Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 45; Flight Crew Total 4953; Flight Crew Type 3200
Situational Awareness
Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
General None Reported / Taken
Human Factors
Cleared for a visual approach at UMP from the east; I announced my intention to land on runway 15. 25 or 30 miles out I was urged by approach to 'keep your speed up; you're number one for landing.' I noted traffic behind me on the TIS (Traffic Information Service)/ADS-B display as well as one aircraft in the pattern; which subsequently disappeared. I announced on CTAF that I was on a six mile right base for 15; then a three mile right base for 15. Only upon turning final did I realize that I had been setting myself up to land on runway 33. Prior to turning final my traffic display announced another aircraft at my six o'clock; same altitude; one mile. This was a ghost warning for my own aircraft. Upon turning final; I received another traffic warning for an aircraft at my twelve o'clock. At that moment I saw the traffic pass overhead 200 feet above me. Winds had been reported on ASOS as 060 at five knots; so I continued landing on runway 33.The hazardous situation was caused by my confusion as to which runway I was planning to land on. This was a thought error and could have been mitigated by double checking in my mind the runway I intended to land on and the pattern I would fly. I find it is easy to confuse a runway and its reciprocal; east and west; and so I need to triple check my thinking when planning an approach and landing. Articulating the plan for landing verbally might have caught the error in thinking; and should be incorporated in my approach briefing. A formal approach briefing should be conducted even for visual approaches. Had I done this; the situation could have been avoided.A second error was failure to fly a standard pattern. Although not required; it is recommended. Had I flown a standard pattern; the hazardous situation could have been avoided.Better see and avoid vigilance might have allowed me to spot the aircraft on takeoff roll. My eyes were not sufficiently out of the cockpit; in part because of the false traffic warning followed by the true traffic warning from the traffic display.I did not hear any calls from the departing aircraft. My switch to the UNICOM frequency occurred late because approach was late in switching me to UNICOM. I could have monitored the UNICOM frequency before being switched to UNICOM for better situational awareness prior to approaching the airport.Approach's request to 'keep your speed up' led me to approach the airport with an unnecessary and inappropriate sense of urgency. This was self-imposed and approach was certainly not asking me to prioritize haste over safety.
BE36 pilot reported a NMAC with another aircraft on a visual approach to UMP when he became disoriented and flew a track to the wrong runway.