Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Troubleshooting; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe
Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Maintenance Action
Aircraft
After takeoff; during climb at approximately 8;000; the Flight Attendant called to let us know that a passenger reported what appeared to be fluid streaming off of the left wing. A pass-traveling ERJ pilot also came on the interphone and told us it definitely looked unusual and excessive; also adding that it didn't appear to be condensation vapor; that it appeared 'heavier' than that. At the time of the call; we were cleared to 16;000. We told ATC we would like to level at 10;000 and stay at 250 KTS while we investigated and coordinated the situation. The venting stopped; but due to the excessiveness and duration of it and after coordinating with Maintenance via radio and Dispatch via ACARS; we elected to air-return and have it investigated. We also discussed the overweight landing with Maintenance and were advised to monitor vertical speed and firmness of touchdown. We elected to land flaps 22 to aid in controllability in the flare; to achieve a smooth touchdown and used max reverse due to the high weight. We did not declare an emergency; since the fuel venting had stopped. We had the pass rider relocated to a seat further aft so he could report to the Flight Attendant if the venting resumed. After landing; a city vehicle (not a fire truck) followed us into the gate and inspected behind the wing to ensure we were not losing fuel. After arrival at the gate; we found fuel coating the underside of the wing coming from the NACA vent. After Maintenance inspected; it was found that the flapper valve between the vent box and the tank had detached and was allowing fuel to flow freely into the vent area; resulting in the venting predominately with fuller tanks and in banks. We were tail-swapped and resumed the flight. We were conducting IOE with a new hire on day 4 with approximately 15 hours. As far as errors; I did find one point during the management of the event; the coordination of who was supposed to be doing what was becoming obscure; so I raised awareness to the event and made sure division of duties was more clearly understood. I don't so much feel that this was a result of my First Officer's inexperience; but rather my trying to make sure everything was being taken care of; causing confusion on the First Officer's part; thinking; 'OK; am I supposed to be doing this or you?' Suggestions: First off; there was no 'emergency'; since the spilling had stopped and we had time; since we were over fueled for the amount of flying we had left to do (since it was an air return). Therefore; I need to take my time a little more and clearly state plans; duties; and expectations. The act of 'micro-managing' can be interpreted as 'are you doing this or am I?' I also would have gotten on the thrust reversers earlier in the future. I should have anticipated the longer ground roll and hot breaks.
An EMB145 left wing fuel tank NACA vent flapper valve failed and allowed fuel to escape overboard through the vent so the flight returned to the departure airport where the aircraft was replaced.