Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Human Factors
I was the pilot flying into ROA at night. We were at 6;000 abeam the airport on a left downwind for Runway 6. We were cleared for the visual approach and I asked for 3;000 feet to be set into the FCP (Flight Control Panel). I was aware there was a ridge we would need to cross on our left base turn; charted at 2;000 feet on the RNAV (GPS) Y approach plate. I planned to descend to 3;000 while turning base and turn onto final at HIVLU; charted at 2;700 on the vertical profile of the approach plate. I began a descent at 2;000 FPM just prior to turning base. On the base leg; I believe due to the rate of descent; a GPWS terrain warning occurred. I immediately increased the power; increased pitch; and arrested the descent. The warning stopped. The ridge was visible throughout the event and the aircraft did not descend below 3;000 until past the ridge and beginning a turn to intercept the final approach course. We continued and made a normal landing.Being unfamiliar with this approach I should have communicated my plan to the Captain and asked if he agreed. After landing we discussed the approach and he explained that we could have descended on downwind to 5;200; continued past the ridge; turned base at or just inside DIXXY; and then followed the descent profile on the approach plate. I agree with his assessment; that would have been a better course of action. In the future I will verbalize my intentions; particularly on approaches I am unfamiliar with; and have a discussion to collaboratively determine the best course of action.
Air carrier First Officer reported receiving GPWS alert during approach to land at ROA airport.