Workload; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

This was my fourth approach down to low minimums on this date; which was having micro burst alerts and windshear alerts on the departure end. Then reported windshear on takeoff and a special Cat II approach to mins back at [the departure airport]. The third leg to SMF required a CAT III approach; but as we were in the approach the weather started to lift. About 1000 ft. we encountered a flock of between 60-80 geese on a collision course; just as we were trying find an escape route the flock separated and went on both sides of the aircraft. We continued the approach when at approximately 600 agl I received NO AIII in the hud; at which point we executed a missed approach. As we setup to come back for another approach the weather had risen to CAT I and was getting better. We setup for a CAT I ILS approaching 1000 agl we had more geese to maneuver around; we were stabilized at 1000agl and still vmc. Not long after the 1000 foot call I saw more geese staying centered on my windshield. I started to maneuver left and high to avoid the geese; after passing the geese I was high and left of course; I started correcting back to course and my FO said I was 2 dots high so I said correcting. I lower the nose too much and got a SINK RATE -I corrected the sink rate and had the runway in sight. We touched down within the first 1500 ft. I was so focused on the runway and getting back to stabilized approach that my First Officer's call out to go around did not register until just prior to touchdown. First I feel the stress of avoiding multiple geese strikes caused me to get tunnel vision to establish a stabilized approach and land the airplane safely. My First Officer correctly said 'go around' however in my intense concentration it didn't register. The outcome was a safe landing and no geese strikes; but my correct course of action should have been a go-around.

Boeing 737 flight crew encountered a flock of geese at 1;000ft. The Captain maneuvered to avoid the birds and ended up high and left of the ILS. During his correction; the crew got a sink rate call out and continued to land in an un-stabilized approach condition.


Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action

After cruising at FL380 with an oat of -33 C; we started a descent and observed an AP TRIM MIS COMP annunciator along with a Master Caution. Upon running the Abnormal Checklist we discovered the elevator trim to be frozen; would not move in either direction electrically or manually; so our speed was reduced to about 250 KTS to achieve a neutral trim setting in the descent. It wasn't until about 8;000 FT with an OAT of +5 C that the elevator trim became unstuck. The only thing we could not comply with was an increased assigned speed by ATC. We landed uneventfully.

The reporter stated that the aircraft's maintenance log indicated the trim actuators were replaced but he and his First Officer suspected ice someplace in the system. His suspicion is based on his having heard of this happening before and because of the fact that the trim returned to normal with warming temperatures during descent. He and his First Officer had flown this aircraft on several short flights the previous day but had not flown above the mid FL200's. Also the aircraft had not been exposed to precipitation and the daylight ground temperatures in the flight areas were in the mid 60's.

A CE-560XL AP TRIM MIS COMP and Master Caution alerted as the descent was begun from FL380 with a -33 OAT so the aircraft was slowed to descend and at about 8;000 FT with a +5 OAT the trim began normal operation so the crew suspected icing somewhere in the trim system.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 96; Flight Crew Total 1137; Flight Crew Type 741

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

Turning downwind at FFFAT both GPS went out. Turning a 9 mile base; the 'Transponder Fail' light illuminated. This was a known problem happening to all aircraft according to Denver Approach.

While descending through 14;000 feet into DEN; approximately 3NM North of the DEN airport; we lost both the L and R GPS signals. We also received an amber TERR FAIL message on both ND's. Reported signal loss to DEN approach.  They responded 'We have had many reports today of GPS signals out'.  The L and R GPS signals restored 5 min after landing and upon taxing into the gate.Upon departure from DEN; while climbing through 3;000 feet; lost both L and R GPS signals.   Reported signal loss to DEN departure.  They responded 'We have had many reports today of intermittent GPS signal loss.'  Shortly after the L and R GPS signal loss we also received a 'XPDR FAIL' light on the  Transponder.  Operation of GPS signals and Transponder returned to normal while climbing through 26;000 feet.Determine if GPS outage was related to 5G activation; Note: while in the DEN airport; personal cell phone displayed 5G WB was in use.

Flight crew reported both GPS and transponder failed on approach and departure into and out of DEN.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 950; Flight Crew Type 500

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

I was returning to HPN from a VFR training flight. I was descending through 4;500 FT to pattern altitude (1;500 FT). The standard procedure when arriving VFR to HPN is to contact New York Approach; and I typically do this over BDR at 4;500 FT. When I did so today; the Controller told me that he was unable to provide services for another few miles; and that I could contact Approach on 124.07 if I wanted flight following. Because I had less than two minutes of flying time before I would enter his airspace; I chose to monitor the frequency instead of changing to 124.07 and almost immediately changing back. About one minute later; the Controller advised a regional jet that he had traffic 300 FT above him and 12 o'clock; descending. I stopped my descent began to look for this traffic. Almost simultaneously; the RJ suddenly appeared from behind; about 2;000 FT off my left wing and slightly below me. I listened to the RJ crew advise TRACON that they had just received a TCAS RA and were taking evasive action. I maintained visual separation while the RJ turned away. The Controller then asked me if I had gotten a good look at the RJ that I had almost descended into. I replied that he had overtaken me from behind and I was unable to see him until he was abeam my wing and had received his TCAS RA.I believe that this chain of events could have been easily avoided if the Controller had given me a squawk code and provided flight following on my initial call up. I have flown VFR into this airport many times; and this is the first time that a Controller on this frequency has been unable to provide services. (When I fly IFR into this airport; I am often given a frequency change over BDR.) He could have then advised me that I had traffic below and overtaking me. I think that situational awareness possibly prevented a mid-air collision: Had I not been monitoring the frequency; I would not have heard the controller call traffic to the RJ and would not have known to arrest my descent.

SR22 pilot descending into HPN from the east experiences a conflict with a CRJ climbing from behind. ATC assistance had been requested one minute prior over BDR and the reporter was instructed to call a different Controller.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel; Person Dispatch

Nearing top of descent; we received an ACARS message from Dispatch that one of the cargo sections had been improperly loaded; with the weight exceeding the floor limit and the dry ice not being loaded properly. Dispatch suggested that the safest course of action was proceeding to [destination] and landing. The Captain and I agreed with this course of action and pressed forward. The flight ended safely.

Boeing 737 First Officer reported receiving notice from ground personnel that the cargo was improperly loaded. Flight was close to destination and landed normally.


Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

During climbout; at approximately 17;000 FT; we received an EICAS message of L HYD OVHT (Left Hydraulic Overheat). We requested to level off at 18;000 FT from Center. We accomplished the QRH procedure; which instructed us to turn off the left engine hydraulic pump. At the time; the hydraulic PSI and quantity were normal. After accomplishing the QRH; we continued our climb to cruise altitude. Some minutes after reaching cruise altitude; we received another EICAS message that the L HYD quantity was low. The message was accompanied by a thud; but I could not tell where the sound originated from. The L HYD SYS Press (Left Hydraulic System Pressure) message also appeared. At this time; one of the flight attendants also called forward to tell us they heard a strange noise. On the status page we noted 3.7rf for the left hydraulic system; and 3;100 PSI for the left PSI. The Center and right systems indicated normal. We accomplished the HYD SYS PRESS L only QRH procedure. The PTU was doing its job as we noted 3;100 system pressure on the left side. The Captain had me notify ATC that we had an abnormal condition with our hydraulics; and for the time being we intended to continue to destination. As I was doing this; he was in contact with Dispatch via ACARS notifying them of our condition. He and I began a lengthy discussion as to whether we should continue to destination; or return. We considered all factors such as weather at locations; aircraft weight; runway lengths and possible system degradations. We referenced the QRH which outlined the items powered by the PTU; Including normal flaps; landing gear etc. Although the PTU was operating and stable; we were concerned that the system might further degrade and require us to use alternate extension of gear and flaps during our approach. Our chief concern was the prospect of an overweight landing if we turned back. If it became necessary to abort the landing attempt and execute a missed approach; it would be a bad situation if we could not retract the gear and flaps during the go around. We were some 30;000 LBS or so over the maximum landing weight. Loss of an engine on approach or go around with degraded flap and gear operation could prove fatal. Given these considerations; and the fact that the weather was good at destination and had 11;000 plus FT of runway; we agreed that we wanted to continue. The Captain conveyed this to Dispatch; and they agreed also that we should continue. The Captain then coordinated a more direct routing. Each ATC facility was notified of our problem as the flight progressed southward. The Captain and I used our time reviewing and re reviewing the procedures for alternate extension of gear and flaps; should it become necessary on our approach. We also discussed our contingency plan in case the weather turned foul or we had to execute a missed approach for any reason. We reviewed the terrain surrounding the airport; and we discussed alternate airports should they become necessary. We rehearsed the scenarios and procedures over and over again; as we new we would be fatigued near the end of the flight. We would be landing near dawn after flying all night; so we wanted to make sure we had the procedures down pat so we could accomplish them with out any doubt. Once we were with destination ATC we declared an emergency; and requested emergency equipment to be standing by to monitor our landing. The Captain briefed the flight attendants for the landing. They were told to perform a 30 second review as a precaution; although we anticipated a normal landing. We once again rehearsed our procedures and then began our descent. The descent was planned a little early to give us additional time to configure the aircraft if necessary. Once we began to configure the aircraft flaps for landing; the TE flaps disagree light illuminated. At this time; the left system went to zero. We used alternate flap extension as directed by the checklist. When the gear was lowered; the gearfailed to extend. We used the alternate gear extension as directed by the checklist. The alternate systems worked as designed; and no further problems configuring the aircraft were encountered. Tower cleared us to land; and we confirmed again that the crash equipment was standing by. The Captain made a smooth touchdown. He had some difficulty deploying the right reverser. He used manual and differential breaking to bring the aircraft to a controlled stop. Steering the aircraft was difficult due to no nose wheel steering; but he was able to clear the runway using differential breaking. Once clear of the runway; we told tower that we wanted our company to tow us to the gate. The tug arrived; we shut down the engines; and were towed to the gate without further incident. The aircraft was not equipped with SATCOM; so communications with dispatch was difficult and accomplished with free text messages to Dispatch. SATCOM would have simplified this task and reduced our work load a great deal.

