ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was working on the D-Side during this event. A C560 was a Citation departing Aurora State to the southeast; requesting FL270. Procedures with P80 are for them to assign aircraft 15;000 FT; the top of their airspace; and hand them off to the appropriate ZSE Sector. Terrain around the P80 area rises quickly; with a number of mountains to the southeast; east and northeast. In the case of the C560; the filed flight plan took him through quickly rising MIAs of 060; 070; and 080; between Mt. Hood and Mt. Jefferson. The aircraft was on a heading of 090; which was not in compliance with the LOA and was not coordinated; but this was not a contributing factor to the safety issue. Conditions were IMC. The aircraft checked in with ZSE Sector 5 level at 060. The R-Side noticed the wrong altitude immediately and asked the C560 to verify that they were climbing to 150. The C560 responded that he was level at 060. The R-Side called P80 Hood to get control and climbed him to 150; asking for a good rate of climb. Mode C did not indicate above 070 before the C560 crossed into the 070 MIA area; although it did indicate 069 just outside of it. P80 Hood was likely busy with weather issues affecting aircraft arriving from the south on the MOXEE arrival. However; had the R-Side not noticed and taken immediate action; the C560 could have done much more than clip the edge of a lower MIA and possibly impacted terrain. As there was more than one error made by P80 Hood in handling the C560; there may have been additional factors at hand other than the increased weather-related workload. Finally; we noticed that MSAW did not activate at any time during the event. This seems to be an error; as the C560 was in level flight for at least three hits; probably more. It's difficult to say what the working environment was like at P80 during the event. The controllers there are usually good about departure procedures and checking altitude; I've only seen them fail to climb aircraft to the appropriate altitude two other times. In both of those cases; it didn't create a dangerous situation like this one. I would encourage a review from P80's perspective; if possible; to see if it was an isolated mistake rather than being indicative of a larger problem. I do not know if there is an additional problem with MSAW; but it seems that it should have been activated in this instance.

ZSE Controller described a near terrain clearance infraction with a departure being handed off from P80; the reporter questioned the absence of a MSAW alarm and the handling by P80.


Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting; Workload

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action

F/CTRL - AIL SERVO FAULT ECAM displayed after experiencing very slight aircraft roll left; (similar to minor wake turbulence). F/CTL Systems page displayed 'R AIL' computer failure symbol (partial box). However both 'G' and 'B' actuator symbols were displayed green when last observed.  Non-normal methodology; QRH procedures; and the Non Normal ECAM Supplemental reference were followed and referenced. Flight Dispatch and Maintenance were advised. The flight proceeded to destination and landed uneventfully. Conditions: Auto Pilot #2 engaged; cruise climb passing through FL310; approximately 265k/.77M; smooth flight conditions.

An A320 ECAM alerted F/CTRL - AIL SERVO FAULT; so the crew completed the ECAM; the QRH. Then they notified Dispatch and Maintenance as they proceeded to their destination.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

In cruise flight at FL350; we heard a loud thump/bang from the rear of the cabin. At this point we had a rapid decompression (2000 fpm plus). Proper checklists were followed to include an emergency descent. Passenger masks were manually deployed. Diverted to ZZZZ and had an overweight landing of 23;700 lbs. No damage was noted to exterior of aircraft upon landing.

At FL350 we heard a loud thump from rear of cabin. Noticed cabin climbing at 2;000 fpm. Complied with memory actions: Donned oxygen masks and selected oxy mic. Notified ATC of pressurization issue and that we were commencing an emergency descent. Declared an emergency. Manually deployed cabin oxygen masks. Ran the emergency checklist. Diverted to ZZZZ. Landed overweight.

HS125 flight crew experiences a loud thump from the rear of the cabin and a sudden loss of cabin pressurization. An emergency descent is initiated and the flight diverts to a suitable airport.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

While heading into BTV we were on vectors to RNAV GPS Z Rwy 33. We were at 5500 feet and on a heading to intercept the final course inbound. While on this heading we were cleared for the approach. We intercepted the inbound course and proceeded with the approach. What I failed to realize is that we were outside NIDUQ. The minimum crossing at NIDUQ is 5400 feet. We were lower than the required 5400 ft and just about to level at HONIB when approach stated that we descended below the required crossing restriction of 5400 feet at NIDUQ. At this point; we had the airport in sight and told approach that we had the airport in sight. He cleared us for the visual and we continued and landed safely without issue.This was the third night. I was tired as I didn't sleep well the night before and I didn't get enough sleep during the day. I definitely tried to sleep during the day; but only slept about 3 hrs. Once on the ground and parked at the gate. I dug into how I missed the fix. I reloaded the approach with vectors and realized that it doesn't load any fixes past HONIB. I have learned my lesson and will always select an IAF instead of vectors. I was also complacent in thinking that it was going to be a visual approach with the RNAV as a backup.

CRJ-200 First Officer reported descending below charted altitude on approach to BTV citing fatigue as a contributing factor.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 7800; Flight Crew Type 2500

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Cruising at 37;000 FT experienced severe to extreme clear air turbulence. We had 1;000 FT altitude loss; speed increased 30 KTS and aircraft banked 30-60 [degrees] to the left. Aircraft then gained 1;500 FT; airspeed decreased to 60-80 KTS with a violent roll to the right. Regained control of the aircraft and reestablished airspeed and altitude. ATC was notified. Once the aircraft was stable I went to the back to checkout the airplane and to re-stow all of the items that were thrown about the cabin.

Hawker 800XP pilot reported encountering extreme clear air turbulence at FL370 that resulted in temporary loss of control of the aircraft.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Attendant Airline Total 13; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 4; Flight Attendant Total 16; Flight Attendant Type 20

Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

As we had slowly started our descent we lost cabin pressure. Everyone was experiencing ear pain. I heard 4 chimes from cockpit. I picked up interphone and got Emergency info from Captain. The oxygen masks deployed however seat 32A/B did not open. I stuck a pin in the hole then a pen then I tried to pry it open with no luck. I smacked it and still did not come down so I had to have the passengers share additional oxygen masks from seat in front. We landed safely and I reported to the Captain of seat 32 A/B. After some sit time we then worked the flight back.

After an MD-80 pressurization failed and the passengers' oxygen masks deployed; a Flight Attendant was unable to lower a single row of passenger oxygen masks which had failed to activate.


Deplaning; Service; Safety Related Duties

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy

A five year old UM (Unaccompanied Minor) was roller skating during service. I discovered her in her skating gear and roller skates as I was completing my service at row 19. There was very mild turbulence. Passengers in rows 20-21 reported that she had fallen several times during flight and they had assisted her to the lavatory while in skates. Unbeknown to either of us flight crew; she had the roller skates in her backpack rather than a carry on. She took her seat as I pulled the cart back to the galley; and my other Flight Attendant kindly convinced her to return to her normal footwear. She assisted her with the removal of the roller skates. The passengers that assisted the UM during service were given complimentary beverages as a gesture of gratitude. There were many concerns as to why she was flying alone. It was very difficult getting her to understand the safety briefing; why she had to remain seated; and keeping her from getting off the plane without a gate agent. She was weighed down with a backpack including the roller skates; as well as a carry on. She tripped multiple times over her luggage on the ramp. She refused to allow anyone to touch her bags. She claimed that I pushed her as she fell over her roller bag in front of myself and the other Flight Attendant. A gate agent in Seattle guided her into the terminal. The UM clearly did not comprehend the safety concerns and ramifications of her actions. I recommend implementation of a safety comprehension assessment of UMs before ticketing for both guardians and UMs.

Flight Attendant reported an Unaccompanied Minor failed to understand and refused to comply with safety instructions; resulting in disruption of service.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

In-flight; Pre-flight; Routine Inspection

Procedure; Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Staffing; Human Factors

When I got to work at XA:50 local; I started checking my workload and the number of flights I was going to receive from the dispatchers I was relieving. I counted 25 flights in the air; that I was supposed to inherit; at least 17 of them were medium to long hauls; departing between XG:00z and arriving before XJ:30z. When I determined the workload I immediately sent the help message; around XB:00 local; and went to talk to the Chief Dispatcher and the Duty Director; and we discussed possible mitigation to the problem; because I was refusing to take the desk in those conditions. First; it was said that a unit coordinator position was going to be closed to alleviate the workload; but that never happened. Then a sector manager came down to my colleague; Dispatcher Y; and asked him if he could take some of my flights; when Dispatcher Y had 20 flights in the air. He declined; since his plate was full already. To me that is lack of situational awareness; as the sector manager are the ones in charge of the flight distribution. Then he continued asking around and a couple of my colleagues picked 2 flights each; so my workload went down to 19; since 2 of those were about to get to the gate; which is still over the company policy; but it was acceptable since there were no complications on the desk. Increase mid night desks and improve the flights distribution.

