Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 27; Flight Crew Total 6230; Flight Crew Type 2930

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types

I was flying west on a track; parallel to the SW leg of Outlaw MOA while remaining about 2-3 miles south of the MOA border. The wing leveler was engaged on heading hold.I was aware of the R-2310 airspace and planned to remain clear before turning and continuing descent to proceed to my destination; FFZ. I had a new tablet program giving navigation information (sectional map view) and a PCAS [Portable Collision Avoidance System] which gives only distance and altitude clearance. Bearing is unknown.For the previous hour plus I had traffic indicated at approximately 4 miles and 200 feet differential. It varied slightly. I could not see any traffic and felt it might be some sort of equipment malfunction as the reading was pretty steady for the previous long time period. I doubted that some other traffic was pacing me. I kept looking however; as it kept bugging me that I couldn't find it; if there was any such traffic.Somewhat later I noted that the PCAS displayed closer separation with the 4 mile traffic. I became anxious as the distance counted down to a mile and the ALERT light began flashing. I clicked off the wing leveler and turned to different headings to look for possible overtaking traffic.I became fixed on finding the traffic and after a few minutes and a descent; the traffic alert disappeared and I proceeded to FFZ for landing. About 10 miles later; I noticed the tablet 'bread crumbs' showed that I had cut across the south section of R-2310.I believe the problem was caused by me not dividing my workload between navigating and traffic avoidance. Using both the tablet/sectional chart display and the PCAS were mitigating factors since their systems were new to me.In addition the right tank had considerably more fuel in it than the left and the airplane tended to turn right when the autopilot was disconnected. My traffic distraction allowed the airplane to turn to a more northerly track and head for R-2310.After landing; the PCAS antenna was examined and found to be tilted away from vertical; which I have been told can cause ghost images. That has now been corrected and a follow up flight test showed no ghost images. I will do a better job of navigating; controlling heading and avoiding possible traffic conflicts.

The pilot of a homebuilt became distracted by what was later determined to have been a ghost target on his Portable Collision Avoidance System and drifted into an MOA he had intended to parallel enroute.


Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Our departure was delayed due to maintenance checks of autopilot/autoland system. Maintenance advised us that system checked out okay after resetting the main aircraft buses and that previous failure was due to possible sticky relay(s). On approach at glideslope capture and triple channel isolation; the autopilot failed; autothrottle failed; auto brakes kicked off. Captain side displays stopped working; multiple messages on upper EICAS (these items eventually resolved when electrical system reverted to normal configuration). We discontinued the approach. Reset the flight directors. Status messages remaining after system was reset were: MAIN BAT CHRGR; EQPT SMOKE TEST; STBY INVERTER. We were vectored around for a second approach. This approach was hand flown using flight director with no issues.

B757 Captain reported an issue with the autopilot in a coupled approach. A missed approach was necessary followed by a hand flown successful approach and landing.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

On flight into MSP. I was PM (Pilot Monitoring) and at 1;200 feet AGL was told by ATC to look for a helicopter at 10:00 o'clock and 600 feet below.  I did not see traffic and responded with 'looking'.  The helicopter reported us in sight and they were told to pass behind the aircraft and he repeated that request.  Shortly after; we got a TA and traffic was 200 feet below and close by at 11:00 o'clock.  Captain deviated slightly from glide path and localizer but not to full scale deflection.  At this time we looked to the left and the helicopter was only 200 feet away and banking hard to the right.  It seemed as if he only just saw us.  We continued and landed with no further incident.  There's not much we could have done different; I believe the helicopter saw different traffic as he should have never been that close to us. Helicopter reporting us in sight and not providing adequate separation.

Air carrier flight crew reported TCAS Alert on approach to MSP airport.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 3769; Flight Crew Type 672

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Pilot was distracted by bird strike on downwind. Did not put [gear] handle down. Landed gear-up on Runway XX at ZZZ on center-line. Jacked airplane and put gear down electrically. Towed airplane to hangar.

BE33 pilot reported being distracted by a bird strike resulted in a gear up landing.


Eurocopter AS 350/355/EC130 - Astar/Twinstar/Ecureuil

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action; General Police / Security Involved

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Aircraft X; (AS350) Eurocopter experienced a drone strike approximately 1 nm south of CXP. Altitude unknown. Pilot in command (PIC) reported thought it was a bird strike; but did not find evidence of bird. Reported sound of an object striking the aircraft and subsequent vibration in tail section. PIC made an immediate landing on the CXP south ramp. Follow-up inspection by company mechanic reported bent trim tab and located dings on fuselage where object struck the aircraft. Repair conducted over next two days. Aircraft departed CXP after two days. FAA FSDO (RNO) notified on morning after two days. I was instructed to contact Carson City Sheriff's Office and request deputy to take a police report.

Reporter reiterated details contained in original report and stated that the helicopter landed on the east circular landing zone on the south ramp at Carson City Airport (CXP).

An airport worker at CXP reported a midair collision between a helicopter and a drone.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

During the preflight logbook inspection it was discovered there had been a gear problem; the aircraft was ferried; fixed; and not test flown. Our briefing included to be aware that the gear might still have a problem. We took off and the nose gear failed to retract. We called ATC and got vectors to run the checklist. At the completion of the checklist; I declared an emergency; did a low pass on the runway; and then landed. During the takeoff; Tower advised that our nose gear appeared half retracted. During the low pass; Tower and an airline crew said our gear appeared to be down; so we stayed in the pattern and landed visually. ALWAYS test fly an aircraft after a landing gear incident/fix before operating a revenue flight.

DHC8 Captain reports accepting an aircraft that had been ferried for maintenance after a gear malfunction. The nose gear does not retract after takeoff and the flight returns to the departure airport.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I was working Local Control with an assist. I cleared Aircraft X for take-off Runway 30. After about 2 minutes; I cleared Helicopter Y for take-off one of the helipads; whose upwind intersects RWY 30. When I realized what I did; I told the helicopter to cross RWY 30 without delay. Aircraft X turned to the right to avert Helicopter Y; but Helicopter Y was already across at that point. I was in direct control of both aircraft. The incident happened because I was lackadaisical in my scan. Volume and complexity were low so I felt I had it. I normally scan Runway 30 prior to clearing a helicopter from the pads; something I didn't do in this situation.  I need to be more consistent with my scan. I need to maintain a heightened awareness when complexity and volume is low so that incidents such as these don't happen.

We were holding short of Runway 30 for our Estimated Departure Clearance Time (EDCT) time of XA00Z.  As the EDCT time approached; we heard a Cessna receive a takeoff clearance from 25L from intersection D.  I looked at the airport diagram and saw that was south of our runway.  Shortly thereafter; we were cleared for takeoff on Runway 30.  Upon takeoff after I made the V1 call I saw Helicopter Y from our right climbing and flying to our left and over our departure runway. I immediately tried to ascertain the best course of action.  After rotation; we made an immediate right turn to avoid Helicopter Y; then returned back on course.Maintaining constant scan and vigilance of the airport traffic/environment and surroundings.

An LGB Controller reports of an airborne conflict caused by his lackadaisical scan. He departed a jet off of runway 30 then departed a helicopter moments later. The helicopter's path crossed the departing jet's causing the conflict. The jet had to maneuver away from the helicopter. The pilots' report of the same scenario.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

Climbing through 28;500 feet we received a left duct bleed warning message; We followed the QRH which advised us that if the condition continues for thirty seconds which it did then all bleed sources will be shut down and we will need to follow the procedure for unpressurized flight. I advised ATC of our situation and our need to execute an emergency descent to 10;000 feet. I notified the flight attendants of the situation and our intention to divert. As we descended we heard from the flight attendants that there was now smoke in the cabin. We choose to divert to [a suitable airport] which was about 80 miles away. We notified our company and ATC of our intentions to land and requested emergency services meet us upon landing. After landing and deplaning the passengers the fire department boarded the aircraft and found smoke coming from the overhead panels near the aft lav. Nobody was injured during the event.One thing that both myself and my first officer commented on after the event was that the oxygen masks were dirty and difficult to see through which was a threat. Also my first officer suffered from sinus block during the emergency descent.As a crew I believe we did a great job of course it can always be improved upon. One thing that I would do next time is use speed mode rather than vertical speed during the descent. From the company I would have liked if the oxygen masks were clean. It's a little late for that after we have donned our masks.

I realized later that I should have also run the QRH procedure for smoke/fumes in the cabin. There were multiple warning/caution messages after the initial triple chime; Bleed Duct warning; so in the high workload environment of using the QRH; donning oxygen; coordinating with ATC; the Flight Attendants and attempting to contact the company; it becomes challenging to process and prioritize duties. I believe this was a valuable lesson for me in many ways but I feel so fortunate to have been flying with such an experienced crew and especially a very capable Captain who made very proactive decisions when he saw that we were losing pressure.Also; it may have been simpler to use the divert feature of the ACARS than try to communicate via radio at 10;000 feet; where reception was not great.

