Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Time Pressure; Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Reposition flight to take an aircraft from ZZZ to CWA for storage. Weather was low IFR and reported 4 miles visibility and 300 ft. overcast. En-route we planned and briefed using the ILS to Runway 8 at CWA. Descending through 18;000 ft. MSP Center advised us to expect the ILS to Runway 35. We programmed and briefed the new approach and completed the descent checklist. (During the descent checklist; we were heavily task saturated. Reducing speed now for a mostly straight-in approach; following the snowflake to hit a crossing restriction; in icing conditions with several cautions for ICE and anti-Ice systems popping up. When on the minimums item; the Captain responded with the landing data information which I prompted again for the correct response and he corrected. Then the checklist was continued and completed). We were cleared direct to RELCO; descend and maintain 3000 ft. and cleared for the ILS into Runway 35. The Captain briefed that the final approach course would be intercepted in FMS/NAV mode then we would transfer to the ILS navigation (LOC/GS) once established. Approximately 5 miles from RELCO I noticed my altitude was indicating below our assigned and the charted altitude of 3000 ft. (~2500 ft.) and we were still descending. I looked at the Captains PFD and his altitude showed above 3000 ft. (~3400 at this point ft.). That ft.s when I notice his altimeter setting was 30.32 instead of 29.32 reported on the ATIS and by MSP center. I called out 'your altimeter setting is wrong; we need to climb'. The Captain proceeded to disconnect the autopilot to stop the descent and begin climbing. At one point I heard the Radar altimeter make the '1000' automated callout. The Captain input the correct altimeter setting on his side and climbed back to 3000 ft. while I informed CWA Tower of the error; the altitude deviation; and that we were correcting back to 3000 ft. Tower asked if we wanted to continue the approach and that they would contact MSP Center to advise them of the error as well. We decided to continued on the approach and configured the aircraft for landing. The Captain continued to fly a stable approach with the autopilot disconnected; breaking out of the clouds about 300 ft. AGL and making a normal landing.Incorrect altimeter setting on the Captain ft.s side. (30.32 instead of 29.32). Failure to properly execute descent checklist items. When listening the the ATIS is wrote down the altimeter and found it shockingly low so I listen a second time to ensure I heard 29.32 correctly. I mentioned this to the Captain and he asked me what the altimeter setting was in order to preselect it in the ISI standby altimeter as a reminder for later. We also had a brief conversation about how we had noticed the large low pressure system that was approaching the destination airport so a very low (hurricane like) altimeter setting made sense.Ensure to properly input altimeter settings; ensure to properly cross-check the entire altimeter setting including the values before and after the decimal place. (Making sure to say 29.32 not .32) Scan all altimeters more often to verify they are in agreement.

While at cruise we both listened to ATIS and discussed the extremely low altimeter at CWA of 29.32. I then got landing data for Runways 35 and 8. I briefed the ILS to Runway 8. We checked in with Minneapolis Center who told us to expect Runway 35; which we accepted. While descending for a crossing restriction of CWA- Runway 35 at 14;000 ft.; I then Runway 35. There was a slight rush due to the change; but it was completely manageable. Descending thru FL180; I dialed in the incorrect altimeter of 30.32; even though I had written down 29.32 on my yoke chart holder scratch paper and dialed 29.32 into the standby altimeter. I then called for and we ran the Descent Checklist. While running the Descent check; neither I or the FO (First Officer) PM (Pilot Monitoring) caught the altimeter error on my side. I believe I said '29.32 Crossschecked'. We were then cleared direct RELCO; cross RELCO at or above 3;000 ft. and cleared for the ILS Runway 35. I dialed in 3;000 ft. and configured to be at 3;000 ft. about 5 miles outside RELCO to allow for deceleration prior to RELCO. Approximately 5 miles outside RELCO; Just slowing to 200 kts; zero flaps and gear up at a 1;000 fpm descent; I believe the PM FO said 'You have the wrong altimeter. We need to climb back up.' I immediately saw the error; clicked off the autopilot and climbed up to 3;000 ft. I then dialed in the correct altimeter. I directed the FO to tell Tower what we were doing. I elected to continue the approach since we crossed RELCO at 3;000 ft. The rest of the approach and landing was handflown and uneventful. Upon post flight debrief; the PM FO said he momentarily saw his RA display less than 1;000 ft. AGL. The math says this is most likely correct. I did not see this on my side; as I was busy. This means; we were unstable and in an Unusual Aircraft State (UAS) and should have done a missed approach/go around. I estimate we may have descended to 800 ft. to 900 ft. agl above airport elevation. The terrain around RELCO appears to be the same as the airfield elevation. We did not receive a GPWS which I believe was due to our speed; descent rate and absence of towers and terrain in the area.The altimeter error and continuing an unstable approach were 90% my fault due to the following 4 reasons: 1. Lack of attention to detail; dialing in the wrong altimeter. 2. Obviously not fully reading the CA (Captain) side altimeter during the Descent Check. 3. Not doing the math in the descent; when the FO PM said 'out of 4000 ft. for 3000 ft.' when my instruments did not indicate the same. 4. Not initiating a missed approach/go-around. This was due to my failure to not realize we were below 1;000 ft. AGL. I became aware of this; after we were level at 3;000 ft. MSL and obviously stable and in position to conduct the approach. In my opinion the FO PM gets 10% of the blame for the following 2 reasons: 1. Not reading my altimeter during the Descent Check. In his defense; it is across the cockpit and difficult to see. 2. Not calling 'Unstable Go Around'; when he realized we were below 1;000 ft. AGL; not configured and not on the approach yet. BUT; the FO PM does get credit for catching the error before I or GPWS did. I thanked him; but I did not shake his hand.PERSONAL: I should pay more attention to every aspect of my flight duties. I have been a Captain for nearly 20 years and have never had a training issue; ATC issue or any event resembling this. I and everyone are unavoidably stressed; which is distracting. 2. COMPANY: I have no suggestions for changes to flight procedures or practices.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported an unstable approach and being unaware of flying approach well  below charted altitude.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

CRJ-900 aircraft returned to the gate with an apparent nose gear issue. After it was parked; the captain performed his walk-around and noticed a large flashlight jammed into the torque links of the nose gear. The aircraft had come in earlier as an inbound which I parked. During my walk around I didn't notice anything unusual with the nose gear as we really don't thoroughly check the under carriage. Especially with this aircraft since the nose gear sits really close to ground.

An aircraft ramp employee reports a CRJ-900 aircraft had returned to the gate with a nose gear issue. Captain performed a walk around and found a large flashlight jammed into the Nose Landing Gear (NLG) torque links.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 341; Flight Crew Type 19200

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Weather

While on a visual approach; Aircraft X had to initiate a go-around due to exceedance of tailwind limitations. Tower was reporting winds of 080/7. While on final; below 1;000 feet AGL; we had tailwinds in excess of 20 knots. Below 500 feet AGL; the tailwinds dropped to between 12-15 knots. Over the Runway 30 threshold; the winds were 080/18 knots; resulting in tailwind readout of 12 to 15 knots. We executed a go-around and returned for another approach. When we checked in again with Tower; they reported winds of about 080/7 again. We executed another approach but were forced to go-around again for excess tailwinds at 50 feet AGL. The tailwind readout was 15 knots. The wind displayed on the ND was 080/18 knots. We requested and received clearance for an approach and landing on Runway 12 which concluded without incident. I contacted Tower by phone after the flight to inquire as to what location on the airfield wind data they report to aircraft was collected. Tower Personnel were unaware of the location. This is the second such occurrence for me in Oakland in the last 12 months requiring a go-around for excessive tailwind component even though Tower was reporting winds within limits. After our two go-arounds and subsequent landing on Runway 12; aircraft were still departing Runway 30. I am writing this report because I believe the wind information being presented to Tower Personnel in OAK may not be from a location that represents conditions at the touchdown zone for that runway.

Pilot reported a go-around due to tailwind limitations and after landing at OAK airport; called Tower to question where the wind indicators were on the airport.  Tower personnel did not know the answer.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

We were just west/northwest of FRG airport. We were at 250 KTS and 4;000 FT. ATC clears us from 4;000 FT to 3;000 FT . I'm the Pilot Monitoring so I'm on the radio. I'm looking at the Class B chart on my iPad. I asked ATC; 'Doesn't this put us under the Class B airspace?' ATC responds; 'Yes; but you'll re-enter in about 1 1/2 miles.' Then he says; 'Can you just descend to 3;000 FT please.' On this aircraft; I can't slow down from 250 KTS to 200 KTS and descend and the Controller obviously needed us to descend now. We descended from 4;000 FT to 3;000 FT. I think the delay may have kept us in the Class B; but I can't be sure. There was no traffic on TCAS or any TCAS alert. We could visually see that there was no traffic under us; approaching us. I accepted the clearance because; first; it seemed like he needed us at 3;000 and I assume; given his response; that he sees something that we cannot so it's safer to descend. I could use some guidance; am I in violation of the FARs when a Controller asks me to descend below the Class B airspace over 200 KTS for a short period of time?

