Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

After takeoff my air speed froze at 150 kts and we had an Airspeed Miscompare as well as an autopilot fail; SWPS (Stall Warning and Protection System) fault; Yaw Damper fail; and Ventral Rudder fail. I stopped my climb at about 2300 ft so that we would remain in VFR. We flew pitch and power until we could determine which airspeed was working. We said we wanted to return and received a new clearance for 2000 ft. We determined the right side was working. I transferred controls to the PM in the right seat. He flew the airplane and I ran all of the check lists. In the process of figuring out what airspeed was working we believe we might have gotten up to 200 kts; overspeeding the flaps that were in position. Our landing was uneventful.

EMB-505 Captain reported loss of the left side airspeed indication along with autopilot; yaw damper; stall warning; and ventral rudder failures. An uneventful return to base was completed using the right side airspeed.


Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload; Distraction

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Airport

All the aircraft mentioned above were vectored to remain clear of VFR traffic conflicts into BFI and PAE. The situation at hand should put IFR aircraft in close proximity to VFR aircraft not in communication with ATC. This situation is becoming more routine at S46 and controllers are being put into situations that are unsafe. We are having to make the decision to push jet traffic lower than normal and vector them around traffic that is not in communication with us. The airspace between PAE and BFI is extremely complex and limited. The airspace between PAE and BFI needs to become controlled airspace or the Bravo at least needs to be lowered. With the addition of PAE commercial service it has brought new conflicts that have been proven to be unsafe. S46 needs help with Class Bravo redesign and it needs to happen fast. The supervisors also need to be paying attention more. A handoff or the position should have been split. This has been a problem also with the addition of the PAE commercial service; the supervisors are not splitting the PAE and BFI sectors or at least providing a handoff for assistance.

A Seattle TRACON Controller reported their airspace is unsafe due to the amount of unidentified VFR traffic allowed to fly in the same airspace as IFR aircraft conducting instrument approaches to several different airports in their airspace.


Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

I was assigned to work on a CRJ-700 aircraft that was scheduled for overnight maintenance. I performed a Visual Inspection of the System Number 1 and Number 2 Hydraulic Accumulators and found that they required removal for end cap Non-Destructive Testing (NDT). During Removal and Reinstallation (R/R); I used shop rags to absorb the hydraulic fluid that normally leaks when this task is performed. When finished I did a thorough inspection for tools and materials. All appeared cleared. I asked a Mechanic Y to inspect the Aft Bay before the 311-Door was closed; to 'make sure I didn't leave anything in there.' He performed a Visual Inspection and declared it clear; he then counter-signed all my work cards.Two days later; I was called to the [Maintenance] Office and shown a picture; taken in ZZZ1 of a shop rag jammed in the Rudder Pulley System. I have no explanation of 'why.' Procedures were followed; other employees performed tasks in the Aft Bay. None of them carried shop rags; but they had opportunity to see a rag left behind. No one reported anything and all Performance Testing showed nothing out of the ordinary. I am not certain that I am responsible for this occurrence; but the possibility is there.

I; Mechanic Y; was at ZZZ Hanger having Hydraulic Accumulators One and Two special Detailed Inspection per work cards by Mechanic X. She asked me to give her a counter-signoff in the Aft Equipment Bay to finish the job. I looked up in the Aft Equipment Bay and did not see any FOD. That evening; acting Supervisor showed me a picture of a rag on one of the rudder cables on the same CRJ-700 aircraft. I talked to the Base Manager the following morning about it and that; there is a possibility that the [shop] rag was one of ours and I could have missed it when I counter-signed for the Aft Equipment Bay. The event occurred because I did not see any FOD in the Aft Equipment Bay. [Recommend] be vigilant and look in the unexpected place for FOD.

Two Mechanics were informed that a shop rag was found jammed in the Rudder Pulley System in the Aft Equipment Bay of a CRJ-700 aircraft after they both had signed-off for the area to be free of FOD material.


Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 4700; Flight Crew Type 2600

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

While on an ambulance flight; I requested and was granted a clearance for transition though an active restricted area. A squawk code was assigned and placed in the transponder with requested oncourse heading provided to the Controlling Agency. I continued monitoring the required frequency. After a short time it was clear that neither the crew nor I had dealt with the local Fire and EMS handling the call of which we were heading. In addition; the radio frequencies for ground contact were not in our aircraft. After asking the requesting agency to use a common frequency. We were told they were unable. At this time I had a phone patch established with the County Dispatch and had landing zone and patient information relayed to us from the scene. This required quite a few transmissions on other radios in the aircraft with all the chatter that comes with these actions. As we approached Class D airspace next to the special use; I informed the Controlling Agency that I needed to change frequencies to Tower. At this time; I was told that they had tried to call me and I did not respond. I informed them I did not hear a transmission and if there was an issue. The operator stated I had flown over or near ranges that had not confirmed 'checked fire'. I apologized for any problems; but it was my understanding that I had received clearance though the airspace and if there was going to be a problem; I would have just flown around the restricted area. I phoned the Controlling Agency the next day to clear up the issue and learned that a clearance may require some time for the agency to make the necessary radio and phone contact to shut ranges down. An aircraft can rapidly approach those areas faster than they can go cold. In essence; a clearance in itself is not the same as a normal clearance in aviation and may be evolving only as fast as separate ranges are contacted. Although I rarely ever ask to pass though these areas; it is important to remember events on the ground often do not occur at the same rate as events in the air. Radio discipline to anticipate the potential time needed to shutdown activity along the flight path needs to be taken into account. Although a clearance in normal aviation is just that; Special Use Airspace has special events that need to be taken into account even with a clearance.

Bell-206 pilot monitoring transmissions related to a medical mission; missed an ATC advisory regarding range activity in a Restricted Area through which the pilot had previously been cleared.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 1277; Flight Crew Type 285

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Evacuated; General Maintenance Action

My family and I were returning home from a short vacation. We had filed an IFR flight plan. We planned to refuel and then complete our trip to our home base. The IFR flight to our first fuel stop was without incident. Monitoring the AWOS prior to landing revealed the winds to be out of the West varying from 240-290 degrees at approximately 5-7 knots. Given that the winds were blowing essentially across the runway in a variable fashion such that the preferred runway would also be variable; a call was made on the CTAF requesting the airport advisory. It went unanswered. The last report from the AWOS as I was approaching the airport indicated the wind at 270 degrees; and so a visual approach and landing was made to runway 34 without incident. The airplane was refueled by me and topped off. A weather briefing was obtained using the ForeFlight commercial app. It revealed good VMC conditions through to our destination. Thus a decision was made to complete the last leg of our trip VFR. A weather briefing continued to reveal the wind to be variable across the runway from the West. A standard preflight inspection was done by me and did not reveal any abnormalities.The engine was started and initially it did run very rough; and this I attributed to the fuel vaporizing in the lines due to sitting in the sun and the hot engine from the recent flight - not an uncommon occurrence in my particular aircraft. Indeed; when the standby electric fuel pump was turned on the engine smoothed out and seemed to run as normal. As we taxied from the ramp I again listened to the AWOS. It revealed the winds to be at 290 degrees at 7 knots; and thus I made the decision to depart from runway 34. The taxi itself appeared to be normal. A standard run-up of the engine did not reveal any abnormalities or anything that sounded unusual. Takeoff flaps were set at 10 degrees as per the POH. Given that we were fully loaded and the density altitude was significantly higher than field elevation; I considered using 25 degrees of flaps as specified in the POH for short field takeoff. I elected not to do this for 2 reasons. First of all; our home field is very similar to this airport with regards to its runway - a 4000 FT runway at approximately 600 feet MSL. I've made many departures under similar conditions without incident using the standard takeoff technique. Given that the aircraft is turbocharged mitigates the deleterious effect of density altitude. My second consideration was that since the winds were so prominent from the West; I was concerned that the added surface area of exposure with the additional flaps might make the directional control more challenging as the takeoff proceeded. Thus I made the decision to use the standard takeoff flap setting.The initial takeoff roll appeared normal; and a quick scan of the instruments revealed appropriate indications. Quickly however the takeoff progressed into something that didn't feel right. Despite using standard crosswind takeoff technique with aileron deflection into the wind it was challenging to hold the aircraft on the centerline. The aircraft also did not appear to be accelerating as quickly as I would've expected and felt very sluggish; almost as if we were dragging something. There was a strong tendency for the aircraft to yaw to the right. The aircraft came off the ground at approximately midfield and I held it in ground effect. The aircraft was very near stall speed and continued to feel very mushy with regards to control feel. I made a quick assessment that we had used up over half of the available runway and had significant obstructions at the end of the runway in the form of tall trees and power lines. I was 100% confident that we were not going to clear the obstructions. I made the decision to abort the takeoff and try stop in the remaining distance we had left. I immediately pulled the throttle to idle and the aircraft settled to the runway. I applied the brakes firmly but evenly and appliedappropriate aileron to counteract the crosswind. I immediately felt the same dragging force pulling me to the right as I had earlier. Despite my best efforts to keep the aircraft on the centerline I was unable to counteract the force that caused me to yaw to the right. We departed the runway to the right and as we went off the pavement I felt the right main gear buckle. The aircraft then slid parallel to the runway for a short distance before coming to a stop. I immediately verified that my family was OK; which they were; and asked them to exit the aircraft. I quickly shut off the master; alternator; electric fuel pump; and magnetos and exited as well. We then walked back down the runway to the FBO.As to my explanation of the cause; examination of the runway demonstrates a single tire skid mark generated by the right main tire which begins approximately at the point I recall touching down and continues until the point of departure from the runway. The single tire skid mark from the right main is joined near the point of departure from the runway by tire skid marks from the left main and nosewheel as well. The orientation of the three skid marks demonstrates that the aircraft was in a leftward yaw as it slid off of the runway; this in attempt by me to hold the aircraft on the runway with left rudder despite the significant drag to the right. The right main gear went off of the runway first and folded back; causing the aircraft to yaw to the right as it slid in the grass parallel to the runway before coming to a final stop. In my opinion a mechanical failure involving the right main tire and/or brake caused an anomaly during the takeoff; slowing my takeoff roll and thus increasing the length of runway needed to become airborne; as well as causing the significant yaw to the right. This persisted during my attempt to stop the aircraft after the aborted takeoff resulting in me being unable to maintain directional control on the runway.