B757-200 First Officer reports a left hydraulic system overheat during climb out and the left engine driven pump is secured in accordance with QRH procedures. After reaching cruise an EICAS message for L Hyd Quantity and L Hyd Pressure is annunciated. The crew elects to continue to destination where alternate gear and flap extension methods are employed prior to landing. The aircraft is towed to the gate.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

During climb out from ZZZ; through approximately 9;000-10;000 feet the AFT LAV SMOKE master warning illuminated. Requested Flight Attendant (FA) 2 do a physical check of LAV status. Advised ATC of LAV smoke warning and advised we required a precautionary return to ZZZ. By time FA reported LAV clear status the warning extinguished. Both passengers and crew noticed an unusual odor in the cabin. First Officer (FO) noticed slight odor in cockpit. Advised ATC. Ran appropriate QRH and normal checklists and returned to ZZZ without further incident.Aircraft was on first flight after dual engine compressor washes. In talking with maintenance personnel after landing it was suspected that residual chemical from the washes was the most likely source of the smoke warning and odor. Aircraft was removed from service for further investigation.

CRJ-700 crew became aware of LAV smoke via master warning in cockpit; resulting in a return to departure airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Weather; Procedure; Aircraft; Company Policy; Manuals

We had a rather complex weather scenario the other day. Based on our experience; I wanted to raise a safety concern regarding our resources (i.e.; Manuals; Reference Page) that describe/highlight the requirements for 'Engine Run-up in Icing Conditions During Taxi and Takeoff'.   There appears to be a disparity between the cold temperature reference page and the AOM regarding 'Engine Run-up in Icing Conditions During Taxi and Takeoff'. The cold temperature reference page states above the table describing the run-up requirements for NG and MAX aircraft 'During periods of prolonged ground operations; when engine anti-icing is required; and the OAT is X degrees C or below; an engine run-up may be required...'. In contrast the NG engine run-up during takeoff procedure states;  'When engine anti-ice is required and the OAT is X degrees C or below; takeoff must be preceded by a static engine run-up to a minimum of 70 percent N1 and confirm stable engine operation before the start of the takeoff roll'.  My safety concern is that the AOM language is more restrictive and detailed (i.e.; identifying the static run-up conditions) and should be replicated on the cold temperature reference page.   Furthermore; another safety concern is that crews may potentially forget about the Engine Run-up requirements as rapidly changing weather conditions may result in very high task loading.

First Officer reported conflicting procedures between B737 NG and B737 MAX flight operating manuals.


Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification; Workload

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

The flight plan had us going straight across via ZZZZZ so minimum time to coast out. I logged us into CPDLC with ZZZZ Oceanic ATC Operations and we did the circle and tick procedures. Then shortly before ZZZZZ ATC re-routed us over ZZZZZ1 and then told us service terminated; squawk XXXX. We dialed up XYX.Z and XYA.Z on the radios. This was my first flight in over 3 months due to COVID schedule reductions. In the process of all of this; we forgot to get a SELCAL Ck with ZZ Radio. I caught this later in the flight and we did the SELCAL check with ZZ Radio. Flight continued uneventfully.We got busy with multiple tasks in a short period of time and overlooked the SELCAL check. I was using the ZZZ Reference Ck list on my iPAD but since you can't check off the items on the iPad it's not as effective as using the actual paper copy. Also; having not flown in so long creates another challenge as I had probably lost some of my regular flow that comes with flying more regularly. These are pilot not flying tasks but as the Captain; it is my responsibility to make sure they get done.Lessons learned: Be sure to use the paper copy of the Reference Guide checklist. There is great value in being able to look and see if any check marks are missing on the checklist.

Air carrier Captain forgot to do a SELCAL check and cited as contributing factors multiple tasks in a short period and having not flown in a long time.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 4300; Flight Crew Type 700

Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Lost right engine and diverted. Uneventful landing. Dual drive Bendix Magneto failed causing complete power loss. The mag was a fresh overhaul installed 20 minutes earlier. It was determined to be a faulty ground within the mag case itself causing both primary coils to fail. Poor design in my opinion!

PA31 pilot experiences a right engine failure in cruise and diverts to a suitable airport. Dual drive Bendix Magneto; installed 20 minutes earlier; failed causing complete power loss.


Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

During final descent I was doing compliance in the cabin. When I got to about row 25-32 I noticed a strong odor I've never smelled before on the aircraft. It smelled like a burning plastic and slightly sweet smell. I asked C Flight Attendant if she noticed the smell when I got to the aft of the aircraft. She said she could smell it. I notified the A [Flight Attendant]. I also started getting a slight headache. The smell did not go away until the doors opened. I noticed I had a metallic taste in my mouth so I was very nervous about my health. I sought medical attention from paramedics. I got medical attention. I had my vitals checked. I wanted to go to the hospital; but the paramedics pretty much talked me out of it by saying my vitals were fine and I wasn't coughing.

Airline Flight Attendant reported 'strong odor' confirmed by other flight attendants. Reporter experienced health symptoms; treated by paramedics on arrival.


Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 400

Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

ATC vectored aircraft to intercept LOC  and informed us of crossing traffic in our vicinity we received two separate traffic alerts and stopped our turn to final to visually attempt to spot the target which caused us to cross through LOC and informed controller we were correcting back on course we then received another traffic alert showing an aircraft within -100 feet so we climb and informed controller we had a traffic alert go off at which point we did make contact visually with traffic ATC  had alerted us to.In the end we made a visual approach to VNY airport not sure what we might have done different as to avoid the situation possibly continued the turn without crossing thru LOC but felt we need to spot the traffic first due to its proximity to us.

A C525B flight crew on a vector to intercept the localizer suffered an NMAC with an unidentified aircraft.  Their decision to stop the turn to intercept; causing them to fly through the localizer; may have been a contributing factor.


Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

During arrival at COE the Captain queried Spokane approach if we could contact them on the ground at COE to receive our clearance for our next leg. Spokane approach informed us that we could contact Spokane Departure on 132.1. The rest of the approach and landing was uneventful. Upon taxi out; I (pilot monitoring) tried calling Spokane Departure on 132.1 to receive our clearance; but was unable to make any contact.  They then called the Lockheed Martin Flight Service Number to receive our clearance; by now the captain had taxied the aircraft to runway 06 and pulled off into the run-up area. The briefer stated that there was another aircraft on a 10 mile final doing only about 90 knots and that it would be another 10 minutes till we were released. The briefer also stated that Spokane Departure had had the radio volume turned down and that we should try contacting them again; if we were unable to reach them; we should call Lockheed Martin National Clearance Delivery Number. After waiting about 5 minutes we heard the Cessna 172 on a 6 mile final calling on the CTAF (122.8).  We asked if they had canceled IFR; they had not.  We informed Cessna that we were trying to receive our IFR clearance; but they refused to cancel.  (This may have been due to the Cessna performing training; since they performed a low approach to runway 06; then appearing to execute the missed approach procedure.) I tried contacting Spokane Departure again by radio using both Com 1 and 2; but was unable to make contact. Next I called Lockheed Martin National Clearance Delivery to receive our clearance. We were cleared as filed; climb and maintain 8000; expect FL410 in 5 minutes; contact Spokane departure on 133.5; squawk [code].  I read back our clearance; and we were released.During climb-out I tried contacting Spokane departure on 133.5; but was unable to make any contact. I then tried contacting Departure on 132.1; but was not able to establish any communication.  During this time the Captain (pilot flying) was maintaining VFR per the Coeur D'Alene 2 Departure.  I tried contacting Spokane two more times with no luck.  I was about to try contacting Spokane on Guard (121.5) when the Captain suggested I look up the Spokane airport diagram and see what frequencies are listed there.  I pulled up the Spokane airport chart on the aircraft MFD and found a Departure frequency of 133.35. I then established radio communications with Spokane departure on 133.35.  I informed Departure that I was unable to make contact with them on any assigned frequency. The controller said; 'That's business as usual.'At all times; FARs; company SOPs and procedures were complied with.  The rest of the flight continued without incident.The Spokane Departure frequency information should be updated to 133.35

