Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors
First Officer was flying; I was pilot monitoring.  We were flying the arrival; and were given the ILS approach.  Weather conditions were 1;200 overcast and 8 miles visibility.  As we were on the arrival; I noticed that there was little to no traffic ahead of us; and we had about a 15-20 knot tailwind throughout our descent.  So; our arrival and approach clearance were fairly quick and efficient; and we received no speed restrictions or delays.  Our altitude was about 5;000 FT and we were intercepting the localizer when we were cleared for the approach.  At this point we were at 250 KTS and clean.  We intercepted the glideslope and I remarked to the First Officer that we needed to level off a little; and slow down so that we could configure for the approach in time to be stable.  He concurred and disconnected the autopilot so that he could level off.  As our speed slowed we began deploying flaps and landing gear in accordance with the speed limitations.  I noticed that we were about 4;000 FT and about a dot and a half high on the glideslope.  I was concerned that we were going to be high and fast and I began coaching the First Officer that we really needed to slow down.  As we came through flaps 30 and flaps 45; I did not realize that our descent had markedly increased.  I was entirely focused on slowing down and making sure the aircraft was configured by 1;000 feet per the stable approach concept.  The First Officer was still hand flying at this point; and I noticed that we were now a dot and half low on the glideslope.  We were fully configured and our speed was quickly approaching our ref plus 5 target.  Our altitude at this point was 1;800 FT.  I said; 'Whoa we're low.  Level off and get back on the glideslope.'  The First Officer complied and we leveled off and began a slight climb back onto the glideslope.  As the glideslope was coming back to us; Tower queried us and said he received a low altitude alert.  I responded that we were back on the glideslope and he replied that it was fairly brief; and by the time he got done telling us about the alert it had extinguished.  The First Officer re-engaged the autopilot and flew a normal approach from this point on; and we made a normal landing within the touchdown zone and taxied to the gate. Earlier on the trip the First Officer had told me that he was new to the 700/900; as he had just transitioned from the 200.  Therefore he was not as familiar with the 900 as I am; particularly with the difficulty involved in descending and slowing down quickly.  There was also not very much traffic in the area.  The First Officer remarked to me that he expected to be slowed down by Approach Control and vectored around before commencing the approach; so perhaps he felt like he had more time than we actually did.  During times of low traffic; Approach tends to let you fly the approach and arrival at speeds of our discretion.  Other threats would be the tailwind during the arrival; which gave us even less time to descend and slow down.  The IFR weather is another threat; this approach would have been much easier if it had been a visual approach and we could easily see what was happening.  We made a few errors during the event.  First; we came in too high and too fast.  We intercepted the approach on glideslope at 250 knots and clean; which made slowing down a difficult task.  We compounded this error by descending too rapidly while we were slowing down and configuring.  I failed to monitor our descent in relation to the glideslope.  I continually had in my mind that we were 'too high too fast;' when in reality we were getting too low.  Another error I made was not actively taking control of the aircraft when I realized our approach was becoming unstable.  I should have either commanded the First Officer to execute a missed approach or taken the controls and executed a missed approach myself.  I attribute those errors to poor judgment on my part.  I need to learn to take a more active role and better communicate to my first officers how I want the aircraft to be flown.  This should have happened much sooner; while we were on the arrival.  I realized that we had a tailwind; very light traffic; and a relatively short transition from arrival to approach.  I need to learn to better communicate situational awareness factors to my first officer; particularly when they are less familiar and less experienced than I am.   I also need to learn to do a better job deciding to go-around in cases of an unstable approach; rather than trying to 'make it work.'  I would suspect that this is a problem that a lot of pilots face:  trying to salvage an unstable approach rather than abandoning the approach and trying again.  This experience greatly impressed upon me the need to execute a missed approach when the time comes; as I failed to do so in this situation.
CRJ-900 Captain describes an unstabilized approach flown by the First Officer who is new to the 900. The Captain laments his late involvement in coaching the First Officer who is initially high and fast then low during the approach; resulting in a low altitude alert from the Tower.