Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

[We] departed normally with the First Officer flying (a well-qualified and professional pilot that I have flown with on many occasions). In the climb it was observed by him that the slip/skid indicator showed that the aircraft required some right rudder. He barely set foot on the right rudder pedal and the aircraft yawed violently to the right. I asked him what he did and he stated that he hardly touched the pedal and the aircraft did that. He used the rudder trim to set the aircraft straight and engaged Number 2 autopilot. We noted and discussed the fact that the trim was set to 2.5 nose right. I commented that this was not right as I had not recalled ever seeing an Airbus trimmed like that before. As we talked further; the auto trim continued to trim the rudder to 2.9-3.1 nose right. Within the next 3 to 5 minutes the aircraft yawed to the right and then left hard enough that one of the flight attendants said that it sent her from one side of the plane to the other at the aft section of the plane. At this point I disconnected the autopilot and turned off all automation. We told ATC that we needed to return as we had an issue with the rudder. We declared an emergency and were given a clearance directly to the airport. During the time back to the airport we experienced several more uncommanded rudder inputs. Aircraft required about half scale deflection of the rudder to the left to fly it back. Light pressure release or any application of rudder trim caused huge variations in the yaw of the aircraft. We elected not to do anything with the rudder or trim and to leave things status quo. Aircraft flew normally other than all the left rudder required. Landed without incident and taxied to the gate.

The reporter states that there were no ECAM messages or any fault lights during the entire flight and that maintenance could not initially find any faults. Maintenance was eventually able to reproduce the rudder kick on the ground and trace the fault to one of the FAC's; which was replaced.

After takeoff; during initial climbout; I noticed the slip indicator was off. I started to apply a small amount of rudder correction. The aircraft reacted as if I had stomped on the rudder. Then I was able to push on the rudder again to correct the skid and started to trim the pressure off. At about 2.5 trim right; I engaged the autopilot. The Captain and I discussed what happened as the airplane continued to trim itself to about 2.9-3.1. Then the airplane had another uncontrolled rudder input while on autopilot. The Captain took control of the airplane and disconnected the autopilot. I declared an emergency and we returned without incident.

A319 flight crew experiences an out of trim situation during initial climb and when the First Officer applies slight rudder pressure the aircraft yaws dramatically. Trim is used to center the brick and the autopilot engaged; resulting in about three units of nose right rudder trim. Another sharp yaw event is produced with the autopilot engaged and the crew elects to return to the departure airport.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 21000; Flight Crew Type 4546

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy

Approximately one hour and fifteen minutes before the end of my break I was startled awake from a deep sleep by a loud bang outside/against the crew bunk. One of the flight attendants apologized profusely for 'accidentally dropping a dish which hit the floor and the wall of the bunk.' I asked her why there were carts in the area when company policy is for carts to not be placed in the area after the first meal service and for the duration of the flight. She apologized again and said that she would try to be more careful. I emphasized that the carts were not supposed to be there and she said she would try to be more careful. I would like to point out that this was a VERY nice and professional crew but that they simply are not getting the message from Operations. I do not blame most of the flight attendants for this - they are not correcting the problem because they are not being told by management to correct the problem. This should be handled institutionally by [management] to ALL flight attendants who work the 777 models.Meanwhile my FAR117 mandated crew rest was grossly disturbed and I could not fall back asleep. What makes this even more critical is that this city pair was recently approved for an FRMS (Fatigue Risk Management System) exemption. This gross safety violation has been occurring for the almost four years that I have been based in ZZZ. There should be NO carts or carriers or any personal belongings placed by door 1L during the flight. Yet it just keeps happening.

B777 Captain reported a continuous issue with the crew rest area.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Rejected takeoff at 110 knots due to loss of all flight instruments. [The cause was attributed to] several loose coax cables.[The reporter suggested] regularly check coax cable connections to important flight instruments data buses.

Air Carrier Captain reported loss of all flight instruments during takeoff. Captain executed a rejected takeoff.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 48

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

The return flight to my home airport was an uneventful flight; beautiful day with sun and light winds around 5-10 KTS. As I approached the area; I monitored the CTAF and listened to the airport traffic. The two other aircraft I returned home with from the fly in had already landed ahead of me. At the 10 mile point I called my position; South/East and 2500 feet. The airport was clear of any weather and was visible at more than 10 miles. During my approach to the airport I listened to three aircraft making calls for landing Runway 31; and heard they were clear of the runway after landing. I continued my approach calling at 5 miles; 3 miles; and pattern entry. I entered the pattern at 2200 feet; about 1.5 miles on the base leg for Runway 31 and set up for a normal landing. I adjusted power for approach and when I was in ground effect I reduced power to maintain appropriate speed to touch down. The tires squeaked the runway at centerline; and I lowered the tail and held back pressure on the control. The wind direction at landing was a quartering headwind from the Right (from the Northeast). As the aircraft slowed to approximately 15-18 mph on the ground taxiing; the left wing was violently raised by an unpredictable; sudden; and extreme change in wind speed and direction; followed by the tail until the aircraft was balanced on its nose. Then if fell over on its back. As it was falling the propeller came to a stop and when no movement was felt I got out of my harness and exited the aircraft. There was no fire; so I returned and turned off the master switch.

The pilot of a tailwheel Experimental Light Sport aircraft reported a loss of control on landing due to a sudden change in wind speed and direction.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

While starting a field standby I reviewed a note about a FOM update. I pulled out my iPad to see that it was updated only to find that I had no Company APP folder. It had been removed from my iPad without my knowledge. That is I had no flight manuals; FOMs; ETC. I asked somebody in the flight office and they said 'Yes; hundreds of pilots have had that happen.' That would have been nice to know before I climbed into the cockpit.

A pilot attempted to update his iPad because of an FOM change and discovered that all Company material and manuals had been deleted from the APP folder. Others reported the loss also.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

While performing the circle to Runway 33 in ASE. The pilot flying disconnected the autopilot and the beginning altitude of 9;200 feet for the circle 33 was set. Hand flying decent rate triggered the EGWS warning. We initiated full power and go around pitch attitude; but we were already past the mountain that triggered the EGPWS. We were still well within a safe distance from airport to continue the visual circle maneuver. This was during day VMC conditions with a light wind out of the north.We should have continued the LOC 15 approach even after we went visual. This would have most likely prevented the aircraft EGWS warning from going off.

In the visual decent into ASE for the circle to 33 Approach; I received a GPWS pull up. After applying go around power and clear of GPWS conflict I initiated the visual decent to set up for the circle 33 approach.

The flight crew of a regional airline; performing a visual approach to a mountainous airport; reported receiving a terrain warning while circling to land. The pilot flying executed an escape maneuver; and after determining that the terrain was no longer a factor; completed the approach and landed uneventfully.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS IMWX

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 178; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 1781

For nearly a year; the approach fix MAVEK is not auto loaded into the FMGCS when the ILS 05R is selected. It is; however; co-located with SMO. Since most pilots have flown into MMMX enough; we understand how to configure the FMGCS to work for us. There are numerous tips both on 10-7 page and elsewhere to assist the pilot.However; by now the situation should have been resolved and has not been. It is a matter of time before two inexperienced pilots go in there and cannot find MAVEK in the box or try to manually insert it and end up with a mess at a very critical time. In addition; if one tries to use total automation; the step down altitude from 9;200 feet to 8;800 feet at PLAZA. The airplane will always be a touch too high to intercept the glide slope. As a result; it will revert to V/S and fly right through the glide slope and get high.Obviously; all of these problems can be solved by going manual and hand flying the approach from MEX 05 all the way down; but can easily catch a new pilot off guard. (Relying on go arounds at Mexico City is not much of a plan)

A320 Captain reported MMMX 05R Approach does not load properly in the FMCGS.


Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Due to COVID-19 the following statements need to be remove or change for the Technician performing the task.task# XX(A) put the mask-regulator unit on your head and your face.task# XX1Breathe through the mask-regulator unit with dilution control lever set to N (normal) and when it is at the 100% position.Remove or make an amendment to skip the step; it's also on the Y type aircraft manual.

Maintenance Technician reported wording in maintenance instructions needs to be changed to accommodate for COVID-19 policy.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was working two radar sectors combined with a trainee and trainer as my coordinator. The traffic volume was high with the normal arrivals; departures; overflights; and practice instrument approaches. The complexity was high due to a 10 minute notice of a flight check aircraft that needed to check an opposite direction approach. Once the flight check aircraft started his opposite direction approach I started briefing the relieving controller in training for a sector split. As the flight check aircraft had just finished with the opposite direction approach and continuing to brief the relieving controller for the split; I radar identified the flight check aircraft and turned him on course for the next approach. As all that was happening; I was descending and vectoring Aircraft X for the ILS approach to a different airport. Aircraft X was the second aircraft in the sequence of three for the ILS approach. As Aircraft X crossed 2 miles north of a satellite airport; Aircraft Y was departing VFR north bound climbing to 3;000 ft. without any communication with me. I called the traffic as soon as I saw the issue and Aircraft Y reported that he was maneuvering to avoid collision. A few seconds later Aircraft Y called VFR looking to pick up his IFR flight plan. Also the weather at each facility within the airspace was overcast or broken around 2;200 ft.

