Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 173; Flight Crew Total 6789; Flight Crew Type 4069
Workload; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Airport; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors
Leaving VABB we had a numerous distractions. Flight was planned to depart 2:30 late. Gate return due to sick passenger and associated security concern with deplaning passenger. Captain then becomes highly concerned cabin crew will time out.The gate return prompted our ACARS to be re-initialized. This caused a lot of confusion with the FO; as so much energy was spent helping the FO properly load the ACARS and download new takeoff data.Taxi out was a cluster of confusion due to a weak FO and high workload mostly due to the new before takeoff checklist. Consequently he became task saturated. Add to this the stress the Captain was putting on the FO to depart the airport promptly.Approaching the end of runway 27 the tower asked if we could accept the next closest intersection N3 instead of N1 (Full length). FO states affirmatively. We were not good for that intersection. Captain more assertively states we are legal to depart from that intersection. Captain states that he is overly familiar with the airport and N3 intersection and it is only '10 feet from the end of the runway' and he would taxi the airplane to make up the difference in any lost runway. I believe the Captain responded to the tower that we could accept the intersection. By the way; the Captain talking to ATC was not unique for this crew as the FO was very weak and overloaded. Consequently the Captain repeatedly keyed the mic to respond to ATC. The IROs spent much of the time assisting the FO; backing up ATC; and backing up the taxiing.As the Captain made the turn onto intersection N3 I was busy scrambling for the takeoff data and verifying runway remaining from intersection N3. Before I could interpret our takeoff data for Runway 27 the FO was advancing the throttles for takeoff. Takeoff and subsequent flight were uneventful. Upon later inspection of takeoff data our flight was not legal to accept that intersection departure given our takeoff data regardless of the Captains efforts to reduce the effect through any taxi maneuvers. I believe Captain was irresponsible and rash not to include input from crew.
A flight crew illegally departed from a runway intersection for which they did not have proper takeoff data. The First Officer was reportedly weak and overloaded and the Captain disregarded other inputs from the Relief Officers.