factor might be that the aircraft had the left Pack on MEL.Suggestions - Again; this was just a mechanical failure that we had to deal with...you know FIX!

Climbing out of FL210 I noticed the cabin pressure was rising at a rate not typical to the aircraft. I (Pilot Flying) leveled off at FL220 to assess the situation. We determined there was a pressurization problem and the cabin altitude was continuing to rise. We advised ATC; requested a descent; and returned to ZZZ without further incident. The Captain and I worked well together using SOPs to determine the issue and make the right decision about how to safely get the airplane on the ground.

A319 flight crew reported a pressurization system malfunction in climb. Returned to departure airport and landed uneventfully.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

After takeoff landing gear handle would not move to the up position. Ran the 'Gear handle will not move to the up position' checklist which has you push the handle release button and move the handle to the up position. The main landing gear retracted but the nose gear remained down. This led to the 'Gear primary or secondary light(s) illuminate with gear handle up' checklist which has you lower the gear and maintain speed. Gear lowered and was verified down and locked. Requested priority handling with ZZZ Approach and requested vectors. Then ran the 'Ground sensor failure' checklist as ground shift had not occurred. Received vectors to ILS [Runway] XXC; ran normal checklists and made an uneventful landing. Did not dump fuel or request equipment however Fire/Rescue was standing by. On landing rollout the nose gear seemed to settle or compress to a low position with an unusual vibration. Stopped on runway and had Fire/Rescue inspect the nose gear; they reported that the nose gear appeared normal. Cleared the runway and taxied to parking uneventfully.

MD-11 Captain reported landing gear handle would not move to the up position after takeoff. The flight crew performed an air turn back and precautionary landing.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Aircraft departed NTD with incorrect ZFW numbers from CLP. Error appears to have come from between  "Ride along" and communication to CLP. Aircraft was 19;700lbs heavier than what CLP was told by ride along; and thus Crew were given incorrect numbers prior to take off.  This is not the first time that actual weights are not correct at departure.  System is severely flawed.

A Dispatcher reported an aircraft departed NTD with incorrect ZFW numbers from CLP.  The aircraft was 19;700 lbs. heavier than what CLP was told by 'ride along.'  The air crew were given incorrect numbers prior to takeoff.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 129; Flight Crew Total 590; Flight Crew Type 300

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Declared Emergency

The flight was a training flight out and back from our home airport with one intermediate stop. A thorough preflight per the flight schools checklist was performed prior to engine start that was unremarkable; no abnormalities were discovered. We flew to the northeast practice area where multiple training maneuvers were performed; then landed and departed our intermediate stop uneventfully. On the return flight we agreed to complete two to three touch and goes; time permitting; at our home airport. The student was given the responsibility to maintain directional control of the aircraft on the runway; including rudder; yoke; and throttle control while I was to retract the flaps and trim the aircraft. These responsibilities were delegated per the suggestions in the FAA Aircraft Flying Handbook. We entered the traffic pattern and successfully completed the first touch and go. On the second touch and go we landed with 30 degrees of flaps and the student completed his responsibilities as I selected 10 degrees of flaps (per the recommended takeoff flap setting in the flight school's checklist); visually noted that the flaps were retracting from the 30 degree position and reset the trim per the takeoff checklist as the student applied full power. The aircraft lifted off prematurely at 52 KTS (normal rotation is at 55 KTS) and the aircraft accelerated in ground effect uneventfully to approximately 57 KTS and climbed to an altitude of approximately 300 FT MSL. At this point the aircraft's airspeed began to drop quickly and I took command of the controls and performed did a cockpit scan: flight instruments checked normal; engine instruments checked normal; and the flaps were selected at 10 degrees. The flap indicating needle adjacent to the flap selector showed a flap setting of 15 degrees but this was not suspicious in itself because the needle often indicates an error of +/- 5 degrees and is accurate only when the flaps are fully retracted or fully extended.However; I visually checked the flaps and noted they appeared to have retracted only to the 20 degree position despite the flaps being confirmed selected for 10 degrees. The instructor lowered the nose to a slightly nose down attitude to gain airspeed. At 300 FT MSL we were indicating a descent rate of 150 FT per minute and the aircraft was not gaining airspeed quickly enough to initiate a climb. This poor performance was further complicated by the effects of density altitude and the midday surface thermals from the ground causing light chop/turbulence.It appeared that a controlled off airport landing might be necessary if the airplane's descent could not be stabilized. Erring on the side of caution to ensure maximum safety of flight; I declared an emergency with the Tower and advised we were unable to maintain altitude due to slow airspeed and a flap malfunction. The Tower immediately cleared the airspace and made all runways available to the instructor's aircraft. At this point the airspeed was trending higher and I was able to initiate a gentle positive rate of climb at 60 KTS at approximately 100-200 FT per minute. A shallow; almost level turn was initiated to join the downwind of the active runway. The aircraft was able to climb to approximately 800 FT in the downwind leg prior to initiating a shallow and gentle turn to a safe landing. During the downwind leg we cycled the flap selector through the full range of flap options and were unable to retract the flaps. The circuit breakers were checked and none of the circuit breakers had been tripped. The flight school checklist and the POH were consulted for a flap malfunction and neither listed a checklist for this problem in either the normal or emergency procedures. After landing safely; the operations manager was specifically notified that this type of failure constitutes a flight control failure and that an immediate notification to the NTSB is required. The aircraft was squawked and grounded bythe flight instructor. A post flight review of all available checklists; flight maneuver descriptions/checklists; the POH and the Airplane Flying Handbook was completed. No evidence was found requiring that the pilot in command of any aircraft completing a touch and go is required to visually confirm that the flaps have completely retracted to the correct takeoff position prior to opening the throttle and accelerating for liftoff/rotation. The only requirement is to select flaps appropriately per the takeoff checklist. A similar review of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association Air Safety Foundation's (AOPA ASF's) safety brief on touch and goes specifically mentions that aircraft equipped with electric flaps may open the throttle after selecting the correct flaps because electric flaps retract slowly and do not harmfully degrade aircraft performance during the retraction. Under normal operations; the flaps would have had sufficient time to retract to the 10 degree position prior to rotation.