TRACON Controller reported they were distracted by splitting a combined sector and a flight check aircraft and did not notice two aircraft in confliction which resulted in a NMAC.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Penetrating a line of thunderstorms through a large gap at FL330; painting no radar returns; radar adjusted to -2.0 degrees down; at approximately 10 miles range a small purple dot return appeared on radar. It was representative of a line of cloud that topped no more than FL350. We could see ahead as we were VMC at this time and we turned approx 20 degrees left and avoided the purple return by 3-5 miles best I can guess. Upon entering the smooth looking cloud; we hit severe turbulence which lifted us from FL330 to 34;300 ft within seconds and placed the jet into a 40-degree left bank. As altitude was still increasing and airspeed as well; with the trend arrow going well into the red barber pole for an over speed situation; I took command of the jet; turned the autopilot off and pitched the nose down to arrest the ascent. As I did this airspeed now went to the negative nearly entering an alpha floor situation. I hand flew the jet until aircraft control was regained. I then turned on the autopilot and gave aircraft control back to the FO (First Officer). ATC then queried us on our altitude deviation. No limitations appear to have been exceeded and on checking with the flight attendants there were no issues or injuries in the cabin.This was a one of a kind event in my [many] years of flying. All normal precautions were taken. Radar was being monitored and nothing unusual was being indicated until the small purple return; the size of a pen dot; appeared at about 10 miles away. We took action and missed the indicated return by 2-3 miles.

During our deviation; we clipped a 'benign/smooth-looking' cloud which generated severe turbulence. We gained approximately 1300 ft in what we estimate to be 3 seconds and were put into approximately a 40-degree bank to the left.

A320 Flight Crew reported severe turbulence after clipping a benign looking cloud.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Once climbed out I noticed it got very hot. On my way to the front to do first class service basket; I called the flight deck and asked if they could give us control of the temperature control. I was told that it wasn't working that one of the packs were out; Captain told A Flight Attendant but she forget to tell me. I told flight deck it was very hot. I served first class basket and return to back gallery to prep for main cabin service. The A FA called to tell me that she heard their mask going off in the cockpit and it didn't sound normal. I attempted to call flight deck and at the same time I noticed that we started to descend. I hung up and started locking carts and told A to secure her galley; pick up any glass items that were out and secure herself because I wasn't sure what was happening and I can't get them on the phone. Then all of a sudden; we had a rapid descent happening; I was still trying to establish communication - nothing. I then remembered that we had a non rev Flight Attendant onboard. I went to her seat and motioned for her to come to the galley. I briefed her on was happening as best I knew and that I may need her in an emergency. The cabin air was now getting a bit thick; we were having to swallow to keep our ears open and it was getting hotter. I called the flight deck on the emergency line. Captain answered and I heard a gasp from him and a mumble of words that sounded like we are going through a rapid descent and then nothing else - I briefed my A Flight Attendant and the non rev Flight Attendant what I heard and told them to stand by. We all ensured galleys were secured; bathrooms were empty. We had not yet secured the cabin; I didn't want to alert the passengers and I had no idea exactly what was happening. We secured ourselves in jump seats. I also briefed the non rev Flight Attendant on the 2R door and put her in the 2nd jump seat because my A Flight Attendant was pregnant and she stated to me on several occasions that she felt like she was going to pass out. So I wanted to have a plan in the event that happened unexpectedly. Shortly [after] the flight deck called and tells us that we have a pressurization issue and we are returning to ZZZ.At this point they had not [advised us]. All calls to us were on the green light line. I asked the Captain; is this a [precautionary landing]; normal landing; and commands and how much time. At that point we prepared the cabin for landing and followed regular protocol. At this time the A Flight Attendant stated that she was feeling really light headed. There was a 2nd non rev Flight Attendant on board. We pulled her; reseated 1A and placed that Flight Attendant in 1A in the event A Flight Attendant passed out between now and landing. I oriented her to the doors; emergency equipment and how to use our oxygen tanks in the event she needed to. I made a final announcement that we were about 10 mins from landing; per Captain; please remain seated for duration of flight and we all secured our seats. I did brief A Flight Attendant; and non rev Flight Attendants that we anticipated a normal landing; and no commands will be called but if you see smoke; smell smoke or fire double ding call bell and I will communicate with flight deck; again I wasn't sure of A Flight Attendant's health. From there we listened for instructions from flight deck. Successful and uneventful landing however it got overly hot. Flight deck called to ask if anyone needed medical. I made a walk through from Door 1A asking if every passenger was ok making eye contact and asking did you need medical. I acknowledged that we know it's hot; we will be at gate quickly and deplane quickly but do you need medical on arrival. No one noted they needed medical. I made it to the back and made an announcement that if I missed the queue and you need medical please press your call button. No response. Notified flight deck that no medical needed but we need to deplane quickly; people were severely wet from sweating and at this point I am also feeling weak now from the heat exposure. We prepared for arrival and deplaned quickly.We did not do any service of any sort in main cabin. I did check and offer water to a mom that had a lap child. The lap child was very hot. She had undressed the baby and attempted to cool baby down. I offered water and wet towels on the taxi in. Parent declined. She had a bottle of water.

E175 flight attendant reported a pressurization problem that resulted in a return to the departure airport.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused

One box of priority cargo to be loaded in the bulk compartment. The loading instruction showed the box as containing [flammable liquid]; on the box the label was Class 8 Corrosive. Unable to get in contact with cargo so the box was not loaded.

Air carrier Safety Office representative reported conflicting information between Load Information Report and Hazmat container label.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Strobes are unusable at night because they flash in the cockpit causing vertigo and disorientation..Please force Airbus to fix thisAction taken: Turned off strobes

A320 pilot reported he shut off the strobes because the flashing at night causes vertigo and disorientation.


During the approach to visual 24 we received a GPWS alert and responded appropriately in VMC conditions. No other issues after. Plan for a higher approach until guaranteed on the approach course for Runway XX.

EMB-145 Captain reported a CFTT event during a visual approach.  The flight crew received a GPWS alert and responded accordingly.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Person Flight Crew; Person Flight Attendant

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

We pushed back in the alley and started both engines. I noticed a smell of jet exhaust; but it wasn't too bad in my mind. The smell dissipated by the time we began our taxi; maybe 2 minutes. We taxied to 10R following 2 airplanes; I got one whiff of exhaust as we moved forward. But; again; not bad or even worth mentioning to the FO [First Officer]. The FO was PF Pilot Flying] and I was the PM [Pilot Monitoring]. We climbed to FL200; cruised for a few minutes and then descended via ZZZZZ arrival. Descending through about 12;000 feet we received a call from the FA [Flight Attendant]. I answered the call. I can't remember which FA called. She said 'I believe we had an air quality event'. I asked if everyone was OK and to describe her symptoms and what the odor was. She said the FA's in the back seemed to feel worse with scratchy eyes; scratchy throat; and a slight headache. We were now passing through approximately 9000 feet. I asked if we needed to have anyone meet them at the gate (medical wise). She said no; as the smell was gone and they weren't getting worse. I told them we'd be on the ground and at the gate in less than 15 minutes. They weren't sure what the odor was exactly; but when I asked if it [could] have been exhaust; she said that was what it most resembled; but was not sure. We landed and the FO made sure to have Maintenance meet us at the gate. As the customers were getting off the plane; I spoke with the mechanic and told him what happened. After everyone was off the plane the whole crew met up in the forward galley and we talked about the event. I asked about when they first smelled the odor. It was at cruise when they first smelled it and felt the symptoms. I asked the FA's if they were OK and if they needed medical attention. They said no. We left the aircraft with the mechanics. I asked if he wanted me write up the odor; because I had not put anything in the logbook. He told me that he didn't need it in the book. The FO and I debriefed the event and talked about it from start to finish. He also noticed the smell of exhaust; but didn't say anything because it happens from time to time. And the smell dissipated rather quickly. I wasn't sure where to file the report; I picked crew illness because I later found out that the 3 FA's were taken off of their trip due to the Air Quality Event. We were rushing to get to our next flight. We were at gate XX and were going to XY and had about 55 minutes to do so. I should have called a timeout and read the FOM about Air Quality Events. I should have written it up in the logbook and called the [Duty Officer]. Lesson learned - don't allow the tight schedules and plane swaps influence the task at hand.

