Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 225; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Even with all the fancy FAR 117 rules the FAA has FAILED. I am still flying just as crappy trips and sometimes MORE so!? Besides the obvious lack of concern from the company because they are 'following the rules; nothing else they can do' mentality. They constantly violate our contract. I know the latter doesn't appear to be a FAA/NASA problem; but when I'm expecting a meal and then none is boarded or worse; it's bad; I go hungry and get a sugar low. I get light headed and obviously I'm now trapped as I can't go out for 5 minutes and pick up something at the airport [fast food] (which isn't nutrition; but better than nothing). Many times crews are forced to pick up food and eat it enroute (cold) as there is less than an hour between flights. Note: how many gate agents eat cold food while at the gate? Have you ever seen a gate agent eating while boarding a flight? They get 30 minutes every 5 hours to eat. Not us. Worst; reason for this report; is that AFTER a redeye flight to IAH (in this example) we are then forced to fly [three more legs] with NO breaks. After a redeye with only 4-5 hours of sleep?!?! It's bad enough to fly one leg back at the end of a four day trip with redeye on day 3 (that arrives in IAH at XA:09 AM day four); however to make us fly a turn before going home; criminal. My body is sweating and I feel ill because my body doesn't know what's going on after an arrival at XAam. Sure; 12 hours seems like enough time to recoup; but it's not. Most of us only get 3-5 hours sleep; then our body wakes up at XIpm. You CAN'T FORCE SLEEP no matter how tired you are... THEN our stomachs growl and we wake up because either food wasn't on the airplane (airport restaurants are closed when [we] arrive at airport and eating so early doesn't cut it at XAam when stomach growling). Food bars and oatmeal only go so far too. To top it off conditions were windy; icing and other factors. Basically it comes down to this... Do you want to be flying on an airplane when BOTH pilots feel like crap? You can only call in fatigued so many times. I can't call in fatigued every other trip. Not realistic and people have families to support and are scared of retaliation. Lets be dead honest why most people/pilots don't report. They are scared for their jobs. They figure I'll just do this only while I'm junior and when I get senior I don't have to worry with it anymore. So to add insult to injury only JUNIOR pilots are placed in this situation (actually not; FAR 117 now makes all pilots schedules poor)? Bad enough an experienced pilot must go through this crap. I've been reporting about this for 20 years. NOTHING has changed with FAR117 and some things are actually WORSE. I'm just reporting this and filing it away to show a paper trail. Lawyers only care about a paper trail. If it were a desk job; sucks; but that's life. Problem is people's lives (YOUR life one day?) is literally in my hands so why let FAA allow these schedules? Oh yea; because of money. Got it.

Air carrier First Officer reports chronic fatigue problem flying the schedules his airline builds; with no help from FAR 117.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Air Traffic Control Non Radar 4; Air Traffic Control Radar 2; Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22; Flight Crew Total 1950; Flight Crew Type 366

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing

Upon the arrival leg into ZZZ the TRACON controller (very good); assisted us getting around the terribly laid out SLC Bravo airspace. The Controller informed us to contact the SLC Tower upon departure for a transition through the Bravo off ZZZ.On departure; we contacted SLC ATCT. The Controller issued a beacon code. We did not receive a Bravo clearance however. We began to orbit. We experienced moderate turbulence; up/down drafts and high engine temps as we orbited and waited for clearance. It never came.The Controller who was clearly working too many frequencies combined was issuing clearances to parked aircraft on Clearance Delivery. This is completely unacceptable. Either the priority of duties is incorrect at SLC Tower or this Controller needs a refresher as airborne aircraft shouldn't be in holding because you're playing catch up on CD. After finishing a third orbit of getting my brain rattled by turbulence; I called on the frequency with just my tail number. The Controller; who'd clearly forgotten that he was also working airborne aircraft cleared me through the Bravo immediately.The Tower needs to understand that there is very little reality in the small area where the Bravo doesn't start near ZZZ. This creates terrain alerts and terrible ride conditions; especially for lighter aircraft.I understand that due to COVID-19 that Controllers are working more frequencies than usual. I get it. This can't happen though. The level of service shouldn't be sacrificed for anything and in this case; it clearly was. Please be better. Airlines not moving on the ground shouldn't have priority over general aviation in the air.

Pilot reported issues with the service provided by SLC Tower and cited Controller workload as a contributing factor.


FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 4R

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

As expected and previously briefed New York approach initially assigned us ILS 4R. Descending through 10;000 we picked up ice and changed to the already requested ice speeds. Approximately 30 miles from the airport New York Approach said now to expect RNAV (GPS-Y) 4R. I was flying and since we were below 10;000 feet and close to the airport; I requested the First Officer to load and brief the approach. As the First Officer was briefing the approach; I thought that I should add how the vertical guidance would be flown; but never followed through on that and never briefed it. We completed the runway/approach change items on checklist. Other aircraft had been cleared for the RNAV (GPS-Z) 4R we discussed that and confirmed that the RNAV (GPS-Y) 4R was the correct approach for us. During the approach I initially used Flight Path Angle (FPA) for vertical guidance; but then switched to VNAV; but at FAF I did not switch back to FPA. At 1;000 feet AGL and the runway in sight I called runway in sight; disconnected auto pilot; called for set missed approach altitude. With the vertical mode still in VNAV; as the First Officer 'set the missed approach altitude' the autothrottles started driving forward and our speed picked up 20 knots. At this time I disengaged the autothrottles and the First Officer selected FPA. We continue the approach verified we are stable at 500 feet and made a normal landing on Runway 4R.In the future I will make sure to brief how the approach will be flown in both lateral and vertical mode; especially when flying RNAV approaches. If there is any doubt I will reference the approach charts in the SOP during the briefing. This will verify what both pilots will expect during the approach.

Air carrier Captain reported recovery from a near unstable approach after a change from ILS to RNAV approach to EWR airport.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 123; Flight Crew Total 4210; Flight Crew Type 280

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

On Date I departed ZZZ with destination ZZZ1.at cruise altitude of 34;000 ft. the left engine Fan speed start increasing on its own. All other parameters (Turbine speed; Fuel Pressure; Oil Pressure and temperature) remain Nominal. As a precautionary measure; I shutdown the left engine; and after completing the checklist; I was vectored and clear to land at ZZZ2. Mechanic Inspection Revealed that the Left engine Fuel Control Unit had Failed.

C550 Captain reported the left engine fan speed began increasing on climb. The Captain elected to perform an in flight shut down and diverted to make a precautionary landing.


Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

It was a normal flight to MSP at 25;000 feet with one pack deferred; sometime after the ROKKK intersection we were given a descent via the NITZR TWO Arrival. I then put 7;000 feet in the altitude preselect and we discussed the altitudes and speeds for the arrival. By looking at the Direct/Intersection page I planned on using 2;000 FPM for our descent rate. About the NITZR intersection ATC slowed to 250 KTS which decreased our descent rate. About 5 miles prior to AANAH intersection my FO mentioned that we still needed to cross AANAH at 10;000 feet. I then pulled the power to idle and deployed the flight spoilers in an effort to make the crossing at AANAH at 10;000 feet. Because of my late actions; we crossed AANAH at 10;800 and at a speed 265 KTS. The rest of the arrival was normal and ATC later gave us vectors for an ILS to 30L.In retrospect I should have asked ATC for a vector off the arrival when I realized we would not make our crossing restriction or I could have asked them if they needed the speed or altitude first. As we all know the 900 can go down or slow down but it cannot do both at the same time. Also greater attention to the arrival (once ATC gave us a speed change) would have given me more time to make all the crossings at the proper speeds and altitudes. These new arrivals are all different and as a crew any deviation from what you have planned can greatly affect your ability to do what ATC or the arrival asks of you.

During a revenue flight to MSP; sometime after the ROKKK intersection we were given descend via the NITZR TWO Arrival. The PF Captain preselected 7;000 feet and we discussed the altitudes and speeds for the arrival. He decided on 2;000 FPM and referenced the direct intercept page for the descent. About the NITZR intersection ATC slowed us to 250 KTS which decreased our descent rate. About 5 miles prior to AANAH intersection I noticed we still needed to cross AANAH at 10;000 feet and brought this to the Captain's attention. He pulled the power to idle and deployed the flight spoilers and started a descent to try to cross AANAH at 10;000. Because of our late actions we crossed AANAH about 10;800 and a speed of 265; the rest of the Arrival was normal. ATC later gave us vectors for ILS to 30L. We should have asked ATC for a vector off the arrival or asked if they needed the speed or altitude first. The CRJ does not slow down and go down at the same time very well; so we should have determined which was more immediate.