A crew had difficulty contacting ATC for a clearance while on the ground at COE and finally received clearance through Lockheed Martin Flight Service. After departure they were unable to contact GEG Departure on the 133.5; the assigned frequency. They finally used GEG charted frequency; 133.35.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 24R

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 300

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

We were flying the SEAVU Arrival and ILS 24R transition. It was clear but there was ground fog that made forward visibility about 3 miles. As we were on approach shooting the ILS; SOCAL approach put a 777 in front of us which we called in sight as we were VMC above the weather. Shortly thereafter; approach cleared us for the visual and sent us to tower even though we had never called the field in sight and were shooting the ILS. We switched to tower and told them we were on the ILS; not a visual as we didn't have the field in sight. They then asked if we had the 777; which we didn't have in sight anymore due to the fog. They then instructed us to go-around which we complied with. It was a crazy go around; 'track localizer and climb to 3;000' and as I'm passing 2;500 feet; they tell me to 'maintain 2;000 feet MSL'; which required me to then do a descending go-around while still de-configuring. We were sequenced back in for another ILS approach. On downwind SOCAL again said this would be a visual approach which we said unable; you don't have the required weather for a visual approach. We were then given the ILS to 24R which went uneventfully.

Pilot reports of an approach into LAX where SCT Approach wanted them to do a visual approach. The weather wasn't good enough for them to do so due to a cloud layer and inability to see traffic to follow. Crew was sent around and then sequenced again for a visual approach which they told the Controller that they couldn't accept a visual because of the weather.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 13; Flight Crew Total 606; Flight Crew Type 606

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Workload

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Weather; Environment - Non Weather Related

The event occurred during an early morning flight from the airport.  It was during a planned Hot Air Balloon Rally.  Conditions were good and favorable for flight.  Situation occurred during initial approach to land.  There were significant changes in the terrain upon approach to land; road surface; open field; water; and then trees.  During approach to land; the two balloons moved toward each other and were in close proximity.  There was incidental contact of the balloon fabric envelope to balloon fabric envelope.  There was NO injury or damage to persons or property or aircraft.Evasive action was taken by maintaining altitude and steerage until practical for a separation of space; at which time the balloon was piloted to altitude and an alternate landing site was identified and a gentle landing was executed.It is believed that the action of the balloons was caused by advection creating a horizontal movement of air; resultant of the changes of ground surface conditions (pavement; open field; water; tree canopy).To prevent recurrence additional education in changing atmospheric conditions; and study of the effects of terrain on air movement should be exercised.  It is also recommended that practicing contour flight over open terrain be executed as often as practical.

Two Hot Air Balloon fabric envelopes made contact during their approach to land because of significant terrain changes including the mix of road surfaces; open field; water; and trees.


Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

We pushed from the gate late due to late inbound. Upon approaching the runway for takeoff we received wind-shear system EICAS message and Weather Radar fail on the ND; we returned to the gate per MX and dispatch. Mx replaced the Wx radar computer and we taxied out for takeoff after another 1 hour delay. We tested the Radar and were painting Wx prior to departure. Climbing through about 6000 ft we received the same messages. We alerted Dispatch and Maintenance Control and later decided to return due to the Wx over the Atlantic.

B757 First Officer reported a weather radar failure during taxi out and returned to the gate for maintenance. After maintenance; the radar appeared to function normally and the flight departed. During climb; another weather radar fail was displayed and the crew elected to return to the departure airport due to expected weather enroute.


While in our descent the Captain noticed the cabin altitude in the amber range. We ran the AOM procedure for 'Cabin Altitude in the amber range.' The cabin altitude kept climbing and so we put our masks on and performed the emergency procedure checklist for Rapid Depressurization followed by the Emergency Descent procedure. We declared an emergency at this time. The cabin altitude was about 9;500 FT. We continued on to destination without incident.

[Narrative #2 contained no additional information.]

When they lost control of their pressurization at FL330; an EMB-145 flight crew declared an emergency; began an emergency descent and performed appropriate procedures and checklists as they descended to a safe altitude and then continued to their destination.


FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway XX

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 188; Flight Crew Total 17335; Flight Crew Type 529

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Descending via STAR ZZZZZX to ZZZZ; VMC conditions; FCU set to SEL SPD 250 kts; NAV; DES; confirmed by FMA's. Just prior to fix ZZZZZ1 approximately 10;000 feet; both Captain and First Officer ND displays went blank for a few seconds. When displays came back on; it took a few seconds for the map functions to return and for us to figure out that the FCU had reverted out of NAV into HDG mode. I manually placed us on a corrective HDG and rearmed NAV mode which then engaged and started to track correctly to the RNAV course. We then started cross checking and observed that not only had the NAV mode reverted; but the descent mode had reverted out of managed descent with constraint protections into Vertical Speed mode; 1800 FPM descending. We caught this at approximately 8;000 feet; shortly after passing fix ZZZZZ1; which has a crossing constraint of 9;000 feet. I disengaged the AP; hand flew and started a level off correction. The next fix was ZZZZZ2 with a constraint of 7;000 feet. We manually set 7;000 feet in the FCU; and set the remaining STAR and APP fixes crossing altitudes and air speeds manually. I hand flew the remainder of the STAR and LNAV App RWY XX in VMC conditions to an uneventful landing.

A319 flight crew had both navigation displays fail on the arrival. The flight crew manually flew the arrival and landed without incident.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 150

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

I was landing ZZZ on left downwind for Runway XX. Two other planes were in pattern and showed close to me on ADS-B in on Ipad. One airplane called out they were behind me...it showed 200 ft below me. The other airplane traffic called out entering crosswind for [Runway] XX. I was just turning crosswind to downwind. I could not see either plane and the safest action to me at time was to continue downwind and stay clear of both/ other planes...with all the distractions I turned into ZZZ1 Class D airspace. I immediately called ZZZ1 Tower to advise them. At same time I visually confirmed other planes and turned base to final and normal landing.

Pilot reported that during pattern entry; they could not see two other aircraft in the pattern and elected to continue downwind instead of turning base; inadvertently entering a nearby Class D airspace.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 28600; Flight Crew Type 3000

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

I was the PNF on this leg.  The Captain was in the cockpit and started the right engine while I loaded equipment on board.  I closed the main cabin door and briefed the passengers.  This was their second leg with us so the briefing was abbreviated since a full briefing was given on the prior leg.  I was in a COVID mask and it was warm outside (82 degrees).  After the load I entered the cockpit and strapped in.  I received a briefing on the clearance and we started the left engine.  I was a bit rushed and I didn't review the departure procedure plate as thoroughly as I should have.  We departed [Runway] XXR and I didn't hear or the captain didn't call for me to select NAV on the MCP.  Therefore; we were late to make the required right turn to 025 degrees.  The Tower asked us to begin the turn.  I was rushed; hot and distracted by the COVID mask a bit.  I should have prompted the NAV selection if the Captain didn't call for it.  This was not a DP where there is a complicated course.  It is RNAV but basically a heading to a vector.  The heading change was subtle and I reviewed the DP in a hurry.

Air taxi First Officer reported a track heading deviation during departure.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 8000; Flight Crew Type 25

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors; Chart Or Publication

We were cleared to descend on the CHINS1 arrival landing south. There are three notes for RADDY intersection. One specifies BFI; which was our destination. The others reference SEA. We briefed RADDY at 11;000 and 250; but missed the fact that it is for landing 31 only. It was our fault.

The crew misread the CHINS1 arrival restriction at RADDY for landing at BFI.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 11520; Flight Crew Type 457

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Airport; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

I took off [early morning] to fly airplane to ZZZ for its condition inspection. Cruise altitude [was] 8;500 feet. I began my descent 30 miles from ZZZ. At 20 miles out on UNICOM frequency; I began to attempt to activate the pilot controlled lights using my microphone button. The lights did not come on. I continued to try to turn on the runway lights with no success. The airfield lights never came on. In attempting to acquire the airfield visually; I kept my descent rate at 500 fpm. At approximately 1/2 mile from the field and approximately 150 feet AGL; I struck a power line. My propeller sliced through the line. I initiated a go-around and climbed to 1;000 feet AGL. I did a control check to determine that I still had a flyable airplane. At this time; I visually acquired the airport and made a landing on Runway 32. After landing the airplane; I taxied to Transient Parking and exited the airplane. I then contacted the police and fire department to notify them of a possible downed power line. The lights not coming on made the airport extremely difficult to find. There was no NOTAM indicating the lights were inoperative. This was certainly a contributing factor to the incident; but I never should have descended so low without the airport in sight. I had been into ZZZ airport many times; and was overly sure of my situational awareness.

