Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 28.8; Flight Crew Total 2040; Flight Crew Type 1200
Other / Unknown; Confusion
Conflict NMAC; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance
Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance
Human Factors
I was flying to CDW. I was about 3 miles east of MMU and around about 1;500 MSL and talking to MMU Tower. The sun had just fallen below the horizon. ATIS at CDW was calling about 4 or 5 miles of visibility and it was hazy. West of my area; there were almost no clouds. CDW seemed to have what appeared to be an overcast/broken layer at what I would estimate to have been 4;000 FT. The light seemed very flat and there was a sort of 'graininess' to the scenery. This is an area that I have been flying in for over 20 years. I am very familiar with it and I have [flown into CDW many times].In order to be 'ahead of the airplane' and to give the greatest amount of time for the CDW Tower controllers to be aware of my arrival; I always ask MMU Tower to allow me to switch frequency to CDW at their earliest practicable convenience. MMU instructed me to switch frequency to CDW Tower while still about 2 miles outside of CDW's Delta airspace (while still in MMU's Delta). CDW was using [Runway] 22 and I was predisposed to expecting that (mistake Number 1). I switched to CDW Tower frequency and announced that I had the information and was landing. The Controller asked me to set up for left downwind 22 entry. I was already west of the extended Runway 22 centerline and was caught unprepared (mistake Number 2). I asked if I can have right downwind 22 entry and I was clearly told by Tower that he needed me to be on left downwind 22. I confirmed and tried to get my visual cues. The only way I can describe the visibility and visual cues of that instant was that they were extremely strange. After 20 seconds of scanning the land features to no avail; for the first time in my flying life; I was having a hard time discerning where I was in relation to the CDW airport. For some reason I came to the false conclusion that I must have changed headings by accident and may have wandered too far east towards TEB. I immediately turned about 90 degrees left to the northwest and flew in that direction for what I believe to have been 30 seconds. Then I looked at my GPS and realized that I had made a mistake and I initiated a 180 to the right and headed southeast. About a minute later I located CDW. I estimate that I was 4 NM to the west of the airport and concluded that I was far enough away that I should not interfere with close traffic (mistake Number 3). A short while later I saw a low-wing aircraft at my 1 o'clock; opposite direction; approximately 200 FT higher than me; and approximately 400 FT horizontal from me. I suspect that he was flying the right crosswind for 22. I saw him at least 5 seconds before we passed each other. I was sure that we would pass each other without incident; as a result I did not make any sudden maneuvers in order not to surprise the other pilot. About 10 seconds after we passed each other; I heard a pilot report to CDW Tower that an airplane passed directly in front of them. I immediately transmitted to Tower that I believe it was me (and announced my call sign). I volunteered that information immediately in order to not have tensions run high while people were trying to ascertain where the situation was taking place and who the involved parties were.I was reprimanded by CDW Tower and he asked why it was that I headed west and then east (which he said he saw on the radar). He went on to say that his instructions are to be followed and that if he instructed left downwind entry; I had to do as he instructed. After I landed; it was apparent that to compound matters; he was coordinating an aircraft with some difficulty which was coming in from the west. Once I heard that; it all made sense to me. He wanted the aircraft with the difficulty to be alone in the western quadrant and that is why he sent me to the eastern quadrant.In my attempt to be 'ahead of the airplane'; I allowed myself to ask for a frequency change too soon and had not fully grasped the visual cues of the CDW environment and surroundings.
BE36 pilot reports becoming disoriented while attempting to enter the pattern at CDW when the Tower instructs to enter a left downwind when the reporter was expecting a right downwind. While maneuvering northwest of the field a NMAC occurs with an in bound aircraft.