Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 12000; Flight Crew Type 5600
Situational Awareness
Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Human Factors
Winds favored Runway 33 so we requested 33 and I briefed for the visual backed up by the ILS. The autopilot was engaged and we were cleared to 2500 feet and vectored onto a right downwind. The ILS app for 33 was loaded in the FMC. We configured to flaps 5 and reported the field in sight. We were cleared for the visual and I requested 1800 feet (alt at FAF) be put in the MCP and called for gear down; flaps 20. At that point we were abeam the FAF and I began a right turn to intercept the final at the Final Approach Course (FAC) or just inside it. Looking back at that point I had not properly selected the lowest range on the HSI; so I was further displaced from the FAC than I thought. I selected VS down 300 feet to begin a descent to 1800 feet and I called for flaps 30. The landing checklist was completed and I selected LOC and once on an intercept heading for the FAC I armed APP. It was at this point I identified the range error on the HSI. I looked down to adjust the range and about that time the GS captured and the aircraft began to descend. I still had the field in sight; but had lost a visual on the runway. We were inside the FAF on an intercept heading; but still to the right of the FAC. The First Officer (FO) called 1000 feet and I began to feel as though I was not in a good position for the runway. We continued to descend for a little longer at which time I disengaged the autopilot and stopped the descent. Tower called and asked us if we had the runway. I had begun a climb when tower call and said that they had a low alt alert and we needed to climb; which we were already doing. I climbed to above 1000 feet AGL; intercepted the FAC and PAPI GS and the landing was uneventful. There were a number of things I could have done better. First; I recognized a loss of Situational Awareness during a portion of the approach and I should have verbalized that to my FO. I should have given myself more time to intercept the final outside of the FAF and should not have started my descent so quickly to 1800 feet. I should have verbalized to my FO when I realized that I was further to the right of the FAC than planned; and also that I had lost sight of the runway. I should not have armed APP until closer or established on the FAC. This would have prevented the GS capture and early descent inside the FAF.
I believe the event was caused by the Captain losing situational awareness. I am not sure where he thought he was in comparison to where he actually was. As I continued to watch our progress on the visual and getting more and more uncomfortable; I should have queried him sooner which would have put me more at ease and possibly made him more aware of where he really was in comparison to the actual FOC to runway 33. I also believe that not descending below the GSI altitude until the runway is in sight and can safely be flown on a normal glide path is the best way to approach a situation like this. Obviously; more communication would have gone a long way for both pilots to be on the same page.
B757-200 flight crew reported getting a low altitude alert from ATC after losing situational awareness on a night visual approach to BDL.