A C-172S Intructor pilot and his student lost control of vertical performance during a touch and go departure when the electric flaps failed to retract to the selected 10 degree extension; appearing to stop at 20 degrees deflection. The Instructor assumed control and eventually managed to accelerate and climb to a safe altitude from where a safe approach and landing were completed.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Manuals; Procedure

I was assigned Aircraft X for my nightly workload on DATE. I was troubleshooting and repairing and MEL on CIDS (Cabin Intercommunication Data System). 'CIDS caution light on FAP'. MEL# 23-XXX. Control Number X. Log page X. The problem discovered to be the Cabin Announcement Module. So I replaced the part with the part that was assigned with the workload; following all maintenance manual references. Specifically AMM 23-73-19. Even checking the supplements attached to the reference. According to the supplement; manufacturer part number Z0XXXXXXXXXX is required to be installed. That number translates to M&E number 29-XXXX-X-XXXX; which was the part number that was assigned to the workload for the night. I did not order this part for this aircraft but verified it was the correct part number according to the supplement. While installing the part; I noticed a part number difference and re-verified I did install the correct part. So I continued with my work. Replaced the module. Reprogrammed it according to the AMM. And completed the operational check. Everything checked good. The caution message disappeared. So I signed off the discrepancy. While filling out the paperwork; I went back in to re-verify I did have the correct part number. It wasn't until DATE1 that I was informed that it was the incorrect part number. I am being told that M&E number 29-XXXX-X-XXXX is in fact the correct part number; which is different from what is listed in the supplement. There is also data missing from the original discrepancy after it was signed off. Both the M&E number and serial number are blank despite there being a tracking tag number written. When the serial number of the part I installed is searched for; it has two different M&E numbers: 29-XXXX-X-XXYY and 29-XXXX-X-XXZZ. The data listed in the computer application is not is not matching up. Also; according to the computer application; I was assigned M&E 29-XXXX-X-XXYY; which as stated before; is the correct part number according to the supplement.Faulty computer application not properly tracking aircraft data. Possibly a miscommunication between technical documents since a supplement has one part number listed and I am being another part number is required. Possibly data manipulation by a third unknown party.Correcting the computer application; by removing the bug that is causing the problem. Add more information to the supplement that is attached to the AMM/IPC of the required part numbers. IPC 23-XX-XX-XXX item 090s states M&E 29-XXXX-X-XXXX contradicting what is written in the attached supplement.

Technician reported misidentifying the correct part number due to bugs in a computer program; and installing the wrong part.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Initially cleared to turn left off of 170 heading (for CB avoidance) to proceed direct to fix EG366 for straight in RNAV Rwy 10. Then ATC cleared us to descend and maintain 3500. Fix altitude at EG366 shows 4000 on Jepp chart. MSA in all sectors is 2000 so I did not query ATC on the lower altitude assignment. Check tgt Altitude message appeared in the scratchpad of FMS; I modified FMS altitude with Captain (CA) agreement to /3500 at EG366. Upon intercepting the vertical path at 3500 feet and cleared for the approach with minimums of 800 feet set in the MCP the pitch mode did not change to VNAV PTH; CA went to FLCH mode on the MCP at this time; and asked what the next lower altitude was. I replied 2000 but also attempted to get the CA to go back to VNAV and push the MCP alt button once to start a descent to mins. I think he did briefly go back to VNAV but then returned to FLCH and V/S as well. CA disengaged autopilot and started descending when he saw the aircraft not descending in path and aircraft got below path less than 400 feet deviation as I recall. Check Airman in center seat instructed CA to level off to intercept the path; I engaged VNAV again and left Autopilot; rest of approach and landing continued on profile.Suggestions: I should have been more assertive in getting the CA to manage the approach in VNAV. I also believe the CA was feeling additional pressure due to the presence of the Check Airman observing the approach and also the marginal weather conditions of numerous thunderstorms in the area. Since we rarely fly RNAV approaches other than in the sim; we should have discussed what we expect to see and when regarding VNAV on the approach and a backup plan of action should things not occur as planned on the approach profile.

My observation was that the CA was unsure of his exact position on the approach (both in altitude as well as in terms of navigation). This might be the reason why he selected FLCH in order to descend. It might also explain the early configuration (Flaps 10 @ 33 DME)Crew communication is a key in this event. The CA never expressed his thoughts or plans and selected different modes without verbalizing or explanations to the rest of the crew.In order to stay protected in min altitudes; VNAV needs to stay enabled during all phases of the RNAV approach.ALL crew members should be comfortable and assertive enough to voice concerns or questions. Any queries should be addressed immediately until everyone is in agreement or a safe alternate action is agreed on.

B747-400 international first officers reported the pilot flying descended below charted altitude at FAF on RNAV approach to SBEG while using FLCH rather than VNAV.


Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On approach as flaps 5 were selected; the flap gauge did not move past the 1 position with a slight asymmetry. A go-around was initiated and the flap lever was set to position 1. The QRH was referenced and a flaps 1 approach was accomplished as per the 'Flaps; Trailing Edge: Asymmetrical' with the flap lever in the 1 detent. The landing data was recalculated and stopping margin and brake cooling were not a factor. Approach and landing were uneventful. I felt a bit rushed to accomplish the checklist and get the aircraft on the ground. Fuel was 5.7 when the go-around was initiated. ATC was keeping us busy with frequency and altitude changes. There was enough fuel to take more time to analyze the situation.

B737-300 Captain reported asymmetrical trailing edge flaps on approach. Go-around was executed; procedures run; and a normal landing ensued.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance; Party2 Other

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

On descent through FL190; a distinct dirty sock odor was detected by both pilots. Oxygen masks donned. 7700 squawked and [advised] with ATC. Reason given for [advising]. Emergency equipment followed to gate; no external issues found. Normal shutdown checklist completed. Report filed by pilots. Confirmation of submission. Mechanic briefed. Mechanic informed me flight attendants reported to him the dirty sock odor was evident after gear retraction in ZZZ. I asked the mechanic for the AML back to update my write up. He refused stating he would advise the Maintenance Manager. He did not as evidenced by the narrative on [reporting website]. I followed up with the [point of contact] in Maintenance Control. He said he would accurately update my briefing in the comments section. He requested I refile my report and I did. He confirmed receipt. The On Duty pilot called to check on crew. ZZZ1 Director called me to check on crew also. ZZZ line mechanic inaccuracies in report narrative is an injustice to all parties involved and a negative aspect to safety in so far as correcting issues.

After a shallow descent was started; pulled for open descent to comply with STAR constraints; engines came to idle; and a strong 'dirty sock' smell was observed in the cockpit. The Captain and I agreed it was a fume event associated with atomized engine oil from our training lessons. We donned O2 masks; I was the Pilot Flying and took control of the Aircraft. Directed ECAM ACTION and the Captain performed the appropriate checklists while I flew the Aircraft and talked to ATC; and landed in ZZZ without any mishaps. Emergency vehicles followed us to the gate and boarded the aircraft and investigated the event. Suspected engine oil seal leaking allowing atomized oil to enter the aircraft pack system.

A330 flight crew reported a fume event during descent; advised ATC; and emergency vehicles followed the aircraft to the gate. Captain also experienced a communication issue with the mechanic regarding the logbook write up.


Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other; Party2 Ground Personnel

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

During boarding I was not informed that we had an emotional support animal. During the flight I realized there was a crate under a passenger seat. I then asked the C flight attendant if she was aware about the animal. Her answer was 'no'. I then took a look at the paperwork that was given to me and I realized there was a code 'ESAN' which we figured out meant emotional support animal. We were not aware of what kind of animal but since it was listed we figured the proper procedures had been reviewed prior to boarding. Which is normal protocol for any animal that boards our aircraft. When we landed in Mexico City and going through customs we then realized it was a monkey in the crate. The C flights attendant asked the owner if monkeys were allowed in Mexico to which the owner responded yes. That she has traveled with the monkey before and it's never been a problem. The following morning we arrived at our gate for our departure and we see the family at the gate. They had been detained in Mexico because of the monkey. After arriving we had some ground time. Before our next flight we were notified that our arriving aircraft had been quarantined because of the monkey. As you can see this was a huge inconvenience not only for the family but for us as crew and the airline. The lack of communication and knowledge has caused major problems and I this situation should have never happened. Either this airport needs more training or they need to put agents that have the knowledge regarding international laws.More communication from ground operations. I know we were running late and the rush to board the flight was their first priority but communication and knowledge regarding international laws should be a top priority as well.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier flight attendants; with a Mexico City destination; reported an emotional service monkey on board the aircraft which caused the plane to be quarantined.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

While preparing for landing at the local airport the front landing gear did not extended. The mains came out as usual and provided 2 green lights but the front light remained red. After pulling the emergency handle the front still did not come out. I notified local traffic of my situation on the local unicom and proceeded to land. The landing was smooth until the nose hit the ground. No injuries; some damage.

