Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
General Flight Cancelled / Delayed
Aircraft; Human Factors
I was assigned to deadhead from to ZZZ to perform an unpressurized flight due to lightning strike on a B767 aircraft. Upon arrival in ZZZ Captain and I were taken to the maintenance operations office at the ZZZ hangar where we were given the AML for Aircraft X. At the same time we observed ZZZ crew who was reviewing the logbook for the same issue for Aircraft Y. Upon further examination and having prior experience with such flights we discovered that the aircraft was not configured for unpressurized flight under the provisions of the MEL. We queried the Aircraft Y crew as to whether they had a similar procedure performed on their aircraft and discovered no unpressurized procedure had been performed on that aircraft either. At approximately the same time we discovered our flight plan had been planned for a cruising altitude of FL400. The crew for Aircraft Y had a flight plan for the same. We contacted dispatch to conference and correct the flight plan and revision 2 of the flight plan was issued for 10;000 feet. We advised the local maintenance personnel that the aircraft needed to be configured for unpressurized flight In Accordance With (IAW) an MEL procedure prior to ferry and contacted Maintenance and advised the same. The crew for Aircraft Y did the same. While local maintenance was deliberating over what to do both crews waited for local maintenance and Dispatch to decide on a procedure to proceed.ZZZ maintenance was reluctant to perform any task and told us to write the aircraft up. We advised them that preparing the aircraft for unpressurized flight was a maintenance responsibility and to confer with Dispatch. The Maintenance and Dispatch per a conversation Captain had agreed the aircraft should be properly configured for unpressurized ferry. In the meantime we broke for lunch and waited on a response. During the same period the crew from Aircraft Y contacted their Chief Pilot and advised them of the current situation and explained to them that (paraphrasing) that they became aware through discussions with us that there may be additional procedures that are required to prepare an aircraft for unpressurized flight that they were not aware and that other line crews assigned to those type of flights may not be aware of. During Her discussion she brought the phone to me to explain in further detail to him what was required prior to flight. I explained that we had performed several of these flights recently and had complied with the MEL on those flights and that per the MEL for adequate smoke removal and cooling such procedure should be performed. He advised me that he was at a Chiefs meeting that there would [be someone to] speak with him for further details. I advised him that [this individual] should be very familiar with the reason for performing such procedure because of our past experience performing such Ferry flights. Several hours later Captain receives a telephone call questioning what the problem was and why we were delayed in performing the ferry. Captain advised that there was a procedure and that the aircraft needed to be properly configured for the aforementioned reasons. [The Captain was told] on the phone that 'you make it so hard'. A little while later [the] Captain received notification to return to base and I was advised by the crew coordinator to ZZZ to perform the same flight the following day with a line First Officer. The crew of Aircraft Y returned to the maintenance hangar to check the status of their aircraft to be told that the aircraft was good 'as is' and essentially to take it 'as is'. During this time I was advised by that [maintenance] had told her that she need not concern herself with our advice concerning the MEL procedure and that (we) were 'renegade or rogue'. Captain had questions concerning the proper dispatch of the aircraft and configuration and eventually timed out for crew duty day reasons. Upon arrival to the hotel I pulled up the next day flying assignments and daily recap. The daily recap acknowledged that the crew were 'waiting for maintenance to comply with MEL for unpressurized ferry'. Upon further investigation of the following day's assignment I discovered that I was not to proceed with the ferry of aircraft X and that a line crew had been assigned to the ferry in my stead. Additionally at approximately the same time a line crew had been assigned to ferry Aircraft Y. It needs to be noted that the GPM Chapter 10 requires the Chief pilot flight test be consulted for the assignment of crews to perform Maintenance Ferry Flight [MFF] and to put in place any special procedures or restrictions. Per procedure that discussion would have to of taken place prior to those crews being assigned. The following morning I saw in [dispatch] the flights had departed for ZZZ1. I researched the FMR's of both aircraft and discovered neither aircraft had any MEL or maintenance provisions applied that would have configured them for pressurized flight. After the aircraft arrived in ZZZ1 local base maintenance personnel advised us that no pre-Ferry BOW had been performed in ZZZ and that additional lightning strike damage had been discovered while undergoing inspection at the base. Additionally in the case of Aircraft Y as it concerns the spotting message; the type of flight crew required was noted as being a 'Supervisory Crew'; but a line crew was assigned. I believe in both instances this to be a serious infraction of the GPM; MEL; and AMM procedures. I also believe this to be a known intentional disregard for procedures and safety on behalf of the Chief Pilot in his assignment of a line crew to ferry Aircraft X and Aircraft Y the following day after codifying the day prior in his recap that the crew previously assigned was awaiting MEL provisions to be complied with.Furthermore; his assigning me to [someone] in ZZZ under the auspices of performing such ferry when the MEL procedures were completed and at the very same time approving a line crew to ferry the very same aircraft is a concerted and deliberate effort to have a unsuspecting line crew move the aircraft without the corporate knowledge from the previous day. I believe this to be intentional because [the Chief Pilot] had a flight test pilot familiar with the procedures (me) in place at ZZZ and had he wanted to make sure the provisions where complied with he would have communicated that to [maintenance] and had me fly the aircraft. Instead; it appears he engaged in 'shopping' for a line crew to 'move the metal' that was not properly configured for the type of flight to be conducted. Furthermore; the appropriate action once a line crew was approved for such flight he should have made sure they were briefed concerning the procedure for correctly configuring the aircraft for unpressurized flight. These procedures are in place to provide for adequate equipment cooling and smoke removal. Knowingly disregarding the procedure places unnecessary risk upon our crews and company assets. It also places our Continuous Authorization to conduct ferry flights in jeopardy. Nefariously approving/assigning line crews to perform an MFF while capitalizing on their lack of familiarity is outside the bounds of acceptable behavior. I firmly believe these issues need to be investigated and appropriate controls immediately put in place to prevent such occurrences from happening again.
B767-300 Captain reported aircraft were being readied for unpressurized ferry flight not in compliance with the MEL and were being crewed by line pilots vice supervisory pilots.