Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown
ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Human Factors; Procedure
I believe I took a point out via landline communications from the N controller on Aircraft Y southbound VFR at 065. I thought the point out was accomplished because the top of my airspace is 060 and VFR traffic at 065 is still a factor for traffic I could potentially have at 060.I was working the V satellite sector. Aircraft X requested an RNAV approach RWY 35 at UAO via the full procedure over UBG. I approved his request and he was tracking direct UBG at 050. I then proceeded to resolve other conflicts and accomplish other satellite landline coordination. While accomplishing those tasks; I observed a CA (Collision Advisory) with Aircraft X and Aircraft Y over the UBG VOR at 050. I immediately issued a safety alert and turned Aircraft X to the right in order to resolve the CA since it appeared Aircraft Y was tracking south-eastbound.If I knew Aircraft Y wanted to descend I would have taken radar contact on him and de-conflicted him with other traffic in my sector. I think we have a cultural problem of being 'too loose' with reference to working aircraft in other controller's airspace.
I was working Aircraft Y; an RV6; descending toward 7S5. Prior to working the aircraft; north informed me that he had pointed out the RV to Newberg (who should have been working him as he was descending through his airspace eventually) but was level at 065. All sectors were very busy. The Newberg Controller was also very busy. Newberg was working an IFR PA44; Aircraft X; doing practice approaches over UBG VOR. The RV pilot did not notify me that he was starting a descent and as soon as I noticed his descent and proximity to Aircraft X; I issued a traffic alert and pointed out the traffic prior to the Collision Advisory being activated. Then I issued an alternate heading of 240 degrees behind the Seminole as they were both close to 050 feet.Newberg was not keeping track of my point out and later asked me 'where that guy came from?' even though he had received a point out. Not really knowing the direction of my traffic he issued a 200 heading to the PA44 who had already turned southwest bound (as I understand it) and descended on his own because he said he was close to the RV6. I leaned over to the Newberg Controller and told him to just keep the Seminole on his previous route as I had vectored the RV6 behind the traffic but Newberg was oblivious. About 15 minutes later Aircraft X asked for the call sign of the RV because of the 'near midair' for his company paperwork.Aircraft Y should have been a point out to me at Hood sector as he would have to descend to 7S5 through Newberg's airspace shortly. He was only 500 feet above Newberg's airspace and did not announce his descent. After the Newberg Controller takes point outs he should continue to be aware of them. I as the Hood Controller should have restricted the RV6 prior to his descent or at lease tell him to advise prior. Also I should have handed off the RV6 to Newberg as I knew he would be descending soon.
P80 TRACON controllers reported a near mid-air collision due to lack of communication and a plan between the controllers.