Beagle 206 pilot reported landing with the nose gear retracted after it failed to extend using normal and emergency methods.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency

I was pilot flying as we departed [to the south] and at approximately 500 feet AGL we heard a very loud 'bang' which was instantly accompanied by significant yaw and vibration and an EGT on the right engine in excess of 913 degrees. Captain X was acting as my First Officer as this was to be my FAA initial upgrade observation flight. Captain X initiated the memory items and checklist associated with Severe Damage while Captain Y who was to evaluate me began communications with the Number 1 Flight Attendant. Shutting down the engine eliminated all vibration and at that point I elected to climb to 4;000 feet MSL and accept delay vectors while Captain X proceeded with the expanded checklists. With the winds shifting I requested the ILS to [land north] for approach and landing. Captain X was able to secure a discreet frequency for our approach and confirmed with the Tower that our plan was to stop on the runway and await an assessment of our condition from Fire personnel. We were given an approximately 10 mile final and landed under our maximum gross landing weight. Captain X and Captain Y were invaluable and enabled us to divide responsibilities and thoroughly complete all required checklists.

I was acting as an evaluator sitting in the jumpseat for initial captain upgrade. After right engine experienced compressor stalls during initial climbout I began to assist as needed with checklist procedures; company communications and return preparations.

B757 Captain and two Check Airmen on an initial Captain upgrade flight; experience an engine failure at 500 FT accompanied by high vibration and fire viewed by the Tower. The Captains combine efforts to accomplish checklists and return to the departure airport for a single engine landing.


Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

We had been cleared for the FMS Bridge Visual Runway 28R. On the FMS Bridge Visual (RNAV-F) Runway 28R SFO; just after passing SAMUL prior to F101D ATC issued us an 'altitude alert'; he said we were supposed to cross the 'Bridge' at 1;800 FT and said we were low. We were in the APR mode with aircraft having crossed SAMUL at 1;500 FT and descending towards F101D at 1;200 FT. We reconfirmed we were in APR mode with the glide path indicator centered (yes). We had the airport and runway visually and confirmed we were at an appropriate altitude for our position and leveled off at 1;200 FT. We confirmed our altitude and position check with the proper PAPI indications from Runway 28R. Pilot flying disconnected autopilot and we continued our approach to landing Runway 28R. Recalling the Controller's statement of 'required to cross the Bridge at 1;800 FT'; I believe he may have thought us to be on the Quiet Bridge Visual Runway 28R; instead of the FMS Bridge Visual Runway 28R as we were cleared. The crossing altitude for the Quiet Bridge Visual is indeed 1;800 FT at the bridge causing the altitude alert from the Controller. On the FMS Bridge Visual SAMUL is prior to the bridge and crossing altitude is lower at 1;500 FT; so by the time we crossed the bridge we were descending towards the crossing altitude of 1;200 FT at F101D; so of course our altitude was required to be lower than 1;800 FT at the bridge. We had visual contact with the airport; ground and all traffic advised the entire approach; and the procedure was followed both laterally and vertically. Looking back I can see the controllers concern and the different minimum crossing altitudes on the two visual approaches that initiated his alert. We as a crew; verified our position and altitude relative to the airport and the charted approach; the aircrafts status; configuration; and ensured the proper MODE was engaged for the approach. We verbalized to each other proper position and configuration and proceeded with the approach and landing.

Was cleared 'FMS Bridge Visual 28R' and handed off to Tower. Autopilot was engaged and was in 'Final APP' mode. Tower reported 'check altitude ....you were to cross the bridge at 1;800'. We showed we were on profile and following the approach path both by electronic and visual means. No other comments by ATC.

A320 flight crew reports being told they are low passing the bridge on the FMS Bridge Visual 28R approach. The crew does not agree; believing the Controller is confusing the FMS Bridge Visual 28R with the Quiet Bridge Visual Runway 28R; which uses different fixes and crossing altitudes.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

I am filing this for some clarification. 2 Inspectors and I performed an inspection procedure on a 757 engine due to a bird strike. There was a point of contention on what it was that we were to inspect using the Fluorescent Penetrant Inspection (FPI) Spot Inspection. The conversation was in a casual manner at first but then took a wrong turn in my view when the supervisor chimed in. We all made mention of how we normally perform our normal best practice procedures; using the FPI Spot Inspection. We normally inspect beyond the normal strike area; to ensure that we accomplish a thorough inspection. Our supervisor stated; as a matter of fact; that the card we were working states 'If you can see bird remains on the Outlet Guide Vane (OGV); do a FPI Spot Inspection; of the OGV segment that has evidence of bird strike'. He then proceeded to inform the three of us; that we were not to look anywhere but that exclusive area of the known strike; or we would be held insubordinate. At this point; there was a growing concern among the 3 of us. I have on numerous occasions heard or have known the following statement. The FAA will contend that we are held to a higher standard for the work that is to be performed and performed by Inspection. We also are of the understanding that any FAA licensed personnel may be answerable for any neighboring discrepancies that may have been in the area at the time of addressing the original discrepancy. With all this being noted; why would it not be of a best practice to extend the areas of our inspection to just outside of the known strike area; without the threat of being held insubordinate should we 'exceed' the known strike area? So the question is; and where we need some extra clarity is this. Wouldn't the FAA hold myself or any other inspector to a standard that the company; as stated by our supervisor; neither promotes nor fosters in the name of aviation safety?

During inspection on a B757 engine due to a bird strike; company supervisor threatened the inspectors with insubordination if they inspected beyond what was required per the maintenance card.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 84; Flight Crew Total 34000; Flight Crew Type 679

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 92; Flight Crew Total 12317; Flight Crew Type 579

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Excursion Ramp

Departing Munich; we were given a push clearance that said; after the crossing Medium Transport aircraft; cleared to push to face north. This was relayed to the push-crew and acknowledged. Push commenced shortly thereafter. We couldn't see; but assumed the Medium Transport passed. A brief time later; Apron control asked us to stop our push; which was relayed to me and the me to the push-crew (there was the lift tug driver and another person on the headphones). I allowed a reasonable amount of time to transfer the stop; but they kept on pushing. I asked them again to STOP the push. The person on the headset seemed confused. I again told them to stop the push; stop the push. The push slowed but never stopped and then began to pick up pace. I then with louder; more stern voice told them to STOP; HALT THE PUSH; figuring the German stop command might do the trick. Nope; the push just continued. After we came to a stop on the start spot; I asked him if he understood what STOP meant - he was flustered. I overheard the FO talking to apron trying to convince them that we had told the push crew to stop multiple times. They mentioned it was a reportable event; hence the filing. This is very rare for Munich or any German airport. I am convinced; this was purely a language issue and the gentleman on the headset did not understand the bigger picture. The tug driver was also dependent on what he told him and I don't think he was aware of what was going on either.