PA-32 pilot detected drag during takeoff and countered with rudder during the prolonged takeoff roll. Once airborne he realized obstacles would not be cleared and landed but ran off the runway end where the right gear collapsed. The right tire and/or brake were thought to be the cause of the takeoff drag.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors

This is minor but did not seem right. We were being vectored to an ILS [Runway] 22L at JFK. Over Farmingdale (FRG) at 4;000 feet; we were cleared to descend to 3;000 feet. The Class B floor here is 4;000 feet. I have flown this pattern countless times. Normally we are kept in the Class B airspace. I said to the First Officer we need to slow to 200 kts. As I am trying to get a word in on the frequency to tell the Controller we were slowing he called us and assigned us 200 kts. I suspect this was to comply with the speed limit. So; yes; for a moment we were in excess of 200 knots below the Class B floor. What bothers me here is why were we assigned an altitude below the Class B when it was not really necessary. If a Controller takes you out of the Class B shouldn't you be advised? The frequency was too busy to ask questions.Not sure. Ask New York TRACON. Next time I'll ask to remain in the Class B.

B757-200 pilot reported being vectored out of and under Class Bravo airspace; causing a possible violation of the 200 knot speed limit.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Gate Agent / CSR; Person Flight Attendant

Routine Inspection; Pre-flight; Aircraft In Service At Gate

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

During boarding Name in seat X came on board aircraft and told me the gate agent had told him to give me his battery for his wheelchair/scooter.  He asked his wife if she knew what type of battery it was and she said she did not know as she looked all over the battery for an indication of the type of battery it was.  She then handed me the battery and I tried to find any indication of what type of battery it was to no avail.  The battery did have a hazmat fire symbol sticker on it.  I let the Captain know about the battery and explained to him that the passenger didn't know what type of battery it was nor was there any indication on the battery to its type.  I called the agent on the Jetway phone that was in the Jumpseat; to let them know we had an issue with this battery.  The agent sent a manager down and I explained to the manager that we didn't know what type of battery it was.  She then called the Ramp Manager to come up.  I gave the Captain the battery to see if he could see something on the outside to indicate what type it was.  When the Ramp Manager came up she told us it was a lithium-ion battery.  I asked her how she knows that and she said that the passenger told her that.  I then explained to the Ramp Manager and the Captain that the passenger told me that they didn't know what type of battery it was.  The Captain then called someone to clarify what type of battery it was and if it was accepted on board in the cabin.  The agent then pulled up a photo on her phone showing a recycle symbol similar to the recycle symbol on the battery; except the symbol on the battery didn't have the words Li-ion in addition to the symbol as the picture that she displayed on her phone did.  All the symbols I have seen for lithium-ion have that addition Li-ion indicating it is a lithium-ion battery.  The Captain thought that she pulled the photo from a manual that they have access to and made the decision to now close the door.  It wasn't until later in the flight when I had explained to him that she just googled it and pulled it up on her phone so that she could shut the door.  I was then able to find in my manual that if the agent had been told by the passenger that indeed the battery was a lithium-ion battery she should have made a notation in the passenger record with a code and instead of the passenger handing me the battery; as per procedure in the manual the agent should have brought the battery on board the aircraft and stowed it either in the overhead bin or under the seat and informed the Lead Flight Attendant and the Captain of the location so that we could inform all other flight attendants on board to then monitor the battery throughout the flight for excessive heat; smoke or other potential fire indicators. [Reporter recommends] not allowing a lithium-ion battery of that [large] size to be boarded on an aircraft or coming up with a safe location to stow that type of battery knowing that there is a potential for a fire hazard.  25 grams of lithium-ion is the max [allowed] per our manual states that we can transport.  This size battery was the max.  On board we have a sleeve [containment bag] for a laptop or tablet or cell phone battery that may catch on fire; this battery would not fit in that sleeve!

A-321 Flight Attendant reported an improperly configured large wheelchair Lithium Ion battery was transported in passenger cabin.


Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 1600; Flight Crew Type 265

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Leading a 4-ship [formation flight] through the Washington; DC SFRA. Between wake turbulence and concern for birds the flight's altitude dropped below that prescribed in the briefing. Speed issues also were challenging due to the vectoring and instructions from Potomac TRACON. These type of aircraft; [are] a sleek and slick platform that does not have speed brakes. Further; rapid and random power changes are not recommended for engine safety and to maintain the integrity of the formation. Power reductions need to be done gradually for engine care and operation and they need to be done even more carefully when managing a formation flight where three other aircraft are all reading off of the lead airplane.  In short; consideration of the safety of the formation priority number one; making rapid changes would have been difficult and unsafe. The spacing and recommended speed changes made by TRACON required our 4-ship [formation] to encounter wake turbulence behind [other aircraft] prior to our entering of the airspace.  The altitude factors were not only wake-turbulence; specifically hawks and other bird life operating at and above the briefing altitude and the lead pilot made a command decision to be at the safe or lower than briefed altitude. Our 4-ship encountered numerous potential bird strikes at the briefing altitude on the inbound portion of the flight.  Safe operation of the flight required the lead pilot to descend below briefed minimum to avoid wake turbulence and wildlife. The problem was further enhanced by known photo ship aircraft; creating additional safety concerns in keeping with safe distance. Judgment was used in keeping ample speed and safe altitude to maintain flight path. At no time was the flight path deviated; but altitude and speed were used to maintain safe flight operations; formation integrity and safe flight.

Lead pilot of a warbird formation flight in Washington DC reported he deviated from assigned altitude because of concerns for wake turbulence and bird encounters.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Received a climb RA while flying the [Runway] XXL RNAV X. We climbed at 1500-2000 FPM; a small civilian aircraft flew under our aircraft and missed us by 400 feet. We heard approach control give traffic advisory to the other aircraft for a '737'. We received no traffic advisories. I consider this event a near miss.No traffic advisories received from approach or vectoring to either aircraft to avoid the conflict.The Approach Controller needs to do their job. Not vector another aircraft into our aircraft. The pilot of the other aircraft should not take climbing vectors into a 737. (Day VFR Weather; 10 miles plus visibility)

Cleared RNAV (RNP) X [Runway] XXL at ZZZ and subsequently received a TCAS RA approaching ZZZZZ. A light civil aircraft called us in sight and approach told them to maintain visual separation. Light civil aircraft was being vectored by approach control when RA commanded a climb to which the Captain (Pilot Flying) executed. We never saw the aircraft but the TCAS display showed them 400 feet below us. When resolved we were cleared a visual approach and landing without further incident.

B737-800 flight crew reported an uneventful landing after an NMAC event requiring evasive maneuver during approach. No traffic information provided to flight crew.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

On takeoff aft flight attendants reported effluent coming from one of lavatories into galley. Lavatories all failed [and] toilets would not flush for 8 hour flight. Due to health/hazard factor with effluent in aft galley and fumes/vapors decided to perform overweight landing. Performed uneventful landing. Maintenance needs to clean probes for waste tanks of lavatories so this does not cause false indicators that effluent tanks are full. We confirmed they were dumped before departing.