CRJ-900 flight crew reports not making the crossing restriction at AANAH on the NITZR2 arrival to MSP due to a late start down. ATC is not advised and AANAH is crossed 800 feet high.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 500

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure

Watching the news in the morning I knew the Cincinnati Bengals had a home game.  The station said their coverage was at 1930.  I checked weather and TFR's on my Nexus 7 using AVARE.  I also have a Garmin GPS with XM WX and it shows TFR's.  Neither shows sports TFR's.  Returning from a trip to 0I8 and heading north VFR I noticed people in the stadium.  I still thought the game started at 1930 so I just figured fans were partying in the stadium pregame.  Just to be safe I went as far west as I could staying inches outside of the CVG airspace.  Looking at my TAC chart it was too close to call whether I was far enough away.  In hindsight; the TV stations coverage of the game was for AFTER the game.  The game started earlier.  I had a chance to do a 180 when I first saw; what appeared to be; people in the station but I was convinced kickoff was at 1930 and didn't process that I might be wrong.  I normally call FSS on cross country flights or any flight with weather issues.  FSS generally does not inform us of sports TFR's; as I recall.  It would be nice if XM included them.

A pilot violated the CVG Football TFR because he thought the game started much later but as he approached; it appeared the game was in progress so he attempted to divert around it but may not have.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action

Approach was stable into the flare. At approximately 5 feet; a gust of wind caused an increase in performance and induced a float. I corrected to arrest the float with a slight forward pressure on the yoke. When the gust dissipated; the correction was removed to arrest the descent. However; the aircraft landed firmly and bounces a couple feet back into the air and immediately resettled. Appeared to land wings level. I didn't notice if the ground spoilers deployed on the initial bounce or see the VSI indication. To my knowledge; the Thrust levers were at idle at approximately 10 feet prior to the initial touchdown. I can't recall completely. Control of the aircraft and had a normal rollout.The aircraft was inspected and shown to have no visible damage and granted a 25 flight cycle waiver to get it to maintenance.

I was conducting initial IOE with a new First Officer (FO). He had flown a 3-day trip with another Line Check Airman prior to this trip with me. We were on day 2 of a trip. The FO was doing very well with all phases of IOE. Winds were gusty as we approached OAJ and he was handling the approach well. Just prior to touchdown; with thrust at idle; a gust of wind caused the airplane to balloon slightly. The FO applied what I thought were appropriate corrections to recover and land. The airplane hit the runway firmly and bounced maybe 2 feet into the air. Before I could react the airplane landed firmly and stayed on the ground. I did not see what the VSI read at the time of the bounce or the landing. After taxiing to the gate; I made an entry in the aircraft maintenance log for a possible hard landing. The initial inspection by the mechanic noted no damage.

Air carrier flight crew reported landing hard after encountering a wind gust during flare.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Conducted a standard preflight DG inspection. Post flight;  was made aware of a dangerous goods discrepancy via an email forwarded from the Duty Officer.  The email stated [the] Flight arrived this morning with unmanifested IDG in the AFT belly; there were also three boxes of dry ice loaded into A1. After  pulling the airways bill numbers for these packages and they showed no scans to the flight. The IDG [Inaccessible Dangerous Goods]  container; had not been assigned to the flight either and was loaded in position X. The Sort DG Manifest was in the pouch of the container but there was no card showing anything loaded.The cause was Improper manifesting and handling of cargo.[I suggest] additional training is provided to cargo loaders and Dangerous Goods personnel.

I was informed via company email by the Duty Officer of undocumented DG loaded in the aircraft that was discovered during offloading in ZZZ1. [The cause was] ramp personnel loading unmanifested DG in ZZZ.[Suggest ramp] not load unmanifested DG.

Flight crew and Dispatcher reported receiving email from Duty Officer regarding unmanifested inaccessible Dangerous Goods on board on a previous flight.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 18500; Flight Crew Type 6500

While hand flying the turn from base to final; my iPad became unresponsive when attempting to switch Jepp FD Pro view from the STAR chart to the approach chart for the ILS 27 approach. The display then blanked and the iPad became completely unresponsive; a state in which it remains hours later. Due to the daytime VMC conditions; having already briefed the approach; and my familiarity with the airport; I continued the approach and landing. The FO (First Officer) suggested giving me his iPad; but at this late stage of the approach I considered it the safest option to continue to the landing without transferring his iPad. The landing; roll out and taxi in to the gate was uneventful. Had this event occurred at night; in IMC; or at an unfamiliar airport a go-around would have been required in order to brief our new plan for operating with limited information for one pilot; and planning the subsequent flight operations and taxi would have been much more difficult without any back-up paper charts to help.

B757 Captain reported failure of Electronic Flight Bag on final approach.


Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Coming in to ROA we were cleared for the visual approach for Runway 34; I was PM and Captain was PF. We were set up for a left base and kept our descent coming down to 4;000 feet. On the descent down we received a GPWS warning for terrain and Captain took immediate action and we climbed out of the terrain we were near. Captain and I both had our terrain mode on; but it was not showing up on the MFD for both sides. ATC also reported to us if we saw the terrain ahead before we received the GPWS.I believe this started from the beginning of our trip both Captain and I were deadheading from ZZZ to ZZZ1 and the aircraft had a hydraulic issue which made our flight delayed. Which got rid of 2 of our 3 flights that we were supposed to operate and made this flight our first flight of the day together. This was also my first time at ROA and Captain told me that he has been there a couple times before so I was unfamiliar with the airport and the surrounding terrain. With it also being a moonless night it was very hard to see the terrain in front of us and with terrain mode on but it wasn't showing us anything made it very difficult to determine exactly where we were at on the ILS approach plate when we were in VFR conditions. I also should have spoken up when I was looking on the approach plate that the highest terrain was 3;508 and Captain was setting the altitude bug to 4;000 feet. I believe our vertical speed was also a factor but I don't remember exactly what Captain had it set to. Captain and I also debriefed together to figure out what we did wrong and what we did right and learn from our mistakes.Add terrain photos or jepp plates on the 10-7 pages to help with situational awareness.

Cleared for ILS 34 on an extended left base and received the ground proximity warning for terrain on decent to the final approach fix altitude. Initially cleared to altitude on our route to 9;000 feet crossing Pulaski (PSK) [VOR]. After PSK on rout to ROA we were then given a decent down to 6;000 feet. Clear night we called airport in sight for the sight of the rotating beacon we set up for ILS 34. On an extended left base approach control gave us heading 090 and we were cleared for the visual to 34. After our clearance I gave a further turn to heading 100 and tried to widen out the base for Runway 34. With our clearance I descended down to 4;000 initially keeping in mind we had a tailwind until turning on final for Runway 34. On our descent to 4;000 we both switched to terrain mode on the PFD and saw nothing. Initially I was still on my legs page on my IPAD and my First Officer on the approach plate. We got a call from Approach asking us if we know the terrain around us and while he asked leveling at 4;000 we got a a TERRAIN TERRAIN PULL UP WARNING. We exercised the escape maneuver and leveled at 6;000. We replied to the approach that we exercised the escape maneuver and discussed that we thought we were south of the terrain further back. At night it is hard to distinguish that but exercised extreme caution until back on final.Cause - No initial knowledge of the area of terrain at night even in terrain mode on PFD. Cross reference with iPad to select altitude until final. Suggestion - I will hold the last cleared altitude at 6;000 feet and go further out towards the IAF before turning for final and descending to final altitude before glide slope capture.

Air carrier flight crew reported a CFTT event during a visual approach to ROA airport.  Reportedly; ATC advised the crew of the terrain right before they received a GPWS warning.  The crew exercised an escape maneuver.


Hydraulic System Lines; Connectors; Fittings

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

An aircraft came in for a weight and balance. After the aircraft was defueled we pushed it into the corner of the hangar in front of the chemical room. I walked over to check on the guys and to see how the work was coming along. As I was walking by the mechanics called me over to the aircraft and they said I needed to come take a look inside of the dry bays just forward of the MLG (Main Landing Gear) wheel wells where the fuel sump drains are located. I looked up into the LH bay and saw a hydraulic fuse zip tied; I then looked up into the RH bay and saw the other fuse zip tied. I asked the mechanics to get a picture and send it to me. I then asked the guys to cut the zip ties and we then verified after they were cut that the levers on both fuses were in the correct positions and they then performed an ops check. It was a complete oversight on my part to not check the other fuses that exist on the aircraft to ensure that they were not zip tied also. Being the 2nd most senior mechanic on shift and also being the shift supervisor it was a complete oversight on my part to not inform them to document what we found and to not take the initiative and document it myself. In all sincerity I just didn't quite understand the seriousness of the situation and how big of an impact it could have had on the safety of flight. I thought of it as a couple of zip ties and nothing more; which is a complete failure on my part. I take responsibility for this; my guys did the correct thing by letting me know what they had found and I failed them by not informing them to document it and not documenting it myself. There was some operational check that were performed at a previous date that requires the hydraulic fuses to be placed in the bypass position. After the check was performed the zip ties were forgotten and not removed from the fuses that were on the aircraft. Anytime we find a situation where things are not as they should be with an aircraft we need to document it. It doesn't matter how big or small it seems to be it must be documented.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

The maintenance crew for an Embraer reported the brake system hydraulic fuses were zip tied in the bypass position.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency

While enroute we were in between buildups. After going through a few clouds we came upon a large buildup that we couldn't avoid. While going through it; we experienced moderate/severe turbulence. The Captain kicked off the autopilot to hand fly around the clouds. We told ATC of the issue and he told us to 'do whatever you need to do.' We exceeded our assigned altitude by 500 FT; but heard nothing else from ATC. After exiting the build up; the cruise portion of the flight continued as normal. Upon arrival at the terminal area we were cleared to fly 040 heading and to descend to 4;000 FT. After leveling at 4;000 FT the Captain advanced the throttles. When he did; the right engine flamed out and the ITT spiked into the red indication. I immediately ran the checklist for engine failure. After securing the engine; we tried a restart but the ITT spiked again when he tried to advance the thrust levers. (Note: the N2 never exceeded 45%.) The Captain immediately shut the engine back down; and we executed an emergency landing without further incident.