Upon receiving our push clearance Ramp control instructed us to wait for an aircraft to taxi by; then push.  This was relayed to the push-crew; and they immediately began to push.  Ramp control instructed us to stop; as the aircraft we were supposed to wait for had not yet passed by.  The Captain instructed the push-crew to stop and had to tell them several times; before they would stop.  When they did stop; they just paused and began to push again.  This happened; I recall about 3 times; and ramp control kept instructing us to stop; but we could not get the push-crew to do so. The push-crew eventually just pushed us all the way back; contrary to our instructions to 'halt.'  No explanation was given; as to why they would not stop.  Ramp Control informed us of our deviation; and their intention to write a report regarding this. We gave them our apologies and explanation that the push crew was not following our directions to stop as they requested.

Air carrier flight crew reported EDDM ground crew would not stop push back as instructed; possibly due to language barrier; resulting in a ramp excursion.


Company Policy; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

[We were] asked to re-position an aircraft that was in storage; We moved it closer to Aircraft X that was already in storage. They then asked us to move it even closer to Aircraft X. While we were moving Aircraft Y  struck Aircraft X. We felt comfortable with the first movement of Aircraft Y; we all felt uncomfortable when [we were] asked to move it even  closer to Aircraft X.

[It was] requested [to] re-position aircraft(s) at storage area. Note: 4 aircraft were parked at the storage area. Requested that 2 aircraft to be parked closer together. Aircraft Y was re-position closer to Aircraft X. [It was] requested Aircraft Y to be moved even closer to Aircraft X.

Air carrier ground crew reported that while repositioning an aircraft in a remote parking location; the wing struck an adjacent parked aircraft. The crew reported that the move was done to fit more aircraft into the parking location.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

We were cleared for takeoff on Runway 22L; as we initiated our takeoff at about 20 or 30 knots we received an ECAM message 'F/CTL ELAC 1 PITCH FAULT'. We rejected the takeoff and notified Tower that we aborted our takeoff and needed to clear the runway to perform a procedure for an alert we had received. After clearing the runway we applied QRH procedures and informed Maintenance Control. We were advised to do an ELAC1 reset which solved the problem. Upon completion of the procedure we proceeded to Runway 22L for another takeoff and received the same fault again with another rejected takeoff. After that we were advised by Maintenance Control to return to the gate. Maintenance deferred ELAC1 which required us to perform a fairly lengthy flight crew action associated with the MEL. After they completed the deferral there were no further faults were noted and the flight continued without any other faults.  Maintenance advised us that our aircraft was not the only one with this problem that morning; and it seemed that due to the extreme frigid cold temperatures over the USA; that it was playing havoc and the 'ELAC1 Pitch Fault' alert had happened to 6 other company aircraft.

A320 First Officer experiences an ELAC1 fault during takeoff and the takeoff is rejected. The ELAC is reset and the second takeoff attempt produces the same result. The crew returns to the gate and Maintenance defers ELAC1; allowing the fight to depart. The reported states that he was informed by Maintenance that six other company flights that morning had the same fault; which was attributed to extreme cold weather.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

A Hawker was on a vector for Runway 01C at 3;000 FT and a CRJ was on downwind for Runway 01L. I turned the CRJ on a base heading a descended them to 3;000 FT. I had planned on the CRJ turning in front of the Hawker; however due to the new GIBBZ RNAV arrival; the CRJ was further west and heading southwest. This resulted in the CRJ making a wider turn than I'm used too; because of this wide turn I lost separation with the CRJ and the Hawker prior to the CRJ having the airport in sight. I would recommend moving the fix SIYOB on the GIBBZ arrival to the west as this would allow a heading between SIYOB and MIKEJ that would parallel the final approach course. Also; with the new arrival the airspace boundary with final and Tilly Sector is further south and this makes it harder to descend the arrivals on downwind and turn towards the airport.

PCT Controller experienced a loss of separation event between two arrivals to IAD. The reporter listed the new GIBBS RNAV STAR's track as contributing to the event.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Right before boarding I started to get itchy; the C FA asked if I was feeling ok; she told me my chest was really red looked like it was sunburned. She asked if I had a sunburn or had been in the sun and I told her I hadn't been in the sun. I looked like I had a really bright sunburn on my chest. My arms started to get red and I looked under my skirt and my legs were red also; I immediately took a Zyrtec to see if the symptoms would subside. This was the 3rd trip I have worn my new uniform and I'm not sure if the heat on the airplane caused my reaction. I called in sick and on my way home ended up with a headache and started coughing. I also was itching all over. When I returned home I took off the uniform and took photos of the reaction and took some Benadryl. Hot on the aircraft; heat activated the reaction. Have jumpseats cleaned and recall uniforms.