A330 Captain reported returning to departure airport after a Flight Attendant reported effluent was leaking from the lavatory into the galley area.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

On short final into ZZZ Runway XXL; we received a GPWS 'Too Low Terrain' warning. We were on glideslope and on PAPI (VMC conditions). We executed a go-around and as we leveled off we received several error messages in the scratch pad [including] 'GPS L incorrect' and a 'Runway/Approach CRS ERROR'. The Captain was flying and could not get NAV data to display on his PFD (Primary Flight Display). He also was unable to tune the ILS frequency for the subsequent approach. We consulted the checklist; then transferred the controls to the First Officer whose displays and NAV data appeared to be reading correctly and hand flew an approach in VFR conditions to a landing without incident. There was a lot of confusion with multiple errors occurring in the cockpit. The GPWS that sounded while we were on the glideslope during short final seemed to be erroneous; but then again with all the errors with the NAV data on the Pilot Flying side; maybe his glideslope was incorrect. In the end; going around and troubleshooting put time on our side and allowed us to determine the best course of action.

A B737 pilot reported several erroneous warnings and display errors on the Captain's side; who was Pilot Flying; during short final. A successful go-around and landing was performed by the First Officer.


Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Co-worker and I that were working in economy were doing our final walk-through before taking our jumpseats. She discovered that neither door 2L or 2R were armed. I confronted the Flight Attendant responsible; but was met with 'whatever attitude.' I asked her what the purpose of the all call was if she didn't even look at her doors then.Also a 2nd item: No-one was present at door for boarding till I noticed from the back and called to purser to inform her she was supposed to be greeting.

Flight Attendant reported discovering that a fellow Flight Attendant did not perform the required door arming safety duties.


Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.0

Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Time Pressure; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Staffing; Weather; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Airspace Structure

Low ceilings and IFR conditions prevailed. Arrival rate of 48. Tower was unable to provide visual separation on departures or arrivals. Dependent ILS approaches were in use with feeders providing a feed to allow finals to stagger arrivals off of the other finals position. A high workload situation for both feeders and finals. In addition; two other airports in close proximity to one another on IFR days are treated as one airport. Arrivals were unable to pick up the airports visually; but instead; had to be vectored for instrument approaches; a high workload situation for the satellite positions. Satellite sector had a handoff position open to assist with their workload but that individual was on position over 2 hours and at one point specifically advised the Supervisor on duty that he was too fatigued to continue in his position.SDL airports' approach puts aircraft over the PXR VOR and within 2 miles of PHX at low altitudes as they make the approach. Aircraft inbound to SDL were in holding over as they were inbound from the west. As aircraft were brought out of holding and provided approach clearances; departures off of PHX had to be stopped by the Traffic Management Coordinator (TMC) position to allow for the SDL bound aircraft to make their approach. PHX arrival volume was high and the TSD Alerts were showing RED as the Arrival rate of 48 was being exceeded.This situation along with all the other workload of the TMC position; which increases during weather events; created an unsafe situation as the ARC position was also combined at the TMC position. As the TMC on duty; I was overloaded with work responsibilities and specifically asked the Supervisor in charge for an ARC to be staffed to allow me to keep up with my job duties at the TMC position. That request was not complied with as there were not enough people to staff the control positions and hand-offs that needed to be open in addition to the ARC position.  From a safety standpoint; this is an unacceptable result and must be addressed.The ARC position at TRACON should NEVER be combined with the Supervisor or TMC position and should ONLY be staffed by individuals that are certified on BOTH the feeders AND finals positions. If the position is not staffed as a standalone position; it should be closed. By combining the ARC with the Supervisor or TMC position during 'slow' periods it has created a situation where the position is rarely opened as a standalone position but rather it remains combined at either the Supervisor or TMC position (most of whom are not certified on both feeders and finals) most of the time even during weather events; special events; periods of high volume of traffic; or during unusual circumstances. This has created an unsafe situation and it must be addressed.

P50 TRACON Controller reported being very busy with aircraft conducting instrument approaches to the main airport as well as the satellite airports. Reporter suggested an additional sector in their unit be opened instead of having to perform both functions by himself. The Supervisor was not able to open the combined sector due to lack of staffing at the time.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 900; Flight Crew Type 700

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

I filed my IFR flight plan for 8000 feet. Soon after establishing cruise altitude I realized I was still IMC and requested 10;000 ft to be above cloud level. I was cleared by ATC to 10;000 ft. The Controller asked for a PIREP. I reported temp -7; wind and no turbulence with buildup ahead of me. He informed me of moderate precip 20 miles ahead. I requested permission to deviate west to avoid build up. He approved deviation with instructions to inform ATC when back on course. I deviated to the west then received a vector to 300 degrees to avoid restricted airspace. I acknowledged; deviated to 300 degrees. During this time I was intermittently in and out of cloud tops for a few seconds. The new vector heading sent me into a cloud I estimate about 1/2 mile wide and 500 feet above my elevation. Upon entering the cloud I immediately began to accumulate ice on my windshield and wing struts. I had already switched on my pitot 30 min earlier but almost immediately experienced a 15 knot decrease in my airspeed. I immediately turned off my autopilot and requested to immediately increase my altitude to 12;000 feet. I had no visibility or turbulence. I had no response from ATC and decided to increase my altitude to 12;000 to avoid further icing. The rate of climb was poor; but I was able to achieve about 300 feet/minute. I called ATC again with no response of my change in altitude. About 1 min later ATC responded 'turn immediately to 360 degrees' which I immediately responded and turned. I was still in IMC; but ice accumulation was not as significant and I was still able to achieve a positive rate of climb. I again informed ATC I was in icing conditions and needed 12000 ft altitude to exit the IMC conditions. I now heard ATC advise an [air carrier] flight to immediately turn; the [air carrier] pilot stated he saw my plane on TCAS and deviated away from me. I have TIS on my G1000 equipped plane and saw the [air carrier] flight at my altitude come to about 2 miles from my location before deviating. [ATC] then instructed me to contact Center; I switched to their frequency and at about 11;500 ft I exited IMC on top.I was able to maintain a cruise speed about 10 knots less than my usual speed. I shed the ice 40 min later when descending. Center instructed me to phone them about my clearance deviation upon landing. The ATC supervisor listened to my account of the episode and informed me the Controller was on a landline during the time I called him twice about my icing predicament and climb to get out of IMC/icing conditions. He acknowledged he understood my clearance deviation for icing. In my opinion everything worked well for this situation. If my immediate deviation did not improve my icing problem I would have declared an emergency and continued my plan of climbing out of IMC/icing conditions. The time between my deviation and actually speaking with ATC was about 45-60 seconds. Of course; at the time the duration of radio silence from ATC seemed excessive. The Controller deviated me and the [air carrier] flight appropriately to avoid close contact. If he had not been on a landline I suspect he would have given me a vector to avoid the conflict entirely.

C182 pilot reported climbing from his assigned altitude to get out of icing conditions prompting an air carrier flight to deviate in response to a TCAS alert.


Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 21.5

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

I was working R46 without a Radar Assist. Traffic was fairly routine with the exception of weather re-routes and in-trail restrictions with no back-to-back BWI or DCA aircraft. Aircraft X from had filed J75. Their preferential route was via J48 which had no in-trail restriction. This aircraft sat on the ground on a bad route for 35 minutes and nobody fixed it. If it had been routed via BAF; as it should have been; this never would have happened because they would have been 20 miles north of NELIE over BAF VOR. As I was relieving the 46 controller he mentioned the bad route coming our way. R47 issued the reroute while he was climbing out in their airspace. Because the aircraft was headed towards NELIE; they issued direct TRIBS intersection which put Aircraft X right over NELIE. I took the handoff; climbed the aircraft to FL260 and handed them right to R20; as they were within 10 miles of the border.Subsequently; I took a handoff on Aircraft Y. Typically I would have issued this aircraft direct to CMK; which would have placed him about 10 NM south of NELIE. However; there was a corporate jet at FL400 doing Mach .74 about 30 miles ahead. As I had to provide 20 miles in trail on J75 regardless of type; altitude; or destination; I left Aircraft Y on the route. Aircraft X left my airspace so I suppressed the data block. I climbed Aircraft Y to FL380. Then I took handoffs on 6 BWI arrivals. The flow restriction stated no back-to-back BWI arrivals. I asked my supervisor to talk to Traffic Management Unit (TMU) and ask for guidance on what I should do with these aircraft. I attempted to call ZNY N42 to ask the controller directly for relief. Most of this was taking place in the vicinity of BOS or PVD and that is where my attention was focused. Aircraft Y was approaching the border with R20 and they had yet to accept the handoff. I assumed it was because they were busy trying to blend their flows for ZNY. My supervisor told the R47 controller and myself that we could selectively reroute BWI aircraft down the coast through ZDC. While we were working on this the conflict alert went off with Aircraft Y and Aircraft X. Aircraft Y was climbing through FL241 and Aircraft X was approaching FL250. I vectored Aircraft Y away from Aircraft X and told him to stop his climb and when able return to FL240. The closest proximity that I saw was about 4.5 miles when I got a report from Aircraft Y indicating 1000 feet vertical separation existed.R20 took the handoff. I called them and told them that Aircraft Y was turning back on course; and sarcastically thanked them for calling me about the impending loss of separation. TMU should never had agreed to '20 miles in trail via J75 with no back-to-back BWI or DCA arrivals.' That's a ridiculous restriction. If ZNY needed 40 or 30 miles in trail on BWI and/or DCA aircraft that should have been the restriction. We rerouted 3 airborne aircraft for no real reason. ZNY would have gotten an airplane every 20 miles and who cares what the destination was? This was regardless of altitude.When ZNY decides to take the night off on the backs of ZBW and ZDC they should be called on their bad actions. At a minimum; the J75 in trail should be stratified so that aircraft going further at higher altitude would be separate from aircraft that need to be started down sooner. Pilots need to do a better job of filing the preferential route. A lot of them have the attitude that they will just file whatever and it's our job to fix it. While it is our job; it is their job to file the preferential routes.Our radar Assists need to do a better job fixing bad routes in a timely manner while aircraft are on the ground. The common attitude is 'its close enough; what's the worst that can happen?' Well; a deal can happen. And now the FAA Handbook 7110.65 is changing and we will have to fix routes 30 minutes prior instead of 15. This problem will only get worse. Traffic management Unit was not even monitoring the BWI traffic while there was an in-trail restriction. Need I say more? Despite all of this; I should have told Aircraft Y to expedite through FL270 feet. We are spoiled with the new modern aircraft. Usually a B737 off PVD would cross NELIE above FL300 feet. I'm guessing that because he received a ground delay; Aircraft Y was trading climb rate for forward speed. I should have known better and been proactive.Typically if I hand a slow aircraft to another sector; I watch them for a while beyond my airspace so I don't run them over. Aircraft X was initially in an area; at an altitude where I never imagined he would get run over. Lesson relearned.

ZBW Center Controller reported an aircraft overtook another aircraft resulting in a loss of separation while they were distracted with other coordination.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

While in cruise; received several messages from ATC that we were slightly off course.  It appeared our FMS and GPS were not giving correct position information; despite following the procedure in the FOIB regarding the ADSB out of service.  We eventually had to request radar vectors until we could confirm green needle backup and continue our course via green needles.  Flight continued with no further problems. Discussed the issue with maintenance and they said to write up the FMS and GPS. FMS and GPS not giving correct location data to pilots. Request vectors earlier before problem continues to get worse.

CRJ-200 First Officer reported navigation problems associated FMS and GPS related issues.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 151; Flight Crew Type 14000

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Cleared visual approach in VMC; autopilot engaged; intercepted heading in descent out of about 3;000 FT; glide slope centered; and set zero altitude when cleared for visual. VOR/LOC captured; pressed APP; and glide slope captured. Then; about 1;100 FT five miles out; I realized the runway looked a little flat; disconnected autopilot; and leveled off. Then; got an altitude alert from Tower; but had already leveled off; and continued to intercept normal glide path for normal landing. Glide slope needle was stuck on center indicating we were on path and autopilot was coupled. We recycled my HSI switch and then got an accurate glide slope reading; so must not have been a signal problem. First Officer's glide slope was working properly. Did not write it up because recycling the HSI switch fixed the problem and could not duplicate the sticking. Never thought an autopilot would couple to a stuck glide slope needle. I should have set 1;500 FT FAF altitude in the window and crosschecked with DME. Better crew coordination of cross checking glide slope needles and call outs would have also helped.

During visual approach autopilot on the Captain's side directed the aircraft to follow the localizer/glide slope by selecting Approach. Everything seemed normal until approximately 1;500 FT. I noticed we were unusually low at the same time as the Captain. While I was attempting to reconcile why our indications didn't match; the Captain disconnected the autopilot and began to intercept a normal glide path. I verified my glide slope needle was accurate and I selected his NAV VOR switch from VOR to NAV and back. The indication was normal after this. During this time Tower issued an altitude alert. The Captain regained a normal flight path and landed safely. I should have been monitoring my glide slope in addition to the visual profile.

B737-300 flight crew reports descending below a normal approach path during a visual approach when the glide slope bar freezes in the centered position. The First Officer's indications function normally; but are not being monitored and the low approach is not detected until five miles from the field at 1;100 FT.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 34; Flight Crew Total 34; Flight Crew Type 34

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Cleared to land RWY 28 and exit via [Taxiway] B but the pilot incorrectly recognized the intersecting runway as [Taxiway] B and exited there.

Cessna 152 student pilot reports being instructed by the Tower to exit on Taxiway B after landing; but mistakes the intersecting runway for Taxiway B.


Light Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

On approach to Runway 30L in SJC we were distracted by a flashing light in the distance past the end of the runway. As we got closer we realized that it was a huge display board on a new stadium northwest of the airport. It was only displaying solid colors like RED; BLUE; etc. It was almost impossible to ignore. I found myself looking away; but when it changed color or intensity; I would look back at it. Our approach was in daylight. I can't imagine what it would be like at night or once this display starts a more dynamic display. This was not well thought out; and is a huge safety problem. There is no way to ignore the display in VMC conditions. It could result in loss of separation with traffic to follow; or perhaps missing a runway assignment. The only way I could see this being allowed is to completely block the display from being seen from the southeast or facing it the other direction. However; if it is facing the northwest it will be an even bigger problem when traffic flow is from that direction. This display is in the same category as a laser event as far as distractions are concerned.

A passenger turboprop pilot expressed concern about the distraction and effects on flight crew vision caused by the bright lights emanating from the huge lighted scoreboard at the soon to be opened major league football stadium just three miles from the far end of runways 30. The reporter likens the displays to laser events.


Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

I was working position B on Aircraft X. I was very well rested and it was day 4 of a 4 day trip. Everything seemed very normal until after takeoff. As we ascended the C and I both begun to feel nauseous and dizzy. At first we didn't mention it to each other but as the flight progressed we both continued to feel dizzy and off balance. As the flight went on I continued to feel almost disoriented and a bit cloudy. We let the pilots know how we were feeling and they had paramedics meet us upon arrival in ZZZ. I will say I felt better once we were on land (less dizzy) but continued to feel cloudy minded and had a noticeable tremor. Our O2 levels and vitals seemed okay so they gave us the choice to be pulled from the flight. However it was day 4 and we both felt like we could make it back to ZZZ1 to finish. The leg back to ZZZ2 did not seem as noticeable but I do think I was still dizzy (almost vertigo like) and foggy minded. As the evening progressed (I commuted home to ZZZ2 on [another carrier] that evening) I had a sore throat and coughed through most of the night. I still have a slight sore throat. I never smelled anything; which is something we thought was strange but I definitely have never experienced those feelings in my year and a half of flying. I am currently already on another 3 day and I definitely think I'm still exhausted from the experience but I do feel better.

A319 Flight Attendant reported she and another Flight Attendant experienced dizzy and off balance feeling that lasted for the remainder of the day. Evaluated on landing by paramedics.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

While on ILS approach to Runway XXC at ZZZ; approaching the FAF; we were configured with gear down and flaps at 20 and were planning a flaps 25 approach and landing. At this point we felt a slight rumble or shudder and the First Officer and I commented to each other that that felt kind of strange but nothing seemed out of the ordinary; however shortly after that the aircraft went through an electrical power transfer and the autopilot kicked off. We also had multiple EICAS messages. Initially we thought we had just lost the left generator; as there was no noticeable yawing tendency; and ran the Generator Off checklist. The generator did not reset. As I started to scan all the EICAS messages; I noticed that the left engine instruments were all spooled back and at that time realized the left engine had failed. It was not intuitive as the plane showed no yawing or rolling tendency initially. At this point we were at or inside the FAF. We [requested priority handling] with Tower and advised them we had lost the left engine and were continuing for landing on Runway XXC. The first officer grabbed the QRC and quickly ran through the ENGINE FIRE SEVERE DAMAGE or SEPARATION checklist. The checklist was completed and airspeed bugs set for flaps 20 landing. The landing was uneventful and we slowed to taxi speed and cleared the runway to the right at the high speed turnoff then pulled on to Taxiway P and stopped for emergency vehicles to inspect the left engine. After fire and rescue inspected the engine; they advised us there was no visible sign of engine damage or fluid leakage. Believing the engine was no threat we coordinated to continue the taxi to the ramp; and emergency vehicles followed us to parking with no further issues. Although things were time compressed; we both felt we had run the necessary checklist and were prepared and set up for the single engine landing. Getting the plane safely on the ground as soon as possible was the priority as we did not know why the left engine had failed.