I was the 'B' FA; After Door closure and demo; and compliance checks we sat in jump[seat] and noticed a strong smell; it smelled like exhaust fumes; the plane backed out and taxied to takeoff; smell continued to worsen. We were covering our nose and mouth and hoping it would dispute. Our eyes and throat were burning; and headaches began; at 10;000 ft we got up to do service. As we reached the main cabin it seemed to dissipate....but then the 'C' flight attendant and I noticed we started to feel fuzzy headed and lack of clarity...we completed our short pub service; trash and compliance and took our jump seats. Upon arrival and deplaning our symptoms seem to worsen...the gate agent also noticed the same smell upon our arrival. As we began to debrief with CA and FO it became clear none of us were fit to fly. We called Supervisor and went to ER in ZZZ. Suggestion: call forward to flight deck immediately upon noticing abnormal exhaust fume levels! Request back to gate!

A320 Captain reported Flight Attendant notification during initial descent of 'air quality event' in the cabin with Flight Attendants experiencing physiological symptoms.


Flight Crew Total 12046; Flight Crew Type 5611

Flight Crew Total 14728; Flight Crew Type 8707

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Security; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

Well into takeoff roll; above 100 knots; I observed a person exiting the left side of the runway. The person was well clear of the left wingtip and I took no evasive action to avoid the person. Once safely airborne; the Captain reported the position of the person to RNO tower.

On takeoff roll out of RNO (16R-First Officer flying); I noticed a young man walking along the edge of the runway while we were rolling down the runway. After liftoff; I reported it to the tower; and they diverted the other landing aircraft to runway 16L. Not really sure what this guy was doing walking on the runway; or what his intentions were.

A319 Captain reported a person was observed walking along and exiting the left side of the runway during takeoff roll.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 125; Flight Crew Total 3100; Flight Crew Type 600

Time Pressure; Workload; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

In cruise flight with about an hour and fifteen minutes to go we got a Chip Detect R CAS MSG quickly followed by an Oil Filter Bypass R CAS MSG. We ran the appropriate checklists and they drove us to continue on to ZZZ1 as it said 'land as soon as practical' and that it's acceptable to operate with the oil filter bypass for up to 4 hrs. We were also getting intermittent DAU2 miscompare CAS messages. Approximately 30 minutes later the Master Warning went off and we got the Oil Pressure Low R CAS MSG which we confirmed on our oil pressure readout as it fell into the red. We ran the checklist and performed a precautionary shutdown of the right engine. We were at 41;000 feet and it was obvious the airplane wasn't going to hold altitude so we requested 31;000 feet so that we could get down and get the APU started which we did. In the descent we could see lights of ZZZ ahead and to our left. We knew there were emergency services there and a long runway so we requested to divert and [notified ATC] for priority. I was hand flying and running the radios while [First Officer] did a great job of running our checklists and setting me up with an extended centerline. ATC vectored us onto about a 5 mile final but the lights of the airport were very faint and by the time we picked it out I realized I was about 400-500 feet high so we made a gentle 360 to lose some altitude and get on glide path. After that the approach and landing were very straightforward.

A Cessna Citation X captain reported an oil system anomaly which led to an engine shutdown and a diversion to a nearby suitable airport.


Instructor; First Officer; Check Pilot; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 177; Flight Crew Total 5143; Flight Crew Type 4028

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Time Pressure; Distraction

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

After landing on Runway XXR in ZZZ; upon clearing the runway we were told via ground to taxi north on Taxiway 1 and enter the ramp at Taxiway 2 for parking at the Gate X. I was the FO acting as an LCA. Both ZZZ ground and ZZZ X concourse ramp frequencies were completely saturated with traffic both inbound and outbound. Upon making the left 90 degree turn onto Taxiway 2; I noticed a rapidly approaching taxi light of an aircraft northbound on Taxiway 3. I immediately directed the Captain to stop and I also abruptly braked from the right seat. Aircraft Y continued to taxi right in front of us and then stopped short of Gate Y to give way to an outbound aircraft. We were never notified by Ground of a potential conflict or to give way to the northbound aircraft. We subsequently were cleared by ramp onto the ramp and to our gate. We missed the other aircraft by about 50 feet.

Taxiing north on Taxiway 1 with a Taxiway 2 entry to ramp for the Gate X.   Cleared Taxiway 2 to entry but not cleared to enter ramp. I made left turn on Taxiway 2 was prepared to stop at Spot XX.  Captain was monitoring ground on VHF1 and Ramp on VHF2.  I was only monitoring Ground on VHF1. I started the turn and was about to cross Taxiway 3 when LCA Captain in right seat  yelled 'STOP STOP STOP!'  I applied immediate max braking and abruptly stopped the aircraft.What I did not see was another taxiing aircraft from my left on Taxiway 3. I was given no radio call to give way to that traffic. My clearance was to the ramp. I do not know why I did not see the approaching aircraft. It was dark and their taxi light was not pointed at me. Regardless; I should have seen it.   We stopped and I would guess our nose was within 50 feet of their wingtip.  I do not know if they saw us or not.  No comment from Ground or ramp about what just transpired.I will say that fatigue may have been an issue.  This was an OE after a 6+ month break in flying and I was feeling some mental fatigue.

Air carrier flight crew reported a ground conflict. The Captain stated fatigue and months without flying contributed to the event.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 55; Flight Crew Total 603; Flight Crew Type 400

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

I was in cruise flight at 6;500 ft. in VFR conditions when my airplane engine started getting rough. I applied full carburetor heat for a few minutes and expected it to clear the issue. However; after several minutes the roughness became worse and despite having full carburetor heat and full throttle (per aircraft POH (Pilots Operating Handbook)) the engine turned off. I was circling about 5 miles south of ZZZ and immediately headed towards it while still at around 5;000 ft. MSL. I spoke to Approach and advised them of my issue and that I was heading to the airport for [an] engine out landing. I kept trying to turn the engine back on during this time while also flying a left traffic for Runway XX. While making the short final approach and descending the engine came on at about 300 ft. AGL and I was able to make a fairly normal landing.

Cessna 150 Single Pilot reported an engine failure inflight.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 17.7

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Situational Awareness; Workload; Distraction; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft X was cleared for a visual approach to RWY 24.  He was flying approximately a 270 heading directly to the airport when I transferred him to the tower about 10 miles from the airport.  Aircraft Y was on a 090 heading about 6 miles northwest of Aircraft X when I gave him a 120 heading to fall behind Aircraft Y.  When I looked back at the radar to see if I could turn Aircraft Y inbound; I observed Aircraft X directly ahead of Aircraft Y.I turned Aircraft Y back to a 060 heading; and he reported the traffic in sight.  I then cleared Aircraft Y behind Aircraft X.  What I was unaware of was that the local controller had told Aircraft X to square off his turn to final.  This caused Aircraft X to turn 40-60 degrees to the northwest of his current approach course.  It put Aircraft X and Aircraft Y in a head to head situation instead of Aircraft Y being on a vector behind the course of Aircraft X.  The local controller never called me to coordinate the turn for Aircraft X.There needs to be a clear definition for when the local controller can turn an aircraft sequenced by the arrival controller. Decisions on sequencing for visual approaches are made with current aircraft tracks in mind when you're turning the next aircraft to follow. An uncoordinated turn by the local controller can easily cause a loss of separation with the following aircraft if the change in course is not observed in time.

Working Local control. I had one aircraft in the left downwind with another arrival behind him in left traffic.  Four or five Jets inbound taking visual approaches from the east and north landing RWY 24 (RWY13/31 Closed).  I had given the small aircraft a right 360 in the downwind to allow spacing for a few of the Jet arrivals; the other VFR was to follow the jet on final and keep it tight if able.  Aircraft X checked in 7-9 miles east of the field on Visual approach at a high rate of speed.  I told Aircraft X to 'Square his base turn to final' and told him about the aircraft traffic he was following. At the time Aircraft Y was still on the northeast heading at 3;000 feet.  Aircraft Y appeared to have received his base turn the same time I gave the Aircraft X his instructions to space him behind the downwind traffic.  I exchanged traffic to Aircraft X and informed him that I did have both aircraft in sight and was maintaining visual from the tower.  Aircraft Y turned back out and re-sequenced behind Aircraft X. I didn't report the incident when it happened because although I was surprised by the Aircraft Y's turn inbound; I had good visibility on both aircraft and I had space to work the Aircraft Y behind the Aircraft X even from the tight base.  I have been informed that the incident is being reviewed for possible OE/OD. *The shift times and breaks are estimated because I don't have the logs from the day with me for this report. In the past; when working Local control I would always have the Arrival frequency playing in the back of the tower over a speaker. It allowed me to hear inbound emergencies sooner; frequency changes to the tower (or not); the general flow of what aircraft coming to my final are doing; and what they have been told (other traffic; closed runways; bird and wind-shear reports) I felt much more connected to the big picture and could better work with the arrival controller. Due to a procedural change last year in the SOP stemming from a runway incursion; the facility has banned monitoring the arrival frequencies while working Local control. If I had been monitoring the arrival frequency I would have heard the Aircraft Y's inbound turn and I could have maneuvered the Aircraft X a bit closer to the field and sent the VFR around for another pass.

