Communication Breakdown
Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors
After we had landed for a scheduled fuel stop. I was told to get off of the plane to ask the handler on the process for the Duty Free receipts for passengers and myself and the Flight Attendant (FA). It was determined that the handler per the customs agent only required the completed Duty Free forms and receipts. I went back to the back to use the restroom; while the passengers were providing the handler with their completed forms; and the majority of the passengers (except the lead and his wife) wanted to get off the plane to stretch their legs and use the restroom. When I came back up front; the Captain advised me he had ordered the fuel; and I was advised to watch this carefully when the truck showed up so I did once the fuel truck arrived. In addition; he went into the FBO; but before I was given a piece of paper at this time from the Captain that had instructions on contacting Clearance that included the following: 'contact 121.7 when 45 mins prior to ETD' at the same time I was also told to watch the fuel. The Captain had written XA:30 for the departure; but we had just landed at XA:03; and when I looked at the time when he walked away from me; I noticed that it was already XA:20. I still had to get the plane ready for departure; obtain the Oceanic Clearance; and watch the fuel. So; I Immediately contacted Oceanic.I contacted Oceanic Clearance and after confusion with the estimated departure time as given of XA:30 by the Captain (CA) Pilot Flying (PF); it was determined that the new estimated time would be XA:40 and I was to wait on the frequency for an amended clearance. The PF then showed up at XA:25 and wanted to know if I obtained the clearance. I replied 'no'; because I was told to standby for a re-route. I was watching the fuel at this time while still listening for Oceanic to call me back. The PF then told me to enter the flight plan as originally filed; and he took over watching the fuel. I advised the Captain that according to the FMS; if we took all of the fuel that he requested that we would be overweight for takeoff and Taxi. We then had a short discussion about this and the issue involved the weight of the cargo was higher than estimated on the flight plan. (Note: takeoff weight was 74;600 per the FMS). I was then told to enter the original route into the flight plan that we currently had even though I was still waiting for Oceanic to contact me with the re-route. The Captain watched me enter each fix from our original flight plan. We then closed up; and I was still waiting on the frequency for Oceanic to call me back since they had last told me to standby earlier. I was then told to call Oceanic again and ask them if we could start engines. I did; but no answer. I was then directed to call the Tower to ask them. I complied; but the Tower asked us if we had the clearance and I replied no. We were advised by the Tower that he had our clearance and he said he would call Oceanic to see if he could give us our clearance. The Tower then came back and told us we could start engines; but that Oceanic had to give me our clearance. It was then decided that the CA would start engines and run the checklist because we were getting close to the XA:40 time constraint while I attempted to speak to Oceanic. CA started the engines; but I do not know if he completed the checklist. I advised the CA that I still did not have the clearance; when I was told to obtain the taxi clearance. I complied and read back taxi clearance; when I heard Oceanic call me. I then went back heads down to obtain the amended clearance from Oceanic as CA taxi[ed] to the Runway. At this point; we were almost to the end of the Runway. I was ordered to just put the first point of the clearance into the FMS by the Captain from the reroute by Oceanic. I then said that we had a departure so I confirmed with the Tower if we should still expect the departure before I placed the first point into the FMS as directed. The Tower said yes. The Tower thensaid if I wanted that I could read back the clearance to the Tower to ensure it was the same thing he had. So I did; and we both had the same re-route. At this point; we are now holding short and I was advised by the CA to tell the Tower we were ready for departure. I replied to the CA that I had not even looked at the departure yet nor had we run any checklist. The CA replied he had looked at the departure and I was told to run whatever checklist I felt necessary; but we had to get airborne. I was then stopped and told again to tell Tower we are ready. I made three attempts at least to express that we were not ready because of checklist and the departure briefing; but I was ignored and ordered to tell ATC that we were ready. The CA said again that he looked at the departure. I asked him what page was he on so I could pull it up quickly and he said he did not know. I pulled it up quickly on my iPad myself; then took a glance at my Nav Display; and completed the checklist as best as I could as we began the takeoff roll. Once airborne; the Captain immediately started shouting that the departure was incorrect. The Captain kept saying we need to turn left; but the FMS was showing a right turn. I kept saying do not turn left and to follow the departure. He kept saying this isn't right and he turned the auto throttles off. We were getting slow; when he kept saying he was going to turn left; and I said stay on the departure AND DO NOT TURN LEFT. He then selected direct to ERABI in the FMS as we were still in heading mode on runway heading whereby deleting BIVES and DISUR off of the departure. At some point; I said we need to turn right and go to ERABI. We were given a higher altitude and at some point while level at 6;000 feet; we managed to get an over speed warning indication because we were now at 340 kts and 6;000 feet. We continued airborne. Once at cruise; the CA obtained the Oceanic clearance from me and the weather to input on his master sheet. I then asked him when he was all caught up with everything that I wanted to talk about what had just happened. About 20 minutes had gone by and we than started to discuss the issues that had just happened and what had happened earlier while flying the approach into Shannon. It was determined at cruise that the CA was looking at the incorrect departure on his iPad. He was looking at the departure off of [a different] runway; and he never compared his plate with the FMS. Even though he told me at least three times that he had looked at this as he is taxing onto the runway. I never [saw] him compare the FMS with his departure plate. Unless I'm asking him to verify something with me. I had also not had the opportunity to do so either because I was task saturated with many different tasks; or my request for a brief or to look at the departure was ignored. I also brought up the fact that the CA either disregards what I say; ignores me; and/or will not answer me when I make a point or ask a question. It's to the point that I am so used to this behavior that I do not really know if he is hearing me or simply ignoring me. He replied that he is going to ignore me if he thinks that what I'm saying or asking is stupid; or if he thinks I should know the answer already. I told him that this is really bad CRM. He acknowledged and seemed to understand my point. I also brought up that I tried over and over to get him to slow down and stop so we could accomplish our tasks; but he's like a bulldozer rolling all over me and not stopping. So; I asked him what I need to do the next time to make him listen to me. He advised me to maybe just remind him that he's focusing on time constraints and point to my watch; and say 'we don't want [a previous incident] to happen again'. He apologized to me and said he really made a huge mistake and he was glad that I would not let him turn left like he was insisting on doing so. We then talked about the over speed issue and I asked him what he was going to do. Hesaid he did not know. I told him that he should at least talk to maintenance and tell him what happened because we busted a limitation on the plane; and he told me he would.Both pilots should be on the same page. Fixating on time and not following SOPs should never happen. If time is going to be an issue; take and accept the delay in order to accomplish appropriate checklist; follow SOP's; brief; and review the FMS. Recommend CRM classes and review the dangers to hazardous attitudes. Emphasis this should be a team effort and both CA and First Officer can learn from each other. The behavior of outwardly ignoring the other pilot; and disregarding any input is very serious. In regards to the over speed issue. I do not believe that anyone was ever told that the plane was actually in an over speed condition. Emphasis should be placed that maintenance should be notified when a limitation has been exceeded to determine if an inspection is required by maintenance before another flight is taken. I shared my point that the lack or refusal to acknowledge or respond on his part in not allowing for proper CRM to take place. This lack of CRM is causing issues because it is getting to the point that I am ALWAYS being ignored and I do not know if the PF is hearing &/or understanding important things that I am saying or suggesting. I again stressed that this is really bad behavior; and is causing a breakdown of practicing good CRM & in my opinion poor Aeronautical Decision-Making.
G-IV First Officer reported poor CRM procedures from the Captain that resulted in possible track deviation.