Sent an ACARS message to Dispatch; but due to time constraints did not speak to them verbally. I felt confident they would have us do what we were doing and land at our destination.If I had to do it over again I would transfer the controls and the radios to the First Officer and run the QRH myself. Not because he did a poor job but because I found myself constantly trying to 'look over his shoulder' to make sure nothing was missed. I feel that this would have reduced my stress level significantly and sped the process up rapidly.

Shortly after encountering significant turbulence while deviating for weather; the flight crew of a CRJ-200 had to shut down the left engine due to its failure to spool up; accompanied by high ITT; following a descent.


Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Climbing out the aircraft began to vibrate in a steady; quick rhythm that felt similar to a PIO (Pilot Induced Oscillation) or a bouncing sensation like being on the end of a diving board and bouncing up and down (porpoising) in the Longitudinal axis of the aircraft.  The Autopilot was engaged in the Command A (Left Side) position and was in a VNAV Climb passing through FL180 at 280 Knots. I was the Pilot flying and noticed it immediately and after just a few seconds I disconnected the autopilot to see if it might have been the cause of the bouncing (thought it could be an autopilot servo malfunctioning). The bouncing sensation continued and actually gained intensity. Next I instructed the First Officer (PM) to roll the airspeed back to 260 knots to see if this flutter or vibration would stop. At the same time I informed ATC that we needed to level off at FL180 to deal with a possible flight control issue. We descended back down to and maintained FL180. As the airspeed bled down through 270 knots I could feel the intensity of the pitch/bounce decrease; and by the time we had slowed to 260 knots the sensation had disappeared. We went through the QRH looking for an applicable procedure and only found the 'Elevator Tab Vibration' checklist. After reading through this procedure we decided that all of the steps had already been complied with in our initial reaction to this event. This did not seem to really fit the situation that we were dealing with inflight. By this time ZZZ was about 80 miles in front of us; and I elected to divert there for its long runways; maintenance; and passenger capabilities. We decided continuing straight ahead in the decent; would be the most prudent/safe way to proceed to get us on the ground in the shortest amount of time while finishing the rest of our duties involved with the Emergency and Diversion. We would land about 1000 pounds overweight. I briefed the Flight Attendants and passengers; then prepared for our arrival. The vibration actually returned as we slowed through about 240 knots; and then went away again. Our landing was uneventful with a smooth touchdown at 145000 pounds. After a quick exterior check by ARFF Emergency vehicles; we were cleared to taxi to the gate.

The reporter stated that Maintenance was unable to find a definitive cause for the oscillations and that a subsequent test flight did not produce the oscillations.

B737-800 Captain experienced short period pitch oscillations climbing through FL180 at 280 knots. The autopilot was disengaged with no change then the airspeed was decreased to 260 knots and the oscillations disappeared. The crew elected to divert to the nearest suitable airport.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

On initial descent for the approach; student powered back from cruise to 30%. When powering back; Instructor felt the aircraft starting to shake violently and continuously while descending. Instructor scanned engine instruments for any abnormality and noticed cylinder 4 EGT and CHT offline. Instructor; [as a] precaution; requested a visual for the south runway and switched the fuel tanks; turned the fuel pump on; etc. Instructor took controls. When nearing the airport; cylinder 4 came online; power was normal and vibrations ceased; abnormality was not duplicated throughout.

SR20 instructor pilot reported Number 4 cylinder went 'offline' on descent; but resumed normal operation shortly thereafter.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 143; Flight Crew Total 5000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 29000; Flight Crew Type 11000

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Our aircraft was cleared the SUOH Reversal 2 for RWY 36 at RJFR. It was loaded into the FMS and confirmed by myself (PM) and the Captain (PF.) On climbout the PF called for the left autopilot shortly after passing 400 feet AGL. I actuated the left A/P and confirmed on the PFD the A/P engaged and the aircraft was in LNAV. I briefly changed the frequency to departure and checked in with our altitude and clearance. The departure called for an immediate right turn after 500 feet to circle over the runway while climbing then proceed to the DGC VOR to the west. Our aircraft was very light with a TOGW of 205;000 kgs and a takeoff thrust setting with a double derate of D-TO-2 and an assumed temperature of 64 degrees Celsius and a Climb-1 thrust setting. Despite the derates on the thrust setting the aircraft had superior climbing performance due to its light weight. After my check-in with departure I noticed the circular magenta LNAV track of the departure on our NDs had disappeared and only showed a line to the west from the airport to the DGC VOR. The aircraft quickly accelerated and was well into a left turn (rather than the prescribed right turn of the SWE2R departure.) My Captain; the PF; directed me to request a direct turn to the DGC VOR with the ATC controllers as the aircraft was deep into its left turn and a right turn was no longer an ideal option. There was no traffic in the vicinity. The request was somewhat hampered by language issues but the controller directed us to fly direct to the DGC VOR and amended our climb to 5;000 feet from 8;000 feet. We had programmed a noise abatement climb into the FMC and the aircraft's performance likely alleviated any noise concerns over the populated areas and handily cleared the surrounding terrain. In discussing the situation with my Captain; our opinion is that the departure is created for lower performance aircraft. With our high speeds on climbout the FMC aircraft quickly passed the right turn point at 500 feet and the FMS had the aircraft make the next logical step of turning left to the DGC VOR. My Captain is informing our company to advise other pilots operating out of RJFR to be aware of this issue and possibly take other steps to accomplish the departures.

During departure out of Kitakyushu Japan using Runway 36 for departure we were given the SUOH Reversal Two Departure (SWE2R) in our clearance it requires a wrap around right turn after 500 feet back to the VOR. We were light on takeoff. On the VNAV page it showed 500 feet then a right turn back to the VOR the turn showed up on the ND as a reasonable turn to the right. We were very light and reached 500 feet very quick. Probably just after the runway end. At 500 feet the magenta line came right back to us and disappeared behind us. The plane started a left turn and I said to First Officer it's supposed to a right turn check it; and at that time Control cleared us to FL80; and I told the First Officer to ask direct to DGC and we went direct DGC. No other mention of this came from the controller; didn't seem to be a problem. That departure procedure seems to more fit for a smaller jet.

A widebody freight aircraft departed on RJFR SWE2R SID and because it was exceptionally light climbed very quickly above the 500 feet right turn constraint and so the confused FMS with VNAV engaged; turned the aircraft left before the crew could respond.


Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was given the clearance to descend via the IVANE3 arrival to Charlotte. Complied with all the restrictions and crossed IVANE at 10;000 FT as depicted on the chart. Looking forward to next fix; realized that GIZMO was cross between 13;000 FT and 11;000 FT. We were already at 10;000 FT and nobody was saying anything. At that point it was too late to climb back up to 11;000 FT to start back down to the next altitude of 9;000 FT so we initiated [a]descent to 9;000 FT after passing GIZMO. ATC issued no alerts or modified instructions. Once on the ground I contacted the ATC facility to let the Manager know of the misprint in the NAS chart which confirmed what was on my approach plate and FMS database. He said that they knew about the issue. I asked why it wasn't notamed and he didnt give me a clear answer. I told him that most regional jets without autothrottles will shoot for the bottom of the arrival windows and I gave him my flight number as an example. Interpret the arrival to stay at 11;000 FT over IVANE rather than descending to 10;000 FT before GIZMO.

A Captain reports that the lowest crossing altitude at IVANE on the IVANE3 to CLT is 10;000 FT and not compatible with the next crossing restriction at GIZMO of 11;000 FT to 13;000 FT.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 35; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 400

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

I filed an IFR plan from VPZ routing CRG OMN. I received a confirmation email form with the expected routing as filed. This trip is one we routinely take. I called SBN clearance on the ground transmitter frequency and received the IFR clearance as filed; 3;000; expect 350 in 10 and contact SBN on 132.05 and hold for release say runway; which I replied 27. We also received a Zulu time which I misunderstood as a void time. I taxied to Runway 27 and called SBN clearance again and I had a different person. They gave me the clearance again; but I did not hear anything about a hold. I departed in VMC conditions and called SBN in the air on 132.05 but they were surprised to hear from me and asked for an ident on code 1354 as assigned in the clearance. SBN gave me heading 090 and radar contact. The SBN Controller then advised that we would have to hold for 45 minutes; we requested a return to VPZ. After landing I called SBN clearance on the ground to ask what was going on. I was advised that Florida airspace was not accepting any flights and to keep the same clearance and code and to call back in 45 minutes. I called back got the clearance and completed the flight. I was confused by the expect departure clearance time [EDCT] as I have never heard that phrase before and thought we had a void time. If SBN had mentioned a ground hold the instructions would have been clearer.