ABE TRACON and tower controllers describe a situation where two aircraft became a conflict resulting in traffic breaking themselves out to re-sequence.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9.8

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I was working CIC (Controller in Charge) and traffic was picking up; with multiple aircraft in the local pattern. I remember I just asked Local Control if they wanted to split off Local 2; and was getting the position ready in anticipation of making the split. Suddenly; I heard Local Control exclaim that they didn't have spacing on the runway; and saw a Cessna touching down with traffic taxiing on the runway ahead; approaching an intersection near midfield. I heard Local Control tell Aircraft Y to expedite to exit; and I thought I also heard the aircraft touching down (Aircraft X) say they were making a stop due to the traffic ahead. Aircraft Y exited without incident; and Aircraft X continued their pattern work after. Local Control recovered the position; and we then split the locals as soon as possible. It was a fast paced environment in the cab at the time; and I think Local Control and myself (as CIC) may have simply overlooked the traffic situation when the first aircraft did not keep their roll speed up; or exit as soon as expected for their full stop. Volume and complexity in the VFR tower environment can spike at a moment's notice. When the staffing is available and workload dictates; it makes good sense to have Local Controls split to balance the workload and provide better oversight of surface operations. A human can only track so many aircraft and scan so many surfaces in a set amount of time; and splitting the locals allows us to accomplish this in a better; safer way. Having the second Local Control open can help us catch sooner if runway spacing will not be sufficient; so we can issue a go around or runway exiting instructions more promptly. It can be a balancing act at times to try to combine and split positions in a timely manner as traffic dictates. I feel like the Watch Supervisor or CIC should try their best to coordinate with Local Control on how they are doing; and what they desire to do (split or stay combined). It can be important for controllers to work positions combined at times to maintain proficiency on their own. However; there are also times when Local Control may not realize they are starting to get overwhelmed with complexity and volume; and it may be necessary for watch supervision to become more assertive and simply direct Local Control to split the position; before they 'lose the picture.' We have to trust each other in the tower cab and realize that suggesting (or directing) someone to split positions should not be viewed as a reflection on a person's abilities; but it is to ensure we utilize our resources as best we can; in order to provide the safest; most efficient service possible to all users of the NAS.

BJC Tower Controller in Charge reported Local Control allowed an aircraft to land with a previous arriving aircraft still on the runway.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

GPS; FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 06

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 6500; Flight Crew Type 170

Time Pressure; Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Airport

VFR day. Trip to TEB. RWY 6/24 closed. Advised on checkin with approach to expect ILS 6 circle to Rwy 1. Told to descend to 2000 ft and turn to 030 to intercept. Maintain 2000 until established cleared for the ILS 6 circle to 1 at TEB. Intercept the LOC and capture glide path (GP) as I approach DANDY on the LOC and GP I begin to realize we are not going to be close to the mandatory 1500 crossing despite being on the GP. I click off autopilot and dive below the GP. I am no longer stabilized and am below the GP in a turbojet aircraft. Thank god it was VMC. I believe I crossed DANDY anywhere between 1450 to 1550 feet. continued to TORBY and executed an uneventful circle to Rwy 1. I was never told by ATC to cross DANDY at a specific altitude nor was anything said to me while after crossing DANDY.I believe that to clear a pilot for the ILS and then to have the pilot go intentionally below the GP is contrary to the regs and training. This is a confusing approach for anyone not familiar with it. My mistake was assuming the GP would bring me across DANDY at 1500 feet. The mandatory note on the plate was (I thought) to emphasize that the pilot has to be on the GP.If that was IMC and being that close to the ground and the ridgeline I wonder if my EGPWS would have gone off?I will not be caught unawares again as regarding that situation; each time I brief a plate I will look for that scenario.

A Corporate pilot flew the TEB ILS Runway 6; circle Runway 1 but was puzzled because his clearance was maintain 2;000 feet until established. He assumed incorrectly on glideslope would fulfill the mandatory 1;500 feet DANDY constraint but a rapid descent met the constraint.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 151; Flight Crew Type 16000

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Approaching San Jose; Oakland Center cleared us to descend via the SILCN1 Arrival. At around 24;000 FT; he handed us off to NorCal Approach. He was surprised and angry to learn that we had been cleared to 'descend via;' and stopped our descent at 20;000 FT. We leveled off at 20;000 FT; and immediately went above the descent profile; where we remained until 500 FT AGL. He was working other traffic; a Lear; crossing below us at around 17;000 FT. When we were clear of that traffic; he cleared us to descend via the arrival. I explained that we were too high at that point to make the runway if we followed the arrival routing so he slowed us to 250 knots; and handed us off to the next lower Controller. I explained our situation to the next Controller; who; as we reached 10;000 FT; cleared us 'speed your discretion.' I explained that would do no good; as the speed limit below 10 was 250 knots; which we were already at. He vectored us off the arrival; and across the final approach course. He then asked if we saw the field; which we did; and he cleared us the visual approach. I told him we were still high; and might not be able to make the runway. Then he told the other carrier MD-80 behind us to follow us; and also cleared the visual. The other carrier replied that we were much too high for them to follow us. We configured to gear down and flaps 40; and worked our way down toward a normal glideslope; which we finally intercepted at 500 feet. We then made a normal landing and cleared the runway just as the other carrier touched down. If we are going to fly RNP STARs; we need to be cleared to descend via the arrival as soon as possible; and need to be able to adhere to the published speeds and altitudes. If we get high; or slow; we cannot make the descent profile; and need to be cleared some other form of arrival. There is very little margin in the published arrivals for a 737 to be able to recapture the profile and none if slowed below the published speeds. We spend the entire time trying to get back on profile; distracting us from checklists that need to be accomplished; and detracting from a stabilized approach. It compromises safety.

B737 Captain reported he was put into an unstabilized approach situation when ATC held him high on the SILCN1 arrival into SJC. Reporter commented that deviations from 'cleared via' clearances often cause problems.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While working R87; I overheard a landline conversation at Ocala Sector (15) with JAX Approach that R2903 was active to FL320. The D15 Controller called the Supervisor on the landline who stated that to his knowledge it was cold; and the Controller asked him to verify the status of this airspace with Missions Sector in TMU. Upon several promptings for a status verification from the D15 Controller; with no response from the Supervisor; the D15 Controller took the initiative to call the Missions Sector himself. After several minutes it was established that R2903 was in fact active to FL320. Shortly after being relieved from position I proceeded to the Missions Sector in TMU and inquired as to what time R2903 went active. The Missions Controller told me it had been active for some time. There may have been several controllers and several aircraft that came into an unsafe proximity or possibly violated this airspace. Additionally; the Supervisor's lack of concern and urgency for establishing the status of this airspace is unacceptable. There was a clear breakdown of communication between the Missions Sector in TMU and the FLM's in the Gulf Area. Without knowing where or how this breakdown occurred; I can't provide recommendations to prevent this from happening again. However; in light of the lack of concern for the status of the airspace and safety of the area; the Supervisor needs to be reminded of needed priorities.

ZJX Controller voiced concern regarding the lack of timely and accurate information referenced the status of R2903; the reporter listing several communication breakdowns within the facility.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Diverted

While taxiing to the runway EICAS momentarily had an ICE COND-ANTI ICE INOP message. I asked the First Officer to run the QRH for the message. Unfortunately; the QRH procedure was performed incorrectly. Part of the statement in the QRH said that if the message disappeared within 60 seconds we could continue. We did not perform the proper QRH procedure to test the system and possibly clear the message. The message had disappeared on its own within 60 seconds. As a result we took off and while climbing out noticed that the EICAS had 2 advisory messages: ICE COND and SPS/ICE SPEEDS. There were also four open inscriptions on the ICE PROTECTION PANEL: ENG AIR INLET; WING and STAB. We were in VMC and only briefly encountered precipitation. I contacted Maintenance Control and discussed with them the messages on the EICAS and the open inscriptions. Maintenance directed us to attempt to clear the messages but we were unsuccessful. Next we were told that if we could remain out of icing conditions we could continue to destination and that they would talk with Dispatch.As the flight progressed we noted that the performance of the aircraft and the fuel burn were not what we expected them to be. As we got further south the number that we felt was accurate had us landing with 900 [LBS] of fuel total. We sent many updates to Dispatch with our current fuel numbers and they came back with us landing with a much higher number. I was unsure if they were taking into account the issue we were having with the ANTI ICE System. Ultimately; we decided that the safest course of action would be to make a fuel stop. As we were descending toward our diversion airport to get fuel the aircraft was not decelerating as it would normally and noted that N1 was at 58%. At that point we declared an emergency and requested landing on the airport's longer runway. When the gear was extended the Anti Ice messages went away and we landed and taxied to the gate. Today I learned to insure that QRH prodecures are properly executed and that I need improve my knowledge of [the aircraft's] system logic.