Flight Attendant reported an allergic reaction to the new company supplied uniform.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I went to the cockpit while FO (First Officer) did the preflight. Upon completing preflight FO brought to my attention a possible fluid leak top of left MLG (Main Landing Gear). I inspected the defect and noted fluid present on what I have come to know as 'banjo fitting' associated with brake lines on upper left MLG strut. FO pointed out stains on left MLG tires likely associated with wind catching the leaking fluid and landing on tire.I contacted Maintenance Control who requested the previously mentioned pictures. I also entered a write-up in AML (Aircraft Maintenance Logbook). Maintenance advised non-[company] on call Maintenance would be called. Approximately 30 minutes later; [Maintenance] arrived and confirmed the fluid present. After consulting with Maintenance Control; [they] advised me that I would be required to run the left engine for 3 minutes. It is my understanding [Maintenance] removed the fluid from the fitting I complied and determined that in feather I could get required pressure. Upon completion of the run; [Maintenance] came to [the] cockpit and declared there was no further evidence of the leak. I mentioned to [Maintenance] that I wasn't sure we accomplished anything as we never applied brakes or ebrake. He left the cockpit for a few minutes and returned stating Maintenance Control instructed us to run engine 3 minutes and actuate the brakes and ebrake a few times. At that point I called Maintenance Control and told them I would need to push back to do the engine run. Maintenance Control stated that was not necessary. I acknowledged their comments believing that was unsafe to do at the gate. I discussed with FO and determined if we captured with the tug and in feather; we could do the test at the gate. My belief was the test done in that configuration mimicked a typical push back operation. I coordinated with Ramp and proceeded to start number one and apply the brakes. At the same time; I took the opportunity to migrate brake fluid; 50% #1 75% #2; thus accomplishing the required Maintenance request. I quickly realized with ebrake pressure being depleted #2 would need to be started. That was accomplished and Maintenance request was completed. With engines in feather I was able to get adequate hydraulic pressure to accomplish the Maintenance request. Had we needed to come out of feather we would have pushed back and accomplished on a taxiway.[Maintenance] did a general visual inspection and determined no further leaks. It is worthy to note no actual maintenance procedure occurred other than cleaning the fitting and running the engine. AML was signed off and we departed for SEA.Upon arrival in ZZZ; FO left the aircraft to get some breakfast. I did the required post flight and upon inspecting the above mentioned 'banjo fitting' I observed a yellowish fluid evident on the connector. The amount was 2 drips vs the 3 drips observed on the original AML entry. I called Maintenance Control and made another entry into the AML. At that point I left the aircraft for about 15 minutes to go get a coffee. I returned to find a Maintenance Technician holding the book and as I recall in the vicinity of the L landing gear. I inquired of the status and he indicated the AML entry was signed off with GVI (General Visual Inspection) no leaks noted. Thinking that was odd; [I] proceeded to observe that [the] connector was in fact clean and free of leaks. I mentioned that someone must have wiped it off. The Technician told no one had. At that point knowing the connector had a leak that reoccurred I told the Technician I would not be able to accept the aircraft. As I recall his response was something along the lines of OK. I called Maintenance Control and explained the situation and they advised me the aircraft was signed off and good to go. I explained to Maintenance Control I was going to refuse the aircraft. Maintenance Control advised me I would need to contact the FODO (Flight Operations Duty Officer). I called Dispatch and he sent a request to FODO to call me. Shortly thereafter FODO contacted me and I explained the situation. He indicated he would contact [Maintenance Operations] and Maintenance Control. [FODO] called me back and relayed a request from Maintenance Control that I fly it just one more leg and they would change out my airplane. I declined as I believed there was a leak that required corrective action before another flight. [FODO] indicated he understood my position and would attempt to secure a different aircraft to finish my day. [Then]; I was advised I had a different aircraft; Aircraft Y. Shortly after that I believe the crew started packing up to go to Aircraft Y on spot 3. Sometime before the FO departed to Aircraft Y a different Technician along with the original Technician that I had interacted with came on board the aircraft. He asked me to point out the leak that I had written up. I proceeded to the left engine and pointed out the connector that was at this point clean and dry. He proceeded to tell me it was clean and no leak was noted. Additionally he pointed out these leaks; presumably ones that I had written up; were on ALL the airplanes and are very common and that's just how those connectors are. He told me that he had not wiped that connector off. Which was interesting as I didn't say or infer he did. He proceeded to then tell me the other side was the same way and 'Why didn't you write that one up.' I began to get a feeling this might escalate into an undesirable exchange so I told that Technician 'Thank you for your observation' and began to collect my belongings for the plane change. After that exchange I observed the two technicians take the AML and enter the walkway out of earshot and examine the logbook and appeared to be making an additional entry into the AML. Before leaving to Aircraft Y the AML was replaced being the Captain seat. Curious what the additional entry might have been; the last entry was the sign off from my original writeup. I got the distinct feeling that the sign off would stand and likely another crew would take the aircraft. As I left the aircraft; I observed both mechanics might be preparing to tow or taxi the aircraft elsewhere. As we waited for Aircraft Y; [I] observed Aircraft X was no longer on the spot where I left it. As I waited for Aircraft Y; I told the FO what had transpired after he left. He told me 'Yeah that mechanic was the same at the aircraft when I came back; that was prior to myself returning to aircraft' 'He; [the] mechanic; told me there was no leak.' I cannot comment what happened when myself and FO were not attending the aircraft but think it is odd a leak I had observed and entered in AML no longer was present. All I know is I would have been delighted had I not observed the original or subsequent leak as we had 12-hour FDP (Flight Duty Period) limited day and original scheduled XC:37 FDP. With that in the back of my mind it would have been convenient to accept the sign off without corrective action; but I felt there was a leak making the aircraft unairworthy. I have responsibility to the highest level of safety for my passengers; crew; and my company. I won't let that be compromised. It's also worthy to note that we blocked in XA37 with an original scheduled departure to ZZZ1 at XB00. Had we been given a different aircraft to begin with we could have done our original trip with a late departure and likely segments on time or very close. As I understand it Aircraft Y was on the hardstand and available the entire time this event occurred. In the end due to additional ATC delays we didn't block in until XF53 and our crew was taken off our turn. I don't know if the flight was cancelled or operated by a different crew. Earlier I mentioned the Technician told me all our [aircraft] had that particular leak. During my post flight on Aircraft Y I noted all the 'banjo fittings were bone dry; clean and no evidence of a leak or previous leak for thatmatter.' This confirms my belief these types [of] leaks are infrequent and require corrective as soon as the leaks are observed.

Air carrier Captain reported refusing aircraft because of a recurring hydraulic leak and was challenged by Maintenance personnel.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Leaving ZZZ to ZZZ1. After take off; Captain did an all-call to ask if we smell something unusual. All Fa's (Flight Attendants) said yes. Captain asked if any of us have experienced fumes in a cabin before and none of the working crew have but the jumpseater seated by 1L have and that jumpseater said it smells exactly like fumes from the plane. Captain then was checking in on us to see if he should have the plane turn around. I'm not sure how his decision making process was but we ended up continuing with the flight.  Later into the flight; Captain called us (all-call) to ask each FA for what symptoms we were having. All Fa's got a headache; #4 got watery eyes as well; #3 had a weird taste on his lips. Eventually once more leveled off from take-off; the smell dissipated. However; as we were about to land; I started smelling the same fume scent again and when we were taxiing into our gate in ZZZ1; I called all FA's to see if they were smelling the fumes again. #4 said she was definitely smelling it again. I was not sure what the #3 said or the #1 said. When we got to the gate; I believe the smell was gone or not as bad anymore. After all passengers deplaned; as I was walking out of the plane; I passed by 3L 3R and all of a sudden a strong smell of the fumes again. I [could] see Maintenance was on board and left to head to operations with FA #1. We talked to Maintenance Operations Manager to see what we can do. We asked them to give us information of an urgent care address and how to go about with a report.

Air Carrier Flight Attendant reported a fume event during climb. The fumes dissipated initially but returned during final landing approach. All flight attendants experienced physiological symptoms.


Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

While boarding a flight I noticed a very large hard covered box in the overhead bin. I asked who's it was and a guest said it was his. I asked him what it was and he said a drum set. I asked if it had a Lithium battery and he said yes. I asked if it could be taken out he said no. That's why It's on the plane because they wouldn't let it go below and I said OK. He said he does it all the time.I then went up and asked the Customer Service Representative to come back and look at it if they had checked it out and she also had a lead on board neither one of them ever answered my questions. Did someone approve this item?I went and talk to the Captain because I was concerned this large box was half the size of the bin with lithium batteries in it and I know that it would not fit in the battery containment bag. We were flying 5 hours over water.I talked to the Captain and he said there were cell phones and laptops on Board with Lithium batteries in them and I said but this box would not fit in our battery containment bag they would. He then said he thought it was OK; so the guest brought his large bag in the overhead bin. I would like to know if this item is approved?We should have checked this item out further before flying.