Dispatcher reported having to work too many flights during shift.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

BAF Tower requested release for Aircraft X off Runway 20; my trainee issued a heading 240 degrees and released off runway 20. The pilots called airborne and were issued a climb to 10;000 feet prior to radar identification by the trainee. I observed the primary targets off the wrong direction; apparently departing Opposite Direction Operation (ODO) Runway 2. I overrode my trainee and issued a traffic alert to Aircraft X reference Aircraft Y who was VFR East of the field on vectors to CEF. Aircraft X reported the traffic in sight and that he was clear of them. I verified the number in flight as I was not near the flight progress strip and seeing the second aircraft in flight I issued a traffic alert to [the other aircraft in the flight] as well. The Aircraft X flight continued on without issue.

A TRACON Controller reported that aircraft were supposed to depart in one direction; but ended up departing in the opposite direction.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

During preflight; I found an unusual wear pattern on the #3 main tire (RH inboard). I took a photograph of the wear; showed it to the CA; and we agreed that it would be prudent to call maintenance. Both the mechanic who answered the radio when I called it in as well as the mechanic who came out to inspect it both said it was a 'common problem' and 'known issue' with the MAX; specifically the #3 tire; and the mechanic who came to the airplane added that in his opinion it's really a landing gear design issue. Maintenance ultimately ended up issuing a deferral item for the tire; deferring replacement until later (but still flagging it for replacement).Guidance in the AOM on tire wear is unclear whether the plies are body plies or tread reinforcement plies. If they are body plies; maintenance managed to convince us to depart with an aircraft that; per the AOM guidance; had an unserviceable tire.Example photos or a more detailed diagram might provide more clarity. And while tires are expensive and the Max has indeed had a number of high-profile 'issues'; if a tire is unserviceable per our own guidance; it should be replaced; whether this is a 'known issue' or not.

B737 MAX 8 First Officer reported finding unusual wear on a main tire which maintenance deferred for a later replacement.  First Officer was informed that it was a known problem.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airspace Structure; Weather; Procedure; Human Factors

I was working arrivals doing ILS approaches. Aircraft X checked in on the downwind and declared minimum fuel. I verified the fuel status and advised the pilot to which runway to expect. I continued working through my other aircraft with an awareness that I needed to get Aircraft X in as soon as feasible. It was low IFR and with the parallel runway configuration aircraft were doing at least 20 mile finals. At the opportune time; I based Aircraft X at 9;000 ft. The aircraft took the turn and I then issued the full ILS clearance to the aircraft. The pilot read back the turn and clearance but not the altitude.As the aircraft approached the localizer; I observed Aircraft X at 8;000 ft. The next hit was below 8;000 ft and now below the MVA. I asked the pilot his altitude to which he did not respond and I tried to climb him but my transmissions were blocked no less than 3 times. The aircraft was now at 7;200 ft. The Low Altitude alert never went off; but I issued a low altitude alert to the pilot and climbed him to 9;000 ft. He read back the clearance but was very slow to climb the aircraft. However the aircraft did accelerate. Due to the fuel situation that the pilot advised me of; I chose not to break the aircraft off the approach but rather to ask if he was able to continue the approach. He replied in the affirmative. I reissued the clearance and reduced his speed. He was now overtaking the traffic in front of him; but I didn't have time to keep him on my frequency due to the altitude of the aircraft next to him. The aircraft climbed while on the localizer until reaching the step down altitude of 9;000 ft and then descended on the approach and landed without further incident.This may have been a pilot error due to the added stress of performing a minimum fuel landing in IFR conditions. I am glad I was able to be of assistance to the pilots.

D01 TRACON Controller reported an aircraft descended below the assigned altitude and below the MVA.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 29; Flight Crew Total 26000; Flight Crew Type 290

Low sun made judging distance from other aircraft difficult when the target was fist pointed out by tower. This should not have been an issue since we were number 1 for landing and the other aircraft was told to follow us.My son and I experienced a near miss in ZZZ airspace. I am asking [the Flight Standards District Office] to look into the incident because; I believe it was due to reckless careless operation regarding Aircraft Y.My son and I were flying Aircraft X. We were returning from a training flight; I; the CFI; and my son the recipient of the training. The days flying began at ZZZ. Our destination was ZZZ1 where we were going to take on fuel; go to lunch and return to ZZZ. My son has a private with approximately 300 flight hours. I was the PIC. I am an ATP and hold multiple other certificates. My CFI is current and I am a retired airline captain. Point is; this is not my first rodeo.We were returning from ZZZ1. Our course line was a direct course from ZZZ1 to ZZZ and we had begun our descent to avoid entering [nearby] Class B airspace. We were VFR. Weather was not an issue as it was CAVU.  My son and I were discussing what entry we could expect. From the ATIS we knew the winds favored RW XX and the ATIS said RW XX was in use. We called ZZZ tower approx. 8 miles north and 3;000 feet. We were cleared in ZZZ airspace and told to expect RW XX. We continued our descent. At the point of first contact with ZZZ tower we were at approximately 3;000 feet. A few seconds after our call to tower Aircraft Y called ZZZ tower. ZZZ Tower told him of our position. ZZZ tower also told us of Aircraft Y's position. We were approximately 3 miles apart and he was at our 2 to 4 O clock.Aircraft Y said he had us in sight and we had him in view also. We also saw his target on our moving map with ADS-B. Tower told us we were Number 1 and told Aircraft Y to follow us and told Aircraft Y he was Number 2. We made a slight left turn to a modified downwind/base. Our focus was on the runway and the approach to landing. I was watching my son closely; his speed and altitude as he needed to slow to configure gear and flaps for landing. I noticed on the moving map that the ADS-B target showed Aircraft Y very close. He was instructed to follow us and last seen he was not a concern. A few seconds later I noticed the ADS-B target was 200 feet right below us. Down and out of the corner of the wing and cowl I saw Aircraft Y below in extremely close proximity. (He looked to be less than 200 feet) I told my son to stop his descent. At that time he also saw the other aircraft directly below us. I said something on the VHF freq regarding the other aircraft's proximity. He was within 200 feet on the ADS-B. I was very upset and had no idea why the pilot of Aircraft Y had gotten so close as I consider this actions a near miss.

Pilot reported a near midair collision on final approach with an aircraft that had been sequenced as Number 2 for landing behind the reporting aircraft.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Uneventful flight to SEA until 250 NM south SEA. SEA weather became a factor with vectors for delays anticipated. No flow times or expected delay time issued. Before getting slowed down and delay vectors; fuel at SEA predicted to be 6.5. SEA weather 220/18G23 10nm -R 1800 BKN 2200 OVC 29.90. PF programmed and briefed 30 Flap landing with 150 Vref. +5 set for additive.Extensive slow down and delay vectors resulted in arrival fuel [calculated 100 NM south of SEA] with 5.5 arrival fuel. Descent via HAWKZ4 landing 16R. Descent via normal HAWKZ profile/speeds. At FL200 updated ATIS to 'M'. SEA weather 300/0 10nm -R 800 OVC 29.94. I commented that frontal passage had occurred and that the winds had shifted. Both pilots set the CAT 1 minimums of 615 feet.Extended downwind vectoring to approximately 28 NM. Turned final and issued approach clearance. Switched [to] Tower and reported 2.5 outside FINKA. Issued landing clearance with winds 300/3. No other PIREPS or braking action reports were given. At 1;800 feet MSL wind observed at 330/15; at 1;000 feet winds 330/22. Airspeed 160 KIAS and going high on glide slope. Rate of descent increased to 1;100 FPM and airspeed 165 KIAS with sink rate warning and 2 dots high on glide path. Continued approach.Began flare at 40 feet AGL aircraft floated and touched down at approximately mid field at 150 KIAS. Speed Brakes deployed and MAX braking and reverse applied. Good deceleration until reaching the last 1;500 feet of runway at approximately 80 KIAS. Continued max stopping effort with intermittent brake releases by anti-skid system. Achieved taxi speed in last 200-400 feet of runway remaining. Landing fuel 5.2 on gauge. Gave PIREP to Tower Controller. Tower initiated runway change.The combination of rapidly changing weather conditions and low fuel state resulted in pressure to get the airplane on the ground despite unstable approach parameters. Pilot monitoring should have directed a go-around when excessive rate of descent became necessary to salvage the approach. A go around with the anticipated runway change would have probably resulted in a minimum or emergency fuel situation. After our PIREP to Tower; airport flow shifted to north flow.

B737-900 FO reported landing long following an unstabilized approach with minimum fuel to a tailwind environment at SEA.


Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Procedure

Current position was approximately 15 NM northwest of CHA; weather conditions were VMC. After a handoff from ATL Center (133.6) to a different frequency (121.7) than the expected TYS Approach Control frequency; 123.9 stored in the Com 1 selector; we were issued a descent to 5;000 FT and a heading of 180 degrees. After a brief period on this heading I questioned our current vector toward higher terrain to the south; but we heard a blend of static along what sounded like Ground Control instructions at another airport. I was questioning if we were still on the correct frequency and we switched from the Company frequency on Com 2 and continued to monitor; while I switched back to ATL on 133.6 to advise that we needed a different vector but was told to return to approach on 121.7. After another attempt to call the Approach Controller we were informed that she had been trying to talk to us on 121.7 and Guard frequency. We were issued an immediate climb to 7;000 and a right turn back to 270 degree heading. This transmission was readable; but weak with static and intermittent bleed over from another frequency. After a subsequent approach clearance a normal approach and landing terminated the flight. We were in compliance with all clearances that were audible to us. The TYS Tower Supervisor informed me during our telephone conversation that there were problems with existing frequencies and that our flight traversed an area that was below his designated MVA. During the subsequent departure back to ZZZ 40 minutes later; the TYS Tower was advising pilots that they were experiencing problems with several frequencies. Unable to hear Approach instructions clearly at all times due to static and bleed over. Using an Approach frequency not in the airport chart and hearing Ground Control instructions and static on the frequency issued (121.7) was confusing. Refrain from using a regional Ground frequency to replace Approach Control.

An Air Carrier pilot reported TYS Approach Control Frequency 121.7 15 NM northwest of CHA has interference from a Ground Control frequency which caused him to miss an Approach Control vector away from high terrain.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 96; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 6800

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

After takeoff from Runway 17R; during climb and making a left turn assigned by Tower I felt a difference in directional control (yawing) to the left. After checking my gages and parameters I saw a solid oil pressure red light for the left engine; I recovered directional control; secured the engine; reported the problem to the Tower; received vectors for and landed on Runway 26 without incident.

When an SA226 lost oil pressure in the left engine the pilot secured it and returned safely to his departure airport.


The published LOC frequency for ILS 26L for LAS is incorrect. The plate says 111.50 but the actual frequency is 111.75. I received the correct morse for 111.75 and we flew a visual approach.

B737 First Officer reported the charted 111.50 ILS frequency for LAS Runway 26L is an error and should read 111.75.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Weather; Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure

During a busy arrival bank to RWY 35; the 4 miles behind a B757 was lost. The weather was VFR and because of a strong quartering tailwind the compression rate was high.  As CIC I was helping the Approach Controller when able to provide visual between arrivals with a high compression rate that would not affect safe landing. In the case of these two aircraft; the pilot had changed to Tower frequency early but did not immediately check on. The Radar Controller attempted to break out the B737 because of the potential loss of 4 miles but received no response. It was about this time I over heard the Local Controller transmitting with the B737 about visual separation and the B757.  The fact was that the Controller had them both in sight but the B737 did not yet see the B757. A heading for pull out was issued and coordinated with satellite radar. The separation went as low as 3.6 before the B737 turned to avoid wake.It's hard to determine an exact recommendation since everyone involved tried hard to make this work. The mitigating factors of the non-responsive pilot due to radio change and the quartering tailwind had a lot to do with this ops error. In hindsight an immediate break out by Local may have saved this from being an ops error but is not guaranteed. Because of the high quartering tailwind is was common for overtakes to reflect 40-90 knot overtakes until at lower altitudes inside the marker. An unfortunate event where everyone was aware and did their best to have a solution that didn't get the results needed for written requirements.

Tower Controller-in-Charge reported a wake turbulence separation operational error; B737 following a B757; due to several contributing factors.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 6

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

I was working the Local 3 position as well as CIC (Controller in Charge). Aircraft X; on about a 1.5 mile final reported seeing a yellow drone east of the final at 900 ft. From there I began the process of reporting the unauthorized UAS Event first via a report. On my initial attempt to file the report; the page used to file the report was not working correctly. It only allowed me to select the type of report; but not the information regarding the event. I restarted the report and kept experiencing the same problem. At this point; I had 3 additional aircraft arriving. I issued each it's landing clearance as well as an advisory of the reported UAS. Those 3 arriving aircraft reported seeing no UAS in the vicinity of their respective final. I contacted the ROC (Command Center) regarding the reporting issue. With their help I was able to fill in information regarding the Unauthorized UAS Event. From there; I began to look for the checklist regarding Unauthorized UAS Events. I was unable to find the checklist at the CIC desk. I was able to find the UAS Binder; however I did not find the reporting checklist. I also checked the ACE-IDS under the checklist section and was not able to find the UAS checklist. I tried to recall from memory; my CIC training on what is supposed to be reported. Not being able to find the correct checklist led me to not report the event to the additional required parties. I now know that I still needed to report this event to the DEN [Domestic Event Network] and PCT; as well as broadcast the event on the IAD ATIS. In retrospect; I also think that I could have recalled another controller from the breakroom for assistance.I would suggest adding the UAS reporting Checklist to the Checklist Section of the ACE IDS. I would also add this checklist the UAS binder for quicker reference.

A Controller working Local Control Combined with Controller in Charge reported an aircraft reported sighting a drone in their airspace but was unable to find the appropriate checklists to report the incident according to the rules.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

I was working the VFR Aircraft X. He informed me that he wanted to take pictures flying north/south lines west of the field south of [Highway X.] [Highway X] is not depicted on our video maps; so I did a point out with NR because Aircraft X would be over the final at some point while flying around taking pictures. I verbally told NR that Aircraft X says that he will stay south of [Highway X]; but that the reason for the point out was because he will probably be over the final too. NR took the point out via automation. When Aircraft Y was descending for an approach I saw him 1 1/2 miles west of my traffic. I called the traffic to my VFR twin propeller and told him to continue northbound for traffic. My twin propeller was thru the final for Aircraft Y and he did have traffic in sight. I told Aircraft X to pass north of traffic and continue his own navigation. Recommendation; make sure that the other Controller issued the traffic if it looked questionable.

TRACON Controller described a NMAC declaration between an IFR arrival and a VFR aircraft on a photo mission. The reporter indicated ATC should have issued additional traffic information to the involved aircraft.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

C208 Caravan TKS equipped. While enroute IFR; encountered unforecast trace [of] ice. TKS switch was in high mode. Pilot observed TKS fluid only flowing from the first two feet of wing and last two feet; no fluid flow on majority of both wings; aircraft had no ice protection with this TKS system. Dusty air seems to clog the wings and render system not operational. Very dangerous; and unreliable. TKS System should be investigated.

A C208 pilot reported that following exposure to dusty conditions when the TKS System was activated during icing conditions in flight the fluid flow on both wings was uneven or absent providing no protection.


Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

I was working on the crew oxygen bottle servicing. My golf cart was parked just outside the forward cargo pit door facing aft and away from the plane. My cordless drill containment box was on top for my golf card. I came out of the forward cargo pit and was getting ready to head back to the shop for another crew oxygen bottle. I locked up my cordless box and removed it from the top of the golf cart. I tossed it on to the right seat; it hit the forward edge bounced off over my tool bag I had on the floor of the card and wedged itself between the electric gas pedal and the bag. Although the cart is equipped with a safety brake it is automatically released if you push the gas pedal. The cart lunged forward at full speed 8-14 feet and hit the lower outer surface of the Number 2 engine inlet. I was on the outside of the cart and could not hold it back. I pushed the golf cart back saw the damage and called my Lead and had him and my Supervisor come out with the camera. We took pictures took the aircraft to the hangar removed the inlet performed condition inspection as instructed by MPM and changed out the engine inlet of the Number 2 engine. The aircraft was flying the next morning. I am very sorry this happened!

A maintenance golf car struck a B737-800 engine inlet after the Mechanic dropped his cordless drill on the seat; it then bounced off only to be wedged on the gas pedal which started the engine and released the brake.


Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Upon departure while the gear was being raised; the nose gear made a loud noise and caused a vibration followed by a 'STEERING INOPERABLE' caution message.  After leaving 10;000 feet MSL we ran the 'Steering Inoperable' QRH checklist and the message cleared.  We continued on to destination airport.  We were cleared for the visual.  I called for gear down and Flaps 30.  Upon the gear reaching full extension; we received the 'STEERING INOPERABLE' caution message.  I had the First Officer run the 'Steering Inoperable' QRH checklist.  The result this time was that the message persisted.  We elected to go-around; and ask for a long downwind to deal with the issue.  We contacted the Company and had everyone included in the situation.  After talking with Dispatch and Maintenance; we talked with ATC and declared an emergency.  We requested [the long runway] and were cleared for the visual.  We then landed and were able to exit the runway.  We tried to reset the nose wheel steering on the ground with no positive results.  We then coordinated with Company and were towed in.  The passengers were included in everything that was taking place.  The Flight Attendant advised me that everyone was OK and happy to be kept abreast.  The only threat that may have existed would have been that we chose to run the 'Steering Inoperable' QRH checklist inside the marker.  We were attempting to solve the problem so we wouldn't have to go around.  We were unsuccessful so we went around.  In the future; I would go around before attempting to resolve the problem.  This would allow us to work on things at a more relaxed pace.

