Flight Crew Last 90 Days 97; Flight Crew Total 5500; Flight Crew Type 1814
Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion
Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control
Weather; Human Factors; Aircraft
[We were] on final airspeed 170 KTS minimum directed by ATC. On the glide slope selected flaps 15; aircraft accelerated to 180 KTS outside of FAF. Near the FAF dropped gear and flaps 20 and selected Vref+20. Aircraft was slow to reduce airspeed; still not at Flap 30 speed at about 1;200 FT AGL. Captain stated 'We're fast and may need to go around.' Approaching 1;000 FT I said we are going around. Pressed Go-Around switches called for flaps 20 (already there). Aircraft began to execute the maneuver with the autopilot on. I felt the pitch rate was 'too aggressive' and forced the yoke forward. Airspeed increased rapidly; I called for flaps 1 and then flaps up; and we got to flaps 1. Throttles moved forward I pulled them back then put both hands back on the yoke; keeping the aircraft from pitching up. Throttles then move toward full throttle and the Captain pulled them back and shortly took the controls. [We] climbed to 3;000 FT turned downwind as directed and shot the ILS again with no further problems.On downwind the Tower reported a 30 KT tailwind at 1;000 FT. In hindsight the aircraft responded as designed. When I limited the pitch up by overriding the yoke; the TMC added more power to get the 2;000 FPM programmed into the Go-Around. This caused rapid acceleration and I developed PIO (Pilot Involved Oscillation) fighting the automation. I should have allowed the Go-Around function to work as advertised; knowing there was going to be the initial pitch; and monitored. Then if a problem developed; remove all the automation and fly the plane. I became so focused on stopping the aggressive pitch up that I focused solely on that lost SA (Situational Awareness) and did not diagnose the true problem. The event was caused by my reaction to the 'feeling' of the aircraft pitching up in the Go-Around. Training with an emphasis on the Go-Around so the initial pitch up is expected. We do multiple go-arounds each year in the simulator but I did not expect the large pitch up at altitude. Possibly institute a 'Discontinued Approach' procedure to be used at altitude.
I was sitting in the jumpseat behind the First Officer. I fell asleep soon after takeoff. I awoke just prior to this event. We were flying the ILS and the Captain said 'this isn't gonna work; we need to go around.' The Captain selected flaps 20; and the power increased. The aircraft pitched up. The crew became very busy at this point. Neither audio speaker was on; so I could not hear radio transmissions. Also; the crew was operating with both packs on; hence the cockpit was unusually loud. This made it difficult to discern exactly what was going on. Just a few seconds after the initial pitch up; while still on runway heading; the nose of the aircraft dropped and we began to sink. Our altitude was probably around 2;000 FT. The Captain said something like 'we need to climb' and the First Officer arrested the sink rate and began a shallow climb. About this time we were given a turn to the west. The Captain appeared busy talking to ATC as well as working the mode control panel; as I think the autopilot was turned off at this point. During the turn to the west; the nose of the aircraft again fell low. I looked at the Captain's flight instruments; and the altitude was somewhere around 1;500 MSL; the airspeed was close to 300 KTS; and we were descending fast. I was just about to say 'watch your sink' or 'pull up' or something to that effect; when the Captain said 'I have it' and he took control of the aircraft. He immediately began climbing. The Captain then flew the aircraft around and we landed.
A B757 First Officer and two jump seaters describe an unstabilized approach and a missed approach that goes awry. Pitch and airspeed are poorly managed and the Captain eventually assumes control.