An EMB-145 flight crew failed to conduct the checklist for an EICAS ice system message when it disappeared on its own prior to takeoff. After takeoff additional EICAS and ICE protections messages illuminated and fuel burn became excessive to the point they decided to land short of their destination for fuel.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Type 10000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

The flight was on time and there were no issues prior to climbout. Upon gear retraction; we saw both A system low pressure lights; initially for the engine pump followed by the electric pump light. We looked for other indications and found the right main landing gear was still in the down position and the A system hydraulic quantity was at zero. We began handling the situation per the checklist and got vectors to a holding pattern to burn off gas. The issue was with the handling of the aircraft. With half the hydraulics and no autopilot; I had difficulty staying exactly at the assigned altitude while trying to deal with the problem. I never got more than 300 feet off the altitude; but Approach Control was concerned and made several calls reference our altitude. At that point the First Officer asked for a block altitude and we were then free to deal with the problem. We eventually returned to [the departure airport] for a normal landing.

A B737 Captain reported returning to the departure airport after losing the A hydraulic system.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Weather

Before takeoff; we had a single channel autoslat failure during Recall check. We cleared the runway and MEL'd this item. After departure sometime below 10;000 feet we noticed the standby attitude indicator was displaying a red flag. Shortly thereafter the standby attitude indicator began to wobble and keeled over for good. All other indications were normal at this time; so we notified maintenance and dispatch and pressed on towards our filed destination. Shortly after reaching cruise; I noticed many of my instruments had red flags including my primary attitude indicator. We were down to one known good source of attitude information at this time and since we were IMC; we decided to immediately [advise ATC] and get radar vectors to nearest VMC. Initially we decided to go to ZZZ; but on the descent I saw ZZZ1 just off the right side of the aircraft and completely in the clear; so we changed the plan and diverted into to [that airport]. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. We then swapped aircraft and took our passengers on to our filed destination.

At cruise; First Officers attitude and airspeed red flagged. We had just entered night IMC into storms in the northeast with one reliable attitude indicator. We contacted Dispatch; and ATC; requested a turn west to known high VFR. [Advised ATC] and landed in a nearby airport.

A B737-300 crew reported many First Officer instruments; including the attitude indicator; displayed red flags so the crew; now in night IMC with one attitude source; diverted to a nearby VMC airport.


Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

After being cleared to fly the RNAV (RNP) Z Runway 26L Approach; I programmed the FMC incorrectly and proceeded to brief the approach. When passing SARRT waypoint the aircraft proceeded to CABNU instead of FINAB. I even commented on how it was odd that the route was away from the field. Approach inquired which approach we were flying and we incorrectly stated RNAV Z 26L. Approach Control canceled our approach clearance and issued a vector; asked if we had the runway in sight; which we did; and cleared us for a visual approach to Runway 26L. We switched frequency to Tower and were cleared to land. The Crew should have been more diligent in our briefing to verify that the runway programmed was the proper and intended runway. The mistake was easy to make because of the Runway 22 RNAV Z and 26L RNAV Z being on adjacent keys in the FMS. A more thorough briefing would have caught the programming error.

B737-700 Captain reported a programming error resulted in a track deviation on the RNAV (RNP) Z Runway 26L Approach at ELP.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Was returning part to ZZZ that wasn't used on aircraft.  Box was closed with no dangerous paper work on it and didn't realize it was hazardous.  It was a Flight Control Unit and didn't know it had a battery in it. Cause: box was closed up and sealed and nothing to alert me that it was hazardous. It was a Flight Control Unit and didn't know it had a battery inside. The part had a [maintenance software company product number] and at the time of the occurrence we were not able to get into [company] software to receive part. Suggestions:  [cargo management system] should have a space to put the part number that you are shipping so if it is hazardous it should be flagged as hazardous.

Airline Maintenance Personnel reported aircraft part erroneously shipped in unlabeled container.


ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Shortly before top of descent Oakland Center changed our arrival to the SERFR 1 RNAV arrival. We flew the arrival remaining in VNAV path the entire way and complying  with all restrictions. Upon handoff to NorCal Approach; Oakland Center commented that we had briefly gone below SFO class B duing our descent. Descending below class B while complying with an arrival published for a primary airport is something neither of us would have considered. This appears to be a new procedure and it looks like it still needs to be adjusted. The fact that the path and restrictions allow for you to go below Class B while flying an arrival designed for aircraft landing at the primary airport is counterintuitive. Furthermore; complying with the arrival would not allow for a speed reduction. Crews and ATC should discontiue use of this arrival until the arrival or airspace can be adjusted. Internally our company should consider a NOTAM and/or 10-7 note to discontiue use until this technicality is resolved.

Pilot reports of flying below the Class Bravo while in a descent into SFO on the SERFR1 STAR. Pilot advises there may be something wrong with the arrival that takes the aircraft out of the Class Bravo which is built to protect the aircraft.


Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Environment - Non Weather Related; Airport; Chart Or Publication

After push-back and contact of Ground Control at C6 we were assigned taxi instructions to taxi to 24L via right turn on taxiway Charlie and hold short C7. Before reaching C7 Ground Control gave further instructions to turn left C7; right Taxiway Bravo; right C8 and left to proceed on Bravo hold short taxiway Papa. Before reaching taxiway Papa we were instructed to proceed on taxiway Charlie; right turn taxiway Sierra; left turn Tango 1; and right turn on taxiway Tango for North Route Taxi to the North Complex. While still taxing west along taxiway Charlie and looking for Sierra both visually and referring to our 10-9 chart; we were advised that we passed Sierra and to make three left turns on taxiways Tango; Bravo; and Sierra to re-join the previously assigned routing. We complied and re-joined Sierra without further complications. Upon reaching Sierra both myself and the Captain confirmed that there is no visible signage or markings identifying taxiway Sierra. Lack of obvious signage or markings identifying taxiway Sierra and some confusion as this instruction is unusual for transition to the North Complex. This event occurred late in the afternoon with low sun angle and some haze causing strong glare in the direction of the assigned turn. Taxiway Sierra is poorly marked and appears as a ramp area for heavy aircraft. This coupled with the unusual taxi instruction could easily lead other crews to make the same error. In addition to improved signage; it is my opinion that a memorandum should be issued to raise flight crew awareness of this potential confusion.

Commercial fixed wing pilot reported a taxiway incursion due to poor signage and pavement markings at LAX.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

For more than two years the FMS keypads have been known to display multiple numbers/letters when pushing one of the buttons. Such as attempting to enter 'ELP' with the result being 'ELLPPP'. This requires an attempt to delete the extra letters. However; the 'delete' key erases more than one letter and can delete the entire word. Under 'normal' operations; the flight crews have had to make this work by multiple inputs and deletes to get the desired input to the FMS. There is an aversion to 'write up' the FMS as it makes it unavailable for several days/weeks. During abnormal/diversion/missed approach conditions; the inability to enter data can lead to a pilot deviation or unsafe situation.  Such was the situation while approaching ELP airport with a thunderstorm over the field. With high wind and windshear reports and visible lightning; I asked for delay vectors as the weather cell was moving north; away from the field.  Approach was happy to comply with the following instruction: 'turn left heading 140; Hold on the ELP 140 deg radial; 15 dme; right turns; 5 mile legs'. I attempted to enter this info into the FMS several times but got worthless data on the scratch pad. I.E. EELPP1400///115 or ELPPP111440//155; etc. As we were rapidly approaching the holding fix; I had to revert to 'green needles' to display the radial and DME info. Unfortunately the First Officer was inexperienced and unable to add value to the situation other than to follow the commands I was telling him. We were late in beginning our initial turn outbound but were able to recover to the holding pattern once I gave him the DME numbers to begin the next turn.As we were in VMC conditions with the airport in sight; and only one other plane in holding below us; we were not in potential safety situation. However; this could have deteriorated quickly.  After a couple of turns in hold; we proceeded to a visual approach with no issues.Earlier this year I had a similar experience with multiple missed approaches at LAX where ATC was barking navigation fixes to proceed to. Again under stressful conditions I needed several attempts to get the correct info into the FMS.The situation with the FMS keypads is well known by the company who continue to dismiss it as nothing more than a 'nuisance issue'. In fact; I brought this topic up to the President on his first companywide conference call earlier this year. He claimed ignorance of the problem.