Air carrier Captain reported being cleared to descend below JFK Class Bravo airspace at a speed above 200 KTS.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

From the ZZZZZX arrival approach gave us a clearance direct to ZZZZZ on the ILS XXL approach. The PM selected the ZZZZZ fix from the DIR FMS page and asked if I agree; I visually verified that direct ZZZZZ was selected and replied I agree and to execute the change. The PM then stated we need to make the 176 course big; and I agreed. After the change was made I verified on PFD1 that the aircraft was in white needles with NAV captured and the fix was ZZZZZ. A few moments later approach asked us if we were going direct to ZZZZZ; and again I verified on PFD1 that the aircraft was in white needles; navigating to the fix ZZZZZ. The PM confirmed that we were direct ZZZZZ. Approach then gave us a HDG to the right of our flight path to fly. I dialed in the requested heading (I think it was 125) and selected HDG on the FCP and verified on the PFD1 that the aircraft was now in HDG mode. Trying to determine what had happened and why we need a course correction I noted the flight path on PFD2 that showed we had been tracking the last heading as an intercept for the extended LOC course outside of ZZZZZ. A brief discussion of what had happened with the PM was conducted and we both agreed that we should not have entered the course; which tells the FMS that you want this heading to intercept; and that it should have been left as the course direct to ZZZZZ as this was the clearance. The approach was conducted without further incident.This was my first flight as Captain after almost X years. I had just completed IOE the previous week; which had multiple interruptions including being taken off line because my IOE Check Airmen had been exposed to COVID. I flew one turn as an FO the previous day; and this flight. I believe my concern to be open to correction caused my response to want to agree with the PM; and this was a common error I had made during training as well; not making the inbound course 'BIG' to have the FMS adjust the flight profile for an intercept as opposed to flying to a specific course. Just because I had made this error before; does not mean that I will make it again; I should have stated out loud why I did not initially ask to make the course big; because I heard the clearance as direct to the fix; not intercept; which we were primed for; due to our position in the flight. Additionally when ATC questioned if we were going direct to ZZZZZ; I check PFD1 to read the status of our navigation; and seeing ZZZZZ as the fix; and NAV captured and in white; believed this could only be the case. In all my time flying this type aircraft; I don't know if I have ever been aware that this shows when intercepting the course; as you would usually see HDG mode to capture. Additionally; the slight difference in the flight path was not great as displayed on PFD2 in the map. This will definitely change the way I verify the mode the aircraft is in; to include tracing the flight path on PFD2.

We were on descent via ZZZZZX Arrival.  We were cleared Direct ZZZZZ before the last fix of ZZZZZX Arrival on the Visual back it up with (ILS) for Runway XXL.  I was PM and selected ZZZZZ and placed it in Magenta line select.  It was my fault for doing the procedure as if we are sequencing for the approach.  So; I select making the course big on the right line select side.  I did asked PF to confirm before executing the FMS.  That ended up extending the centerline and the aircraft continued to fly it current heading tracking toward the extended centerline.  Roughly; after 30 seconds Approach Control came on and asked if we are direct ZZZZZ.  I verified the FMA as well as on the left side of the compass rose on the PFD.  It [was] displaying ZZZZZ and in white FMS letter.  So; I responded that we are going direct to ZZZZZ.  Approach after that gave us a heading of 125 to have the aircraft position heading toward ZZZZZ.  After that both PF and I talked over to see what went wrong during the execution.  We both came to an agreement that it was due to my mistakes for making the intercept course big.  After we heard toward; ZZZZZ Approach cleared us to join the LOC for XXL and we called for the field in sight.  We were cleared for the visual for XXL.  Everything and aircraft landed safely without any other issue. My suggestion is to be more vigilant and [have] more situational awareness.  Especially; if you don't fly often.  As well as making sure understanding what you are selecting and understand clearance fully.

Air carrier flight crew reported a track heading deviation during arrival and both pilots cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

There were some mask compliance issues with passengers in XX1 and XX3 as well as YY1 and YY2.  Both separate parties did later comply. Row XX complied after I informed them I'd be issuing a warning if they continued to not comply. I told them that they will be banned from our airline if it continued.That was my 3rd time telling them and they complied. All parties eventually complied.

Flight Attendant reported passengers in 2 separate parties would not initially comply with face mask policy until given a warning.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

The event in question transpired while taxiing out for departure at DTW. I was taxiing the aircraft east on runway 9L. Our instructions were taxi 9L M for a 21R take off. I was taxing the aircraft on 9L when I looked and was wondering why there was an Airbus taxiing down on M. That is when I quickly realized that I had taxied past M and was now approaching runway 21R and that Airbus was actually aborting its takeoff. I quickly stopped the aircraft and made a hard left turn towards M. We were told by ATC to call when we got to destination which I did. I mistakenly taxied the aircraft past the intersection I was supposed to turn left on. I mistakenly was looking at 21R thinking it was M. Which for that part of the airport they do parallel each other. I have operated numerous times out of DTW with those exact instructions and have never taxied past M. I will now verbalize each intersection as I pass them and cross compare to the 10-9 page. Please contact me if you have any further questions or concerns.

We were taxiing out to runway 21r via runway 9L and taxi way M. While using 9L for taxi I was briefing the departure for 21R. I looked up to see that we had passed taxiway M and was about to cross the hold short line for 21R. I verbalized to the captain that we needed to stop. At that point the captain hit the breaks to stop. From my point of view it looked like we stopped the aircraft about 5 feet from the hold short line. From a stopped position we were able to make a hard left turn and join taxi way M. We spoke to the DTW tower when we landed and they said that the ASDE system on the field showed us crossing the hold short line for 21R. In the future I will be more alert to my situational awareness and stay heads up as long as possible. It also might be better for DTW ground control to use taxiway V which parallels runway 9L for aircraft going to 21R instead of using a closed runway as a taxiway.

CRJ200 flight crew reports being cleared to Runway 21R at DTW via Runway 9L and M Taxiway. The Captain taxies past Taxiway M and the next intersection is Runway 21R where an incursion occurs; causing a rejected takeoff.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

After pushback attempted to start engine 1. No N1; no fuel flow. Started #2. Attempted to start #1 again. On third attempt no N1; no fuel flow; but we got a fire warning momentarily. We heard a bang and could see smoke. The fire warning went out instantly. We had fire department check for fire and proceeded to the gate.

A320 flight crew reported returning to the gate after experiencing engine start anomalies; including a momentary fire warning; during pushback.


Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

We were cleared via the MONAA RNAV STAR to MEM. We entered the crossing restriction altitudes as hard altitudes but failed to plan properly for the descent speeds and were unable to comply with 250 KTS at MONAA or 210 KTS at ZAMET. I had not done this arrival before and failed to plan altitude and airspeed restrictions properly. As we began the descent from FL240 past ZOKER I realized my error and we notified ATC that we would not be able to make the airspeed restrictions. Shortly after MONAA they cleared us pilot's discretion to 4;000 FT effectively taking us off the STAR and allowing us to catch up.This is very frustrating because I know how to plan a descent but these new stars seem to me to be overly complicated. I had no trouble until this one. I will be very alert to the fact that mistakes are easily possible during these arrivals and will plan accordingly.

An air carrier flight crew erred in their descent calculations and were unable to comply with the crossing speed restrictions on the MONAA RNAV STAR to MEM.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 600

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Procedure; Human Factors; Airspace Structure

While in the terminal area approaching PDK; I called PDK in sight 5 miles to the west at 3;000 FT MSL. Atlanta Approach advised 'to slow to 160 KTS; cleared for the visual approach; contact Tower.' I began my descent and began to slow as I was cleared late and still high for the approach and switched to Tower. I had descended below approximately 2;700 FT when Tower advised that due to traffic on approach south of me (which meant I was closer to the airport) I needed to turn south for a downwind and that the Tower would call my base. I was given no specific heading so turned south to 180 degrees and ceased descending at approximately 2;500 FT MSL; as I was aware that the MSA in the area was 3;700 FT and I was being vectored in a visual pattern regardless of being an IFR aircraft. I was given no altitude clearance or advisory even though my previous clearance for a 'visual' instrument approach was effectively cancelled by the Tower vector. I noticed the large antenna array approximately 2 miles in front of me. The Tower was busy with small aircraft training; and took [some] time to get back to me. I cleared the antennas without evasive action however IFR vertical terrain clearance was questionable. The approach and landing was completed without incident to Runway 3L. During taxi; another potential loss of separation occurred once with PDK ground. An aircraft in the pattern was using a non-preferred crosswind runway (Runway 34; while landings on 3L and 3R where in progress). I was cleared to taxi on A; crossing Runway 34 to the FBO. I began my taxi and was told less than 20 FT from the intersection to 'Stop Immediately' and Hold Short of [Runway] 34 for landing traffic. The Ground Controller was a different voice than before and sounded agitated. I was able to stop before crossing the runway threshold; however higher then usual braking force was required; causing passenger questions. I was eventually cleared to the FBO and I requested a phone number. I called the PDK Tower and inquired as to the chain of events; possible loss of terrain clearance in the air; and traffic clearance on the ground. I was advised that they had a conflict with the other inbound traffic and that Atlanta Approach had miss sequenced my arrival speed and vector. The Tower Controller said that I was safely clear of the antennas and that they were watching me. I reminded them that I was an IFR aircraft; and that they had given me a radar vector towards terrain without any altitude restrictions or advisories in an area where I was previously assigned and below the MSA. They said they would make note of that. I was advised that on the ground I was taxing to fast (my taxi speed was approximately 10 KTS; uphill; and as I was able to bring the aircraft to a stop in less than 20 FT; I dismissed this excuse/explanation). They advised that they were monitoring the situation and if I had not been able to stop or did not respond to the radio (the ground frequency was also busy as they were reading IFR clearances on the same channel) the Tower could have had the aircraft on approach 'go around' and that separation was never an issue. When I asked why the 'plan B' was to have the aircraft go around; knowing the pilot of the aircraft was training; and possibly a student pilot; why was I cleared only seconds prior to taxi across the runway; they said that they had several controllers monitoring the situation. At this time I became aware that the initial Ground Controller was also in training. I feel that ATC workload was exceeded or at the ragged edge of the human factors margin during these events and that given another variable in the chain; an accident could have occurred. Thankfully the weather was good; and visual avoidance was adequate.

