Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Workload; Confusion; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface
ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach
Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure
On arrival into DCA via TRUPS ONE we were vectored off course prior to RANJR. We were then cleared direct to RANJR. Due to the workload briefing and reviewing the descent and approach; and increased cognitive load due to less familiarity with flat panel interpretation (particularly scale setting and screen clutter); I forgot to engage LNAV after executing [the direct to RANJR clearance]. ATC detected the deviation and cleared us direct to direct PJAAE; Cross PJAAE at FL240; and then descend via the arrival. My alert First Officer noticed that the [charted] crossing at PJAAE was between FL230 and FL210; so we would NOT be in the arrival envelope crossing PJAEE. He questioned the controller who modified the clearance to cross PJAEE at FL230; and then descend via. During this time we reviewed the way the TRUPS ONE track overlays the ROSSLYN LDA and planned our transition. (We had briefed landing Runway 1 prior to Top of Descent.) The way in which the TRUPS ONE arrival overlays the ROSSLYN LDA approach leads to confusion and distraction; it is difficult to reconcile the way in which these two approaches are integrated. We did not want to delete the redundant points early because we were not sure how ATC would clear us. This resulted in additional workload and distraction as we reconciled these two procedures and how to make the transition while ensuring that the descent parameters were being met--which required using speed brakes. Meanwhile; while we were in the midst of analyzing and briefing the approach while simultaneously confirming the airplane was complying with the arrival; ATC asked us twice if we were proceeding to a fix not on our arrival. Upon questioning; ATC acknowledged their error. However; this caused additional distraction and workload as our attention was drawn away from reviewing and briefing the approach. At this time; we received a vector off the descent and onto the RIVER VISUAL; in the vicinity of STAND. The combination of all these factors led to overlooking the speed restriction at STAND with which we did not comply. Upon receiving clearance for the RIVER VISUAL we were instructed to maintain NO LESS THAN 170 KTS to 5 DME. The absence of information or control relative to other traffic led us to believe that we were first for the field so I kept up our speed.We were then switched to the Final Controller who asked if we had a B757 in sight four miles ahead. This was the first mention of preceding traffic. We reported that we did not have the traffic in sight and were instructed to go around. Altogether this descent/approach combination seems poorly designed and poorly understood and executed by ATC. I accept responsibility for missing the direct clearance and speed restriction but believe the construction of the TRUPS ONE arrival; and its integration with the RIVER VISUAL was a mitigating factor.
A B757-200 flight crew was stymied by the complexity of the TRUPS RNAV STAR; confusing inquiries by ATC; an unfamiliar control panel display; vectors on and off the STAR; lack of familiarity with the procedure and--bottom line--the workload requried to monitor and comply with all the above. A directed go around due to separation with preceding traffic resulted.