Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 450
Situational Awareness
Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors
Departure from TEB on the RUUDY 2 departure with BREZY transition was assigned for an empty ferry flight. My First Officer was to fly the leg. The departure was loaded in the FMS and the flight director was to be used in NAV mode. The pilot flying had set 2;000 FT in the altitude selector. Our airplane uses the Proline21 system. The departure calls for 1;500 FT at WENTZ then 2;000 FT at TASCA (or assigned by ATC). After a normal takeoff I ran the checklist while the SIC was hand flying the airplane following the flight director. 1;500 FT was reached before WENTZ and I realized that he was not leveling of. I called it ('Altitude; go back to 1;500!') but by the time he reversed the trend and descended we had reached 1;800 FT. New York Approach made a friendly (I think) statement: 'for future reference do not climb to 2;000 FT until passing WENTZ.'After our short flight we debriefed what had happened. He was blindly following the flight director and forgot to level of at 1;500 FT even though he knew the altitude restriction. I believe that multiple factors contributed to the event. I have flown many times with this crew member; including that particular departure. Knowing the departure; before the takeoff a preselection of 1;500 FT was a safer approach with VNAV preselected. Even though we briefed the departure; including the altitude restriction; the event took place. This shows that the flying pilot was not fully competent in the automation on this airplane and relies too much on the Flight Director on the departure phase of the flight. We talked about the event and I explained to him that the FMS and flight directors as well as autopilots are tools that we have for more efficient and safer flights but that you need to fully understand their limitations and constantly check that they are doing what they are supposed to do. When approaching an assigned altitude (or course or heading) it should be checked that the flight director (or autopilot) shows a trend of leveling of and if not; immediate action must be taken. I explained to him that the best way to set up the departure is to have the flight director set on NAV and VNAV with 1;500 preselected. Being set on NAV only provides lateral guidance and requires much more attention when approaching the altitude restriction with a greater risk of overshooting the altitude. Even though the FMS points were verified before takeoff with 1;500 at WENTZ the Flight Director cannot be blindly followed. In this case the flight director would have leveled of at 2;000. During my next recurrent training I will mention the event so that maybe they can incorporate this type of automation issue in their training. Also knowing my crewmember and having flown with him before multiple times; including this departure; gave me I guess an overconfidence of his skills and his understanding of the flight director potential issues. He had told me that that he understood the 1;500 restriction and had setup 2;000 has the final altitude on the departure. I should have suggested the 1;500 preselection. Allowing the SIC to fly a leg; should always be treated with extra attention and much more lengthy briefs as they often spend a lot of time observing the Captain from the right seat but spend less hands on flying time.
Hawker 800 Captain describes an altitude deviation during the RUUDY4 departure from TEB; with the First Officer flying. The altitude placed in MCP altitude window was 2;000 FT and the departure was hand flown in NAV only.