Small Transport pilot reports being cleared for the visual approach to PDK by Atlanta Approach then issued a heading by the Tower for traffic. The reporter stops descent at 2;500 FT and on a southerly heading passes over antennas depicted as 2;049 FT on the RNAV 3R approach chart. After landing during taxi; a late hold short clearance requires a sudden stop.


Flight Crew Total 12098; Flight Crew Type 214

Flight Crew Total 6736; Flight Crew Type 1312

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

On ferry flight prep the fuel panel was improperly set to tank to engine with the uncommonly low fuel load. Override pumps were never turned on to allow for 'tank to engine' EICAS prompt and cross feed valves were improperly left open. This resulted in a 'fuel qty low' EICAS warning at top of descent due to low fuel in main tanks 1 and 4. Total fuel quantity was plentiful with but we declared min fuel out of an abundance of caution. Landed uneventfully with 1.5 hours of fuel.

During descent on the first ferry leg of a charter day; we received a low fuel warning for the number one tank. Upon observing that the fuel in number one was less than 1;500 pounds; and even though all crossfeeds were open and there was plenty of fuel in the center tanks; we declared minimum fuel as a safety precaution. The landing was executed without further incident. Upon further discussion after landing; we determined that because of the non-standard fuel load different than we are used to on the long haul flights; the fuel system logic was improperly set to manage our fuel.

The B747 flight crew declared 'minimum fuel' when they received a 'fuel quantity low' EICAS warning. There was more than enough fuel on board; but the fuel panel had been set incorrectly.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 213.03; Flight Crew Total 3502.58; Flight Crew Type 2406.13

Communication Breakdown; Workload; Confusion

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 108; Flight Crew Total 4380; Flight Crew Type 1264

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

[Aircraft X] was assigned the KM 7A approach and descent in to PEK. We were initially assigned Runway 01 ILS. A few minutes later we were instructed to fly from present position direct to KM. Shortly after passing KM we were instructed to change runway again (2nd change) to the ILS-36L. Then; just prior to a left turn on arrival track (LNAV engaged and active) we were yet again given a runway reassignment. This time; we were given instructions; to now again (3rd change); expect runway 01 ILS. Upon installing ILS 01; just prior to a left turn on track; we noticed a map shift to the right of track. The shift was likely less than 1/2 mile. Just as we noted the shift we had come upon the left turn which the aircraft did not make. At the moment we were going to tell Approach Control we had missed the turn and needed a left vector; ATC instructed us to turn left to a 110 heading. He also asked why we had missed the turn...but then immediately switched us to the Final Approach Controller before I could answer his inquiry. Throughout the issue I am reporting; the A/P (Auto Pilot) was engaged/active; and LNAV indicated engaged/active as well. Then; prior to final base segment; (VMC) of the final approach; the Controller asked us if we had a visual with an aircraft ahead; moving from Right to Left. We answered in the affirmative. He instructed us to 'maintain visual contact and 'follow' that aircraft'. Upon turn; it immediately became apparent that the aircraft ahead was flying the ILS to 36L...and we had previously been instructed ILS 01. We immediately resolved that issue after a verbal confirmation that Aircraft X was to fly the 01 ILS...as previously instructed. We landed on Runway 01 without any issue. [Upon] arrival at gate; while no further request was made my ATC; I decided to call ATC Approach Controller to explain what had originally occurred where and why the left turn had not been made. The Ground Controller; after several minutes; was able to give me a telephone number. Thereafter; I spoke to the Controller Supervisor and stated exactly what we saw/experienced... that; for some reason; the FMC did not make our left turn correctly. He seemed to accept my explanation without any further questions.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier flight crew received several last minute runway changes from ATC. Flight crew made numerous changes to FMS route and aircraft was slow to respond to a left hand turn.


Physiological - Other; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Human Factors; Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

As previously reported; the strobes on these aircraft are positioned such that they flash brightly into the cockpit; causing pilot vertigo. As such; the pilot is forced to turn off the strobes for the entire flight to avoid vertigo; thereby creating more of a potential collision risk due to the strobes being turned off. Go fly one of these things at night with the strobes on.

An A320 pilot reported the sharklet equipped aircraft strobe lights are positioned such that in flight at night and in clouds they are blinding in the cockpit and cause vertigo. The reporter turned the strobes off.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

I was conducting a Private Pilot check ride. I pulled the power on the applicant and let us get low enough before I asked for a go around that apparently either a local resident filed a complaint with Approach or Approach got a low-altitude alert based on our ADS-B. I continued the descent lower than normal as the applicant was having a difficult time setting up for his landing. By the time I asked for a go-around we apparently either set of an alarm or alarmed someone on the ground. I did not note the altitude as I was focused on the applicant's effort to get into a good position to land.I will; in the future; break off the maneuver at least 5600 ft. AGL unless we are orbiting; or approaching; an airfield.

C150 flight instructor reported triggering a low altitude alert during a simulated engine failure maneuver.


ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Airspace Structure; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors

Aircraft X was operating about 5 miles south of the airport. Aircraft Y; called ready for departure. The pilot of Aircraft Y requested southbound to the Plaza and then east for sightseeing. I cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff and on course. I issued traffic to the Aircraft Y about the helicopter and the helicopter about the Aircraft Y. Helicopter volunteered to descend a bit.As the Aircraft Y approached the Plaza I saw Aircraft Z approaching from the southeast and direct to the field. The twin antennas; helicopter; Aircraft Y; and the downtown buildings were all directly between the field and Aircraft Z. I passed traffic to both the Aircraft Y and helicopter about Aircraft Z; which was about five or six miles southeast of them and level at 3;000 feet. Aircraft Z was about 1 1/2 to 2 miles south of the helicopter and Aircraft Y when the Aircraft Z checked onto the Local Control frequency on a Visual Approach and descending. I immediately instructed the Aircraft Z to turn and maintain altitude to avoid collision with the VFR aircraft. Once Aircraft Z was clear of conflict; I cleared the pilot to land. My relief arrived as Aircraft Z was rolling out; so I gave the brief to a trainee and his instructor. I went to the break room for lunch as the Aircraft Z taxied to park.The scenario remained troubling with unresolved questions; so I drove over and met with the Aircraft Z pilot. During our conversation; the pilot relayed that he had an iPad app on which he received an ADS-B hit. He asked the Approach Controller about it and was told there was no traffic in the area. When the ADS-B target turned yellow; he asked again; receiving he same response. The pilot also stated he would file a report about the event. Both VFR targets were displayed continuously on the Tower radar display. Our feed is derived the same radar antenna.One of my initial questions was answered by the Aircraft Z pilot. Why did he start descending into VFR traffic? He was told there wasn't any by the approach controller. Why would the Approach Controller say that? Either the filter limits were set in such a way to exclude the VFR traffic; or the controller; for whatever reason; didn't see either target. Or perhaps; and most disturbingly; the 'we don't separate VFRs' thing continues.We've had issues with Kansas City Approach switching aircraft on Visual Approaches with pertinent and unresolved VFR conflicts. The first time; the pilot on a Visual Approach is even aware of the VFRs existence is; all too often; after they've checked on with Tower. When they give us sufficient time to fix it; it isn't a problem. So; either resolve the conflict; or ship the inbound sooner.Aircraft approaching direct from the southeast on Visual Approaches have presented their own problems over the years. If an inbound is at or near the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) they often have difficulty getting the field in sight because of the downtown buildings; regularly resulting in additional vectors and a late frequency change inside of the Transfer Control Point. The two tall and obstructing radio antennas are an additional hazard. If the inbound is high enough to see the field they sometimes require additional maneuvering to lose the excess altitude; and again have to deal with the twin antennas. A straight in of; say; 7 to 10 miles fixes it. Inbound aircraft won't have to contend with finding the field through the downtown buildings or the twin antennas. The VFR reporting point attracts VFR aircraft; occasionally in large numbers. A straight in from 7 or more miles keeps inbound aircraft geographically separated from that traffic.