EA-500 pilot departing VPZ is given an expected departure clearance time with his clearance; but is not familiar with the phrase. After takeoff ATC assigns a 45 minute hold due to Florida airspace not accepting any aircraft. Reporter elects to return to VPZ to wait out the EDCT.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Tower advised two aircraft circling Papa John's stadium to remain west of our departure corridor; and one aircraft over downtown to remain east of our departure corridor. Tower controller then issued traffic alerts to us and cleared us for takeoff via the SID. Approximately 1000 FT we received a TCAS warning to maintain vertical speed. I switched to TCAS view on my PFD and it showed us passing directly overhead a target at 400 feet. Traffic was not seen. RA then instructed us to level off momentarily before indicating clear of traffic. In retrospect; I'm not sure if the offending traffic either had time to clear out or misjudged our path; however next time I will be more assertive with the tower to ascertain the locations of the traffic and insuring they are well clear before beginning the takeoff roll.

Widebody pilot reported NMAC departing SDF.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

aircraft was configured for take off on runway 5L. Take off clearance was received with a Climb to 6000 feet on a 050 heading; normal take off continued after rotation Speed hold was called for at that point both Flight Directors as well as the speed selected disappeared from both PFDs. Captain (Pilot monitoring) informed tower that we would want to remain with them and would be returning to the airfield. We were instructed to make right traffic at or below 2500 feet. upon entering the downwind at 2500 feet for 5L the flight directors returned; and autopilot was engaged; we then received the GPWS terrain advisory and climbed to 3000 feet advising tower were doing so. The flight then continued for a normal visual approach to runway 5L. threats: task saturation; night time; degraded automation; mountainous terrain undesired aircraft state: GPWS for terrain resulting in the immediate necessity of climbing. I have learned to keep my Situational awareness level higher now especially when operating at airports that include mountains etc. Looking back we should have queried about left or right traffic knowing that there were terrain considerations on the right downwind.

EMB-145LR First Officer reported getting a terrain advisory from GPWS in the pattern at TYS.


Confusion; Situational Awareness; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC assigned a new altitude crossing restriction at MAYOS intersection on the IVANE5 RNAV arrival of FL220 instead of the published between FL260 and FL240. At the same time they slowed us to 250 KIAS instead of the published 280. This was done very late and we were unable to both slow and descend. We were flying an [a heavier A320 series aircraft] at a high landing weight and it was not physically possible to make the new restriction. We asked for and got the restriction deleted and we did a 'best possible descend and slow'. There were no conflicts or issues in this instance.ATC has made it a habit to change the crossing restriction at MAYOS. I am told it is a 'turf war' between Washington and Atlanta Centers. However; I have never flown the IVANE arrival as published. One thing that is always changed is the crossing restriction at MAYOS is changed to FL220 from between FL260 and FL240. This alone is a problem as we as pilots have to wait for ATC to give us the change for us to put it into our FMGC and then allow the aircraft to recompute or we have to override the automation and hand fly.In addition; we were given this clearance late and they compounded the issue by having us slow below the normal published descent crossing speed. All of this became impossible to accomplish as a [heavier A320 series] at high landing weights just will not slow down and come down that fast. We were forced to tell ATC that we could not comply with the newly assigned restrictions.ATC has been issuing a crossing restriction at MAYOS that is different than what is published. They must figure out what they want at MAYOS and publish it that so we can properly fly this arrival. This is a 'minor' problem; but it is happening every day and will eventually cause a 'major' problem if not fixed. We need to have the arrival published with a reasonable expectation that we will fly it as published. Right now that is not happening and ATC must be forced to fix this issue.

Pilot reported of being assigned a new altitude crossing restriction instead of the published restriction. Pilot was also told to slow 30 knots more than the published speed. Pilot advised they could not slow down and get down and asked for and received relief on the crossing restriction.


Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure; Staffing

B737 departed Runway 4 at El Paso; runway heading. My trainee radar contacted B737 and told the a/c to maintain 8;000 feet for traffic (an IFR over flight above B737 at 9;000 feet.) A few minutes go by and I tell my trainee to turn B737 direct SSO to avoid restricted airspace. A few minutes later B737 is on course and ZAB had taken the hand off. My trainee goes to ship B737 to Center and I notice he was level at 8;000 feet. I key up and ask B737 if he is climbing; and said no he was assigned 8;000 feet. I climbed B737 to 17;000 feet and shipped him to Center but at that time; although B737 was above the height of all obstructions; the MVA he was in was 9;000 feet. At the time we were working the radar east position in the TRACON.There was a Controller in the back of the room having a loud conversation with the Supervisor. Although the Supervisor was trying his best to listen in to me and my trainee; the Controllers' voice was over powering. I would recommend that if you are not needed in the TRACON; you are not allowed in the TRACON. The guy I was training had less than 20 hours and as much as I was trying to listening in; the other Controller in the room was very distracting and his presence not necessary. We have SID's and STAR's at ELP; but when we are on Runway 4 like we were today; there is no STAR going west bound off Runway 4. If there was a STAR off 4 west bound that actually worked; unlike our other SIDs and STARs; this problem would not have occurred if we had a west bound SID off [Runway] 4.

Aural distraction during Departure Controller training contributed to the failure of the trainee to assign a higher altitude to a departing B737 off ELP. The departing aircraft was briefly below the MVA; although above all obstacles.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 505; Flight Crew Type 387

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

Upon reaching clearance for ILS XX circle Runway XY at ZZZ from Approach; we were switched over to ZZZ Tower frequency. Established on the approach between the IAF and FAF; I keyed the mic to establish contact with Tower inbound. The entire avionics turned off completely; losing intercom; transponder; GPS/Nav/Comm 1; and Nav/Comm 2. ZZZ was currently under IFR due to 2SM visibility; but we were in visual conditions on the approach course. I broke off from the approach and turned to the south; since we were no longer receiving navigational guidance along the approach; and I had no communications to contact Tower or Approach. I knew the weather towards the south was looking clearer so the plan was to continue south towards ZZZ1 or ZZZ2. We troubleshot the avionics; checking circuit breakers and cycling the avionics switch to no avail. No indications of ammeter discharge or low voltage illuminated; and the turn coordinator was still operable as well as engine instruments; so I presumed that the failure was based solely on avionics and not complete electrical failure. We descended lower; maintaining VFR so that we could receive cell signal; and I contacted ZZZ Tower via cellphone; since they gave us instructors their phone number another time when they had an ATC/instructor meeting. I told them we were okay; and had complete avionics failure. I asked for the phone number for ZZZ1 Tower so I could communicate with them if I decided to continue south to ZZZ1. At that time; the visibility and clouds around ZZZ began to clear up and we could start to see towards ZZZ. I asked ZZZ Tower if the field was still IFR; and they replied that it just went VFR. We proceeded inbound toward ZZZ; maintaining VFR; and were able to receive landing and taxi clearances for our aircraft through the cell phone. The aircraft was repaired; with the problem being a short-circuited avionics switch.

C172 flight instructor reported a complete failure of communication and navigation equipment while on an instrument approach and in reduced visibility. The instructor broke off the approach; remaining in visual conditions; and was eventually able to contact ATC on a cell phone and make a successful approach and landing.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

I was training on 59/93 with multiple complex military operations including Crystal/Amraam and AR614. Aircraft Y flashed at me from 56. I took the handoff and Aircraft Y checked on requesting AR614. I told him to maintain block FL230-FL240 and I put in FL270 as a hard altitude and flashed him at Sector 76 because they clear participating aircraft into AR614. 76 took the handoff and I gave Aircraft Y [a] frequency. He requested UHF so I gave him UHF. 76 called on the landline and asked me to try Aircraft Y again because he did not check in. I tried Aircraft Y again and gave him a different UHF. 76 called back again requesting communications with Aircraft Y and Aircraft Y was no longer on my frequency. The AR614 block is FL250-FL270.I took a handoff on Aircraft X from 56 going to Mexico requesting FL360 and climbed him to FL240. 76 called me and said he still has not had Aircraft Y check in on his frequency. I tried to contact Aircraft Y and did not get a reply. We tried him several times. Aircraft Y was orbiting south of AR614 at FL240. We had to give Aircraft X a 180 heading immediately and a descent to FL190. We had to contact Aircraft Y on guard frequency for him to come back up on 59 frequency.The aircraft operating in AR614 should take VHF frequency change. Aircraft Y should have reported back [to] frequency if no response on 76 frequency. AR614 has been a long standing issue in 59 airspace. It is located in a major corridor and 59 does not clear aircraft into the tract. The departure procedures from SAT approach should be through Rocksprings airspace since they are the ones to own AR614. Corpus acts as a middle man in the procedures outlined for AR614 which leaves room for error because if 76 doesn't take the handoff then we are stuck with a high performance jet orbiting in the corridor and we can only climb him to FL240 which is also the bottom of the high sectors airspace stratum.The amount of military operations that we have to deal with on a day to day basis along with heavy commercial traffic can result in unsafe situations. The amount of military operations is a burden to the controllers that have to work it since we are required to bend over backwards for them and they keep requesting more and more. There needs to be better procedures; airspace design; and a limit to military operations in order to assure the safety of the NAS (National Airspace System).

