Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting
Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
General None Reported / Taken
Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure
We were assigned to do a flight covered by a Special Maintenance (MX) Ferry Permit -- technically an Operational Check Flight (OCF) in accordance with the Non Routine Flight Operation (NRFO) manual. Both of us are not NRFO pilots and the flight was classified as a Group I flight.The open discrepancy was related to the HYD system -- particularly; a discrepancy when the flaps are raised to Flaps 0. The original Ferry Permit included two limitations: No icing conditions and speed below 200 KTS. However; once reviewing the MX logbook I realized that the MX sign-off for the ferry flight included a statement that the flaps were preset to Flaps 7 -- the usual configuration prior to engine-start is Flaps 0. I contacted the Assistant Chief Pilot (ACP) to confirm what the intended parameters of the flight should be. The ACP thought we were free to utilize the flaps as needed aside from raising it to Flaps 0; however; he wanted to confer with MX first. Turns out; MX wanted us to maintain Flaps 7 configuration throughout the flight -- to include landing. Upon the receipt of said information; I asked for a revised Special MX Ferry Permit that includes the additional limitation.Upon flight deck pre-flight inspection we noticed the flaps were indeed set to Flaps 7; however; the Flap Control CB was pulled and collared. I reviewed the log-book again to find whether a notation was made related to the pulling and securing of said CB. None was found. Therefore; I contacted the ACP again for clarification. The 'Air Boss' indicated that the CB should not be pulled and collared and that no MX procedure exists for doing so.Once MX rectified the CB situation and completed another inspection and [logbook] entry as to the safe condition of the aircraft and a proper Special MX Ferry Permit in hand we departed on the short flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1.We planned on utilizing the Abnormal/Emergency Checklist for this flight -- Flaps Inoperative Approach and Landing -- as it is the only data and checklist we have for a partial flap landing. The normal procedures checklist does not address partial flap landings. Furthermore; neither dispatch; nor; iPreFlight performance calculator have data for Flaps 7 landing. No briefing by the Company was conducted to advise/instruct us to utilize said Abnormal/Emergency Checklist. What safety implications would it have had in case we didn't think ahead and plan accordingly -- I.e. Systemically; what are the chances the next crew won't remember to do so?Initially; an alternate was needed for the flight. Dispatch wanted to send us to ZZZ1 which has a shorter runway; without the accurate data the dispatcher had no way of knowing what we would need. We asked the alternate to be filled for ZZZ3 instead that would have had a much greater margin of error for such a NRFO operation.Finally; after asking for Flaps 7 takeoff data from Dispatch on more than a few phone calls; Dispatch released us with Flaps 15 takeoff data instead. We confirmed via iPreFlight locally what takeoff performance as well as landing performance we needed prior to launch; however; it did not decrease our workload; and; from a systemic stand point; would other crews have done the same 100% of the time?The question that I have; why are the crews seemly the only safety/regulatory valve for such a NRFO operation? This Company has an accepted/approved Safety Management System program/manual; it would be my hope that the crews would not be the only safety/regulatory valve in the system. Particularly; as neither one of the assigned crew was a NRFO crew.
Captain of a Non Routine Flight Operation reported his thoughts on maintenance procedures for compliance with a maintenance ferry flight for an aircraft with a flap issue.