Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 24
Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic
Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure
MSP/M98/ZMP OS (Operations Supervisor); OM (Operations Manager) and TMU (Traffic Management Unit) personnel made the decision to be on a 12/17 configuration after the weather briefing (light surface winds and winds aloft were out of the northwest from 20-28kt). Right at the beginning of the arrival bank; the TMU personnel said we were going to switch to 30/17 (wind 210/10) and that the Tower was done departing Runway 12's and would only be straight out off of Runway 17 with departure traffic. At the time there was a TMU; OM and 2 OS in the room with only one feeder position open and 2 finals. Someone came in to give me a break as I had been at another position for an hour prior to splitting approach and I suggested that another feeder be open or an [Assist] for coordination with the runway change as we had way too many aircraft in our airspace at the time with 4 gates full of traffic inbound. ZMP was calling on the line from every gate as we were unable to take hand offs due to the number of aircraft already in our airspace and the complexity that this created for the entire room. TMU and/or the OS/OM had not coordinated with ZMP to slow the traffic down or spin aircraft due to the runway change. The Tower departed a [carrier] on 12L straight out into the 30's ACDA (Advanced Continuous Descent Approach) after we were told over 10 minutes prior that there were no more 12's departures. At that point; the north Approach Controller asked for the departures to be stopped but none of the management personnel or TMU did anything so I called up and stopped all departures to alleviate some of the complexity that was escalating without help from management or TMU. The situation that was unnecessarily created by the TMU/OS/OM making the decisions and therefore created a safety event/concern for the Controllers; especially those at M98 and ZMP.The SOP/LOA regarding runway changes needs to be followed and the TMU/OS/OM personnel need to make better decisions in regards to choosing runways and the timing of runway changes if it is not imminent. These same individuals need to be held accountable and if they are going to put everyone in this position; they also need to assist with the coordination and communication instead of putting it all on the controllers.
M98 TRACON Controller reported Management creating a configuration change that unnecessarily increased Approach and Center's workload.