Just inside the FAF and descending on glide path for Runway XXC at ZZZ; we heard a subtle; odd sound (maybe a couple of thumps?) and immediately afterwards; the Master Caution light illuminated and I think the autopilot kicked off. We noticed the left generator was off line. The Captain asked me to run the Generator Off checklist. I did this and it did not reset. While I was running this checklist; more EICAS messages came up indicating #1 engine failure. At that point we were already at Gear Down and Flaps 20. The Captain commented that the engine appeared seized. I looked at the Engine instruments and notice EGT and Oil Press gauges were red. EGT had reached 680 and Oil Pressure was low. It was obvious the #1 Engine had some sort of major failure. He stated intentions to me that we would land single engine and remain at Flaps 20 and for me to run the Engine Fire Severe Damage Checklist. It was a bit rushed being on short final but I was able to accomplish most of the checklist with the exception of the Flap Over-ride switch which was self-critiquing when its verbal warning sounded. Somewhere during all that; I [requested priority handling] and told Tower we would taxi clear and then have Fire & Rescue check our condition. After an uneventful landing; we taxied clear and ran the after landing checklist. Fire and Rescue gave us the all clear on the #1 Engine and aircraft in general and we elected to taxi back to the ramp using normal procedures. After a brief discussion with Maintenance; we departed the aircraft and the Captain filed an event report.

Flight Crew reported engine failure at final approach fix which caused them to request priority handling and continue to landing.


Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

We left the gate at MTJ and moments later; we announced our intentions on UNICOM frequency 122.8 to cross runway 13/31 at taxiway D on our way to runway 17 via A. Both pilots noted that the airplane was 'clear left and clear right'. Approximately halfway across the runway; an unknown voice on the UNICOM frequency said: 'Air Carrier X be advised that someone is [in] the pattern not talking to anyone on this frequency'. Approximately 1 second later we heard a broken transmission stating '31' and noticed a single engine Cessna had begun its takeoff roll towards us on runway 31. The moment I noticed the aircraft on the runway; I applied power to clear the runway as fast as possible. Once clear; the first voice on the UNICOM; advised the other aircraft that no one could hear his radio calls; and if that pilot could hear this transmission; please key the mike twice. The pilot of the other aircraft keyed the mike twice. From my position on taxiway D prior to entering runway 31/13; I could not see that any aircraft was on runway 31. Additionally; once I noticed the aircraft on its takeoff run; I noticed that the pilot did not have any takeoff; or recognition lights illuminated. We continued our taxi via taxiway A to runway 17; and the flight departed without further incident. Montrose airport should be a controlled field considering its size; and number of daily commercial departures and GA traffic. In addition; all pilots must maintain a high level of alertness when operating in an uncontrolled environment.

A Regional Jet Captain crossing Runway 13/31 at MTJ experiences a conflict with a Cessna departing Runway 31. CTAF procedures were in effect but the Cessna pilot had an extremely weak radio. The Captain believes that MTJ is far too busy to be an uncontrolled airport.


Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Departing from DIA we lost Left GPS taxiing out.  On climb out we lost both GPS and had transponder failure.  Alerted ATC and they knew about it; said everyone was having the same issue and it would go away 30 miles east of Denver.  We eventually got both GPS back and transponder fail went away 60nm east if Denver climbing through FL260.   Worked fine rest of the flight. Heard numerous aircraft having the same issue near Denver.  Alerted Dispatch via ACARS that it might be a 5G interference issue but they said 5G wasn't activated in DEN yet; so I have no idea what's causing the issues there then but it's widespread and hitting all the aircraft.

Air carrier Captain reported departing DEN the loss of GPS and transponder.


Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 4400

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

The problem is with the emergency exit row seating. This aircraft is a B737 with 148 seats. This aircraft has a single emergency exit row window in the mid cabin. The seating has been changed to accommodate 148 passengers. When the LOPA (engineering diagram) was set up the company installed a row of 3 seats at the emergency exit. These seats have the back lock in the upright position. There is no way to open the emergency window in the unlikely event of an emergency that required the evacuation of passengers. Not sure how the inspection department of could sign this off. This aircraft does not comply with Part 121.585 for the emergency exit row. When brought up to the head office they come back and say it's legal. Have picture of the aircraft and not sure how to forward the picture for proof.

The reporter stated that the emergency exit window problem had been corrected.

B737 Captain reported a seating configuration that did not allow the emergency over wing exit to be opened. When contacted; the reporter stated the problem had been corrected.


Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

As we began the takeoff roll the First Officer's airspeed did not come off zero and auto-throttles disconnected. Near approximately 80 KTS we recognized the First Officer had lost his CADC and I began a rejected takeoff procedure. First Officer advised Tower of our rejected takeoff. We exited the runway and began to assess the aircraft and our immediate needs. Plenty of runway was left and the brake temp was slow to rise. We called ATC and requested to return to the gate and also informed our Maintenance to meet the aircraft to perform all necessary inspections. Brake temperature never exceeded 205C and had already begun to cool down prior to parking at the gate. Taxi back to terminal was uneventful and info was entered into the [logbook].

MD-83 Captain reported losing First Officer CADC on takeoff roll; so the takeoff was rejected and the flight returned to the gate.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Was scheduled to fly a B777. Flight plan showed a MEL with an open APU door in flight and an extra increase of 10;500 pounds of fuel burn for door drag and windmill/burn. Got to the aircraft and was told the logbook was down stairs as the mechanics were working on an APU oil quantity low light and a low level oil quantity in APU. Was told later that the MEL had been there for 8 days and the APU had to be refilled from very low on every flight for the last 4 days even though it hasn't been run in flight. They said they topped off the APU with oil but they couldn't extinguish the APU low oil EICAS message or the low oil quantity on the diagnostics page. They got it to clear and it came back on again. I asked why the APU was losing so much oil when it has not been running and they deduced it was because it was wind-milling and eating the oil through the seals and bearings etc. I wasn't convinced of that but was more concerned about the indications of low oil qty. After troubleshooting for 3 hours they asked if I was happy to take it with an inoperative oil quantity indicating system and EICAS message showing. The mechanic who was supposed to be the guru came out and indicated there was nothing to worry about even if it was leaking oil because the APU will shut down in flight with low oil pressure or high oil temperature. I quickly realized he didn't know how the APU operates in flight and those are not the items the APU will shut down for in the attended mode which is engines running or in flight. I heard rumblings from an earlier mechanic that the Tech working the flight was not comfortable letting the aircraft go with its' history and the fact we don't have anything to tell us if it's operating with no oil or not. Finally after 3 hours I told the local mechanic that I wanted to talk to the Tech REP working the flight. He called and after discussing the situation; he said he felt uncomfortable letting it go and was told that I was happy to take it with an inoperative oil quantity sensing system for the APU. I told him I wasn't happy about it all since the APU will not shut down for low oil pressure or high oil temp and if over the Pacific it starts spewing smoke or fumes into the cabin from operating with no oil; I was not going to take that risk. He said that was his concern completely and with its' history of coming in from every flight with very low oil; he didn't feel comfortable even though it is probably correct it is due to the wind-milling. He said if it is a leak; then running it now which nobody has done in the last 8 days would put us in unknown territory. I talked with my cockpit crew for feedback from them and they concurred that they didn't feel comfortable and at that point decided I was rejecting the aircraft for safety reasons. We never did see the logbook until it was brought up for me to refuse the aircraft.

The Captain of a B777 refused to accept the aircraft for flight due to an APU door open in flight. Fuel burn would have been excessive and the constant low oil quantity was a concern.


MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Staffing; Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft

I had just walked into the TRACON to open up the mornings positions. At the time the late night midnight FLM was busy on the computer; accomplishing his morning duties; while the mid CPC was working the TRACON combined. The weather was foggy and the RVR for the runways was fluctuating between 1200 and 3000 for the touchdown. The shift CPC was working an emergency that needed to get in to the airport. As a result the CPC had to vector about 7 aircraft in order to give the emergency priority to the runway. The late night CPC was coming up on his going home time so I was asked to open FINAL instead of the Departure position. The late night CPC was unable to give me a briefing; so I just assumed the position and took over. At that time the emergency made a go around and proceeded to be vectored back to me for sequencing. I asked the emergency if he needed priority handling to the runways as I had 3 to 4 on the final and would have to vector him under the aircraft. He stated that he did need the service; so I vectored him North under a crossing (right to left) air carrier inbound and exchanged traffic. I then vectored the emergency to with a left turn to join the final. The vector would put the emergency in front of the other air carrier with the required 2 mile stagger needed for parallel approaches; since there were not enough personnel to open the monitors. Apparently; I missed the read back or the emergency failed to make the turn. At the time a FLM came up next to my right side and starting barking instructions. This may have been a part of why I missed the read back. As a result the emergency went through the localizer. I turned the emergency left to rejoin the localizer and believed that he still would have the required 2 mile staggered separation from the other air carrier now off his left rear going to [parallel runway]. The emergency was at 2;000 FT when I cleared him and was shipped to the Tower as soon as he joined the final. We need at least 2 CPC's on the mid night shifts. The FLM has a lot of duties to perform before the morning FLM arrives and when the weather deteriorates like it did the FLM can not help.

TRACON Controller described an unsafe condition when the handling of an emergency aircraft resulted in one go around and one failure to turn onto the Localizer; staffing was listed a contributory.


Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

On final approach to Runway 31R around 1;000 feet MSL; I saw two white drones on the left side of our aircraft appeared to be hovering. I was able to see them clearly so they must have been around 200 to 300 feet away from us. They were typical recreational type drones with four props. We passed them in a few seconds and didn't have to alter the path. I notified the JFK Tower immediately. We landed uneventfully.The authorities will have to do something about this 'drone' problem. It is becoming out of control.

An air carrier Captain on JFK Runway 31R final at about 1;000 feet reported two UAS aircraft hovering about 200-300 feet away from them and left of the final approach course. Evasive action was not required.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

We were struck by lightning during descent into ROA at about 13;000. We were told there would be some moderate turbulence and heavy rain.  No thunderstorms were forecast and METAR and TAFs all looked acceptable. There were clouds everywhere. Since we only had one pack we could not cruise above 25;000 and this prevented us from flying above the weather. We were asked to descend a bit earlier and started getting vectored around to avoid weather and there wasn't anything noticeable painted on the weather radar and out of nowhere we were struck by lightning. The turbulence was bad and bumpy till touchdown. When I inspected the plane after landing; that's when I realized we also had a bird strike.

Radar displayed light to moderate rain. Queried ATC on weather location and intensity. They agreed with our route and headings. We continued our descent to the field; roughly 2 minutes of increasing rain and turbulence up to heavy rain and moderate/heavy turbulence. Once through the worst of it; and it started slacking off a little; we were struck. We lost windshield heat but regained it with a switch reset. We also lost the number one comm system. The RMU was functioning correctly but we were unable to reestablish communications until we used the Number 2 system.

Air carrier flight crew reported being struck by lightning on descent to ROA. Evidence of a bird strike was also noted after landing.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 400

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 15550; Flight Crew Type 3000

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Distraction

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

The weather leaving ZZZ was clear and winds were calm. Other than a taxi instruction that was incorrect from Ground Control where the controller kept providing a taxi from the North Ramp even though we requested taxi from FBO ramp; the taxi out to the runway was normal. Tower Control took over the taxi instructions prior to crossing the landing Runway of XXR and XXL while we were given instructions to taxi to Runway XY. Runway XY was entered into the FMS (Flight Management System) with the departure. The takeoff briefing was performed as we taxied out identifying a Long Range Nav takeoff and confirming the L Nav selection on the guidance controller. The takeoff was normal at XA:45Z until around 500 ft. above ground level; a wasp was seen coming out from the top of the glare-shield and landed on the hand of the Pilot Flying. It became apparent that the wasp was going to cause issues immediately.Initial focus was to ensure aircraft was just flying but no attention was made to the flight director. We were still flying with wings somewhat level and nose high although later we realized we had turned slightly to the right. The control of the aircraft swapped back and forth from Left to Right-Side Pilot several times as the wasp kept flying around. The Right-Side Pilot finally found a napkin in the cockpit to attempt to kill the wasp and transfer of control went back to the Left-Side Pilot. Finally the wasp was trapped and focus was back to navigating versus just attitude flying. At that point; we noticed that the flight was not on course about the time that Departure asked us our heading. I told them to standby as we finally killed the wasp under the napkin. We were given a heading of 330 which we then initiated only to be later told just to navigate back to the east toward ZZZ1. Moments later; we were informed that ATC wanted a phone call to which I replied that it would be quite some time before that could happen. What we did correctly [was] fly the aircraft. At no point in the takeoff and initial climb out did we lose control of the aircraft while attempting to find and kill our invading wasp. No other traffic was identified nor did the TCAS (Traffic Collision Alerting System) alert us to that issue. What we did not do correctly [was] navigate. The crew kept having to juggle the wasp vs. the airplane in an attempt to not get stung. Not to be taken lightly given different weather and terrain conditions but this one is for the books and for training classes for sure.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Gulfstream IV flight crew reported a wasp was discovered in the cockpit after takeoff.


Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

While taking off from Houston today; we struck a bird during rotation. The bird appeared to be traveling towards the number two engine. There was a noise associated with the event. The engine was still producing normal thrust and we got no master warning or caution indications. We continued to climb out and noticed that the low pressure spool vibrations were higher than normal. We also heard and felt vibrations in the aircraft. Climbing through 10;000 feet; the flight attendants called up and reported that they were also feeling and hearing the vibrations. We leveled the aircraft off at 16;000 feet at 270 knots and told Center that we needed to work on an issue. I called ARINC and got a hold of Maintenance. I informed them of the bird strike; and the indications on the low pressure spool; which were in the green ranging between 1.0-3.0. Maintenance told me that since the indication was in the green that it was up to me whether not I return to ZZZ and have the engine looked at. I decided that the safest course of action would be to return to ZZZ and have the engine checked out with Maintenance. When we got to the gate I left the cockpit to look at the number two engine. I found several fan blades damaged. The aircraft was taken out of service and we were swapped into a different aircraft and completed the flight to [destination].

E175 pilot reported a bird strike and after returning to departure airport observed damaged fan blades on the walk around.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 65; Flight Crew Total 3850; Flight Crew Type 120

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Object

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

While parked with one engine running and the GPU running and connected the SIC departed the aircraft due to a cargo door not secured annunciation. The cargo door was closed and the SIC was returning to the flight deck when ground personnel pointed to and requested permission to remove the left main chalk. At the time of this request the aircraft was triple chalked. The SIC granted permission to remove the left chalk at which point the aircraft started moving forward. The PIC immediately stopped the aircraft but not before the GPU chord and plug had damaged the receptacle onboard the aircraft. The mishap concluded without any injury to personnel or further damage to the aircraft.

Embraer Phenom 300 pilot reported the unintentional movement of the aircraft on the ground; causing damage to a Ground Power Unit plug and access door.


Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Procedure; Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling

CRJ 900 Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) states that a tool was needed to perform an APU Battery change. That tool is a hoist. Mechanics came to me stating that we do not have this tool and that it is necessary for safe installation of an APU battery. They refused to complete the task due to improper safety equipment. I notified the supervisor that in the task card; job set up states to install hoist. The supervisor's immediate reaction was to send home the mechanics for insubordination because they were refusing to do a job even though they viewed it as safety risk. I told the supervisor that I believed it to be a safety risk to install a battery without using the hoist. He then agreed that it was a safety risk and that he did not want to see anyone get hurt. He was aware that the battery weighs over 80 LBS. It then was break time. During break the supervisor looked up in the introduction in the AMM for tooling. He stated that the introduction states that; 'In some cases; the recommended tools and fixtures given in the Maintenance Procedure are given to make the removal or installation of a component easier; but are not necessary.' He then showed again that maintenance procedure remains equally safe for the persons who do the maintenance and for the equipment. But I told him he missed the statements; 'While the maintenance procedure may specify these tools and fixtures to help a person who the maintenance; maintenance procedure can be done even if the tool or fixture is not available (unless specified differently) with the conditions that follow: The intent of the maintenance procedure is not significantly altered and the revised maintenance procedure is approved by the operator's engineering authority.' Bombardier assumes no responsibility for the precision of the revised maintenance procedure. I argued that the statement above did not condone us to be able to alter from the task because 1) There was no blue page listing that it was appropriate to do so as Bombardier stated needed to be done and 2) altering from the task and not using the listed tool is liable to cause injury to the mechanic doing the job because there is not a safe way of lifting a battery into the Aft Equipment Bay. The response of the supervisor was that we have been doing it this way for years without injury so it must be safe. I do not believe that this is a safe action and that just because we have not had an injury in the past by not following this AMM procedure does not prevent from having an injury in the near future. With the threat of sending home mechanics because they refused to install an APU Battery unsafely I went ahead and installed it and notified the supervisors on duty that I intended on reporting this to the safety department because I found it a violation of safety. The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health's recommended weight limits has this task listed as high probability of lower back injury if you list the variables into their lifting equation. The cause of this safety hazard is Company's constant denial of requests for this tooling that is needed for the safe removal and installation of an APU Battery. Management has been notified several times that they need to purchase this tool and it is constantly rejected. Company states that they are a safety oriented company yet they continue to deny this request for equipment that can prevent back injuries. This has started to become an issue since Company implemented OSHA's new work place regulation. The stands that were used to aid in installation of the battery without the hoist have been tagged out since they are higher than OSHA new fall policies. It has been stated that an email was sent that allows removal of the handrails if entering the AFT Equipment Bay because then the aircraft becomes the rails; yet mechanics have not seen a policy in writing so they are concerned about violating these regulations and being terminated. I voiced my concerns to managementbut was told that the battery must be changed. Purchase the hoist.

