Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Troubleshooting
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action
Aircraft; Weather
This was a FFOD flight. While completing the hydraulic test; Hydraulic Pump 3B would not work. While writing this up; cabin boarding commenced. The associated circuit breaker 1A2 remained set in. Because of this problem; along with the emergency lights not working; and in consultation with Maintenance Control; it was determined that the airplane would be deplaned because it was unknown how long the flight would be delayed in getting maintenance personnel to the airplane to resolve the maintenance issues with the aircraft. I left the aircraft; still prior to the original departure time; and notified the ramp agents and gate agents. The passenger gate checked bags were brought back on the cart to the front of the plane so passengers would be able to have their things in the terminal. I made the announcement to the passengers face-to-face via the Flight Attendant's (FA) inter-phone explaining that we would be deplaning due to the aircraft needing maintenance and the time required for them to complete their job to ensure the airplane was safe for flight. It was also due to the hot temperatures making it uncomfortable in the cabin of the aircraft.As the passengers deplaned; there were a number of passengers saying that they would rather be late; but fly in a safe airplane. I kept assuring them their safety is our top priority. A couple expressed discontentment due to the strain placed on their travel plans and possibility missing their connections. I told them I that I apologized for the inconvenience; but that I needed to make sure they were completely safe on our flight and directed them to the gate agent to see what could be done to help them. I did not see anyone making a video or taking pictures with their phone. There were a couple of people talking on the phone.While I was greeting the passengers as they deplaned; the first officer notified me that the R PACK HI TEMP caution message came on and shut the PACK down by itself. This was then written up in the ELB.During the approximately 1 hour and 55 minutes delay; I made several trips into the terminal (about every 15-20 minutes) to make announcements to the passengers providing up-to-date information regarding the time frame of the delay; the status of the maintenance process; and to express sympathy for the inconvenience and disruption to their travel; but that their safety is our first priority.Maintenance came out to the airplane and resolved the hydraulic pump issue and verified the emergency lights had been charged long enough by the APU and the R PACK was deferred.By the time Maintenance had completed their items; several passengers had rebooked to a flight leaving for ZZZ just an hour or two later. Some that were just flying to ZZZ opted to drive instead saying the trip would be quicker. Again; I did not see anyone appearing to be making a scene or social media post; video; or taking photos. There was one man who expressed his displeasure at not making his connection in ZZZ. I expressed my apologies for his inconvenience; but told him that his safety was our top priority.As Maintenance had returned the airplane to service on their part; we elected to board the airplane while waiting for Dispatch to return the airplane to service. I made the announcement in the terminal that the maintenance issues had been resolved; again expressing apologies for the inconvenience; but telling them that their safety is our top priority. At that point; boarding commenced. I called Dispatch and verified that I had the the amended release; with its associated limitations on the cruise altitude. They then returned the airplane to service; which we saw verified in the ELB.After boarding; the flight deck crew and cabin crew complied with all procedures and we pushed out of the gate for taxi. After contacting ATC; we had a 5 minute wait for our flow time at the end of the runway. After waiting; we departed climbing on departure; with me acting as Pilot Flying (PF).As we climbed throughabout 7;000 feet; the L PACK HI TEMP caution message illuminated. A couple seconds later; the PACK fault light illuminated and the cabin depressurized slowly. I told my First Officer that we were going to level off at 9;000 feet; which we did.I verbalized that this was an unanticipated threat and that I was flying the airplane. I stated that there were no QRC procedures or memory items. I then told him that I was going to have him fly the airplane; holding a general orbit over the airport within the confines of the airport. I made the radio call at that point to ATC that we were leveling off at 9;000 feet and would be making turns over the top of the ZZZ1 airport for what I approximated to be about 15 minutes. ATC asked if we were declaring an emergency. I declined declaring an emergency and told him that when I got back with Center; that I would want vectors back for the approach. Center responded with 'roger.'I then proceeded with the QRH abnormal L PACK HI TEMP (Bleed source is engine) procedure. The procedure did not resolve the problem and the caution message remained illuminated. Because I did not have any operative PACKS that negated the ability to transfer the bleeds from the engines to the APU.I contacted Ops on COM 2 and notified them of the problem and that we would be coming back to the airport. They responded and understood. I called the Flight Attendant and notified her of the problem; but that this was not an emergency; just to clean up the cabin and configure for landing. I told her that she had 10 minutes.I then made a PA announcement that we had lost pressure in the cabin and that we would be returning to ZZZ1 after I had completed a couple of procedures. I expressed my