CRJ-900 Captain reported continuing problems with the FMS keypads displaying multiples of whatever character is input into the scratch pad.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling

Aircraft X was in the hangar and in work for a fuel leak. First and second shift had removed the underwing fuel panels to begin the tank ventilation process. When I got there for my shift the panels where removed and a fan had been set up to help remove the fuel vapors from the tank. I was the lead mechanic who was assigned to the plane for the shift. I proceeded to check the AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual) reference for fuel tank repairs and found that it calls for an oxygen fed respirator while performing repairs in the fuel tanks if the oxygen levels are between 19.5% and 23.5%. When I informed the supervisor of this; he picked from stores a non-calibrated oxygen level meter and found the oxygen level in the tank to be at 20.9%. The Supervisor on duty for the night told me I needed to have one of the mechanics get in the tank and begin drying out the tank so we could begin repairs. He gave me a common paint respirator with disposable charcoal filters and told me it would be suitable for use in the fuel tank. I then showed the Supervisor the AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual) reference and told him that the paint respirator he had given me was not the right one for work inside fuel tanks and told him that unless he was able to acquire an oxygen fed respirator like the AMM calls for that I was not going to have any of the mechanics work inside the fuel tank as it is not a safe environment. The Supervisor continued to tell me that I needed to put someone in the tank with only the paint respirator and when I told him that due to safety and health concerns I would not let anyone go inside the fuel tanks without the proper breathing equipment as called out by the AMM; he proceeded to tell me to go home. We need the proper PPE (Personal Protective Equipment) and safety equipment per the AMM if we are doing any work inside of a fuel tank.

Aircraft Technician working on EMB-145LR was not provided correct safety equipment for fuel tank entry.


Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 27500; Flight Crew Type 75

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 8500; Flight Crew Type 1200

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Center cleared us direct to LLO after having lost GPS signal approximately 200 miles east of ABQ due to jamming from White Sands Missile Range. Clearance after ABQ read direct LLO KIDDZ2 to HOU. After crossing LLO flew the lateral portion in accordance with ATC instructions. Eventually we were cleared via the KIDDZ2 to HOU. The NFP (SIC) received the ATIS and programmed the RWY4 approach and transition along with the bottom altitude of 6;000 per the KIDDZ2 Star. The captain engaged VNAV and both pilots confirmed it was engaged and captured. The aircraft began the descent on target via the arrival meeting all altitude restrictions. Northwest of AAHZZ we allowed the aircraft to descend below 10000. At this point ATC instructed us to maintain 10;000 and queried us about descending via the arrival. The Captain replied in the affirmative and apologized to which the controller replied there were no conflicts. We continued to an uneventful landing at HOU.

After crossing LLO flew the lateral portion with ATC assigned altitudes until JAAES then after JAAES cleared to descend visual the KIDDZ2. The NFP (SIC) had received ATIS and programed in the runway 04 transition as ATIS indicated being the ILS 04 in use. The NFP then set the bottom altitude (6000). I armed VNAV and verified the VNAV engaged and captured.The aircraft began a descent to cross JAAES between FL200 and 17000. After crossing JAAES on target and appeared to be on target to cross KIDDZ 14000 and 12000 ARTCC handed us off to TRACON (119.17) and the NFP checked in. I was then distracted for a moment monitoring the approach speed inputs to the FMS when ATC instructed me to maintain 10000. At this time I was descending thru 9800 and advised ATC I was climbing back up to 10000. The controller then [asked] if I was cleared to descend via and I replied yes. I then realized the aircraft failed to meet the requirement to cross KIDDZ at the charted altitudes. So I apologized to which he replied no problem at which time he started giving me vectors and altitudes. No loss of separation occurred.

CE560 flight crew reported a loss of GPS signal west of LLO due to military jamming at the White Sands Missile Range. They were vectored by ATC to LLO and the KIDDZ2 Arrival to HOU. During the arrival; the AAHZZ crossing restriction of 10000 feet was overshot due to unknown automation issues.


Troubleshooting; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Captain was Pilot Flying. First Officer was Pilot Monitoring. Aircraft was at 5;000 ft. when ATC cleared flight to proceed direct the FAF (Final Approach Fix); to cross the FAF at or above 2;000 ft. and cleared flight for the ILS Approach. When level at 2;000 ft.; the aircraft was approximately 30 to 35 miles south of the FAF on an intercept course greater than 90 degrees. The aircraft's heading had previously been established when ATC cleared flight to proceed direct. While proceeding direct the Pilot Monitoring made call 'flight instruments verified' The Pilot Flying also verified ILS via Morse code identifier. Pilot Flying did not select Approach Mode as flight was still almost on a 90 degree intercept to final and still in heading mode. Pilot Flying began to turn the heading bug with the intent to position he aircraft on an intercept less than 90 degrees so that Approach Mode could be selected. While level at 2;000 ft.; approximately 30 to 35 miles south of the FAF both Captain and First Officer displayed LOC and GS and the flight director/auto pilot captured this LOC and GS. The Aircraft then made an immediate 30 degree bank and began a descent exceeding 1;500 ft. per minute. The crew queried each other about the LOC and GS capturing at the exact same time. The Pilot Flying then realized the flight path was not in line with the MFD. As the Pilot Flying was about to ask the Pilot Monitoring to contact ATC for heading; ATC contacted flight. The Pilot Flying disconnected the autopilot and asked the Pilot Monitoring to tell ATC we need a vector back to the FAF. At that moment ATC contacted the flight and asked are we still direct. The Pilot Monitoring replied and then a second controller asked why we were below 2;000 ft. The Pilot Monitoring told ATC the aircraft autopilot indicated it captured LOC/GS. The flight director/autopilot responded to something; but it was not the LOC and GS for the ILS at our destination. This resulted in lateral and vertical deviations from the ATC clearance. ATC gave instruction to climb to 2;000 ft. and a heading back to the FAF. The flight was then given vectors back to the FAF on a significantly less intercept course with normal approach and landing. At no time was the aircraft on any known ILS associated with our destination. After landing; Captain contacted TRACON and spoke with a TRACON Controller who stated there's no issues with the ILS that he was aware of. No other localizers are in the vicinity. The Controller also stated he had been working that sector and there had been no anomalies. This flight had a Captain in the jump seat during the entire event. The jump seater witnessed the aircraft 'behave' as though it had captured a LOC and GS. Upon landing the crew reviewed the maintenance log which indicated the aircraft had at least two recent entries regarding flight director and autopilot malfunction. These previous entries indicated flight director anomalies during approach mode and not in-flight. This is consistent with what we experienced. The flight director functioned normally during all other phases of flight. Flight director and autopilot Maintenance Log entries should appear on the release with date and time of event.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

ERJ145 Flight Crew reported that an autopilot malfunction on approach resulted in a course and altitude deviation.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I had Aircraft X report that he had responded to a TCAS RA. He was in conflict with a VFR target heading south-southeast bound at 17500 feet and NOT talking to ATC. Below is the information I pulled from the situation.Aircraft X was issued a revised descent clearance to 18000 feet and issued a traffic call on a VFR target at 17500 feet by the controller I was relieving. I was already plugged into the sector and reviewing my SIAs/Notams to relieve the controller. Aircraft X responds that he is looking for the traffic. Position relief briefing begins recording. I reissue the VFR traffic to Aircraft X and gave him a pilot's discretion descent to 11000 feet. Aircraft X read back the altitude clearance. Aircraft X tells me that he is responding to a TCAS RA; in which I acknowledged him and asked him to report when he was done responding. I had observed Aircraft X descend down to 17700 feet and climb back to 18000 feet. Aircraft X reports done with RA. I notified the supervisor of the RA. I issued a descend via clearance to Aircraft X and further coordinated with Approach that the pilot stated he may be a bit high for the first few fixes on the arrival. Aircraft X was switched over to TRACON frequency. I was taken off sector to go to the supervisor's office and discuss the Performance Record of Conference I was given for not doing my job correctly. Below is a copy of the text that was contained in the PRC for this situation.Aircraft X responded to a TCAS RA after receiving a discretionary descent and a traffic call for a VFR aircraft at 17500 feet that we were not in communications with. Even though the pilot had accepted the discretionary descent; he did not acknowledge the traffic call. No traffic alert or avoidance maneuvers were offered to the pilot. While there is no set or specific guidance on separation of IFR to VFR aircraft; the 7110.65 2-1-1 states that the primary purpose of the ATC system is to prevent the collision of aircraft in the system. In this specific situation; a traffic call was not sufficient enough for prevention; and the pilot had to take evasive maneuvers based off of their equipment. In the future; I expect you to utilize all tools available and the training you have received to enhance your judgment in predicting potential conflicts. When aircraft may come into unsafe proximity with each other; you must use positive means to separate aircraft. A few examples of positive means include but are not limited to using altitude separation; issuing vectors; ensuring the pilot has the other aircraft in sight; etc. Please use caution and positive; preventative control in future situations.'We start discussing the situation and I told him that I felt that I didn't do anything wrong in this situation. I issued a 2nd traffic call and a discretionary descent to the pilot. The supervisor stated that I should have done more to prevent this situation from happening. He also 'STRONGLY ADVISED' me to file an ATSAP report because this situation was going to go to the regional office; and possibly further for more review. I told him that at this point (in the meeting); we should just agree to disagree and complete all tasks required to close up the meeting because I felt that he was disciplining me for no reason.This is the 2nd time in a matter of about 4 weeks where I have been talked to by this particular supervisor about him thinking I am not doing my job correctly. I told him during the meeting yesterday that I didn't agree with his interpretation nor did I feel I did anything wrong in both situations and that at this point I feel that he is targeting me and singling me out. I've had an individual from Quality Assurance and another supervisor tell me that they felt I hadn't done anything wrong in this RA situation. I also told him I hadn't planned on filing an ATSAP as I didn't feel this was an issue; but now that he had talked to me about it and made it quite clear that this situation was going much further out of the building; I felt pressured into filing this report. I understand that some of the dynamics of this situation do not fall under the ATSAP umbrella; if you will; but this is where I chose to start. I am also discussing this with a few other people concerning some of the other things that are going on with this person and their perception of the product of my work. I would like to see the ASAP report that is filed by the pilot to understand his side of the story.

