Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine
Training / Qualification
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem
Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
I was conducting a Part 135.293 flight evaluation. The flight had progressed smoothly for approximately 2 hours and we had already flown all required maneuvers as well as two instrument approaches. We were just about finished with the practice approach for the VOR-A circle to land. We had descended to our circling minimums of 980 ft. as we began the circle to the east for a right downwind. [We were] visual at this point at about 100 kts. and flaps set to 'Approach' when he initiated his base-to-final turn. It was evident that he was going to overshoot the runway and I asked him what he thought to which he did not immediately verbally answer but in turn steepened the bank to try and make it. It was at this point that I announced 'Go-Around' and [Pilot Flying] aggressively pushed the power lever forward without immediately pulling the airplane out of its descending turn. It became evident that I had to take controls and as I was pulling back on the yoke and leveling the aircraft the power had already risen to 2615 torque which I immediately and aggressively pulled back to compensate. We completed the positive exchange of controls as we were climbing out to the west of the tower up to the pattern altitude of about 1500 ft. Keep in mind; all of this happened in a mere 2-3 second time period between us both realizing the unstable turn and the go-around maneuver. Upon re-establishing the aircraft and configuring it for the next approach; the yellow 'ETM EXCEED' annunciation popped up in the panel. I knew that the annunciator had something to do with the engine briefly being outside of its rated limits; but my training and experience has taught me that if the engine is in fact in an over torqued state; a red 'TORQUE EXCEED' annunciator comes on and immediate landing is required. With it only being the 'ETM EXCEED' light being Engine Trend Monitor light; I conducted the rest of the flight as usual. We re-flew the circle to land maneuver; which he excelled at on the second try and went about the rest of the Check Ride (touch and go's and one final practice ILS). As the Pilot Monitoring (PM) and Check Airman; it was my duty and responsibility to keep an eye on all factors going on at all times. It was a VMC day with a lot of traffic (two other aircraft in the pattern); I was monitoring the airspeed and aircraft attitude; the very actions and explanations and engine instruments along with an electrical issue that maintenance had made me aware of prior that day. My work load was extremely high that morning; but I noticed the addition of too much power within mere fractions of a second and the torque gauge had not stabilized to a specific setting yet when I already reacted to counter the situation. The First Officer training consists of one week theory training in a classroom setting and one three hour flight which may be extended to another three hour flight if training records indicate. The pilot was explained to me as a good pilot whom did well during his training in both ground class as well as inflight. Up to the incident; nothing that pilot did indicated to me that there was a major discrepancy on theoretical knowledge of the procedures and the only shortcoming was the lack of time spent in aircraft. His flight training was conducted in one of our Legacy 208B aircraft and the check ride was conducted in the newer and glass panel avionics suite-equipped EX aircraft which has drastically different gauges and system knowledge requirements. The pilot had never flown such an aircraft before and there was some general coaching going on about the various digital indications and procedures and I did tell him during the first take off briefing that the digital torque gauge in the EX display panel has a major and very noticeable lag to it and he should set the takeoff power using the analog torque gauge which sits low and very out of sight on the instrument panel of the aircraft. However; pilot had already successfully flown two previous missed approaches with proper torque setting and call outs for the takeoff power to be set by the pilot monitoring. He had also recovered from two different stall maneuvers earlier in the evaluation; both with no major deficiencies. He acted as a professional and knowledgeable pilot up until the incident where he panicked and rushed the power forward more so than he should have. My reaction was to take control of the aircraft and correct the excessive torque setting back to a more appropriate setting for the flight condition at hand. [I suggest to] add more thorough training on take-off procedures and go-around procedures. Especially on the roles of Pilot Flying as well as Pilot Monitoring. Many new hire applicants for the First Officer role have no experience with this and it is in their old habit to do all of the power changes and flap setting adjustments. It is crucial that they do not ever just jam the power lever full forward without asking for the proper take off power to be set.
C208 check pilot reported the pilot flying over-torqued turbine engine on a go-around maneuver.