Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 47
Fatigue; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Aircraft; Airspace Structure; Human Factors
Incident occurred on SFO FMS Bridge Visual to Runway 28R. First Officer has recently completed IOE and had not yet consolidated; so was prohibited from taking off or landing at SFO. Captain allowed First Officer to fly the STAR to practice VNAV descents and took the aircraft once it was established on final; (Runway 28R FMS Bridge Visual). As the aircraft was vectored to intercept the final course; a TCAS traffic warning sounded for traffic intercepting final for Runway 28R and quickly went away. Captain and First Officer were visual with the traffic; which was intercepting final for Runway 28L. First Officer was still flying as the aircraft turned to intercept final using LNAV; while the Captain monitored the traffic; which was now established on final for Runway 28L and very close.Both pilots were distracted by the proximity of the traffic and the fact that the aircraft was belly up to the traffic on the turn to final; making it hard to visually clear; but also recognized that the aircraft needed to slow down. First Officer called for flaps 10 at approximately 208-210 kts. IAS; Captain moved the flap handle then both pilots verbalized that the Flaps 10 speed was 205 - the Captain immediately moved the flap handle back into the flaps 5 position as it appeared that the flaps had not yet started moving. After this the Captain took the controls and configured normally for the approach; calling the field in sight while monitoring the traffic on Runway 28L final.At approximately 1;500 feet; the Captain called for the landing checklist and both pilots saw that the flaps were still at 5 degrees. The Captain elected to go-around and directed the First Officer to call Tower for missed approach instructions. The First Officer never heard any Go-around callouts so the go-around was non-standard.Once the First Officer told tower that the AC was going around; ATC replied with a barrage of instructions and questions; so it's likely that the First Officer did not hear the Captain's callouts. Once the aircraft was leveled off at 5;000 feet and stable; the Captain announced that the gear was still down. The First Officer and Captain decided to leave it down since the aircraft had been turned for a downwind approach for Runway 28L and would be ready for a turn to final soon.The Captain flew the aircraft and the First Officer got in the QRH. The crew ran the FLAPS - TRAILING EDGE FLAP DISAGREE checklist. The flap moved up with no problems so the crew called the checklist complete and 'proceeded normally' per the checklist. The Captain briefed the ILS Runway 28L approach; the First Officer requested vectors to final with ATC. The Captain configured normally and made an uneventful approach and landing.
First Officer was Pilot Flying the FMS Bridge Visual Runway 28R at SFO. Since the First Officer was not yet consolidated; the plan was for him to fly the aircraft until approximately 1;500 ft. on the approach fully configured for landing and then we would transfer aircraft control for Captain landing.We were given several speed restrictions on the approach. Speed 210kts; speed 180kts; speed 160kts. There was also traffic in close proximity to Runway 28L causing both a threat and a distraction. During slowdown phase we were above the ATC requested speed with flaps 5 and speed brake in flight detent. The First Officer as Pilot Flying called for flaps 10 at 210 kts. At that moment as Pilot Monitoring; I was looking at the traffic next to us to ensure safe separation. I began to move the flap lever and had not checked the speed. The First Officer immediately recognized the mistake and said something about speed. I recognized we were at 210 kts. and I reacted and moved the flap handle back to 5. The flaps indicated 5.At that point the First Officer called for gear down; then flaps 10. Then from what I remember he called for flaps 30 landing checklist. That is the point I recognized the flaps indicated 5 degrees with the flap handle set to 30. We have a brief exchange about going around and we transferred aircraft control and began the go around at about 1;500 ft. AGL with the auto pilot on. We moved the flap handle back to flaps 5. The flaps did not go beyond flaps 5. The aircraft next to us on Runway 28L was directly abeam and same altitude. I pushed the power up and as we called for a go-around.Tower directed us to fly runway heading climb to 3;000 ft. I apparently had not pushed the TOGA button because the auto pilot was still engaged. I dialed in runway heading 284 degrees and selected heading select. The aircraft began a slight left turn towards the aircraft abeam on approach to Runway 28L which made me uncomfortable so I disconnect the auto pilot and turned back to the right to fly slightly right of the Runway 28R center line. I sensed the aircraft was not climbing as expected which brought my attention to redo the go-around procedure. I called TOGA going around flaps 5 (distraction) check thrust positive rate gear up set missed approach altitude.. I called heading select; level change set speed 180. Tower directed us to climb to 4;000 ft.I asked the First Officer to pull out the checklist. I can remember being concerned about our fuel so I felt the need to be expeditious. Tower then turned us to the south for approach to Runway 28L. We did not raise the gear or did we notice the gear was down or accomplish an after takeoff checklist. I also asked the First Officer to call flight attendants to let them know what was going on. I sent a quick note to Dispatch about the flap issue. On downwind; Tower climbed us to 5;000 ft. I reprogrammed the FMS for ILS 28L. We finished the checklist by moving flap lever to flaps 2 and the flaps moved to flaps 2. I did not fully comprehend the cause of the flap malfunction for another few moments. I distinctly remember thinking 'what is that noise' which was the gear being down. That's when I realized the gear was down. We configured to flaps 10 to test the flaps and elected to leave the gear down since we were abeam the runway. We finished a visual approach and landing to Runway 28L and taxied to the gate. We debriefed the incident in detail.Plenty of lessons learned for a fairly new Captain without previous 737 experience and a brand new First Officer in SFO. Fatigue was a factor. Inexperience was a factor. The threat from the aircraft on Runway 28L was a factor. A TCAS RA on final was a factor. The non-practiced go around from approximately 1;200 ft. was a factor. The step climb was a factor. Our experience level was a factor. I feel we muddled through the problem which lends credit to our overall flying experience and training. We both remained very calm. It was not pretty but a very valuable experience.
B737 flight crew reported becoming distracted; resulting in an unstabilized approach followed by a go-around.