B737-900 Flight Attendant reported concerns regarding transport of large Lithium Ion battery powered device in cabin overhead without thorough research.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Upon showing to the airport and checking the logbook as I normally do; I found that the MEL 28-15-XX and 28-15-XX that were applied to Aircraft X the previous two days had been changed for misapplication of the MEL. The correct MEL should have been 28-15-XX and 28-15-XX which considers the outer tank fuel unusable for flight planning calculations. When the first two MELs were applied the situation we had (transfer valves opening on ground) seemed to be the correct MEL. After subsequent flights on [the next day] another crew saw the transfer valves did not open and suspected the wrong MEL had been applied. This plane has had multiple issues with the fuel system and everything Maintenance does to fix the problem doesn't seem to fix the issue. I am filing this report because possibly flew the airplane with the incorrect MEL applied. When I flew the airplane the MEL seemed to be correct in that the transfer valves were open and that the fuel from the outer tanks drained to the inner tanks before the inner tank reached its low level sensor to command them to open. If the future if I am ever uncertain about an MEL; I will talk to the local mechanic and Maintenance Control to make sure we are all on the same page and that we get the right MEL applied.

A320 First Officer reported MEL may or may not have been applied correctly as associated with the fuel system.


Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Latest update to Jepps for LAWGR 3 RNAV Arrival into Denver shows incorrect top of the block altitude at LAWGR; which does not match top of the block altitude in the FMS.  While in cruise and building the approach into Denver we saw the altitudes did not match.  Just then an aircraft on the arrival ahead of us asked Denver Center that they saw the same discrepancy; and asked what was the correct altitude.  ATC said LAWGR should be At or Below 22;000 feet. (and above 19;000 feet); and that they were aware that aircraft were reporting seeing At or Below 20;000 feet for that point on their Electronic Flight Books; but were having the correct altitudes show in the FMS when loading the arrival.  I told ATC we had the same issue.  They and the next sector on the arrival both repeated that the top altitude for LAWGR should read 220B-190A.   Same thing on today's flight from LNK to DEN on the LAWGR--we briefed the correction and confirmed again the top altitude with ATC. Send out an email to all company pilots about this and to use the altitudes in the FMS for LAWGR when on that arrival.  Get it corrected in Jepps.

An Air Carrier pilot reported a discrepancy between Jeppesen Charts and FMS database in the altitude blocks at the fix LAWGR on the LAWGR3 RNAV Arrival to DEN. The FMS database has the correct altitude block.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Incursion Runway

We were departing out of Hayden. The First Officer made a call to taxi at the non controlled airport and neither of us heard anyone else make calls. He then called ATC to get our release. They said we were released and neither of us recalled him saying anything about any traffic in the area. The First Officer than made one more call to say we were about to depart Runway 10. I crossed the hold short line and then prior to making a turn onto the runway to line up and takeoff I saw a corporate jet landing 28. I hit my brakes hard and stayed there. Even though we had crossed the hold short line; I felt it was safer to stay there then to attempt a quick taxi onto the runway and then off at the next taxiway. The jet then made a turn off well before they got to us. The First Officer and I discussed it and both agreed we never heard any calls from the other jet and both know we got released by Denver for departure and didn't recall any traffic alerts and they definitely did not hold us for release for an inbound aircraft. Make sure to start listening to ATC Center and the airport CTAF sooner in case they talk about traffic before we get on frequency for departure. Thought we were doing a good job of monitoring both; but could have been distracted when doing a checklist.

Air Carrier Captain preparing to depart Runway 10 at HDN notices a corporate jet landing Runway 28 and stops short of the runway but over the hold line. CTAF procedures had been used and an IFR release had just been received from Denver Center with no mention of in bound traffic.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 5000

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Ground Incursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

We were cleared for takeoff 34R. Another aircraft had just cleared Runway 34R at E and not turned south on to B taxiway. We were cleared for takeoff. As we approached E on 34R we were in the process of rotating and it was apparent that the other aircraft's tail was not on the taxiway side of the intersection markings. The tail of the other aircraft was not intruding over the runway side marker paint. As we passed the tail of the other aircraft we experienced a strong bump from his engines. Takeoff and climb were normal after that.

We mentioned it to Tower who replied that he was 'clear of the runway.'

An Air Carrier Crew departed SEA Runway 34R and received jet blast when barely airborne from a B747-400 which had not cleared the runway hold short lines to exit the runway.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

A Cherokee was on about a 5 mile final for Runway 30R with a ground speed of 120 KTS. An MD80 was switched to my frequency by Approach Control. The MD80 was about 4.5 miles behind the Cherokee with a 60 KT overtake. I issued instructions to the MD80 to make an S turn for spacing with the slower Cherokee. Weather was good VFR and the MD80 was on a Visual Approach. The MD80 complied and made a good S turn. I advised the Cherokee to plan an early turn off at Taxiway J if possible for the traffic following. The Cherokee said they would comply. The Cherokee landed and was able to turn off at Taxiway J without difficulty; made a prompt turn off and did not stop as he was issued taxi instructions to parking. The MD80 was cleared to land as the Cherokee was rolling out on the runway as I anticipated he would make Taxiway J without problem. The Cherokee was off the runway completely; and taxiing at a good rate; when the MD80 crossed the landing threshold. As the MD80 was in the flair and about to touch down the ASDE alerted; 'Runway 30R; Go Around'. It was too late to issue a go around in my opinion; and so I did not. The ASDE indicated the conflict was in fact between the two concerned aircraft (red flashing circle observed around the Cherokee). I don't believe adequate spacing was provided behind the Cherokee to start with; as an S turn by the MD80 and an early turn off were both necessary to make it work; but it did work. The reason I did not send the MD80 around was twofold.  1. The MD80 was too close to touchdown and; 2. The Cherokee was clear; and I had just scanned the runway so I knew it was clear; and the ASDE was indicating the Cherokee was the conflict which I knew was incorrect. This last part all happened pretty quickly; as you can imagine. I really don't know; unless something can be done to tighten up ASDE parameters to avoid alerts that aren't necessary. Less than 5 minutes later I had another ASDE alert for a closed runway; telling me to send an aircraft around that was on final for a completely different runway.

STL Controller described his/her reasoning for not complying with an ASDE-X commanded go around; the reporter noting the 'conflicting' traffic was observed completely clear of the landing runway.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 1670; Flight Crew Type 1000

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

After being turned loose from ATC; I; Aircraft X; entered right downwind for [Runway] 20. I announced my presence and my intention to land on 20. I heard Aircraft Y was also right downwind for 20. I called him to try and see where he was in relation to the field and did not get a response. I called Aircraft Z on the end of 20 and told him he had time to get off before I turned base. I called to Aircraft Y again and did not hear a response. I announced my turn for right base to 20. Aircraft Z on the ground announced that Aircraft Y had also called for right base for 20. My wife screamed and looked out of my left window and there was Aircraft Y. He turned left and I continued my descent and landed.