A CRJ-900 flight crew reported receiving a L Bleed Duct warning in climb. The crew executed an emergency descent and diverted to the nearest suitable airport.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 248.75; Flight Crew Total 15334.82; Flight Crew Type 8230.55

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Wet dog/dirty sock very faint odor during cruise flight. Turned off both recirculating fans. Immediately got 2 EICAS messages said smoke detected in both pilot and flight attendants crew rest areas. Restored recirculated fan operation and EICAS messages went away. Purser called about the warning on her panel. Inspected crew rest areas; no smoke or odor found. After block in at ZZZ with engines shut down; strong wet dog/dirty sock odor came back. During deplaning; Purser and other flight attendants said aft cabin area smelled like jet fuel. This seemed to be a separate issue; but sent this additional ACARS write up in after block in and verbally notified on radio. Phone call to [Maintenance Control] was made later to add details verbally.

B777 Captain reported 'dirty socks' odor in passenger cabin which dissipated.


Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

We received GPS jamming at FL370 around LAKTO.

Air Carrier First Officer reported GPS jamming.


Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

In flight the First Officer informed me that the #2 power lever was causing odd torque indications. Initially when a power lever change was made; the engine would react as if the opposite change occurred. As the power lever was increased; torque decreased approximately 3% before increasing again. As the power lever was decreased; torque increased approximately 3% before decreasing. We landed safely in our filed destination; made a note in the aircraft logbook; and contacted Maintenance Control. The aircraft was met by mechanics; who performed an engine run on the ground. The aircraft was signed off and returned to service.  After the sign off; we readied the aircraft for departure. The logbook showed a corrective action that the problem could not be duplicated. We departed; took off; and in the climb noted the exact problem as before. Maintenance was contacted; and we were advised to return to the departure airport. We landed safely; parked the aircraft; and contacted Maintenance.  We were met at the aircraft by the Mechanic who signed the aircraft off; who immediately apologized. He indicated that the original Mechanic who performed the engine run refused to sign the aircraft off. He also stated that the original Mechanic had indicated a slight split in the power levers; one that was within limitations. Lastly; he informed me that the Mechanic who sat in the right seat of the aircraft during the runup indicated that the engine was acting exactly as we described above. Pilots must be able to always trust that other workers are doing their jobs correctly. Not just maintenance personnel; but occasionally flight attendants; ramp workers; gate agents; and dispatchers. If we weren't able to trust other employee groups; we would never be able to run an efficient operation.  I'm not certain if operational pressures led to an un-airworthy aircraft knowingly receiving a sign off; or if there was a major breakdown in communication between the Mechanic who performed the engine run and the Mechanic who signed the aircraft off.  Either way; a mechanic who refuses to sign an aircraft off should stand by his refusal; and not allow an unsafe airplane to take flight. A mechanic who signs off an airplane should be certain of its airworthiness prior to flight.

A protocol should be implemented for a situation like this where a Mechanic who is signing off an aircraft; but who is not the one who performed the actual work; has to discuss the issue with his immediate Supervisor as well as the Mechanic who is doing/did the work. This would help to eliminate any breakdowns in communication.

A DHC-8 crew detected a momentary torque increase when the throttle was reduced and a momentary decrease with a throttle increase. Maintenance cleared the discrepancy as could not duplicate but the aircraft returned after takeoff for the same behavior.


Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

On arrival at night into ZZZ; aircraft was being marshaled into Gate XXX. Ground crew gave the stop signal for completion of parking; and I distinctly remember watching the Captain set the parking brake which is always what I use as my indication to turn off the fasten seat belt sign and continue with my flow. After completing my flow; I slid my seat back and took off my headset; to which I heard someone scream; 'Woah woah woah!' from outside the aircraft. At this moment I realized the aircraft had begun rolling forward [and] the engines had not been shut off yet. I immediately got on the brakes; which caused an abrupt stop. The Captain also got on the brakes and we both saw; at the same time; the parking brake handle was down and stowed. I distinctly remember watching the Captain pull up and turn the parking brake handle and I never heard the click of the parking brake being released. The aircraft rolled about 10 feet. before being stopped. No injuries occurred on the ground or in the cabin from the abrupt stop. Engines were shut off and passengers deplaned with no further incidents. The Captain and I discussed it and we both agree that the parking brake was definitely set after stopping and did not hear it being released at any point afterwards. A suggestion for myself would be to not become so complacent on making sure the parking brake is set from just the Captain setting the handle. I can also look outside to verify that the aircraft has stopped moving and that everything is secured; as well as the handle being up with the parking brake light turned on.

Upon arrival into ZZZ; we pulled into Gate XXX and I set the parking brake. The FO (First Officer) verified I set the parking brake and then began his flow; and I continued my flow as well. After a few seconds; maybe 5-10; we heard a shout from the right side of the aircraft and both of us looked over; then looked ahead; and realized the aircraft was moving forward. We both immediately applied pressure to the brakes and the aircraft stopped. The aircraft had moved about 6 to 10 ft. beyond the stop bar. I looked down and noticed that the parking brake was in the released position. I set it again; then verified that upon releasing pressure from the pedals that the aircraft continued to stay in position. We both finished our flows; ran the parking checklist; and then discussed the event.Both of us remembered vividly verifying that the parking brake had been set; and the FO mentioned to me that he would never begin his flow and turn off the fasten seat belt sign until verifying the parking brake had been set. We checked with the Flight Attendant and no issues had occurred in the cabin as a result of the sudden braking. The airplane; although forward of the stop bar; did not come in contact with nor was close to any equipment; vehicle; or building. The jet bridge was able to be pulled into position without having to reposition the airplane.I do not know how the parking brake released; I can only guess that when I set the parking brake I must not have rotated it the full 90 degrees and it slipped back into the released position; though neither the FO nor I heard the brake lever snap back into the released position. That being said; because I immediately began my parking flow after setting the brake; I failed to identify that the position of the brake lever changed and that the aircraft began moving because my attention was focused inside the aircraft.Personally; I will now always be verifying more closely that the parking brake stays put after releasing the pedals and will wait to verify no further aircraft movement with the parking brake set; and give the ground crew time to set the chocks before moving my attention inside to continue my flow. It has been [to] my understanding through my training that it is imperative to finish my parking flow as soon as possible; including turning off the hydraulic pumps and engines as a safety measure to the ground crew. However; in light of the event tonight; it seems to me that the safer course of action to all involved is to pause my flow after setting the brakes and disconnecting steering; that it should be safe for the ground crew to approach the aircraft at that point to set the chocks while I maintain my attention outside. Only after verifying that the chocks are set should I continue my flow and allow my attention to come back to the inside of the aircraft.

EMB-145 flight crew reported an inadvertent release of the parking brake at the gate.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

On landing rollout EZE tower gave the instruction 'hold position' as aircraft approached Rwy 17/35; which is the routine exit from Rwy 11. Aircraft speed was 10-15 knots. I asked the FO to ask Tower to repeat and confirm as it was an unusual clearance; somewhat garbled due to accent and not accompanied by any other information. The instruction was repeated; but within a few seconds changed to exit via Rwy 17/35 then Taxi via H/D to the gate. At no time prior to the final instruction did we taxi onto Rwy 17 and no further mention was made. Another aircraft was on final for Rwy 11 and an airliner was apparently in position and hold on Rwy 17W with lights on. There was no further radio discussion.This incident is troubling as seems to violate several SOPs; specifically that Rwy 11 belonged to our aircraft and we had not been given any information about another aircraft on Rwy 17. We should not be told to stop on our landing runway absent an emergency. Instructions should only be to exit at Rwy 17/35 (normal procedure) or to continue to the end. The controller appeared to give this inappropriate clearance to hold position as an expedient; to wit; there are no land/hold short provisions for EZE nor any turnoffs prior to Rwy 17/35. Also; requiring an aircraft to stop on a runway with another aircraft on final is a potentially dangerous situation as well.

Air carrier Captain reported receiving an ambiguous clearance from Tower during the landing rollout at SAEZ.


ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Weather

On departure at 16;000 FT on a heading of 240 we were handed of to JAX Center. We were unable to contact JAX Center due to frequency congestion. After trying several times to contact JAX Center we were forced to deviate from our assigned heading of 240 to a heading of 180 due to a level 5 thunderstorm off the nose. We had attempted to declare an emergency but were unsure that the controller ever heard it. After some time the controller handed us off and we turned back on course.