ZSE Controller issued VFR traffic to an aircraft and restricted the aircraft above the traffic. The Controller issued a pilot's discretion descent to the aircraft. The aircraft received an RA for the VFR traffic.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 16; Flight Crew Total 4500; Flight Crew Type 1100

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Departing C83 Byron IFR; I deviated from the ODP because I had relatively good visual with the ground and proceeded on course to destination.  The visibility was such that they were doing skydiving at Byron.  I now realize that ATC doesn't know what my conditions are and that I need to stick to the plan so as not to increase their workload to handle my errant ways.

Single pilot reported deviated from IFR clearance by flying direct course to destination instead of following the ODP on departure without ATC authorization.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Aircraft X was eastbound at 7000 ft; Aircraft Y was westbound at 16000 ft the targets merged but I didn't call traffic being separated by 9000 ft. Aircraft X asked if we had any traffic because he had a near mid-air with traffic within 300ft. I issued the traffic at 16000 that merged ranged in the display as far as I could and still nothing. About 30 seconds later a primary target (Aircraft Z) appeared 3 miles behind Aircraft X. The primary target was not displayed or hidden from sight. Make the targets a different color than the data blocks. Maybe if it was hidden under the data blocks it would show up a different color.

ZFW Controller reported an aircraft under his control reporting a NMAC. The Controller had traffic 9;000 feet above this aircraft and did not see any other traffic. Controller zoomed radar scope in and saw nothing. Seconds later the Controller observed a primary target 3 miles south of the reporting aircraft.


I was the pilot flying; after takeoff; I called for the First Officer to retract the gear. We were well within the normal profile for gear retraction; and the First Officer moved the gear selector to up. As we climbed; we heard the nose gear doors close; but could still hear the noise associated with the main gear being down. Soon after; we received the 'Gear Disagree' warning message. We continued the climb profile; while maintaining an airspeed below 200 KIAS for the landing gear limitation. At a safe altitude; I transferred controls and radios to the First Officer and completed the QRH procedure for the 'Gear Disagree' warning with the gear selector in the up position. During this time; we contacted ATC and notified them we would be restricted to 200 KIAS because the landing gear would be extended for the duration of the flight. I also contacted Maintenance Control via ACARS and they told us to contact line maintenance on the ground when we got to [destination]. Since it was early morning; and we had plenty of fuel; (we were tankering an extra hour plus worth of fuel); we decided to continue. We discussed the situation; there was no immediate danger; we had maintenance and assistance if needed; and the flight was short enough where we would have plenty of fuel flying at our slower airspeed and with the landing gear down. Furthermore; the entire region was complete VFR and was expected to remain that way throughout the day. We also discussed if the situation did become serious; [a suitable alternate] was on the way and would make a great diversion airport if needed. We continued and landed and taxied in without further incident.The cause of this event was a malfunction of the landing gear system on the CRJ-200. The failure was not serious and did not affect the immediate safety of the flight.

[Report narrative contained no additional information]

CRJ-200 flight crew reported continuing to destination in VFR conditions after the main landing gear failed to retract after takeoff.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

We were on final approach for Runway 12L in MSP. We were assigned 4000' and 170 kts. We were configured with flaps 20. Just prior to glideslope intercept at HAMML (10.9 DME); we experienced a sudden and momentary pocket of turbulence; possibly from the preceding Aircraft Y's wake. Our aircraft instantly rolled to a 45 degree right bank; and a momentary pitch up attitude of approximately 5 degrees and brief stick shaker and the autopilot disconnected. I reacted immediately pushing the nose over; rolling the wings level and adding max thrust; all simultaneously. The encounter was very sudden and we were able to return to stable flight fairly quickly. Once stable we were still at assigned altitude but fast and were able to slow to assigned speed and engage the autopilot. We then captured the glideslope and finished configuring the aircraft prior to the FAF and made a safe and uneventful landing. I believe it was an encounter of wake turbulence from the Aircraft ahead of us. Even though our aircraft experienced the stick shaker; we were at a safe airspeed and we believe it was triggered by the sudden increased load factor associated with the turbulence. Once at the gate we confirmed that there were no injuries and we contacted Maintenance to report our encounter with severe turbulence. We encountered a pocket of severe turbulence on approach. I strongly believe it was due to the preceding aircraft's wake.

On final approach into MSP at approximately 4000' MSL prior to glide slope intercept with flaps at 20 we encountered severe turbulence that led to a significant roll upset of about 45 degrees or more to the right; and about a 5 degree pitch up. The roll upset caused the autopilot to disengage and the stick shaker was immediately activated. The FO (First Officer) was PF (Pilot Flying) and was able to promptly recover the aircraft once normal control was regained. At the time of the incident we were assigned and flying 170 kts IAS as assigned by ATC. I believe the stick shaker activation was caused by the sudden pitch up and increase in load factor; as the airspeed did not decrease significantly. The airspeed increased normally with the application of max power and once control was regained we reduced power to prevent a flap overspeed having confirmed that normal control and flight was regained. The recovery was prompt and the aircraft did not deviate any more than 100' from the altitude that we were at for the segment of the approach. We were able to re-engage the autopilot and intercept the glide slope shortly after and complete the approach without further incident. I queried ATC about our preceding traffic and they said that it was an Aircraft Y; which shouldn't create significant wake. I am not sure if it was wake turbulence or a pocket of turbulence in the cloud. We landed without incident and taxied to the gate. We ensured that all passengers and crew were okay; and contacted Maintenance to have them inspect the aircraft following the severe turbulence encounter. I believe the cause was either wake turbulence or an area of turbulence embedded in the cloud.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported encountering turbulence on approach into MSP that was possibly related to the Medium Transport they were following.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 7; Flight Crew Total 492; Flight Crew Type 485

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication

On a VFR flight from EWB to 08R our almost direct route crossed into the Class D airspace of OQU; but remained south of the 10nm outer ring of PVD airspace. At about 3nm before reaching the Class D limit; I contacted OQU tower requesting clearance to transit the Delta airspace at 2000 ft.; southeast to southwest.ATC response was that the airspace above 1299 MSL was the under the authority of PVD approach. I explained that my path of flight will take me south of the PVD airspace limit but ATC still refused to give me clearance. On the chart; the Class Delta airspace 5nm limit clearly extends south of the 10nm ring up to 2500 MSL.My suggestion is that if the airspace south of the 10nm ring is indeed not the responsibility of OQU by MOA with PVD; then the chart should be aligned to show that.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 18000; Flight Crew Type 400

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

ATC assigned 160 KTS to 4 DME. The Captain (pilot flying) slowed to 155 KTS after a wake turbulence encounter at approximately 6 DME. ATC queried our speed; we reported 155 KTS and explanation. They chastised us and there was no problem. Normal landing. Aircraft behind us continued normally.

A330-300 First Officer reported slowing below assigned speed on final at EGLL following a wake vortex encounter.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 280; Flight Crew Total 10000

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Flew the FMS Bridge Visual to 28R at SFO. First Officer was flying. Landing was uneventful. While holding between runways to cross 28L; Crew noticed that VHF 1 was set on Tower and Approach Control with Approach still selected. Neither crew member remembered acknowledging landing clearance. Tower Controller made no comment while clearing the crew to cross 28L. Crew called Tower after block in and Controller said everything was fine. Crew was distracted by light aircraft traffic calls on final.

A B757 First Officer reported landing without clearance on SFO Runway 28R because the crew were distracted by ATC calls about light aircraft traffic on final.


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

After takeoff; I (FA 2) smelled a strong odor of dirty bleach and [experienced] a headache; dizziness; tightening of throat; nausea and burning eyes. After level off the smell dissipated. Still felt very nauseated; headache; dizziness and tightness in throat throughout the flight. On descent the same smell continued with same symptoms. FA 4 started feeling nauseated and headache. After landing I could still smell the odor and ask FA 1 to come to the back of airplane and midway through the cabin she started feeling nauseated; headache and dizziness. Captain put the event in the logbook and the plane was taken out of service. FA 1; 2; and 4 went to clinic and then hospital for blood work. After 5 hours blood was taken. Results were normal. The blood work should have been drawn a lot earlier.