Cessna 182 pilot reported a NMAC during approach at a non-towered airport.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8.0

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6.5

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway; Ground Incursion Runway

Aircraft X was a maintenance aircraft under tow repositioning from the west side of the airport to the east side. Aircraft X was instructed to proceed via taxiways DD; G to hold short of RWY4. A portion of taxiway A was closed for aircraft that were parked on the taxiway overnight. On this flow outbound departures typically taxi via A; E and B but with taxiway A closed between E and G they had to taxi via A; G and B. My plan was to have Aircraft X hold short of RWY4 for a few minutes until a couple outbound aircraft cleared taxiway G and taxiway B. After reviewing the audio; Aircraft Y had called for outbound taxi. Mistakenly I called them Aircraft Y maintenance and gave them clearance to taxi via N; A and hold short of M. Aircraft X maintenance took the clearance and read it back. At that point Aircraft X crossed the active departure runway (RWY4) and went onto taxiway B. Even though I missed the read back; at no point did I instruct any aircraft to cross a runway. I am perplexed as to why Aircraft X did not question the clearance. They were holding short of RWY4 at G. The clearance they took was taxi N; A hold short of M and there were not crossing instructions in the clearance. There is no possible way to get to taxiway N from where they were. I got busy with other duties and caught the crossing just as they cleared. Local Control had cleared Aircraft Z for takeoff as Aircraft X was crossing. It appears that Aircraft Z delayed their takeoff roll and verified with local control that they were cleared for takeoff. I don't believe it is good practice to use an actual callsign to tow/re-position aircraft. Aircraft X is an actual flight in the NAS. [Other companies] use a combination of letters and numbers. These maintenance aircraft are typically driven by ramp workers and not pilots. Giving these guys similar sounding callsigns is not a good idea and will probably lead to more of these incidents.

LGA Tower Controllers reported a tug driver towing an aircraft took another aircraft's instructions and taxied across a runway while a departure was cleared to takeoff.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

We were assigned Spot by ramp control. Upon contact with LAS ground control; the clearance was; (paraphrased); 'Taxi to Runway 25R; via [A#]; via B; hold short of A2.'We taxied single-engine and as we approached taxiway [A#]; the First Officer stated; 'STOP!' We held short of taxiway C while Aircraft Y went by at a high rate of speed. The distance between their winglet and our nose was probably 5 to 7 feet! Taxi speed for Aircraft Y was over 25 knots and possibly 30 knots.I have over 30;000 flight hours and this is the closest I have ever been to another aircraft where a potential for a collision during taxiing was evident.LAS Ground twice apologized for the event to us directly.Ground control did not issue instructions to [either Aircraft X or Y] on the potential for conflict; although we had converging clearances. We had the right of way from a priority perspective of relative distance; but the other aircraft was traveling at a faster taxi speed. Interestingly; there was a line up at the approach end for departure.Aircraft Y was approximately number four in the queue.Ground did not issue instructions that would have provided concise directions to either air carrier. Aircraft Y was taxiing at an apparent high rate of speed and was determined to get in the queue; then wait. We were lucky that the First Officer was studiously watching the other plane; and issued a forceful callout.I truly believe if Aircraft Y had to stop; it would have been abrupt.

Air carrier Captain reported near collision on ground due to Ground Control not providing correct instructions.


Situational Awareness; Distraction; Time Pressure

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

During vectors to ICN we got a delay due to unauthorized drone activity. Approach Control was unable to predict the length of the delay. We were at least the 6th aircraft in line being delay vectored. We evaluated our fuel and the number of aircraft ahead of us being delayed and transmitted Pan Pan to Approach Control for vectors to land at ICN. Approach Control would not vector us to ICN. They asked for our alternate airport which was ZZZZ1. We reported to Dispatch of our diversion and followed another flight diverting to ZZZZ1. We landed; parked and later departed again to complete the flight to ICN. This diversion was due to the unauthorized drone activity. No one had the ability to predict the length of the delay. The only known and the safest course of action was to divert to our alternate airport.

Upon switching approach control we could here holding instructions being given to aircraft.  We immediately began evaluating options for fuel and landing.  After being vectored for around 10-15 minutes Captain made the decision to declare minimum fuel.  The approach controller  responded that we were number 7 for landing at Incheon and requested our alternate airport.  We informed him that Gimpo (RKSS) was the alternate given a vector for approach.  Landing was uneventful.  Apparently there was drone activity near RKSI which prevented aircraft from landing.  Without any clear time frame as to when we would be landing and being number 7 for landing we made the decision to divert.  Don't really have any.  Can't control rogue drone activity.

Air Carrier Captain reported diverting to the alternate airport due to a UAV blocking traffic at the primary airport and holding fuel becoming an issue.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 0; Flight Crew Total 0; Flight Crew Type 0

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

As operator of a maintenance vehicle; I entered Runway 31 from the intersection with a short taxiway; letter unknown; leading from the terminal ramp. I failed to see a Beechcraft Baron 55 twin engine landing on Runway 31 after an abbreviated visual check as I approached the runway from the ramp.I did not hear communications from the aircraft as the airband radio mounted in the vehicle was not operating. This was discovered while clearing the vehicle access gate onto the ramp and I proceeded without the radio in operation. My warning beacon on the vehicle roof was operating normally.I did a visual check downwind as I approached the short taxiway connecting the ramp to Runway 31 and failed to see the Baron on its final approach. I can only speculate it must have been very close to touching down; or already wheels-down as I pulled into its path.My first awareness of the aircraft was a shortened roar of engines as it passed slightly in front of and over my vehicle. I was approximately mid-point and nearing the centerline of the runway; moving at about 30 MPH. After a startled; reflexive duck I saw it by craning my head out the open driver side window. The Baron was gear up and accelerating hard to avoid my vehicle.After seeing the Baron circling for a second attempt; I turned around from the ASOS site and returned to the ramp after it had landed and pulled up to the fueling point. I exchanged information with the pilots and airport manager. After this exchange; I departed the airport to return to my home station.Multiple failures on my part led to this event. Distraction played a part as did lack of situational awareness. This is a quiet airport and we can grow complacent; this leads to bad choices. I did not stop fully at the hold line short of Runway 31 and perform a proper visual check for a non-towered AOA. Had I done so; I would in all likelihood have seen the Baron already on the ground and rapidly approaching my position. This is the key failure and only fast and accurate reaction by the pilot avoided a serious accident.

A quick rejected landing and go-around by the flight crew of a Beech Baron averted a likely collision with the reporter's maintenance vehicle when he pulled onto the runway without a thorough scan of the pattern and without a functioning radio to monitor CTAF transmissions at the uncontrolled airport.


Working the early midnight inbound push; I had a few inbounds with the first straight in to 28L and an E145 angling in from the southeast for 28R and a BE58 inbound from the southwest. I issued traffic to follow on 28L and the traffic for 28R to the BE58. The BE58 reported both aircraft in sight and I cleared him to follow the traffic to 28L and maintain visual separation with the traffic for 28R. The BE58 read the clearance back verbatim; so I went on to the rest of my sequence and switched him to the Tower. It was a week later that I was informed by someone half way across the country that because the BE58 didn't read back his call sign I would be hit with an error. I've been working airplanes for nearly 30 years and training others to work airplanes for most of that time and knowing that someone sitting behind a desk half way across the country will nail me for a Class A; or whatever they call the bad one now; error; I am going to have to change the way I work and how I train others how to work airplanes. The safe; orderly and expeditious flow of air traffic will have to just be the safe and orderly flow of traffic.