Air Carrier pilot was unable to contact Center during climb out to deviate for weather due to frequency congestion. A deviation was initiated before communication is established.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 2.70; Flight Crew Total 81.90; Flight Crew Type 79.90

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

After receiving a briefing from DUATS; planning the flight; performing a preflight inspection; fueling the airplane; and waiting 10 minutes before sampling the fuel from the 3 sumps; I departed to the east then I turned to a magnetic heading of 180 degrees and nosed down to begin an enroute descent. I leveled off at 2;000 FT. At this point in the flight; no problems had been detected. Shortly after leveling off; the RPM very suddenly began alternating between the cruise setting I had set and an idle throttle setting. I immediately turned towards ZZZ and used the surges of power to climb as much as possible. I attempted to troubleshoot the problem by activating carb heat (and leaving it applied full for the duration of the flight); applying full throttle; selecting left and right mags and enriching the mixture. None of these resulted in a significant improvement. At this time I advised Approach of this emergency. The maximum altitude was 2;900 FT. Approach requested I squawk a discrete code (in the 7700 range). I complied but I was too low for radar contact. I was instructed to switch frequencies and speak to Center. I advised Approach that I was unable to comply; since by this time I was using my free hand to pump the primer to maintain altitude. I asked Approach to call ahead to ZZZ since I was unable to change the frequency to advise traffic of my approach. I was advised that they would do this and that the ground crew would be standing by. Maintaining altitude became impossible. However; sufficient altitude remained such that landing at ZZZ was successful. The cause of the mechanical problem has yet to be determined. While carb icing may be a possibility; no decrease in performance during cruise was evident prior to the very significant RPM fluctuations. Also applying carb hear did not cause any noticeable change; such as rough running or backfire.

C150 pilot experiences surging engine at 2;000 FT and is able to divert to a nearby airport before the engine quits completely.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

We were on a 6 mile final when tower cleared a Cirrus to land in front of us. When this happened separation from the traffic began to decrease; tower then cleared the Cirrus for a low approach. This seemed to cause confusion in the Cirrus cockpit. We continued until the spacing was unsafe; the Cirrus appeared to be on the runway. At around 400 ft. we executed a go around. As we began to climb at go around thrust flaps 8 the Cirrus began to climb as well giving us a TA and tower asked us to side step to the right. I began a turn to the right as the pilot monitoring watched the traffic below us carefully. While our focus was on avoiding the traffic we neglected to call 'positive rate' and raise the gear. This led to a delay is raising the flaps form 8 to 0 to clean up the airplane. Since we were already at pattern altitude we made the decision to leave the gear down since we were moments away from needing to lower it again. Towers poor spacing was the initial cause of the event. However our focus on keeping visual separation from the traffic led us to neglect some of our duties. Although traffic avoidance was and should be our top priority in that situation. We could have called a go around earlier when we saw that there could be a potential conflict. This would have given us more time and led to less task saturation.

While on about a six mile final tower cleared a Cirrus to perform a short approach to a touch and go in front of us. As we continued the rate of closure was greater than tower anticipated and tower changed the Cirrus clearance to a low approach only. We continued our approach until about 400 ft. AGL. At this time it appeared the Cirrus did a touch and go and was on the runway for a long time. I felt that the separation margin was too small and called for a go around. We completed the first portion of the go around but then the Cirrus had started his upwind and was directly in our path. We prioritized maintaining visual separation with the Cirrus and complying with ATC separation instructions and failed to bring gear up and do a climb sequence until we were on a downwind and ran the after takeoff and then another decent check. After this we completed all check lists and had a safe landing. Poor aircraft separation by ATC. It sounded like there were two controllers in the tower; one being trained and the other a supervisor. Waiting too long to call for the go around. We waited until a go around caused too much going on and made us miss checklists and call outs due to high work load. Misinterpreted instructions by the Cirrus. When ATC changed the landing clearance for the Cirrus it was unclear if they understood what ATC actually wanted. I think the biggest thing that could be done to avoid similar situations is to call for a go around earlier when we saw there might be a conflict with spacing. There were cues earlier in the approach indicating a potential for loss of separation; but it was also possible for us to land had the Cirrus followed instructions in a timely manner. We should have erred on the conservative side to not put us in an overloaded task situation.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported failing to retract landing gear during a go around due to ATC vectored traffic.


Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action

During climbout passing approximately 11;000 FT received ECAM advisory for EXCESSIVE CABIN VERTICAL SPEED and ECAM warning for EXCESSIVE CABIN ALTITUDE. [We] leveled off at 13;000 FT while donning oxygen masks. Number two cabin pressure regulator was deferred. [I] could not control cabin altitude with Manual Pressurization Control. Received vectors from Departure Control to allow a descent to 10;000 FT. Asked for and received vectors for a return to the departure airport. Believe cabin outflow valve was stuck full open leaving no way to control cabin pressure. Doubt could have been prevented.

An A310 ECAM alerted EXCESSIVE CABIN VERTICAL SPEED and EXCESSIVE CABIN ALTITUDE as the aicraft climbed through 11;000 FT.The QRH was complied with and the flight returned to the departure airport.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

I was the pilot flying and my First Officer was the Pilot Monitoring. We departed with normal procedures and call-outs. At 400 feet I; as Pilot Flying; commanded 'Heading Mode'. At approximately 700 feet I was alerted to a Master Caution light and a LAV SMOKE DET annunciation. I was able to hear the lavatory smoke detector and was then promptly contacted by the flight attendants regarding the alarm. Passing 1000 feet I called for 'Flaps Up. Climb Power. VNAV.' Once this was accomplished; I stated that I had the aircraft and radios and asked my First Officer to Run the QRH for LAV SMOKE DET annunciator. I requested a return to the airfield.The First officer completed the QRH procedure and the Return Checklist while we were on a left downwind leg for a visual approach. I contacted the Tower and was cleared for landing. At some point on final approach; the LAV SMOKE DET annunciator went out and the audible alarm coming from the lavatory ceased. All crew members in both the cabin and cockpit smelled the smoke during the [event].We confirmed that we were below our landing weight limitation and then I called for the gear to be lowered and the Landing Check accomplished. We landed without incident and taxied clear. We deplaned normally and had the fire department inspect the lavatory specifically and the rest of the aircraft generally. Flight attendants informed me that they saw a haze of smoke during the LAVATORY SMOKE DET. The last time I flew this aircraft I had a slightly dissimilar smoke in the cabin event. My previous event occurred 15 days ago. And another cabin smoke event occurred 5 days prior to that.

MD80 Captain experienced a master caution light and a LAV SMOKE annunciation at 700 feet on departure. A return to the field was requested while the First Officer performed the QRH procedures. At some point during the approach the LAV SMOKE DET annunciator went out and the smoke began to dissipate. The reporter indicated that he experienced a similar event 15 days prior in the same aircraft and another event 5 days prior to that.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 323; Flight Crew Type 8000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Crew was ready for departure. Departure time had passed. The explanation given to me for our delay was a weight and balance problem with life rafts (Hazmat) being transported. Had it not been for the weight and balance issue; I would have been unaware that we had life rafts on the aircraft. We received the [Weight and Balance System] takeoff data ten minutes past departure time. When we received the [Weight and Balance System] data we proceeded with the normal procedures to get the aircraft off of the gate. I failed to receive the air bill for the Hazmat onboard. After arriving at the gate in ZZZ1 I was given a copy of the air bill to sign to be put on file. The Operations Agent should be sure to communicate that there is Hazmat onboard the aircraft. I should make sure that I have the paperwork before departure.

Air carrier Captain reported receiving required pre-departure Hazmat documents on arrival at destination.


Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Aircraft X had DG 44lbs. Cryogenic liquid-gas needed to be loaded into pit 6. Central Load planning (CLP) decided to hold the item due to size of the pit and items in. Station OPS and Ramp notified not to load the DG and to be held off. Station couldn't find the DG after flight took off. CLP requested AUDIT from arrival station. [Destination] Ramp Supervisor confirmed that DG loaded into pit 4 which it is not showing on [dangerous goods form] and never notified to pilot. DG nitrogen has to be loaded only [in] pit 6. Load was illegal and safety hazard.

Aircraft X was planned by Central Load Planning (CLP) as a standard load; City forward; all transfer bags were planned aft. The mail was planned for pit 3; and 1 item of freight; which happened to be dangerous goods; was planned for pit 6. Upon my review of the loading when I came on duty; I was uncomfortable with the placement of the hazmat; since; due to its SLS code; [nitrogen]; on this particular aircraft; can only be loaded in pit 6. With that; once 15 bags were placed with it; left only 72 [pounds] remaining before exceeded the floor limit. I discussed this with my supervisor. We both decided it would be best to hold it off; and put it on a larger airplane that could accommodate the 15 bag requirement. The loading was revised and ready. At this time the [dangerous goods form] had not yet been printed. Upon review of the final loading; the flight pushed; all pits had transfer bags; which was not the way it was planned; and the hazmat was not onboard. After the flight departed; the [departure airport] cargo planner called me to ask why the hazmat was held off for CLP. I explained the situation; and asked him if we could plan it on the widebody. The hazmat was planned for the bulk pit of [that aircraft]. I received a call from the cargo planner who advised me that the hazmat was unable to be located and could I hold it off. At this time; I asked them both if we could audit the flight inbound; just a hunch; the hazmat was onboard. [Cargo Planner] had called me back to advise me that the cart the hazmat shipment was planned for had been located; and it was empty. The Ramp Supervisor at [destination] called back to advise [my lead] that the hazmat was loaded on the plane; and it was in pit 4. Both errors in the loading of the dangerous goods. I called to advise the Cargo Planner that the shipment had been located.

