Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Situational Awareness
ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert
Airspace Structure; Procedure
Woodside sector requested release on Aircraft X from San Carlos; vectors V334 SAC VOR. I released the aircraft and asked them to climb the aircraft to 4;000 FT prior to handoff. They agreed. When the aircraft checked in heading 080; I turned it to heading 090 to join V334 north of SJC. RHV Tower called and requested release on Aircraft Y; SR22/G; RHV SJC SNS V111. After coordination with Licke Sector; I released the aircraft. When Aircraft Y checked in; I RADAR identified it; pointed it out to SJC; and initiated a handoff to Licke Sector. I asked Aircraft Y if he could maintain his own terrain/obstruction clearance on a heading of 090. The pilot said affirmative; so I told him to maintain his own terrain/obstruction clearance; turn right heading 090; climb and maintain 5;000 FT. The pilot read it back. A moment later I noticed that Aircraft Y was turning left instead of right. I transmitted to him; but did not get a reply. I transmitted a radio check again; and he answered. I then instructed him to turn right immediately to a heading of 090 for traffic inbound from the South. He apologized for making the wrong turn and complied. I scanned back to Aircraft X and saw he was turning to join V334; and saw his altitude at 4;100 FT; while in the 4;100 FT MVA. I assumed that I had already issued altitude 5;000 FT to him and shipped him to the Mulford/Grove Sector. He checked in at 4;000 FT with Mulford/Grove; and they climbed him to 5;000 FT. I recommend that detailed departure procedures (SIDs) are established for departures off of San Carlos; Palo Alto; and Reid-Hill View Airports to ensure that complex airspace and higher MVA's are less of an issue. Standard procedures off SQL and PAO have departures routed to V334 climbing to 3;000 FT; although the aircraft's flight takes them into a 4;100 FT MVA. The complexity of the airspace surrounding these airports really puts the controller and pilots at risk because there is very little 'wiggle' room to which a controller has to climb and vector the aircraft. Procedures should be set up so that pilots can climb on protected routes and remain within the confines of the tight airspace in that vicinity. The 4;100 FT MVA used to be 4;000 FT until about a year or two ago. The raising of the MVA to 4;100 FT really put us at risk with little time to react.
NCT Controller described a possible MVA infraction involving a SQL departure routed via V334. The reporter noted recent MVA increases and limited airspace make this routing difficult to handle and suggests formalized SIDs to ease workload.