Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Training / Qualification
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
General Work Refused
Airport; Company Policy; Weather; Procedure
On approach to landing I received an ACARS message from the Dispatcher to call when I landed about returning to ZZZ. After landing and parking checklists were complete the crew and I began to turn the aircraft back to ZZZ. I called the Dispatcher. [Dispatcher] said there was going to be issues getting back into ZZZ. Dispatcher said they had 1 TAF from the national weather service that was legal for Dispatch; and 1 TAF from [Company] that was NOT legal for dispatch; and would I be OK with using the legal TAF.The other issue we had is that ZZZ was advertising ILS Runway X approaches. I was a high minimums Captain; and would be needing to go down to CAT 1 Minimums to land in ZZZ. Exemption requires the use of autopilot down to DA/H. The ILS Runway X into ZZZ requires hand flying the approach from the final approach fix. So the issues we had were two fold. 1. Questionable use of a TAF for legal dispatch and 2. We couldn't shoot an approach into ZZZ when we got there. I told [Dispatch] that I was not comfortable departing with this information; and from the tone of voice; I gleaned that Dispatcher agreed with the decision. Dispatcher said I'd need to speak to the Manager on Duty; and told me before I was transferred that there was 1 [Company] mainline high mins Captain holding to see if he could be allowed to shoot the Runway XX ILS into ZZZ--in an effort I felt to give me as much information to justify my decision to the Manager on Duty.When Dispatcher connected me to the Manager on Duty; it went straight to voicemail and then disconnected. While I waited for a call back; I reached out to 2 company check airman; to get their thoughts and feelings about the situation. Both thought that this was HIGHLY irregular and said they felt that I made the right decision in NOT dispatching with the information. After reviewing Op Specs; it states that the national weather service is an approved source OR 'a source approved by the national weather service in accordance with 121.101 b2. Now for the FAA representative on this panel; my interpretation of the intent of the Op Spec is that if the national weather service weather is not available for that destination; then another approved source can be used. I do not believe the FAA intended for [Company] to be able to pick and choose the TAF source to suit our needs on different days of the week from different sources. As I stated on the phone if something were to go wrong with our flight; the FAA would point to the two pilots and say 'you had more conservative weather; why didn't you go with that.'The FAA representative on this panel needs to hold the company to account and advocate changes in either the Ops Specs or in the FOM or both. Picking and choosing TAFs to fit our needs is NOT a SAFE practice; and leads our airman down the primrose path to a situation. I spoke with the Chief Pilot on Duty and subsequently the manager on duty. I felt [Chief Pilot] was disingenuous at best on the phone and I felt pressured to fly. After I had made my decision not to fly; I felt that he was pressuring me by giving arguments to go in order to reverse my decision and get a departure off the ground. He said we could use the alternate TAF because it was newer (not much newer) than the [Company] TAF. I told him I don't think it's legal or prudent to depart for ZZZ when they are advertising Runway X when we can't shoot that approach. [Chief Pilot] then said that this was totally 'normal and standard' and 'that's why we have alternates.' I told him first that this is not normal or standard; that I had spoken with 2 company check airman in the last few minutes who agreed with me that they have NEVER heard of doing something like this; and that I should NOT dispatch. I also told [manager] that; no sir that is NOT why we have alternates. We have alternates so that in the event we arrive our destination and the weather has deteriorated to the point we can't shoot an approach; that we have a plan and fuel to proceed to and land at a new airport safely. We don't dispatch aircraft to airports that we can't shoot an approach to. I pointed to Op Spec C55 which states that you don't get lower weather min credit for CAT II ops unless you are CAT III engine inoperative certified. I pointed to this rule and said that this is the FAAs intent that we can't dispatch to an airport that we can't shoot an approach to. [Chief Pilot] disagreed and pressed on. He said that they would call ATC and see if we could shoot the Runway XX approach. This was absolutely absurd and irresponsible in my opinion. TRACON isn't going to change the entire traffic flow for ZZZ; ZZZ1 and ZZZ2 just so 1 aircraft can land that hasn't even dispatched yet. I asked him on the phone if he had confirmation from the FAA that we would be allowed to shoot Runway XX; he only pointed to the previously mentioned [company] mainline flight which a high mins Captain that the Dispatcher had referenced. For the FAA to consider; I have no idea what that flights situation was. They could have been holding for extended periods; they could have gone missed and been min fuel or emergency fuel; etc. I have no idea why or if in fact they are going to shoot a Runway XX approach. I can't base the decision to dispatch my aircraft on unknown rumor and innuendo from things that [Chief Pilot] 'heard.' [Chief Pilot] has been an Assistant Chief Pilot for years; he knew exactly what he was doing to smooth talk on the phone to get a new Captain on high mins to change their mind and dispatch. This was at best irresponsible. Finally; new weather TAF came out with improved ceilings AND most importantly; ZZZ started to advertise Runway XX approach. ONLY with this new information in hand did I make the decision to dispatch for ZZZ. I want the FAA member to recognize that these were not actions of a safety conscious airline to conduct business by picking and choosing which TAF source suits us for that particular day; and to pressure ANY Captain especially a new Captain to dispatch to an airport that they can't shoot an approach for! I'm just shocked that this happened. As a follow up; while flying this week; I ran into a senior Standards Check Airman known as one of 'the elites' I told him how the company tried to pick and choose which TAF source to use and the Runway X issue at ZZZ. He confirmed it was a good decision of mine NOT to dispatch and that I took appropriate action. Also a pilot here who used to be a dispatcher said that often times dispatchers will use the alternate TAF sources on releases and the pilots here don't even notice this practice. If weather is coming from an alternate source; it should state clearly on the release either in the TAF language or in the remarks. Recommendation1. The FAA rep needs to either amend Op Spec and or the FOM to state that picking and choosing TAFs is not approved or allowed. FAA needs to amend Op Spec and or the FOM to state WHICH weather sources are approved. the language of Op Spec is so overly broad and I feel that the company and the ACP / MOD Lombardo took advantage of the vagueness of language to pressure departure. Op Spec's intent is that IF the national weather service doesn't have a TAF for a destination that we can then reach out to another source. I.e. we fly to fort de France the national weather service doesn't put out a TAF for this destination; so we can reach out to American Airlines or purchase a TAF. Its intent isn't to willy nilly pick which one is most convenient. The ERC and FAA need to insist that if we have multiple TAFs that we should be REQUIRED to use the more conservative TAF. 2. The FAA needs to amend rules that we cannot and should not dispatch to airports that we can't shoot approaches to. 3. The MOD / ACP needs to be spoken to that this is not acceptable. Having an 'operational discussion' is a thinly veiled excuse for pressuring a captain to fly. 4. The FAAalso needs to institute a policy that once a PIC has made a NO GO decision with the Dispatcher; that should be the end of the conversation. The Manager on Duty should not have an 'operational discussion' with the PIC; because that's been used as a veiled attempt to pressure the pilot to fly. Our PICs are fully capable in conjunction with dispatch to make that decision; and it should stand.I flew with a pilot within a few days of this incident who said that this same [Chief Pilot] pressured him to fly previously as well. It's clearly a pattern; it's clearly out of bounds; and it needs to stop. I would have thought that this would be common sense; but apparently it's not; and we need language to protect this from happening again. I'm very disappointed that I even have to write a [report] on this issue in the first place.
Air carrier Captain reported being excessively pressured to dispatch a flight to an airport that was below legal weather minimums.