GA pilot reported aircraft contacted a power line during descent into airport at night.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 250; Flight Crew Type 320

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Incursion Taxiway

I departed runway XY to rejoin XZ pattern which was the active runway & pattern. On the crosswind leg at approximately 400 - 500 ft a significant coolant leak was detected in the cabin and coolant was observed running down side of fuselage & door on pilot side. I turned 180 degree and declared an emergency. With an assumption of complete coolant loss; low altitude; and a potential loss of engine I announced and proceeded to land on Taxiway C as the best and safest option. I know this airport well and Taxiway C is rarely ever used. Any other option would have required another 90 degree turn.

Experimental aircraft pilot reported an engine coolant leak and fearing an immediate engine failure; elected to land on a taxiway.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

On descent into DAY as pilot flying about 7-5 miles from KEKEE and at 10;000 ft. while on the KEKEE3 the Captain and I were expecting a turn towards the left for the visual approach to 6L. We heard our call sign and were told to turn to heading 260. The Captain read it back and we turned to 260. We both stated that is was an odd heading to get but thought it was for the traffic we could see on TCAS. As we continued we got the TCAS caution of traffic. We were discussing the fact that we thought we would be getting a R/A [when] ATC called the traffic to us and told us the heading was not for us and that he had told us not to turn after we read it back.While that was happening the RA warning went off and I followed the instructions to descend as the Captain let ATC know we were descending because of the RA. ATC was handling aircraft on multiple frequencies. When clear ATC told us to maintain 9;000 ft. and turn to 360 heading. We were then cleared to a 5 mile final; called the airport in sight; and landed on 6L with no other issues.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier flight crew reported they took a heading clearance for another company aircraft that resulted in a RA while on descent to DAY airport.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 111; Flight Crew Type 3866

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 15002; Flight Crew Type 6363

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

We leveled off at FL270; cruising at Mach .794 with the autopilot off. It was smooth. It was a clear night. After we leveled off; the Captain made his PA announcement to the passengers and turned the Fasten Seat Belt (FSB) off.Center gave us a 'Pilot Discretion' to FL240. At that moment we encountered what we presumed to be a momentary pocket of Moderate turbulence. I believe the aircraft banked approximately 25 - 30 degrees to the right; and the altitude fluctuated from maybe 100 feet up to between 60 and 160 feet down. I leveled the wings and was right back at altitude not thinking anything about it; as it smoothed out as quickly as it came. This was the second flight of the day. The Captain went to the briefing room; I went to the gate. The plane was on the ground; but not at the gate. I used my IPAD to receive and review the flight papers; reviewed WSI (Weather Services International) and loaded the flight plan into Jeppesen FD-PRO. The dispatch weather in the flight papers showed no indication of a turbulent ride; and both airports and the route were actually and forecasted VMC conditions upon planned arrival time. On WSI; after loading the route; I received the WSI briefing. Then I reviewed the WSI Radar picture; FPGs; SIGMETs; Radar Summary and the Rapid Precision Mesoscale (RPM) Forecast Turbulence. The RPM Turbulence forecast showed an area of turbulence at FL270 well south of our route. All indications from WSI; DX weather; and the absence of PIREPS along our route of flight indicated to me a nice flight. Our preflight briefing in the cockpit corroborated what we both reviewed while apart.As the Pilot flying; the takeoff out of ZZZ was VMC; and the climb all the way to F270 was smooth. We were planned with a CI 155 and above 10000 MSL accelerated to 335 knots. I was hand flying the aircraft.Turbulence was momentary. We both thought instantly that it was a wake of an aircraft. I do not recall seeing anything on TCAS and I saw nothing in the sky. The captain inquired me if I was going to start down as he was putting FL240 into the MCP; I stated that it was smooth and that I would wait; and in that moment we encountered another pocket of Moderate turbulence and told him we are starting down. The Captain turned the FSB sign on again and mentioned to check seatbelts. All this happened within 10-15 seconds.At that same instance; I happened to be monitoring the service interphone and I heard a Flight Attendant (FA); ask 'if there is any doctor onboard to raise their hand because we have a severely injured FA on board.' The captain was letting Center know that we were leaving FL270 and reported the turbulence as Moderate to severe. In this same moment; I engaged the 'B' Autopilot and 'LVL CHG' foreseeing what is about to happen and told the captain we have a severely injured FA in the back. He assigned me the aircraft and the radios and stated that we will [advise ATC]. I suggested we report the turbulence as severe and then [advise ATC] which he did to ZZZ Center.All of this took place in less than a minute. It all happened extremely fast and we were back in smooth air out of FL267 on the way down to FL240. I believe present speed was Mach .794 and the aircraft went to Control Wheel Steering (CWS) Pitch; I believe because we were near the barber pole. I overrode the CWS; causing the Autopilot to disconnect and simultaneously pulled the thrust levers back; targeting for a 280 KIAS descent; reengaged the autopilot with a 'VS' pitch mode of something greater than 1500 ft/min rate of descent.Center asked for the status of the FA and our intentions. The Captain and I discussed continuing to ZZZ looking at the distance to the airport from the fix page and it was 105 NM. Exercising CRM; I entered an alternate airport into the fix page and we were about 160 NM away. I agreed with his decision and stated to Center that we are continuing to ZZZ and to have paramedics and ambulance standing by; because we have a severely injured FA onboard.The captain informed me that he was going to call dispatch and that he will be off; and I said to call him using 'call me MD'.We were handed off to the next controller; and upon checking in I confirmed with him that he knew we were an emergency aircraft with a severely injured FA onboard. I did let the Captain know that I plan on max speed all the way to ZZZ. We were informed by the lead FA that the injured FA will need to go to the hospital right away. I relayed this to Center. Because of her injuries and under our emergency authority; we did not comply with the FAR restriction of 250 KIAS below 10000 MSL. We were cleared to 11000 MSL than to 4000 MSL. With approach control; we were asked if we want straight in to the runway. I asked for the winds; '210/6'. I said yes. We were cleared discretion to 2000 MSL and pulled the runway data via ACARS. When the Captain was done with his communications I informed him of being cleared straight in and to reference the ACARS printer for the landing data. We briefed for the ILS; and ran the approach descent and approach checklists. The ILS was not operational; but we used FMC map mode and performed a VMC landing in VMC conditions. Approach lights and PAPI were operational.The ambulance and police were standing by the Gate upon landing. I believe there were 3 additional passengers who also required medical attention according to the FA's during debrief.

During flight a B737 encountered severe clear air turbulence which caused an injury to a Flight Attendant. The flight crew advised ATC and landed at the destination airport.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

Human Factors; Procedure; Company Policy

Blocked in ZZZZ1 and noticed that the ZZZZ ramp had left the ramp copy of the signed release on aircraft.  I handed the release to the ramp agent in ZZZZ during pre-flight after signing.We got to the jet which had just arrived.  Due to health screening; we did not go into ZZZZ Operations as we normally would. The inbound crew was still onboard; and we had [X] jumpseaters.  We then had to deplane while the disinfecting crew came onboard.  It was very hectic.  Once on board; and able to get to the cockpit to pre-flight; I had to call into ZZZZ Operations for the trip folder with the weather and flight plan release. After I signed the release; I placed it on the first observer seat until a ramp agent came to the cockpit. The ramp agent took the release from me; but must have placed it down on the 1st observer seat; and then forgotten it.  The ZZZZ ramp is not used to taking the signed release as we normally review the release and sign it online in ZZZZ Operations.  I did not have a chance to review the release via iPad prior to arriving at the aircraft due to the health screening; and the commotion at the jet with cleaners; jumpseaters; inbound crew hanging out; etc.Just need to remember to assure it goes overboard with the ramp agents; the ramps agents need to be reminded to not forget the paperwork.

Air carrier Captain reported they departed with the flight release form still in the aircraft. Reportedly; ramp personnel forgot the form in the aircraft after the crew had handed it to them.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Fatigue

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

I had two Air Carrier X aircraft inbound each going to a different runway. Aircraft X and Aircraft Y. I was busy and instructed the wrong Aircraft to slow to 250 knots then descend to 7;000 feet. I descended the top aircraft rather than the bottom aircraft. I saw Aircraft X slowing from 300 to 250 knots instead of the bottom aircraft. I thought something was wrong and instructed the aircraft to maintain 11;000 feet. They had already started down and got as low as 10;700 feet. Aircraft Y had the other aircraft in sight however a LOSS had already occurred. Similar sounding call signs and an above average traffic volume lead me to instruct the wrong airplane to start a descent with another aircraft beneath them. Long term fatigue from 6 day weeks and a quick turn definitely contributed to this mistake. The last few weeks have been full of short breaks; high position time; and lots of convective activity.

