Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown
Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT
General None Reported / Taken
Human Factors
Today I was operating as the FO (First Officer) from ZZZ. [The weather] was incredibly clear and quiet so the Captain requested that when I pick up our IFR flight clearance from FSS to request a VFR climb through 17;500 which I did and FSS gave us the VFR climb as requested. I was the Pilot Flying; and as the Captain briefed with me we were doing a left downwind departure. It was also previously briefed that I would depart the left down around the high mountain RCO (Remote Communications Outlet). Upon departure and initial climb the gear was coming up and the Captain called for the left turn. I had planned on waiting a bit longer but looking at the local terrain off my left I saw no risk and making the turn when we did. This departure was completely non-automated and raw data for the way the Captain likes to fly. Truthfully I spent most of my career flying in [this area] so I was not uncomfortable with his techniques. When the left turn was made I did not think or feel that we were at risk of getting a GPWS. Unfortunately as we transited the ridge line we got the audible GPWS warning. We both immediately acknowledged the terrain and that we were not at risk and already passed the ridge. An escape maneuver was not performed due to the daytime VFR weather and the terrain clearance. After leveling off and cruise the Captain and I debriefed the entire event very thoroughly and both agreed the corrective action that we took was reasonable and he thought my lateral spacing was adequate but he was thinking I was climbing faster than I really was. Looking back on the event there are things that could've been done to prevent this event. Better crew communication and waiting a bit longer for the left turn. Flying the full departure would have been the best thing to do. That was not going to be allowed by the Captain but at no time do I believe SOPs were broken. Next time I feel it would be better to fly the full departure and or give the terrain a much larger buffer.
Requested and received from FSS a VFR climb through 17;500 ft. direct ZZZZZ departing Runway XX from ZZZ. During the departure briefing; I explained to the FO (First Officer) (his leg) that I like to curl around the NW portion of the [area] giving the passengers a nice view. I have done this many times before without incident. The issue this time was a little miscommunication between the FO and myself regarding a rather small puffy cloud; and I made a slight mention that I didn't mind that little guy as I could see through it. The FO decided to avoid it; causing the GPWS to alert. I wasn't too concerned as all terrain in sight. I just think adding some color to the possible FOQA report could be helpful as this has become a hot topic. It was absolutely not my intention to have that alert; as I wanted a little more pitch up; it just kinda happened a little quickly. I probably should been a little more assertive in what I wanted; as the FO has 220 hours in the [aircraft type] and didn't think it would alert. Again; neither of us intended that result.
Air carrier crew reported inadvertently activating the GPWS Terrain Warning during climb out after a miscommunication between the First Officer and Captain.