MKC Tower Controller reported receiving an aircraft on a Visual Approach descending into a conflict with VFR traffic.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft; Logbook Entry

The station received an e-mail to correct the logbook of Aircraft X. Contract maintenance; NAME; (NUMBER); at ZZZ replaced the SPCU on DATE. He failed to enter the item in the logbook. Upon further investigation; I found NAME unqualified on Company planes and logbook in Software.DATE; TIMEUpon clarification from tech; the SPCU was documented in the logbook. However; the galley battery meter module was not documented in the logbook. We're confirming the part number and performing ops check for the module.

Technician reported that a records check discovered an unqualified technician had performed maintenance tasks on an aircraft and did not make the required log book entries.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 16850; Flight Crew Type 415

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Ground Incursion Runway

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Dropped off passengers at Cuyahoga County Airport (CGF). Only the two pilots [were] on board.We got our IFR clearance to head back to the home airport. [It is] about a 15 minute flight.  [We] got a taxi clearance to taxi to Runway 6. Tower was about to close. While taxiing; Ground Control let us know we had about 30 seconds till they would close and to use the Ground frequency of 121.85 to contact CLE ATC for release. That was the first link in the chain of events; tower facility closing.Second link; my copilot didn't hear the correct frequency to contact CLE ATC on. He was going to use 118.50. I let him know it was 121.85; but he insisted it was the other. We went back and forth on that 3 times. So; I let him use 118.50. Figured he would figure it out when he tried; and he did as Tower let him know it was 121.85. That ate up a good 30 seconds or more of time. We got our release time from CLE. Jumping from frequency to frequency; thought I heard the aircraft make a call in the pattern.Third link; as we taxied out; we were notified of an aircraft in the pattern. [We] didn't know [the] exact position of it; but knew it was there.Fourth link; after landing and then taxiing back out; the side windows were slightly fogged over from our decent on the inbound flight. Cold soaked windows [and] warm moist air caused the side windows to begin to fog over.Fifth link; since we knew of an aircraft in the pattern; I asked on the frequency if there was anyone on Final Approach to Runway 6 at Cuyahoga. No reply.It all added up; copilot and I looked for an aircraft on final before we transmitted we were departing Runway 6. Again; no reply from inbound aircraft. [We saw] no landing lights in the sky from the approach direction to Runway 6; possibly due to the side window starting to fog over. Or; maybe the inbound aircraft wasn't yet directly in line for a straight in approach? No idea; either way; we saw no lights. We started to taxi for the runway.Next we heard the Ground Controller say to the aircraft in the air to make a right 360. I immediately stopped our aircraft. We were across the hold line with the tail of the aircraft at about the hold line position. The nose of our aircraft was not on the runway itself; but theoretically; we all know; once past that hold line an aircraft is still considered on the runway. In that position; copilot and I saw the lights of the inbound aircraft turning south in what appeared to be their 360 turn. Looked to be a quarter mile or so away. At that point in time; I chose to make another call that we were departing Runway 6. I decided best to get our aircraft out of the approach end environment of the runway completely. Still heard no reply from the inbound aircraft.Several things that added up.I should have simply waited and waited and waited till the aircraft in the pattern was on the ground.Before the Tower closed; they could have given a position report on the pattern aircraft; or maybe I missed that if they did. Or; possibly saying to us; it would be advised to wait till the inbound aircraft landed as is was on a close base or such.Hearing the proper frequency by the copilot would have given a better opportunity to get things right first time instead of trying to find the right freq.Inbound pilot could have replied when asked if anyone was on final; or could have spoken up when we advised we were about to take off. Maybe [they were] student pilot(s); low time; or just distracted with work load.Glad the Ground Controller was still listening in on the frequency and told the inbound aircraft to make a 360 turn. That broke the chain of events. Tower closing and switching of who to talk with an aircraft in the pattern; improper radio frequency; simple confusion. One thing leads to another. Best to hold position until all knows what is going on.

Corporate Captain reported traffic conflict with an inbound aircraft just as the Tower was closing.


Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

We were flying on the ILS Runway XXR into ZZZ. We were between waypoints ZZZZZ and ZZZZ1. I was completing the Before Landing Checklist when ATC alerted us to our altitude being 500 ft. below the FAF altitude of 2500 ft. I advised ATC that we were recovering to 2500 ft. and we climbed back to 2500 ft. There was no negative impact on the flight. I suggest a more vigilant situational awareness and adherence to SOP calls.

While conducting an ILS approach to Runway XXR at ZZZ; a brief loss of situational awareness occurred and the aircraft descended below the intercept altitude of 2500. It is imperative that the crew must be vigilant at critical times of the flight. The Flying Pilot must have a clear understanding of all ATC instructions.

Air taxi flight crew reported descending below glide slope intercept altitude due to loss of situational awareness.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

On the day prior to our aborted takeoff; we experience the following faults during takeoff:AUTO FLIGHT A/THR OFF & AUTO RUDDER TRAVEL LIMITER SYS FAULT. During our subsequent push and after engine start; we again received an AUTO FLIGHT A/THR OFF ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor). We called Maintenance Control; pulled back to the gate and deferred the Auto thrust system. We also deferred an F/CTL and FUEL Class II MSG. We pushed and taxied to the runway. During our takeoff attempt we did not get the expected FMAs (flight mode annunciators) after setting takeoff thrust. The backup speed system activated; changing the speed tape red and 'SPD LMT' flashed red on our PFDs (primary flight displays). Numerous ECAMs were also triggered. We aborted the takeoff and returned to the gate. It was determined that the aircraft's pitot static system was clogged with insect debris.The next day; we returned to the aircraft and prepared to depart. While waiting for pushback; another AUTO FLIGHT A/THR OFF was triggered. Maintenance Control was called and testing produced no faults even with the ECAM present. The Auto Thrust was again deferred using MEL 22-XX-XX.We complied with the requirements of MEL 22-XX-XX. We then did a low speed abort; out of an abundance of caution and because of the numerous issues encountered earlier; when we did not receive a MAN FLEX or MAN TOGA FMA. Our thinking was that these would be displayed; as they are manual power settings and not autothrust settings.While we knew we would not have an autothrust indication on the FMA. We thought that we would still have the MAN TOGA or MAN FLX FMAs. VOL II specifically makes a note that the RWY FMA may be absent; but does not mention the possible absence of MAN FLX or MAN TOGA FMAs.I called Maintenance Control. Maintenance Control was not sure if the FMAs should be displayed and told us to return to the gate. I called the duty phone. The base Chief Pilot I spoke to did not know either. The mechanics on the aircraft were not sure and asked to speak to the MEL subject matter expert. I then called [another Captain]. [The] Captain informed me that we would not get the FMAs with an inoperative A/THR system. He also took the time; and I am grateful that he did; to explain some other pitfalls that a pilot can expect with an inoperative A/THR system.The mechanics also included in their corrective action that the MEL was unclear and stated that it needed to be addressed. During climbout we received an ENG GA SOFT FAULT. After landing Maintenance Control did not believe this to be associated with our A/THR deferral and asked me to enter it into the logbook for tracking and crew awareness.In Summary; our takeoff was aborted after numerous issues were experienced during our previous two flights. This including a previously aborted takeoff due to an ADIRU (Air Data Inertial Reference Unit) 1+2+3 miscompare. This resulted in the loss of all airspeed information and numerous ECAM warnings during takeoff. Two pitot tubes had to be removed and replaced. This abort was also due to unclear guidance contained in MEL 23-XX-XX.