apologies of the continued problems and the inconvenience to them.Because of the slow depressurization of the aircraft; the CABIN ALT caution message came on while I was running the L PACK HI TEMP QRH procedure. This was expected and I ran the abnormal QRH procedure for CABIN ALT after finishing the procedure for the L PACK HI TEMP. The CABIN ALT caution message persisted; as expected. My next procedure to run was the abnormal QRH for Unpressurized Flight Procedure (PACKs off). I completed this procedure; confirming the guarded switches with my First Officer. During this entire time; my First Officer had been making CTAF radio position calls. Another airplane had flown up underneath us and was staying 1;000 feet below us. Because of this; the other airplane would get within 800-900 feet below us and kept tripping TCAS traffic alerts. My previous instructions to my First Officer were to orbit the airport; which he was doing. I had to stop the QRH procedures and redirect where to put the airplane to avoid the continued TAs. I changed my instructions to him that he could outline the geographic exterior of the valley to avoid the other airplane. We never heard any radio calls on CTAF from the other airplane of what they were doing or any intentions. These radio calls are not required in the ZZZ1 area.I finished the QRH procedures.I called the passengers again and attempted to assure them that; although we had lost pressure; the airplane was still flying fine and the flight crew was working to get the airplane on the ground safely and we should be on the ground within 10 minutes.I contacted ATC and they told me that unless I could climb higher than 10;000 feet; I would not be able to get vectors. Because the weather visibility was virtually unlimited and there were no clouds; I called the airport insight and cancelled IFR. In hindsight; I should not have canceled IFR; but I was still given traffic advisories from Center until we were clear of the conflicting targets.I directed the FO to fly east over the desert area that had lower terrain obstacles that would allow us to descend to land on Runway XX.I explained to my First Officer that we didn't have cabin pressure and that we would need to plan a slow descent rate.I heard the FA's jumpseat click and I called her to verify that she had been able to complete her duties; which she affirmed. I then made a PA announcement attempting to assure the passengers that the procedures were complete and we would be landing in about 5 or so minutes. I went on to explain that because the airplane was not compensating for the lack of pressure that they would feel the pressure change in their ears.Inside the airplane; it did get very hot. Even with the RAM AIR open; we were not able to cool it off. I did have concern about some of the elderly passengers we had onboard. The ECS page said the cabin temperature was 34 degrees C; but it felt hotter. The QRH procedure talks about keeping the speed up to 250 knots for cabin cooling; but that was not possible due to landing and having to keep the airplane confined in the valley and maneuvering for landing.We landed normally; besides the pressure; and taxied into parking at the terminal. We opened the door; which immediately allowed cooler air into the cabin; and I made another passenger announcement; again expressing apologies for the problems and that they could talk to the gate agent to make further arrangements.I wrote up the L PACK HI TEMP caution message in the ELB; called maintenance control and finished up with them. Operations then wanted to move the airplane to an adjacent FBO to open up gate space for flights expected later. Maintenance Control made a note in their record of the location of the airplane being moved to the FBO and stated that they were fine with the airplane being relocated.As passengers deplaned; they were frustrated with the return of the flight.After everyone was deplaned and safe in the terminal; the plane was pushed back and we repositioned it to the FBO. I called Dispatch and had them close out the ELB; as the program had locked me out from being able to close out myself. Old equipment on a hot day.I cannot entirely control the effectiveness or reliability of an airplane or its systems.
The Captain was flying out of ZZZ1 on the ZZZZZ departure; Runway XX. With the right pack deferred already; we received a left pack hi temp on the right; climbing turn. Upon receiving the caution message; we established a benign flight regime at 200kts; 9;000 feet in a right-hand orbit atop ZZZ1. The Captain then assigned duties amongst the crew per [company guidelines]; specifically I flew the aircraft and the captain ran the appropriate checklists and assumed pilot monitoring duties. Concurrently; we notified ZZZ Center; ZZZ1 OPS and Dispatch of our situation and intentions. While completing checklists we received a traffic advisory from ZZZ Center and TCAS advisory. We were able to visually acquire the other aircraft quickly and adjust our flight path to continue our response to the situation. After completing all required checklists; we notified the FA and passengers about the situation and reengaged with ZZZ Center about our intentions to return into ZZZ1. We conducted a standard descent/approach briefing; set up a left-hand intercept onto the final approach course and established a slow; deliberate descent profile on the approach [Runway] XX into ZZZ1 and landed/taxied to the terminal without incident. The left pack hi temp caution message caused the crew to conduct the actions as described in the narrative.Issues with aircraft cannot be completely avoided; the crew acted and responded to the situation in compliance with our directives and in a safe manner.
Flight Crew reported an air turn back after the left pack failed after takeoff with the right pack on MEL.