Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 3200; Flight Crew Type 95
Communication Breakdown; Other / Unknown
Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors
We departed Runway 22 under VFR rules in VMC with the intent of picking up an IFR clearance airborne as authorized by our Ops Specs. Weather was not a factor at all. We made standard position reports on the published UNICOM for taxiing; taking the runway; departing; and direction of departure after becoming airborne and were in communication with the FBO who passed us the current ASOS information and 'no reported traffic' on our taxi call. I estimate we had been monitoring the UNICOM for 7-10 minutes prior to takeoff. After takeoff I climbed straight ahead to around 700-1;000 FT AGL and began a turn to the west towards our next waypoint after the SIC's transmission of our intention to depart in that direction to our next waypoint. At that moment the TCAS gave a 'Traffic; Traffic' alert and our MFD immediately transitioned to a traffic display. I noted a converging target and focused my visual scan on my side of the aircraft while directing the SIC to scan his side. He immediately called out a traffic conflict at our 2 o'clock and slightly higher. I visually acquired a yellow J-3 Cub-like aircraft in apparent cruise at about 1;000-1;500 FT AGL on a southbound heading; noting the aircraft to be stationary in our windscreen. I pushed forward on the yoke to stop our climb and to level off what I considered to be slightly more than 500 FT below the Cub's altitude. Based upon my 3;000+ hours as a fighter pilot I estimate we passed laterally 2-500's in front of the Cub's nose on a perpendicular heading for a total miss distance of around 1;000 FT; though I lost sight of the Cub as we leveled off due to the cockpit ceiling and don't know the precise distance. The Cub took no apparent evasive action. I estimate that had my SIC not seen the Cub and pointed it out to me (and had not taken control of the aircraft as he and I had discussed previously was well within his purview); we would have passed much closer to the Cub and potentially had a mid-air collision. The root cause of this situation was my failure to depart in a standard 45 degree left-hand turn to the south or continue straight ahead to pattern altitude after takeoff from Runway 22. Though I did depart straight out on a 220 heading initially; I should have continued my straight ahead climb while the SIC contacted ATC for our IFR pickup prior to continuing on course instead of turning to the right and west as I did. A contributing factor was the Cub's close proximity to the traffic pattern at a low altitude and his apparent lack of radio communications to/from traffic on the published UNICOM. Potentially the Cub pilot was in a standard upwind leg for Runway 22; but since he wasn't communicating and we lost sight of him I do not know if he was in cruise or entering the pattern. This near mid-air reemphasized the need to follow standard procedures for VFR departures when intending to pick up an IFR clearance. After reviewing the incident mentally; I was surprised the Cub wasn't communicating even though he clearly had a transponder that thankfully tripped our TCAS. Finally; though mistakes were made; the mid-air was avoided through a combination of TCAS and a divided visual scan. Though procedures exist to mitigate this type of occurrence; they do not completely protect pilots and we were fortunate that our systems worked and we were able to visually acquire the conflicting traffic.
King air Captain reports an airborne conflict with J3 Cub after departing VFR from an uncontrolled airport. TCAS provided a timely warning and evasive action was taken. The Cub pilot was without radio or chose not to communicate.