A320 Captain reported that an aborted takeoff.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Passenger Ms. X was disruptive during flight as she was unhappy with her seat assignment and came into the FC cabin demanding a better seat. I led her to door 1L jumpseat to speak with her as fellow crew members continued the service. She was loud and telling me 'I'm a senior citizen and I should have been upgraded; I can no longer sit in that middle seat! Does [the company] have senior citizen seating?; I responded with 'No ma'am but we do have [premium economy seats].' She gets louder and say '[the company] discriminates against senior citizens? Even the XX Transit has senior citizen seating!' I kindly ask her to keep her voice down; that I am right here listening and we do not need to disturb the FC customers. Then she really starts yelling and says 'No I won't keep my voice down! What will you do - punch me in the teeth and drag me out!? You want to be on the news?!' Fellow crew member leads her to the main cabin to get away from FC and the flight deck and I called the flight deck to let them know of the situation. We agreed that if this escalated; authorities might need to meet the flight. At this point she sat in 16A; in our designated crew rest area. I sit next to her to explain that unfortunately with our full flight I could not offer a different seat and that this was designated for crew use and not passengers. I ask her to kindly take her assigned seat as we would need to take up her seating issue with ground staff upon landing. She refused. She actually crossed her arms and closed her eyes and refused. She said 'I'm not going; you can just drag me out.' She would not tell me her name or seat assignment; she said she lost her boarding card. I told her if she did not comply with crew direction I would need to get the captain involved and that would likely mean that authorities would need to meet the flight. She said 'I don't care; I'm not moving.'I went forward to advise crew and flight deck. When I returned to the main cabin with a fellow flight attendant to find her original seat so I could look on my Link at her name; I saw that she had then taken her original seat. I did not further engage her as now she was where she needed to be. She was fine the remainder of the flight. Upon deplaning; as I stood at door 1L; she deliberately slammed her carry-on luggage into/against my legs. I was completely dumbfounded; as were the captain and 2 other flight attendants that witnessed this. The captain stepped on to the jet bridge to stop her but she was already gone. This woman was disruptive and belligerent and advanced herself to a level 2 security threat; though fortunately while on the ground. It is out of principle that I am so upset and feel this needs to be addressed. The blatant disrespect for crew and disregard for civility is a major problem.Additionally; she was traveling with her daughter whom was also a bit of a problem. During the service she was in the FC cabin waiting for a restroom. When I asked her to please utilize the restrooms in the main cabin; as now those carts were out of the aisle and we were in the middle of the service; she refused. She complained later to crew about me that 'That witch told me I cannot use the bathroom up front.' These customers are on return flight next week. At the very least; crew and ground staff should be notified and they need to know their behavior is a violation of FARs and totally unacceptable.

B767-300 Flight Attendant reported a disruptive passenger on a trans Atlantic flight who demanded an upgraded seat due to her senior citizen status and refused to return to her assigned seat.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

On visual approach to Runway 9; 15 flaps were lowered below the flaps 15 limit speed and confirmed in cockpit between pilots. Near that time; the aircraft hit turbulence or the wake of the preceding B777. During extension or shortly thereafter; the aircraft speed jumped up then returned to normal deceleration of speed. This momentary speed increase lasted only a few seconds. Because the speed increase happened so fast; neither of us were certain if the flaps limitation was exceeded. After landing; we pulled up a flap report and printout showed 203 KTS for flaps 15. Flap overspeed was entered in logbook; Maintenance deferred inspection to next 100 hour check.

B737-800 flight crew reported encountering possible wake turbulence in trail of a B777 on approach to MIA that resulted in a flap overspeed.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Type 21000

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Aircraft; Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling

Deadhead to pick up flight. Upon arrival; am informed that the last Crew assigned the aircraft refused to fly it. I told Ops 'I'd take a look' to see if it was dispatchable. Upon inspection of the logbook; I noticed that the FMS was non-operable and to put some icing on the cake; the pressurization system had failed also and was being run in manual mode. I then refused the aircraft also. Now; in all honesty; if I had to fly around Texas on a bright sunny day such that it was; this aircraft would have been workable (Notice I didn't say 'Fine'). But to go to a busy airport in the country with an aircraft that can't do LNAV or VNAV and doing it single Pilot-like because if you haven't run a pressure controller in manual; you'd quickly realize that your basically single-Piloted because it takes that much attention from the FO running that system alone. So; I utilized my judgement built on years of flying and opted not to take it.

Captain refused aircraft due to multiple maintenance issues.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

On climbout passing about FL 180 we received an aural warning and a boxed 'Cargo Fire Lower'. It lasted about two cycles and stopped. We did not see a flashing discharge switch when we looked up as the warning was gone.  This repeated about three additional times with the same result. By the time we would look up the discharge switch was no longer flashing.  We declared an emergency and [began a return to the departure airport] for a visual approach. No smoke or other indications of a fire noted. The aural warnings ceased once we began our [return]. Fire crews saw nothing obvious on the aircraft after landing. Fire trucks escorted us back to the gate and inspected the bellies and found no signs of a fire. We released the aircraft back to Maintenance.

A DC-10 CARGO FIRE LOWER alerted three times with the TRI tone but no flashing discharge switch so an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport but no sign of fire was seen.


Cessna Aircraft Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Type 12000

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Type 4000

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

This [report] is being submitted solely for the purpose of bringing up a serious safety concern involving the incursion of an airborne general aviation aircraft; and my aircraft; on Taxiway ECHO and holding short of Runway 13R hold sign and hold marking. Tower cleared [the] Cessna to land on Runway 17; instructing the Cessna to 'fly to the numbers'. The Cessna had positioned himself to fly directly over my aircraft (over around Passenger row five at approximately 100 feet AGL). The tail height of my aircraft is 47 feet. In my estimation; the Cessna; while descending; only cleared my aircraft by 52 feet. His pattern was not on Runway 17 final approach course or aligned with the Runway 17 Center line; until abeam Taxiway FOXTROT. His flight path was observed out of the First Officer window at about our 3:30 position and the Cessna exited out the Captain's window from about our 9:30 position. We completely observed the underside belly of his aircraft. It's important to note that: His runway (Runway 17) had no displaced threshold. Our aircraft was distinctly visible and identifiable to the Cessna Pilot. The Cessna flight path was intentional. The Cessna Pilot endangered the safety of his aircraft and that of the Passengers and Crew of my aircraft; and exercised poor judgement.Due to the complex runway configurations and because Taxiway ECHO between Runways 17 and 13R are in close proximity; aircraft cleared to land from a right traffic pattern; should be instructed to align on Runway 17 early so as to not overfly aircraft positioned between Runways 17 and 13R.

A small Cessna was cleared to land Runway 17 at HOU. After acquiring the aircraft in sight [from] the First Officer seat; I made the comment; 'It looks like he is coming right at us.' The Cessna flew directly overhead. I saw the underside of his aircraft and then watched as he made a sharp right turn to land on Runway 17. I believe the Cessna intentionally overflew our aircraft. The Cessna came in unnecessarily close contact with our aircraft and negligently endangered the safety of our Passengers and Crew. The Pilot exercised extremely poor judgement. His flight path for landing on Runway 17 should have been behind our aircraft and to our left.

Air Carrier flight crew reported that a Cessna aircraft landing on Runway 17 overflew their aircraft at a dangerously low altitude as they were holding short of Runway 13 at HOU.


Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

We were flying into ORD on the FYTTE RNAV STAR. At some point on the arrival we were given a crossing restriction of F240 at BHAWK. A couple minutes prior to BHAWK we were re-cleared to descend via the FYTTE2 Arrival. As we were already nearing BHAWK I decided I would leave F240 selected as it was between the F260-F220 restriction at BHAWK and then continue the descent via the arrival after BHAWK. At this point I realized it was just past the hour and a new ATIS should be available for ORD. So; I thought I'd get the ATIS so I could begin briefing the approach into ORD. While focused on the task of reviewing the weather and approach; I failed to resume our descent via the FYTTE. Moments later; we received a call from Chicago Center asking if he had cleared us to descend via the arrival. The captain responded that he had and we would be unable to make the FL210-17;000 feet crossing restriction at STNLE. I immediately began a descent. Center responded with a new clearance to cross FYTTE at 11;000 and 300kts. This occurred just prior to crossing STNLE; which we crossed at around FL220-FL230.The root cause was my lack for prioritizing threats. Because of that failure; I was distracted with prepping for the approach. In hindsight; I do feel that a fatigue induced lack of focus may also have allowed this error on my part.There were lots of things I could have done to prevent this. First and foremost; as pilot flying it is my job to fly the airplane first. I should not have begun another task until I had not only planned for the next step in the arrival but actually waited and executed it. I could have asked the non flying pilot to get the ATIS. I also could have tried to get the ATIS 4 or 5 minutes sooner but was distracted by some minor flight deck conversation. I will say as an aside; that I do feel that the inconsistency in how arrivals are conducted in O'Hare does make this type of an event more likely. I don't think I have ever flown an O'Hare arrival as published. The altitudes and airspeeds are always changing. In the case of this event we were cleared with a crossing restriction; then re-cleared back onto the standard descent. I notice that having the routine of a consistent arrival keeps you thinking about the next fix. Most of the time flying the FYTTE arrival and really most arrivals in O'Hare we get a clearance for FYTTE at 11000 and 300kts; bypassing all the other crossings. I think more descend via's and less altering of the approaching in O'Hare would help keep me from making this mistake again; although that is no excuse.