Two air carrier Load Planners reported loading procedural errors resulted in the illegal transport of HAZMAT cargo.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30.2; Flight Crew Total 1957; Flight Crew Type 142

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Human-Machine Interface

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Flying in IMC conditions we were routed around the Portland airspace for a landing at HIO RNAV approach to [Runway] 13. While on an assigned heading to intercept the [Runway] 13 approach the aircraft flew through the inbound leg and continued west. Shortly thereafter the autopilot disengaged. I took over the aircraft and began the process of reprogramming the FMS as the guidance to the RNAV 13 was no longer active. The aircraft was in the landing configuration so flaps; landing gear and power settings had to be managed at the same time. I was also aware that there was terrain ahead. Being a single pilot the workload was very high. The conditions at 3;500 FT were IMC with heavy rain at times. I re-programmed the FMS (a complicated job in this aircraft) to an approach to [Runway] 13 at HIO. I turned right to reconfigure a landing to [Runway] 13. The Controller gave me a right turn heading to avoid the terrain. Maintaining aircraft control while performing radio and avionics tasks was a challenge. I was able to re-align the aircraft to intercept the inbound to [Runway] 13 and the rest of the approach was uneventful.

PC12 pilot describes an RNAV approach to HIO in rain and turbulence that does not go as planned with the aircraft not intercepting the final approach course and continuing west toward high terrain. ATC issues a turn back; the FMS is reprogrammed; and a successful approach ensues.


Beechcraft Twin Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 291; Flight Crew Total 1508; Flight Crew Type 1108

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We departed from runway XY. On CTAF; we announced departing the pattern to the south (track of 165 degrees direct to destination as cleared). An inbound Baron they were south-west of the airport entering the downwind for Runway XY. As RWY XY has a published right-hand traffic pattern; we assumed the traffic would be staying west of our position by several miles; and would be no factor. I ensured all exterior lights remained on and switched the recognition lights to 'wig-wag' mode to increase viability. Shortly after; while climbing to our clearance altitude; we made visual contact with an aircraft above us at approximately our 1-o'clock position and descending. I immediately began an evasive maneuver by descending and turning away. Once clear and resuming our climb; the Baron pilot asked who he almost hit with about 300 feet to spare. I informed him that Runway XY had a published right-hand pattern; and that his incorrect position report indicated that he should have been to the south-west of the airport and no conflict. Instead; his incorrect left-downwind entry placed him in our departure corridor. He responded by stating he was unaware that it was a published non-standard pattern for Runway XY.

A Caravan 208B flight crew departed Runway XY and turned to 165 degrees direct to their destination as cleared. When a Baron reported inbound from the southwest to the downwind for Runway XY the Caravan crew believed there would be no conflict; since Runway XY utilizes a right hand pattern. A 200 foot vertical and horizontal NMAC resulted when the Baron pilot; admittedly; was unaware of the non-standard right hand pattern and had instead proceed to the east to enter left traffic.


Aircraft; Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling

FMS Nav data base showed current except the date indicated was Nov. 1994 instead of 2014. The currency information was amber instead of white. Flight was carried out with no occurrence or deviations.

An overseas based Gulfstream Captain was taken aback while checking the Nav database during preflight to see that the Nav data appeared current yet the currency date year read 1994 vice 2014.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 299; Flight Crew Type 6000

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Within approximately three minutes of level off at cruise altitude of FL400; we heard three to four loud thumps and the cabin began climbing between 400 to 500 FPM. The flight attendants were called and they verified that they heard the noise. They also noted that the cabin was louder than normal especially near Row 5 on the First Officer's side. As we begin to communicate with ATC for a descent; the cabin altitude had climbed to 9;000 FT. We began an ATC coordinated immediate descent for lower. This action preempted an altitude warning and potential emergency descent. As we began our descent the cabin began to climb at a higher rate; approximately 900 FPM. At about 9;500 FT cabin altitude; the cabin began to descend. The cabin stabilized [as the aircraft reached] approximately FL240. The pilot flying reviewed appropriate QRH checklists while the pilot monitoring coordinated with all appropriate outside agencies for the alternate. We diverted and landed without further incident.

B737-700 First Officer reports several loud thumps after leveling off at FL400 and the cabin altitude begins climbing. A descent is initiated and the cabin stabilizes as the aircraft reaches FL240. The crew elects to divert to a suitable airport.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

On initial briefing the crew noticed a history of problems with the Fuel Qty Channel system resulting in numerous status messages and maintenance actions; including: four just before this flight.  The maintenance action taken for that item has been: Bite Check Fuel Processor No Faults Found. Replaced EICAS Sign Consolidation Card Ref MM31-XX-XX. The crew spoke to Dispatch and Maintenance Control and inquired about the system.  Maintenance Control had no information and could not suggest anything other than to recite the same write-up we had. The crew asked for a copy of the maintenance procedure; and was told to speak to local maintenance. Line maintenance provided a copy of the procedure and the associated wiring diagram; 767 Wiring Diagram Manual; but did not know anything about the repair. Note: There was also a chronic write up involving the Aft Galley FA system constantly chiming. All systems were perfectly normal on preflight and departure. We departed with 98.1 Fuel On Board at the gate. At cruise altitude the flight attendants reported that the FA Galley system again had a repetitive chime which could not be extinguished. After contacting Dispatch and Maintenance Control; the crew performed the Maintenance Control recommended reset maneuver of depowering and repowering buttons on the Forward FA panel. This solved the problem for a short while but had to be repeated throughout the flight; as the incessant chiming reappeared. After several hours of flying; while still in ETOPS airspace; a status message appeared which indicated Fuel Channel Failure.  There were no other immediate malfunctions. The crew compared Totalizer vs. Calculated Fuel on Progress Page 2 of the FMC units; and they indicated approximately 30.5lbs of fuel remaining; between both main tanks.  The center tank was empty.  Within a few minutes; all fuel quantity indications disappeared from the overhead panel; and the Totalizer Fuel number disappeared from Progress Page 2. After reviewing the QRH; and the 767 Flight Manual; and finding no procedure for or reference to a Fuel Quantity Indication failure; the crew contacted Dispatch and Maintenance Control on SATCOM.  Maintenance Control noted the log history but could not provide any help; other than to suggest that the problem might correct itself; 'usually it just comes back'. The crew asked Maintenance Control if there was any other method to determine the quantity of fuel in the tanks; in order to rule out a fuel leak.  He didn't know and just suggested reading the Fuel Leak Procedure in the Flight Manual.  The crew advised they had read that procedure; referenced it; and asked again if there was any way to monitor the fuel quantity (other than visual external inspection) to verify the absence of a fuel leak.  Maintenance Control did not know of anything and did not seem to understand the question. Dispatch did not have any suggestions either. After reviewing the passenger manifest and determining that there were no deadheading pilots on board; the crew briefed the Purser on the situation.  The First Officer (FO) then went back; made a visual inspection; and saw no sign of fuel leak.  The FO also spoke to the flight attendants in the aft section of the airplane and enlisted the help of one of the FAMs who was seated in a window seat; to monitor the situation and advise if they noticed anything.The Captain reviewed the wiring diagram the relevance of Air/GND Signal 1 and Air/GND Signal 2 in relation to the FUEL QTY INDicators; and specifically the history of the Status message appearing; or disappearing after landing.  There were no indications of an air/ground sensing problem nor any C.B.s popped. Maintenance Control sent an ACARS message wondering if the problem had fixed itself yet. After reviewing the situation internally; the crew decided the  safest course of action was to press on to destination; continuing to monitor; but not to accept any delays; such as holding; due tothe inability to determine fuel on board; and therefore make a proper risk assessment of holding delays. Dispatch advised that they would coordinate with ZZZ control to insure there were no delays into ZZZ. When the crew checked in with [next ATC] control; they advised that they would not be able to accept any delays into ZZZZ. Shortly thereafter; Flight was switched to [another ATC] control.  The controller gave a frequency change to speak to an ATC supervisor.  The ATC supervisor inquired into the exact problem; and the crew advised that all systems were normal; except for the loss of fuel quantity indications. The ATC controller advised that the flight would have to declare a PAN or a Fuel Emergency in order to avoid holding in ZZZZ.  The Captain declared a PAN; and confirmed that we required no additional assistance at that time. Shortly thereafter; Dispatch sent a message advising that he had spoken to ZZZZ; and the only way to avoid holding was to declare an emergency; which he advocated doing. The Captain called Dispatch on the SATCOM and tried to clarify whether a PAN or a Fuel Emergency was required to meet ZZZZ ATC requirements. The Dispatcher wasn't sure; and the Captain confirmed that we want to do whatever ZZZZ ATC wants for their airspace.' Meanwhile; ATC was giving us preferential handling; including two or three 'short cuts' with direct clearances through their airspace.  After waiting over 10 minutes and still not receiving clarification from Dispatch; flight declared [our fuel situation with ATC]; but confirmed that they needed no assistance other than an absence of delays. The Captain and flying First Officer brought the resting FO back to the cockpit early to involve him in the situation.   The crew briefed and prepared early for the ILS XXL approach into ZZZZ. There was some discussion of reference speeds; and the veracity of the information on the FMC. All crewmembers compared the landing speeds  references on the FMC against the expected values based on takeoff weight; known fuel on board at takeoff; less burn; and came up with values consistent with the FMC reference page. We had an uneventful approach; landing; and taxi to the gate.  At the gate with the parking brake set; and the parking checklist complete; the fuel quantity indications still were inoperative. While waiting for the jetway driver to appear; the fuel quantity indications reappeared and indicated approximately 20.1 pounds on board; and the FUEL QTY CHANNEL status message disappeared. The crew had previously requested that the fuel tanks be dripped in order to obtain accurate remaining fuel quantity indications for maintenance and the next crew.   Hopefully; this will be helpful to maintenance in evaluating the problem.

