Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Situational Awareness; Workload
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
General None Reported / Taken
Human Factors
The First Officer was Pilot Flying (PF) and Captain was Pilot Monitoring (PM). We had briefed the RNAV GPS 15 backed up by the visual approach to runway 15 at BDL. There is no ILS to runway 15. Per the PF's request; we had slowed to 180 knots with the flaps set to CONFIG 2 prior to turning inbound to final. During the (early) turn to final; I realized we were high (PAPIs) and suggested we extend the landing gear to help us descend. The PM disconnected the autopilot and initially set a vertical speed that triggered a momentary GPWS. We were visual with the runway and I set the vertical speed to 1600 feet per minute (down) to give him a proper target pitch attitude. The [Flight Computer] PROG page indicated a vertical deviation of +450 feet (above computed glide path) so I thought we would be able to correct back to path and stabilize for a visual approach. We selected final flaps but were still 25 knots fast at 1000 feet. We were very busy slowing to reference speed and I suggested 'go around if you're not comfortable.' In retrospect; I should have said 'Go-Around.' By 500 feet we were 10 knots above target. We were on the PAPI (two reds and two whites) so I said to continue as I was comfortable we would touch down in the prescribed landing zone. I did not; however; confirm the engines were spooled up for a go-around. We touched down in the required landing zone and proceeded to the gate.I have read about past events and wondered how this could happen to anybody. Here is how it happened to us. We were cleared to a short visual approach and rushed to go down and slow down. Having the field in sight leads one into believing a (steep) approach can be salvaged by 500 feet as long as the speed can be slowed to within limits while properly configured. Despite being within speed criteria at 500 feet; the engines do not have time to spool up in the event of a go-around. The thrust levers in the A320 remain in the Climb detent until retarding the power during landing. The engine gauges must be consulted; which regretfully; we did not do.Proper altitude management with respect to three-to-one calculations would help to get ahead of a pending steep and ultimately unstable approach.A Go-Around at 2000 feet is a far better decision than rushing to descend; configure and slow to be stable at 500 feet. Even if you make the speed; you can't possibly be spooled up properly for a go-around. As a new Captain; this was my first experience with a 'slam dunk' sort of approach. It is very easy to critique myself after the event. A Go-Around is a 'no fault' event. We were carrying 7200 pounds of ferry fuel in addition to our reserves and planned landing fuel. The weather was 'clear and a million;' and there was only one other aircraft behind us in the traffic pattern. Why NOT go-around? I can only say I now know the symptoms leading to this sort of event:1.Beautiful VFR day2.Visual Approach3.Short turn inbound to final4.Not being directive when obviously rushed 5.Continuing below 1000 feet to stabilize (legal but not smart in this situation).6.Last minute 'coaching' from the PM seatThe most important lesson learned was to be directive in a situation like this. Take all confusion out of the equation by simply saying 'Go-Around' like we do in the simulator. Despite our training; it is very easy to try and save a situation like this; particularly in such clear weather with the field in sight the whole time. Events occur in rapid succession; and a poor outcome is the likely result.
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A320 flight crew reported continuing with an unstable approach to landing contrary to SOP.