Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument
Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75; Flight Crew Total 9700; Flight Crew Type 1300
Other / Unknown
Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence
Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action
Human Factors; Weather
Preflight review of radar showed widespread isolated thunderstorms over the sea. Takeoff and initial climb and associated checklists were completed uneventfully. The autopilot and autothrottles were being used as I flew the aircraft and the First Officer monitored. We both had our radar selected on at varying ranges and tilt angles; no echoes were noted in the departure path. A fuel balance transfer was underway as we approached FL240. As we climbed through FL240 we both noted the appearance of St. Elmo's fire on the radome. Shortly thereafter; we encountered moderate chop and liquid precipitation. I asked the First Officer to secure the fuel transfer and place the cowl and wing anti-ice systems on; which he did simultaneously; the autopilot disengaged and the left hand windshield heat shut itself off. I advised that; 'I have control of the aircraft' and proceeded to fly the aircraft with the autothrottles still engaged. After approximately 2-3 minutes; I re-engaged the autopilot when the chop subsided. The aircraft and its systems were functioning normally with the exception of the left-hand windshield heat; which could not be reset. I consulted the MEL; which noted that the aircraft could be dispatched with one side inoperative provided flight into known icing was avoided. We agreed that we could continue safely and proceeded to do so. We landed at destination uneventfully and disembarked our passengers. After the passengers boarded their bus at the base of the aircraft stairs; I proceed inside the FBO to pay our bill. After exiting the FBO; I proceed to walk around the aircraft from the front right side; (nearest the FBO) in a clockwise direction; ending at the boarding stairs. In my haste to depart; I neglected to notify Maintenance of the inoperative windshield heat and flew the aircraft [on one more leg]. After arriving; while completing post flight duties; it was brought to my attention by the First Officer that there was damage to the radome. Logbook entries and Maintenance notifications were made at this time.
G-IV Captain is informed of damage to the radome at the conclusion of the second leg of flying; that likely occurred on the first leg and was not detected due to a preflight inspection that did not include the radome. A window heat failure that occurred on the first leg also was not entered into the logbook until the end of the second leg.