C90 TRACON Controller reported an airborne conflict after descending the wrong aircraft due to similar sounding callsign confusion.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 450; Flight Crew Type 80

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Air Traffic Control

Flying level at 8000 feet and talking to Jacksonville controller; I noticed a plane on ADS-B straight ahead and about 7 miles and 1000 feet below. The plane was climbing and when I noticed it at 5 miles and 800 feet; I queried the controller. His response was that I should be on a different frequency and gave me that frequency. On changing frequency; I switched off autopilot and prepared for an immediate turn all while searching for the traffic. On listening to the new frequency; it was clear that the controller was communicating with that plane and was frustrated that I was not in communication with him. ADS-B shows that we were within 400 feet of each other but I never saw the other traffic. The new controller asked what my previous frequency was. The flight proceeded normally thereafter.The problem likely arose from task saturation in the controller's sector due to increased traffic from [an aviation event]. We were just north of Lakeland; just west of the Center City VOR. A contributing factor is the difficulty in determining the correct communication frequency and change over points for sectors. These are shown; but minimally; on the IFR low charts. In the future; I plan to be much more diligent about which sector I am in and knowing when that sector changes.

Small aircraft pilot reported a NMAC north of LAL while on an IFR flight.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 7000

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Ground Personnel

Upon pushback from gate; the tow vehicle disconnected the towbar when I was clearly asking him in accordance with ramp instructions to push deeper in the alley.  The line crew never instructed us me to set the parking brake and proceeded to disconnect the tow bar prior to my setting the brakes.  When I continually was calling him to push deeper in the alley; it felt as though the ground crew began to pull us forward against my clear instructions to continue the push.  When we started moving forward; the headset operator began to frantically call for us to set the brakes; at which point I had to immediately put the brakes on realizing that unbeknownst to myself and the First Officer that we were in fact rolling forward as opposed to being pulled forward.  I immediately got on the headset with the lineman and instructed him that we were telling him to push deeper to allow another aircraft into our gate.  The lineman reattached the tow bar and pushed us further back; at which point I clearly instructed him under no circumstances was he to allow the tow bar to be disconnected without clearly hearing me tell them that my parking brakes were set.  Somewhere in the conversation; the lineman which seemingly had an accent of some sort stated that he didn't hear me which is all the more reason that I was greatly concerned that the line people making assumptions disconnected the ground equipment nearly causing a collision on the ground with the tow truck.  This is completely unacceptable in my and the First Officer's opinion.  I just cannot imagine why they would disconnect the ground equipment when he clearly told us that he could not hear us.  The more we thought about it the more baffled we became at such a terrible situation this was due to the lineman's lack of situational awareness and how such a terrible incident was just inches away.  Again this was a total unacceptable lack of communication on the headset operator's part.

B737 Captain reports being disconnected from the tow bar by the ground crew without instructions to do so or instructions to set the parking brake. The aircraft rolls forward nearly hitting the tug before realizing the tow bar is not connected. The towbar is reconnected to push deeper into the alley per ramp instructions.


Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10.5

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Procedure; Human Factors; Weather; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy

Cherry Point (NKT) handed Aircraft X to me climbing going northbound. He needed to deviate to the right for weather. I called NKT to let them know and thankfully he said; reference R5314 and Phelps that was ok. We were not showing either piece of airspace active and if NKT would not have reminded me to keep Aircraft X clear of the active airspace; it could have been a problem. I just received a safety briefing the day before about this very issue. Military airspace being active and the controller working the sector not knowing. This was the 4th occurrence in about 24 hours after the briefing. Guess the briefing isn't working.

ZDC Controller reported issuing a point out due to weather; getting it approved; and then learning some special airspace was in fact hot. Reporter did not know the airspace was hot until the point out and other Controller advising.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Human Factors; Manuals; Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling

At the beginning of my shift I was notified of a road trip to ZZZ1 for a Flap Halfspeed message on a CRJ-700. After finally getting to the aircraft; we verified the problem and started our troubleshooting by removing the Panels beneath the Right Hand Flap Brake Position Sensing Unit (BPSU). After removing; I saw F4 red thermal tape wrapped around the lower wiring harness. After I removed the tape I found multiple broken wires and a poorly soldered splice. I notified Maintenance (MX) Control of my discovery and waited for a response regarding corrective action. After communication between myself; MX Control and the leads in the hangar; it was determined that a general splice could not be used; and that we would have to rebuild the harness. MX Control told me that they found a Service Bulletin (SB) that averaged 31 hours to rebuild the harness and they were sending another plane there to deliver the parts to us. We were also told not to begin any maintenance on the plane; because there was a chance of getting a Ferry permit to return the plane to ZZZ so it could be worked on by an Avionics Technician inside our hangar. After waiting over six hours; we were notified in the [morning] that there was no possibility of a Ferry permit due to the weather; and that we would need to begin repairing the harness as soon as possible. I verified multiple times with our MX Controller that they wanted us to perform the repair at an outstation; on the ramp; in winter; and having very minimal avionics experience at best between my assistant and myself. The Controller confirmed that we needed to start the repair. After removing the damaged section of the old harness; we started the buildup of the new one. It was at this time we realized that we didn't have all the parts we needed. After discussing it with the hangar leads; we realized that the Service Bulletin Kit we were using did not include the repair for our harness; but only for the one above it. At this point we realized that the Service Bulletin that was sent to us could not be used to repair the harness that was damaged. We continued to wait multiple hours for MX Control to find alternate means of compliance; before we finally asked for and were granted relief. The event occurred due to a lack of communication and planning on Maintenance Control's part. Knowing the complexity of this build up and the time necessary to comply with it; the aircraft should have been fixed under better conditions; by an experienced Avionics' Technician. When I returned to work today; I was notified that the Aircraft had been ferried here the night before. This should have been Maintenance Control's plan of action the very same moment they realized what the repair was going to take.

The reporter stated they were unable to complete repairs because the wrong parts were shipped to them. The reporter also identified the acronym (BPSU) that was used in the text so there is a better understanding of what is meant in the report.

Myself and one other mechanic were on duty starting at XA:30; while one other mechanic was on vacation and the other two mechanics scheduled for the same shift were already at ZZZ1 waiting on Maintenance Control to give them orders when around XF:00 myself and my fellow coworker were sent to relieve the other crew already at ZZZ1 who had been on the job for around 30 hours by this point. As me and my coworker took a charter flight we arrived around XI:00; were brought up to speed on the electrical issue. The first crew then took the charter flight back. Myself and my coworker then started in on building this harness which we soon came to find out was extremely difficult for we did not have the skills of an avionics expert and the inexperience in such a system so complex. After building the harness which had taken all night inside [FBO hangar] which we were grateful they allowed us to use. We went outside to the aircraft which had been parked on the ramp all night. We started to try and figure out the splices only to come across the problem of it being too cold for the shrink wrap to actually shrink properly and our tools to properly work. After being outside for 2 to 3 hours we decided to time out after it was past our 16 hour mark. Maintenance Control decided to send us to a hotel around XT:30 and we were granted rest only to return to the aircraft after to continue working outside when temperatures were around the low twenties. We return [10 hours later] to continue working and after hours spent outside splicing and taking breaks in between to warm up we finally finished the splicing only to ops check the flaps system still not working properly. Our controller from Maintenance control after becoming frustrated with us after we asked them what they want us to do next; told us they had no idea and told us to figure it out and then passed us off to another controller. Maintenance control then decided to change out the BPSU which we did not feel comfortable with changing for we had never done it and it had to be RII as well. My coworker and Myself informed Maintenance control several times that we did not feel comfortable but the pressure to do it anyways continued until they decided to call our upper management over us because thoughts were in place that we just wanted to skip out on doing the maintenance. As myself explained again that we did not feel comfortable; my fellow coworker started to come down with flu like symptoms so he requested medical attention when Maintenance Control told him that he was on his own and he had to call Ops himself and hung up on him. My coworker called Ops and after getting a brief checkup was instructed to go to a medical center to get checked out. I had to drive my coworker about 25 to 30 minutes one way to the urgent care at the hospital; drive back to where the aircraft was and wait for an hour and a half and then drive and pick back up my coworker. I instructed Maintenance control of the issue and they informed me two people from ZZZ2 were coming to relieve us and to sign off what we had done and wait to do a turn over. After I picked my coworker back up and returned we signed off what we did and then talked to Maintenance control about how we were getting home. We were told to take 8 hours rest and then we decided we were to drive back because we had a lot of stuff that belonged to ZZZ Stores and needed to be returned there. We were told that we would have a rental car ready for us to pick up after we took 8 hours rest and instructed to drag all of our stuff to the hotel with us. After we took our 8 hours rest I called Maintenance control for them to tell us that they never got a rental car because the rental car company was out of cars to go one way. Myself and my fellow coworker then called our management in hopes of getting some actual useful help for Maintenance control appeared to not be doing their job. We went to the airport to try and get some form of car only to not be able toget one. At this point it was [very late at night] and we were instructed to go back to the hotel and when the rental car company opened [in the morning]; Maintenance Control would have a rental car set up. We woke up and called Maintenance Control to find out that 3rd shift Maintenance Control never turned our information over to 1st shift and never heard anything about setting up a rental car for us and then we were instructed to drag everything back to the airport where [the aircraft] was going to repo back to ZZZ2 then to ZZZ. After we took [the aircraft] to ZZZ2 we then turned around 3 hours later and took a flight on the aircraft back to ZZZ arriving [in the late evening].The event occurred because a Ferry permit was not obtained to begin with while the aircraft was still in flying conditions before decisions from Maintenance Control was to cut the electrical harness. Also with the inexperienced Maintenance controllers; some of the problems we encountered could have been solved if proper procedures as of the turnover of information we give them would have been passed on from controller to controller.

