Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 350; Flight Crew Total 23000; Flight Crew Type 8132
Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
General None Reported / Taken
Procedure; Human Factors
I have flown into Missoula multiple times this winter. Missoula can be a challenging airport to fly into. On my previous flights I have used the ILS to runway 12 because of the IFR conditions and night arrivals. Today we were expecting a visual to runway 30. The conditions were VFR with high ceilings and excellent visibility. We had the airport in sight about 60 miles out. Because this was the first time that either of us had attempted this approach we did an extensive briefing and set up the FMC for the approach. We flew the VOR-B approach and then transitioned to the visual approach. The FO (First Officer) was flying and configured early hitting all the target speeds and altitudes until we turned about 2 mile final. There was some confusion on that segment of the approach regarding descent technique which resulted in us being approximately 500 feet high. At that point the FO suggested that we go around. We were on speed completely configured with the checklist completed and I thought we could still meet our stabilization criteria so I pushed him to continue. This was my first poor decision. At my urging he increased the descent rate and we got up to 3 sink rates each corrected immediately. By 500 feet I perceived that we had caught our glide path which resulted in a landing in the touchdown zone albeit a little fast. We exited the runway at A4 for a normal taxi to the gate.
We were cleared for the visual approach to runway 30 into MSO. We briefed the VOR B and the visual arrival to 30 in the charts. We briefed thoroughly and had configured on schedule and on speed and fully configured at managed speed at the 6 DME fix. As I turned in and lined up with the runway; I saw that we were high even though I followed the profile and the chart exactly. I was at 6500 feet at the 6 DME fix and started to descend at 1200-1400 fpm as soon as I crossed it. Regardless; the PAPI showed high and I told the Captain I think we should go around. He said we were just slightly high and we can catch the path so just keep coming down. I adjusted my rate of descent accordingly. As we were getting onto the path; we received a sink rate and I adjusted. Then lowered the nose again to stay on the path and the 'sink rate' came on again. I adjusted again. It happened one more time for a total of 3 times while I adjusted and then nosed back over to stay on path. By 500 feet there were no sink rate alerts and I landed in the touchdown zone with minimum floating albeit 10-15 knots fast. I applied full reverse thrust and minimum braking (I got on the brakes ~85 knots) we taxied off at A4.In debriefing at the gate; the Captain and I agreed that we should have just gone around; especially after the sink rate. I suggested the go-around early on and should have pushed for it after the first sink rate call; even though we were getting on the descent path. The problem with this approach into MSO; is that I followed the procedure to a fault. I did exactly 1200-1300 FPM from 6 DME-2.2 DME as called for in the chart and it did not get me to 3900 feet by 2.2 DME. We were on profile the entire approach early on; so to be high all of a sudden was something we thought would be a minor adjustment or a quick fix and it wasn't. It should've been an open descent in the turn until 3900 (we couldn't see the PAPI until lined up at about 2.5 DME.)
Air Carrier flight crew reported continuing an unstabilized approach into MSO even after receiving three 'sink rate' advisories.