Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance
Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency
Aircraft; Procedure; Company Policy; Chart Or Publication
After an aircraft swap we picked up Aircraft X. At this time the Captain and I were reviewing the MEL items and noticed that the flaps were going to operate at half rate because of a flap issue. We took off and I called for 'flaps up After Takeoff Checklist.' The Captain responded shortly after saying 'After Takeoff Checklist complete;' at which time we both verified that the flaps had retracted knowing that there was an issue with the flaps. While climbing out of FL180 we received a 'Flaps Fail' caution message. We pulled up the full EICAS and verified that the flaps were indeed up; continued our climb; and ran the QRH flap fail procedure. The QRH called for returning the flaps to the previous position; which was 0; and didn't really address the situation. The deadheading Captain verified that they were up. At this point we decided to continue. The QRH never stated 'land at the nearest suitable airport;' the flaps were at 0; and we were well over our max landing weight. We knew the weather was good and that destination has longer runways. Throughout our flight we discussed what actions we would take if the flaps did not extend during our approach. Sure enough the flaps didn't extended; we declared an emergency; ran the QRH again; notified the flight attendants; passengers; Dispatch; and I transferred to controls to the Captain. After the QRH was complete and we were set up for the approach; we commenced the approach and safely landed. We did not require assistance on the 13;000+ foot runway and our brake temperatures were normal.
The aircraft was dispatched with one of the flap skew sensors deferred; resulting in a continuous 'low flap speed' EICAS message. Crew followed MEL procedures and planned to configure early and advise ATC that we would need to slow sooner on approach and farther out than usual. Climbing out of the departure airport well after the takeoff checklist was complete and the EICAS had de-cluttered; we received a 'Flap Fail' EICAS message. After the pilot flying called for the appropriate checklist we realized that to accomplish the QRH procedure we would have to both slow way down below Vfe and descend since we were now in the low FL200s. Flaps and slats were both indicating 0 on the EICAS. We conferred on our options and decided that they were: 1) Descend and slow; run the checklist and if the problem wasn't corrected; burn thousands of pounds of fuel holding and then land at ZZZ. 2) Continue to our filed destination; burning fuel in the process; configure early as required by the MEL; which would allow us to run the QRH procedure for flap failure if the problem wasn't resolved. Additionally; our destination has a longer runway and the weather was forecast to be very nice. Remembering that a deadheading Captain was on board; we asked him to discreetly look out the window and visually confirm that the flaps were up. He reported back that they were; in fact up; which corresponded to the EICAS indication. We decided to continue not only because of the factors indicated above (longer runway; good weather; fuel burn) but also because we thought it likely that the flap failure message would extinguish when we ran the QRH procedure. We considered that it was highly unlikely to lose the remaining and only flap skew sensor since the 'Flap Low Rate' message is very rare; especially considering that one had already failed on the aircraft previously. Furthermore; we hypothesized that; since the failure occurred long after the flaps were retracted; it was not a problem with the SF-ACEs but actually a possible electronic glitch that would resolve itself upon the completion of the QRH. In other words; the flaps weren't in transit at the time of the failure so it was either the other skew sensor failing or an electronic glitch. We also knew that if the flap failure message was generated as a result of the flaps binding on retraction then system logic would allow us to extend them. When we were handed off to Approach we told them of our MEL and that we would need to 'dirty up' and slow down early. After slowing; we ran the Flap Fail QRH and determined that the flaps had failed although we could configure Slats to 3; which we did. We declared an emergency and requested their longest [runway.] We sent our Dispatcher an ACARS and I briefed the flight attendants and passengers. I did not tell the flight attendants to run their 12 steps because I told them that it would be a 'normal; abnormal landing.' I essentially told the passengers the same thing and prepared them that the approach would seem different to them but for us it was something we train for and that I personally had successfully accomplished on two other occasions. I reminded them to follow the directions of the flight attendants and 'any other uniformed crew member;' remembering the deadheading crew. We advised Tower that we would be coming in fast for their planning purposes. Landing was uneventful and we taxied to the gate without assistance. Passengers seemed relieved but completely un traumatized by the event. I leave it to the company; FAA; and the aircraft manufacturer to decide if we should dispatch with one of the two skew sensors deferred since we lose all redundancy for such a critical secondary flight control system like flaps. This was my second flap failure (in the EMB 170) and the flight attendant's third. Consider that even though the stand-by attitude indicator is deferrable; company policy is that we will not dispatch without it being operational. Perhaps we should take the same conservative approach on this system as well. Note: The simulator training we have received was very helpful in this scenario. In fact; the First Officer did the same procedure in the sim one week prior to our event. We were very proficient with what can be a long and convoluted checklist and the training paid dividends in the cockpit.
An EMB-170 EICAS alerted 'FLAP FAIL' while climbing through FL180 with the flaps already retracted so the crew continued to their destination; declared an emergency after the flaps failed to extend and completed a normal; abnormal landing.