A CRJ-200 was given an altered crossing altitude of at FL240 at BHAWK on the FYTTE RNAV STAR to ORD which was subsequently reversed and they were cleared to 'descend via' the FYTTE which included the restrictions 'Between FL260 & FL220.' Instead of reprogramming the pilot flying opted to wait until crossing BHAWK to reengage the descent; but failed to do so when distracted by other tasks. An altitude deviation at the following fix resulted; abated by a revised clearance from ATC.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

The abuse of the emergency radio frequency; 121.5; colloquially know as 'guard;' is getting out of hand. As professional pilots; we strive to monitor guard on our #2 radio in case we miss a frequency change on our #1 radio; or to be able to assist in case of an aircraft is in distress.  Occasionally someone will acknowledge a radio call; make a position report; or make a PA to passengers with their transmit button accidentally on the wrong radio.  The person normally recognizes the mistake quickly and sets the transmit to the correct radio.  But then comes the frequency abuse as people chime in with remarks; animal sounds; bodily function sounds and any number of various sounds from their smart phones; all on the emergency frequency.  The situation is getting worse everyday.  It is to the point where those of us who have a modicum of radio discipline are turning off our guard receivers to keep from getting distracted by the clown act that is playing out on the emergency frequency.  The emergency frequency is quickly becoming unusable as an tool in the event of an emergency. I have X years of experience as an active duty/reserve military aviator.  I have X+3 years of experience as a commercial airline pilot.  I have many times busted military flight students for lack of radio discipline.  As a first officer; I have never flown with a captain who abused the emergency frequency. As a captain; I have not flown with a first officer who abused the emergency frequency.  I believe this is a maturity problem that is being caused by a newer generation of aviators who feel at home abusing the emergency frequency while remaining anonymous.  This is way out of hand and needs to be addressed by the FAA. The problem is not going to go away until emphasis from up high comes down to primary flight schools; corporate training facilities and airline training departments. Somebody needs to step in and stop the madness.

Air carrier Captain reported that guard frequency is frequently being used to transmit non-aviation related chatter and sounds; resulting in the frequency becoming unusable as a tool in the event of an emergency.


Medium Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 09R

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On the ILS V 9R Approach in PHL; we were cleared for the approach at 2;000 until established; 170 knots to KELEE. Inside ASOCI we descended to 1;800 to capture the GS. Aircraft was configured for landing at the FAF. As checklist was being completed; the First Officer (FO) indicated an anomaly with the approach; that something was wrong. The GS indicator was not showing and the plane was descending. The autopilot was disconnected and I called for and initiated a go-around; taking control of aircraft. As the go-around commenced; ATC advised of a low altitude alert. The go-around was executed and completed as ATC issued a clearance to climb to 3;000 feet and vectors to the southwest.  ATC then asked if we wanted to try the ILS V Runway 17 due to the more favorable winds for that runway and the possible glideslope issue on 9R. We accepted vectors for the ILS V Runway 17 and flew a standard approach to a landing; with all aircraft autoflight systems operating normally.  The FO resumed control of the aircraft after the go around was completed and flew the subsequent approach to landing. Flight crew awareness that aircraft was descending on a path outside the normal glideslope path for the approach. Not certain why event occurred. It appears the autopilot descended the aircraft on a path other than the intended glideslope for the approach. Possible glideslope failure. Not sure what anomaly occurred; but it appeared to be a one-time event as the aircraft systems operated normally for the subsequent approach.  Crew situational awareness and CRM contributed to successfully recognizing the unintended flight path and discontinuing the approach; executing a go around.

A Turboprop Captain reports getting below the glideslope during a night visual approach to PHL with the First Officer flying. The First Officer indicates that something is amiss with the approach and the Captain takes control and executes a go-around at the same time the Tower issues a low altitude alert.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 25R

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 172; Flight Crew Type 6958

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Inbound to LAX; we were set up for an approach to 24R off of the RIIVR 2 Arrival.  We were then told to descend via the RIIVR 2 and cleared the ILS 25L.  That was no problem since we had adequate time to reprogram the box and pull out the new approach plate.  While on final; we were given a speed change (don't remember the details) and were told we were cleared direct TAANK for the ILS 25R.  This put us in a jam since we were in a -300 and had to find the appropriate approach plate and reprogram the box.  By the time we got the box programmed; the course indicator didn't make sense to me since I now realize we were already past TAANK.  In the heat of the moment; I felt like I was flying blind and did not have good situational awareness.  At one point the Controller asked about our location and the Captain said something about just finishing the reprogramming and were correcting.  He also said the field was in sight and we were cleared visual approach 25R.  Since I lost situational awareness momentarily; I believe I may have drifted right slightly and gotten slightly low on the approach at or above altitudes. We eventually 'got back into the Green;' but it was very uncomfortable!  I believe we worked well as a crew and did our best to adjust to this last-minute change.  I don't understand why this happens so often.  Please relay to the controllers that these last-minute changes can really throw us into a fur ball.  It is not good business to switch us like that in such a busy environment.  It takes a while to recover and; in that time; bad things can happen with fast moving airplanes.

B737-300 Fist Officer reports a last minute change from runway 24R to 25L then to 25R at LAX which causes confusion and possible altitude and track deviations. The Captain reports the field in sight and is cleared for the visual.


Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

After leaving the gate we received an IDG1 CAS message. After deferring item with Maintenance Control we continued using the APU generator for the duration of the flight. Approximately 40 miles east of [a nearby suitable airport] we received an APU OIL PRESS CAS msg. Following the QRH; since the APU was considered essential to flight we directed by the QRH to land at nearest suitable airport. We landed at [the nearby airport] without event. After several hours of positive feedback by maintenance we cancelled the flight and repo'd the A/C back to [maintenance base]. No fault was found with the APU and the IDG was found not serviceable.

CRJ-200 Captain reported he was dispatched with a generator out of service and subsequently noted an APU fault. Since the APU generator was required; they diverted to the nearest suitable airport in accordance with procedure.


Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Other Glider

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1200; Flight Crew Type 300

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

I entered left downwind to Runway 12 at AVQ for landing.  A Cessna was ahead of me on downwind for a touch and go; and I announced over CTAF that I was number 2 behind it.  To adjust for my greater airspeed than the aircraft I was following; I extended my downwind considerably; and turned base after the aircraft ahead was already on short final.  As I turned final; I realized that the distance to the aircraft ahead; which was nearing touchdown; was less than I had planned for.  I considered going around; but determined that the aircraft ahead would already be airborne when I touched down; and therefore continued.  As I descended through about 100 feet AGL I encountered wake turbulence from the aircraft ahead; which was noticeable in the otherwise calm air; but not difficult to control.  I touched down just prior to the aircraft ahead lifting off. In retrospect; I should have gone around early and avoided the situation; which would have been a real hazard had the aircraft ahead decided to stop on the runway.  AVQ is a *very* busy airport; with aircraft of widely varying performance.  On my approach this day; a Phenom departed; several light aircraft were in closed traffic doing touch and goes; a Cessna 421 was waiting to depart; and another aircraft was inbound on the RNAV 12 approach.  This airport needs a Tower!

Beechcraft 33 pilot reported encountering wake turbulence just before landing at AVQ.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

I was the SIC; and we picked the plane up at the service center. I was pilot flying and occupying the left seat. We were ferrying the plane to pick up a passenger. Pre-flight; engine start; taxi; take-off; climb; and all related checklists were normal. On descent to 17;000 FT; and passing FL190; we heard a muffled bang. There was a shudder followed by continuous vibration. I immediately began to reduce power to slow down. There were no CAS messages displayed and engine instruments and pressurization all remained normal. We decided that the Captain would call the company and I would fly and communicate with ATC. Center gave us a further descent to 11;000. Maintenance decided we needed to divert. I informed Center of the change of destination. They wanted us to climb to 14;000 FT for the new route. Climbing through 12;000 we both noticed a funny odor and the vibration was getting worse. I requested a level off at 12;000 and that was granted. We proceeded to a divert station; declaring an emergency due to vibration from an unknown source. We configured early in case there was an issue with the gear or flaps. We landed without incident and taxied off and clear of the runway and came to a stop close to the emergency vehicles. We had contact with them and they told us we had significant damage to our right engine. We shut down right there and were later towed to the Service Center. We found much of the underside cowling of the right engine missing.

I was PIC and was pilot not flying for this day's legs. The First Officer accomplished an exterior inspection while I got the flight plan for this leg and the next leg and the plane was fueled. Nothing unusual was noted on the exterior and interior preflight except for a low oil message on the right engine. I went back into the hangar and asked that 1/2 quart be added to the engine. After insuring that the oil was added and the oil service was closed I walked around the aircraft to insure that every thing was locked/latched. Nothing was noted. Takeoff [before sunrise]; climb out (to FL370); and cruise were normal. During descent; between FL180 and 17;000; we both heard a loud bang followed by a low vibration and rumbling. We checked all the systems and the engine indications and everything was normal. We both discussed the situation and decided that I would call Maintenance and the Assistant Chief Pilot. The First Officer took over communication in addition to his flying duties. During the call Maintenance and the Assistant Chief Pilot decided that we should divert. I was put in contact with Dispatch and our release was amended. While I was obtaining the new release; the First Officer told Center that we needed to divert. Our main concern was that we had a gear problem even though all indications were normal. When I finished the call to Headquarters I took over pilot not flying duties. We were handed off to another Center Frequency and I declared an emergency. When I contacted Approach I again declared an emergency. By this time all the checklist were accomplished and we were cleared for an ILS at our divert station. The First Officer started configuring early; flap and gear extension were normal. Landing was normal but as we retracted the thrust reversers we got an engine control fault R CAS message. After we cleared the runway we stopped so the fire trucks could inspect the airplane. As they looked at the airplane it was recommended that we shut down engines because we had extensive damage to the right engine. We shut the engines and the rest of the airplane down and exited; normally; to look at the right engine. That was when we saw that most of the bottom of the right engine cowling was missing. I contacted Headquarters and we waited for Cessna to come to inspect the engine. After the inspection we were towed to the Service Center.