B767 Captain reports being dispatched in an aircraft that has had numerous previous write up concerning the fuel quantity indication system. It works initially then fails enroute. Flight continues to destination.


FMS Or FMC; GPS; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS ILS Z RWY 6

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Workload; Physiological - Other; Time Pressure; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Environment - Non Weather Related; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport

Night visual to Runway 6 in ILM. I am aware [the PAPI and glide slope for ILS Z RWY 6 are not coincident.] However; while on the glide slope for ILS Z RWY 6; the PAPI displayed high (3 white; 1 red) for the entirety of the approach. Additionally; there was a slight perceived bleed through of white on the red light and red on the white lights; meaning the colors washed together. This remained until the aircraft crossed over the threshold.The PAPI seems to be less than a 3 degree angle and would cause pilots who relied solely on the vertical information displayed by it; to be too low while conducting an approach to RWY 6. The ILS glide slope appears to be the most reliable source of vertical information.The PAPI needs to either be fixed or turned off. A pilot will naturally adjust their vertical path to that of their visual references; which in the last 500 ft. will be the PAPI (at night). This will cause aircraft to descend below the glide slope before reaching the Runway Threshold. The Company has done well in mitigating the issue with a [special] page as well as opening this issue [with our safety division]; but the FAA needs to be willing to step in and solve the issue; otherwise this is an incident waiting to happen.

Air Carrier First Officer reported there was a slight perceived bleed through using the PAPI of white on the red light and red on the white lights; meaning the colors washed together.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 850

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

[We were] cleared to 'Line Up and Wait' on Runway 1L at LAS and asked to report in sight on Runway 1R a departing B737; which we did. We were then cleared for takeoff and told to keep [the B737] in sight and 'maintain visual separation.' Our departure clearance was the Las Vegas 4 departure which calls for a right turn to 050 at 2500 feet MSL. As the Captain turned to a heading of 050; he noted he was turning in the same direction as [the B737] and was just under its altitude. The Captain thought this strange and became concerned about low altitude wake turbulence and the possibility of hitting [the B737]. The BeechJet was outperforming the B737 and was climbing higher than the B737 and getting closer. Both eyes were now outside the aircraft. The Captain retarded the thrust to slow the climb and the IAS. Shortly thereafter; ATC stated to [us]; 'Do not overtake [the B737].' [The B737] was getting harder to see as it was beginning to disappear under [our] nose because of [our] nose attitude. The Captain queried the FO (First Officer) as to what altitude we were climbing on the SID and the FO stated; 'FL240'; put it into the altitude selector; and then immediately went eyes outside. After we climbed through 7000 feet; ATC queried our altitude. The FO responded; 'Climbing through 8600 on the SID.' ATC then queried; 'Confirm you are on the McCarren 4 Departure.' The FO responded; 'Negative. We are on the Las Vegas 4.' ATC then said; 'The altitude is 7000 on both departures. What altitude are you climbing to?' The FO responded with; 'What altitude do you want?' We were then assigned an altitude of FL190 and a heading of 070. We were then given a number and asked to call upon landing.The Captain called the number and was given the tower number to call instead. The Captain was told that they had made mistakes and no further action would take place.The crew was distracted with avoiding a mid-air collision due to a misunderstanding by ATC of what the departure clearance was. They allowed [us] to turn into an aircraft on the same SID and an almost simultaneous parallel departure. If we had done the McCarren 4 Departure; our headings would have been divergent instead of convergent. We inadvertently busted an altitude; but with our attention focused outside; we avoided a tragedy.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

BE40 flight crew reported climbing through an altitude restriction departing LAS when they became distracted by a conflict with a preceding B737.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors

We were flying into FSD and had briefed for the ILS approach to runway 3. The Tower had closed for the night and the automated weather was reporting light winds and clear skies and there were no NOTAMS affecting the ILS 3 approach or runway 3. We advised Center of our intentions to fly the ILS 3. As we got closer we saw what looked like cells on the radar over the airport and the FAF for the ILS 3. We listened to the AWOS again and it was now saying light winds but also light rain and thunderstorm over the field. We asked to have radar vectors to the RNAV 15 to avoid the cell over the FAF for ILS 3. Center was busy talking to other aircraft but then approved us for the RNAV and gave us vectors; descending us to 5000 feet. We broke out of the clouds and saw the airport and saw that the ILS 3 would keep us clear of the clouds and that there was no thunderstorm in the immediate area of the airport. We had gone beyond the localizer course by that point but asked for vectors to the ILS 3 again. Center gave us a vector to intercept the localizer and told us to report established. We quickly set up the FMS and proceeded.As we approached the course; the localizer was not becoming active. We intercepted on pink needles and reported established. Center cleared us for the approach. At this point I thought we should have the localizer and started troubleshooting to determine why we weren't seeing it. We had the correct frequency and it was loaded in the FMS. We were gear down and flaps 1 and 210 kts at 5000 feet. I pushed the approach button and got nothing; and didn't start the descent. We got closer to the airport and I saw that we were high crossing the FAF. I disconnected the autopilot and started a descent but immediately saw we were too high and fast to safely fly the approach. We asked Center for vectors back to the FAF to try again. He told us to descend to 3500 feet and turn left back to the FAF for the procedure turn for the ILS 3. We did.We flew back to the FAF in visual conditions and continued to troubleshoot the localizer. We configured for the approach and turned back toward the runway. We could clearly see the airport and runway the whole time. Center told us that when we were turned back toward the airport to switch to the advisory frequency. We were established on the FMS course but the localizer was still not showing up or identified. By this point; our fuel was at 2900 pounds and I was concerned about fuel and the weather in the area. I elected to continue the approach visually but did not switch back to Center and ask for the visual approach. We landed without incident. After landing I talked about the approach with my First Officer and reviewed the NOTAMS to see if I had missed anything. I didn't see anything that would indicate the ILS was out of service. I didn't see that we had made a mistake on the frequency or the loading of the approach. The ILS was out of service and we didn't know it. We became focused on the ILS and failed to ask for and execute a visual approach. The weather in the area and my decision to try to fly the ILS after changing to the RNAV caused us to become task saturated and behind the airplane. The Tower and Approach Control being closed took away some of the resources that could have helped us get a better picture of what was really happening at the airport and with the ILS; and the Tower being closed required us to make more radio calls and took away some of the focus from flying.Any time I fly an ILS I make sure I see the identifier and I did not do that this time. In the future; I will stick to the plan I have made if it still seems safe to do so; in this case it was to fly the RNAV approach. I will recognize the limitations and extra workload that occur when flying into a non-towered airport and not allow complacency to override my situational awareness. When we did not receive the localizer but had the airport in sight I should have asked for the visual approach but wasfixated on the instrumentation problems. Also; I should have gotten slower sooner and given us more time to maneuver and get into position to make a stabilized approach.

Air carrier Captain reported executing a go-around from their approach to FSD when it became obvious the ILS was out of service. There was no NOTAM relating to the outage.


Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload

Distraction; Workload; Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Climbing out in VMC EICAS indicated a L HYD QTY (left hydraulic quantity) warning. This was confirmed by checking the L HYD QTY on the Status Page of the EICAS. The quantity continued to fall and a L HYD SYS PRESS (left hydraulic system pressure) warning was indicted on the EICAS. Completed applicable QRH procedures; discussed problem; procedures and options as a crew and then coordinated with Dispatch and Maintenance Control. Continued to our filed destination and declared an emergency with Approach due to time required for Alternate Flap and Gear extension and loss of nosewheel steering. Landed 36 and cleared runway to the left and stopped northbound on Taxiway. [We] terminated emergency with Ground. Coordinated with tug crew and was towed to parking the assigned spot. Completed shutdown procedures and debriefed as a crew and with Maintenance. After coordination with Company Maintenance; the problem was initially identified as component material failure of the Left Hydraulic System in the left wheel well area.