ZHU Center Controller reported an unsafe situation when a military aircraft went No Radio and a carrier had to be vectored away from the No Radio aircraft.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Climbing out; passing about 16;000 ft; we got a Master Caution Door with the aft service door light illuminated. QRH had us call Flight Attendant to check door handle. FA (Flight Attendant) reported the handle slightly 'up' but returned to 'down' position. Door light went out so no further Crew action required. Upon passing FL340 we got another Master Caution Door with aft service door light illuminated. Called FA again they stated the door handle 'up' slightly. When asked if they thought there was a problem with the door; they stated that it was the liquor bag they had hanging on the door handle and that when they were removing it they were raising the handle to the unlocked position. Upon landing I briefed them that they are not to hang anything from the door handle. To which they stated 'everyone does this; this is how we have always done it.' So on the following flights I briefed the FA's that they are not to hang anything from the door handles. To which they stated 'We always hang the recycle bag on the forward galley door and the liquor bag from the aft door' because that's how they 'were taught.' It was also mentioned that they have had several [bulletins] that told them not to do this.The fact that there have been [bulletins] issued to the FA's about not hanging items from the door handles; but that they continue to do it is troubling. There is a serious safety issue with this.

Air Carrier Captain reported that Flight Attendant procedure of hanging and removing liquor and recycle bags from cabin door handles caused inflight illumination of door warning lights.


General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

I was tasked to perform a trend on Aircraft X; to replace the rudder trim knob; due to the knob coming loose. I removed old knob and installed the new knob. as I was not able to find a reference to replace the knob; I used task in the AMM. Under this reference is sub task which tells of testing the rudder trim system via the knob. At the time; the trim functioned without any noted problems.On take off from ZZZ the aircraft experienced a rudder trim run away event.Instead of using AMM for a reference for replacing the rudder trim knob; the CMM (Component Maintenance Manual) should be referenced in the AMM for knob replacement. Could not find a CMM reference; so I thought there was no reference for this.Rudder Trim Control Panel replaced due to event.The AMM reference should direct to the CMM for maintenance on the rudder trim panel and it's components; as the CMM was difficult for me to find.

Technician reported difficulty in locating correct reference for replacing the Rudder Trim Knob.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

While on a reposition flight to SNA; we encountered what appeared to be some sort of drone at approximately 8;000 FT over LA airspace. We were on an assigned heading at 8;000 FT and I noticed something [with] gray/silver color out in front of us. There was no advisory from ATC regarding traffic or any alert from the airplane stating 'traffic'. We couldn't tell how fast it was going as we were going 250 KTS and it passed quickly off the right side of the airplane approximately 100-200 FT below us. It looked like some sort of round object (similar to that of a balloon; but definitely not a weather balloon). We weren't sure if it was hovering or what as we passed it rather quickly. We reported it to ATC and he was very appreciative regarding the report.About 8 minutes later as we were approaching the base leg into SNA at 3;000 FT; we saw traffic on the TCAS at our altitude. ATC advised us of said traffic (unknown type) and that it was fast moving approximately 170 KTS. He said it would be no factor as we would turn inside of it to join the ILS. The airplane [TCAS] then began saying 'TRAFFIC; TRAFFIC' and the target changed course and went RED. The airplane gave us an RA to climb and we immediately climbed to avoid whatever it was. We never saw anything. Once we were clear of the traffic; we advised ATC we responded to an RA and he said thank you. We landed uneventfully. Ground Control then asked us to call SOCAL regarding the drone report to give specifics about what it looked like. He took our information and no further action was required.

A flight crew in LAX airspace reported passing close by what appeared to be drone at approximately 8;000 FT enroute to SNA then taking evasive action from a TCAS TRAFFIC alert at 3;000 FT on approach.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 3300; Flight Crew Type 1500

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

At XA:36 local time; I departed ZZZ for ZZZ1 in Aircraft X. It was a flight I have done many times. The majority of these flights are performed VFR without flight following. In order to stay under the Class B airspace but above the pattern altitudes of transitioning airports (UZA); I fly at 3000 ft. MSL (2000-2500 AGL). I monitor the CTAF for UZA and make calls that I am transitioning above the airport at 3000 ft. This morning; shortly after tuning into UZA's CTAF; I heard one plane departing the pattern. I made a call at 10 miles from the east. Before my 5 mile call; Aircraft Y on the ground at UZA Aircraft Y announced he was departing Runway 2 with no announcement of direction of flight. I responded that I was 5 miles to the east transitioning at 3000 ft. over the field. I received no response. His next call was to the effect of 'making a right turn to 150 up to 3000 ft.; last call'. I made a response to the effect of 'I am east of the field at 3000 heading west' but he must not have heard it due to switching to CLT Departure. I glanced at on-board traffic and noticed a target 600 ft. below me and climbing in my direction. I looked outside and by the time I saw the plane; he was headed at me at my same altitude and banking to head west bound. I made an evasive maneuver to the north. By the time he rolled out; we were both on a west heading at 3000 ft. less than a quarter of a mile from each other. I immediately tuned into the first CLT Approach frequency I could recall (120.05) and announced that I was Aircraft X over UZA and a plane had been directed to turn right at me. The Controller said 'it would be nice if you could descend a little bit; he's IFR'. 1) even though he failed to announce pertinent information such as direction of departure; the pilot in Aircraft Y departing UZA made calls on CTAF but he was obviously not listening to anyone else. On a perfectly VMC day; he chose to get his IFR clearance on the ground and ignore CTAF protocol. Yes; he has an obligation to follow IFR clearance but certainly not to his own (and my) detriment2) the Controller decided to give the pilot an initial clearance to a southeast heading even though the plane's destination was a northwest heading. This is not to mention that the southeast headed caused the pilot to make a right-turn departure in a left-turn pattern. This Controller failed to see me coming from the east even though I had been on a constant heading and altitude for nearly 10 minutes. Then; he tried to infer that the traffic conflict was my fault and I should have been lower. Had I been lower on this flight; I would have been in conflict with the traffic sooner and would have had less time to react to the plane making a 1000+ fpm climb directly at me. Furthermore; I would have been closer to the traffic pattern at a 'busy airport' as he told me UZA was. 3) I had every right to be cruising in the manner I was. Per 91.159; since I was under 3000 ft. above the surface; I was allowed to cruise at 3000 ft. Again; I would not want to cruise lower due to UZA's busy airspace and I can't cruise higher because of the Class B and wake turbulence from planes inbound/outbound from CLT. I could have been on flight following but I felt it was a safer measure to listen/call on UZA's CTAF.

General Aviation pilot reported taking evasive action during cruise in response to a near mid-air collision with another aircraft that had departed from a nearby airport on an IFR clearance.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 16000; Flight Crew Type 300

On entering downwind leg ATC advised of departure traffic that would pass in front of us. We reported to ATC that traffic was not in sight and [asked] if they would like us to modify our downwind to mitigate traffic issue. ATC told us to fly downwind at our discretion and to maintain 1;500 feet MSL until advised. I was able to see traffic who was slightly above us but appeared contact was imminent. I made an evasive dive and turn to avoid collision. We were on flight following with NORCAL and assigned transponder code prior to entry into Class D airspace. Tower was notified of evasive action.