CE680 flight crew experiences a loud bang followed by a low vibration and rumbling during descent for landing. All indications in the cockpit are normal but the crew diverts for maintenance at the company's request. Post flight revealed that most of the bottom of the right engine cowling was missing.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.0

Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Workload

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

I was working Arrival radar during our extended radar outage. I had a sequence of 4 aircraft and a VFR practice approach on final. Two aircraft were joining the downwind for Runway 26L. Aircraft X was from the south; and I was attempting to 'chase' Aircraft Y to follow him to the airport. I had originally descended Aircraft X to 3000 feet and Aircraft Y to 5000 feet. I changed the altitudes and descended Aircraft X to 4000 feet and Aircraft Y to 3000 feet. Because of this Aircraft Y ended up at the same altitude as Aircraft X. I was late to notice this because there was no Conflict Alert and no RA from the pilots. I called the traffic to both pilots but was delayed doing so as the radar was updating so slow; and the data tags became overlapped. Both aircraft had the other in sight; however; I had already lost separation between the two. I cleared Aircraft Y for the Visual Approach rather than bring him through the localizer like I should have done. A VFR Aircraft Z was on a 2 mile final. I called upstairs to ask Tower to break out the Aircraft Z. I should have asked them to turn the aircraft southbound; but I was desperate to just have the aircraft out of the way. Once I cleared Aircraft Y I turned Aircraft X to a 090 heading and eventually brought them in once everything was resolved. GRR is on a long term radar outage; and plans to be on CENRAP (TRACON using long range Center radar feed) for an extended period of time. We are fighting staffing issues and trying to train new controllers. Today we were below our staffing numbers for the day but a Supervisor was filling in for a controller that was on sick leave. The Supervisor was busy doing other tasks and the TRACON was being run on a single person rotation. This should not happen when we have the added complexity of CENRAP added to our workload. I am a trainer for a Tower trainee; and the other member of the team is a trainer for someone in the TRACON. Because of this; we both only get minimal time on the position we aren't training on. I felt very rusty in the radar room; and it showed when a complex problem developed. Due to being on CENRAP there was no Conflict Advisory warning. This is something I completely forgot about. Especially since the Supervisor came into the TRACON earlier in the day and tested the alarms to make sure they worked. We are regularly without a Supervisor monitoring the operation. Lately they have been on leave; or attending training elsewhere; leaving us short on supervision. This increases the workload on the Controllers who are already busy working traffic; and training.

[Report narrative contains no additional information.]

A TRACON Controller utilizing Center Radar procedures reported vectoring two aircraft heading to the final approach course onto conflicting courses.


Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

Cleared for takeoff on [Runway] 16R. All checklist completed and aircraft handed over to First Officer. Max power set and scanning instruments when both L. and R. Pitot Heat Fail; L. and R. AOA Heat Fail; along with the Master Caution light. This occurred at 60 KTS. As Captain; I called for a 'reject' and took control of the  aircraft. Tower informed of reject. There was a little amount of confusion about the 'pitot failure.' I asked the Company Ramp Office to call the Tower personnel and make sure there was no misunderstanding. Returned to the gate where the maintenance write up was corrected by replacing the MSC Controller.  Second takeoff uneventful; continued to destination.

A MD11 Captain rejected the takeoff at 60 KTS when the Master Caution alerted Pitot and AOA heater failures.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 6

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Procedure

I worked Aircraft X and the aircraft was not loaded with new [OAPM (Optimization of Airspace and Procedures in the Metroplex)] procedures. [I recommend updating the] airplanes.

ZLA Center Controller reported working an aircraft that did not have new OAPM arrival procedures available on the aircraft.


Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related

Descending into ROA for a visual approach to Runway 34; the GPWS provided an aural warning of terrain. To accommodate ATC and terrain to the south of the airport we remained high initially; but began a descent once cleared for the visual approach. The use of electronic means of glideslope for the ILS to 34 were used to back up the visual approach. About 7 DME the GPWS advised the terrain and the flight crew adjusted its flight path.

Air carrier flight crew experienced a GPWS warning in visual conditions while executing a steep visual approach to the airport. Nearby high terrain was a factor.


B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 30000; Flight Crew Type 50

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Cleared to FL310; as we approached FL310 it was obvious the aircraft was not going to level. While leveling we overshot the altitude by several hundred feet. I called Center and the Controller said to continue climb to FL330. When I looked at the altitude window it was set at 31;800. We were warned in the simulator that this system was hyper-sensitive. If you set it and brush your finger on the knob as you pull off it will change the altitude. On IOE it was again brought up and the company has put out two bulletins regarding the altitude select window. Yet it still got me. The First Officer I was flying with said he had seen this several times since he has been on the airplane. He demonstrated how you could push the knob in to 'recruise' the FMC and if you put the slightest side pressure on the knob it will change the selected altitude. I just finished 15 years flying the B777 and never once saw anything like this occur. I believe Boeing has a serious design fault with this system that needs to be addressed.

B787 Captain reported the altitude alert set knob is too sensitive and easy to mis-set.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Fatigue; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Expecting a visual to 17 we were 20 miles out and direct to PNS. A scattered layer at 2000 MSL was obstructing our view so I asked approach control for direct to BRENT. Approach control gave us direct BRENT and descend to 1700 MSL. On a right base direct BRENT the FO said he spotted a beacon; but I still couldn't see it thinking the layer was the reason. I had listened to the ASOS and noted pilot controlled lighting was on CTAF but forgot to click the lights on using COMM2. We were slowed to 160 kts with Flaps 3 and gear down as we approached 3 miles from BRENT. Approach told us field at 2 o'clock; I replied still searching. Approach gave us a 140 heading to join. This had us going inside BRENT at 1700 MSL. The FO stated; 'Oh; the runway lights are off'. I scrambled to click the lights on with COMM2 but had 119.1 tuned in. The FO disengaged the AP pitched the nose down to remain on glide path while I was doing this. We were not cleared for an approach however. We lost 150 to 200 feet of altitude. Approach control told us; 'Low altitude alert' and gave us a left turn heading 090. We corrected back to 1700 MSL. We were vectored back around for the ILS but by now had the lights on and the runway in sight.Both the FO and I remarked during the descent that we could feel the lateness of the night and were fighting to remain alert. We think this contributed to the event. ATC turning us inside final while holding 1700 ft MSL was not a help. The FO's reaction was to start descending to capture the glide path because he knew otherwise we would be too high. But because we were neither cleared for a visual or the ILS; we should have remained at 1700. I had my focus on the box correcting a frequency and clicking on lights when I should have accomplished that a while ago so I could maintain situational awareness at a critical time. Taking the initiative to activate runway lights early on instead of waiting to see the airport beacon would have given us the visual in time. Also asking for a vector to join outside of the FAF would buy more time to see the airport and control the lighting.

After thinking about the events the causes were the runway lights being off and my failure to recognize a slight descent. The pilot monitoring thought she was clicking them on but the frequency was off by one digit. Also; I should have left the autopilot on until we were cleared the approach to assure we didn't drift down. Task saturation as well as trying to find the runway (eyes outside) probably led me to not noticing a loss of altitude prior to being cleared the visual. Both crew members noted prior to descent that we were beginning to feel the effects of a long day with multiple weather delays and deviations. Finally the turn inside the final approach fix only exacerbated the situation by giving us less time. In the future this situation can be mitigated by a more detailed brief describing the additional actions necessary for a closed runway; also if I had left the autopilot on the plane would not have drifted down. I also would not have accepted the heading that cut us inside the final approach fix and instead asked for a vector away. ATC informed us on our vectors to the ILS that he could see that the lights were not on. It would have been nice to have been told this information sooner considering he knew we were having trouble finding the runway and we thought we were clicking the lights on.

Air carrier flight crew reported difficulties during a night visual approach to PNS due to the runway lights not being activated via mic clicks. A low altitude alert was issued by ATC and the flight was vectored back around for another attempt.


Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Confusion; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Descending into PHX on the HYDRR1 RNAV STAR landing to the east.  On initial contact with approach control was told to expect runway 7R.  The next controller initially told us to expect the visual for runway 7R.  At approximately 7;000 feet the controller told us to turn to a heading to intercept the localizer for runway 8 and contact the final approach controller.  At that time I believed he cleared us to 6;000 feet.  We assumed we were being kept a little high due to Luke AFB airspace located west of PHX.  Upon initial contact with the final controller she cleared us for the runway 8 approach to PHX and told us to maintain 210 kts till a 10 mile final.  The Captain and myself both expressed concern that we would be too high and fast for a stabilized approach.  I informed the controller that we were unable to maintain 210 kts till a 10 mile final.  She then issued a clearance to turn to a heading for the runway 7R approach.  Both the Captain and I were confused on this clearance since we were initially issued the runway 7R approach followed up by the runway 8 approach and now back to the runway 7R approach.  I then asked the controlled about the clearance if it was correct since neither myself nor the Captain have received a clearance like this before flying into PHX.  She seemed to be frustrated with us and told us to fly the approach.  At this time we were not sure if we were cleared for the ILS Rwy 7R or the visual approach to runway 7R and she seemed to be confused somehow with what was going on.  I asked for an altitude to descend to and a heading to fly.  Was told to descend to 3;000 feet and was given a heading to fly.  She informed us that we would be flying through the runway 7R localizer.  We told her that we were going to need a phone number to call and she quickly rattled off a phone number; told us to turn to a heading that would re-intercept final and cleared for the visual for runway 7R.  I repeated what I could on the clearance and stopped talking since we were overwhelmed with flying and navigating under the high workload.   We intercepted final inside the final approach fix and was able to be established on a stable approach by our 1;000 foot callout.  Once I contacted the tower we were cleared to land on runway 7L.  Since we were stable on the approach at this time we accepted and landed on runway 7L.

