Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Airport; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Equipment / Tooling
A visual; Flaps 25 approach to Runway 28R at SFO was briefed and due to NOTAMs; we were planning on using the 2.9 GP for 28R in our Pegasus FMS and VNAV Path for [glide] slope guidance. On approach to SFO; due to traffic below; SFO ATC held us high and then due to a medical emergency behind us; they kept us fast. We accepted the FMS Bridge Visual to 28R; but ATC insisted we maintain higher than normal speeds throughout the approach. The sun was directly in our faces in the descent (landing was at 1932L) and that was a slight distraction. With the glare; I found myself spending more time looking inside at the instruments. In addition; the GS and PAPIs for both 28R and 28L were inoperative.As the pilot flying; I twice insisted on a slower speed from ATC and also used full speed brakes and early gear extension to manage the approach. We were correctly set up to use VNAV Path in the end game. I configured to Flaps 25 around 1;500 feet AGL and captured the VNAV path very soon after. I reduced our sink rate quite a bit and added power to stay on the VNAV path and followed the flight director that was commanding about a 600 FPM descent. Almost immediately; I observed the runway picture and asked the F/O if he thought we looked high and he agreed that we did. I increased the sink rate for a short while and we set up vertical speed 800 down as a better reference (better than the inexplicably high and incorrect VNAV path.) I was configured and on speed prior to 1;000 AFL and stabilized the sink rate shortly thereafter. But then; I made one more assessment that we still looked high and I did one more increase in sink rate prior to landing. I started to pull back before the EGPWS warned 'sink rate' and we settled into a stable path immediately after the EGPWS said 'sink rate.' Both of us were totally eyes out assessing the runway and our visual path with (and I am now realizing that I have become GS; PAPI and VNAV Path dependent) and we were unaware of when we passed 500 feet. I realize now that my second increase and then decrease in sink rate may have resulted in an unstable approach at or below 500 feet. The fact that we landed smoothly and in the touchdown zone is good; but no consolation for the fact that I should have been doing better cross checking of the runway and instantly disregarded the erroneous VNAV Path capture and should have been more eyes out on this entire approach.When all the various factors put us high and fast; then I must put the gear down even sooner. In other words; I should be even more aggressive when faced with developing threats about taking action to reverse the trend; and in this case; gear sooner would have helped to give myself more time to assess and settle into a nice; comfortable final approach. Also; I should be super aware of 3 to 1 and mostly eyes out in these slam dunk situations; visually assessing the runway early and often (especially with no PAPI or GS) and not relying solely on VNAV Path for my SA.
The Captain was trying to use FMS glide path info to assist his descent. Due to sun angle; I had my attention on airspeed and path until the Captain asked how he was doing. I looked up and saw we were at a higher than normal altitude in relation to the runway; but I said we were still looking okay.
A B757-200 flight crew struggled to achieve a stabilized approach inbound to Runways 28L/R on the FMS BRIJJ visual with GS/PAPI/VASI OTS for both runways. Requests from ATC to keep their speed up to assist with a following aircraft with a medical emergency was a contributing factor.