Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue
Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Aircraft; Manuals; Chart Or Publication
RFO was PM while FO was in rest. RFO upon returning to cockpit for physiological break; noticed Alert 'LAT FUEL UNBAL'. By the time I looked; alert went away. After RFO was seated; alert returned. We selected fuel on systems display and noted Number 3 fuel tank with excessive fuel; believe approximately 3000 lbs+; relative to tanks Number 1 and 2. Also noted fuel FILL icon on display and switch on overhead panel on. Attempted to stop FILL by way of selecting MANUAL on fuel panel; than pushing Number 3 FILL switch. This had no effect. Reselected auto 2nd auto controller and no change noted in FILL valve position and fuel in Number 3 tank was increasing at a fast pace. Consulted the QRH for LAT FUEL UNBAL and moved Fuel system select switch back to Manual. Proceed to FUEL CROSSFEED DESIRED checklist. Opened Crossfeed for tank 1 turned pumps for tank 1 off. By this time fuel in tanks was approximately Number 1 13;000 lbs; Number 2 12;000 lbs; Number 3 19;000 lbs. While fuel in tank 1 seemed to stabilize; tank Number 2 continued to decrease and the difference to below 10;000 lbs. It appeared all tail tank fuel was being moved to tank Number 3. RFO reported later that he saw fuel in tank Number 3 as high as 20;000 lbs at some point. I discussed with the RFO that I wished to balance tank Number 2 and hope that it would help lower tank Number 3 if we could include tank Number 2 in the crossfeed. He showed concern about turning off fuel pump on tank Number 2 and we reviewed FUEL CROSSFEED DESIRED checklist and concurred that more than one tank could be crossfed according to QRH. We complied with QRH and when selecting tank Number 2 fuel pump off; Number 2 engine shutdown. At this point fuel issues were put aside and we dealt with ENGINE RESTART INFLIGHT. We reestablished that I would fly and deal with ATC while RFO ran checklist. We had been at FL380 and aircraft was unable to maintain altitude; so [advised ATC] and requested with ZZZZ control descent to FL340 which they agreed and shortly thereafter they requested we descend to FL320. RFO advised while reviewing the QRH that the Pratt & Whitney engine need to be at or lower than FL300 to affect an inflight restart. At this point; I directed the RFO to wake the FO and shortly thereafter; he returned to the cockpit. I requested FL280 and ATC approved. After passing FL300; I advised RFO to attempt start if within perimeters and we were; so he restarted Number 2 engine. Multiple alerts after the engine shutdown were dealt with as and when time allowed. After the engine was restarted; I delegated duties so I could call Operations via SELCOM while RFO (still in right seat) could be PF and FO could deal with remaining alerts. After consultation with Operations and Maintenance Control; we all agreed that landing at ZZZZ was both prudent and that no diversion was necessary. By this time we were handed to another control facility and shortly thereafter [advised ATC all was well]. Continued to ZZZZ landed Runway XXL without incident and taxied to gate without assistance. Conditions at ZZZZ with CAVOK as observed with good visibility and light winds.Great assistance from both RFO and FO. Would also add that ATC were very helpful; did not impede or hamper us while workload was high. I was very pleased that all these facilities did not contribute to our problems with unnecessary queries or clearances. Problem with Number 3 fuel tank FILL valve and attempt to balance fuel due to this problem created situation which caused problems leading to engine Number 2 flaming out. In debrief with crew; we went over very carefully events leading up to the failure of engine 2 to remain running. We believe we followed the QRH procedure as published. After engine Number 2 failed; our attention was directed away from the fuel issue and only revisited after engine Number 2 was restarted. At that point; fuel system had been returned to Auto and Number 3 FILL closed and fuel did rebalance. We did note; however; that the FILL on tank Number 3 did come on again for an indeterminate amount of time during the descent phase. One of many nuance faults after the engine shutdown was the failure of Number 2 engine HYD pumps to remain on when system controller was in auto. The pumps worked when HYD SYS elected to MANUAL but would turn off when in auto. I elected to leave sys in auto; accept the pumps off in cruise and expected that when SLATS were extended sys Number 2 would pressurize. It worked as expected. Failure of FILL VALVES in tank Number 3 was not a failure I have practiced nor expected from my training. The inability to control this valve may be an issue worth consulting with the system engineers who built it. Otherwise; this was a failure of the part that I did not have the resources at hand to fix. Regarding the engine shutdown; I wrote up the failure and at this point believe issues with the fuel system management contributed to this problem. Many lessons learned or re learned about managing a nonstandard event during flight. With three pilots on board; I wish I had brought the resting FO into the loop earlier to reduce work load and get further opinion on management of the problems.
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]
MD-11 flight crew reported a lateral fuel imbalance which they troubleshot using the QRH and caused the #2 engine to shut down. They successfully restarted the engine and landed at the destination airport.