Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 9; Flight Crew Total 4531; Flight Crew Type 2567
Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload
Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Flight Crew Took Evasive Action
Human Factors; Airport
We were conducting a training flight at ZZZ in Aircraft X large fixed wing UAS. All pre-departure activities were normal and uneventful. We took off from Runway XX. Our Visual Observer for the day was overhead in position for departure. We applied power and began a normal takeoff run and became airborne somewhere near the midfield point. About one minute after power application we were over the departure end of the runway (directly over the numbers for Runway XY) and had just reached approximately 300 ft. AGL. We were about to commence our right turn into the crosswind leg of the traffic pattern when I saw an aircraft; later identified as helicopter Aircraft Y; come into view from the left side of the HUD display. The aircraft appeared to be at our same altitude and on a collision course with us. I yelled out 'Hard Right Turn' and the pilot at the controls immediately complied. It appeared full control input was not applied; so I told him full deflection turn; which he complied with. Almost immediately after ordering the hard right turn; we heard Visual Observer come on the radio and advised an 'immediate right turn to the east' which we complied with. At this point we lost all sight of the helicopter and were completely reliant on Visual Observers for our situational awareness. After arriving at our easterly heading; Visual Observer advised to continue the turn to the south which we again complied with. During this turn I asked our Visual Observer if continuing the turn to the west would be advisable to avoid the helicopter and they said yes. We continued the right turn to heading of west. The helicopter continued east and I called for a climb to 6;500 ft. MSL to put some distance between the two aircraft. Shortly after we leveled off at 5;000 ft. MSL; Visual Observer advised that the helicopter had landed on the southeast corner of the [landmark]. This would have put them directly under our final approach to Runway XX at about 1.5 miles or so. We remained at this altitude for approximately 15 minutes when Visual Observer advised the helicopter had shut down on the ground and their rotors were no longer turning. We descended for the traffic pattern during which we noticed the visibility decreasing rapidly from smoke blowing into the area from local fires. I contacted Visual Observer to see if they concurred with the observation which they did. They said the flight visibility was decreasing alarmingly fast so we decided to conduct a full stop and call it a day. The helicopter was transiting from south to north directly over the departure end of an active airport runway at approximately 300 ft. AGL with no radio communication whatsoever. Attempted to contact the helicopter with no response.
UAS pilots had a near miss with a helicopter on climb out and took evasive action.