[Narrative 2 contained no additional information.]

A B757 EICAS alerted L HYD QTY then; L HYD SYS PRESS. The QRH was completed and an emergency was declared at the destination airport where alternate flap and gear extension checklists were completed prior to landing with no nose wheel steering.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Incursion Taxiway

While working Local Control; the several tower members observed two pedestrians with camera equipment enter the movement areas multiple times. First; they walked questionable close to the movement area at the back of the Runway 31 Run-up. I am not sure if they entered the run-up or not; but they were watched as they continued walking towards Taxiway Zulu near Lima. They set up their camera equipment and then crossed Taxiway Zulu at Lima and went into the median between Zulu and Runway 31.At this point I stopped normal operations and sent two aircraft around; Aircraft X and Aircraft Y. I also held Aircraft Z short of Runway 31 and did not issue a takeoff clearance while pedestrians were in close proximity to the runway. I also advised an aircraft who was originally taxiing back to Runway 31 via Zulu to use extreme caution as the taxi path took them in close proximity to the pedestrians. While I was working the traffic; other controllers got in touch with Airport 1; another controller walked out to the catwalk and yelled for the pedestrians to move away from the runway back into the non-movement area. Once the pedestrians were clear of all movement areas I resumed normal operations. Airport 1 was able to get to the pedestrians as they were still on Lima to issue the deviations. Apparently the photographers were there at the request of an aircraft; Aircraft A; to take pictures while they flew the traffic pattern. They made a comment that they told the photographers to stay on the far side of the fence. I think if any pedestrians are being asked to be near the movement area; they should have an escort by someone who knows where pedestrians can or cannot go on the field.

PAO Controller observes people not authorized near a runway on a taxiway. Controller stops operation until a airport vehicle removes the people.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Type 5000

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Taxiing out to Runway 1L; we received a taxi clearance from a busy Ramp Control. The area around our gates at SFO is undergoing construction and taxi room is very limited. Multiple aircraft were approaching 1L and there was an A380 that had pushed back and was creating space/taxi issues for Ramp and Ground Control. We received multiple taxi instructions/changes during our taxi with Ramp and were told to contact Ground as we passed the A380. My focus at this time was primarily outside ensuring clearance on the A380. As we passed the A380 and checked in with Ground Control; we were given another taxi clearance change and it was at this time that Ground also included an altitude cap of 5000 on departure. I heard the taxi clearances but did not hear the new altitude clearance limit of 5000.We were switched to Departure Control passing approximately 1000 AGL. I was the Pilot Monitoring and told Departure we were on the SSTIK1 climbing via the SID. We were in a left hand turn and Departure Control told us to roll out on a heading of 220 and climb to 10;000. I acknowledged and shortly after Departure asked me what altitude Tower had given us on departure. Tower had not given us an altitude on our takeoff clearance so I replied 'to climb via the SID' per our PDC. Departure didn't ask anything else and continued to provide vectors as they often do on this SID out of SFO. Shortly after; the FO stated he thinks we may have been given an altitude limit by Ground Control during one of our taxi instructions. I told him I didn't hear one and that it's unusual (from Ground) but definitely possible. He looked at his notes on his Release and realized during one of his readbacks to Ground; he had 5000 written down. I believe Departure Control realized there was a miscommunication at some point on the ground. He didn't seem upset or stressed. We received a new clearance limit and vector from Departure before even reaching 5000 and I'm guessing he gave this to us based on me checking in passing around 1000 with 'climbing via the SID'.

B737 flight crew reported misinterpreting an altitude clearance on departure due to a communication error with ATC. The cleared altitude was confirmed with ATC and the flight proceeded uneventfully.


Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 300

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

I just read a few articles regarding the fact that the B737Max was fitted with a maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) that the pilots were unaware of; and that no mention was made of this feature in the B737's FCOM (Flight Crew Operations Manual). I had a similar experience on a Boeing 737-800 three years ago; that I would like to share with you. On January XX; 2016; I was [Captain of] a Boeing 737-800. While [flying] at FL370; the aircraft suddenly depressurized without giving us any Master Caution; aural or visual warning. What I later learned was that the outflow valve suddenly fully closed; causing the cabin altitude to reach its 9.1 PSI structural limit; at which time both overpressure valves suddenly opened; causing a rapid depressurization. We had to perform an emergency descent. The [airline] engineering department determined; with the support of a Boeing provided document (FLEET TEAM DIGEST: 737NG-FTD-21-10004); that the aircraft depressurized because of the faulty activation of a safety pressure switch. The issue I am raising here; if that the safety pressure switch which activated at the wrong time; causing the depressurization; was not; and as far as I know; is still not mentioned in the 737's FCOM. I first learned of the existence of this safety feature after the incident; while reading the document Boeing had provided to [airline] Maintenance; and which was labelled 'Confidential'; or 'Secret' or something to that effect. This is why when I read the articles about the 737 Max; I realized that maybe there was now at Boeing; a culture of installing additional safety devices that pilots need not know about. Without going into too much technical detail; the 737NG' pressurization system has two identical automatic cabin pressure controllers (CPC); one of which controls the cabin; the other which is a backup. They interchange at each aircraft cycle. The three position selector switch which controls the pressurization are labelled NORM; ALTN; and Manual. The aircraft is normally flown on NORM. Should a fault occur; the CPC can sometimes automatically switch from the NORM to the ALTN; at which time a master caution rings and an AUTOFAIL light illuminates. If the switchover does not occur automatically; the pilot; after a Master Caution and an Autofail light; can manually switch to the second CPC by selecting ALTN. Should that fail to recover the pressurization; the MANUAL position allows direct control of the outflow valve position. The aircraft is normally flown on NORM since the CPC associated with these switch positions NORM and ALTN swap positions at each cycle. If one of the CPC system fails; it is supposed to automatically switch to the other CPC; at which time a Master Caution warning light comes on with a chime; and an AUTO FAIL light comes on. If there is no auto switching; the crew can manually go to ALTN position; and should that fail; the crew can go to MANUAL control. All this is clearly explained in the FCOM and there are non-normal checklist and procedure that cover them. Boeing decided to add an additional safety feature; which for reasons that baffle me; is not listed in the FCOM; and that I knew nothing about until my incident. It kicks in should an aircraft depressurize and the pilots take no action; as occurred in [an accident in 2004]. In that accident; the pilots had inadvertently taken off with the Pressure Selector on Manual and an outflow valve set at an intermediate position. The pilots had failed to recognize that they were pressurizing slowly and when the visual and aural signal did come; they misinterpreted them and did nothing; until they lost consciousness. The added safety feature Boeing added; was; I imagine; installed to thwart any such reoccurrence. Each of the CPC is associated in the outflow valve with a cabin pressure switch calibrated at 14;500 feet of cabin pressure. Should the continuous cabin altitude warning go off at 10;500 feet; and the masks deploy at 14;000feet and still no action taken by the pilots; this pressure switch; calibrated at 14;500 feet of cabin pressure; overrides the commands of the CPC to the outflow valve and sends a close command; regardless of the Rotary Switch position. The idea behind this is that should we again have a situation where neither pilot took any action after depressurizing; this device would automatically close the outflow valve and restore cabin pressure; and hopefully bring the two unconscious pilots back to life. The idea is good. On my flight; the cabin pressure switch; which was calibrated to send a close signal to the outflow valve at 14;500 feet cabin altitude; faulted and activated at a much lower cabin altitude with no cockpit warning; save the cabin pressure differential gauge in the overhead panel which crept up to 9.1 PSI. When it reached the limit; the overpressure valves opened; as they were meant to do in such a case; and the cabin depressurized quickly. Boeing indicated to [company] that several 737NG operators had experienced the same problem before mine. The object of this report is not to talk about the depressurization or of the failure which caused it; but to highlight the fact that Boeing decided to install this additional safety feature without making any mention of it whatsoever in the FCOM. So obviously; pilots do no train for this occurrence; since they ignore its very existence; I only learned about it after my incident. The second thing I would like to highlight; is that in the aircraft in which I had the incident; the faulty activation of the cabin pressure switch did not set off a master caution or an AUTOFAIL light; although the Boeing document did say that there was a fix that would trigger a warning in case of faulty activation; and that was Nord Micro Bulletin CSB 21933-21-003. But it seems that the installation of that fix is optional. Our Flight Ops did not even know this device existed; so how could we decide to install an upgrade for something we knew nothing about.