On a field trip to investigate a 'Flap Half Speed Message' on a CRJ-700; aircraft maintenance technicians found broken wires and poorly soldered connections in the Brake Position Sensing Unit (BPSU). Unable to repair the component due to the wrong parts being sent; the aircraft was ferried to the company maintenance center for repairs.


Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Programmed wrong SID. I would suggest that a SID (or STAR) not have a fix that is the name of another SID (STAR). I should not have missed this; but with the passenger problem I got in a hurry.

Reporter stated that the Flight Plan departure was the MAXXO 3 which was loaded in the FMC. Reporter stated that he and the First Officer were distracted by a passenger issue when the PDC was received with a different Departure (FTHLS 5) that concluded with a MAXXO transition. Reporter said that both he and the first Officer keyed on the word MAXXO and did not change the Departure. Reporter stated that it was their mistake; but the use of a fix name that is also the name of another Departure can be misleading.

On receiving PDC during cockpit preparation I noted a reroute. I changed the previously entered routing on my iPad Jeppesen app. After changing the route in my iPad I was distracted by one of the flight attendants asking for help with a passenger issue. On returning to cockpit preparation duties I made the enroute changes to the flight plan; but did not change the SID from the one previously entered. I started making the enroute changes at the end fix of the SID which was the same fix on both SIDS. Error was noted shortly after takeoff. Using a fix that is in multiple procedures as the title of one of the procedures can cause misidentification of the procedure. Don't title a SID with a fix that is in multiple procedures of the same type.

Air carrier flight crew reported they flew the wrong PHX SID due to confusion between the name of the SID and the name of a fix utilized in other PHX SIDs.


Time Pressure; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Workload

I had been concerned with the aircraft even making it into ZZZ due to runway conditions and crosswinds at the time of landing. My focus then turned to being able to depart from ZZZ and making sure we had the fuel necessary for deice; and that braking conditions did not continue to deteriorate; as there were some reports of braking action being poor.The first alert I can find referencing a ZZZ Center closure was at XA:20L. There were several emails that followed; however due to the weather and runway conditions I was dealing with in ZZZ; and the multitude of messages coming through; it did not register that my flight would be affected by the ZZZ [Center] closure.Had we departed on time; and not been delayed for deicing; we would have entered the airspace in time to continue as normally scheduled. Our departure time was XA:50Z. The first fix into ZZZ [Center] airspace was ZZZZZ [Intersection]; which is roughly 5 NM from the airspace border. To reach ZZZZZ [Intersection] based on my filed flight time took 1hr and 25 minutes; which would have put us into ZZZ [Center] at XC:15Z; with a 1 hour and 15 minutes buffer.  At XB:54Z; I ACARSed the flight as they were close to their 1 hour Top of Descent Point; and I wanted to check in. At this time I was going through my email inbox; and we were receiving a lot; when I realized my flight would be affected by the closure. Once I realized this; I immediately called my coordinator; who verified that the NOTAM for the airspace closure did not allow us to even drop down once entering the airspace; and was only published for overflights; and at XC:00Z I ACARSed to return to gate; since even if they departed immediately; which they had just started the deice process; they would be pushing it to make it into the airspace in time (they were already filed fast). The flight returned to gate and was delayed several hours in order to allow for arrival to ZZZ [Center] after it opened at XF:30Z.I missed the original emails stating the closure which would have given myself; the crew; and the coordinator a heads up to be careful of our times deicing. It is hard to check every email. For ATC-0 events; I believe there should be other forms of notification to dispatchers to prevent this from happening. I do not believe ATC-0 NOTAMs attached for pilot paperwork; as the Captain said he did not see it; and reviewing the paperwork; I did not either.

Dispatcher reported receiving an ATC Zero event notice too late; the flight was already taxiing for takeoff; and then having to notify the crew to return to the gate for a several hour ATC delay.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

We had just leveled off at FL320 and I did my First fuel score which showed us up 2.8 on fuel. The next waypoint showed us up 2.4. The next two waypoints continued trending down. We checked the winds but they where within 5 knots of planned. We then went to PROG page 2 to see Totalized and Calculated Fuel which is where we began to see a discrepancy. We initially saw a difference of 1.4 between both. We decided to monitor and the split between them continued to climb. Once we saw the the trend was continuing we called the Mechanics up to see if we could solve this issue. Before departure there was maintenance action on a Center Fuel pump pressure sensor. Also at this time we where burning out of the Center tank so the general feeling was that the suspected leak was in the center. After trying different configurations we found that CTR L pump off; Dual Crossfeeds Open; CTR R pump on slowed the suspected but did not fully stop it. At this point we where approaching 2:45hrs in flight and well over the pacific. We initiated a SATCOM call with Dispatch and Maintenance control. After explaining the situation; various other possibilities such as fuel migration or indication issues discussed and back and forth with them; Captain and I both agreed that it was unsafe to continue as 1. We where operating the fuel system in a Non-Normal way without checklist guidance. 2. Will this Suspected Fuel Leak get worse? 3. Where is the Fuel going? Overboard or somewhere else where it can cause severe issues? 4. If it gets worst later on; we would have to divert into ZZZZ1 with a plane full of American Troops. 5. ZZZ is only 2:30hrs behind us and we easily have enough fuel to return even with the current leak. We then made the decision to return.Dispatch was advised and I requested a change of destination and return to ZZZ through CPDLC with Center. We where shortly cleared direct ZZZ; asked if we wanted to request priority handling and we both agreed it would not be necessary. We continued to monitor the fuel difference on the way back and it continued to climb to 2.7 difference between Totalized and Calculated while operating in the modified Fuel Configuration. Had we not modified the fuel pump configuration we would have easily been more in the 5.0 to 6.0 region of difference. We burned enough gas for a normal and uneventful landing back in ZZZ about 2:30hrs after initiating the return back to ZZZ. After the desicion to Return to ZZZ was made Captain and FO (who where in crew rest) where advised and brought up to speed on what was going on and the course of action we where taking.This was detected through the Fuel Score numbers and the difference between totalized and calculated.Fuel Scores are more important then some people think. It allowed us to catch this early; And not when it would have been potentially a severe problem.

B767 First Officer reported an uneventful air diversion due to a critical fuel system malfunction.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 141; Flight Crew Total 701; Flight Crew Type 4796

