Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Workload
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency
Aircraft; Human Factors
During the climb-out about 4;500 feet N1 on Engine 1 decreased about 6-8%. The power change was noticed immediately and then power returned to requested N1. The First Officer and I discussed the uncommanded power reduction change and checked EICAS; other indications were normal. We noted the change and said we would keep an eye on it. Then [we noted] EICAS message 'Engine 1 rev disagree' on EICAS for a second or two and then EICAS screen went blank. I felt a power loss and then I reduced the thrust on Number 1 because I was concerned with the EICAS message I had seen. The EICAS screen then came back on and [we] saw 'Engine 1 out' then message cleared and [we] had 'Engine 1 rev disagree' on EICAS. At this time we referred to the QRH 'Engine rev disagree' and performed the procedure. We notified ATC of [our] Emergency and leveled off. We continued to run QRC procedures; which resulting in us shutting down the Number 1 engine. We briefed the Flight Attendant and asked ATC to notify [our] company. We also confirmed with ATC that they would have emergency equipment standing by. We chose [the appropriate runway] for winds.  We had ATC vector us until we were ready for the approach. We continued to run checklist as directed by the QRH.  I informed the passengers that we would be returning to [departure airport]. After landing and informing ATC we would not need emergency assistance we exited the runway and stopped and called the Flight Attendant; [told her] everything was fine; then informed her we would be taxiing to the gate. After arriving at the gate and parking pulled the CVR CB. The First Officer and I were communicating throughout the trip and today when we really need to work as a team it paid off. [This] demonstrates how important it is to continually work on crew communication skills. Errors: we made mistakes on verbiage; callouts of checklist; and somehow we overlooked or missed the crossfeeding consideration on the QRH communication or checklist error. Due to this; we did get a fuel imbalance message at which time we did start crossfeeding. We landed within limitations. To improve performance; I will review QRH on a more regular basis and pay more attention to proper verbiage and continue to work on my communication skills.
The high workload that occurred at the realization of an engine failure was one of the biggest threats in this incident. Multiple targets in the vicinity of [the airport] were also a factor as ATC had to vector us around from the North to the visual.
EMB-145LR flight crew reported losing Number 1 engine shortly after takeoff. Engine was shut down; emergency declared; and a safe return to departure airport was executed.