Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Human-Machine Interface; Time Pressure; Confusion
Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach
Flight Crew Became Reoriented
Aircraft; Procedure
On final as the airspeed bled off to Vap (Approach Speed); the PM noted that green dot was above Vap. I observed that green dot was approximately eight knots above Vap. I verified that the aircraft was configured correctly and requested that the PF add at least ten knots to bug speed. We briefly discussed the large amount of fuel on board (tankering) and the PF opined that there must have been a calculation error. Having increased airspeed to the new bug speed; we determined that we were stabilized and continued [the] approach. I failed to recognize that this constituted a misconfiguration and should have required that I initiate a go-around in order to rework the landing data. We landed uneventfully.We debriefed at the gate and concluded that there was a calculation error in the landing data resulting in an incorrect landing weight and inappropriate landing V-speeds. We attempted to determine whether this was caused by an automation error or a 'fuel on board' data entry error but the ACARS landing data printout did not reveal what 'fuel on board' weight had been used in the landing calculation. In examining the ACARS takeoff data and landing data after the fact; the ACARS landing weight was 61;030 lbs and the ACARS zero fuel weight was 121 lbs less at 60;909 lbs. The fuel on board at the gate was 11;700 lbs.The weight disparity in the landing calculation appears to have been on the order of 11;770 lbs; which is very close to the fuel on board we observed at the gate (11;700 lbs). The landing init page was automatically cleared on landing; and looking at the landing init page in flight may not capture the actual numbers that were sent via ACARS when requesting landing data. Including the 'fuel on board' information on the ACARS landing data printout could be useful as a cross check. Simply printing the calculated landing weight; as is done now; may require mental calculation to discern a disparity whereas a direct reading 'fuel on board' number printed on the ACARS printout that correlates directly to the fuel quantity displayed on EICAS could help to alert flight crews to such a disparity. Another 'reality check' could be added to the automation when the disparity between entered fuel on board and release landing fuel exceeds a certain value; or when landing fuel on board is less than a minimum value as happens on the EICAS with yellow and magenta coding.As it was; I failed to monitor the fuel on board data entry when the PM requested landing data; exercising the expectation bias that he had done the due diligence since he had not requested that I verify his data entries before sending. I do not know whether the PM even made an entry to override the FMS value; or whether the FMS-supplied entry was zero or blank; so it is possible that this is also an automation error; especially since the new ACARS Rev. N was just instituted and contains significant rework of the weight and balance sections -- perhaps a coding error slipped in. In future; I will monitor and/or double-check the landing init data entry and ask my other flight deck crew members to do the same. I will also compare the ACARS generated landing weight against the zero fuel weight.
EMB-175 flight crew reported a calculation error in the landing data which resulted in an incorrect landing weight and inappropriate landing V-speeds.