Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Total 22000
Time Pressure; Training / Qualification; Workload
Deviation - Speed All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Flight Crew Diverted
Airport; Human Factors; Weather
I am submitting this [report] per recommendation of the FOQA gatekeeper.[During cruise]; the #1 Flight Attendant notified me of an unresponsive passenger; that Flight Attendants had administered O2 and that 2 doctors were evaluating the passenger. I handed the plane the First Officer and asked him to plan a divert. I then spoke with the doctor in charge (an internist) who told me that the passenger was not doing well (minimal pulse and no blood pressure) and that he needed a hospital NOW and we should not continue. I told him it would be at least 20 minutes to land and he said; 'We'll do what we can for him.' I then contacted Dispatch and advised the divert to ZZZ. I asked #1 Flight Attendant for an update (no change). I rejoined the First Officer and we flew RNAV approach; which minimizes air and taxi time. During the first arc (right turn west to north) we had trouble getting the airspeed down [analysis- we had 35 kt. tailwind]. During the second arc (left turn- north to west) while lining up with the runway; I noted a 40 kt. tailwind on the ND [analysis- low level jet off mountain and ridge to east- etiology unknown]; 4 red on the VASI and the plane dropping with a nose rise. I commanded a go-around. The WINDSHEAR WINDSHEAR (RED) aural warning sounded. First Officer did a go-around. Sometime during the go-around; I saw speed on the hook and I saw rapidly accelerating speed; which we recovered from. I coordinated vectors to Runway XX. At about 200 ft. we went high on path and landed slightly longer than GS intercept. (I believe we re-entered the low level jet from the east) and we landed and taxied to the gate.FOQA noted some irregularities during the go-around- indicating a possible procedural breakdown. I saw the hook; saw the increasing speed ( I raised flaps to 1); did not see the overspeed. But frankly; after hearing the wind shear warning; my training and instincts were to not hit the ground- overspeeds were secondary. Upon reflection; I believe we encountered 4 windshears as we transitioned between winds south at 35 and east at 40: Once on final; then one climbing out; then on approach and then again in the roundout flare. This may explain the airspeed variations. This windshear event was not like the scenario we have trained on for my entire career; and therefore somewhat confusing.Throughout I felt rushed by the medical condition but also wary of putting the entire aircraft in jeopardy. There was constant tension with each decision.Under pressure; I could not find contact information on the ipad that was in my trip book in the past. This was a distraction. [Company] training on the A320 is horribly insufficient- not enough repetitions; not enough actual error analysis by instructors; not enough sims; not enough emphasis on auto systems and how they work. I am not the only one who thinks this; in 6 weeks on line; the vast majority of pilots I've interfaced with say the same thing.
A321 Captain reported a wind shear event during a medical diversion that resulted in a go-around.