TRACON Controller was informed a week after the event that an error occurred because he failed to insure a visual separation clearance response included a call sign.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 2900; Flight Crew Type 200

Party1 Flight Crew; Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Flying VFR from the west into CHD (Chandler; AZ). Phoenix Approach handed me off to Chandler Tower; who advised me; as I copied; that I would be #2 to land on Runway 22R following another aircraft. If I remember correctly it was 'You're number two behind a Cessna on final...' Approaching the airport from the west (CHD has two parallel runways - 22L and 22R); 22R made sense to me. I identified the traffic ahead and followed it; landing on 22R after the Cessna was off the runway and Tower had cleared me to land. It was a normal landing; until on roll-out Tower advised me that I had landed on the wrong runway - if I remember correctly the Controller said I had been cleared to land on Runway 22L; not 22R. In any case; that would have put me on a different runway than the plane I had been instructed to follow. And remember; I was approaching from the west; so [Runway] 22R was logical and the assignment I thought I got. (Also I don't believe there was anyone else in the ATA at the time.)As I was taxiing off the runway I keyed the mike and apologized - saying this was my first time at the airport. The Tower Controller didn't respond; I switched to Ground and got clearance to taxi to my destination. But in thinking about it later; I decided to file this report to make a suggestion that might make this particular situation absolutely clear. If indeed I landed on the wrong runway; it was because I was told to follow the aircraft ahead and I'd be number 2 to land. In my 40 years of flying I have never been told to follow another aircraft ahead in the pattern if that aircraft was landing on a DIFFERENT runway than I had been be cleared for. So the suggestion: at an airport with parallel runways; if the Tower doesn't want the #2 plane to land on the same runway as the plane he's told to follow; it would be helpful to advise the #2 aircraft that it will NOT be the same runway that the plane he is following is landing on. As for me; in a parallel runway situation when told to follow an aircraft ahead; I will double-double-check my runway assignment on short final. Between Tower clarification and my double-check maybe there won't be any misunderstanding.

After being cleared to land; the pilot of a BE24R was informed by the Tower Controller that he had landed on the wrong runway. The reporter understood he was #2 and was to follow a Cessna on final; and did just that; landing on the same runway after the Cessna had cleared.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

After 20 years of flying it has come to my attention that we carry Dangerous Goods (DG) on board that is not declared or known to the flight crew! Maybe I'm just slow to learn; but this seems to be a surprise to me and a lot of other crew members! During the DG inspection we learned of Lithium Metal batteries being carried on board in position 4R as part of the known shipper exemption UN 3090 Section II Label but not declared on DG paperwork. For starters; the DG agent we had was kind enough to inform the First Officer (FO) during the DG inspection that we had lithium batteries onboard that were not on the DG manifest because it was part of the UN 3090 Seciton II known shipper exemption. The FO mentioned this to me as I was handed the DG paperwork to sign that it had been inspected and met our requirements. Even as IDG there are loading requirements we need to be aware of! To my knowledge; I had never heard of DG that could be carried onboard without being declared on the manifest; so I further queried the DG agent. He tried to explain it to me; but I couldn't find any reference in the FOM or in the DG Job Aid that referenced us being allowed to carry DG that was not declared. There are inferences made in the DG Aid when you read the section labels (UN 3090 Section II) that say 'DO NOT PUP AS DG' and 'This package MUST be inspected by the origin location Dangerous Goods Specialist' and 'FORBIDDEN IN PASSENGER AIRCRAFT' and 'PRIMARY LITHIUM BATTERIES -- FORBIDDEN FOR TRANSPORT ABOARD PASSENGER AIRCRAFT.'After finding no reference in our materials (FOM; PHB; etc); I called the Duty Officer (DO) to see if he could clarify the situation. As far as I could tell; we needed to either have the Li declared on the DG Manifest or unloaded. Unfortunately; the DO was unable to make a determination because the DG Job Aid and FOM didn't have any further clarification and there was no one in the DG department at work at that time of the day.After more querying; more research; and more phone calls; finally the ramp DG Manager came out with copies of their manual to clarify the situation. Basically; the photocopies and clarification she gave said that we have known shippers that ship DG under the known shipper program in approved containers which are inspected at the origin ramp that do not have to be declared on the DG manifest (because they aren't 'PUP'd into the system!)Her explanation was sufficient to convince me (us) that the shipment of undeclared Li Metal was legal; but that certainly didn't make it safe; hence this report! I really appreciate the fact that the original DG agent made the FO aware of the non-manifested Li batteries; and I really appreciate the manager coming out to explain the situation; but it is unsatisfactory from a safety perspective. I definitely don't want the DG agent to be in trouble for letting us know; because we need to know. In fact; I wish MORE agents would make us aware of the situation. This system however is BROKEN and UNSAFE. Ultimately we took a 35 minute delay for clarification of the situation; which could have been avoided by having a better notification system and declaring them on the DG form!WOW. It's shocking that we can carry DG that the flight crew doesn't know about; and further more CFR wouldn't know about in the event of an emergency! If there's a fire on board; it is imperative to know where all the DGs are loaded and what types! If I'm halfway across the ocean and my closest airport is 1000 miles away; type of DG and location goes into my decision making process of ditching the aircraft!I'm sure this has been going on for a long time; and I'm sure it's convenient for the company and for the shippers; but it is definitely NOT in the interest of safety when it comes to the flight crew and potentially CFR in the event of an emergency! It begs the question to wonder how long it has been going on and how much/how often this happens. As flight crew this is very; very scary; and the lack of known information certainly does not contribute to good CRM/decision making in the event of an emergency!Unsafe [company] policy it to blame to this unsafe situation! I'm not sure who benefits from this the most - [company] because of less paperwork of the shipper because of less paperwork (or is it less shipping cost?); but all I know is the flight crew (and possibly CFR) is at risk because of DG being carried aboard in positions we are unaware of! Information is knowledge and in this case lack of knowledge can lead to bad decision making.CHANGE THE POLICY! Obviously this falls under IATA; but I'm sure [company] can be more restrictive; like we seem to do with a lot of FOM policies! Whether a shipper is using UN 3090 II exemption or not; the DG ought to be listed somewhere and the flight crew needs to know where and in what quantities! And in particular for Lithium Batteries!!! This particular exemption can't even be carried on passenger airplanes and yet we as flight crew don't need to know about it?!?!?! We carry a lot of DG and it makes a lot of money for [company]; and that's great. But it needs to be carried SAFELY and the crew needs to know where and in what quantities.

Captain reported that Lithium Metal batteries can be carried onboard the aircraft under IATA shipper exemption UN 3090 Section II but not declared on the Dangerous Goods paperwork. The reporter recommended a change in policy.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 5640; Flight Crew Type 170

Events and Conditions: The day was nice (VMC) little to no turbulence enroute and upon approach and landing there was no turbulence or gusts. The approach to landing was smooth and precise; on localizer and glide slope all the way to touchdown even though we were on a visual approach. Upon landing; after the main wheels touchdown and power levers going to ground idle; the elevators then uncoupled and we proceeded with the after landing rollout with the nose wheel coming into contact with the ground softly. We then taxied to the gate without declaring an emergency since we were on the ground when it happened. We then notified Dispatch and Maintenance of our problem. We remained with the aircraft until it was fixed. The Maintenance Inspector came with a special tool and his publications needed for him to reengage the elevator. Maintenance informed us that no post maintenance flight check was needed after the re-engagement of the elevator and their running a maintenance checklist. Maintenance then signed the maintenance flight log off as airworthy and we returned to service.

An ATR-72's elevators uncoupled during the landing flare with no aircraft damage; so Maintenance re-engaged the elevators and returned the aircraft to service.