Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Human Factors
At approximately XA30 Pacific Standard Time; an Airbus crew flying to RNO encountered an unstable approach to landing. During this event; the Airbus was occupied by two cockpit jump seaters as well as a full cabin of passengers and cabin crewmembers.At the time of this incident; RNO was arriving traffic to the North and the crew were reassigned the 'Rusme 2' Arrival which provides a terminating fix/approach transition over the 'Spoon' intersection to the KRNO ILS 34L. Winds aloft; during descent and arrival; presented a tailwind scenario for the crew.With little success in slowing and/or configuring the aircraft for a stabilized approach and landing; this flight crew crossed 1;000 feet RA at 181 knots with ONLY Flaps 2 and Gear Down. Further; the aircraft was not on Glideslope and the Pilot Flying attempted to complete S-turns (night ops in a terrain-ridden environment) to induce drag and recover a failed approach.As an observer in the center jump seat; I decided to give the crew the 'benefit of the doubt' regarding the decision to call a Go-Around at and after 1;000 feet RA. Astonished that neither crewmember called a Go-Around despite an insufficient landing configuration AND an approach speed in excess of 50 knots; I stated; 'Guys this doesn't look good; come on; Go-Around' at approximately 800 feet RA.At this point; the First Officer agreed with my assessment; the Captain; however; continued to 'fight-the-approach' until the First Officer stated; 'Go-Around.' At approximately 700 feet RA; the Captain enacted the Go-Around procedure.The Captain was the Pilot Flying. My judgement/opinion suggests that the resulting unstabilized approach was the direct result of (1) the Captain's decision to disregard the recommended '210 knots' speed limitation at 'Spoon' (crossed this fix at 250 knots); (2) the Captain's decision to delay gear extension despite being high on the glideslope and unable to slow due to the prevailing winds aloft; (3) the Captain's decision to stow the speed brakes after establishing 'Flaps 2' (without gear down); and (4) the Captain's and/or First Officer's limited understanding or lack of respect for the 'stabilized approach' criteria. This data/recount is provided to the best of my knowledge despite being almost [a few] days old.
During approach; a cockpit observer suggested to the flight crew that a Go-Around was warranted during to an unstable approach condition. Flight crew executed a Go-Around.