CRJ-200 Captain reports a loud noise and vibration from the nose gear as it is being raised after takeoff.  A 'STEERING INOPERABLE' caution is annunciated and is cleared using QRH procedures.  During approach at the destination airport; the caution reappears when the gear is extended and cannot be cleared.  A go-around is initiated followed by an uneventful landing with a tow to the gate.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Procedure; Software and Automation

We were cleared for the Visual Approach. The FO (First Officer) was PF (Pilot Flying) and briefed a visual backed up with the ILS. ATC brought us in on a 4 mile final from a left base which was inside the final approach fix on intercepting the final/Localizer we were slightly low but as it was a visual I told him he was a little low but I let him continue since we were stable and spooled up just below the Glideslope. At about 800 ft. the FO was still descending and we got a Glideslope aural Emergency Ground Proximity Warning (EGPWS) to which he stated correcting and he leveled off to get back on profile. We continued to a landing.I noticed he was low and called it out and then the EGPWS called it out as well. [The] cause was the First Officer misjudged his height and continued descending. I assumed he would correct expediently but he only shallowed his descent rate slightly. The Pilot Flying took corrective action. I'll be more assertive next time and suggest the FO go outside the final approach fix while doing the visual so he has time and isn't rushed.

An Air Carrier Captain reported ATC vectored them inside the Final Approach Fix and cleared them for a Visual Approach. The First Officer descended early below the glideslope and the aircraft received a Ground Proximity Warning but continued to a successful landing.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

After climbing through the flap retraction altitude we executed the After Takeoff Checklist. We were in icing conditions immediately after takeoff with the APU running the pack. This flight was operated with a deferred right pack. The bleed source was transferred from the APU to the engines causing the single pack to shut down due to an over pressure event. At this point we both realized we were no longer pressurizing the aircraft. I proceeded to transfer the radios to the Captain (pilot flying) and followed the QRH procedure for L PACK HIGH PRESSURE msg. The Captain simultaneously shallowed our climb to prevent a future high cabin altitude situation from arising. At some point on the departure ATC issued us a heading off the SID; I believe because we had shallowed our climb and were in danger of missing a crossing restriction on the RNAV SID. I cannot be certain because I was heads down in the QRH. At this time the Captain informed ATC of our issue and asked for a heading and an altitude to keep us below 10;000 FT MSL. We were assigned a heading; and an altitude of 7;000 FT. Shortly after these events I finished the QRH procedure and restored the pack to normal operation. The flight continued and we rejoined the RNAV SID and continued to our destination without further incident. The biggest threat was the distraction from the SID due to the concern for aircraft pressurization resulting in a shallower than normal ascent. The flight crew should have informed ATC of the pressurization issue earlier especially since we were on an RNAV SID with crossing restrictions. Another threat was the division of tasks during the execution of the abnormal procedures. The tasks were divided but we found that both pilots were watching over each other and trying to help when able which at times caused confusion or further distraction from the tasks at hand. Better discipline in division of duties as well as keeping ATC more involved in our status.

CRJ200 First Officer reports being dispatched with a single pack and using the APU as the bleed source for takeoff. When the bleed source is switched to the engines after flap retraction an over pressure occurs and the pack shuts down. QRH procedures are used to restore the pack and the flight continues to destination; although a crossing restriction may have been missed on the RNAV departure.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Rain had stopped about 30 minutes prior to the event. [Flight X] was instructed to taxi via Taxiway 'J' and hold short of Runway XX. The aircraft started rapidly increasing speed. Instead of staying directly on the taxiway lines to maneuver onto Taxiway 'J;' the aircraft cut zig-zag corners in what I thought would be an effort to join Taxiway 'J' southbound. The aircraft never made the right turn southbound on Taxiway 'J.' Instead it appeared to be heading directly for the Runway YY hold short line at Taxiway 'M.' I recognized the rapidly evolving situation and was only able to key the microphone and repeat '[Flight X] STOP. [Flight X] STOP. [Flight X] STOP.' The aircraft stopped; realized that they hadn't turned south on 'J' and proceeded without any further problems.

Ground Controller observing an Air Carrier taxiing at high speed and cutting taxiway corners; issued a 'stop' instruction when the aircraft missed a turn and was about to enter the active runway.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 8800

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 151.5; Flight Crew Total 4700; Flight Crew Type 171

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Left hydraulic quantity decreased to 0.17. Quantity stable with engine pump depressurized and electric pump off. QRH was complied with appropriate actions. [We] discussed situation with Dispatch and Maintenance Control. [We] continued to destination; briefed flight attendants and passengers. Declared an emergency and coordinated for emergency response and tow in tug. [We] landed uneventfully.

Approximately one hour after departure we received a L HYD QTY status message. We immediately pulled up the status page and saw the left hydraulic quantity was .17 with a RF indicator next to it. Center and right hydraulic quantities were normal. As we pulled out the QRH; a L HYD ENG PUMP status message illuminated. We then ran the L HYD ENG PUMP Checklist in the QRH which instructed us to turn off the left engine driven hydraulic pump. Soon after we got a L HYD SYS PRESS status message. We then ran the L HYD SYS PRESS Checklist in the QRH which instructed us to turn off both the left engine and electric driven hydraulic pumps. We reviewed the rest of the checklist and decided that this emergency did not require a diversion and elected to continue on to destination. The Captain then contacted Dispatch and Maintenance and advised them of the situation and they concurred that we did not need to divert. We also got a status message that the Power Transfer Unit had failed; so we would have to deploy flaps and gear with the alternate systems. Captain decided it would be best for him to do the landing since the alternate control switches were on my side of the aircraft and it would be easier for me to manipulate them; so we transferred control of the aircraft and I took over the monitoring pilot duties. We declared an emergency with Center and requested the fire trucks be present upon landing. Captain then briefed the flight attendants; and briefed the passengers. We also coordinated with Dispatch that we would need to be towed from the runway to the gate due to loss of nose wheel steering. Captain performed a flaps 20 landing as per the QRH and had an uneventful landing and exited the runway. The fire command reported a small amount of smoke from either the left engine or left strut after landing. We shut down the left engine on their request and they finally reported all was okay after about 15 minutes. All four left brake temperatures did read 5 after landing but did not increase further from that. Maintenance was given the okay and hooked up a tug and towed us to the gate.

B757 flight crew experiences a L HYD QTY status message in cruise followed shortly by a L HYD ENG PUMP status message. The left engine pump is turned off in compliance with L HYD ENG PUMP QRH procedure. Soon after a L HYD SYS PRESS status message appears and the left electric pump is turned off. The crew elects to continue to destination. Prior to landing the PTU fails requiring alternate gear extension and electric flap extension using the alternate switches.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 130

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency

I experienced a loss of power after completing a descent to altitude from my cruise phase.  Out of haste; I quickly declared an emergency because I was on an IFR flight plan and I wanted to go direct to destination in order to execute a power off landing.  I was; at the time; on a vector from the TRACON for the ILS.  After declaring an emergency I immediately established my best glide speed and turned direct.  After those two were established; I began trouble shooting the problem.  I soon realized that my mixture control was too lean; because I had been operating lean-of-peak at altitude; it caused the engine to lose power at a lower altitude when I applied a higher power setting after leveling out from the descent.  I richened the mixture; and power was re-established.  I told ATC that the airplane was working fine now to which they enquired if I wanted to complete the approach.  I told them no because I was VMC; and I was already off course.  I terminated my IFR flight plan; and the TRACON gave me a telephone number for me to call when I landed.  I landed; called the TRACON; talked to the Supervisor Controller and I thought that was the end of it.A couple of weeks later; I received a phone call from an Inspector from the FSDO who wanted to know what happened.  He requested a logbook entry from an A&P mechanic stating that the aircraft was inspected and found airworthy after having declared an emergency.  I told him that my uncle; whom is an A&P; had seen the aircraft after the incident but really had not inspected the aircraft.  I told him that it was an operator error; and that I didn't think the aircraft needed to be inspected.  He persisted and still wanted a logbook entry.  After consulting with my uncle; we thought that this was still the wrong approach.  I called back the Inspector and told him that we didn't think that submitting a made up maintenance log book entry was the appropriate response.  He balked; and I offered to submit him a letter saying it was operator error.  I also asked him if my pilot license was in jeopardy to which he replied no.  I did not believe him.  I wrote the letter and submitted it via email; and I am still scared that the FAA will take enforcement action against me because I declared an emergency; in hindsight; that was in haste.I think that this will affect air safety because now I am more reluctant to declare an emergency because I think that the FAA will bother me (they want it in writing; I don't know why a statement won't suffice); or possibly take enforcement action against me.  After the event; I thought the situation was closed when I talked to the TRACON but that was hardly the case.  The FAA Inspector that contacted me was persistent; and relentless in wanting to obtain some sort of documentation explaining the event.  I still believe enforcement action may occur.  Because of this fear; rational or irrational; I now feel a little bit more reluctant to declaring an emergency; when I would think a situation really warrants it.  This can be dangerous because the full range of options to the pilot in command should be available to meet the extent of the emergency without outside pressure.

BE35 pilot reports leveling off after a long descent to find the engine unresponsive. An emergency is declared before it is discovered that the mixture control had been left at a lean setting and power is quickly restored.  Queries from a FSDO Inspector have left the reporter fearful of repercussions.