A319 Flight Attendant reported feeling ill after being exposed to fumes in the cabin. Other flight attendants reported similar effects; and three of them went to the hospital.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Environment - Non Weather Related; Staffing; Human Factors

While taking Runway X for departure in ZZZ; we saw a single engine tail wheel GA aircraft climbing on the upwind leg and turning out to the north around midfield after taking off the opposite direction on Runway YY. We were unaware of this departing traffic until seeing them airborne at what I would guess 200 feet AGL. I stopped the aircraft around the runway numbers when I saw the airborne aircraft and we had not initiated our takeoff roll. They were most likely off the ground by the time we taxied onto the runway; but we could not see all the way to the opposite end due to runway slope. The GA aircraft made a CTAF radio call telling us he had self announced his intersection departure off Runway YY. We told them we were unaware they were taking off the opposite direction.The airport was uncontrolled at this time of day due to reduced Control Tower hours of operation. We were monitoring CTAF frequency while holding short of the runway and simultaneously getting our IFR clearance from Center. I remember hearing a call on CTAF but couldn't clearly understand it. This was further hindered by listening to both radios at the same time. I don't recall hearing any previous CTAF calls such as this other aircraft self announcing their taxi. When the other aircraft called us after taking off; my First Officer mentioned he believed to have heard the aircraft announce departure off Runway XX. The aircraft stated he announced an intersection takeoff for Runway YY. Main contributing factors were an airport that has enough traffic volume to require a Control Tower not having their Tower open; nice VFR weather for GA flying; the GA pilot not being clear about their intentions over CTAF or speaking up when we announced our takeoff intentions for the opposite runway; calm winds allowing for takeoff from either direction; and not pausing as a crew before taking the runway to verify we understood the unclear CTAF call and would be clear of conflicting traffic.I would assume the Control Tower is running a reduced schedule due to less air traffic than normal given the current coronavirus climate. It would be better if they were open at this time in the morning when Part 121 flights are scheduled. Self announcing on CTAF is everyone's responsibility at an uncontrolled airport. The GA aircraft could've been clearer about their intentions and made more calls. As a crew; we did our part by announcing our intentions; and that should  caught the attention of the opposite direction traffic. The only remaining factor that could've prevented this potential runway incursion would be for us to use good CRM by each focusing our listening attention on individual comm radios during situations requiring monitoring of both; and ensuring to verify that any unclear radio calls are not coming from any potentially conflicting traffic.

Captain reported a GA aircraft departed in opposite direction while they were on the runway ready for takeoff. The Tower was closed at the time of the event.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

We started taxiing out in SAV before the Tower was open. The wind was calm; and two airplanes were taxiing to Runway 10. To get to Runway 10 from the terminal you take Taxiway F to Taxiway E normally; so that is what all three airplanes did. When you turn onto Taxiway E from Taxiway F there are red lights across the taxiway indicating a closure; so all three airplanes did the same thing; stop. I assume the first two airplanes did the same thing as we did when they stopped. Check their 10-7 pages and the NOTAMs; nothing about a taxiway closure in either. Both [Air Carriers ahead of us] continued down taxiway to Runway 10 for takeoff; which we now know is a closed taxiway from E1 to the west end of Runway 10. Unfortunately; after consulting our 10-7 pages and the NOTAMs; we did the same thing. There is a sign on the side of the taxiway next to the red closure lights that says ILS critical area closed when the Tower is closed between 12:00 and 0600; nothing about the taxiway actually being closed. I assume both airplanes in front of us believed that the ILS critical area should be open since it was severe VFR just like we did. Once we finally looked over our SAV 10-9 page once we were airborne; we saw the little boxed note that talks about the taxiway closure up by the terminal. We did wait to taxi down the end of the runway until after we had been released by Center; though.Obviously there is an issue. Three airplanes did the same thing and it wasn't because we just wanted to taxi down a closed taxiway; it is because there is some confusion with the facility. I believe the sign on the side of the taxiway needs to say the same thing as the boxed note on the 10-9 page; that the taxiway is closed not just the ILS critical area. Errors we made: Not looking at all the boxed notes on the 10-9 page. Following the pack; we talked about back taxiing then just decided to do what the other airplanes had already done.I think the boxed note on the 10-9 page should also be in our 10-7 pages.

Taxing out in SAV with the Tower closed and before dawn to Runway 10 via Taxiway F and E. Making the turn onto Taxiway Echo; we noticed red lights across the taxiway. They were associated with a yellow information sign that said; 'Taxiway Echo ILS critical area closed when Tower closed.' Since it was VMC; and two other air carrier aircraft taxied past it; we decided it was okay to continue onto the rest of the taxiway. Once past the line we noticed that there were no taxiway edge lights; which raised some red flags. We continued and once in flight; I looked closer at the 10-9 page. There was a note indicating that Taxiway Echo was closed past the critical area when Tower was closed. I did reference this on the ground; but I missed it. It is very confusing signage and notations on the 10-9 page. The 10-9 says the taxiway is closed past the ILS critical area when Tower is closed; but the sign makes it seem that it is only closed when the weather is below that which the ILS critical area is protected. We were unsure which they wanted. I think this should be reviewed as it did; and probably will continue; to cause confusion in the future. Since two other aircraft in front of us did the same thing; there is obviously an issue here.The threats were that the field was uncontrolled; it was dark; and it was very early in the morning. There may have been an error of taxing on a closed taxiway; but we are unsure if this is the case due to confusing and conflicting information.

The SAV Airport Diagram Chart notes that Runway 1 and 10 ILS critical areas are closed when the Tower is closed but the restrictions are easily overlooked and should be described on other publications also.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Distraction; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

ATIS had winds 040/7 360v150. We were approaching 28 for departure when Tower called traffic on four-mile final; gave us the winds and cleared us for takeoff. I heard the winds; but they didn't register in my consciousness. We took off; and used a lot of the runway. On climb out above 10;000'; we asked each other about the winds; and pieced together that they were stronger out of the east than we had realized. We got the new ATIS; which had just changed; and copied winds of 070/10G16. Entering that into the [flight computer]; we saw that was 13 knots of tailwind; and out of limits.

B737 flight crew reported taking off with a tailwind out of limits after having been given the latest winds by the Tower.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 5200; Flight Crew Type 3400

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Cleared to descend to 12;000 ft. and read back cleared to 12;000 ft. Through 13;000 ft. Approach told us there was a low altitude alert and that we were cleared to 14;000 ft. not 12;000 ft. like we read back.

CE560E pilot reported getting a low altitude alert from ATC.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 212; Flight Crew Total 870; Flight Crew Type 220

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure; Weather

My student and I were on an IFR flight plan to MKO. We received clearance from ATC (Fort Worth Center) to descend to 3;500 ft. MSL from 5;000 ft. MSL and were cleared direct to POKYO for the RNAV RWY 13 into MKO. When we were about 5nm west of POKYO; ATC warned us of an airplane at our 12 o'clock; heading towards us about 5nm away. We looked for the traffic but were unable to see the reported traffic. We were in VMC conditions with broken clouds around us about at our same altitude. Visibility was unlimited. About a minute or two later ATC again warned us of the traffic and when we reported we were unable to see the traffic; ATC instructed us to turn right 40 degrees to avoid the oncoming traffic. Upon initiating the turn; I saw Aircraft Y fly about 300 ft. below us. Once the aircraft passed us and was no longer a factor; we were cleared back direct to POKYO and cleared for the approach. We then executed a hold in lieu of a procedure turn and continued the approach. Once we were about 3 miles from the final approach fix (CULAD); ATC cleared us to change to the advisory frequency and advised us to cancel our IFR flight plan on the ground or with them in the air. We elected to cancel our IFR flight plan in the air with Ft. Worth Center since we were in VMC conditions had visual contact with the airport. Once we switched over to CTAF; our traffic alert system alerted us of traffic at our same altitude and location. We started to look around and I saw Aircraft Y to the West of us; at our same altitude; and about half a mile away initiating a bank away from us. My student announced our location and intentions on CTAF and the pilot of Aircraft Y replied 'We've almost hit you guys twice now and you should be talking on CTAF when you're operating close to an airport.' I replied that we were on an IFR flight plan talking with Ft. Worth Center and they had just switched us over to CTAF. The Aircraft Y pilot then replied that we should be monitoring the CTAF frequency anyway. I thanked the pilot for his advice and for not running into us twice. MKO is class G airspace until 700 ft. AGL and then class E after then.

GA pilot reported an NMAC on approach prior to communications transfer from ARTCC to CTAF.