Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Confusion; Situational Awareness
ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy
Human Factors
I was on Tower CIC and Flight Data; and another controller was on LC/GC. E/AP issued a point out for an IFR enroute aircraft (Aircraft Z) crossing the departure corridor about 5 NM from the field (northeast to southwest at 4;000 feet MSL). Aircraft Y called about 10 NM northwest of the field inbound for a touch and go at 4;000 feet MSL descending to 3;000 feet MSL. Aircraft X called up ready to depart off Runway XX. LC coordinated with E/AP for a left turn on course to avoid a loss of separation between Aircraft X; Aircraft Y; and Aircraft Z; which was approved. Aircraft X was cleared for takeoff with a left turn on course; but took a little longer than expected to start his roll. When the aircraft did not execute a turn off the departure end as we thought he might; LC asked Aircraft X to start turn on course now. Aircraft X was climbing to 2;800 feet MSL when LC started issuing the traffic. In response to his TCAS; Aircraft X descended on his own to 2;500 feet MSL until he had the VFR traffic in sight. Traffic was never issued to Aircraft Y about the departing jet. When the traffic was in sight and no factor; Airrcaft X climbed and maintained 3;000 feet MSL until the IFR Cessna was in sight; who was now about 4 NM W/NW of the field at 4;000 feet MSL. Recommendation; 1. If Plan A doesn't work; recognize it ASAP and use/have a Plan B ready. There are many things we could've done to avoid the loss of separation; but we did not act in a timely enough manner. You can tell on the tapes how quickly LC got flustered when Aircraft X didn't depart; climb; and turn as fast as we thought Aircraft X could. The Plan A COULD have worked; but it didn't. We needed Plan B ready much quicker than we had. 2. Issue traffic to everyone. LC was talking non-stop which inhibited his ability to issue traffic to Aircraft Y; but it could've been called much sooner. 3. Let the departing traffic know why you need a quick turn out. If LC had issued 'Traffic; Cessna 5 miles northwest inbound on downwind for Runway 32 at 3;000 feet' Aircraft X may have been able to get the turn done quicker; or they could've requested to hold. 4. E/AP should not have approved the turn on course if he didn't think it would work especially with the point out aircraft crossing the departure end. 5. As TCIC; I should've been quicker to react and assist LC in handling the situation in a timely manner and make suggestions. 6. Also develop Plans C; D; and E7. We need to (and will) try to imagine how a situation will develop and be ready for when something doesn't happen the way we planned.
Departed ZZZ with take off clearance Runway XX to 4;000 feet; left turn direct [to a certain fix]. Initial climb we were advised of traffic one 1 o'clock at 3;400 and a second target at 4;000. We immediately realized that there was going to be loss of traffic separation issue unless we took action. Pilot Flying disengaged the autopilot and decided to level off at 2;700 until traffic had passed. At that time we climbed to 3;000 and got recleared 3;000 because of more traffic at 4;000 on our flight path. Aircraft issued TA but situation resolved without an RA.
Tower Controller described a conflict event between an IFR and VFR aircraft; the reporter noting multiple chances were available to the controller to prevent this event but none were taken.