737 Captain reported concern that the aircraft manufacture is creating a culture of installing addition safety devices that pilots need not know about.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 250; Flight Crew Type 5

Incident occurred during taxi out. The pilot of our aircraft; on a personal sight-seeing flight; taxied from the VNY 'Prop Park' area via A2. We checked in with Van Nuys Ground at 'Checkpoint 1' which is short of Taxiway A in a non-movement area. Ground issued an instruction to pass behind two aircraft taxiing northbound on A to runway 16R via A; C. We requested an intersection departure from Taxiway D; which was straight ahead; in order to remain clear off the building congestion of jet traffic at the full length.Ground issued us instructions to pass behind the second jet and taxi to 16R via A; D. We correctly identified the second jet and taxied short of the runway on D without issue. At this point I identified a [high-wing light aircraft] in front of us; known to me to be a flight training aircraft. They had made the left turn onto A and were behind two business jets and unable to access the large run up area.We became preoccupied with a departure and takeoff briefing followed by an engine run up. During the run up; I noticed the [other aircraft] from earlier passing off our left and accessing runway 16R at D; a taxiway we currently were occupying. The pilot flying and I reacted with shock and the pilot flying stood on our brakes; idled the engine and we braced for potential impact. We were on the centerline of D and at the hold short bars. The [other aircraft] appeared to pass us with its left main gear nearly hitting the edge lights; and its high wing passed within 2 feet of our low wing with the [other aircraft's] wing strut coming imperceptibly close to our wing edge. It was extremely close; and I cannot fathom why the aircraft would do that.As we were preoccupied and only listening for our call sign; we did not hear what the instruction to the [other aircraft] was and I do not know if they were cleared to make this maneuver by ATC or did so on their own.

Light aircraft pilot reported a near-collision with another light aircraft on a taxiway at VNY airport.


Cleared to taxi into gate. Initially thought we were not on centerline because we were getting either bad or no guidance. Moved the acquire left/right to acquire the taxi guidance. By the time I stopped the aircraft we were now slightly (approximately 3-5 ft) past the nose spot. Proceeded with a normal shutdown.

Captain of a large turbojet reported stopping past the parking stop point due to insufficient guidance.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 128; Flight Crew Type 18000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

It had snowed overnight and was snowing at push time with visibility at five miles or greater. This equated to light snow on the Deice Chart. The aircraft had been deiced overnight but with snow continuing to fall we needed to be deiced again at push to establish a holdover time for taxi out and the aircraft fuselage was covered with snow anyway. We established contact with Iceman and asked for one step deicing. Current temperature and weather gave us 20 minutes holdover time which the FO and I agreed should be sufficient for departure. The aircraft was deiced and Iceman said the aircraft was free of contaminants. The Push Crew got on the headset and told us the fuselage was still covered in snow. We again contacted Iceman and told him the Push Crew still saw snow and we needed it removed. He deiced the aircraft again and once again stated the aircraft was free of contaminants. The Tug Driver again got on the headset and said there was still snow on the fuselage of the aircraft. I asked him to get the Supervisor (who was the Iceman) and discuss the problem. They had what appeared to be (to us) a heated conversation. After this the Tug Driver/Wingman got in the deice truck and deiced the aircraft again. We referenced the ground deice manual on the way to verify the fuselage needed to be deiced prior to departure. As a side note; I did notice another Company aircraft taxi out with snow on the fuselage.  I feel that everyone needs to be in agreement that the aircraft is clean before we leave the gate. The Tug Driver should be commended for bringing this to our attention. He could be the one that breaks the error chain that leads to an incident. Had we ignored him this time; he may not speak up next time.Appears to be improper training on deice procedures. Perhaps more training for Ground and Flight Crews would be appropriate. Instead of just publishing the winter ops manual and distributing it.

B737 Captain reported being deiced three times at the gate before the snow and ice was finally removed from the top of the fuselage. The tug driver informed the Captain that the job was not completed two times. The deice crew apparently believed that snow and ice did not need to be removed from the fuselage.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Workload; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Environment - Non Weather Related; Software and Automation; Aircraft

We were visual with the runway and flying the ILS Z 16R; after Glideslope intercept; the Localizer course in the HUD started to flutter from side to side but never lost signal. At approximately 200 ft. the Radio altimeter in the HUD also blinked a few times; but never lost signal. All altitude call outs were normal; 100; 50; 40; 30 20 10 ft. I did not write up anything in the AML; but did contact Tower to relay what we experienced to see if they were having any issues with the ILS. At no time did I feel the approach was unstable or not safe because we were VFR with the runway. However; given the 5G issues; If we were flying a CAT III approach I would have executed a GO AROUND because the ILS signal did appear slightly unstable. This is a hard event to describe because no instrument failures or equipment failures occurred. It just wasn't normal! The ILS signal appeared slightly unstable; but reliable. Again we were VFR so continued the approach.  The fluttering from side to side was no more then 2 degrees. A better word to describe the fluttering maybe vibrating from side to side in a rapid motion all the time staying within the localizer course. The blinking of the Radio Altimeter was also rapid and less then a second between and only happened a couple of times. First Officer as far as I can recall did not notice anything on the Dual Cue or the PFD. Only in the HUD. It just wasn't normal. No real suggestions because I cannot point to an instrument or signal failure. It just wasn't normal. But at no time was it unsafe.

Air Carrier Captain reported the Radio Altimeter display on their Heads Up Display blinked and they received an unstable ILS signal while on approach.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Once again WSI came to our rescue. The weather [to] PVR was exploding to put it mildly. Thunderstorms easily cresting 50;000 feet were encountered the entire way to PVR. If we had not had the assist from WSI; inflight; near real-time; we could have encountered severe weather and its related issues. In a convective environment; WSI (and its God's eye view especially of the radar picture) is invaluable! WiFi and its ability to connect to WSI should be an absolute go/no go system when potential for severe weather exists. It's too important!Weather coverage over Mexico is limited to say the least. Using satellite data from WSI (although not as good as radar) was extremely helpful. I don't know what can be done to improve the weather radar coverage over Mexico. Electric aircraft (fly by wire with computerized commands REQUIRED for flight) do not react well with lightning/electrical storms. Avoidance is paramount.

A319 Captain reported the availability of WSI weather information was invaluable in thunderstorm avoidance on a route in Mexican airspace.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Enroute to ZZZ1 from ZZZ started to experience power surges on the engine when I was in the cruise phase of flight. Without manipulation of the power control lever the engine would surge from about 900 foot pounds of torque up to 1800 foot pounds of torque. The power surges were continuous and could not be controlled with the control power lever. When I landed I still had 600 foot pounds of torque at an idle power setting and landed the aircraft safely at 120 kts with 10 degrees of flaps.Unknown. Maintenance is still looking into the matter and trying to figure out what the cause of the power surges. Director of safety is looking at the video footage of the flight.My reaction was to trouble shoot the situation. When the power surges were consistent; I decided to divert back to ZZZ. At that point I did not declare an emergency as I was still trouble shooting by manipulating the power control lever and seeing how the engine would react. While enroute to ZZZ I inquired to ATC about the weather at the field as I remembered the field went IFR after I departed. Sure enough the field was IFR and I did not want to try to shoot an ILS while dealing with a loss of control of power management. At that point I decided it was the right thing to advise ATC as I could not control the power surges of the engine and divert to ZZZ2 where it was clear VFR weather with calm winds. ATC asked which runway I would like. I picked Runway XX since I was on a westerly heading and had the field in sight and the winds were calm. I did land the aircraft at a higher than normal landing speed but was still able to land safely with using about half of the runway.

C-208B Captain reported engine surges resulted in diversion to VFR airport.


Flight Crew Total 22707; Flight Crew Type 11458

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

While conducting our cockpit preflight of the crew oxygen system we observed a drop from approximately 1700 PSI to 160 PSI. Upon notifying maintenance it was discovered that the crew oxygen valve had been turned nearly completely off. We had flown this same aircraft to ZZZZ three days prior from ZZZ and the O2 had tested properly before departure. ZZZZ Maintenance had not serviced the system upon our arrival. The airplane then returned to ZZZ prior to returning to ZZZZ for today's flight. So I conclude that the servicing error had happened in ZZZ. This is the third instance of this exact scenario that I have discovered while pre-flighting B767 aircraft during approximately the past 5 months; and the prior two instances also took place in ZZZ. Anecdotally my First Officer on today's flight told me that another captain had recently told him the same thing happened on his flight departing from ZZZ.Considering I have flown a relatively small sample of flights from ZZZ during the past 5 months; such a high number of instances of this error is especially alarming and I think needs some high level attention. It is likely that it is happening on other flights if it has happened on 3 of mine. Clearly if not detected during pilot pre-flight it presents a huge safety threat. Two maintenance techs have now told me that their procedure when servicing crew O2 is to open the valve fully; then turn it back a small amount. It appears in my three instances that they did the exact opposite--turning it fully off then barely cracking it open; as the O2 levels did return slowly to normal after depleting during the test.

B767 Captain reported that during preflight the crew oxygen system did not test properly; and the oxygen bottle valve was found to not be fully opened.


Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Unplanned go-around [we were] on Runway 25 by an A320 who was under my control at the Local Control 1 position. Traffic departing 19 complex under the control of Local Control 2. The A320 advised going around; I immediately looked for traffic off 19's. Traffic was rotating midfield; the departure; P180; was to the left of the A320 on a 175 degree heading. I issued traffic on Lear converging and unkeyed to try to hear what Local Control 2 was instructing his traffic to do. My assistant instructed Local Control 2 to have his aircraft stay low and pass below the A320. I keyed up to tell the A320 what the Lear was going to do but visually; saw the Lear climbing and banking right. I instructed the A320 to turn left and established Visual Separation with Lear Jet. Local Assistant was coordinating with L30 and he told me to turn the A320 to 240 degrees; climbed the A320 to 6;000 confirming still visual separation with Lear Jet. Told the A320 to contact L30; the A320 came back to my frequency asking what runway he can expect. I advised Runway 25L and told to contact departure again. During the time of this situation a Traffic Management Coordinator was the CIC. TMU usually monitors Ground Control to help them anticipate flow times. I don't know if the Traffic Management was monitoring a position. I feel if a regular controller was staffing the CIC position they might have caught the go around earlier. When I advised Local Control 2 the A320 was going around I didn't get an immediate response from him that he heard me. Perhaps a Supervisor/Controller CIC would have yelled louder at him. Also a Supervisor/Controller CIC might have taken more immediate action to have Local Control 2 cancel the take off clearance of another A320 who was departing behind the Lear with visual separation.

I was working Local Control 2 during a slow session. I was issuing takeoff clearances to aircraft departing Runway 19L. I issued a take off clearance to a Lear 60 Runway 19L. I gave a subsequent takeoff clearance to an A320 using visual separation from the LR60 ahead of him. After giving both clearances; I heard the Assistant Local Control 1 Controller say that they had a go-around off Runway 25L. I saw the go-around traffic about midfield Runway 25L. I immediately called the traffic to the LR60 who was about 3/4's of the way down Runway 19L and airborne and requested that he 'stay low' or 'go low.' The pilot of the Lear immediately reported the traffic in sight and started to climb at a remarkable rate. I told the Lear to maintain Visual Separation on the traffic when I noticed the Airbus start to begin a left turn. I told the Lear that the airbus was in a left turn now below him and to his left. I then instructed the Lear to contact Departure. With the LR60 now approximately 1.5 miles south of the airport with the go-around approximately 0.5 miles in trail and lower; I issued traffic to the subsequent departure off Runway 19L. The departure reported the traffic in sight; I told him to maintain visual separation with the traffic and to let the Departure Controller know that he had him in sight. I then told the A320 to contact Departure. I don't really know if there is a solution to this issue. The late go-around from the other A320 certainly didn't help the situation.

LAS Controllers described a developing conflict involving a go-around on Runway 25L and departure from the Runway 19 complex. The reporter indicated that a more experienced CIC may have completed the need internal coordination more quickly.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 775; Flight Crew Type 680

Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

I took off in the morning; on an IFR flight plan MYAM; Marsh Harbor; Bahamas.  After contacting Miami Center and a slight deviation for buildups; I was instructed to fly direct ZFP; Freeport VOR; and then fly BR70V direct MYAM.  After passing ZFP and turning toward MYAM on BR70V; we were advised to switch to another Miami Center Frequency; and around the same time observed a wall of towering cumulus clouds between us and our destination; stretching without apparent end to the north and to the south.  ATC was advising at least 3 other aircraft (2 IFR and one VFR) heading for the same airport; reporting locations of moderate to heavy precipitation.  I talked to the Controller as I was approximately 15-20 miles east of ZFP on BR70V and he advised either deviating north or to the south of the heavy precipitation that was at my 12 o'clock.  (I should note that our plane is equipped with ADS-B Out but after the immediate coastal area out of FPR was not painting any weather at all on the ADS-B at or east of ZFP; so I had no help from that equipment and thus was relying on visual observation and ATC guidance).  I told the Controller I would take the southerly route and he suggested a heading of 140. I turned to that heading and actually flew about 145 degrees as I could see the fringe of a towering cumulus ahead that I wanted to avoid.  The new heading was not going to avoid the towering cumulus clouds altogether but per ATC would avoid the heaviest precip.  I could hear the transmissions of the VFR aircraft on ATC and it appeared she was at approximately 3;000 FT or below; ahead of me by about 30 miles or so; and reported a reasonably clear view ahead.  Consequently; as it was clear I was flying into rapidly building areas of precip and towering cumulus; I asked the Controller for lower; hoping to get down under the clouds; but he would not or could not give me a lower altitude.  As I approached the building clouds and began to enter them; we experienced some light turbulence and updrafts that began to lift the plane a few hundred feet.  As I had always been trained to do; I concentrated on holding wings level and did not make any aggressive attempt to hold altitude; though I knew I was climbing above my assigned altitude.  I called ATC and asked for another 500 FT which would get me to approximately 8;000 FT where I hoped to level off.  He did not immediately give me that clearance.  In a few more seconds; the Controller asked for my altitude; which I reported then as of 7;400 FT and I again asked for an additional 500 FT to get to 8;000 FT.  He admonished me for not telling him about the altitude change (which I had already asked for) but then shortly cleared me to climb to 9;000 FT.  I was out of the clouds and precip then and I immediately began the climb.  He also told me 'when able direct Marsh Harbour' but we were still trying to avoid the ever-growing towering cumulus and obvious areas of precipitation.  After flying a bit at 9;000 FT I again asked for lower; eventually getting cleared to 7;000 and then to 5;000 FT; at which point we were in solid IMC and some rain; and still approximately 25 miles or so from Marsh Harbour. Radio signals from MIA Center were becoming weaker but he cleared me down to 3;000 FT.  I had disengaged the autopilot at that time and while attempting to reprogram the GPS to direct MYAM had an unintended course deviation to the right of approximately 30 degrees.  I turned back on course as soon as I realized that and then descended; again through solid IMC and heavy rain.  I could hear the Controller calling asking me to call to report cancelling IFR on his frequency but at that point I could not do so.  At approximately 3;000 FT I broke out into VMC conditions and continued to descend to approximately 2;300 FT at which point I could see the airport at my 12 o'clock and approx 6 miles.  I called to cancel IFR but the Controller could not hear me.  A commercial aircraft relayed my cancellation; and then came back with ATC's direction approving the cancellation and to squawk VFR; which I did.  I then proceeded to land at MYAM without further incident.

The reporter states that on line checking of the weather in the Bahama's during preflight did not show any weather; nor did a post flight check.

PA28 pilot reports encountering thunderstorms during an IFR flight to MYAM and deviating with ATC assistance to avoid the heaviest weather.  On board ADS-B weather was not displaying any weather east of MYGF.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 236; Flight Crew Type 236

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

We were cleared for the RNAV Visual Approach to Runway 19R at LAS. Everything was normal; and at about 500 ft AGL; we received a TCAS Traffic Alert. We were fully configured at the time; and the First Officer then saw two helicopters (flying very close to each other) just to the right of our flight path; about 200 feet lower than we were. I initiated a go-around; and we told Tower of the TCAS event. We were never informed by ATC of any traffic at all during any phase of the approach. We then received vectors to an uneventful landing on 25L.

Large transport flight crew were cleared for an RNAV Visual Approach. They were fully configured; but at about 500 ft AGL they received a TCAS Traffic Alert. They observed two helicopters flying close to each other and about 200 feet lower than them. They executed a missed approach and returned for an uneventful landing.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 2355

Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Near FQF 270 Radial at 20 DME; FL360; level cruise flight; passed approximately 100 feet from right wing what appeared to be a weather balloon equipped with a 100-150 feet payload tether; payload orange in color.  Reported to Denver Center.  They stated previously unreported.

Air carrier First Officer reports a NMAC with a weather balloon at FL360 near Denver.


Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Procedure

At XA00 local time; Chief Dispatchers sent out a message to the floor stating IT needed to do an unscheduled outage from XB00-XB45L for ACARS and SABRE FPM This outage was not made known to us nor did we have a [notice] about this outage. The Chiefs were walking around asking if anyone still needed SABRE and I did. I was in the process of finishing an airborne reroute and trying to get numbers to my flight that was scheduled to depart at XG15z during the outage. I told the Chiefs I was not ready; but it was too late; the IT department once again took down SABRE FPM without getting the OK from the Chief Dispatchers. This happens all too frequently. IT does not care; they just take systems down when they want without getting OK from the Chiefs on the midnight shift. Eventually one day we are going to have an incident because of IT's carelessness. Furthermore; I have a few flights en route that will need possible help around some weather and I have lost ACARS. I am pretty sure that as a result of an earlier report regarding outages; we were supposed to have [notice] for outages.

Dispatcher reported losing equipment due to an unscheduled IT repair.