I was the flying pilot. Descending via HYDRR ONE RNAV ARRIVAL procedures; the ATC controllers (from two different ATC controller`s) had warned us that the runway to land will be the 7R for the day. Approach briefing was done for RWY 7R and I had loaded up the MCDU; the secondary flight plan for the approach to Runway 8 as backup. Then; after we changed to the last ATC approach controller she gave us a heading (I believe) of 050 to join the ILS 8 localizer. But she kept us high around 7;000 feet's then 6;000 feet. Sometimes this is due to Goodyear airport flight path or Luke AFB. The aircraft speed was around 250kts. (Not sure maybe less) Then; she cleared us for the visual approach but maintaining 210 kts until 10 DME distance. Due to the aircraft height and speed; I decided to lower the landing gear early to slow down the aircraft and loss altitude. Immediately we let her know ATC unable to comply with speed and distances that she requires due to the aircraft height; 'too high' and the airport was getting closer faster and we will be out the descent profile ratio and perhaps might have to go-around at the end if; we are not stabilized the approach at the 1;000/500 feet AFL gate. The controllers did not like our answer 'unable 'and immediately she gave us a vector heading (I believe) 160 heading and any aircraft speed. 'Any speed You want; she said'... Also she said that we might cross the localizer 7R and come back-up. I maintain an altitude of 3;000 feet. At this time. She creates confusion or I should say uncomfortably task loaded; not completely clear; because we are clear for visual approach for Runway 8 but now we are changing to another runway and have the instruction of a heading/altitude; as well as the possibilities to crosses the 7R flight path to the south and re-joined for the approach. I keep the aircraft at the last assigned altitude and heading. We have in sight at all time the runway 8; 7R and L due to a clear beautiful day. First Officer (FO) asked her if we are clear for the approach. She did reply 'No; You are NOT.' FO asked again; 'what heading and altitude do you want us to fly?' Then; she said 'Do you have the runway 7R in-Sight'? First Officer answered back with calling the airport in sight. The controller then; cleared us for the visual approach for 7R runway. We asked for her phone number and she tried to give us several time too fast but the frequency was saturated. We have to aviate; navigate and communicates the aircraft first due to the proximity to runway 7L and possible jeopardized the landing (Unstabilized approach). So; the First officer decides to change to the tower frequency to get the authorization instructions from tower control and land the aircraft safely.  Upon contacted tower we were offered runway 7L for landing (this is the fourth runway change) to what we accepted because we were well stabilizes in the approach path. Knowledge; skill and aircraft handling made us to land the aircraft successfully. On a clear beautiful day we had four (4) different runways changes instructions. But we followed every single ATC instructions. I did not request Runway 8 for landing. She should ask before if we are comfortable to fly the approach or should say; give me the best forward speed until 10 DME. We weren't following any aircraft traffic for runway 8 as well as there was not traffic in TCAS display instrument system ahead of us. This was at the end of a 4 day trip and three (3) legs; long day....

After several runway changes; and with some discussion about speeds and altitudes and headings; the crew landed successfully on Runway 7L at PHX.


Confusion; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

On the arrival flying downwind; the First Officer asked for flaps 5. When I moved the flap handle to the flaps 5 position; there was no flap movement displayed on the flap position indicator. Both indicators remained at zero. After determining there were no popped circuit breakers; we got out the QRH and ran the checklist for No Trailing Edge Flaps. The Standby Flap switch was armed and the Flap switch was moved and held in the down position. Still there was no flap movement shown by the indicators. We did however have leading edge flaps extended. I checked the circuit breakers again and found the 'TE Flap Drive AC' breaker had popped. After the cooling period; I reset the breaker; and once again tried the Alternate Flap switch. The breaker popped a second time. We continued the checklist and configured for a no flaps landing. After completing the checklist; I took the controls and asked the First Officer to review the QRH and make sure nothing had been skipped. I continued on the controls to the landing. We had been given the left runway for landing. We wanted the longer right runway; so at this point we declared an emergency; requested the longer runway and landed without incident.

A B737-300 Captain reported that when flaps 5 were selected no trailing edge flap movement occurred so an emergency was declared; the QRH completed and a landing with Leading Edge devices only completed.


Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 90; Flight Crew Total 28700; Flight Crew Type 505

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Captain was on an intercept heading to join the ILS XXR. We were assigned 2;400 feet to join the ILS XXR. I was making a First Officer instrument sub panel change and was head down and noticed the jet at 1;750 feet when it should have been 2;400. At the same Approach noticed it and repeated the assigned altitude. That was my first time in the right seat on the Citation V. Previous limited in training with the company was left seat only. It was also my first revenue flight with the company. I did fly both seats in the CE500 in the early 1980's. We landed without further incident but we did not have the terrain separation desired while at that altitude. There was no other traffic that time of night fortunately. Later that night when I flew 2 legs I did notice that that the autopilot would not always capture altitudes while descending with altitude select annunciated. Possible contributing factor was the short notice flight assignment on a late night mission.

A CE560 First Officer reported the aircraft did not capture 2;400 feet on approach and while he was heads down the Captain allowed a descent to 1;750 feet before both he and ATC alerted about the deviation.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 312; Flight Crew Type 10000

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

On takeoff from BUR Runway 15; we were put into position awaiting our flow time. I expected to wait the two minutes and saw an aircraft that appeared to be on final to Runway 8. Then; Tower advised us there were two helicopters where we saw that traffic and they would be passing southwest of the airport. We called them in sight and they also called us in sight. We were cleared for takeoff. We could just see the aircraft over the hangars west of Runway 15; but we knew we could keep them in sight during the takeoff roll. As we became airborne; it became obvious the track of the helicopters was closer that I had estimated before takeoff roll. I became very concerned that our SID heading to 210 degrees was going to put us in very close proximity to the helicopters with about a 90-degree intercept. I delayed the turn until about 1;000 FT AGL (1;800 MSL). I think the helicopters were about 1;200 FT AGL. I remained at V2 to V2 plus 20 until over 2000 MSL. We received a TCAS TA at some point as we climbed over the helicopters. As we got switched to Departure; I told BUR Tower I wasn't happy with the separation we had with the helicopters.After getting above 10;000 I called the Tower back and informed him I was filing a near mid-air collision report so he was aware and could mark the tapes. We were in a -700 with only 30 or so passengers so our climb was very good. Had we been full of passengers and/or in a -300; I feel there would have been a significant risk of a collision. While all aircraft had each other in sight; I don't know if the helicopters would have been able to avoid us had our climb been slower or had not delayed the turn to a 90-degree intercept and 200 knots of speed. BUR Tower was trying to help expedite us but; if we had waited less than a minute; the helicopters would have been well past our planned departure track. Had I been able to see the picture on a radar screen; I would not have accepted the takeoff clearance.

A B737-700 flight crew departing BUR was distressed when; after advising them of two helicopters in the general vicinity of their SID departure path and; after confirmation of visual contact by all flight crews involved; the Tower cleared them for takeoff.  The reporter elected to make an NMAC report due to their in-flight proximity to the helicopters.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter FOD

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

During gear retraction we smelled a strong burning rubber smell and then heard one or two bangs.  I saw no abnormal engine indications and suspected that one of the tires had exploded in the wheel well.  We declared an emergency and began to burn down to a normal landing weight.  We did one tower fly by with no positive result.  Flight attendants did a planned evacuation brief as a precaution and passengers were told that the plan was to do a normal landing and egress via the aft airstairs.  A deadheading crewmember [from another airline] further back in the fuselage said he believed it was left tire damage and he was correct.  We did an uneventful unpressurized landing.  Landing by the copilot was flawless. Post flight inspection revealed loss of tread on a left tire; flap damage and evidence of tire debris ingestion on the left engine.

The Captain was concerned about taxiing or being towed due to possible explosive failure of the left tires. The Captain decided to use the aft cabin stairs to administratively remove the passengers; on the closed runway as the safest option. The passengers boarded the buses uneventfully and carefully.

MD-82 flight crew reports they were alerted to a tire failure on takeoff by several loud bangs and a burning rubber smell. They declared an emergency and returned to the departure airport.