CRJ-900 maintenance technicians reported they did not have the proper equipment to safely replace an APU battery.


Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Distraction; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

I was training with my primary trainer on LCC (Local Control Center). The traffic flow was landing 18L/C/R and departing 27 initially. There were multiple heavy to severe areas of thunderstorms in the area and the departure runway was changed to 18C then back to 27 and at times both 18C and 27. RWY 18L was closed by airport management for an undisclosed reason. The big 'X''s were out there but at no time did I see a vehicle. RWY 18R is hardly ever used at all and I believe it was also closed for some reason. At approximately the time previously reported; Aircraft X crossed the threshold and Aircraft Z was on a 4-5 mile final. I opted to LUAW (Line Up and Wait) Aircraft Y because the departure line was increasing and the arrivals were wanting to get down before the thunderstorms in the vicinity arrived. The main complexity was the fact; in my opinion; that 18L was not being used so all aircraft in the afternoon push were combined to only one runway; coupled with weather. When Aircraft X landed; with Aircraft Y in LUAW; we reached out to Aircraft Z as he hadn't yet checked in on a 4 mile final and his speed was higher than usual for an aircraft with that proximity to the runway and the window for this squeeze play to work was becoming exponentially reduced. Due to the fact that the west side of the ramp is closed due to construction; the taxiway closer to the approach end of 18C (J) was being used for outbound aircraft and arrivals were delegated to the second taxiway (K).When Aircraft X landed; I initially told him to exit when able. My instructor informed me that this was not a good choice of verbiage as it didn't convey any sense of expediency that was applicable in this situation. I then told him to exit on taxiway K and to contract ground and he read that back. I looked and saw Aircraft X start to turn his nose wheel onto J instead of K and looked at Aircraft Y's position and saw that he still hadn't lined up. I discerned that to utilize anticipated separation that by the time Aircraft Y had started his takeoff roll that Aircraft X would be clear of the runway and Aircraft Z would not have to be sent around. As soon I cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff; I looked over to the ground controller to inform him that Aircraft X had taken J and not K when my instructor told me to cancel his takeoff roll. I looked and realized that Aircraft X had; in fact; turned briefly into the J exit; realized his mistake and turned back onto the runway to exit at K. I called Aircraft Y and told him to cancel takeoff clearance and send Aircraft Z around. After listening to the tape; it was brought to my attention that either the call sign was cutoff or not transmitted as Aircraft Y did not cancel his roll and Aircraft X was expedited off the runway. Aircraft X was on the runway approximately 5 seconds after Aircraft Y started his roll.It was brought to my attention today; 3 weeks from the date of the incident; that this was considered a significant event. Perhaps not closing the majority of the runways during the busiest push of the busiest day of the week would have been a prudent decision?

CVG Developmental Controller training on Local reported a runway incursion when the landing aircraft turned at the wrong intersection to exit then back onto the runway causing the departure to be canceled and another arrival sent around.


Flight Crew Last 90 Days 231; Flight Crew Type 347

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Airspace Structure; Equipment / Tooling; Aircraft

In cruise at FL340; while PF (Pilot Flying) was entering data via ATSU (Air Traffic Service Unit); heard warning for Autopilot disengagement; also single chime repeating every 3 seconds or so; ECAM (Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring) showed Autopilot disconnect; Auto throttle disconnect; indications showed Thrust Lock . Matched throttle lever angle to display; used instinctive disconnect switch on throttles; pressed autopilot disconnect button on control stick; then re-engaged auto-thrust and Autopilot 1. ECAM read PRESS Landing elevation fault; set Manual landing elevation. PF set manual elevation knob to +100 (elevation of destination). Captain MCDU showed FM (Flight Management) light illuminated. Selecting an FMGC (Flight Management Guidance Computer) button resulted in a wait for function; so PF selected MCDU menu button and then FMGC. Bottom scratch pad showed Independent Operation (of FMGC). PFD (Primary Flight Display) showed 1FD2; indicating both FMGC were functioning. F/O (First Officer) MCDU had been defer red inop and MEL prior to pushback. Could only see FP (Flight Plan) page; and entries had no effect. Waypoints did not cycle through when passed; and distance did not count down. DIR; RAD NAV; DATA; INT; SEC keys showed no response to pressing. Cycled Captain MCDU CB IAW (in accordance with) QRH with no effect. Again; IAW QRH and [Maintenance Control] direction; cycled CB for both FMGC one at a time. Still no effect. Three or four times later during flight; autopilot and auto-thrust systems disengaged; but was able to re-engage both. Informed ATC that we were unable to navigate via RNAV; and though cleared DCT DHART waypoint; we would need a heading. Center assigned us a heading; direct the ZZZ4 VOR when able. Both sides were tuned remotely using the RMP (Radio Management Panel). Center changed our Arrival to the ZZZ1 [STAR] and then the ZZZ2 [STAR] to make things easier on us; requiring only that we track the ZZZ3 046R inbound. Then gave us vectors for the ILS 27 at ZZZ. The entire time we were talking with Dispatch on VHF2 (until we lost contact) and communicating with dispatch and maintenance via ACARS. Aircraft responded to normal inputs via FCU. PF and PM (Pilot Monitoring) referenced Manual for landing speeds and PM briefed ILS approach under visual conditions; including how to fly published missed approach. Normal landing and rollout and taxi to gate accomplished. In chocks; determined that FMGC1 failed; and with MCDU2 deferred inop there was no way to provide input to FMGC2.

An Airbus flight crew experienced a failure of the Flight Management Guidance Computer #1. This failure; coupled with a previously deferred Multi-Purpose Control and Display Unit #2; rendered the aircraft incapable of continuing to navigate in an RNAV environment. After assistance was requested from Air Traffic Control; headings were issued; and the flight proceeded safely to the destination airport.


Party1 Flight Crew; Party1 Dispatch; Party2 ATC

Party1 Dispatch; Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

I received a flight plan for [a flight to] OMDB filed to DESDI as the final fix. This has been the final filed fix for many years. I prepared using Jepp FDPRO and selected the new Dec load and it did not have any DESDI STARS. It doesn't have DESDI connecting to any STARS that I can find and all of the STARS have changed. Since I had a similar experience in RJAA years ago; I ask the Dispatcher to make sure we will have no issues. In other words; I am being proactive knowing I can't fly an arrival past DESDI; and I will arrive with none of the new STARS since I will be required to select the previous database based on a takeoff before XX01Z. I choose the FMS database ending XX Dec to comply with the FOM. I chose the previous database due to my takeoff time being prior to XX01Z of XX Dec and I carefully scrutinize the SID out of ZZZ based on the new XX Dec Jepp. The Dispatcher explains that our flight planning system will not allow a flight plan based on the new XX Dec load until after XX01Z. I arrive in OMDB and they acted very surprised and not happy that we could not fly the new STARS. We explained that we had called ahead and that fell on deaf ears. They asked if we could proceed direct to at least 4 different fixes and we had to say unable.I understand that we fully complied with the FOM and FARs as did the Dispatcher. This is about safety and a Flight Crew's expectations. I hate surprises in the air. In particular; after a 7 hour 2 man flight where we were vectored 90 degrees then back the other way 180 degrees and burned an extra 4;000 pounds of fuel. If the Dispatcher and Crew know they cannot fly any new arrivals; then the controlling agency should know upon arrival that radar vectors will be required; i.e. no surprises. The FMS database not coinciding with new IAPs works fine in the domestic system; however; not so great internationally. If we know we can't fly a STAR or approach; it is not the safest course of action to put the burden on the Crew to deal with it when they arrive.It would appear that airlines and ATC agencies from around the world have different interpretations/procedures of when to activate a new FMS database. Everyone should be doing the same thing so that crew and ATC expectations are the same. The safety implications of not knowing what to expect are tremendous. FAA; A4A and ICAO level discussions to standardize and enforce one policy worldwide.