During climb out the cabin crew called to let us know that the galley power was not working. Upon reviewing EICAS and the electrical system there were no unusual indications. However one CB labeled BAT BUS DISTR located on P6-1 panel bottom forward position closest to the First Officer's seat and kit bag was open. In order to determine what was controlled by the breaker we contacted Maintenance Control. They advised the CB controlled quite a number of items including ALT GEAR; RAT; GEN DISCONNECT; and more. Since the list contained several safeties of flight items we decided to attempt one reset of the CB. After resetting the breaker all systems returned to normal and we continued to monitor the situation. In addition we contacted Dispatch and informed them of our action and the flight continuing to our destination.It was quite possible that the CB may have accidentally been pulled or bumped by [the] First Officer seat belt.

[No additional information was included in the secondary narrative].

When a Flight Attendant advised they had no galley power on the B767-300ER the flight crew investigated and found the BAT BUS DISTR circuit breaker near the First Officer's seat and flight bag was open. When closed; after consultation with Maintenance; the problem was resolved and the flight continued to its destination.


Embraer Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 550

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

While on an approx. 10-15 visual final for RWY 18R at 5000' ATC vectored an Airbus inside of our course for the Visual 18R. Shortly thereafter the aircraft sharply rolled left (approx 60 deg bank) and pitched down. This action caused the autopilot to fail. At the time I was getting ready to disengage the autopilot and hand fly the remainder of the approach. My hands were very close to all of the controls in preparation to hand fly. Once the event occurred I added correctional aileron and pitched up adding thrust. After a second or so we returned to straight and level flight. The Captain advised ATC immediately of the event to which they seemed surprised and we continued the visual approach. Once on the ground the Captain advised the flight attendant and passengers of the cause of the turbulence on final as otherwise it was an extremely smooth night for flying.

EMB F/O reported encountering wake turbulence from a preceding Airbus on approach to CLT.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

I was working the Final Sector at P80 in the evening and anticipating a moderate arrival rush. A MD11 heavy was the first in a long line of arrivals to two parallel Runways 28R/L. The MD11 heavy check in descending to 070; I issued a further descent to 053 which happens to be the MVA. At about the same time I observed a VFR uncorrelated target at 072 along the flight path of the MD11 heavy. I issued the traffic to the heavy and he responded by stating they had him on their TCAS. The VFR aircraft that turned out to be a high wing Cessna began a rapid descent. I issued the VFR traffic again to the MD11 and issued a 20 degree turn to the right. The VFR aircraft then turned towards the heavy jet; now less than 3 miles away; who responded by saying he had them in sight. I then instructed the MD11 to maintain visual separation and if needed stop the descent. The MD11 leveled off and stated the Cessna had passed less than 100 FT from them. The pilot was not pleased and stated he thought the Cessna may have never seen them. On a previous transmission I explained I was not in control or in any direct communication with the VFR target. As a result of the level off and this VFR aircraft coming within less than 100 FT from the heavy jet; they were now too close and too high to continue the approach to the airport. Increasing my workload; breaking MD11 out and placing the aircraft over a densely populated area at a very low altitude; I had to climb the MD11 to 040 and re sequence him on the approach. At P80; we are constantly issuing traffic on all 3 STARS as well as the departure side; and being placed in these types of situations involving TCAS and evasive maneuvering. This type of operation is totally unacceptable and having these Air Carrier and heavy cargo types; which is the majority of the traffic in the Portland; OR area; in such close proximity to small airplanes that are not required to call us is a disaster waiting to happen. This type of situation has become common-place here at PDX/P80 and until someone at a higher level decides to push forward the real issue of Class B airspace; this will continue to happen. These small airplanes have no business flying in and around the finals at whatever altitude while talking to nobody. Outside the veil of our Class C airspace is a complex array of MVA's; noise abatement; and unique topography. This area of neglect has taken its toll and continuing to act in a negligent manner won't serve the flying public or the controllers well.

P80 Controller described a conflict event between an Air Carrier arrival into PDX and a VFR aircraft flying near the final; the reporter suggesting that a Class B be established for the PDX area.


Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Party1 Dispatch; Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Approximately 45 minutes after departing ZZZ we were in level flight at our cruise altitude of FL300; autopilot and A/T on; at a steady speed of .77/300 KIAS (right in the middle of the flight envelope). I was Pilot Monitoring and the First Officer was Pilot Flying. It was a beautiful morning with clear skies and no turbulence. Suddenly we had an ECAM message 'OVER SPEED' accompanied by flashing master warning lights and a continuous repetitive chime. We accomplished the FIX strategy; with the First Officer maintaining aircraft control. We initially crosschecked our airspeed indications; but all 3 were in agreement with no abnormalities. I verified that the flap handle was up and the aircraft indicated a clean configuration. The only ECAM procedure indicated was 'VFE....235'; which was obviously impossible at our altitude. We discussed the situation and decided to execute the Unreliable Speed Indication/ADR Check procedure in the QRH. The Pilot Flying disconnected autopilot; A/T and flight directors and we double-checked pitch and power; which were appropriate for our flight regime. We did not turn off any ADRs because all flight instruments appeared normal and I did not want to 'compound' the emergency by taking the aircraft out of normal law at that time. At no time were we within 15-20 knots of Vmax.We were able to silence the repetitive chime by pushing the EMER CANC button but the ECAM message and flashing master warning light remained. I instructed the Pilot Flying to declare an emergency and turn toward ZZZ2; the closest suitable airport. In coordination with ATC; he began a descent and slowed to 280 KIAS; then 250 KAIS at 10;000 feet. I notified Dispatch; the flight attendants and the passengers; then discussed an overweight landing with the First Officer. After slowing down; the OVER SPEED warning would intermittently extinguish for a few seconds and then return (again with flashing master warning lights and continuous repetitive chime). After evaluating all relevant circumstances I determined that it was safer to land overweight than to continue flight until at or below maximum certificated landing weight. Because the OVER SPEED warning was not associated with an actual over speed condition I was concerned about possible alternative causes (e.g. an ADR problem or other unknown malfunction) that could affect aircraft controllability. The First Officer flew a textbook ILS approach to Runway XXC and executed a flawless overweight landing (185;000 lbs.); touching down at less than 200 fpm rate of descent and delaying brake application (with the brake fans on the brake temperatures never rose above 150 [degrees] Celsius after landing). We taxied to the gate; shut down the aircraft and deplaned the passengers. Aircraft mechanics arrived and conducted over speed and overweight landing inspections; finding no damage. [Maintenance Control] decided that since no actual over speed had occurred; all that was required was to reset the warning system by lowering and retracting the flaps (which the mechanics did) and the aircraft would be returned to service. I discussed the matter with the [Maintenance Control] representative and expressed my concern that this would not identify or address the actual cause of the problem. [Maintenance Control] stated that the only way to troubleshoot the aircraft would be to download and analyze the FDR data; but that the required personnel and equipment were not available at ZZZ2. They offered to reset the ADRs and Flight Warning Computers instead. At this point I told [Maintenance Control] that I would not fly the aircraft again unless further investigation was done; and made an entry in the aircraft logbook to that effect. The First Officer and I subsequently requested to be removed from flight duty for the remained of the day.

Captain reported ECAM Message OVER SPEED with all three airspeed indication reading no over speed; diverted for a precautionary landing at an airport without the technicians or equipment available to return aircraft to service; so flight crew refused the aircraft.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

While in cruise at 35;000 feet and in excess of 90 knots of wind from the tail; the flight had been in constant light and occasionally moderate chop. I requested 37;000 feet after confirming performance capability; and hearing ATC advice that higher altitudes were better than lower and the closer we got to 40;000 feet the better the ride. We were told 'Aircraft X; I have your request' and we were handed off to three subsequent controllers each assuring us that the next would assign our climb. Both PM (Pilot Monitoring) and PF (Pilot Flying) recognized the flight path was taking us directly into a cloud bank; and the turbulence levels were becoming more of a solid moderate chop. As a result; PM (the Captain) advised the Cabin Crew to secure themselves and instructed the passengers to take their seats and securely fasten their seat belts. This event took place less than 10 minutes from entry into extreme turbulence.On the last handover; we had a converging aircraft 1;000 feet above us and traveling in the opposite direction. When ATC called the traffic for each of us; we were just entering the cloud bank into IMC conditions. Almost immediately; we encountered an increase in turbulence to solid moderate (changes in aircraft attitude and altitude occurred; but the aircraft remained in positive control). However; within seconds; we encountered severe turbulence including large abrupt changes in altitude; attitude; airspeed; as well as wind shear and updrafts. The result was initially a traffic alert. Within a few more seconds; we were in extreme turbulence and the aircraft was being tossed about violently; control was practically impossible; and the aircraft was being pushed upwards.The PM called the increase in speed and retarded the thrust levers as the aircraft was being shaken so violently that it took both hands of the PF to maintain positive control. Then a TCAS RA alerted us with a 'LEVEL OFF' command with the converging traffic icon in the PFD illuminated yellow. Almost immediately after; the icon turned red and PF pressed the FORCE TRIM INTERRUPT" button and shoved the yoke forward into the RA box to comply with the given guidance. The turbulence continued so violently that the autopilot was fully kicked offline; and the aircraft remained in a diving attitude per the TCAS guidance.During this period; and as a result of the wind shear and turbulence; the aircraft's speed fluctuated between a momentary illumination of the green PLI (Pitch Limit Indicator) and the triggering speed for a stick shaker activation. PM continued to apply speed brake and retard thrust levers to maintain the aircraft speed within limit (at no time did we encounter either a yellow or red PLI; or the stick shaker). At 30;500 feet we came out of the most violent turbulence and were able to reestablish a climb back to assigned altitude. Immediately after; the Captain contacted the cabin crew for an evaluation on any injuries or known damage. Beyond all the drinks and unsecured items being thrown around; none were reported; so we continued to the assigned destination. After landing; the post flight walk around revealed what appeared to be abnormal alignment or misalignment on the right outboard aileron."

