Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Human Factors
Acting as Pilot Monitoring (PM) on the SAT to ZZZ leg. Multiple constructions zones at the SAT airport combined with an intersection departure on a 'nonstandard' runway (to us) for departure. Beautiful weather. Quick turnaround time. Short taxi from gate to an intersection takeoff on Rwy 04. [Performance data] called for flaps 5 takeoff. FMC loaded flaps 5. I selected flaps 1. Completed our Before Takeoff Check and a review of the [performance data] and close out. Both of us called out '1. Green light' versus 5 Green light. Took off. Discovered our error once airborne. Complacent? Obviously but had no idea and would not have agreed with that assessment if you had told me. Rushed? Somewhat but my experience level should have caught that error. Disappointed with myself to say the least! Lesson learned. Will not repeat this mistake.As stated above; somewhat rushed; construction areas dictated taxi routes which took up brain bytes; short turn time; a nonstandard runway and an intersection departure to boot.I did not do my usual close review of the [performance data]. Usually I circle the runway and flap setting on the [performance data]. This time [I] did not. Have no idea why.
During preflight set-up; [performance data] was reviewed for intersection Take Off [TO] on rwy 04 at N2 per NOTAMs. TO was briefed as flap 5 but after push and start when ready to taxi; I called for 'flaps 1; taxi' and the flaps were set at 1; not 5. Speeds were very nearly identical and TO power setting differed by .03 N1 So the error was not trapped until 1000 FT call for 'VNAV' and speed tape bugs were correct for flap 5; but we were (erroneously; of course) already at flaps 1 config.We were fortunate that conditions were fair; I tend to rotate a bit too slowly due to being new to the aircraft type; and the performance data between our planned and actual (erroneous) TO was negligible in this case. In other conditions the same error might not have been without consequence. A very profound lesson regarding review of [performance data]; Closeout; and actual configurations and settings.We were very surprised and humbled that the error was not caught pre-takeoff. In future; I will ALWAYS have [performance] data; and closeout in front of me during First Officer pre-takeoff/closeout brief; and ensure correct thrust; as well as flap settings as shown.
A B737-800 flight crew; to include a check airmen in the jump seat; reported departing SAT with flaps 1 instead of the correct setting of flaps 5.