Captain had consulted with Dispatch to ensure we were filed correctly; since we were airborne during database and charting changeover. He informed me [Dispatch] had told him we were filed the only way we could be and that he'd contacted UAE to confirm the DESDI arrival would be available at our planned arrival time. Upon entering UAE airspace we were rerouted to B748. B416 airway was removed in the chart change. Since we were operating on the 'old' database we had to tell them we were unable and accepted radar vectors. I believe we operated on the incorrect database for the flight.Flight planning failure. UAE executed the database and charting change at XX30Z. We should have been filed using the XX Dec data. We were informed the flight planning software would not allow Dispatcher to file on the new route for our departure; based on time.

Air carrier flight crew reported that their Dispatcher was unable file the correct arrival for an international destination due to the difference in times when the FMS database and charting updates occur.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

After takeoff; the cabin experienced a fume event. The smell was oil based and strong. The Aft Flight Attendant was experiencing burning eyes and discomfort. The First Officer also complained of discomfort in the eyes. The aft flight attendants also complained of a headache. I instructed the cockpit crew to don oxygen. We first suspected deicing glycol but the nature of the smell was more oil based. We attempted to allow the smell to dissipate after takeoff but the Flight Attendant indicated it was not improving. Upon landing; the flight attendants and both pilots noticed the smell increased. The flight attendants indicated the smell was consistent with nail polish. Both flight attendants had expressed concern and one had asked to return to the field as one was uncomfortable and experiencing physical symptoms and did not feel capable of performing her duties. [Advised ATC] and returned to ZZZZ. EMS personnel boarded the airplane and confirmed concerns of fumes in the cabin but no visible haze or smoke. I; the Captain; was not experiencing any physical symptoms (yet) however I did don oxygen as a precaution. With the condition of our Aft Flight Attendant; we were obligated to get her medical attention and therefore [advised ATC] and returned to ZZZZ.

After departure; the crew had experienced and communicated to each other that there was an odd smell in the cabin/flight deck. Since this was after a de-icing procedure we decided to wait a few minutes to see if the smell would dissipate. I; the Pilot Flying; donned crew oxygen mask due to my complaint of my eyes feeling 'heavy.' As we called the flight attendants to check in; the Aft Flight Attendant was having symptoms of burning/watering eyes. The decision that was made was to [advise ATC] due to the symptoms the Aft Flight Attendant was having. Upon landing; I called the flight attendants to check in. Both said that there was a new smell of 'nail polish' during taxi to the gate. Both Captain and I had recognized the new odor. EMS had escorted us to the gate and boarded the plane. As I spoke to one of the EMS personnel as he approached me in the flight deck; he had complained few minutes into the conversation that his eyes were beginning to burn as well.

ERJ-175 flight crew reported a cabin fumes event that was experienced by two crew members who had physiological symptoms. This resulted in an air return.


Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

During approach; I was in the process of slowing the aircraft down and got the stick shaker briefly.  The air was very turbulent with some wind shear.  As I approached Vref we entered some turbulence that caused the stick shaker to briefly activate.  I immediately took action and continued the flight without further discrepancy.

A CRJ-200 Captain reported a brief stall warning while slowing for an approach in turbulence and wind shear.


Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 19; Flight Crew Total 4191; Flight Crew Type 435

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

We were preparing to depart Runway XX at ZZZ for a VFR flight to ZZZ1. After completing engine run-up; we advised via the CTAF that we were going to hold for the two aircraft that were inbound to Runway XX. The first aircraft was coming in from the north on a straight in approach. The second had been doing touch & go's and was currently on the downwind leg.   Because the first aircraft was on a long final (7+ miles) and was slow; we concluded that by the time he landed; the aircraft on the downwind would already be on the base to final leg so we decided to wait for both to land. The pilot flying announced this on the CTAF.When the second aircraft touched down on the runway and began to accelerate to take off again; (he was doing a touch & go) we announced that we were going to take position on the runway and hold momentarily to create some space as our airplane (Cessna 182) climbs quite a bit faster than the aircraft ahead (a Cessna 172).  Once the Cessna 172 was on the upwind leg; we began our takeoff roll. As soon as we started moving; a tandem seat taildragger flew right over us. He side stepped slightly to the right and began a go-around. He was no more than 10 feet above us with a lateral displacement of 15-20 feet. No radio transmissions were made by that aircraft at any time before; during or after this incident. The taildragger then got fairly close to the Cessna 172 ahead of it on the upwind leg and we observed it make a turn to the crosswind while remaining in the traffic pattern as we climbed out to the south on our way to ZZZ1.In addition to there being no radio calls from the aircraft; it also did not show as a traffic alert (visual or aural) on our ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast) traffic system; which makes me wonder whether that aircraft was equipped with an ADS-B transmitter. As a point of reference; anytime I share the traffic pattern with other ADS-B equipped aircraft (as mandated by regulation within the 30 mile mode C veil); I always get visual and aural alerts to traffic close by.

C-182 pilot reported aircraft had a NMAC with another aircraft during takeoff roll.


Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 30

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Flew VFR on top and encountered engine problems. Started descend under partial power and declared an emergency. Was issued IFR clearance and vectored in to ZZZ for an ILS approach. Engine quit on the rollout. Mechanic found the problem to be a faulty intake valve.

Pilot reports he had encountered engine problems in flight and had to land his Mooney M20F aircraft in emergency conditions. The Lycoming engine quit on rollout. Mechanic found faulty intake valve.


Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

We were holding over SMO at 14;000 FT due to weather at the airport. There was also a thunderstorm near the holding fix which we flew into. I was the non-flying pilot and was task saturated trying to get the weather for our alternate and QRO; so we could decide where to divert. I didn't know the ICAO identifiers to get the weather which made the whole process quite difficult. We decided to go to our alternate. We were given a fix to go to along with the routing and given a climb to FL240; our cruise altitude to our alternate. Neither of us heard the routing. So I called back to question it. I put the first fix in the box but did not but did not execute it because I was unsure of the routing. I told the Captain it was in the box but not executed and pointed to the fix and the dashed line. It appeared that he was on the way in heading select so I went back to getting the weather and routing. I was heads-down. ATC then asked where we were going. I looked up; saw that we were in a right turn level at 15;000. The fix we were cleared to was to our left requiring a left turn. I pointed to the fix on the PFD and told the Captain that's where we need to go; turn left. He said he knew that and needed the weather. I went back to getting the weather after I thought things were being corrected. Then with panic in his voice; ATC questioned us again as to why we were still turning right. He gave us a heading to 270; but we were still in a right turn. I said we are turning right; we need to turn left. The reply was; I know. I said we are turning right go left...no reply; so I took control of the airplane by turning off the autopilot and turning to the 270 heading. The speed-bug was set at 200 KTS and we were not climbing so I spun the bug to 250 and hit N1 for the climb. At this point; we came out of the clouds and I saw another plane off to our right and about 1;000 FT higher. It was never a factor but I'm assuming the cause for the concern on ATC's part. Once we were pointing in the right direction and climbing; the Captain took the airplane back but could not get any of the automation to work. The autopilot wouldn't turn on; the command bars were gone; and none of the automation was working correctly. I could see that the Captain was getting wrapped up in the automation again while hand-flying. I told him to fly the plane and I would figure it out. Once it got figured out; the autopilot was engaged and we proceeded to our alternate for an uneventful landing.There were a couple things that went wrong. First; I was heads-down getting weather when that wasn't important at that moment. Second; there was a breakdown in the automation and situational awareness. Discussing this at length with the Captain; we determined that the first fix was not executed. So the holding pattern was still active. The initial turn to the fix was done via heading select. When LNAV was selected; the plane turned right to recapture the holding track. I didn't see any of that as I was heads down. There was weather; terrain; communication trouble; automation trouble/confusion; and lack of correctly prioritizing tasks. There was a lot going on all at the same time.

While holding at SMO waiting for weather to improve at our destination we decided to divert to our alternate. I was flying the aircraft as Captain. We were cleared out of the holding pattern to a fix then jet route to our alternate. Initially I selected a heading to the cleared fix and the aircraft began to turn in that direction. The new fix was inserted on 1L of the FMC but not executed. LNAV was selected and the plane turned to re-intercept the holding pattern. The autopilot was disconnected and the plane was manually returned to the correct course. No loss of separation occurred and the flight proceeded to our alternate without incident.Maintain better situation awareness especially in high threat airports and confirm the automation is doing what it is supposed to.

A B737-800 Captain failed to turn right on an initial heading to their alternate after exiting holding so the First Officer took control in repose to ATC's concern about the wrong direction toward traffic.