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

EMB-175 flight crew reported possible damage to aircraft flight controls after an encounter with extreme turbulence in cruise flight at 35;000 feet.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 25L

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We understood we were cleared to descend via the RIIVR [STAR] and also cleared for the Runway 24R ILS approach. Therefore; we complied.  After RIIVR; between 11;000 and 10;000; we were told to level at 10;000 and turn left to intercept the 25L ILS approach; which is what the Controller said we had been originally cleared for.  We complied. If memory serves me; this problem has occurred for quite some time. Often; Controllers speak very rapidly while issuing clearances; which also include requests to make speed and altitude changes different from the SID or STAR. These requests while easy to make; often require immediate computer; aircraft configuration; and control changes in order to comply. They are usually followed by frequency changes; aircraft noise; radio congestion; and other distractions. I respectfully suggest that maybe since this event has occurred before; a simple fix we might consider would be for example; to confirm the name of the first fix for the runway extension as a backup.Sometimes it can be easy to misunderstand a directive because of many factors; from rapid speaking on the part of the Controllers; flight deck noise; radio congestion; etc. Since my First Officer and I both were convinced we  heard 24R; as evidenced by the FMC being loaded accordingly and the fact that we turned after RIIVR toward the first 24R fix; maybe it would be best; since this has happened before to others as well; to have the Controllers and Pilots confirm the very first fix initiating the runway extension as a backup.

The Captain was the Pilot Flying. He briefed the RIIVR Arrival and ILS 24R approach and transition. He also briefed the possibility of receiving clearance for the ILS 25L approach from ATC. The LOC frequency for 25L was present on standby on the Captain's side. We received a clearance to slow to 270 knots during our initial descent and then a clearance to cross GRAMM at FL190 and increase the speed to 280 knots. Before reaching GRAMM; ATC switched us to SoCal Approach. SoCal cleared us to descend via the RIIVR 2 Arrival and cleared us for the ILS approach to a specific runway at the same time. The Captain verbally verified the last crossing restriction on the briefed approach of 2200 feet at JETSA and set 2200 feet in the MCP while in VNAV/LNAV. I agreed and repeated 2200 feet. At some point before RIIVR; SoCal slowed us to 250 knots. After crossing RIIVR and passing approximately 11;000 feet; SoCal told us to maintain 10;000 feet and cancelled the approach clearance. SoCal advised us we were joining the 24R LOC when we were cleared for the ILS 25L. SoCal gave us a heading to join the 25L LOC and cleared us for the ILS 25L.After completing the Parking Checklist at the gate; we debriefed the event. The Captain and I agreed that in our minds we both thought we were cleared for the ILS 24R at the time the clearance was received. However; neither one of us could rule out the fact nor the possibility that we may have been cleared for; and read back; the ILS 25L. If that is the case; neither one of us caught the discrepancy between the issued clearance and the approach programmed in the FMC.Although we may have been in the Yellow due to some task loading caused by receiving several altitude/speed changes from ATC in a short period of time; we did not return to the Green in that instance due to a failure on our part to verbalize/verify/monitor. I know this type of deviation is not infrequent at LAX. Would it be possible to have ATC ask Crews to verify and verbalize the first waypoint on the approach when clearance is received? This would force the Flight Crews to look at the LEGS page and verify that they are on the right transition. In other words; a similar concept to verifying and verbalizing the first waypoint on a RNAV departure by ATC and the Flight Crew when a takeoff clearance is issued.

B737-700 Flight Crew reports being cleared for the ILS 24R off the RIIVR 2 to LAX. Before intercepting the LOC for 24R; ATC cancels the clearance and tells the crew to turn left and intercept the LOC for the ILS 25L; and that the original clearance had been to 25L.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 535; Flight Crew Type 375

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

While doing touch and go's with my student on XXR; we were told to follow an aircraft ahead of us in the pattern. Upon reaching downwind to base; we turned to follow another aircraft that was actually ahead of the aircraft we were instructed to follow. This resulted in a traffic conflict between us and the aircraft we were supposed to follow. The aircraft we were flying was not equipped with any traffic avoidance equipment or ADS-B. This does not negate my responsibility as an instructor to maintain situational awareness at all times. I debriefed this with my student and have continued to share lessons learned with my other students since this event. When in doubt about traffic to follow; always ask for sequence.

C172 Flight Instructor reported following wrong aircraft in pattern resulting in NMAC.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 15.33

Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

I plugged in on Sector X after getting my weather briefing. The R side started the briefing as I was getting familiar with the position. Since traffic has dropped and picked back up from COVID my area often works in unusual configurations to manage traffic. I plugged into Sector X and noticed that I was going to working low altitude Y and two high altitude sectors X and Z. This meant I was going to be working the ground to FL370. I was listening to the briefing and scanning the board when I saw two aircraft flashing. The Controller had issued descend via the ZZZZZ3 to Aircraft Y at FL320 with clearance to 16;000 in our airspace and descend via the ZZZZZ1 to Aircraft X at FL340 converging together east of ZZZ3 VOR. I had not even gotten to the point of scanning the data blocks yet in the briefing because I would have mentioned this as appearing to be unsafe. Aircraft X started down as the two aircraft were converging (which started the flashing) and the R-side told Aircraft X to maintain FL330 when they were out of FL334. I worried that the aircraft wouldn't be able to stop their descent in time; but the pilot read back something like; 'Okay stopping at FL330.' The pilot didn't say they couldn't stop the descent and the Controller assumed that the pilot didn't need a traffic call because they would be able to level off in time. The R-side giving me the briefing said I thought these two procedures were separated. I told them that Aircraft X was direct ZZZZZ for the ZZZZZ3 which negates the prior restrictions and would make that a pilot's discretion descent to ZZZZZ. The aircraft came from Area [A] which is required to have the aircraft on full routing or APREQ the shortcut. Area [A] didn't APREQ the shortcut and the R-side didn't notice the abbreviated routing. Aircraft X descended to FL328 and told the controller that they got an RA. The R-side was finishing the briefing at this time and unplugged to I called traffic to Aircraft Y when they were approximately 1 NM past each other.Area [A] should leave aircraft on the appropriate routing or APREQ the shortcut. I see multiple times in each work day where aircraft are not on the right routing and I do not get a call to APREQ it. This is a recurring problem. Also; my area changes the configuration constantly throughout the shift to keep sectors from going 'red.' I appreciate that the Supervisor or CIC is trying to prevent a red sector but constantly changing configurations is confusing. Since March I have only worked this configuration (Y/X/Z) one other time and it is starting to seem like there is no consistency in the area. Lastly; the R-side should have read the routes of the two aircraft and not issued the descend via clearance to Aircraft X. Aircraft X started down earlier than expected but well within their ability and Aircraft Y stayed much higher than normal. Both aircraft did everything right. The two clearances are not separated when a shortcut is issued.

Center Controller reported that during a controller de-brief/switch an airborne conflict occurred due to the distraction.


Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 600; Flight Crew Type 580

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

While performing a checkout flight with a low time PPL I had the pilot perform an engine out drill by reducing the power to idle and informing the pilot the engine had failed. The drill was completed satisfactorily and I informed the pilot to recover at 1;000 feet MSL and climb to 2;000 to perform landings at [a nearby airport]. Shortly after the smooth application of full power the engine stumbled and began shaking. I took over controls of the aircraft and attempted to troubleshoot systems. All engine gauges indicated normal. The engine continued to run but with reduced power. I [notified ATC] and determined I was able to climb at approximately 100-200 fpm. I continued climbing at VY until I was within gliding range of ZZZ; proceeded inbound at 3;000 feet MSL; spiraled down once positioned above the runway; and landed without issue. The aircraft was able to taxi under its own power to transient parking. It was determined the aircraft had a stuck valve.

C172 instructor reported a rough running engine resulted from a stuck valve.


ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I was working LGA Departure. LGA was departing R31 and the first A320 departed on an assigned SID heading of 340 degrees. On initial contact from the Tower; the first A320 was climbed to; I believe 15;000. As the first A320 was about four miles northwest of LGA I noticed a EWR R22 arrival; a second A320; southeast bound at 4;000 heading toward the first A320. The EWR arrival would normally be at 3;000 at this point on the EWR final but for some reason was not. I instructed the first A320 to turn right to a 360 degree heading to keep these aircraft further apart and instructed the first A320 to maintain 8;000 so as not to interfere with the previous LGA departure off his right front that was climbing out of 8;000. I called the second A320 traffic to my first A320 aircraft but the first A320 did not report having the second A320 in sight. The EWR Controller turned the second A320 aircraft onto their R22 final; without a point out and the two aircraft passed with slightly less than three miles within less than a 1;000 FT vertical separation. I at no point left my airspace nor violated EWR's airspace during this incident.

N90 Controller described a likely loss of separation event when traffic inbound to EWR was higher than required and conflicted with LGA traffic.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 23000; Flight Crew Type 7800

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Maintenance

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

The aircraft was dispatched with the aft pressurization outflow valve auto controller failed. The aft outflow valve; per the Maintenance Release; should have been inoperative and deactivated. During climb; the cabin altitude and rate of climb closely followed the aircraft altitude and rate of climb. At approx. 9;000 feet; with the cabin about 8;400 feet; we advised ATC that we could not climb higher than 10;000 feet due to the cabin pressure problem. We leveled at 10;000 feet; and the cabin stopped climbing at about 9;400 feet. We contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control for advice. After roughly 10 minutes; we decided that our off course vectors and extended flight at 10;000 increased our fuel consumption would probably not allow us to continue to ZZZZ. Also; concurrently; Maintenance Control had us select 'Manual' on the aft valve control and attempt to control the aft valve manually. In manual mode; we were able to cycle the aft valve towards closed. At this point; Maintenance control suspected an illegal dispatch due to a probable non-compliance with the Maintenance Release. Due to the fuel question; and the legality issue; we (Maintenance Control; Dispatch; and myself) decided to divert back to ZZZ. ATC was notified of our intent to return to ZZZ; Fuel was jettisoned per the Emergency Check List (ECL); and we configured the airplane; FMC; and navigation for a return to ZZZ; Flight Attendants and passengers were briefed/notified; with a normal ILS and landing runway 25L accomplished. An emergency was not declared. No aircraft limit was exceeded. No emergency authority used. After landing; it was discovered that the outflow valve system was not configured. Diversion/Air Return.

A Captain reports that an MEL Maintenance (M) procedure had not been complied with when an aft pressurization outflow valve auto controller was deferred on their B777 and the aircraft released for dispatch. During climb; the cabin altitude and rate of climb closely followed the aircraft's altitude and rate of climb. The aircraft would not pressurize; requiring a return to their departure airport.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

On climb out at approximately FL230 we got a loud vibration/ noise. I checked the electrical synoptic page; shortly after the right generator went yellow then shut down. We ran the appropriate checklists starting with the GEN 2 OFF BUS which led to inflight shutdown and a single engine approach and landing.A combination of self awareness and systems info available in the cockpit allowed us to isolate the problem.We suspect the cause to be a failed generator.Our reaction was in line with the SOPs for single engine operations.Single engine operations in a mountainous environment can be especially challenging and should be taken into account in training.

Captain reported electrical failure during climb out and the flight crew diagnosed it as a #2 generator failure. The Captain reported compliance with the QRH and continued the flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 2900; Flight Crew Type 2800

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Tower closed pilot to pilot radio. Announced intentions to take off. Another aircraft on short approach did not announce properly and on very short final shouted stop!". Stopped 5 ft. from hold line and turned around. Pilots need to properly announce position and intention in non towered circumstances."

Pilot departing SNA where the Tower was closed reported they began to enter the runway with another aircraft on short final which had not reported its positions properly. The aircraft on short final advised the reporter to stop taxiing.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

The First Officer reported for duty for this three day trip with multiple symptoms; including sniffles; sneezing; and coughing. These symptoms were pronounced during the first leg ZZZ-ZZZ1. At the layover hotel; prior to departure on day two; the FO informed he that was going out to find some cold medicine.  On the second leg; ZZZ1-ZZZ; the FO still had the symptoms. He stated that he felt better now that he had taken [over the counter cold medicine]. I noted that he was irritable during prep for departure; and overly impatient with some routine local delays in boarding and fueling. On departure; he made some errors (set heading 300 when ATC assigned 030). His symptoms continued to ZZZ.  After block in at ZZZ; before the next leg; I asked if he thought he should continue. I asked if he might be better to call in sick and go home. He stated that he couldn't call in sick every time he had a head cold. I was exhausted from a poor night of sleep with anxiety over flying a three day trip with a sick person 18 inches to my right. I was exhausted from listening to him sniffle; sneeze; and cough. I was exhausted and not fit myself to continue. I had also informed the ZZZ Chief Pilot and the ZZZ [personnel management] that this FO was sick. I was not provided any guidance on Company policy or procedure for working with a sick coworker. I was basically ordered by the Chief Pilot to continue the trip with the sick FO. I was cautioned by the Chief Pilot not to try to advise the sick FO to call sick. The [personnel management] offered the opposite advice - that I should ask the sick FO to call sick. I will report the facts of this event to the FAA under the AIR21 Whistleblower Program.

Captain of A319 reported that he was ordered to continue flying with a sick FO and was becoming ill and fatigued in the process.


Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 181; Flight Crew Type 9

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was flying to Lincoln; California (LHM) to practice touch and goes in a PA28R 180. I entered the traffic pattern for Runway 15 on a 45-degree entrance; calls previously had been done at approximately 5 miles and 2 miles out. I entered the downwind; completed my GUMPS check and proceeded to base. A single engine Cessna took off from Runway 15 while I was on final. I completed the touch and go and climbed out to enter the crosswind; call made; at approximately 500 feet above ground level. The Cessna in the pattern flew an exaggerated upwind pattern; apparently he had made a crosswind call; and a downwind call and I crossed in front of his line of flight. I was notified by the pilot of the Cessna of the error; and apologized for the intrusion. I noticed his aircraft to my left hand side; approximately 300 feet to the inside of the pattern 50 feet lower. I exited the parallel downwind and flew a right hand one-eighty turn out and reentered the downwind leg. The contributing factors to the intrusion was my low time in a PA28R with fixation on the departure processes; likely not hearing and registering mentally the crosswind and downwind calls by the Cessna. An additional error was not announcing my intention to fly a touch and go for Runway 15.

PA28R pilot reported a NMAC in the pattern at LHM airport.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 111; Flight Crew Total 3546; Flight Crew Type 1.5

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Taxiway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

During the flight portion of a flight review/IPC; we experienced a taxiway excursion due to a total loss of brake pressure.After landing and taxing back to runway XX; in ZZZ; the brakes lost pressure while entering the runway. We decided not to takeoff. I checked my brakes and they did not work either.Exiting on taxiway; the aircraft seemed under control and we were discussing shutting down the engine once we made it to the ramp area.The aircraft started veering to the left. I joined on the pedals; full right rudder and full brake; no change; still veering. I told pilot to shut it down. He pulled the mixture to cutoff. The aircraft then went off the side of the taxiway; the propeller struck two taxiway lights and the right main ran over one light before the plane came to a stop. The engine seemed slow to shut down while at mixture cutoff. Pilot said that the boost pump was on and that was most likely the reason for the delayed shutdown. The engine was shut down; however; the propeller continued to windmill.Two of the propeller blades were damaged and there was a scratch on the side of the wheel fairing. No other damage to the aircraft. Neither of us were injured.

Lancair ESP Flight Instructor reported a taxiway excursion due to a total loss of brake system.


Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Equipment failures resulted in navigation and heading errors that required no-gyro vectors to final approach at planned destination. Weather was clear sky and unlimited visibility for duration of flight and the left seat was the pilot flying. Approximately 15 minutes after level off at FL410; IRS-1 began to drift from the aircraft's blended solution of lateral position. Maximum drift indications from the FMS indicated a drift rate of >10 and a total drift of 71 NM after 30 minutes. Additionally; wind speed and direction from IRS-1 were highly irregular in bearing and strength. We considered re-aligning IRS-1 and reviewed the checklist. Instead; we decided to monitor IRS-1 and utilized PFD SEL-right for the A-Autopilot to follow guidance since IRS-2's navigation was operating normally. One hour and 15 minutes after the first indications; the drift improved from 71 NM to 4.9 NM with drift rate of 1.0. A few minutes later; IRS-1 drifted back out again (ultimately back to 70 nm+). Ten minutes later IRS-2 drifted to 12.0 NM and increasing with subsequent FMS messages saying GPS-1 and GPS-2 FAILED. Max drift indications for IRS-2 reached 49 NM and 25 NM for both GPS-1 and GPS-2. When IRS-2 started to drift; we informed ATC of our predicament and that we were not RVSM capable. Additionally; we requested to join the J10 airway between OBH and DSM VORTAC's in order to follow raw-data (green needles) between the two stations and an altitude block of FL410 to FL430 to begin realignment of both IRS's. We descended about 250 FT when IRS alignment began while flying on standby gauges for 20-30 seconds IAW with the checklist (DUAL IRS FAILURE). We attempted to update the true heading in the FMS (button 3R on the IRS status page) from the magnetic compass but primary headings were about 20-30 degrees off in flight. Neither IRS returned to display lateral (lat-long) position information for the remainder of the flight. We continued to navigate point-point using the green needles; however; due to our lack of confidence in our heading system; we requested no-gyro vectors for a visual approach during arrival to our destination. On final approach and during landing rollout on Runway 31C; the primary headings read 275 degrees (magnetic compass was oscillating +/-10 degrees from 310). We confirmed the Standby-PWR switch was on throughout the flight and there were no off-flags on the PFD's/MPD's. We recommend the following for further investigation: -Review IRS in flight alignment checklist for completeness (DUAL IRS FAILURE and IN FLIGHT ALIGNMENT OF ONE IRS; during an in flight alignment; the current checklist directs to set IRS to ATT position and remain there (not return back to NAV mode). Based on system descriptions in the Cessna Operating Manual (OM) Model 750 and our Initial Pilot Training Manual (IPTM); the IRS will not regain alignment until the IRS rotary knob is placed in the OFF position for at least 3 seconds then NAV (ref: Cessna OM; pg 3-83 and our IPTM). The current checklist may be incomplete.

CE750 First Officer described a dual IRS/GPS failure at FL410 and attempted realignment; which is unsuccessful. Flight continues to destination with ATC assistance.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure

While doing a self awareness scan of my flight following computer I noticed that one of my flights appeared to have either accepted or requested a direct routing direct to CRAMM Intersection from their present position. At that time it appeared that they could drift outside of 50 NM from the shoreline so I attempted to contact unsuccessfully on ACARS. When I did re-establish communications I asked if they were direct CRAMM and why? They replied 'COMPLIED WITH PREV MESSAGE IN ROUTE TO CRAMM'. When I looked for this 'previous message' in ACARS review I could not find it logged. I finally found the message in [the provider] server stating: **** CREW ADVISORY **** DIRECT-TO ADVISORY FOR [your flight] RECOMMEND REQUEST DIRECT-TO CRAMM FPR. I explained to the crew that this message was not generated by me and that [I was concerned] they may have gone more than 50 NM from the shoreline. They responded: 'IT WAS A ***CREW ALERT* WE CHECKED IT DID NOT TAKE US FARTHER OUT WE JUST WENT DOWN THE COAST'. They further stated: 'THE ONLY INFO COMING INTO MY PLANE SHOULD BE FROM MY DISPATCHER NOT JUNK MAIL.'I got no warning or alert that this message was sent. I simply reacted to the potential issue of the flight going beyond 50 NM from the shoreline in violation of the FARs because this aircraft had no life rafts installed.This 'system' sends recommendations to the aircraft under the guise that the Dispatcher is the one generating the recommendations. These recommendations should go to the Dispatcher first to suggest any amendment to a release. If the Dispatcher concurs with the suggestion he should be the one to uplink them to the flight crew. Further; the system only looks for traffic and winds. What's going to happen when it directs one of my crews to take a shortcut through a line of severe thunderstorms?

A Dispatcher took exception to the unilateral routing recommendations sent by a new 'computer system' to flight crews rather than to the flight Dispatcher for his/her review before transmission at his discretion.


Pilot Not Flying; First Officer; Relief Pilot

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

[I] reviewed all flight paperwork. Reviewing the Differed Item List (DIL)/Minimum Equipment List (MEL) document; we noted that there was a deferral for a 'Loud Hum on Flight Interphone'. We noted that we were supposed to use the Ground Service Interphone for Flight Deck to Ground communications. After proceeding to the aircraft; we accomplished all required cockpit preflight duties. After receiving the Release the Captain and flying First Officer (FO) talked about the applicable cockpit deferred items and proper switch location per the flight crew section of the MEL. The crew validated that there was a loud hum in the flight interphone position and placed the overhead inter phone switch to the Service Interphone position. We did engage in a short discussion about how the loud hum might impact us in case of a Fire; Smoke or Fume situation in establishing effective crew communications between the pilots. We felt that while it could be a distraction; we would still be able to communicate. Prior to departure time; ground personnel came to the cockpit to see if we could pull Ground power; at which time we informed them that they would need to plug into the service interphone jack for Ground to flight deck communications. When they plugged in; we experienced a loud hum in the interphone system. The FO tried to communicate with ground personnel but was unable to. Ground personnel and Maintenance came back into the cockpit at which time they communicated that they would use hand signals to push us back. They reviewed hand signals for fire; brake release; brakes set and engine start/shutdown with the Captain. They coordinated that Maintenance would walk with the airplane during push and maintain visual contact with the Captain and the tug driver. Today; they would be using a tug that lifts the airplane vs a towbar push. They also coordinated that we would pass the push clearance and break away area to them via a relay with Ops. After Maintenance and Ground personnel departed the cockpit and all aircraft doors were closed; we finished our Before Push Checklists; verified cabin ready with Flight Attendants (FA); and called for push/start clearance. After receiving clearance from Ramp Control; we relayed to Ground personnel; through ops; that we were cleared to push. At that time; ground personnel had the tug lift the airplane; gave the release brakes signal; the Captain released the brakes; and gave the brakes released signal. The pushback was uneventful. The brakes we set In Accordance With (IAW) with coordinated hand signals. The tug disconnected from the airplane; we were given the cleared to start engine signal and proceeded with a normal start. After being given the all clear signal by ground personnel; we called for taxi and taxied to Runway. Takeoff and climb out were uneventful. [I] went on first break. When I came back; the Captain went on break. The Pilot Flying (PF) (flying FO) and I had a discussion about the number of deferred items the airplane and the length of the Release (eight pages). We also talked about writing up the Service interphone; since it did not work for us; which was contrary to the write up which said it worked normal. We also talked about the proper switch placement on the audio panels when using the Service interphone; since there had been some confusion on the ground. During this discussion we relooked at the Release and also the MEL Document on our Ipads. It was during this review; that we began to realize that even though the MEL; in the SPEC NOTES; talks about 'Alternate procedures are established and used.'; it also said in the Operations Placard Flight Crew section A; the 'Nose gear service interphone must operate normally.' Further researching the Flight Operations Manual (FOM); in Chap 3; Section 50 PUSHBACK/TOW-OUT; we found the warning that 'Pushback without headset communications is prohibited.' Additionally; reviewing FOM; Chap 3 Operating Information; page; Pushback Using Hand Signals; seemsto indicate that pushback with hand signals might be allowed in situations bulleted on page. After the Captain came back from his break; we had a crew discussion about whether we had conducted a proper pushback IAW with the FOM; FOM and MEL. Our discussion became centered around about whether the MEL use of the wording 'Alternate procedures...' allowed for the use of hand signals during pushback and met the criteria of the FOM bullet 'Authorized by MEL' After landing we coordinated for Maintenance to meet us at the aircraft. Working with Maintenance personnel at the nose gear position; we retested both the flight and service interphones and confirmed that neither was working normally.

Aircraft had several MEL items (both cabin and system related 'Do' items). [It] required performance adjustment awareness and crew verification actions. Additionally; Ground to Flight deck Interphone System MEL also required verification and action. During cockpit set up and MEL verification; maintenance was asked to review and agree on use/communications using the Service Interphone function as directed by [the] MEL.Both maintenance and the flight deck crew agreed that the loud humming noise on the flight interphone also negatively impacted communications using the Service Interphone. Maintenance and the flight deck crew agreed that an additional communication method (using the operations frequency to provide a relay (as necessary) via handheld radio with the pushback crew WAS BOTH SAFE AND TIMELY. Maintenance provided additional marshaling assistance (5-6 ground ramp personnel). Upon maintenance request; the flight deck crew reviewed appropriate handling signals with the pushback crew. The pushback was both safe and uneventful.En route; our Flight Crew conducted a review of the Flight Operations Manual (FOM); MEL and Flight Manual as each relates to and influenced BY [the] MEL. Issues we discovered:1) We determined that there was no longer Flight Manual (FM) guidance for using hand signals for pushback in the 777 fleet. 2) The FOM limits hand signals during pushback to narrow body fleets3) The MEL stated that the Service Interphone must work (while it did work; the flight deck to ground portion of Service Interphone communications was not clear during our discussions with maintenance).

B777 flight crew reported that on pushback the interphone was not available for communications. The crew elected to use hand signals; which they later learned were not allowed by their company.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This is a diesel powered air compressor booked on Aircraft X and then to ZZZ1 on a truck. As per the letter attached to the freight; it was drained of fuel and oil; but when you open the fuel cap and inspect; there is a great deal of residual diesel still in the unit. In my opinion; this should have been tendered as Class 9; UN3530; Engine; Internal Combustion.

Ground employee reported Hazmat cargo improperly configured as well as incorrectly classified for air transport.