PA-28 pilot reported an NMAC in the pattern at RHV.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.5

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft X checked onto my frequency at Flight Level 340 requesting FL360. As soon as I was able; I climbed him to FL360. At this point he was approximately 40 miles from opposite direction traffic climbing out of DFW. I anticipated separation and climbed Aircraft Y to FL350 (I believe he was out of FL310 when this was issued). A few minutes later; I noticed Aircraft X was levelling at FL355. Concerned they now might be traffic with Aircraft Y; I asked Aircraft X to report level at FL360. No response. I attempted again; no response. I then noticed Aircraft X descending (FL354) head-on into Aircraft Y. Two immediate clearances were issued; one to Aircraft X (30 degrees right; no response) and one to Aircraft Y (descend to FL330). Shortly after the immediate clearances were issued; Aircraft X responded and told us he was trying to get a hold of us and was turning left 30 degrees. I can only assume we kept blocking each other out although I never heard him transmit anything. He went on to tell me that there was a ghost target 400 feet above where he was (FL355). There was no traffic 400 feet above. He leveled off without saying anything and stayed there for several minutes. I queried him on receiving a TCAS RA and he said that he did not receive one. The target for Aircraft X was in the vicinity of two others: Aircraft Y (now at FL340) and another carrier (directly above at FL390). After getting things somewhat stabilized; Aircraft X mentioned over the frequency that this same airplane had similar issues that were previously reported. It's my mistake for anticipating separation; however working a heavy departure sector we have to take some calculated risk getting aircraft safely to altitude. The immediate actions that were taken did not result in a loss of separation and more importantly kept the planes separated. Going forward I will start using a time to climb clearance and focus on calling traffic earlier to key in the pilots on the traffic situation as well. As for the pilot; I understand that he has a duty to keep the passengers safe. Avoiding a ghost target; in my opinion; was the right move on his part. I wish he would have advised us prior to taking action then it would have been a non-event; but as he mentioned he said he made an attempt to tell us with no response. If the plane really did have previous reports of this issue then I believe that needs to be a priority for this airline and the FAA. Had the pilot of Aircraft X decided to descend to FL350 or FL345 on his own to avoid the conflict; there very well could have been a midair collision. Thankfully we're just talking about faulty equipment that can be fixed.

ZFW controller reports of an aircraft that doesn't climb because of a false target being displayed on their TCAS. Controller had climbed aircraft to requested altitude and then became traffic for another aircraft because it didn't climb to requested altitude. Pilot told controller this problem happened with the aircraft before. Event lead to a loss of separation.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Sea

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 66; Flight Crew Total 2770; Flight Crew Type 129

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Was in air to conduct engine checks after re-pitching propeller and adjusting carburetors on a Rotax 912 ULS engine; at last minute decided to do water skip and go landing on a river north of my home field.  Usually retracted gear on takeoff and rechecked configuration of gear to be sure it was up on downwind and final when landing in the water. This time my attention was distracted due to watching for boat wakes and logs in river and I failed to ensure I had gear in proper position. When I touched down the plane submarined and I was swimming. If I had used my checklist to ensure the gear was in correct position I would not have to repair the plane. If I had gear lights I might have detected the incorrect position before touchdown.

A Progressive Aerodyne Searey pilot forgot to raise the landing gear before doing a river skip and go so that when he touched down the aircraft pitched over and filled with water.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 37; Flight Crew Total 2216; Flight Crew Type 549

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

On ILS 12 approach into OAK; with the expectation to 'circle' to 10R upon visual contact (It's more of a side step; but the clearance is still to Circle). Pilot Flying called airport in sight while tracking the localizer inbound at roughly 1800-2000 MSL. I looked up to look for the runway; and we were in the clouds. Approach cleared us for the visual to 12; circle 10R. I mentioned that I didn't see it; and he made a remark about stop looking at my iPad (approach plate). I subsequently told him my half of the airplane was in the clouds and I can't see anything. He kept the aircraft on autopilot and let it continue to track the glideslope down after intercept. Upon breaking out and figuring out where the PAPI was for 10R; he disconnected and aligned on the extended centerline of 10R. We were fully configured to land; and I began making callouts. He kept the airplane fast due to the heavy crosswind; so I called 'Plus 20 and on PAPI/Glideslope' He then dropped below glideslope roughly more than 3 miles out. He didn't respond to the comment; and I added he was 'One dot low' He didn't reply. Then we proceeded to drop lower on the glideslope; and I made the call he was '2 dots low' and commented he needed to get back up (to the glideslope). The Pilot Flying replied 'We're okay'. I then made another gripe about him being too low. The final comment he made was 'a buck thirty (130 KIAS); right where I need to be' Which was much faster than VRef (115) or VApp (124) (speeds are rough recollections). I then looked down because we were over land; but not over the airport property. I then saw trees being lit up by the landing gear lights. I shouted one more time that we were low; and he continued the same path and touched down shortly after the numbers; but before the Touchdown Zone. Upon exiting the runway; I confronted him and told him 'that's not cool man'. His response was 'I knew where we were the whole time' I told him I didn't know where we were; and he grunted and brushed it aside.

Learjet 40 First Officer reported an OAK ILS 12 Approach with a clearance to circle to Runway 10R. The Captain flew the visual segment at higher than planned airspeed and low on the glideslope and did not respond to the First Officer's callouts.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 2500; Flight Crew Type 500

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

I made my CTAF call that I was on the take off roll on for right closed traffic. Upon reaching about 40 knots I noticed a [Bombardier] Q400 taxing out from the commercial terminal. I said to myself; 'Surely they will stop. I made my radio calls and they are airline pilots. They will stop.' Well; they did not stop. They started to cross my runway as I was reaching about 80 knots. If I rejected the take off there was a chance; on the wet runway; that I would have slid into them should they have slowed their taxi or stopped on the runway. So I proceeded with my take off roll. I then rotated a bit early; and as I flew over their previous taxi path across the runway that I was on their tail was clearing the runway. I estimate my aircraft was about 100 feet above them; or less. The pilots made no radio calls - at least none that anyone heard on CTAF with both me and the FBO monitoring the frequency; nor did they evidently hear my calls. Nor did they look before crossing a runway at an uncontrolled field as all my lights were on.

The Pilot of a C421 observed a Regional Carrier approaching the runway during his takeoff roll. He was surprised to find them crossing in front of him; but elected to rotate early rather than attempt to reject the takeoff.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 26

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Airspace Structure

ZKC called us and requested control for turns and speed assignment on Aircraft Y.  We released it.  Aircraft Y was a 'flash through' to us from ZDV to ZKC at 37000 feet. We noticed that ZDV had just handed off Aircraft X and Aircraft Z to ZKC both at 37000 feet. Aircraft X was out front of all three aircraft and the slowest of the three. ZKC had to speed Aircraft X up max forward; and turned Aircraft Z 20 degrees right so they could turn Aircraft Y 20 degrees right and slow him down as much as practical. The turn on Aircraft Y was not working so they had to climb him to 38000 feet; wrong altitude for direction of flight; to keep separation!  All of this occurred within 15 miles from ZDV airspace. All three aircraft had come from the same ZDV sector. Decertify all ZDV 'controllers' and close ZDV for a week to run simulation problems for much needed retraining. Let the adjacent centers CONTROL the aircraft that would normally be 'observed' by the inadequate employees at ZDV.

ZMP Center Controller reported approving point-outs of three in trail aircraft and noticed the fastest aircraft was overtaking the slower aircraft. The aircraft had to be turned and climbed to a new altitude to maintain separation.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 7300; Flight Crew Type 250

Workload; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 3550; Flight Crew Type 750

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

The center controller told us to descend via the KIDDZ2 arrival and fly the runway 4 transition. ATC vectored us off the arrival three times with subsequent hard altitudes and speeds to maintain. We were on an assigned heading; at 9;000 ft and 210 KIAS when the controller told us to proceed direct GEEEO and resume the arrival there. We interpreted that instruction as crossing GEEEO at the mandatory-charted altitude of 6;000 ft. We began our descent and around 8;500 ft ATC asked if he had given us an altitude and we said no; we repeated his instruction and determined at that instance we made an error. We weren't told to descend VIA. The controller cleared us to 7;000 ft and handed us off to the next sector. The rest of the flight was uneventful.

Corporate flight crew cleared to descend via the IAH KIDDZ2 received several vectors off route then cleared 'Direct GEEEO; resume the arrival.' Erroneously; they began a descent from 9;000 ft thinking 'Resume' meant cleared VIA.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 161.15; Flight Crew Total 22693; Flight Crew Type 1605.98

Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Confusion

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

After takeoff with gear up; Captains Flight Director (FD) and Flight Management Annunciations (FMA) showed different indications than what was depicted on First Officer instruments. The crew climbed to 10;000 feet per the departure SID. A steady warning horn sounded at level off. There were no Amber Caution lights; or Master Caution lights. There was no QRH checklist that addressed the steady warning horn. The crew elected to return to departure airport suspecting a possible landing gear sensing switch. There was no adverse cautions or lights except the steady warning horn. The crew landed 5;000 lbs over max landing weight at approximately 150 feet per minute vertical speed. After rollout the PSEU light illuminated (light only active on ground.) The aircraft was taken out of service by Maintenance. A Built-in Test Equipment (BITE) check of the Proximity Switch Electronic Unit (PSEU) showed the aircraft electronics had calculated that the flight never climbed above 200 feet AGL. The crew climbed to 10;000 feet indicated before assessing the cause of the steady warning horn. The BITE check determined a huge difference in actual altitude versus computed altitude. The steady warning horn was indicating erroneously an altitude deviation. The crew flew the aircraft normally to a landing. After gear down; flaps 15; the warning horn stopped sounding.

The B737 crew had different indications on their flights directors and FMAs; and a steady warning horn sounded at level off. The crew returned to the departure airport; and Maintenance discovered a faulty Proximity Switch Electronic Unit (PSEU).


Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Weather; Environment - Non Weather Related

I was Flight Attendant (FA) 3; and Flight Attendant 2 was also present. There were 4 people total in the aft galley and all of a sudden the turbulence hit. The female passenger went down first and she put her leg out to catch herself and when she did that she caught my leg and I was not able to brace myself. When I went to the ground I went backward and landed up on my bottom hitting extremely hard and hurting my back immediately. Flight Attendant 2 slid against the aft right door. The other passenger was coming out of the lav. Both passengers appeared to be ok. The captain came over the PA and told everyone to put on seatbelts. It took me a while to get up off the floor because of how I felt. I then called the purser and notified her of all us in the back and told her to notify the cockpit. After that the captain called back and first spoke to Flight Attendant 2 and then the captain wanted to speak to me and I said I did appear to hurt my back. He apologized because they did not see this coming and captain said it was 'wake' turbulence and mountain turbulence and he said it was so hard that it took the airplane off autopilot. He had us sit the remainder of the flight because we didn't have to much further to landing.

A Flight Attendant reported being injured by unexpected turbulence.


Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

When I moved power levers forward for takeoff the left engine torque increased to 40% while the right engine remained at zero; prop oil pressure was in yellow/red and prop RPM was 300RPM. There was noticeable yaw toward the right. I immediately retarded both power levers and the right engine Oil Pressure Warning came on. I notified Tower we were aborting and he cleared us to vacate the runway. We then returned to the ramp; and deplaned the passengers.

An SF340B flight crew rejected their takeoff and returned to the ramp when the right engine failed to respond to the power lever.


Training / Qualification; Distraction; Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

After starting the right engine for taxi; I turned both packs ON and immediately noticed a very strong oil/machinery smell. I isolated each pack individually; and the condition remained. I shut both packs down; and the condition abated. It was a very strong oil smell not related to engine exhaust induction from the aircraft exterior. The fumes were certainly coming from the bleed system. The same symptoms occurred with the subsequent Number 1 Engine start as well. In order to stop the fumes; I had to shut both packs down for several minutes until the engine oil temperature was stabilized. Fumes are entering the bleed air system for the first several minutes of engine operation.I suggest[ed] that after starting the Number 2 Engine and experiencing fumes; and diagnosing if the source were the packs or the bleed system; I shut down both packs for 2 minutes and retried the packs. The fumes resumed. I suspected that if I let the engine oil temperature stabilize after warming up to normal idle temperature; the fumes may stop. I shut both packs down until the engine oil temperature stabilized; and put the packs back on. No fumes. After the Number 1 Engine start; I waited to put the packs on until the Number 1 Engine oil temperature stabilized and put both packs on. No fumes. The next morning we operated the same aircraft. With each engine start before putting the packs on I waited until the engine oil temperatures ceased warming up and stabilized. This proved to be effective; and we experienced no fumes. My specific suggestions are: Do not operate the packs until engine oil has stabilized after engine start. Place a box-check option under Event Details for fumes on reports to track fume occurrences and numbers which exhibit fumes on engine startup.

A B757-200 First Officer let the engine oil temperature stabilize before turning the packs ON in order to prevent oil fumes from entering the air conditioning system.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 26.0

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

The [adjacent] Center controller was initiating handoffs on Aircraft X and Aircraft Y to the adjacent Center sector. Both aircraft were eastbound at 33000 feet. The transferring Center controller had 'DV8R' in the fourth line of the data block on Aircraft X. Aircraft X was just north and parallel to Aircraft Y. We noticed that because Aircraft X had clearance to deviate right; he was now on a collision course with Aircraft Y. The receiving Center Controller quickly called and told them to descend Aircraft X to 31000 feet. If this hadn't been done Aircraft X and Aircraft Y would have lost separation on the border of our airspace!This has been going on for 25 plus years! That Center's controllers; nor the Supervisors or the Operations Managers are held accountable for this atrocious negligence! The Supervisors; Area Managers; Quality Assurance and so forth are all aware of these situations and still to this day; nothing has been done.

ZMP Center Controller reports two aircraft were handed off to them on conflicting courses. Reporter stated this is a recurring issue at this particular sector.


Workload; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Aircraft; Airport; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

On arrival into DFW we were assigned DEBBB 1 RNAV arrival.  Then ATC modified our clearance to cross BELFER intersection at FL 240; and a speed restriction at BELFER. ( I believe it was at least 290 kts). Then we were cleared to descend via the DEBBB arrival; and given another speed restriction. ( I believe it was 270 kts). Then we were assigned another speed restriction (I believe it was 290 kts). Finally we were cleared to comply with the speeds on the arrival. We did make all of the altitudes on the arrival; but not at all of the speeds assigned. Because the VNAV is not 'on approach mode'(ie: flaps out); speed intervene will not cause VNAV to stay ON PATH; ON SPEED. Therefore each modification to the DEBBB 1 must be programmed into the FMC manually. Each modification requires one pilot to reprogram; and the other pilot to verify the change. Then it can be executed. Then the FMC must recalculate the entire VNAV PATH for the entire arrival; meantime VNAV PATH drops off to VNAV SPEED. Each modification to the arrival requires this same sequence of events. This puts a very high workload on the flight crew; heads down; on a descent into a busy terminal area. And in most cases even if this reprogramming is done promptly and accurately; the FMC cannot recalculate the new path quick enough to keep the jet on the correct vertical path. I do believe we can fly these complex new arrivals as published. However I know we cannot fly them safely if ATC continues to modify them on the fly.

Coming into DFW after 14 hour plus flight from HKG. Assigned DEBBB 1 arrival into DFW; descend via....then ATC said cross BELFR at FL 240; 290 knots. Cleared again to 'descend via' with 270 knot restriction. Now increase to 290 knots. Then cleared to comply with speeds on arrival. Made all the altitude crossing restrictions; but had to increase speed to make target altitudes. VNAV was not on approach logic; speed intervention and constant airspeed changes made for a busy; heads down experience while in the terminal area. It's a difficult situational awareness event; keeping up with the airspeed changes; modifying the FMS; and complying with ATC. It seems the approaches are being partly flown in VNAV; and partly given alt/airspeed restrictions as in the past. A difficult hybrid to manage; especially with the length of duty day. Do VNAV descents; or don't. The mixing of the two can lead to a high; heads down cockpit; in the terminal area.

A B777-300 flight crew; nearing the end of a 14 hour flight; discussed the difficulties and distractions of reprogramming and complying with ATC alterations to RNAV STAR 'descend via' clearances.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 52; Flight Crew Total 1212; Flight Crew Type 52

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; General Maintenance Action

After departing; we were being vectored around traffic during the climb sequence of the flight. Upon receiving clearance to FL230; I noticed the cabin pressure light begin to intermittently flash. I increased the cabin inflow and adjusted the cabin altitude; with only a slight improvement of the annunciator panel. The door lock and door seal lights were in their normal lit configuration at this time. I recycled the door seal to test its integrity. Shortly thereafter; the door flew open; with resultant depressurization. Cabin contents were flying about the cabin; my headset and glasses departed the plane; along with my passenger's purse; papers; and pillows. A blanket from the back seat covered my head and face; and was pulling my head out of the cabin into the slipstream. My passenger pulled the blanket off my head; and I saw we were in a steep nose down attitude. I pulled back power and eased the descent. The plane was very difficult to control at this point; and cabin contents were flying around; hitting us both. I elected to try to get the plane under control before considering an attempt at landing. I asked my passenger to replace my headset onto my head; and I was able to communicate with ATC; informing them that we had lost our door. At some point; the door completely departed the plane; improving the flight characteristics considerably. After slowing down and aggressively trimming; I was able to get back control of the plane and said we would return to the departure airport since the plane was now flyable and the runway environs were familiar. After a couple of minutes of trying to communicate with Center; I checked my headset cord; and realized it had been shredded by the prop wash and was unusable. I had my passenger place her headset on my head and used her push-to-talk button to communicate. I asked for permission to change to Tower frequency and requested a downwind approach to Runway 01; since it would give me a chance to test the flight characteristics in the landing configuration at pattern altitude. Tower immediately cleared us to land. With flaps and gear down; the plane was more stable; and the landing was uneventful.

The Reporter stated that the gull wing door had been checked and appeared closed. He is not certain at this point what could have been done differently. He would tell anyone flying that aircraft to get factory training because this type event is taught in training and without that training he is not certain that he could have recovered.

A Lancair IV/G door departed in flight at 12;500 FT after the pilot checked the door seal. The cabin pressure light was flashing intermittently even though the door lock and door seal lights were normally configured.


Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 1040; Flight Crew Type 800

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Aircraft; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Software and Automation

Aircraft X entered the airspace for 4 miles south of HIO at 020 heading eastbound. I used the ADS-B function on the radar display to determine the call sign. It appeared as if Aircraft X was going to join the pattern at ZZZ; a nearby airport. Aircraft X exited the airspace and was not in conflict with any aircraft. No attempt at communication was made. Aircraft X turned north and re-entered the airspace at 2100 ft.; 4 miles southeast of HIO. Aircraft X then made a right turn and joined a 5 mile final at 1800 ft. Aircraft X broke off of final and flew north; then suddenly rejoined a 3 mile final. This was the first attempt at communication with Aircraft X. I attempted communications and Ground Control attempted communications on their frequency; 121.5; and the practice area frequency.  Aircraft Y was in right traffic for the right side runway and Aircraft X looked like he was joining final for the same runway I changed Aircraft Y to the left runway and issued a full stop landing clearance until Aircraft X was safely on the ground. Aircraft X overflew the right runway and began circling in the north portion of the airspace. Aircraft X was given the green light gun signal multiple times but never landed. In total; 6 different aircraft had their flight paths adjusted to avoid Aircraft X. Aircraft Y called ready for departure; IFR on a SID. I called Approach and requested a 5 minute release to attempt to avoid Aircraft X's erratic flight paths. Aircraft X was on a left downwind heading for the opposite direction runway and had been circling for approximately 15 minutes. I cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff assuming that Aircraft X would continue their right turns and not be a factor for Aircraft Y. Aircraft X suddenly turned a left base and descended just at Aircraft Y was lifting off. I issued a traffic alert for Aircraft Y; who reported the traffic in sight and maneuvered to avoid Aircraft X. It appeared that the closest proximity was 200 ft. lateral and 0 ft. vertical. Aircraft X overflew the runway at 500 ft. and made a left turn northbound. Aircraft Y rejoined the SID and was shipped to Departure Control. Ground Control received a phone call from ZZZ1 Tower; who has been in contact with Aircraft X since he entered HIO airspace. Ground Control advised that Aircraft X is cleared to land on any runway. Aircraft X intercepted a left base for an intersecting runway but flew through final. Aircraft X transitioned outside of the airspace at 1000 ft. Aircraft X was tagged up as 'VIOLTR' and Approach advised that Aircraft X landed at ZZZ1.The backup radios in the Tower are difficult to use. Having a newer; digital; handheld version similar to the ones that pilots use might make it easier to establish communications with a lost pilot. A shout line connected to the other nearby towers might also help.

As the pilot in command; I departed in my airplane on a VFR cross country flight to ZZZ1. The aircraft has an installed GNS 430W GPS and GTX-330ES transponder providing ADSB capability. The route of flight followed a basically southerly course direction; with route guidance provided by the G430W direct to my destination. Approximately 15 to 20 miles from my destination; I announced my intention to land. The GPS map course indicated that I was closing in on what was indicated to be my destination; and I made preparations to land; with a call to Tower; indicating my intentions. Having received no response; I maneuvered the aircraft west of the airport in an attempt to gain some time for working out the communication problem. Eventually; I received a broken communication that provided clearance to land. I set up my approach and noticed that the runway markings did not match up to what I expected and did not land. I found out later that I was at a nearby airport however; and this did not correspond to my Garmin 430W readout. Given the communications issues I was having; I contacted my son with my cell phone; who was on the ground having traveled there independently. He contacted the Tower; indicating there was a problem with my flight. The Air Traffic Controller on duty; at that time; was able to locate my aircraft almost immediately and provided vectors. Communications between my aircraft [and ATC] improved as I flew closer to the airport. I made a safe; uneventful landing.To summarize; it is apparent that there were significant issues with medium to long range communications and erroneous GPS information that directly caused concerns with this flight. There was nothing obvious indicating that there was equipment failure on board my aircraft; at that time or subsequently. The return trip was perfectly normal; with support from ATC flight following the entire way; later that evening.The real concern comes down to bad GPS tracking data; which placed me in the wrong airport airspace unintentionally; whereas; I had reason to believe; based on erroneous information; that I was receiving correct information pursuant to an airport arrival at my intended destination There have been published reports of military GPS interruptions for testing and training purposes in the area that are known to have impacted civilian aircraft. Perhaps such jamming activities disrupted my GPS on board; thus would have provided inaccurate location guidance to my Garmin 430W.

Pilot and a Tower Controller reported the pilot flew to the wrong airport. The pilot reported the error was likely due to the pilot's GPS giving false indications or being jammed.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 9.9; Flight Crew Total 222.7; Flight Crew Type 137.1

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Departed T41 (LaPorte Municipal) on rwy 23 for VFR flight. This was only my second time departing on this runway. Northbound; approaching INNIS intersection I noticed a very high EGT reading for the #3 cylinder (aircraft was less than 10 hours out of annual where the #4 cylinder was replaced). Oil Temperature was normal; mixture was rich the entire flight at 1700. Notified Houston approach that I would like to return to T41 and they provided vectors to the Fred Hartman bridge. During the return leg EGT returned to normal. I selected -D-> on my GPS and entered a previous waypoint (T41) and the extended centerlines appeared on the map. I notified ATC that I had the airport in sight and would be straight-in for runway 23 in case the engine decided to act up. I firmly had T41 in sight when I noticed the EGT gauge going high again. Odd because this was reduced power during the right base turn to rwy 23. While troubleshooting (head down and locked) I continued in a right turn and when I looked up; saw the runway straight ahead; but looking farther away than I remembered. About 3 miles out I noticed the PAPI was showing slightly low and the just slightly left of the MALSR. This should have been my first clue that something was wrong because T41 has neither of these lighting aids. As the EGT was still off-scale high I continued and landed smoothly. On rollout; I looked around and did not notice any familiar landmarks at T41 and then it hit me. I landed at the Wrong Airport! (EFD). So concerned was I about the high EGT that I got tunnel vision and saw what I wanted to see on approach (rwy 23 at LaPorte) instead of what was actually rwy 22 at Ellington Field (EFD). Halfway down the runway; contacted Ellington Ground where an upset controller said they had attempted light gun signals and callouts on 121.5. None of which I saw because I was expecting to land at an uncontrolled field with no tower and was tuned and announcing on 122.7 (T41 CTAF). Ground provided instructions to parking. I apologized for such a bone-headed move and I asked if I needed to call or visit the tower and the controller said 'no need' and informed me that this has happened before because of the similar runway alignments and the close spacing between the two airports. Also; as it turned out; when I selected the 'previous waypoint' on my GPS; it in actuality was EFD instead of T41 and the extended centerline fooled me into thinking it was LaPorte rwy 23. Was provided clearance to return to LaPorte by ATC and landed safely on rwy 23. Upon deplaning; found EGT probe for the #3 cylinder was loose.Error: Busted EFD airspace and landed on EFD rwy 22 without a clearance. Lessons learned: During arrival around the pattern; head outside and on a swivel; not attempting to diagnose and repair something that clearly cannot be fixed airborne. I was so fixated on the high EGT that tunnel vision and 'get-there-itis' set in and convinced me the the EFD rwy 22 was actually T41 rwy 23. I seldom use runway 23 at LaPorte and had not yet acquired a good sight picture for the approach to that runway. Be extra-vigilant when landing on unfamiliar runways and always question your sight picture on approach to make sure you have the correct airport.

General aviation pilot reports landing at the wrong airport after a high EGT reading causes him to turn back to T41. The GPS is misprogrammed for EFD instead of T41 and between troubleshooting and maneuvering the reporter ends up landing on Runway 22 at EFD instead of Runway 23 at T41. The high EGT indication was found to be a false indication due to a loose EGT probe.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 1456; Flight Crew Type 45

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Confusion

Flight Crew Student; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 233; Flight Crew Type 8

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Upon completion of run up; engine failure on runway scenario was briefed; as well as engine fail scenarios after takeoff. We continued taxi to Runway XXL. I took control of radios; got takeoff clearance from Tower; Student completed final pre-takeoff items. Once aligned with runway; student smoothly applied full power. Once the aircraft reached full power; I cut the power lever on the left engine; to simulate an engine failure. Student became confused by sudden left yaw; and lost control of the aircraft. I repeatedly said; 'abort' 'abort.' I was unable to apply any brake due to a lack of brakes on instructor side. (Brakes only installed on left side.) Student confused and flustered; returned idle power lever to full position. I loudly said 'my controls' 'my controls.' Student then passed me the controls. Once he let go of the control wheel; the aircraft ascended into ground effect; albeit at too slow a speed. I promptly reduced power; and the plane quickly descended to the runway in a slight left bank attitude; and hit the surface; when I believe the gear collapsed; and the aircraft skidded to the left edge of the runway.

After the run up we briefed for takeoff and aborted simulated engine failure procedure; then when we were on the runway I apply full power and after that my instructor cut off the left throttle and after that the aircraft started going to the left side. I lost control of the airplane and then my instructor said I have control and I said you have control and then when he took the controls; the airplane lifted off in ground affect and my instructor try to control the airplane and then the left wing touch the ground and then sliding the airplane over the runway until stop in the grass and then my instructor cut off master and fuel pump and the selector fuel off and then we evacuated the airplane.

PA-30 flight instructor reported that a student lost control of the aircraft during takeoff; resulting in a gear collapse and damage to the aircraft.