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted

Starting with the descent into ZZZZ we were cleared the arrival and a descent to FL190 with thunderstorms and lightning on both sides of the route. Turbulence was light to moderate with intermittent rain and ice pellets. We were instructed that an airplane had gone around on the RNP Runway XX for lack of visibility although we could not get any exact information on what the conditions at the field were. ATIS was not operating for the station and we were relying on Approach Control to pass us that information. METAR through ACARS showed that the conditions at the field were OK with a few low clouds but high ceilings and almost no wind. Further complicating matters was the fact that enroute we received a message from Dispatch that the ILS for Runway XX was unserviceable thus forcing us into the RNP Approach with higher minimums and higher visibility requirements. Shortly after being told by Approach that an aircraft had gone around at ZZZZ we were instructed to hold at ZZZZZ as published at FL190. This hold was in airspace that was mostly clear from severe weather but with thunderstorms mostly to the north and east in close proximity to the hold. At this time we calculated a Bingo fuel to our filed alternate of ZZZZ1 which was 95 miles away. Fuel upon entering the hold was 10;200 and we calculated a BINGO for ZZZZ1 of 8;100 lbs. which would get us from a missed approach to ZZZZ1 with about 6;000 lbs. remaining. Requesting the METAR through ACARS showed the weather at ZZZZ1 was VMC. With little knowledge of the actual field conditions at ZZZZ other than that visibility may have been poor we elected to commence the arrival and attempt the RNP for Runway XX. Approach was still reporting that the conditions on the field were good but that an airplane had gone around about a half hour ago. We were then cleared a descent in the hold and then cleared for the approach. This was only after making many radio calls to ZZZZ Control to determine what their plan was for us. Other than being told to hold they provided no EFC (expect further clearance) time and we were given no options. We informed Approach that if we needed to execute the missed approach we would then need to proceed directly to our filed alternate; ZZZZ1. It was at this time we were informed that this was not possible and that ZZZZ1 was not accepting any more aircraft. I instructed the FO to contact Dispatch for clarification. Dispatch informed us that ZZZZ1 was in fact accepting aircraft but that the nearest alternate beside ZZZZ1 was ZZZZ2; which was over 300 miles away. During the approach ATC told several other aircraft requesting a diversion to ZZZZ1 including 2 other [Company] aircraft and a [Airline] heavy that they were not accepting aircraft. After Approach switched us to ZZZZ Tower they informed us that there was 'no visibility'. They also told us that they 'cannot see the runway from the Tower' but they had the lights full up. We flew the approach to minimums and I did not see the runway and started the published missed approach. The FO said he saw the runway just after we started the missed approach. During the missed approach we once again asked for vectors to ZZZZ1. This was a very high workload environment at night; in the weather with terrain and still burning fuel. Approach told us that ZZZZ1 was not accepting aircraft. He repeatedly told others the same thing. At this time we were looking for further options but in my mind we could not afford to hold and did not have the fuel to go to ZZZZ2. Exacerbating this problem was the fact that my years old iPad; although sufficiently charged was at times very slow to respond to my inputs. Several times I had to look across the flight deck at my FOs iPad to confirm information. After telling Approach that we needed to divert to our filed alternate they would again insist we couldn't go there then started talking to other aircraft. At this time I instructed the PM to tell approach that we were proceeding to ZZZZ1;that we were minimum fuel; and we put that at the top of the LEGS page and began heading that way at 10;000 ft. Approach was still being unhelpful and he was saturated with other aircraft and radio calls. I instructed the PM to remain on ZZZZ Control frequency and selected ZZZZ1 Approach on VHF2. After contacting them and relaying our position and intentions they said they would make room for us and to proceed direct the field. I told them we were still in contact with ZZZZ control and that we would be back with them shortly. Switching my attention back to the flight deck the PM had set up the FMC for ZZZZ1 and I sent the Diversion message to Dispatch and informed the Flight Attendants and passengers that we were proceeding to ZZZZ1. While proceeding direct to ZZZZ1 I used Captains Authority to deviate west and south for more thunderstorms between ZZZZ and ZZZZ1 as ZZZZ still wasn't responding to queries in a timely manner. The PM informed me that he could not get a word in edgewise with ZZZZ Control but they had reluctantly cleared us to ZZZZ1 at 12;000 ft. I instructed him to switch frequencies to ZZZZ1 Approach since we could not get ZZZZ to respond or give much helpful information at all. After the weather deviation ZZZZ1 approach was very helpful and accommodating and cleared us for the VOR DME Runway XX at ZZZZ1. The approach and landing were uneventful. After landing we held on a taxiway for about an hour waiting for a gate. There were at least 4 other diversions there in similar situations. At this time I called Dispatch and told them what had happened and we decided that we would attempt to refuel with a ZZZZ2 alternate and go to ZZZZ. There was no response with ZZZZ1 Operations so coordination was done with Ground and Operations personnel there. They were very helpful. The Flight Attendants also informed us that several passengers were asking if they could disembark at ZZZZ1. After seeing the situation I said that this was not possible.... we didn't even have a gate or jetway driver let alone Customs personnel or ground handlers to retrieve bags. After coordinating the short flight back to ZZZZ we departed and landed relatively uneventfully at ZZZZ a little over 3 hours late. The only issue upon arrival was that although METAR said that conditions at ZZZZ were CAVOK upon switching to Tower we were once again informed that visibility was poor and that they could not see the runway from the Tower. ATIS was still not updated or even operating. We saw the runway at about 800 ft. AFE. There was significant low level fog but the approach was safe and uneventful. Taxi in and shutdown was also uneventful. A few things to note here: The ILS being unserviceable significantly impacted our ability to land in poor visibility. ATIS was not operating and Approach and Tower were passing conflicting; ambiguous field conditions. There was a significant problem in understanding what the conditions on the field actually were as METAR said one thing while Approach said another and then Tower advised there was 'no visibility' with no concrete data on what the visibility really was. The runway has no centerline lights; no distance remaining markers; and no grooves even though it was wet. ZZZZ Control was far less than helpful in all regards. We had to 'push the rope' to get any kind of clearance. They didn't even provide an EFC (Expect Further Clearance) time in the hold. They appeared task saturated which is completely understandable. However; his insistence that nobody could go to our legally filed alternate led to a lot of confusion. Ultimately we had to just be forceful and tell them that's where we were going. They provided us a clearance there but no handoff. We felt like we basically had to affect our own rescue. Flying around in bad weather; at night; in terrain; with a developing fuel situation with little help from ATC was task saturating. The PM (the FO); although with low time and on probation; was excellent and we could not have accomplished the mission without him.

B737 Captain reported communication difficulties exacerbated conditions during bad weather causing a diversion to refuel and later arrive safely at original destination airport.


This was my first trip after the iPad implementation. I pulled it out to see if it worked and it didn't. After initially signing in to unlock it; I tried to see if I could access my manuals. All I got was an error message stating my profile expired. I received no training on this piece of equipment; and I don't own a notepad (or whatever these things are called); so I had no idea what to do. I consulted the highly inadequate 'guide to [use] iPad' handout I received with it; and the bulletin regarding the iPad. Neither of these addressed this error message. I ended [UP] taking it into the Flight Office before my flight to seek guidance. The expert said the iPad dumped everything; and he had to completely reload it. When I asked why this happened (so I make sure it doesn't happen again) he said something to the effect of: yeah; it just does that sometimes. Great! So there I may be; in the cockpit; in an emergency situation; trying to access my flight manual; and nothing! Once again this is a clear case of the company's 'ready; fire; aim' style of management. This device is not yet ready for implementation; and therefore not safe as the only reference device for our manuals.

A319 Captain reports trouble accessing material in his company issued iPad and suggests that it is not ready to replace paper charts and manuals.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Weather; Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals

I revived a call from ZZZ indicating a Captain and an FAA ASI would not allow the flaps to be deiced with them in the extended position. Both cited the AMM as not allowing this. Embraer (manufacture) was contacted immediately.  A verbal discussion yielded limited results. After a discussion with the Flight Deck and ASI; the flaps were dropped to remove the contamination. The flight continued safely.

A manager is informed that a Captain and an FAA ASI would not allow the flaps to be deiced with them in the extended position; with both citing the Airplane Maintenance Manual as not allowing this.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Arrived overhead SPS inbound from southeast at 4000 ft. Activated pilot controlled lighting prior to being overhead to confirm location of runway. CA began turn to displace for downwind for runway 15C. We both noted that runway 33 was lit for use which was opposite direction for winds. We had planned to land runway 15C due to wind. Upon turning final; realized 15C was not lit when comparing LOC course to actual lit runway. runway 15R was lit. CA called for go around; we executed the go around and returned to left downwind to brief runway 15R visual approach. No further issues. After researching why runway 15R was lit we discovered we missed the note in the release. We also realized the notes in the 10-9A page can be misleading. Note 1 is clear that 15R/33L are lit when the Tower [is closed]. Note 3 is less clear with the use of 'and' and the caveat of 'depending on weather'. Additionally; the lighting to both 15R and 33L are described as MALSR and the diagrams on approach plates are the same. They are not. 33L has lead in lights with SFLs; but 15R does not. At least they weren't lit last night. We saw we had briefed and expected one runway but lighting to a different runway was encountered. We trapped that error by not continuing to accept the approach and possibly simply transitioned to a sidestep. So we went around and prepared for the 'new' runway. The release note would be better served if it were in the Arrival Remarks of the 10-7X page. The strange caveats of the approach plate notes in the 10-9A page could be clarified. For our improvement our crew could have discussed the notes. But we both missed the notes. So we need to incorporate better awareness of where notes can be located.

A medium turbojet First Officer reported there was confusion in the cockpit during a night visual approach to SPS airport concerning runway lighting and airport notes.


Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

I was flying pilot. During the takeoff roll; I looked to crosscheck airspeed at approximately 10 knots before V1 (V1 = 151 kts). As I looked back outside; the 'CONFIG FLAPS' master warning went off. The Captain called reject and took control of the aircraft. Estimated airspeed that the reject decision was initiated was approximately 145 kts. As we were slowing down; I noticed spoilers were not deployed; and I manually deployed the spoilers to the 'up' position. Then; as directed by the Captain; I also made a radio call to tower to advise of the rejected takeoff. The aircraft quickly slowed down to taxi speed and we were easily able to taxi clear at the end of the runway onto taxiway.We were instructed to taxi back. During this time; there was some communication difficulties with tower/ground. It was hard to understand what they were asking; and there was a lot of 'say again'. During taxi; we were monitoring brake temps and watching them rise; while answering questions from the controller. I was trying to coordinate between the Captain and Ground controller whether or not we could return to the parking stand. While; we continued holding short of taxiway; Ground asked us to call our handler for parking assistance. While we were stopped; initially one tire went flat. We asked for a tug to tow us in due to the flat tire. While we were waiting; a total of 7 tires went flat. When we started losing more tires; our on-board mechanic said we could not move or tow the airplane with flat tires. We were now stuck on an active taxiway.

First Officer of a jumbo cargo aircraft reported a high speed rejected takeoff due to a flap configuration warning light. The takeoff was aborted successfully; however the spoilers failed to deploy as designed resulting in several main gear tires deflating due to aggressive braking and subsequent heat buildup.


Bombardier/Canadair Undifferentiated or Other Model

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

General Maintenance Action; General Work Refused

I received CLR (Cargo Load Report) with motorized mobility aid - lithium ion battery aft cargo compartment circled with no aft cargo weight listed. I inquired the rampers and they said there was a mobility aid scooter in the back and they didn't know the weight or if the battery was still installed. The gate agent asked the passenger about the device and they said the lithium ion battery was installed and could not be removed. I reviewed the FOM dealing with mobility aid device batteries. I had the gate agent inform the passenger that battery would have to be removed from the mobility aid; and they would need to carry the battery with them under the seat in front of them. The passenger said the battery could not be removed; and that they could not travel without it. They decided to get off the flight. More training for rampers to recognize hazardous materials and to properly record cargo.

CRJ Captain reported HAZMAT procedure violation due to a mobility aid with a non removable lithium ion battery in aft cargo.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

While working the Arrival Radar position the first and only arrival I took a handoff on was Aircraft X. He appeared a little high but the crossing fixes for the center don't lock them down to anything other than at or above 12;000 feet. He was around 16;000 feet 2 miles from the fix. The aircraft checked on inside my airspace and immediately stated he was unable to meet any speed or altitude restrictions on the arrival due to Center taking him off the arrival and giving him a higher rate of speed to the fix. Then he advised me he was assigned descend via clearance over the fix and switched all in the same transmission. Thank goodness I had no other traffic because this required multiple vectors and hard descents to avoid others airspace and set him up for a stable approach. Zero coordination was done with me from the Center per usual.We at CLT see this every day. Most controllers just complain really loud about this in the operation/break room but are unwilling to spend time filling out the [reports]. Most Supervisors are the same way and don't do the [reporting] on it. I was this way for a while but this happens to me multiple times a day and it's super frustrating. We are in a constant jam not being coordinated with and with guys high and fast on a short side arrival at the 6th busiest airport; it's unacceptable. Some days we even have to have our TMC's (Traffic Management Controllers) request to give airplanes hard crossing altitudes to make it workable. This doesn't help the airlines and even makes it harder for the center due to phraseology; yet it's the only way to make it work sometimes. We need to either have the procedure to be a hard crossing altitude (the airlines won't like this because it does away with their profile descent); have the Center be better at assigning these profile descents earlier and force them to be established in their airspace (won't happen without your help); or redesign the arrivals fully (best option but will cost a lot of money which won't be approved.) We would like to take these lessons learned from the 4 or 5 years we have had this and use this to adjust how things run. This would be quicker and could easily allow for more aircraft in our airspace without these issues. All we need is to have ZTL held accountable or at minimum coordinate with us when they mess up. At that point from time to time they may have to eat an airplane or two. If tower makes a mistake and launches 4 of the same transition back to back to back to back I don't just give them all normal speed and fixes further along their route and not coordinate. We fix these issues we just ask that they do a better job.

CLT TRACON Controller reported an arriving aircraft was handed off to them that was unable to comply with any of the restrictions on the RNAV Arrival due to being left high and fast.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 162; Flight Crew Total 1100

Troubleshooting; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15.7; Flight Crew Total 42; Flight Crew Type 12

Troubleshooting; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

This was an engine fire that occurred after a hot start attempt. We tried to start the plane normally with the fuel pump; and then attempted again without the fuel pump. After the first attempt we decided to let the starter cool down for 20 seconds and cranked for another 10 seconds with the mixture lean and the throttle half way as the hot start [procedure] said. The engine almost started so we decided to pump the throttle. We let the plane rest; but soon after; the engine started smoking and we rushed out of the plane; cut off the mixture; and got the closest fire extinguisher to extinguish the flame. We should not have pumped the throttle as this could have been the cause of the engine fire; especially with a hot engine.

Upon attempting to start the aircraft; we went through the normal before engine start checklist and cranked the engine; it almost started but did not. We then tried the flooded start procedure with full lean mixture and full throttle. The aircraft still sputtered but did not start. We then turned off the electric fuel pump and waited 20 seconds for the starter to cool down. Then we tried once more with no start and still the flooded start procedure. After that we decided to let the started cool off for longer and turned off the battery master to save battery charge. Shortly after turning off the electrical switches we noticed smoke coming out from under the cowling. We set the mixture to full lean and vacated the aircraft; confirmed the presence of flames under the cowling; retrieved a fire extinguisher and put out the fire

PA-28 Instructor Pilot and Student reported evacuating the aircraft on the ramp when they experienced and engine fire following multiple start attempts.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 168; Flight Crew Total 12634; Flight Crew Type 1586

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Upon arrival in ZZZ the Ramp Agent informed us that an electric wheelchair was loaded into a container and the unfinished paper work was sitting on the electric chair seat. The agent in ZZZ1 had informed us the passenger had his wheel chair loaded in the belly. We were unaware that the wheel chair was electric and had batteries. This should have had a Hazmat paperwork and notification to the flight deck.

B777 Captain reported electric wheelchair transported to destination without required documents or NOTOC at departure airport.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

I took over the RADAR position at BPT/SBI. There were several slow aircraft in the 20's and 1 at FL190 moving eastbound which caused a complexity issue for aircraft departing the Houston terminal area. At the same time there were at least 2 aircraft westbound at FL220 moving slowly which compounded the complexity. As the departure traffic began to increase significantly; a military jet came out requesting W147D. The coordination for this airspace is very communication intensive (in fact; 7 sectors must be called and advised/requested that it is going active).  A D-Side was placed and she began helping out.  Aircraft X departed with Aircraft Y departing after on the same route of flight.  The departure (I90) controller coordinated with my D-Side that Aircraft X was assigned 280 knots or greater and Aircraft Y was assigned 280 knots. Both were leveled at interim altitudes and then their climb was resumed when they cleared the traffic.  I noticed that the Aircraft Y was overtaking the Aircraft X so I amended that Aircraft X's altitude to FL180 and instructed the Aircraft Y to expedite his climb to FL230. I  don't know if there was ever less than 1;000 feet between but there was less than 5 miles. I told the supervisor on duty and he called his counterpart at I90 (Houston Approach Control). The I90 supervisor told my supervisor that the departure controller was in training and the trainer had taken over when he was overwhelmed. He also said that the trainee put speeds on both aircraft but removed the speed restriction on one of them (It wasn't clear which). Neither myself nor my D-side was made aware that a speed restriction had been removed.I recommend that all speed restrictions are forwarded from approach to ARTCC. Flow control might also look into routing 'low and slow' aircraft away from busy departure sectors during periods of high traffic.

ZHU Controller reports of a loss of separation due to lack of speed control. Other sector did not advise the working sector that speeds were not given/or removed to continue separation standards.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Received radar jamming at approximately 80 NM west to 80 NM east of ABQ VOR. The QRH was run for all abnormal alerts. ATC advised and a logbook entry was made with Maintenance being advised in route. No further interruptions occurred. Ground GPS jamming around the ABQ VOR is regularly occurring.

Air carrier First Officer reported experiencing radar/GPS jamming in the vicinity of ABQ VOR.


Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted

Passing through FL220; we received a L duct warning message. I leveled off the aircraft and called for the checklist. Within 15 seconds of the warning both packs had shut down. While the other pilot was doing the checklist I advised ATC that we needed to descend to 10000 ft. After completing the checklist; the non-flying pilot notified the flight attendants of the situation and then notified company. After getting everything accomplished we decided to divert to [a suitable airport]. We then notified the company of our plan; then ATC in addition to the passengers. We had a non-eventful landing.

CRJ900 flight crew reported experiencing pressurization issues.